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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS INDEX

DMPA. Defense Materials Procurement Agency	IIAA. Institute of Inter-American Affairs	SHAPE. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
ECAFE. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East	IJC. International Joint Commission	TCA. Technical Cooperation Administration
ECE. Economic Commission for Europe	ILO. International Labor Organization	U.K. United Kingdom
ECOSOC. Economic and Security Council	IMC. International Materials Conference	U.N. United Nations
EDC. European Defence Community	IPS. International Press Service	UNC. United Nations Command
EPU. European Payments Union	ITU. International Telecommunication Union	UNESCO. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
FAO. Food and Agriculture Organization	MSA. Mutual Security Agency	UNICEF. United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
GARIOA. Government and Relief in Occupied Areas	NAC. North Atlantic Council	UNKRA. United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade	NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization	UNRWA. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
HICOG. United States High Commissioner for Germany	NSC. National Security Council	UNTA. United Nations Technical Assistance
IBRD. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	OAS. Organization of American States	UPU. Universal Postal Union
ICAO. International Civil Aviation Organization	OEEC. Organization for European Economic Cooperation	U. S. S. R. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross	PHS. Public Health Service	VOA. Voice of America
IIA. International Information Administration	PICMME. Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe	WHO. World Health Organization
	ROK. Republic of Korea.	WMO. World Meteorological Organization

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Correction in Volume XXVIII

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following error:

April 27: page 608, left-hand column, letter from General Harrison to General Nam II, the date in the subhead should read:

April 16

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The Department of State

Bulletin

V. XXVIII, No. 706

January 5, 1953



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January 5, 1953

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Results of Meeting of North Atlantic Council, Paris, December 15-18

The 4-day meeting of the North Atlantic Council which opened at Paris on December 15 was the tenth which Secretary Acheson had attended as head of the U.S. delegation. In view of his impending resignation as Secretary of State, delegates of other member nations paid tribute to him during the closing session, on December 18. Printed below, in addition to the text of the communiqué issued after the meeting, are the farewell remarks made by Secretary Acheson and of the delegates of Denmark, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

1. The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council ended in Paris today. The Chairman was Mr. Ole Bjørn Kraft, Foreign Minister of Denmark. It was attended by thirty-two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Economics and Defence.

2. The Council received a Progress Report by the Secretary General, which outlined the structure of the International Secretariat. It described the work accomplished in the last eight months by the Council, meeting regularly through the Permanent Representatives, and the development of close working relations between NATO's civilian and military authorities. It also dealt with the constructive work of the Council's Committee on civil defence, and of those concerned with non-military aspects of the Treaty covered by Article 2, such as over-population and social, cultural and informational matters.

3. After taking note of Lord Ismay's report, the Council adopted a resolution (the text of which is issued with this communiqué) periodically to review the Organisation's work under Article 2 of the Treaty.

4. In parallel with the Secretary General's Report, the Council considered a progress report prepared by the Military Committee. This Report showed a great advance in the training and effectiveness of the various national forces assigned to the Supreme Commanders. Combined land, air and sea manoeuvres had shown a marked improvement in cooperation between units as well as at the staff level. The Report also showed a substantial advance in the standardization of international military procedures, notably in signals.

5. The Council approved proposals from the Military Committee for the establishment of a Mediterranean Command, so completing the European Command structure for the defence of the North Atlantic Area. Admiral Lord Mountbatten has been appointed.

6. The Council considered the Strategic Guidance submitted to them by the Military Committee, which took account of the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO. In approving it the Council reaffirmed their determination to defend all the territories and peoples of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

7. The Council also had the benefit of statements from the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. General Ridgway paid tribute to the high quality of the forces under his command but emphasized that only by a continuing increase in the forces assigned to him would he be able to carry out his responsibilities. Consequently, there could be no relaxation: on the contrary every effort must be made to increase NATO armed strength as rapidly as possible. Admiral McCormick spoke in similar vein.

8. Against this background the Council then considered the first report on the Annual Review for 1952. They noted with satisfaction that the increase in forces agreed to at Lisbon had been substantially achieved by the end of 1952, and that it was planned to make further individual and collective efforts in 1953 to increase, improve and strengthen the forces now in being. At the same time they recognised that strong defence requires a healthy economy.

9. For the future, the Council directed that more emphasis should be given to increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the alliance and the units necessary for their support rather than to the provision of greater numbers, to the extent that resources were not available for both tasks. The Council noted the progress being made in the co-ordination of production of defence equipment and directed that further study be given to this and to further standardisation in this field. The Council also welcomed the assistance given to European production by United States off-shore procurement contracts.

10. Agreement was reached on the financing of a further portion of the Infrastructure pro-

gramme for airfields, communications and jet fuel supplies, to the amount of approximately £80 million.

11. During the past eight months, the Council have regularly exchanged views and information on political problems affecting their common interests. At this meeting the Council paid particular attention to the struggle in Indo-China, to the European Defence Community Treaty, and to the situation in Eastern Germany. They noted in particular that, despite the Soviet Union's repeated declarations favouring a German peace treaty and German unification, no reply had been received to the proposals of the United Kingdom, France and the United States sent three months ago. The Council also received a progress report upon the work of the Interim Commission of the European Defence Community. The Council adopted resolutions (the texts of which are attached) on Indo-China and the European Defence Community.

12. It was agreed that the next Ministerial Meeting of the Council should be held as early as possible in the Spring of 1953, when its first task will be to consider the final report on the Annual Review for 1952.

13. In the course of the present Meeting, the Council considered the present situation of the Atlantic Community and its prospects for the future. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, fourteen sovereign states have developed a degree of voluntary co-operation without precedent in history. By combining their resources and their knowledge, by sharing the material burden of defence, by the constant practice of mutual consultation and mutual assistance, member states have already increased their common strength, understanding and unity.

14. Member governments are more than ever convinced that the course they have chosen is the best way of protecting their free society from direct or indirect Communist attempts to overwhelm it. Such improvement as has taken place in the general international situation can be attributed to the efforts which member governments have made in increasing their collective strength since the foundation of the alliance. If there were any relaxation in these efforts, there would be a corresponding increase in the dangers to which they are exposed. The increasingly successful co-operation of the fourteen member governments is a clear proof that the avowed intentions of the Soviet Government to sow dissension in the free world will not succeed.

15. The Council re-affirmed the purpose of their alliance as being for defence, for peace, and for security, and their resolve to extend the scope of their joint action, and collectively to preserve their common heritage of freedom. The Council welcomed the sense of unity which is steadily growing among the peoples of the Atlantic Community.

Resolution on Implementation of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty

Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 17th December, 1952

The North Atlantic Council

CONVINCED of the necessity of a continuing review and of an adequate solution of economic problems which face member states, not only to provide the defence effort with a firm foundation but also to promote social progress and the ideals of freedom which are the bases of the North Atlantic Community; and

2. HAVING IN MIND Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the work already initiated within the organization to give effect to the report of the Committee on the North Atlantic Community, approved by the Council at its Lisbon session and particularly as far as over-population problems are concerned

3. *Agrees* that member Governments should seek by individual and collective measures to strengthen their political and economic capacities by finding solutions to their problems such as balance of payments, increase of output, internal financial stability and manpower; and that the results of their endeavours should be examined periodically by the Council.

Resolution on Indo-China

Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 17th December, 1952

The North Atlantic Council

Recognizes that resistance to direct or indirect aggression in any part of the world is an essential contribution to the common security of the free world;

HAVING BEEN INFORMED at its meeting in Paris on the 16th December of the latest developments in the military and political situation in Indo-China;

Expresses its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long continued struggle by the French forces and the armies of the Associated States against Communist aggression; and

Acknowledges that the resistance of the free nations in South-East Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community;

And therefore agrees that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserves continuing support from the NATO governments.

Resolution on the European Defence Community

Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 17th December, 1952

The North Atlantic Council

RECALLING the decisions taken by the Council at Brussels and at Lisbon regarding German participation in Western defence, and the resolution

of the 26th May 1952 by which the Council noted that the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community fulfilled the conditions embodied in the Brussels and Lisbon decisions;

TAKING NOTE that this Treaty was signed on the 27th May 1952;

TAKING NOTE of the progress made towards European integration, in particular in the economic field by the creation of the Coal and Steel Community which is already functioning;

HAVING NOW HEARD the report on the activities of the Interim Committee of the Conference for the Organization of the European Defence Community submitted by the Chairman of this committee;

Reiterates that the defence of Europe, including Western Germany, calls for the early establishment of the European Defence Community;

Re-affirms the importance of the reciprocal guarantees exchanged between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the members of the European Defence Community;

Stresses the paramount importance which the Atlantic Community attaches to the rapid entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community and consequently, to its ratification by all the signatories, as well as to the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty¹ on guarantees given by the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to members of the European Defence Community.

SECRETARY ACHESON'S REMARKS TO THE COUNCIL

Mr. Chairman, Fellow Members of the Council: I am deeply touched and very grateful for what the Chairman has said about my service here with you. This is the last meeting which my colleagues and I will attend—for at least 4 years. It has been a great experience for all of us to have worked in the creation and the building of this great institution. It is particularly gratifying to us that our tenure of office lasted long enough so that we could have one meeting under the new Organization which was set up in Lisbon and which has been so brilliantly managed by Lord Ismay and his devoted International Staff and all of us here in our delegation would feel very remiss if we left your company without expressing to Lord Ismay our deep gratitude for what he has done for all of us and for NATO.

I am told that before the eyes of a drowning man his entire life passes in review and perhaps an expiring Minister may be permitted to review briefly some of his recent life in this Organization. And I do this, not to recall or to bore you with events which you know very well, but to suggest to you that we have all been part of a great movement here, perhaps the full significance of which we do not yet fully grasp.

¹ BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 896.

This movement began soon after the end of the war and it is characterized, as I think we can see, if I may review this story briefly, by two things which are of great significance and great importance; I should say three things. One is the tremendous vitality and imagination of European statesmanship and this comes at a time when Europe has been through very difficult years—exhausting years—and yet we find a flowering of statesmanship in Europe which is both surprising under the circumstances and really wonderful for the future of the world. Secondly, the thing that I think is impressive is that this statesmanship is exercising itself in a direction which, although not new in the world, is new in the last 5, 6, or 7 centuries, and that is the movement toward unity, toward a wider and greater unity and a softening of the particularisms of nationalistic feeling. The third thing which I think is significant is that the members of NATO across the sea are getting a new sense of their unity with these forces in Europe and, for the first time since the beginning of my country, there is a readiness, a willingness, and understanding that we must assume obligations with you in the maintenance of peace through the common defense. If we keep these things in mind, perhaps it is worth while to look for a moment at some of the particular developments.

The first which I think begins to show the evolution of this idea was the OEEC, and here again you have a response from America to a European statesmanlike proposal—a proposal put forward by Mr. Bevin and Mr. Bidault to bring the European countries together. At that time it was all of them, including the Iron Curtain countries, for the purpose of working out in common an economic program in which the United States would assist. Now here is the foundation of the idea of common action, unified action, united action to deal with a common problem. And then it develops in another way, and the next phase in this movement was taken by a man who, I think, is very dear to the hearts of all of us here, Mr. Ernest Bevin. I think we all have the highest regard for his character and the deepest affection for the man himself. And I know that, in saying this, I would have the full support of Mr. Eden as well as the rest of us.

It was in January 1948 that Mr. Bevin communicated with Secretary of State Marshall and said that he was thinking about putting forward a plan, with his European associates, to create a Union. He had not quite decided what form it would take, whether it would be a treaty, whether it would be purely military, but it was to bring together in a political, spiritual, military, and a defensive way the Western European countries. General Marshall responded that the United States would support it vigorously, which they did, and that resulted in the Western Union Treaty, which Mr. Schuman said in a speech at

luncheon today was really the genesis of NATO. And then the next step was the development of the North Atlantic Treaty and that in turn is a series of developments.

After the Western Union began to develop, there were discussions with Secretary Marshall and my colleague, Mr. Lovett, who was Under Secretary of State. Then Mr. Lovett worked with Senator Vandenberg and prepared with him and Senator Connally the Vandenberg Resolution which laid the foundation with the U.S. Congress for a receptive attitude toward the sort of ideas which were coming from Europe. And the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty was to get, for the first time, a commitment from the United States that an attack on one of our countries was an attack on all of us; and that therefore we would not, in the event of a future war, have to wait for a disastrous period of time while the American Nation made up its mind as to what its basic interests were. When I succeeded General Marshall and took over from Mr. Lovett, the ground work for the negotiation of this treaty had been well laid and we could carry it to a successful conclusion in 1949.

Almost as soon as we organized under the North Atlantic Treaty and began meeting here in these Councils, we discovered that the idea of a guarantee through political association, important as that was, was not enough. Our colleagues began to speak to us about the fact that it was a great advance that the United States was ready at the outset to throw in its lot with the Western European nations; but, if there was no preparation, then the United States would be liberating a continent which would have been largely destroyed. Therefore, it was necessary to do more than have a political guarantee; it was necessary to prepare, and we had a meeting in London in May 1950. At that meeting we learned something to which I shall return in a moment. It was at that time that Mr. Schuman told Mr. Bevin and me about the proposal which would be brought forth in a very short time and which became known as the Schuman Plan, which was the third great step. But meanwhile we went on in NATO, and at the May meeting we discussed the importance of what was then called "balanced collective forces" as against "balanced national forces"; and we passed resolutions along that line; we passed resolutions creating a permanent Council of Deputies and other very advantageous measures; but we had hardly finished that work when we saw that it was inadequate. All it had done was to continue NATO as a planning operation but not as an executive or functioning operation. There were plenty of plans but there was no execution.

During that summer we had a great many suggestions including a long memorandum from the French Foreign Office indicating some of the steps which in their judgment were necessary to build an effective, closely knit organization. Then we had

the meeting in September in New York, and there our delegation put forward a suggestion which was that there should be a real unified command with troops, a staff, a commander, and supply arrangements so that there would be in Europe an army which could grow and be effective. At the same time it was pointed out by our military advisers that in order to have any effective defense of Europe it had to be a defense as far east as possible, and that was particularly important to the northern members of this Organization—the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. And so we worked in September on a plan for a forward defense, and in working on that plan it became perfectly clear that it was not workable unless Germany took part in its own defense and in the defense of Europe. But the problem was how to do that and we adjourned that meeting without coming to a conclusion.

Then we met in Brussels, and there we adopted the unified command and the idea that Germany should participate in its own defense and the defense of Europe. In the meantime, M. Pleven had put forward a proposal that would take the main ideas of the Schuman Plan and apply them in the military field, and we went to work on that and also on an alternative plan—but the more we worked at it the more clearly it seemed that what later became known as the European Defense Community was the only proper solution to this matter, and we went to work very hard at that point. And so the treaty was finally signed, not only to create the EDC but also providing, as was so necessary, the way to bring Germany voluntarily and willingly and on a basis of equality into its own defense and the defense of the West.

In the meantime the third great step—the Schuman Plan—was going forward; going through all the difficult stages of negotiation and ratification, and finally it has been put into effect. I think that it is fair to say that at the present moment we have no idea how vast will be the change in the thinking of Europe and of the countries outside of Europe as the Schuman Plan actually operates, because here there is, in truth, a cession of sovereignty—here is a new edict, which will create new types of thinking and the cohesion of new loyalties to it, and it is of the most profound significance to Europe and to the world.

That brings us back again to where we are with the EDC. It is now before a number of parliaments for consideration. There are all sorts of difficulties of one sort or another which arise. We in the United States do not minimize or underestimate those difficulties. We know the great problems which it raises for all of you who are considering it. But what I want to suggest to you is that, in the light of the review which I have made this afternoon and in the light of the further provisions which are in the EDC treaty and which are now actually in operation through the *ad hoc* group, which is working on a broader political

foundation for unity in the Western world—what we have in the Epc treaty is not merely a method of bringing German troops to the defense of Europe, but rather an essential step in one of the great developments of history—which is unification, through the Coal and Steel Community, through the military community, and through the political association which is now under discussion.

Here you have an essential step in the building of this great new force in the world. And from the point of view of a colleague of yours across the sea, I cannot overemphasize to you the importance which we attach to this movement and to this step in the movement. Perhaps, if I may use a figure of speech, it seems to me that as you create this strength and unity—this European entity—you are in effect creating a great centripetal force which will bring into an ever closer association with Europe, our British friends across the Channel and your American and Canadian friends across the Atlantic Ocean. It is as this strength is created at the center, as this vital, new, strong development occurs that you will attract strength. If this process is reversed now, in my judgment you will set up a centrifugal force. If, instead of having unity at the center, you have disunity, you will have disunity and weakness throughout the Atlantic community. And this isn't a matter that people can argue about, nor is it a matter that one can approve or disapprove. It is in my judgment as inevitable as the movements of the stars in their courses. It would be just as silly to argue with the course of a star as it would be to say that there just must be closer and closer association between Great Britain, as the next neighbor, and Canada and the United States on the one hand, and a weak Europe on the other and do nothing about it.

Whereas, if you go forward, as I know you will, and develop this ever-growing strength and unity, then you will present an ever-growing attraction to your British, Canadian, and American friends.

That is the last message which I and my colleagues would like to leave with you. We believe that we have all taken part in something of profound significance. It seems to us that if we are successful here, the twentieth century will be known for what has come out of our work and will not be known for the disasters which preceded it.

At your next meeting you will have other colleagues from the United States. They are all known to us and we know that they will work with you just as closely and just as enthusiastically as we have, and we know that you will give them your confidence and your friendship. They are as loyal and devoted as we are to our country, and not only to that, but to this great association which our country has so freely and so unanimously joined, and I know that we can recommend our successors to you and that you will find them worthy of your confidence. I am deeply touched,

Mr. Chairman, by what you have said and I am honored to have had this opportunity to say one last word before we break connections which we have held for so long, and at the end of this meeting, all of us will bid you an affectionate farewell.

TRIBUTES OF OTHER DELEGATES

Björn Kraft, Foreign Minister of Denmark

Before going on to other business, other items, I should like to say a few words on a more personal note to the Secretary of State of the United States.

Mr. Acheson will retire next month from the high office he has held for nearly 4 years. I am sure that all members of the Council will agree that Mr. Acheson's retirement will mean a grievous loss to our organization. Mr. Acheson was instrumental in the creation of NATO, and he signed the treaty on behalf of his Government. He has been working untiringly to forward the cause of the Atlantic community. He is indeed one of the master builders of the organization. But even though Mr. Acheson will soon no longer be representing his Government, I am sure that he will continue to lend his support to NATO. I was gratified to read the other day that he had promised to do so in a statement to the press. There could be no better spokesman for NATO than Mr. Acheson. I am sure that the Council will join me in thanking Mr. Acheson for his great service to the organization and in wishing him the best of luck. I call on Mr. Acheson.

[Secretary Acheson's statement is printed above.]

Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, United Kingdom

Gentlemen, as we listened just now to the moving account which Mr. Acheson has given us on the growth and development of our defense arrangements in the West, I think most of us must have felt how much we owe in all of this to Mr. Acheson himself, and it is a subject about which he talked least. I am indeed grateful for his generous tribute to Mr. Bevin which will move all my fellow countrymen, and yet we cannot forget that, in the years since he became Secretary of State, the foreign policy of the United States has evolved toward ever closer partnership with the free nations of the West. His most famous predecessor, and that responsible architect, General Marshall, will be remembered and honored in Europe for the plan of economic aid which he organized on behalf of this Continent when stricken by the scourge of war. When Mr. Acheson took over the conduct of his country's foreign policy, it was already apparent that economic recovery was not enough. Strength and defense also were needed to confront aggression from the East but we, the free nations, were divided; we were disorganized; we were unarmed. No other statesman in the free world has so clearly formu-

lated the ideas and the theories under which we were to confront this new danger as Mr. Acheson himself. The doctrine of creating situations of strength at the various danger points of the free world was enunciated by him as long ago as 1949. He has spoken out clearly from the beginning for the ideal of an Atlantic community. The heart of this ideal, as he said himself, if I may quote his word—I hope it won't embarrass him—they are very good words—is the unity of belief, of spirit, of interest of the community of nations represented here. In a series of notable speeches over a period of years he elaborated these themes. He showed how the free world could build up a deterrent to war by unity and strength. Some of my colleagues were present when Mr. Acheson took the chair at the first working session of the North Atlantic Council in London; that was in May 1950. Then the broad plan of our work was laid down and the machinery was set up and the long effort begun which was to lead out of the extreme peril of our defense disposition in which we then stood. He has been with us, I think, at every meeting of the Council since then. Under his guidance the United States has played the major part in building up our common defenses. We thank him, and with him his colleagues, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Lovett, Mr. Snyder, each and all of whom have played so remarkable a part in our work. In losing them we shall lose good friends and I am sure you will all agree if I say to them in all sincerity, "Thank you; we salute you for what you have done. It will have its place in history."

Robert Schuman, Foreign Minister of France

[Unofficial translation]

Mr. President, it would perhaps be superfluous and difficult to express any better what has already been said, by yourself, Mr. President, and by our colleague Mr. Eden. But I believe that continental Europe has the duty also to express its gratitude with regard to him who, for 4 years, has represented the great continent across the Atlantic.

It is an exceptional declaration that we must make, that despite the distance, the divergencies of destiny, there has been, from the first contact, from the first day, this complete comprehension of the needs, the peculiarities of Europe. And if Europe has had the courage to think of its unity, to undertake it, it is because she has felt supported by him and by those who represent this great continental unity of the United States; this solidarity which has been established, not for any considerations of self-interest but in the search for a unity placed on the highest level, a world-wide level. I am sure that that is the secret of the successes that we have already been able to attain.

Mr. Acheson, permit me to say to you, for you and for us: You will be a great Secretary of State of your country, and you have been a great servant of the cause of the unity of Europe on one hand, of the unity and cooperation in the world on the other hand.

Alcide de Gasperi, Foreign Minister of Italy

[Unofficial translation]

I associate myself with all my heart with the sentiments, with the votes of thanks of the President, and of the speakers who have preceded me. I thank Mr. Acheson and his colleagues particularly for the work which they have done for us and also, particularly, for the last messages which they have left us in favor of European unity. We would like to make every possible effort to arrive at this goal.

Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence of Canada

Just for a minute to refer to the very moving speech by Mr. Acheson: There are three reasons why I should make a very brief comment on what he said so well and what has been referred to by the other representatives.

In the first place Canada is a medium power. In the second place I believe that had our Minister of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson—Mike Pearson as he is so familiarly known—a former chairman and a good friend of all of you, been here, he would have felt moved to say a word or two not only because of his friendship and admiration for Mr. Acheson but because of his role in NATO. The third reason, however, is quite a personal one and that is that Mr. Acheson was almost a Canadian. He is, if I may say so in French, a *Canadien marqué*. I remember first meeting him at the Council of UNRRA in 1943 when he presided with such distinction over the first international meeting held during the war to prepare for the postwar period. Since then he has presided with equal distinction and with growing stature over almost every meeting which has built up the postwar world. He has himself in his remarks stressed the positive achievements that have been made by us here around this table and in other meetings. We in Canada have probably closer relations with the United States than any country has had with another; that those relations have moved along so well during this difficult postwar period is due in no small measure to his wisdom, his sagacity, his courage, and his friendship. On that account I support everything that has been said and in the name of Mike Pearson thank him most warmly for what he has done for all of us.

Enshrining the Symbols of Liberty

*Address by the President*¹

White House press release dated December 15

We are assembled here on this Bill of Rights Day to do honor to the three great documents which together constitute the charter of our form of Government.

The Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights are now assembled in one place for display and safekeeping. Here, so far as is humanly possible, they will be protected from disaster and from the ravages of time.

I am glad that the Bill of Rights is at last to be exhibited side by side with the Constitution. These two original documents have been separated far too long. In my opinion, the Bill of Rights is the most important part of the Constitution.

We venerate these documents not because they are old, not because they are valuable historical relics but because they still have meaning for us. It is 161 years today since the Bill of Rights was ratified. But it is still pointing the way to greater freedom and greater opportunities for human happiness. So long as we govern our Nation by the letter and the spirit of the Bill of Rights, we can be sure that our Nation will grow in strength and wisdom and freedom.

Everyone who holds office in the Federal Government or in the government of one of our States takes an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. I have taken such an oath many times, including two times when I took the special oath required of the President of the United States.

This oath we take has a deep significance. Its simple words compress a lot of our history and a lot of our philosophy of government into one small space. In many countries, men swear to be loyal to their king, or to their nation. Here we promise to uphold and defend a document.

This is because the document sets forth our idea of government. And beyond this, with the Declaration of Independence, it expresses our idea of

man. We believe that man should be free. And these documents establish a system under which man can be free and set up a framework to protect and expand this freedom.

The longer I live, the more I am impressed by the significance of our simple official oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. Perhaps it takes a lifetime of experience to understand how much the Constitution means in our national life.

You can read about the Constitution and you can study it in books, but the Constitution is not merely a matter of words. The Constitution is a living force—it is a growing thing.

The Constitution belongs to no one group of people and to no single branch of the Government. We acknowledge our judges as the interpreters of the Constitution, but our Executive branch and our Legislative branch alike operate within its framework and must apply it and its principles in all that they do.

Symbols of Faith and Liberty

The Constitution expresses an idea that belongs to the people—the idea of the free man. What this idea means may vary from time to time. There was a time when people believed the Constitution meant that men could not be prevented from exploiting child labor or paying sweatshop wages.

We no longer believe these things. We have discovered that the Constitution does not prevent us from correcting social injustice or advancing the general welfare. The idea of freedom which is embodied in these great documents has overcome all attempts to turn them into a rigid set of rules to suppress freedom.

As we look toward the future, we must be sure that what we honor and venerate in these documents is not their words alone but the ideas of liberty which they express.

We are engaged here today in a symbolic act. We are enshrining these documents for future ages. But unless we keep alive in our hearts the true

¹ Made on Dec. 15 at the National Archives, Washington, in dedicating the new shrine for the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.

meaning of these documents, what we are doing here could prove to be of little value.

We have treated the documents themselves with the utmost respect. We have used every device that modern science has invented to protect and preserve them. From their glass cases we have excluded everything that might harm them, even the air itself. This magnificent hall has been constructed to exhibit them, and the vault beneath, that we have built to protect them, is as safe from destruction as anything that the wit of modern man can devise. All this is an honorable effort, based upon reverence for the great past, and our generation can take just pride in it.

But we must face the fact that all this pomp and circumstance could be the exact opposite of what we intend. This ceremony could be no more than a magnificent burial. If the Constitution and Declaration of Independence were enshrined in the Archives Building, but nowhere else, they would be dead, and this place would be only a stately tomb.

The Constitution and the Declaration can live only as long as they are enshrined in our hearts and minds. If they are not so enshrined, they would be no better than mummies in their glass cases, and they could in time become idols whose worship would be a grim mockery of the true faith. Only as these documents are reflected in the thoughts and acts of Americans can they remain symbols of a power that can move the world.

That power is our faith in human liberty. That faith is immortal, but it is not invincible. It has sometimes been abandoned, it has been betrayed, it has been beaten to earth again and again and, although it has never been killed, it has been reduced to impotence for centuries at a time. It is far older than our Republic. The motto on our Liberty Bell, "Proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof," is from the book of Leviticus, which is supposed to have been written nearly 1,500 years before Christ. In the 35 centuries since that date, the love of liberty has never died, but liberty itself has been lost again and again.

We find it hard to believe that liberty could ever be lost in this country. But it can be lost, and it will be, if the time ever comes when these documents are regarded not as the supreme expression of our profound belief but merely as curiosities in glass cases.

Today, the ideals which these three documents express are having to struggle for survival throughout the world. When we sealed the Declaration and the Constitution in the Library of Congress almost a year and a half ago, I had something to say about the threat of totalitarianism and communism.² That threat still menaces freedom. The struggle against communism is just as crucial, just as demanding, as it was then.

We are uniting the strength of free men against this threat. We are resisting Communist aggression and we will continue to resist the Communist threat with all our will and all our strength.

Danger Threatening the Freedom Ideal

But the idea of freedom is in danger from others as well as the Communists. There are some who hate communism, but, who, at the same time, are unwilling to acknowledge the ideals of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. They are people who believe it is too dangerous to proclaim liberty throughout all the land to all the inhabitants. What these people really believe is that the Preamble ought to be changed from "We, the people" to read, "Some of us—some of the people of the United States, but not including those we disapprove of or disagree with—do ordain and establish this Constitution."

Whether they know it or not, those people are enclosing the spirit as well as the letter of the original Constitution in a glass case, sealed off from the living Nation. They are turning it into a mummy, as dead as some old Pharaoh of Egypt, and in so doing they are giving aid and comfort to the enemies of democracy.

The first article of the Bill of Rights provides that Congress shall make no law respecting freedom of worship or abridging freedom of opinion. There are some among us who seem to feel that this provision goes too far, even for the purpose of preventing tyranny over the mind of man. Of course, there are dangers in religious freedom and freedom of opinion. But to deny these rights is worse than dangerous; it is absolutely fatal to liberty. The external threat to liberty should not drive us into suppressing liberty at home. Those who want the Government to regulate matters of the mind and spirit are like men who are so afraid of being murdered that they commit suicide to avoid assassination.

All freedom-loving nations, not the United States alone, are facing a stern challenge from the Communist tyranny. In the circumstances, alarm is justified. The man who isn't alarmed simply doesn't understand the situation—or he is crazy. But alarm is one thing, and hysteria is another. Hysteria impels people to destroy the very thing they are struggling to preserve.

Invasion and conquest by Communist armies would be a horror beyond our capacity to imagine. But invasion and conquest by Communist ideas of right and wrong would be just as bad.

For us to embrace the methods and morals of communism in order to defeat Communist aggression would be a moral disaster worse than any physical catastrophe. If that should come to pass, then the Constitution and the Declaration would be utterly dead and what we are doing today would be the gloomiest burial in the history of the world.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 1, 1951, p. 528.

But I do not believe it is going to come to pass. On the contrary, I believe that this ceremony here today marks a new dedication to the ideals of liberty.

Since 1789 we have learned much about controlling the physical world around us. In 1789 they had nothing to compare with our modern methods of preserving priceless documents. They did not know how to place these sheets under conditions that, left undisturbed, may keep them intact and legible for a thousand years.

Perhaps our progress in learning the art of government has been less spectacular, but I, for one, believe it has been no less certain. I believe the great experiment that we call the United States of America has taught much to mankind. We know more than our forefathers did about the maintenance of popular liberty. Hence it should be easier, not harder, for us to preserve the spirit of the Republic, not in a marble shrine, but in human hearts. We have the knowledge; the question is, "Have we the will to apply it?"

Whether we will preserve and extend popular liberty is a very serious question, but, after all, it is a very old question. The men who signed the Declaration faced it. So did those who wrote the Constitution. Each succeeding generation has faced it, and so far each succeeding generation has answered, "Yes." I am sure that our generation will give the same answer.

So I confidently predict that what we are doing today is placing before the eyes of many generations to come the symbols of a living faith. And, like the sight of the flag "in the dawn's early light," the sight of these symbols will lift up their hearts so they will go out of this building helped and strengthened and inspired.

U. S. Protests Soviet Attack on Air Force Plane off Hokkaido

Press release 921 dated December 16

The American Embassy at Moscow on December 16 delivered a note concerning the U.S. Air Force plane shot down off Hokkaido on October 7, 1952. The U.S. note was in reply to a communication from the U.S.S.R. dated November 24, 1952.

Text of the U.S. note together with that of the U.S.S.R. follows:

Text of U.S. Note of December 16

The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Ministry's note of November 24, 1952, concerning the United States Air Force plane shot down near the Japanese Island of Hokkaido on October 7, 1952.

The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government has repeated its allegation

that the United States Air Force plane violated the state frontier of the Soviet Union and that it opened fire on the Soviet aircraft. This allegation is in complete contradiction with the facts of the case. As the Soviet Government is aware, the radar plot of the tracks of the United States and Soviet aircraft showed conclusively that the United States plane was intercepted 32 miles from Yuri Island and approximately six miles from the Island of Hokkaido by Soviet fighter aircraft which illegally entered Japanese territory in the course of making this interception. The United States plane was entirely undefended; in keeping with the routine character of its mission, it carried no bombs and its guns were inoperative.

The United States Government therefore must reiterate its protest against this unprovoked and unjustifiable attack on the United States aircraft, and must request again that the Soviet Government make payment of appropriate compensation for the loss of this aircraft and the lives of the crew members who have perished.

The United States Government also cannot accept the Soviet Government's declaration that it does not consider it necessary to enter into discussion of the statement of the United States Government that Yuri Island is not Soviet territory. In the view of the United States Government, Yuri Island, together with the other islands of the Habomai Group, is Japanese territory under Japanese sovereignty and the status of these islands as Japanese territory has not been changed by the fact of their occupation by the Soviet Union.

Text of Soviet Note of November 24

[Unofficial translation]

In connection with the USA Government's note of October 17, 1952,¹ the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to state the following.

The Government of the USSR cannot recognize as satisfactory the reply of the Government of the USA to the Soviet Government's note of October 12² this year with regard to the violation of the state frontier of the USSR by an American military airplane in the region of Yuri Island.

Instead of taking urgent measures to prevent violations of the Soviet frontier by American airplanes, the Government of the USA took the path of an unfounded denial of the fact of a violation of the Soviet frontier by an American military airplane on October 7 and is trying to justify the illegal acts of the crew of this airplane which opened fire on two Soviet fighter planes. Such a position of the Government of the USA is in clear contradiction with generally recognized standards in mutual relations between states.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 650.

² *Ibid.*, p. 649.

In the Soviet Government's note of October 12 there were set forth the actual circumstances of this affair. It was clearly established that the American four-motored B-29 bomber at about 1530 o'clock October 7 Vladivostok time violated the state frontier of the Soviet Union in the region of Yuri Island. Instead of complying with the demand of the two Soviet fighters—to follow them for landing—the violating airplane, which, as the Government of the USA itself acknowledges in its note of October 17, was armed, opened fire on the Soviet fighters.

In view of the fact that a violation of the Soviet state frontier by an American military airplane has been clearly established, the Soviet Government cannot accept for consideration the claim of the USA Government contained in its note of October 17. It goes without saying that American authorities bear responsibility for the consequences of the violation of the Soviet frontier.

The Soviet Government is not in possession of any information regarding the whereabouts of the members of the crew of the American violating airplane.

The Government of the USSR considers it necessary to remind that in the USSR, as in other countries, there are instructions in force according to which, in case of a violation of the state frontier by a foreign airplane, flyers are required to force it to land at a local airport and in case of resistance to open fire on it.

The Soviet Government does not consider it necessary to enter into discussion of the arbitrary statement of the Government of the USA that Yuri Island is allegedly not Soviet territory, since it is without any foundation and in crude contradiction with the provisions of the Yalta Agreement concerning the Kurile Islands, which was signed by the Government of the USA.

Reiterating its position set forth in the note of October 12, the Soviet Government again insists that the Government of the USA take the necessary measures to prevent henceforth violations of the state frontier of the USSR by American airplanes.

Letters of Credence

Ecuador

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ecuador, José Ricardo Chiriboga Villagómez, presented his credentials to the President on December 12. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 914 of December 12.

Venezuela

The newly appointed Ambassador of Venezuela, César González, presented his credentials to the President on December 12. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 915 of December 12.

U.S. Protests in Linse Kidnaping Case

*Following are the texts of notes, dated November 25 and December 10, sent by Walter J. Donnelly, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, to Gen. Vassily I. Chuikov, chairman of the Soviet Control Commission for Germany, concerning the kidnaping of Dr. Walter Linse from the American sector of Berlin on July 8:*¹

Note Dated November 25

[Telegraphic text]

It is now more than three months since we agreed that our representatives should conduct a joint inquiry into the kidnaping of Dr. Linse. More than two and a half months ago we gave you information which specifically identified the police station in the Soviet sector to which Dr. Linse was taken by the kidnapers, and other information, from which all details of the crime could have been easily and immediately ascertained. Subsequent attempts of my representative to meet with his Soviet colleague, or even to get answers about the progress of your inquiry, were singularly unsuccessful.

The West Berlin police have now completed and published results of their inquiry with complete identification of the kidnapers and complete details of their relations to security forces under your control and of the organization and execution of the crime. I attach a copy of their statement in case it has not been brought to your personal attention.²

When you agreed to an investigation into this kidnaping, you clearly recognized your obligation to return Dr. Linse to the U.S. sector of Berlin and to punish the perpetrators of the crime as soon as it was shown that Dr. Linse had been kidnaped into the Soviet sector or zone. This fact has now been shown, together with the fact that the kidnaping was carried out by police agencies under your control. I therefore demand that you carry out your obligations and deliver Dr. Linse to the U.S. authorities in the U.S. sector of Berlin and take prompt action to punish the perpetrators of the kidnaping and those associated with them.

Note Dated December 10

[Telegraphic text]

Tomorrow I shall be leaving for home.³ Before I go I must once more request your good offices in alleviating the fate and speeding the release of Dr. Walter Linse from the detention he has so unjustly suffered in the Soviet zone of Germany.

¹ For text of a U.S. protest dated July 8, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1952, p. 320.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1952, p. 823.

³ The White House announced on Dec. 5 that the President had accepted Mr. Donnelly's resignation, effective Dec. 31.

You doubtless know the Linse case. You have seen police reports, the cold facts and figures; but I wonder if you equally know the tragic drama behind the case, which has received so much publicity in the press in all parts of the West.

Mrs. Linse has visited me on many occasions. Her story is so full of courage and hope that I must again appeal to you. I like to believe that under similar circumstances you too would be inspired to write and speak on behalf of this woman who has lost her husband who, like her, must live in hope for the day of their reunion.

Mrs. Linse is suffering the same mental anguish which caused the death of Dr. Linse's father a few weeks after the kidnaping of his son. She is constantly tormented by the last picture anyone had of her husband . . . that of a man brutally dragged off by hooligans, leaving behind one shoe and glasses as evidence of his brief and brave struggle.

I want to do whatever I can to ease the suffering which Mrs. Linse is undergoing. Though her husband may be lacking many things, she has constantly in her mind that he needs glasses and shoes. I would like to satisfy her desire to replace these, which she wants especially to do now at the Christmas season.

Mrs. Linse has asked if you could furnish, through me, the prescription for his glasses and size of shoes. After she purchases these articles, she will deliver them to me. I shall then forward them to you and ask that you be so good as to transmit them to Dr. Linse. I shall appreciate it if I might then be sent an acknowledgment from Dr. Linse that he has received these articles, so that I may reassure Mrs. Linse.

I also request that you have delivered to Dr. Linse the food package which I am sending him as a Christmas gift in my own name. Dr. Linse must know that I have not forgotten him, nor has my country.

Finally, because I am so deeply moved by the human suffering which has been caused by this brutal kidnaping, I appeal to you, General Chuiikov, to leave nothing undone to have Dr. Linse speedily returned to his home. I would like to feel that you and I have been able to make the beginning of the New Year the beginning of a new life for the Linses.⁴

⁴ On Dec. 11 the package sent to Dr. Linse in care of the Soviet headquarters in East Berlin was returned by special messenger, together with Mr. Donnelly's Dec. 10 letter to Gen. Chuiikov. The package was marked "Addressee Not Known."

MSA Allotment for Defense Support Program in Indochina

The Mutual Security Agency announced on December 18 that it has earmarked 30.5 million dollars for a defense support program in the Associated States of Indochina during the current fiscal year.

About 4 million dollars is to be used for military petroleum products and about 26 million dollars to finance purchases of such items as air-navigation aids, railway rolling stock and equipment, airfield facilities, telecommunications equipment, and hospital equipment and drugs for the military forces in Indochina.

Through an agreement with the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army will act as the procurement agency for all items with the possible exception of some petroleum supplies. The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Indochina will be responsible for the supervision of the end use of these items in the same manner as all other military assistance supplies.

The 30.5 million dollars for direct support of the military operation represents approximately half of the Msa program in Indochina for the 1953 fiscal year. The other half is being used for economic-aid projects in fields such as medicine and public health, agriculture and forestry, transportation and other public works, public administration, and industry.

American economic dollar aid in Indochina dates back to June 5, 1950, when the support program was initiated by the Economic Cooperation Administration, Msa's predecessor. However, the 30.5 million-dollar Msa program for defense support in the current fiscal year marks the first time that Msa or Eca dollars are being used in Indochina for commodities which go directly to the military forces.

Certain specific military projects will be supported by the Msa dollars. Two provide for expansion of the Tourane power plant and the Haiphong electric-power plant and power line. Another will supply machinery and equipment for the Saïgon arsenal. More than 1 million dollars of Msa funds will finance purchases of rails and rolling stock for railways in Vietnam which serve essential military needs.

Another project calls for basic improvement of air-force bases, including supplying of flood lights, motor pumps, storage tanks, generators, and cranes. MSA will also pay for equipment to be used in storing, testing, and distributing petroleum products for the Armed Forces.

Fighting off attacks of the Communist Viet Minh, the Indochinese forces are battling the aggression mainly in North Vietnam. The Viet Minh attacks have grown more intensive in the last 2 or 3 years, though they originally began on a sporadic basis about the time of the end of World War II.

As a result of the warfare, Indochina has a refugee and relief problem, which MSA is also helping under its economic-aid program. It is supporting the Indochinese Government's resettlement programs and projects for hospital and medical care of civilian war wounded and for distribution of food, clothes, and other essential needs to refugees.

The MSA defense-support program in Indochina is separate from the direct military aid provided through the Department of Defense. Purchases of arms and other military equipment for Indochinese military forces are financed by the Department of Defense under its portion of the Mutual Security Program, and dollars used for this purpose are not included in the MSA-administered defense-support program.

U.S. Attitude Toward Purchase of Bolivian Tin Concentrates

Press release 928 dated December 19

In view of the numerous inquiries which the Department of State has received from the press concerning the purchase of Bolivian tin concentrates, it is deemed necessary to define clearly and precisely the attitude of the U.S. Government.

First, the United States has made several spot purchases of Bolivian tin concentrates since the MNR¹ regime assumed control of the Bolivian Government in April 1952. The last purchase, made in September 1952 from the Banco Minero, an agency of the Bolivian Government, covered all Bolivian production through September 1952 which had not already been contracted for sale. Delivery of ores in South American ports under this arrangement was not completed until the end of November.

Second, since September 1952 the Bolivian Government has not offered for spot sale to the United States any tin concentrates whatever.

Third, the United States has informed the Bo-

livian Government on several occasions that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is prepared to consider offers from Bolivia to sell tin concentrates on substantially the same basis as in the earlier purchase agreements. At no time has the United States refused to buy Bolivian tin.

Fourth, recently the Bolivian Ambassador to the United States informed the Department that the Bolivian Government wished to conclude a one-year contract for the sale of Bolivian tin concentrates. The interested agencies of the U.S. Government are currently considering the feasibility of such an arrangement.

Tax Conventions With Finland Enter Into Force

Press release 926 dated December 19

On December 18, 1952, according to information received by the Department of State from the American Legation at Helsinki, the instruments of ratification of the United States and Finland with respect to two tax conventions (treaties) were formally exchanged at Helsinki, namely: (a) the convention of March 3, 1952, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, and (b) the convention of March 3, 1952, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates and inheritances.

Upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification the two conventions entered into force in accordance with their respective terms.

The Senate, on July 4, 1952, gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the conventions. On July 21, 1952, the President ratified both conventions. A proclamation with respect to the entry into force of each of the conventions will be issued by the President.

Finland Makes Purchase From International Monetary Fund

The Government of Finland on December 5 purchased U.S. \$4,500,000 from the International Monetary Fund with Finnish markkas. At the same time, a stand-by arrangement was concluded under which the Finnish Government may purchase up to \$5,000,000 more from the Fund at any time during the next 6 months.

Finland's purchase was its first transaction with the Fund. The stand-by arrangement with Finland represents the first use of a facility adopted recently that permits members to obtain advance assurance of access to the Fund's resources.

¹ *Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario.*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings ¹

Adjourned During December 1952

ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Council: 17th Session	Montreal	Sept. 9–Dec. 5
Air Transport Committee: 17th Session	Montreal	Sept. 10–Dec. 2
Air Navigation Commission: 11th Session	Montreal	Sept. 23–Dec. 4
Standing Committee on Air Performance: 3d Session	Montreal	Nov. 11–Dec. 5
ITU (International Telecommunication Union): International Plenipotentiary Telecommunication Conference.	Buenos Aires	Oct. 1–Dec. 21
UN (United Nations):		
General Assembly: 7th Session (1st Part)	New York	Oct. 14–Dec. 22
Economic and Social Council: Consultative Group in the Field of Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders—Combined European and North American Regional.	Geneva	Dec. 8–16
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Fourth Meeting of Representatives of National Commissions	Paris	Nov. 8–Dec. 11
General Conference: 7th Session	Paris	Nov. 12–Dec. 11
First Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in South Asia and the Pacific.	Bombay	Dec. 10–23
West Indian Conference: 5th Session	Jamaica	Nov. 24–Dec. 4
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
FAO/WHO Joint Meeting on Malnutrition in Mothers, Infants and Children.	Gambia (Africa)	Nov. 28–Dec. 4
Forestry and Forest Products Commission for Asia and the Pacific: 2d Session.	Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.	Dec. 1–13
Meeting of Experts on Index Numbers	Rome	Dec. 1–5
Inter-American Livestock Production: 2d Meeting	Bauru (Brazil)	Dec. 8–19
Near East Forestry Conference	Amman (Jordan)	Dec. 13–20
Caribbean Commission: 15th Meeting	Jamaica	Dec. 1–8
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Latin American Manpower Technical Conference	Lima	Dec. 1–13
Technical Meeting on the Protection of Young Workers in Asian Countries, with Relation to their Vocational Preparation.	Kandy (Ceylon)	Dec. 1–10
Meeting on Suppression of Dust in Mining, Funnelling and Quarrying.	Geneva	Dec. 1–17
Sixth International Conference of Social Work	Madras	Dec. 14–19
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Ministerial Meeting of the Council (First).	Paris	Dec. 15–19

In Session as of Dec. 30, 1952

International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26, 1951–
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Scheduled January 1–March 31, 1953

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Meeting on Rice	Bangkok	Jan. 5–
Coordinating Committee: 3d Session	Rome	Mar. 16–
Council Committee on Relations with International Organizations	Rome	Mar. 30–
Inter-American Research Seminar on National Income	Santiago	Jan. 5–
International Rubber Study Group: Second Session of Working Party	London	Jan. 5–
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Second Southeast Asia Regional Air Navigation Meeting (and Limited South Pacific).	Melbourne	Jan. 13–
First Air Navigation Conference	Montreal	Feb. 24–
UN (United Nations):		
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Railway Subcommittee: 1st Session	Bandung	Jan. 14–
Inland Waterways Subcommittee: 1st Session	Bandung	Jan. 14–
Committee on Inland Transport: 2d Session	Bandung	Jan. 19–
Committee on Industry and Trade: 5th Session	Bandung	Jan. 26–
Ninth Session of the Commission	Bandung	Feb. 6–
Second Regional Conference on Trade Promotion	Manila	Feb. 23–

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Dec. 23, 1952. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled January 1—March 31, 1953—Continued

UN—Continued

Population Commission: 7th Session	New York	Jan. 19—
Transport and Communications Commission: 6th Session	New York	Feb. 2—
Statistical Commission: 7th Session	New York	Feb. 2—
Committee on Non-Governmental Organization	New York	Feb. 16—
General Assembly, Reconvening of 7th Session	New York	Feb. 24—
Economic Commission for Europe: 8th Session	Geneva	Mar. 3—
Commission on the Status of Women: 7th Session	New York	Mar. 16—
Technical Assistance Committee	New York	Mar. 16—
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 8th Session	New York	Mar. 30—
Economic and Social Commission: 15th Session	New York	Mar. 31—
Consultative Group in the Field of Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (Latin American Regional).	Brazil	March
WMO (World Meteorological Organization):		
Regional Association I, Africa	Tananarive	Jan. 19—
Commission for Climatology: 1st Session	Washington	Mar. 12—
WHO (World Health Organization): Executive Board: 11th Session	Geneva	Jan. 21—
International Wheat Council:		
11th Session	Washington	Jan. 30—
Reconvening of 8th Session	Washington	Feb. 2—
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade): <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee for Agenda and Intersessional Business of the Contracting Parties.	Geneva	Feb. 2—
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Textiles Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 2—
Committee on Work on Plantations: 2d Session	Habana	Mar. 16—
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: 3d Extraordinary Meeting.	Caracas	Feb. 9—
Pakistan Science Conference, 5th Annual	Lahore	Feb. 16—
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defense Science	New Delhi	Feb. 25—
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Petroleum Planning Committee: 4th Meeting	Paris	February
Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport: 3d Session	Paris	February
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council	Paris	March*
Cannes Film Festival, 6th International	Cannes	Mar. 11
Pan American Highway Congress: Interim Committee	Undetermined	March
International Rubber Study Group: 10th Meeting	Copenhagen	March
International Tin Study Group: 7th Meeting	London	March

U. S. Denounces Soviet Charges of “Mass Murder” of Prisoners

In the early morning hours of December 21, the date on which the General Assembly had intended to end the first part of its seventh session, the U.S.S.R. representative, Andrei Gromyko, announced that his delegation requested inclusion on the agenda of a new item, dealing with the alleged “mass murder” of Chinese and Korean prisoners of war. At a meeting of the General Committee called the same day, at his request, it was agreed to include the item and to consider it without delay. At its December 21 plenary session, the General Assembly accepted the Committee’s recommendation. After completing action on other agenda items in an all-night session, the Assembly early the next morning defeated the Soviet resolution by a vote of 5-45, with 10 abstentions.

Following are statements made by Philip C.

Jessup in the General Committee on December 21 and by Ernest A. Gross in the plenary session on December 22.

AMBASSADOR JESSUP’S STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 21

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 21

I believe that the delegations in the General Assembly of the United Nations will feel not only a natural sense of irritation but also a feeling of disgust and, I may say, contempt for this last minute shabby propaganda trick which the delegation of the Soviet Union seeks to perpetrate upon the General Assembly.

The term a “knock on the door at midnight” has become symbolically associated with the kind of

tactics that the Soviet Government and its secret police employ in depriving the people unfortunate enough to live under that rule of all of the situations which normally come to human beings in the course of their daily life. It would seem as if the Soviet delegation thought that it could intimidate the General Assembly of the United Nations by a "knock on the door at midnight" just as the Assembly was about to adjourn.

I don't think it is appropriate, Mr. Chairman, in the General Committee to engage in a prolonged discussion of this utterly false, slanderous defamatory proposal, which is now before us. The delegation of the United States, of course, makes no objection to putting this on the agenda. It should be put on the agenda and disposed of forthwith.

Its urgent character derives not from the misstatements which we have heard just now from the representative of the Soviet Union, but from the need of the General Assembly to remove quickly, emphatically, and clearly from its consideration false and baseless charges of this kind. I should merely like to point out certain things, Mr. Chairman, as indicative of the character of this proposal of the Soviet Union, a proposal which reaches a new low in terms of the tactics of that delegation in the United Nations.

It is alleged in this paper we have and in the explanatory note that certain events transpired in a prisoner-of-war camp on the Island of Pongan. I am able to inform the members of the General Committee, as the delegation of the United States will be prepared in greater detail to inform the General Assembly, that there are no Chinese prisoners of war on this island. There are no prisoners of war, whether Chinese or Korean on this island. There are only Korean civilian internees of long standing. There are 9,200 of these Korean civilian internees on the island in two enclosures.

The incident to which I assume the Soviet representative refers, although the totally inaccurate and false nature of his statements makes it difficult to know whether he refers to anything, but if he is referring to the item in the press to which he seems to refer, I can say that the incident involves one enclosure consisting of 8 compounds. Two of these 8 compounds did not participate in the incident. It is perhaps a curious coincidence, Mr. Chairman, that this incident occurred on the same day that the Chinese Communist regime rejected the General Assembly resolution on nonforcible repatriation of prisoners of war. Would it seem fantastic to the members of the General Committee to assume that Communist instigation among these internees led to the riots which required disciplinary action? Surely that is not a fantastic assumption.

Mr. Chairman, as I have said, I don't want to detain the General Committee with a full discussion of this item. My delegation will be prepared to discuss it forthwith in the plenary session. There is no objection, in fact we welcome, as I have

said, the course that you have proposed that this should be taken up and disposed of and I believe that the General Assembly, on hearing on the one hand the false propaganda, unsupported allegations of the Soviet delegation and the statement of facts which my delegation will put before the Assembly, will take the appropriate action to dismiss this and to express the sense of outrage which it has that an item of this character should be brought forward in this way at this time.

AMBASSADOR GROSS' STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 22

In the remarks which I have to make I should like to ask the Assembly to keep in mind three factors which seem to me to be relevant to the question which is put before the Assembly and the manner in which it has been put forward. The first is the timing selected by the Soviet Union delegation in raising the question; the second is its motives in doing so; and the third is the substance of the charges made here, not for the first time but repeatedly, *ad nauseam*, as they have been, from the day when the Korean item came up for discussion before the First Committee at this session.

On an unforgettable Sunday, June 25, 1950, the Security Council met and decided to repel aggression. Now, many Sunday nights later, the General Assembly meets to expose a hollow propaganda maneuver by the Soviet sponsor of that aggression. The world knows who is for peace in Korea and who is using every means to prevent peace. On December 3, 54 nations declared their will to peace in Korea. The Soviet Union representative this evening reviles the assembled dignity of this organization and says that the Indian resolution was rubber-stamped by the Assembly under U.S. pressure. The Soviet Union Government and its satellites voted against peace, and that is the fact they are seeking to conceal this evening.

Our patience is tried and our intelligence insulted by a shabby midnight propaganda stunt. Nevertheless, it is fitting that this Assembly should discuss the item that the Soviet Union representative has raised so hastily. My Government urged that the Soviet Union item be included in the agenda, waiving the rules which could have been invoked to prevent its inclusion today. We believed that the item should be discussed before we finished our pre-Christmas work, and we took this position because we believe the Soviet Union accusations should be brought out of the dark corners of their origin and be exposed to the white light of truth.

I turn to facts. What was the background of the events at Pongan? Here are the facts: On Pongan Island, over 9,000 Koreans were interned. These were captured Communist guerrillas operating in South Korea and other Communists rounded up for revolutionary activities behind the

lines. They were not prisoners captured from enemy armies. There were no Chinese among them.

On December 6, 1952, the prisoner-of-war command reported indications that plans for a mass break-out were being formulated within the United Nations Command prisoner-of-war and internee camps. As the Soviet Union representative brought out a few moments ago, this was just 3 days after the adoption by the Assembly of the Indian resolution calling for peace in Korea. As the Soviet Union representative said, there is a connection between these facts. I believe the connection will be clear to all those of us who are free to think for ourselves and realize that this was part of a conspiracy and a design which was undoubtedly related to the actions taken by the Assembly. Who the conspirators were, we shall now see.

Coded documents had been intercepted in several of the compounds. The code was broken by the authorities and the documents disclosed plans for a mass break. The code appeared to be common throughout the main camp and the branch camp areas, indicating that the plan was centrally directed. The date and time that these plans were to be operative was not known.

An investigation was, of course, at once initiated. All camp commanders were acquainted with the situation and were directed to take every precaution to negate any attempt by the internees to put such plans into effect.

Eight days after the first reports became available the plot matured in the violence at Pongan, and the Assembly will note that this violence occurred on the same day that the Chinese Communist authorities rejected the U.N. resolution. The Chinese Communist authorities knew and selected the day on which they chose to send their rejection. And here, again, the connection between the despatch of that note and the events on the island of Pongan was surely not an accident or a coincidence.

The Facts of the Case

Now, just what did happen at Pongan? At noon on December 14, reports came to the commander of the camp that internees in two of the camp compounds were massing. It was evident that immediate action was necessary to prevent the rioters from breaking out of their compounds and inciting their fellows in the six other compounds to attempt similar action. The compound commander, with a small detachment of United States and Republic of Korea guards, had to act at once to prevent many hundreds of internees from breaking out of their compounds and inviting pitched battles. These facts are put before my colleagues in the Assembly on behalf of the Unified Command. They are not based upon news despatches.

The camp commander at once despatched platoons to the two compounds in which the internees had begun to mass. Into the first of the compounds, compound F, went 110 guards of the U.N. Command. Twenty of them were armed with shotguns. They deployed as skirmishers 25 yards away from the massed internees, who had drawn themselves up many ranks deep in military fashion. Behind these ranks of the internees were hundreds more, threatening, screaming, and throwing rocks down upon the U.N. guards from a high ledge upon which they had taken positions. The camp commander ordered the rioters to quiet down and to disperse. When his order was disobeyed, he realized that only a show of force could restore order and prevent a mass break-out of the rioters. The plan disclosed in the codes which had been intercepted and broken was in the process of being matured.

What show of force could be employed? The direction of the wind made the use of tear gas impossible. A frontal approach by the few guards upon the many massed men was out of the question. But the rioting was skillfully organized, planned, and directed and it was necessary to fire volleys to quell the rioters in the two compounds where the disturbances started. And, meanwhile, internees were massing in four of the other compounds, again obviously in pursuance of a prepared plan. A burst of fire was necessary in two of these compounds in order to prevent further outbreaks. Having quelled the riots in the first two compounds, the camp commander was able to send the guards into three other compounds and move the demonstrators out without having to use firearms. The dead and wounded were at once evacuated. These are the facts as reported by the commanding officer on the spot to the U.N. Command.

The necessity for using force to repress inspired and centrally directed outbursts of fanatical violence by prisoners is, at times, unavoidable. That such unavoidable use of force should result in casualties is no evidence that force was not required.

In normal course the U.N. Command at once instituted an investigation of the incident on Pongan. This investigation, which is still under way, may well develop further facts about the origin of this latest in a series of ruthlessly executed plans to sacrifice human lives, to create propaganda for cynical use on occasions such as this. And who has shown more vividly and with more sickening directness how such fabricated propaganda can be used?

We also deplore the fanaticism, the suicidal frenzy which would have involved far greater casualties among both internees and guards of the U.N. Command alike if the measures I have described had not been swiftly and firmly adopted.

One may ask: What was the purpose of the outbreak at Pongan? I suggest to the Assembly

that escape was not their only motive, that bloodshed was the real motive, the sacrifice of as many internees as possible and the deliberate fashioning of ammunition to provide an excuse for a false issue, for the fact is that from the beginning of the consideration of the Korean question in the General Assembly, the consistent purpose of the Soviet Union Government and its delegation here has been to create the impression that prisoners of war all wished to be repatriated and are being held against their will. That has been the consistent purpose of the Soviet Union representative from the first moment the matter was discussed by him at the commencement of this session. This explains why the Soviet Union representative has produced this propaganda item out of the middle of the night. It is obviously a clumsy attempt to smear the United States and the United Nations at the last minute, in an effort to cover up the fact that the aggressors and their Soviet Union sponsors have rejected peace in Korea.

Soviet Rejection of Indian Proposal

Does the Soviet Union representative really think he fools anyone by this maneuver? The world will not forget that the Soviet Union Government and its satellites have rejected the fair and honorable proposal introduced by the Government of India for the settlement of the prisoner-of-war question, as set forth in the resolution of December 3.

The world will always remember the patience and perseverance with which the United Nations has sought peace in Korea at Kaesong, at Panmunjom, and here. The world will not be misled into believing that black is white simply because the Soviet Union Government says so.

The agenda item before us and the explanations we have heard this evening amount to a warmed-over version of the charges and invective with which Mr. Vyshinsky sought vainly to confuse the prisoner-of-war question earlier. We have now heard still another round of these same lines which characterize the Soviet Union approach to the problem of peace in Korea.

The Soviet Union representative this evening talked at some length, of some 15 or 20 minutes, concerning incidents on Koje and Cheju Islands where there were and are prisoners of war, not internees but prisoners of war. He has talked, as Mr. Vyshinsky did before him, about the failure of the United States, as he alleges, to comply with its obligations under the Geneva Convention. What are the facts about the treatment of prisoners of war in Korea? The Government of the United States, in its initial presentation on the Korean question, made these facts perfectly clear on October 24 in the First Committee of this Assembly.

From the very beginning the U.N. Command

has followed the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949. There has never been any secret about the administration of U.N. prisoner-of-war camps. We have thrown these camps wide open to the International Committee of the Red Cross and have encouraged full investigation of conditions within our camps. There has been a thorough scrutiny of what we have done and the world has been kept fully informed. On occasions when the International Committee has criticized us for any conduct, the U.N. Command has taken any necessary corrective action.

What has been the practice on the other side? The Communist authorities have hidden their treatment of prisoners from the eyes of the world. They have failed to appoint a protecting power or any benevolent organization such as the Red Cross. They have continually refused to permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to send representatives to inspect their camps. They have refused to exchange relief packages, and until very recently they have refused to exchange mail; they now allow this, on only a most limited scale. They have refused to report on the health of prisoners of war, and they refuse to exchange the seriously sick and wounded, as is required by the Geneva Convention. They have failed to give the accurate location of prisoner-of-war camps and they have failed to mark them properly. They have situated their camps in places of danger near legitimate military targets, in defiance of the Geneva Convention.

The U.N. Command has observed the Geneva Convention in all these respects. The International Committee of the Red Cross has been attempting for some time to contact the Communist authorities in order to obtain access to their camps and in order to persuade the Communists that they should live up to the Geneva Convention. But the only answer the International Committee of the Red Cross has ever received from the Communists was a statement from the North Koreans early in the conflict that they would live up to the Geneva Convention. Having said that, the North Koreans dropped a curtain of secrecy over the treatment of prisoners of war.

The Soviet Union Government may now recognize the mistake which it made in brutally rejecting the Indian resolution for peace in Korea, and thus contemptuously flouting the will of the United Nations. But does the Soviet Union Government really believe that it can retrieve this mistake by injecting a false issue into our deliberations at this eleventh hour of our session? The Soviet Union representative's midnight maneuver will go down in our annals along with Mr. Vyshinsky's laughter at disarmament during the last Assembly.

The Soviet Union Government has only one way out from the consequence of its betrayal of peace. That way is to accept the U.N. proposals for solving the prisoner-of-war question. Until they do so, the world will remain convinced that those who

have launched aggression in Korea insist that the bloodshed continue.

The Soviet Union and its satellites stood alone against the 54 nations which endorsed the principle of nonforcible repatriation as the key to peace in Korea. Now the Soviet Union can only offer this lurid effort to mask its own desire to see the conflict continue as long as the Soviet Government can delude the victimized people of Korea and China to fight for it.

I have already suggested that the Soviet Union item does not pose a new problem for us. The Soviet world-wide propaganda apparatus has been pouring out accusations of U.N. Command mistreatment of prisoners of war as part of its hate

campaign. All of us have been sickened by this effort to poison international relations. The United States is eager to take this opportunity to expose the latest chapter in the Soviet Union hate campaign.

In conclusion, there is a lesson to be drawn from this eleventh hour maneuver by the Soviet Government. It furnishes proof that when members of the United Nations unite on a moral issue and rally from all parts of the earth around the cause of peace and in defense of the Charter, the enemies of peace are driven into corners of desperation. But we do not believe that our unity can be broken or undermined by acts of lying desperation such as those we have witnessed here.

Admitting New Members to the United Nations

*Statements by Senator Alexander Wiley
U. S. Representative to the General Assembly*

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 13¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 13

The United Nations can never achieve its maximum effectiveness so long as all those nations qualified for membership are not among us. We need the fresh energy and enthusiasm that new blood will give us. We need the collective strength and wisdom which the new members will bring to our deliberations. They, in turn, need the badge of membership in the United Nations in order to play their proper role in the world community and participate with us in our efforts to promote world peace.

It is no exaggeration to say that the problem before us is one of the outstanding organizational problems of the United Nations. On its solution depend the future growth and vitality of this Organization.

Yet, to speak frankly, we have reached an impasse in our efforts to solve the membership deadlock. For 6 years now we have tried to find a satisfactory solution—without any success.

Why? I think the answer is clear. One of the permanent members of the Security Council has abused its privileged vote. Except for this, the representatives of 14 nations who are not among us would be in this Committee Room today. I refer to Italy, Ireland, and Portugal, ancient states

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Dec. 13 on the question of admitting new members.

whose people have contributed so greatly to civilization; to the Republic of Korea, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, at this moment valiantly resisting aggression; to Japan, whose people have produced a new structure of democratic government; to the peace-loving states of Austria and Finland, who have made such a brave recovery from the havoc of war; to the newly independent states of Ceylon, Libya, and Nepal; and to the Kingdom of Jordan, rich in history and religious tradition.

All of these states secured seven or more affirmative votes in the Security Council when their membership applications were considered. All have thus had the majority necessary for recommendation by the Security Council. But the Soviet Union has repeatedly blackballed them by its use of the veto. Italy has been a victim of the Soviet veto on five occasions.

In a period of 6 years, Soviet representatives in the Security Council have cast a total of 28 vetoes to bar the door of this Organization to qualified applicants. In effect, they have tried to impose a crude dictate on the will of the United Nations—and this on an issue which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered a vital security matter.

The voting record of the Soviet Union—which has been designed to hamstring the effective operation of the United Nations—is well known to the members of this Committee. At the San Fran-

cisco conference in 1945 it was agreed that important decisions of the Security Council should require the unanimous approval of the five permanent members. At the same time, the great powers solemnly assured their colleagues that they would accept the trust reposed in them and would not use their veto power willfully to obstruct the work of the Council. The veto, in other words, was to be used *only in very exceptional cases*. But with the Soviet Union the exception soon became the rule.

The Soviet Veto Record

Let us now look briefly at the record. Let us recall the patient efforts of past General Assemblies to break the membership deadlock.

In the late summer of 1947, the Security Council voted upon the applications of Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, and Finland. Each of them received more than the seven votes needed for admission, but each application was vetoed by the Soviet representative.

Before the vote, in discussing the qualifications of Italy and Finland, the Soviet representative acknowledged that these two countries met the membership qualifications set forth in article 4 of the Charter. However, he said he would be unable to vote for them unless the other members of the Council agreed to admit Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. None of these three countries was, in the view of almost every other member of the Council, qualified for membership. This fact did not trouble the Soviet representative. He insisted on his deal—or else. All five must be admitted or none of them would be.

Since then, the number of applicants has increased. But the Soviet position remains the same. Take it or leave it: The price of admission for states which have been found qualified for membership by the General Assembly and have received more than seven votes in the Security Council is acceptance of those states which were not deemed qualified and were unable to secure the required number of votes in the Council.

In the fall of 1947, the General Assembly had become increasingly disturbed over the lack of progress in the field of membership. And so, taking cognizance of the Soviet position, the Assembly decided to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The question was: Could a member of the United Nations in the Security Council or General Assembly make its vote on membership dependent on conditions not expressly provided for in paragraph 1 of article 4 of the Charter? In other words, could a member nation properly condition its vote for one candidate on the acceptance of other candidates?

The International Court of Justice gave its advisory opinion in May 1948. It was this: No member of the United Nations is juridically en-

titled to make its consent to admission of a state dependent on conditions not expressly provided for in article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter. In effect, therefore, the Soviet insistence on its package deal is inconsistent with the Charter.

Study of Voting Procedure

At its third session, in the winter of 1948, with the advisory opinion of the Court as a point of reference, the General Assembly again tried to break the membership deadlock. It adopted overwhelmingly a series of resolutions asking the Security Council to reconsider, in the light of the Court's advisory opinion, the seven applicants who had been barred by Soviet vetoes.

Meanwhile, another development was taking place which was vitally related to a solution of the membership problem. The Interim Committee of the General Assembly had embarked upon a study of voting procedure in the Security Council. The results of this study were embodied in a resolution adopted by the General Assembly in the spring of 1949. Among other things, the resolution recommended this: The permanent members of the Security Council should try to agree among themselves upon what possible issues they might forbear to use the veto. And it suggested that admission to membership in the United Nations was such an issue.

Now that resolution pointed a simple way out of the membership impasse, provided the members of the Security Council were willing to follow its recommendations. China, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States supported this proposal. Indeed, as early as 1947, my Government declared it would not use the veto in voting on membership applications. The U.S. representative told the Assembly at that time, and I quote:

... The United States will not exercise its right of veto in the Security Council to exclude from the United Nations any of the present applicants which the Assembly deems qualified for membership, and we would go further and would be willing to accept complete elimination of the veto in the Security Council in reference to the admission of applicants in the future.

That was the attitude of my Government in 1947. Less than a year later, in June 1948, the Senate of the United States, of which I have the privilege to be a member, formally expressed its approval of this position. By a vote of 64 to 4, the Senate adopted a resolution authored by the late Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg, who is known as one of the founders of the United Nations and one of the chief architects of my country's bipartisan foreign policy. The Vandenberg resolution urged my Government to seek voluntary agreement in the United Nations to remove the veto from questions involving the admission of new members.

As recently as last January, my Government reaffirmed its willingness to renounce the use of the veto on membership questions. An American

delegate to the sixth session of the General Assembly in Paris said, and I quote:

My Government, in keeping with the frequently expressed views of the General Assembly, has adhered to the policy that it will not prevent the admission of any state whose application is approved by a sufficient number of the other Members. We will not frustrate the will of this Organization.

Unfortunately, neither the position taken by my Government, nor the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, nor the resolution of the Assembly calling for restraint in the use of the veto has had any perceptible results on the membership deadlock. Meanwhile, as one session of the Assembly followed another, the number of qualified candidates for membership kept increasing; so did the number of Soviet vetoes.

Last year in Paris, the General Assembly made still another determined effort to break the log jam. It once again called upon the Security Council to reconsider pending applications of new members. It recommended that the Council base its action on conditions contained in the Charter; and it requested the permanent members of the Council to confer with one another in order to make recommendations on the pending applications.

These consultations took place in the course of the past summer. The results were negative. The Soviet delegate insisted once again on a horse trade. He would not permit the admission of nine nations deemed qualified by the General Assembly unless the Council admitted five Soviet-sponsored applicants who could not otherwise get the necessary number of votes. In addition, the Soviet representative vetoed the newly presented applications of Cambodia, Laos, Libya, Japan, and Vietnam, nations, which in the opinion of my Government, are peace-loving states and fully qualified for membership. The 10 other members of the Council voted to admit these states.

So much for the review of the record. Where do matters stand today? Fourteen nations that should be among us are barred from taking their seats. In more than 2 years, not a single new member has been admitted to the United Nations.

Now, certainly, this is a deplorable situation. It is one that inevitably tests our patience. Soviet abuse of the veto on membership applications is only one phase of the Kremlin's deliberate obstruction of any progress in the United Nations and, in fact, of any progress toward true peace. But, because the proper solution of the membership problem is so vital to the growth of the United Nations, we cannot afford to give way to impatience. We cannot afford to adopt a course of action that we might well regret later.

Of course, we must break out of the impasse in which we find ourselves. But we must do so in a way that is fully in accord with the provisions of the Charter.

And this raises the question: Have we explored

every possibility that might lead to a solution of this problem? At the present time, there are a number of specific courses of action that have been suggested as a way of ending the deadlock. Let us review some of them briefly.

Courses of Action for Ending the Deadlock

The suggestion has been made that we might ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on this question: Does the negative vote of a permanent member of the Security Council defeat an application for membership when the application has received seven or more votes in the Council? In 1950 the International Court of Justice held that an affirmative recommendation in the Council was required before the General Assembly could admit an applicant. But that opinion does not directly answer the question as to whether a negative vote cast in such circumstances is a veto.

The distinguished representative of Peru has introduced a resolution recommending another course of action.² Under his proposal, when seven or more Council members, including the permanent members, have given an applicant their vote, the Assembly is entitled to conclude that the Council has made a favorable recommendation. The Peruvian delegate argues that this has already happened, for example, in the case of Italy. In the past, Italy has always received more than seven affirmative votes in the Council when its applications have been considered separately. The Soviet Union voted for Italy's admission under the package deal. Consequently, the Peruvian delegate argues, Italy has received a favorable recommendation from the Council, notwithstanding the five Soviet vetoes cast against Italy when its application received individual consideration. And therefore the ingenious argument runs that the General Assembly can vote to admit Italy or any one of the nine nations for whom the Soviet delegate on the Security Council has voted under the package deal.

Still another suggestion on the membership question is made in the proposal introduced by the delegations of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.³ By this draft resolution the General Assembly would decide for itself that the veto does not apply in membership cases. According to this theory, when the Security Council has cast seven affirmative votes for an applicant, the Assembly can proceed to admit the applicant.

Then of course there is the well-known Soviet package deal: This would involve the admission of five applicants sponsored by the U.S.S.R. as the price of admission for nine other applicants deemed qualified by the General Assembly.

Another suggestion has emerged from the conclusions of the study of the Interim Committee on

² U.N. doc. A/AC.61/L.30 dated Dec. 8.

³ U.N. doc. A/AC.61/L.31 dated Dec. 10.

voting in the Security Council. The permanent members of the Council should agree voluntarily to renounce the use of the veto on admission to U.N. membership.

And, finally, there are those who feel it is time to come to grips with the problem by amending the Charter.

These are some of the suggestions that have been made. There are, I am sure, still others. The suggested avenues of approach to this problem reveal serious disagreements. Some of the suggestions seem to us highly dangerous and raise grave constitutional issues.

Under the circumstances my Government sees great merit in the draft resolution presented by the five Central American delegations.⁴ This resolution would create a Special Committee which would make an exhaustive study of the membership problem. The approach is similar to that followed by the Interim Committee in 1948, when it established a special group to study the problem of voting in the Security Council. While not all the results of that study have yet borne fruit, it was, in the opinion of my Government, a very constructive piece of work. The results of the efforts of a similar group on the membership problem should be of even greater utility to the United Nations.

We are now approaching the end of a session. In the General Assembly's debates on the membership problem, we have reached, it seems plain, a delicate point where hasty or ill-considered action, born of impatience, may have unfortunate results.

What we need is a careful, unhurried objective exploration of every aspect of this problem. We need to put our heads together and draw upon our collective wisdom, undisturbed by the pressure of time or the charged atmosphere of the Assembly.

For these reasons my Government supports wholeheartedly the draft resolution of the five Central American delegations providing for inter-sessional study of the problem. We pledge our utmost cooperation in this study if the Assembly votes to undertake it. And let us hope that from the labors of an intersessional committee may emerge the elements of a solution, satisfactory to all. With a will to unite our efforts and with the help of divine guidance, may the nations move forward on the road to peace!

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 17⁵

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 16

I should like to comment on the remarks made during the course of this debate by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland. I should also like to speak in support of the draft resolu-

⁴ U.N. doc. A/AC. 61/L.32 dated Dec. 10. The five Central American delegations referred to are Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

⁵ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Dec. 17.

tions contained in documents L.37, L.38, L.39, and L.40. By these resolutions, the General Assembly would determine that Japan, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are peace-loving states within the meaning of article 4 of the Charter: That they are willing and able to carry out the obligations of the Charter and should therefore be admitted to the United Nations.

Let me begin by saying once again that my Government believes in the goal of universality of membership. We look forward to the day when every candidate will meet the qualifications set forth in article 4 of the Charter. In the view of my Government, the following 14 applicants are peace-loving states: Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Japan, the Kingdom of Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Republic of Korea, and Vietnam.

They are willing and able to carry out the obligations for membership contained in the Charter. They would be among us today, if it were not for the shocking abuse of the veto by one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

How, let us ask, does this permanent member—the Soviet Union—justify its consistently obstructive policy? We have once again heard from the Soviet and Polish representatives the familiar charge that the Security Council and, in particular, the United States have discriminated unfairly against five applicants supported by the Soviet Union. The Soviet representative demands their admission as the price for agreeing to the admission of the qualified applicants. Otherwise, he tells us—no deal.

I cannot find adequate words to describe the Soviet proposal. It is nothing less than an attempt at hold-up. In effect, the Soviet representative says: Pay me the tribute I demand or you go no further.

Is there any substance to the Soviet charge of discrimination against their candidates for membership? The facts will show that this is just another example of Soviet double talk. The facts will also show that all 14 of the qualified applicants to which I have referred have received more than the seven votes required in the Security Council. One vote and one vote alone—the Soviet veto—has kept them out of the United Nations. If this is not discrimination, I should like to know what the word means.

On the other hand, when the 5 Soviet-sponsored states submitted their applications to the judgment of this organization, what was the result? None has ever been able to secure the required number of favorable votes in the Security Council. The General Assembly has never found a single one of them qualified for membership.

These repeated findings of the General Assembly do not impress the Soviet delegate. He speaks of blocs of votes which the United States allegedly controls. We hear of mechanical majorities which the United States can muster as it pleases.

A Calculated Insult

The Soviet delegate's remarks are a calculated insult to the vast majority of delegates in this room. Let the Soviet delegate inspect the voting record of the Assembly. He will find no mechanical voting here. On every issue, the great majority of representatives vote their convictions. My Government, happily, has often found itself in agreement with the majority. It has also been outvoted. Does this record substantiate the charge of the Soviet delegate?

Has it ever occurred to the Soviet delegate that when 54 nations vote for peace in Korea it is because they sincerely want to end the bloodshed? Has it ever occurred to him that when the vast majority of this organization is in substantial agreement on an issue, and only the Soviet bloc is in opposition, it is because the majority is right and the Soviet bloc is wrong? Has it ever occurred to him that men of different nations, races and creeds can agree out of sincere conviction and not because they are forced to agree?

Unfortunately, the Soviet delegate judges others on the basis of his own experience and the practices of his Government. He imputes to others the motives which inspire Soviet actions.

If there is any mechanical voting in this organization, it is the voting record of a mechanical minority of five nations led by the Soviet Union. Show me one instance where the Soviet delegate has voted yes, and his camp followers have voted no. When Mr. Gromyko sings pianissimo, a soft echo is heard from the other members of the Soviet bloc. And when the Soviet representative roars fortissimo, thunder is heard from the rest of the chorus. He calls the tune, the others dance. And woe betide the unlucky one who falls out of step.

In his speech on Monday, the Soviet delegate took it upon himself to criticize my diplomatic manners. I found this interesting, coming from the representative of the Soviet Union. I could not help recalling that it was the Soviet Government which cracked the whip on Czechoslovakia when that unfortunate country dared to announce its acceptance of Marshall Plan aid before hearing from Moscow. Publicly humiliated, the Czech Government had to back out under the Kremlin's orders. How many times have Czechoslovakia and other countries felt by harsh experience the rude methods of Soviet diplomacy? How often have they experienced threatening Soviet declarations, blockades that endangered peace, walkouts from international meetings, the use of Soviet military force to coerce compliant conduct from a peaceful neighbor? I need not rehearse the long sorry record of Soviet diplomacy.

The qualifications for membership in this great organization are set forth in the Charter in unequivocal terms: Article 4, paragraph 1, provides that membership is open to all peace-loving states that accept the obligations of the Charter, and,

in the judgment of this Organization, are able and willing to carry them out.

Article 1 describes the purposes of the United Nations in specific language. Let me recall some of them: To develop friendly relations among nations; to promote and encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to settle disputes that might lead to a breach of the peace in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.

How, we may ask, does the behavior of the regimes sponsored by the Soviet Union square with the obligations of membership and purposes of the United Nations? The record speaks for itself. It is a damning record.

To dispose quickly of one of the applicants—Outer Mongolia—let me say that so far as most of us here are concerned it is a phantom state. Certainly it has never demonstrated the slightest capacity to play the normal role of a sovereign state in the international community. What of the others? Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. Here, too, the record is clear.

Support for Aggression in Korea

All of these states have rendered at least moral support to Communist aggression in Korea. All have waged the most open and virulent kind of hate propaganda against the free world. All of them defied the efforts of the General Assembly to end the guerrilla war in Greece. All refused to cooperate in repatriating Greek children, a heartless act which this Committee has condemned. They have waged and continue to wage a war of nerves against Yugoslavia, a member of the United Nations. They have molested foreign diplomats and imprisoned foreign citizens on false charges.

Let me now turn to another page of the record. As we all know, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania are bound by the provisions of their peace treaties to protect and safeguard human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and public meeting. How have the regimes in power in these three Balkan countries lived up to their solemn obligations?

Once again, the record is clear. In each country a ruthless minority—directed from Moscow—has seized power through force, terror, and intimidation. This minority has maintained itself in power by cruelly suppressing every fundamental right and essential freedom in open defiance of the express provisions of the peace treaties. Leaders of opposition political parties have been liquidated; their parties suppressed. Religious organizations have been destroyed or taken over by the state. Religious leaders have been martyred and replaced by stooges obedient to the regimes in power. Freedom of expression, of press, publication, and public meeting no longer exist. Politi-

cal dissent has been snuffed out. Freedom of worship has been curtailed or subverted. The trade-unions have been transformed into servile instruments of the state. The judiciary has been perverted into a weapon of injustice. Arbitrary arrest, deportation, imprisonment, and forced labor are common practices. People are seized, taken from their homes at night, and never heard of again. Over every man, woman, and child hovers the evil shadow of the secret police.

Such is a summary description of the sinister course of events which has transformed Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania into police states. Time does not permit me to trace, step by step, the way this tragic transformation took place in the course of 2 or 3 years. Instead, let me call the roll of honor of three of the outstanding heroes who resisted the tyrants and who paid heavily for their resistance:

Nicolay Petkov, great Bulgarian patriot. All his life he fought tyranny. Executed by the Communists.

Juliu Maniu, beloved peasant leader of Rumania. He devoted himself to bettering the conditions of the Rumanian peasants. Sentenced to life imprisonment by the Communists.

Cardinal Mindszenty, first Catholic of Hungary. Faithful to his Lord, he refused to submit to the dictates of a Communist Caesar. Sentenced to life imprisonment.

These are but a few of the heroic victims of Communist violence and oppression whose names we know. But what of the others . . . the nameless millions in all these three countries who have never accepted the dictatorships that rule them? They suffer in silence and wait patiently for their torment to end. For them we have the most heartfelt sympathy and friendship.

The Polish and Soviet delegates gave us a highly lyrical account of the peaceful reconstruction, as they put it, taking place in the so-called People's Democracies whose admission they favor. As they spoke, the following thought occurred to me: If their accounts are true, then the peoples of these countries must enthusiastically support regimes so devoted to their welfare and happiness. Why then, why, I ask, have human rights been so ruthlessly suppressed in all these countries? Why isn't there freedom of press and opinion? Why cannot the people worship God as they choose? Why are not opposition political parties permitted to exist? Surely, if the regimes in power are as benevolent as the Polish representative said, they would have nothing to fear from permitting the exercise of such freedoms. And surely, too, they would have nothing to fear from lifting the Iron Curtain which walls their countries off from the free world. They would permit citizens from the free world to visit these

so-called earthly paradises. They would be only too happy to permit their own citizens to travel freely abroad and to see for themselves how lucky they are to live in the People's Democracies. After all, in what the Soviet-bloc representative would term a decadent democracy like the United States, hundreds of thousands of citizens travel abroad every year and hundreds of thousands of foreigners enter the country every year.

Fear of Possible Comparisons

Could it be that the Soviet-bloc Communist regimes do not permit this because they are afraid? Afraid that if they permitted their citizens to travel freely abroad, too many of them would not return? Can it be that they fear the comparisons their people would make between the life in the free world and life at home? Can it be that if they permitted human rights to flourish within their borders, they would be thrown out of power forthwith?

This is what I suspect. And I suspect it not merely because there would otherwise be no way of explaining their obvious fear of giving their people freedom of speech, press, religious worship and political opinion. I suspect it for another very good reason: for the evidence they themselves give us when they are not talking for propaganda consumption.

The Polish delegate gave us a glowing description of events in Rumania. Does he think we are utterly naive? Only a few months ago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in that country—Ana Pauker—one of the veteran leaders of world communism was purged along with a host of other important officials. They have not yet been brought to trial. Presumably their confessions are being prepared for them, and this takes time. But in justification of the purge, we are told by official propaganda that these high officials were responsible for every kind of sabotage, responsible indeed for bringing Rumania to the verge of economic crisis.

And this is only one example—Bulgaria and Hungary and the other countries of the Soviet bloc have been torn by similar purges.

Now I do not presume to pass judgment on the victims of Soviet-style justice or injustice. But I raise this dilemma. Either the victims of these purges are guilty or not guilty. If they are guilty, what are we to say of a system which claims to be so progressive and yet is torn periodically by convulsions in which trusted and lifelong Communist leaders admit to the blackest crimes? And if they are not guilty, what are we to say of a system in which justice is so tortured as to produce these ghastly frame-ups?

In either case the periodic upheavals in the so-called People's Democracies, and the justifications offered for them, do not substantiate the poetic accounts which the Polish and Soviet representatives offered for our consumption.

Peace Treaty Violations

Let me turn now to a problem which has concerned past assemblies—the problem of the violations of the human rights provisions of the peace treaties by the regimes of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Disturbed by these violations in 1949, my Government invoked the dispute-settlement clauses of the treaties. A number of other treaty signatories did likewise. We called upon the Communist regimes concerned to join in establishing commissions to settle the disputes. All three countries refused.

I shall not attempt to describe our patient efforts to settle these differences. The General Assembly repeatedly endorsed and encouraged these efforts. It expressed its deep concern over the problem and did its best to bring the disputes to the judgment of a settlement commission. The International Court of Justice held that a dispute between the three Balkan states and the other treaty signatories existed and that the Balkan countries were required, under the provisions of the peace treaties, to appoint representatives to a settlement commission.

What were the results? The Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian regimes flouted the repeated recommendations of the General Assembly and ignored the advisory opinion of the Court. They never appointed representatives to a settlement commission, or even admitted the existence of a dispute. The General Assembly finally condemned by an overwhelming majority the refusal of these three countries to abide by the provisions of the peace treaties.

Mr. Chairman: Against the background of this record, I think it is fair to ask—

Can the Soviet-sponsored applicants honestly pledge to uphold the Charter when they have so consistently acted contrary to its principles?

Can the Charter be anything more to them than a scrap of paper?

And, finally, to turn to a related aspect of this problem—what are we to say of the deplorable voting record of the Soviet Union in the long history of the membership problem?

At San Francisco, remember, it was agreed that important decisions of the Security Council should require the unanimous vote of the permanent members. They assured their colleagues that they would solemnly accept the trust reposed in them and not use the veto power willfully. The veto, in other words, was to be used in very exceptional cases. With the Soviet Government, the exception became the rule.

In his speech on Monday, Mr. Gromyko made a very revealing statement on the Soviet attitude toward the veto. He said, and I quote:

I should like to point out that the way in which any State utilizes its so-called power of veto is entirely up to that State to use as it sees fit in accordance with its policies and principles.

Now let us consider well what Mr. Gromyko said. In effect, he is telling us that the Soviet Government is not bound in the slightest by the principles and purposes of the Charter. It will use the veto as it sees fit, irrespective of these principles and purposes. If the Soviet regime abuses its privileged vote, so much the worse for the other members of the Security Council who abide by the obligations of the Charter. So much the worse too, for any opinions of the International Court of Justice. Were the Czars ever more arbitrary or capricious?

On 55 separate occasions, Soviet representatives have cast vetoes to obstruct the will of the majority of the Security Council and to frustrate the work of this organization. In the membership question alone, Soviet representatives cast 28 vetoes. The great Italian Nation was five times a victim of the veto.

Some Important Soviet Vetoes

What about the other vetoes? Let me call the roll of some of the most important:

Efforts to bring to an end Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea . . . three vetoes.

Efforts to secure international control and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the reduction, limitation and control of conventional armaments . . . four vetoes.

The request for an impartial investigation of Communist germ warfare charges . . . two vetoes.

Efforts to mediate the fighting in Greece, instigated by Moscow and carried on by Communist guerrillas . . . six vetoes.

Efforts to end the dangerous situation caused by the Soviet blockade of Berlin . . . one veto.

Inquiry into the Soviet employment of duress in the overthrow of the democratic Beneš-Masaryk Government of Czechoslovakia . . . 2 vetoes.

Mediation of the war between Indonesia and the Netherlands . . . 3 vetoes.

This is a roll call of some of the most important Soviet vetoes. It is a roll call of obstruction of the Security Council's efforts to resolve tensions and promote peace.

And, unhappily, this attitude is only part of the picture. The obstructive tactics employed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council are mirrored by similar tactics in the General Assembly. They are mirrored in the Soviet attitude toward the specialized agencies of the United Nations. The Soviet regime has refused to participate in or cooperate with such humanitarian bodies as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and almost all the other specialized agencies.

What has become of the bright hopes and visions of 7 years ago? When this Organization came

into being at San Francisco, mankind had just passed through a terrible war. The cry was for peace and a better world.

We all felt sure then that this cry would be answered. The American people trusted the purposes of the Soviet Government. Had we not worked together to defeat Nazi aggression? Had we not responded to the Soviet appeal for aid in their hour of peril by giving lavishly of our substance and the blood of our youth?

We hoped, that the Soviet regime would recognize the good will of the American people. We hoped that in the postwar years it would permit the Russian people to respond to the friendship and admiration of the American people. We hoped that out of an alliance sealed in blood, there would arise a peaceful world.

These hopes were cruelly deceived. The visions of a brighter world that mankind dreamed of have faded. The Soviet regime cut its people off from contact with their American friends. It took the path of aggression against its former allies in the free world. As a result, instead of devoting all our energies to peaceful reconstruction, we have had to rearm to defend ourselves. We have had to unite with other free nations in such regional security organizations as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We have had to devote to the defense of peace—sweat, toil, and wealth that could be so much more fruitfully applied to creating a better world.

Today, when I look at the record of Soviet vetoes in the Security Council, and indeed at the whole of Soviet policy in international affairs, I ask myself: What is the Soviet regime trying to do? Is the Soviet Union trying to kill the United Nations? What are the Soviet purposes in regard to this Organization?

I wish I could be an optimist: I wish I could believe that the policies of the Soviet Government and the applicants it has sponsored are based on simple errors of judgment; that they are not part of a calculated design. Unfortunately, I cannot.

The Cominform leaders are fanatically convinced that everything they do is right. They are imbued with the belief, and have repeatedly stated it in their most important theoretical works, that the peaceful coexistence of the Communist and non-Communist worlds is in the long run impossible. They are dedicated to a doctrine which demands the overthrow of the non-Soviet world by subversion or violence. They are in absolute control of public opinion in their own countries. They make promises not to keep them. They sign treaties and proceed to break them. They are in Lenin's words ready and willing "to agree to any sacrifice" and to "resort to any stratagem and maneuver and illegal methods" in order to advance the Soviet cause of world domination.

Let me now address myself to an agreeable task. I wish to speak for a few minutes in support of the draft resolution contained in document L37.

Under this resolution the General Assembly would determine that Japan is, in its judgment, a peace-loving state within the meaning of article 4 of the Charter; that it is able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter and should therefore be admitted to the United Nations. This resolution would also request the Security Council to take note of Japan's application in the light of the Assembly's determination. In 1945, immediately after conclusion of hostilities the Japanese people and Government, under the Allied Occupation, set out to build a new peace-loving and democratic nation. They undertook this task with a vivid memory of the destruction that war entails. Defeat in war and the subsequent occupation rid Japan of its militaristic masters. It did more: It created a climate favorable to the growth of democratic principles and institutions. The enthusiasm with which the Japanese people have participated in the political affairs of their country is evidence of their dedication to peaceful advancement.

On April 28, 1952, Japan formally reentered the society of nations. This was the date of the entry into effect of the peace treaty which was signed a little over a year ago at San Francisco by 48 nations. Already over 30 nations have entered into or resumed full diplomatic relations with Japan on the basis of sovereign equality. In the preamble of this treaty, Japan recorded intentions and aspirations welcomed by the whole world. It declared its "intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. . . ."

In article 5 of the treaty, Japan accepted the obligations of article 2 of the Charter, in particular the obligations to settle its disputes by peaceful means, to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force; and to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter.

On June 23, 1952, Japan filed its application for membership in the United Nations. In the letter of application, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, and I quote: "The Japanese people have an earnest desire to participate in the work of the United Nations and to utilize the purposes and principles of the Charter as a guide to the conduct of their affairs. There exists among the Japanese people nation-wide sympathy with the objectives of the United Nations to foster international peace and cooperation among nations. The Government of Japan is eager to apply for membership in the United Nations, therefore, and will undertake to fulfill the obligations of membership in the Organization by all means at its disposal."

The United States was proud to submit to the Security Council a proposal that Japan be admitted to membership. This proposal was voted

upon last September and received 10 votes in favor to 1 opposed. We deeply regret that the Soviet Union again chose to block the will of every other member of the Council by casting a veto.

However, in the opinion of the United States and of every member of the Security Council, save the Soviet Union, there is no question but that Japan is willing and able to carry out the obligations of the Charter. The fact that Japan has already cooperated with the United Nations in many areas is ample demonstration of Japan's sincerity and ability. Japan is a responsible member of most of the specialized agencies of the United Nations: the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and others. Recently, Japan became an associate member of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

Japan's interest in the ideals and objectives of the United Nations is by no means confined to governmental circles. The work of the United Nations and its specialized agencies is a matter of wide popular interest in cities, towns, and villages throughout Japan. The Japanese people have made sizable contributions to the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund. Over 300,000 Japanese citizens signed a petition requesting the admission of their nation into the United Nations. This petition was recently submitted to the Secretary-General.

Surely Japan's indications of intention backed up by demonstrated performance leave no room for doubt as to her ability and the firmness of her desire to carry out the obligations imposed by membership in the United Nations. The United States believes that it would be a great advantage for the United Nations to have in its midst this great nation, which has once more become a friendly independent member of international society. It would be no less an advantage to Japan. Its admission would provide Japan with a further stimulus to continue the positive contributions it is already making to the United Nations.

As I said before, were it not for the Soviet veto, the General Assembly would already have before it a favorable recommendation on Japan's candidacy. Under the circumstances, it seems to me that the least this Assembly can do is to go on record as determining that Japan is qualified for membership and requesting the Security Council to take note of Japan's application in the light of this determination.

The General Assembly has already given such endorsements to all ten qualified states who have received more than the required number of votes in the Security Council but who have been barred by the Soviet veto. Since the Japanese application was filed only last June, this is the first time the Assembly has had the opportunity to render

its judgment on Japan's qualifications. Not to do so at this time would be an act of unwarranted discrimination.

The same thing, I hasten to add, should be said for the candidacies of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, also filed this year. Like Japan, they would already have received a favorable Security Council recommendation except for the Soviet veto. I need not speak at any length in support of Assembly action determining that they are qualified for membership. The French delegation has sponsored draft resolutions in support of the applications of these three States and has described to us their qualifications. We support these draft resolutions wholeheartedly.

The basic accords leading to the independence of these three States were signed between them and France in 1949. Early in 1950 other free nations took notice of the newly reestablished status of these countries. Since that time recognition has been accorded by 33 sovereign States. The recognition has been strengthened through reciprocal establishment of legations and embassies by the Associated States and other powers. The three States have participated in a number of international conferences and have adhered to international regulatory conventions. They have already joined many of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. General Assembly endorsement would provide a heartening stimulus for beleaguered peoples fighting desperately for their independence against those aggressive organizations seeking to overthrow the legal governments.

Let me make it clear that I am urging the General Assembly to endorse the applications of Japan and the Associated States of Indochina at this session. There should be no confusion over our support of such action now and our support for an intersessional study by a special committee where the more complicated problems involved in a solution of the membership deadlock would be studied. General Assembly endorsement of the qualifications of the four new applicants would merely be consistent with the Assembly's findings in the case of 10 other nations that it has found qualified for membership and bring the record up to date. This action does not need further study, nor would it prejudice the contemplated Assembly committee study in any way.

As for the resolutions before us proposing different solutions of the membership impasse, I can only repeat what I have said in my opening speech on this subject. We are now in the last week of the present session. The debates we have heard demonstrate a large measure of disagreement over the appropriate course of action to pursue. Solution is vital. Hasty action would be dangerous. What we need is a careful, unhurried exploration of every aspect of this problem, undisturbed by the pressure of time or the charged atmosphere of the Assembly.

Therefore, my Government renews its support

of the draft resolution of the five Central American delegations providing for intersessional study of the problem. We pledge our utmost cooperation in this study if the Assembly votes to under-

take it. And, working loyally with the other members of the study group, we shall do our best to break the deadlock in which our organization now finds itself.

U. N. Deliberations on Draft Convention on the Political Rights of Women

*Statements by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
U. S. Representative to the General Assembly*

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 12¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 12

As most of you know, the subject of this convention—equal suffrage for women—is very close to my heart. I believe in active citizenship, for men and women equally, as a simple matter of right and justice. I believe we will have better government in all of our countries when men and women discuss public issues together and make their decisions on the basis of their differing areas of experience and their common concern for the welfare of their families and their world.

In the United States, and in most countries today, women have equal suffrage. Some may feel that for that reason this convention is of little importance to them. I do not agree with this view. It is true, of course, that the first objective of this convention is to encourage equal political rights for women in all countries. But its significance reaches far deeper into the real issue of whether in fact women are recognized fully in setting the policies of our governments.

While it is true that women in 45 of our 60 member nations vote on the same terms as men, and in 7 more already have partial voting rights, too often the great decisions are originated and given form in bodies made up wholly of men, or so com-

pletely dominated by them that whatever of special value women have to offer is shunted aside without expression. Even in countries where for many years women have voted and been eligible for public office, there are still too few women serving in positions of real leadership. I am not talking now in terms of paper parliaments and honorary appointments. Neither am I talking about any such artificial balance as would be implied in a 50-50, or a 40-60 division of public offices. What I am talking about is whether women are sharing in the direction of the policy making in their countries; whether they have opportunities to serve as chairmen of important committees and as cabinet ministers and delegates to the United Nations.

We are moving forward in my country in this regard, for we have had women in all these posts, but not enough of them, and they do not always have a full voice in consultation. I do not expect that there will ever be as many women political leaders as men, for most women are needed in their homes while their children are small and have fewer years in which to gain public recognition. But, if we are honest with ourselves, we know that all countries have a long way to go on these matters. I believe it is this situation, far more than the continued denial of equal suffrage in a few countries, which has spurred interest in this convention and brought it before our Committee today. This situation cannot be changed entirely by law, but it can be changed by determination and conviction. I hope we will use this discussion to deepen these convictions in ourselves and in our governments.

This convention is the result of work in the

¹Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on the item "Draft Convention on the Political Rights of Women." For text of the operative paragraphs of the draft, see BULLETIN of Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1046. The Committee approved the draft on Dec. 17. In plenary session on Dec. 20 the General Assembly amended the convention and voted to open it for signature after the end of its present session.

Commission on the Status of Women. The United States is proud of the contribution it has been able to make to this Commission through the participation of our representatives, Judge Dorothy Kenyon and Mrs. Olive Goldman.

The terms of the draft convention before us are simple. Articles 1 and 2 provide for the right to vote and to be elected to publicly elected bodies, such as parliaments, established by national law. These are the basic rights which all people must have to express their interest and protect themselves against discrimination or deprivation of liberty. The Charter of the United Nations reaffirms in its preamble the principle of equal rights for men and women. The first General Assembly endorsed these rights when it unanimously adopted the resolution recommending that all member states, which had not already done so, adopt measures necessary to fulfill the purposes and aims of the Charter in this respect by granting to women the same political rights as men. This convention spells out this recommendation in clear and practical terms, on which all parties in a country can unite.

I think I am correct in saying that 24 countries have taken action to extend suffrage rights for women since the Charter was signed in 1945. The most recent of these changes have been in Lebanon and Bolivia—so recent that they are not included in the Secretary-General's excellent memorandum analyzing the record of women's suffrage in 1952.² Important gains have been made within the past few years in a number of other countries—Greece, for instance, and in Haiti.

Article 3 of this convention goes beyond the basic rights in articles 1 and 2 into the matter of public office. It provides that women shall be entitled to hold public office established by national law on the same terms as men, and to exercise all public functions in the same way. The object of this article—to encourage opportunities for women in government service—has my hearty endorsement, and that of my Government. Women today hold many important Government posts and an increasing number are in executive positions and in Foreign Service. The wording of article 3 presents certain problems that I believe we should discuss, and in a moment I will go into them in more detail. In principle, however, I am sure we are all in agreement with article 3.

We are also asked to consider formal clauses to complete the convention, on the basis of texts proposed by the Secretary-General. The United States is in general agreement also with these proposals. This is a very simple convention, and it would seem to us that the formal clauses should be limited to the fewest necessary to make the convention effective. These would presumably be those providing for ratification or accession,

entry into force, settlement of disputes, notification, and deposit. The Secretariat has proposed certain other clauses which, of course, can be included if the Committee desires, but they do not seem to me to be essential. The simpler and shorter we can keep this convention, the more readily people will understand it and the more effective it will be.

There are other questions we will no doubt want to debate in regard to this convention. I hope, however, that in our debates we will never lose sight of the significance and importance of our objectives.

Now I want to go back to article 3. This is a very interesting article, for the right to "hold public office" includes both elective and appointive office. The right to be *elected* to public office has usually been recognized along with the right to vote. For instance, the Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, formulated at Bogotá in 1948, includes the right to vote and to be elected to national office. Article 2 of this convention covers a part of this right, the right to be elected to such bodies as parliaments. However, the right to be *appointed* to public office has not previously been included in an international convention, so that we are now considering its expression in treaty terms for the first time.

In relation to appointive office, the language in article 3 is very broad.

The term "public office" is taken to include appointments to posts in the (1) civil service, (2) foreign (diplomatic) service, and (3) judiciary, as well as (4) posts primarily political in nature, such as cabinet ministers or secretaries. The number of appointive offices established by national law is usually large, far larger than the number of offices filled by election, and the tasks to be performed by appointive officers are likely to vary widely in substance and in level of responsibility.

Article 3 specifies offices are to be held "on equal terms with men." This is also an inclusive phrase, covering such matters as recruitment, exemptions, pay, old age and retirement benefits, opportunities for promotion, employment of married women. All these are important matters on which women have sought equality for many years.

As I said before, in the United States women have the rights specified in this convention, including the rights we believe article 3 is intended to cover, and we have long urged that women in all countries have similar opportunities. A question does arise, however, as to whether the term "public office" is intended to include military service. My delegation believes it is not so intended. Almost all countries make some distinctions in the kinds of military duty they regard as suitable for women. The most usual distinction, and a natural and proper one, is that women are not used as combat troops and are not appointed to certain posts

² U.N. doc. A/2154 dated August 13.

which might involve the direction of combat operations. Our attitude toward article 3 is, therefore, based on the understanding that it does not include military service.

The United States also has some difficulty with the phrase "public functions," which occurs in the second part of article 3. The U.S. law "Public Office" covers all public posts and this may be true in other countries. The term "public functions" accordingly does not seem to add anything to the text. The phrase might be clarified, however, if the words "related thereto" were inserted after "public functions." This would make it quite clear that no traditional or legal limitation on women in any country, such as restrictions on a woman's right to serve in certain professions or to bring suits at law would interfere with her capacity to serve in public office.

If the phrase is retained in its present form, the view of the United States would be that the public functions referred to in this convention are co-terminous with public office.

This convention on political rights of women is not in itself an answer to the problems of modern government. But it points up, I believe in useful ways, how governments can expand their resources by taking full advantage of the energy and experience of their women citizens. Women's organizations throughout the United States have stated their belief in its principles and its value. The convention is a symbol of the progress women have made in the past 100 years, and a challenge to them to claim and make full use of the political rights they achieve. It is for these reasons that the United States hopes that this Committee may agree on a text to which we can give unanimous endorsement.

STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 15³

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 15

I want first to say just a little about the statements which the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union and several of her colleagues have made on the situation of women in the United States. These delegates seem concerned, for instance, that in most of our States women share the domicile of their husbands and vote from it as their legal residence. Of course, this is true also of the men; their legal residence is the family domicile shared by their wives. In the United States we assume that husbands and wives wish to live together, and we protect their right to do so, and to share in the management of family affairs and the guardianship of their children. If the woman desires to be separated from her husband, she can set up a separate domicile. The courts also decide how best to protect the welfare of children

³ Made in Committee III on Dec. 15 in answer to Soviet charges of U.S. discrimination against women, and on proposed amendments to the draft convention on political rights of women.

of separated couples, and unless there is good reason to the contrary, the mother is almost always preferred to take care of young children.

A great many of the other comments which have been made seem to spring from the same source—a difference of opinion, really, as to the importance of the family in all our relationships, including our responsibilities as individuals toward our governments. We were struck, for instance, with the distinction the distinguished delegate of Byelorussia made Saturday afternoon. She said, I believe, that one of the great values in the provision of crèches and nursery schools in the Soviet Union was that it permitted a woman to fulfill her role as mother and at the same time share in the public life of her country. We do not think of the "role of mother" in our country as separating women or denying women a full share in our public life. We feel rather that it is the family which is the center for men and women alike, and for their children, and we try to make it possible for the father of the family to earn enough so that the woman can stay home and care for their children if she wishes. At the same time, as you all know, American women participate fully in all professions and public activities, and more than half our employed women are married women.

Our family relationships result in a number of legal and judicial distinctions which limit the husband as well as the wife. Our laws are changed if these distinctions become unjust to either party, and changing conditions, particularly in modern business, have led to various changes. But the family is still the center of American living.

I am puzzled by certain other comments that have been made because, so far as I can see, what my Soviet colleagues wish us to do is to discriminate against men.

For instance, people in the United States speak many languages. Here in New York you will hear many different languages in the streets and restaurants. In some of our States, however, one seldom hears any language but English. In those States, voters are usually required to be literate in English. But in others—for instance, our Southwestern States, where Spanish is frequently spoken—voters may qualify in either language. In our courts, interpreters are always provided for those who cannot speak or understand English. In no case is there discrimination against women as such.

The distinguished representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet countries have spoken also of the situation of Negro voters in the United States. As you know, great progress has been made in recent years in assuring Negro voters full security in casting their votes. Many more Negroes voted in this past election than ever before in our Southern States as well as Northern. The figures these delegations quoted seemed to be somewhat out of date in this regard. It was implied that the difficulty Negro women have experienced

in regard to suffrage is connected with the existence of a poll tax in some of our Southern States. The poll tax is a per capita tax, once usual in many countries, but it is now being replaced almost everywhere by other forms of taxation. It now exists in only five of our States. It applies equally to all people, whites as well as Negroes. However, since it applies equally to men and women, I do not see how any provision on the poll tax could be included in this convention without its resulting in discrimination against men.

I have been glad to hear that Soviet women hold many public offices and participate widely in public life. I have been glad to note this year that the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia have included women on their delegations to the General Assembly. There have been very few women on these delegations in the past—in fact, I do not recall any since the first General Assembly in 1946. I hope that this convention may lead to greater participation by women in the true organs of power in the Soviet Union, such as the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, in which I understand no women are now included. The experience women have achieved in the more formal and subsidiary bodies throughout the Soviet Union should entitle them to recognition also in bodies which determine the major policies of their Government.

The Soviet Union has brought in a number of amendments, and I want also to discuss these briefly. I understand those on the first three articles of the convention are similar to those presented in sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women and in the Economic Council. Both the Commission and the Council rejected the changes and additions in these proposals on the ground that they are unnecessary in so simple a convention as this one. I would like to point out, however, that the language proposed by the Soviet Union, presumably to assure application of this convention "without discrimination," is in fact very discriminatory, because it enumerates only a few grounds and omits others. The most notable omission is in regard to political opinion. The Soviet amendment also omits the phrase "without discrimination of any kind," which might otherwise cover "political opinion." It seems to me that in a convention on political rights, if you are going to provide any guaranties against discrimination, the most important one would be freedom for all types of political opinion. But, as I said before, the intent of this convention to apply to all women is entirely clear, and we believe any such

additional clause would be confusing and might in fact have the result—as the Soviet proposal does—of limiting its effect.

The proposal to expand article 2 by enumerating certain other bodies also seems unnecessary, since all those mentioned in the Soviet draft are included within the phrase "publicly elected bodies" already in article 2. Neither does it seem necessary to add their proposed article 4, calling for implementing legislation. In so simple an agreement as this, the convention itself is sufficient.

Another proposal has to do with the proposed clause on settlement of disputes and provides for arbitration rather than a reference to the International Court of Justice. The United States regards this proposal as a departure from the procedures already approved as part of our U.N. structure and will oppose it accordingly.

Several countries have proposed that the convention include a clause on the extension of the convention to non-self-governing and trust territories. Women in all territories under the administration of the United States have the rights in this convention, and we believe all women everywhere should have them. As I said earlier, this is a very simple convention, and the simpler and briefer we can keep the formal clauses, the easier it will be for people to understand it and the more effective it will be. However, the United States has no objection to the addition of such a clause, if the majority desire it. In this case, my delegation would prefer the Indian text in L. 333.

We have been listening with great care to the statements on this convention, because, you remember, the United States indicated in its statement that we do not believe the convention applies to military service, and asked whether that was the general opinion among the delegates. We, therefore, appreciated greatly the strong expression of agreement with our position by the distinguished delegate of France, and also various other statements which supported this view. I believe no contrary view has been expressed and take it there is general agreement that the present convention does not include military service. As I said earlier, the United States regards the obligation it would undertake under this convention with regard to "public functions" as coterminous with "public office."

I have not answered certain charges against the United States as to the economic situation of women—Negro women especially—because this is a convention on political rights, and I have not wanted to take the time of this Committee for irrelevant matters.

Challenge Presented by Moroccan Question

Statement by Philip C. Jessup

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 15

We come to this debate on Morocco with the advantage of having heard the long discussion that we have just completed on the kindred question of Tunisia.² I recall what the distinguished representative of Pakistan said in opening the Tunisian debate:

The two subjects [of Tunisia and Morocco] are perhaps symptomatic of the state of political and constitutional development at which we have arrived, and similar considerations apply to both of them. I may have to enter into some detail in submitting our observations on the Tunisian case, and it may not then be necessary to repeat those general observations and considerations when we come to discuss Morocco.

Certainly my own delegation does have the sense that we approach the present question from a more advanced point of general understanding of the points of view represented in this Committee. Therefore, with full regard for the importance of the problem of Morocco and with full respect for the sincere concern which motivated the proponents of this item, we feel justified in confining our statement largely to the arguments which are applicable specifically to Morocco.

There are of course significant differences between the two problems. We must recognize the distinctive characteristics of the peoples of the two ancient sovereign states of Tunisia and Morocco.

The racial pattern is more intricate in Morocco. The non-Moslem minorities are larger. The Moslem population is divided into two large and distinct ethnic groups. This pattern undoubtedly requires a high degree of statesmanship in order to achieve a system of self-government which will assure justice to all elements of the community.

In the political field, the treaty of Fez grants to the French far more extensive powers than do

the treaties of Le Bardo and La Marsa. Finally, the French Protectorate covers only a portion of the territory with the sovereign domain of the Sultan of Morocco, other states having legal rights and interests in other parts of that domain.

I shall not attempt to analyze the implications of these differences. Our attitude toward both questions—the question of Tunisia and the question of Morocco—has been determined by our belief that we cannot in this Committee usefully concern ourselves with specific problems which can only be solved in direct negotiation between the parties concerned.

We find ourselves again facing a question which relates to the fulfillment of national aspirations. We again have the problem of deciding what, if any, action by the General Assembly will be really helpful.

For the second time the problem is brought before us, not by one of the two states principally involved but by a group of 13 other states.³

Like the treaty of Le Bardo between France and Tunisia, the treaty of Fez between France and Morocco—which governs the relationship between these two sovereign states—is recognized as a valid international obligation.

We can hardly be surprised that treaties such as these, involving the closest relationship between two countries, the most complicated interplay of two administrative structures, and an intimate and long continued juxtaposition of two cultures, would present problems in their implementation. Both of these treaties establish not a static but an evolving relationship. When we consider that both treaties are dedicated not to the freezing of the *status quo* but to continuous progressive change through the development of free and vital national institutions, we are impressed once more

¹Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 15.

²For text of a statement by Ambassador Jessup on the Tunisian question, see BULLETIN of Dec. 22, 1952, p. 986.

³This group of 13 states includes Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

by the need for wisdom in the contacts between the parties.

The great English philosopher Alfred North Whitehead has said:

In a living civilization, there is always an element of unrest, for sensitiveness to ideas means curiosity, adventure, change. Civilized order survives on its merits and is transformed by its power of recognizing its imperfections.

In subscribing to treaties based on the principles of development, both parties have displayed the creative power of recognizing present imperfections and seeking to remedy them in an orderly fashion.

I believe I can accurately state that all of us, regardless of differences in our views, agree that it will be most beneficial to Tunisia, to Morocco, to France, and to world peace, if there is a situation in which these two protectorates progress steadily toward the fulfillment of their national aspirations.

To stress the area of agreement and to say that the problem before us is one of techniques is in no way to belittle the difficulties that remain. To achieve progress and change and at the same time to preserve order and justice is a fundamental challenge to the capacity of a civilization. We are confronted now by the same challenge that we have already faced in connection with the Tunisian question.

Many members of this Committee have expressed their deep concern over the recent outbreaks of violence in North Africa. Except for five delegations representing governments which are officially committed to a program of revolutionary violence and subversion, I believe all members of the Committee share this view. The Government of the United States deplors all resort to violence in which the cause of peace and progress must always lose more than it can gain. I believe we all agree that the cause of peace has lost a valuable supporter with the death of a great Tunisian patriot, Farhet Hached. This influential leader had been a steadfast advocate of the interests of the Tunisian people and had always publicly stated that he favored a policy of moderation. We hope that the spirit of moderation for which he stood will be the dominant spirit in Morocco and in Tunisia.

In appealing for calm in Morocco, we can do no better than to quote the words of His Majesty, the Sultan of Morocco. My delegation would certainly say a heartfelt "Amen" to his prayer that "God extend to us a reign of calm and peace so that a friendly and peaceful cooperation between the inhabitants of this country, and especially the French and Moroccans, may be achieved."

I cannot dwell on any aspects of the relations between France and Morocco without mentioning, in addition to the well-known profound friendship existing between France and the United States, the perhaps less well-known historic friendship

between the United States and Morocco. Morocco was one of the very first nations to recognize the independence of the United States and my country has never forgotten the friendship between ourselves and the people of Morocco. For this reason, we are particularly desirous that France and Morocco, with both of whom we are tied by the close bonds of history, may work out peacefully and rationally the differences which may exist between them.

In short, while there are similarities between the Tunisian and the Moroccan problems, the nature of the differences lead us to the conclusion that the Moroccan problem is more complex and requires very high statesmanship in its solution. Hasty and unsound moves would cause even more harm to the peoples of Morocco and France and to the people of the world.

The sense of urgency and the need for moderation are two themes that have been heard again and again in the two debates. Energy and ingenuity must be combined with patience and restraint if a happy resolution is to be found for the urgent problems now troubling Morocco.

Again, we cannot accept the plea that we distrust the sincerity of France. We say again, "We trust France and wish to support, and not in any way to make more difficult, the achievement of the high purposes to which France has pledged herself."

We have faith in the peoples and Governments of France and Morocco who must and will work out their destinies together.

Proposal To Invite Bey of Tunis To Send Spokesman to U. N.

*Statement by Philip C. Jessup
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 10

I am bound to say that the reasons which have been advanced by proponents of this item in favor of it seem to me to be arguments which lead my delegation to the conclusion that this invitation to His Highness the Bey of Tunis should not be extended. I would like to comment on several of the points which have been made.

For example, the distinguished representative of Iraq reminded us that His Highness the Bey is in treaty relations with France. That is true. Therefore, it seems to me we must look at the treaty and see what those treaty relations are. If one looks at article 6 of the treaty of Le Bardo, one finds in it that His Highness the Bey "*s'engage à ne conclure aucun acte ayant un caractère inter-*

¹ Made Dec. 10 in Committee I (Political and Security) on Pakistan's motion relating to participation by the Bey of Tunis in the debate on the Tunisian question. The motion was rejected later in the same session.

nationale”—conclude no act of an international character.

Now, I should suppose that no one could deny that if His Highness the Bey accredited a delegate to come to the United Nations to argue a question whether France has complied with its obligations under the treaty, or perhaps to contend that the treaty should be changed, that it was outmoded, or whatever his argument might be, that surely the act of His Highness would fall within this provision of the treaty. Therefore, if the Committee were to send this invitation to His Highness the Bey, it would in effect be asking him to violate his treaty obligations. I am sure that is a result which the Committee would not wish to bring about.

Now, I do not want to make a long legal argument, but I do think it is necessary, perhaps in anticipation of any attempted rebuttal of what I have said, to recall that the distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan [Sir Zafrullah Khan], in that very illuminating address which he made in behalf of his delegation here the other day, did refer to certain principles about the interpretation of treaties in connection with the treaties between France and Morocco. He did not advance these as his own view. He was reading from a document. However, there were suggestions, there were brief quotations from opinions of the old Permanent Court of International Justice to the effect that treaties should be interpreted according to certain legal maxims and that the result of the application of these maxims was to get an interpretation favorable to the position of Tunisia as against perhaps some other interpretation favorable to France.

That is of course a subject which has been much debated in juridical circles for a long time. Personally, I believe that it is well agreed and well supported by international jurisprudence and by doctrine that the whole basis of interpreting a treaty is to find out what the parties intended, what they were trying to do when they wrote these words into the treaty. Now, it may be said that the parties did not have in mind the question of the procedures of the United Nations and therefore did not cover that. Well, of course, they did not have it in mind in 1881. But who can doubt that, if they had been so farsighted as to contemplate an international organization, they would have thought that this provision would apply equally to international organizations as to bilateral international relations, and the spirit of the treaty, the spirit of the creation of the protectorate, is obviously along those lines.

I would not want to leave this just as a legal question. The distinguished representative of the Soviet Union has said that the extension of this invitation and action upon the invitation would give us valuable information. However, as I have tried to explain in the statement I made the other day on behalf of my delegation on this question, we are not concerned here, in my opinion,

in collecting a lot of information about Tunisia because we are not a court collecting evidence and trying to pass judgment on the basis of evidence. As far as information is concerned, I would recall that another distinguished representative of Pakistan in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, in connection with the so-called *apartheid* item and the Union of South Africa, said there is not a library in the world where any one who cares to read cannot obtain dozens of books written from all angles describing the situation in South Africa. That is equally true, of course, in regard to Tunisia, if we were engaged in the process of collecting all the available information.

The point was made even more emphatic by the representative of Egypt this morning who said that he thought that if a representative of the Bey came here he would present us important elements on which we could base our judgment. Well, now, it is precisely that point with which I must differ as I have explained more at length in my other statement. We are not here, it seems to me, as a court passing judgment. It is for that reason again that it seems to me that this is not an appropriate action to take.

Again I would like to put it rather on an even broader ground—and it is the spirit with which we have been trying to approach this whole question—what is going to be helpful in the actual dealing with this question which is before us and about which many delegations are so intimately concerned. Is it practically advantageous to the work of this Committee in aiding us to reach an appropriate disposition of this item on our agenda to send an invitation to His Highness the Bey of Tunisia to send a representative here to speak before it?

Again, as I have tried already to explain to the Committee, it seems to me the best thing the Assembly can do is to try to create an atmosphere in which negotiations between France and Tunisia can proceed in a calm and forward-looking manner. And because this is an item proposed by the delegation of Pakistan, I would like to recall another remark made by another distinguished representative of Pakistan in discussing the Palestine question in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, when he told us that the whole problem of adjustments in the Middle East depends on the creation of the right psychology. I think that is a wise observation. I think it applies to the situation before us here in dealing with this Tunisian question. I do not think that the creation of the right atmosphere or the creation of the right psychology for the actual settlement of this question—which I repeat must in the long run be determined in negotiations between France and Tunisia—I do not think that an atmosphere or that psychology would be created by the extension of this invitation.

For all of these reasons, my delegation will vote against this proposal.

The United States in the United Nations

[December 19-23, 1952]

Security Council

By a vote of 9 to 0, with the U.S.S.R. abstaining, the Council on Dec. 23 approved the U.S.-U.K. draft resolution urging that India and Pakistan begin negotiations immediately to work out a specific agreement on demilitarization of their forces in Kashmir.¹ As a party to the dispute, Pakistan did not participate in the decision. Under a Netherlands amendment, accepted by the sponsors, paragraph 7 of the approved text urges India and Pakistan "to enter into immediate negotiations *under the auspices of the United Nations Representative* in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease fire line" after demilitarization. The italicized passage replaces the phrase "at the Headquarters of the United Nations" in the original draft. As in the original draft, the approved text of paragraph 7 specifies that the number of forces remaining on Pakistan's side should be between 3,000 and 6,000 and the number on the Indian side between 12,000 and 18,000, bearing in mind the principles of criteria suggested by the U.N. representative in his September 4, 1952 proposal.

The session opened with an extended interchange between Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (India) and Sir Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan), during which the former rejected Pakistan's "concrete offer" of Dec. 16 and declared that India was "not prepared to enter into any talks on the basis suggested in paragraph 7" of the draft resolution.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K.) expressed concern at suggestions that the draft contained proposals inconsistent with and contrary to the principles of the UNCIP resolutions. Reviewing the earlier texts in detail, he concluded that their principles had been faithfully reflected, as had the essential elements in the demilitarization provisions. The limits within which the parties were asked to negotiate an agreed figure for the forces on each side, he pointed out, were the limits proposed by the U.N. representative.

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 801.

John C. Ross (U.S.) restated his delegation's position that the joint resolution was not intended in any way to impair or limit the authority of the U.N. representative and that the latter was expected to continue to exercise his functions under previous resolutions. The United States assumed that negotiations would be under his auspices and therefore willingly accepted the amendment offered by the Netherlands.

Despite the fact that both parties had not found it possible to accept the draft, he emphasized that it had meaning and importance; it represented a careful study and appreciation of the U.N. representative's suggestions which, after 16 months of work, it was appropriate for the Council to make.

V. K. Krishna Menon (India) said that his Government was willing to continue negotiations on the basis suggested by the U.N. representative but that it would not be a party to negotiations on the basis of paragraph 7 of the draft and would regret a Council decision approving the resolution.

General Assembly

The Assembly on Dec. 19 approved the Latin American resolution on Morocco, 45 (U.S.)-3 (Belgium, Luxembourg, South Africa)-11 (Soviet bloc, U.K., Pakistan). In Committee I the United States had voted against the resolution because of a Pakistani amendment replacing one of the operative paragraphs. (The Pakistani wording would have made this paragraph identical with the one in the Tunisian resolution.)

The original paragraph was restored in plenary. As approved, it expresses hope that the parties will continue negotiations on an urgent basis toward developing the free political institutions of the people of Morocco, with due regard to legitimate rights and interests under the established norms and practices of the law of nations. The vote on the amendment to restore this wording was 29 (U.S.)-8 (Soviets, Pakistan)-22. The French delegation was absent throughout the entire proceedings, both in the Committee and in plenary.

During the Dec. 19 session President Lester B. Pearson announced the appointment of the following as members of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, Egypt, France, Israel, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

At its Dec. 20 session, the Assembly adopted the Committee I resolution recommending a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian treaty. The vote was 48-0-2 (Pakistan, Afghanistan), identical with that of Committee I on Dec. 19; the U.S.S.R. and its four associates did not participate on either occasion. Pakistan abstained, its representative said, in protest against the inconsistency shown by some of the states supporting the resolution in regard to other questions involving similar principles, such as the Palestine and Moroccan questions. His delegation nonetheless supported the aspirations of the Austrian people.

In other action at the Dec. 20 meeting, the Assembly, by a vote of 37-2-13 (U. S.), established a 15-member committee to study the question of defining aggression and approved the opening for signature of the Convention on Political Rights for Women by a vote of 46-0-11. It also approved Committee III drafts on refugees, the U. N. International Children's Emergency Fund, and integration of economic and social development, and Committee IV texts on administrative unions, cessation of information on the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam to the Committee on Factors, postponement of consideration of South-West Africa until the eighth session of the General Assembly, and an amended resolution on the Ewe question.

The Assembly concluded the first part of its seventh session at 4:45 a. m. on Dec. 22 after acting on 13 items during an afternoon and an all-night meeting. The final item, "Complaint of Mass Murder of Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War by U. S. Armed Forces on the Island of Pongan," had been added to the agenda at the request of the Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, who on Dec. 20 addressed a letter to President Pearson enclosing a draft resolution and an explanatory note citing the killing of 82 prisoners on Dec. 14.

Agreement to consider the item without delay was reached at a meeting of the General Committee on Dec. 21 by a vote of 12-0-2, after the words "Complaint of . . ." had been added to the original Soviet title. During the Committee's debate, Philip C. Jessup (U. S.) referred to the Soviet request as a "last-minute shabby propaganda trick." He continued:

The term "a knock on the door at midnight" has become symbolically associated with the kind of tactics that the Soviet Government and its secret police employ in

depriving the people unfortunate enough to live under that rule of all of the situations which normally come to human beings in the course of their daily life.

It would seem as if the Soviet delegation thought it could intimidate the General Assembly of the United Nations by a "knock on the door at midnight" just as the Assembly was about to adjourn. . . .

The delegation of the United States, of course, makes no objection to putting this on the agenda. It should be put on the agenda and disposed of forthwith.

Its urgent character derives not from the misstatements which we have heard just now from the representative of the Soviet Union, but from the need of the General Assembly to remove quickly, emphatically, and clearly from its consideration false and baseless charges of this kind. . . .

It is perhaps a curious coincidence, Mr. Chairman, that this incident [at Pongan] occurred on the same day that the Chinese Communist regime rejected the General Assembly resolution on non-forcible repatriation of prisoners of war. Would it seem fantastic to the members of the General Assembly to assume that Communist instigation among these internees led to the riots which required disciplinary action? Surely that is not a fantastic assumption. . . .

There is no objection, in fact we welcome, as I have said, the course that you have proposed, that this should be taken up and disposed of, and I believe that the General Assembly, on hearing on the one hand the false propaganda, unsupported allegations of the Soviet delegation, and the statement of facts which my delegation will put before the Assembly, will take the appropriate action to dismiss this and to express the sense of outrage which it has that an item of this character should be brought forward in this way at this time.

The General Committee's vote on inclusion of the Soviet item, which preceded the decision to consider the item without delay, was 11-0-3 (Argentina, China, Honduras).

At the opening of the Dec. 21 plenary, it was decided to take up the new Soviet item after completion of the original 13 agenda items, despite Mr. Gromyko's efforts to have it considered after the second item.

The Assembly proceeded to approve the second report of the Credentials Committee, Committee V's reports on the U. N. joint staff pension fund, the 1953 budget estimates, Committee V's recommendation that the organization of the Secretariat be considered as a possible agenda item at the Eighth General Assembly, and the same Committee's proposal concerning the question of defining a probationary period in a Staff Regulation.

Trusteeship Items—In addition to the five resolutions submitted in the Committee IV report, a new draft resolution on the Wa-Meru land case was proposed during the Dec. 21 plenary by Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Uruguay. The 7-power proposal invited the administering authority to relieve the hardships suffered by the Wa-Meru and to grant compensation for lost lands. It further expressed hope that the authority, in consultation with the Wa-Meru, would find a satisfactory adjustment of the issue and asked the Trusteeship

² For full text, see p. 16.

Council to invite the administering authority to consider the possibility of utilizing part of the area in question as an experimental farm for training indigenes.

The U.K. and France both announced support for the new draft and opposition to the resolution recommended by the Committee in the Wa-Meru case which invited the administering authority to take appropriate steps to return immediately to the Meru the lands from which they were expelled. Ambassador Jessup expressed belief that the Assembly could look forward to fruitful results from the 7-power draft. In the voting, however, neither it nor the Committee's text received the necessary two-thirds majority.

The Assembly approved Committee IV resolutions on the following questions: Indigeneous participation in territorial government and Trusteeship Council work, the Trusteeship Council's report, the hearing of French Cameroons petitioners, and the hearing of Somaliland petitioners.

Membership—On the membership question, the Assembly voted to establish a special 19-member committee to study proposals relating to U.N. membership and confirmed the U.S. proposal as to Japan's fulfillment of membership qualifications. Similar determinations were accepted regarding Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Libya, and Jordan, with the Soviet bloc consistently casting five negative votes.

On a Philippine motion, the word "simultaneous" was deleted from the Polish proposal requesting the Security Council to reconsider 14 applications in order to submit a recommendation on their admission; the Polish proposal was then rejected by a vote of 9-30 (U.S.S.R., U.S., U.K., France)—10.

Committee VI Proposals—The Assembly established a 15-member committee to study the Secretary-General's memorandum on measures to limit the duration of regular sessions and confirmed a Committee VI resolution relating to claims for injuries incurred in U.N. service. It also approved the Committee's request that the Secretary-General transmit a copy of the corrected Chinese text of the Genocide Convention to U.N. members and nonmembers.

Committee II Report—The following resolutions recommended by Committee II were approved: The expanded technical-assistance program; the 3-part proposal on financing economic development relating to the proposed special development fund, the proposed International Finance Corporation, and the analysis of the flow of private capital; establishment of equitable international prices for primary commodities; migration and economic development; land reform; the right to exploit freely national wealth and resources; and increasing food production.

The U.S. delegation voted in favor of all but the resolutions on prices and exploitation of national wealth and resources. The latter, which, in effect, is concerned with nationalization, was amended by India to include a reference to the need to maintain "the flow of capital in conditions of security." The purpose of the addition was to clarify further the protection of foreign capital. The Indian representative explained. Isador Lubin (U.S.) said that this change was "a considerable improvement" but that it did not go far enough. He noted that U.S. amendments designed to assure protection to foreign capital in greater detail had not been adopted by Committee II.

Adoption of the Committee II resolutions completed action on the original agenda. Consideration of the new Soviet item opened with a lengthy address by Mr. Gromyko, who charged that the "bloody brutality" of the American "monsters" in the Pongan prisoner-of-war camp overshadowed all previous "atrocities" and constituted retaliation against prisoners desiring repatriation. He claimed that the incident offered new evidence of the U.S. policy of systematic extermination of all Chinese and Korean prisoners.

Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) asked the Assembly to keep three factors in mind when considering the item: The timing selected, the motive, and the substance of the charges which, he said, had been repeated *ad nauseam* since discussion of the Korean item first began at this session.³

Turning to the facts behind this "shabby midnight stunt," he explained that the 9,000 Koreans interned on Pongan represented captured Communist guerrillas and included no Chinese. Centrally directed plans for a prisoner uprising matured on the same day that the Chinese Communists rejected the U.N. resolution on Korea, Ambassador Gross pointed out; ". . . the connection between the despatch of that note and the events on the Island of Pongan was surely not an accident or a coincidence." He concluded:

. . . there is a lesson to be drawn from this eleventh hour maneuver by the Soviet Government. It furnishes proof that when members of the United Nations unite on a moral issue and rally from all parts of the earth around the cause of peace and in defense of the Charter, the enemies of peace are driven into corners of desperation. But we do not believe that our unity can be broken or undermined by acts of lying desperation such as those we have witnessed here.

Selwyn Lloyd (U.K.) called the Soviet charge a last-ditch attempt to score a propaganda victory at this session, and added that it was quite evident that the Chinese High Command was deliberately inciting the incidents which served as the excuse for introducing the Soviet item.

He agreed that the death of 82 men was a grave matter but expressed confidence that the U.N.

³ For full text, see p. 16.

Command would conduct a fair, objective investigation. Turkey, Greece, Canada, New Zealand, France, and Israel made statements in opposition to the Soviet item. The Soviet complaint was then rejected by a vote of 5-45-10 (Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen), and the Assembly adjourned.

Following are the agenda items to be considered when the second part of the session begins on Feb. 24:

1. Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter: report of the Collective Measures Committee.

2. Regulations, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments: report of the Disarmament Commission.

3. Interference of the United States in the internal affairs of other states as manifested by the organization on the part of the Government of the United States of subversive and espionage activities against the U.S.S.R., Peoples, Republic of China, Czechoslovakia, and other peoples' democracies.

4. Question of an impartial investigation of charges of use by United Nations forces of bacteriological warfare.

5. Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and measures to strengthen peace and friendship among nations.

6. Reports of the United Nations Agent-General for Korean Reconstruction.

7. Complaint of non-compliance of states still detaining members of the Greek armed forces with the provisions of resolution 382 A (V), adopted by the General Assembly on 1 December 1950 recommending "the repatriation of all those among them who express the wish to be repatriated."

8. Report of the Secretary-General on personnel policy.

9. Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

10. Appointment of the Secretary-General.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Great Lakes Fisheries Discussions

The Department of State announced on December 17 (press release 924) that negotiations between the U.S. and Canadian Governments would open on that day at Washington looking toward

the conclusion of a convention for the Great Lakes fisheries.¹

Certain Great Lakes fisheries, especially the more valuable ones such as the lake trout, are suffering from the scourge of the sea lamprey, a predatory, eel-like creature which lives by attaching itself like a leech to a fish and subsisting upon its blood. It is estimated that some 5 million dollars in lake trout alone have been lost each year to this parasite since 1949. The lamprey is now invading Lake Superior and threatens to destroy the lake-trout fisheries there, as it has already destroyed those of Lakes Huron and Michigan.

The immediate purpose of the convention is to bring about joint action by the United States and Canada to eradicate this pest. The Fish and Wildlife Service, cooperating with research agencies in Michigan and the other Great Lakes States, has developed electrical and mechanical devices which will control the lamprey, but these must be installed on both U.S. and Canadian shores of the lakes to be effective. In addition, it is expected that arrangements will be made to coordinate the fishery research programs in the lakes which are now being undertaken by eight State Governments, the Province of Ontario, and the two National Governments.

The U.S. delegation is as follows:

Chairman

William C. Herrington, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary, Department of State

Members

J. L. Kask, Assistant Director, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Warren F. Looney, Foreign Affairs Officer, Department of State

Sylvia Nilsen, Treaty Adviser, Department of State

William M. Terry, Acting Chief, Office of Foreign Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior

Claude Ver Duin, Executive Secretary, Michigan Fish Producers' Association; Secretary, Wisconsin Fish Producers' Association, Grand Haven, Mich.

F. A. Westerman, Chief, Fish Division, Michigan Department of Conservation, Lansing, Mich.

¹On Dec. 19, the Department announced (press release 927) that preliminary discussions between the two Governments had been completed and that further discussions would be resumed in late January.

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†929	12/22	Ierc proposals on Koje-do
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*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State

Bulletin

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U.S. Foreign Policy in Review

Address by the President¹

White House press release dated December 19

You men are engaged in one of the most important studies that Americans can engage in today. You are studying our national policy in its broadest sense. Our national policy is not simply our foreign policy or our military policy or our domestic policy. It is a combination of all three. The internal domestic policies which a nation follows are the foundations of its foreign policy and its military policy. What we can do and ought to do abroad depends upon the kind of nation we are at home.

We are, above all else, a peaceful nation, and what we want most in the world is peace—a just and lasting peace that will release the constructive and creative energies of mankind and increase the happiness of men and women everywhere.

Our national policy, the policy you are studying, in all its aspects, is simply a policy designed to reach that objective. It is a policy for peace.

You who are privileged to study here have an opportunity that is available nowhere else in our country. You are given facts that cannot be generally publicized. You can look at the problems confronting the United States in the world today clearly, steadily, and as a whole. I am sure you appreciate this opportunity and understand how important this background will be in the positions of high responsibility you will occupy when you leave here.

I want to talk to you today about this policy for peace and what our country has been doing to put it into effect since the end of the World War II. There has never been a greater need than there is now to think about these matters clearly and comprehensively. We must try to do this with detachment and without partisan bias. The situation of the world is such that anything less than our clearest and wisest judgment may be disastrous to our future.

If we look back over what we have done since the end of World War II, I think we can say that we have been successful in laying the foundations for a structure of peace. Things which were merely principles in 1945 and only blueprints in 1947 and 1948 have now become established realities—growing and living institutions.

We have done a great deal and we have done it very rapidly in the past 7 years. Some of our policies have been successful and some have not, but, by and large, it can be said that we have created the basic framework that is necessary to resist aggression and to uphold the principles of the United Nations. Whether that structure will succeed depends upon a number of factors, including the degree to which we give it material support. But the progress we have already made gives us confidence that we can succeed.

1945 and Our Hasty Demobilization

At the end of World War II, the people of the United States were anxious to return to peaceful concerns. We wanted to forget about the problems of national security and national defense. We were indeed too eager to do this, and, in our hasty demobilization, we impatiently threw away a good deal of what we needed.

A little more than 7 years ago, in a speech which I made in New York on October 27, 1945,² I pointed out that we needed to continue to have strong armed forces and a universal training program. I said that we needed these things in order to enforce the terms of the peace, to fulfill the military obligations which we were undertaking as a member of the United Nations, and to protect the United States and the Western Hemisphere.

To many people these statements sounded like strange talk in 1945. In those days, few of us realized that we would need strong defenses and trained manpower. Some people still don't see why we have to have universal military training.

¹ Made at the National War College, Washington, on Dec. 19.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 28, 1945, p. 653.

But the intervening years have proved that this was the right position to take in 1945. A new danger was then beginning to appear—a danger which has since become quite familiar. That was the refusal of one of our former allies to cooperate in the efforts of the free nations to build a peaceful world. That nation—that former ally—set out to expand its own power by taking advantage of the weariness and yearning for peace that was prevalent throughout the world in the chaotic aftermath of the war.

This threat was global. It was sustained and persistent. It included political subversion, economic stratagems, and military and diplomatic pressure. It was aimed at all free nations, wherever weakness might appear, and most particularly at the nations in Europe and Asia bordering on the territory dominated by the Soviet Union.

To meet this threat we had to devise new plans and programs. We had to develop measures that were new, that went beyond many of our traditions and experiences. I think that we have met this problem, and on the whole we have met it successfully. The American people did develop new measures to meet this postwar threat to freedom. These measures have by now become so familiar to us that many of us tend to forget what they are designed to do.

Our first objective is to preserve peace in the world. Our determination to do that was very clearly stated, I think, in the same speech I made in October 1945 setting forth the principles that were to guide us in international affairs. I said then that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world but that we are prepared to use our military strength to fulfill our obligations as a member of the United Nations. Along with this, I stressed our conviction that it is essential that there be no territorial changes which are not in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned and that no government be imposed on any nation by the force of any foreign power.

That was said in 1945. We recognized at that time that there were limitations on what this country could do to make that declaration effective. We knew we could not prevent subversion or conquest everywhere in the world. But we engaged ourselves to stand firmly behind the United Nations and to use our resources to make freedom secure for ourselves and for others.

Bolstering the Free Nations' Internal Strength

Our first problem was to help the free nations strengthen themselves as rapidly as possible. The war and its aftermath had seriously weakened them. Destruction, economic chaos, hunger, political turmoil—all appeared to open the way for Communist subversion. The human misery and confusion in Europe and Asia aroused Communist expectations of easy opportunities for expansion.

The free nations had to have new internal strength before they could resist Communist pressure.

In 1947 we moved first to help the people of Greece. Their national independence was threatened by foreign intrigue, guerrilla warfare, and military pressure. We gave them military and economic aid. Greece did not lose its independence. The elements that were trying to destroy that independence were defeated. The Greek people recovered, to stand beside the people of Turkey in defense of freedom and stability in the area of the eastern Mediterranean.

Next, we moved to bolster the internal strength of the nations of Western Europe. By their own efforts alone they were unable to recover from the terrible economic devastation of the war. Communist imperialism, using political weapons, was moving rapidly to take over their governments. We set out to give to these peoples economic assistance and a sense of hope and confidence in the future.

Moving ahead another step in our program to keep the peace, we signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. This joined the free nations of the Atlantic area in a pact which was something much more than a traditional military alliance. It was instead a permanent partnership in the task of maintaining and assuring the peace. It brought the countries of Western Europe into closer economic and military unity.

These measures have, up to now, been successful. Never has the United States made a better investment in security.

The peoples of Western Europe did not succumb to panic and despair; they did not yield their freedom to internal subversion or to outside intimidation. The peoples of Western Europe are not in Communist hands today and they are not going to be. The economies of these countries recovered, despite the embittered efforts of the Communists to prevent it. Today, the military potential of these Western European peoples is growing. This is of tremendous importance to the world. The men and machines of Western Europe are a key factor in preserving peace and freedom. If they should fall under Communist control, the scales of world power would shift drastically in favor of Communist imperialism.

We have also had to meet Communist efforts to gain control over the two great peoples on the western and the eastern borders of the Soviet Union—Germany and Japan. Here, too, we have been largely successful.

That part of Germany not occupied by Communist forces—and it is the greater part—has been enabled to maintain its freedom. We have helped it toward a position of full sovereign equality in the community of free nations. We hope that it will become an important part of the newly emerging united Europe.

On the other side of the world, the Communists have also been thwarted in seeking the political

capture of Japan, with its industries and its trained manpower. We have signed with the Government of Japan a fair and generous Treaty of Peace. We have shown our confidence in the Japanese people.

Another step in carrying out our policy for peace was taken when we joined with other free countries in the Pacific area in a series of security arrangements.

This whole policy of ours met its greatest test when the Communists attacked the Republic of Korea. That was the great challenge—that was the crisis that decided whether we meant what we said, whether we were really determined to support the United Nations and the concept of international law and order.

I believe the Communists were bent on testing the authority of the United Nations and the strength of the free countries by force sooner or later. If the test had not come in Korea, it would have come somewhere else. But it came in Korea, and that was where we had to meet it and stop it.

The Communist aim was to bring South Korea under Communist domination, to demoralize the resistance of the free nations to communism, and to prepare the way for attacks elsewhere. The Communists have failed to achieve this end. But our aim, which was to repel the attack, to support the Charter of the United Nations, and to prevent the piecemeal conquest of other free nations—this aim has been achieved.

This conflict has taken tragic sacrifices. It has caused impatience and disagreements among us. But in spite of this, we have stood firm.

By every possible means we have been trying to restore peace and security in Korea. The Communists have refused the opportunity we offered for an honorable end to the fighting. The result is a terrible and a serious problem. But while we deal with this problem, let us not lose sight of how much we have already accomplished by fighting in Korea.

Accomplishments in Korea

If the attack had been allowed to succeed, the United Nations would have been shattered, and all our hopes of building up a collective-security system for the free nations would have been destroyed. If we had failed to meet the test there, the free world today might well be in retreat before communism on a dozen other fronts.

The foreign policy we have developed in these last 7 years is not a negative one. It is not simply a design to resist communism. It is much more. It is a program of going forward, overcoming want and poverty, and enlarging freedom. Behind the shield of defensive alliances and military strength, it is our purpose to help people to improve their conditions of life—to create a world in which democracy and freedom can flourish. This is a part of our total policy which is uppermost in

my concern. It is affirmative, creative, and constructive.

Through the Point Four Program, through measures of economic development, we are moving to bring modern technological progress into the reach of other peoples so that they can help themselves to raise their standard of living.

In the Helping-Hand Tradition

This kind of activity comes naturally to us. It is close to the helping-hand tradition of the American frontier. But today it has a new significance. For the majority of the people of the world live in what are called "underdeveloped areas." These people are determined to conquer poverty and disease and misery. We can show them how to do it. With patience and understanding, we can help them adapt the methods of modern science to their own needs.

Our programs of technical cooperation, our information programs, our exchanges of books and people—all are intended to broaden the horizons of freedom and progress in the world. Furthermore, they are a vital weapon against Communist imperialism. They show that the genuine road to progress is the way of freedom. They show that the deeds of free men are better than the false promises of communism.

In carrying out all these steps I have been describing, we have experienced both successes and failures. In this great world struggle there have been some burdens we could not undertake because our resources were not unlimited.

China was one of those. With all our material help, and it was very large, the Government of China was not able to save itself.

Let no one think that this Administration underestimates the effects of the Communist victory in China. We know that the capture of the great Chinese people by a clique of ruthless Communist fanatics was a tragic loss to the cause of peace and progress in Asia and elsewhere. We hope it will not be an irrevocable loss.

It is very easy now to look at some particular part of the whole world problem and say we did the wrong thing there. But those who criticize past decisions rarely look at the entire balance sheet of our assets and commitments and tell us what things we should have dropped in order to do the things they think we should have done. They forget that our power is not unlimited and that we cannot commit ourselves everywhere.

I do believe, however, that we have by and large succeeded in the main purposes to which we have set ourselves and our resources. We have demonstrated to the Communists that their expansionist efforts will be checked.

The sum total of the actions we have taken and which I have briefly described has now brought us, I believe, to a situation in which it should become clear to the Soviet leaders that they cannot

gain their objectives by the use of force. They know this country is becoming strong. They know the strength and unity of the free nations is mounting. They can gain nothing from war but catastrophe.

In recognizing our progress, we must not belittle the dangers that still lie ahead.

The Soviet leaders have not abandoned their purposes. They are persistent and determined. Even if they turn away from outright aggression, they still hope to win. More and more I think they are placing their hopes of victory on factors in the free world which they think will work to their advantage. They are placing their hopes above all on the differences and disagreements among the free countries, particularly between ourselves and the others. To this end they are conducting against the people of the United States the most shameless, cynical, and terrible campaign of vilification that has ever been conducted against an entire people anywhere.

We must not underrate the dangers this involves.

Our great wealth and our responsibilities as a leading world power have led to much resentment and misunderstanding, even among other free and friendly peoples.

The aid programs we have carried out, along with all the good they have done, have led to much oversensitiveness and to many unhealthy reactions. Giving aid is not easy, either for those who give or for those who receive.

These difficulties are frequently exaggerated, but we would be foolish to underrate their importance. They involve some serious dangers. If we wish to proceed successfully with our policy for peace, we must meet this present phase of the Communist challenge as we have met others in the past. We must make a real effort to overcome the things that tend to divide us from our friends and allies.

Moving Forward to a Better, Safer World

If this is done—if we are able to preserve unity and confidence among the free nations—we need not be panicky today about the state of the world. We are not on the losing side. The world is not about to collapse around us.

We have a clear and consistent policy for peace. It is not a perfect one. No course of action ever is. It needs constant improvement and revision. But it has proved basically a sound and rugged policy, in line with the feelings of our people and the requirements of the situation.

Future historians may recognize some mistakes. But on balance, I believe they will say that never in history did a great nation respond so effectively and promptly to new and unaccustomed problems as did this Nation in the past 7 years; and never was a greater or more enlightened effort expended for a nobler purpose—the aim of world peace.

One of our greatest dangers today is the danger

of impatience. It is the danger that we will sell ourselves short—that we will underrate our own accomplishments. It is the danger that we will break away from the best path, just because it is long and stony and because there are times when we cannot see over the top of the hill. It is the danger that we will take hasty or erratic action, and thereby sacrifice the very real and impressive achievements already in our hands.

What we need in this coming period is faith in ourselves, courage to do the difficult and distasteful things, consideration and forbearance for our allies, without whose confidence and help our purposes will not be accomplished.

To guide us on this path will soon be the responsibility of new people. No statesmen have ever had a heavier responsibility than these men will have. Let us see that they are given the type of support they need to do their work. Let us tell them frankly when we think they are wrong. But let us support them wholeheartedly when they are right. Let us work with them for peace and freedom in the world and for progress and security for our country.

If we do these things, I am sure we can continue to move forward, with God's help, to a better and safer world.

Administration of Tinian and Saipan

Executive Order 10408¹

WHEREAS the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (hereinafter referred to as the trust territory) was transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by Executive Order No. 10265 of June 29, 1951,² and

WHEREAS the purposes of the trusteeship agreement approved by the Security Council of the United Nations on April 2, 1947, and by the United States Government on July 18, 1947, can better be effectuated by placing in the Secretary of the Navy the authority and responsibility for the administration of that portion of the trust territory which includes the islands of Tinian and Saipan:

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. The administration of that portion of the trust territory which includes the islands of Tinian and Saipan is hereby transferred from the Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of the Navy, such transfer to become effective on January 1, 1953.

2. When the transfer of administration made by this order becomes effective, the Secretary of the Navy shall take such action as may be necessary and appropriate, and in harmony with applicable law, for the administration of civil government in that portion of the trust territory which includes the islands of Tinian and Saipan and shall, subject to such policies as the President may from time to time prescribe and, when appropriate, in collaboration with other departments or agencies of the Government, carry out the obligations assumed by the United States as the administering authority of the trust territory under the terms of the trusteeship agreement approved by the United States on July 18, 1947, and under the Charter of the United Nations: *Provided*,

¹ 17 *Fed. Reg.* 10277.

² BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 106.

however, That the authority to specify parts or all of either of such islands as closed for security reasons and to determine the extent to which Articles 87 and 88 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be applicable to such closed areas, in accordance with Article 13 of the trusteeship agreement, shall be exercised by the President: *And provided further*, That the Secretary of the Navy shall keep the Secretary of State currently informed of activities on such islands affecting the foreign policy of the United States and shall consult the Secretary of State on questions of policy concerning such islands which relate to the foreign policy of the United States, and that all relations between departments or agencies of the Government and appropriate organs of the United Nations with respect to such islands shall be conducted through the Secretary of State.

3. The executive departments and agencies of the Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Departments of the Navy and Interior in the effectuation of the provisions of this order.

4. To the extent that they pertain to the islands of Tinian and Saipan, the provisions of Executive Order No. 10265 of June 29, 1951, shall be superseded by the provisions of this order as of the date set out in the paragraph numbered 1, above.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 10, 1952.

Review of Progress in Latin America

Following is the text of a year-end statement by C. O. Rowe, Acting President of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs of the Technical Cooperation Administration:

Nineteen hundred and fifty-two marked a decade of technical cooperation between the Latin American Republics and the United States, represented by the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. It also opened a broader concept of cooperative technical assistance designed to encompass new fields of activity which will make a contribution to economic development. Looking beyond traditional programs of health and sanitation, food supply, and education, the cooperative program aims toward developing assistance to industry, labor, and public administration; the provision of technical and scientific services; the development of natural resources; and the improvement of social welfare and housing.

This cooperative program is becoming more and more a matter of pride with the American Republics. It has been an inspiration to many other areas where similar programs are under way.

Training of Latin American nationals continues to be one of the most important responsibilities of each of the cooperative programs. Over 850 technicians have been provided with opportunities for advanced technical training in the United States during 1952. One important device of training in the United States is the development of special courses designed for specific training groups. A group of 25 rural teachers from three Republics has recently completed a 10-month course under a contract with the University of Maryland. Another group of 12 from an Ameri-

can Republic is being trained at the University of Texas to assume its duties as the core of the teaching staff of an important normal school.

Local training is provided to Latin American nationals through seminars and workshops, demonstration projects, adult-education courses, on-the-job training within industry, summer schools, normal-school training of teachers, and day-by-day association with their U.S. colleagues working in the jointly financed programs.

During 1952, the participating governments have expanded considerably the activities of these jointly financed programs, most of which are of the *Servicio* type. Today there is a total of 43 jointly financed programs in operation: 17 in the field of health and sanitation, 14 in agriculture and the development of natural resources, 10 in education, and 2 which provide assistance to industry and government services. Approximately 620 U.S. technicians are participating in the activities of these programs, working with over 15,000 Latin American nationals.

The key to the success in carrying out a plan for economic development—and there have been many plans proposed in the past—is the reservoir of available Latin American technicians who are trained to do their jobs. After 10 years of progress, competent Latin American technicians are becoming increasingly available to carry through programs successfully. Consequently, international lending agencies are approving loans to Latin American Governments for agricultural and industrial development. They are making these loans on the basis of known available technical knowledge and manpower, recognizing that the resulting improvement in economic conditions will serve to safeguard the loans. Loans cover purchases of many kinds of capital equipment. Joint economic-development commissions have been utilized to develop investment programs and to complete those surveys which are needed to substantiate applications for loans. In countries where these joint commissions have been established, projects have been planned for the development and improvement of railways, highways, ports and harbors, shipping facilities, municipal water-supply and sewer systems, agricultural equipment, irrigation and hydroelectric power, warehousing, and industry. A number of loan applications have been approved and others are under consideration by international lending agencies.

The successes of the technical-cooperation programs have not been easily achieved. They have been possible only because of the cooperative spirit and the constructive thought and labor on the part of the Latin American countries and their technicians. The United States shares with its Latin American neighbors the firm belief that great strides have been made and will continue to be made toward the mutual strengthening of the economic and human resources in the hemisphere.

Witnessing the Birth of a New Europe

by Myron M. Cowen

Ambassador to Belgium¹

Today while we are luncheoning here, there are two meetings taking place in Europe that are illustrative of the world in which we live. In Vienna, the Communist Party has sponsored another of its quite numerous international peace conferences and, in Paris, the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is meeting.

It is sometimes difficult for us who are not Communists and who do not live behind the Iron Curtain to follow the logic of the propaganda of the U.S.S.R. The meeting in Vienna can hardly be seriously intended to bring about peace. New York, where the United Nations has been meeting, or Korea, where the truce negotiations have been going on for over one year, would seem to be more appropriate places to discuss peace. The choice of the city of Vienna for this week's meeting does not make sense to us. The Western Nations have spent close to 8 years trying to bring about a peace treaty with Austria so that that unfortunate country could once again be united. At literally hundreds of meetings it has been the U.S.S.R., and only the U.S.S.R., that has prevented the making of a peace treaty with Austria. The Austrian people who have been allowed to vote in the Western zone have shown an overwhelming lack of appreciation of the Russian occupation. Some 95 percent of them have voted against communism. They have not had the privilege of seeing the peace that is being talked about in Vienna this week.

Likewise, the timing of the so-called peace meeting in Vienna appears unfortunate to those of us who live in a free world. It follows by such a few days the U.S.S.R.'s outright rejection of the Indian effort to find a solution to the war in Korea.

If, as I suggest, we who are allowed to use our own minds find little logic in the words of the Communists in Vienna that contrast so shockingly in the actions of the Communist world, it would still be a tragic mistake for us to ignore this meeting. We once took Nazi Germany too lightly. We thought that the lies spoken by its leaders

completely, wholly discredited them. We should not now ignore this meeting in Vienna. Today from the loudspeaker of communism comes the automatic repetition, "peace, peace, peace;" while at the same time from the U.S.S.R. spokesmen in Korea and at the United Nations comes, "no, no, no," to each constructive effort to bring about peace.

To us, this inconsistency does not make sense, and we would reject those who say "yes" and "no" at the same time. But not all of the world reads well-reported and accurate stories of the sessions of the United Nations and of the truce negotiations in Korea. Some of the world will only see the artificial peace doves of Vienna and hear the loudspeakers saying, "peace, peace, peace." And even in our own countries there will be some who are tired and confused, to whom the loud reiteration of the word *peace* will be easier to follow than the twisted course of obstruction and aggression that has kept the world from peace in these recent years.

It is because the nations of the free world have so painfully learned in the last 7 years that the same men who sponsor meetings for peace in Vienna can be responsible for intimidation, aggression, and war in other places that we have today regional security pacts in the Americas, in the Pacific, and among the nations of the North Atlantic community. The meeting that is being held today in Paris of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is for the very purpose of measuring our defenses against the sponsors of the peace conference in Vienna.

We know too painfully well the policies and actions against which these defensive pacts were built—Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Korea, the darkness that shrouds Central Europe and China, the continuous veto in the United Nations, the sabotage and obstruction of the Communist Parties within our own borders, the civil war that still flickers in the Philippines and which is a roaring fire at this moment in Indochina.

As the free nations took stock of the postwar world, what did they find? They found that the

¹Excerpts from an address made before the Belgo-American Association at Charleroi, Belgium, on Dec. 19.

world had been sharply divided into two parts by the Iron Curtain. On the other side of the Iron Curtain the U. S. S. R. controlled the largest empire in the history of the world. The U. S. S. R., its satellites, and China comprised a population of some 750,000,000 people. The U. S. S. R. had not disarmed after the war. It had kept up its own forces and had taken energetic steps to build new forces in the satellite states and China. It was devoting its resources to increasing its capacity for making war. In addition, the free nations found that the U. S. S. R. did not want a peaceful solution of the causes of international tensions. Or it would tolerate only such solutions to international problems that increased Communist power and weakened the independence of the free nations.

These were the conditions, these were the facts of the world in which the free nations faced their struggle for survival. Immediately these nations had to:

1. Rearm.
2. Rebuild.
3. Re-create viable or workable economies.
4. Refill the vacuums in those areas of the world

from which power and authority had been withdrawn.

Future of the North Atlantic Community

Today, because of the limits of time, let us concentrate our consideration on the North Atlantic community and see how the problems have been met: Have the steps taken been satisfactory? What of the future?

As you know, these questions which we are now considering are being intensively discussed throughout the free world. I make a serious effort to keep myself informed of this discussion as it is reflected in three groups of newspapers, those of the United States, Great Britain, and the Continent. Please do not misunderstand me. No mortal man could adequately follow all of these papers, but it is possible by looking at them from time to time to be familiar with their major reactions to this discussion.

The reason I mention this to you is that I have come to a conclusion about this discussion that might be somewhat of an oversimplification but which I believe is essentially true.

I have come to believe that there are two sharply contrasted types of men who are engaged in looking for answers to our questions. The man of one of these types starts his examination of the problem by saying, "What is it that we must have in order to reach a satisfactory answer to our problem?"

And the other type of man starts his examination of these problems by saying, "Are we going in the right direction, and are we making substantial progress?"

Before I go further with our discussion, I must

reveal to you that I find myself in this last classification, and my answers will therefore have some bias. I think that we may start our discussion with some positive signs of progress.

First, in the years immediately after the war Europe was faced with serious economic collapse; this has been avoided. Today's industrial output in Western Europe is approximately 40 percent larger than in 1948 and 60 percent larger than in 1947. Agricultural production has improved. Trade between European nations, which had practically stopped in 1947, has now increased until it is one-third more than it was in prewar years.

Second, this economic improvement has been made while the countries of Western Europe have been engaged in a large rearmament program. This improvement has not been made by cutting consumption, which is today at prewar levels. Defense burdens today are higher than they were in 1938.

Third, European military forces have consistently improved. Today, a potential aggressor would know that Europe's military forces, with American assistance, would meet his force with force.

Fourth, the political health of Western Europe has improved greatly and is continuing to improve. Communist strength in European governments has constantly declined.

However, as important as these factors are, much more important are the many manifestations of Europe's ancient political genius. No one can have observed Europe since 1947 without being struck by the manifestation of political talent, imagination, skill, and vitality.

It has been said that the free world today faces the problem of unity in freedom or unity in slavery. This statement seemed particularly pertinent to the Europe of 1947. Since that time, under the most difficult circumstances Europe has made almost unbelievable steps toward integration. Perhaps the peril that faced Europe has been impetus for the progress Europe has made. Certainly, there has been stimulation for the evolution and development of new political institutions from both sides of the Atlantic. Undoubtedly, the economic and military assistance programs of the United States have made a very substantial contribution to this progress. But it is equally true that no matter what the magnitude of these programs might have been, they could not have been superimposed on a community that lacked political talent, capacity, vitality, and a will to succeed.

It is impossible now to trace the growth of the many new political institutions which have developed in Europe since 1947, but I would like to recall a few of the major developments. The first step toward European economic union grew out of U.S. assistance under the Marshall Plan. It was the establishment by 16 countries of Western Europe of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Its primary respon-

sibility was to insure the effective use of American aid. Among its first responsibilities was the task of recommending the distribution of Marshall Plan funds among the European countries who participated in the plan. It was in this committee that many of the most competent experts in Europe worked together as members of the European community, rather than as citizens of one country.

The OEEC created the European Payments Union (EPU) as a clearinghouse for intra-European payments. The creation of EPU, as it is called, was a first step toward the creation by Western Europe of one large and competitive market where goods and currencies could move freely.

In 1948 the Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to create a collective-defense system that would be capable of protecting the security of the Western European nations.

However, the Brussels treaty went much further than an agreement of the signatories to come to each other's aid in the case of an armed attack. The countries that signed the treaty agreed to organize and coordinate their economic policies and activities. They agreed to develop social services and to promote cultural exchanges.

The present North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) grew out of the Brussels treaty. The primary objective of NATO has been to build "an integrated military force adequate to defend Europe." This force is intended to be more than a paper force to come into being at a time of emergency. It is intended to be a force in existence in peacetime.

One of the articles of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for collective action in political, economic, and social fields. Every day there are countless decisions made and actions taken under NATO that represent European integration. Many of the decisions of NATO are political and economic in character—for an example, "The Annual Review" that is made of each country's contribution in relation to that country's economic capability.

European integration has already been developed more intensively in yet another organization, the Coal and Steel Community. Six European Governments—Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, and West Germany—have pooled their coal and steel industries into single production and marketing areas.

These same six countries have agreed to merge their national armed forces into a single European defense force. In the near future, the legislative bodies of all of these countries should have this agreement before them for ratification.

The European Coal and Steel Community is an established, functioning institution. When, in addition to that, the European Defense Community comes into being, a strong and united Europe will lie a very short distance in the future.

I told you that I looked at the recent years of European history with a prejudice. My prejudice, my preference, is to measure these years by what has been accomplished rather than measuring them by what has not been accomplished. These have been great achievements. They are visible evidences of the talent and vitality of the new Europe.

Hopes Held by the Men in the Kremlin

However, no matter how great these achievements are, we must consider the other point of view that asks whether there is in Europe today a force which could successfully defend Europe against a Soviet attack. What progress has Europe made toward the restoration of its capacity for self-defense? To both of these questions, the answers would be negative. Europe has not a force in being comparable to Soviet forces that we know exist, and Europe still has tremendous steps to take before it can reestablish its capacity for self-defense.

From the great outpouring of speeches and printed material at the recent Moscow Conference, it would appear that the men in the Kremlin wish time to build up the productive capacity of their unparalleled empire. They have made it clear that they believe that their system can endure a long Cold War better than the free nations. They have made it clear that they believe that the free nations cannot work out their economic problems without conflicts, that the free nations will not be able to maintain the unity they have been developing. These views will bear our close attention. The men in the Kremlin will take every opportunity that is presented them to separate the free nations and undo the unity that has been achieved.

In addition, the free world can never be sure that the men in the Kremlin will not decide to attack. At any moment they may decide that it will profit them to attack and attempt to destroy the growing strength of the free nations.

These are dangers that we must face immediately. They are dangers that we must live with. They constitute a risk which we cannot ignore.

I have said several times that I am impressed by the accomplishments that have been made. I think that we in our day are witnessing the birth of a new Europe. I believe this new Europe has the capacity and the fortitude to achieve heights that will surpass even its ancient greatness. There are dreadful problems before it, economic problems, social problems, and political problems. All of these have to be solved in order to solve the military problem. I believe that the new Europe has a momentum that is just now getting under way. I believe this momentum is sweeping the old defeatism away. I believe it is gaining the power to reestablish the new Europe—"mistress as of yore . . . of the hearts of men."

Soviets Say "Wrong Address" in Reply to U.S. Notes on Hungarian Plane Incident

Elim O'Shaughnessy, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the United States at Moscow, on December 17 transmitted a note to Jacob Malik, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the liability of the Soviet Government arising from the seizure and detention of the U.S. C-47 airplane 6026 and its crew in Hungary on November 19, 1951.

An earlier U.S. note on the subject had been delivered to the Soviet Foreign Office on December 10, 1952.¹ On December 11, 1952, the Soviet Government returned to the American Embassy in Moscow the U.S. note of December 10, on the ground that the note was "incorrectly addressed," implying that it should have been addressed to the Hungarian Government.

Following receipt of Mr. O'Shaughnessy's December 17 communication, the Soviet Government, in a note dated December 20, returned the U.S. note for the second time. Printed here are the texts of (1) the Soviet reply to the original U.S. note of December 10; (2) the U.S. communication of December 17 transmitting the December 10 note under new cover; and (3) the second Soviet reply.

Soviet Note of December 11

Moscow, December 11, 1952.

MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AD INTERIM.

There is returned herewith your note No. 473 of December 10, 1952, as incorrectly addressed, since it refers to the question of the American military transport airplane C-47 which in November 1951 violated the frontier of the Hungarian Peoples Republic and was confiscated by the Hungarian authorities together with objects in it in accordance with the judgment of the Budapest Military Tribunal.

Yours respectfully,

Y. A. MALIK

TO MR. O'SHAUGHNESSY,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R., Moscow

U. S. Note of December 17

Press release 923 dated December 17

The Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the United States of America presents his compliments to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Acting Minister's note dated December 11, 1952, returning to the Embassy the United States note of December 10 concerning the airplane incident in Hungary on November 19, 1951, on the ground that the note was incorrectly addressed.

The Soviet Government is well aware that the United States Government has communicated separately with the Hungarian Government in this matter.² The United States note of December 10 to the Soviet Government refers clearly to instrumentalities of the Soviet Government which were involved in the detention of the United States plane and crew and concerns actions, material, and information which only the Soviet Government can explain or provide. Thus the United States note to the Soviet Government is not incorrectly addressed, but the Soviet Government has apparently failed to take proper notice of its full contents. Specifically, the attention of the Soviet Government is called to numbered paragraph 2 of the United States note, which requests identification of certain items with regard to Mr. Vishinsky's speeches before the United Nations General Assembly in Paris; to paragraph 3 requesting copies of statements and investigation reports in the Soviet Government's files; and to paragraph 4 which concerns provisions of treaties, agreements and arrangements between the Soviet and Hungarian Governments.

As regards the statement made in the Acting Foreign Minister's note that the United States aircraft was confiscated by the Hungarian authorities in accordance with the judgment of the Budapest Military Tribunal, it may be pointed out that that statement does not establish defi-

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 22, 1952, p. 981.

² *Ibid.*, p. 982.

nately whether the Soviet Government turned over to the Hungarian Government the airplane and its contents and, if so, on what date and under what circumstances the transfer occurred. Moreover, the Soviet note does not make clear whether the Soviet Government is claiming that the decree of confiscation by the Hungarian military court relieves the Soviet Government from liability to the United States Government for failure to return the airplane and its contents or their value.

In the absence of a specific reply on these points, the United States Government will assume that the United States property in question was voluntarily turned over to Hungarian authorities by the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government is informed that the action of turning over the described property to the Hungarian authorities and the action of the Hungarian authorities in purporting to confiscate the property in no way relieve the Soviet Government from liability to the United States; and further that any steps which the United States may take directed to obtaining a return of the property in question, or their value, from the Hungarian Government will in no way constitute condonation by the United States of the illegality of the Soviet Government's action or relieve it from liability to the United States.

The Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* therefore is again transmitting the original United States note and requests the Acting Minister for Foreign Af-

fairs that due consideration be given to the note and an appropriate reply be transmitted as requested.

Soviet Reply of December 20

No. 50/U.S.

In connection with the note of the Embassy of the United States of America No. 495 of December 17, 1952, with which the Embassy again forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. the note of the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. of December 10, 1952, the Ministry states the following.

Inasmuch as the Embassy's note of December 17, 1952 touches upon the same question as the note of the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in the U.S.S.R. of December 10, 1952, which was returned to the Embassy for reasons set forth in the letter of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Y. A. Malik, of December 11, 1952, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not see any reason for new consideration of this question and returns herewith the Embassy's note of December 17 and the Embassy's note of December 10 which was attached to it.

Moscow, December 20, 1952.

*To the Embassy of the United States of America,
Moscow*

U.S. Position on ICRC's Proposals Relative to Kojedo Incident

Press release 929 dated December 22

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) released last week at Geneva a collection of correspondence in two volumes, called the "Korean Conflict," covering the period from January 1 to June 30, 1952.

News stories based on the ICRC release of correspondence referred to a committee letter dated May 12, 1952, and to a letter from Gen. Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief, United Nations Forces. The letter from General Clark was dated June 12, 1952, and was in fact a reply to a letter of May 24, 1952, from the ICRC.

The ICRC correspondence of May 12 was in the form of an aide-mémoire to the American Consul at Geneva. This aide-mémoire of May 12 was answered by the American Consul on July 28. The Consul's reply did not appear in the collec-

tion of correspondence released by the ICRC last week. Following are the texts of the ICRC's aide-mémoire and the reply of the American Consul:

ICRC'S AIDE-MÉMOIRE OF MAY 12

The attention of the International Committee of the Red Cross has recently been drawn by its Delegation for Korea to the dangerous situation prevailing in the United Nations POW Camp No. 1 at Kojedo, and, in addition to the events of 18 February 1952, to the grave occurrences in this camp on 13 March and 10 April 1952.

On 13 March a group of soldiers of the Republic of Korea and a group of Korean prisoners of war from Compound 93, who were under guard by South Korean soldiers, passed alongside Compound 92 (which was also a Compound of Korean

prisoners of war). The prisoners of war of the two Compounds 92 and 93 are stated under these circumstances to have begun throwing stones at one another on grounds of differences of political opinions. Certain South Korean soldiers are said to have been hit by these missiles, on which they opened fire, and killed 12 prisoners of war and wounded 26.

On 10 April in the matter of a wounded prisoner in Compound 95, whom his comrades refused to permit to be moved to the hospital, orders were issued to move the man. Unarmed military personnel of the Republic of Korea entered the Compound for the purpose, but did not take the formation they were directed to take. Trouble followed, in the course of which the American troops opened fire, in which ROK soldiers joined. As a result there were wounded and dead amongst the prisoners of war and the guards.

In the dual circumstances it appears that the firing constitutes a violation of Article 42 of the Geneva Convention of 1949.

The Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross delegation for Korea thought it necessary to inform General Ridgway personally on 25 March as to the position, and in particular as to the events of 13 March above stated, and to make certain proposals to him with a view to improving the position. The proposals in question were for:

1. Withdrawal of the South Korean guards of Koje-do Camp, their employment as guards of their compatriots constituting a continual risk of incidents.
2. Avoidance of political demonstrations of any kind, and in particular of the continuance of the political programme of the C. I. E.¹ for the education of prisoners of war. Political questions do not in general concern the International Committee of the Red Cross; but it thought it should raise the present issue in view of its humanitarian aspects, political activities being a constant source of incidents.
3. Distribution of the enormous Koje-do Camp amongst smaller camps, which would be more easily controlled.

General Ridgway agreed in principle with these three proposals. He gave immediate orders with regard to the second proposal. He said he would endeavour to find means of acting on the first proposal. The third proposal was, he said, a matter which exceeded his powers, but he would support the proposal, should occasion arise. The International Committee of the Red Cross has since learnt that steps have been taken on the subject of this last proposal.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is anxious in the first place to say how much it appreciates the facilities which have been given to it to enable it to fulfil its tasks in connection with

¹ Civil Information and Education.

the prisoners of war. It also appreciates the understanding displayed by the highest Military authorities in relation to the Head of the International Committee's delegation.

In submitting the above to the competent authorities, the International Committee of the Red Cross is expressing the hope that the proposals put forward by its delegate will be taken into consideration. Their application would most likely avoid the repetition of serious incidents, and in general promote relaxation of a dangerous tension.

CONSUL GENERAL'S REPLY OF JULY 28

The Consul General of the United States of America has the honor again to refer to the Aide-Mémoire of the International Committee of the Red Cross dated May 12, 1952. This document concerned the situation then prevailing at the United Nations Prisoner of War Camp No. 1 at Koje-do in South Korea.

The Consul General has been instructed to reply to the Committee's Aide-Mémoire as follows:

1. It is believed that the following facts more completely describe the incident of April 10, 1952, at Camp No. 1:

(a) On April 10, 1952, the Communist prisoners once again challenged camp authorities. This incident began with a violent Communist demonstration inside the barrier of Compound 95 of Enclosure Number 9. The several compounds of this enclosure containing North Korean Army enlisted men had been involved in virulent Communist agitation, beatings, and intimidations of non-Communists since mid-September, but never before had the leaders or the group as a whole openly challenged camp authority. In the efforts to restore order one prisoner of war was wounded. A United States Army Captain and two United States soldiers, all unarmed, immediately entered the compound dispensary, just within the compound gates, to remove the wounded man to the hospital. They were forced to withdraw by the swarming Communists.

(b) Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, then Camp Commandant, promptly ordered that the Communist leaders in the compound permit the evacuation of the wounded Communist. When they refused, General Dodd ordered 100 unarmed Republic of Korea guards into the enclosure to bring out the casualty. The guards were promptly set upon with clubs and stones; one guard was seized by the Communists and disappeared in the rioting mass. The armed guards outside the perimeter, in an attempt to protect the unarmed Republic of Korea soldiers, fired into the enclosure, wounding, among others, a United States Army officer and some Republic of Korea guard personnel.

(c) At this point, the Communists staged a mass rush on the open gates. This attack was

stopped by the prompt and determined action of an American officer and two American soldiers manning a jeep-mounted .30 caliber machine gun which was covering the gate to prevent any mass escape. As a result of this disturbance, precipitated and continued by the prisoners, three Communists were killed and fifty-seven wounded; four Republic of Korea Army guards were killed, six wounded; and one American officer was slightly wounded.

2. With regard to the three proposals made by the International Committee of the Red Cross to General Ridgway, the following information presents certain developments since the proposals were made, as well as certain facts not mentioned by the International Committee of the Red Cross, pertinent to the subject.

(a) Withdrawal of South Korean guards: A large number of UN (other than Republic of Korea) guards are now on Koje-do; however, the magnitude of the job directs some utilization of South Korea guards.

(b) Education of prisoners of war: The CI&E program consists of an orientation program during which prisoners of war, on a voluntary basis, attend lectures on the history of Korea and China; Korea under the American occupation; the aims, structure, functions and accomplishments of the United Nations; the principles, ideals and practices of democracy as contrasted to those of totalitarianism. Following the orientation program, prisoners of war are assisted in developing vocational skills which will enable them to participate in the future rebuilding of their countries while at the same time to improve their living conditions in the camps where they are held as prisoners of war. This phase was removed from the program early in April, 1952; the entire CI&E program was discontinued late in April, 1952, because of the screening operations and the subsequent transfer of prisoners of war to other compounds. A complete CI&E program, including the "orientation course", is currently in progress at all installations housing prisoners of war who have refused to return to Communist control. In these installations, the program is being well received by the prisoners. Camp authorities especially desire the CI&E program as a means of providing constructive use of the time of the prisoners, which contributes to good order and discipline.

(c) Distribution of prisoners of war: It is believed that this has been satisfactorily arranged. By June 22, 1952, eighty-one thousand prisoners of war had been moved to more manageable 500-man compounds.

3. It is believed that appropriate action has been taken on the International Committee of the Red Cross proposals to avoid repetition of serious incidents and to relax tension in the compounds.

Loan for Expansion of Iron and Steel Production in India

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on December 19 announced a loan of 31.5 million dollars for a major expansion of iron and steel production in India. The borrower is the Indian Iron and Steel Company, Ltd. (IISCO), a privately owned Indian company whose works are situated in West Bengal. The loan is for a term of 15 years and is guaranteed by the Government of India.

The loan will help the company carry out a 5-year project for increasing its blast-furnace capacity from 640,000 tons to 1,400,000 tons of iron a year and for raising finished steel capacity from 350,000 to 700,000 tons annually. When completed, the company's program will double the quantity of foundry iron now available from domestic sources in India and will increase the country's present output of finished steel by about one-third.

India is now in the second year of a 5-year plan for economic development. Greater supplies of iron and steel are essential to the continued progress of the plan. Large amounts of both will be required for the increased production of food, a pressing need of the Indian economy. Iron is required for the manufacture of plows and other farm equipment. Steel is needed for the construction of large irrigation and flood-control works designed to increase agricultural output, for extension of railroads and roads, for hydroelectric works to furnish power to industry and rural areas, and for new housing. The demand for steel is already considerably larger than can be met by Indian producers, and substantial amounts of foreign exchange are spent each year for steel imports.

India is in a particularly good position to produce her own steel. Her steel companies are low-cost producers. The country has rich deposits of the basic materials needed—iron ore, coal, manganese, and limestone—and labor is plentiful. IISCO's works, west of Calcutta in the Burnpur area of the Damodar Valley, are situated conveniently close both to basic raw materials and to the principal markets for steel in India.

The present loan grows out of recommendations made by an International Bank mission headed by George Woods, chairman of the First Boston Corporation. The mission concluded that the Bank could most quickly help India achieve important gains in production by helping to finance new facilities at the works of IISCO and of the Steel Corporation of Bengal, Ltd. (SCOB).

SCOB and IISCO are separate companies but are to be merged as of January 1, 1953, under legislation introduced in the current session of the Indian Parliament. The assets and liabilities of SCOB will be transferred to IISCO, and SCOB will cease to

exist. The plants of the two companies are under the same management, and their works at Burnpur already are physically integrated.

The program for which the Bank's loan is being used consists of the expansion of the integrated facilities at Burnpur, the modernization of IISCO iron plant at Kulti, a few miles from Burnpur, and the expansion and mechanization of IISCO's operations at its iron mines at Gua. At Burnpur, two new batteries of 78 coke ovens each will be installed and an obsolete 40-oven battery will be removed; two new blast furnaces, each with a daily output of 1,200 tons of iron, will be installed. Steel-making facilities will be increased by the addition of a third 25-ton Bessemer converter. The finishing departments in the rolling mills will be expanded for additional tonnage. At IISCO's Kulti works, which make iron for foundries, the blast furnaces will be modernized and equipment will be installed to lower production costs.

The total cost of this program is estimated at approximately 73.5 million dollars. More than half of the cost will be met out of IISCO's revenues and by loans and advances from the Indian Government; the Bank's loan will be used to pay for imported equipment and services.

While the Bank in the past has lent funds for private manufacturing enterprises, it has done so by making loans to intermediary borrowers, such as central or development banks, who have re-lent the proceeds to these enterprises. The IISCO loan is the first the Bank has made directly to a manufacturer. The interest rate is 4¾ percent including the 1 percent commission which, in accordance with the Bank's articles of agreement, is allocated to a special reserve. Amortization payments will begin on April 15, 1959, and are calculated to pay off the loan on October 15, 1967.

This is the Bank's fourth loan in India. The others are 31.2 million dollars for the rehabilitation of the Indian railways; 18.5 million dollars for the development of power and irrigation in the Damodar Valley; and 7.5 million dollars for land clearance in central India. The first project has been completed; the others are still being carried out.

Point Four Agreement for Indian Malaria Control

Press release 933 dated December 30

A malaria-control program designed to provide protection for approximately 75 million people in India by March 1954 has been agreed upon between the Government of that country and the Technical Cooperation Administration, it was announced on December 30. The program provides for a contribution by the United States of 5,200,000 dollars of Point Four funds for the first

year's operation and of 14,900,000 rupees (the equivalent of 3,129,000 dollars) by India for the same period.

During the last fiscal year the United States contributed 648 thousand dollars of Point Four funds to the Indian malaria-control program. These funds were used for the purchase of DDT and resochin tablets.

India has included the control of malaria in its over-all 5-year development plan. Point Four will supply some 4,000 long tons of 75 percent wettable DDT, 2,250 Hudson sprayers, 4,500 stirrup pumps, 75 motor-driven spraying units, 75 microscopes, 300 trucks, 75 jeeps, and 9 station wagons for the operation of the program. The cost of these items, all to be purchased in the United States, is estimated at 5,200,000 dollars. The Indian contribution is to be used in defraying local costs, materials, and services.

For more than a century, malaria has been recognized as the most formidable health problem in India. The Government already has taken measures to combat it and its program today is calculated to bring benefits to some 30 million people. The best available statistics indicate an annual occurrence of 100 million cases with one million deaths directly attributable to the disease and another million in which malaria is an indirect factor.

There are no direct figures on the personal monetary losses the disease has been causing, but the World Health Organization found that since the beginning of its malaria program in Terai, United Provinces, there has been a 36 percent increase in land under cultivation, an equal percentage of increase in grain-food production, more than 100 percent increase in production of grain and edible oils and in industrial undertakings. There was a 75 percent increase in population due to resettlement of Pakistani refugees who returned to the territory after it was made safe.

The organization for the malaria-control program rests with the Malaria Institute of India and the state governments. Nine of the states have programs in operation; eight others have limited organizations. They are assisted with funds and technical advisers by the Central Government.

The proposed nation-wide program which provides for continuous operation is divided into a 3-year accelerated program, financed in part by the Indo-American Fund to bring malaria speedily under control, and a state-controlled program financed by the states with or without funds from the Central Government. The over-all control will rest with the Ministry of Health of India, with state, private, and governmental-agency participation.

The international, bilateral, and selected governmental agencies will serve as an advisory committee to the Ministry of Health with respect to the malaria-control program and its operation. They will also provide expert technical consulta-

tion or assistance as requested by the Ministry of Health of India or by the states. Constant evaluation of the program will be made to insure its efficient operation.

The Indian 5-year plan also includes the construction of a DDT plant (programed for 1954-55) to supplement the output of the DDT plant programed by the Government of India with the assistance of the World Health Organization. The plant is scheduled to be put into operation during the spring of 1954, with an output of 750 tons of DDT.

The Indo-American cooperative program is for 3 years. During that time the Indo-American Fund will be used to provide financial assistance to the states through grants of DDT and essential new equipment. State governments and the Central Government will provide the rupee costs for operations in an amount at least equal to the DDT costs. At the end of the 3-year period the Central and state governments will provide all funds for the continuation of the program. It is planned to establish and operate 200 malaria-control units. Each unit will benefit about one million population and will utilize from 30 to 40 tons of DDT. It will consist of a malaria-control officer, four senior malaria-control inspectors, four malaria inspectors, an accountant, three clerks, five van drivers, 13 field workers (full time), 130 part-time field workers, and 6 other persons for watchmen, sweepers, and peons.

It is planned to get 75 of these units into operation during 1953-54. An additional 50 will be added the next year and a final 75, to bring the total to 200, during the third year of the program.

The World Health Organization and Rockefeller Foundation have collaborated in India's malaria-control program and the latter still provides consultation on request, overseas training for malariologists and contributions to the support of operations in malaria control in Mysore State.

During the entire period of the program, special attention will be given to training Indian technicians to continue the operations when the original 3-year plan is completed. The medical officers and malaria inspectors will receive their training at the Malaria Institute and the spraying crews will get their training in the field.

Point Four in Saudi Arabia

Press release 2 dated January 2

Dr. Samuel S. Stratton, U.S. director of Technical Cooperation in Saudi Arabia, having concluded his assignment, left his post on December 19, 1952, to return to the United States.

John A. Dunaway, chief of the Government Services and Public Administration Division of the TCA staff in Saudi Arabia, will be acting director of technical cooperation until a successor to Dr. Stratton is named. Mr. Dunaway, a specialist in customs and tariff matters with long experience in the international field, has had service with various international commissions in the Near East and a period of service as financial adviser to the Government of Liberia. He is presently engaged in helping the Government of Saudi Arabia revise and modernize its entire tariff and customs system, as part of a broader undertaking for systematizing the entire fiscal and monetary structure of the Government.

During Dr. Stratton's year in Saudi Arabia, a monetary agency has been established; a system of Government control over expenditures and receipts has been inaugurated; a new currency has been adopted; ground-water surveying and water-well construction has continued and expanded; plans have been completed for surveys of the Riyadh-Jidda railway route, preliminary to award of contracts for construction; the nation's first commercial school has been started; and preliminary work has been completed on a cooperative community-development program, which will be a large-scale effort by the Saudi Arabian Government to improve the economic and social conditions of villagers. Activities in health, sanitation, education, and agriculture are expected to get under way shortly.

Letter of Credence

Syria

The newly appointed Ambassador of Syria, Farid Zeineddine, presented his credentials to the President on December 18. For text of the Ambassador's remarks and of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 925 of December 18.

American Citizens in the U.N. Secretariat

LETTER FROM SECRETARY ACHESON TO REPRESENTATIVE FRANK L. CHELF¹

Press release 932 dated December 30

DECEMBER 30, 1952

MY DEAR MR. CHELF:

In the course of testimony before the Subcommittee of which you are Chairman, an official of the Department of State has discussed the highly confidential arrangements whereby the Department of State has identified for the Secretary-General of the United Nations American citizens employed in the United Nations Secretariat, or contemplated for employment therein, whom the Department believed, on the basis of investigation, to be Communists or under Communist discipline.

You have asked that officers of the Department furnish to your Committee the names of the persons in the Department of State who evaluated the information resulting from the investigation of American citizens employed or who were contemplated for employment by the United Nations. Evaluation is not a single act. It is a process involving a series of responsible administrative actions. The official in the Department of State who is responsible, under my supervision, for handling all aspects of United States policy toward the United Nations and all relationships between the United States and the United Nations is Mr. John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs. On instructions from the President, the Department is unable to supply you with the names of those persons who participated in the evaluating process in connection with American citizens in the employ of the United Nations.

To carry out successfully the foreign policy of the United States, the Department of State requires loyal, objective, fearless, and able performance of duty by operating officials. All tasks assigned to a subordinate official of the Department of State must be carried out in that manner, whether the individual likes the particular task or not. Some tasks are themselves likable and enjoyable while others must be performed regardless of whether the official enjoys them. If the name of a subordinate official who evaluated se-

curity information regarding American employees in the United Nations were to be made public, or, indeed, if the names of those officers who drafted particular political documents regarding our relations with individual foreign countries were to be made public, the successful carrying out of the foreign policy of the United States would be adversely affected, if not seriously compromised. It is apparent, at the outset, that a demand for the names of subordinate officials involved in any particular foreign relations task of the Department of State is, by itself, indicative that the task upon which they have been engaged is a matter of public controversy; if the subject matter itself were not a matter of controversy there would ordinarily be little motivation for any desire to identify subordinate officials connected with it. A practice of making public these names would of necessity be a signal to all subordinate officials of the Department of State to avoid as best they could becoming involved in matters which were controversial, or, if unavoidable, for each to tailor his actions with respect to such a matter to what he conceived to be, at that time, the state of popular feeling or of any articulate portion of the public regarding it, even though he considered that action based upon that feeling or a portion of it to be contrary to the interest of the United States, as his own honest, considered, and trained judgment saw that interest. Not only that, he would be apt to document his precise contribution or attitude—"make a record"—on the controversy against the day when he would have to justify himself "on the record". A foreign service or civil service career official, loyal and trained, who enjoyed his work and wished to continue in it, would without question consider that he would be taking risks which would appear to him to be undue should he act otherwise under those circumstances. A Department of State whose officers avoided working on difficult and controversial matters, or adjusted their own judgments to what they conceived to be popular judgments, or were busily engaged in "making records", could not operate effectively to carry on successfully the foreign relations of the United States.

These considerations have long been recognized in the Department and have resulted in the adoption long ago of the principle of effective responsibility of the top officials of the Department.

¹Chairman, Special Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary.

These men, the Assistant Secretaries of State or their equivalent in rank, are responsible for the work of all subordinate officials who serve under them. They, and the Secretary of State under whose supervision they work, are responsible for all the work performed by the Department of State. Their subordinates have their confidence or they cease to be subordinates. It is essential in order that the efficiency of the Department as an operating institution be maintained, to preserve this principle. To disclose the names of subordinate officials who have evaluated the security information on an American citizen employed by the United Nations, or who drafted a controversial note to the French, would undermine that principle to the detriment of the Department and the United States.

The arrangements between the United States and the United Nations regarding the identification of American citizens employed by the United Nations who are Communists or under Communist discipline were established on the most highly classified basis in 1949. The names of the evaluating officials in the Department of State who performed functions under this arrangement were classified on the same basis at the same time. While the existence of this arrangement has been made public, this portion of the arrangement has not been and cannot be declassified. It is essential that this be so in order that the integrity of the investigative files themselves can be maintained. For the furnishing of the names of these officials can lead only to questioning of these officials regarding their action—the reasons for their evaluation of particular individuals. Such questions could be answered only upon the basis of information contained in investigative files as recollected by the officer. As a consequence, information contained in investigative files themselves would have been disclosed. As you know, it is the established policy of this Government that security files of individuals must remain confidential in the public interest.

For these reasons, and by direction of the President, the names of the subordinate evaluating officers cannot be furnished.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN ACHESON

**STATEMENT BY JOHN D. HICKERSON
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR U.N. AFFAIRS²**

Press release 934 dated December 31

I should like to begin by first clarifying certain important points that have arisen in the recent discussions on the subject of the loyalty of Americans on the U.N. Secretariat. Let me summarize

²Made before the Special Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Dec. 31. For text of Mr. Hickerson's statement before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on Dec. 10, see BULLETIN of Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1026.

the main points first and then take them up in greater detail later.

1. The Department of State has always felt that Americans who are Communists or under Communist discipline should not be employed by the United Nations and that all appropriate steps should be taken to remove them. This view has been shared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who under the Charter of the United Nations has the responsibility of hiring and firing Secretariat employees.

2. In 1946 Secretary Byrnes established the policy that, with the exception of the appointment of the first Assistant Secretary-General for Administrative and Financial Services, the U.S. Government would not make recommendations for employment on the U.N. Secretariat. That policy has been followed ever since.

3. The Department of State has never undertaken to clear or "give a clean bill of health" to any American employed by the United Nations. The fact that the Department of State did not make adverse comments on Americans on the U.N. Secretariat under a confidential arrangement started in the fall of 1949 did not mean that those individuals were cleared, and this was understood by the Secretary-General. The U.S. Government was not in a position to assume responsibility for the reliability of Americans on the Secretariat on loyalty grounds, and the Secretary-General was so informed.

4. The Department of State could not, without violating security practices of the U.S. Government, make available to the United Nations the information provided it by the FBI and other security agencies which was the basis for the adverse comments sent to the Secretary-General.

5. The Department has not had evidence justifying a conclusion that there was spying or espionage on the part of American citizens employed by the United Nations. If either the Department of State or the Department of Justice had had evidence justifying such a conclusion, prompt action would have been taken under the criminal laws of the United States by the Department of Justice which has responsibility for enforcing these laws.

6. Without in any way minimizing the importance which the Department places on seeing that the employees of the Secretariat are persons of integrity, it should be borne in mind that the security of classified information is not involved in this question. The employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations do not have access to any U. S. security information.

7. Despite the handicaps which the confidential nature of the arrangement with the Secretary-General imposed on it, the arrangement achieved the dismissal of a number of disloyal Americans and prevented the employment of others.

Misconceptions on these points have arisen from the failure to understand the background of the

confidential arrangement between the U.S. Government and the Secretary-General on subversive Americans on the U.N. Secretariat. The confidential nature of the arrangement created limitations and difficulties.

The U.N. Secretariat is one of the principal organs of the United Nations. It is a staff of international employees charged with servicing the various organs and agencies of the United Nations and of serving the 60 member nations represented in these organs. It was clear when the organization of the United Nations was being planned that this staff had to be set up as an impartial and objective staff, subject to the orders of no member state. The Secretariat was accordingly placed under the authority of the Secretary-General, the chief administrative officer of the organization, and established as an international civil service not subject to instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization. Of course, we realized that some governments might abuse the position of their nationals on the Secretariat. But we believed that the United States should set an example, and we did, in seeking to assure a firm basis for the international character of the Secretariat as the only means of establishing a solid basis of confidence by the member states in the work of the organization.

It is important to look at the precise provisions of the Charter on this subject:

Article 7, paragraph 1 states that "There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat."

Articles 97 through 101 recite the detailed Charter provisions in regard to the composition of the Secretariat. These articles read as follows:

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instruc-

tions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

In effect the Charter, in particular articles 100 and 101, states that hiring and dismissal of U.N. staff members is the sole responsibility of the Secretary-General in accordance with the regulations established by the General Assembly and that the Secretary-General shall not seek or receive instructions from any government in the discharge of this duty as well as his other duties. At the same time, every member state is committed to respect the international character of the Secretary-General's responsibilities and not to seek to influence him. The United States has acted accordingly in its relations with the Secretary-General.

The second factor basically affecting the nature of the confidential arrangement was that before the International Jurists' Report last month³ the Secretary-General had not found it possible to discharge Americans on the stated ground that they were Communists or under Communist discipline. Furthermore, in discharging employees the Secretary-General had to contend with an elaborate appeals procedure, including an Administrative Tribunal, with power to demand a reversal of the Secretary-General's action or damages in lieu thereof. These circumstances made it essential that the Secretary-General protect himself against the charge that he was being unduly influenced by the U.S. Government, in violation of the Charter, when moving against persons identified by the Department as subversive.

At the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, Trygve Lie was elected Secretary-General and, under regulations established by the General Assembly, he proceeded to appoint the Secretariat staff.

Subsequently, in 1946 the Secretary-General discussed with the Department the recommendation of an American as Assistant Secretary-General for Administrative and Financial Services, and the general question as to whether the U.S.

³ U.N. doc. A/INF/51 dated Dec. 5, 1952.

Government proposed to make recommendations with respect to other U.S. nationals to be employed in the Secretariat. J. B. Hutson was recommended for the post of Assistant Secretary-General by Secretary Byrnes and was appointed by Mr. Lie. At the same time, Secretary Byrnes indicated that it would be the policy of the U.S. Government not to make recommendations with respect to subordinate positions. The Department, in pursuance of this policy, has not recommended persons for employment in the Secretariat. It has not given instructions to the Secretary-General, nor has it assumed a responsibility for "clearing" employees.

When I assumed my present duties as Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs in August 1949, I found that the Department of State was concerned over the situation which investigative reports were disclosing. A few days after assuming these duties I discussed this problem with one of the principal assistants of the U.N. Secretary-General. As a result of our mutual concern with the problem, there was worked out a confidential arrangement under which the U.S. Government was to identify for the Secretary-General U.S. nationals employed by the United Nations or contemplated for employment who would appear to be members of the Communist Party or under Communist discipline. The purpose of this arrangement was to give the Secretary-General all the assistance we felt we could properly give him but without assuming any part of his responsibility.

Under this arrangement, the Secretary-General undertook to submit to the Department lists of names of U.S. nationals on the Secretariat or being considered for employment, with the request that the Department inform the United Nations whether readily available information disclosed any police or criminal record. The Department of State initiated name check investigations drawing upon such information as was available in the Department, together with such information as was made available on request by the FBI and other investigative agencies of the Government. The information was reviewed by the Department. A routine reply was then made to the United Nations on the question of evidence of a criminal or police record. If the national agency checks had produced information which was considered to warrant an adverse comment on the grounds of Communist membership or subjection to Communist discipline, this adverse comment was conveyed by word of mouth before despatch of the cover reply. The security practices of the U.S. Government made it impossible to communicate to the United Nations the detailed security information on which the adverse comment was based.

Let me emphasize that we did not undertake to "clear" anybody, and the Secretary-General understood this. Furthermore, as a consequence of

the confidential nature of the arrangement, the U.S. Government was not in a position to conduct full field investigations on Americans in the U.N. Secretariat. Such investigations would have become a matter of general knowledge and would have undermined the operation of the arrangement.

The arrangement thus operated under many handicaps. A considerable period was required for the U.S. Government to deal with individual cases. The removal of Americans identified under the arrangement by the Secretary-General required further time. Ill-advised or precipitate action would have revealed the confidential arrangement and made it even more difficult to bring about removal. The determination of loyalty in border-line cases was extremely difficult due to the dependence on information gained from normal channels and the inability to conduct and follow through on field investigations. Nevertheless, the arrangement was the best possible one under the circumstances and did produce results. The arrangement has achieved the dismissal of a number of Americans on whom the State Department transmitted adverse comments and has prevented the employment of others.

Throughout the period of the operation of the confidential arrangement, we have been involved in the serious and delicate problems inherent in an international staff of a world-wide organization. It is difficult for the United Nations to justify one rule for American employees and other rules for other nationalities. There are a number of valued and capable employees whose countries have lost their freedom since their employment by the United Nations. The home countries of these employees would welcome a chance to terminate their employment with the United Nations and to submit substitutes for them in the Secretariat. At the present time, approximately one-half of the nationals of Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Secretariat were employed before the Communists took over the Governments of these countries, and the Secretary-General has resisted pressure from their present Governments to effect their removal. Competent Secretariat employees should be protected from political changes of government, peaceful or revolutionary, in their home countries, if an effective Secretariat is to be maintained.

Because of the complexities of the problem and of the U.S. concern, the Secretary-General on November 7 announced the appointment of a Commission of international jurists to study this whole problem and submit recommendations to him. On November 29 the Commission's report was published. In effect, the Commission of jurists concluded that the United Nations should not employ any person on whom he has reasonable grounds for belief that he is engaged or has been engaged or is likely to be engaged in subversive activities against the host government; and that the Secre-

tary-General of the United Nations had the authority to discharge and to deny employment to such U.S. nationals.

The Department of State has recommended to the President that he sign an Executive order taking full advantage of the conclusions and recommendations of the jurists' report and of the Secretary-General's acceptance of it. Under the proposed procedure the U.S. Government will screen present and proposed U.S. employees of the United Nations and transmit information to the Secretary-General to insure that only loyal Americans are employed.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF FORTHCOMING EXECUTIVE ORDER

Press release 931 dated December 30

At the direction of the President, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the Civil Service Commission have prepared an Executive order designed to assure that American citizens employed by the United Nations are loyal Americans and persons of the highest integrity, faithful to their obligations as international civil servants. The Executive order will establish a procedure for the screening of Americans on the U.N. Secretariat which is similar to the Federal loyalty program. This procedure was made possible by and formulated in the light of the conclusions and recommendations made in the report of the U.N. Commission of Jurists of November 29, 1952, and accepted by the U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie as the basis of his personnel policy.

The report of the jurists concluded that the Secretary-General has authority to remove Americans from his staff on the grounds of disloyalty to the host country, the United States. As stated by the jurists:

In exercising his responsibility for the selection and retention of staff the Secretary-General should regard it as of the first importance to refrain from engaging or to remove from the staff any person whom he has reasonable grounds for believing to be engaged or to have been engaged, or to be likely to be engaged in any subversive activities against the host country.

The jurists' report pointed up the difficulties for the Secretary-General in proceeding against a Secretariat employee on the basis alone of a member state's general conclusion that the person in question should be removed. The report suggested that the member state should give the Secretary-General evidence or information supporting its conclusion. These observations were made in connection with the jurists' affirmation that the selection and retention of the U.N. staff is the sole responsibility of the Secretary-General.

Following acceptance of the jurists' report by the Secretary-General, the Department of State informed the President that the report established a comprehensive and satisfactory basis for assur-

ing that only loyal Americans are employed on the U.N. Secretariat. Both the Department of State and the Secretary-General had been in agreement that subversive Americans should not be employed by the United Nations and that all appropriate steps should be taken to remove them. However, before the jurists' report, the Secretary-General had not found it possible to remove Americans on these stated grounds. This made it necessary that assistance given by the U.S. Government to the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities be on a highly confidential basis with all their limitations and attendant difficulties.

The Executive order will establish for Americans employed or being considered for employment by the United Nations a procedure of investigation, hearing, and review. Full field investigations will be conducted by the FBI on all persons other than minor employees. Full field investigations will be conducted even on minor employees when warranted by derogatory information developed by the Civil Service Commission in a preliminary investigation. Following investigation, individuals on whom adverse information is developed will be afforded the opportunity of hearings and review by the Civil Service Commission Regional Loyalty Boards and the Loyalty Review Board on the basis of the standards set forth in the Executive order.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations will be advised of the decisions of the Loyalty Boards together with the reasons therefor, stated in such detail as security considerations of the United States permit. Furthermore, at any stage in an investigation, the Secretary-General may be provided with derogatory information as a basis for suspension or other interim action pending a final determination by the Loyalty Boards. Under article 101 of the U.N. Charter, the decision as to employment or removal rests with the Secretary-General.

The new procedure will differ from former arrangements in four major respects. (1) For the first time, the United States will be able to give clearance to American employees in the United Nations. Until now it has not given clearance or a "clean bill of health" to anyone. (2) The information essential for a responsible and considered determination of the loyalty of Americans employed in the United Nations will now be available through investigative processes comparable to those for Federal employees, including full field investigations where necessary. (3) Americans employed in the United Nations will be protected in their rights through the hearing and appeal process. (4) The Secretary-General will have the benefit of pertinent information as a basis for his decisions.

It is expected that the Executive order will be issued promptly. Detailed plans for its implementation are being pressed urgently by the Civil

Service Commission and the Departments of State and Justice within the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government, and in consultation between this Government and the United Nations.

The United States is host to the United Nations at its headquarters in New York. It regards the United Nations as an important instrument for the promotion of international peace and security, and it has been the U.S. objective since its establishment to strengthen the United Nations so that it can fulfill the purposes of the Charter effectively and in accordance with its principles. The new procedure under the Executive order is in furtherance of that objective, and is consistent with the role of the United States as a faithful member, supporter, and host.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF JANUARY 9

Press release 12 dated January 9

All true Americans share the view that U.S. citizens of only the highest integrity and having the fullest confidence of the public should be employed by the United Nations. The U.S. Government is unrelentingly opposed to communism and to those who accept its discipline. U.S. nationals who fit this description are not suitable international civil servants.

The President today issued an Executive order designed to assure that Americans employed by the United Nations are loyal Americans and persons of the highest integrity, faithful to their obligations as international civil servants. It is hoped that the procedures established under the Executive order will allay current anxiety about the loyalty of Americans employed by the U.N. Secretariat and will free from any taint of suspicion the vast majority of the 2,000 Americans whose service in the United Nations has been a credit to this Nation.

It is important to reaffirm the wholehearted support of the people and Government of the United States for the principles and objectives of the U.N. The new procedure under the Executive order reinforces this support as it assists the Secretary-General in removing from the U.N. Secretariat and preventing the employment by it of Americans who are in no way suitable persons for an international civil service.

The U.N. is still a new organization. Only the tests of experience and the willingness of its member states to contribute to its strengthening will cure the imperfections of such a new organization. But, with these imperfections, the U.N. remains the best instrument at our disposal in the quest for international peace and security. As the host Government for the United Nations, it behooves us all to reaffirm our faith in the organization. We must never cease to work in a calm, orderly, and persistent manner toward the goal for which it was established and to do our utmost to help it to function effectively.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10422¹

Prescribing procedures for making available to the Secretary General of the United Nations certain information concerning United States citizens employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat of the United Nations

WHEREAS the United States has ratified the Charter of the United Nations and is participating in the activities of the United Nations by virtue of the ratification of the said Charter (59 Stat. 1031), and of the authority granted by the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (59 Stat. 619); and

WHEREAS a Commission of Jurists has advised the Secretary General of the United Nations that he should regard it as of the first importance to refrain from employing or to dismiss from employment on the Secretariat of the United Nations any United States citizen who he has reasonable grounds for believing has been, is, or is likely to be, engaged in espionage or subversive activities against the United States; and

WHEREAS the Commission of Jurists has also advised that the United States should make available to the Secretary General information on which the Secretary General can make his determination as to whether reasonable grounds exist for believing that a United States citizen employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat has been, is, or is likely to be, engaged in espionage or subversive activities against the United States; and

WHEREAS the Commission of Jurists has further advised that the independence of the Secretary General and his sole responsibility to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the selection and retention of staff should be recognized by all Member Nations; and

WHEREAS the Secretary General has declared his intention to use the conclusions and recommendations of the opinion of the said Commission of Jurists as the basis of his personnel policy in discharging the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Charter and staff regulations of the United Nations; and

WHEREAS in the participation by the United States in the activities of the United Nations it is in the interest of the United States that United States citizens who are employees of the Secretariat of the United Nations be persons of the highest integrity and not persons who have been, are, or are likely to be, engaged in espionage or subversive activities against the United States; and

WHEREAS it is in the interest of the United States to establish a procedure for the acquisition of information by investigation and for its transmission to the Secretary General in order to assist the Secretary General in the exercise of his responsibility for determining whether any United States citizen employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat has been, is, or is likely to be, engaged in espionage or subversive activities against the United States; and

WHEREAS such procedure should afford opportunity for hearing to any United States citizen employed or being considered for employment on the Secretariat as to whom an investigation discloses derogatory information, so that the person affected may challenge the accuracy of any such information;

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

¹18 Fed. Reg. 239.

PART I - INVESTIGATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS EMPLOYED OR BEING CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT ON THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1. Upon the receipt by the Secretary of State from the Secretary General of the United Nations of the name of and other necessary identifying data concerning each United States citizen employed or being considered for employment by the United Nations, there shall be an investigation of such person in accordance with the standard set forth in Part II of this order.

2. The Secretary of State shall forward the information received from the Secretary General of the United Nations to the United States Civil Service Commission, and the Commission shall conduct a preliminary investigation.

3. The preliminary investigation conducted by the Civil Service Commission of any such person shall be made at all available pertinent sources of information and shall include reference to:

- (a) Federal Bureau of Investigation files.
- (b) Civil Service Commission files.
- (c) Military and naval intelligence files as appropriate.
- (d) The files of any other appropriate Government investigative or intelligence agency.
- (e) The files of appropriate committees of the Congress.
- (f) Local law-enforcement files at the place of residence and employment of the person, including municipal, county, and State law-enforcement files.
- (g) Schools and colleges attended by the person.
- (h) Former employers of the person.
- (i) References given by the person.
- (j) Any other appropriate source.

4. Whenever information revealed with respect to any such person is derogatory, within the standard set forth in Part II of this order, the United States Civil Service Commission shall forward the information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau shall conduct a full field investigation of such person: *Provided*, that in all cases involving a United States citizen employed or being considered for employment on the internationally recruited staff of the United Nations, the investigation required by this Part shall be a full field investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

5. Reports of full field investigations shall be forwarded through the United States Civil Service Commission to the appropriate Regional Loyalty Board of the Civil Service Commission. Whenever such a report contains derogatory information, under the standard set forth in Part II of this order, there shall be made available to the person in question the procedures of the Civil Service Regional Loyalty Board (including the opportunity of a hearing) and the right of appeal to the Commission's Loyalty Review Board, in like manner as provided for with respect to employment with the executive branch of the Government of the United States under Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended. The Regional Loyalty Board, or the Loyalty Review Board on appeal, shall transmit its determinations, together with the reasons therefor stated in such detail as security considerations permit, to the Secretary of State for transmission to the Secretary General of the United Nations for his use in exercising the responsibility with respect to the integrity of the personnel employed by the United Nations imposed upon him by the Charter of the United Nations and the regulations established by the General Assembly, and in light of the Report of the Commission of Jurists.

6. At any stage during the investigation or loyalty board proceeding the Secretary of State may forward to the Secretary General, in as much detail as the investigative and loyalty review agencies determine that security considerations will permit, the derogatory information disclosed by investigation. This shall be for the purpose of permitting the Secretary General to determine whether or

not he should take Interim action with respect to the employee prior to the completion of the procedures outlined in this order. The making available of any such information shall be without prejudice to the right of full hearing and appeal as provided for herein.

7. The Secretary of State shall notify the Secretary General in all cases in which no derogatory information has been developed.

PART II - STANDARD


1. The standard to be used by a Regional Loyalty Board or by the Loyalty Review Board on appeal, in making an advisory determination as provided for in paragraph 5 of Part I of this order with respect to a United States citizen who is an employee or is being considered for employment by the United Nations, shall be whether or not on all the evidence there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States.

2. Activities and associations of a United States citizen who is an employee or being considered for employment by the United Nations which may be considered in connection with the determination whether or not on all the evidence there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved to the Government of the United States may include one or more of the following:

- (a) Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs.
- (b) Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof.
- (c) Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the constitutional form of government of the United States.
- (d) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of United States documents or United States information of a confidential or non-public character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his previous employment by the Government of the United States or otherwise.
- (e) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, while an employee of the United States Government during a previous period, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
- (f) Membership in, or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, or group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

PART III - OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The provisions of Parts I and II of this order shall be applicable to United States citizens who are employees of, or are being considered for employment by, other public international organizations of which the United States Government is a member, by arrangement between the executive head of the international organization concerned and the Secretary of State or other officer of the United States designated by the President.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 9, 1953.

Migration Committee To Expand Services in 1953

FOURTH SESSION OF THE PROVISIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF MIGRANTS FROM EUROPE

by George L. Warren

The fourth session of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe was held at Geneva from October 13 through October 21, 1952.¹

The Migration Committee was established provisionally for 1 year at Brussels in December 1951, following the Conference on Migration, which was attended by 27 governments. Fifteen of the governments that were represented at Brussels participated in establishing the Committee; its purpose was to facilitate the movement out of Europe during 1 year of operations of approximately 100,000 migrants and refugees, who would not otherwise be moved.

The 19 governments which were represented as members of the Committee at the fourth session were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Paraguay, Sweden (which had joined since the third session), Switzerland, the United States, and Venezuela. Interested international organizations, the Holy See, and the following 10 governments were represented at this meeting by observers: Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Norway, Panama, Peru, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay. Bolivia was represented at the second session as a full member, but has not yet confirmed its membership in writing to the director.

At the fourth session the representative of Norway indicated informally that favorable parliamentary action on the membership of Norway might be expected shortly; this was confirmed

after the meeting by Norway's formal acceptance of membership. Word was received from the Argentine Government during the session that a decision to join the Committee had been reached, and the Committee was requested to send a representative to Rio de Janeiro after the meeting to negotiate for Argentina's membership. The representative of Costa Rica indicated informally his Government's interest in joining the Committee at an early date.

The following were elected to serve as officers at the fourth session: Count Giusti del Giardino (Italy), chairman, A. L. Nutt (Australia), first vice chairman, N. Hadji Vassiliou (Greece), second vice chairman, F. Donoso (Chile), *rapporteur*.

The Subcommittee on Finance, composed of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States, met from October 9 through October 11 and thereafter occasionally during the fourth session of the full Committee. The U.S. representative was elected chairman. The Subcommittee considered the report of the director on the budget and plan of expenditure for 1952, the proposed revised staff regulations, the proposed budget and plan of expenditure for 1953, the proposed scale of government contributions to the administrative budget for 1953, and the proposed revised financial regulations.

Total of 62,808 Moved From Europe

The Subcommittee found that between February 1 and September 30, 1952, the Committee had moved 62,808 persons out of Europe, including 23,876 refugees. Of the latter, 660 were moved with the assistance of voluntary agencies. It also found that the anticipated movement for the calendar year 1952 would approximate 100,000 as

¹ For articles by Mr. Warren on the Brussels Conference on Migration and the first, second, and third sessions of the Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 169; *ibid.*, Apr. 21, 1952, p. 638; and *ibid.*, July 21, 1952, p. 107.

opposed to the 137,000 estimated at the second session of the Committee in February 1952. The sources and destinations of the 62,808 moved were as follows:

<i>Countries of Emigration</i>		<i>Countries of Immigration</i>	
Austria	10,375	Australia	10,702
Far East	600	Brazil	5,365
Germany	34,578	Canada	7,295
Greece	126	Chile	563
Italy	6,011	Israel	264
Netherlands	7,451	United States	36,618
Trieste	753	Venezuela	627
Other	2,914		

In consequence of this reduced movement, the revised estimate of income for administrative expenditures for 1952 was \$2,252,080 as opposed to \$2,359,060 previously budgeted. The revised estimate of income for operations for 1952 was \$27,984,793 as against the earlier budget of \$38,991,600. Including \$20,890 of miscellaneous income, the estimated total income for 1952 was set down as \$30,257,763 as against the earlier figure of \$41,350,660. Contributions to the administrative budget received by September 30, 1952, totaled \$1,667,476, leaving a balance due of \$584,604, including \$196,391, the fourth quarter payment of the United States. Assuming the receipt of all estimated income and the final movement of 100,000 persons in the calendar year 1952, there would probably be a carry-over of resources on January 1, 1953, of approximately \$3,000,000, which was considered to be a minimum requirement if operations were to be continued in 1953.

The Subcommittee transmitted the estimate of income of \$30,257,763 and of expenditures of \$26,950,830 for the calendar year 1952 to the full Committee for its consideration. In doing so, the Subcommittee noted that the payment of contributions to the administrative budget by member governments had been very satisfactory, but that contributions to the operating fund for the payment of nonreimbursable movements would fall short by \$1,200,000 of the original estimate of \$11,000,000.

The Subcommittee reviewed in detail the proposed revised staff regulations, including a new salary scale, designed to provide more flexibility at no greater cost to the Committee, and transmitted the draft as revised to the full Committee. The Canadian and U.S. representatives expressed their preference for an all-inclusive salary scale at headquarters but did not press the issue. The Subcommittee also examined and transmitted to the full Committee the revised financial regulations submitted by the director for adoption in the event that operations were continued beyond December 31, 1952.

The Subcommittee on Finance also examined a proposed revision of the scale of allocations to member governments of contributions to the administrative expenditures for 1953, which was set forth both in terms of percentages and units with a proposed value for each unit. One hundred percent of the administrative expenditures for

1953 was allocated to the existing membership. Additional allocations were made to prospective members. The allocation to the United States remained at 33.33 percent as in the original scale effective for 1952. The percentages assigned to other members were in all cases slightly increased. However, the total dollar amount of each contribution for 1953 was less than the respective contribution for 1952, due to the lower budget of administrative expenditures for 1953. The revised scale was transmitted to the full Committee for consideration and adoption.

Expansion of Committee's Activities Proposed

Having considered the progress report of the director covering the period from June 1 to September 30, 1952, the full Committee dealt first with the question of continuing the Committee's activities after December 31, 1952. The governments of certain emigration and immigration countries proposed the adoption of a resolution prolonging the activities of the Committee indefinitely beyond December 31, 1952. The discussion on the continuance of the Committee's activities was influenced substantially by the "Report on Technical Aid and International Financing for the Encouragement of Migratory Movements from Europe," made by the director in accordance with the Brazilian resolution adopted at the third session. This resolution requested the director to confer with other international organizations active in the field of migration with a view to reporting to the Committee at its fourth session the findings and conclusions of these organizations with respect to ways and means of facilitating migration through technical assistance and international financing, which might be of significance to the Committee in its efforts to achieve greater movement out of Europe. The director's report suggested that the Committee expand its services and, in particular, participate in the organization and financing of pilot colonization projects.

The argument presented by those governments which proposed to establish the Committee on a permanent basis was, briefly, that the Committee's experience in 1952, while fully justifying the establishment and continuation of the Committee, had shown that the mere movement of migrants and refugees, even with passage supplied for some at the expense of the Committee, had not produced the anticipated impact on the problems of surplus populations and refugees in Europe. In order to make a more effective contribution to the resolution of these problems, the Committee would need to expand its activities and devote attention to the possibilities of increasing the volume of migration from Europe through the encouragement of colonization schemes. To do this it would be necessary to give the Committee permanent status. In the discussion the representatives of cer-

tain immigration countries—notably, Australia, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela—took the position that a substantial increase above the present movement of migrants to their countries could take place only if accompanied by the investment of external capital in colonization projects.

The representatives of other member governments, including the United States, indicated that they were not prepared or authorized at this session of the Committee to consider the prolongation of the Committee's activities beyond the calendar year 1953. The future of the Committee and its terms of reference might be considered, however, during the sessions of the Committee to be held in 1953. These governments indicated also that they were not prepared to authorize the Committee at this time to engage in the management, operation, or financing of colonization projects but would support the offer of staff services by the Committee to the interested governments of emigration and immigration countries which might develop colonization projects cooperatively. It was envisaged that the participation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in the financing of these projects might be sought.

Committee To Continue Under New Title

The resolution finally adopted on the question of the continuance of the Committee's activities and on the "Report of the Director on Technical Aid and International Financing of Migration" provided that the Committee would continue operations during 1953 under the title "Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration," that it would expand its services directly connected with movement under the terms of the Brussels resolution, and that it would make its staff available to assist interested governments of emigration and immigration countries to develop a formula for the financing of colonization projects which might make possible the successful presentation of such projects to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development by these governments. All other proposals for activities by the Committee not covered by the basic resolution adopted at Brussels² would be presented to the Committee at its next session, as expanded terms of reference in a draft constitution proposing a more permanent status for the Committee.

The budget and plan of expenditures for 1953 as originally presented was based on a quota of movement during 1953 of 140,000. The Subcommittee on Finance considered this estimate optimistic. The director therefore revised the budget and plan of expenditures for 1953 to provide for a quota of movement of 120,000, administrative expenditures of \$2,147,000 as recommended by the Subcommittee on Finance, and operational ex-

penditures of \$34,608,475—a total of \$36,755,475. An item of \$600,000 was included in this budget, which was finally adopted by the full Committee, to provide for the improvement and expansion of services in processing migrants prior to movement and in the distribution of migrants after arrival in the reception countries—such services to be undertaken only at the request of governments and under the terms of the Brussels resolution. It was reported in the discussion that the governments of certain countries, such as Italy, Brazil, and Venezuela, were more interested than formerly in calling upon the Committee for expert services of this character. The discussion also suggested that the movement of migrants might be increased up to 25 percent by such services, even under existing immigration potentialities.

The Committee adopted revised staff and financial regulations and a new scale of allocations to member governments of contributions to the administrative expenditures. These actions were made necessary by the decision to continue the Committee's activities during 1953 and the developments during the current year.

The discussions of the Committee at its fourth session clearly showed that the countries of emigration—Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands—were anxious to achieve a larger movement of migrants out of Europe. Unfortunately, the contraction in movements to Australia and Canada, anticipated to be temporary at the previous session, had continued during the fall of 1952, and movements to the Latin American countries, though promising, had not attained the desired momentum. The cessation of movement to the United States, owing to the termination of the U.S. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, was also an important factor in reducing the volume of movement. These developments, however, served to renew the determination of the Committee to exercise every resource to exploit and to increase existing possibilities of immigration. The Committee was encouraged in this effort by the offers of collaboration and assistance made by the other international organizations which participated as observers in the Committee's session.

The United States was represented by George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State. Donald C. Blaisdell, U.S. representative for International Organization Affairs, Geneva, served as alternate representative. The advisers were Guy J. Swope, Chief, Displaced Populations Division, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany; Eric M. Hughes, Deputy Chief, Escapee Program Coordinating Unit, Frankfurt; and David E. Christian, Paris office, Mutual Security Agency.

The Committee decided to convene its fifth session at Geneva in March 1953.

•*Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State.*

² For text of this resolution, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 171.

U.N. Support for Early Austrian Settlement

Statement by Benjamin V. Cohen

*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 17

The United States welcomes the resolution proposed by Brazil, Lebanon, Mexico, and the Netherlands,² calling upon the governments concerned to reach agreement on an Austrian treaty to terminate the occupation of Austria and to restore to Austria its rights to sovereign statehood.

As one of the Four Powers occupying Austria, the United States on its part has sought, and will continue to seek, to carry out the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, that promised to restore to Austria her freedom and independence.

There can and should be no misunderstanding that the Moscow Declaration proclaimed and was intended to proclaim the restoration of Austrian independence as one of the objectives of the war against Nazi tyranny. It was so recognized by the Soviet Union: in a proclamation to the citizens of Vienna in March 1945, the late Marshal Tolbukhin, commanding the Russian forces in Austria, said:

The Red Army has set foot on the soil of Austria not to conquer Austrian territory. Its aim is exclusively the defeat of the enemy German-Fascist troops and the liberation of Austria.

The Red Army backs the Moscow Declaration of the Allied Powers on the independence of Austria.

The temporary occupation of Austria can be justified only as a war measure. The continuance of the occupation following the war can be justified only to the extent necessary to effect an orderly transfer of sovereign power to the Austrian people and to insure the removal of the tentacles, military, political, and economic, by which the Austrian people were held in the thrall of foreign tyranny. Austria's independence cannot be restored by transferring Austria from the tentacles of one tyranny to those of another. We are pledged to leave Austria free and not enslaved by or beholden to any foreign power, and by that pledge in its entirety the United States intends to stand.

¹Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Dec. 18.

²U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.16 dated Dec. 17.

Early in 1946 at the Council of Foreign Ministers the United States urged that consideration be given to an Austrian treaty to restore Austria's independence, and the United States continued so to urge at subsequent meetings of the Council. In a formal declaration on October 28, 1946, the United States reaffirmed that it "regarded Austria as a country liberated from forcible domination by Nazi Germany and not as an ex-enemy state."

The United States proposed that the four occupying powers should join not in a peace treaty as with an enemy state but in a state treaty with the liberated Austrian State recognizing its independence. In this position the United States had the support of the United Kingdom and France.

But it was not until early 1947 that the Soviet Union was willing to begin a discussion of the Austrian treaty. Since that time, 376 quadripartite meetings have been held; 33 were held in the Council of Foreign Ministers, 85 in the Austrian Treaty Commission, and 258 by the Austrian Treaty Deputies—but there is still no Austrian treaty.

The efforts of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to conclude a treaty which would restore to Austria its freedom and independence have been frustrated by the intransigent attitude of the Soviet Union. In the negotiations the Soviet Union conditioned its agreement to an Austrian treaty upon the settlement of specific problems on their own terms. The terms on which the Soviet Union insisted were not calculated to safeguard the sovereign independence of Austria but to perpetuate the dependency of Austria upon the Soviet Union even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In the summer of 1949 far-reaching concessions were made by the Western Powers to the Soviet Union and it was thought that a compromise agreement had been reached on the principal points standing in the way of a treaty. But no sooner was tentative agreement reached on these points than the Soviet Union insisted on new and some entirely extraneous conditions to the conclusion of the treaty. It would seem that the Soviet Union has little interest in a treaty to restore Austrian independence but is concerned

only to perpetuate and increase its power over Austria.

Soviet Attitude on German Assets in Austria

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Austrian treaty is most significantly revealed by its attitude on the problem of German assets in Austria.

Under the terms of the Potsdam Agreement, reparation claims of the Allied Powers against Germany were to be met in part from appropriate external German assets. It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria itself.

There was nothing in the Potsdam Agreement which detracted or could in good faith be construed to detract from the solemn Allied pledge in the Moscow Declaration that Austria should be restored as a free and independent State. There was, moreover, nothing in the Potsdam Agreement which detracted or could in good faith be construed to detract from the solemn Allied pledges in the London Declaration of January 5, 1943, that the Allied Powers would do their utmost to defeat methods of dispossession practiced by enemy governments in enemy-controlled countries, even though the dispossessions were apparently legal in form or purported to be voluntarily effected.

But despite the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and the London Declaration of 1943, the Soviet Union in its zone in Eastern Austria seized, under the claim of German external assets, hundreds of properties including (1) properties legally owned by the Austrian State; (2) properties seized by force and duress from legitimate owners by the Nazis; and (3) properties owned in part or in whole, not by Germans but by U.N. nationals.

In 1947 the Soviet Union transferred all these assets which it had seized in its zone to Soviet corporations, which have administered them without regard to Austrian laws and to the detriment of the Austrian economy. These corporations have become an *imperium in imperio* in disregard of Austrian sovereignty. They have claimed exemption from taxes, custom duties, and other laws of the land. Through these corporations the Soviet Union has put itself in a position to exert a strangle hold on the economic life of Austria.

This action of the Soviet Union, based upon its own unilateral and wholly unwarranted interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement, has cost Austria the use of properties valued conservatively in excess of 700 million dollars. These properties include, in addition to 300 industrial enterprises, over 200,000 acres of farm lands and forests.

The loss to Austria of the production of these properties and the loss of taxes and custom duties is figured in hundreds of millions of dollars. From oil production alone, the loss exceeds the amount which Austria would have been called upon to pay annually to the Soviet Union had a treaty been

Text of Austrian Treaty Resolution³

U.N. doc. A/Resolution 61
Dated December 23, 1952

The General Assembly,

RECALLING the terms of resolution 190 (III) of 3 November 1948, whereby an appeal was made to the great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace,

RECALLING the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 1 November 1943, whereby the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America recognized that Austria should be re-established as a free and independent State,

RECALLING FURTHER that the Government of France joined the three above-mentioned Governments in said declaration as of 16 November 1943,

CONSIDERING that, in the spirit of said declaration, the four Powers accepted the responsibility of re-establishing a free and independent Austria, and, to that end, have entered into negotiations toward the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty,

NOTING WITH CONCERN that those negotiations, which have been under way intermittently since 1947, have hitherto failed to bring about the proposed objective,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT that such state of affairs, still prevailing after a lapse of seven years since the liberation of Austria at the end of the Second World War, and arising from the inconclusive stage of the aforementioned negotiations, does constitute a source of deep disappointment for the Austrian people, who have by themselves made successful efforts toward the restoration and democratic reconstruction of their country,

RECOGNIZING that only through the unhampered exercise by the Austrian people of their freedom and independence can these efforts attain full realization,

TAKING FURTHER INTO ACCOUNT that such state of affairs hinders the full participation by Austria in the normal and peaceful relations of the community of nations and the full exercise of the powers inherent in its sovereignty.

HAVING IN MIND that the solution of this problem would constitute an important step towards the elimination of other areas of disagreement and therefore towards the creation of conditions favourable to the accomplishment of world peace,

DESIRING to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security and the developing of friendly relations among nations in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter,

ADDRESSES an earnest appeal to the Governments concerned to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian Treaty with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in its sovereignty.

³ The resolution was adopted by Committee I on Dec. 19 by a vote of 48-0-2 (Pakistan and Afghanistan); the Soviet bloc of five did not participate. The plenary session approved the resolution on Dec. 20 by an identical vote.

concluded upon the basis of compromise proposals made by the Western Powers in the summer of 1949.

Those proposals, as I have said, constituted major concessions on the part of the Western

Powers to the Soviet Union. For a time they promised to break the long stalemate on the treaty. A written statement of agreed principles was approved by all Four Powers.

Incorporating the provisions of the agreement into agreed articles of a treaty, however, proved to be more difficult. Finally, in October 1949, the Soviet Foreign Minister declared his Government would raise no further difficulties on the remainder of the unagreed articles if the Western Powers would accept the Soviet position on the German assets.

With this statement in mind and with the concurrence of the Austrian Government, agreement was reached on article 35 of the treaty, which involved further concessions to the Soviet viewpoint on the troublesome question of German assets. Only five relatively minor articles remained unagreed. It seemed as if the conclusion of the treaty were surely in sight.

Extraneous Issues Raised by the Soviets

The Soviets, however, shortly raised a new issue, taking the position that there could be no further negotiations on the unagreed articles until the question of Austria's debt to the Soviet Union for payment of supplies and services delivered to the Austrian Government by the Soviets at the close of the war was settled.

This was a matter completely between the Soviet Union and Austria. It had nothing to do with the treaty. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France were in no way involved. They had made no claims of this nature on the Austrian Government.

The Austrians speak of this claim as the "dried peas" debt. Its history goes back to the early days of the Allied occupation when the Soviets turned over to Austrian authorities large quantities of dried peas to feed the hungry population. The peas, it is alleged by the Austrians, actually were from Wehrmacht stores in Vienna which the Russians had captured.

The Austrians had found settling this debt difficult. The Soviets had refused to set a figure. They had ignored Austrian notes. In fact, the Austrians had been unable to obtain even a reply from the Soviet Government to the Austrian inquiry regarding payment.

However, in order that this issue might not continue to block conclusion of the treaty, the Western Powers finally offered to accept the Soviet version of this alleged debt and include it in the draft treaty.

The Soviets, however, refused to consent to agreement even on terms defined by themselves. As the insincerity of the Soviet position on this debt became too obvious for even Soviet comfort, they dropped it but raised the even more clearly extraneous issue of Trieste and, subsequently, questions relating to denazification and demilitarization of Austria.

These questions were not germane to the Austrian treaty or within the competence of the Austrian Treaty Deputies, whose sole function is to negotiate and to conclude an Austrian treaty.

Trieste is, of course, a question related to the Italian treaty. Austria has nothing to do with Trieste and can do nothing about Trieste. The Soviet Union is simply using Austria as a pawn in the Soviet Union's struggle to cling to and extend its own power in Central Europe.

As for demilitarization, the Allied Council in Vienna in 1947, after a Four Power survey of the entire country, reported that Austria possessed no military organizations, no military fortifications, no military armaments, no aircraft, no warships, and no naval installations.

The occupation forces do not permit possession by Austria of any of these items. She is not permitted to have even a civilian airplane, let alone military aircraft. In other words the country is, and has been for 7 years, completely demilitarized.

The only military forces in Austria today are those of the Allied Powers, and the facts are that the Soviet forces far exceed the combined strength of the Western Powers forces. Their military installations and airfields far outnumber those of the Western Powers. It is ridiculous, therefore, to say that Austria cannot be granted a treaty because it is not demilitarized. The one way to demilitarize Austria is to conclude a treaty which will rid Austria of foreign troops which it does not want.

The Soviet charge that the Austrian Government has failed to denazify is equally specious. Austria has complied with the denazification laws approved by the Allied Council. There are no blood purges or concentration camps in Austria. There are free elections and free political parties in Austria and an independent judiciary which insures respect for human rights. Austria may have some shortcomings, as have all other states, but Austria has freed itself from the Nazi patterns which are all too evident in the regimes of its Cominform neighbors.

Recent Attempts To Break the Impasse

I will speak briefly of more recent developments concerning the Austrian treaty. In a further and renewed effort to conclude a treaty, the Western Powers proposed a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies in London in January 1952. The Soviets refused to attend this meeting, again raising the extraneous issues to which I have referred.

In order to break this impasse, the Western Powers proposed on March 13, 1952, a short, simple treaty containing only the minimum essentials to an Austrian settlement and giving Austria real freedom as repeatedly promised by all four occupying powers. This abbreviated treaty contains only eight articles, all but one of which are agreed articles from the old, long draft treaty.

The single new article relates to the German assets. It calls for the relinquishment to Austria of all property, real and personal, of whatever description, held or claimed, by all of the occupying powers as German assets.

The Western Powers felt that this step was nothing less than simple justice in light of the fact that Austria has now been occupied for 7 years and that hundreds of millions of dollars have been drained from her economic assets. Concessions made by the Western Powers to give Austria prompt relief from the burdens of occupation cannot be indefinitely maintained when that prompt relief is not forthcoming.

In view of the heavy burdens which the prolonged occupation had imposed on Austria, we hoped that the Soviet Union would accept this abbreviated treaty.

The Soviet Government, however, refused to do so, despite an offer by the Western Powers to include four other agreed articles from the long draft treaty. The Soviet Union replied to this offer by raising again the same extraneous issues previously referred to and once again failed to appear for a meeting of the Treaty Deputies in London on September 29, 1952.

It is not the Western Powers' insistence on the exact terms of a long or a short treaty which stands in the way of the restoration of a free and independent Austria. It is, I am sorry to say, the intransigence of the Soviet Union which continues to use Austria as a pawn for its own imperialistic purposes and its own aggrandizement. The Western Powers are willing to accept any treaty in terms adequate to insure the restoration of Austria's independence and its freedom from foreign domination.

The United States does not consider it necessary to contrast the liberality of the occupation forces of the Western Powers in Austria with the oppressive character of the Soviet occupation policy. The record of the Western Powers in this regard is well known. An examination of this record would convince anyone that the Western Powers have, in the absence of a treaty, made every effort to ameliorate Austria's situation and to grant to the Austrian Government, to the greatest extent possible within the terms of existing occupation agreements, control of its own affairs. They will continue to do so.

The Brazilian resolution asks only simple justice for Austria; it asks only that the Four Powers which have occupied Austria since 1945 fulfill their pledged word under the Moscow Declaration and the U.N. Charter.

Austria has earned the restoration of her sovereignty and independence. Austria has reestablished its democratic Constitution of 1929, which guarantees the preservation of democratic rights and interests of the individual. Since the autumn of 1945, there have been in Austria free elections and free political parties.

The Austrian Government, established following the 1945 elections, is recognized by the Governments of the occupying powers and maintains normal diplomatic relations with many governments throughout the world.

Austria has applied for membership in the United Nations and, in the view of my Government, deserves admission to membership in this organization. The General Assembly has recommended favorable action on Austria's application for membership. Even the Soviet Union considered Austria as qualified for membership under its package proposal.

Despite the failure of past efforts, my Government will continue to press for an honorable settlement of the Austrian treaty question, asking only that such a settlement leave Austria in full sovereign control of its political and economic destiny.

We are entirely willing to meet with representatives of the Soviet Union to discuss and conclude such a treaty. We will meet again and again and again. But our experience of these past 7 years leaves little hope for arriving shortly at a satisfactory conclusion unless something more is added.

Perhaps this resolution is that something more.

My Government urges that the General Assembly place the moral weight of the United Nations behind the effort to secure a just settlement of this issue in accordance with Charter principles.

Austria seeks only justice. And it is justice long delayed. My Government believes that Austria is entitled to its freedom and independence under the Charter. The United States, therefore, supports the resolution submitted by Brazil, Lebanon, Mexico, and the Netherlands.

General Assembly's Role in the Palestine Question

*Statement by Philip C. Jessup
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 19

In order to explain the view of the delegation of the United States and the vote which we shall cast on the draft resolution and amendment before us,² it is necessary very briefly to indicate the point of view of the U.S. delegation concerning the role of the General Assembly in this Palestine question which is now under consideration.

It seems to us that the interest and purpose of

¹Made on Dec. 18 in plenary session in explanation of vote on the Palestine item. The resolution urging the parties to the dispute to enter into direct negotiations failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority at the Dec. 18 meeting; the vote was 24-21-15.

²U.N. docs. A/AC. 61/L. 23/Rev. 4 and A/L. 134.

the General Assembly in considering this question is to aid, insofar as it can, toward the achievement of a solution of this difficult problem. Until this problem is solved, the peace and prosperity of that great area of the Middle East cannot be assured, and until that is assured, the whole structure of international peace cannot be considered firm and permanent. Therefore, it has seemed to my delegation that each step taken by the General Assembly, each vote passed in the General Assembly, must be influenced by the conclusion of a delegation: whether that step, whether that vote, will contribute toward the achievement of a solution of the Palestine question.

When the General Assembly, 5 years ago, began its consideration of the Palestine question, it recommended definite substantive solutions for various elements of the Palestine problem. But it became generally realized that solutions could not be imposed upon the parties.

Just 4 years ago last Thursday, December 11, 1948, John Foster Dulles, speaking for the delegation of the United States at the General Assembly session in Paris, on this question, remarked: "The General Assembly does not have the power to command them [the parties] or lay upon them precise injunctions."³ Since that is true, it becomes obvious that any solution must be an agreed solution and, in the last year or so, the General Assembly, having taken that into account, has not sought to determine the actual substantive solution of elements of the problem in Palestine, but rather has recommended to the parties methods and procedures by which they themselves might agree upon some such solution. And that is the course which the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee has followed this year in its consideration of this question.

Both in the Committee and in the plenary session of the General Assembly we all make an earnest effort to agree upon some recommendation which might be unanimously accepted, and, particularly, might be accepted by the states directly concerned with the problem. Unfortunately, this year it is apparent that that happy result is not going to be attained. In those circumstances the General Assembly must exercise its best judgment on the propositions laid before it as to what course will be most helpful, having in mind our ultimate objective. We must proceed, by the processes defined for the General Assembly, to express that judgment; and it is precisely that which the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee has done in recommending to the General Assembly the draft resolution which is before it.

When this draft resolution was first introduced in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee by eight delegations, its language was very simple. In connection with the chief issue which has developed in the debates, it is well to recall this—that the

draft resolution as originally introduced simply called upon the parties to enter into direct negotiations.

In the course of the Committee's consideration, various changes have been made in the resolution in order to meet the objections which were advanced to it in its original form. It was argued in the Committee that this simple appeal for direct negotiations would constitute an impairment of the rights of some of the parties, that it would prejudice their rights. Accordingly, we now find in the resolution as it comes to us the express words that the entering into direct negotiations shall be "without prejudice to their respective rights and claims."

It was argued in the Committee that the simple form of the resolution ignored the previous resolutions of the General Assembly as if they were being repealed or as if they were lost sight of and deemed to be of no account. Accordingly, in the course of the debates in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, additional words were inserted to provide that in these direct negotiations the parties should be advised to bear in mind the resolutions, as well as the principal objectives of the United Nations on the Palestine question. It was also suggested that in connection with the problem of the Holy Places in Palestine there were interests of third parties which should also be borne in mind, and language was adopted in the resolution now before us which would take that into account also.

Emphasis on Direct and Unconditional Negotiations

It seems to me quite clear that in the resolution as it comes to us, with the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee, there is no surrender or impairment of rights suggested. On behalf of the delegation of the United States, I pointed out in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee,⁴ and I reaffirm it here on behalf of my delegation, that the language of this resolution does not mean that the parties, in undertaking direct negotiations, should first abandon what they consider to be their legitimate rights and interests or cast aside the expressions of the General Assembly's views that have been set forth in the various resolutions on Palestine. We believe that direct negotiations should be direct and unconditional, and that the parties on the one hand and on the other should enter into these direct negotiations uncontrolled by any prior assertion or prior condition, that it should be a free and open negotiation.

As we entered into our discussion of this question in plenary meeting of the General Assembly, we were confronted with an amendment introduced by the Philippine delegation. I think that our consideration of that amendment must again be guided by our answer to the question: will the adoption of this amendment help in serving our fundamental purposes? As I have already stated,

³ BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1948, p. 793.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 953.

it seems to me clear, and the representative of Panama has pointed this out, that the adoption of this amendment would not succeed in securing that unanimity which we all would so much like to see. Therefore, we must examine it in its particular parts to see the utility and effect of each part of the amendment.

As we examine it, it is quite clear, at least to my delegation, that it introduces no new concept which is not already to be found in the resolution which comes to us from the Committee. In the first place, the amendment suggests that the words "bearing in mind" should be replaced by the words "on the basis of." It might seem to one who has not followed the debates that this is an innocent and meaningless change of language, but to those who have followed these discussions through long and sometimes weary hours in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee it is well known that this question of the exact expression to be used in this context engaged the attention of the Committee over a very considerable period of time, that various formulae were suggested, and I believe that on the basis of that discussion one is forced to the conclusion that the inclusion of these words "on the basis of" would result at least in the conclusion in some minds that the negotiations were to be based upon certain conditions, in other words, that we would be back at the conditional type of negotiation, which my delegation does not think the proper approach to direct negotiations. We believe, therefore, that the original language in paragraph 4 of the draft resolution, on this point, should be maintained.

Secondly, there is a suggestion that we should add at the end of paragraph 4 the words "and, in particular, the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem." It seems to me that that would not be a wise addition to the resolution. In the first place, the specific example which is here proposed to be included in the resolution, namely, the question of the internationalization of Jerusalem, is precisely that one task which cannot be accomplished merely by the direct negotiations of the parties. The parties may facilitate the result, but the internationalization of Jerusalem, as has been apparent from all the previous debates of the General Assembly, is an international task and not a task which is confined solely to the negotiations of the parties. In the second place, we know that there are several points which are of major concern in a final settlement on Palestine. They have been mentioned by various representatives this morning, and they include particularly the territorial question and the question of refugees, and these are not particularly called to mind. The question arises, why should we call to mind one question and not the other questions?

Moreover, it seems to me we are all highly conscious of the fact that this question of the internationalization of Jerusalem has a very deep and sacred meaning for many peoples throughout the

world and for peoples of many faiths. I cast no doubt at all upon the motives of the representatives of the Philippines who introduced this amendment, nor upon the motives of those who support this amendment, but I do fear that the introduction of this idea in this form at the last moment of our considerations might lead in some minds to a suspicion that this is an element thrown into the parliamentary consideration of this question for some parliamentary reason, and not solely on the basis of the deep religious concern which so many of us have in the ultimate solution of this problem.

Specific Issues Before the Assembly

More broadly, the question which concerns this General Assembly in voting on this amendment and on this resolution is this: We are not being asked to vote for or against resolutions passed by the General Assembly in 1947 or in 1948 or in 1949 or any other year. We are being asked to vote on a specific resolution recommended to us by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee and upon a specific amendment to that resolution. We must make up our minds as to the wisdom of the adoption of the particular amendment to that resolution recommended to us. It is impossible to say that when one votes on the question of substituting words one is, on the basis of that, expressing a fundamental opinion as to the soundness or wisdom of this or that paragraph of some prior resolution of this General Assembly adopted some 4 or 5 years ago. Similarly, when one votes on the question of adding some words referring to the internationalization of Jerusalem, one is not being asked to vote here as to whether one favors internationalization or whether one believes that is the way to protect the Holy Places and to regulate that part of the whole Palestine question. That is not the issue upon which we are going to vote, and anyone who votes against the addition of this phrase is not saying he does not believe in the internationalization of Jerusalem. We are considering, as I have said, the addition of particular words to a particular resolution, looked at from the point of view of the total result which this Assembly will produce in the expression of its opinion on the issues which are now before us for decision at this stage of the perennial discussion of the Palestine question.

Finally, in closing I should like to remind my fellow representatives that many of us have been through a number of debates on this Palestine question at a number of different sessions of the General Assembly.

Many of us remember that in previous sessions of the General Assembly we have found that in the course of our debates we have been conscious of very strong differences of opinion as to the wise course to follow in the framing of a resolution. I am very happy to recall that on previous occa-

sions, when the sound of the eloquent arguments no longer echoed in our ears and when we proceeded to deal realistically with situations which practically confronted us as governments, we were able to go forward again in unity and in harmony in our common effort to solve the problem.

On behalf of the U.S. delegation—since the United States is a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission—I wish to assure the Assembly and particularly to assure those states concerned with this problem that as a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission the United States remains and continues to be ready to offer all assistance in its power to the parties in any efforts they may make toward the solution of this problem.

For the reasons I have given, the U.S. delegation will oppose the Philippine amendment and will maintain its vote for the draft resolution in the original form in which it came to us from the Committee.

U. S. Reaffirms Position on Kashmir

*Statement by John C. Ross
Deputy U. S. Representative in Security Council*¹

I repeat the view of my Government that any agreement of the parties on a just basis which would settle the dispute, whether reached directly or under the auspices of the U.N. representative [Frank P. Graham], would be welcomed by the United States. The cosponsors have put before the Security Council a draft resolution which we feel organizes some of the suggestions of the U.N. representative on the issue which we consider to be basic—the question of demilitarization.

The U.N. representative has told the parties that he will at all times welcome suggestions from either Government directed to settling the main differences between them and therefore directed to the solution of the dispute. Therefore, nothing contained in the draft resolution stands in the way of the parties coming forward with suggestions of their own. Nothing in the resolution

¹ Made in the Security Council on Dec. 23. At the same meeting, the Council adopted the amended U.S.-U.K. resolution on Kashmir; the amendment, proposed by the Netherlands and accepted by the sponsors of the original draft, urges India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations "under the auspices of the United Nations Representative" in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line after demilitarization. The passage in quotation marks replaces the words "at the Headquarters of the United Nations" in the original draft (BULLETIN of Nov. 17, 1952, p. 801). The Council's vote was 9-0, with the U.S.S.R. abstaining; as an interested party, Pakistan did not participate.

alters or reduces in any way the powers of the U.N. representative under the previous resolutions.

I consider it undesirable, unnecessary, and unconstructive to go back into the history of this case and reexamine the basis of the resolutions of the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan. Therefore, I do not propose to discuss the charge of aggression. To my Government the important political fact for us is that the parties have agreed that the accession of Kashmir will be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. That is the agreement and the principle which we are attempting to help the parties to turn into a reality. In the opinion of my Government the draft resolution before the Security Council rests foursquare on this agreement embodied in those resolutions.

Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the view which the U.N. representative has expressed that an early agreement on demilitarization would have as one immediate practical result the induction into office of the plebiscite administrator who could then proceed with his necessary study of the entire problem of a plebiscite.

Now a word about the two amendments suggested by the representative of the Netherlands dealing with the procedures under which negotiations would be conducted. The representative of the Netherlands is quite correct in recalling the view of my Government that the draft resolution is not intended in any way to impair or limit the authority of the U.N. representative and our expectation that he will continue to exercise his functions under the previous resolutions of the Security Council. I think it is fair to say that in doing so we would expect that negotiations of the parties would be under his auspices. Therefore the United States is glad to accept the amendment offered by the representative of the Netherlands which would make explicit in the draft resolution our intention that these negotiations be conducted under the auspices of Dr. Graham.

In accordance with his authority and responsibility, it is fitting that the place where the negotiations take place should be left to the U.N. representative. We should not expect him in the time at his disposal and after the months of effort which he has put into this case to travel back and forth considerable distances in conferring first with one party and then the other. Without in any sense attempting to make a determination for him, it occurs to me that in this stage, as in the previous stage, the U.N. facilities at Geneva might be particularly useful and appropriate for these negotiations.

The draft resolution calls upon the parties to report and authorizes the U.N. representative to report on what transpires. We have no preconceived idea of the nature of the report which the parties and which the U.N. representative would

consider it appropriate to make. It may well be that the parties will ask the U.N. representative to synthesize and put before us as part of his report their respective views. But that is a procedural matter on which we feel the parties and the U.N. representative should have a considerable degree of flexibility to decide those questions among themselves.

My Government regrets that both parties to

this dispute have not found it possible to accept the draft resolution. However, we believe that the draft resolution has meaning and importance because it represents a careful study and appreciation of the U.N. representative's suggestions which, after 16 months of work, it is appropriate for the Council to make. We therefore urge the members of the Security Council to vote in favor of the draft resolution.

Chinese Communists Reject U. N. Proposals on Prisoners of War

On December 5, 1952, Lester B. Pearson, President of the seventh session of the General Assembly, cabled messages to Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist Government, and Pak Hoen En, North Korean Foreign Minister, transmitting the text of the resolution on Korea which the General Assembly adopted on December 3.¹ Printed below are Mr. Pearson's message to the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister and excerpts from the latter's reply:

Mr. Pearson's Message of December 5

The General Assembly of the United Nations, at its 399th plenary meeting on December 3, 1952, adopted a resolution under item 16 (a) of its agenda—Korea: Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Under the terms of that resolution, originally sponsored by the Government of India, the President of the General Assembly is requested "to communicate the following proposals to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and to the North Korean Authorities as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement so that an immediate cease-fire would result and be effected; to invite their acceptance of these proposals and to make a report to the General Assembly during its present session and as soon as appropriate."

In discharge of the duty placed upon me by the terms of that resolution, I have the honor to transmit to you the text of the resolution and to invite your acceptance of the proposals contained therein.

I send this message to you against the back-

ground of the casualties, the sufferings and the destruction in Korea which are inevitable consequences of war, and I add my personal appeal that you should give it your most thoughtful and sympathetic consideration. When the First Committee of the General Assembly, by a unanimous decision, agreed to treat the Korean question as a matter of urgency, its decision reflected the concern of all members of the United Nations, a concern which I am sure is shared by the peoples of the world, over the tragedy of war and devastation in Korea, and their deep desire to bring this war to an end on terms acceptable to both sides.

To this end negotiations have been proceeding for some 16 months at Panmunjom, in the course of which a wide measure of agreement on the terms of an armistice has been reached.

The sole remaining issue which has not been settled in the course of these armistice negotiations concerns the principles and procedures by which the repatriation of prisoners of war can be effected.²

In itself, the prisoners-of-war issue is a challenge to the fundamental humanitarian instincts which are shared by all mankind and urgently calls for solution. In camps on both sides, human beings have been kept for long months under military detention while the lengthy negotiations concerning their fate have been continuing. There is an inescapable moral obligation on both sides in the Korean conflict to make every possible effort to insure that these prisoners of war shall be free to return to their homelands, and their speedy return facilitated.

The discussion of this matter in the First Committee of this Assembly has made clear the general

¹ For text of this resolution, see BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 916.

² For an analysis of the prisoner-of-war issue by Secretary Acheson, see BULLETIN of Nov. 10, 1952, p. 744.

agreement in the United Nations that this problem should be dealt with and the repatriation of prisoners of war should be effected under the terms of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of Aug. 12, 1949, under the well-established principles and practice of international law, and under the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement.

It was also generally agreed that prisoners of war should be released from the custody of the detaining powers to a repatriation commission so that they can be free to exercise their undoubted right with respect to repatriation, and that it was inconsistent with common humanitarian principles that a detaining power should offer any hindrance to the return to their homelands of any prisoners of war.

Finally, there was general agreement that the Geneva Convention cannot be construed as authorizing a detaining power to employ force to effect the return of individual prisoners of war to their homelands.

The General Assembly resolution clearly states the above principles with respect to the solution of the prisoner-of-war issue and, in addition, makes concrete proposals with regard to the machinery of repatriation.

It represents ideas put forward by many governments represented in the General Assembly, whose unanimous desire is to bring peace to Korea. The resolution can make this desire effective because its acceptance will make it possible to achieve an armistice and a complete and immediate cessation of hostilities.

The resolution, in addition, makes reference to the desire of the General Assembly to expedite and facilitate, once an armistice is effective, the convening of a political conference as provided for in article 60 of the draft armistice agreement already accepted by the military negotiators at Panmunjom.

It is my earnest hope that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China will accept these proposals of the General Assembly as a basis for the solution of the one remaining issue which has prevented the conclusion of an armistice during the negotiations at Panmunjom.

Once this issue is solved, it will become possible to bring the fighting to an end and complete the program for a peaceful settlement in Korea leading, we must hope, toward a more general settlement which would contribute to peace in Asia and in the world.

The United Nations is determined to do everything possible to bring the fighting to an end in Korea. This is also the declared aim of the Central People's Government. This common aim can be achieved if the proposals which are now submitted for your consideration are, as I earnestly hope will be the case, accepted in the spirit in which they are put forward.

In this hope, as President of the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, I appeal to you to accept these proposals of the United Nations as forming a just and reasonable basis for an agreement which will serve to bring about a constructive and durable peace in Korea.

I shall look forward to receiving as soon as possible your reply to this communication, which I shall report to the General Assembly when it is received.

In accordance with the decision of the General Assembly, the text of the resolution has also been communicated to the North Korean authorities, to whom I am sending a similar message.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

LESTER B. PEARSON,
President of the General Assembly.

Chinese Communist Reply of December 14

[Excerpts]

I have received your cable of Dec. 5, 1952, which communicated the text of the resolution based on the draft resolution of the Indian delegation and adopted on Dec. 3, 1952, by the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, under the item of its agenda entitled "Korea: Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea."

I am hereby authorized to make the following reply on behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China.

The General Assembly of the United Nations, after illegally adopting in February 1951 the shameful and calumnious resolution slandering China as an aggressor, has now, in the absence of the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the Korean Democratic People's Republic, discussed the Korean question and adopted a resolution supporting the United States Government's position of forcibly retaining in captivity prisoners of war in contravention of international conventions, and facilitating its continuation and expansion of the war raging in Korea. Such an action is clearly illegal and void and is firmly opposed by the Chinese people.

This illegal resolution adopted by the General Assembly is based on the Indian draft resolution, having as its basic content the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war [and] does not correspond to the description in your cable that it deals with the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war "under the terms of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of Aug. 12, 1949, under the well-established principles and practice of international law, and under the relevant provisions of the draft armistice agreement."

Quite to the contrary, it is entirely based on the so-called principles of "voluntary repatriation," all of which are in essence the "principle"

of forcibly retaining in captivity prisoners of war, a principle which the United States side has unjustifiably maintained ever since Oct. 11, 1951, when the Korean armistice negotiations entered into discussion on the prisoner-of-war item on the agenda and which is universally recognized as violating the Geneva Convention and international law.

Department's Comment on Communist Rejection of Peace in Korea

Press release 919 dated December 15

The United States has learned with deep regret that the Chinese Communists have flouted the solemnly expressed views of the General Assembly of the United Nations. They have rejected the fair and reasonable proposals contained in the resolution on Korea adopted with the approval of 54 members of the United Nations.

Thus the Communists have again rejected peace in Korea. The U.S. Government has no doubt that other governments share the deep concern of the United States over this rejection and the 54 governments which supported the General Assembly resolution will wish to give careful consideration to the situation confronting the United Nations.

During more than 15 months of negotiation in the field by the U. N. Command delegation and the extensive discussions in the General Assembly, the United Nations has shown its determination to take every practicable step to bring about an armistice in Korea which would end the hostilities on a basis consistent with the humanitarian principles of the United Nations.

The U.S. Government reaffirms its determination to continue to fulfill its responsibilities in Korea. The U.N. Command remains ready to meet again with the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom whenever they accept the proposals contained in the U.N. resolution or any of the other numerous proposals which have been made to them by the U.N. Command, or whenever they advance constructive proposals of their own which could lead to an honorable armistice. However, there can be no compromise with the basic humanitarian principles contained in the resolution of the General Assembly of December 3, 1952. If the Communists accept these basic U.N. principles, the proposals now outstanding provide numerous alternative methods for settling the question of prisoners of war. Until the Communists accept these basic U.N. principles, the U.S. Government cannot see what useful purpose will be served by having the United Nations propose to the Communists still other plans for implementing these principles.

The responsibility for whether there shall be peace in Korea clearly lies with the Chinese Communists and North Korean authorities and their supporters.

All countries, in and outside the United States, whether they are for or against the Indian draft resolution, consider that this draft resolution supports the "principle of no forcible repatriation" maintained by the United States Government. Even Mr. Krishna Menon, the Indian delegate to the United Nations who tabled the illegal resolution, himself makes no attempt to hide this.

Such an illegal resolution based on the so-called

principle of "voluntary repatriation" or "no forcible repatriation" cannot possibly settle what you describe in your cable as "the sole remaining issue which has not been settled in the course of these armistice negotiations," namely, "the principles and procedures by which the repatriation of prisoners of war can be effected."

If the United States had adhered to the draft armistice agreement instead of deliberately inventing the so-called principle of "voluntary repatriation" or "no forcible repatriation" as an excuse to obstruct an armistice in Korea, then, this "sole remaining issue which has not been settled," would long ago have been satisfactorily settled, and the Korean war, which is a matter of common concern to the people of the whole world, would long ago have been brought to an end.

The resolution which you forwarded bases itself not only on the so-called principle of "voluntary repatriation" or "no forcible repatriation," but also on the hypothesis that there are actually some among the Korean and Chinese captured personnel who "refuse to return home" to rejoin their families and lead a peaceful life. This does not accord in the slightest with human nature: still less does it square with facts.

The facts are that the United States has long since flagrantly cast aside the provisions of Article 17 and other articles of the Geneva Convention regarding the humane treatment of prisoners of [war] and has in the prisoner-of-war camps under its control placed large numbers of United States, Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek special agents in responsible posts and has even planted Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek special agents posing as Korean and Chinese prisoners of war, to coerce prisoners of war to make declarations "refusing repatriation" and of "unwillingness to return home," by frequent recourse to so-called "persuasion," "screening," "rescreening" and "interrogation" of the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war—measures effected by such utterly savage and inhuman methods as torture, massacre and mass starvation.

In reality, prisoners of war are those combatants of one side who are under the armed control and at the forcible disposal of their enemy and have no freedom. Release and repatriation is a right to which all prisoners of war of both sides are entitled as soon as an armistice comes into effect—that is, they should be freed from the armed control of the enemy and be returned to their own side so that they may regain their freedom and return to their homeland to lead a peaceful life.

Since prisoners of war are entitled to such rights, how can [there] be such a question as "forcible repatriation"—or "return to their homeland effected by force?" The unfounded argument that "a detaining power may not employ force to effect the return of individual prisoners of war to their homelands" cannot hold water. It can find no basis whatever in the Geneva Convention.

It is evident that the adoption of the illegal resolution by the General Assembly aims to divert the indignation and attention of the people of the world from the criminal terrorism, as evidenced in the "screening" of prisoners of war by the United States, to the so-called question of "forcing prisoners of war to return to their homes," or "force shall not be used to effect the return of prisoners of war to their homelands." All of you who have taken this action are indeed "challenging the fundamental humanitarian instincts."

The proposal to give the United Nations the final authority of appointing the umpire and the final authority of disposing of those prisoners of war allegedly "unwilling to go home" is really extremely absurd. Can it be that those delegates who sponsored and adopted the illegal resolution in the United Nations have really forgotten that the United Nations is one of the belligerent parties in the Korean war?

To put it more frankly, having passed through a circuitous course in which resort was made to many deceitful tactics, these provisions actually adopt in full the three proposals put forward at Panmunjom on Sept. 28, 1952, by the United States. None the less, these provisions are couched in terms more sly in order to deceive more easily the people of the world and to facilitate the realization of the United States Government's scheme to forcibly retain in captivity prisoners of war in violation of international conventions.

Gen. Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Gen. Peng Teh-Huai, commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, in their letter of Oct. 16, 1952,³ to General Clark of the United States, proposed that all prisoners of war be brought to a demilitarized zone to be handed over directly to and accepted by the other side, and that repatriation be effected after visits and explanations.

Taking into account the complicated situation mentioned above, these proposals first of all enable prisoners of war to be released from the armed control of the opposite side, to give them the protection of their own side, so that the total repatriation of prisoners of war in accordance with humanitarian principles, international practice, the Geneva Convention and the [armistice] agreement can be assured.

From the above, it can be clearly seen that the illegal resolution is unreasonable because it runs counter to the conscience of man, completely violates humanitarian principles, international practice as well as the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the draft-armistice agreement; it is unreasonable because it recognizes the "desire" of the prisoners of war to "refuse repatriation," a "desire" created by the United States side by the most brutal methods; it is unreasonable because it insists on the retaining in captivity of tens of thou-

sands of Korean and Chinese prisoners of war as hostages in order to force the Korean and Chinese side to yield to the United States; it is unfair because it deliberately attempts to impose on the Korean and Chinese side the utterly groundless "principle of voluntary repatriation" which the United States has maintained throughout and because it rejected without any reason the proposal of the Korean and Chinese side for the repatriation of all prisoners of war in adherence to the Geneva Convention, and the proposal of the delegation of the Soviet Union for the immediate and complete cessation of hostilities in Korea prior to the settlement of the question of the repatriation of all prisoners of war.

In view of these facts, I cannot but inform you solemnly that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China considers that such an illegal resolution cannot possibly provide "a just and reasonable basis for an agreement."

On the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war, the Central People's Government considers that the Korean and Chinese side is at once correct and just, fair and reasonable in insisting on the principle of total repatriation, a principle which is in conformity with humanitarian principles and the Geneva Convention. The settlement of the question of the repatriation of prisoners of war in the Korean armistice negotiations must and can only be achieved on the basis of the Geneva Convention.

Your cable devoted considerable verbiage to an attempt to show that by adopting this illegal resolution which has as its basic content the United States "principle of voluntary repatriation" under an Indian cloak, all of you earnestly desire a speedy conclusion to the Korean war. However, this illegal resolution which you forwarded fully demonstrates that it abjectly submits to the brutal will of the United States Government which uses violence to carry through the forcible retaining in captivity of prisoners of war so that the Korean armistice negotiations might be broken off and sabotaged and that the Korean war might be prolonged and expanded.

All of you are not doing everything possible to bring the fighting to an end in Korea. You are doing everything possible to induce and coerce some of the nations represented in the General Assembly to endorse jointly the policy of the United States of no armistice, no negotiations, and no peaceful settlement but the prolongation and expansion of the Korean war. At the same time, all of you attempt further to shift the responsibility for the failure to end the war to the Korean and Chinese side. It can be positively stated that this attempt of yours to shift responsibility will be of no avail.

If, as you said in your cable, the General Assembly's "unanimous desire is to bring peace to Korea," then it should insist upon the principle of the total repatriation of prisoners of war as

³ *Ibid.*, p. 752.

embodied in the Geneva Convention and international law.

It should sternly demand that the United States side immediately resume the negotiations at Panmunjom, and with the proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question submitted by Mr. Vyshinsky, delegate of the Soviet Union, on the 10th and 24th of November⁴ as a basis, bring about the accomplishment of a complete cease-fire on the part of the belligerent parties in accordance with the draft Korean armistice agreement already agreed upon by both sides as a first step; and then refer for settlement the question of the total repatriation of prisoners of war, together with the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, to the Commission for the Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question, composed of the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, India, Burma, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, the Korean Democratic People's Republic and South Korea.

If such a procedure is followed, an armistice in Korea can be immediately achieved, and the distress of the Korean peoples as well as the casualties on both sides can be brought to an end. Thus, the General Assembly can indeed speedily "bring peace to Korea."

However, the present session of the General Assembly has already rejected such a fair and reasonable proposal which can really lead to peace. I, hereby, once again make the following proposal: To realize the fervent desire for peace of the people of the world, to demonstrate the sincerity of the Chinese people for an early restoration of peace in Korea, and to preclude the further use of the prisoner repatriation issue as an obstacle and pretext in the realization of an armistice in Korea, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China requests that the General Assembly rescind the illegal resolution which you forwarded, call upon the United States Government to resume immediately the negotiations at Panmunjom, and with the draft Korean armistice agreement as a basis, to bring about the realization of a complete armistice as a first step and then to refer for settlement the question of the total repatriation of prisoners of war to the above-mentioned "Commission for the Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question."

If the General Assembly agrees to discuss this request, then representatives of the People's Republic of China and the Korean Democratic People's Republic must take part in the discussions.

Should the General Assembly reject even such a just request, and still persist in maintaining the illegal resolution which aims at supporting the United States Government in forcibly retaining in captivity prisoners of war in violation of inter-

national conventions, then it would further demonstrate that your purpose, far from being the achievement of peace in Korea and the Far East, is nothing but the continuation and expansion of the Korean war so that peace in the Far East and throughout the world can be further disrupted at some future date. This would all the more expose the United Nations as increasingly becoming a tool of the ruling clique of the United States in its preparations for war and for the expansion of aggression.

All those who support the war policies of the ruling clique of the United States must bear the grave responsibility for the consequences of such action.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Document Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

A regular feature, will be resumed in a subsequent issue.

⁴ U.N. docs. A/C.1/729, A/C.1/729/ Rev. 1/Corr. 1/Add. 1.

President's Decision on Continuance of Aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy

White House press release dated December 30

Identical letters regarding continuance of U.S. aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy have been sent by the President to Kenneth McKellar, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate; Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate; Tom Connally, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate; Clarence Cannon, Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives; Carl Vinson, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives; and James P. Richards, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. The text of the letter follows:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I have been informed that certain goods of primary strategic significance have been shipped from the United Kingdom, France, and Italy to various countries of the Soviet Bloc in fulfillment of long-standing obligations. The total value of the shipments is \$2.5 million.

The commitments to deliver these goods were made before the effective date of the embargo provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 (the Battle Act), Public Law 213, 82nd Congress. But the actual shipments took place after that date. And they consisted of items which have been listed by the Administrator of the Act as items that should be embargoed to the Soviet Bloc in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act.

Thus I have been faced with a grave decision. Under Section 103 (b) of the statute I am required either to terminate all military, economic, and financial assistance to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, or to direct that assistance be continued in spite of the shipments.

The provisions of the Battle Act with respect to termination of aid are as follows:

First, the Act requires—with no possibility of exception—the termination of all military, economic, or financial assistance to any nation which, after the effective date of the embargo provisions of the Act, knowingly permits the shipment of arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic

energy materials to any nation or combination of nations threatening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all countries under its domination.

The shipments made by the United Kingdom, France, and Italy were not arms, ammunition, implements of war, or atomic energy materials, and indeed the Administrator informs me that to his knowledge no country receiving assistance from the United States has made any shipments of that kind whatever.

In addition the Act provides for the termination of aid to any country that knowingly permits the shipment to the same nations of petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, or items of primary strategic significance used in the production of arms, ammunition, and implements of war. However, in cases involving items of those types (known as "Title I, Category B" items), the President may direct the continuance of aid to the country permitting the shipment "when unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States." The President may make such a determination after receiving the advice of the Administrator and after taking into account these four considerations: "the contribution of such country to the mutual security of the free world, the importance of such assistance to the security of the United States, the strategic importance of imports received from countries of the Soviet bloc, and the adequacy of such country's controls over the export to the Soviet bloc of items of strategic importance."

The Administrator, Mr. W. Averell Harriman, who is also the Director for Mutual Security, has advised me that aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy should be continued. He made this recommendation after consulting with the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, and Commerce; the Office of Defense Mobilization, Mutual Security Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, and Central Intelligence Agency.

Upon his advice, and after taking into account the four statutory considerations listed above, I have directed the continuance of assistance to the

United Kingdom, France, and Italy. The rest of this letter will explain my reasons for so doing.

The "Prior Commitments" Problem

Up until the present case, there have been three decisions to continue aid to countries which had knowingly permitted shipments prescribed under the Battle Act.¹ In those three cases the United States continued its aid to:

The Netherlands, which had permitted certain oil drilling equipment to be shipped to Poland; Italy, which had permitted a grinding machine to be shipped to Rumania; Denmark, which had permitted a tanker to be shipped to the U.S.S.R.

Those cases all involved "prior commitments"—that is, commitments made before the Battle Act embargo lists went into effect on January 24, 1952. The shipments of \$2.5 million which now have been made by the British, French, and Italians also were in fulfillment of prior commitments. Still more of these commitments remain on the books of Western European countries. The problem of how to handle these obligations has been one of the most difficult issues that has arisen in the administration of the Battle Act.

The first question to be faced was whether the Act applies to such commitments at all. The Act prohibits further assistance (unless a Presidential exception is made) when a country "knowingly permits" the shipment of items included in the Title I, Category B embargo list. In many cases, the countries in question had entered into trade agreements guaranteeing that they would permit the shipment of these items, and in other cases had issued, or promised to issue, export licenses covering such shipments. Thus there is a real question, especially in those countries where an export license cannot legally be revoked, whether the knowing permission had not been given at the time the foreign government signed the trade agreement or issued the export license. If it had been given at that time, the subsequent shipment would not be relevant, since the knowing permission had taken place before January 24, 1952, the effective date of the embargo list. If the Act were so construed, aid could be continued to such a country without a Presidential determination that continuance of aid was necessary.

Despite the legal ambiguity surrounding this question, however, the Administrator has construed the Act as being applicable to all *shipments* of embargoed items after the effective date, even though the *permission* was given beforehand. I concur in this interpretation. It is the interpretation that seems to be most closely in accord with the objectives of the Act, which are to increase the strength of the United States and the coop-

erating nations and to impede the military ability of the Soviet Bloc. The contrary interpretation also raises certain questions as to inequality of treatment, based perhaps on nothing more substantial than the fortuitous timing of the issuance of an export license.

For the Western European countries, however, the prospect of breaking firm contracts, made in good faith, raised serious problems. The governments of these countries pointed out that East-West trade is basically the exchanging of Eastern raw materials for Western finished metal products, and that this involves a considerable time differential in deliveries. The Soviet Bloc had placed contracts months, and even years, before many of the items now requiring embargo under the Battle Act were agreed to be strategic by most countries, and also before the invasion of Korea in 1950. In many cases the Soviet Bloc had carried out its portion of the exchange by making deliveries of timber, grains, coal, and other essential commodities, and was awaiting shipment of goods which, in effect, had already been paid for. The manufactured products, because of the time differential, were scheduled for delivery to the East in 1952, 1953, and 1954.

The Western European countries attach importance to the fulfillment of their formal trade obligations to the Soviet Bloc. They point out that the Communists constantly seek to picture the Western World as morally bankrupt and bent on the destruction of peaceful relations with the Soviet Bloc. They feel therefore that the moral position of the Western World in this battle of ideas would be weakened by outright violation of clear commitments.

Despite the force of these contentions, the United States requested the Western European countries concerned to freeze their shipments of prior commitment items, so that a joint review of the problem could be undertaken. This request led to an intensive review. As a result, the Western European countries decided that some of the projected shipments could be eliminated without prejudice to the foregoing considerations. The eliminated shipments involved about one-quarter of the outstanding prior commitments.

The three Battle Act exceptions already granted for the Netherlands, Italy, and Denmark total \$3.3 million.

Additional items valued at about \$2.5 million now have been shipped. These are the British, French, and Italian shipments with respect to which I now have made a determination that aid should be continued. The shipments originated as follows: United Kingdom, \$583,818; France, \$959,245; and Italy, \$940,000.

The items shipped from the United Kingdom were forging machines, special metal-working machines, pumps, valves, rolling mill equipment, balances, locomotives and parts, specialized testing devices, ball and roller bearings, industrial

¹ For texts of the President's letters regarding these decisions, see BULLETIN of May 5, 1952, p. 720; *ibid.*, July 14, 1952, p. 75; and *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 198.

greases and oils, a small quantity of nickel, and one blower. The items shipped from France were boring machines, valves, chemical equipment, compressors, electronic equipment, aluminum, and ball bearings. The items shipped from Italy were rolling mill equipment and ball and roller bearings. (See Appendix for a list of the items, their values, and their destinations.)

There remain a number of other prior commitments on the books not only of the United Kingdom, France, and Italy but also of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany. If further shipments of this kind take place, the United States Government will examine such cases on their merits and determine the appropriate action in the light of all the circumstances.

Why the Cessation of Aid Would Be Detrimental to the Security of the United States

Following are the considerations, specified in the Battle Act, which have led to the conclusion that unusual circumstances indicate that the cessation of aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States.

A. Contribution of those countries to the mutual security of the Free World

All the countries associated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are important to the success of the common undertaking. But the United Kingdom, France, and Italy are the three largest European members of NATO and the vital importance of their participation can scarcely be exaggerated. In their foreign policies they support, as a basic principle, action directed toward the military and economic integration of Western Europe. By reason of their geographical locations, their industrial capacity, their armed forces and their other resources, they are in a position to make, and they are making, contributions of the greatest value to the security of the Free World.

In two world wars the United Kingdom has shown its determination to fight for its democratic way of life, and has, in those wars, borne the shock of combat in the early stages. In this sense it has in effect been a first bastion of defense for the Free World. Its example during the dark days of 1940 and 1941 when it stood, with the Commonwealth, practically alone was one that cheered free men everywhere. France, the traditional ally of the United States from the time of the American Revolution, has likewise stood in the forefront of those willing to fight for a way of life that respected the dignity of the free individual. And Italy, despite a dark period in its history, has in recent years aligned itself firmly with the free nations of the world, and in the face of formidable obstacles has made a contribution of great value.

Together, the United Kingdom and France ac-

count for about four-fifths of the defense expenditures of the European NATO countries. Their share of the total production of military equipment is even higher. They rank highest among those countries in the percentage of gross national product devoted to defense spending.

The United Kingdom makes almost half of the defense expenditures of the European NATO countries. The United Kingdom and the United States have cooperated with each other in a manner unique in the history of nations. Common defense policies have been developed, and the practice of consultation that was undertaken during the last war has made possible a coordinated defense which is a cornerstone of United States security. The air bases in the British Isles are a key element in the Free World's system of defense. The British fleet, together with that of the United States, stands in defense of our shores as well as theirs. The British merchant marine furnishes the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, with lines of supply. On the continent of Europe the British have the largest armored force of any NATO country, including the United States.

France, a country which has been the battlefield of both world wars, which has seen the best of its youth depleted by those wars, which has undergone the anguish of enemy occupation, and which has been forced to struggle bitterly for its economic health, is second only to the United Kingdom among European NATO countries in defense expenditures and in output of military equipment. The vast communications network upon which the common effort depends is centered in France. While making its defense contribution in Europe, France is carrying the burden of a war against Communists in Indo-China. Into that war it has poured a vast sum of money and the pick of its trained officers.

Italy's contribution to the common security is in a sense one of the most noteworthy on the continent. For out of the wreckage of fascism has arisen a resolute government determined to play a major part in the struggle for freedom. Having experienced the evil of totalitarianism, Italy has resolved to stand on the side of freedom and to defend that freedom. Its natural resources are few. The social pressures which are the outcome of the poverty and distress of the masses have been intensified by years of totalitarian rule. Nevertheless, and despite the presence of a Communist party that feeds on the poverty of the country, the Italian Government has taken firm steps to preserve its internal security. It has modernized its military installations. In its harbors are based the NATO Mediterranean command, and its communications and supply facilities are of incalculable value.

The factories of these three countries produce goods and services needed by the NATO forces, and this production is given priority over civilian

needs. By June 30, 1952, the United States had placed contracts with European manufacturers for \$684 million of equipment to be used by NATO and the United States military forces. About half this amount is coming from France, with Italy and the United Kingdom having the next largest shares. In the year ending June 30, 1953, additional contracts of \$1 billion are expected to be let in Europe.

B. Importance to the security of the United States of assistance to those countries

The security of the United States is squarely based on the unity of the Western nations and the continued strengthening of their free institutions.

In like manner the effectiveness of the contribution that the United Kingdom, France, and Italy can make toward that unity and strength is dependent at the present time on assistance from the United States.

Since the end of World War II the United States has given net grants and credits to Western Europe that amount to \$23.1 billion in economic aid and \$2.7 billion in military aid—a total of about \$25.8 billion. Of the economic aid, \$6.4 billion went to the United Kingdom, \$4.5 billion to France, and \$2.4 billion to Italy. Those three countries also received large shares of United States military assistance.

All this aid represents an investment directly in the interests of United States security. To terminate aid to the United Kingdom, France, and Italy would seriously impair that security because it would jeopardize the effectiveness of the free nations' first line of defense in Europe. Our assistance is indispensable to the three countries; without it they would be unable to carry the military burdens they have assumed in NATO. Moreover, since the plans developed in NATO are integrated plans which depend for their success on the continued performance of these countries, the collapse of their defense efforts would mean the collapse of the whole NATO system. We would be imperiling a \$25 billion investment in Western defense for a consideration of \$2.5 million worth of shipments which already have gone to the Soviet Bloc. Regrettable as these shipments may be, and important as these commodities may be to the Soviet Bloc, their strategic advantage to the Communists is far outweighed by the damage to our own security that would result from the termination of assistance.

C. Strategic importance of imports received by those countries from the Soviet Bloc

Each of the three, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, has historical trade relationships with one or more of the countries now included in the Soviet Bloc. A certain degree of dependence upon Eastern Europe has been developed, both as a market and a source of supply. The three nations have exchanged their own products for

essential coal, grain, foodstuffs, and other commodities. If these countries were forced to shift to other sources of supply, the shift would require the expenditure of more dollars, which these countries do not have.

The United Kingdom can produce only 40 percent of its own food supply. It is thus dependent on imports to feed its population. Since the end of World War II the United Kingdom has obtained very important quantities of coarse grains and timber products from the Soviet Bloc. The coarse grains, through the increase in domestically produced meats and poultry products, have made a vital contribution to the diet of the British people. The timber products have helped to provide adequate housing for a significant number of British families; and such items as pit props have assisted directly in the increase of coal production.

If the British did not obtain these important items from the Soviet Bloc, they would either have to procure them largely in dollar areas or go without. If they decided to procure these items in dollar areas, they would almost inevitably have to reduce their defense expenditures in order to obtain the needed dollars. If they decided to go without, they would have to worsen an already austere standard of living. Either alternative would weaken the British contribution to the common defense.

A somewhat similar pattern exists in both France and Italy—made more difficult in both these countries, however, by the presence of large and vocal Communist groups. The Communist propaganda line has long been that refusal to trade with Eastern Europe has placed severe hardships on Western Europeans by cutting them off from important supplies traditionally purchased in Eastern Europe.

Italy still depends on the Soviet Bloc for supplies of such vital imports as coal, manganese, iron and steel, wheat and foodstuffs. Italy normally imports about nine-tenths of its coal requirements, and in 1951 the Bloc supplied 12½ percent of Italy's coal imports and 11 percent of coke imports. Also in 1951 the Bloc supplied 6.5 percent of Italy's manganese imports, 7 percent of its pig iron imports, over 12 percent of wheat imports, and almost 20 percent of other grains including rye, barley, and oats.

France, too, gets important quantities of certain essential imports from the Soviet Bloc, such as certain types of coal, although France's total trade with the Bloc is not as large as Italy's or Britain's. In 1951 France received from the Bloc almost 10 percent of its coal and coke imports, 8½ percent of its total glycerine imports, and 10 percent of its asbestos imports.

Part of the reason why Western Europe has been able to reduce its dependence on Eastern supplies to these levels, and hence withstand to a marked degree the Soviet Bloc pressures for strategic items, has been the existence of United States

UNITED KINGDOM

Shipments of Title I, Category B Items to the Soviet Bloc
After Jan. 24, 1952

Item	Quantity	Destination	Value
Forging machines.....	9	5 U. S. S. R.; 4 Poland.....	\$188, 892
Specialized metal working machines.....	2	Poland.....	6, 418
Pumps.....	4	Poland.....	760
Valves.....	40	Poland.....	12, 192
Rolling mill equipment.....	Poland.....	25, 144
Rolling mill equipment.....	Hungary.....	87, 682
Blower.....	1	Poland.....	63, 913
Balances.....	7	U. S. S. R.....	2, 752
Specialized testing devices.....	7	1 Hungary; 3 Poland; 3 U. S. S. R.....	26, 501
Ball and roller bearings.....	1008	17 Poland; 10 Hungary; 981 Czechoslovakia.....	19, 003
Nickel.....	86 kilograms.....	Poland.....	654
Lubricating oils and greases.....	50 gals.....	China.....	66
Mineral oil.....	17.9 tons.....	Poland.....	1, 809
Lubricating oils.....	196 gals., 7 cwts.....	Poland.....	190
Transformer oils.....	18,000 gals.....	Poland.....	14, 000
Insulating oils.....	100 gals.....	Poland.....	126
Greases and oils.....	6 gals., 12 oz.....	Poland.....	20
Locomotives and parts.....	\$100,511 Poland; 32,230 Hungary; 955 Czechoslovakia.....	133, 696
Total.....			\$583, 818

ITALY

Shipments of Title I, Category B Items to the Soviet Bloc
After Jan. 24, 1952

Item	Quantity	Destination	Value
Centreless grinding machine (exception previously granted).....	1	Rumania.....	\$11, 000
Rolling mill parts.....	Poland.....	440, 000
Ball and roller bearings.....	Czechoslovakia.....	500, 000
Total.....			951, 000
Exception previously granted.....			11, 000
Net.....			\$910, 000

Shipments of Title I, Category B Items to the Soviet Bloc
After Jan. 24, 1952

Country	Amount
United Kingdom.....	\$583, 818
France.....	959, 245
Italy.....	940, 000
Total.....	\$2, 483, 063

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Harold G. Kissick as Chief of the Division of International Conferences, effective November 9.
Harold F. Linder as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, effective December 12.

aid. If we were suddenly to withdraw this aid, the flow of strategic goods and services to the Iron Curtain areas would be bound to increase. This would defeat the purpose of the Battle Act, not contribute to it.

D. Adequacy of British, French, and Italian controls over the export of strategic items to the Soviet Bloc

Failure to abrogate all their prior commitments should not be allowed to obscure the fact that these three countries have long operated effective controls over strategic items and have prevented the shipment of large quantities of these items to the Soviet Bloc. The British, in fact, enacted controls before the United States did so. Many improvements can undoubtedly be made in some controls systems, and work along these lines is in progress. These countries have been important participants in international discussions of controls—a cooperative program that is unprecedented.

In deciding whether to terminate aid in these cases, I have been guided by the basic objectives of the Act—to strengthen the security of the United States and of the Free World. This Government has sought constantly to avoid placing weapons in the hands of the Soviet Bloc with which to attack the Free World. But weapons take various forms. They may be commodities of strategic importance; they may be hunger or discontent within the borders of friendly countries; or they may be discord between our allies and ourselves. We must guard against giving the Soviet Bloc any of these weapons. It is my firm conviction that the decision to continue aid in these cases best serves the security interests of the United States.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

APPENDIX

FRANCE

Shipments of Title I, Category B Items to the Soviet Bloc
After Jan. 24, 1952

Item	Quantity	Destination	Value
Boring machines.....	3	1 Poland; 2 Czechoslovakia.....	\$768, 240
Specialized chemical equipment.....	3 units	Poland.....	35, 868
Chemical processing equipment.....	2 shipments.....	Poland.....	14, 360
Compressors.....	Poland.....	38, 001
Valves.....	Poland.....	29, 167
Electronic equipment.....	Poland.....	4, 789
Bearings.....	Poland.....	37, 320
Aluminum.....	50 tons.....	Poland.....	31, 500
Total.....			\$959, 245

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* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The State of the Union

*Message of the President to the Congress*¹

[Excerpts]

To the Congress of the United States:

I have the honor to report to the Congress on the state of the Union.

This is the eighth such report that, as President, I have been privileged to present to you and to the country. On previous occasions, it has been my custom to set forth proposals for legislative action in the coming year. But that is not my purpose today. The presentation of a legislative program falls properly to my successor, not to me, and I would not infringe upon his responsibility to chart the forward course. Instead, I wish to speak of the course we have been following the past 8 years and the position at which we have arrived.

In just 2 weeks, General Eisenhower will be inaugurated as President of the United States and I will resume—most gladly—my place as a private citizen of this Republic. The Presidency last changed hands 8 years ago this coming April. That was a tragic time: a time of grieving for President Roosevelt—the great and gallant human being who had been taken from us; a time of unrelieved anxiety to his successor, thrust so suddenly into the complexities and burdens of the Presidential office.

Not so this time. This time we see the normal transition under our democratic system. One President, at the conclusion of his term, steps back to private life; his successor, chosen by the people, begins his tenure of the office. And the Presidency of the United States continues to function without a moment's break.

Since the election, I have done my best to assure that the transfer from one Administration to another shall be smooth and orderly. From General Eisenhower and his associates, I have had friendly and understanding collaboration in this endeavor. I have not sought to thrust upon him—

nor has he sought to take—the responsibility which must be mine until 12 o'clock noon on January 20. But together, I hope and believe, we have found means whereby the incoming President can obtain the full and detailed information he will need to assume the responsibility the moment he takes the oath of office.

The President-elect is about to take up the greatest burdens, the most compelling responsibilities, given to any man. And I, with you and all Americans, wish for him all possible success in undertaking the tasks that will so soon be his.

What are these tasks? The President is Chief of State, elected representative of all the people, national spokesman for them and to them. He is Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces. He is charged with the conduct of our foreign relations. He is Chief Executive of the Nation's largest civilian organization. He must select and nominate all top officials of the executive branch and all Federal judges. And on the legislative side, he has the obligation and the opportunity to recommend and to approve or veto legislation. Besides all this, it is to him that a great political party turns naturally for leadership, and that, too, he must provide as President.

This bundle of burdens is unique; there is nothing else like it on the face of the earth. Each task could be a full-time job. Together, they would be a tremendous undertaking in the easiest of times.

But our times are not easy; they are hard—as hard and complex, perhaps as any in our history. Now, the President not only has to carry on these tasks in such a way that our democracy may grow and flourish and our people prosper, but he also has to lead the whole free world in overcoming the Communist menace—and all this under the shadow of the atomic bomb.

This is a huge challenge to the human being who occupies the Presidential office. But it is not a challenge to him alone, for in reality he cannot meet it alone. The challenge runs not just to him

¹H. doc. 1, 83d Cong., 1st sess.; delivered by reading clerks in the House and in the Senate on Jan. 7.

but to his whole Administration, to the Congress, to the country.

Ultimately, no President can master his responsibilities, save as his fellow citizens—indeed, the whole people—comprehend the challenge of our times and move, with him, to meet it.

It has been my privilege to hold the Presidential office for nearly 8 years now, and much has been done in which I take great pride. But this is not personal pride. It is pride in the people, in the Nation. It is pride in our political system and our form of government—balky sometimes, mechanically deficient perhaps, in many ways—but enormously alive and vigorous; able through these years to keep the Republic on the right course, rising to the great occasions, accomplishing the essentials, meeting the basic challenge of our times.

There have been misunderstandings and controversies these past 8 years, but through it all the President of the United States has had that measure of support and understanding without which no man could sustain the burdens of the Presidential office, or hope to discharge its responsibilities.

For this I am profoundly grateful—grateful to my associates in the executive branch—most of them nonpartisan civil servants; grateful—despite our disagreements—to the Members of the Congress on both sides of the aisle; grateful especially to the American people, the citizens of this Republic, governors of us all.

We are still so close to recent controversies that some of us may find it hard to understand the accomplishments of these past 8 years. But the accomplishments are real and very great, not as the President's, not as the Congress', but as the achievements of our country and all the people in it.

Let me remind you of some of the things we have done since I first assumed my duties as President of the United States.

I took the oath of office on April 12, 1945. In May of that same year, the Nazis surrendered. Then, in July, that great white flash of light, man-made at Alamogordo, heralded swift and final victory in World War II—and opened the doorway to the atomic age.

Consider some of the great questions that were posed for us by sudden, total victory in World War II. Consider also, how well we as a Nation have responded.

The Overriding Question of Our Time

I come now to the most vital question of all, the greatest of our concerns: Could there be built in the world a durable structure of security, a lasting peace for all the nations, or would we drift, as after World War I, toward another terrible disaster—a disaster which this time might be the holocaust of atomic war?

That is still the overriding question of our time. We cannot know the answer yet; perhaps we will

not know it finally for a long time to come. But day and night, these past 8 years, we have been building for peace, searching out the way that leads most surely to security and freedom and justice in the world for us and all mankind.

This, above all else, has been the task of our Republic since the end of World War II, and our accomplishment so far should give real pride to all Americans. At the very least, a total war has been averted, each day up to this hour. And at the most, we may already have succeeded in establishing conditions which can keep that kind of war from happening for as far ahead as man can see.

The Second World War radically changed the power relationships of the world. Nations once great were left shattered and weak, channels of communication, routes of trade, political and economic ties of many kinds were ripped apart.

And in this changed, disrupted, chaotic situation, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two strongest powers of the world. Each had tremendous human and natural resources, actual or potential, on a scale unmatched by any other nation.

Nothing could make plainer why the world is in its present state—and how that came to pass—than an understanding of the diametrically opposite principles and policies of these two great powers in a war-ruined world.

For our part, we in this Republic were—and are—free men, heirs of the American Revolution, dedicated to the truths of our Declaration of Independence:

. . . that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Our postwar objective has been in keeping with this great idea. The United States has sought to use its pre-eminent position of power to help other nations recover from the damage and dislocation of the war. We held out a helping hand to enable them to restore their national lives and to regain their positions as independent, self-supporting members of the great family of nations. This help was given without any attempt on our part to dominate or control any nation. We did not want satellites but partners.

The Soviet Union, however, took exactly the opposite course.

Its rulers saw in the weakened condition of the world not an obligation to assist in the great work of reconstruction, but an opportunity to exploit misery and suffering for the extension of their power. Instead of help, they brought subjugation. They extinguished, blotted out, the national independence of the countries that the military operations of World War II had left within their grasp.

The difference stares at us from the map of Europe today. To the west of the line that tragically divides Europe we see nations continuing to act

and live in the light of their own traditions and principles. On the other side, we see the dead uniformity of a tyrannical system imposed by the rulers of the Soviet Union. Nothing could point up more clearly what the global struggle between the free world and the Communists is all about.

It is a struggle as old as recorded history; it is freedom *versus* tyranny.

For the dominant idea of the Soviet regime is the terrible conception that men do not have rights but live at the mercy of the state.

Inevitably this idea of theirs—and all the consequences flowing from it—collided with the efforts of free nations to build a just and peaceful world. The Cold War between the Communists and the free world is nothing more or less than the Soviet attempt to checkmate and defeat our peaceful purposes, in furtherance of their own dread objective.

We did not seek this struggle, God forbid. We did our utmost to avoid it. In World War II, we and the Russians had fought side by side, each in our turn attacked and forced to combat by the aggressors. After the war, we hoped that our wartime collaboration could be maintained, that the frightful experience of Nazi invasion, of devastation in the heart of Russia, had turned the Soviet rulers away from their old proclaimed allegiance to world revolution and Communist dominion. But instead, they violated, one by one, the solemn agreements they had made with us in wartime. They sought to use the rights and privileges they had obtained in the United Nations, to frustrate its purposes and cut down its powers as an effective agent of world progress and the keeper of the world's peace.

Despite this outcome, the efforts we made toward peaceful collaboration are a source of our present strength. They demonstrated that we believed what we proclaimed, that we actually sought honest agreements as the way to peace. Our whole moral position, our leadership in the free world today, is fortified by that fact.

The world is divided, not through our fault or failure, but by Soviet design. They, not we, began the Cold War. And because the free world saw this happen—because men know we made the effort and the Soviet rulers spurned it—the free nations have accepted leadership from our Republic, in meeting and mastering the Soviet offensive.

It seems to me especially important that all of us be clear, in our own thinking, about the nature of the threat we have faced—and will face for a long time to come. The measures we have devised to meet it take shape and pattern only as we understand what we were—and are—up against.

The Soviet Union occupies a territory of 8 million square miles. Beyond its borders, east and west, are the nearly 5 million square miles of the satellite states—virtually incorporated into the Soviet Union—and of China, now its close partner.

This vast land mass contains an enormous store of natural resources sufficient to support an economic development comparable to our own.

The Stalinist World

That is the Stalinist world. It is a world of great natural diversity in geography and climate, in distribution of resources, in population, language, and living standards, in economic and cultural development. It is a world whose people are not all convinced Communists by any means. It is a world where history and national traditions, particularly in its borderlands, tend toward separation than unification, and run counter to the enforced combination that has been made of these areas today.

But it is also a world of great man-made uniformities, a world that bleeds its population white to build huge military forces; a world in which the police are everywhere and their authority unlimited; a world where terror and slavery are deliberately administered both as instruments of government and as means of production; a world where all effective social power is the state's monopoly—yet the state itself is the creature of the Communist tyrants.

The Soviet Union, with its satellites, and China are held in the tight grip of Communist Party chieftains. The party dominates all social and political institutions. The party regulates and centrally directs the whole economy. In Moscow's sphere, and in Peiping's, all history, philosophy, morality, and law are centrally established by rigid dogmas, incessantly drummed into the whole population and subject to interpretation—or to change—by none except the party's own inner circle.

And lest their people learn too much of other ways of life, the Communists have walled off their world, deliberately and uniformly, from the rest of human society.

That is the Communist base of operation in their Cold War. In addition, they have at their command hundreds and thousands of dedicated foreign Communists, people in nearly every free country who will serve Moscow's ends. Thus the masters of the Kremlin are provided with deluded followers all through the free world whom they can manipulate, cynically and quite ruthlessly, to serve the purposes of the Soviet state.

Given their vast internal base of operations, and their agents in foreign lands, what are the Communist rulers trying to do?

Inside their homeland, the Communists are trying to maintain and modernize huge military forces. And simultaneously, they are endeavoring to weld their whole vast area and population into a completely self-contained, advanced industrial society. They aim, some day, to equal or better the production levels of Western Europe and North America combined—thus shifting the balance of

world economic power, and war potential, to their side.

They have a long way to go and they know it. But they are prepared to levy upon living generations any sacrifice that helps strengthen their armed power, or speed industrial development.

Externally, the Communist rulers are trying to expand the boundaries of their world, whenever and wherever they can. This expansion they have pursued steadfastly since the close of World War II, using any means available to them.

Where the Soviet Army was present, as in the countries of Eastern Europe, they have gradually squeezed free institutions to death.

Where postwar chaos existed in industrialized nations, as in Western Europe, the local Stalinists tried to gain power through political processes, politically inspired strikes, and every available means for subverting free institutions to their evil ends.

Where conditions permitted, the Soviet rulers have stimulated and aided armed insurrection by Communist-led revolutionary forces, as in Greece, Indochina, the Philippines, and China, or outright aggression by one of their satellites, as in Korea.

Where the forces of nationalism, independence, and economic change were at work throughout the great sweep of Asia and Africa, the Communists tried to identify themselves with the cause of progress, tried to picture themselves as the friends of freedom and advancement—surely one of the most cynical efforts of which history offers record.

Thus, everywhere in the free world, the Communists seek to fish in troubled waters, to seize more countries, to enslave more millions of human souls. They were, and are, ready to ally themselves with any group, from the extreme left to the extreme right, that offers them an opportunity to advance their ends.

Geography gives them a central position. They are both a European and an Asian power, with borders touching many of the most sensitive and vital areas in the free world around them. So situated, they can use their armies and their economic power to set up simultaneously a whole series of threats—or inducements—to such widely dispersed places as Western Germany, Iran, and Japan. These pressures and attractions can be sustained at will or quickly shifted from place to place.

Thus the Communist rulers are moving, with implacable will, to create greater strength in their vast empire and to create weakness and division in the free world, preparing for the time their false creed teaches them must come: the time when the whole world outside their sway will be so torn by strife and contradictions that it will be ripe for the Communist plucking.

This is the heart of the distorted Marxist interpretation of history. This is the glass through which Moscow and Peiping look out upon the world, the glass through which they see the rest

of us. They seem really to believe that history is on their side. And they are trying to boost "history" along, at every opportunity, in every way they can.

I have set forth here the nature of the Communist menace confronting our Republic and the whole free world. This is the measure of the challenge we have faced since World War II—a challenge partly military and partly economic, partly moral and partly intellectual, confronting us at every level of human endeavor and all around the world.

It has been and must be the free world's purpose not only to organize defenses against aggression and subversion, not only to build a structure of resistance and salvation for the community of nations outside the Iron Curtain, but, in addition, to give expression and opportunity to the forces of growth and progress in the free world, to so organize and unify the cooperative community of free men that we will not crumble but grow stronger over the years, and the Soviet empire, not the free world, will eventually have to change its ways or fall.

Our Defense: Military Security and Human Progress

Our whole program of action to carry out this purpose has been directed to meet two requirements.

The first of these had to do with security. Like the pioneers who settled this great continent of ours, we have had to carry a musket while we went about our peaceful business. We realized that if we and our allies did not have military strength to meet the growing Soviet military threat, we would never have the opportunity to carry forward our efforts to build a peaceful world of law and order—the only environment in which our free institutions could survive and flourish.

Did this mean we had to drop everything else and concentrate on armies and weapons? Of course it did not: side-by-side with this urgent military requirement, we had to continue to help create conditions of economic and social progress in the world. This work had to be carried forward alongside the first, not only in order to meet the nonmilitary aspects of the Communist drive for power but also because this creative effort toward human progress is essential to bring about the kind of world we as free men want to live in.

These two requirements—military security and human progress—are more closely related in action than we sometimes recognize. Military security depends upon a strong economic underpinning and a stable and hopeful political order; conversely, the confidence that makes for economic and political progress does not thrive in areas that are vulnerable to military conquest.

These requirements are related in another way. Both of them depend upon unity of action among the free nations of the world. This, indeed, has

been the foundation of our whole effort, for the drawing together of the free people of the world has become a condition essential not only to their progress, but to their survival as free people.

This is the conviction that underlies all the steps we have been taking to strengthen and unify the free nations during the past 7 years.

What have these steps been? First of all, how have we gone about meeting the requirement of providing for our security against this world-wide challenge?

Our starting point, as I have said on many occasions, has been and remains the United Nations.

We were prepared, and so were the other nations of the free world, to place our reliance on the machinery of the United Nations to safeguard peace. But before the United Nations could give full expression to the concept of international security embodied in the Charter, it was essential that the five permanent members of the Security Council honor their solemn pledge to cooperate to that end. This the Soviet Union has not done.

I do not need to outline here the dreary record of Soviet obstruction and veto and the unceasing efforts of the Soviet representatives to sabotage the United Nations. It is important, however, to distinguish clearly between the principle of collective security embodied in the Charter and the mechanisms of the United Nations to give that principle effect. We must frankly recognize that the Soviet Union has been able, in certain instances, to stall the machinery of collective security. Yet it has not been able to impair the principle of collective security. The free nations of the world have retained their allegiance to that idea. They have found the means to act despite the Soviet veto, both through the United Nations itself and through the application of this principle in regional and other security arrangements that are fully in harmony with the Charter and give expression to its purposes.

The free world refused to resign itself to collective suicide merely because of the technicality of a Soviet veto.

The principle of collective measures to forestall aggression has found expression in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, the North Atlantic Treaty, now extended to include Greece and Turkey, and the several treaties we have concluded to reinforce security in the Pacific area.

But the free nations have not this time fallen prey to the dangerous illusion that treaties alone will stop an aggressor. By a series of vigorous actions, as varied as the nature of the threat, the free nations have successfully thwarted aggression or the threat of aggression in many different parts of the world.

Our country has led or supported these collective measures. The aid we have given to people determined to act in defense of their freedom has often spelled the difference between success and failure.

We all know what we have done, and I shall not review in detail the steps we have taken. Each major step was a milestone in the developing unity, strength, and resolute will of the free nations.

The first was the determined and successful effort made through the United Nations to safeguard the integrity and independence of Iran in 1945 and 1946.

Next was our aid and support to embattled Greece, which enabled her to defeat the forces threatening her national independence.

In Turkey, cooperative action resulted in building up a bulwark of military strength for an area vital to the defenses of the entire free world.

In 1949 we began furnishing military aid to our partners in the North Atlantic community and to a number of other free countries.

The Soviet Union's threats against Germany and Japan, its neighbors to the west and to the east, have been successfully withstood. Free Germany is on its way to becoming a member of the peaceful community of nations, and a partner in the common defense. The Soviet effort to capture Berlin by blockade was thwarted by the courageous Allied airlift. An independent and democratic Japan has been brought back into the community of free nations.

In the Far East, the tactics of Communist imperialism have reached heights of violence unmatched elsewhere—and the problem of concerted action by the free nations has been at once more acute and more difficult.

Here, in spite of outside aid and support, the free government of China succumbed to the Communist assault. Our aid has enabled the free Chinese to rebuild and strengthen their forces on the island of Formosa. In other areas of the Far East—in Indochina, Malaya, and the Philippines—our assistance has helped sustain a staunch resistance against Communist insurrectionary attacks.

The supreme test, up to this point, of the will and determination of the free nations came in Korea, when Communist forces invaded the Republic of Korea, a state that was in a special sense under the protection of the United Nations. The response was immediate and resolute. Under our military leadership, the free nations for the first time took up arms, collectively, to repel aggression.

Aggression was repelled, driven back, punished. Since that time, Communist strategy has seen fit to prolong the conflict, in spite of honest efforts by the United Nations to reach an honorable truce. The months of deadlock have demonstrated that the Communists cannot achieve by persistence, or by diplomatic trickery, what they failed to achieve by sneak attack. Korea has demonstrated that the free world has the will and the endurance to match the Communist effort to overthrow international order through local aggression.

It has been a bitter struggle and it has cost us

much in brave lives and human suffering, but it has made it plain that the free nations will fight side by side, that they will not succumb to aggression or intimidation, one by one. This, in the final analysis, is the only way to halt the Communist drive to world power.

Heart of the Free World's Defense

At the heart of the free world's defense is the military strength of the United States.

From 1945 to 1949, the United States was sole possessor of the atomic bomb. That was a great deterrent and protection in itself.

But when the Soviets produced an atomic explosion—as they were bound to do in time—we had to broaden the whole basis of our strength. We had to endeavor to keep our lead in atomic weapons. We had to strengthen our Armed Forces generally and to enlarge our productive capacity—our mobilization base. Historically, it was the Soviet atomic explosion in the fall of 1949, 9 months before the aggression in Korea, which stimulated the planning for our program of defense mobilization.

What we needed was not just a central force that could strike back against aggression. We also needed strength along the outer edges of the free world, defenses for our allies as well as for ourselves, strength to hold the line against attack as well as to retaliate.

We have made great progress on this task of building strong defenses. In the last 2½ years, we have more than doubled our own defenses, and we have helped to increase the protection of nearly all the other free nations.

All the measures of collective security, resistance to aggression, and the building of defenses, constitute the first requirement for the survival and progress of the free world. But, as I have pointed out, they are interwoven with the necessity of taking steps to create and maintain economic and social progress in the free nations. There can be no military strength except where there is economic capacity to back it. There can be no freedom where there is economic chaos or social collapse. For these reasons, our national policy has included a wide range of economic measures.

In Europe, the grand design of the Marshall Plan permitted the people of Great Britain and France and Italy and a half dozen other countries, with help from the United States, to lift themselves from stagnation and find again the path of rising production, rising incomes, rising standards of living. The situation was changed almost overnight by the Marshall Plan; the people of Europe have a renewed hope and vitality, and they are able to carry a share of the military defense of the free world that would have been impossible a few years ago.

Now the countries of Europe are moving rapidly toward political and economic unity, changing

the map of Europe in more hopeful ways than it has been changed for 500 years. Customs unions, European economic institutions like the Schuman Plan, the movement toward European political integration, the European Defense Community—all are signs of practical and effective growth toward greater common strength and unity. The countries of Western Europe, including the free Republic of Germany, are working together, and the whole free world is the gainer.

It sometimes happens, in the course of history, that steps taken to meet an immediate necessity serve an ultimate purpose greater than may be apparent at the time. This, I believe, is the meaning of what has been going on in Europe under the threat of aggression. The free nations there, with our help, have been drawing together in defense of their free institutions. In so doing, they have laid the foundations of a unity that will endure as a major creative force beyond the exigencies of this period of history. We may, at this close range, be but dimly aware of the creative surge this movement represents, but I believe it to be of historic importance. I believe its benefits will survive long after Communist tyranny is nothing but an unhappy memory.

In Asia and Africa, the economic and social problems are different but no less urgent. There hundreds of millions of people are in ferment, exploding into the twentieth century, thrusting toward equality and independence and improvement in the hard conditions of their lives.

Politically, economically, socially, things cannot and will not stay in their prewar mold in Africa and Asia. Change must come—is coming—fast. Just in the years I have been President, 12 free nations, with more than 600 million people, have become independent: Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Korea, Israel, Libya, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, and the Associated States of Indochina, now members of the French Union. These names alone are testimony to the sweep of the great force which is changing the face of half the world.

Working out new relationships among the peoples of the free world would not be easy in the best of times. Even if there were no Communist drive for expansion, there would be hard and complex problems of transition from old social forms, old political arrangements, old economic institutions to the new ones our century demands—problems of guiding change into constructive channels, of helping new nations grow strong and stable. But now, with the Soviet rulers striving to exploit this ferment for their own purposes, the task has become harder and more urgent—terribly urgent.

In this situation, we see the meaning and the importance of the Point Four Program, through which we can share our store of know-how and of capital to help these people develop their economies and reshape their societies. As we help Iranians to raise more grain, Indians to reduce the

incidence of malaria, Liberians to educate their children better, we are at once helping to answer the desires of the people for advancement, and demonstrating the superiority of freedom over communism. There will be no quick solution for any of the difficulties of the new nations of Asia and Africa—but there may be no solution at all if we do not press forward with full energy to help these countries grow and flourish in freedom and in cooperation with the rest of the free world.

Our measures of economic policy have already had a tremendous effect on the course of events. Eight years ago, the Kremlin thought postwar collapse in Western Europe and Japan—with economic dislocation in America—might give them the signal to advance. We demonstrated they were wrong. Now they wait with hope that the economic recovery of the free world has set the stage for violent and disastrous rivalry among the economically developed nations, struggling for each other's markets and a greater share of trade. Here is another test that we shall have to meet and master in the years immediately ahead. And it will take great ingenuity and effort—and much time—before we prove the Kremlin wrong again. But we can do it. It is true that economic recovery presents its problems, as does economic decline, but they are problems of another order. They are the problems of distributing abundance fairly, and they can be solved by the process of international cooperation that has already brought us so far.

These are the measures we must continue. This is the path we must follow. We must go on, working with our free associates, building an international structure for military defense, and for economic, social, and political progress. We must be prepared for war, because war may be thrust upon us. But the stakes in our search for peace are immensely higher than they have ever been before.

Implications of the Atomic Age

For now we have entered the atomic age, and war has undergone a technological change which makes it a very different thing from what it used to be. War today between the Soviet empire and the free nations might dig the grave not only of our Stalinist opponents, but of our own society, our world as well as theirs.

This transformation has been brought to pass in the 7 years from Alamogordo to Eniwetok. It is only 7 years, but the new force of atomic energy has turned the world into a very different kind of place.

Science and technology have worked so fast that war's new meaning may not yet be grasped by all the peoples who would be its victims; nor, perhaps, by the rulers in the Kremlin. But I have been President of the United States, these 7 years, responsible for the decisions which have brought our science and our engineering to their present

place. I know what this development means now. I know something of what it will come to mean in the future.

We in this Government realized, even before the first successful atomic explosion, that this new force spelled terrible danger for all mankind unless it were brought under international control. We promptly advanced proposals in the United Nations to take this new source of energy out of the arena of national rivalries, to make it impossible to use it as a weapon of war. These proposals, so pregnant with benefit for all humanity, were rebuffed by the rulers of the Soviet Union.

The language of science is universal, the movement of science is always forward into the unknown. We could not assume that the Soviet Union would not develop the same weapon, regardless of all our precautions, nor that there were not other and even more terrible means of destruction lying in the unexplored field of atomic energy.

We had no alternative, then, but to press on, to probe the secrets of atomic power to the uttermost of our capacity, to maintain, if we could, our initial superiority in the atomic field. At the same time, we sought persistently for some avenue, some formula, for reaching an agreement with the Soviet rulers that would place this new form of power under effective restraints—that would guarantee no nation would use it in war. I do not have to recount here the proposals we made, the steps taken in the United Nations, striving at least to open a way to ultimate agreement. I hope and believe that we will continue to make these efforts so long as there is the slightest possibility of progress. All civilized nations are agreed on the urgency of the problem and have shown their willingness to agree on effective measures of control—all save the Soviet Union and its satellites. But they have rejected every reasonable proposal.

Meanwhile, the progress of scientific experiment has outrun our expectations. Atomic science is in the full tide of development; the unfolding of the innermost secrets of matter is uninterrupted and irresistible. Since Alamogordo we have developed atomic weapons with many times the explosive force of the early models, and we have produced them in substantial quantities. And recently, in the thermonuclear tests at Eniwetok, we have entered another stage in the world-shaking development of atomic energy. From now on, man moves into a new era of destructive power, capable of creating explosions of a new order of magnitude, dwarfing the mushroom clouds of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

We have no reason to think that the stage we have now reached in the release of atomic energy will be the last. Indeed, the speed of our scientific and technical progress over the last 7 years shows no signs of abating. We are being hurried forward, in our mastery of the atom, from one discovery to another, toward yet unforeseeable peaks of destructive power.

Inevitably, until we can reach international agreement, this is the path we must follow. And we must realize that no advance we make is unattainable by others, that no advantage in this race can be more than temporary.

The war of the future would be one in which man could extinguish millions of lives at one blow, demolish the great cities of the world, wipe out the cultural achievements of the past—and destroy the very structure of a civilization that has been slowly and painfully built up through hundreds of generations.

Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men. We know this, but we dare not assume that others would not yield to the temptation science is now placing in their hands.

Words of Advice to Stalin

With that in mind, there is something I would say to Stalin: You claim belief in Lenin's prophecy that one stage in the development of Communist society would be war between your world and ours. But Lenin was a pre-atomic man, who viewed society and history with pre-atomic eyes. Something profound has happened since he wrote. War has changed its shape and its dimension. It cannot now be a "stage" in the development of anything save ruin for your regime and your homeland.

I do not know how much time may elapse before the Communist rulers bring themselves to recognize this truth. But when they do, they will find us eager to reach understandings that will protect the world from the danger it faces today.

It is no wonder that some people wish that we had never succeeded in splitting the atom. But atomic power, like any other force of nature, is not evil in itself. Properly used, it is an instrumentality for human betterment. As a source of power, as a tool of scientific inquiry, it has untold possibilities. We are already making good progress in the constructive use of atomic power. We could do much more if we were free to concentrate on its peaceful uses exclusively.

Atomic power will be with us all the days of our lives. We cannot legislate it out of existence. We cannot ignore the dangers or the benefits it offers.

I believe that man can harness the forces of the atom to work for the improvement of the lot of human beings everywhere. That is our goal. As a nation, as a people, we must understand this problem, we must handle this new force wisely through our democratic processes. Above all, we must strive, in all earnestness and good faith, to bring it under effective international control. To do this will require much wisdom and patience and firmness. The awe-inspiring responsibility in this field now falls on a new Administration and a new Congress. I will give them my support, as I am sure all our citizens will, in whatever con-

structive steps they may take to make this newest of man's discoveries a source of good and not of ultimate destruction.

We cannot tell when or whether the attitude of the Soviet rulers may change. We do not know how long it may be before they show a willingness to negotiate effective control of atomic energy and honorable settlements of other world problems. We cannot measure how deep-rooted are the Kremlin's illusions about us. We can be sure, however, that the rulers of the Communist world will not change their basic objectives lightly or soon.

The Communist rulers have a sense of time about these things wholly unlike our own. We tend to divide our future into short spans, like the 2-year life of this Congress, or the 4 years of the next Presidential term. They seem to think and plan in terms of generations. And there is, therefore, no easy, short-run way to make them see that their plans cannot prevail.

This means there is ahead of us a long hard test of strength and stamina, between the free world and the Communist domain—our politics and our economy, our science and technology against the best they can do—our liberty against their slavery—our voluntary concert of free nations against their forced amalgam of "people's republics"—our strategy against their strategy—our nerve against their nerve.

Above all, this is a test of the will and the steadiness of the people of the United States.

There has been no challenge like this in the history of our Republic. We are called upon to rise to the occasion as no people before us.

What is required of us is not easy. The way we must learn to live, the world we have to live in, cannot be so pleasant, safe or simple as most of us have known before, or confidently hoped to know.

Already we have had to sacrifice a number of accustomed ways of working and of living, much nervous energy, material resources, even human life. Yet if one thing is certain in our future, it is that more sacrifice still lies ahead.

Were we to grow discouraged now, were we to weaken and slack off, the whole structure we have built these past 8 years would come apart and fall away. Never then, no matter by what stringent means, could our free world regain the ground, the time, the sheer momentum, lost by such a move. There can and should be changes and improvements in our programs to meet new situations, serve new needs. But to desert the spirit of our basic policies, to step back from them now would surely start the free world's slide toward the darkness that the Communists have prophesied—toward the moment for which they watch and wait.

If we value our freedom and our way of life and want to see them safe, we must meet the chal-

lenge and accept its implications, stick to our guns and carry out our policies.

I have set out the basic conditions, as I see them, under which we have been working in the world and the nature of our basic policies. What, then, of the future? The answer, I believe, is this: As we continue to confound Soviet expectations, as our world grows stronger, more united, more attractive to men on both sides of the Iron Curtain, then inevitably there will come a time of change within the Communist world. We do not know how that change will come about, whether by deliberate decision in the Kremlin, by *coup d'état*, by revolution, by defection of satellites, or perhaps by some unforeseen combination of factors such as these.

But if the Communist rulers understand they cannot win by war, and if we frustrate their attempts to win by subversion, it is not too much to expect their world to change its character, moderate its aims, become more realistic and less implacable, and recede from the Cold War they began.

Do not be deceived by the strong face, the look of monolithic power that the Communist dictators wear before the outside world. Remember their power has no basis in consent. Remember they are so afraid of the free world's ideas and ways of life, they do not dare to let their people know about them. Think of the massive effort they put forth to try to stop our campaign of truth from reaching their people with its message of freedom.

The masters of the Kremlin live in fear their power and position would collapse were their own people to acquire knowledge, information, comprehension about our free society. Their world has many elements of strength, but this one fatal flaw: the weakness represented by their Iron Curtain and their police state. Surely, a social order at once so insecure and so fearful must ultimately lose its competition with our free society.

Provided just one thing—and this I urge you to consider carefully—provided that the free world retains the confidence and the determination to outmatch the best our adversary can accomplish and to demonstrate for uncertain millions on both sides of the Iron Curtain the superiority of the free way of life.

That is the test upon all the free nations; upon none more than our own Republic.

Our resources are equal to the task. We have the industry, the skills, the basic economic strength. Above all, we have the vigor of free men in a free society. We have our liberties. And while we keep them, while we retain our democratic faith, the ultimate advantage in this hard competition lies with us, not with the Communists.

But there are some things that could shift the advantage to their side. One of the things that could defeat us is fear—fear of the task we face,

fear of adjusting to it, fear that breeds more fear, sapping our faith, corroding our liberties, turning citizen against citizen, ally against ally. Fear could snatch away the very values we are striving to defend.

Already the danger signals have gone up. Already the corrosive process has begun. And every diminution of our tolerance, each new act of enforced conformity, each idle accusation, each demonstration of hysteria—each new restrictive law—is one more sign that we can lose the battle against fear.

Facing the Future With Faith and Courage

The Communists cannot deprive us of our liberties—fear can. The Communists cannot stamp out our faith in human dignity—fear can. Fear is an enemy within ourselves, and if we do not root it out, it may destroy the very way of life we are so anxious to protect.

To beat back fear, we must hold fast to our heritage as free men. We must renew our confidence in one another, our tolerance, our sense of being neighbors, fellow citizens. We must take our stand on the Bill of Rights. The inquisition, the star chamber, have no place in a free society.

Our ultimate strength lies, not alone in arms, but in the sense of moral values and moral truths that give meaning and vitality to the purposes of free people. These values are our faith, our inspiration, the source of our strength and our indomitable determination.

We face hard tasks, great dangers. But we are Americans and we have faced hardships and uncertainty before, we have adjusted before to changing circumstances. Our whole history has been a steady training for the work it is now ours to do.

No one can lose heart for the task, none can lose faith in our free ways, who stops to remember where we began, what we have sought, and what accomplished, all together as Americans.

I have lived a long time and seen much happen in our country. And I know out of my own experience that we can do what must be done.

When I think back to the country I grew up in—and then look at what our country has become—I am quite certain that having done so much, we can do more.

After all, it has been scarcely 15 years since most Americans rejected out-of-hand the wise counsel that aggressors must be “quarantined.” The very concept of collective security, the foundation stone of all our actions now, was then strange doctrine, shunned and set aside. Talk about adapting; talk about adjusting; talk about responding as a people to the challenge of changed times and circumstances—there has never been a more spectacular example than this great change in America's outlook on the world.

Let all of us pause now, think back, consider

carefully the meaning of our national experience. Let us draw comfort from it and faith, and confidence in our future as Americans.

The Nation's business is never finished. The basic questions we have been dealing with, these 8 years past, present themselves anew. That is the way of our society. Circumstances change and current questions take on different forms, new complications, year by year. But underneath, the great issues remain the same—prosperity, welfare, human rights, effective democracy, and above all, peace.

Now we turn to the inaugural of our new President. And in the great work he is called upon to do he will have need for the support of a united people, a confident people, with firm faith in one another and in our common cause. I pledge him my support as a citizen of our Republic, and I ask you to give him yours.

To him, to you, to all my fellow citizens, I say, Godspeed.

May God bless our country and our cause.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 7, 1953.

Revised Budget Estimate For Fiscal 1953

White House press release dated January 9

In the 1953 Budget, which was transmitted to the Congress in January 1952,¹ budget expenditures for the fiscal year 1953 were estimated at \$5.4 billion dollars. In the 1954 Budget now being transmitted,² expenditures for 1953 are estimated at 74.6 billion dollars, a decrease of 10.8 billion dollars.

The original estimate was made 6 months before the fiscal year 1953 began and was based on program plans as they then existed. The current revision has been prepared with the benefit of 5 months' actual experience in the fiscal year 1953—from July through November. It reflects production difficulties, amendments to the 1953 Budget made after it was transmitted to the Congress, and the effects of appropriations and other legislation enacted during the last session of the Eighty-second Congress.

As the following table indicates, the decline in estimated expenditures for 1953 is largely the result of revisions in the major national security programs—military services, international security and foreign relations, atomic energy, and a few other directly defense-related programs:

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1953

(In billions)

Program	January 1952 estimate	January 1953 estimate	Increase (+) or decrease (-)
Major national security			
Military services	\$51.2	\$44.4	\$-6.8
International security and foreign relations	10.8	6.0	-4.8
Development and control of atomic energy	1.8	2.0	+.2
Promotion of the merchant marine2	.2	. . .
Promotion of defense production and economic stabilization8	.5	-.3
Civil defense3	.1	-.2
Total, major national security	65.1	53.2	-11.9
Interest	6.2	6.5	+.3
Veterans' services and benefits	4.2	4.5	+.3
All other	9.9	10.4	+.5
TOTAL	\$5.4	74.6	-10.8

The downward revision of 11.9 billion dollars in estimated expenditures for major national security programs occurs almost entirely in the estimates for our own military services and for foreign aid. It reflects lower levels of production and delivery of military equipment for our Armed Forces and for the foreign military-assistance program than were scheduled last January. The monthly levels of production scheduled a year ago, upon which the estimates in the 1953 Budget were based, turned out to be too high in the light of the complex designs of military equipment and the difficulties encountered in firming up contracts before they were let. In addition, the original estimate of expenditures has been reduced because the Congress authorized smaller programs for the Department of Defense and the Mutual Security Program than were included in the 1953 Budget. Labor-management disputes, particularly those in the steel and aircraft manufacturing industries, also slowed down the rate of deliveries and of expenditures.

Expenditures for the atomic-energy program in the fiscal year 1953 are now estimated .2 billion dollars higher than a year ago because of the expansion of the program approved by the second session of the Eighty-second Congress after the 1953 Budget had been transmitted. Primarily because more private financing was available than had originally been anticipated, direct Government expenditures for expanding defense production are now estimated .3 billion dollars lower than in January 1952. The decline of .2 billion dollars in estimated expenditures for civil defense

¹ H. doc. 285, 82d Cong., 1st sess.

² H. doc. 16, 83d Cong., 1st sess., transmitted Jan. 9.

is largely the result of a substantial reduction by the Congress in the appropriation recommended by the President in the 1953 Budget.

On the whole, expenditures for other programs in 1953 are now expected to be 1.1 billion dollars higher than they were estimated a year ago. The increase in the estimate for interest is due mainly to the fact that an extra interest-payment period on some securities fell within the fiscal year 1953. The increase in estimated expenditures for vet-

erans' services and benefits reflects primarily the legislation enacted during the second session of the Eighty-second Congress providing readjustment benefits for Korean veterans and increased pensions. Increased expenditure estimates for farm-price support programs (primarily Commodity Credit Corporation) and for mortgage purchases by the Federal National Mortgage Association account for the rise in the estimate for all other programs.

Commission on Immigration and Naturalization Reports to the President

Following are excerpts from the report of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, released January 1:

Letter of Transmittal

JANUARY 1, 1953.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

The President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization submits to you its report pursuant to your request of September 4, 1952, and Executive Order No. 10382.¹

We believe that the separately printed record of hearings held by the Commission provides information of permanent value to the executive and legislative branches of the Government. The work could not have been done without the wholehearted cooperation of many individuals, organizations, and institutions interested in the problem.

The Commission hopes that its study and recommendations will contribute to public understanding of this vital matter, and assist the Congress in the consideration of legislation to improve the immigration and naturalization laws and policies of the United States.

Respectfully submitted.

THOMAS G. FINUCANE
ADRIAN S. FISHER
THADDEUS F. GULLIXSON
MSGR. JOHN O'GRADY
CLARENCE E. PICKETT
EARL G. HARRISON
Vice Chairman
PHILIP B. PERLMAN
Chairman

HARRY N. ROSENFELD
Executive Director

Introduction

The President of the United States established the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization on September 4, 1952, and required it to make a final report not later than January 1, 1953. He directed the Commission "to study and evaluate the immigration and naturalization policies of the United States" and to make recommendations "for such legislative, administrative, or other action as in its opinion may be desirable in the interest of the economy, security, and responsibilities of this country."

This Report is the result of the Commission's study, and contains the recommendations for an immigration policy best suited, in its judgment, to the interests, needs, and security of the United States. The Commission's functions under the Executive Order are now completed, and it ceases to exist 30 days after this Report is submitted to the President.

It is noteworthy that all the major religious faiths of America urged the President to appoint a commission for this general purpose. The General Board of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America issued a statement to this effect in March 1952. In August 1952, the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, through its Committee on Displaced Persons and Refugees, urged the creation of a commission to study the basic assumptions of our immigration policy. Its statement was signed by representatives of the War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the Church World Service of the National Council of the Churches of Christ, the United Service for New Americans, and the National Lutheran Council. And in September 1952, the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church urged the appointment of a commission to study the need for emergency

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 15, 1952, pp. 407-408.

refugee legislation and "to review our permanent immigration policy and its basic assumptions."

It became evident during the debate in Congress and public discussions after the passage June 27, 1952, of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (generally known as the McCarran-Walter Act) over the President's veto,² that the new legislation does not adequately solve immigration and naturalization problems, and that the codification it contains fails to embody principles worthy of this country.

Immigration and nationality law in the United States should perform two functions. First, it should regulate the admission and naturalization of aliens in the best interests of the United States. Second, it should properly reflect the traditions and fundamental ideals of the American people in determining "whom we shall welcome to a participation of all our rights and privileges."

This Report discusses the manner in which the law presently regulates the admission and naturalization of aliens, recommends revisions, and explains why the Commission believes these revisions better serve the welfare and security of the United States.

As a separate document, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives has published the extensive record of the 30 sessions of hearings held by the Commission in 11 cities in various sections of the country. The record shows what a substantial and representative cross section of the American people believe to be the best immigration policy for this country.

It is appropriate to examine the second function of immigration policy, the reflection of American traditions and ideals. The Commission would state them as follows:

WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS . . .

1. *America was founded upon the principle that all men are created equal, that differences of race, color, religion, or national origin should not be used to deny equal treatment or equal opportunity.*

Americans have regarded such doctrines as self-evident since the Declaration of Independence.

The immigration law is a key to whether Americans today believe in the essential worth and dignity of the individual human being. It is a clue to whether we really believe that all people are entitled to those "unalienable rights" for the preservation of which our nation was created. It indicates the degree of American humanitarianism. It is a gauge of our faithfulness to the high moral and spiritual principles of our founding fathers—to whom people, as the children of God, were the most important resources of a free nation.

2. *America historically has been the haven for the oppressed of other lands.*

² For text of the veto message, see *ibid.*, July 14, 1952, p. 78.

The immigration law is an index of the extent of our acceptance of the principle that tyranny is forever abhorrent and that its victims should always find asylum in the land of the free. It tests whether we continue to believe that the home of the brave should offer a promise of opportunity to people courageous enough to leave their ancestral homelands, to search for liberty. It is a measure of our fidelity to the doctrine upon which this country was founded, the right of free men to freedom of movement. The immigration law discloses whether Americans still concur in George Washington's challenge:

" . . . to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance."

3. *American national unity has been achieved without national uniformity.*

The immigration law demonstrates whether we abide by the principle that the individual should be free of regimentation. It attests whether we still respect differences of opinion and the right to disagree with the prevailing ideas of the majority, and whether we still welcome new knowledge, new ideas, and new people. It reveals the strength or weakness of our convictions that democracy is the best philosophy and form of government.

4. *Americans have believed in fair treatment for all.*

The immigration law is a yardstick of our approval of fair play. It is a challenge to the tradition that American law and its administration must be reasonable, fair, and humane. It betokens the current status of the doctrine of equal justice for all, immigrant or native.

5. *America's philosophy has always been one of faith in our future and belief in progress.*

The immigration law indicates our outlook on the future of America. Those who have faith in a dynamic, expanding, and strong American economy see immigration not only as a part of our heritage but also as essential to our future. On the other hand, those who regard the future of America in terms of a static economy and a maximum population, view immigration with alarm.

6. *American foreign policy seeks peace and freedom, mutual understanding and a high standard of living for ourselves and our world neighbors.*

The immigration law is an image in which other nations see us. It tells them how we really feel about them and their problems, and not how we say we do. It is also an expression of the sincerity of our confidence in ourselves and our institutions. An immigration law which reflects fear and insecurity makes a hollow mockery of confident world leadership. Immigration policy is an important and revealing aspect of our foreign policy.

No doubt our ideals have not been honored in America at every moment and in every respect. But they have certainly governed our thought and

actions over the 175 years of the nation's life. They will continue to do so. The Commission believes that these traditions and ideals should be basic to our immigration laws. Insofar as our immigration policy violates these American traditions and ideals, it weakens the foundations of our liberty and undermines our security and well-being. It also damages our position of leadership and destroys the esteem and good reputation the United States has earned in the past.

Other considerations must also condition our immigration laws, such as the protection and preservation of our security against the dangerous and the diseased. The Commission emphasizes that one of its major concerns in applying these principles has been the necessity for the immigration law to safeguard the welfare and security of the United States. However, it is convinced that a full regard for protecting our national security does not require a hostile attitude toward immigration; on the contrary, it believes that full security can be achieved only with a positive immigration policy based not on fears but on faith in people and in the future of a democratic and free United States.

WHAT WE BELIEVE

The Commission believes that immigration has given strength to this country not only in manpower, new industries, inventiveness, and prosperity, but also in new ideas and new culture. Immigrants have supplied a continuous flow of creative abilities and ideas that have enriched our nation.

The Commission believes that an outstanding characteristic of the United States is its great cultural diversity within an overriding national unity. The American story proves, if proof were needed, that such differences do not mean the existence of superior and inferior classes.

The Commission believes that it is contrary to the American spirit to view every alien with suspicion and hostility. The Commission is convinced that the American people will not knowingly tolerate immigration laws that reflect distrust, discrimination, and dangerous isolationism. The Commission believes that the American people are entitled to a positive, not a negative immigration policy, and that they desire a law geared to the forward-looking objectives of a great world power.

The Commission believes that although immigrants need the United States, it is also true that the United States needs immigrants, not only for its domestic or foreign benefit, but also to retain, reinvigorate and strengthen the American spirit.

The Commission believes that we cannot be true to the democratic faith of our own Declaration of Independence in the equality of all men, and at the same time pass immigration laws which discriminate among people because of national origin, race, color, or creed. We cannot continue to bask

in the glory of an ancient and honorable tradition of providing haven to the oppressed, and belie that tradition by ignoble and ungenerous immigration laws. We cannot develop an effective foreign policy if our immigration laws negate our role of world leadership. We cannot defend civil rights in principle, and deny them in our immigration laws and practice. We cannot boast of our magnificent system of law, and enact immigration legislation which violates decent principles of legal protection.

Nor can we ourselves really believe, or persuade others to think that we believe, that the United States is a dynamic, expanding, and prosperous country if our immigration law is based upon a fear of catastrophe rather than a promise and hope for greater days ahead.

The Commission believes that our present immigration laws—

flout fundamental American traditions and ideals,
display a lack of faith in America's future,
damage American prestige and position among other nations,
ignore the lessons of the American way of life.

The Commission believes that laws which fail to reflect the American spirit must sooner or later disappear from the statute books.

The Commission believes that our present immigration law should be completely rewritten.

Immigration and Our Foreign Policy

The Commission is convinced that our present immigration law has a detrimental effect upon our foreign relations in a variety of ways.

Discriminatory racial and national restrictions in immigration law have made enemies for the United States in the past, and will continue to lose us friends as long as they remain in the law. In this respect, our immigration law conflicts with American propaganda abroad, an important arm of foreign policy, which emphasizes equality and mutual interests among the free nations. Present immigration law causes large areas of the world, of greatest importance to our own national security and welfare, to resent us and view us with growing distrust.

The immigration laws of the United States frustrate our foreign policy by hindering our efforts in friendly and allied countries to encourage their political stability and unity, rebuild their economies and strengthen their military power.

Rigidity in the national origins quota system prevents the United States from acting quickly and effectively in helping to relieve refugee and overpopulation problems when and where they arise. Population pressure gives rise to economic and political instability and thus augments the very conditions which foreign aid programs of the United States are designed to ameliorate. More-

over, the inability of the United States to deal flexibly with refugee and overpopulation pressures reduces the influence this country might exert on other countries to help solve these problems.

Our present national origins quota system prevents the United States from giving asylum to escapees from the Iron Curtain countries. Besides being contrary to American traditions, this barrier tends to disillusion the escapees, and denies us the value of their help in organizing effective pro-democratic appeals. The present immigration law is inconsistent with the aim of our foreign policy to uphold the values of freedom in contrast to the chains of Communist dictatorship. The effect is to blunt one of our most important psychological weapons in the cold war.

Our immigration law and procedures have had the effect, in some instances, of keeping out temporary visitors who should be welcomed to this country. The testimony has shown that important circles in friendly foreign countries are growing resentful of American immigration policy, and are losing confidence in the sincerity of American professions of devotion to democracy.

The Commission's study of the effect of the present immigration laws upon our foreign relations leads to this conclusion: in order to advance our national interests, strengthen our security, and contribute to the achievement of our foreign aims, American immigration policy should be free from discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, creed, or color and should be flexible enough to permit the United States to engage fully in such special migration efforts as may be important to the security of the Free World.

The Administrative Agency

The Commission recommends:

1. That a Commission on Immigration and Naturalization be created, to be appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation, responsible for the administration of all immigration and naturalization laws.

2. That present duplication of functions between the consular officers in the Foreign Service of the Department of State and the immigrant inspectors in the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice be eliminated, and that a consolidated service under an Administrator of Immigration and Naturalization responsible to the proposed Commission be substituted.

3. That a Board of Immigration and Visa Appeals be created under the proposed Commission, with final administrative appellate authority (except in cases involving the exercise of discretion) in all cases of visa denials, exclusions, deportations, and other related matters.

I concur wholeheartedly in the policy recommendations in the report of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization. I believe that their prompt adoption would be in the interest of the United States, both in the conduct of its foreign relations and in the continued vigorous growth and development of its economy and its society. However, in only one small aspect of the report, that dealing with the administrative arrangements for the issuance of visas overseas, I cannot see eye to eye with my colleagues.

The Report proposes to set up, in effect, another separate foreign service by authorizing the Administrator of Immigration and Naturalization to set up visa offices overseas as part of the unified program. In view of the importance which the report places on the foreign policy of the United States, a view in which I wholly concur, I cannot see what is to be gained by separating the administration of the proposed program from the agency which is charged with the administration of the foreign policy of the United States. It may well be that the Department of State is subject to legitimate criticism in its activities under the present system for not having paid enough attention to the foreign policy aspects of the administration of the visa issuing function. But in my judgment the remedy for that defect is not to be found in divorcing it entirely from this function. It may well be true that in its administration of the visa function overseas the Department of State has relied excessively upon "experts;" that is, persons who spend a large proportion of their time doing nothing but visa work. If the Department, however, has erred in this respect, this tendency should be corrected, not accentuated, and the participation in the visa function of officers who have an over-all responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations should be encouraged, not made impossible.

The same can be said with reference to the problem of placing an additional group of United States officials in foreign countries to represent the United States of America. I am aware that my colleagues are led to their concept of administration by their views that a visa once issued should be final, and not subject to review at the port of entry except for identity, physical condition, and security status. From this they deduce, by the maxim of "No responsibility without authority," the conclusion that the visa issuing function must in turn be under the proposed commission. I wholly agree that a visa once issued should be final and not subject to review at the port of entry except for identity, physical condition, and security status. I wholly agree also that there should be an independent Commission on Immigration and Naturalization. I am completely in accord with the recommendation that there should be a formal procedure for review of consular decisions

with respect to visas. However, I do not agree that these desirable ends require that persons other than consular officers should issue the visas.

I am reinforced in this view by the fact that in over 200 Foreign Service posts there is not an adequate work-load of visa cases to justify the establishment of a separate visa office. My examination of the statistics shows that almost 50 percent of all visas are issued in posts of this kind. The proposed solution—that is, to have the consul, in effect, act as a hearing officer but without any power of decision, even in a clear case—does not seem to me to be a satisfactory one. Certainly it does not seem to be satisfactory to have two separate systems, one disposing of 53 percent of the visas and the other disposing of 47 percent.

I believe the proposed Commission should avail itself of the very real advantages in using the Foreign Service to accomplish its requirements abroad, as do some 45 United States Government agencies at the present time. The proposed Commission would thus have a widespread, flexible, operating service with the particular advantage of utilizing its broad experience in foreign affairs. This experience will be invaluable in evaluating the intent of the alien, and his social, economic, and political background, and in estimating the effect of the alien's admission to the United States upon our foreign relations and domestic security and development.

The proposed Commission would have the same responsibility and authority, the same freedom in the issuance of substantive guidance and direction as it would enjoy with its own employees. It could participate with other government agencies, under procedures now established under the Foreign Service Act of 1946, in the selection, training, assignment, and promotion of Foreign Service personnel, and could participate in the day to day administration of the Service by the Department of State to the extent necessary to meet its requirements.

Except for this single administrative detail, I am in complete accord with the Commission's conclusions and recommendations.

Recommendations

Throughout this Report are various recommendations, appearing in the chapters in which particular subjects are discussed. The more important ones are briefly restated here, without reference to the order in which they appear elsewhere:

The Quota System

1. The national origins quota system should be abolished.

2. There should be a unified quota system, which would allocate visas without regard to national origin, race, creed, or color.

3. The maximum annual quota immigration should be one-sixth of 1 percent of the population

of the United States, as determined by the most recent census. Under the 1950 census, quota immigration would be open to 251,162 immigrants annually, instead of the 154,657 now authorized.

4. All immigration and naturalization functions now in the Department of State and the Department of Justice should be consolidated into a new agency, to be headed by a Commission on Immigration and Naturalization whose members should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

5. The maximum annual quota of visas should be distributed, as determined by the proposed Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, on the basis of the following five categories:

The Right of Asylum
Reunion of Families
Needs in the United States
Special Needs in the Free World
General Immigration

6. For the next three years, within the maximum annual quota, there should be a statutory priority, implementing the Right of Asylum, for the admission annually of 100,000 refugees, expellees, escapees, and remaining displaced persons.

7. The allocation of visas within the maximum annual quota should be determined, once every 3 years, by the proposed Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, subject to review by the President and the Congress.

Fair Hearings and Procedure

8. Enforcement functions should be exercised, under the Commission's supervision and control, by an Administrator. Quasi-judicial functions should be exercised, under the Commission's supervision, by a statutory Board of Immigration and Visa Appeals.

9. The same officials should not be permitted to exercise both enforcement and judicial functions. Aliens should be accorded a fair hearing and procedure in exclusion and deportation cases. Hearings in deportation cases should conform with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Hearing officers should be responsible only to the proposed Board of Immigration and Visa Appeals, which should have authority to exercise final administrative review of their decisions, subject to further review in limited cases by the Commission. Aliens should have a right of administrative review, before the Board of Immigration and Visa Appeals, from denials of visas; and have a clearly defined method of seeking court review of orders of deportation.

Admissions and Deportations

10. The conditions for admission of aliens into the United States should

bear a reasonable relationship to the national welfare and security;

be definite in their meaning and application; include discretionary authority to waive specified grounds of inadmissibility, in meritorious cases;

provide for exclusions without hearing, for reasons of security, only upon direction of the Board of Immigration and Visa Appeals; and not be based on the so-called criminal judgments of totalitarian states.

11. The grounds for deportation of aliens already in the United States should

bear a reasonable relationship to the national welfare and security; not be technical or excessive;

not be retroactive so as to penalize aliens for acts which were not prohibited when committed; and

not require the deportation of aliens who entered the country at an early age, or those who have been residents for such a long period as to become the responsibility of the United States.

12. In connection with the deportation of aliens, there should be discretionary authority to

allow them to depart voluntarily instead of deportation;

adjust their status within the United States if they are currently qualified to reenter;

suspend deportation under reasonable conditions; and

adjust the status of bona fide official defectors from totalitarianism.

13. A resident alien who is not otherwise deportable should not, by reason of a brief absence from the United States, be subject to exclusion or deportation.

14. Unless proceedings for deportation and denaturalization are brought within ten years, they should be barred.

15. Arrangements should be made to expedite the processing of visas for temporary visitors, including leaders in art, scientific and business fields, and the law should apply to such nonimmigrant aliens only such restrictions as are directly concerned with the health, safety, and security of the United States.

Security

16. The security of the United States should be protected by continuing to bar the entry of spies and saboteurs.

Aliens who are present members or affiliates of any totalitarian party, including Communists, Nazis, and Fascists, should be denied admission into the United States except where their membership is involuntary; or

affiliations is not knowingly or willingly to further the aims and principles of such parties.

They should be deported except where they

entered the United States at an early age or have been residents for such a long period of time as to have become the responsibility of the United States.

Aliens who are former members or affiliates of any totalitarian party may be admitted provided

they have repudiated and are now opposed to such totalitarian ideologies; and

the responsible administrative officers make a finding that the admission of such aliens would not be contrary to the public interest.

They should be deported unless

they have repudiated such doctrines for at least five years.

Citizenship

17. The law should not discriminate against naturalized citizens but should place them in the same status as native-born citizens, except where citizenship was procured by fraud or illegality. The law should minimize or remove restrictions which create statelessness, disrupt family unity, or impose unreasonable conditions or procedures upon the acquisition or retention of citizenship.

Restrictions on Dairy Imports

Statement by the President

White House press release dated December 31

The Secretary of Agriculture announced yesterday [December 30] that he was applying some additional restrictions to imports of dairy products, in accordance with the provisions of Section 104 of the Defense Production Act.

Section 104 requires the Secretary of Agriculture to put restrictions on imports of dairy products in various circumstances, including the situation in which the restrictions may be needed to prevent unnecessary expenditures under a Government price-support program. Since the Government has recently been buying considerable amounts of butter and other dairy products, the Secretary had no choice but to restrict imports which might add unnecessarily to his purchases.

It is a thoroughly objectionable piece of legislation. It was tacked on to the Defense Production Act in 1951, over the Administration's opposition. The measures which the Secretary of Agriculture has been forced to take under its provisions will not be helpful to American interests. On the contrary, this kind of step in the end is bound to hurt not only our relations with other friendly countries but also the agricultural interests that the law is supposed to protect. While the restrictions

themselves are going to have very little effect on the American market, they are going to hurt our friends in the Netherlands, Sweden, New Zealand, and a number of other countries. These countries are going to lose dollars. They are going to be in a poorer position to buy American agricultural products and in a poorer position to finance their defense efforts. This is the kind of law which makes the job of the Kremlin's propaganda experts a great deal easier. The only recourse I can see is to repeal this provision of the law.

Joint Emergency Loan to Afghanistan for Wheat

Press release 10 dated January 8

The Department of State and the Export-Import Bank of Washington announced on January 8 an emergency loan of 1.5 million dollars to Afghanistan for the procurement of wheat and flour from the United States. Sardar Mohammad Naim, Afghanistan's Ambassador to Washington, with Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, and officials of the Department of State concluded loan arrangements in a ceremony at the Bank.

In normal years Afghanistan is self-sufficient in wheat, which is its basic food. However, this year Afghanistan must import a substantial proportion of its wheat needs. The extent of Afghanistan's wheat shortage and the limitations of its foreign-exchange position are such that the U.S. Government has felt it necessary to take prompt steps to meet the request of the Government of Afghanistan for the acquisition of wheat and flour from the United States.

The loan to the Government of Afghanistan is being made by the Export-Import Bank, using funds to be disbursed by the Technical Cooperation Administration and made available under the authority provided in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended. The loan is to run for 35 years with interest at 2½ percent per annum, interest payments to begin after 4 years and repayment of principal to begin after 6 years. The wheat and flour thus provided is to be distributed by the Government of Afghanistan in certain critical areas of the country to supplement quantities procured locally.

Serious adverse crop conditions in Afghanistan have resulted in a drastic wheat shortage, with the result that in some normally surplus areas the yield was less than two-thirds of the 1951 harvest. It is expected that the wheat and flour will begin to move almost immediately to meet the emergency need of this country situated in South Asia on the borders of Iran, Pakistan, and the U.S.S.R.

Panel of Consultants Submits Study Concerning Armaments

Press release 13 dated January 9

On April 28, 1952, the Department of State announced the appointment of a Panel of Consultants to advise and assist the Department and other agencies of the Government in connection with the work of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. The members of the Panel are:

Vannevar Bush, Carnegie Institute of Washington
John Dickey, President, Dartmouth College
Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Joseph E. Johnson, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
J. Robert Oppenheimer, Director, Institute for Advanced Study

The Panel elected Dr. Oppenheimer chairman, and selected McGeorge Bundy, associate professor of Government at Harvard University, as executive secretary. The Panel has held some 20 meetings.

The Panel has also from time to time discussed a number of specific problems with officers of the Department of State and with members of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations. The Panel has now concluded its work with the submission to the Secretary of State of a study concerning armaments and American policy. This paper embodies the findings and recommendations of the Panel and will be available to the incoming Secretary.

Liberian Lend-Lease Payment

Press release 918 dated December 15

On December 10 the Liberian Government, through its Embassy at Washington, remitted checks totaling \$150,000 to the U.S. Government. This sum represents the first amortization payments made by the Liberian Government to the United States for lend-lease expenditures in connection with the construction of the Port of Monrovia.

The cost of the Port construction was \$20,000,000 and will be paid back in full from the money earned by operation of the Port facilities.

Letter of Credence

Great Britain

The newly appointed Ambassador of Great Britain, Sir Roger Makins, presented his credentials to the President on January 7, 1953. For the texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 8 of January 7.

Inter-American Cooperation on Highway Problems

**EXTRAORDINARY PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY CONGRESS,
MEXICO CITY, OCTOBER 26 TO NOVEMBER 1, 1952**

by Jack Garrett Scott and Melville E. Osborne

An Extraordinary Pan American Highway Congress met at Mexico City from October 26 to November 1, 1952. This special meeting was held chiefly to consider problems related to the possible establishment of a permanent highway organization which would function in the intervals between the periodic Pan American Highway Congresses, pursuant to a provision made by the Fifth Pan American Congress, held at Lima in 1951. Other projects studied during the Congress concerned methods of planning, financing, constructing, maintaining, and elaborating the highway systems of all the Latin American Republics.

The Congress was attended by more than 300 official delegates and observers, including official representatives from 16 of the American Republics. The U.S. Government was represented by the following delegation:

Chairman

Jack G. Scott, Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation, Department of Commerce

Special congressional delegate

Spessard L. Holland, U.S. Senate

Delegates

Robert B. Brooks, Consulting Engineer, St. Louis, Mo.

Edwin W. James, Chief, Inter-American Regional Office, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

Henry H. Kelly, Office of Transportation and Communications, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Russell Singer, Executive Vice President, American Automobile Association, Washington, D. C.

Francis Turner, Assistant to the Commissioner, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce

Secretary

Melville Osborne, Assistant Attaché, American Embassy, Mexico City

All delegations were agreed on the urgency and need for completing the Pan American Highway

at the earliest opportunity and undertook their discussions in a spirit of complete harmony and unity of purpose.

Resolutions Adopted by the Congress

The principal question, that of the possible formation of a pan-American highway organization of permanent character, was considered initially by the commission dealing with international relations. The plan which emerged from the commission's deliberations and which was finally adopted by the Congress in plenary session (1) eliminated all previously organized bodies designed to provide continuity between Pan American Highway Congresses;¹ (2) established a new Interim Committee to implement the resolutions of this and previous Congresses until the next Highway Congress meets;² (3) accepted the offer of the Organization of American States to provide, through the Pan American Union, secretariat services for future Highway Congress activities; and (4) established three Technical Committees of Experts. These working groups are to make studies and recommendations, respectively, on (1) the problems of the organization of modern national highway departments; (2) planning of the Pan American Highway and its secondary road system, particularly where such routing crosses international boundaries; and (3) the financing of public highways. Each of the 21 American Republics was appointed to serve on at least one of these working groups of experts.

¹The organizations terminated were the Permanent Institution of Pan American Highway Congresses, including the Central Committee of that body, and the Pan American Highway Confederation, a semiofficial group which had been in existence for several years.

²The Sixth Highway Congress is scheduled to meet in Venezuela in 1954, at which time the Interim Committee will be disbanded in favor of whatever new organization is set up by that Congress.

Statement by Senator Holland

Following are excerpts from a statement made on October 29 at the Pan American Highway Congress by Senator Spessard Holland, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Roads, who was a delegate to that meeting.

The United States favors the early completion of the Inter-American Highway, which will provide modern and efficient overland communication through the friendly Republics extending from Panama to the United States. As tangible evidence of our continuing interest and cooperation, the United States has given substantial assistance, technically and financially, to the construction of the highway.

For example, under legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress and through bilateral agreements entered into with individual Republics for the purpose of sharing construction costs, more than 40 million dollars has already been spent or committed by the United States, most of it in recent years. As further assurance of our sincere and friendly interest, the U.S. Congress has this year authorized, but not yet appropriated, an additional sum of 16 million dollars, consisting of 8 million dollars for each of the next 2 fiscal years, 1953 and 1954, for the purpose of continuing the construction of this highway on a cooperative basis.

We all look forward to the early completion of the highway from Panama to the United States, so that all kinds of motor vehicles may move readily across this magnificently interesting and important region and promote its economic development, along with better hemispheric understanding and greater solidarity.

Mr. President, I wish to express the cordial appreciation of our Nation for the friendly mention appearing in the pending resolution of the part which the United States has played in this joint venture. We firmly believe that the completion of the Inter-American Highway will be highly beneficial to our Nation and to each of our friendly neighbors which it will traverse.

Functions of the Interim Committee

The new Interim Committee, composed of the representatives of the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and the United States, was empowered to (a) study proposals and submit to the Sixth Congress draft plans on a permanent pan-American highway organization to provide continuity between Highway Congresses; (b) stimulate and coordinate the activities of the three working committees; (c) review the reports of

these committees and submit comments and suggestions on their final reports; (d) stimulate the distribution of information on pan-American highway problems and techniques through the facilities of the Secretariat of the Organization of American States; and (e) encourage the American Republics to adopt and put into effect the resolutions of all Highway Congresses. In cooperation with the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-Ecosoc) of the Organization of American States, this committee will also handle the general functions of preparing for the next Congress. The Committee's first session will be convoked by the IA-Ecosoc.

A Transitory Committee was appointed to carry out the functions of the Interim Committee until such time as the latter is functioning. The members of the Transitory Committee were designated as the delegates to the Council of the Organization of American States from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and the United States.

During its discussion of the organization of national highway departments, a subject which will be studied by one of the working groups, the Congress adopted the report of a technical committee which recommended standards for the organization of highway departments in those countries without present adequate highway departments and presented in general outline the objectives to be reached in organizing a modern highway department.

The Congress adopted two practically identical resolutions, suggested by its Commission on Financial and Administrative Affairs, with regard to financing the Highway. One concerned financing the uncompleted sections of the Inter-American Highway, that part of the Pan American Highway extending from the Mexican-U.S. border to the Panama Canal, and the other concerned financing the remainder of the Pan American Highway. Both resolutions suggest a plan whereby the American Republics may seek the assistance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in financing the uncompleted sections of the Highway within their borders. Under this plan the International Bank would purchase national bonds to guarantee any loans made.

The resolution concerning the Inter-American Highway expressed thanks to the United States for its financial and technical assistance which has made possible the building of the Highway to its nearly completed stage.

The Congress reviewed over 100 technical papers which had been recommended for publication by its commissions on road-engineering techniques, highway operation and safety, and highway education and rapprochement. A large percentage of the papers submitted was ordered published in the technical documentation of the Congress.

The Commission on Highway Operation and Safety considered numerous proposals and plans

for improving highway safety in the Western Hemisphere. A number of these proposals were presented in plenary sessions for adoption by the Congress in the form of resolutions.

Construction Priorities Established

The Congress recommended that first priority in construction work be given the uncompleted sections of the Pan American Highway and second priority be given to transversal branches connecting the capitals of the American Republics with the arterial Highway. This resolution had particular significance for those Republics through whose capitals the Pan American Highway is not routed and whose resources are insufficient for immediate construction of both the arterial and the transversal highways desired.

In a resolution deriving from proposals made by its commission dealing with international relations, the Congress recommended the immediate signature and ratification by all American Republics of the International Convention on Road Traffic of 1949. This treaty, which came into force in March 1952,³ provides for world-wide reciprocity on automobile registration plates and drivers' licenses, as well as for other measures designed to facilitate international motoring, and will eventually supersede the 1943 Convention on the

Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic. The Congress also recommended that the American Republics adopt an international convention on uniform road signs and signals when such a convention is presented for ratification by the United Nations.

The Commission on Highway Education and Approchement considered a number of technical proposals relating to public education on the importance of roads and highways.

A complete report on the activities and decisions of the Congress will be published in due course by the Mexican Organizing Committee.

Discussions in commission meetings and plenary sessions revealed clearly the desire of the delegates to establish a new and clear basis for cooperative activities, to work closely with the Organization of American States and its secretariat (the Pan American Union), and to insure that definite recommendations on numerous important problems are prepared for action at the next Congress in 1954. The Congress met in a spirit of mutual friendliness and cooperation, and unanimity was reached on all of its resolutions.

• *Messrs. Jack Garrett Scott and Melville E. Osborne, coauthors of the above article, were chairman and secretary, respectively, of the U.S. delegation to the Extraordinary Pan American Highway Congress.*

United Nations Progress in the Task of Peace

*Address by Ambassador Warren R. Austin
U.S. Representative to the United Nations⁴*

I talk with you at a time when our hearts are expanded by the Christmas message of Peace on Earth, Good Will Toward Men.

These words have a profound spiritual meaning. In my assignment as U.S. representative to the United Nations I have tried to act in accordance with them. Our job is to bring peace on earth, and to instill good will among men. In a moment I will report to you about these efforts.

But first I should like to acknowledge tribute to Woodrow Wilson. In my adoption of the United Nations, I have been strengthened by study of the Wilson tradition. I opposed the League of Nations, although I favored the World Court. During the dark days of World War I, President

Wilson's mission was to convince the world that it must organize itself for peace. He did that job well. Although the League of Nations foundered, President Wilson's ideas took deep root in the minds of men. His ideas, and the noble experiment they engendered, helped inspire our second great attempt to organize the world for peace—the United Nations.

My study has also given me the faith and courage of our forefathers, including our greatest Presidents. Now, my friends, my official mission is coming to a close. Soon I shall be turning over the task to an able and distinguished successor—Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

This is an appropriate time for me to share with you my great faith in the United Nations. It is a faith tempered by the tragedy of our time—the tragedy that peace, so near our grasp, eludes us; the tragedy that freedom, even dearer than peace,

³ See BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1952, p. 545.

⁴ Made over the NBC radio network on Dec. 27, in connection with the Woodrow Wilson Foundation's observance of the 96th birthday anniversary of President Wilson.

must be defended by force in Korea and elsewhere. But my faith is strengthened by the knowledge that those who fight in Korea understand Woodrow Wilson's words, "right is more precious than peace."

As an American and a Republican, I am deeply proud that we have taken leadership in the effort to make the United Nations work. This is a task which we owe history. We should not forget that our failure to make the League of Nations work contributed heavily to a tragic era. But America has gone through a profound revolution in its outlook on world affairs since then. We have dedicated our resources and our energies to full participation in world affairs because we know that our security and liberties permit no other course.

Let me give you a few concrete illustrations of the vast progress we have made since President Wilson's time, and more especially during the past 7 years. When the first clouds of aggression loomed in Manchuria, and Ethiopia, and Munich, the free nations failed the League. When the second aggression occurred, all member states of the United Nations—save the Soviet group—voluntarily and spontaneously united in resistance to aggression. Under inspiring American leadership, the United Nations first met force with force in Korea. That action was right in 1950, and it is right today. If we had not met the challenge in Korea, we would surely have been forced to meet it on our own shores.

But the political and military mission is still unfulfilled in Korea. Our hearts are heavy that American boys have to spend Christmas under fire. We are saddened by the sacrifice which the Korean peoples have been called upon to make. We are deeply moved by the fact that soldiers of many nations have given their lives for the common security against armed aggression.

These past weeks, we tried to find a peaceful solution through the General Assembly. But the Communists have made it perfectly clear that they will not stop the fighting unless we pay a price in human freedom which would mean our abandoning the cause we have been fighting for. Now 54 nations in the Assembly have said with unmistakable firmness that the free world will not pay that price. The free peoples have said that they will continue to oppose the Communists' armed forces and violation of moral obligations. We will not be a party to a forced repatriation of prisoners of war. Forced repatriation would result in mass murder. It would crush the spirit of resistance which sustains peoples against the threat of Communist aggression.

The stakes in Korea are world peace and human freedom. These the United Nations will never surrender. While our hearts are heavy that the fighting goes on, our faith and determination to see the job effective remains strong.

In reflecting on the past years of my mission, I think also of our success in healing conflicts.

There were times—in Palestine, in Indonesia, and in Kashmir—when the fighting seemed destined to go on forever. Yet the United Nations succeeded in stopping each armed conflict. It also succeeded in removing the controversy from the battlefield to the conference table. Is this not evidence that our courage and faith will prevail?

Recall the near conflicts, such as the Soviet pressure on Iran in 1946, when the United Nations helped to prevent war from starting.

I remind you also of the record the United Nations has made in adjusting difficult situations and working out settlements on thorny issues—such as the Indonesian question, which was brought from the battlefield to the conference table and was finally settled. Indonesia today is a sovereign state which participates as a member with us in the councils of the United Nations.

Recently we have had another example of the advantage of conciliation in the United Nations. The General Assembly was confronted by tense and difficult situations in North Africa. There was full and frank discussion of the Tunisian and Moroccan questions. The Assembly by large majorities agreed on resolutions which counsel negotiation between the parties—negotiation with respect to the political development of these countries. The Assembly helped create an atmosphere favorable to the working out of real solutions to these problems. Thus positive gain in the right direction was defined.

There is the extraordinary progress which the United Nations has made in facilitating better living conditions for the great majority of the world's peoples. In different ways the United Nations has spurred economic and social progress. It has brought hope to those who otherwise might have succumbed to Communist pretensions. If there is inadequate food, lack of freedom often seems relatively unimportant. What price glory to struggle against poverty and slavery? However, the United Nations has done the job on the ground—by showing peoples from Haiti to Thailand how to suppress malaria; how to grow more and better corn; how to read and write; how to build dams and irrigation systems. This work is of immense importance, for it helps stamp out the root causes of war, and it gives people a real stake in freedom.

In these past 7 years, we have learned much about the road to peace. We have seen U.N. achievements, and we have begun to learn that the United States is equal to the demand that the quest for peace imposes.

The road is rougher than we hoped it would be when we signed the Charter in 1945. We have lost some of the buoyant enthusiasm of those days, but we have gained the determined courage of a battle-tested veteran. We have found the direction, though time has not been speedy.

At this Christmastide, and at this time in my

career, I know as never before that this Nation cannot stand alone. It cannot survive without spiritual growth. It must strengthen its freedom now through fullest participation in and support for the United Nations.

My task is unfinished. The task of men is never finished. To Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., I

have confidence in turning over my official responsibilities. Carrying forward the task of peace is an assignment which enriches significance in history and adds new meaning to faith. The tremendous resources to guide the U.S. Mission to the United Nations are truth and an understanding heart.

A Reply to Charges Against the U. S. Economic System

Statement by Senator Alexander Wiley

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 18.

Many unfounded charges have been made against the United States by the representative of the Soviet Union and the representatives of its satellite states. I have requested the opportunity to reply.

The representatives from the Soviet countries have had a great deal to say in this debate about the so-called "aggressive armaments race," allegedly instigated by the United States. It is true that we in the United States have decided to divert a large proportion of our productive capacity to building up our defenses. Why have we done so? We have done so because free peoples everywhere have seen aggression and threats of aggression—in Korea, in Malaya, in Yugoslavia, Berlin, and Greece, to mention but a few.

The fact is that the Soviet economy never really demobilized after the war. It continued to produce large quantities of weapons and to maintain large military forces. In the middle of 1950, almost 5 years after the end of the war, the Soviet Union still had approximately 4½ million men under arms. In contrast, the United States reduced its active military forces from about 12 million men in 1945 to 2½ million in 1946, and to 1½ million by the middle of 1950. We also cut down our military expenditures drastically. In terms of 1951 prices, our defense expenditures were reduced from 1944 to 1946 by almost 120 billion dollars. In contrast, the Soviet Union was devoting twice as great a proportion of its national income in 1946 to military expenditures as was the United States. In the years from 1947 to 1950,

the Soviet Union devoted almost three times as great a proportion of its national income to military purposes as the United States.

In the face of aggression and threats of aggression backed up by this huge Soviet military force, may I ask what alternatives were available to the free peoples of the world? Should they have supinely accepted the loss of their freedom? Until some enforceable international arrangement is accepted by the Soviet Union to curtail armaments and to assure against further Soviet aggression, is there any alternative to the American people other than to see to their defenses?

The American people are determined to remain free. The ruling classes in the United States—workers, farmers, and businessmen, almost 160 million of us—are determined to make every necessary sacrifice for this purpose. That is why we have embarked upon and will continue to pursue our program of rebuilding our defenses.

The financial burden of fighting Communist aggression in Korea has been heavy. The burden of rebuilding the defenses of the free world has been great. Despite this, the developed countries have not flagged in their support of practical development programs in the less developed regions. The volume of grants and loans available to these parts of the world in 1951 increased over the previous year and continued at approximately the same level in 1952. And I may repeat what has been so frequently said by my Government: The expansion of the economies of the underdeveloped countries is an integral part of our program to increase the strength of free peoples against the subversion and aggression which threaten them as well as ourselves.

Thanks to the high level of economic activity in

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Dec. 18.

the United States, the American people have been able to continue their assistance in building up the free world. Our production has continued to expand in 1952. Our gross national product has risen from 325.6 billion dollars in the first half of 1951 to 333 billion dollars in the second half of the year and to 336.5 billion dollars in the first half of 1952.

Our employment has continued at record high levels. In the first half of 1952 civilian employment averaged 60.5 million. Unemployment declined from 3.3 percent of the civilian labor force in the first half of 1951 to 2.9 percent. Today, our unemployment figure is less than 1,500,000 people—of which more than one-half were only unemployed 4 weeks or less. And the standard of living of our workers has not declined—as many predicted that it would.

This does not mean that everything is perfect in the United States. There is still a need for soil conservation. There are still farms that need electricity. There is still a need for houses. Many parts of our country can use more and better schools and hospitals. There are still a number of people whose incomes do not permit them the standard of living that we think is adequate. We are conscious of these needs and we are striving to meet them.

Propaganda of "Collapse"

Do the figures I have just given sound like the description of a nation about to collapse economically—as the propaganda from Eastern Europe would lead us to believe? The figures I have quoted are evidence of an economic strength which will continue. When our defense expenditures start to level off, we shall be able to make the necessary adjustments. Our tax structure, our system of farm aid, our wage and income structures, the more equitable distribution of our national income, our system of social-security benefits—all these will serve to cushion such adjustments. Moreover, the indications are that private investment will remain high. And our wage structure and the large liquid assets in the hands of our workers and farmers should dispel any doubt as to the maintenance of high consumer spending.

The delegate from Poland has referred to the purposes that the Economic and Social Council and this Committee were meant to serve. We look upon these bodies as world economic forums where we might learn to understand each other's problems more thoroughly. The fact is, however, that at times this forum has been grossly abused. Instead of presenting honest information so that we might constructively aid one another, the delegates of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states have used this forum to wage a propaganda war against the free world. Year after year, they have tried to spread the illusion that the United

States is a nation of greedy and bloody monopolies. They would have the world believe that we have no interest other than power and profits. The Soviet delegate has even gone so far as to say that our only interest in the less developed countries is to "suck the blood" of their economic life.

I do not think that I need identify the motives behind these systematic attacks. They are all too obvious.

No matter how long they continue this attack, however, and no matter how often they repeat their distortions, this *deliberate attempt to undermine world confidence in freedom*—whether it be human freedom or the freedom of enterprise—is doomed to failure. No matter how insistent their efforts to divide the free world by distortions and wild fabrications, they are doomed to failure.

They are doomed to failure because they refuse to accept the fact that the basic tenet of freedom is a profound faith in the individual human being. The basis of free government is that every single individual has inherent within him hopes and desires, talents and skills and abilities, which in an atmosphere of freedom and encouragement provide immense opportunities for development. Given the tools with which he may work his way—and by that I mean mainly a good education and his own inborn ability; and given the opportunity—and by that I mean a society in which he is free to develop and use his talents and skills—he will exert himself to the utmost of his energy to achieve the hopes which he holds dear.

And when I talk of freedom, I am not talking of unlimited business license. Nor do I mean that lack of self-discipline which was characteristic of much of the nineteenth century. American public opinion rejects the profiteer just as it does the rascal.

U.S. Attitude Toward Monopoly

Now, what about these great American businesses, these so-called monopolies which Soviet propaganda insists have no other ambition than to enslave the world?

Let me first say that we believe it is unhealthy for any single business enterprise to acquire an overwhelming measure of economic power. For this reason we have our antitrust laws and our investigators and our prosecutors who are constantly on the watch for those who would conspire to monopolize any economic sphere in restraint of trade on behalf of their own self-interest. This is not merely a paper law. It is a deeply held philosophy of government engrained in our society.

This is not to deny the fact that we have many large corporations in the United States. But who owns these corporations? A recent survey showed that more than 6½ million persons hold stock in the relatively small proportion of U.S. corporations that are listed in the New York Stock Exchange. In fact, in many of America's larger

corporations, the number of stockholders actually exceeds the number of workers. In 1951, for example, average employment in America's 100 largest manufacturing organizations was about 42,000 per company. At the same time, the average number of shareholders per company was 54,000. Thus, for every four employees there were five shareholders.

For example, the American Radiator Company had 67,004 shareholders and 22,581 employees—a ratio of 3 owners to 1 employee. The American Tobacco Company had 75,017 shareholders and 19,000 employees—a ratio of 4 to 1. The Anaconda Copper Mining Company had 118,616 shareholders and 39,672 employees—a ratio of 3 to 1. The Du Pont Company had 138,168 shareholders and 86,874 employees. General Electric Company had 252,993 shareholders and 210,220 employees. And even such huge enterprises as U.S. Steel and Western Electric had approximately as many owners as workers. In the case of U.S. Steel, there were a little over 300,000 workers compared to 268,226 shareholders. Westinghouse's 102,912 shareholders may be compared to its 108,654 employees. And many of these employees are among the stockholders of the companies in which they work.

In addition to these millions of stockholders, there are 86 million insurance-policy holders whose savings are invested in 29 billion dollars' worth of corporate bonds held by U.S. insurance companies and who thus have a vast stake in U.S. industries. And millions of others, not shareholders themselves, have savings to the tune of 40 billion dollars invested in the U.S. economy by the savings banks and savings and loan associations in which they have their deposits.

One need only go back to the most recent business census of the United States for another refutation of the specious monopoly charges of the East European delegates. That census showed that there were 3,840,000 independent business firms operating in the United States in 1947. It also showed that two out of every three businesses are owned by individuals. Twenty percent are partnerships. Only one business in ten is a corporation. Even in manufacturing, nearly 70 percent of our business firms are individually owned.

When we do have monopolies in the United States, they are publicly regulated. They are to be found in the public-utility field, primarily in the fields of electric power, transportation, and communications.

The American Telephone and Telegraph Company is regulated by the Federal Government and by 48 State governments and the District of Columbia. This system now serves nearly 37½ million telephones of its own—more than twice the number it serviced before the war. Last year, it spent over a billion dollars on new construction. It serviced a total of over 145 million telephone conversations every day of the week.

How the Working Man Fares

Since the propagandists of the Soviet Union and its puppet states like to shed such tears on behalf of the workers of the world, it would be appropriate to inquire what effect the American type of shared ownership has had on the ordinary men and women in our society. Take the average income of factory workers as an example. Their average weekly earnings increased from less than 10 dollars a week in 1909 to about 60 dollars a week in 1951, or sixfold. Real earnings, after allowance for rise in prices, more than doubled. At the same time, the length of the working week was reduced from 60 hours to 40 hours. The average family income last year was 4,320 dollars. Half of our families had incomes in excess of 3,530 dollars.

Underlying these changes has been the continued increase in our productivity—in agriculture, in industry, and in transportation. In 20 years, from 1929 to 1950, there was a 75 percent increase in total physical output of all private industry. Taking into consideration the population increase, the average increase in production in private industry per person was 1¾ percent every year. This phenomenal increase in productivity represents not only technological advancement but growing cooperation between labor unions and management. With the years, wages have gone up, profits have increased, and consumers have more goods to buy at moderate prices.

In 1914 it took the average worker 25 hours to buy a ton of coal to heat his house. Now it takes less than half as long—10 hours and 20 minutes. In 1914 it took 17 minutes to earn a pound of bread. Now it takes 6 minutes. It took 24 minutes' work then to buy one quart of milk. Now it takes 9 minutes—about a third as long.

All of these things have been made possible because we have learned how to combine technology with forward-looking management techniques and morale-building human relations. And by the term "human relations" I mean everything from trained executive personnel to relations between management and free labor unions. I also mean the personal relations that exist between foremen and workers and between workers themselves.

These things have been made possible because we have learned how to share the savings arising from greater productivity with the workers in the form of higher wages, and with consumers in the form of lower prices. This, in turn, has bettered our standard of living and increased employment opportunities.

This sharing of our increasing output—together with a system of progressive income taxation—has resulted in a vast upward leveling in the distribution of our national income.

In 1929, when our national income was less than 90 billion dollars, five percent of our citizens in the top income brackets got 34 percent of this

national income. In 1951, when our national income was nearly 280 billion dollars, the percentage that went to this group was only 18 percent. Or, to put it another way: In 1929, 66 percent of the national income was received by the 95 percent of our population in the lower income brackets. In 1951 their share of this much larger income had risen to 82 percent.

Thus, the average income of families in our lower and middle-income groups has risen very rapidly. In 1951 one in every three families had an income of 3,000 to 5,000 dollars; another one in every five between 5,000 and 10,000 dollars. Thus, millions and millions of families have moved upward into an income bracket which permits them to enjoy the better things of life. They are industrial workers, office workers, farmers—millions of whom, in the past 2 decades, have moved upward in the income scale.

In a moment, I shall contrast this situation with what is taking place in the Soviet Union.

Restrictive Elements Must Go

Now, what is the significance of all of this? It is this: If we are to have a continuously expanding economy, we must eliminate, insofar as is humanly possible, the elements which make for restriction. This means the strengthening of free labor unions so that they can act effectively to assure that workers do in fact get their fair share of the benefits of improved productivity. It means giving as much attention to marketing and distribution as to production. It means developing competitive conditions among producers and distributors of commodities so that they have no alternative but to pass on the benefits of improved productivity to consumers.

In short, we have learned that to have a growing economy we must eliminate practices that place limitations on production, such as the division of markets and the restriction of output—whether imposed by public regulation or by private arrangement or merely by habit patterns which act to hold back the progress of production and low-cost distribution.

By contrast, let us look at the promise and reality of the Soviet world.

The political philosophy and the social organization of the Soviet system constitute a complete denial of those human values and concepts which have made for freedom and for progress.

The result is a society with no understanding, let alone respect, for the dignity and the rights of the individual. He is a tool of the all-powerful state. He has no political rights. True, there are the trappings of Western democracy and a Constitution stipulating popular representation, the rights of man, and limits to governmental power. But, as Andrei Vyshinsky, the authoritative interpreter of Soviet law, has put it: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is unlimited by any statutes

whatsoever." Thus we have before us the picture of a great nation which, having cast off the yoke of an inefficient and corrupt monarchy, has fallen victim to an even worse despotism. All decisions on political, social, cultural, and economic matters are made by a few men at the top of the Soviet Communist Party. If ever there was a monopoly, here is one. Contrast this with the 60 million people who went to the polls in the United States a little over a month ago. Of these, over 33 million dared to vote against the party in power.

Let us consider the conditions of the ordinary worker in the Soviet Union. The organizations which call themselves trade-unions in the U.S.S.R. have chiefly one function: to increase, in the interest of the state, the volume and quality of production while lowering the cost of production. Collective bargaining is not among their functions and the strike not among their weapons. A concrete illustration of what this means in the Soviet world has been given us by the Czechoslovak Minister of Interior, Nosek. In 1951 the Czech coal miners dared to ask for the restoration of the 5-day workweek which they had enjoyed before the Communists took over. To this, Mr. Nosek replied that "what was revolutionary under the capitalist system is reactionary and counter-revolutionary today."

Soviet Regimentation of Labor

Soviet workers have to put up with whatever labor conditions their one and only employer dictates. Wages are fixed by the governments. So are prices and working hours. Labor discipline is strict and any breach of its numberless provisions is severely punished. All jobs are frozen. Leaving the place of employment without the express permission of the management is punishable by imprisonment for from 2 to 4 months or, in defense industries, up to 8 years.

Since 1938 every worker has been required to have a labor book with detailed data on his employment history. This internal passport enables the boss to control the worker effectively at all times. To sum up: *Labor is defenseless against the monopolistic employer—the omnipotent state. It is hedged in by punitive legislation. It is under constant pressure to increase output.*

There is another question that might be asked: Has the Soviet system of complete regimentation paid off in terms of social dividends? Have the sweat and toil of the Soviet worker, not to mention his loss of freedom, been compensated by a better life for the people and by higher standards of living?

An approach to this question can be found by comparing the time it takes a worker in Moscow and in some of the free countries to earn the necessities of life. Take food, for example. A recent study shows that it requires 4½ hours of working time for a typical factory worker to buy a pound

of butter in Moscow as compared with a little under 2 hours in Germany and $\frac{3}{4}$ of an hour in Denmark.

It takes 9 minutes of work in a factory to earn a pound of potatoes in Moscow. Throughout Western Europe it requires less than 5 minutes, whether it be in Italy or Denmark or Germany. In some of these countries, it takes as few as 2 minutes.

The cost of a pound of bread varies from about 14 minutes of work in Moscow to 6 to 10 in Switzerland, Ireland, Denmark. It takes nearly twice as long to earn the money to buy a pound of pork in Russia as in Italy and $3\frac{1}{2}$ times as long as in Norway. For a pound of sugar it takes a little under 2 hours' work in Moscow as compared with 37 minutes in Italy and 21 minutes in France and Germany.

There is evidence available to show that in 1937, the peak year before the Second World War, per capita consumption in the U.S.S.R. was as low as in 1928. Indeed, the evidence indicates that per capita consumption in 1937 was not much above the level of 1913—the last year of peace in Czarist Russia. And there is every evidence that since 1937 per capita consumption in the U.S.S.R. has increased only slightly, if at all.

While income distribution in the United States has been substantially leveled up in the past 2 decades, the opposite development can be observed in the Soviet Union. There is a growing disparity in incomes and with it there has emerged a new class structure.

The Soviet Union has developed several upper classes. At the top, there are the leaders of the Party and Government, the managers of large enterprises, and well-known intellectuals. On the next level are minor dignitaries and luminaries. Down below are the toilers. Furthermore, the upper class may now endow their children with expensive education and with considerable inheritance. Soviet income taxes on high incomes are low. There appears to be no inheritance tax. From a tax point of view, the Soviet Union is an ideal place for millionaires.

The Question of East-West Trade

I now turn to some other false charges that have been made against my Government. Among them is the charge that the United States has tried to prevent East-West trade in peaceful goods. The truth—stated many times by other official spokesmen for the United States, and a truth which I assert again—is that the United States is not opposed to such trade and has not opposed such trade.

We will *not*, however, condone the shipment of strategic goods to the Soviet bloc. The reason for this is well known. We will not permit our trade to feed a Communist war machine which has already unleashed a military attack against peaceful peoples in Korea and which previously had

shown the true face of its aggressive designs in the Soviet seizure of Czechoslovakia.

We are all too familiar with the many tirades delivered in the United Nations in recent years by representatives of the Soviet Union or its satellites on the subject of trade controls.

In recent months, however, the Soviet bloc has given a new twist to these tirades. They now talk not only about the wickedness of our security trade controls—while, of course, maintaining rigid control over their own strategic exports. But they now talk about more than this. They now talk about the value—indeed, the necessity—of expanding international trade generally. Listening to the representatives of the Soviet bloc, one might believe that the Soviets had now abandoned doctrines which have guided their conduct for over 30 years.

I think we are all familiar with these doctrines. They were set out by Lenin himself in his report on concessions at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, in December 1920. Said Lenin:

Restoration of trade relations is a means of making large purchases of machinery needed by us. . . . The sooner we have achieved this . . . the sooner will we be economically independent from the capitalist countries.

That was in 1920. In 1941 a prominent Soviet economist, Mishustin, spelled out the same principle in greater detail. He wrote:

The main goal of Soviet import is to utilize foreign merchandise, and first of all machinery, for the speediest realization of the plans for socialist reconstruction, for the industrialization of the national economy, and for the technical and economic independence of the U.S.S.R. . . . *The import of the U.S.S.R. is so organized that it aids the speediest liberation from import.*

That was in 1941. And, 5 years later, with the postwar creation of a Soviet sphere of influence, Moscow imposed this self-sufficient policy—a policy which, need I add, is the *death* of international trade—on the Soviet bloc as a whole. In its dealings with its East European satellites and with Communist China, Soviet policy has been to reorient their trade almost exclusively to itself. And, in its dealings with the free world, its policy has been to limit imports to goods essential for reindustrialization and rearmament.

The extent to which this policy goes has been bluntly spelled out in a secret Czechoslovak directive issued in the spring of 1950. This directive pulled no punches. It provided: (1) Only absolute essentials are to be imported from capitalist countries and these only when adequate supplies cannot be found within the Soviet realm; (2) insofar as possible, payments are to be made through exports of nonessential goods; (3) to the extent that shipping is available, all imports are to be channeled through Polish ports and are to be carried in Soviet-realm ships.

So much for imports. Now, regarding exports: (1) Nothing is to be delivered to capitalist countries which is required in the Soviet Union or the

so-called People's Democracies; (2) no exports of strategic goods are permitted to capitalist countries; (3) the People's Democracies are to be granted priority in delivery of goods required for the rebuilding of their economy; (4) exports to capitalist countries are to be limited to nonessential goods insofar as possible; (5) deliveries of steel products to capitalist countries are to be reduced to a minimum; (6) shipping across West Germany and from West European ports is to be reduced to a minimum; and, whenever possible, Soviet Union or satellite vessels are to be employed for overseas trade.

This history of Soviet trade shows the hypocrisy of the appeals made by the representatives of the Soviet bloc for an expansion of trade between the Soviet-bloc countries and the free world.

Soviet Noncooperation in World Trade

And where has the Soviet Union been when the free nations of the world have tried to further world trade?

Not only has the Soviet Union refused to participate in projects of international cooperation; it has tried its best to discredit them, to smear them, and to sabotage them at every opportunity.

So, we may ask, whence comes this sweet reasonableness, this talk about trade and peace? But, some may say, Soviet doctrine and Soviet behavior toward these various international organizations and programs do not reflect actual Soviet-bloc practices in concrete transactions. Well, let's take a look at Soviet-bloc trading practices.

I might refer you to the difficulties my own countrymen have experienced in trying to do business with Communist Czechoslovakia. We have heard a lot about the Soviet-bloc countries wanting to trade with foreign businessmen. But how do the facts fit in with these claims? First, the property of American nationals in Czechoslovakia was confiscated without compensation. Next, the Czechoslovak Government persecuted and harassed American firms to such an extent that it was virtually impossible for them to do business in Czechoslovakia. Third, the Czech Government—as have all Soviet-bloc governments—declared it treasonable for its citizens to furnish the necessary information on trade which is essential to the conduct of commercial enterprise. Fourth, American charitable and welfare organizations were forced to discontinue their work. And, finally, American citizens were imprisoned without justification.

This is what can happen to individuals. It can also happen to nations. For individuals the cost can be too high financially. For nations it can cost too much in independence.

I have recalled to you the facts of Soviet doctrine and practice in the international trade field. I ask you to examine the current Soviet pretensions in the light of their behavior. Plainly, Soviet doctrine and practice in this field, to say

nothing of Soviet doctrine and practice in the political and military fields, force us to consider the recent statements of representatives from the Soviet bloc on this question as simply *hypocritical propaganda*.

In saying this, I do not mean to imply that the United States—as other free nations—would not welcome *bona fide* action by the Soviet bloc in joining the family of nations that practice as well as preach an expansion of international trade. The Government of the United States always welcomes opportunities to increase world trade—but *not* at the price of its national security or the security of other free nations.

I might add that the Soviet bloc would find the reception of its trade propaganda more favorable if other Soviet activities were consistent with it. As it is, this propaganda falls on skeptical ears because it is accompanied by aggression and threats of aggression and by subversive activity everywhere. The Soviets must change their ways before any credence can be given to their words. And, until they do change, we must continue to take with a large grain of salt all their current talk about peace and trade.

Polish Charges

The United States has also been charged with “torpedoing” international economic cooperation.

This sounds strange—coming as it does from the delegate of Poland, a state which has refused to become a contracting party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and which seems to be making a habit of pulling out of the few specialized agencies it has joined without paying the contributions it has solemnly contracted to pay.

The charge sounds hollow from a member of a bloc of states which has established an unenviable reputation for obstructing international economic cooperation in the United Nations in all its forms. These countries make it a crime to supply to the U.N. Statistical Office certain information which most other member nations gladly supply.

All we hear from them is percentages—rarely, if ever, a figure that means anything. The Soviet bloc has never contributed a ruble, a zloty, or a crown to the relief of the Palestine or Korean refugees, yet they make loud outcries and political capital out of their sufferings. These countries refuse to cooperate in the work of the Economic Commission for Europe and now use the Commission only as a sounding board for political propaganda. These countries have made it a principle not to join in, or cooperate with, the work of most of the specialized agencies.

According to the Polish delegate, the economic state of the world outside of what he called his “harmonious” area is one of stagnation and decline. Although the Polish delegate quoted copiously from the last bulletin of the Economic Com-

mission for Europe, it is plain that he did not read all of it. If he had, he might have seen that in a number of West European countries, 1952 consumption is at considerably higher levels than in 1949 and that agriculture and building are making strides. He might also have seen the statement that in Eastern Europe, despite the continued increase in industrial production, consumption standards in several countries, notably Poland and Czechoslovakia, show no tendency to rise. Indeed, in Poland and Czechoslovakia—and I quote—"there has been a general lowering of real wages."

Finally, the representatives of the Soviet bloc have dragged out their shopworn slander that American business—or, as they call it, "American monopoly capital"—wants war and has forced an "armaments race" upon the world. They say that American capital has forced this armaments race on the world because of its lust for vast profits.

Since the concept that the capitalist system maintains itself by war is basic to the Lenin-Stalin theory of economics, one would naturally expect the representatives of the Soviet bloc to repeat this falsehood.

But let us look at what war means to American business. It means price controls, wage controls, and priorities. It means allocations, power shortages, shortages of materials, and higher taxes. It means wearing out of equipment, dislocation of markets, conversion difficulties and reconversion hangovers, relocation of plants, the fear that competitors will take over their peacetime markets, and endless other headaches.

Is it surprising, then, that the American businessman does not want war or an armaments race? Is it surprising, then, that, at the beginning of World War II, it was the totalitarian countries and not the capitalist countries which were most prepared for war?

The Profits Picture

And as to the false charge that American business reaps great profits out of the defense effort, let us look at the facts. The only profit that interests businessmen is profit *after* taxes. In this connection, the defense effort, forced upon my country by the aggression which took place in Korea in mid-1950, has already brought about a 29 percent increase in personal taxes, a sharp boost in excise taxes, a 53-percent jump in corporate taxes, and the revival of the excess-profits tax as well.

And now let us see what has happened to the actual earnings of American business since the Korean war began. Last year, as our delegate in this Committee pointed out, the trend had already become clear. He showed that earnings, after taxes, of U.S. business in the first 9 months of 1951 were 9 percent lower than they had been in the same period in 1950 before the defense effort had

taken effect. He also showed that this was true for most industries, including those which are generally considered to be armaments industries.

That trend still continues. The figures showing the earnings of American business for the first 9 months of 1952 indicate that the earnings of 510 of our largest companies in 60 different fields amounted to 3.9 billion dollars—as compared to 4.4 billion dollars in 1951 and 4.8 billion dollars in 1950. In other words, they dropped 9 percent between 1950 and 1951 and they dropped another 10 percent between 1951 and 1952.

And what industries showed these declines in profits? It is true that the earnings of the aircraft and machine-tool industry rose. But the earnings of the steel companies, the iron and steel fabricators, the petroleum companies, and the chemical companies—that is to say, the industries vitally related to our defense program—all of these earnings fell, most of them for the second successive year since Korea.

We feel that the facts speak for themselves. Their significance will be recognized by any fair-minded person who is not so smothered in Stalin's dogma that he is unable or unwilling to see the truth.

But the real test of who wants war and who wants peace is what governments do to further one or the other. This Assembly has tried its best to find fair and equitable solutions to the Korean situation. Who was it who voted against the Indian proposal—a proposal which represented the civilized world's effort to bring about peace in Korea? The roll call against the Indian resolution included only (1) the Soviet Union, (2) the Soviet Ukraine, (3) Soviet Byelorussia, (4) Czechoslovakia, (5) Poland. Nobody else voted against it. They spoke vehemently against it, both in the First Committee and in the Plenary.

By their acts you shall know them.

My Government has repeatedly stated in this Committee and throughout the Assembly that we look forward to the day when men "shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

We still cling to our belief in this prophecy. Above all things we desire peace—world peace—lasting peace and the world-wide prosperity which that peace will make possible. Of course we cannot accept peace imposed on Soviet terms and based on Soviet domination. When we say peace, we mean peace based upon mutual respect among free nations.

We look forward to the day when all the members of the United Nations will be able to agree upon a universal plan of disarmament with adequate control, inspection, and enforcement. On that day, we in the United States shall be glad to join with other member states in increasing our contribution to a widespread program of economic

development, a program which might well accomplish the great objectives outlined for us in our Charter. I hope that when that day comes all freedom-loving, democratic countries will be able to join together in putting into constructive use those resources of goods and technology which are already available to us but which the obstruction of a small group of states prevents us from applying to better ends than arms.

The sooner the world is freed from the fear of aggression, the sooner will my country be in a position to carry out its share in the great program of development which we all so desire.

U.N. Membership Based on Principles, Not on Deals

*Statement by Benjamin V. Cohen
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 21

I should like to explain briefly the votes the U.S. delegation will cast on the resolutions before us.

It is clear from the debates in Committee that all of us regard the membership problem as the outstanding organizational and constitutional problem of the United Nations. The future growth and vitality of the United Nations depends upon its solution. So long as all of those nations qualified for membership are not here among us, the United Nations cannot achieve its maximum effectiveness. New blood would bring fresh energy and enthusiasm as well as collective strength and wisdom to our discussions.

The debate in the Committee convinced my Government that the Central American draft resolution calling for the creation of a special committee to study the problem of admission to membership offered the most constructive method of procedure. Such a committee will be able to make an objective and careful exploration and analysis of the membership problem. In this connection, we recall the work of the subcommittee set up by the Interim Committee to study the problem of voting in the Security Council. The results of that study were, in the opinion of most delegations, highly useful. The results of the efforts of a similar group on the membership problem should be of equal, possibly greater, utility to the United Nations. We sincerely hope that the work of the Committee will help the United Nations to

¹ Made in plenary session on Dec. 21. Later in the same meeting (the last held by the General Assembly before adjourning until February 1953), the following actions were taken on membership: The Assembly voted to establish a special committee to study proposals on membership, confirmed the U.S. proposal as to Japan's fulfillment of membership qualifications, approved similar resolutions relating to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Libya, and Jordan, and rejected the Polish "package" resolution.

progress toward the goal of universality of membership.

During the course of discussions in the Committee, many suggestions were made with a view to ending the membership deadlock. Our delegation was particularly impressed by the serious thought and study our friends from Latin America have given to the membership problem. We listened with great interest especially to the distinguished delegate from El Salvador, Ambassador Urquia, and to Ambassador Belaunde from Peru. While a number of the suggested solutions seem to my Government to raise grave constitutional issues, the special committee will undoubtedly wish to study them all carefully to determine whether they offer a feasible method to move toward fuller recognition and implementation of the principle of universality.

Our delegation will have to vote against the Polish draft resolution which was defeated in the Committee. The Polish resolution, which calls for a "package deal" admission of 14 states, in our opinion, prejudges the question of admission. This is true whether the text of the proposal calls for *simultaneous* admission or simply for admission. The Polish draft resolution would have the General Assembly express by implication what we have not been willing to express explicitly: that all of the states listed therein are qualified. It would equate certain states which have not been found qualified (that is Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Outer Mongolia) with such peace-loving nations as Italy, or Austria, or Ceylon.

We are firm supporters of universality of membership, Mr. Chairman, but universality should be based upon principles and not upon deals. The Polish proposal is based on a deal not on a principle. It includes some applicants and excludes others on the basis of no stated standard. It includes some but not all applications which have received endorsement by a majority of the Security Council and includes those applications which have not received such endorsement. It provides the United Nations with no clear and defined criteria by which to judge the pending applications not included in the partial list contained in the Polish resolution or to judge future applications. We favor no deals which leave some existing and all future applications to the whim of future deals rather than to disposition on the basis of stated principles or standards. It may possibly be urged with reason that principles of admissibility should be more liberal than those we now apply. But those principles upon which we agree should be of universal application so that they may be applied to all future as well as existing applicants.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, a word of explanation of our vote endorsing the membership applications of Japan, the three Associated States of Indochina, Jordan, and Libya.

This will be the first time the General Assembly

is able to pass on the application of Japan. The Japanese Government filed its application for membership in June of this year. It would already have had a favorable recommendation from the Security Council were it not for the veto cast by the Soviet delegate to the Council last September.

In the view of my Government and in the view of the overwhelming majority of representatives on the *Ad Hoc* Committee, Japan is qualified for membership. It seems to me, therefore, it is only fair for the Assembly to put itself on record in this sense. Such action will provide Japan with further stimulus to continue the positive contributions it is already making to the specialized agencies of the United Nations of which she is a member. It will encourage the Japanese people to continue on the path of peaceful advancement.

For similar reasons we have endorsed the membership applications of the three Associated States of Indochina and will vote for them. And, finally, we will vote to support the membership applications of Jordan and Libya. The Assembly has already found those two states qualified for membership. We shall be glad again to express our endorsement of their qualifications for membership.

Soviet Attacks on Social Conditions in U.S.

*Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated December 9.

After the speakers' list was closed, the Committee heard the distinguished delegates of the Ukraine, Soviet Union, Poland, and Byelorussia talk at great length about social conditions in the United States. These four speakers, like another speaker earlier in the debate, made many allegations about declining standards of living in this country, about our inadequate facilities for housing, education, health, and social welfare, about racial discrimination, and about the high cost of living in the United States. These speakers all asserted that the defects in American life are due primarily to the preparations of our Government for war.

This is the seventh year in which I have heard these same old, stale charges hurled against the United States. On several previous occasions I have replied to these charges, point by point, with the true facts. But, after all, no one ever expects replies to Soviet slanders to have any effect whatsoever on their representatives. Each year I present the facts about the situation in the United

¹Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on Dec. 9.

States; and then the next year these representatives offer up the same old distortions of fact.

The Committee is so far behind in its schedule that I will not delay it today with any detailed rebuttal. I should like merely to summarize what I have said on six previous occasions, knowing full well it will not prevent this group of representatives from saying the same thing all over again next year.

First, the U.S. Government and the American people do not want another world war; they are not preparing for another world war; they are doing, and will do, everything in their power to maintain international peace and security and to resist aggression.

Second, social conditions in the United States are not perfect and the standard of living of large numbers of the American people is far from satisfactory. It does not require this annual shower of crocodile tears by this group of representatives to make me aware of the defects in American life. I am fully aware of these defects, for I have spent the better part of my life fighting to help correct them.

Third, despite the fact that the standards of health, education, social welfare, housing, and race relations are not as high in the United States as we Americans would desire, they are much higher than the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union and her colleagues would lead the Committee to believe.

Every year, the distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union and her colleagues quote a long list of figures to show what a small part of the *Federal* budget of the United States is devoted to education, health, social insurance, and similar activities. Every year I have to remind these delegates that the major expenditures in our country for education, health, social insurance, and similar activities comes not out of the Federal budget, but from the States, the counties, the cities, and the towns, and from private sources of many kinds. Let me cite just one figure, for probably the seventh time, to show the utter falseness of all these charges. The distinguished delegate of the Soviet Union stated that less than 1 percent of the budget of the Federal Government in the United States is devoted to education. That is a correct statistic because education is not the primary responsibility of the Federal Government, but that statement gives a completely false impression. The States, local communities, and private institutions are primarily responsible for education in the United States. In the fiscal year 1950-51 our State and local governments spent a total of \$7,500,000,000 on education, or 34.1 percent of their total expenditures; and our private institutions in addition spent many millions of dollars on education.

Fourth, despite all the imperfections in our American society and despite all I have heard about the perfect paradise that exists in the Soviet Union, Poland, Byelorussia, and in certain other

countries—I am sure every person with decent instincts still prefers to live in imperfect freedom than in a propaganda paradise without freedom. For the last 20 years in this country, the Republican Party, a majority of our newspapers, and millions of our citizens have been criticizing and denouncing the Government; and for the next 4 years, the Democratic Party, many of our newspapers, and millions of our citizens will be criticizing and denouncing the new Administration. Yet not one Republican politician or diplomat has been imprisoned or hanged for his opposition to the Government in power. Not one newspaper has been suppressed. Not one citizen has been shipped off to a slave-labor camp. Nor will anything of this kind happen in the next 4 years to any American who happens to disagree with the Republican Administration.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we in the United States know better than these critics the many things that are lacking in our country. We have done much in the past, and we are doing much today, to correct these injustices and these low standards. We would be doing even more today if we were not compelled by the aggression in Korea and by the threat of aggression elsewhere to help strengthen the free world and to preserve the peace.

Activities of the International Materials Conference

Distribution of Copper

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on December 16 that member governments have accepted its proposal for an allocation of copper for the first quarter of 1953,¹ subject to a review of the supply-demand situation at the end of January to ascertain whether the allocation need be continued for the remainder of the quarter.

Reported requirements of primary copper for the first quarter 1953 continue to exceed estimated availabilities, even though there has been a noticeable easing of the copper market in recent months.

Estimated availabilities of primary copper in the first quarter 1953 amount to 704,790 metric tons. The Committee has recommended a first-quarter plan of distribution of 723,080 metric tons as compared with 747,655 metric tons in the previous quarter. The requirements indicated by some countries are slightly lower than in the previous quarter and this factor and more realistic supply figures result in a reduced total allocation. There is an apparent over-allocation of 18,290 metric tons (2.6 percent) which will provide a measure of flexibility to the distribution plan.

¹ For distribution plan, see IMC press release of Dec. 16.

Direct defense needs have again been given priority.

Primary copper only (blister and refined) is included in the distribution plan. As in previous quarters, semifabricated products have not been allocated but all exporting countries are again asked to maintain their exports of semifabricated products at a level commensurate with their allocation of primary metal for civilian consumption in accordance with normal patterns of trade.

The Committee agreed to continue the arrangement whereby domestic users in the United States and in other countries would have the opportunity to purchase any copper allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference and not used by them.

In accepting the Committee's recommendations, the Chilean Government made a reservation by which it may dispose of a limited tonnage of its copper without reference to the distribution plan. Notwithstanding this reservation, the Chilean Government has stated its desire to take into account the recommendations of the Committee whenever possible in regard to that limited tonnage.

Twelve countries are represented on the Committee. They are Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The plan of distribution has been forwarded also to the governments of 27 other countries, not represented on the Committee, for which allocations have been recommended.

Distribution of Molybdenum

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee on December 18 announced its recommended distribution of molybdenum for the first calendar quarter of 1953.² The Governments of all 13 countries represented on the Committee have accepted the recommendations. These countries are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

In accepting the recommendations, the Government of the United States made the condition that domestic users of molybdenum in the United States should be authorized to purchase the quantity of such material allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference and not used by any such participating country. In view of this, the Committee agreed to make arrangements whereby such domestic users in the United States or other countries would have the opportunity to purchase molybdenum allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference but not used by any such participating country.

² For distribution plan, see IMC press release of Dec. 18.

Molybdenum has been under an international plan of distribution since July 1, 1951. Although availabilities have been increasing, the metal continues to be in very short supply as compared with the requirements of the consuming countries. This is especially so when the stock-piling requirements of these countries are taken into consideration.

Total free-world production of molybdenum in the first quarter of 1953 is estimated by the Committee at 6,408.25 metric tons metal content. This estimated production shows an increase of nearly 13 percent as compared with estimated production in the fourth quarter of 1952 and over 75 percent above the rate of production in 1950. On the other hand the defense and stock-piling requirements of the free world are still much in excess of the estimated production. It is necessary therefore that all countries of the free world should do their utmost to implement the present recommendations for the distribution of the metal and give every attention to the measures recommended by the Committee for conservation and substitution.

The plan recommended provides for the distribution of the whole free-world production of molybdenum, both in the form of ores and concentrates and primary products. Primary products are defined, as in the case of previous distributions by the Committee, as ferromolybdenum, molybdic acid and molybdenum salts, including calcium-molybdate and molybdic oxide. Roasted molybdenum concentrates are regarded by the Committee as being included in ores and concentrates, as in the case of previous distribution plans.

In framing the recommended plan of distribution, the needs of all countries, whether members of the Committee or not, were carefully considered. The distribution plan is now transmitted to all governments, including those not represented on the Committee, wherever the countries concerned are interested in the export or import of molybdenum in the form of ores and concentrates or primary products. All governments are being requested to carry out the plan of distribution recommended.

Of the total estimated production of 6,408.25 metric tons metal content of molybdenum to be produced in the first calendar quarter of 1953, the distribution plan provides that 6,124.25 metric tons be distributed in the form of ores and concentrates and 284 metric tons as primary products, this latter quantity also being distributed, in the first instance, to countries manufacturing primary products from ores and concentrates.

Distribution of Nickel

The Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee on December 18 announced that its 14 member governments have accepted a first quarter 1953 distribution plan for primary nickel and oxides.³

³ For distribution plan, see *Imc* press release of Dec. 18.

The recommended plan of distribution has been forwarded to all interested governments for implementation.

As in the distribution plans for the last two quarters of 1952, provision has been made whereby any nickel allocated to, but not used by, countries participating in the plan of distribution, will become available for purchase by consumers in the United States and other countries. Japanese production has reached a level which will permit the export in 1953 of a small amount of refined nickel.

The estimated nickel availabilities for the first quarter of 1953 of 37,270 metric tons are only 210 tons or about 0.6 percent higher than for the fourth quarter of 1952. Therefore, the recommended allocation still falls considerably short of requirements. As a result, the Committee's report to all governments again stresses the need for strict economy in the use of nickel.

The countries represented on the Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee are Belgium (for Benelux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Tungsten Distribution Plans Discontinued

The Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on December 18 that member governments had accepted its recommendation to discontinue international distribution plans for tungsten after December 31, 1952.

The consistent improvement in the tungsten-supply situation, together with the return of easier market conditions, will now permit such action.

The Committee will, however, continue to keep the supply and demand position under review. Any developments which would justify further action will be given due consideration. It has been agreed that if two or more countries, whether members of the Committee or nonmembers, experience serious difficulties in obtaining the necessary supplies, they may request the Committee to consider the reestablishment of the allocation system.

When tungsten was first allocated in July 1951, for the third quarter of that year, actual production of the metal amounted to about 3,150 metric tons metal content, whereas production for the first quarter of 1953 is estimated at more than 4,700 metric tons. With this increase of about 50 percent, supply and demand are approximately in balance. Further increases in production, however, are expected and it is believed that they will be necessary before the existing restrictions on end use can be fully relaxed.

The 13 countries represented on the Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Allocation of Sulfur

The Sulfur Committee of the International Materials Conference on December 22 announced the allocation plan for crude sulfur for the first quarter of 1953, which was unanimously accepted by its member governments. Seventeen governments are represented on the Sulfur Committee: Australia, Belgium (representing Benelux), Brazil, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

A substantial improvement has taken place in the sulfur position over the last 6 months of 1952. This has been brought about both by an increase in production and by some reduction in demand, resulting from the fact that the level of industrial activity in many countries was lower than previously anticipated, and from the increased use of other sulfur-bearing materials and various conservation measures. The export availabilities and import requirements for the first quarter of 1953 are approximately in balance.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Discussions on World Rice Situation (FAO)

The Department of State announced on January 6 (press release 7) that under the auspices of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), an intergovernmental meeting on the world rice situation had convened at Bangkok on January 5. The U.S. delegation to this meeting is as follows:

Delegate

Dexter V. Rivenburgh, Commodities Specialist, Production and Marketing Administration, Department of Agriculture

Members

Isom Deshotels, Assistant Agricultural Officer, Special Technical Economic Mission, American Embassy, Rangoon
Howard Parsons, Economic Counselor, American Embassy, Bangkok
Graham Quate, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, Bangkok

At the meeting, representatives of both importing and exporting countries, which are members of FAO, will review the recent trends in the production and international movement of rice and discuss governmental policies affecting rice production. Participants will exchange information

The Committee discussed the possible termination of international allocations but considered that the improvement in the supply position might be only of a temporary nature. Furthermore, the Committee recognized that in many cases the requirement figures for individual countries were based on a continuation of restrictions on the use of sulfur as such and thus might not reflect a true estimate of world demand. In view of this, the Committee has recommended the continuation of allocations for the first quarter of 1953, as shown in the attached schedule.⁴

The Committee agreed to make arrangements whereby domestic users in the United States and in other countries may purchase any sulfur allocated to other countries participating in the International Materials Conference and not used by any such participating country.

As on previous occasions, the Committee dealt only with crude sulfur and did not allocate the relatively small quantities of refined sulfur which enter into international trade. The Committee expects, however, that trade in refined sulfur will continue to follow the normal pattern.

about production policies, economic incentives, marketing methods, and technical assistance and will consider possible arrangements for future consultations on problems of rice supply. Technical questions concerning the storing of rice will also be discussed as an FAO meeting to deal with rice storage, previously scheduled for December 1952, was postponed to coincide with this meeting.

Inter-American Seminar on National Income

Press release 5 dated January 5

From January 5 to 17, statistical experts from the United States will attend an Inter-American Research Seminar on National Income at Santiago, Chile. The seminar, which will be held on the campus of the University of Chile, is being sponsored by the Government of Chile, the Pan American Union, and the Inter-American Statistical Institute, with the cooperation of the University of Chile and the United Nations.

U.S. participants in the seminar will be: *chairman*, M. Joseph Meehan; *members*, George Jaszi

⁴ For allocation schedule, see IMC press release dated Dec. 22.

and Harlow D. Osborne, all from the Office of Business Economics, Department of Commerce. Also participating will be Hale T. Shenefield of the American Embassy, Santiago.

The general purpose of the seminar, which is one of the projects of the technical-cooperation program of the Organization of American States, is to provide an opportunity for statistical specialists from the American Republics to exchange information on the problems involved in the use of national-income data and to analyze methods of solving these problems. It is hoped that the seminar will encourage the support and assistance which experts and offices will require in their efforts toward the stabilization and development of national incomes; and that it will establish relations which will permit the exchange of personnel and information among countries leading to an improvement of statistical services in each country.

Interested international organizations and institutions, including those which maintain relations with the Organization of American States, have been invited to send observers to the seminar.

Nature of Reports to U.N. by Unified Command

Press release 1 dated January 2

Following is the text of a letter from Ben H. Brown, Jr., Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, which is in reply to a letter from Representative Walter Rogers regarding an inquiry received by Representative Rogers from a constituent concerning reports that all military movements in Korea must initially be cleared through a Soviet citizen on the United Nations Secretariat:

DECEMBER 30, 1952

MY DEAR MR. ROGERS: I have your letter with which you enclosed a letter from a constituent who refers to an article appearing in the November issue of the *American Mercury* and asks if it is true that all military movements in Korea must first be cleared through Constantine Zinchenko, a Soviet citizen on the United Nations Secretariat.

The statement which is attributed to the article in the *American Mercury* is entirely without foundation. By resolutions of the Security Council the United Nations established for the Korean action a Unified Command under the United States. The actual conduct of operations in Korea in accordance with general United Nations principles and objectives was left to the United States. The United States Government has not cleared and does not clear any proposed military movements or any directions to the troops with any organ of the United Nations or any person on the Secretariat. The United States reports to the United Nations periodically on the events

which have taken place in the Korean fighting. These reports do not contain classified information and are available to the public generally.¹

Mr. Zinchenko has held in the United Nations Secretariat the post of "Assistant Secretary General in charge of the Department of Security Council Affairs". In this capacity he has no access whatever to any classified information of the United States Government and no voice in the determination of any policies of the United States or of the United Nations in regard to Korea. Any decisions or recommendations which the United Nations might wish to make in regard to the Korean fighting would have to be made by the Security Council or by the General Assembly. Mr. Zinchenko and other members of the United Nations Secretariat would have nothing to say in regard to the adoption of any such resolution.

If I can give you further information on this or any other subject, do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

BEN H. BROWN, JR.

Acting Assistant Secretary

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

- Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs of the United States. Staff Study No. 1. United States Overseas Information Programs (Background Study). November 17, 1952. Committee Print. 82d Cong., 2d sess. 48 pp.; Staff Study No. 3. The Soviet Propaganda Program (A Preliminary Study). November 17, 1952. Committee Print. 82d Cong., 2d sess. 23 pp.
- Treaties and Executive Agreements. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, Second Session on S. J. Res. 130 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements. May 21, 22, 27, 28, and June 9, 1952. 540 pp.
- The Katyn Forest Massacre. Hearings Before the Select Committee To Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre. Eighty-Second Congress, Second Session on Investigation of the Murder of Thousands of Polish Officers in the Katyn Forest Near Smolensk, Russia. Part 6. (Exhibits 32 and 33 Presented to the Committee in London by the Polish Government in Exile). 199 pp.; Part 7. June 3, 4, and November 11, 12, 13, 14, 1952. 537 pp.
- Mutual Security Legislation and Related Documents With Explanatory Notes. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. November 1952. Committee Print. 82d Cong., 2d sess. 137 pp.
- Institute of Pacific Relations. Hearings Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, Second Session on the Institute of Pacific Relations. Part 13. April 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, May 15, 16, and 29, 1952. 550 pp.; Part 14. May 2 and June 20, 1952. 805 pp.

¹For texts of the most recent U.N. Command reports and citations to earlier reports, see BULLETIN of Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Davies, Vincent Loyalty Cases

LOYALTY REVIEW BOARD'S FINDINGS

Press release 920 dated December 15

The Department of State on December 15 made the following announcements:

The Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission notified the Department on December 12 that it had "arrived at the conclusion that there is no reasonable doubt of the loyalty of Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., to the Government of the United States." Accordingly, the Loyalty Review Board approved the favorable finding of the State Department Loyalty Security Board, which had cleared Mr. Davies on October 17, 1952.

The Loyalty Review Board has also notified the Department of its conclusion in the case of John Carter Vincent, "that there is a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the Government of the United States." In making this finding, the Loyalty Review Board noted specifically that it had not found Mr. Vincent "guilty of disloyalty."

Mr. Vincent, who is 53 years old, served in the U.S. Army in the First World War and has over 30 years Government service.

The Department on December 15 suspended Mr. Vincent, who is minister and diplomatic agent at Tangier, and ordered him home. The recommendation of the Loyalty Review Board that the services of Mr. Vincent be terminated has been brought to the attention of the President, who will discuss the matter with Secretary Acheson upon the latter's return from the NATO Conference at Paris.

Complete texts of the letters addressed to Secretary Acheson by Hiram Bingham, chairman of the Loyalty Review Board, in regard to Mr. Vincent and Mr. Davies are printed below:

DECEMBER 12, 1952

The Honorable
The Secretary of State

In Re: Case of John Carter Vincent
Chief of Mission, Tangier, Morocco

SIR: Under the provisions of Regulation 14 of the Rules and Regulations of the Loyalty Review Board, a panel of the Board has considered the case of the above named employee. The members of the panel reviewed the entire record in the case and heard the testimony of Mr. Vincent in person and argument of counsel on his behalf.

Without expressly accepting or rejecting the testimony of Louis Budenz that Mr. Vincent was a Communist and "under Communist discipline" or the findings of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (a) that "over a period of years John Carter Vincent was the principal fulcrum of I. P. R.¹ pressures and influence in the State Depart-

ment" and (b) that "Owen Lattimore and John Carter Vincent were influential in bringing about a change in the United States Policy in 1945 favorable to the Chinese Communists," the panel has taken these factors into account.

Furthermore, the panel calls attention to the fact that Mr. Vincent was not an immature or subordinate representative of the State Department but was an experienced and responsible official who had been stationed in China from April 1924 to February 1936 and from March 1941 to August 1943, and who thereafter occupied high positions in the Department of State having to do with the formulation of our Chinese policies.

The panel notes Mr. Vincent's studied praise of Chinese Communists and equally studied criticism of the Chiang Kai-shek Government throughout a period when it was the declared and established policy of the Government of the United States to support Chiang Kai-shek's Government.

The panel notes also Mr. Vincent's indifference to any evidence that the Chinese Communists were affiliated with or controlled by the U.S.S.R.

Mr. Vincent's failure properly to discharge his responsibilities as Chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of State, War and Navy to supervise the accuracy or security of State Department documents emanating from that Subcommittee was also taken into account.

Finally, the panel calls attention to Mr. Vincent's close association with numerous persons who, he had reason to believe, were either Communists or Communist sympathizers.

To say that Mr. Vincent's whole course of conduct in connection with Chinese affairs does not raise a reasonable doubt as to his loyalty, would, we are forced to think, be an unwarranted interpretation of the evidence. While we are not required to find Mr. Vincent guilty of disloyalty and we do not do so, his conduct in office, as clearly indicated by the record, forces us reluctantly to conclude that there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the Government of the United States.

Therefore, it is the recommendation of the Loyalty Review Board that the services of Mr. John Carter Vincent be terminated.

DECEMBER 12, 1952

The Honorable
The Secretary of State

In Re: Case of John Paton Davies, Jr.
Foreign Service Officer

SIR: Under the provisions of Regulation 14 of the Rules and Regulations of the Loyalty Review Board, a panel of the Board has considered the case of the above named employee. The members of the panel reviewed the entire record in the case and heard the testimony of Mr. Davies in person and argument of counsel on his behalf. The panel also heard the testimony of several witnesses and considered additional top-secret evidence.

It is not within the province of the Loyalty Review Board to approve or disapprove of the wisdom or judgment of Mr. Davies as a Foreign Service Officer and we do not purport to do so.

After a full study of the entire record, and after listening to the highly confidential testimony of General Walter Bedell Smith, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Ambassador George Kennan, former head of the policy planning staff of the State Department, particularly with regard to Mr. Davies' suggested utilization by the C.I.A. of the services of persons alleged to be Communists, we have arrived at the conclusion that there is no reasonable doubt of the loyalty of Mr. John Paton Davies, Jr., to the Government of the United States.

Accordingly, the findings of the State Department Loyalty Security Board are hereby approved.

¹ Institute of Pacific Relations.

PRESIDENT AUTHORIZES NEW REVIEW OF VINCENT CASE

White House press release dated January 3

The President on January 3 sent the following memorandum to Secretary Acheson:

MEMORANDUM TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have read your memorandum of today concerning the case of John Carter Vincent. I think the suggestions which you make are well taken and I authorize and direct you to proceed in the manner which you have outlined.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Following is the text of Secretary Acheson's memorandum to the President:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: *Case of John Carter Vincent*

I have recently been advised by Chairman Bingham of the Loyalty Review Board that a panel of the Loyalty Review Board has considered the case of Mr. John Carter Vincent, a Foreign Service Officer with class of Career Minister. Chairman Bingham also advises me that while the panel did not find Mr. Vincent guilty of disloyalty, it has reluctantly concluded that there is reasonable doubt as to his loyalty to the Government of the United States. Chairman Bingham further advises me that it is therefore the recommendation of the Board that the services of Mr. Vincent be terminated.

Such a recommendation by so distinguished a Board is indeed serious and impressive and must be given great weight. The final responsibility, however, for making a decision as to whether Mr. Vincent should be dismissed is that of the Secretary of State. I am advised that any doubt which might have previously existed on this point has been removed by the recent decision of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in *James Kutcher, Appellant, v. Carl Gray, Jr., Veterans Administration, Appellee*. That case establishes that the action of the Board is a recommendation "just that—nothing more" and that in the last analysis upon the Head of the Department is imposed "the duty to impartially determine on all the evidence" the proper disposition of the case.

A most important item on which I must rely in exercising this responsibility, is the communication from Chairman Bingham in which he advised me of the conclusion reached by his panel. This communication contains elements which raise serious problems.

In the first place, I note a statement that the panel has not accepted or rejected the testimony of Mr. Budenz that he recalls being informed by

others that Mr. Vincent was a Communist and under Communist discipline. The panel also states that it does not accept or reject the findings of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate with respect to Mr. Vincent and the Institute of Pacific Relations or the findings of the Committee with respect to the participation of Mr. Vincent in the development of United States policy towards China in 1945. The panel, however, proceeds to state that, although it has not accepted or rejected these factors, it has taken them into account. I am unable to interpret what this means. If the panel did take these factors into account, this means that it must have relied upon them in making its final determination. Yet I am unable to understand how these factors could have played a part in the final determination of the panel if these factors were neither accepted nor rejected by the Board.

This is not merely a point of language. It is a point of real substance. It is difficult for me to exercise the responsibility which is mine under the law with the confusion which has been cast as to the weight which the panel gave to the charges of Mr. Budenz or the findings of the Senate Committee.

The communication from the panel raises another issue which goes to the heart of operation of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. It is the issue of accurate reporting. The communication contains the following statement:

The panel notes Mr. Vincent's studied praise of Chinese Communists and equally studied criticism of the Chiang Kai-shek Government throughout a period when it was the declared and established policy of the Government of the United States to support Chiang Kai-shek's Government.

Mr. Vincent's duty was to report the facts as he saw them. It was not merely to report successes of existing policy but also to report on the aspects in which it was failing and the reasons therefor. If this involved reporting that situations existed in the administration of the Chinese Nationalists which had to be corrected if the Nationalist Government was to survive, it was his duty to report this. If this involved a warning not to underestimate the combat potential of the Chinese Communists, or their contribution to the war against Japan, it was his duty to report this. In the hearings which followed the relief of General MacArthur, General Wedemeyer has testified that he has made reports equally as critical of the administration of the Chinese Nationalists.

The great majority of reports which Mr. Vincent drafted were reviewed and signed by Ambassador Gauss, an outstanding expert in the Far East. Ambassador Gauss has made it crystal clear that in his mind the reports drafted by Mr. Vincent were both accurate and objective.

I do not exclude the possibility that in this or in any other case a board might find that the reports of an officer might or might not disclose

a bias which might have a bearing on the issue of his loyalty. But in so delicate a matter, affecting so deeply the integrity of the Foreign Service, I should wish to be advised by persons thoroughly familiar with the problems and procedures of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. This involves an issue far greater in importance than the disposition of a loyalty case involving one man. Important as it is to do full justice to the individual concerned, it is essential that we should not by inadvertence take any step which might lower the high traditions of our own Foreign Service to the level established by governments which will permit their diplomats to report to them only what they want to hear.

The memorandum from Mr. Bingham indicates that the Board also took into account "Mr. Vincent's failure properly to discharge his responsibilities as Chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of State, War and Navy to supervise the accuracy or security of State Department documents emanating from that Subcommittee". The statement which refers to the security of the files seems to me to be inadvertent. Presumably it is a reference to the fact that State Department documents were involved in the *Amerasia* case. However, in the many Congressional investigations which have followed that case it has not been suggested that Mr. Vincent had any responsibility for those documents. I have not discovered any such evidence in the file in this case. The reference to the accuracy of the State Department documents emanating from that Committee is obscure. In any case, while it might be relative to Mr. Vincent's competence in performing his duties, it does not seem to me to have any bearing on the question of loyalty.

The report finally refers to Mr. Vincent's association with numerous persons "who, he had reason to believe", were either Communists or Communist sympathizers. This is indeed a matter which, if unexplained, is of importance and clearly relevant. It involves inquiry as to whether this association arose in the performance of his duties or otherwise. It further involves an inquiry as to the pattern of Mr. Vincent's close personal friends and whether he knew or should have known that any of these might be Communists or Communist sympathizers.

All these matters raised in my mind the necessity for further inquiry. This further inquiry was made possible by the documents in this proceeding which you provided me upon my request. I find upon examining the documents that the recommendation made by the panel of the Loyalty Review Board was made by a majority of one, two of the members believing that no evidence had been produced which led them to have a doubt as to Mr. Vincent's loyalty. In this situation, I believe that I cannot in good conscience and in

the exercise of my own judgment, which is my duty under the law, carry out this recommendation of the Board. I do not believe, however, that in the exercise of my responsibility to the Government, I can or should let the matter rest here. I believe that I must ask for further guidance.

I, therefore, ask your permission to seek the advice of some persons who will combine the highest judicial qualifications of weighing the evidence with the greatest possible familiarity of the works and standards of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, both in reporting from the field and making decisions in the Department. If you approve, I should propose to ask the following persons to examine the record in this case and to advise me as to what disposition in their judgment should be made in this case.

Judge Learned B. Hand, who, until his retirement, has been the senior judge for the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to serve as Chairman;

Mr. John J. McCloy, former High Commissioner for Germany;

Mr. James Grafton Rogers, former Assistant Secretary of State under Secretary Stimson;

Mr. G. Howland Shaw, a retired Foreign Service Officer and a former Assistant Secretary of State under Secretary Hull; and

Mr. Edmund Wilson, a retired Foreign Service Officer and former Ambassador.

I should ask them to read the record in this case and at their earliest convenience inform the Secretary of State of their conclusions.

DEAN G. ACHESON
Secretary of State

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Jan. 5-9, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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*Not printed.

¹ See BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 62.

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The Department of State bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Challenge of the Cold War

*Excerpt from President Truman's Farewell to the Nation*¹

I suppose that history will remember my term in office as the years when the cold war began to overshadow our lives. I have had hardly a day in office that has not been dominated by this all-embracing struggle, this conflict between those who love freedom and those who would lead the world back into slavery and darkness. And always in the background there has been the atomic bomb.

But when history says that my term of office saw the beginning of the cold war, it will also say that in those 8 years we have set the course that can win it. We have succeeded in carving out a new set of policies to attain peace—positive policies, policies of world leadership, policies that express faith in other free people. We have averted World War III up to now, and we may already have succeeded in establishing conditions which can keep that war from happening as far ahead as man can see.

These are great and historic achievements that we can all be proud of. Think of the difference between our course now and our course 30 years ago. After the First World War, we withdrew from world affairs; we failed to act in concert with other peoples against aggression; we helped to kill the League of Nations; and we built up tariff barriers which strangled world trade. This time we avoided those mistakes. We helped to found and to sustain the United Nations. We have welded alliances that include the greater part of the free world. And we have gone ahead with other free countries to help build their economies and link us all together in a healthy world trade.

Think back for a moment to the 1930's and you will see the difference. The Japanese moved into Manchuria, and free men did not act. The Fascists moved into Ethiopia, and we did not act. The Nazis marched into the Rhineland, into Austria, into Czechoslovakia, and free men were paralyzed for lack of strength and unity and will.

¹ Address made over radio and television on Jan. 15 and released to the press by the White House on the same date.

Think about those years of weakness and indecision, and World War II which was their evil result. Then think about the speed and courage and decisiveness with which we have moved against the Communist threat since World War II.

The first crisis came in 1945 and 1946, when the Soviet Union refused to honor its agreement to remove its troops from Iran. Members of my Cabinet came to me and asked if we were ready to take the risk that a firm stand involved. I replied that we were. So we took our stand. We made it clear to the Soviet Union that we expected them to honor their agreement and the Soviet troops were withdrawn.

And then in early 1947, the Soviet Union threatened Greece and Turkey. The British sent me a message saying they could no longer keep their forces in that area. Something had to be done at once, or the Eastern Mediterranean would be taken over by the Communists. On March 12 I went before the Congress and stated our determination to help the people of Greece and Turkey maintain their independence.² Today, Greece is still free and independent; and Turkey is a bulwark of strength at a strategic corner of the world.

Then came the Marshall Plan which saved Europe, the heroic Berlin airlift, and our military-aid programs.

We inaugurated the North Atlantic pact, the Rio pact binding the Western Hemisphere together, and the defense pacts with countries of the far Pacific.

Korea: History Repeating Itself

Most important of all, we acted in Korea. I was in Independence, Mo., in June 1950, when Secretary Acheson telephoned me and gave me the news about the invasion of Korea. I told the Secretary to lay the matter at once before the

² For text of the President's message, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1947, p. 534.

United Nations and I came on back to Washington.

Flying back over the flat lands of the Middle West and over the Appalachians that summer afternoon, I had a lot of time to think. I turned the problem over in my mind in many ways, but my thoughts kept coming back to the 1930's—to Manchuria, Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Austria, and finally to Munich.

Here was history repeating itself. Here was another probing action, another testing action. If we let the Republic of Korea go under, some other country would be next, and then another. And all the time, the courage and confidence of the free world would be ebbing away just as it did in the 1930's. And the United Nations would go the way of the League of Nations.

When I reached Washington, I met immediately with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and General Bradley, and the other civilian and military officials who had information and advice to help me decide what to do. We talked about the problems long and hard. It was not easy to make the decision that sent American boys again into battle. I was a soldier in the First World War and I know what a soldier goes through. I know well the anguish that mothers and fathers and families go through. So I knew what was ahead if we acted in Korea.

But after all this was said, we realized that the issue was whether there would be fighting in a limited area now or on a much larger scale later on, whether there would be some casualties now or many more casualties later.

So a decision was reached—the decision I believe was the most important in my time as President. In the days that followed, the most heartening fact was that the American people clearly agreed with the decision. And in Korea, our men are fighting as valiantly as Americans have ever fought because they know they are fighting in the same cause of freedom in which Americans have stood ever since the beginning of the Republic.

Where free men had failed the test before, this time we met the test. We met it firmly. We met it successfully. The aggression has been repelled. The Communists have seen their hopes of easy conquest go down the drain. The determination of free people to defend themselves has been made clear to the Kremlin.

As I have thought about our world-wide struggle with the Communists these past 8 years, day in and day out, I have never once doubted that you, the people of our country, have the will to do what is necessary to win this terrible fight against communism. Because I have been sure of that, I have been able to make necessary decisions even though they called for sacrifices by all of us. And I have not been wrong in my judgment of the American people.

That same assurance of our people's determina-

tion will be General Eisenhower's greatest source of strength in carrying on this struggle.

Now, once in a while, I get a letter from some impatient person asking, why don't we get it over with? Why don't we issue an ultimatum, make all-out war, drop the atomic bomb?

For most Americans, the answer is quite simple: We are not made that way. We are a moral people. Peace is our goal, and justice and freedom. We cannot, of our own free will, violate the very principles that we are striving to defend. The whole purpose of what we are doing is to prevent World War III. Starting a war is no way to make peace.

But if anyone still thinks that just this once, bad means can bring good ends, then let me remind you of this: We are living in the 8th year of the atomic age. We are not the only nation that is learning to unleash the power of the atom. A third world war might dig the grave, not only of our Communist opponents but also of our own society—our world as well as theirs.

Fatal Flaw of Communist Society

Starting an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men. Then, some of you may ask, when and how will the cold war ever end? I think I can answer that simply. The Communist world has great resources and it looks strong. But there is a fatal flaw in their society. Theirs is a godless system, a system of slavery; there is no freedom in it, no consent. The Iron Curtain, the secret police, the constant purges, all these are symptoms of a great basic weakness—the rulers' fear of their own people.

In the long run, the strength of our free society and our ideals will prevail over a system that has respect for neither God nor man.

Last week, in my State of the Union Message to the Congress,³ and I hope you will all take the time to read it—I explained how I think we will finally win through.

As the free world grows stronger, more united, more attractive to men on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and as the Soviet hopes for easy expansion are blocked, then there will have to come a time of change in the Soviet world. Nobody can say for sure when that is going to be, or exactly how it will come about, whether by revolution, or trouble in the satellite states, or by a change inside the Kremlin. Whether the Communist rulers shift their policies of their own free will, or whether the change comes about in some other way, I have not a doubt in the world that a change will occur.

I have a deep and abiding faith in the destiny of free men. With patience and courage, we shall some day move on into a new era, a wonderful golden age, an age when we can use the peaceful

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1953, p. 87.

tools that science has forged for us to do away with poverty and human misery everywhere on earth.

Think what can be done, once our capital, our skills, our science—most of all atomic energy—can be released from the tasks of defense and turned wholly to peaceful purposes all around the world. There is no end to what can be done.

I can't help but dream out loud a little here. The Tigris and Euphrates Valley can be made to bloom as it did in the times of Babylon and Nineveh. Israel can be made the country of milk and honey as it was in the time of Joshua.

There is a plateau in Ethiopia some 6 to 8 thousand feet high that has 65 thousand square

miles of land just exactly like the corn belt in northern Illinois. Enough food can be raised there to feed 100 million people.

There are places in South America—places in Colombia and Venezuela and Brazil just like that plateau in Ethiopia—places where food could be raised for millions of people.

These things can be done, and they are self-liquidating projects. If we can get peace and safety in the world under the United Nations, the developments will come so fast we will not recognize the world in which we now live.

This is our dream of the future—our picture of the world we hope to have when the Communist threat is overcome.

The Nature of the Atlantic Partnership

SECRETARY ACHESON'S FAREWELL PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT

Press release 25 dated January 14

If you will indulge me this morning, I have jotted down a few sentences of a personal nature, which I should like to say to you in this meeting.

My Friends and Colleagues of many years: This is our last meeting. Ours has been a long and often tumultuous life together. But rarely dull! We have known one another too well to expect sentimentality or grandiloquence at this changing of the guard.

So we can say at noon what one said by moonlight, that "parting is such sweet sorrow." And we can agree with another poet that "the one who goes is happier than those he leaves behind," without overdoing the happiness or the sweetness of the sorrow.

This is an end and to be taken as such.

The President has told what we have aspired to do and done, and why, in one of the great State papers of our Republic—the message on the State of the Union.¹ He will speak again tomorrow. And he should speak, and speak alone, for his has been the great task and burden of leadership simply and bravely carried.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 19, 1953, p. 87.

My testament is much shorter and easier. It is a final word to fellow craftsmen, a word out of a long striving. It is not a word for popular consumption, no "message," no inspirational paragraph.

I don't need to tell you that the Secretary and the Department of State are only and, in their field, the chief servants and advisers of the President and that only by mutual loyalty in those roles can the Republic be best served. I need not say, I think, that in my experience this loyalty has been mutual and complete. I am deeply grateful for that.

But now the roles of command and advice and the travail of alien knowledge which goes with it pass to other hands. And our thoughts are with them. I ask for them something beyond good will and a fair chance.

"Efficiency," says Conrad, "of a practically flawless kind may be reached naturally in the struggle for bread. But there is something beyond—a higher point, a subtle and unmistakable touch of love and pride beyond mere skill."

This place cannot live without that, nor prosper without your recognition of it. So do not keep your eyes too close to your pencil points. And do not think too ill of my successor if occasionally

there is a reminiscent note. For continuity of tradition is strong even in this new building.

Think, rather, of Prester John:

Then he walks as to his garden where
he sees a feathered demon
Very splendid and important on a spicy
sort of tree!
"That's the Phoenix," whispers Prester, "which
all eddicated seamen
Know the only one existent, and he's
waiting for to flee!
When his hundred years expire
Then he'll set hisself afire
And another from his ashes rise most
beautiful to see!
With wings of gold and emerald, most
beautiful to see!"

Perhaps "wings of gold and emerald" are too much to expect of the foreign policy of the United States. But wings there have been and will be, strong and buoyant; and in their fashioning will continue to be that subtle and unmistakable touch of love and pride beyond mere skill.

Now, I think we shall open the meeting, as we usually do, to questions.

The European Defense Community

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you at all concerned at the action of the new French Government in seeking some amendments to the EDC treaty?

A. May I talk for a moment about the situation, as I see it, in Europe today, and answer that question a little indirectly and with some background.

I think there are clouds on the horizon in Europe, there are problems, there are difficulties. The other day I asked some of my colleagues if they would look through the press in the months in 1947 prior to General Marshall's speech at Harvard, and the announcement of the Marshall Plan, with a view to comparing the amount of space and the nature of the comment on European affairs then with the amount of space and the nature of the comment now. This was done quickly and what I report is not a scientific survey of the press, but it is interesting to note that there was far less discussion about the condition of Europe in, say, May 1947 than there is today. Today there is a great deal of discussion, informed and good discussion, and a great deal of worry.

Now the interesting thing about that to me is that the condition of Europe in the spring of 1947 was very serious indeed, almost approaching disaster; whereas, the situation which we find today is that, if anything, there has been a check in forward progress, but not a retrogression. I think it is natural and very interesting to see that there was less worry and less comment about an almost disastrous situation 5 years ago than there is now about a situation which had been moving forward very strongly and which is temporarily checked.

It is right that there should be concern and, of

course, it is right that there should be a lot of comment. I think it is proper to note the nature of the problems but I think we should not become completely obsessed in the difficulties and not see the background.

The facts of the matter are, I think, that there has been very great progress, economically, militarily, and politically, in the whole Atlantic community and in the Western European part of it. The European defense forces today are very sizable forces, not as great as we would wish, but very sizable. They hardly existed 5 years ago.

We have heard a great deal about set-backs and slowdowns, but the fact of the matter is that in 1953 our European allies will be spending over a billion dollars more on their defense requirements than they did in 1952, so that we are going forward; we are not going backward.

There has always been, over these years, a very substantial economic recovery so that this military effort has been made without cutting into existing standards of life. Of course, that effort has prevented a forward movement in those standards but it has not caused them to regress.

Now, all of that, I think, is important to have in mind. I think it is also important to have in mind, and this bears more directly upon the question which was asked of me, that there has been a very great political development, a very great understanding on both sides of the Atlantic, of the nature of the Atlantic partnership and what is required to make it endure.

Certainly, in this country we are fully aware, I believe, that our European allies in NATO are in a true sense of the word partners and that we must work with them and treat them as partners. I think on their side they see the nature of the effort which they must make to maintain their part of the partnership.

Secretary Acheson, in an informal ceremony, on January 16, bade farewell to his colleagues in the Department and in the Foreign Service. On that occasion, employees presented Mr. Acheson with the chair which he occupied at White House Cabinet meetings. For text of remarks made at the ceremony by Mr. Acheson, see p. 161.

It is no longer, I think, an open question that we in the United States need this partnership and want this partnership. I think that is an accepted political fact in American life.

What is not so clear is what it is that we are going to get and what it is that we shall be in partnership with; and here may I refer to something which I spoke about at the last meeting of NATO, and I think that the remarks made at that time are going to be released today and will be available to you.² That was the tremendous im-

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 5.

portance of the fact of the growing unity of Western Europe and some of the consequences which flow from that. I pointed out that the Schuman Plan was no longer a plan, it was an actuality, it was in actual operation, and next month there will open the broad market provided by the Schuman Plan and the various taxes and other things which are provided for will go into effect.

In other words, it is an operating fact in Europe today and it is profoundly changing the attitudes of mind of all people in the six countries and outside who are affected by it or part of it. Some time ago it would have seemed almost impossible that this could happen. So when we see that there are difficulties in the way of the European Defense Community, I think we have to compare them with the difficulties which existed for the Schuman Plan and, when we see another fact, I think that we can be optimistic and not pessimistic about the future of the European Defense Community.

I think that community, the work of the *ad hoc* committee which is working on the political structure which will supervise and control both the Schuman Plan and the European army are indications that the real vital force in the mid-twentieth century is this movement toward unity and it will have a very great effect upon our Atlantic partnership.

I ventured to say in Paris, at this last meeting, that it seemed to me that the movement toward unity in Europe could be compared to a *centripetal* force operating in the center of this Atlantic partnership, because strength attracts strength—weakness repels strength—and as this strength grows in Europe, there will be, to my mind, an inevitable drag closer of Great Britain and then of North America into closer and closer association in the Atlantic alliance.

If that movement toward unity does not continue, if it should turn in the opposite direction and be a movement toward disunity, then I said that I thought there would be a *centrifugal* force set up in the center of a line which would tend to throw off and break apart, rather than pull together and make closer.

It seems to me that these are fundamental axioms of political life. They are not ones that one can argue about. It does no good to say that it would be better if it were otherwise. It's just a fundamental fact of political life that this strength will pull in all parts, knit them more closely, hold them more closely together, whereas the opposite will inevitably bring about a loosening of the alliance.

With all of that in mind, I think it is a mistake to be pessimistic. I think one should look quite clearly and candidly at the difficulties, and they are formidable difficulties, but I believe that they can be and will be surmounted, because this Euro-

pean Defense Community is a vital part of this strength of the Atlantic alliance. And the strength of the Atlantic alliance is a vital part of the security and life of all the countries which participate in it. When there is such a tremendous need and understanding for something, I think one can believe that the forces which will bring it about are stronger than the forces which will block it.

Soviet Evocation of Anti-Semitism

Q. Mr. Secretary, may we have your views on the Soviet policy against the background on the news from Moscow yesterday and the anti-Semitism and the arrest of these doctors?

A. I don't think that there is anything that I can add to what seems to me the brilliant analysis of that whole question in the President's State of the Union message. I think that really gives you the whole story completely and so far as this latest move is concerned, I think Mr. McDermott³ spoke about that yesterday and I concur in everything that he said.

[In a statement to the press on Jan. 13, Mr. McDermott said:

The reported Soviet arrest of a number of Jewish doctors under accusation of medical sabotage seems to be another step in the recent Soviet campaign against the Jews, revealed in the anti-Zionist aspects of the Slansky trial. The Soviets have had recourse again to an old technique of theirs. The real motivation for the present charges is not yet known, but the Soviets have used this technique of the accusation of medical sabotage before. For example, it was claimed during the 1937 purge trials that Maxim Gorky, the writer, had been the victim of medical sabotage by opponents of Stalin. It is becoming increasingly clear that current Soviet allegations of Zionist plots are indicative of an extraordinary and growing sense of internal insecurity.]

Japanese Warning to the Soviets

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything to say about the situation which has developed in the Far East concerning Russian planes flying over Japan? The warning which was given?

A. Well, I think that what has happened there is not surprising and is a perfectly normal attitude for the Japanese Government to take. I think any government which finds that the air over its territory is being infringed by planes of other countries would naturally issue a warning that this must stop, and that is what the Japanese Government has done. I think it is also perfectly understandable and normal, and natural, that in the light of the fact that the Japanese do not have the air force necessary to protect the inviolability of their own sky, that they should ask this Government, which under its treaty has the right to do so, to take any necessary steps to prevent further inroads.

³ Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations.

The Principle of National Unity in Foreign Policy

by Myron M. Cowen

Ambassador to Belgium¹

I can quite easily understand why, when you were kind enough to invite me here, you suggested that I might talk to you about the recent election and the development of American foreign policy. For 20 years, most of the lifetime of you who are students, there has been one party in power in the United States. It was with the leadership of this party that the United States fought the last horrible war. It was with the leadership of this party that the United States helped to create the United Nations.

It was under the leadership of this party that the United States participated in the rebuilding of the economic and military strength of the Western World, through the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Now another party will come into power in the United States. It is a party that we have not been able to observe in office, since during the past 20 years it has not had the responsibility of government. To many people, especially outside of the United States, this party and its leaders have simply been identified as the opposition. If the Democratic Party has been identified with participation in the United Nations, or with NATO, or with the Marshall Plan, has not the Republican Party been critical of the foreign policy of the Administration? And will we not now see a period in which there will be material changes in U.S. foreign policy?

I said a moment ago that I understood why you might ask about the effect of the elections on the development of our foreign policy. I meant my statement sincerely, but do you know that, in a sense, I believe the vast majority of Americans would be a little puzzled by the question.

During political campaigns and at other times, harsh criticisms are made of each other by political opponents. The harsher the criticism, the more publicity it is liable to achieve. For the visitor

or the foreigner, it is very difficult to appraise these criticisms. Which represent an important body of opinion and which represent an extreme position that commands little support? To the man in his own home this appraisal is so easy that he is frequently unaware that he is making it. Certainly he hears and reads that some politician has demanded that a chief of cabinet have his head chopped off. Or he reads that another politician demands that his country declare war on its neighbors. But to the man at home these statements are not causes for alarm because he knows they represent no important body of responsible opinion.

If I may speak for my countrymen, I think they have had abundant opportunity to pass judgment on our foreign policy as it developed since the war. We have had four national elections since then—in 1946, 1948, 1950, and 1952. In all of these we voted for Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. In 1948 and 1952, we voted in addition for President. In these elections, the American voter has chosen men from both parties who have wholeheartedly supported the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, the Pacific security treaties, and NATO.

In these 7 years since the end of the war, the United States has developed a foreign policy to meet the new conditions that have come into being in the world. This foreign policy has not been a Democratic foreign policy. This foreign policy has not been a Republican foreign policy. It *has* been a national foreign policy.

Words Spoken by the New President

As an example of its bipartisan nature, you may recall that the Marshall Plan was first voted into being by a Congress in which the Republicans had a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate.

During the political campaign before the last elections, a distinguished American made an ad-

¹Excerpts from an address made on Dec. 16, 1952, before the Foreign Affairs Group at the University of Louvain, Louvain, Belgium.

dress in which he reviewed the important postwar votes on foreign policy. He said:

The United Nations Charter was approved by the Senate by a vote of 89-2; the North Atlantic Treaty was approved by a vote of 82-13 and the Vandenberg Resolution was adopted by a vote of 64-6.

Parenthetically, I might remind you that the late Senator Vandenberg was the distinguished Republican champion of a bipartisan foreign policy. The Vandenberg Resolution was the piece of legislation in which the Senate made clear the U.S. intent to participate in regional agreements like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This resolution was therefore the bridge between the Brussels Pact and NATO. Returning to the speech from which I was quoting:

The Marshall Plan was approved in the Senate by a vote of 69-17.

The Japanese Peace Treaty was approved in March of this year by the Senate with only 10 opposing votes. The United States-Japanese Security Treaty was approved with only 9 opposing votes. The United States-Australian-New Zealand and the United States-Philippine security treaties were approved with no recorded opposition.

The peace contract with West Germany will restore to it a large measure of sovereignty and the opportunity to cooperate in NATO on the basis of equality. It was approved by the Senate in May of this year with only 5 votes in opposition.

These words that I have been quoting were spoken by President-elect Eisenhower last summer in the middle of the campaign. He went on to add:

... Our friends must know that they can depend upon the continuity of our policies. . . . The Republican Party is dedicated to the principle of national unity in foreign policy. As President, it will be my purpose to cooperate with the congressional leaders of the Democratic Party and make them real partners in formulating our basic foreign policies.

I could quote for you many other expressions of the same type that illustrate a determination on the part of important political leaders of both parties to insure that we continue a bipartisan foreign policy, but let us say that President-elect Eisenhower speaks for his Government-to-be.

There are two observations that I think we can now make about the recent elections and the development of our foreign policy.

The first observation is that the election of General Eisenhower means a continuation of the main lines of foreign policy adopted by the American people in the 7 years since the end of the war.

In the second place, we should notice how great is the number of Americans who support these policies. Governor Stevenson also made it apparent that he would continue these policies if elected.

Having made these observations, how specifically can we chart U.S. policy in differing situations and in different parts of the world? Here I think it might be valuable to consider what the basic principles that lie back of the postwar development of U.S. foreign policy are.

We have wished a world at peace where man's skills and his resources can be concentrated to conquer hunger and alleviate illness, a world where he can be free to live under a government of his own choosing.

We hoped that it would be immediately possible to progress toward such a world at the war's end. Therefore we were among the initiators of the United Nations. We thought that by the establishment of the United Nations, the nations of the world would be able to build an international machinery to ease tensions and reduce the area of possible conflict and, believing that, we demobilized at great speed. Never in the history of the world had armies comparable to ours in size demobilized so rapidly. Immediately we took steps to establish, within the United Nations, the machinery for the control of world arms and armament.

It is not necessary to review all of the long road of heartbreak and disappointment that we have seen since the war. But whether it is because of Czechoslovakia yesterday or Korea today, we understand the necessity for building our military and economic strength and for building strong patterns of security. We have made important steps forward in our own rearmament. Working with you and the other NATO countries, we have together built a security pact for Europe. And the NATO countries have made great progress in building up their defenses.

The Soviet Union Needs Time

But we are still faced with great danger. We have seen in Moscow, recently, the Soviet leaders carefully unroll their blueprints and discuss their plans. Hitler wrote of his plans and we did not pay sufficient attention to his words. We should carefully consider the present Soviet reasoning.

The Soviet Union needs time to absorb its gains and use the great resources in the area it controls from the Elbe to the waters off the Philippines.

The leaders of the Soviet Union believe that the countries back of the Iron Curtain are much more able to endure what Ambassador Frederick Anderson² has called "a long period of strenuous alertness" than the countries of the Atlantic community.

They believe that the free nations cannot continue their economic recovery, their rearmament, and their opposition to aggression in Korea and Indochina. Under the strain of this effort, the Kremlin believes that the free nations will not work together. Stalin has said that we cannot exist in the contracted world cut into by the Iron Curtain; that without the markets back of the curtain we will squabble among ourselves and lose our unity.

And, of course, the U.S.S.R. will use every de-

² Deputy U.S. special representative in Europe.

vice of its international Communist Party to create division, suspicion, and mistrust among the members of the Atlantic community. Their worst fear is the growing unity and strength in the Atlantic alliance.

You have asked me what I thought the U.S. elections meant in terms of U.S. foreign policy. I think they have meant a restatement of American unity and American determination to pursue the objectives of our postwar policy. In specific approaches to specific problems there may, of course, be changes. This would be true regardless of administration or political party. Our foreign policy cannot be a static thing; it must be dynamic. And we are by no means convinced that we have all of the correct answers. We know we have not, and we know that we must ask you and the other free countries to give us the benefit of your thinking and of your criticism.

We in the free world have had to face many dangers in the last 12 years—war and its attendant desolation and the period of crises of these last 7 years. We have shown that we have been able to meet these problems as they arose. In one sense, we are now facing our greatest danger—"the long period of strenuous alertness."

This period is going to test the free nations of the West and of the East in yet another way—it is going to make demands on our moral strength. To face it we must be prepared economically, politically, militarily, but principally and above all, morally. Without moral strength, we shall not survive.

It is to great institutions like this University that men turn for strength in such times.

I am sure that they will continue to find here the religious and intellectual leadership that has drawn them to Louvain over so many centuries.

U. S. Requests Departure of Yuri V. Novikov

Press release 27 dated January 15

The Department of State has been working with the Department of Justice in connection with the espionage case of Otto Verber, et al., against whom an indictment was opened on January 15.¹ Upon the arrest of the defendants and in view of the information contained in the indictment regarding the activities of Yuri V. Novikov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy at Washington, the Department has notified the Embassy that Mr. Novikov is persona non grata to this Government and has requested his immediate departure from the United States. The text of the note follows:

The Secretary of State presents his compliments

¹ See also Department of Justice press release of that date.

to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and states the following.

The Government of the United States has ascertained that Yuri V. Novikov, Second Secretary of the Embassy, has engaged in activities incompatible with his status as an accredited diplomatic official.

Therefore, this Government is impelled to declare Mr. Novikov *persona non grata*. The Embassy is requested to make arrangements for his immediate departure from the United States.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, January 14, 1953

Exchange of Notes Concerning Territorial Violations of Japan

Press release 34 dated January 16

Following is an exchange of notes between the Governments of Japan and the United States concerning flights by unauthorized foreign aircraft over the territory of Japan. The Japanese note was delivered to the American Embassy at Tokyo on January 13. The U.S. reply was delivered to the Japanese Foreign Office on January 16.

Japanese Note of January 13

Violations of Japan's territorial air over Hokkaido by foreign military planes have of late become increasingly frequent. The Japanese Government considers that such trespasses are not only forbidden under international law but also constitute a grave menace to the security of Japan. The Japanese Government does not possess at present any means effectively to repel such violations.

I have the honor, therefore, to request Your Excellency on behalf of the Japanese Government that, if similar violations of Japan's territorial air should occur in future, the United States authorities concerned take effective and appropriate measures to repel them for the protection of the common interest of Japan and the United States of America.

U.S. Note of January 16

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Ministry's Note concerning violations of Japan's territorial air over Hokkaido by foreign military planes.

The United States Government has noted that the Japanese Government considers such trespasses to constitute a grave menace to the security of Japan. It has further noted the request of the Japanese Government that the United States au-

thorities take effective and appropriate measures to repel similar violations of Japan's territorial air should they occur in the future.

In accordance with the request of the Japanese Government the United States Government has instructed the Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, with all practicable assistance from the Japanese Government, to take all possible measures necessary and proper under terms of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan dated September 8, 1951, to repel all such violations of Japan's territorial air.

U. S. Note to U. S. S. R. on Austrian State Treaty

Press release 16 dated January 12

In pursuance of the resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 20, 1952,¹ appealing to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian treaty, the U.S. Government, through its Embassy at Moscow, on January 12 delivered a note to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs inviting attention to the U.N. General Assembly resolution and announcing its intention to call a meeting of the Austrian treaty deputies in London at an early date.² Similar notes were delivered by the British and French Embassies at Moscow. The text of the U.S. note follows:

The United Nations General Assembly on December 20, 1952, adopted a resolution addressing an earnest appeal to the Governments of the Four Powers which occupy Austria to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach an agreement on the terms of an Austrian Treaty with a view to an early termination of the occupation.

The United Nations General Assembly resolution emphasizes the world-wide support for Austria's plea for the restoration of her full freedom

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 68.

² The Department of State announced on January 19 (press release 35) that at the request of the U.S. Government, whose deputy will be chairman of the next meeting, the Secretary General of the Austrian Treaty deputies had issued invitations on January 14 to the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union for a meeting of the deputies at London on January 30.

and sovereignty. The United States Government which has in the past urged and continues to urge full Austrian independence and sovereignty not only welcomes this resolution but also considers that it imposes an additional and immediate obligation on each of the Four Powers to give renewed and urgent consideration to the fulfillment of their pledge made in the Moscow Declaration of 1943.

The United States Government for its part urges that every effort be made now to conclude a Four Power Treaty. It is proposed, therefore, rather than to continue the sterile exchange of notes, the most recent of which is the Soviet Government's note of September 27, 1952, that a meeting of the Austrian Treaty Deputies be held at an early date for the purpose of concluding an Austrian Treaty. Since the United States Deputy will be in the chair at this meeting, he will request the Secretary General of the Austrian Treaty Deputies to issue invitations for an early meeting of the Four Deputies in London.

Special Grant to Yugoslavia

The Mutual Security Agency on January 8 announced a special grant of 20 million dollars to Yugoslavia as a supplement to 78 million dollars already earmarked in order to enable Yugoslavia to purchase food and raw materials.

Very hard hit by drought which destroyed almost half its corn crop last summer, Yugoslavia has had to revise drastically its import program to cope with the situation, MSA said. Ordinarily, corn is exported by Yugoslavia, but the damage to that crop and to all bread grains and fodder crops has made that impossible.

The 20 million dollars is a special grant by MSA in addition to the 99-million-dollar tripartite aid program in which the United States is participating with the United Kingdom and France. The U.S. share of this tripartite program is 78 million dollars. To date for the present fiscal year Yugoslavia has received allotments of 50 million dollars from the United States under the tripartite program, designed to assist Yugoslavia to maintain its independence from Cominform domination and to support Yugoslavia's defense effort, which is proportionately one of the largest in Europe.¹

¹ For an article on U.S. and tripartite aid to Yugoslavia, see BULLETIN of Nov. 24, 1952, p. 825.

Year-End Report of the Mutual Security Agency

A continued rise in the output of heavy industry during 1952 reflects the emphasis placed by Western Europe upon building production facilities in an effort to meet the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), according to a report released on December 30 by the Mutual Security Agency (MSA).

In the Far East, the report stated, the year also brought stronger emphasis on defense-supporting activities in Formosa and Indochina, along with expansion of basic economic-development projects in these two countries and in the Philippines and Thailand.

The report covers the activities of the Mutual Security Agency, which was created last December 31 to succeed the Economic Cooperation Administration. In Europe, MSA operates a defense-support program for the NATO countries, Western Germany, and Yugoslavia and continues the economic-aid program for Austria. In the Far East, MSA administers economic and technical-assistance programs in Indochina, Formosa, Thailand, and the Philippines.

A summary of the report follows:

MSA's efforts during the year were devoted to supplying the Western European countries with the essential raw materials, machine tools, and other industrial and agricultural commodities to help our European partners carry out their defense programs and to achieve and maintain the expanding economy and political stability that are indispensable to military strength.¹

During the year, defense-support funds of MSA went in increasing amounts for commodities directly useful in gearing Western European production to defense.

Europe's steel output, mainstay of economic and defense strength, hit an all-time high in October, with the production of 5.5 million metric tons for the month. This was a gain of 12 percent over October of last year; and for the January-October period, it was 8 percent ahead of the corresponding 10-month period of 1951.

European production of railroad equipment,

motor vehicles, machinery, and other defense production were at peak levels in 1952, while shipbuilding continued at capacity.

The record output of metals and metal products, the high level of chemical production, plus the continued growth in construction and in capital-goods production, proved sufficient to offset the contraction in the consumer-goods industries.

To support the increased requirements of expanding heavy industries, Western Europe increased electricity output through October by 6 percent over the previous year and coal production by 3 percent.

The total industrial output of Western Europe in September and October was higher than in the fall of 1951, the previous peak. Total industrial output for the year will show an increase of about 2 percent over 1951 and almost 50 percent above the levels in the first quarter of 1948, just prior to the start of the Marshall Plan. Agricultural production has increased by 3 percent over the 1951 crop year and by more than 30 percent over 1948.

The European Coal and Steel Community (the Schuman Plan), the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the European Payments Union (EPU) are noteworthy examples of cooperation that has been developing since the beginning of the Marshall Plan.

Schuman Plan in Operation

Designed to create a single market for coal and steel among member countries, the Schuman Plan can provide a solid base upon which to build a more dynamic, unified Europe for peace as well as defense. The Plan was brought into being July 25, 1952, after each of six Parliaments had ratified the treaty.

Other highlights dealing with Western Europe's economy, as reflected in latest available figures, are:

(1) A decline in the cost of raw-materials imports largely restored the purchasing power of Western European exports to their mid-1950 position.

(2) The price rise that followed the Korean outbreak was brought to a halt; wholesale prices in almost all countries in October were below the

¹For an article on MSA operations in Western Europe, see *Field Reporter*, November-December 1952, Department of State publication 4744, p. 3.

December 1951 level, and the cost-of-living indexes were not much higher.

(3) Unemployment, though higher than a year ago in most countries, was serious only in Italy. German unemployment has declined significantly from last year.

(4) The foreign-trade deficit fell to less than 300 million dollars in September, whereas 12 months before it was 470 million dollars. In the first quarter of 1952 it averaged 550 million dollars per month.

(5) A considerable degree of balance has been achieved in intra-European payments. The largest debtor in the ECU, the Sterling Area, has begun to improve its position by running surpluses in recent months. The cumulative positions of the large ECU creditors have either leveled off, as in the case of Belgium, or actually declined, as in the cases of Germany and Italy. France and Turkey continue in difficult positions.

The inflationary forces have abated and do not present as great a threat to economic stability and steady expansion as they did a year ago. Measures taken to control inflation, the restraint of consumers, and good harvests have somewhat reduced the serious inflationary threat.

Materials directly related to Europe's defense build-up received priority in MSA's procurement authorizations. Out of a total of 1,251,650,000 dollars in procurement authorizations issued for commodities in the January-November 1952 period, 620,850,000 dollars went for raw materials and semifinished products as compared to 318,499,000 dollars for the corresponding period of last year. Authorizations for nonferrous metals jumped from approximately 31 million dollars in 1951 to 213 million dollars in 1952; iron and steel-mill materials from 16 million dollars to 134 million dollars; nonmetallic minerals from 6 million dollars to 19 million dollars; and metallic ores and concentrates from 9 million dollars to 19 million dollars. At the same time, authorizations for the food, feed, and fertilizer group dropped from approximately 348 million dollars for that period of last year to 218 million dollars for the same period this year.

Counterpart funds—local currencies deposited by Governments of participating countries in amounts commensurate with dollar grant aid—played an increasingly important role in the year's program.

In accordance with the mandate of the Congress, the primary objective of MSA counterpart policy in Western Europe has been to advance the defense build-up of NATO countries. The equivalent of more than 568 million dollars in counterpart funds was approved for withdrawal, during the January-October 1952 period, for direct military projects, such as the construction of military bases and harbor installations, the production of aircraft, combat vehicles, ammunition, ships, and other major matériel. This brought the cumulative fig-

ure for military purposes, including approvals under ECA, to approximately 711 million dollars.

MSA also allocated to Defense Materials Procurement Agency the equivalent of 16 million dollars in local currencies from the U.S. portion of counterpart accounts, in the past 5 months alone, for use in procuring strategic materials or to finance projects for the development of their production.

Emphasis on Productivity, Technical Assistance

Focusing more sharply upon Western defense preparations, the MSA productivity and technical-assistance program expanded. In the calendar year 1952, more than 3,600 persons came from Europe to study the causes and effects of American productivity; approximately 275 persons also came from the Far East to study the solution of problems directly applicable to those critical areas, thus bringing the total number of visitors who have come to the United States under the MSA-ECA technical-assistance program since January 1949 to approximately 10,500. In addition the MSA-ECA technical-assistance program has sponsored the sending of more than 1,000 American experts abroad to help European industries increase their productivity and to help all participating countries in Europe and the Far East make better use of existing resources, both human and material.

Defense support was inherent in many MSA technical-assistance projects carried out this past year in such fields as foundry operations, machine tools, electronics and electrical equipment, chemicals, motors and engines, engineering, abrasives, plastics, mining, metallurgy, rubber goods, and production of electric power, gas, and petroleum.

Typical of projects related directly to defense, through which results of American experience were made available to selected representatives of NATO countries, were:

French officials, representing the French Institute of Advanced Studies for National Defense, examined U.S. methods of solving industrial and military problems; Italian naval experts studied U.S. techniques to speed construction of Italian vessels; Danish Army Engineers looked into fuse manufacture; British and Turkish engineers made studies of arms production; British technicians studied methods of overhauling U.S.-made engines used by the RAF; Danish and French experts inquired into production of quartz crystals, vital to manufacture of telecommunications equipment; Belgian paint manufacturers surveyed U.S. methods of protecting military equipment; and French technicians made a study with the view of expanding production of high-grade batteries for French and NATO military transport and telecommunications.

Yugoslavia took part in the technical-assistance program for the first time in 1952, sending 111 trainees to the United States to study methods of

strengthening defense efforts against threats of Communist aggression. The first such project for Trieste also got under way.

Some 64 of 143 major ECA-generated projects in Western Europe went into operation during 1952, providing invaluable basic production capacity for the defense program. These industrial, public utility, and public-works projects, which in some instances also have received supplemental aid from MSA, now are turning out such essential defense items as iron and steel, petroleum products, coal, chemicals, and power.

In electric-power development, eight units in MSA-ECA-sponsored projects were completed, adding more than 500,000 kilowatts to the power capacity of the free world.

Eleven of 16 European petroleum-refinery projects, sponsored by MSA-ECA, were completed and are now operating. Five other units, still under construction in several of these refineries, should be in operation by the end of 1953.

From the 11 operating installations, which have added 433,000 barrels a day to the free nations' crude-oil refining capacity, are flowing gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, diesel oil, fuel oil, and other projects essential to the defense program.

During the past year, MSA approved a total of 22,688,000 dollars in supplemental dollar financing for previously approved major projects. This included 3,952,000 dollars for steel-mill equipment and 800 thousand dollars for a galvanizing line for the Finsider Company plants in Italy; 8,474,000 dollars for equipment for the SOLLAC Company steel mills in France; 500 thousand dollars for iron-mining equipment for the Alpine Montan Company in Austria; and 3,155,000 dollars for a road-building program in Turkey. In addition, a 2,500,000 dollar project was approved for grain handling and storage facilities in Turkey.

Investment-Guaranty Program Expanded

Service to American firms interested in making private investments abroad also was expanded. At year's end MSA had several thousand volunteer field counselors in the United States and overseas to serve American firms. MSA's "Contact Clearinghouse Service," which places prospective U.S. investors in touch with foreign enterprises needing capital or processes, was expanded to cover countries in Southeast Asia and those participating in the Point Four Program.

During 1952, MSA moved ahead on authority granted by the Congress to expand the scope of its investment-guaranty program to include countries of the Near East, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Previously, the agency issued investment guaranties, which insure American private investors against loss by expropriation or currency inconvertibility, only in Marshall Plan countries of Europe.

Under the expanded program, negotiations were begun with several countries for guaranty agree-

ments, which are a prerequisite to issuing guaranties on individual American investments in the given foreign countries. Such agreements, initiating or expanding the program, were concluded by the United States with 11 countries during the year, including the first two in the Far East—the Philippines and China (Formosa)—and the first in a Near East country, Israel.

MSA now has agreements with 13 nations where U.S. investments can be given this protection to cover both expropriation and currency inconvertibility: Austria, Belgium, China (Formosa), Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia. In two other countries, Turkey and the United Kingdom, currency inconvertibility coverage can be issued. Negotiations are going forward with several other countries for agreements.

Six new guaranties and three additions to existing guaranties were issued during the year to investors in such industries as pharmaceuticals, miners' lamps, boiler chemicals, valves, elevators, asphalt tile, and trailers to protect investments in the United Kingdom, Italy, Turkey, Germany, and France.

Up to the end of 1952, MSA-ECA has issued a total of 38,792,248 dollars in investment guaranties, of which 37,489,017 dollars covered currency inconvertibility.

As to over-all agricultural production, the latest crop year showed an increase of 3 percent over the previous year, reaching a level 13 percent higher than prewar. Only in Austria has the total output failed to reach or surpass prewar figures. Production of bread grains and coarse grains was higher than the year before, while output of fats and oils rose substantially. Sugar and potato production was materially higher than prewar.

While production increased, there were at least 2 million more people to feed than the year before. As a result, per capita production showed only a 2 percent gain and just about reached the prewar average.

Despite these over-all gains, Western Europe still is dependent on the rest of the world for 30 percent of its food needs. Higher output is the only basic answer, and the OEEC has raised its goal to an output of 25 to 30 percent over prewar for the 1956-57 crop year.

Defense Support in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, the year witnessed expansion of defense support in Formosa and Indochina while, at the same time, increased economic support and technical assistance helped the two countries build up their strength to resist the threat of Communist aggression.

Defense support in the Associated States of Indochina is helping Indochinese and French troops who are fighting off the Communist Viet Minh attacks. The program in Formosa is de-

signed to strengthen the island fortress home of the Government of the Republic of China, a key part of the free world's defense line in the Pacific. In these two countries, Msa is supplying items to increase munitions output and to expand military facilities.

At the same time, Msa basic economic aid extended to these two countries is being used for the purchase of commodities needed to rehabilitate and revitalize production and to reduce inflationary pressure. In Formosa, Msa has helped the Government to broaden the industrial base by developing the island's hydroelectric resources, increasing the manufacture of chemicals, and expanding the production of coal.

In Indochina, a major Vietnam-Msa program is resettlement of refugees from areas where the Communist Viet Minh are attacking. Land is provided by the Government, with Msa helping to provide emergency housing, food, and seeds.

Programs like these, as well as projects in Thailand and the Philippines, illustrate the Msa programs which combine both technical assistance and complementary commodities where needed. In the Philippines, the Msa program has emphasized projects to implement land, labor, and fiscal reforms and there has been Msa financing of surveys, road building, and health measures for resettlement projects designed to ease agrarian problems in densely populated areas.

In Thailand, where agricultural resources are not fully developed, Msa has been emphasizing projects designed to increase the production of rice for export. There have also been notable advances in the field of public health, with Msa doctors, public-health officials, and nurses demonstrating modern techniques.

Programs in Burma and Indonesia, which were administered by Msa until July 1, 1952, are now being carried on by the Technical Cooperation Administration.

Following are a number of vital goals toward which the Southeast Asia nations are now working with American cooperation:

(1) Improving governmental efficiency through the adoption of new administrative and fiscal procedures, and expansion of civil service training.

(2) Developing and strengthening services and practices essential to social and political stability as well as economic development, such as agricultural extension services; agricultural and small-business credit institutions; public-health systems; agricultural cooperatives; and legislation assuring farm tenants a fair share of production and correcting other land-tenure problems.

(3) Increasing production of rice and corn through irrigation, seed improvement, and wider use of fertilizer, and expanding production of protein food through livestock improvement and

the introduction of modern techniques in the fishing industry.

(4) Increasing production and export of basic materials through improved transportation and port facilities and surveys to determine the extent of natural resources.

(5) Improving their military position, expanding their foreign and internal trade, and quickening the process of national unification through the rehabilitation of ports and inland waterways, construction of roads and bridges, and the improvement of railway operations.

(6) Increasing the productivity of manpower by reducing the incidence of disease through malaria control, helping the establishment and initial operation of health centers and clinics, and training more medical and public-health personnel.

(7) Laying the foundations for future progress by rehabilitating and expanding agricultural and vocational-training systems.

Allocation of Loan to Spain for Economic Development

The Mutual Security Agency on January 8 announced the completion of the allocation of the 62.5 million-dollar loan to Spain which was authorized by the Congress in fiscal year 1951.

The final allocations include an amount of approximately 3 million dollars to provide equipment for the modernization and increased productivity of the Spanish coal-mining industry; 500 thousand dollars for the purchase of steel plate for the construction of an oil tanker, and 150 thousand dollars for expansion of facilities for the preservation and canning of fruits and vegetables.

The various credits under the 62.5 million-dollar loan are making possible economic developments in Spain which will otherwise be limited by foreign-exchange deficiencies and which will increase Spain's capacity to raise its levels of imports and exports, as well as to increase production of goods and services to be made available to the Spanish people.

In addition to the loan program now completed, the Congress has authorized the use of up to 125 million dollars, at the discretion of the President, for military, economic, and technical assistance to Spain. Negotiations leading toward agreements for use of these funds are now under way between the Governments of the United States and Spain.

All credits under the 62.5 million-dollar-loan program were extended by the Export-Import Bank, acting as agent for Msa and its predecessor, ECA. All credits extended to Spain are guaranteed by the Spanish Government.

A large portion of the 62.5 million-dollar U. S. loan, nearly 18.3 million dollars, has been for the purchase of commodities—wheat, cotton,

tin plate, coal, and others—essential to the Spanish economy. Another 16.8 million dollars of the loan has been extended to the transportation and power industries, principally for the import of heavy equipment for railroads and for the construction and extension of power facilities, including a floating power plant to be located at Cartagena.

The credits established for agricultural development, about 13 million dollars in all, including 3.5 million dollars for fertilizer, are designed to provide equipment and materials that will make possible greater agricultural production. About 8 million dollars, including the recent 3 million-dollar credit for coal-mining equipment, will go into improvements in the mining industry. Equipment also will be provided for lead, iron, tungsten, and pyrites mining.

The remaining portion of the 62.5 million-dollar loan has been allocated for import of other important equipment and supplies for Spanish industry for which dollar exchange would otherwise be limited. The principal loan in this group is a 6 million-dollar credit for expansion of a steel mill and construction of a fertilizer plant.

Following is a list of credit (in thousands of dollars) approved by ECA-MSA since the start of the loan program, September 6, 1950:

Capital development

Fertilizer and steel plant	\$8,540
Spanish National railways (Renfe)	8,263
Electric power plants	6,751
Minerals production (including mining equipment)	7,815
Agricultural and seed-processing equipment	3,300
Lignite mining and power-plant equipment	1,706

Commodity assistance

Wheat	\$7,250
Cotton	5,000
Coal	3,500
Fertilizer	3,500
Farm tractors, parts, and attachments	3,450
Tin plate	2,000
Barrel staves	500
Steel plates (for oil tanker)	875

New Manganese Project Undertaken in Brazil

Authorization of an Export-Import Bank loan of up to 67.5 million dollars and signing of a Defense Materials Procurement Agency purchase contract, involving the production of 5½ million tons of high-grade manganese ore from new deposits in Brazil, one of the largest projects of its kind ever undertaken, were announced on January 8 at Washington and at Rio de Janeiro.

The project is to be undertaken by Industria e Comercio de Minerios, S. A., (ICOMI) of Rio de

Janeiro, a Brazilian corporation in which the Bethlehem Steel Company holds partial stock interest. Approximately 4 million dollars has already been invested in exploration and other preparatory work at the mine site.

Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, and Jess Larson, Administrator of DMPA, said that at least 70 percent of the 5½ million tons of ore, production of which will cover a period of several years, is to be offered to the United States. In 1951 the United States used about 1,700,000 tons of manganese, essential in steel production, and it is estimated that consumption was considerably higher last year. Most of the ore has to be imported.

The principal of the credit is to be repaid by December 31, 1965, and it will bear interest at the rate of 4½ percent per annum. The DMPA purchase contract runs to June 30, 1962, but would terminate upon repayment of the loan at an earlier date.

The rich Brazilian deposits are located in the Federal Territory of Amapa about 150 miles northwest of the capital city of Macapa.

The deposits have been tested by core drilling and are estimated to contain upward of 10,000,000 tons of high quality ore, averaging 45 to 47 percent manganese. Mining will be by open-pit methods and the ore, after being crushed and screened at a plant to be built near the mine, will be shipped to the docks on the Amazon River over a railroad which is also yet to be constructed. The railroad will be of standard design and will be 134 miles in length, half in dense tropical jungle and half in open savannah country.

It is expected that large-scale production will get under way by 1956. During that and the following year, the company is to deliver to the U.S. Government, for stockpiling or other defense uses, a total of 400,000 tons of ore. The U.S. Government has an option under the contract on 30 percent of the total output.

In return, DMPA has guaranteed the company a floor price of 65 cents per long-ton unit based on 45-47 percent ore (c.i.f. Eastern Seaboard ports) for any part of the production up to 5½ million tons that the company offers to the U.S. Government. On the basis of estimated future requirements, it is expected that the greater part of the production that is not purchased by the U.S. Government will find a ready market in the United States and other countries of the free world.

In order to produce ore on the scale contemplated, extensive installations will be necessary, including all necessary housing and community facilities for employees, a dock and loading facilities at the Port of Santana, near Macapa on the Amazon River, the railroad from the mine to the port, and mining plants and equipment.

The Port of Santana, where the ore will be transferred from the rail cars to oceangoing ves-

sels for shipment to the United States, will be on the north bank of the Amazon River near its mouth and is squarely on the Equator. Facilities for the rapid loading of large vessels will be installed, as well as docks for the handling of other freight.

Complete towns will have to be constructed, both at the mine and at the port, to house the company's 500 employees and their families. Included in the plans are schools, playgrounds, and hospitals and all other facilities necessary to make living healthful and comfortable in this tropical climate.

Mr. Gaston pointed out that, in addition to providing substantial dollar earnings for Brazil, the project will play an important part in safeguarding the American steel industry from future shortages of this essential alloy.

"The Brazilian Government, under President Getulio Vargas, and the Government of the Territory of Amapa, under Governor Janari Gentil Nuñez," Mr. Gaston said, "have taken an active role in making possible this development which will provide substantial employment at the mine and on the railway and should result in opening up a new area."

Mr. Larson said the new agreement was one of the most significant steps taken to assure adequate future production of materials needed to supply the country's expanding defense program.

Mr. Larson continued:

The friendly country of Brazil, the U.S. Government, defense industries, and the Brazilian company that is undertaking this project should all benefit.

The Defense Materials Procurement Agency has been doing everything possible to boost production of manganese within the continental United States. The Agency has a domestic purchase program and is assisting in a number of research and experimental projects toward this end. But there is no question that the United States will continue to be dependent upon outside sources for the greater part of its manganese needs for a good while to come, if, indeed, it ever can become self-sufficient.

This project has very great potentialities, both with respect to this Nation's defense program and the benefits that automatically go with the development of a big mining operation.

Ten-Year Development Program Proposed for Jamaica

Recommendations for the economic development of Jamaica were published on January 9 in the report of a mission to Jamaica organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Governor of Jamaica. Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank, transmitted the report to the Governor, His Excellency Sir Hugh Foot, on December 19.

The mission, under the leadership of John C. de Wilde of the Bank's staff, was in Jamaica during

March and April 1952. It consisted of seven experts.¹ The two agricultural specialists were selected in consultation with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), which also defrayed a portion of the salary and expenses of one of them.

The mission proposes a 10-year development program aimed at increasing the production of goods and services from a level of £85 million in 1950 to approximately £150 million in 1962. "Timid half-measures," the mission stresses, "will not solve Jamaica's problems of the future. The program must hold the promise of real advance if it is to capture the imagination of the people and command their continuous support and cooperation. . . ."

The program calls for Government expenditures of £34,324,000 over the 10-year period. To allow for the possibility that obstacles may arise, a reduced program has also been drawn up. Under it, public expenditures would be £27,973,000 and production would increase to about £136 million. The mission urges, however, that the maximum program be the goal; if it is carried out, Jamaica would make substantial progress, the mission believes, in solving its chief problems—chronic unemployment and widespread poverty.

Most of the expansion of production and employment the mission foresees will result directly and indirectly from the development of agriculture. "Contrary to widely prevalent belief," the mission states, "we are convinced that the potentialities of agriculture in Jamaica are far from exhausted."

Chief among the recommendations in this field are a vigorous soil-conservation campaign to rebuild the fertility of hill lands; extension of irrigation in the plains and valleys and reclamation of part of the swampland; a pasture-improvement program and a rise in the price of beef to stimulate the growing of livestock; a complete aerial and ground survey as a basis for proper planning of land use and for carrying out essential improvement works; and the taxation of land on the basis of unimproved, rather than improved, value to give additional incentive to development. The mission believes that if these measures are taken it should be possible to put an additional 150,000 acres of land under cultivation and to increase yields significantly. This would permit a substantial increase in the production of beef and milk, sugar, bananas, coffee, cacao, citron, rice, and other food crops.

¹John Hugh Collier, economist; Albert Winsemius, economic adviser on industry; A. D. Spottswood, engineering adviser; Douwe Groenvelde, agricultural economist; W. V. Blewett, adviser on agricultural production; I. M. Labovitz, adviser on social services; and Ann Mary Rozeck, secretary and administrative assistant.

The report of the mission to Jamaica has been published in a single bound volume of 288 pages and may be obtained from the Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 18, Md., for \$5.

Retiring Deputy U.S. Representative on Disarmament Commission Reports to the President

Press release 24 dated January 14

Benjamin V. Cohen, deputy representative of the United States on the U. N. Disarmament Commission, on January 15 presented to the President a report on the work of the U. N. Disarmament Commission and particularly on the "efforts of the United States in close cooperation with other members of the Commission to carry out the mandate of the General Assembly in accordance with the spirit and the principles of the Charter."

Following is the text of a letter, dated January 12, 1953, from Mr. Cohen to the President. A copy of the report is appended.

JANUARY 12, 1953.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

At your request I have served as Deputy United States Representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission and have represented the United States at practically all the meetings of the Commission during the year 1952.

As the work of the Commission for the year is now concluded, I am submitting my resignation both as Deputy Representative on the Commission and as Alternate Representative of the United States to the Seventh Session of the General Assembly to become effective at your earliest convenience.

All of us who have worked on our disarmament proposals have been inspired in our work by the leadership you have taken in this field and by your continuing personal interest and support. We therefore felt that we should at this time make a report to you of the work of the Disarmament Commission and in particular of the efforts of the United States in close cooperation with other members of the Commission to carry out the mandate of the General Assembly in accordance with the spirit and principles of the Charter. The report is appended to this letter.

The statements and proposals which have been made on behalf of the United States in the Commission are the product of the joint efforts of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the United States Mission to the United Nations. The tripartite proposals submitted on behalf of the

United States, France and the United Kingdom represent the joint efforts of all three governments.¹ The cooperation achieved within our Government and with friendly governments has made it possible for us to supply principles and proposals for an effective and comprehensive disarmament which may be realized in the future.

Early in the deliberations of the Commission, the United States submitted a statement of essential principles for a disarmament program. These principles sought to relate the task of disarmament to the law of the Charter and to give effect and meaning to the basic Charter obligation of states to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter. The goal of disarmament therefore must be not to regulate the armaments to be used in war, but to prevent war. To achieve this goal, all states have a responsibility to cooperate to establish and maintain an open and substantially disarmed world. In a substantially disarmed world no state should be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war. In an open world no state should be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other states having knowledge of such preparedness long before the offending state could start a war. An effective disarmament program must reduce the danger of war and the fear of aggression.

But we did not confine our work in the Disarmament Commission to the submission of general principles. We submitted and joined in submitting a number of working papers which sought to suggest practical means and measures by which we might make a start in the development of a concrete and comprehensive disarmament program.

We submitted a working paper containing concrete suggestions for a continuing system of disclosure and verification which would embrace all armed forces and armaments including atomic.

EDITOR'S NOTE. Ambassador Cohen's report is available in full as Department of State publication 4902.

¹ For a summary of proposals made to the Disarmament Commission, see BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 648.

Such a system would provide the ground work for effective safeguards and realistic controls to ensure that agreed disarmament would become actual disarmament.

In collaboration with France and the United Kingdom, we submitted proposals for fixing numerical limits on the armed forces of all states. The proposals, if accepted, would result in a substantial and balanced reduction of armed strength and lessen the likelihood and the danger of war. The initial reduction for the United States and the Soviet Union would be more than 50 percent.

In collaboration with France and the United Kingdom, we suggested practical procedures to prevent the undue concentration of permitted armed forces in particular categories of services, to limit armament in types and quantities to those necessary and appropriate for the support of permitted armed forces, and to bring all essential elements of the disarmament program into balanced relationship. Under these procedures it was contemplated that all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted were to be eliminated, that all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction were to be excluded from permitted armaments, and that atomic energy was to be placed under effective international control to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only.

We reiterated our support of the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy, but at the same time we reaffirmed our willingness to examine seriously and with an open mind any proposal for the effective control of atomic energy which might be presented.

Finally we suggested a plan for the elimination of bacteriological weapons and facilities for their production and use, within the framework of a comprehensive disarmament program. The plan would not rely on mere paper promises that such weapons will not be used, but would ensure that such weapons are not available for use.

We do not contend that the constructive proposals thus far presented to the Commission would solve all problems. The proposals were not intended to be final and definitive in terms or exhaustive in details. They were intended only to provide a basis for discussion and to open avenues by which we might approach understanding and agreement.

No one who has closely followed the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission can doubt that the United States and other free nations have sincerely and diligently sought to find practical ways and means of moving towards a disarmed world. Unfortunately, the Soviet representative on the Commission was unwilling or unable to discuss seriously any of the working papers submitted to the Commission or to make any constructive suggestions. The Soviet representative merely insisted that the Commission adopt the elusive phantom proposals, which the Soviet Union had first made in the General Assembly several years ago

and which had been repeatedly rejected by the General Assembly. Yet he refused to give explanations or answer questions concerning these shadowy and elusive proposals. The Soviet Union endeavored from the very beginning of the Commission's deliberations to divert it from its important tasks by making monstrosly false charges that the United Nations forces in Korea were waging bacteriological warfare. While continuing to reiterate these slanderous charges, the Soviet representative vetoed in the Security Council all efforts on our part to secure an impartial investigation of them.

The Disarmament Commission cannot force disarmament agreements upon recalcitrant nations. It cannot bridge deep and fundamental differences by linguistic sleight of hand. Excessive zeal to obtain agreements which gloss over rather than resolve these differences may even increase the tensions and fears which stand in the way of necessary agreement. Until others are willing to disarm, the free and law-abiding nations of the world must maintain the armed strength necessary to deter aggression.

In spite of the obstructive tactics of the Soviet Union, the work of the Disarmament Commission during the past year contributed significantly to a better understanding of the disarmament problem, and we feel that the United States can take pride in its part in this work.

In the interest of world peace it is important to continue, through the Disarmament Commission and in every other way open to us, efforts to develop a better understanding of the problems of armaments and the significance of disarmament as a means of reducing the danger and fear of war. We are deeply convinced that with better understanding of these problems, the overwhelming common interest of all peoples in peace and the instinct of self-preservation will induce the statesmen of all nations to save their peoples from the horrors of war in the Twentieth Century. For as new instruments of warfare may be developed which would far surpass previous weapons in terms of sheer destructiveness, it becomes imperative that all nations reexamine their self-interest in these problems. All nations have an equal stake in their solution. For at stake is the survival of our common humanity.

Faithfully yours,

BENJAMIN V. COHEN

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE DEPUTY UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE ON THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

JANUARY 12, 1953

Introduction

In view of your deep and active interest in the development of an effective and comprehensive

disarmament program I have thought it would be appropriate for me at this time to make a report to you on the work of the U.N. Disarmament Commission and in particular on the efforts of the United States in close cooperation with other members of the Commission to carry out the mandate of the General Assembly in accordance with the spirit and the principles of the Charter.

The statements and working proposals which have been made on behalf of the United States in the Commission are the product of the joint efforts of the State and Defense Departments, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the United States Mission to the United Nations. The tripartite proposals submitted on behalf of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom represent the joint efforts of all three governments. The cooperation achieved within our government and with friendly governments on the Commission has made it possible for us to supply the ideas and materials with which an effective and comprehensive disarmament program may in the future be wrought.

Our Responsibilities Under the Charter

It may seem paradoxical to many that we should discuss disarmament in the United Nations in 1952, when the nations of the world are increasing their armaments at an accelerated pace.

But the United States has made it clear in the discussions of disarmament in the United Nations that the burden of armaments has been thrust upon us and is not of our choosing. We have learned that in an armed world we cannot safely rely on unarmed good will. But we have made it clear that we would infinitely prefer a world order in which the energies and resources now diverted to armaments could be used to advance human dignity and well-being.

On November 7, 1951, in an address explaining the proposals of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France for the establishment of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, you, Mr. President, stated:²

We are determined to win real peace—peace based on freedom and justice. We will do it the hard way if we must—by going forward, as we are doing now, to make the free world so strong that no would-be aggressor will dare to break the peace. But we will never give up trying for another way to peace—the way of reducing the armaments that make aggression possible.

Five months later, on April 2, 1952, General Eisenhower, then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, in his first report to the NATO countries declared:³

Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic, and moral strength as the Communist world would never dare to challenge.

When that point is reached, the Iron Curtain rulers may finally be willing to participate seriously in disar-

mament negotiations. Then we may see fulfilled the universal hope expressed in the United Nations Charter to reduce the "diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources."

Our position is clear and unequivocal. Until all nations cooperate in good faith in putting into effect a balanced reduction in armed forces and armaments, we must build up and maintain the armed strength of the free world to guard and preserve the peace. But we have shown that we are ready, willing, and eager to work out a comprehensive disarmament program, to reduce the danger of war and the fear of aggression. That is the duty of all member states under the Charter of the United Nations.

Under the Charter, all members have agreed to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. Under the Charter all members have agreed to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The maintenance of large armaments undermines confidence in the fulfillment of the solemn Charter obligations of member states not to use force or the threat of force as an instrument of national or ideological policy.

But the use of force or the threat of force in international relations cannot be eliminated by unilateral disarmament by any one state or group of states. All states must cooperate.

All members of the United Nations have a responsibility to see that force is used only in self-defense and in the service of the Charter and not as an instrument of national or ideological policy.

Disarmament must be viewed as a means of carrying out the obligations under the Charter not to use force or the threat of force for settling disputes among nations. The objective of a disarmament program must be to prevent war, not to regulate the armaments used in war. We have tried to make clear that the United States does not accept war as inevitable; that the job is to reduce the likelihood of war by insuring that no nation possesses the means to commit a successful act of armed aggression. The aim is to reduce the likelihood of war by reducing the possibility of war and armed aggression.

In its efforts toward disarmament, the United States has concentrated single-mindedly on the root problem, the prevention of war itself. When men fight to kill it is hard to regulate the manner of killing. True humanitarianism as well as realism supports the view that the only practical way to eliminate the horror of war is to eliminate war itself.

That of course does not mean that we are uninterested in examining the rules for the conduct of war or in finding better ways to protect civilians

² *Ibid.*, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 799.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 579.

and prisoners should war occur. But in developing a disarmament program we must strive, not to codify the rules of warfare but to reduce the possibility of war.

Responsible statesmen cannot rely upon paper promises which provide no assurances of their observance. We cannot make genuine progress toward disarmament by piecemeal attempts to forbid the use of individual weapons without safeguards designed to give assurance that such weapons will not be available for use. We have, therefore, urged in the United Nations that efforts be directed toward a comprehensive disarmament program which will insure that nations do not retain in their military establishment armed forces and armaments in types or in volume beyond those required for self-defense and to meet their Charter responsibilities. Forces and weapons not expressly permitted should be eliminated under effective international safeguards sufficient to remove the possibility and fear of prohibited forces or armaments being available for use.

The most solemn promise in the history of international relationships is that contained in the Charter against the threat or use of force of any kind in any way in international relations contrary to the purposes of the Charter. A disarmament program should provide the safeguards necessary to assure that no state will be in a position to break this solemn promise. No lesser promise can be relied upon if that most solemn promise is broken. A state which would flout the Charter to make war cannot be relied upon to honor any lesser promise as to how it will wage war.

This is the framework within which we have undertaken in the Disarmament Commission our Charter responsibility "for formulating plans . . . for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Early Efforts Toward Disarmament

At the time the Charter was adopted, Nazi and Japanese aggression had been crushed. We looked forward to a peaceful world. We sought to cooperate to relieve the peoples of the world of the fear of war and the burden of armaments.

Relying on the good faith of the Soviet Union and its promises to fulfill its Charter and treaty obligations, we demobilized our armed forces.

We did even more. Less than a year after the momentous discovery by the United States of the war potential of the atom, we proposed that the United Nations undertake to develop an effective plan for the international control of atomic energy which would insure its use for peaceful purposes only. Within the same year the United States presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission the basic principles of a constructive plan for the effective international control of this new force which would make possible and encourage its use by all nations for peaceful pur-

poses. These principles with minor modifications were accepted as a working basis by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 1946, and a plan based on these principles received the overwhelming endorsement of the Assembly in 1948. The plan may not be perfect. Possibly it can be improved upon. But we can be very proud of the part we have played in working out the U.N. plan for the control of atomic energy. We are confident this plan could do the job of controlling effectively the atomic weapon and other related weapons as well, since its contemplated procedures actually encompass the entire field of atomic energy.

In 1946, when we first suggested the basic principles of the plan, we had hoped that if general agreement could first be reached on a plan for the effective international control of this new force of atomic energy, with its tremendous possibilities for good or for evil, then, in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and good will, agreement on the other essential parts of a comprehensive disarmament program would not be difficult of accomplishment. That was the reason why we thought in the early days of the disarmament discussions in the United Nations it would be better not to merge the discussions of conventional armaments with the discussions of atomic-energy control.

In the Commission for Conventional Armaments the United States, France, and the United Kingdom placed great stress on the development of a system for the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments. We believed then, as we believe now, that such procedures generate mutual confidence necessary for any program of guaranteed disarmament. If disarmament is to be considered seriously and not merely as an instrument of propaganda, statesmen responsible for the peace and security of their countries cannot rely on paper promises to disarm, but must have assured means of knowing that promises made are kept.

Unfortunately our hope that progress in the field of atomic energy would stimulate progress in the field of conventional arms proved unfounded. Progress was stalled at a dead center in both commissions. In the Atomic Energy Commission the Soviet Union rejected the control features of the plan which had been developed on the basis of the U.S. proposals and itself presented no acceptable alternative. In the Conventional Armaments Commission the Soviet Union rejected the proposals for a system for the disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments because it did not include atomic armaments. In an effort to break this deadlock, at the fifth session of the General Assembly you, Mr. President, suggested a new approach to the task of disarmament by merging the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. As you recall, our hope was that the valuable preliminary work done in both fields could

be preserved and that the new framework might be helpful in meeting the objections of the Soviet Union.

Disarmament Resolution of January 11, 1952

At the sixth session of the General Assembly, the United Kingdom, France, and the United States joined in proposals to set up a new commission with a broad mandate to develop comprehensive and coordinated plans for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments including atomic. To pave the way for fresh efforts to reach realistic agreements, the proposals stressed the fact that a genuine system for disarmament must include all kinds of armed forces and armaments, must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system, and must include safeguards which will insure compliance by all nations.

By an overwhelming vote on January 11, 1952, the sixth General Assembly passed a resolution based on the proposals of the three Governments.⁴ The resolution established a Disarmament Commission, composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada, and directed the Commission to prepare draft proposals to be embodied in a treaty or treaties for submission to a conference of all states, concerning—

(1) regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;

(2) elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

(3) effective international control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, with the present U.N. plan being used as the basis for the Commission's considerations until a better or no less effective plan were devised;

(4) progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic, the implementation of such a scheme being recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament program;

(5) methods for fixing over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and armaments, and for determining the allocation within their respective military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments;

(6) the establishment of an international control organ (or organs) to insure the implementation of the treaty or treaties; and

(7) an adequate system of safeguards to insure observance of the disarmament program.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507.

The Disarmament Commission

As a member of the Disarmament Commission, the United States has put forward every effort to carry out the mandate of the General Assembly. The United States, individually and in collaboration with France and the United Kingdom, has placed before the Disarmament Commission working papers and proposals which we believe provide a working basis and broad outline for a practical and comprehensive disarmament program. In the development and consideration of these proposals we had constructive assistance and cooperation from all members of the Commission with the exception of the Soviet Union. It might be illuminating to review the principal suggestions we made in the Disarmament Commission.

Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program

On April 24, 1952, the United States introduced a paper setting forth what we considered "Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program" (DC/20, pp. 83-84). It represented an attempt to clarify and agree on objectives and principles which we believed should guide the Disarmament Commission in developing the details of a comprehensive disarmament program.

We were influenced to present these principles and objectives at the outset because of the insistence of the Soviet Union that we could make no progress until we took certain decisions on principles. The Soviet representative had argued in the Commission, as the Soviets have argued in past General Assemblies, that the United States was opposed to any general reduction in armed forces and armaments because the United States was unwilling to accept the Soviet proposals that immediate decisions should be taken to reduce by one-third the armed strength of the great powers and to prohibit the use of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The record is clear that the United States is dedicated to the goal of significantly reducing armaments and effectively eliminating atomic weapons from the world's arsenals. The United States rejected the Soviet proposals for the same reasons which caused the General Assembly repeatedly to reject them, because they are not contrived to achieve a balanced reduction in armed strength or to provide safeguards which would insure their observance. In fact, they would clearly result in a dangerous imbalance of strength in favor of the Soviet Union and other states having mass armed forces. We were confident that our statement of principles would clearly demonstrate that the United States actively favors a truly balanced reduction in over-all armed strength, which would include the elimination of mass armed forces as well as all weapons of mass destruction. What we are opposed to is paper agreements, or paper decisions, which pro-

vide no tangible safeguards or assurances of their observance.

Responsible nations cannot morally or legally bind themselves to disarm on the basis of a decision in principle or on the basis of paper promises and without adequate and unequivocal safeguards to protect them from the hazards of violations and evasions. But if there could be agreement in advance on the objectives and principles which should govern a comprehensive and coordinated disarmament program, such agreement should greatly simplify the main and primary task of agreeing on specific and practical measures for arms reductions and eliminations, and concrete and workable safeguards to carry out these principles and objectives.

With this hope of facilitating the work of the Commission, the United States submitted its paper on Essential Principles for a Disarmament Program.

For the most part these principles, summarized below, derive from the Charter and the resolutions of the General Assembly.

1. The goal of disarmament is not to regulate the armaments to be used in war but to prevent war by relaxing the tensions and fears created by armaments and by making war inherently, as it is constitutionally under the Charter, impossible as a means of settling disputes between nations.

2. To achieve this goal, all states must cooperate to establish an open and substantially disarmed world,

- (a) in which armed forces and armaments will be reduced to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no state will be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war, and
- (b) in which no state will be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other states having knowledge of such preparations long before an offending state could start a war.

This principle of an open and substantially disarmed world stems from the fourth freedom, freedom from fear, which President Roosevelt proclaimed in 1941. It was President Roosevelt himself who translated freedom from fear in world terms to mean "a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world."

If we want a disarmed world we must insist that all states refrain from the use of force or the threat of force as an instrument of national or ideological policy. An effective disarmament program must be conceived with a determination to strengthen the peace and reduce the possibility of war, not as a haggling process to determine the kinds of arms which may be used in the next war or to gain a strategic advantage at the start

of the next war or to reduce the costs of preparing for war. If we want to make progress toward disarmament, states must come to rely for their strength, as for their welfare, not on the number of battalions or weapons they have ready to unleash on a moment's notice, but on the health, happiness, and economic efficiency of their people in peacetime.

The other four principles which we enumerated in our paper refer to the nature of the international agreements necessary to progress toward the disarmament goals mentioned in our first two principles.

3. These international agreements must bind all states to reduce their armed forces to levels and restrict their armaments to types and quantities no more or greater than may be necessary for the maintenance of internal order and the fulfillment of their obligations to maintain peace and security in accordance with the Charter.

4. These international agreements must provide a comprehensive and coordinate disarmament program, balanced throughout the process of reduction so as to avoid any disequilibrium of power dangerous to the peace and envisaging the progressive and concurrent elimination of mass armed forces and all instruments adaptable to mass destruction, including atomic and bacteriological.

5. These international agreements must provide effective safeguards to insure that all phases of the disarmament program are carried out. In particular, the elimination of atomic weapons must be accomplished by an effective system of international control of atomic energy to insure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes only.

6. The safeguards provided in these international agreements must include an effective system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments including atomic, to achieve the open world in which alone there can be effective disarmament.

We not only outlined the principles and objectives of a comprehensive disarmament program. We submitted a number of working papers making concrete suggestions as to how they could be carried out in practice.

System of Disclosure and Verification of All Armed Forces and Armaments

The General Assembly resolution had directed the Disarmament Commission to consider from the outset plans for progressive disclosure and verification, the implementation of which was recognized as a first and indispensable step in carrying out the disarmament program envisaged by the resolution. In order to assist the Commission in complying with this directive, the United States submitted to the Commission on April 5, 1952, a working paper containing "Proposals for

Progressive and Continuing Disclosure and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments." (DC/20, pp. 30-42.)

A system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification is, as the General Assembly has declared, an essential part of any plan for "guaranteed disarmament." Such a system is necessary to provide the basis for effective safeguards and realistic controls to insure that agreed disarmament becomes actual disarmament.

The system of disclosure and verification suggested in the U.S. working paper is continuing, progressive, and complete and would provide advance warning against violations, under competent international control. The system covers all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic from the very start.

We suggested that disclosure and verification should be carried out progressively, step by step. We suggested the system should proceed by stages not because we wanted to proceed at a snail's pace but because we know that in the present state of world tension no state would tear the veil of secrecy from its most carefully guarded security arrangements unless it could be satisfied that all states are proceeding with the same good faith and the same understanding and at the same pace. The concept of stages is introduced not to delay and obstruct but to facilitate and expedite progress and to establish confidence.

Our paper suggested five stages in all, each stage to follow when the previous stage has been satisfactorily completed. This concept of stages was intended to protect all states in the event of a serious violation or collapse of the program by providing a check on the good faith of other states. The disclosure and verification system, we believe, should proceed from the less secret to the more secret information, both to prevent premature disclosure of more secret information until substantial cooperation and good faith had been demonstrated through the working of the previous stage, and also because the less secret information can be more readily verified. We sought to provide that the information disclosed in the atomic field at successive stages should be approximately parallel to the information disclosed in the nonatomic field.

We have tried to make the first step in both fields a meaningful stride toward the goal of confidence. The first stage would disclose in breadth, although not in depth, the general contours of the military establishments of all nations. And the first stage includes so much information of a quantitative nature that the disclosures in the atomic field, for example, would give a clear indication of existing atomic strength—our own and that of other countries. That first stage calls for a verified report on the existing strength of all armed forces as well as on the location of installations and facilities required for the production of armaments of all types, including atomic.

The successful completion of this first stage would do more to inspire international confidence and reduce tensions than any amount of words could ever accomplish.

The second stage would provide detailed information on the organization of armed forces and on the installations and facilities supplying the basic materials required to produce all armaments, including atomic. The third stage would give detailed information on armaments (except novel armaments which were not in general use by the end of World War II but are volume production today), as well as detailed disclosure of kinds and amounts of fissionable material, and full data on the operation of installations and facilities which produce armaments and fissionable material. The fourth stage would give information in detail concerning the installations and facilities used to produce novel armaments, including atomic weapons. And the fifth stage would provide detailed disclosure of the novel armaments themselves and of atomic weapons.

The Soviet representative in the Disarmament Commission refused to give serious attention to our working paper on disclosure and verification and at the same time failed to submit any alternative proposals of his own to carry out the directions of the General Assembly that plans for disclosure and verification be considered from the outset. The Soviet representative characterized our effort to develop a workable system of disclosure and verification as a gigantic intelligence and espionage operation bearing no relation to disarmament. It is true, of course, that states have become so accustomed to living in the dark that they have become suspicious of the light. But it is truly impossible to see how, in our imperfect world, we can make real progress toward disarmament so long as the Soviet Union is unwilling even to consider means of moving toward agreement on a workable, continuing, progressive process of disclosure and verification. Responsible governments cannot be expected to agree to cut down their own defenses unless through an effective disclosure and verification process they are reliably informed as to where such cuts will in fact leave them in relation to the armed forces of other countries.

The Soviet representative on the Commission also criticized our proposals on the ground that the atomic disclosures were relegated to a remote and indefinite stage. Actually there is a considerable amount of atomic disclosure in the very first stage. But the Soviet representative seemed more concerned to find reasons for rejecting our proposals than to open up any avenues for possible agreement.

We recognized that there might be differences as to the stages and the speed with which the program passes from one stage to another. We contemplated that as soon as one stage was finished the next would begin. We believed that, with

genuine cooperation on the part of all states, all the stages could be completed within 2 years. The purpose of providing stages was to facilitate the process by creating confidence. In order that there be mutual confidence, there must be disclosure by degrees so that all nations are free of the fear that one nation is getting more knowledge than another or that the process is in any way inequitable.

We tried, in submitting the plan, to make clear that it was a working paper, that we were open to suggestion, and that we wanted to find out what sort of safeguards we could collectively devise. We tried to make it clear that the proposed system of disclosure and verification was not intended to exclude or delay reductions in armed forces and armaments or eliminations of weapons adaptable to mass destruction, but on the contrary was intended to provide the necessary ground work for such reductions and eliminations.

Ceilings on All Armed Forces

On May 28, 1952, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France submitted to the Disarmament Commission proposals suggesting the fixing of numerical limits on all armed forces of all states. (DC/20, pp. 125-130.)

The tripartite working paper of May 28 made clear that we are prepared to grapple earnestly and sincerely not only with the problems of safeguards but with substantive measures to secure drastic and balanced reductions in armed strength.

The tripartite working paper of May 28 dealt with one of the essential parts, in some ways the most important part, of a comprehensive disarmament program: the manpower strength of the armed forces.

A nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its armed strength. Other elements must be dealt with in any comprehensive disarmament program. But aggressors are not likely to go to war without the armed forces necessary to insure the successful accomplishment of their aggressive purposes. All armaments depend upon manpower, and their effectiveness in varying degrees is affected by the armed forces available to use them. A substantial and balanced reduction of armed forces should greatly lessen the likelihood and fear of war. If even tentative agreement could be reached on the ceilings to be placed on permitted armed forces, we felt that would greatly facilitate efforts to agree on reducing and restricting the quantities and types of permitted armaments.

Our tripartite working paper suggested fixed numerical ceilings on the armed forces of the United States, the U.S.S.R., China, the United Kingdom, and France. As a basis for discussion, it proposed equal maximum ceilings of between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 for the United States, the U.S.S.R., and China and equal maximum ceilings of between 700,000 and 800,000 for the United

Kingdom and France. The reductions proposed were substantial and balanced. They sought to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace in the relations of the great powers among themselves or with other states, and thus to reduce the danger of war. The reductions for the United States, and we assumed, for the U.S.S.R. and China would be well over 50 percent. We felt if that could be secured there would be less likelihood of any powerful country's being in a position where others would fear its readiness for war or its capability for a surprise attack.

The tripartite working paper also suggested that there should be agreed maximum ceilings for all other states having substantial armed forces which should be fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. The ceilings would be fixed in these cases also with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. We contemplated that the ceilings would normally be less than one percent of the population and would normally be less than the current levels. But we recognized that there would be special cases requiring different treatment and that there is no one automatic formula which can be rigidly applied in all cases. The basic objective must be the avoidance of any imbalance of power dangerous to the peace.

Many of the present difficulties both in Europe and in Asia spring from an imbalance of armed strength which causes some nations to feel they live only by leave or grace of their more powerful and none too friendly neighbors. If a balanced reduction of arms is to reduce both the fear and danger of aggression it must take into account the balance of armed strength of the most powerful states not only in relation to one another but also in relation to their neighbors.

The numerical limitations proposed were flexible and were not intended to be final or exhaustive. They were offered not as fixed limitations but as tentative standards to serve as a basis for discussion and negotiation.

These proposals stressed one of our fundamental objectives in the disarmament field. We would eliminate as far as possible the danger of resort to war by reducing the practicability of successful aggression. Genuine enforcement of agreed levels of armaments would prevent excessive concentrations of military power which endanger peace and security.

We believed our proposals to be eminently fair and deserving of study. It was a great disappointment to us that the Soviet representative in the Disarmament Commission gave them scant consideration and denounced them as cynical and hypocritical. The Soviet representative also criticized and misrepresented them on the ground that they did not deal with the distribution of the permitted armed forces among the various services

nor provide for the limitation of armaments and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. He ignored the fact that our working paper and our statements in the Commission made clear that our paper was intended to deal with only one aspect of a comprehensive disarmament program and that the other essential components which he mentioned were to be dealt with before we concluded our work. But unfortunately the Soviet representative again showed more concern to find reasons for rejecting our proposals than to find possible avenues toward agreement.

Distribution of Armed Forces and Limitations on Types and Quantities of Armaments

On August 12, 1952, the United States again joined with France and the United Kingdom in submitting a tripartite supplement to the tripartite working paper on ceilings for the armed forces. (DC/20, pp. 162-164.)

In this supplement we proposed to prevent undue concentration of the permitted armed forces in particular categories of service and to limit armaments in types and quantities to those necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed forces. We suggested practical procedures to facilitate the development of mutually agreed programs to accomplish these purposes and to bring all essential components of these programs into balanced relationship.

We specifically suggested that if our proposals for fixing numerical limitations on all armed forces were accepted and the powers principally concerned were prepared to undertake in good faith serious negotiations looking toward their implementation, arrangements might be made for a conference of the Five Great Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council with a view of reaching tentative agreement among themselves by negotiation on—

(a) the distribution by principal categories of the armed forces that they would consider necessary and appropriate to maintain within the agreed ceilings proposed for their armed forces;

(b) the types and quantities of armaments which they would consider necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed forces within the proposed numerical ceilings;

(c) the elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being understood that all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction should be eliminated and atomic energy should be placed under effective international control to insure its use for peaceful purposes only.

We further proposed that following a Five Power conference, regional conferences might be held attended by all governments and authorities having substantial military forces in the respective regions. In light of the tentative agreement

reached by the Five Great Powers, the regional conference would endeavor to reach similar tentative agreement on the above-mentioned subjects, including agreement on the over-all numerical ceilings for the armed forces of all governments and authorities in the region.

We proposed that all these agreements should be incorporated in a draft treaty comprehending and bringing into balanced relationship all essential components of the disarmament program.

In our paper we recognized that the needs and responsibilities of states are different. Considerable flexibility in negotiation would be necessary to obtain concrete and satisfactory results. The important thing is to obtain the greatest practicable reduction in armed forces and armaments in order to reduce the danger and fear of war, bearing in mind the necessity of avoiding, throughout the process of reduction, any serious imbalance or disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any part of the world.

In order to clarify the concept of balanced relationship between the essential components of a comprehensive disarmament program, the tripartite supplement suggested that the timing and coordination of the reductions, prohibitions, and eliminations should insure that there would be balanced reductions of over-all armed strength at all stages throughout the disarmament process until the agreed limits are reached. In particular, the initial limitations or reductions in armed forces and in permitted armaments should commence at the same time as the first steps toward the elimination of prohibited armaments, with synchronization throughout the process. The elimination of prohibited armaments would cover the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, whatever their nature, including the elimination of atomic weapons as the result of an effective system of international control of atomic energy. In order to oversee the job, the tripartite supplement proposed that an international control authority should be established at the commencement of the program, assuming progressively its functions to insure the carrying out of these limitations, reductions, curtailments, and prohibitions.

This concept of synchronization throughout the disarmament process is necessarily stated in general terms, for the details depend upon working out the specific reduction process in each field. Of course the United States, France, and the United Kingdom do not seek to gain any advantage, imagined or real, which might give the preponderance of military power to the West at the expense of other powers.

The synchronization of the disarmament process must be designed to further the concept of balanced reduction which avoids a disequilibrium of power. It applies to atomic weapons, to artillery, to bacteriological weapons, to mass armies.

In this context, as throughout the entire pro-

gram, effective and balanced disarmament must be viewed as a means of reducing the danger and fear of war, not as a bargaining process to obtain strategic advantages in event of war.

Unfortunately, the Soviet representative on the Disarmament Commission refused to accept the tripartite working paper with the supplement, even as a basis of discussion.

International Control of Atomic Energy

The United States has always considered that a system for the effective international control of atomic energy is an indispensable component of any disarmament program.

The United States took a leading part in developing the U.N. plan for the control of atomic energy. That plan was the product of thorough study in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission. It was approved by an overwhelming vote in the General Assembly. It should be reiterated that the U.N. plan would provide for elimination and prohibition, through effective international control procedures, of all the various types of weapons based on the release of atomic energy, and the plan's references to control of atomic energy should be read throughout in that light.

The General Assembly at its last session directed the Disarmament Commission to use the U.N. plan as the basis of the Commission's deliberations until a better or no less effective plan is devised. The General Assembly further directed the Commission to consider any proposals regarding atomic-energy control which might be submitted to it.

The United States has continued to support the U.N. atomic-energy plan as the best plan presently available. But we made it clear in the Disarmament Commission that in no sense do we regard the plan as immutable and incapable of change and improvement. The United States reaffirmed its willingness to examine seriously and with an open mind any proposals for atomic control which might be presented.

We did more. In our working paper proposing a continuing and progressive system of disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments, the United States expressly included atomic armaments. The system of disclosure and verification proposed lays the ground work for continuing inspection. Other elements of control are of course very important and necessary in the field, but any plan must include a process of continuing inspection. Any international system for the control of atomic energy, whatever its nature, must involve extensive disclosure and verification as part of a process of continuing inspection.

The Soviet Union has rejected the U.N. atomic-energy plan but has proposed no acceptable alternative. It has objected particularly to the ownership and other control features of the U.N. plan, contending that control should involve only

continuing inspection. But in the Disarmament Commission the Soviet Union has refused to explain in any detail the kind of continuing inspection plan which would be acceptable to it, and it was unwilling even to consider our suggestions for continuing disclosure and verification in the atomic field or any other field.

The concept of disclosure and verification which includes continuing inspection provides an indispensable first step in laying the ground work for any control plan in the atomic field. Until the Soviet Union is willing to consider this concept little progress can be made toward determining what other elements of control, those contained in the U.N. plan or others, may be necessary. We are interested in controls not for the sake of controls nor as an end in itself. We are interested in controls as a necessary means for effectively eliminating atomic weapons from national arsenals.

Elimination of Weapons Adaptable to Mass Destruction, Including Bacteriological Weapons

The United States made clear in the Disarmament Commission that in its view a comprehensive disarmament program should include not only the effective international control of atomic energy to insure the elimination of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only but the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, including bacteriological weapons. This position we reiterated in our proposal on essential principles and in both the tripartite proposal and supplement.

Beginning with the very first meeting of the Disarmament Commission in New York the Soviet Union sought to poison the atmosphere of the Commission and obscure the clear and unequivocal position of the United States on this subject by making false and sensational charges that U.S. troops were conducting germ warfare in Korea and China. The Soviet Union sought to leave the false impression that the United States was opposing any effort in the United Nations to devise ways and means of eliminating bacteriological weapons as a part of a disarmament program.

The monstrously false charges regarding the use of germ warfare in Korea and China, which were completely irrelevant to the disarmament discussions, were categorically denied by the Unified Command and by the highest U.S. officials. The United States invited the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate the charges. But the North Korean authorities and the Chinese Communist authorities ignored the offer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to make an investigation. When the United States sought to have the Security Council request the Red Cross to make such investigation, the Soviet Union vetoed the proposal.

On August 15, 1952, I made in the Disarmament Commission a statement fully explaining the position of the United States on bacteriological

disarmament and in particular on the adequacy of the Geneva protocol as a means of securing bacteriological disarmament. I tried to make clear our conviction that the objectives of the protocol could not be more worthy or laudable, *but*—and this cannot be repeated too often—that the protocol does not provide security against the manufacture, the stockpiling, and the use of bacteriological weapons. The Soviet representative placed great stress on the Geneva protocol in the Disarmament Commission, and it was brought to the attention of the seventh General Assembly in the item introduced by the Polish representative, which as of this writing has not yet been considered. It might be useful to repeat here certain portions of my statement of August 15 to the Disarmament Commission.⁵

In the U.S. statement of August 15 we outlined a proposal for the elimination of bacteriological weapons and facilities for their production which could be made effective as part of a comprehensive program, a plan which would not merely prohibit the use of bacteriological weapons but would provide assurance and safeguards that such weapons would not be available for use. On September 4, 1952, the United States presented a summary of these proposals as a working paper to the Commission (DC/20, pp. 191-192).

The plan we suggested for the elimination of bacteriological weapons and facilities for their production is inseparably connected with an effective and continuous system of disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments such as we have proposed. Such a comprehensive system of disclosure and verification would lay the necessary ground work for the elimination of germ weapons and facilities for their use and production, within the framework of a comprehensive disarmament program. It may be true that there are no theoretically foolproof safeguards which would prevent the concoction of some deadly germs in an apothecary's shop in the dark hours of night. But when the United States proposed the establishment of safeguards to insure the elimination of germ warfare along with the elimination of mass armed forces and all weapons adaptable to mass destruction, we sought what is possible and practical, not the impossible. Bacteriological weapons to be effective in modern warfare would require more than the dropping at random of a few infected spiders, flies, or fleas. They would require industrial establishments, facilities for maintaining agents, transport containers, and disseminating appliances. Such arrangements and facilities will not readily escape detection under an effective, comprehensive, and continuous system of disclosure and verification which the General Assembly has declared to be a necessary

prerequisite of any comprehensive disarmament program.

We therefore proposed in our working paper of September 4 that at appropriate stages in an effective system of disclosure and verification agreed measures should become effective providing for the progressive curtailment of production, the progressive dismantling of plants, and the progressive destruction of stockpiles of bacteriological weapons and related appliances. Under this program, with cooperation in good faith by the principal states concerned, all bacteriological weapons and all facilities connected therewith could be eliminated from national armaments and thus not only their use but their very existence prohibited.

If we wish to achieve effective disarmament and to reduce the danger and fear of war we must not be content with paper promises not to use weapons of mass destruction. Such promises would only give to treaty-breaking aggressors their choice of weapons. We must see to it that prohibited weapons are not available for use.

The "Phantom" Proposals of the Soviet Union

At the seventh session of the General Assembly the Polish delegation reintroduced the proposals which the Soviet delegation presented to the sixth General Assembly and which that Assembly referred to the Disarmament Commission. These same proposals had been submitted by the Soviet Union to previous assemblies, which refused to accept them, and in the Disarmament Commission the Soviet Union failed to elaborate their proposals or to offer any new arguments in support of them.

The Soviet proposals may be described as "phantom" or "ghost" proposals because like ghosts they constantly appear and reappear, but one can never catch hold of them. They are shadowy and elusive, and it is impossible to state precisely just what they are or are intended to be. They call upon the Five Great Powers to reduce their armed forces within one year by one-third and to submit full data on their armaments. They call for immediate adoption of a decision on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of strict international control over the observance of that decision by all states, with the right of the international control organ to conduct inspection on a continuing basis but not to interfere in the domestic affairs of states.

Now inasmuch as no data whatsoever are forthcoming until these decisions are taken, states cannot determine in advance how the reductions which are supposed to be made will leave them in relation to the armed strength of other states. Nor has the Soviet Union ever sought to explain how the simple one-third reduction would be applied to all the complicated components which make up

⁵ For text of Mr. Cohen's statement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 25, 1952, p. 294.

the armed strength of a nation. On their face, the proposals would perpetuate and not remove any imbalance of power which now exists and no machinery is provided for the implementation of even the vague promises called for in the proposals.

Since the proposals call for the prohibition of the atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and only a one-third reduction in conventional armaments, the proposals would in fact enormously increase the relative armed strength of states with large mass armies. The proposals run counter to the basic principles of a balanced reduction in armaments. Certainly the Soviet Union would object if we reversed their proposals and called upon the Soviet Union and all other states to abolish immediately all armed forces and nonatomic armaments, and to reduce existing stocks of atomic weapons by one-third.

While the proposals profess to recognize the necessity of an international control organ's having some control over their observance, the Soviet Union has refused not only in the Assembly but in the Disarmament Commission to discuss any concrete measures of international control. While insisting that a U.N. control organ must not interfere in domestic affairs, the Soviet Union has refused to explain what it means by interference in domestic affairs. It has branded any effort on our part to work out a system of disclosure and verification as an intelligence and espionage operation, despite the fact that the General Assembly has declared that such a system is a prerequisite to any program of guaranteed disarmament. It was impossible in the Disarmament Commission to prevail upon the Soviet representative to explain what the Soviet proposals for strict international control meant.

A few instances from the record of the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission will serve to illustrate the evasiveness of the Soviet representative in giving any explanation of the "phantom" Soviet proposals.

On April 4, the representative of France requested the Soviet representative to clarify two points: First, the meaning of the proposal that prohibition and establishment of control should come into effect simultaneously—Did it mean that prohibition began the day agreements were signed, or when the control organ was actually in a position to operate? And, second, the precise implications of the proposal that the international control organ undertake "continuous inspection" *but* "without interference in the domestic affairs of States"—in other words what constitutes continuous control, and how is it to be limited so as not to interfere in domestic affairs?

The Soviet representative replied that the purpose of the questions "is to obscure these concrete proposals, since they are abundantly clear to any objective person who has long been acquainted with them and since there is nothing obscure about

them. They can only be obscure to someone who does not wish to understand them, is opposing the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and for this purpose is still, as before, finding various pretexts."

The Soviet representative then stated that non-interference was self-explanatory—he termed it "a very clear and precise formulation"—and that simultaneous prohibition and control was also self-explanatory, meaning that the two would be introduced simultaneously. (DC/C.1/PV.1, pp. 4, 5, 24, 25, 26.)

At the meeting on April 9 the representative of the United Kingdom asked if the "decision to announce the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of controls" meant a broad agreement that an organ would be set up, or that a detailed plan for operations, specifying rights and duties of the organ and of states, will have been at that stage accepted by the governments and written into the decision. Regarding the question of interference in domestic affairs, he cited the uniquely restrictive attitude of the U.S.S.R. toward what free societies consider normal practices and asked for a precise understanding of the Soviet proviso. He asked for an unequivocal statement of the Soviet Union's attitude on this point which we could then discuss dispassionately and objectively.

At the same meeting the representative of Canada repeated the questions his delegation had asked the Soviet representative at the sixth General Assembly, in order to secure the clarification of the Soviet proposals which had not been furnished at that time.

In answering these questions, the Soviet representative repeated in substance Mr. Vyshinsky's reply at the sixth Assembly to the same questions. He said the questions showed "some conspiracy among delegations not willing to discuss the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the question of control." He went on to say, "The raising of these questions was in itself a device to avoid discussion of the substance of the U.S.S.R. proposals. . . . in order to obscure the issue, they bombarded the Soviet Union delegation with questions. That same device is being repeated now. Instead of a definite discussion of the clear-cut U.S.S.R. proposals, artificial questions are being asked. . . ." He called it playing at questions and answers.

And at the same meeting, we ourselves asked the Soviet representative to state clearly his conception of international control. We asked if the Soviet control proposal contemplated national or international ownership of fissionable material, and national or international ownership, operation, and management of facilities producing dangerous quantities of fissionable material. Would the international control organ have the right to station inspectors continuously at any particular installation? Could inspectors be sent wherever

and whenever the control organ considered it necessary? Could the control organ "interfere" with the freedom of a state so far as might be necessary to insure that there was no possible evasion or violation?

In reply, the Soviet representative stated it was necessary to agree on principles before replying to our questions. As long as we did not abandon the U.N. plan, there was no point in discussing a system of inspection on a continuing basis. As he said, "This is the fundamental issue, and until we get beyond it there is no point in discussing details of the how, why, and wherefore. . . . Until we clear up this basic question, until we reach agreement on it, there is no point in considering the details."

Similarly, he insisted there must be agreement on a "decision" to prohibit atomic weapons before "discussing details and particular points." (DC/C.1/PV.2, pp. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 30, 31, 35, 36.)

On May 8 the representative of France made one more attempt. He asked for a yes or no answer to the question of whether by "continuing inspection" the Soviet representative actually meant that international inspectors could be stationed day and night in all atomic-energy establishments, at all stages of production, so that we are assured that at no stage of production can any quantity of fissionable material, however small, be diverted for the clandestine manufacture of bombs.

The Soviet representative replied, "When the United States and France . . . are prepared to withdraw this obsolete, unacceptable, and worthless proposal"—meaning the U.N. plan—"then I shall be prepared to give a concrete explanation of how we think control and continuing inspection should be carried out. As long as our approach to the question remains so utterly different, there is no need for me to give any details." (DC/C.1/PV.4, pp. 28, 33.)

At the meeting on May 14 the representative of the United Kingdom tried again, asking the same questions, hoping, as he said, to convince the Soviet delegation that its position was genuinely obscure. The Soviet representative replied as before. "The details," he said, "can and should only be discussed when we have reached agreement on the system to be adopted." Until such time as the U.N. plan is abandoned, he said, "it is futile to discuss the details of a system of control on a permanent basis. It would be so much idle talk. That is how the matter stands on this question." (DC/C.1/PV.6, pp. 6, 12.)

There were other attempts by members of the Commission to elicit some reasoned explanation of the Soviet proposals. They were all met the same way. The vague and unexplained slogans which constitute the Soviet proposals must be accepted before any details could be given.

The Soviet proposals remain, as they have always been "phantom" proposals, elusive shadows without substance.

Conclusion

Despite the lack of progress toward agreement among the Great Powers on disarmament, we must not be discouraged.

The United States and other members of the Disarmament Commission worked hard to secure a better understanding of the problems which must be met if we are to move toward a disarmed world free from the danger and fear of war. The constructive proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission during the past year make a significant contribution to the better understanding of these problems.

We do not contend that the constructive proposals thus far presented to the Commission would solve all the problems. They were not intended to be final and definitive in terms or complete and exhaustive in details. They were intended only to provide the basis for discussion and to open up avenues by which we might approach understanding and agreement. To keep the road to understanding and agreement open to new approaches, we sought to avoid freezing our positions or taking inflexible stands.

As the Secretary of State of the United States stated in his opening address in the general debate:⁶

. . . disarmament cannot be achieved unilaterally. It cannot be achieved by denunciation in a battle of epithets. It can be achieved only by international agreements under effective safeguards which will protect law-abiding states from the hazards of violations and evasions.

The Disarmament Commission cannot force disarmament agreements upon recalcitrant states. It cannot bridge deep and fundamental differences by linguistic sleight of hand. Excessive zeal to obtain agreements which gloss over rather than resolve these differences may even increase the tensions and fears which stand in the way of necessary understanding.

In the interest of world peace it is important to continue, through the Disarmament Commission and in every other way open to us, efforts to develop a better understanding of the problems of armaments, and the significance of disarmament as a means of reducing the danger and fears of war. There is reason to believe that with the development of better understanding of these problems the overwhelming common interest of all peoples in peace and the instinct of self-preservation will induce the statesmen of all nations to save their peoples from the horrors of war in the twentieth century. For as new instruments of warfare may be developed which would far surpass previous weapons in terms of sheer destructiveness, it becomes imperative that all nations reexamine their self-interest in these problems. All nations have an equal stake in their solution. For at stake is the survival of our common humanity.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 639.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FIFTY-THIRD REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1-15, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2875
Transmitted December 19, 1952

I herewith submit report number 53 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 September 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1359-1373 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

On each of the first three days of September, Liaison Officers at both sides met, and the Communists delivered a letter from their Senior Delegate addressed to the United Nations Command Senior Delegate. These letters were based on United Nations Command news reports of three incidents, occurring at United Nations Command Prisoner of War Camps, in which two prisoners were killed and twenty-eight were wounded. In each letter the Communists charged the United Nations Command with barbarous and inhumane treatment of prisoners, lodged a stereotyped protest, and threatened serious consequences. No reply was made to these letters which were obviously designed to further enemy propaganda purposes.

On 4 September, the Delegations reconvened for another fruitless session. The Communist opened with an abusive and insulting statement which contributed nothing toward solving the question of disposition of those Communist prisoners who have stated their determination to forcibly resist repatriation. In response to the Communist charge that the United Nations Command was lying about the number of its war prisoners who were unwilling to return to their homes, the United Nations Command Senior Delegate recalled the standing, and often repeated offers of

the United Nations Command to permit the Communists to verify the attitude of those prisoners. In a careful summary of the situation he reminded the Communists of the devastation resulting in North Korea because of their refusal to conclude an Armistice, and pointed out the fact that the number of Communist casualties suffered during the delay in reaching an Armistice over the issue of voluntary repatriation, equalled or exceeded the number of those prisoners at issue. Contrasting the striking disadvantages of continuing the conflict with acceptance of the reasonable proposals of the United Nations Command, he seriously questioned the Communist desire for an Armistice. He emphasized the inhumanity and illogic of the stubborn Communist insistence upon the return of all prisoners. He called attention to the fact that by thus prolonging the conflict the Communists callously imposed needless sacrifices on the North Koreans and clearly exposed the hypocrisy of their propaganda utterances. He ended his address by repeating the offer to conclude an Armistice promptly upon Communist agreement to return about 12,000 captured United Nations Command personnel in exchange for 83,000 Communist personnel who are not opposed to repatriation. He then proposed a recess until 12 September unless the Communists were prepared to exchange lists of prisoners to be repatriated.

In his customary, repetitious manner the Communist Senior Delegate then made an answering statement in which he rehashed all his earlier false accusations and threats. Reaching new heights of mendacity seldom attained by even practiced Communist spokesmen, he charged the United Nations Command with the purpose of reducing Korea to a colony so as to invade China and instigate a world war, and attributed the United Nations action in the case of Korea to greed for war profits on the part of a few war-mongers and munitions merchants. He obstinately adhered to his demand for the return of all war prisoners, and without adding the slightest note of progress, abruptly agreed to recess for another week.

Following this meeting there were no further developments until 11 September when the Liaison Officers held a meeting. The Communists introduced two new Liaison Officers. United Nations Command Liaison Officers then accepted a letter of protest charging the United Nations Command with "persecuting to death" a prisoner who had committed suicide by hanging.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on Dec. 19. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668; the 48th report, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 795; the 49th report, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 883; the 50th report, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958; the 51st and 52d reports, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034.

On 12 September, the Delegations of both sides reconvened in a session that made no progress whatever, and resulted solely in agreement to recess again until 20 September. There was no noteworthy variation in the pattern followed at this meeting which was nearly an exact duplicate of earlier meetings.

On 15 September, Liaison Officers held a meeting at which the Communists protested an alleged violation of the conference site. They charged the United Nations Command with scattering slanderous leaflets in the area and provocations against their military police. This charge is under investigation. In a formal letter of protest, similar to earlier letters, the Communist Senior Delegate noted news reports of the death of one, and wounding of seven Communist prisoners in a United Nations Command Prisoner of War Camp incident. United Nations Command Liaison Officers then delivered a letter from the United Nations Command Senior Delegate requesting immediate action on the part of the Senior Communist Delegate to properly mark, or furnish correct locations of Communist Prisoner of War Camps Numbers 12 and 14, which United Nations Command photo reconnaissance revealed to be not in accordance with Communist-furnished information.

Following a detailed, standard plan for all of the United Nations Command prisoner of war camps, construction improvements and winterization preparations continued on a large scale. The transfer of responsibility for prisoner of war installations from Eighth Army to the newly created Korean Communications Zone proceeded smoothly without any break in the continuity of administration and control.

From the decrease in the number of incidents of violence and the growing evidence of obedience and cooperation throughout pro-Communist Prisoner of War Camps, it appears that efforts to contest the control of camp authorities have been suspended, at least temporarily. Of particular interest has been the attitude of the Communist Armistice Delegation in attempting to propagandize on isolated incidents which the United Nations Command has openly and promptly released to the public. Unable to cope with a free press and apparently realizing that their propaganda efforts have become less and less effective, the Communists have resorted to writing a separate letter of protest based on each United Nations Command news release concerning violence in prisoner of war camps. The general temper of these slanderous documents makes them unworthy of reply.

United Nations Command ground forces found the enemy increasingly active after a three day lull occasioned by a tropical storm. This increased Communist aggressiveness was demonstrated by a series of determined local attacks aimed at seizing disputed territory on the western, central and eastern fronts. During the night of 6-7 September, the enemy unleashed a series of attacks against several United Nations Command outposts on each of the three fighting fronts. These unusually intensive efforts met with initial successes only on the central front and even these limited gains were later partially negated by United Nations Command counter-attacks. Hostile artillery and mortar fire reached the highest volume yet employed in the Korean conflict with

43,531 rounds falling across the battle line in a single day on 7 September. On at least two separate occasions in the Yulsa area upwards of 18,000 rounds of artillery and mortar were fired in support of local Communist attacks. The daily average for the entire front amounted to a new high of approximately 12,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. In addition to repulsing numerous enemy probes and intercepting their patrols, United Nations Command forces conducted many raids. The small task forces involved generally endeavored to pierce the hostile counter-reconnaissance screen or make the enemy disclose his defensive positions. The only significant change in front line deployment of hostile forces occurred on the eastern front where a North Korean division was replaced, on a normal rotation basis, by another division formerly in reserve.

The western front was highlighted by repeated enemy attacks against a well-defended United Nations Command outpost southeast of Punji. The aforementioned position is the same one which ably repelled numerous hostile attacks during the latter part of August. The first of the recent attacks occurred on the night of 4-5 September and was estimated to be of battalion size. In conjunction with this attack the enemy hit another United Nations Command outpost four miles east of Punji with a reinforced company. Both of these attempts were repulsed with heavy loss to the attackers. Again on 6-7 September the enemy unleashed five artillery and mortar-supported attacks against United Nations Command elements in the Hungwang-Punji area. Of these attacks, an eight-hour battalion strength thrust proved outstanding. This effort, as did all others on the western front, terminated in an enemy withdrawal.

On the central front action centered in the Yulsa sector where the enemy succeeded initially in forcing United Nations Command forces to relinquish two hill positions. It was during the fighting for possession of these positions that the enemy employed an unprecedented volume of artillery and mortar fire in support of local objective attacks within a limited area. The enemy began his attacks against the two hill positions southeast of Yulsa on 6-7 September. United Nations Command elements, although forced to relinquish both positions, immediately launched several counter-attacks which ended in failure as a result of the determination of the defenders and their previously unequalled volume of supporting fires. One of these positions, a mile and a half southeast of Yulsa, was the scene of a bitter battle that ended with the enemy still in possession after two days of close-in fighting. United Nations Command elements succeeded in retaking the position on 9 September, only to relinquish it again later in the afternoon to a sharp and determined Communist counter-attack. On 14 September, the hostile defenders were again forced to give up the position to United Nations Command attacking elements. This seizure initiated another furious struggle for the possession of the hill. The renewed battle which followed consisted of several attacks and counter-attacks in which the strong point changed hands several times. At the close of the period the enemy was entrenched on the hill with the final outcome of the contest still in doubt. Three thousand yards to the east the other disputed outpost

was retaken, after several unsuccessful attempts, by United Nations Command elements on 8 September. Here also an enemy attack again forced a slight United Nations Command withdrawal later the same day. On 9 September, a United Nations Command counter-attack carried to the top of the hill and during the next two days four company-strength hostile attacks were repulsed with the assistance of heavy defensive fires by United Nations Command artillery. The enemy made another bid, his strongest, to retake this position on 13 September when he committed a battalion to the task. This attack failed after a firefight of nearly four hours' duration and at the close of the period this position remained firmly in the possession of United Nations Command elements.

On the eastern front two enemy companies struck a United Nations Command outpost three miles southwest of Tupo on 6 September. The hostile force remained engaged for two and one-half hours before retiring after a futile effort. Earlier the same day a smaller but extremely aggressive enemy force assaulted another United Nations Command outpost four miles southeast of Tupo. In the ensuing fight which lasted nine hours, United Nations Command defenders withdrew slightly only to counter-attack and recapture the lost territory after inflicting heavy losses on the Communist aggressors. Activity in other sectors remained comparatively light with the usual daily patrol contacts and small nightly probes initiated by hostile reconnaissance groups.

With the end of the rainy season, weather for the next several months will be suitable for major ground operations. As yet there is no substantial indication that the Communists will utilize the improved weather conditions for launching a ground offensive. However, this more favorable weather has already been reflected by an increase in the enemy's vehicular traffic over recent levels which were reduced as a result of heavy rains. The increased trafficability of Communist supply routes will facilitate the replenishment of any category of supplies in the forward areas which may have been temporarily reduced during the height of the wet weather. The unprecedented increase during this period in the hostile expenditure of artillery and mortar ammunition serves to clearly portray the enemy's favorable logistical position in regards to these essential items. The advent of better weather also witnessed an increase in the number and intensity of local enemy attacks. This more aggressive attitude by hostile elements is not considered as preliminary to an imminent offensive as evidenced by the enemy's failure to exploit initial gains where made. The enemy's interest in the terrain features which were attacked during the period stems from the defensive suitability of these positions or results from the recent seizure of several of them by United Nations Command elements.

United Nations Command naval jet and propeller driven aircraft operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan ranged over North Korea striking pre-briefed targets and targets of opportunity from the bomblines to the Manchurian border. Strikes were launched almost daily against enemy transportation facilities; supply and troop concentration centers; factories, buildings, and warehouses of military significance. Three full-effort

strikes were launched during this period. The first was a joint Navy-Air Force strike against military targets in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang; the second was at the targets within visual distance of the Manchurian border against the Musan iron mines and ore concentrating plants, and the synthetic oil refinery at Aoji; and the third at barracks, troop concentrations, and other targets in the Hoeryong area. Smoke caused by exploding fuel tanks and burning buildings prevented accurate assessment of results of the Pyongyang and Musan-Aoji strikes. Pilot claims in the Hoeryong strike include destruction of many barracks and warehouses, with extensive damage to a pulp plant, a vehicle parking and supply area, ammunition and gunpowder storage area, two locomotives and a number of railroad cars, and a railroad station. Attacks continued during this period against hydroelectric plants, transformer stations, and industrial plants. Attacks on interdiction targets resulted in numerous rail cuts, destruction or damage to railroad and highway bridges, locomotives, railroad cars, trucks and boats. Close support sorties were flown in direct support of front line troops.

United Nations Command land and carrier-based naval aircraft operating on the Korean west coast conducted offensive strikes against enemy installations as far north as Kangso in the Chinnampo area; in the Hwanghai Province, and in support of front line troops. Attacks continued against enemy transportation facilities, gun positions, supply and storage areas, troop concentrations, transformer stations, warehouses and buildings of military significance, small boats, junks, and sampans. On two occasions MIG-15's were engaged by United Nations Command conventional fighters. In one engagement a MIG-15 was shot down in the vicinity of the friendly island of Sokto.

Shore-based naval aircraft provided friendly front line units with close air support, and flew strike and reconnaissance sorties deep into enemy territory. These sorties resulted in destruction or damage to numerous gun and mortar positions, bunkers, personnel and supply shelters, warehouses, railroad cars, railroad and highway bridges, and rail and road cuts. Numerous personnel and troop casualties were also inflicted.

Patrol planes conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and Tsushima Straits. They also flew anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the bomblines to Chongjin with surface units making day and night coastal patrols firing on key targets along the coastal main supply route daily to maintain rail cuts, bridge cuts and blocked tunnels at several points. The enemy was denied the use of the coastal waters for shipping, and fishing was curtailed. All craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore. Enemy coastal movements were kept under surveillance. Naval gunfire accounted for destruction or damage to a number of locomotives, railroad cars, trucks, railroad and highway bridges, and sampans, also numerous rail cuts, tunnel blocks and personnel casualties were reported. Other targets destroyed or damaged included

gun positions, bunkers, troop concentrations, industrial buildings, power plants, observation posts, and supply areas.

Navy Task Elements at the east coast bomblines patrolled the area north to Wonsan daily and provided gun-fire support on call from the front line troops. Shore batteries were engaged and silenced in many instances, and shore fire control parties reported destruction and damage to guns, mortars, bunkers, and personnel shelters, and numerous enemy troop casualties.

Typhoon Mary following in the wake of typhoon Karen caused high seas that tore enemy mines loose from their moorings. As a result many more mines than usual were sighted and destroyed, particularly in the Wonsan area.

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels along the Korean east coast. Many ships received near misses. While delivering call fire at the bomblines, one ship was hit by an enemy shore battery causing minor structural damage and one personnel casualty. Damage to the ship was superficial and her operational readiness was not impaired. Another ship, while on routine patrol north of Tanchon, received near misses which resulted in slight shrapnel damage; however, no personnel casualties were reported and the ship continued her patrol. In many cases minesweepers and motor torpedo boats, operating close to the shore, received machine guns and small arms fire. There were no reports of damage or casualties. In all cases the ships effectively suppressed the enemy shore battery fire.

United Nations Command surface units on the Korean west coast manned anti-invasion stations along the coast from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Daylight firing into enemy positions destroyed gun positions, communications and transportation facilities, supply build-ups and troop concentrations. Patrols were made nightly, and mainland positions opposite friendly islands were illuminated to deter any enemy attack plans.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United Nations Command forces in minesweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, coastal areas and anchorages free of mines of all types. Enemy fishing sampans were dispersed and driven ashore when encountered during sweeping operations.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation ships, and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces.

The first two weeks of September were marked by swift air battles between United Nations Command interceptor aircraft and enemy MIG-15's on all but five days. During these engagements, United Nations Command pilots destroyed a total of thirty-eight MIG aircraft and damaged thirty-seven enemy jets. Other claims against the Russian-built jets were withheld pending assessment of gun camera film.

On 1 September, the United Nations Command interceptors engaged twenty-eight MIG aircraft and were able

to damage two of them before the MIGs escaped to their sanctuary across the river in Manchuria. Weather closed in until 4 September, when the United Nations Command pilots reported sighting 110 MIGs over North Korea. In a series of engagements, United Nations Command pilots accounted for a total of twelve MIGs destroyed and three damaged. Eight of the MIGs exploded in the air, and only two pilots were observed to bail out. On the next day, one MIG spun in without a shot being fired by United Nations Command aircraft. A United Nations Command interceptor received minor damage as a result of a mid-air collision with a crippled enemy jet.

On only two occasions were the enemy aircraft able to penetrate the interceptor screen to attack the fighter bombers operating deep in enemy territory. On one occasion, MIGs attacked the United Nations Command fighter bombers while they were on their bomb run. In this encounter, six MIGs were destroyed and nine damaged.

The medium bombers dealt two smashing blows to hydro-electric installations in North Korea. The first of these took place on 4 September, just after typhoon Mary passed through Korea, against the Chosen No. 1 plant which the Communist forces had been trying to repair.

On 12 September, the medium bombers attacked the Suiho hydro-electric plant which was also undergoing intensive repair. Strike photography showed good patterns and hits on important facilities, but complete assessment of damage is not yet available. This plant had been under close surveillance by reconnaissance aircraft ever since the fighter bomber attack of 23 June 1952.

Other targets for the medium bombers included a 2,500 acre supply center near Yangdok, which was hit by the medium bombers for the first time on 8 September. A large manufacturing and supply storage area in the northeast section of Pyongyang was also bombed with 145 buildings reported destroyed. The supply center at Sopo-ri was attacked on 9 September, and observers reported good coverage of the target area.

The medium bombers also flew along the front line in close support of ground troops. Seven missions of this type were flown on the night of 12-13 September. In addition, leaflets designed to weaken the morale of North Korean civilians and enemy troops were dropped.

On 5 September, fighter bomber aircraft concentrated on destruction of targets at a mine and industrial center northeast of Kunu-ri, where eight separate target areas were hit. Claims from this action and other targets scattered through North Korea included destruction of military buildings, warehouses, railroad cars, supply dumps, and completion of several rail and highway cuts.

Other strikes of the jet and propeller-driven fighter bombers were carried out against a troop billeting area south of Yonan, a military academy at Sakehu, mining facilities and supply storage areas at Kunu-ri and supply buildings at Sibyon-ni, Singye and Namchonjom. They scored rail cuts at Sinanju, hit a rail and bridge complex south of Kanggye in North Central Korea and cut rail lines between Pyongyang and Sukchon.

The fighter bombers struck at supply stockpiles near the front lines and set off five secondary explosions at a hidden ammunition dump near Kumsong. Claims on these and other general support sorties during the period

included destruction at many bunkers, gun positions, military buildings, and numerous casualties among enemy troops.

In night and day attacks, United Nations Command light bombers hit military targets at Kangdong and in the Kyomipo and Sariwon areas. They struck a troop concentration and supply area near Sihyon-ni and also attacked military supplies north of Chorwon and troops in the Yonan area.

In attacks on interdiction targets the light bombers cratered highway junctions in the Sinmak, Ichon, Suan and Singosan areas. The light bombers continued the practice of patrolling the main supply routes after night attacks on supply targets. They utilized small fragmentation bombs to create temporary road blocks to slow Communist vehicles until fighter bombers on first-light missions could make their attacks.

On 12 September, in a continuation of the policy of warning civilians when military targets near populated areas were scheduled for attack, a loudspeaker aircraft warned the people of Sohung, seventy-five miles northwest of Seoul, that military targets in the area would be destroyed. Within thirty minutes light bombers poured bombs into military supply targets at that point.

Combat cargo transports continued to fly logistical sorties, airlifting supplies and personnel in support of United Nations Command operations in Korea.

Reports from refugees fleeing Communist tyranny indicate that United Nations Command warnings to North Korean civilians to avoid military targets are gratefully received, but that officials of the Communist police state are taking stringent measures to prevent these humanitarian messages reaching the people. In addition to warnings of a general nature, warnings to specific areas in which military targets are located were broadcast as much as thirty minutes in advance of bombing attacks. By means of news leaflets and news broadcasts, the United Nations Command continued efforts to penetrate the barrier of censorship and to combat Communist distortion with factual information. A large portion of this information concerned developments at Panmunjom, reiterating United Nations sincere desires to achieve a realistic Armistice and explaining the nature of the problem which blocks agreement.

Rear Admiral B. Hall Hanlon, United States Navy, on 30 August was appointed Commander in Chief, United Nations Command representative on the Combined Economic Board, vice Major General Thomas W. Herren. The Combined Economic Board consists of representatives of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea Government, as provided in the Agreement on Economic Co-ordination between the Unified Command and the Republic of Korea signed 24 May 1952. General Herren, Commanding General, Korean Communications Zone, retains over-all responsibility for United Nations Command civil affairs activities in Korea. Admiral Hanlon has been appointed his Deputy for Civil Affairs. The Korean Communications Zone was established in July to relieve the Commanding General, Eighth Army, of logistical and territorial responsibilities not immediately related to the conduct of combat operations in Korea. All United Nations Command civil affairs ac-

tivities in Korea, including relationships with the Republic of Korea Government and administration of the United Nations Command civilian relief and economic aid program are, therefore, in the sphere of responsibilities of the Commanding General, Korean Communications Zone.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Southeast Asia, South Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting (ICAO)

The Department of State announced on January 12 (press release 14) that under the auspices of the Air Navigation Commission of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Second Southeast Asia and limited Second South Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting will convene at Melbourne on January 13. The U. S. delegation to this meeting will be as follows:

Delegate

Henry S. Chandler, Chief, International Standards Branch, Airways Operations Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Special assistant to the chairman

Evan J. Lewis, Chief Adviser, CAA International Field Office, Bangkok, Thailand

Alternate delegates

Gilbert V. Tribbett, Icao Adviser, Air Carrier Safety Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

James F. Angier, International Air Ground Aids Specialist, Establishment Engineering Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Edmond V. Shores, Aeronautical Telecommunications Specialist, Airways Operations Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Gordon D. Cartwright, Meteorologist-in-Charge, Pacific Supervisory Office, U.S. Weather Bureau, (Honolulu), Department of Commerce

Hugh H. McFarland, Regional Icao Representative, Airways Operations Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Clement Vaughn, Commander, U.S.C.G., Search and Rescue Agency, U.S.C.G., Department of the Treasury

Advisers

E. Thomas Burnard, Operations Division, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

William B. Hawthorne, Chief, Technical Section, Aviation Division, Federal Communications Commission

Grove C. Johnson, Lt. Col., U.S.A.F., Flight Operations Division, Director of Operations, Department of the Air Force

Winton E. Modin, Communications Specialist, Pan American Airways, Aeronautical Radio, Inc.

Frank G. Raysbrook, Capt. U.S.N., Office of Director of Naval Communications, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy

Charles A. Stiefelmaier, Lt., U.S.N. Aviation Meteorological Adviser, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy

Secretary of the delegation

Charles S. Millet, Consul, American Consulate, Melbourne, Australia

At the forthcoming meeting, participants will discuss matters of air navigation in: (a) the Southeast Asia region, which for the purpose of the meeting will include the western part of New Guinea and that part of Australia in which international air routes of the Southeast Asia region terminate; and (b) that part of the South Pacific region lying west and southwest of Hawaii.

Delegates will review the existing ICAO facilities plan for the regions and prepare any necessary amendments to the plan with reference to such subjects as: (1) aerodromes, air routes, and ground aids; (2) communications facilities and services; (3) meteorological facilities and services; (4) the provision and operation of search and rescue facilities and services. In this connection the participants will list and evaluate, in the light of their effect on operations, all known and particularly serious deficiencies in the provision of facilities and services necessary to the efficiency, regularity, and safety of air transport.

Special attention will be given to the item "Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Services (AFTS) including preparation of a long-term plan for the region," since Southeast Asia and the South Pacific are the only areas for which an AFTS long-term plan has not been prepared. The meeting will also consider the proposed air route Perth-Cocos Island-Mauritius-Johannesburg, which lies in the African-Indian Ocean region.

Inland Transport Committee (ECAFE)

The Department of State announced on January 16 (press release 31) that at the second session of the Inland Transport Committee of the U. N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which will be held at Bandoeng, Indonesia, January 19-23, the U. S. delegate will be Anthony Bisgood, Chief of the Industrial Division of the Special Technical Economic Mission, Bangkok. Lubert Sanderhoff, Second Secretary and Consul, American Embassy, Djakarta, will serve as adviser to the U. S. delegate.

In 1951, at its seventh session, ECAFE decided to establish an Inland Transport Committee as a means of furthering regional cooperation in the development and improvement of rail, highway, and water-transport facilities. The Committee was directed to serve in a consultative and advisory capacity in the field of inland transport in Asia and the Far East; to provide a forum for discussion among governments of inland-transport subjects; to stimulate the development of inland transport in the region; and to promote agreements between governments on long-term inland-transport policy for the area. At the same session, ECAFE decided to establish a railway subcommittee and also authorized the Inland Transport Committee to set up subcommittees on highways and inland waterways to consider and examine problems essentially concerning these means of transport. The first session of the Sub-

committee on Highways was held at Bangkok, August 18-23, 1952.

Mr. Bisgood, assisted by Mr. Sanderhoff, is also representing the United States at the first sessions of the Subcommittees on Railways and Inland Waterways of the Inland Transport Committee, which are being held at Bandoeng, January 14-17.

During the forthcoming session of the Inland Transport Committee, participants will review reports and recommendations submitted by the three subcommittees, determine the work program and priorities for 1953, discuss the coordination of transport in the region, survey library services and facilities, and prepare the Committee's report for submission to ECAFE.

Restrictive Business Practices (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on January 12 (press release 15) that on that date the fourth session of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Restrictive Business Practices of the U. N. Economic and Social Council would convene at New York. The U. S. Government, at this session is represented by the following delegation:

Representative

Corwin D. Edwards, Director, Bureau of Industrial Economics, Federal Trade Commission

Adviser

Raymond Vernon, Deputy Director, Office of Economic Defense and Trade Policy, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

Since its establishment by the Economic and Social Council in 1951, the Committee has made considerable progress in drafting an international agreement, for possible submission to governments, looking toward the prevention of restrictive business practices which have harmful effects on the expansion of production or on international trade.

At the present meeting, final discussions will be held on the Committee's proposals for such an agreement, which must be submitted to the Economic and Social Council by March 1953. The principal remaining questions concern the recommendations which the *Ad Hoc* Committee will make to the Economic and Social Council regarding the internal structure of an international body to administer the proposed agreement. The United States is a member of the Economic and Social Council and will be in a position to discuss this matter further at the next session of the Council. The Committee will also consider its report on restrictive business practices and legislative or other measures adopted by various countries to counteract them.

The United States in the United Nations

A regular feature, will be resumed in a subsequent issue.

Secretary Acheson's Farewell to His Colleagues

Press release 32 dated January 16

Secretary Acheson in an informal ceremony, on January 16, bade farewell to the employees of the Department and the Foreign Service. The occasion was the presentation, by the employees of the Department and the Foreign Service, to Mr. Acheson of the chair which he occupied at Cabinet meetings at the White House. The Secretary was introduced by Robert J. Ryan, Assistant Chief, Division of Foreign Service Personnel. Mr. Acheson's remarks together with those of Mr. Ryan follow:

Mr. Ryan's Introductory Remarks

Mr. Secretary and Mrs. Acheson: The employees of the Department and the Foreign Service are very proud of your many and outstanding achievements.

Your high sense of duty, your statesmanship, your courage, your patience, and your fortitude have been an inspiration to all of us.

You, sir, are a true public servant.

As you take your leave of the Office of the Secretary of State, may we express to you our thanks and sincere appreciation for your leadership and support. Our most sincere wish, sir, is that the years ahead will bring every happiness to you and your family.

Mr. Secretary, this chair is the chair which you occupied during your tenure as a member of President Truman's Cabinet. It is a great privilege and honor, on behalf of the employees of the Department and the Foreign Service, to present it to you as a small token of our esteem and affection.

Secretary Acheson's Reply

Mr. Ryan, and my very dear friends: I am more deeply touched than I will be able to tell you this morning at what Mr. Ryan has said, and the fact that you should have wished to make me the gift of this chair, and that so many of you should have come here this morning to say goodbye to me.

I hope that I can see many of you again this afternoon. My door will be open, and I should be delighted to shake hands with any and all of my friends from the Department who find it possible to come in to see me.

This chair will be a gift which I shall treasure

through my life. I think I can say of my Cabinet chair what the Supreme Court of the United States said of something quite different. The Supreme Court in one of its cases, referring to this quite dissimilar object, said: "It is not a place of rest or final destination."

I have simply not found in this chair a place of rest.

There were occasions when it seemed likely that it might be my place of final destination.

I shall treasure it because it will bring to my mind every time I look at it two memories which are very dear to me. It was in this chair that I have sat for four crucial, tumultuous, and strenuous years at the right hand of my Chief.

It was in this chair that I have sought to bring him all the help and support and loyalty of which I am capable. And it is sitting there that I have received from him that unswerving support and loyalty without which no one in my position can ever hope truly to serve his country. So it will bring him very close to my mind when I see it.

But it is also in this chair that I have attempted to lay before him the distillation of all your work and all your wisdom and all your experience because no Secretary of State by himself can possibly be of help to the President of the United States, which he can be if he acts as the agent through whom your help goes to your President, and that is what I have tried to do.

And through the long years in which we have been friends and companions in the same length, I have grown every day to know more and more that you are a part of a great and goodly company which stretches back through the years to the very beginning of our Nation and that today, as always, there is here that devotion to country, that loyalty to your work, that wisdom which is so necessary for our country.

Yours is not an easy task nor one which is much appreciated. You don't ask much of your fellow citizens, and if any of you are so inexperienced that you ever do, you receive very little. Certainly not much in the way of material recompense; certainly not very much in the form of appreciation of your work, because you are dealing with matters which, though they affect the life of every citizen of this country intimately, do it in ways which it is not easy for every citizen to understand.

And so you are dealing in a field which I called the other day a field of "alien knowledge," which seems strange to many of your fellow citizens.

One thing I think you are entitled to ask, and, again, if you have not received that you are entitled to ask that you should not be vilified; that your loyalty should not be brought in doubt; that slanders and libel should not be made against you.

You know, and I know, all of us are aware, that in the times in which we live there is a security problem before our country. We know that that is a problem which must be dealt with wisely and

justly and quietly by people who are expert in dealing with it. It cannot be made the mere adjunct of something of which it is not a part. And I believe that the difficulties through which you have been will be temporary difficulties because they are not in tune with the great traditions of American life.

We have traditions here in the United States about the Government. One which grows out of our early history sometimes makes our life a little uncomfortable. In the early days of our country, government was conceived as something alien and something which threatened the liberties of the citizen. Therefore, we have a tradition in this country of skepticism about government, of looking at it very carefully, of seeing whether our public servants can take it.

That isn't always comfortable, but, on the whole, it is good. Any time when there are governments in the world which are dedicated to crush the liberties of the citizens, it is good that in this great country people look with some skepticism upon government as such. That is one of our traditions.

But we have another, and I think far deeper, tradition and that is the tradition of public service. I should like to mention only two people who are compatriots of ours, who have worked in the field in which you and I have worked. One of them, before our country was a nation, worked in the field of foreign affairs: Benjamin Franklin—one of the first ambassadors this Nation ever had and who served it abroad before it was a nation. The other, a very great and illustrious predecessor of mine, to whom I feel often very close indeed, is John Quincy Adams, a peppery old fellow to be sure. But he, like Benjamin Franklin, never for one moment believed that the holding of office was a question of power—it was a question of service.

And both of those men, and other men who have served in important positions, and thousands of people who have served less prominently, have been motivated by that same deep tradition of public service. It is only by that that a democracy, a republic such as ours, can live. And it will live, and this Department will continue, as it has throughout its history, to be honored by those whose honoring is really worth while, and probably abused by those whose abuse is unimportant.

In saying one last word to you I should like to put it in the words of farewell which appear almost as our language began to appear. You will find it in Bunyan's *Pilgrims' Progress* and there another met with his friends to say good-bye, and he said to them: "My sword I give to him who shall follow in my pilgrimage. My courage and skill I give to him who can take it. My marks and scars I carry with me to bear witness for me that I have fought his battles who will be my rewarder."

Thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Resignation of Secretary Acheson

White House press release dated January 16

The President has sent the following letter to Dean Acheson, accepting his resignation as Secretary of State:

DEAR DEAN:

I have your letter of resignation, effective at the end of my term, January 20, 1953, and I accept it with warm thanks for a job well done. I am glad I've had you with me all the way.

You have been my good right hand. There is no need for me to go into detail about all that you have accomplished. Certainly no man is more responsible than you for pulling together the people of the free world, and strengthening their will and their determination to be strong and free.

I would place you among the very greatest of the Secretaries of State this country has had. Neither Jefferson nor Seward showed more cool courage and steadfast judgment.

Our association has been a grand experience, from start to finish. I hope Mrs. Acheson prevails on you to take a good long rest. You deserve it.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Following is the text of Secretary Acheson's letter to the President:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I hereby present my resignation as Secretary of State effective at the end of your Presidential term and request your acceptance of it.

In presenting my resignation, Mr. President, may I express my gratitude to you for the confidence you have placed in me, for your unwavering support and for the great kindness which you have always shown me. You have given me the honor of serving my country under a leader who has had and has my full devotion and respect.

May rest and happiness and peace be yours for years to come.

Respectfully,

DEAN ACHESON

Resignations

David K. E. Bruce

On January 13, 1953, President Truman accepted the resignation of David K. E. Bruce as Under Secretary of State and as U.S. Alternate Governor of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. For the texts of Mr. Bruce's letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release of January 13, 1953.

Edward G. Miller, Jr.

Edward G. Miller, Jr., as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, effective December 31, 1952.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Ambassador Locke Resigns

Press release 917 dated December 12

In commenting on the resignation of Ambassador Locke as U.S. representative on the Advisory Commission of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and as the Secretary of State's special representative in the Near East to coordinate economic and technical-assistance programs, which was announced on December 12, Secretary Acheson stated that he greatly appreciated the contributions made by Ambassador Locke in furthering our programs in the Near East. The Secretary understands that Mr. Locke is returning to private business following his year of service with the Department.

The text of Ambassador Locke's letter of resignation as the Secretary's special representative follows:¹

DECEMBER 10, 1952

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Since it is my understanding that the Department of State finds generally acceptable my recommendations regarding the urgent need of a capital assistance program for the Near East, subject of course to the necessary clearances in the Executive Branch and confirmation by the Congress, I feel that we now, in effect, have a sound economic policy for that vital area of the world and that, accordingly I can with a clear conscience return again to private business. I therefore submit my resignation as your Special Representative in the Near East to coordinate Near Eastern economic and technical assistance programs effective January 5, 1953.

Much of course remains to be done in the political field in the Near East, and I should like also to emphasize the importance of further progress in that direction if we are to move ahead to any significant degree in economic matters.

Sincerely yours,

EDWIN A. LOCKE, JR.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Mutual Assistance in Raw Materials. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2472. Pub. 4684. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement, with annex, between the United States and the United Kingdom—Dated at Washington Jan. 18,

¹ For text of Mr. Locke's letter to the President, tendering his resignation as representative on the Advisory Commission of the U. N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and for the President's reply, see White House press release dated Dec. 12.

1952; entered into force Jan. 18, 1952; and annex signed at Washington Jan. 29 and Feb. 12, 1952; entered into force Feb. 12, 1952.

Health and Sanitation, Cooperation Program in Brazil. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2464. Pub. 4689. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Brazil—Signed at Rio de Janeiro Dec. 28 and 29, 1951; entered into force Dec. 31, 1952.

Defense, Control of Electromagnetic Radiation in the Event of Attack. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2459. Pub. 4690. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba—Signed at Habana Dec. 10 and 18, 1951; entered into force Dec. 18, 1951.

Technical Cooperation, Establishment and Operation of Training Centers and Other Services in Puerto Rico. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2485. Pub. 4693. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Organization of American States—Signed at Washington Feb. 12 and Mar. 3, 1952; entered into force Mar. 3, 1952.

Cooperative Program of Agricultural Education. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2455. Pub. 4698. 8 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia—Signed at Bogotá Jan. 10 and 12, 1952; entered into force Jan. 12, 1952.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Jan. 12-16, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press release issued prior to Jan. 12 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 917 of Dec. 12, 1952.

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16	1/12	Note to U.S.S.R. on Austrian treaty
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*18	1/12	Truman: Death of Chilean ambassador
*19	1/12	Acheson: Death of Chilean ambassador
*20	1/13	Baker resignation: Claims commission
†21	1/13	Pt. 4 to study Egyptian industry
†22	1/14	Regulation on collisions at sea
*23	1/14	Kennan: Soviet-American relations
24	1/14	Cohen: Disarmament commission report
25	1/14	Acheson: Farewell press conference
†26	1/15	Convention on aircraft damage
27	1/15	Novikov: Persona non grata
†28	1/15	Regional association for Africa (Wmo)
†29	1/15	Semiannual report of IIA
†30	1/16	Air force agreement with Venezuela
31	1/16	Inland transport committee (ECAFE)
32	1/16	Acheson: Farewell to colleagues
†33	1/16	Population commission (Ecosoc)
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* Not printed

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN

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Proclaiming Our Faith Anew

INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

MY FELLOW CITIZENS: The world and we have passed the midway point of a century of continuing challenge. We sense with all our faculties that forces of good and evil are massed and armed and opposed as rarely before in history.

This fact defines the meaning of this day. We are summoned, by this honored and historic ceremony, to witness more than the act of one citizen swearing his oath of service in the presence of his God. We are called as a people to give testimony, in the sight of the world, to our faith that the future shall belong to the free.

Since this century's beginning, a time of tempest has seemed to come upon the continents of the earth. Masses of Asia have wakened to strike off shackles of the past. Great nations of Europe have waged their bloodiest wars. Thrones have toppled and their vast empires have disappeared. New nations have been born.

For our own country, it has been a time of recurring trial. We have grown in power and in responsibility. We have passed through the anxieties of depression and of war to a summit unmatched in man's history. Seeking to secure peace in the world, we have had to fight through the forests of the Argonne, to the shores of Iwo Jima, and to the mountain peaks of Korea.

In the swift rush of great events, we find ourselves groping to know the full sense and meaning of the times in which we live. In our quest of understanding, we beseech God's guidance. We summon all our knowledge of the past and we scan all signs of the future. We bring all our wit and will to meet the question: How far have we come in man's long pilgrimage from darkness toward light? Are we nearing the light—a day of freedom and of peace for all mankind? Or are the shadows of another night closing in upon us?

The President's Prayer

Following is the text of a prayer which the President wrote early on the morning of his inaugural, January 20, 1953, and delivered before he began his address:

Almighty God, as we stand here at this moment, my future associates in the executive branch of the Government join me in beseeching that Thou will make full and complete our dedication to the service of the people in this throng and their fellow citizens everywhere.

Give us, we pray, the power to discern clearly right from wrong and allow all our words and actions to be governed thereby and by the laws of this land.

Especially we pray that our concern shall be for all the people, regardless of station, race or calling. May cooperation be permitted and be the mutual aim of those who, under the concept of our Constitution, hold to differing political beliefs—so that all may work for the good of our beloved country and for Thy glory. Amen.

Great as are the preoccupations absorbing us at home, concerned as we are with matters that deeply affect our livelihood today and our vision of the future, each of these domestic problems is dwarfed by, and often even created by, this question that involves all human kind.

This trial comes at a moment when man's power to achieve good or to inflict evil surpasses the brightest hopes and the sharpest fears of all ages. We can turn rivers in their courses, level mountains to the plains. Ocean and land and sky are avenues for our colossal commerce. Disease diminishes and life lengthens.

Yet the promise of this life is imperiled by the very genius that has made it possible. Nations

amass wealth. Labor sweats to create—and turns out devices to level not only mountains but also cities. Science seems ready to confer upon us, as its final gift, the power to erase human life from the earth.

At such a time in history, we who are free must proclaim anew our faith.

This faith is the abiding creed of our fathers. It is our faith in the deathless dignity of man, governed by eternal moral and natural laws.

This faith defines our full view of life. It establishes, beyond debate, those gifts of the Creator that are man's inalienable rights and that make all men equal in His sight!

In the light of this equality, we know that the virtues most cherished by free people—love of truth, pride of work, devotion to country—all are treasures equally precious in the lives of the most humble and of the most exalted. The men who mine coal and fire furnaces and balance ledgers and turn lathes and pick cotton and heal the sick and plant corn—all serve as proudly and as profitably for America as the statesmen who draft treaties or the legislators who enact laws.

This faith rules our whole way of life. It decrees that we, the people, elect leaders not to rule but to serve. It asserts that we have the right to choice of our own work and to the reward of our own toil. It inspires the initiative that makes our productivity the wonder of the world. And it warns that any man who seeks to deny equality in all his brothers betrays the spirit of the free and invites the mockery of the tyrant.

It is because we, all of us, hold to these principles that the political changes accomplished this day do not imply turbulence, upheaval, or disorder. Rather this change expresses a purpose of strengthening our dedication and devotion to the precepts of our founding documents, a conscious renewal of faith in our country and in the watchfulness of a Divine Providence.

The enemies of this faith know no god but Force, no devotion but its use. They tutor men in treason. They feed upon the hunger of others. Whatever defies them, they torture, especially the Truth.

Here, then, is joined no pallid argument between slightly differing philosophies. This conflict strikes directly at the faith of our fathers and the lives of our sons. No principle or treasure that we

hold, from the spiritual knowledge of our free schools and churches to the creative magic of free labor and capital, nothing lies safely beyond the reach of the struggle.

Freedom is pitted against slavery; light against dark.

Free Peoples Sharing a Common Bond

The faith we hold belongs not to us alone but to the free of all the world. This common bond binds the grower of rice in Burma and the planter of wheat in Iowa, the shepherd in southern Italy and the mountaineer in the Andes. It confers a common dignity upon the French soldier who dies in Indochina, the British soldier killed in Malaya, the American life given in Korea.

We know, beyond this, that we are linked to all free peoples not merely by a noble idea but by a simple need. No free people can for long cling to any privilege or enjoy any safety in economic solitude. For all our own material might, even we need markets in the world for the surpluses of our farms and of our factories. Equally, we need for these same farms and factories vital materials and products of distant lands. This basic law of interdependence, so manifest in the commerce of peace, applies with thousandfold intensity in the event of war.

So are we persuaded by necessity and by belief that the strength of all free people lies in unity, their danger in discord.

To produce this unity, to meet the challenge of our time, destiny has laid upon our country the responsibility of the free world's leadership. So it is proper that we assure our friends once again that, in the discharge of this responsibility, we Americans know and observe the difference between world leadership and imperialism; between firmness and truculence; between a thoughtfully calculated goal and spasmodic reaction to the stimulus of emergencies.

We wish our friends the world over to know this above all: We face the threat—not with dread and confusion—but with confidence and conviction.

We feel this moral strength because we know that we are not helpless prisoners of history. We are free men. We shall remain free, never to be proven guilty of the one capital offense against freedom, a lack of staunch faith.

In pleading our just cause before the bar of his-

tory and in pressing our labor for world peace, we shall be guided by certain fixed principles.

These principles are:

The First Task of Statesmanship

(1) Abhorring war as a chosen way to balk the purposes of those who threaten us, we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop the strength that will deter the forces of aggression and promote the conditions of peace. For, as it must be the supreme purpose of all free men, so it must be the dedication of their leaders, to save humanity from preying upon itself.

In the light of this principle, we stand ready to engage with any and all others in joint effort to remove the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations and so to make possible drastic reduction of armaments. The sole requisites for undertaking such effort are that, in their purpose, they be aimed logically and honestly toward secure peace for all; and that, in their result, they provide methods by which every participating nation will prove good faith in carrying out its pledge.

The Futility of Appeasement

(2) Realizing that common sense and common decency alike dictate the futility of appeasement, we shall never try to placate an aggressor by the false and wicked bargain of trading honor for security. For in the final choice a soldier's pack is not so heavy a burden as a prisoner's chains.

Keeping America Strong and Productive

(3) Knowing that only a United States that is strong and immensely productive can help defend freedom in our world, we view our Nation's strength and security as a trust upon which rests the hope of free men everywhere. It is the firm duty of each of our free citizens and of every free citizen everywhere to place the cause of his country before the comfort of himself.

Respect for Other Nations' Sovereignty

(4) Honoring the identity and heritage of each nation of the world, we shall never use our strength to try to impress upon another people our own cherished political and economic institutions.

Sharing the Common Defense of Freedom

(5) Assessing realistically the needs and capacities of proven friends of freedom, we shall strive

to help them to achieve their own security and well-being. Likewise, we shall count upon them to assume, within the limits of their resources, their full and just burdens in the common defense of freedom.

Indispensability of Economic Health

(6) Recognizing economic health as an indispensable basis of military strength and the free world's peace, we shall strive to foster everywhere, and to practice ourselves, policies that encourage productivity and profitable trade. For the impoverishment of any single people in the world means danger to the well-being of all other peoples.

Strengthening Regional Groupings

(7) Appreciating that economic need, military security, and political wisdom combine to suggest regional groupings of free peoples, we hope, within the framework of the United Nations, to help strengthen such special bonds the world over. The nature of these ties must vary with the different problems of different areas.

In the Western Hemisphere, we join with all our neighbors in the work of perfecting a community of fraternal trust and common purpose.

In Europe, we ask that enlightened and inspired leaders of the Western nations strive with renewed vigor to make the unity of their peoples a reality. Only as free Europe unitedly marshals its strength can it effectively safeguard, even with our help, its spiritual and cultural treasures.

Holding All Races and Peoples in Equal Regard

(8) Conceiving the defense of freedom like freedom itself to be one and indivisible, we hold all continents and peoples in equal regard and honor. We reject any insinuation that one race or another, one people or another, is in any sense inferior or expendable.

Making the U. N. an Effective Force

(9) Respecting the United Nations as the living sign of all people's hope for peace, we shall strive to make it not merely an eloquent symbol but an effective force. And in our quest of honorable peace, we shall neither compromise, nor tire, nor ever cease.

By these rules of conduct, we hope to be known to all peoples. By their observance, an earth of peace may become not a vision but a fact. This

hope—this supreme aspiration—must rule the way we live.

We Must Be Willing to Dare All

We must be ready to dare all for our country. For history does not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or the timid. We must acquire proficiency in defense and display stamina in purpose.

We must be willing, individually and as a nation, to accept whatever sacrifices may be required of us. A people that values its privileges above its principles soon loses both.

These basic precepts are not lofty abstractions far removed from matters of daily living. They are laws of spiritual strength that generate and define our material strength. Patriotism means equipped forces and a prepared citizenry. Moral stamina means more energy and more productivity on the farm and in the factory. Love of liberty means the guarding of every resource that makes freedom possible—from the sanctity of our families and the wealth of our soil to the genius of our scientists.

So each citizen plays an indispensable role. The

productivity of our heads, our hands, and our hearts is the source of all the strength we can command, for both the enrichment of our lives and the winning of peace.

No person, no home, no community can be beyond the reach of this call. We are summoned to act in wisdom and in conscience; to work with industry, to teach with persuasion, to preach with conviction, to weigh our every deed with care and with compassion. For this truth must be clear before us: Whatever America hopes to bring to pass in the world must first come to pass in the heart of America.

The peace we seek, then, is nothing less than the practice and the fulfillment of our whole faith, among ourselves and in our dealings with others. It signifies more than stilling the guns, easing the sorrow, of war.

More than an escape from death, it is a way of life.

More than a haven for the weary, it is a hope for the brave.

This is the hope that beckons us onward in this century of trial. This is the work that awaits us all, to be done with bravery, with charity—and with prayer to Almighty God.

Secretary Dulles' Message to His New Associates

Statement by Secretary Dulles¹

TO MY ASSOCIATES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE

As I assume the post of Secretary of State, my thoughts turn to my future associates in the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

We are united by the heavy responsibilities that press upon us. We are front-line defenders of the vital interests of the United States which are being attacked by a political warfare which is as hostile in its purpose and as dangerous in its capabilities as any open war. President Eisenhower recently stated, "This nation stands in greater peril than at any time in our history."

The peril is of a kind which places a special responsibility on each and every member of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. It requires of us competence, discipline, and positive loyalty to the policies that our President and the Congress may prescribe.

¹ Made on Jan. 21 immediately after he was sworn in as Secretary of State; circulated among Department offices and Foreign Service posts and released to the press on Jan. 22 (press release 40).

Less than that is not tolerable at this time.

Lest any misunderstand, let me add that loyalty does not, of course, call for any one to practice intellectual dishonesty or to distort his reporting to please superiors. Our foreign policies will prevail only if they are based on honest evaluations of the facts.

Each foreign mission will have its appointed task, which will form part of our nation's overall strategy designed to win peacefully the struggle that has been forced on us. Each mission will be expected to accomplish its task.

It will be necessary, from time to time, to adjust our Department and Foreign Service so that we shall be best able to discharge our responsibilities and reach our chosen goals. This will be done with all of the consideration which the situation seems to permit. But the national welfare must be given priority over individual concerns.

I know, and our fellow citizens know, that those who comprise the Department of State and Foreign Service are, as a whole, a group of loyal Americans dedicated to the preservation of American ideals. You are the worthy heirs of a noble tradition. I am honored to be one of you and I am confident that, under the leadership of President Eisenhower, we shall go on to deserve well of the nation we love and serve.

IIA Provides Inaugural Coverage

Press release 37 dated January 19

The International Information Administration (IIA) used its broadcasting, film, and press facilities to carry the story of the inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States throughout the world.

A special inaugural program over the Voice of America, from 11:45 a.m. to 1 p.m. January 20, was beamed simultaneously to Europe, the Near and Middle East, Far East, and Latin America on a total of 42 frequencies. The massed transmission was carried by a score of domestic transmitters and relayed by medium wave or short-wave transmitters in England, Germany, Greece, Tangier, Hawaii, and the Philippines, as well as by the seagoing relay base, the U. S. Coast Guard Cutter *Courier*, now anchored in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The special radio program originated from both the Capitol steps in Washington and Voice of America studios in New York. Full inauguration coverage was provided in all of the 46 VOA language services.

The inaugural programs were relayed locally in a number of countries. In Japan, for example, the broadcasting corporation of Japan relayed over its regular network a half-hour VOA Japanese-language program to an estimated 20 million listeners.

The IIA gave complete film coverage to the speech, parade, and other functions.

IIA's press service will send the full text of the inaugural address to America's missions abroad as soon as it is available. Text of the address will be sent in English and will also be made available in translations.

Semiannual Report of IIA

Press release 29 dated January 15

Secretary Acheson on January 16 sent to Congress the Ninth Semiannual Report of the International Information and Educational Exchange Program, which is administered by the Department of State through the International Information Administration (IIA).

In the document, the Secretary reported on the activities, expenditures, and effectiveness of the psychological offensive of the United States. The report is required by Public Law 402 (80th Cong., 2d sess.).

In an attached memorandum, Wilson Compton, Administrator of the IIA program since January 1952, stated that the program is "gaining in impact and effect in most but not all of the countries in which its activities are under way."

This is the first report since all of the "foreign information activities for the administration of which the Secretary (of State) is responsible"

were consolidated in the IIA program. The report is a comprehensive summary of the policies and information objectives of the United States in four great areas of the world; it describes the "Menace of Communist Propaganda"; and it gives examples, country by country, of the IIA action programs now under way. The report also explains the technical operations of the IIA services—radio (the Voice of America), press, motion pictures, information centers, and the exchange-of-persons program, as well as the support of the program through private enterprise cooperation.

In a section headed "Some Assumptions for the Future," the report states that "the Soviet Union will continue its policy of using all available means to defeat our policies and program; and that these actions will intensify the pressures on the free world."

The report concludes with two recommendations:

We should maintain and increase our efforts to reach behind the Iron Curtain.

We must demonstrate our decent and constructive purposes so effectively that we will inspire the confidence of people in other countries and their greater willingness to join with us in developing a world community of free nations.

Following is the text of Mr. Compton's memorandum to Secretary Acheson, transmitting the report:

The overseas information program of the United States, administered by the Department of State through the U. S. International Information Administration, is gradually gaining in impact and effect in most but not all of the countries in which its activities are under way. This program is not as good as its most enthusiastic advocates claim. It is not as had as its severest critics say. There have been some wasted and misdirected efforts and some negligent "housekeeping." Most of these situations have been substantially improved. Some have been corrected. All of them are having attention.

Following your order in January 1952 establishing the U.S. International Information Administration (IIA), all of the "foreign information activities for the administration of which the Secretary [of State] is responsible" have now been consolidated within this program. In addition, agreements have been completed or are in process with the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) for the practical integration of the IIA-MSA information activities in Europe, country by country. This has been a great gain. Steps toward similar integration in the countries of Southeast Asia should be undertaken. By agreement with the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) we are handling its general information activities.

The report transmitted with this letter covers the period from January 1, 1952, through June 30, 1952. It should be noted, however, that beginning as of July 1, 1952, we have undertaken the responsibility for the information programs in Germany and Austria. At the request of the Department of the Army the Japan program was transferred to the International Information Administration at the end of April. Therefore, the overseas in-

formation program—which on June 30, 1952, covered 85 countries—now covers 88 countries, including major activities in several “high priority” countries. The desirability and the financial feasibility of continuing an information program in a number of the “low priority” countries are under review.

The contemplated reorganization of constituent units of the International Information Administration is under way. Its chief goals in each country are:

Sharper definition of U.S. information objectives.

More positive, i. e. less defensive, themes.

Strengthening of overseas staffs with maximum use of qualified local nationals; and concurrently the conversion of media divisions into effective means of servicing approved country programs.

Larger initiative, responsibility, and authority in overseas missions.

Better means of determining effectiveness of each country program.

To complete these changes in organization and functions is a formidable undertaking. It will take at least 18 months. We have had much help from the Bureau of the Budget, encouragement from the Advisory Com-

mission on Information and the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, and useful suggestions from committees and members of the Congress. These improvements in basic organization should be diligently pressed. In no other practical way may we expect to direct our efforts where they will count for the most, with the least waste and with the largest return from the funds invested in this overseas “crusade of ideas.”

The procedures which you established for assuring the day-to-day guidance of the information activities in conformity with United States policy have worked satisfactorily. The International Information Administration appreciates the assistance, for this purpose, of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and of the regional bureaus of the Department of State.

As currently reported to you, steps have been taken to assure that no person of doubtful loyalty to the United States will be engaged or continued in this program.

This office is grateful for the interest and cooperation of your office and of the Office of the Under Secretary in these initial stages of the organization of the International Information Administration.

WILSON COMPTON
*Administrator, International Information
Administration.*

Whither Disarmament?

*by Benjamin V. Cohen*¹

There is one point on which I should hope there would be general agreement. At this stage of the struggle for disarmament it is essential that we adhere strictly to the principle of rotation in office. Having devoted most of my time the past year as our representative on the U.N. Disarmament Commission, I am keenly aware that we need an infusion of new blood and new ideas. The struggle for disarmament is too important to be handicapped by veterans who are beaten down rapidly by their own frustrations and are apt, if they stay at the task too long, to lose hope, resiliency, and vision.

During the past year the Disarmament Commission has made little progress toward agreement between the free and the Cominform world on

¹ Address made at Washington on Jan. 16 before the Workshop on World Disarmament sponsored by officers of various national organizations. For Ambassador Cohen's letter of resignation as deputy U. S. representative on the U.N. Disarmament Commission and his report on the Commission's work, see BULLETIN of Jan. 26, 1953, p. 142.

disarmament. But it seems to me that considerable progress has been made in an educational way toward a better understanding of the nature and significance of the problem of disarmament.

In the Commission our Government has tried to direct serious attention not only to the basic objectives and principles of disarmament but to suggest various practical approaches toward a disarmament program. We have planted seeds which if properly nurtured will, we hope, in the future bring forth rich fruit.

Let me summarize the proposals which we have made:²

(1) We have submitted a statement of the essential principles of disarmament. We have sought to relate the principles which should govern a disarmament program to the law of the Charter. We have sought to give effect and meaning to the basic Charter obligation of states to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent

² For citations to texts of these proposals, see summary printed in BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 648.

with the purposes of the Charter. We have insisted that the goal of an effective disarmament program must be not to regulate the armaments to be used in war, but to prevent war.

To achieve this goal, all states have a responsibility to cooperate to establish and maintain an open and substantially disarmed world. That is the only way in fact to eliminate armed force or the threat of armed force as an instrument of national or ideological policy. In a substantially disarmed world, no state should or would be in a condition of armed preparedness to start a war. In an open world no state should or would be in a position to undertake preparations for war without other states having knowledge and warning of such preparations long before the offending state could start a war.

These principles must be adhered to if the world is to enjoy the fourth freedom—freedom from fear—which President Roosevelt proclaimed in 1941. It was President Roosevelt himself who translated freedom from fear in world terms to mean a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor anywhere in the world.

We must therefore approach the problem of disarmament from the standpoint that no state can have a sovereign right to wage war or to menace the world with its arms.

Effects on International Relationships

Before summarizing the other proposals which we made in the Disarmament Commission, it might be worth while to consider some of the far reaching effects that the genuine acceptance of these principles of disarmament could have in the course of time on international relationships.

If there were reasonable certainty that no nation was in a state of armed preparedness to undertake a war with any prospect of success, or to accomplish an act of aggression by a quick, decisive blow there would be a profound change in the climate of international relationships. Differences would remain differences in ideas, in interest, and even in power. But the people would know that they could not suddenly explode into war. The road to genuine understanding and peaceful settlement would not be blocked by the necessity of considering every problem in light of its effect on military potential in some future war rather than in light of its effect on human welfare in a peaceful, friendly world. The barriers to East-West trade, for example, would fall of their own weight. There would be much less danger of states seeking to strengthen and protect themselves in event of war by strategic settlements which themselves plant the seeds of friction and war.

For good or ill, even in a disarmed world, power

would still be an important factor. But national power in a disarmed world like power in the domestic field would depend not on armed preparedness, but on the health and virility of the people and the industrial and economic development of the nation. There should be very little difference in power relationships if all states arm to the hilt or if all states disarmed completely, but there should be a great difference in the happiness and welfare of the people.

Many of you may say all such thinking in the international field is visionary and unreal, but I suppose many people in the early days of the development of private law regarded the lawmakers who sought to outlaw private wars and private armies as visionaries and dreamers. It is worth remembering that the primary end of all primitive private law was to keep the peace. Crude approximations of justice through ordeals and trials by battle were accepted as far preferable to allowing men to take the law into their own hands and to engage in private wars.

It was probably not easy for primitive man to give up the right to take the law into his own hands in order to redress wrongs done him or his family. Even in modern society the instinct of man to duel and to feud is not completely extinct. But it was in a sense the genius of primitive law that it forbade resort to violence to rectify wrongs even before it developed completely adequate means of punishing or redressing wrongs other than the breaking of the peace.

In historic perspective, it would seem that the effective outlawing of war is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of the rule of law. There would seem to be considerable ground for the belief that the effective outlawing of war and of national armaments must come before there can be any extensive development of world law or world order rather than the other way around. Of course as progress is made toward the elimination of war and of armaments, the need for the development of effective procedures for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means will be better appreciated and understood. Practical statesmen may then give as much attention to the problem of the peaceful adjustment of differences as they now give to the problem of armed defense. States may even become conscious not only of their obligation under the Charter to refrain from the use of force except in defense of the Charter, but their obligation under the Charter to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.

Universal disarmament imposing drastic limitations on national armaments would not stand in the way of collective security. On the contrary, by bringing its task within manageable proportions, universal disarmament should increase the possibility of effective collective security immeasurably. Law enforcement in the international

field, like law enforcement in the domestic field, does not depend on the vast accumulation of arms in the possession of the peace officers, rather it hinges upon the rigid limitation of arms in the possession of organized groups not responsible to the peace officers. Large national armies and armaments are as inimical to international peace as large private armies and armaments have always been to domestic peace.

In the long run, it is likely that justice will fare better in a world where neither nations nor individuals may take the law into their own hands and fight it out. There is much greater danger of confusion of right and might in an armed world than in a disarmed world. In an armed world there must be arms to support and sustain the right. Every nation remembers with pride its efforts to support and sustain the right with its arms and fighting men. But there is no assurance that in an armed world armed power, even in the service of the right, may not come to have a corroding influence on men's ideas as to what is right and what is wrong. The power of righteousness is on the whole, over a fair stretch of time, more likely to prevail in a disarmed world than in an armed world.

Suggested Approaches to a Program

Let us now return to the summary of our work in the Disarmament Commission and some of the practical approaches to a disarmament program which we suggested to the Commission.

(2) We submitted a working paper containing concrete suggestions for a progressive and continuing system of disclosure and verification under effective international control which would embrace all armed forces and armaments, including atomic and bacteriological. The working paper was to provide a system of continuing inspection as the ground work for effective safeguards and realistic controls to insure that agreed disarmament became actual disarmament. Responsible statesmen cannot rely on mere paper promises which provide no assurance of their observance. We cannot make genuine progress toward disarmament by piecemeal attempts to forbid the use of particular weapons without safeguards designed to give assurance that such weapons will not be available for use.

We have suggested that disclosure and verification be carried out progressively in five stages. We have suggested that the system proceed by stages not because we want to proceed at a snail's pace, but because we know that in the present state of world tension, no state would tear the veil of secrecy from its most carefully guarded security arrangements unless it could be satisfied that other states were proceeding with the good faith and the same understanding and at the same pace. We have sought to provide that the information disclosed in the atomic field should be approximately

parallel to the information disclosed in the non-atomic field.

(3) We joined with France and the United Kingdom in submitting a tripartite working paper suggesting the fixing of numerical limits or ceilings on all armed forces of all states. As a basis of discussion the working paper proposed equal maximum ceilings of between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 for the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, and equal maximum ceilings of between 700,000 and 800,000 for France and the United Kingdom. The paper suggested the fixing of comparable maximum ceilings for all other states having substantial armed forces.

Many of the present difficulties both in Europe and in Asia spring from an imbalance of armed strength which causes some nations to feel that they live only by leave or grace of their more powerful and none too friendly neighbors. Obviously, if a balanced reduction of arms is to reduce the danger and fear of war, it must take into account the balance of armed strength of the most powerful states not only in relation to one another but also in relation to their neighbors. The over-all reductions proposed and contemplated by the tripartite paper were balanced and substantial. The initial reduction for the United States and the Soviet Union would be well over 50 percent.

A nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its armed strength. Other elements must be dealt with in any comprehensive program. But aggressors are not likely to go to war without the armed forces necessary to insure the successful accomplishment of their aggressive purposes. Tentative agreement on the size of permitted armed forces should greatly facilitate agreement on the quantities and types of permitted armaments.

(4) In collaboration with France and the United Kingdom, we submitted a supplement to the tripartite working paper suggesting practical procedures to prevent the undue concentration of permitted armed forces in particular categories of services, to limit armaments in types and quantities to those necessary and appropriate for the support of permitted armed forces, and to bring all essential elements of the disarmament program into equitably balanced and fairly synchronized relationship.

Under these procedures it was contemplated that all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted were to be eliminated, that all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction were to be excluded from permitted armaments, and that atomic energy was to be placed under effective international control to insure its use for peaceful purposes only.

(5) We reiterated our support of the U.N. plan for the control of atomic energy, but at the same time we reaffirmed our willingness to examine seriously and with an open mind any proposal for the effective control of atomic energy which might be presented. We pointed out that the concept of

disclosure and verification which includes continuing inspection provides an indispensable first step in laying the ground work for any control plan in the atomic field. Until the Soviet Union is willing to consider this concept, little progress can be made toward determining the other elements of control—those contained in the U.N. plan or others—which would be necessary.

(6) Finally, we suggested a plan for the elimination of bacteriological weapons and facilities for their production and use, within the framework of a comprehensive disarmament program.

The Soviet Union sought to leave the false impression that the United States was opposing any effort in the United Nations to devise ways and means of eliminating bacteriological weapons as a part of a disarmament program. The record proves the exact contrary. It was the Soviet Union which would not budge beyond a paper promise—carrying with it no effective guarantee of its observance—not to use bacteriological weapons. It was the United States which proposed that in connection with an effective system of disclosure and verification all bacteriological weapons be eliminated from national armaments and thus not only their use but their very existence prohibited.

Paper Promises Not Enough

We cannot be content with paper promises not to use weapons of mass destruction. Aggressors who would break their Charter obligation not to go to war could not be trusted to keep their paper promises not to use bacteriological weapons if they had them and found their use advantageous. In any effective disarmament program we must see to it that prohibited weapons are not available for use.

We do not contend that the proposals thus far presented to the Commission would solve all problems. The proposals were not intended to be final and definitive in terms or exhaustive in details. They were intended only to provide a basis for discussion and to open avenues by which we might approach understanding and agreement.

Unfortunately the Soviet representative on the Commission was unwilling or unable to discuss seriously any of the working papers submitted to the Commission or to make any constructive suggestions. The Soviet representative only insisted that the Commission adopt the elusive phantom proposals which the Soviet Union had first made in the General Assembly several years ago and which the General Assembly has rejected repeatedly. When requested, he even refused to give explanations or to answer questions concerning these shadowy proposals.

The Disarmament Commission cannot force agreements upon recalcitrant nations. It cannot bridge deep and fundamental differences by linguistic sleight of hand. Excessive zeal to obtain agreements which gloss over rather than resolve

these differences may even increase the tensions and fears which stand in the way of necessary agreement.

We have tried to avoid freezing our positions or taking inflexible stands. But until the Soviet Union is prepared to talk seriously and to negotiate in good faith, we must be on our guard against negotiating ourselves out of sound positions for the sake of illusory agreements.

We should not modify or abandon valid and reasonable proposals before any sincere negotiations have started. If we do so, we may lose the confidence of our own people without securing any genuine concessions from others.

We must maintain an open mind, but an open mind need not be a weak or fuzzy mind. Until we can reach the stage of serious discussions with the Soviet Union, we should devote our time, energy, and resourcefulness to improving and perfecting our proposals rather than to compromising and emasculating them. We should review and re-examine our positions and ideas to determine whether they are intrinsically sound, workable and fair from the point of view not simply of any one nation, but of the community of nations.

Let us make sure that we really are ready to negotiate when the time for real negotiations comes, as it surely must come if the civilized world is not to be blown to smithereens. Let us make sure that we ourselves thoroughly understand the full sweep of the problems of disarmament in all their political, psychological, and technical aspects. I do not minimize the preparations already made, but much, much more remains to be done. And in this task we must enlist our best, our most resourceful minds. The task requires wisdom, vision, and courage. While we must guard against premature concessions and compromises before serious negotiations begin, we must redouble, not slacken, our efforts to break down the barriers which stand in the way of serious talks and discussions. In this task also we need our best, our most imaginative, resourceful, and fearless minds. It will be little comfort to those who may survive another world war to know that it came not through our fault.

Of course if and when we arrive at the stage of serious negotiations, we cannot expect to write our own ticket. We will have to accept or reject agreements that can be had, not by the standard of perfectibility, but by the standard of comparative good. We will have to ask ourselves not whether the agreements we can secure are ideal but whether they are better than no agreements.

Many agreements less than ideal may be in our

Correction

BULLETIN of Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1019, footnote 2: The date is incorrect; demolition was not completed until Jan. 6, 1953.

interest and in the world's interest. But we must not assume that any agreement is better than no agreement. Any militarist would accept an agreement to disarm his adversaries. While there may be no one exclusive test by which we can judge the acceptability of a disarmament agreement, the most important test would seem to be whether the agreement is likely to reduce the danger of war and the fear of aggression.

Relating disarmament to the prevention of war does not in my judgment remove it from the field of practical world politics. On the contrary, it brings it into the field of practical world politics.

We are, I fear, deluding ourselves if we think that we can make progress in disarmament if we regard it merely as a bargaining process involving haggling over quotas of armaments with a view to regulating the armaments used in war, or to codifying the rules of war, or to reducing the cost of preparing for war. When nations engage in total war and fight to kill, it is difficult to regulate the

manner of killing. Realists are not likely to take disarmament seriously until they become convinced that disarmament can prevent war.

No nation today can be indifferent to the threat to its very survival of the new instruments of modern warfare. Even the most fanatical and aggressive power must balk at self-destruction. There is good reason to believe that in a thermo-nuclear age the instinct of self-preservation will impel the leaders of all nations to accept common survival in preference to mutual extinction.

In the interest of common survival, we must quicken our efforts within the United Nations and in every other way open to us to develop a better understanding of the problems of armaments in this atomic and thermonuclear age and the significance of disarmament as a means of eliminating the danger and fear of war which threatens the survival of our common humanity. Let us bestir ourselves before the curfew sounds the knell of a parting world.

Calendar of Meetings ¹

Adjourned During January 1953

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Meeting on Rice	Bangkok	Jan. 5-16
Regional Extension Development Center	Beirut	Jan. 6-17
Inter-American Research Seminar on National Income	Santiago	Jan. 5-17
Rubber Study Group, 2d Session of Working Party	London	Jan. 5-27
UN (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council:		
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Inland Transport Committee, Inland Waterway Subcommittee: 1st Session	Bandung	Jan. 14-17
Inland Transport Committee, Railway Subcommittee: 1st Session	Bandung	Jan. 14-17
Inland Transport Committee: 2d Session	Bandung	Jan. 19-23
Population Commission: 7th Session	New York	Jan. 19-30
WHO (World Meteorological Organization):		
Regional Association for Africa: 1st Session	Tananarive	Jan. 19-31*

In Session as of January 31, 1953

International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26, 1951-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Council: 18th Session	Montreal	Jan. 13-
Southeast Asia/South Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting (and limited South Pacific)	Melbourne	Jan. 13-
WHO (World Health Organization):		
Executive Board: 11th Session	Geneva	Jan. 21-
UN Ecosoc (United Nations Economic and Social Council):		
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: 4th Session	New York	Jan. 12-
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Commission on Industry and Trade: 5th Session	Bandung	Jan. 26-
CFM (Council of Foreign Ministers):		
Deputies for Austria	London	Jan. 30-
International Wheat Council: 11th Session	Washington	Jan. 30-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Jan. 22, 1953. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled February 1—April 30, 1953

GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade): <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee for Agenda and Intercessional Business of the Contracting Parties.	Geneva	Feb. 2-
ILO (International Labor Office): Textiles Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 2-
Governing Body: 121st Session	Geneva	Feb. 20-
Committee on Work on Plantations: 2d Session	Habana	Mar. 16-
Joint ILO/WHO Committee on the Hygiene of Seafarers: 2d Session.	Geneva	Apr. or May
UN (United Nations): Transport and Communications Commission: 6th Session	New York	Feb. 2-
Statistical Commission: 7th Session	New York	Feb. 2-
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: Ninth Session of the Commission.	Bandung	Feb. 6-
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	New York	Feb. 16-
ECAFE: Second Regional Conference on Trade Promotion	Manila	Feb. 23-
General Assembly, Reconvening of 7th Session	New York	Feb. 24-
Technical Assistance Conference: Third	New York	Feb. 26-
Economic Commission for Europe: 8th Session	Geneva	Mar. 3-
Commission on the Status of Women: 7th Session	New York	Mar. 16-
Technical Assistance Committee	New York	Mar. 16-
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 8th Session	New York	Mar. 30-
Economic and Social Council: 15th Session	New York	Mar. 31-
Consultative Group in the Field of Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (Latin American Regional).	Brazil	Mar.
Human Rights Commission: 9th Session	Geneva	Apr. 6-
Economic Commission for Latin America: 5th Session	Rio de Janeiro	Apr. 6-
UN/ILO <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on Forced Labor	Geneva	Apr. 17-
ECAFE: Regional Conference on Mineral Resources Development.	Tokyo	Apr. 20-
Fiscal Commission: 4th Session	New York	Apr. 27-
International Wheat Council: Reconvening of 8th Session	Washington	Feb. 2-
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization): Information Conference	Paris	Feb. 5-
Petroleum Planning Committee: 4th Meeting	Paris	February
Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport: 3d Session.	Paris	February
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council	Paris	March
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: Third Extraordinary Meeting.	Caracas	Feb. 9-
Pakistan Science Conference, Fifth Annual	Lahore	Feb. 16-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization): First Air Navigation Conference	Montreal	Feb. 24-
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defense Science	New Delhi	Feb. 25-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization): Meeting of Group of Experts on Emergency Food Reserve	Rome	Feb. 23-*
Coordinating Committee: 3d Session	Rome	Mar. 16-
Committee on Relations with International Organizations	Rome	Mar. 30-
Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 3d Meeting.	Rome	Apr. 21-
Cannes Film Festival, VIth International	Cannes	Mar. 11-
WMO (World Meteorological Organization): Commission for Climatology: 1st Session	Washington	Mar. 12-
Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 1st Session	Washington	Apr. 2-
OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation): Conference on European Inland Transport	Paris	Mar. 18-
International Rubber Study Group: 10th Meeting	Copenhagen	March
International Tin Study Group: 7th Meeting	London	March
Mining and Metallurgical Congress, Fifth Empire	Australia and New Zealand	Apr. 12-
ICEM (Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration): Finance Subcommittee	Geneva	Apr. 13-
Fifth Session of ICEM	Geneva	Apr. 16-
South Pacific Conference: Second	Nouméa	Apr. 16-
PASO (Pan American Sanitary Organization): Executive Committee: 19th Meeting	Washington	Apr. 19-
Inter-American Council of Jurists: 2d Meeting	Buenos Aires	Apr. 20-
South Pacific Commission: 11th Session	Nouméa	Apr. 25-
Timber Trade Conference (Caribbean Commission)	Trinidad	April
Icsu (International Council of Scientific Unions): Joint Commission on Physiological Optics	Madrid	April
Central and South Africa Transport Conference	Lourenço Marques	April

Human Rights in the United States: 1951

The following report was prepared at the request of the United Nations for publication in its "Year-book on Human Rights," and is similar in form to reports prepared on the same subject in previous years. The Department of State had the cooperation of interested agencies of the Government in assembling information on the various topics considered in the report.

In the political and legal tradition of the United States the rights of individuals have always comprised protection of individual liberty against Government as well as the right of individuals to claim positive action by Government to protect their rights. This high value placed on limitations on the powers of Government finds expression in constitutional provisions which define those powers and subject them to specific restrictions. The liberties thus guaranteed to everyone in the United States must be respected by governmental agencies, Federal as well as local; and they find protection, when necessary, in the courts of the States and of the United States. The responsibility for affirmative action to protect and extend the recognized rights of Americans similarly rests on the Governments of the United States, the States, territories, and local communities, each according to the functions constitutionally assigned to it in the Federal structure of the United States.

Constitutional and legislative provisions relating to human rights have a long history in the United States. Many of the statements on freedom of speech, press, and religion and the right to self-government date back to the charters and agreements made at the time the first settlers came to America. These bills of rights, as they were called, were frequently retained and expanded in constitutions framed in the early colonies and later in the various States, and were the basis for the first ten amendments, known as the Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution. Additional rights protecting citizens are in the body of the Constitution, and some have been added in later amendments.

Under the judicial system of the United States, the interpretations of particular constitutional and legislative provisions in relation to cases brought before the courts become precedents which

must be taken into account in later cases, thus constantly expanding the understanding and application of these provisions in the changing situations of modern life. Since the provisions in the early colonial and State constitutions related largely to civil and political rights, a great body of legislative and judicial interpretation exists in this field. In the field of social, economic, and cultural rights, the legislative and judicial activity reported in any one year tends to be relatively greater, both because of the complex problems involved as the country opens up new opportunities to its citizens and because fewer laws and precedents have as yet been produced to give these rights their full and precise meaning. The responsibility of State Governments in regard to social, economic, and cultural rights is extensive, as under the U.S. Constitution the Federal Government may exercise only limited powers in certain areas, and the promotion of certain rights, such as education, is largely a function of the States.

In addition to the support for human rights by governmental agencies, constitutional and legal provisions, and court decisions, not least in importance is the support afforded in the exercise and enjoyment of these rights by the attitude of the American people and the whole climate of public opinion.

Progress of the United States in the field of human rights during 1951 must therefore be considered as supplementing and reaffirming the basic human rights and liberties long enjoyed in this country.

This survey touches only on the major and most significant developments in this field, viz on definitive actions and statements of the executive branches of the Federal, State, and Territorial Governments, on the most important Federal, State, and Territorial laws, on international agreements which have actually come into force, and on legal principles established by decisions of the highest courts of the land. A complete picture would also include reference to the day-to-day Federal, State, and Territorial activities relating to human rights and to those continuing from past years and to the vast financial provision for these

activities made by States, Territories, and local communities as well as by the Federal Government.

Part I will take up those actions of the Federal, State, and Territorial Governments and some of those of their local subdivisions which have seemed to represent significant developments in the field of human rights in the United States in 1951, including both civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social, and cultural rights on the other. Part II will refer to the several international agreements made by the United States which came into force in 1951 and contained references to human rights.

I. FEDERAL, STATE, AND TERRITORIAL ACTIONS

Human rights can be affected by action of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the Governments of the United States, the States, and Territories, or local governmental units. Such actions may range from an Executive order of the President, a law of the Congress, or a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States to a local city ordinance regulating the holding of street-corner meetings.

General

As in previous years, President Truman by proclamation¹ designated December 10 as Human Rights Day and called upon the people of the United States to celebrate that day by public reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by other ceremonies designed to enlarge our understanding of its provisions and thus to "join with the citizens of other countries in a common effort to strengthen the forces of freedom, justice, and peace in the world through promoting the universal achievement of the fundamental human rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration."

Similarly, December 15 was widely celebrated as Bill of Rights Day, commemorating the 160th anniversary of our Bill of Rights, which is the name popularly given to the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States. It is these amendments which contain the principal guarantees of human rights in the Constitution, including those of freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of petition for redress of grievances, the right of freedom from search and seizure, the right of fair and speedy trial, trial by jury, and confrontation of opposing witnesses, the prohibition of excessive bail or fines, and of cruel and unusual punishments, and the right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

Practical methods of promoting an understand-

¹ 16 Fed. Reg. 12449.

ing of human rights were set forth in the publication issued by the U.S. Office of Education entitled *How Children Learn About Human Rights*.² This booklet gave suggestions for teaching children about human rights and for the application of the principles involved in human rights to situations arising in the schoolroom.

Civil and Political Rights

The enjoyment of his civil and political rights by the inhabitant of the United States is well grounded in specific constitutional provisions, legislation, judicial holdings, more than a century of usage and precedent, and a favorable state of public opinion. Specific aspects of these rights are defined still more clearly each year by law or judicial action. For instance, in 1951 progress was recorded in the removal by additional States of the poll tax as a requirement for voting. The requirements of a fair trial were more clearly set forth and other civil and political rights were better defined.

GOVERNMENT BY THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE

Voting. The Federal Constitution assures the citizens of the United States a republican form of government, responsive to the will of the people through their elected representatives and expressly provides that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or sex. In 1951 additional measures to assure every citizen the right to vote in fair and honest elections were adopted in several States.

Two States, South Carolina and Tennessee, eliminated payment of poll tax as a qualification for voting. South Carolina, in a general election in 1950, had approved a constitutional amendment to this end, and during 1951 this amendment became effective by action of the General Assembly. These actions reduced the number of States requiring payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite for voting to five.

In October 1951 the Louisiana Democratic State and Central Committee deleted a rule that only whites could participate in the party's primary elections in that State.

In Florida the election law of 1951 was interpreted as forbidding segregation at the polls by permitting but one place of entrance to the polls and one place of exit from the polls.

In Alabama a constitutional amendment was adopted requiring those seeking to register for voting to satisfy the county registrars that they are of good character, that they have fulfilled the obligations for State and Federal citizenship, can read and write any article of the U.S. Constitu-

² Wilhelmina Hill and Helen K. Mackintosh, Federal Security Agency, Office of Education, *How Children Learn About Human Rights*, Bulletin No. 9, 1951, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951).

tion, and pass a written examination to be prepared by the State Supreme Court.

An Alabama law affirmed for certain workers the right to take time off to vote, thus making 26 States which have given statutory protection of this privilege for some or all workers of the State.³

Several States adopted laws to facilitate absentee voting, particularly by members of the armed forces. As an aid in keeping its list of voters correct, Connecticut passed a law providing that citizens, other than those in the armed forces, who have not voted for 4 years, must file a formal application in order to be retained on the list.

Provision for the Constitutional Government of Puerto Rico. The Territory of Puerto Rico continued during 1951 its progress toward a fuller measure of self-government. Pursuant to an act of the Congress approved on July 3, 1950,⁴ which provided that the people of Puerto Rico might reorganize their Government under a new constitution to be drafted by them, a referendum was held in Puerto Rico on June 4, 1951, on the question of accepting or rejecting this proposed procedure. By a vote of 387,016 to 119,169, the Puerto Rican voters accepted the invitation to draft a constitution.⁵ On August 27, 1951, a date set by the Puerto Rican Legislature, an election was held for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and the Convention began its meetings on September 17, 1951.

LIFE, LIBERTY, AND SECURITY OF PERSON

The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Federal Constitution provide that no person shall be deprived by governmental authority of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that a special State police officer who, in his official capacity, by use of force and violence, obtained a confession from a person suspected of crime, was guilty of violating a Federal statute (18 U.S. Code 242) which makes it a crime for any person, under pretense of law, to deprive any other person of a right, privilege, or immunity secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States. The constitutional right held to have been violated in this case was the right, guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law.⁶

³Details of the provisions of these laws may be found in *Time Off For Voting Under State Law*, U.S. Department of Labor Bulletin No. 138, revised (Washington, 1952).

⁴64 Stat. 319.

⁵See BULLETIN of Nov. 10, 1952, p. 758, for an analysis of human rights provisions in the Puerto Rican Constitution.

⁶*Williams v. United States*, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).

The fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that no State shall deny any person the equal protection of the laws.

In the case of *Dowd v. Cook*⁷ the defendant was convicted of murder in a State court, sentenced to life imprisonment, and immediately confined in a State prison. The prison warden, however, acting pursuant to then existing prison rules, prevented the defendant from filing appeal papers with the State Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of the United States held, in a habeas corpus proceeding brought in a Federal court, that the warden's suppression of the appeal papers was a violation of the provision of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States that "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The court held, further, that in the circumstances of the case, nothing short of an actual appellate determination of the merits of the conviction could cure the original denial of equal protection of the law and ordered the district court to enter an order allowing the State a reasonable time in which to afford the convicted man the full appellate review he would have received but for the suppression of his papers, failing which he should be discharged.

FREEDOM FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The fourth amendment of the Constitution, which curbs abuses of authority by Federal officers, provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case of the *United States v. Jeffers*⁸ the Supreme Court held that where Federal police officers, acting without a warrant to search or arrest, but with reason to believe that a suspect had narcotics unlawfully concealed there, entered an apartment belonging to other persons, and seized narcotics claimed by the suspect, the search and seizure were not incidental to a valid arrest and hence were in violation of the fourth amendment of the Federal Constitution, in the absence of exceptional circumstances to justify their being made without a warrant.

FAIR TRIAL

The Constitution of the United States contains numerous safeguards with respect to a fair trial, including guarantees of the right to protection against the requirement of excessive bail, compulsory self-incrimination, and double jeopardy, and

⁷340 U.S. 206 (1951).

⁸342 U.S. 48 (1951).

protection of the right in criminal cases to a speedy and public trial before an impartial jury, with confrontation of opposing witnesses and assistance of counsel.

Excessive Bail. In *Stack v. Boyle*⁹ the Supreme Court held that bail set before trial of a defendant in a Federal court at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to assure his presence at the trial violates the eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "excessive bail shall not be required."

Counsel to Be Afforded. Another decision of the Supreme Court held that the due process-of-law clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution requires a State to afford the defendant assistance of counsel in a noncapital criminal case when there are special circumstances showing that without a lawyer the defendant could not have an adequate and fair defense.¹⁰

Jury Selection. In a case¹¹ involving the conviction of two Florida Negroes for rape, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida affirming the conviction because the method of jury selection had excluded Negroes from both the grand jury and the trial jury. Two justices also considered that the conviction should have been reversed on the ground that a fair trial had been made impossible because of the circulation of newspaper and radio reports of alleged confessions by the defendants, which confessions had not been presented in the course of the trial.

Laws permitting women to serve on juries were enacted in 1951 in three States—New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. At the end of the year, there were only six States and two Territories in which women were not eligible for jury service: Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.

Self-incrimination. Two cases decided by the Supreme Court gave expanded significance to the right of protection against self-incrimination. In the case of *Blau v. United States*¹² the court upheld the right of a witness before a Federal grand jury to refuse to answer questions concerning her activities and records of the Communist Party on the ground that to answer such questions might result in self-incrimination and would be contrary to the provisions of the fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States that: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."

In the other case¹³ the court held that the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment extends not only to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a

Federal statute but also to those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the individual being questioned for a Federal crime. The court stated that to sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the particular factual setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered, might be dangerous because an injurious disclosure could result.

GRANT OF ASYLUM

During 1951, as in previous years, the Congress enacted legislation, in the form of private laws, to provide asylum in the United States for various individuals who might otherwise be required to leave the country.¹⁴

Entry of additional displaced persons into the United States was facilitated by a law¹⁵ which extended until December 31, 1951, the termination date for the issuance of visas for eligible displaced persons, and which extended until June 30, 1952, the terminal date of the period during which 5,000 nonquota visas could be issued to eligible displaced persons.

RIGHT TO OWN PROPERTY

The Federal Constitution protects persons from being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and this right has been affirmed on numerous occasions. Protection of the right of ownership in property was again upheld in the courts when the Supreme Court decided in *United States v. Pevee Coal Company*¹⁶ that the temporary seizure and operation by the Government of a coal mine, in order to avert a nationwide strike of coal miners, resulted in a "taking" of property entitling the mine owner to recover compensation under the fifth amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Freedom of religious worship has been among the most carefully guarded of all the rights enjoyed by the individual in the United States and has been repeatedly confirmed by the courts.

The most noteworthy case decided by the Supreme Court in 1951 in which the right of freedom of religion was upheld was that of *Niemotko v. Maryland*.¹⁷ In this case the appellants' applica-

⁹ 342 U.S. 1 (1951).

¹⁰ *Palmer v. Ashe*, 342 U.S. 134 (1951).

¹¹ *Shepherd v. Florida*, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).

¹² 340 U.S. 332 (1951).

¹³ *Hoffman v. United States*, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).

¹⁴ For example, Private Law 30, 82d Cong., 1st sess., approved May 14, 1951.

¹⁵ Public Law 60, 82d Cong., 1st sess., approved June 28, 1951.

¹⁶ 341 U.S. 114 (1951).

¹⁷ 340 U.S. 268 (1951).

tions to a city council for permits to use a city park for Bible talks was denied, for no apparent reason except the council's dislike for appellants and disagreement with their views. Appellants were convicted in a local Maryland court of disorderly conduct for attempting to hold public meetings and make speeches in the park without having secured permits. There was no evidence of disorder or threat of violence or riot, and it was shown that permits customarily had been granted other organizations for similar purposes. The court held that appellants were denied equal protection of the laws, in the exercise of freedom of speech and religion, contrary to the fourteenth amendment and reversed the convictions.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

Several important issues involving constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and expression were decided by the U. S. Supreme Court.

In the case of *Feiner v. New York*¹⁸ the petitioner had made an inflammatory speech on a city street. The crowd blocked the sidewalk and overflowed into the street. Its feelings were rising, and there was at least one threat of violence. In order to prevent such violence, police officers thrice unsuccessfully requested the petitioner to stop speaking. After his third refusal, and after he had been speaking over 30 minutes, he was arrested and later convicted of incitement of a breach of the peace. The court sustained the conviction against the claim that it violated the petitioner's right of free speech under the fourteenth amendment. The court emphasized that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views but that when a speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, the police are not powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.

In the case of *Kunz v. New York*¹⁹ the Supreme Court held invalid a New York City ordinance which required police permits for religious meetings on city streets. The Court's ruling reversed the conviction of the Rev. Carl Jacob Kunz, who had been arrested and fined 10 dollars for preaching without a permit in 1948. In this case the court held that the ordinance, because it did not contain appropriate standards for administrative action and gave an administrative official discretionary power to control in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious matters on the city streets, was invalid under the fourteenth amendment.

In a case arising out of questioning of a witness by the California Legislature's Committee on Un-American Activities,²⁰ the Supreme Court held that the privilege of legislators to be free

from arrest or civil process for what they do or say in legislative proceedings has been carefully preserved in the formation of State and National Governments, and that in order to find that a legislative committee's investigation has exceeded the bound of legislative power, it must be made plain that there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the judicial or executive branches of Government.

In the case of *Breard v. Alexandria*²¹ it was determined that rights of salesmen to go on private property are not unlimited and must be weighed against the right of privacy of the property owners. In this case the court upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance forbidding the practice of going from door to door for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, without prior consent of the owners or occupants. The court rejected the claim that such an ordinance offends the provision of the fourteenth amendment that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. The court also held that such an ordinance does not abridge the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments since these constitutional rights have never been treated as absolutes and that it would be a misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and free press to use them to force a community to admit the sellers of publications to the home premises of its residents.

In *Dennis v. United States*²² the Supreme Court on June 4, 1951, upheld the constitutionality of the provision of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act) which makes it a crime for any person knowingly or willfully to advocate the overthrow or destruction of the Government of the United States by force or violence, to organize or help to organize any group which does so, or to conspire to do so. The defendants in this case were the 11 leaders of the Communist Party of the United States, who were found by the jury to have willfully and knowingly conspired to organize the Communist Party as a conspiratorial organization intended to overthrow the Government by force and violence "as speedily as circumstances would permit."

An important action in defense of the freedom of communication of ideas was taken by the Federal Communications Commission when it announced that it would enforce strictly the law forbidding radio broadcasting stations to censor speeches by political candidates and that even if the speech is libelous the station must not interfere.²³

Several State legislatures enacted legislation against subversive organizations or activities.

¹⁸ 341 U.S. 622 (1951).

¹⁹ 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

²⁰ Federal Communications Commission File No. BR-449, "In the Matter of the Application of WDSU Broadcasting Corporation, New Orleans, Louisiana for Renewal of License."

¹⁸ 340 U.S. 315 (1951).

¹⁹ 340 U.S. 290 (1951).

²⁰ *Tenney v. Brandhove*, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).

By a Massachusetts law, any person who is a member of an organization attempting to overthrow the Government by unconstitutional means and who remains a member of it knowing it to be subversive may be fined and imprisoned. Laws against subversive organizations were also passed in Indiana, Michigan, and New Hampshire. The Indiana law provided mandatory terms of imprisonment for membership in subversive organizations, while in Michigan it was made a felony to conceal knowledge of subversive acts.

ACCESS TO PUBLIC SERVICES

Service in Armed Forces. The principle of equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed forces without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin was established by an Executive order of the President of July 26, 1948.²⁴ The order provided that this policy should be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.

The integration of racial groups in the armed services intended by this order has been completed in the Navy and the Air Force. In the Army changes are still in progress to complete compliance with the order. Thus in March 1951, the Department of Defense announced that racial segregation had been ended at the Fort Dix, N. J., reception center and shortly thereafter it was announced that the Army now has complete integration at all of its training centers, although segregation still prevails in some combat units. In an announcement of July 26, 1951, the Department of Defense announced that steps were being taken by the Army to carry to completion the integration of Negro personnel, already in progress, in all combat units of the Far East Command.²⁵ The integration was to be phased over a period of approximately 6 months. A similar integration program was to be applied to service units.

An extensive historical study of race relations and the process of integration in the U.S. Navy was published during the year 1951 by one of the first Negroes to serve as an officer in the Regular Navy, Lt. Dennis D. Nelson, under the title *The Integration of the Negro into the United States Navy*.²⁶ While this is not an official history, the author was given full access to official documents and records and such materials were used with full authority. This work showed that the former concentration of Negro personnel in the steward's branch was being eliminated and that nearly half of Negro personnel were in other assignments.

²⁴ Executive Order 9981, 13 *Fed. Reg.* 4313.

²⁵ Department of Defense press release 997-51, July 26, 1951.

²⁶ Dennis D. Nelson, *The Integration of the Negro into the United States Navy* (New York, Farrar, Straus, and Young, 1951).

Appointment and Election to Public Office. Candidacy for election to public office is open to those persons who can fulfill the legal requirements for officeholding, while appointment to positions in the Federal and State Government service is open to those who can meet the qualifications for a particular post. Among the qualifications for certain positions involving responsibility for the security of the Government is assurance that the appointee is in fact loyal.

The legislature of Pennsylvania passed a loyalty bill affecting teachers and other State and local government employees. The law provides for the removal of such employees when charged with specific instances of subversive activity with the charges backed up by a "fair preponderance of evidence," while employment may be refused to persons in whose cases there is "reasonable doubt" of loyalty. An appeal mechanism, with appeal to the courts, was also set up.

Efforts by States and municipalities to prevent members of subversive organizations actively seeking the overthrow of constitutional government from becoming candidates for public office or from serving as public employees were upheld by the Supreme Court. In *Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore*²⁷ the Supreme Court held that a State could constitutionally require that in order for a candidate for public office to obtain a place on the ballot he must take an oath that he is not engaged "in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the Government by force or violence," and that he is not knowingly a member of an organization engaged in such an attempt.

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

The expansion of the economic, social, and cultural rights enjoyed by the individual appears most clearly through the listing and enumeration of the new provisions made by law or regulation in each of these fields. The year 1951 was especially marked by large increases in the number of persons covered by the social-security program, steady improvement in the provisions of the unemployment-insurance laws, further progress toward nondiscrimination in employment, large provision for improved housing, an all-time high in elementary and secondary school enrollment, and increased cultural interchange between the American people and those of foreign countries.

SOCIAL SECURITY

The basic social-security program of the United States is intended to provide economic security to elderly and retired workers or to surviving families by means of an old-age and survivors' insur-

²⁷ 341, U. S. 56,923 (1951).

ance system. The number of persons covered by this program were largely increased by amendments to the Social Security Act, which were adopted in 1950 and became effective January 1, 1951.²⁵

Steps were taken through amendments to the Railroad Retirement Act in Public Law 234, approved Oct. 30, 1951, to effect still more complete coverage of retired workers. These amendments increased benefits and included provisions for transferring to the old-age and survivors' insurance (social-security) program the wage credits of individuals who die or retire with less than 10 years of railroad service. These workers or their survivors may thus receive old-age and survivors' insurance benefits. The bill also included provisions relating to financial interchange and benefit interrelationships between the two programs.

State legislation also affected the coverage of the old-age and survivors' insurance program. The 1950 Social Security Act amendments had provided for the extension of coverage to State and local governmental employees (other than those in positions already covered by retirement systems) through voluntary agreements between the State and the Federal Security Administrator. By the end of 1950, three States (Arkansas, Idaho, and Oklahoma) had already effected such agreements and four others (California, South Dakota, Washington, and West Virginia) had passed enabling legislation. During 1951 agreements were effected by the four which had passed their enabling legislation in 1950 and by an additional 24 States and Territories (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). By the end of 1951, there were six other States (Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and South Carolina) which had enacted enabling legislation but had not yet effected coverage agreements.

Much of the public-assistance legislation enacted by the States during the 1951 legislative sessions was designed to implement other amendments to the Social Security Act adopted in 1950. In 16 States legislation enacted in 1951 established programs of assistance to persons who are permanently and totally disabled. Some additional States had taken the necessary action in legislative sessions called late in 1950; in others the legislative authority already placed in the State Welfare Department was sufficiently broad to permit them to benefit from the new Federal grants for disability assistance. Thus, by the end of 1951, a total of 36 jurisdictions were making pay-

ments under approved plans for aid to the permanently and totally disabled.

A few States enacted special legislation to broaden the program for aid to dependent children by providing for the consideration of the needs of the parents or other adult relatives caring for the dependent child; other States took advantage of the new provisions in the Federal Act without enacting additional legislation. A number of States raised the statutory maximum payment for one or more of the assistance programs. In 1951, 29 States enacted legislation relating to income exemptions for aid to the blind to comply with the 1950 amendments to the Federal Act. Under the impetus of these same amendments, 17 States enacted legislation to provide for assistance payments to patients in public medical institutions, and several adopted special legislation taking advantage of a new provision to aid payments for medical services. A few States took legislative action in connection with a Federal provision in the Revenue Act of 1951 (Public Law 183, approved October 20) providing that Federal aid may not be withheld because the State makes its welfare records available to public inspection. Various provisions enacted by the States in 1951 were designed to establish the responsibility of relatives for persons receiving public assistance.

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

Each State has its own unemployment-insurance law and operates its own unemployment-insurance system with cooperation and grants of funds from the Federal Government.

Almost 35 million workers in industry and commerce were employed in jobs covered by the Federal-State system of unemployment insurance in 1951. Such laws are in effect in the 48 States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii, and a special Federal system covers railroad workers. Workers in agriculture, domestic service, public service, and nonprofit organizations are generally not covered. In one-third of the States, all workers in covered industries are protected; in the other States, workers in smaller firms are excluded.

Benefits are provided by the States under varying conditions. In 1951, 22 States increased their maximum weekly payments and 8 States increased the maximum potential duration of benefits. This emphasis on the size of the weekly payments rather than the period during which payments are made resulted from the continued rise in wages and in the cost of living and the expectation of continued high-level employment during the next few years.

The 1951 sessions of the State Legislatures (Alaska, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin) saw the first 30-dollar basic maximum weekly benefit and the elimination of the last maximum benefit under

²⁵ These amendments have been summarized in the report on *Human Rights in the United States in 1950*. See BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1072.

20 dollars. After the 1951 amendments, 15 States with 55 percent of the covered workers in the country had a maximum basic weekly benefit of 26 dollars to 30 dollars and 18 States with a quarter of the covered workers had a maximum of 25 dollars.

Of the eight States which increased maximum duration of benefits, five extended duration to 26 weeks, two to 24 weeks, and one to 22 weeks. Thus it became possible in 1951 for claimants in 18 States to qualify for benefits for 26 weeks and for up to 23 weeks in more than one-half of the States.

Colorado increased the weekly benefit by 26 percent and potential duration of benefits to a uniform 26 weeks for claimants who had had wages in excess of 1,000 dollars in each of 5 consecutive years and had drawn no benefits during the period.

Basic maximum benefits in a benefit year, not including dependents or other allowances, ranged from 240 dollars to 689 dollars in 1950; largely because of changes in maximum weekly benefits, the range after the 1951 amendments were enacted is from 240 dollars in Arizona to 795 dollars in Wisconsin. The laws of 10 States with approximately 40 percent of the covered workers now provide for basic maximum annual benefits of 700 dollars or more, while the basic maximum benefits were between 500 dollars and 700 dollars in 25 additional States with another 40 percent of the covered workers.

Disability benefits are payable for nonoccupational disabilities to workers covered by railroad unemployment insurance and by four States.

California increased the maximum weekly benefit for temporary disability insurance from 25 dollars to 30 dollars, allowed receipt of hospital benefits while claimants are receiving remuneration from an employer, and exempted from contribution and benefits individuals who belong to a religious sect that depends upon prayer for healing.

Workmen's Compensation. Benefits to injured workers, which are provided throughout the United States, were increased in 34 States and Hawaii. Benefits for temporary total injury, the most common type of injury, were raised in 28 States and Hawaii. An increase of 20 percent or more in maximum weekly benefits was voted in eight States. An Illinois amendment provided that 75 percent of the weekly wages might be paid as benefits for temporary total disability and as high as 97½ percent may be paid for workers having three or more dependent children. Maximum weekly benefits of 30 dollars or more (including allowances for dependents) are now provided in more than half of the States.

Death benefits were raised in 28 States and Hawaii. For example, maximum total benefits were raised from 8,400 dollars to 9,200 dollars in Alabama; from 7,500 dollars to 10,000 dollars in Maryland; and from 6,000 dollars to 8,000 dollars in North Carolina. In Oklahoma, death benefits

were provided under the act for the first time, the maximum amount being set at 13,500 dollars.

Benefits payable for medical aid were increased in seven States; provision was made in seven States and Hawaii for additional appliances to be furnished the disabled worker; and benefits for burial expenses were increased in six States.

Coverage for occupational diseases was introduced in Alabama and Vermont and extended in several other States. Altogether 25 States, Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia now provide full coverage of occupational diseases, while 18 others and Puerto Rico cover specified diseases.

Rehabilitation services for the injured worker were provided in the workmen's compensation laws of Missouri and Puerto Rico, in addition to the 18 States with laws already containing specific rehabilitation provisions; and such services were improved or benefits increased in North Dakota, Ohio, and Utah.

JUST AND FAVORABLE CONDITIONS OF WORK

Migratory Workers. The conditions surrounding migratory workers had been the subject of study by a special Commission on Migratory Workers, appointed by President Truman in 1950 to inquire into the social, economic, health, and educational conditions among migratory workers, both alien and domestic, in the United States. In March 1951, the Commission issued a report of findings and recommendations growing out of public hearings held throughout the United States in 1950. The report included recommendations for legislative action on both the Federal and State levels.

Congress enacted a law dealing with migratory labor,²⁹ which authorized the Secretary of Labor, upon certification by the Secretary of Agriculture that such workers are needed, to recruit farm laborers in Mexico, transport them to the United States, provide them with necessary subsistence while en route, as well as emergency medical care, and guarantee that employers will comply with the terms of the individual work contracts with the laborers. An agreement was made with the Mexican Government (see Part II below) covering rights under contracts to be enjoyed by Mexican agricultural workers in the United States.

Several States enacted in 1951 laws designed to improve the condition of migratory workers. California enacted a law regulating farm-labor contractors, under which persons who recruit farm laborers are required to be licensed and bonded, and providing for refusal or revocation of a license by the Labor Commissioner for failure to comply with specific requirements set up by the law to protect the workers who are recruited.

²⁹ Public Law 78, approved July 12, 1951.

In Minnesota, the State Board of Health was specifically authorized to make sanitary regulations relating to migrant-labor camps, in addition to its previous authority to make such regulations for lumbering and industrial camps. Wisconsin also enacted legislation under which all industrial camps must be registered with the State Board of Health and must obtain annual certificates which may be revoked if the camp does not comply with regulations issued by the Board.

Industrial Safety. A number of laws were enacted in 1951 to provide safe work places and working methods. The authority of a State agency to draw up industrial safety regulations was increased or strengthened in Montana, Michigan, Tennessee, and Washington. More specific provisions for the detection and prevention of hazardous conditions included: a Massachusetts law prohibiting the removal of safety guards on machinery having movable parts unless the machinery has been shut down for repairs; in California, an increase from 10 dollars to 25 dollars in the minimum fine for failure to report an accident; in Oregon, specific authority for the State Industrial Accident Commission to post a notice of any violation of a law or rule requiring a safety appliance, device, or safeguard, the notice not to be removed until the employer has complied.

Minimum Wage. A minimum wage, applicable to workers engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for interstate commerce, was established by the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.³⁰ In January 1950, amendments³¹ strengthening the provisions of this Act came into force. These amendments raised the legal minimum wage of all workers in interstate commerce from 40 to 75 cents an hour, improved the enforcement provisions, and clarified and modified the overtime provision and the exemptions. The basic protection of this minimum wage applies to about 21 million employees, constituting more than half of all employees in the United States other than those working for Government agencies. During the year marked progress was made in putting these important changes in the law into effect. Wage rates below 75 cents were permitted, under circumscribed conditions, for handicapped workers, for apprentices, for learners in occupations which require training periods, and for workers in certain industries in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. The wage orders applicable to industries in these two areas are reviewed periodically in order to achieve the statutory objective of the 75-cent minimum wage as rapidly as economically feasible.

The year 1951 saw an increase in the subminimum rates for learners in a number of industries. The general direction of these revisions was to-

ward the establishment of a 65-cent hourly base for learners' rates, as compared with the 55-cent and 60-cent level which prevailed generally during 1950. New rates were set in the hosiery industry, the cotton-garment industry, and in a number of others.

Under the Walsh-Healey Act,³² two new wage determinations were issued by the Secretary of Labor in 1951, and proceedings on several others were nearing completion. This is the Federal law which requires that at least the minimum wage prevailing in an industry be paid in the execution of Government contracts for materials, supplies, and equipment, exceeding 10,000 dollars in value. The new wage determinations covered the Chemical and Related Products Industry and the Dental Goods and Equipment Manufacturing Industry. These were in addition to the rates already set in some 40 industries, many of which have been the subject of more than one determination. In most important industries in which no wage determination has been made, employment is generally covered by the 75-cent hourly minimum under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

State minimum-wage laws, designed to assure the workers covered by them at least a minimum adequate standard of living, are in effect in 26 States. Three States strengthened their laws during 1951. Most laws apply only to women and minors but in five States—Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island—they apply also to adult men workers. In Connecticut the minimum-wage law of that State, applying to men, women, and minors, was amended to establish the same statutory minimum-wage rate as is fixed by the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act—namely, 75 cents an hour. The Act also deleted the provision allowing the wage board to differentiate between male, female, and minor employees in recommending minimum-wage rates.

During the year 1951, 26 wage orders improving wage rates and working conditions were issued in the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and 11 States—Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. Of these, seven orders in four States established a basic minimum wage of 75 cents an hour, the minimum currently in effect under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act for workers in interstate commerce. In a number of States, other wage orders were in process of revision at the end of the year.

Women Workers. All but four States have laws regulating the hours of employment of women. In 1951 New York made permanent the provision permitting women over 21 to be employed until midnight in mercantile establishments and also passed bills removing certain prohibitions on

³⁰ 52 Stat. 1060.

³¹ 63 Stat. 910.

³² 49 Stat. 2036.

employment of women at night by permitting women to work in factory-operated restaurants in the previously restricted period between midnight and 6 a. m. and permitting them to work in other restaurants after midnight with the consent of the State Industrial Commissioner. Indiana suspended the operation of its night-work law covering manufacturing establishments for a 10-year period ending March 15, 1961. A number of States enacted laws to permit relaxation of hour standards for women during the national defense emergency under specific conditions.

The Massachusetts Legislature approved a bill to tighten the provisions of its law on equal pay for women. Maine enacted a teachers' equal pay law. At the end of the year, 12 States and Alaska had equal-pay laws in effect for women in private employment, while 16 States and the District of Columbia had equal-pay laws for teachers.

Right to Strike. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1951 upheld the right of workers to strike in a decision which held invalid a Wisconsin State law outlawing the right to strike in the case of failure of bargaining negotiations where the employer involved furnished essential public-utility service.³³ The Supreme Court held that the law was in conflict with Federal law in that it prohibited the exercise of rights guaranteed by Federal labor legislation.

Nondiscrimination in Employment. Under an Executive order in February 1951 by which President Truman authorized the Departments of Defense and Commerce to let defense contracts,³⁴ he directed that there should be no discrimination in connection with the letting of such contracts against any person on the ground of race, creed, color, or national origin, and that all contracts let under these conditions should contain a provision that the contractor and any subcontractor thereunder should not so discriminate.

In December 1951 President Truman issued an Executive order³⁵ establishing a Committee on Government Contract Compliance, the purpose of which was to secure better compliance by contractors and subcontractors with provisions in their contracts with the U. S. Government obligating them to practice nondiscrimination in the performance of their contracts. These provisions specifically forbade discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin and extended to subcontracts as well as to original contracts. They had not, however, been secured by any system of uniform regulation or inspection common to all the contracting agencies of the Federal Govern-

ment and widely understood by the contractors and their employees. The Executive order was intended to correct this deficiency. It placed the primary responsibility for securing compliance with the nondiscriminatory provisions with the head of the agency of the Federal Government letting each contract. The Committee appointed under the order was expected to examine and study the compliance procedures in use and to recommend changes that would strengthen them. It was to be composed of five members representing Government agencies and six other members designated by the President. President Truman in issuing the order expressed the view that in fulfilling a contract with the Federal Government a contractor should follow the national policy of equal treatment and opportunity.

Colorado in 1951 enacted a fair-employment-practices law providing for an educational approach to problems of discrimination in private employment because of race, creed, color, and national origin, or ancestry. In signing the law, Gov. Dan Thornton called the act "a forward step in human relations" and reaffirmed "Colorado's belief in equal rights for all." In the city of Denver, Colo., the City Council approved an ordinance establishing a permanent Commission on Human Relations, succeeding previous committees appointed by the mayor. The purpose is to eliminate bias in employment of city and county workers and in providing city services to the public.

The action of Colorado makes three States that have the educational type of fair-employment-practices law for private employment—Colorado, Indiana, and Wisconsin. Eight States—Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington—have acts under which authority is provided to enforce the ban on specified practices of discrimination. In 1951 the New Jersey antidiscrimination law was amended by adding a prohibition against discrimination because of liability for military service; and a California law prohibited discrimination in the acceptance of apprentices on public works on the ground of race, creed, or color.

The New Jersey Constitution of 1948 provided for municipal or local committees on civil rights in each of the townships. By 1951, 17 such local public intergroup-relations agencies existed in New Jersey.

New Jersey has a Division Against Discrimination in the State Department of Education, with a budget of 65 thousand dollars and 12 employees. It is under the Commissioner of Education and the Assistant Commissioner of Education is director of the Division Against Discrimination.

Besides the 11 States having fair-employment laws, local ordinances regarding fair-employment practices were in effect in some 20 cities, including Phoenix, Ariz.; Chicago, Ill.; Sioux City, Iowa; Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Youngstown,

³³ *Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway, and Motor Coach Employees, Division 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board*, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).

³⁴ Executive Order No. 10201, 16 *Fed. Reg.* 1049. The directive was extended on Oct. 31, 1951, to cover contract letting by the Department of the Interior, by Executive Order No. 10298, 16 *Fed. Reg.* 11135.

³⁵ 16 *Fed. Reg.* 12303.

Ohio; and Philadelphia, Pa. Eight of these ordinances were adopted during 1951. In Philadelphia the new city charter created a Commission on Human Relations which would take over the duties of the municipal Fair Employment Practices Commission, created by an ordinance in 1948. By the end of 1951, fair-employment-practices legislation existed in States or cities which held 32.5 percent of the Nation's population.

HOUSING AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION

Housing Legislation. Basic Federal legislation intended to furnish assistance in providing suitable housing dates from before World War II. The Housing Act of 1949³⁶ provided aid in the housing of low-income families and for slum clearance and urban redevelopment. The 1949 Act set forth the goal of the U.S. housing program as a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family. The Housing Act of 1950³⁷ authorized more liberal financial assistance for construction of low-cost houses through the mortgage-insurance program.

Much of the Federal legislation affecting housing enacted in 1951 had as its purpose assistance in the provision of housing and community facilities essential for workers in areas which had become critical housing areas as a result of defense activities. Public Law 139,³⁸ approved Sept. 1, 1951, contained provisions to assure that private enterprise would be afforded full opportunity to provide the housing needed and set up a liberal mortgage-insurance program to assist private enterprise in such undertakings, such assistance to be available in critical areas for a period of not less than 90 days before the Federal Government would construct any permanent housing in such an area. The Federal Government was to construct only such necessary housing as private builders did not within the 90-day period indicate they would provide. The President was authorized to provide essential community facilities and services and to make loans and grants to local communities to assist them in providing community facilities and services.

Other laws affecting housing provided an additional 3,875,000 dollars for loans for housing in Alaska and authorized the provision of temporary housing or emergency shelter in the case of major disasters.

Legislation affecting housing was also enacted by over three-fourths of the State and territorial legislatures in session during 1951.

Laws regarding housing authorities in Georgia, Hawaii, Nevada, and Puerto Rico were amended to authorize any housing authority having rural areas within its jurisdiction to undertake the provision of housing for persons of low income within

such areas. New York created seven new housing authorities in towns and cities in that State. Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Nevada made provision for veterans' preference in admission to low-rent housing projects.

Seven States, making a total of 34 States, four Territories, and the District of Columbia, enacted new legislation authorizing the undertaking of slum clearance and local redevelopment projects by local public agencies.

Nondiscrimination in Housing. A trend toward elimination of discrimination in housing and public accommodation continued in 1951.

The Housing and Home Finance Agency issued a statement of policy designed to eliminate discrimination with respect to families belonging to minority groups displaced in the course of Federally assisted slum clearance operations requiring suitable rehousing arrangements for such families.³⁹

Another policy statement required communities planning defense housing to be assisted by the Federal Government to provide fully for incoming defense workers of minority groups. It was also stated that defense housing and community facilities to be provided directly by the Housing and Home Finance Administrator should be available for any eligible worker, with no denial on the basis of race, color, creed, or national origin.⁴⁰

The Public Housing Administration's Low-Rent Housing Manual, in a general statement on racial policy applicable to all low-rent housing projects developed and operated under the Housing Act of 1937, declared that to be eligible for assistance, programs must reflect equitable provision for eligible families of all races in accordance with the volume and urgency of their needs for such housing, and that such housing should be of substantially the same quality, with the same conveniences and facilities.

State and local governmental agencies also took action against discrimination in connection with housing.⁴¹

A Wisconsin law relating to sale of property for nonpayment of taxes was amended to provide that racial restrictions on the property were not among restrictions surviving a tax sale.

In New York City an ordinance was enacted to bar discrimination in selection of tenants for housing built with city aid. In this ordinance it was declared to be the policy of the city to assure equal opportunity to all residents to live in decent, sani-

³⁶ This statement of policy appeared in an announcement by the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency on Nov. 5, 1951. See Housing and Home Finance Agency press release HHFA-0A-241.

³⁷ Statement by Housing and Home Finance Administrator, Nov. 15, 1951.

³⁸ For the texts of these provisions, see *Non-discrimination Clauses in Regard to Public Housing and Urban Redevelopment Undertakings* (Washington, Housing and Home Finance Agency, November 1950) and supplements thereto.

³⁹ 63 Stat. 413.

³⁷ 64 Stat. 48.

³⁶ 65 Stat. 293.

tary, and healthful living quarters, regardless of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry.

Other cities making statements of policy opposed to discrimination in connection with public housing and urban redevelopment were Cincinnati, Pasco, Wash., Omaha, Nebr., Pontiac, Mich., and Toledo.

In Los Angeles County, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution prohibiting discrimination in the use of any land owned by the county. In the city of Los Angeles the City Council passed an ordinance declaring that all plans for city-assisted redevelopment projects shall contain clauses prohibiting discrimination and segregation in the sale or renting of housing units in these projects.

In the case of *City of Birmingham v. Monk*⁴² the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the District Court and held that a city zoning ordinance making it unlawful for Negroes to occupy property for residential purposes in areas zoned as white-residential, and making it unlawful for white persons to occupy property for the same purpose in an area zoned as Negro-residential, violated the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States which prohibits States from depriving persons of property without due process of law. The Supreme Court of the United States refused to review this decision on May 28, 1951.

Among State and local acts to prevent discrimination in access to and use of places of public accommodation were the repeal by the Maryland Legislature of a law requiring segregation of Negroes on intrastate steamboats and railways, which had long been obsolete except on Chesapeake Bay ferry boats; amendment of a Wisconsin law prohibiting hotels, resorts, or other places of public accommodation or amusement from discrimination on account of race or color, to include prohibition also of discrimination because of creed, national origin, or ancestry, and of discriminatory advertising; and a provision in the newly adopted City Charter in Philadelphia against discrimination in extending the use of city property.

HEALTH

Congress passed several laws in 1951 to improve health services or protection to citizens of the country. Among them was Public Law 139, already mentioned, which assists in the provision of hospital and sanitary facilities in communities affected by defense activities. Under its provisions the Surgeon General of the United States is to administer the portions of the law dealing with health, sewage, and sanitation facilities. The Migratory Farm Labor Act includes provision for emergency medical care for this group of workers. A protective law, an amendment to the

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, bars the sale, without prescription, of certain barbiturates, narcotics, and new experimental drugs.

Most significant of State legislation enacted in 1951 were several mental-health laws. During 1951 Idaho and Utah adopted the model State mental-health law which provides for (1) maximum opportunity for prompt medical care; (2) protection against emotionally harmful or degrading treatment; and (3) protection against wrongful confinement and deprivation of rights. The South Carolina Legislature passed a law setting up the South Carolina Mental Health Commission and providing for revision of the mental-health laws. In addition, a 5 million dollar bond issue was initiated to provide for the construction of State mental institutions. The State of Washington enacted a new law regarding psychopathic delinquents; it provides for their release from State hospitals upon correction of personality problems. Individuals thus concerned may become useful members of society without criminal convictions on their records. Also, a law for rehabilitation of mentally handicapped children was passed by the State Legislature. In this same vein, the North Carolina Legislature passed a law which provides for treatment of "mentally dangerous" persons who were charged with crime and found innocent. Other States which enacted mental-health legislation were New Jersey, Vermont, and California.

Legislation recognizing alcoholism as an illness was enacted in several States. As the result of such legislation, boards, divisions or commissions on alcoholism were created in Michigan, Georgia, Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Vermont. In addition, educational programs to combat alcoholism have been provided for in Georgia, Indiana, Maine, North Dakota, and Vermont. The Georgia law provides procedures for committal of alcoholics for treatment and rehabilitation. Florida passed a law for the establishment of a hospital for alcoholics. Thirty-nine States and the District of Columbia have official agencies for medical care, research, and rehabilitation in the field of alcoholism, following the basic principle of regarding alcoholism as a disease rather than viewing its victims as criminals and social misfits.

The chronically ill were also beneficiaries of State legislation in 1951. Minnesota passed a law authorizing its counties to create and maintain nursing homes for the chronically ill and aged person. New Jersey passed legislation providing for State-supervised, county-operated programs of assistance to chronically ill persons.

For the benefit of sufferers from tuberculosis New York's Legislature made a requirement that each county should afford free hospital care for tuberculosis patients, while Delaware provided a bond issue for the improvement of its tuberculosis sanitariums.

⁴² 185 F. 2d 859 (1951); 341 U. S. 940 (1951), certiorari denied.

Connecticut passed legislation granting financial aid to a program of nursing education.

General legislation enacted during the year included statutes creating a Department of Health in Arizona and authorizing the creation of city, county, or district public-health departments in Wyoming. The Federal Government and most States already have official agencies responsible for public-health activities.

CHILD WELFARE

Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth. The Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth held at the end of 1950 constituted one of the high points in work for children in the United States in recent years and was among the largest citizen undertakings in behalf of children in the history of the country. The conference was called by the President and planned by a national committee of citizens appointed by him. It was sponsored on behalf of the Federal Government by the Children's Bureau of the Federal Security Agency, in accordance with its function, as defined in the basic legislation creating it in 1912,⁴³ to investigate and report on all matters related to child life and to increase opportunity for the full development of all children by promoting their health and social welfare. The U.S. Congress made special appropriations to the Children's Bureau for the conference.

One result of the conference was the creation of a National Midcentury Committee, organized in the spring of 1951. This committee, in collaboration with agencies of the Federal Government, the latter working through the Federal Interdepartmental Committee for Children and Youth, set six program goals as a follow-up of the work of the Midcentury Conference. These goals are:⁴⁴

1. Strengthening family life.
2. Providing opportunities for young people to take part in significant local, State, and national activities.
3. Providing equal opportunities for all children with particular reference to overcoming those conditions which make for discrimination because of race, religion, or national origin.
4. Strengthening spiritual life.
5. Pooling the skills of the experts from different fields to further the total well-being of the child.
6. Encouraging the application and use of tested research knowledge in programs for children and youth.

Prohibition of Child Labor. Prohibition of child labor and regulation of work by young

⁴³ 37 Stat. 79.

⁴⁴ The text of these recommendations may be found in the *Social Security Bulletin* published by the U.S. Federal Security Agency, vol. xiv, No. 2, February 1951, p. 10.

people has been dealt with in the United States in both Federal and State legislation. The basic law, the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,⁴⁵ set minimum standards for the employment of young people in establishments engaged in producing goods for shipment in interstate commerce. The provisions of this act were strengthened by amendments, which became effective in January 1950,⁴⁶ and tightened the prohibitions on child labor. These included a direct instead of an indirect prohibition of the employment of underage children in the production of goods for interstate commerce, a direct prohibition of their employment in interstate commerce, and a provision which permits their employment in agriculture only outside of school hours in the district in which they are working. In 1951 considerable progress was made in implementing these amendments.

Several orders issued under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act came into effect, by which certain occupations were designated as hazardous, in which children less than 18 years of age were forbidden to work. Hazardous Occupations Order No. 9, which became effective in January 1951, applied the act's 18-year minimum age standard for hazardous work to all underground and some surface occupations in all mines other than coal mines, to which an earlier hazardous occupations order applies.

State laws regulating conditions of work for young people were improved in four States during 1951. In New Hampshire the 14-year minimum age standard was made applicable to all occupations except agriculture and domestic service, instead of to specified occupations. Age certificates were required for minors 16 and 17 years of age in Delaware. In California workmen's compensation benefits were increased 50 percent for minors injured while illegally employed. Under an Ohio law the minimum age for employment in a number of hazardous occupations was raised from 16 to 18, and an 18-year minimum was set for additional occupations.

Aid to Handicapped Children. The legislature of Illinois authorized local school boards to establish and maintain special educational facilities for mentally handicapped children. State aid for such programs was to be granted up to a maximum of \$250 per child.

In Arizona a program was set up for the education of homebound crippled children, as well as for crippled children in institutions; provision was made for the establishment of a children's colony for handicapped children.

Public Child Welfare Services. Laws were enacted in Delaware and Florida establishing departments of welfare with responsibility for public child-welfare services. New Jersey authorized

⁴⁵ 52 Stat. 1060.

⁴⁶ 63 Stat. 910.

State-wide services and financial aid for children with the proviso that they should be available when and so long as these are not available from a private agency. The Southern Illinois Services Center was established under the Department of Public Welfare to care for children when private and local public services are not available. The State of Washington established a Division of Youth Services within the Department of Institutions to assist in the provision of public services for delinquent children.

EDUCATION

Public education in the United States is a function of the individual States and their subdivisions, rather than of the Federal Government, and educational systems and laws relating to education vary somewhat from State to State. Everywhere, however, public education is free in the elementary and secondary schools. Compulsory education laws differ somewhat from State to State, with school-leaving ages ranging from 14 to 18, but including all elementary schooling. With education thus accessible to all, enrollment in elementary and secondary schools, public and private, in the United States set a new record in 1951 at 29,828,000, while college and university enrollments numbered about 2,500,000.

Enrollments at this record level put a severe strain on the physical facilities of the school system of the country. Extensive use was made during the year of the two important laws passed by Congress during September 1950,⁴⁷ which provided for assistance by the U. S. Government in construction of schools in areas affected by Federal activities, and for Federal assistance to schools in such communities for current operating expenses.

Efforts were made to cope with the shortage of teachers, particularly teachers in elementary schools. The average salary of teachers in elementary schools in the United States during 1950-51 was \$2,980—a 3.3 percent increase over the preceding year. A ruling by the Wage Stabilization Board gave school authorities the right to raise salaries of teachers at their own discretion, provided the increases did not exceed the 10 percent over January 1950 levels permitted as increases to industrial workers and other segments of the labor force of the country. A California law set a minimum of \$3,000 for salaries of public school teachers in that State.

Several States adopted legislation affecting segregation in the schools and for the prevention of discrimination in educational opportunities.

Arizona adopted a law making segregation in the schools optional with local school boards and as a result Tucson and several other cities changed to a nonsegregated school system.

⁴⁷ 64 Stat. 967,1100. These laws are summarized in the report on *Human Rights in the United States in 1950*. See BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1076.

In New York the Fair Educational Practices Act was amended to cover unfair discriminatory practices governing admission to trade and business schools, while an Oregon law made it illegal for vocational, professional, or trade schools to discriminate in admissions on the basis of race or creed. The New Jersey Division Against Discrimination reported that as of December 1950 no cases had come to its attention involving admission policies and practices in postsecondary (higher) schools.

In Illinois discrimination in schools of nursing and of optometry was prohibited by administrative action of the State Department of Registration and Education.

On the other hand, the Georgia Legislature passed a school appropriation bill containing a provision withholding all State funds from the public school and university system, if any court should order the admission of Negroes to institutions heretofore reserved for whites.

In line with the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1950 on cases involving discrimination in university education, considerable numbers of Negro students were admitted to the graduate schools of several southern State universities.

Vocational Rehabilitation. Vocational rehabilitation of the physically handicapped has been a recognized function of the Federal and State Governments in the United States for more than 30 years. Under Federal law, the Federal Office of Vocational Rehabilitation approves State plans for vocational rehabilitation, grants funds to State agencies, develops standards and assists State agencies in their plans and operations.

In 1951 the legislature of West Virginia amended its laws relating to the vocational rehabilitation of disabled individuals to include provision for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of special centers for the vocational rehabilitation of handicapped persons and of workshops for blind and severely disabled persons. This is the first State legislation of its kind enacted, although the establishment of special centers for rehabilitation of severely disabled individuals has been accelerated throughout the country.

The Montana Legislature passed an act providing for preference to blind or severely disabled persons in securing, through lease, license, or other type of contract, space in State-owned or other public buildings. This action brought to 21 the number of States having such legislation with respect to State-owned or other public buildings.

CULTURAL RIGHTS

The right to participate freely in the cultural life of the community and to enjoy its cultural advantages is exercised in the United States not only by American citizens, but by large numbers of visitors from abroad, who come to this country both as a result of the U.S. Government's program

of exchange of persons, and through privately sponsored exchange arrangements, or of their own volition.

The U.S. Government's program of exchange in the field of cultural relations was increased greatly during 1951. This was especially true of the international exchange of persons, by which government grants enable teachers, research scholars, labor leaders, newspaper publishers, editors, and writers to come to the United States for study and research, with provision for travel and observation as desired, while similar grants permit Americans to travel abroad.⁴⁸

International exchange of persons is provided for in several types of programs officially sponsored by the Federal Government.⁴⁹ The U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act (Smith-Mundt Act)⁵⁰ provides for a reciprocal exchange of students, trainees, educators, and leaders of thought and opinion between the United States and other participating countries, which vary from year to year. The Fulbright Act⁵¹ authorizes the use of certain foreign currencies and credits acquired through the sale of surplus property abroad for educational exchanges. By 1951, 24 countries had made agreements with the United States to participate in such exchanges. Several programs provided for exchanges of persons between the United States and certain countries or areas. The convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, popularly known as the Buenos Aires convention,⁵² provides for the annual exchange of two graduate students between each of the signatory American Republics. There are specialized programs for exchanges with Germany⁵³ and Austria.⁵⁴ A program of educational exchange with Finland⁵⁵ authorizes the use of payments by Finland on her debt to the United States for exchanges of persons and educational materials between the two countries. An Iranian-American trust fund arrangement⁵⁶ provides that the amount paid by the Government of Iran in settlement of a claim by the U.S. Government be expended for the education of Iranian students

⁴⁸ Under these plans of exchange more than 7,800 persons were exchanged under programs conducted with 70 countries during the year ending June 30, 1951. Of these, 6,291 were awarded grants to come to the United States, while some 1,528 Americans received grants for similar travel abroad. In addition, grants were awarded to 2,894 Chinese students and scholars to complete their studies in this country.

⁴⁹ For additional details on exchange in the field of cultural relations, see the *Seventh and Eighth Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of State to Congress on the International Information and Exchange Program, for 1951* (Department of State publications 4401 and 4575).

⁵⁰ 62 Stat. 6.

⁵¹ 60 Stat. 754.

⁵² U.S. Treaty Series No. 928, 51 Stat. 178.

⁵³ 64 Stat. 198.

⁵⁴ 64 Stat. 613.

⁵⁵ 63 Stat. 630.

⁵⁶ 64 Stat. 1081.

in the United States. A Chinese emergency aid program⁵⁷ provides assistance to Chinese students and scholars in the United States. Exchange activities also took place during 1951 under the technical cooperation and economic cooperation programs, consisting generally in bringing foreign nationals to the United States as trainees and in sending U.S. experts abroad to help participating countries with problems related to their economic or technical developments.

Other foreign visitors came to the United States for cultural and educational purposes and Americans traveled abroad under privately sponsored exchange projects, which, however, received Government encouragement and assistance. Some 4,800 persons were exchanged through assistance given to 464 private organizations, fraternal and business groups, educational institutions, and foreign governments. Also, in accordance with the provisions of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act, some 513 exchange visitor programs were designated, by which 17,700 persons were exchanged under Government and private programs.

During 1951 approximately 30,000 foreign students were studying in American colleges and universities.

While only a small percentage of the visitors to the United States for cultural purposes were supported by Government grants, numbers of others were assisted in their visits, in such matters as establishing professional and community contacts, by orientation and service centers for foreign visitors operated by the U.S. Government in New York City, Washington, Miami, New Orleans, and San Francisco. These centers, which served nearly 20,000 foreign visitors in 1951, arrange visits with local civic, business, cultural, religious, and other groups to enable foreign visitors to gain a more accurate picture of America and its way of life than would be otherwise possible.

II. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Several international agreements which came into force during 1951 contained important provisions dealing with human rights.

The Charter of the Organization of American States,⁵⁸ which had been signed at Bogotá on April 30, 1948, was ratified by the United States during 1951 and came into force December 13, 1951. Its ratification by the U.S. Senate was accompanied by the reservation that "none of its provisions shall be considered as enlarging the powers of the Federal Government of the United States or limiting the powers of the several states of the Federal Union with respect to any matters recognized

⁵⁷ 63 Stat. 709, 64 Stat. 198.

⁵⁸ For text, see Department of State publication 4479. Pertinent clauses of the Charter appear in the *United Nations Yearbook on Human Rights for 1948*, pp. 437-439.

under the Constitution as being within the reserved powers of the several states.”

The agreement between the United States and Iceland for the defense of Iceland pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed on May 5, 1951, was followed by an annex on the status of U.S. personnel and property in Iceland, which was signed on May 8, 1951, and entered into force on that day.⁵⁹ The annex contained provisions regarding the rights to fair trial of members of the U.S. forces in Iceland or dependents of members of such forces who might be prosecuted under the jurisdiction of Iceland. It was agreed that such persons should be entitled to a prompt and speedy trial; to be informed in advance of the specific charges made against them; to be confronted with the opposing witnesses; to have compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses, if these were within the jurisdiction of Iceland; to defense by a qualified advocate; to have the assistance of a qualified interpreter; and to communicate with a representative of their Government.

A new agreement between the United States and Mexico regarding Mexican agricultural workers employed in the United States was signed and entered into force on August 11, 1951.⁶⁰ The agreement dealt with workers who were selected in Mexico under the auspices of the Mexican Government and whose work was carried out in the United States under a standard work contract, which was incorporated into the agreement and the observance of which was to be supervised by representatives of the U.S. and Mexican Governments. The agreement contained in article 8 provides against discrimination against Mexican workers because of their nationality or ancestry. Article 15 regarding wages provided that the employer should pay wages to a Mexican worker at the contracted rate or at a rate not less than the rate prevailing in the area for similar work of domestic agricultural workers, whichever is the greater. By article 35 the U.S. Government agreed to exercise vigilance and influence to the end that Mexican workers might enjoy impartially and expeditiously the rights granted by the laws of the United States.

The standard work contract contained clauses requiring the provision for the Mexican workers of hygienic lodgings, adequate to the climate conditions of the area and not inferior to those ordinarily furnished to domestic workers in the area. The contract contained standard clauses relating to provision of medical care and personal injury compensation, methods of wage payment, and wage standards.

Three agreements were made in 1951 to devote to educational purposes the proceeds in foreign currency arising from disposal of surplus property

by the U.S. Government. Such agreements were concluded with Denmark, Iraq, and Japan.⁶¹ The agreements with Denmark and Iraq provided for the creation of the U.S. Educational Foundations in Denmark and Iraq and an exchange of students and teachers, while the Japanese agreement covered the activities of the U.S. Educational Commission in Japan, and an educational exchange program.

Two international agreements came into force which helped to guarantee the right of an author to protection of the moral and material interests resulting from his literary or artistic productions.⁶² These were copyright agreements with Finland and Italy, which extended the time for complying with copyright provisions by reason of conditions, such as difficulty of communication, arising out of World War II.

A number of other international agreements concluded during 1951 dealt with cooperation between the United States and other countries under the terms of the Point Four Program for extending technical assistance to underdeveloped areas. This assistance is designed to aid in the advancement of economic and social standards in the underdeveloped regions of the world. This Program was first proposed by President Truman in his inaugural address on January 20, 1949, as the fourth point in a statement on American foreign policy. The act for international development, approved June 5, 1950,⁶³ gave the Program legislative sanction, while Public Law 165, approved October 10, 1951, authorized continuance of the Program. The United States also contributed to the expanded program of technical assistance administered through the United Nations and the specialized agencies.

Each project for technical assistance administered under the United States program grows out of the requests from a foreign government and is worked out cooperatively through an agreement between the Technical Cooperation Administration and the government of the country concerned, in terms of personnel, equipment, funds, and other contributions to be supplied by each party. Activities under the Point Four Program aim at raising the living standards of the underdeveloped areas by helping to increase food production, stamping out disease, improving schools, developing water and mineral resources, and bettering transportation, housing, public administration, and industry. American technicians go out to work with the technicians and people of other countries on these problems and supply advice and technical skills to further development projects, and qualified persons from these countries are also

⁶¹ For the texts of these agreements, see Department of State publications 4424, 4269, and 4438.

⁶² For the texts of these agreements, see Department of State publications 4511 and 4510.

⁶³ 64 Stat. 204.

⁵⁹ For the texts of the agreement and annex, see Department of State publications 4294 and 4351.

⁶⁰ For text, see Department of State publication 4435.

given additional training opportunities in the United States.

Most of the general agreements for Point Four cooperation with other countries were concluded during 1950 and 1951. By the end of 1951 there were more than 30 such bilateral agreements in force. These general agreements were supplemented by a number of specific agreements covering individual projects, distribution of costs, and despatch of American advisory missions, particularly in the fields of agriculture, health and sanitation, and education. As a result of requests from governments and the agreements resulting therefrom, there were by the end of 1951, 619 American technicians working on over 200 projects in 33 countries.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Regional Association for Africa (WMO)

The Department of State announced on January 15 (press release 28) that the First Session of the Regional Association for Africa of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) will convene in Tananarive, Madagascar, on January 19. The United States will be represented by an observer delegation, as follows:

Chairman

Arthur W. Johnson, Meteorological Attaché, Geneva

Adviser

Vernon O. Snead, Major, U. S. A. F., Department of Defense

Participants in the forthcoming meeting will discuss technical meteorological questions, technical-assistance projects in Africa, and actions required on the part of members of this Regional Association by resolutions and recommendations of other bodies of WMO.

WMO, established in 1951, is a specialized agency of the United Nations which evolved from the International Meteorological Organization. Its basic objective is to coordinate, standardize, and improve world meteorological activities and to encourage an efficient exchange of meteorological information between countries. The functions of each of the six regional associations of WMO include promotion of the execution in the region of resolutions of the WMO Congress and Executive Committee; coordination of meteorological and associated activities in the region; and making recommendations to the WMO Congress and Executive Committee on matters within the scope of the organization.

Associations have been established by WMO for the regions of Africa, Asia, South America, North and Central America, the Southwest Pacific, and

Europe. The membership of each association is determined by the meteorological observation networks lying in or extending into the particular region, but regional association meetings are open to official observers representing any member of WMO.

Population Commission (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on January 16 (press release 33) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the seventh session of the Population Commission of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (Ecosoc), scheduled to meet at New York, January 19-30, 1953, by the following delegation:

Acting U.S. Representative

Roy V. Peel, Director, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce

Advisers

Dudley Kirk, Division of Functional Intelligence, Department of State
Conrad Taueber, Assistant Director, Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce

The Population Commission is one of the functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council which were established in 1946, under article 68 of the U.N. Charter, to make studies, prepare reports and other material, and advise the Council with respect to matters within their respective special fields. The specific functions of the Population Commission are to study and advise the Council on population changes and trends, migrations, and any other demographic questions on which U.N. bodies seek advice.

Items to be considered during the forthcoming session include progress reports on projects in the fields of population studies and demographic statistics; report of the first meeting of a preparatory committee for a world conference of experts on population, scheduled to be held in 1954 under U.N. sponsorship in collaboration with the interested specialized agencies and the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population; studies of the interrelationships between population trends and social and economic factors; a proposed program of studies of fertility and mortality; studies and research in migration and draft recommendations for the improvement of migration statistics; questions pertaining to population censuses taken in and around 1950; seminars and training courses in demographic techniques and analysis, to be held as projects of the U.N. Technical Assistance Administration during 1953 and 1954; demographic aspects of the programs of the regional economic commissions; revision of draft recommendations for improvement and standardization of vital statistics; concerted practical action on population questions; and a schedule of priorities for future work of the United Nations in the field of population.

Visa Work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service

CHANGES UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF JUNE 27, 1952: PART I

by *Eliot B. Coulter*

The Immigration and Nationality Act was enacted on June 27, 1952, over a Presidential veto, to become effective December 24, 1952.¹ The act, which was based upon a study by congressional committees of the immigration system of the United States, was designed to include in one act the permanent provisions of the immigration laws which Congress considered should be retained and new provisions believed to be desirable.

The act generally removes racial bars to immigration and naturalization. The act eliminates the previous discrimination between the sexes by placing a husband and a wife upon the same basis. The definition of "child" as a member of a family group has been expanded in the act to include a stepchild and a legitimate child, but not an adopted child.

The act modifies the previous list of classes of excludable aliens.

The act provides a more detailed and practical classification of nonimmigrants and immigrants. Preference immigrant status within each immigration quota is provided for needed skilled workers and for certain classes of relatives of U.S. citizens and of alien permanent residents.

The act follows the "national origins" principle, inaugurated in the Immigration Act of 1924, in the determination of the immigration quotas other than those within a newly created Asia-Pacific triangle quota area.

The act provides for the creation within the Department of State of a Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, under an administrator. The Bureau will include a Passport Office, a Visa Office, and such other offices as the Secretary of State may establish, under separate directors.

Dual System of Examination of Aliens Continued

The act continues the dual system of examination of aliens seeking to enter the United States through the issuance by consular officers abroad of visas to qualified applicants and through the examination by immigration officers at ports of entry of aliens who have obtained visas. This procedure follows the usual international practice. The jurisdiction of the two services does not overlap, but close liaison is maintained to insure a uniform interpretation of the law.

In the operation of the visa system, visa applicants are given appointment dates for a discussion of their cases or are registered on a quota waiting list for later appointment scheduling when their turns are reached.

Applicants are informed of the documents, including a passport, which they should assemble and of the evidence which they should present for the purpose of establishing their proper classification under the law and their eligibility to receive visas.

Consular officers are responsible under the law for the issuance or refusal of visas. The Department of State is responsible for the general supervision of the administration of the act, insofar as the Department of State and the Foreign Service are concerned. The Department of State may instruct consular officers regarding interpretations of the law and may furnish them with advisory opinions concerning other phases of the work. The Department of State may also obtain reports from consular officers in individual visa cases under an informal visa review procedure with a view to determining whether the action taken or contemplated is in accord with the law and regulations.

¹ Public Law 414, 82d Cong., 2d sess.

In the course of a year, consular officers examine several hundreds of thousands of visa applicants, issue visas to aliens who qualify under the law, and refuse visas to those who fail to qualify thereunder. At many posts, officers of the U.S. Public Health Service conduct the medical examination of immigrants and, where deemed necessary, of nonimmigrants. At other posts, where such officers are not available, the medical examinations are conducted by competent local physicians.

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, like the Immigration Act of 1924, classifies aliens desiring to proceed to the United States as *immigrants* and *nonimmigrants*. Under the act an alien is classified as an immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, and to the satisfaction of the immigration officer at the time of application at a port of entry for admission, that he is a nonimmigrant.

Classification of Nonimmigrants

Nonimmigrants are classified under the 1952 act as follows:

- (A) Government officials
- (B) Temporary visitors
- (C) Transit aliens
- (D) Crewmen
- (E) Treaty aliens
- (F) Students
- (G) International organization aliens
- (H) Temporary workers
- (I) Representatives of foreign press, radio, film, or other foreign information media.

Government Officials—The 1952 act classifies foreign-government officials in three categories under the provisions of section 101 (a) (15) (A) as follows:

- (1) Ambassador, public minister, or career diplomatic or consular officer.

To be eligible for this nonimmigrant classification

(Symbol A-1) the official must have been accredited by a foreign government recognized *de jure* by the United States, and he must be accepted by the President or the Secretary of State. The members of the immediate family of such official are accorded a similar classification.

(2) Other officials and employees of a foreign government.

To be eligible for this nonimmigrant classification (Symbol A-2) such aliens must have been accredited by a foreign government recognized *de jure* by the United States and must be accepted by the Secretary of State. Such foreign government must accord to the United States similar privileges with respect to United States officials and employees. The members of the immediate families of such officials and employees are accorded a similar classification.

(3) Attendants, servants, personal employees of the officials and employees of a foreign government referred to in (1) and (2).

To be eligible for this nonimmigrant classification, the foreign government must accord to the United States similar privileges with respect to United States officials and employees. The members of the immediate families of such attendants, personal employees and servants are accorded a similar classification.

The act exempts foreign-government officials of these three classes from certain of the exclusion and deportation provisions of the act in view of the fact that the U. S. Government maintains diplomatic relations with countries which may be expected to send representatives and employees to the United States who, without such exemptions, would be excludable. In general, the aliens of these classes are required to have passports and obtain suitable visas, and are not exempted from the provisions of the act relating to public safety.

Temporary Visitors—The 1952 act provides nonimmigrant classification for a temporary visitor, defined in the act as:

an alien (other than one coming for the purpose of study or of performing skilled or unskilled labor or as a representative of foreign press, radio, film, or other information media coming to engage in such vocation) having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning and who is visiting the United States temporarily for business or temporarily for pleasure.

The term "business" refers to legitimate activities of a commercial or professional character but does not include purely local employment or labor for hire. The term "pleasure" refers to the purpose of an alien in coming to the United States temporarily as a tourist or for some other legitimate purpose, including amusement, health, rest, visits with relatives or friends, or education incidental to other purposes. An alien coming to the United States for the purpose of "study" is required to qualify under (F) as a "student" and is not classifiable as a temporary visitor.

Related Materials

Article by Mr. Coulter on the Department's visa work—BULLETIN of Oct. 10, 1949, p. 523; also available as Department of State publication 3649.

Text of President Truman's message explaining his veto of the Immigration and Nationality Act—BULLETIN of July 14, 1952, p. 78.

Text of regulations relating to diplomatic visas and to the documentation of nonimmigrants and immigrants, issued by the Department of State on Dec. 15, 1952—17 *Fed. Reg.* 11565.

Text of regulations issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, on Dec. 17, 1952—17 *Fed. Reg.* 11469. (See also list of corrections, 18 *Fed. Reg.* 200.)

Excerpts from the report of the President's Commission on Immigration and Naturalization—BULLETIN of Jan. 19, 1953, p. 97.

An "Exchange Visitor" is an alien selected to participate in an exchange-visitor program designated by the Secretary of State under the provisions of the U. S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended.

A temporary visitor for business is given the symbol "B-1"; a temporary visitor for pleasure is given the symbol "B-2"; and an exchange visitor is given the symbol "Ex."

Transit Aliens—The 1952 act provides nonimmigrant classification for an alien passing through the United States in immediate and continuous transit to a foreign destination or to and from the U. N. Headquarters District. An alien in transit is given the symbol C-1; an alien in transit to and from the U. N. Headquarters District is given the symbol C-2; a foreign government official, members of his immediate family, and his attendant servant or personal employee are given the symbol C-3. An alien who desires to travel more extensively or to remain for a longer period than is permitted to an alien entering the United States for immediate and continuous transit is required to apply for a visa under a different classification, usually that of temporary visitor.

Crewmen—The 1952 act provides nonimmigrant classification for the member of the crew of a vessel or aircraft serving in good faith in any capacity required for normal operation and service and intending to land temporarily and solely in pursuit of his calling as a crewman and to depart from the United States with the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived or some other vessel or aircraft. A crewman is given the symbol "D."

A crewman is required to be in possession of a passport, seaman's book, or other travel document showing the bearer's origin, identity, and nationality, if any, and valid for entry of the bearer into the country of issuance for a period of 6 months beyond the termination of the period of contemplated entry.

A crewman is also required to have an individual visa or, until all crewmen can be individually documented, to be included in a crew-list visa issued by a consular officer to the master of the vessel or commanding officer of the aircraft. A crew-list visa is not required, however, if the vessel or aircraft commences its journey to the United States from a port or place at which no American consul is stationed or is not readily accessible at a nearby place; if the vessel or aircraft is owned or operated by a foreign government and is of a non-commercial character; if the vessel or aircraft is operating solely between a port of the United States and a port of Canada; if the vessel or aircraft is operating on a regular service between a port in Florida and Habana, Cuba, and a crew-list visa is obtained to cover the first trip each month or whenever a new crewman is signed on at other times; if the vessel or aircraft touches at a port in the Virgin Islands; or if the vessel or aircraft

which is proceeding from one foreign place to another and is diverted from its course to a port in the United States under emergency conditions. In such cases, however, the crewman may be permitted to land temporarily only upon a waiver by the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, jointly, on the basis of an unforeseen emergency in an individual case.

If a crewman is properly documented or a waiver is granted for him, he may be granted a conditional landing permit by the examining immigration officer on form I-95A, B, or C. This permit may, in certain cases, be used for landing on subsequent arrivals.

The definition of "crewman" in the act does not include a member of the crew of a fishing vessel having its home port or operating base in the United States. Such persons are classified as immigrants and are required to be documented as such.

Alien crewmen on a foreign naval vessel or aircraft are exempted from the documentary requirements relating to crewmen on other vessels or aircraft. In such cases, it is customary to make advance arrangements to cover arrival and in this connection the matter of documentation and waiver of documentary requirements.

Treaty Aliens—The 1952 act provides nonimmigrant classification for an alien accorded certain rights of entry and sojourn for trade or investment purposes under the provisions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a national. The act covers two categories of treaty aliens, a treaty trader and a treaty investor.

A treaty trader must be coming to the United States under the provisions of an applicable treaty, solely to carry on substantial trade, principally between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a national. Such alien is given the symbol "E-1." The spouse and child of such alien are given the same classification if accompanying or following to join him.

The term "trade" means trade of a substantial nature which is international in scope, carried on by the alien in his own behalf or as an agent of a foreign person or organization engaged in trade, and is principally between the United States and the foreign state of which the alien is a national.

A treaty investor must be coming to the United States under the provisions of an applicable treaty concluded after June 27, 1952, solely to develop and direct the operations of an enterprise in which he has invested or in which he is actively in the process of investing a substantial amount of capital. Such alien is given the symbol "E-2." The spouse and child of such alien are given the same classification if accompanying or following to join him.

With respect to treaty traders, treaties of com-

merce and navigation have been concluded between the United States and the following countries:

Argentina	Greece
Austria	Honduras
Belgium	Ireland
Bolivia	Italy
Borneo	Latvia
China	Liberia
Colombia	Norway
Costa Rica	Paraguay
Denmark	Spain
El Salvador	Switzerland
Estonia	Thailand
Ethiopia	Turkey
Finland	Yugoslavia
Great Britain	

No treaties covering investors have been negotiated up to January 6, 1953.

Students—The 1952 act provides nonimmigrant classification for an alien coming to the United States temporarily for study. A nonimmigrant student is given the symbol "F" and must qualify under the following definition:

an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning, who is a *bona fide* student qualified to pursue a full course of study at an established institution of learning or recognized place of study in the United States, particularly designated by him and approved by the Attorney General after consultation with the Office of Education of the United States . . .

The Attorney General has approved, until further notice, the schools and places of study which, as of December 23, 1952, are included in the list of approved institutions.

A student must show that he has adequate scholastic preparation to enable him to take a full course of study and he must be coming to take a full course. He must have adequate knowledge of English or other language acceptable to the institution. He must also have a passport valid for at least 6 months beyond the contemplated period of stay in the United States. He must also have made adequate financial arrangements to meet his needs.

Certain official students may be classified as foreign-government officials. Certain official and other trainees may be classified as foreign-government officials, or as exchange visitors under a designated program, or as temporary workers.

International Organization Aliens—The 1952 act provides nonimmigrant classification for an international organization alien, coming within one of the following five classes:

(1) a designated principal resident representative of a foreign government recognized *de jure* by the United States, which foreign government is a member of an international organization entitled to enjoy privileges, exemptions, and immunities as an international organization under the International Organizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669), accredited resident members of the staff of such representatives, and members of his or their immediate family; (Symbol G-1).

(2) other accredited representatives of such a foreign government to such international organizations, and the members of their immediate families; (Symbol G-2).

(3) an alien able to qualify under (1) or (2) above except for the fact that the government of which such alien is an accredited representative is not recognized *de jure* by the United States, or that the government of which he is an accredited representative is not a member of such international organization, and the members of his immediate family; (Symbol G-3).

(4) officers, or employees of such international organizations, and the members of their immediate families; (Symbol G-4).

(5) attendants, servants, and personal employees of any such representative, officer, or employee, and the members of the immediate families of such attendants, servants, and personal employees; (Symbol G-5).

The act exempts international organization aliens of these five classes from certain of the exclusion and deportation provisions of the act, in a manner similar to that in the case of foreign-government officials. In general, the aliens of these classes are required to have passports and obtain suitable visas, and are not exempted from the provisions of the act relating to public safety.

Temporary Workers—The 1952 act provides nonimmigrant classification for a temporary worker coming within one of the following three classes:

(1) an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning, who is of distinguished merit and ability and who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform temporary services of an exceptional nature requiring such merit and ability [Symbol H-1]; or

(2) who is coming temporarily to the United States to perform other temporary services or labor, if unemployed persons capable of performing such services or labor cannot be found in this country [Symbol H-2]; or

(3) who is coming temporarily to the United States as an industrial trainee [Symbol H-3].

Before a nonimmigrant visa may be granted to an alien as a temporary worker, a petition by the prospective employer must have been filed with and approved by the Attorney General. The approval of a petition to bring in a temporary worker constitutes *prima facie* evidence that the alien may be granted such classification. However, the alien must satisfy the consular officer that he is entitled to this classification and if such officer has reason to doubt the *bona fides* of the case, he shall report the facts to the Department of State for the information of the Attorney General.

Representatives of Foreign Press, Radio, Film, or Other Foreign Information Media—The 1952 act provides nonimmigrant classification for a representative of foreign press, radio, film, or other foreign information media, if the foreign government of which the alien is a national accords similar treatment to American citizens of a similar class. Such alien is given the symbol "I."

The alien must be a *bona fide* representative of the foreign information medium and must be coming to the United States solely to engage in such vocation. The spouse and child of such alien, if accompanying or following to join him, are given the same status.

Documentary Requirements and Procedures for Nonimmigrants

PASSPORT AND VISA

The 1952 act requires a nonimmigrant to be in possession of a passport valid for a minimum period of 6 months from the date of the expiration of the contemplated initial period of stay, and a valid visa or border-crossing identification card, unless such documentation has been waived under authority of the act.

The term "passport" means any travel document issued by competent authority showing the bearer's origin, identity, and nationality if any, which is valid for the entry of the bearer into a foreign country.

A passport is not limited to a national passport but, in certain cases, may consist of two or more documents which, when considered together, fulfill the requirements.

A border-crossing identification card may be issued to a Canadian citizen or British subject having a residence in Canada, or to a Mexican citizen having a residence in Mexico, who has frequent occasion to cross the border for a legitimate purpose.

The act provides that the requirement of passport or visa or both may be waived by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State acting jointly:

(A) on the basis of unforeseen emergency in individual cases,

(B) on the basis of reciprocity with respect to nationals of foreign contiguous territory or of adjacent islands and residents thereof having a common nationality with such nationals, and

(C) in the case of aliens proceeding in immediate and continuous transit through the United States under a contract between the transportation line and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

WAIVER OF PASSPORT AND VISA REQUIREMENTS

Under authority of the act, the passport and visa requirement has been waived for nonimmigrants in the following categories:

(a) *Canadian citizen* who has a residence in Canada and (1) is making application for admission to the United States from Canada; or (2) is making application for admission to the United States after a visit solely to some place in foreign contiguous territory or adjacent islands.

(b) *British subject* who has a residence in Canada and is making application for admission to the United States from Canada, or from, and after a visit solely to, some place in foreign contiguous territory or adjacent islands.

(c) *Mexican national* who (1) is a military or civilian official or employee of the Mexican national government, or of a Mexican state or municipal government, and the members of his family, making an application for admission to the continental United States from Mexico on personal or official business or for pleasure; or (2) is passing in immediate and continuous transit through the continental United States from one place in Mexico to another by means of a transportation line which crosses the border between the United States and Mexico; or (3) is a member of a fire-fighting group entering the

United States in connection with fire-fighting activities.

(d) *International Boundary and Water Commission officers, employees, and other personnel* entering the United States in the performance of their official duties.

(e) *French national* who has a residence in French territory in the West Indies and who is in possession of a round-trip transportation ticket, and who is making application for admission into Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands of the United States for business or pleasure.

(f) *Netherlands subject* who has a residence in Netherlands territory in the West Indies and who is making an application for admission to Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands of the United States for not more than 24 hours.

(g) An alien being transported by railroad in immediate and continuous transit through the United States from one part of Canada to another, or directly from one part of Mexico to another, without stopover, in accordance with the terms of a contract between the transportation line and the Attorney General, provided that such alien while in the United States shall be in the custody of an officer of the United States or such other custody as may be approved by the Attorney General.

(h) An alien being transported by a transportation line (other than a railroad referred to in (g)), in immediate and continuous transit through the United States without stopover from one foreign place to another, in accordance with the terms of a contract between the transportation line and the Attorney General, provided that such alien is in possession of a travel document which is valid for his entry into a foreign country for a period of not less than 60 days after the date of transit, and such alien while not aboard an aircraft which is in flight through the United States, shall be in the custody of an officer of the United States.

(i) An alien member of the armed forces of the United States holding identifying documents and applying for admission under official orders or permit.

(j) An American Indian born in Canada, crossing the border.

WAIVER OF VISA BUT NOT OF PASSPORT REQUIREMENTS

Under authority of the act, the visa requirement but not the passport requirement has been waived for nonimmigrants of the following categories:

(a) *Canadian citizen* having a residence in Canada who is returning thereto from any country or place, and is making application for admission to the United States. (See previous categories for waivers of passport and visa requirements in certain cases.)

(b) *British subject* having a residence in British territory in the West Indies, who is making an application for admission to Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands of the United States.

(c) *Netherlands subject* who has a residence in Netherlands territory in the West Indies and who is making an application for admission to Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands of the United States for more than 24 hours.

(d) Nationals of foreign contiguous territory or adjacent islands who are entering the United States as seasonal or temporary workers under specific legislation enacted by Congress and in accordance with international arrangements concluded upon the basis of such legislation.

NONIMMIGRANT VISAS

Application—The act requires every alien applying for a nonimmigrant visa to state in his application his full and true name, the date and place of his birth, his nationality, his race and ethnic classification, the purpose and length of his

intended stay in the United States, his personal description, and such additional information as may be necessary to his identification and to the enforcement of the law and regulations.

In the case of a child under 14 years of age or an alien physically incapable of making an application, the application may be made by such alien's parent or guardian, or, if there is no parent or guardian, by any person having legal custody of, or a legitimate interest in him.

Application for a nonimmigrant visa is to be made on Form 257, consisting of an original copy and three copies (257 a, b, c, and d).

Every applicant for a nonimmigrant visa is required to appear in person before a consular officer to execute Form 257. However, in the discretion of such officer, personal appearance may be waived in the case of a child under 10 years of age, a government official, or an international organization alien.

Every applicant for a nonimmigrant visa is required to furnish with his application three identical photographs which reflect a reasonable likeness of the alien at the time of his application. Each photograph is to be 2 x 2 inches in size, unmounted, without head covering, on light background, and must clearly show a full front view of the facial features of the alien. The requirement of photographs may, in the discretion of the consular officer, be waived in the case of a child under 10 years of age, unless he is the bearer of a separate passport, a government official, or an international organization alien.

An alien must ordinarily apply for a nonimmigrant visa in the district of his residence. However, in a case involving hardship, a consular officer may accept an application from an alien physically present in his district, although such alien may have a residence in another district.

An applicant for a nonimmigrant visa is required to present with his application a certified copy of each document considered by the consular officer to be necessary to a determination of the alien's eligibility to receive a visa. However, if the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer that any document or record is unobtainable, the alien may be permitted to submit other satisfactory evidence of the fact to which such document or record would pertain. A document or record is to be considered to be "unobtainable" if it cannot be procured without causing the applicant or a member of his family actual hardship other than normal delay and inconvenience.

A medical examination may be required in the case of an applicant for a nonimmigrant visa if the applicant comes from an area or in a status which indicates that a medical examination is advisable or if the consular officer otherwise has reason to believe that the applicant may be ineligible to receive a visa on medical grounds.

Issuance—If a consular officer is satisfied that an applicant is a nonimmigrant and is eligible to receive a nonimmigrant visa, he may issue such visa, which is evidenced by a stamp placed in the alien's passport and properly executed by the officer. If the passport was issued by a government not recognized *de jure* by the United States, the visa stamp is not placed in the passport but is impressed on Form 257.

A single nonimmigrant visa may be issued to include more than one qualified applicant if each such alien executes a separate application. Usually a single nonimmigrant visa is issued to cover the members of a family group included in a single passport.

Fees—The act requires that the fee for a nonimmigrant visa shall, as nearly as practicable, correspond to the total of all similar visa, entry, residence, or other fees, taxes, or charges assessed or levied against nationals of the United States, in connection with their entry or sojourn, by the foreign countries of which such aliens are nationals or stateless residents. On a reciprocal basis, visa fees have been waived for nationals of a large number of countries. In some cases, however, substantial fees are required to be collected, on a reciprocal basis.

Validity—The validity of a nonimmigrant visa relates to the period during which it may be presented by the bearer at a port of entry in applying for admission. A nonimmigrant visa is usually valid for a period of 12 months but on a reciprocal basis it may be given a validity of 24 months. Under certain circumstances, however, a visa may be limited in validity to a shorter period or for one application for entry. Ordinarily, a nonimmigrant visa may be used by the bearer for any number of applications at ports of entry during the period of validity.

The period for which a nonimmigrant may be admitted by the immigration authorities at a port of entry is determined by such authorities and does not depend upon the validity of the visa.

Revalidation—A consular officer may revalidate a nonimmigrant visa which is about to expire or which expired less than 3 months prior to the application for revalidation, under certain conditions, if the officer is satisfied that the alien has maintained a *bona fide* nonimmigrant status and is otherwise eligible to receive a nonimmigrant visa.

Refusal of Nonimmigrant Visa—The act requires a consular officer to refuse nonimmigrant documentation to an alien under certain circumstances, as follows:

(1) if it appears to the consular officer from the statements in the application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that the alien is ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation under section 212 of the Act or any other provision of law;

- (2) if the application fails to comply with the provisions of the Act or regulations issued thereunder; or
(3) if the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that the alien is ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation under section 212 or any other provision of law.

Exemptions—The act provides for nonimmigrant exemptions from the categories of aliens ineligible under section 212, as follows:

- (1) illiterates;
- (2) polygamists;
- (3) aliens suffering from a physical defect, disease, or disability likely to affect his ability to earn a living, provided that a bond or undertaking has been given to the Attorney General to assure such alien's support;
- (4) aliens appearing to be likely to become a public charge, provided that a bond or undertaking has been given to the Attorney General to assure such alien's support;
- (5) foreign-government officials and International Organization aliens, with respect to exemptions from exclusion grounds other than those relating to passports and visas and public safety.

Revocation of Nonimmigrant Visa—A consular officer may revoke a nonimmigrant visa if he knows or after investigation is satisfied that the visa was procured by fraud, a willfully false or misleading representation, the willful concealment of a material fact, or other unlawful means, or the officer obtains information establishing that the alien was otherwise ineligible to receive the visa.

A consular officer may invalidate a nonimmigrant visa if he finds that the alien has become ineligible for such visa.

If practicable, the bearer of the visa is to be notified of the proposed revocation or invalidation and given an opportunity to show cause why such action should not be taken. Notice of revocation or invalidation of a nonimmigrant visa is to be given to an appropriate representative or official of the transportation line on which the alien is known or believed to intend to travel to the United States.

Registration and Fingerprinting—The act requires every alien applying for a visa to be registered and fingerprinted, except:

- (1) Government official, (A) (i) or (ii).
- (2) International Organization alien (G) (i, ii, iii, iv).
- (3) Applicant for diplomatic visa exempted under the diplomatic visa regulations (22 CFR Part 40).
- (4) Child under 14 years of age.

Admission or Exclusion of Nonimmigrant at Port of Entry—The bearer of a nonimmigrant visa issued by a consular officer is subject to examination by an immigration officer at a port of entry. The act (section 221 (b)) provides that

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to entitle any alien, to whom a visa or other documentation has been issued, to enter the United States, if, upon arrival at a port of entry in the United States, he is found to be inadmissible under this Act, or any other provision of law.

Temporary Admission of Excludable Alien—The act provides that an alien (a) who is applying for a nonimmigrant visa and is known or believed

by the consular officer to be ineligible for such visa under one or more of the exclusion provisions enumerated in section 212 (a) of the act—other than those under (27) and (29)—which relate to aliens whose entry is contrary to public interest or public safety may, after approval by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the Secretary of State or by the consular officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, or (b) who is inadmissible under one or more of the paragraphs enumerated in section 212 (a) of the act—except (27) and (29)—but who is in possession of appropriate documents or is granted a waiver thereof, be admitted into the United States temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the Attorney General.

Classification of Immigrants

Immigrants are classified under the 1952 act as follows:

NONQUOTA IMMIGRANTS

(1) *Nonquota Spouse and Child of United States Citizen*

A United States citizen may file a petition with the Attorney General (Form I-133) to obtain non-quota immigrant status for an alien spouse or minor unmarried child or stepchild. The child must be under 21 years of age at the time of application at port of entry for admission. A "marriage," unless consummated, is not recognized unless the contracting parties were present at the marriage ceremony in the presence of each other. Accordingly, a marriage ceremony performed by proxy or by telephone is not recognized.

(2) *Nonquota Returning Resident Alien*

An alien having the status of an alien admitted into the United States for permanent residence, who has domicile in the United States and is returning from a temporary visit abroad is accorded nonquota immigrant status.

(3) *Nonquota Native of Western Hemisphere Country*

The act provides nonquota immigrant status for an alien born in Canada, the Republic of Mexico, the Republic of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, or an independent country of Central or South America. The act accords similar status to the spouse or unmarried minor child (regardless of country of birth) if accompanying or following to join such alien. This provision does not apply in the case of a Chinese person or a person coming under the Asia-Pacific triangle provisions, except an unmarried minor "triangle" child accompanying or following to join a Western Hemisphere alien.

(4) *Nonquota Person Eligible for Reacquisition of Citizenship*

The act provides nonquota immigrant status for

an immigrant who was a citizen of the United States and is entitled under section 324 (a) or 327 of the act to apply for reacquisition of citizenship. (Such person may be a woman expatriate who lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to an alien, or by reason of the loss of United States citizenship by her husband, or by reason of her marriage to an alien who was ineligible to citizenship, and who has not acquired any other nationality by any affirmative act other than marriage); or a military expatriate who lost his citizenship by entering or serving in the armed forces of a foreign state.

(5) *Nonquota Former Citizen Eligible for Repatriation*

The act provides nonquota immigrant status for an immigrant included within the second proviso to section 349 (a) (1) of title III of the act. Such person may be a child who lost his citizenship prior to January 1, 1948, through the naturalization in a foreign state of a parent or parents and who applies for a nonquota immigrant visa prior to December 23, 1953.

(6) *Nonquota Minister of Religion*

The act provides nonquota immigrant status for a minister of religion who continuously for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of his application for admission to the United States has been, and who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of minister of a religious denomination. The religious denomination must have a *bona fide* organization in the United States and must have a genuine need for the services of the applicant. The religious organization must file a petition with the Attorney General on behalf of the minister and such petition must be approved before nonquota status may be accorded to the alien. The spouse or child of such alien may be given a similar status, if accompanying or following to join him.

(7) *Nonquota Employee of United States Government*

The act provides nonquota immigrant status for an immigrant who is an employee or an honorably retired former employee, of the United States Government abroad, and who has performed faithful service for a total of 15 years or more, if the principal officer of the Foreign Service establishment shall have recommended the granting of nonquota status to such alien in exceptional circumstances and the Secretary of State shall have approved such recommendation as in the national interest. The accompanying spouse and child of such alien may be granted a similar nonquota status.

QUOTA IMMIGRANTS

(1) *Needed Skilled Worker—First Preference*

The act provides that the first 50 percent of each quota (plus any portion of the remainder of the

quota not needed for the second and third preference classes) shall be made available for the issuance of immigrant visas to qualified quota immigrants whose services are determined by the Attorney General to be needed urgently in the United States because of the high education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability of such immigrants and to be substantially beneficial prospectively to the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States. A similar status is accorded to the spouse and child accompanying such alien.

The person or concern in the United States desiring the services of such alien is required to file a petition on Form I-129 with the Attorney General and such petition must have been approved by him before the alien may be given first preference status.

(2) *Parent of United States Citizen—Second Preference*

The act provides that the next 30 percent of each quota (plus any portion of the quota not needed for the first and third preference classes) shall be made available for the issuance of immigrant visas to qualified quota immigrants who are the parents of a United States citizen 21 years of age or over. Such citizen child must file a petition on Form I-133 with the Attorney General and such petition must have been approved by him before the alien may be given second preference status.

(3) *Spouse and Child of Alien Lawfully Admitted for Permanent Residence—Third Preference*

The act provides that the remaining 20 percent of each quota (plus any portion of the quota not needed for the first and second preference classes) shall be made available for the issuance of immigrant visas to qualified quota immigrants who are the spouses or children of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Such lawful resident alien must file a petition on Form I-133a with the Attorney General and such petition must have been approved by him before the alien may be given third preference status.

(4) *Brother-Sister-Son-Daughter of United States Citizen—Fourth Preference*

The act provides that any portion of the quota not required for the issuance of immigrant visas to the first, second, and third classes, shall be made available for the issuance of immigrant visas to other qualified quota immigrants charged to such quota, and that not to exceed 25 percent of such remaining portion of each quota shall be made available for the issuance of immigrant visas to qualified quota immigrants who are the brothers, sisters, sons, or daughters of United States citizens. Such sons or daughters may be either married minor children or children 21 years of age or over, married or unmarried. The citizen must

file a petition on Form I-133 with the Attorney General and such petition must have been approved by him before the alien may be given fourth preference status.

(5) *Nonpreference Quota Immigrants*

The act provides that any portion of the quota not required for the issuance of immigrant visas to the first, second, third, and fourth preference classes, may be used for the issuance of immigrant visas to other qualified quota immigrants.

Under the provisions of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended, prior to July 1, 1954, up to 50 percent of a quota may be used for the issuance of visas to qualified nonpreference quota immigrants coming under the second proviso to section 3 (c) of the Displaced Persons Act.

An immigration quota may be reduced if so provided in an Act of Congress.

• *Mr. Coulter, author of the above article, is Assistant Director of the Visa Office. Part II of his article will appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953.*

Confirmations

John Foster Dulles

The Senate on January 21 confirmed John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

The Senate on January 23 confirmed Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., as U. S. representative to the U.N.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2466. Pub. 4691. 11 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Lima Feb. 22, 1952; entered into force Apr. 26, 1952.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2467. Pub. 4692. 11 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba—Signed at Habana Mar. 7, 1952; entered into force Mar. 7, 1952.

Technical Cooperation, Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Authority. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2456. Pub. 4699. 7 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Australia—Signed at Washington Nov. 16, 1951; entered into force Nov. 16, 1951.

Economic Cooperation With Indonesia. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2484. Pub. 4700. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement, with annex, between the United States, Indonesia, and the Netherlands—Signed Feb. 11, 1952; entered into force Feb. 11, 1952.

American Dead in World War II, Hamm Military Cemetery. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2446. Pub. 4704. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Luxembourg—Signed at Luxembourg Mar. 20, 1951; entered into force June 11, 1951.

Aviation, Flights of Military Aircraft. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2417. Pub. 4708. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and India—Signed at New Delhi July 2 and 4, 1949; entered into force July 5, 1949.

Double Taxation, Taxes on Estates of Deceased Persons. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2533. Pub. 4775. 17 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States and Switzerland—Signed at Washington July 9, 1951; entered into force Sept. 17, 1952.

Together We are Strong. Commercial Policy Series 144. Pub. 4614. 40 pp. 20¢.

"In unity and cooperation among the free nations is the strength we need to face the common danger." A pamphlet picturing the need for trade to achieve collective security.

Where To Go for U.N. Information. International Organization and Conference Series III, 82. Pub. 4648. 35 pp. 15¢.

Sources of information in the United States about the United Nations and the U.N. specialized agencies.

Pacific Coast Conference on Private Investment in International Development, San Francisco, Sept. 24-25, 1952. Economic Cooperation Series 36. Pub. 4795. 19 pp. 20¢.

Summary of the discussions.

Time and People—Point 4 in Perspective. Economic Cooperation Series 37. Pub. 4816. 6 pp. 5¢.

Article by Stanley Andrews, Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration.

UNESCO Basic Documents. International Organization and Conference Series IV, UNESCO 20. Pub. 4788. 25 pp. 20¢.

A collection of documents including the Constitution, the public law providing for U.S. membership, the by-laws of the Commission, the rules of procedure, and a list of member states of UNESCO.

The United States in the United Nations
A regular feature, will be resumed in a subsequent issue.

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**Check List of Department of State
 Press Releases: Jan. 19-23, 1953**

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to Jan. 19 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 28 of Jan. 15, 29 of Jan. 15, and 33 of Jan. 16.

No.	Date	Subject
†35	1/19	Meeting of Austrian treaty deputies
†36	1/19	Reports on Puerto Rico to U.N.
37	1/19	IA covers Inauguration
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bulletin

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THE STATE OF THE UNION

*Message of President Eisenhower to the Congress*¹

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Eighty-third Congress:

I welcome the honor of appearing before you to deliver my first message to the Congress. It is manifestly the joint purpose of the Congressional leadership and of this Administration to justify the summons to governmental responsibility issued last November by the American people.

The grand labors of this leadership will involve: application of America's influence in world affairs with such fortitude and such foresight that it will deter aggression and eventually secure peace; next, the establishment of a national administration of such integrity and such efficiency that its honor at home will insure respect abroad; encouragement of those incentives that inspire creative initiative in our economy, so that its productivity may fortify freedom everywhere; and, dedication to the well-being of all our citizens and to the attainment of equality of opportunity for all, so that our Nation will ever act with the strength of unity in every task to which it is called.

The purpose of this message is to suggest certain lines along which our joint efforts may immediately be directed toward realization of these four ruling purposes.

The time that this Administration has been in office has been too brief to permit preparation of a detailed and comprehensive program of recommended action to cover all phases of the responsibilities that devolve upon our country's new leaders. Such a program will be filled out in the

weeks ahead as, after appropriate study, I shall submit additional recommendations for your consideration. Today can provide only a sure and substantial start.

Definition of a New Foreign Policy

Our country has come through a painful period of trial and disillusionment since the victory of 1945. We anticipated a world of peace and cooperation. The calculated pressures of aggressive Communism have forced us, instead, to live in a world of turmoil.

From this costly experience we have learned one clear lesson. We have learned that the free world cannot indefinitely remain in a posture of paralyzed tension. To do so would leave forever to the aggressor the choice of time and place and means to cause greatest hurt to us at least cost to himself.

This Administration has, therefore, begun the definition of a new, positive foreign policy. This policy will be governed by certain fixed ideas. They are these:

1. Our foreign policy must be clear, consistent and confident. This means that it must be the product of genuine, continuous cooperation between the Executive and Legislative branches of this Government. It must be developed and directed in the spirit of true bipartisanship.

2. I assure you members of this Congress—I mean this fully, earnestly, and sincerely—the policy we embrace must be a coherent global policy. The freedom we cherish and defend in Europe and in the Americas is no different from the freedom that is imperiled in Asia.

3. Our policy, dedicated to making the free world secure, will envision all peaceful methods

¹ Excerpts from the President's message delivered to the Congress on Feb. 2 (H. doc. 75, 83d Cong., 1st sess.). Also available as Department of State publication 4915.

and devices—except breaking faith with our friends. We shall never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves. I shall ask the Congress at a later date to join in an appropriate resolution making clear that this Government recognizes no kind of commitment contained in secret understandings of the past with foreign governments which permit this kind of enslavement.

4. The policy we pursue will recognize the truth that no single country, even one so powerful as ours, can alone defend the liberty of all nations threatened by Communist aggression from without or subversion within. Mutual security means effective mutual cooperation. For the United States, this means that, as a matter of common sense and national interest, we shall give help to other nations in the measure that they strive earnestly to do their full share of the common task. No wealth of aid could compensate for poverty of spirit. The heart of every free nation must be honestly dedicated to the preserving of its own independence and security.

5. Our policy will be designed to foster the advent of practical unity in Western Europe. The nations of that region have contributed notably to the effort of sustaining the security of the free world. From the jungles of Indochina and Malaya to the northern shores of Europe, they have vastly improved their defensive strength. Where called upon to do so, they have made costly and bitter sacrifices to hold the line of freedom.

Need for Closer European Cooperation

But the problem of security demands closer cooperation among the nations of Europe than has been known to date. Only a more closely integrated economic and political system can provide the greatly increased economic strength needed to maintain both necessary military readiness and respectable living standards.

Europe's enlightened leaders have long been aware of these facts. All the devoted work that has gone into the Schuman Plan, the European Army, and the Strasbourg Conferences has testified to their vision and determination. These achievements are the more remarkable when we realize that each of them has marked a victory—for France and for Germany alike—over the divisions that in the past have brought such tragedy to these two great nations and to the world.

The needed unity of Western Europe manifestly

cannot be manufactured from without; it can only be created from within. But it is right and necessary that we encourage Europe's leaders by informing them of the high value we place upon the earnestness of their efforts toward this goal. Real progress will be conclusive evidence to the American people that our material sacrifices in the cause of collective security are matched by essential political, economic, and military accomplishments in Western Europe.

6. Our foreign policy will recognize the importance of profitable and equitable world trade.

A substantial beginning can and should be made by our friends themselves. Europe, for example, is now marked by checkered areas of labor-surplus and labor-shortage, of agricultural areas needing machines and industrial areas needing food. Here and elsewhere we can hope that our friends will take the initiative in creating broader markets and more dependable currencies, to allow greater exchange of goods and services among themselves.

Action along these lines can create an economic environment that will invite vital help from us. Such help includes:

First. Revising our customs regulations to remove procedural obstacles to profitable trade. I further recommend that the Congress take the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act under immediate study and extend it by appropriate legislation. This objective must not ignore legitimate safeguarding of domestic industries, agriculture, and labor standards. In all Executive study and recommendations on this problem, labor and management and farmers alike will be earnestly consulted.

Second. Doing whatever our Government can properly do to encourage the flow of private American investment abroad. This involves, as a serious and explicit purpose of our foreign policy, the encouragement of a hospitable climate for such investment in foreign nations.

Third. Availing ourselves of facilities overseas for the economical production of manufactured articles, which are needed for mutual defense and which are not seriously competitive with our own normal peacetime production.

Fourth. Receiving from the rest of the world, in equitable exchange for what we supply, greater amounts of important raw materials which we do not ourselves possess in adequate quantities.

In this general discussion of our foreign policy, I must make special mention of the war in Korea.

This war is, for Americans, the most painful phase of Communist aggression throughout the world. It is clearly a part of the same calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pressing in Indochina and in Malaya, and of the strategic situation that manifestly embraces the island of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist forces there. The working out of any military solution to the Korean War will inevitably affect all these areas.

The Administration is giving immediate increased attention to the development of additional Republic of Korea forces. The citizens of that country have proved their capacity as fighting men and their eagerness to take a greater share in the defense of their homeland. Organization, equipment, and training will allow them to do so. Increased assistance to Korea for this purpose conforms fully to our global policies.

Seventh Fleet no Longer to Shield Communist China

In June 1950, following the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea, the United States Seventh Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese Communist mainland.

This has meant, in effect, that the United States Navy was required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China. Regardless of the situation of 1950, since the date of that order the Chinese Communists have invaded Korea to attack the United Nations forces there. They have consistently rejected the proposals of the United Nations Command for an armistice. They recently joined with Soviet Russia in rejecting the armistice proposal sponsored in the United Nations by the Government of India.² This proposal had been accepted by the United States and 53 other nations.

Consequently there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists. This permitted those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea.

I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China. Permit me to make this crystal clear: This order implies no aggressive intent on

our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.

Our labor for peace in Korea and in the world imperatively demands the maintenance by the United States of a strong fighting service ready for any contingency. Our problem is to achieve adequate military strength within the limits of endurable strain upon our economy. To amass military power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another.

Both military and economic objectives demand a single national military policy, proper coordination of our armed services, and effective consolidation of certain logistics functions.

We must eliminate waste and duplication of effort in the armed services. We must realize clearly that size alone is not sufficient. The biggest force is not necessarily the best force—and we want the best. We must not let traditions or habits of the past stand in the way of developing an efficient military force. All members of our forces must be ever mindful that they serve under a single flag and for a single cause. We must effectively integrate our armament programs and plan them in such careful relation to our industrial facilities that we assure the best use of our manpower and our materials.

Because of the complex technical nature of our military organization and because of the security reasons involved, the Secretary of Defense must take the initiative and assume the responsibility for developing plans to give our Nation maximum safety at minimum cost. Accordingly, the new Secretary of Defense and his civilian and military associates will, in the future, recommend such changes in present laws affecting our defense activities as may be necessary in order to clarify responsibilities and improve the total effectiveness of our defense effort. This effort must always conform to policies laid down in the National Security Council.

Role of National Security Council

The statutory function of the National Security Council is to assist the President in the formulation and coordination of significant domestic, foreign, and military policies required for the security of this Nation. In these days of tension, it is essential that this central body have the vitality to perform effectively its statutory role. I propose to see that it does.

² See BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, pp. 74-78.

Careful formulation of policies must be followed by clear understanding of them by all peoples. A related need, therefore, is to make more effective all activities of the Government related to international information.

I have recently appointed a committee of representative and informed citizens to survey this subject and to make recommendations in the near future for legislative, administrative, or any other action.³

A unified and dynamic effort in this whole field is essential to the security of the United States and of the other peoples in the community of free nations. There is but one sure way to avoid total war, and that is to win the cold war.

While retaliatory power is one strong deterrent to a would-be aggressor, another powerful deterrent is defensive power. No enemy is likely to attempt an attack foredoomed to failure.

Because the building of a completely impenetrable defense against attack is still not possible, total defensive strength must include civil defense preparedness. Because we have incontrovertible evidence that Soviet Russia possesses atomic weapons, this kind of protection becomes sheer necessity.

Civil defense responsibilities primarily belong to the state and local governments—including the recruiting, training and organizing of volunteers to meet any emergency. The immediate job of the Federal Government is to provide leadership, to supply technical guidance, and to continue to strengthen its civil defense stockpile of medical, engineering, and related supplies and equipment. This work must go forward without lag.

Loyal and Reliable Federal Employees

Our vast world responsibility accents with urgency our people's elemental right to a government whose clear qualities are loyalty, security, efficiency, economy, and integrity.

The safety of America and the trust of the people alike demand that the personnel of the Federal Government be loyal in their motives and reliable in the discharge of their duties. Only a combination of both loyalty and reliability promises genuine security. To state this principle is easy; to apply it can be difficult. But this security we must and we shall have. By way of example, all principal new appointees to departments and agencies

have been investigated at their own request by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Confident of your understanding and cooperation, I know that the primary responsibility for keeping out the disloyal and the dangerous rests squarely upon the Executive branch. When this branch so conducts itself as to require policing by another branch of the Government, it invites its own disorder and confusion.

I am determined to meet this responsibility of the Executive. The heads of all Executive departments and agencies have been instructed to initiate at once effective programs of security with respect to their personnel. The Attorney General will advise and guide the departments and agencies in the shaping of these programs, designed at once to govern the employment of new personnel and to review speedily any derogatory information concerning incumbent personnel.

To carry out these programs, I believe that the powers of the Executive branch under existing law are sufficient. If they should prove inadequate, the necessary legislation will be requested. These programs will be both fair to the rights of the individual and effective for the safety of the Nation. They will, with care and justice, apply the basic principle that public employment is not a right but a privilege.

All these measures have two clear purposes. Their first purpose is to make certain that this Nation's security is not jeopardized by false servants. Their second purpose is to clear the atmosphere of that unreasoned suspicion that accepts rumor and gossip as substitutes for evidence.

Our people, of course, deserve and demand of their Federal Government more than security of personnel. They demand, also, efficient and logical organization, true to constitutional principles.

I have already established a Committee on Government Organization. The Committee is using as its point of departure the reports of the Hoover Commission and subsequent studies by several independent agencies. To achieve the greater efficiency and economy which the Committee analyses show to be possible, I ask the Congress to extend the present Government Reorganization Act for a period of 18 months or 2 years beyond its expiration date of April 1, 1953.

There is more involved here than realigning the wheels and smoothing the gears of administrative machinery. The Congress rightfully expects the Executive to take the initiative in discovering and

³ See p. 217.

removing outmoded functions and eliminating duplication.

In all Departments dedication to these basic precepts of security and efficiency, integrity and economy can and will produce an Administration deserving of the trust the people have placed in it. Our people have demanded nothing less than good and efficient government. They shall get nothing less.

The Question of Immigration

Now our civil and social rights form a central part of the heritage we are striving to defend on all fronts and with all our strength.

There is one sphere in which civil rights are inevitably involved in Federal legislation. This is the sphere of immigration.

It is a manifest right of our Government to limit the number of immigrants our Nation can absorb. It is also a manifest right of our Government to set reasonable requirements on the character and the numbers of the people who come to share our land and our freedom. It is well for us, however, to remind ourselves occasionally of an equally manifest fact: we are, one and all, immigrants or the sons and daughters of immigrants.

Existing legislation contains injustices. It does, in fact, discriminate. I am informed by members of the Congress that it was realized, at the time of its enactment, that future study of the proper basis of determining quotas would be necessary. I am therefore requesting the Congress to review this legislation and to enact a statute that will, at one and the same time, guard our legitimate national interests and be faithful to our basic ideas of freedom and fairness to all.

Now we have surveyed briefly some problems of

our people and a portion of the tasks before us.

The hope of freedom itself depends, in real measure, upon our strength, our heart, and our wisdom. We must be strong in arms. We must be strong in the source of all our armament, our productivity. We all—workers and farmers, foremen and financiers, technicians and builders—all must produce, produce more, and produce yet more.

We must be strong, above all, in the spiritual resources upon which all else depends. We must be devoted with all our heart to the values we defend. We must know that each of these values and virtues applies with equal force at the ends of the earth and in our relations with our neighbor next door. We must know that freedom expresses itself with equal eloquence in the right of workers to strike in the nearby factory—and in the yearnings and sufferings of the peoples of Eastern Europe. As our heart summons our strength, our wisdom must direct it.

There is, in world affairs, a steady course to be followed between an assertion of strength that is truculent and a confession of helplessness that is cowardly.

There is, in our affairs at home, a middle way between untrammelled freedom of the individual and the demands for the welfare of the whole Nation. This way must avoid government by bureaucracy as carefully as it avoids neglect of the helpless.

In every area of political action, free men must think before they can expect to win.

In this spirit must we live and labor, confident of our strength, compassionate in our heart, clear in our mind.

In this spirit, let us together turn to the great tasks before us.

A SURVEY OF FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS

*Address by Secretary Dulles*¹

It has been now just 6 days that I have been Secretary of State and I can assure you that they have been very, very busy days. They have been a perfect mass of accumulated problems, but I hope never to be too busy to talk with the Congress and with the people of the United States so that they will know what it is we're thinking about and what our purposes and intentions are.

I've already met with two congressional committees that deal primarily with foreign affairs and now I want to have a chance to talk with you. Of course, it's obvious that after 6 days I haven't got the answers to all the problems. It would be ridiculous if I pretended that I did have, but I do think it's worth while to tell you what our position in the world is and the spirit with which we approach the solution of these problems.

The first thing that I want to make clear, and I want to make it abundantly clear, is that I consider that it is my job to work for the people of the United States. I am part of your Government; it's you that have hired me and pay me and you're entitled to have me do the best that I can for you. And that is going to be the spirit of the State Department and of our ambassadors. You needn't be afraid that we're working against you and for others.

President Eisenhower has often used a phrase, "enlightened self-interest." That is going to be the guide as we go on to make our foreign policy. In our own interest, our enlightened self-interest, we have to pay close attention to what is going on in the rest of the world. And the reason for that

is that we have enemies who are plotting our destruction. These enemies are the Russian Communists and their allies in other countries.

Now you may ask, how do we know that they are really trying to destroy us? The answer to that one is that their leaders teach it openly and have been teaching it for many years; everything that they do fits into that teaching. And in this country our courts have had to look into the question, and they've found most recently, only last week, that the Communist party in this country is part of a gigantic conspiracy designed to overthrow our Government by violence.

You may say, "Do we need to take this threat seriously?" The answer to that is that the threat is a deadly serious one. President Eisenhower recently said this Nation stands in greater peril than at any time in our history. Any American who isn't awake to that fact is like a soldier who's asleep at his post. We must be awake, all of us awake, to that danger.

Interdependence of Our Foreign Policy

Already our proclaimed enemies control one-third of all the people of the world. I've here behind me a map which shows the vast area which stretches from Kamchatka near Alaska, the northern islands of Japan, and right on to Germany in the center of Europe. That's an area which the Russian Communists completely dominate. In that area are 800 million people, and they are being forged into a vast weapon of fighting power backed by industrial production and modern weapons that include atomic bombs. If this block of 800 million people is compared with our population, about 150 million people, it means that if

¹Delivered to the Nation over radio and television networks on Jan. 27 and released to the press (no. 45) on the same date. Also printed as Department of State publication 4911.

we were alone against them the population odds against us and in their favor would be 7 to 1. In the case of the First World War and the Second World War there was a big coalition on our side against the despots so that the manpower ratio then was about 7 to 1 in our favor. It wouldn't be pleasant to have a war in which the odds against us were 7 to 1.

Another important fact is that this vast area of Asia and Europe, which our enemies control, has within it all of the natural resources which they need. On the other hand, we are largely dependent on overseas goods. For example, our steel industry, which is of course basic, in peace production and war production, depends very largely upon importations of manganese from overseas. So, if we were alone, not only would the manpower odds be terrifically against us, but we would be at a great disadvantage in the production of the weapons that we needed.

These are some of the reasons why the enlightened self-interest of the United States compels that we should have friends and allies in the world. At the present time, the Soviet Communists are carrying out a policy which they call encirclement. That means they want to get control of the different areas around them and around us, so they will keep growing in strength and we will be more and more cut off and isolated. They said they don't want to start an open war against us until they have got such overwhelming power that the result would not be in doubt. That strategy has been to pick up one country after another by getting control of its government, by political warfare and indirect aggression. And they have been making very great progress.

At the end of the Second World War, only a little over 7 years ago, they only controlled about 200 million people. Today, as I say, they control 800 million people and they're hard at work to get control of other parts of the world.

Areas of Concern

Let me now, with a map before me, pick out some of the high spots of trouble. Let's start with Korea, which naturally comes first to our minds because of the cruel and bloody war going on there. What's that all about? One thing that it's about is Japan. You see the Soviet Union has already moved into the northern islands which are very close to Japan. In fact, they are within 2 miles of northern Japan and

their planes are reported daily almost as flying across the northern part of Japan. You can see from this map that, if they had not only this area up to the north of Japan but also had all of Korea, then Japan would be within the Communist pincers. And, if the Russians or Chinese Communists got control of Japan with its great industrial power, then they could use that to process the raw materials which come from Asia, from Manchuria, and from China and to process them into arms and weapons for the vast manpower of China. And that, if it happened, would be a very unfortunate thing for us. It was hard enough for us to win the war against Japan in the Pacific when Japan was alone, when China was our ally and the Soviet Union was neutral. If Russia, China, and Japan all combined, it would be pretty tough going for us in the Pacific. Stalin has boasted that with Japan the Soviet Union would be invincible. We don't need to believe that but at least we can see that it would be pretty tough going.

The Soviet Russians are making a drive to get Japan, not only through what they are doing in northern areas of the islands and in Korea but also through what they are doing in Indochina. If they could get this peninsula of Indochina, Siam, Burma, Malaya, they would have what is called the rice bowl of Asia. That's the area from which the great peoples of Asia, great countries of Asia such as Japan and India, get, in large measure, their food. And you can see that, if the Soviet Union had control of the rice bowl of Asia, that would be another weapon which would tend to expand their control into Japan and into India. That is a growing danger; it is not only a bad situation because of the threat in the Asian countries that I refer to but also because the French, who are doing much of the fighting there, are making great effort; and that effort subtracts just that much from the capacity of their building a European army and making the contribution which otherwise they could be expected to make. I'll touch on that problem later on when we get to Europe.

Now then, we can go on to the next area, which is the Arab world. In the Middle East we find that the Communists are trying to inspire the Arabs with a fanatical hatred of the British and ourselves. That area contains the greatest known oil reserves that there are in the world, and the Soviet interest is shown by the fact that

Stalin, when he was negotiating with Hitler in 1940, said that that area must be looked upon as the center of Soviet aspirations. If all of that passed into the hands of our potential enemies, that would make a tremendous shift in the balance of economic power. And furthermore, this area also has control of the Suez Canal, and that is the portion of the world and the seaways of the world which has long been guarded and called the life-line which made it possible for Europe to be in communication with Asia. There, there are difficulties at the present time between the British Government and the Government of Egypt which relate to the question of the defense and control of the Suez Canal.

Then if we move on further we can go to Africa. And throughout Africa the Communists are trying to arouse the native people into revolt against the Western Europeans, who still have political control of most of Africa. If there should be trouble there that would break the contact between Europe and Africa, Africa being a large source of raw materials for Europe.

And then we come now, as we go around the globe, to Western Europe itself. In Western Europe we find that there is in existence there one of our major foreign policies, the foreign policy that is called by the word NATO, NATO standing for North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The purpose there was to tie the Western European countries together with association from United States and from Canada, so as to create there a community which would be strong enough to deter any attack on Western Europe by the Red armies. This area of Western Europe has always been historically an area which was strong in the military sense. And the countries have quite a considerable military tradition. The trouble has been that in the past these Western European countries have used their military strength with which to fight each other and to bleed each other. Particularly France and Germany, as you know, have been fighting each other about once in every generation for quite a long time.

The present hope is that Germany and France will join in a single European defense community; then we would have a situation where they could not fight each other and where their combined strength with that of their other allies would make it unlikely that the Red armies would attempt to invade Western Europe. That's a

good idea and it has had in this country bipartisan support. Unfortunately the plan now seems to be somewhat stalled. It seems as though some of the French people and some of the German people want again to go in their separate ways. That's one of the reasons why President Eisenhower asked me and Mr. Stassen, who directs the mutual-assistance program, to go to Europe this week. We want to look the situation over at first hand and see whether this trend to unity is on the upgrade or is on the downgrade.

Let me say to you first of all that in this trip we are taking we are not going to make any commitments of any kind, sort, or description. The problem of making commitments is for the Congress of the United States working in cooperation with the executive departments of the Government. We shall be there to observe and to listen but not to make any commitments.

The United States has made a big investment in Western Europe on the theory that there could be unity there. Of the 40 billion dollars which we have sent abroad since the end of the Second World War, almost 30 billions have gone into Western Europe. If, however, there were no chance, and that I just refuse to believe, but if it appeared there were no chance of getting effective unity, and if in particular France, Germany, and England should go their separate ways, then certainly it would be necessary to give a little rethinking to America's own foreign policy in relation to Western Europe.

So you see that as we look around the world so far we've looked at Asia, and we've looked at Europe, and we've looked at Africa, but then also we've got this Hemisphere to look at. And

On January 28, Secretary Dulles extended his greetings to Department employees who were gathered at the west entrance of the new Department of State Building. For text of remarks made on this occasion by the Secretary, see p. 239.

we have to look at South America. Sometimes we're inclined to take South America for granted. But the reality is that there are strong Communist movements in South America, and Fascist influences in some quarters, which are working away, largely underground so far, and they're trying to destroy the traditional friendship between the people of the American Republics. The past administration has been so preoccupied with some of those problems of Europe and Asia

and Africa that I referred to that I fear it may have somewhat neglected South America and taken it for granted that we could forget about South America for a time and then go back again and find everything the same as it was before. But actually any such policy of neglect would lead to growing danger.

Basis for a Successful Foreign Policy

You can see that there is plenty of trouble around the world, I've pointed out some of the high spots of trouble, but there are many more. There are plenty of areas which are vulnerable to the political warfare which the Russians are waging; if these areas were lost, then the Russian Communists would have largely completed their encirclement of the United States and be ready for what Stalin has called the decisive blow against us with the odds overwhelmingly in their favor. That's a gloomy picture, but it need not and it must not discourage us. These Russian Communists are not supermen and their strategy is not irresistible. I feel absolutely confident that we can make it fail. Now, as I said, I'm not going to attempt to tell you tonight in any detail what will be the foreign policies of President Eisenhower's administration. It would be foolish to attempt to do that so quickly—it's only a week ago today that President Eisenhower was inaugurated—but I think I can, on the basis of what I know about him, give you two indications as to the outline of our foreign policy, one negative and the other positive.

Now first the negative one. We will not try to meet the Soviet strategy of encirclement by ourselves starting a war. Take that for certain. A few people here and there in private life have suggested that a war with Soviet Russia is inevitable and that we'd better have it soon rather than later because, they said, time is running against us. President Eisenhower is absolutely opposed to any such policy and so, of course, am I and all of my associates in the State Department and the Foreign Service. We shall never choose a war as the instrument of our policy.

It says in the Bible, you recall, that all they that take the sword perish with the sword. And even people who do not accept that as a doctrine of faith should at least remember that twice within our generation great and powerful despots have taken the sword. Germany and Japan, for example, have taken the sword with seemingly

overwhelming power only in the end to perish miserably. Now, of course, we know that our enemies do not have moral scruples. In fact, they deny that there is such a thing as a moral law. They preach violence. Stalin has said, and it is taught to every one of his Communist followers, that the world transformation which they seek cannot, they say, be achieved without violence. And Stalin went on to say that any who thought that their goals could be achieved peacefully have either gone out of their minds or are traitors to the Communist cause. We know that they've used violence, at least on a local scale, in several countries of the world, including Korea and Indochina. They're building up a vast military machine; they've rejected U.N. proposals for an armistice in Korea; and they've rejected U.N. proposals for effective limitation of armament. Therefore we ourselves must have a strong military establishment and we should encourage the creation of military strength among our friends; but the purpose is never to wage war but only to deter war. Not only shall we never invoke war to achieve our purposes but we shall try to the best of our ability to stop the wars that are now going on in the world, notably these wars in Korea and Indochina. Today these wars go on because the enemy thinks he's getting an advantage by continuing the war. I believe that General Eisenhower will find the ways to make the enemy change his mind in that respect so that they too will want peace.

The Answer—Love of Freedom

Now the other purpose of our foreign policy, and this is the positive aspect, must be to create in other peoples such a love and respect for freedom that they can never really be absorbed by the despotism, the totalitarian dictatorship, of the Communist world. The Russian Communists, as I've pointed out, have swallowed a great many people to date, approximately 800 million, but you know there is such a thing as indigestion. People don't always get stronger by eating more; sometimes they eat more than they can digest and then they get weaker instead of getting stronger. Already there are signs of indigestion within the Russian Communist world. The purges and the trials that are going on in Eastern Europe, the wholesale executions that are going on in Communist China—all these things show the people are restive and are unhappy. The fact that the Com-

munist rulers feel that they have to resort to these tactics of terrorism in order to make the people do their will—that fact is a sign of weakness, not a sign of strength. And a great deal can be done to make these peoples, these captive peoples, retain such a love of freedom and independence, and to bring such a love and determination to keep independence on the part of these peoples that I've talked about, who are menaced, that they can't be swallowed and digested by Soviet communism. And perhaps in time the indigestion will become so acute that it might be fatal.

Now what's our job and our task in that respect? Our job is to serve our own enlightened self-interest by demonstrating by our own performance, by our own examples, how good freedom is and how much better it is than despotism is. Now who can put on that performance, that demonstration, to show that example? The only people in the world that can do it are you, the people of the United States of America. And it means that each of you has a task in foreign policy. Foreign policy isn't just something that's conducted by secretaries of state and by ambassadors in different parts of the world; every one of you has got a part in making a successful foreign policy for the United States, because whether or not we peacefully succeed will largely depend upon the demonstration you make as to the value and productivity of liberty. You must work hard enough at whatever your task is to show that freedom is more productive than slavery. You must be resourceful and inventive enough so that our instruments of peace and, if need be, war are better than any that can be invented by the despots and their captives. We must be compassionate and friendly and good neighbors because people who are wholly selfish are never an attractive people. If each of you will recognize that you have a part to play in making freedom seem desirable, then all of us together will make freedom so sought after throughout the world that the Russian Communists will be bound to fail in their strategy of encircling us by swallowing up the rest of the world.

National Conduct and Example—Our Responsibility

The point I want to emphasize is that the heart of a successful foreign policy is our national conduct and example, and that is a matter for every individual and not just the diplomats. So far as your Government is concerned, you may be sure that it will not be intimidated, subverted, or conquered. Our Nation must stand as a solid rock in a storm-tossed world. To all those suffering under Communist slavery, to the timid and the intimidated peoples of the world, let us say this: you can count upon us. Together with the other free peoples of the world we can, I am confident, peacefully achieve an honorable peace.

Now I suppose some of you are wondering whether the State Department can really be trusted to take a strong lead against Russian communism. There have been some shocking revelations which showed that some Communists and sympathizers have found their way into high places and betrayed secrets, even that of the atomic bomb. I can assure you that all of the resources of Government, and that includes the FBI, are going to be employed to be sure that any such people are detected and cleaned out. I can promise you that our foreign policies, our new policies, will never to the slightest degree reflect any lack of faith in the ideals and the principles on which this Nation was founded.

Let me now in conclusion say that I believe that our foreign policies should be open so that you can know what they are, and they should be sufficiently simple so that you can understand them and judge them, and they should be sufficiently decent and moral so that they will fit into your idea of what you think is right. These principles of openness, simplicity, and righteousness—these principles are those which are in accord with what used to be the great American traditional foreign policy. That has been our great tradition and I am proud that we here in the State Department and in our Foreign Service will have a chance to carry on that great tradition and to live up to it. And in that way we shall, I think, deserve and I hope we shall receive the support, the confidence, and the cooperation of the American people.

Purpose of European Trip

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*¹

Press release 55 dated January 30

President Eisenhower has asked Mr. Stassen and me to make this trip to Europe in order to gather information about problems which we and other nations of the Atlantic community must deal with in our common effort to attain peace, security, and economic health. Cooperation among the nations of the Atlantic community is of the utmost importance to all of us because it is clear that the collective strength of these nations, if properly directed and organized, is far greater than their strength would be if each pursued separate and individual nationalistic programs and policies. During our trip we will visit the six countries which plan a European Defense Community, namely, Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, and also the United Kingdom, which is closely associated with this project. We are looking forward with very great interest to our meeting with the top Government officials in these countries and to hearing about the latest developments concerning the European Defense Community, which was developed by the Europeans themselves with great courage and imagination as a step toward that unity which all recognize as necessary.

In conclusion I would like to reiterate what I have recently said on several occasions, namely, that the purpose of this trip does not involve the making of new commitments but rather it is to gather information on common problems which the new Administration will take into consideration in the formulation of policy.

Netherlands to Forego U.S. Defense Support Aid

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 44 dated January 27

The Netherlands Government is to be warmly congratulated on its announcement that, after careful consideration of the economic position of the country, it has decided not to request defense support aid for the fiscal year 1952-53.

This action, which is in the best Dutch tradition of self-reliance, deserves the admiration of the American people. Our Netherlands friends have had to struggle hard to overcome their need for economic aid. The cooperation of agriculture and industry and, above all, the tenacity of purpose, hard work, and the willingness to sacrifice on the part of the people of the Dutch nation have enabled the Netherlands to surmount the enormous obstacles they faced when hostilities ceased in 1945

¹Made at the Military Air Transport Terminal at Washington on Jan. 30.

after years of destruction and occupation. Their achievement is the more remarkable in view of the increase in the Dutch defense effort within NATO since the North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea. To help make this effort ever more effective, the United States will continue the program of direct military aid under which assistance is furnished in the form of arms and equipment for military, naval, and air forces.

The Dutch statement of the importance and usefulness to them of aid received under the Marshall Plan and the Mutual Security Program is sincerely appreciated, and I offer my best wishes for the continued improvement in the economic strength and security of the Netherlands.

International Information Activities Committee Appointed

The President on January 26 appointed a committee to be known as the President's Committee on International Information Activities. The Committee will survey and evaluate the Government's information and related policies and activities with particular reference to international relations and the national security.

The members of the Committee are William H. Jackson, *Chairman*; Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, representing the Secretary of State; Sigurd Larmon, representing the Director for Mutual Security; Gordon Gray; Barklie McKee Henry; John C. Hughes.

Abbott Washburn will act as executive secretary of the Committee.¹

In announcing this action, the President said: "It has long been my conviction that a unified and dynamic effort in this field is essential to the security of the United States and of the other peoples in the community of free nations. All executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government are authorized and directed, as a matter of common concern, to cooperate with the Committee in its work.

"The establishment of this Committee and the scope of its inquiry were discussed at the Cabinet meeting last Friday morning and received full and complete support.

"The Committee's final report and recommendations are to be in my hands not later than June 30."

The appointments of C. D. Jackson and Mr. Larmon, respectively, were made by the President after consultation with and at the designation of Secretary Dulles and Harold E. Stassen. A nominee of the Secretary of Defense will be named to the Committee shortly.

The Committee will cease to exist 30 days after submission of its final report to the President.

¹For biographical data on members of the Committee, see White House press release dated Jan. 26.

Treatment of American Property in Soviet Zone of Germany and Soviet Sector of Berlin

Press release 41 dated January 23

On February 23, 1952, the American Embassy at Moscow delivered a note to the Soviet Foreign Office calling attention to the evasion by the Soviet Control Commission of its responsibilities for the protection of American properties, rights, and interests situated in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany and in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The U.S. note pointed out that as a result of transfer of these responsibilities by the Soviet Control Commission to German agencies in the Soviet zone of occupation, American property owners have been denied access to their property, have been unable to manage or supervise their property, have had no voice in the selection of agents, and have been unable to obtain information concerning their property or to prevent its management in a manner which impairs its value.

The U.S. note called upon the Soviet Government to take the necessary measures to control the actions of the German authorities and to rescind the measures taken against American properties, rights, and interests concerned. It concluded that, failing satisfaction, the United States would have no alternative but to hold the Soviet Government answerable for the resulting damage to American interests in the Soviet zone of Germany as well as in the Soviet sector of Berlin.

On May 23, 1952, the Soviet Foreign Office sent a reply to the American Embassy at Moscow stating that the transfer of management and safekeeping of foreign property on East German territory to the "German People's Republic" was in accordance with Declaration No. 2 of the Control Council in Germany, and that accordingly the assertion by the Government of the United States that such transfer was not in accord with the obligations of the Soviet Government is without foundation.

On January 16, 1953, the American Embassy at Moscow sent another note to the Soviet Foreign Office rejecting the explanation of the Soviet Government and reasserting that the United States would hold the Soviet Government answerable for the resulting damage to American properties,

rights, and interests in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany and in the Soviet sector of Berlin.

Texts of the U.S. and Soviet notes follow:

U.S. NOTE OF FEBRUARY 23, 1952

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, acting upon instructions from the United States Government, has the honor to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the protection of American properties, rights and interests situated in the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany and in the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

The Government of the United States understands that in accordance with a protocol signed on June 20, 1950, the administration and protection of foreign properties, devolving upon the Soviet Union, has been transferred to certain German agencies in the Soviet Zone of occupation. In the view of the Government of the United States, however, whereas this protocol purports to delegate certain responsibilities for protection of foreign properties, rights and interests, the Soviet Government must be aware that such action cannot absolve it from the obligation to insure the protection of such properties, rights and interests until the final peace settlement.

It has come to the notice of the United States Government that developments permitted by the Soviet Control Commission are in no way consistent with the obligation of the Soviet Government to protect foreign property, rights and interests in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The evidence available to the United States Government supports the conclusion that the Soviet Control Commission is in fact evading its responsibility in the matter of American property, rights and interests in Germany. Measures have been taken which are equivalent in their effect to sequestration of American property. Representatives of American owners have been denied access to the property and records of such owners. Agents appointed by American owners to manage or supervise their property have been summarily deprived of their powers. American owners have had no voice in the selection of the successors to their agents, and have been unable to obtain from them information concerning their property or to prevent its management in a manner which impairs its value.

The American Embassy accordingly calls upon the Soviet Government to take the necessary measures to control the actions of the German authorities purporting to act on behalf of the Soviet Control Commission and to rescind the measures so far taken against American properties, rights and interests concerned. Failing satisfaction, the United States Government will have no alternative but to hold the Soviet Government answerable

for the resulting damage to American interests in the Soviet Zone of Germany as well as in the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

SOVIET REPLY OF MAY 23, 1952

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and referring to the Embassy's Note No. 411 of February 23, 1952 relative to the protection of American properties, rights and interests in East Germany, has the honor to state the following:

In accordance with the appropriate quadripartite decision under which German authorities are responsible for the preservation, maintenance and prevention of plundering of foreign property, which is mentioned in Declaration No. 2 of the Control Council in Germany to the German people, the Soviet Control Commission transferred to the Government of the German People's Republic functions with regard to the management and safekeeping of foreign property on East German territory. Similarly, all questions connected with the safeguarding and maintenance of American property on East German territory are regulated by laws of the German People's Republic based on the mentioned quadripartite agreement. Such an arrangement fully assures the safety of the foreign property on East German territory until the time of final decision of the question of the fate of this property connected with conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

As a result of the foregoing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR considers that the assertion of the Embassy of the USA that the mentioned decisions taken by the Soviet Control Commission somehow do not correspond with the obligations of the Soviet Government regarding the protection of foreign property rights and interests in East Germany is without foundation.

U.S. NOTE OF JANUARY 16, 1953

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, acting upon instructions from the United States Government, has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note No. 19 of May 23, 1952 concerning the protection of American properties, rights and interests in the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany and in the Soviet sector of Berlin.

The United States Government regards the explanation set forth in the Soviet Government's note as an entirely unsatisfactory response to Note No. 411, dated February 23, 1952, from the American Embassy. With respect to the Ministry's statements regarding Control Council Proclamation No. 2, the Government of the United States wishes to point out that the basic purpose of those provisions of that Proclamation which are relevant to this matter was to ensure the protection of United Nations properties, rights and interests. However, as the United States note of February 23 emphasized, developments which the Soviet Government has permitted in its area of control in Germany have had and continue to have precisely the opposite effect on American property. The United States Government, therefore, has no alternative but to reiterate that, unless satisfactory action is taken by the Soviet Government to cause the rescission of the measures taken against American properties, rights and interests in the Soviet zone of Germany and the Soviet sector of Berlin by German agencies purporting to act on behalf of the Soviet Control Commission, the United States Government will hold the Soviet Government answerable for the resulting damage to American properties, rights and interests in those areas.

February 9, 1953

Fur Imports from U.S.S.R. and Adjacent Areas

Press release 42 dated January 26

Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 provides that "as soon as practicable" the President shall deny trade agreement benefits "to imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and to imports from any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement." Effect was given to this provision by the President's proclamation of August 1, 1951,¹ under which trade-agreement benefits would be suspended with respect to imports from particular nations or areas following their designation in a letter from the President to the Secretary of the Treasury. Following steps to terminate agreements with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland, with which the denial of trade-agreement benefits would conflict, the President on November 20, 1951, notified the Secretary of the Treasury that such benefits should be suspended with respect to imports from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Poland, and certain adjacent areas.²

The President on January 17, 1953, sent to the Secretary of the Treasury a new letter superseding his letter of November 20, 1951, in order to specify more adequately those areas the imports from which would be affected by the letter of November 20, 1951. The second paragraph of the new letter continues without change the prohibition against the importation of certain furs, the product of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, contained in the second paragraph of the letter of November 20, 1951.

The text of the new letter, which will supersede the earlier letter on February 19, 1953, is as follows:

President's Letter of January 17

My DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Pursuant to Part I of my proclamation of August 1, 1951, carrying out sections 5 and 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, I hereby notify you that the suspension provided for therein shall be applicable with respect to imports from the following nations and areas:

Poland, and areas under the provisional administration of Poland (the former Free City of Danzig, and areas in Germany including the area in East Prussia) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the area in East Prussia under the provisional administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Pursuant to Part II of that proclamation of August 1, 1951, I hereby notify you that the entry, or withdrawal from warehouse, for consumption of ermine, fox, kolinsky, marten, mink, muskrat, and weasel furs and skins, dressed or undressed, shall be prohibited as to the products of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The provisions of this letter shall apply to products

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1951, p. 291.

² *Ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1951, p. 913.

specified herein which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on and after February 19, 1953 on which date this letter shall supersede my letter to you of November 20, 1951 under the proclamation of August 1, 1951.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN

The Honorable
JOHN W. SNYDER,
Secretary of the Treasury.

U. S. Air Force Agreement With Venezuela

Press release 30 dated January 16

There was signed on January 16 by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and César González, Ambassador of Venezuela to the United States, an agreement providing for the detail of personnel of the U. S. Air Force to serve as an advisory mission in Venezuela. The agreement is to continue in force for 4 years from the date of signature and may be extended beyond that period at the request of the Government of Venezuela.

The agreement is similar to numerous other agreements in force between the United States and certain other American Republics providing for the detail of officers and enlisted men of the U. S. Army, Navy, and Air Force to advise the armed forces of those countries. The provisions of the agreement relate to the duties, rank, and precedence of the personnel of the mission, the travel accommodations to be provided for the members of the mission and their families, and other related matters.

Economic, Technical Aid Agreement With Indonesia

Press release 17 dated January 12

On January 12, 1953, the Governments of Indonesia and the United States concluded a new agreement terminating and replacing their agreement of Jan. 5, 1952, which provided for the extension of economic and technical and of military assistance on a grant basis. While continuing to honor the old agreement, the Indonesian Government has taken the initiative in negotiating the new agreement, which provides for the continuance of economic and technical aid and the discontinuance of military aid on a grant basis.

Technical and economic aid to Indonesia totaled about 16 million dollars in fiscal years 1951 and 1952. Of this amount, approximately 6 million dollars was requested by Indonesia for the stimulation of food production; 4 million dollars for public health; 2 million dollars for industrial engineering and engineering development; and 2 million dollars for education and vocational training. The conclusion of the new agreement has cleared the way for discussions between the two

Governments as to the size and content of the technical-assistance program for fiscal year 1953.

Under the former agreement, the U. S. Government had almost completed a grant of about 5 million dollars' worth of equipment under a 1950 program for the maintenance of internal security. The Indonesian Government has indicated its intention to pay for the small undelivered balance of this program, about 12,500 dollars, in accordance with its desire to purchase, instead of to receive as a grant, any military equipment which it may obtain from the U. S. Government.

Revised Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea

Press release 22 dated January 14

The revised International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea will come into force on January 1, 1954. These Regulations were agreed upon among the delegates to the International Safety of Life at Sea Conference held at London in 1948. They were circulated to all interested governments by the Government of the United Kingdom, acting at the invitation of the other participating governments. When substantial unanimity of acceptance had been reached, the Government of the United Kingdom was to notify all other governments of that fact, setting an effective date not less than 1 year ahead. The United States is now in receipt of formal notification that substantial unanimity has been reached and that the date of January 1, 1954, has been decided upon as the effective date for the new Regulations.

Among the more important changes introduced by the 1948 Regulations are the following:

(1) The Regulations apply to seaplanes on the water as well as to water craft.

(2) The second white masthead light which is allowed by the existing Regulations becomes compulsory except for vessels less than 150 feet in length and for vessels engaged in towing.

(3) The range of visibility of lights on fishing vessels is standardized at two miles. In the existing Regulations no range is specified.

(4) The stern light which is allowed by the existing Regulations becomes compulsory and its range of visibility is increased from one to two miles.

(5) The range of visibility of anchor lights is increased for all vessels under 150 feet in length from one to two miles and for vessels over that length from one to three miles.

(6) When a power-driven vessel which, under the Regulations, is to keep course and speed, is in sight of another vessel and is in doubt whether the other vessel is taking sufficient action to avert collision, it may use a signal consisting of five short blasts.

The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1948, have so far been accepted by the following countries:

Australia	France	Norway
Belgium	Greece	Pakistan
Brazil	Holland	Peru
Burma	Hungary	Poland
Canada	Iceland	Rumania
Chile	India	South Africa
Colombia	Iraq	Spain
Denmark	Republic of Ireland	Sweden
Dominican Republic	Italy	Turkey
Ecuador	Mexico	United Kingdom
Egypt	New Zealand	U.S.A.
Finland	Nicaragua	U.S.S.R.
		Yugoslavia

Convention on Aircraft Damage

Press release 26 dated January 15

The diplomatic conference convened under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Rome on September 9, 1952, pursuant to the invitation of the Italian Government, completed work on and adopted and opened for signature and ratification or adherence a Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Persons on the Surface.

This convention has as its purpose the provision of uniform rules and limits of liability applicable to the operator of an aircraft for damage caused to persons or property on the surface in a nation other than that in which the aircraft is registered. It also contains provisions governing the manner in which the nation overflown may assure itself that the operator of the overflying aircraft has insurance or other security for any liability which may eventuate under the convention. The convention has no application whatsoever to domestic aircraft, that is, to the aircraft of any contracting nation while flying over that nation.

Thirty-two nations, including three which were represented by observers, participated in the work of the Conference. Fifteen nations signed the resulting convention at Rome, October 7, 1952, and three more nations have signed it in the intervening period. No nation has yet ratified the convention, which will become effective as between the nations which have then ratified it on the ninetieth day after the instrument of ratification of the fifth nation is deposited with the International Civil Aviation Organization. The convention remains open for signature by any nation until it becomes effective and for adherence without signature at any time thereafter.

The United States did not sign the convention at Rome and has not done so since. Although possessing the appropriate powers to sign a convention, the U.S. delegation considered that the convention, as adopted and opened for signature by the Conference, contained provisions which depart so substantially from the U.S. views and

posed such important problems of law and policy as to require further careful consideration and analysis before determining whether to sign. Among the major problems presented which it was felt warranted further consideration are—

1. The inclusion of the principle of absolute liability of the operator for any damage caused by his aircraft, regardless of the existence of fault. The United States sought a convention predicated on a rebuttable presumption of fault.

2. The relatively low limits of liability provided, particularly with respect to large transport aircraft. The convention contains a scale of limits starting at approximately 33 thousand dollars and increasing according to weight, but with the rate of increase becoming progressively lower as the weight increases. Under this scale, the maximum liability for the largest plane in commercial operation today would be approximately 800 thousand dollars. The United States sought substantially higher limits.

3. The provision of an individual limit of liability for injury or death of any one person of 33 thousand dollars. The United States opposed any individual limit and particularly one limiting liability for personal injury.

4. The provision whereby absolute liability without any limit in the amount thereof is imposed in cases of deliberate acts done with the intent to cause damage, including cases where such acts were those of a servant or agent acting in the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority. The United States contended that, having adopted the principle of absolute liability, the limits provided by the convention should be removed only in the most extreme circumstances involving intentional wrongdoing amounting in effect to criminal intent and that, in cases of acts of servants or agents, such unlimited liability should be imposed on the operator only when the act is done pursuant to express authority.

5. The provisions governing security for the operator's liability which incorporate the principle that the nation being overflown, while entitled to require insurance or other security for an operator's liability, is compelled to accept as sufficient evidence of the final responsibility of an insurer the certificate of the nation of registry of the aircraft or of the nation of the domicile of the insurer as to such financial responsibility. This approach also required elaborate provisions for the administration of this system of certificates. The United States urged that the country overflown should be entitled to satisfy itself as to any reasonable doubts in respect of financial responsibility of the insurer.

6. Inclusion in the convention of the so-called "single forum" solution of the problem of jurisdiction, under which actions for damages under the convention can be brought only in the courts of the states where the damage occurred, except in certain limited circumstances where the parties agree

upon a different forum, requiring that judgments rendered in the single forum be executed in other states, subject to specified exceptions. The United States urged provisions which would have permitted considerably more flexibility in the choice of fora while at the same time assuring the defendant an opportunity to preserve the limits of liability.

Numerous other provisions of the convention likewise present problems of greater or lesser importance which warrant further study and consideration, all of which will be taken into account in determining the course which the United States should pursue in relation to this convention.

Plans are now being formulated, and will shortly be announced, for affording all interested persons an opportunity to make their views and comments on this convention known to the Government prior to determining what course to pursue.

At the present time, the minutes of the Conference are in the process of being prepared by the International Civil Aviation Organization and are not yet available in final form. It is not known at this time how soon the minutes will be completed and available for distribution by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

The convention was prepared in Spanish, French, and English texts, these being the official languages of the International Civil Aviation Organization. All three texts are equally authentic. Every reasonable effort was made to have the texts conform in meaning, although literal translations were not always possible. Copies of the French and Spanish texts can be obtained from the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal. The English text of the convention is attached.¹

Summary of 1952 Activities of Export-Import Bank

Loans for the development of sources of strategic materials abroad have accounted for more than half of the credit activities of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, the foreign lending agency of the U.S. Government, during the year 1952, according to a statement issued on January 16 by Herbert E. Gaston, the Chairman of the Bank, summarizing the calendar-year's activities.

The total amount of loan commitments from the Bank's funds for strategic and defense materials purposes during the year was 314.2 million dollars, out of a total of loan commitments for the entire year in the amount of 596.6 million dollars.

As the year ended, the Bank had under consideration substantial additional loans for mining of strategic metals and for transportation and power projects and for auxiliary power and transportation projects.

Among the commitments made during the year were loans for transportation, power plants, and port facilities in Africa to expedite the movement of strategic materials to the United States and other markets.

Under consideration at the close of the year were applications in the amount of 169 million dollars for financing the development and expansion of foreign sources of critical materials.

In addition to the 314.2 million dollars of loan commitments from the Bank's own funds for strategic materials and other defense objectives, loans to the amount of 44.04 million dollars were made on certification by defense agencies as essential from funds provided for defense purposes.

The Directors will report to the Congress net profits of 26 million dollars for the last 6 months of 1952, making profits for the calendar year 50.7 million dollars. The profits for the year were arrived at by deducting from gross revenue from loans of 73.3 million dollars operating expenses of 1 million dollars and interest of 21.6 million dollars paid to the Treasury of the United States.

In June, the Directors approved the payment of a 20 million dollar dividend to the Treasury of the United States representing 2 percent of the 1 billion dollars of capital stock of the Bank, all of which is held by the Treasury. This dividend was paid out of the net profit during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952. The Bank's undivided profits for the 6 months ended December 31, 1952, together with the accumulated reserve for contingencies, aggregate 292.4 million dollars.

Total outstanding loans and undisbursed commitments of 3.2 billion dollars in 48 countries around the world were on the books of the Bank on December 31, 1952. Principal repayments on outstanding loans amounted to 186 million dollars for the last 6 months of 1952, bringing the total for the calendar year to 271 million dollars. Loan disbursements totaled 293 million dollars for the last 6 months of 1952, making a total of 478 million dollars for the entire year.

New credits amounting to 183 million dollars were authorized by the Board in the last 6 months of 1952.

Colombia To Receive Loan for Irrigation Project

Authorization of an Export-Import Bank loan of 4,500,000 dollars to the Caja de Credito Agrario, Industrial, y Minero, an agency of the Republic of Colombia, was announced at Washington on January 12.

The loan represents an increase in the existing line of credit of 10 million dollars authorized in July 1943. The additional funds will be used to complete the financing of an earth-fill flood-control dam on the Bogotá River and the Saldana and

¹Not printed here.

Coello irrigation projects, which include some 60,000 acres of fertile agricultural lands in the Tolima Plain in the valley of the Magdalena River west of Bogotá.

Advances under the line of credit are to be repaid in 20 semiannual installments commencing in July 1955. Interest on balances outstanding, at the rate of 4 percent per annum, will be paid semi-annually.

Construction of African Railway

The Export-Import Bank of Washington on January 15 announced a credit to the Republic of Portugal to finance in part the construction of a new railway from the Rhodesias to the port of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. This project will be carried out jointly by the railway lines of Mozambique and the Rhodesias. At the same time, the Rhodesian Railways are carrying out a major development and equipment program to improve service generally throughout Northern and Southern Rhodesia. It is understood that the Northern Rhodesian Government has approached the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for assistance in financing this program and that further discussions will take place in Washington soon.

The railways of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and of Mozambique jointly have planned the construction of about 340 miles of new railroad to assist in the economic development of central Africa and to provide increased export rail capacity for the mining areas of the Rhodesias. Copper and cobalt from Northern Rhodesia and chrome from Southern Rhodesia now are exported to the United States and friendly nations principally through the port of Beira in Mozambique. The capacity of the existing railway and of the port itself is so fully utilized, however, that all of the minerals awaiting export cannot be handled promptly. The railways therefore intend to construct an alternative route to the sea by way of the excellent port of Lourenço Marques in southern Mozambique.

This new route traverses a region in Southern Rhodesia and in Mozambique which presents no serious construction difficulties. The area is well adapted to farming and cattle raising, the development of which will benefit the populations of both countries and will provide local traffic for the new railway. The route in Southern Rhodesia also passes through a region which, although presently undeveloped, shows evidence of extensive mineral resources.

The Export-Import Bank, following discussions with representatives of the Government of Portugal and the Mozambique Railways, has authorized a credit of \$17,000,000 to the Republic of Portugal to cover the cost of U. S. materials, equipment, and services for that portion of the new line which will be constructed in Mozambique.

Point Four Mission To Study Egyptian Industry

The Department of State announced on January 13 (press release 21) that Thomas D. Cabot, prominent business executive and financier of Boston, and a group of American industrial specialists from Arthur D. Little, Inc., internationally known firm of industrial research and engineering consultants in Cambridge, Mass., have arrived in Egypt to advise and assist the Government of Egypt in developing the country's industries under a Point Four program.

The first phase of the project of technical cooperation will take about 4 months and will consist of a study of the raw-material resources, actual and potential markets, marketing conditions affecting Egypt's domestic and export trade, available industrial facilities and skills, and related matters. This phase will be followed by recommendations to the Government of Egypt for specific action and undertakings for advancing the industrialization of the country and developing more fully its economic potentials.

The project will continue to furnish advisory and development services to the Government of Egypt and to business firms in particular fields as specific industrial opportunities are undertaken by domestic or outside capital.

Mr. Cabot is serving temporarily as an industrial consultant to the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) of the Department of State. He will work with the Point Four staff in Egypt, as will the representatives of Arthur D. Little, Inc., while the industry services project is in progress. He has served as a consultant to the Department of State previously, and in 1951 he was Director of International Security Affairs in the Department.

The group from Arthur D. Little, Inc., will be comprised of Earl Stafford as field project manager and Richard M. Alt as chief economist. A. G. Haldane, Director of the International Division of Arthur D. Little, Inc., will also accompany the group for the first 2 weeks.

These industrial experts will be provided under contract with TCA by Arthur D. Little, Inc. As the project locates and identifies specific possibilities for industrial development, additional specialists may be furnished by Arthur D. Little, Inc.

The Office of International Trade of the Department of Commerce will assist in the project by supplying technical information and assistance as needed, and by aiding in the evaluation of reports and recommendations.

The Government of Egypt requested the assistance of Point Four in planning and taking necessary steps to develop the resources and markets of the country through a soundly conceived program of encouraging industrialization through both domestic and outside capital. Many surveys

have been made of Egypt's resources. The purpose of the Point Four industry project is not to survey but to stimulate actual development, including locating specific opportunities, recommending action necessary to attract investment, interesting investors in particular fields and sites for industrial development, and developing general plans for advancing industrialization in line with the aims of Egypt's whole economic and social development program.

As is customary in Point Four projects, the Egyptian Government will assign its own technicians to work with the Americans and will provide most of the local facilities and expenses necessary, such as office equipment, clerical help, translators, transportation within Egypt, office space, local labor, and the like. Point Four is paying the salaries and supporting expenses of the American specialists.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FIFTY-FOURTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 16-30, 1952¹

U.N. doc. 5/2897
Transmitted January 6, 1953

I herewith submit report number 54 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 September 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1374-1388 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The main Armistice Delegation met on 20 September 1952 and again on the 28 of September 1952.

In the first meeting the Communists continued to slander the United Nations Command, calling the United Nations Command Delegation liars and accusing the United Nations Command of being the aggressors in the Korean conflict.

The substance of the senior United Nations Command Delegate's comments follow.

On the 25 of June, 1950, the United Nations Commission in Korea, composed of representatives from Australia, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, and Turkey, reported that North Korean forces had crossed the

38th Parallel and the invasion was assuming the character of full-scale war.

When this Commission, two days later, reported that North Korea was carrying out a well-planned, concerted, and full-scale invasion of South Korea, and that North Korea would not heed the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations to cease hostilities and withdraw its forces, fifty-three nations accepted the findings of the United Nations Commission and only five—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia and Poland, refused to accept the recommendations that assistance be furnished to the Republic of Korea. Let me read the list of the names of the countries who by vote in the United Nations General Assembly branded your side as the aggressor in Korea. It is a rather imposing list: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, El Salvador, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

It would appear that a considerable portion of the world has its own opinion as to who was the aggressor in this tragic war.

You have the effrontery to claim that the United States has "stolen the name of the United Nations". The United Nations Command in Korea contains fighting forces of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom and United States. There are medical units

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on Jan. 6. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report, May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668; the 48th report, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 795; the 49th report, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 883; the 50th report, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958; the 51st and 52d reports, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034; and the 53d report, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 155.

from Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden. The following countries have provided transportation, medical supplies, food, funds, and other miscellaneous supplies for the relief of the unfortunate people who are the victims of your aggression: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Italy, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Iceland, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Viet Nam, and Venezuela.

On the 28 of September 1952 the United Nations Command Delegation reviewed past proposals that it had offered designed to solve the prisoners of war question and gain an Armistice and three new ones, any one of which could solve the prisoners of war question if the Communists really want an Armistice. The senior United Nations Command Delegate speech is quoted.

United Nations Command: I have an important statement to make.

For many weeks the prisoner of war issue has blocked the achievement of an Armistice in Korea. On 1 July we suggested to you that a solution to the problem must be one that to a reasonable degree meets the requirements of both sides. You have admitted the soundness of that proposition.

It must now be clear to you that one of the requirements of our side which cannot be compromised is that of no forced repatriation.

Within this humanitarian principle the United Nations Command has made honest efforts to achieve an Armistice. So that there can be no doubt of the objectivity and sincerity with which the United Nations Command Delegation has attempted to find a solution to the prisoner of war question, I will restate the proposals which we have previously offered and which you have summarily rejected.

We have previously proposed that joint teams or Red Cross Teams with or without military observers of both sides, be admitted to the prisoner of war camps of both sides, to verify the fact that non-repatriates would forcibly resist return to the side from which they came. As an alternative we proposed that all the prisoners of war of both sides be delivered in groups of appropriate size to the demilitarized zone and be given the opportunity to express their preference on repatriation, the interview to be done by one or a combination of the following:

- A. International Committee of the Red Cross.
- B. Teams from impartial nations.
- C. Joint teams of military observers.
- D. Red Cross representatives from each side.

Either one of these proposals, if accepted by your side, would have allayed any legitimate fears you might have had that the prisoners of war were being coerced into rejecting repatriation to your side and would have produced an Armistice.

I now present to you three additional alternate proposals, any one of which will lead to an Armistice if you truly desire one. I ask that you give careful consideration to them because they represent the only remaining avenues of approach on which our side can agree to an Armistice. All of these proposals are based on the prior formal acceptance of an Armistice by both sides, with the disposition of prisoners of war to be determined thereafter according to one of the following procedures.

A. As soon as the Armistice Agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war in the custody of each side shall be entitled to release and repatriation. Such release and repatriation of prisoners of war shall begin in accordance

with the provisions of Article Three of the Armistice Agreement. Both sides agree that the obligation to exchange and repatriate prisoners of war shall be fulfilled by having them brought to an agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone. The prisoner of war shall be identified and his name checked against the agreed list of prisoners of war in the presence, if desired, of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams. The prisoner of war shall thereupon be considered as fully repatriated for the purposes of the agreement. Both sides agree, however, that any prisoner of war who at time of identification states that he wishes to return to the side by which he had been detained shall immediately be allowed to do so. Such former prisoner of war shall thereupon go into the custody of the side to which he wishes to go, which side shall provide him with transportation from the demilitarized zone to territory under its control in Korea. Such individual, of course, shall not be detained as a prisoner of war but shall assume civilian status, and in accordance with Paragraph fifty-two of the Armistice Agreement, shall not again be employed in acts of war in the Korean conflict.

B. As soon as the Armistice Agreement goes into effect all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. All prisoners objecting to repatriation will be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups where, at a mutually agreeable location, they will be freed from military control of both sides and interviewed by representatives of a mutually agreed country or countries whose forces are not participating in the Korean hostilities, such persons being free to go to the side of their choice as indicated by such interview. The foregoing procedure will be accomplished, if desired, with or without military representation from each side and under the observation of one or a combination of the following:

- (1) International Committee of the Red Cross.
- (2) Joint Red Cross teams.
- (3) Joint military teams.

C. As soon as the Armistice is signed and becomes effective all prisoners of war who desire repatriation will be exchanged expeditiously. Concurrently, if logistical capability permits, or as soon as possible thereafter, those prisoners of war who have previously expressed their objections to repatriation will be delivered in groups of appropriate size to a mutually agreed upon location in the demilitarized zone and there freed from the military control of both sides. Without questioning, interview, or screening, each individual so released will be free to go to the side of his choice. We will agree, if desired, to have this movement and disposition of non-repatriates accomplished under the observation of one or a combination of the International Committee of the Red Cross, joint teams of military observers, or Red Cross representatives from both sides.

We have now offered you the widest selection of choices the United Nations Command can offer. Each of them will produce an Armistice. I urge that you give mature and careful consideration to our proposals. For that purpose I propose a recess for ten days, and that we meet again here at 1100 hours on 8 October. Our staff officers will be available at any time to answer questions on any of our proposals.

The Communists immediately rejected these fair and reasonable proposals but agreed to meet again on 8 October 1952.

On 28 September 1952, the United Nations Command announced that approximately 11,000 South Koreans who had been held in its custody as prisoners of war were reclassified as civilian internees and would be released to the Republic of Korea beginning in early October. In order to provide for orderly assimilation into the economy of the Republic of Korea, and to assist this group in their

return to civilian pursuits, a detailed plan was drawn up which, it is estimated, will take about six weeks to complete.

Thorough screening and investigation of the status of each of these persons had established the fact that they were originally improperly classified as prisoners of war. Continuous screening has disclosed that this group, like the 27,000 civilian internees previously released, were detained because of various accidental circumstances of war, principally the dislocation of great masses of civilian population during the latter part of 1950 and early 1951.

These nationals of the Republic of Korea had been retained in a camp near Masan, Korea. They had previously elected, during individual screening, to remain in South Korea. They are, of course, not among the 83,000 prisoners of war whom the United Nations Command has reported to the Communists for repatriation. In accordance with its consistent stand to abide by the humanitarian objectives of the Geneva Convention, the United Nations Command is furnishing the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, with complete information concerning the release of these civilians.

The operation of most of the prisoner of war camps proceeded satisfactorily with continued improvement being made in physical facilities and accommodations. The extensive plan for winterizing quarters, kitchens, and hospital space is well under way and should be completed in sufficient time to meet cold weather.

On 22 September 1952, the first of a series of incidents occurred in a prisoner of war camp on the island of Cheju-do, holding almost 6,000 Chinese Communist prisoners of war who had expressed their desire to return to Communist control in the event of an Armistice. On this date a work detail outside the compound had flagrantly disobeyed a legal camp order. It was necessary to use force to restore order. On 25 September, while a work detail was returning to the compound area, one prisoner deliberately broke ranks. This action started a series of events which developed into an open demonstration that again had to be settled by force. One day later, on 26 September, security forces had to enter another compound where existing orders were being violated and discovered, while restoring order, forbidden Communist literature and several strips of red cloth which had been concealed, undoubtedly for future use as flags. On the same day, information received from sources within the camp indicated that the inmates of another compound had planned to execute the camp commander and one other United Nations officer if they were to be required to salute the camp commander, which provision is expressly contained in Article 39, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1949. As a security measure, the inmates of this compound were removed and a search conducted, during which eleven (11) prisoners of war were found to have hand-fashioned knives. There were also some literature and red strips of cloth confiscated. These repeated rebellious actions indicate clearly an attempt to embarrass the United Nations Command and contest the right of the camp authorities to maintain discipline and to administer and operate this installation in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

During the period 28-29 September, the proposals made by the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation to the Communists at Panmunjom on 28 September were translated and distributed through all prisoners of war installations. Camp authorities disseminated this information through various media of communications in order to emphasize to the prisoners held by the United Nations Command that these proposals in no way constituted a retreat from our basic principle of no forced repatriation. It was stressed too, that the efforts of our delegation were directed solely to securing an Armistice on honorable terms without requiring an exchange of prisoners by use of force.

The increased tempo of enemy aggressiveness demonstrated in early September did not diminish. The enemy again employed assault forces of up to battalion strength at scattered points across the United Nations Command front. In only two instances was the enemy successful in retaining outpost positions gained during the series of attacks which began 17 September. The first of these is southeast of Sangnyong while the second is near a hill mass east of the Pukhan River. The volume of enemy artillery and mortar fire decreased with a daily average of 9,000 rounds falling along the battle line. On 29 September the Communists employed a new daily high of approximately 47,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. The majority of the fire was utilized in support of Communist attacks on the central front. United Nations Command forces continued their tactics of local raids and patrolling to counter enemy reconnaissance elements and seek out hostile defenses. There was no major change in enemy dispositions across the front. However, in the area east of Mabang another division was moved up to reinforce front line positions.

On the western front a bitter struggle developed for the possession of previously contested outposts in the Mabang and Sangnyong areas. Initially a hostile force employing elements of a battalion attacked a United Nations Command outpost six miles south-southeast of Sangnyong on 17 September. The same outpost was the target for an enemy battalion on the following day. This latter attack succeeded in taking the position, decimating the small United Nations Command defending force. The accuracy and quantity of hostile interdiction fire prevented supporting friendly elements from extricating the bulk of the defenders. The outpost in the action described above is referred to as "Kelly". Two subsequent attempts to recapture this hill position resulted in failure, due to the high volume of well placed enemy artillery and mortar fire and fanatic resistance displayed by the enemy. A battalion, well supported by tank and artillery fire, attacked a position southwest of Mabang the evening of 18 September. Friendly elements were forced to consolidate their positions which allowed the enemy to partially occupy the outpost. After being reinforced, United Nations Command elements continued the fight until midnight 19-20 September. The situation then remained static until the evening of 20 September when a nine hour attack was initiated which restored the position to United Nations Command control.

On the central front, action was again centered in the Yulsa sector where the battle for control of two hill

positions which began in the previous period continued. One of these outposts, one and a half miles southeast of Yulsa, was still in enemy hands on 15 September. However, it was reoccupied by friendly forces on 18 September and immediately became a target for a series of attacks by the Communists. Late the same day the enemy, employing heavy supporting fires, launched a strong attack against the position but was forced to withdraw. During the ensuing several days further attacks were initiated by the Reds, but in lesser strength than the first. An abortive attempt to dislodge friendly forces occurred during the early morning hours of 29 September after which the enemy withdrew. This was followed a few hours later by another attack during which hostile forces occupied the position. A friendly counterattack compelled the Reds to withdraw and the outpost was restored to friendly hands by noon of 29 September. The second outpost, three thousands yards to the east, had been retaken by United Nations Command elements on 9 September. Hostile elements, however, persisted in their attempts to again drive the United Nations Command defenders from the position. On the night of 28-29 September the outpost was struck by a hostile company which was forced to retire after a four and one-half hour fight. About midnight 28-29 September two adjacent outposts in the vicinity of a hill mass east of the Pukhan River were attacked initially by a small enemy force. As the action progressed this initial group was reinforced piecemeal until it was of battalion size. Friendly attempts to reinforce the defending garrison were to no avail and by morning the Communists completely occupied the terrain feature. Despite two United Nations Command counterattacks the enemy remained in possession of the hill at the close of the period. On the evening of 29 September fire from a group of enemy tanks proved to be the opening move of an enemy attempt to capture two adjacent outpost positions south and east of Kumsong. The battle, which at times included hand to hand fighting, flamed and died intermittently for the following twenty-four hours. At noon on 30 September a portion of the hostile force succeeded in occupying one of the positions but were ejected several hours later by a United Nations Command counterattack.

On the eastern front there was a marked increase in patrol action and nightly probes by the enemy, particularly in the Yuusil area. On 21 September a company, which was later reinforced to battalion size, attacked a position five and a half miles east-southeast of Yuusil and succeeded in partially occupying it. United Nations Command elements launched a counterattack which forced an enemy withdrawal. The following morning two enemy companies attacked another position two miles to the north but after a seven hour fire fight were forced to withdraw. During the night of 23 September the extreme eastern portion of the front flamed into prominence. Here the Communists employed two battalions to attack two hill positions north and east of Oemyon. The enemy succeeded, after two and a half hours of fighting, in temporarily penetrating one of the positions. However, a dawn counterattack completely restored this position and the enemy retired.

Indications still point predominantly toward a con-

tinued defensive attitude by hostile forces. Front-line reports reveal that the enemy is persistently improving and adding depth to his defenses. Meanwhile prisoners of war state that the mission of their units is one of defense. These same prisoners of war fail to reveal any knowledge of large-scale offensive preparations within their units. Vehicle movements in Communist-held areas rose sharply during the early part of the period. This may have been motivated by the enemy's determination to maintain his front-line supply stocks at adequate levels in spite of the logistical strain imposed by the increased battle action. There still is no evidence that the greater aggressiveness displayed by the Communists during the month of September presages a major hostile offensive. In fact several prisoners of war have reported that the increased number of hostile attacks was a result of concern by the Communists over the possibility of a United Nations Command offensive.

United Nations Command naval aircraft operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan struck pre-selected targets and targets of opportunity from the Bomblin to the Manchurian border. Strikes were launched almost daily against enemy transportation facilities, supply, troop concentration and mining areas, factories, and warehouses. Major targets included mining areas west and northwest of Tanchon and northwest of Songjin, where pilots reported an ore processing plant was ninety percent destroyed. Thirty-three of the mine buildings and ten warehouses were destroyed also in the vicinity as were three buildings of a carbide plant at Puryong-dong. Four buildings were damaged in a strike on a cement factory near Tajin-dong. At Kyongsong a factory area was left burning. Industrial and waterfront areas at Sinpo, Chaho, and Tanchon were hit repeatedly during the period. Attacks continued against hydroelectric plants and transformer stations. The Kyosen Number One hydroelectric plant was again damaged. Pilots reported fifty percent destruction of a powerhouse and damage to a transformer yard, penstocks and surge tanks.

Attacks on interdiction targets resulted in numerous rail cuts, destruction of or damage to railroad and highway bridges, locomotives, railroad cars, trucks, and boats. Numerous close support sorties were flown during the period in direct support of United Nations Command ground forces.

United Nations Command carrier based Naval aircraft operating in the Yellow Sea continued their offensive strikes against enemy installations in central west and northwest Korea as far north as Hanchon. Throughout the Hwang Hae province attacks were pressed against enemy transportation facilities, supply and storage areas, troop billets and troop concentrations, gun positions, transformer stations and warehouses and buildings of military significance. As a result of these strikes pilots reported transportation by road or rail in the Chinnampo area had been seriously hampered. Pilots reported the destruction of all rail bridges on the main line between Chinnampo and the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. As a result of strafing and bombing of troop concentrations in the Haeju-Yonan area 302 were killed and 257 wounded. Photographs of a strike with 1,000 pound bombs against sluice gates in the Yonan area revealed breaches in each of the three gates. Communist jet aircraft appeared

more active in the area during the period but no attacks were made on naval aircraft.

Shore based Marine aircraft provided friendly front-line units with close air support and flew strike and reconnaissance sorties deep into enemy territory. These sorties destroyed or damaged numerous gun and mortar positions, bunkers, buildings, personnel and supply shelters, warehouses, railroad cars, railway and highway bridges and many rail and road cuts were made. Numerous personnel and troop casualties were also inflicted.

Patrol planes based in Japan conducted daylight reconnaissance missions over the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea, and Tsushima Straits. They also flew anti-submarine patrols and weather reconnaissance missions for surface units in the Japan and Yellow Seas.

United Nations Command surface craft on the Korean west coast manned anti-invasion stations from Chinnampo to the Han River Estuary in support of the friendly islands north of the battle line. Firing on enemy coastal positions destroyed gun positions, communications and transportation facilities, supply build-ups, troop concentrations, and troop billets.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the Bomblin to Chongjin, with surface units, on day and night coastal patrols firing on key targets along the coastal main supply route daily to maintain rail cuts, destroy bridges and block tunnels at several points. Truck and train traffic was harassed almost daily in the Wonsan area. Rail targets between Tanchon and Songjin were hit repeatedly during the period, a locomotive and many railcars being destroyed. Tracks were cut frequently; many bridges were destroyed and a number of tunnels were blocked in the area. The enemy was denied the use of the coastal waters for shipping. All craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore. Enemy coastal movements were kept under constant surveillance. Naval gunfire accounted for destruction to or damage of numerous gun positions, bunkers, industrial buildings, power plants, observation posts and supply areas. Troop concentrations were also hit, a number of casualties resulting.

Navy task elements at the east coast Bomblin patrolled the area north to Wonsan daily and provided gunfire support on call from the front-line troops. Ships also fired illumination on call from shore fire control party and air spot. The shore fire control parties reported destruction or damage to guns, mortars, bunkers, bridges, road junctions, buildings, supply areas, sampans, personnel shelters and many troop casualties.

Enemy shore batteries were active almost daily against the blockading vessels along the Korean coast, and a number of ships were fired on. While firing on enemy rail targets north of Tanchon the *Cunningham* received five hits and seven airbursts from an estimated enemy 105 to 155 mm. battery. Eight crewmen of the *Cunningham* were wounded. Damage to the ship was minor and her operational readiness was not seriously impaired. Fire from enemy shore batteries was effectively suppressed whenever encountered. The *Barton* struck a probable mine while patrolling east of Wonsan harbor. A hole approximately five feet in diameter was torn in the forward fireroom. Five enlisted men are missing

and six injured. The vessel was sent to Sasebo for repairs.

Vessels of the Republic of Korea Navy conducted close inshore patrols and blockade along both coasts and assisted United States forces in minesweeping duties.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep the channels, coastal areas and anchorages free of mines of all types. Enemy fishing sampans were dispersed and driven ashore when encountered during sweeping operations. Seven mines were sighted, five of these being destroyed.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lift and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces.

The United Nations Command air force continued its air battles with the enemy's MIG-15s. During these engagements, twenty-two of the Russian built jets were destroyed and twenty-one additional were damaged. These victories established a new record of enemy MIGs destroyed during any one month of operation. Sixty of the Russian built jets were destroyed by F-86s and fifty-eight more were damaged, as the United Nations planes continued to hunt and engage the enemy aircraft before they could reach the safety of the Yalu River. The previous monthly record for confirmed claims was set in April 1952, when forty-four enemy aircraft were destroyed by United Nations Command air forces.

On 16 September 134 enemy jets were observed aloft. Forty-six United Nations Command planes engaged fifty-six of the enemy jets in eighteen separate battles. Five MIGs were destroyed and three damaged. The MIGs were aggressors in only five of the air battles but those attacks generally were of the hit-and-run pattern that has now become the mainstay of Red tactics. The United Nations Command Sabrejets initiated the action in thirteen instances and pressed the attack until the MIGs fled to the safety of the Manchurian border.

The number of MIGs sighted for the next three days was considerably reduced but during the entire period MIGs were observed during each day of operational weather. Their tactics and formations showed no discernible change and no change in the enemy air capability was indicated.

Fighter-bombers continued to destroy Red military supply areas during the period, striking points north and southeast of Kumsong, an ammunition dump southwest of Namchonjom and a vehicle parking and repair area north of Kumsong. They also attacked a munitions factory at Pukchong, and struck troop concentrations south of Sinchon, west of Haeju, at Kyomipo, Chaeryong and southeast of Haeju. Marine aircraft attacked a locomotive repair shop between Pyongyang and Samdung.

In other attacks the fighter-bombers destroyed rail and road bridges west of Kowon and near Tongchon, scored rail cuts east of Sinmak and destroyed and damaged military buildings northeast of Hwangju and at Chinnampo.

Continuing their day and night attacks, invader light bombers hit Communist military supply points at Tongni, a supply complex at Sinchang-ni, a troop and supply concentration at Sohung and similar targets in the Wonsan

area. In a daylight formation attack, the invaders destroyed a fuel dump southwest of Sinmak. Other missions accounted for the destruction of sections of rail lines near Kangdong and Yongpo-ri.

The night intruder aircraft destroyed numerous Communist vehicles attempting to move supplies south to the front, following the practice of creating temporary road blocks with butterfly bombs and then attacking vehicular traffic halted on the roads.

On 19 September, United Nations Command superforts staged the first daylight raid of the Korean war in eleven months. In a change of role from night bombing to a formation daylight strike, they attacked three supply and troop concentration areas at Yongpo, Tongchon and Chig-yong. Post-strike photography showed a total of 125 buildings destroyed. Escort for this mission was provided by Sabrejets but no MIGs were observed in the area. Other Sabrejet aircraft provided screening cover in the Chongchon River area.

During the period, the B-29s carried out a series of raids on large supply complexes in North Korea, striking installations at Sopo-ri, Huilliak, Pyongyang, Pachunjang and other points. They also attacked enemy marshalling yards at Sinmak and Hwangju destroying terminal equipment, rail cars and supplies. On 27 September, the medium bombers attacked two bridges south of Huichon and one bridge west of Sinanju.

On 30 September, night flying medium bombers carried out a successful attack against the Namsan-ni chemical plant on the Yalu River, just five miles from Suiho. This was the largest attack made since 4 September 1952 when the Chonsen hydroelectric plant was attacked.

Regular close support sorties were flown each night over frontline targets, with the bombers operating under control of ground radar stations.

Combat cargo aircraft flew normal logistical sorties in support of United Nations combat operations. Two squadrons of C-124 aircraft were being utilized for training and cargo missions, with a limited number being flown on cargo missions to Korea.

Air Rescue Units continued their regular missions and performed one of the most daring rescues of the war. On 28 September a United Nations Command helicopter rescued a Sabrejet pilot who had parachuted over the sea thirty miles off the Manchurian border. The downed airman was recovered by use of a sling dropped from the hovering helicopter. No enemy MIGs rose to interfere with the rescue even though the incident occurred at a point within a few seconds flying time of the Antung bases.

United Nations Command leaflets and radio disseminated factual information to civilians and enemy troops behind the Communist barrier of controlled and distorted information, and stressed the efforts of the United Nations to achieve peace and rehabilitation in Korea. Humanitarian warnings to civilians in the vicinity of targets being attacked by United Nations Command aircraft were continued on a large scale. Airborne loudspeakers were used in one area to warn civilians of the impending bombing of military installations. Reports indicate that the Communist leaders, through their rigidly controlled mass-

propaganda media, are inciting the people in a calculated "hate" program centering around charges of alleged United Nations Command use of bacteriological warfare.

Communiqués Regarding Korea to the Security Council

The Headquarters of the U.N. Command has transmitted communiqués regarding Korea to the Secretary-General of the United Nations under the following U.N. document numbers: S/2865, Dec. 4; S/2866, Dec. 5; S/2867, Dec. 8; S/2868, Dec. 8; S/2870, Dec. 10; S/2871, Dec. 12; S/2872, Dec. 12; S/2874, Dec. 15; S/2876, Dec. 15; S/2877, Dec. 18; S/2878, Dec. 19; S/2879, Dec. 19; S/2885, Dec. 23; S/2886, Dec. 23; S/2888, Dec. 29; S/2889, Dec. 29; S/2892, Jan. 5, 1953; S/2894, Jan. 6; S/2896, Jan. 6; S/2899, Jan. 8; S/2900, Jan. 9; S/2902, Jan. 12; S/2905, Jan. 15; S/2908, Jan. 19.

Investigation of Employees at U.S. Mission to U.N.

U.S./U.N. press release dated January 26

Following is the text of a letter, dated January 25, addressed to J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Chief of the United States Mission to the United Nations:

DEAR MR. HOOVER: I request that you undertake, as soon as possible, a full field investigation of all of the employees at the United States Mission to the United Nations, and that you will let me have this report on each person as soon as it is completed.

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.

U.S. To Cease Reporting to U.N. on Puerto Rico

Press release 36 dated January 19

The U. S. Government is informing the Secretary-General of the United Nations that it will cease to transmit information on the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in accordance with chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations.

This action, approved by the President, was taken in view of the full measure of self-government which has been achieved by the people of Puerto Rico under their new Constitution and in accordance with the express wishes of the Government of Puerto Rico.

Since 1946 the United States has transmitted annually to the United Nations information on Puerto Rico pursuant to article 73 (e) of the U.N.

Charter which relates to territories whose peoples "have not yet attained a full measure of self-government." The new Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which was entered into force on July 25, 1952, was developed by the people of Puerto Rico and their duly elected representatives, and conforms with their wishes as expressed in popular referenda and elections. The new Constitution was subsequently approved by the Congress and the President. Thus the people of Puerto Rico, in agreement with the Government of the United States, have established their own government within a union with the United States.

The U.S. Government, therefore, believes that it is no longer necessary or appropriate for it to transmit information to the United Nations on Puerto Rico since the new Commonwealth cannot be considered as a non-self-governing territory.

In connection with the foregoing there follows an exchange of messages between the President of the United States and the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico:

The PRESIDENT
The White House

In as much as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico under its Constitution has now achieved a full measure of self-government, it should no longer be included among the areas on which reports are made by the United States to the United Nations under the Charter. I understand that notice of intention to discontinue report should go to the Secretary-General by January 25th, that is, within six months of the effective date of Constitution.

I, therefore, respectfully urge you to approve sending of required notice by Secretary of State.

Greetings.

LUIS MUÑOZ MARÍN
*Governor,
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico*

JANUARY 19, 1953

The GOVERNOR
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

I am glad to approve the action requested in your telegram of January 16 and congratulate you on the political and economic progress made by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico under your guidance.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

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- Treatment of People of Indian Origin in the Union of South Africa. Report of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee. A/2257, Nov. 17, 1952. 5 pp. mimeo.

¹Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The U.N. Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

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- Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories. Report of the Fourth Committee. A/2296, Dec. 8, 1952. 36 pp. mimeo.
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Visa Work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service

CHANGES UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF JUNE 27, 1952: PART II¹

by *Eliot B. Coulter*

The 1952 Act requires an immigrant to be in possession of a valid passport and a properly issued immigrant visa, reentry permit, border-crossing identification card, or other valid entry document, unless such documentation has been waived under authority of the Act.

The Visa Regulations (22 CFR 42.36) require every alien applying for an immigrant visa to present to the consular officer an unexpired passport valid for at least 60 days beyond the period of validity of the immigrant visa, except:

(1) an immigrant who is stateless, or is outside of the country of his nationality and establishes that he is unable to obtain a national passport, and who presents two or more documents which, when considered together, fulfill the requirements of a passport; *Provided*, That written permission to enter a foreign country shall be considered as fulfilling one of such requirements if it is clearly valid for such purpose and specifies no conditions to such validity for the alien's entry during a period of at least 60 days beyond the period of validity of the visa;

(2) an immigrant, lawfully admitted for permanent residence who is returning from a temporary visit abroad;

(3) an immigrant child under 2 years of age, who was born during his mother's temporary visit abroad, and who is accompanying a parent on the first return of the parent to the United States after such child's birth;

(4) an immigrant who is a member of the armed forces of the United States;

(5) an immigrant who establishes that he is unable to obtain a passport, who is not within one of the exceptions above mentioned, and in whose case the requirement of a passport shall have been waived by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State.

Application for Immigrant Visas

The act requires every alien applying for an immigrant visa to make application therefor in such form and manner and at such place as shall be by regulations prescribed.

Application for an immigrant visa is to be made on Form 256.

¹ For part I of this article, see BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 195.

Separate application is to be made by each alien immigrant, except that in the case of an alien under 14 years of age, or one physically incapable of executing an application, he may have the application executed in his behalf by a parent or guardian or, if he has no parent or guardian, by any person having lawful custody of, or a legitimate interest in him.

Every applicant for an immigrant visa, including an alien whose application is executed by another person, is required to appear personally at the consular office in connection with his application.

Each applicant is required to furnish with his application 3 identical copies of his photograph, reflecting a reasonable likeness of the alien as of the time of the application, 2 x 2 inches in size, unmounted, showing a full front view without head covering, and printed on light background.

An alien shall apply for an immigrant visa in the consular district of his residence. However, a consular officer, at his discretion, may accept an application from an alien having no residence in his district if such alien is physically present and the officer is satisfied that the application may be accepted without prejudice to the security of the United States.

If an applicant for an immigrant visa expects to precede his family to the United States, the consular officer may arrange for an informal examination of the other members of the family to determine whether there is reason to believe that, if they later apply for visas, there are likely to be grounds of ineligibility to receive visas.

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

An applicant for an immigrant visa is required to furnish with his application 2 copies of a police certificate, any prison record, military record, birth certificate, and of all other records or documents deemed by the consular officer to be neces-

sary to a determination of his eligibility to receive a visa.

If an immigrant establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer that any document or record is unobtainable, the consular officer may permit him to submit other satisfactory evidence of the fact to which such document or record would pertain. A document or record is considered to be "unobtainable" if it cannot be procured without causing to the applicant or a member of his family actual hardship, other than normal delay and inconvenience.

MEDICAL EXAMINATION OF IMMIGRANTS

The act provides that prior to the issuance of an immigrant visa to any alien, the consular officer shall require such alien to submit to a physical and mental examination. At consular offices where medical officers of the U. S. Public Health Service have been assigned, the required examination will be conducted by such officer. At other offices, the required examination will be conducted by a physician selected by the alien from a panel of reputable and competent local physicians approved by the consular officer.

REGISTRATION AND FINGERPRINTING OF IMMIGRANTS

The act requires each alien who applies for an immigrant visa to be registered and fingerprinted, except a child under 14 years of age. Form AR-4 is used for the fingerprinting of a visa applicant. An applicant executing an application on Form 256 is thereby automatically registered if the visa is issued.

ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRANT VISAS

Form 256 contains on one side a space for the visa. When completed and properly executed, such visa form constitutes the immigrant visa.

IMMIGRANT VISA FEES

The act provides that the following fees shall be collected:

- (1) For the furnishing and verification of each application for an immigrant visa (which shall include the furnishing and verification of the duplicate) . . . 5 dollars.
- (2) For the issuance of each immigrant visa . . . 20 dollars.

VALIDITY OF IMMIGRANT VISAS

An immigrant visa may be issued to be valid for a period not to exceed 4 months. If originally issued for a shorter period of validity, it may be extended up to a date which shall not be more than 4 months from the date of issuance.

If the original immigrant visa has been lost or mutilated or could not be used by the holder be-

cause of reasons beyond his control and for which he was not responsible, a new nonquota immigrant visa may be issued or a new quota immigrant visa bearing the same quota number may be issued during the same quota year.

REFUSAL OF IMMIGRANT VISAS

The act requires a consular officer to refuse an immigrant visa to an alien under the following circumstances:

- (1) if it appears to the consular officer from statements in the application, or in the papers submitted therewith, that the alien is ineligible to receive a visa under Section 212 of the Act or any other provision of law,
- (2) if the application fails to comply with the provisions of the Act or regulations issued thereunder; or
- (3) if the consular officer knows or has reason to believe that the alien is ineligible to receive a visa under Section 212 or any other provision of law.

Exemptions—The act provides certain exemptions from the categories of aliens ineligible under Section 212 of the Act. These exemptions are mentioned below, in the section listing the classes of excludable aliens.

When an immigrant visa is refused, a memorandum of refusal is prepared on Form 290 and retained in the appropriate consular file. The action of refusing an immigrant visa is to be reviewed by the consular officer in charge of visa work at the post. If he or the principal officer at the post does not concur in the refusal, the case is to be referred to the Department for an advisory opinion.

If upon preliminary examination and after being informed by the consular officer of grounds of ineligibility, the alien decides not to execute a formal visa application, such a circumstance constitutes an informal refusal of an immigrant visa. If an immigrant visa is refused after formal application, the consular officer shall write or stamp diagonally across the visa side of Form 256a and b, in red ink, "Visa refused under authority of —" and shall insert the specific provision of law or regulation on which the refusal is based.

REVOCAION OF IMMIGRANT VISAS

A consular officer may revoke an immigrant visa if he finds that the visa was procured by fraud, misrepresentation, or other unlawful means, or if he obtains information establishing the alien's ineligibility to receive the visa.

If practicable, the bearer of the visa is to be notified of the proposed revocation and given an opportunity to show why such action should not be taken.

Notice of the revocation of an immigrant visa is to be given to an appropriate representative or official of the transportation line on which the alien is known or believed to intend to travel to the United States.

**ADMISSION OR EXCLUSION OF
IMMIGRANT AT PORT OF ENTRY**

The act provides in Section 221 (b) that "Nothing in this act shall be construed to entitle any alien, to whom a visa or other documentation has been issued, to enter the United States, if, upon arrival at a port of entry in the United States, he is found to be inadmissible under this act, or any other provision of law. The substance of this subsection shall appear upon every visa application."

Waiting Lists

An intending immigrant may be registered on a waiting list maintained at a consular office for the various oversubscribed immigration quotas. An application for registration must be submitted by mail. The exact time of receipt of each properly executed application for registration is to be noted thereon and constitutes the registration priority in the proper category on the appropriate quota waiting list.

Aliens registered on waiting lists prior to December 24, 1952, are continued on waiting lists under the act under their original priorities.

In the case of a first-preference immigrant the act provides that immigrant visas shall be issued to eligible quota immigrants in the order in which a petition on behalf of each such immigrant is filed with the Attorney General.

In the case of second-, third-, fourth-preference, and nonpreference immigrants, the act provides that immigrant visas shall be issued to eligible quota immigrants strictly in the chronological order in which such immigrants are registered in each class on quota waiting lists. An immigrant visa may not therefore be issued to an alien out of his proper turn on the waiting list.

In the case of nonquota immigrants, a consular officer may, if the number of applications exceeds the capacity of his office to act currently upon such applications, establish administrative waiting lists comparable to the quota waiting lists.

The application of a quota immigrant for registration on a waiting list is considered as automatically including any parent, spouse, or child such immigrant or his spouse may have, whom he may wish to have accompany him, regardless of whether such person was specifically mentioned in the application for registration. No other alien is considered to be included in the application unless they are members of the immediate family by blood or marriage and are residing regularly in the household of the principal registrant and are specifically named in the application.

No alien may have his name entered or retained on a quota waiting list while he is in the United States, *except*:

(1) an alien who is maintaining or seeking to enter in the status of a government official, crewman, treaty

alien, international organization alien, temporary worker, or representative of foreign information media;

(2) an alien who entered the United States before September 10, 1946, and was registered on a waiting list before July 1, 1949, provided that such alien did not enter the United States in violation of the immigration laws;

(3) an alien who is proceeding to, or remaining in, the United States at the behest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The registration of a quota immigrant shall be canceled if:

- (1) the registrant dies;
- (2) the registrant was erroneously listed on the waiting list;
- (3) the registrant enters the United States in violation of the immigration laws;
- (4) the registrant abandons his intention to emigrate;
- (5) the registrant has been denied an immigration visa on some ground which cannot be overcome by the presentation of further evidence or by a probable change in the circumstances of his case;
- (6) the registrant is issued an immigrant visa;
- (7) the registrant is issued a nonimmigrant visa, except in cases referred to above in which retention on a waiting list is authorized; or,
- (8) the registrant is issued a nonresident alien's border-crossing identification card, except in cases in which retention on a waiting list is authorized.

An alien's name may be reinstated on a waiting list under the original priority date if he proceeded to the United States as a visitor or transit alien for an urgent and brief visit or for immediate and continuous transit journey, if the alien establishes that he departed promptly from the United States.

Excludable Classes of Aliens

The act excludes from the United States aliens who are of the following classes, with the exceptions indicated:

- (1) Feeble-minded;
- (2) Insane or who have had one or more attacks of insanity;
- (3) Afflicted with psychopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental defect;
- (4) Narcotic drug addicts or chronic alcoholics;
- (5) Afflicted with tuberculosis in any form, leprosy, or any dangerous contagious disease;
- (6) Certified by the examining surgeon as having a physical defect, disease, or disability, when determined by the consular officer or immigration officer to be of such a nature that it may affect the ability of the alien to earn a living, unless the alien establishes that he will not have to earn a living;
- (7) Paupers, professional beggars, or vagrants;
- (8) Criminals—
 - (a) Aliens who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude other than a purely political offense, or who admit having committed such a crime, or who admit committing acts which constitute the essential elements of such a crime. (However, aliens who have

committed only one such crime while under 18 years of age may be granted a visa if the crime was committed more than 5 years prior to the date of application for admission to the United States, unless the crime resulted in confinement in a prison or correctional institution, in which case such alien must have been released from such confinement more than 5 years prior to the date of the application for a visa or for admission.) ;

(b) Aliens who have been convicted of two or more offenses other than purely political offenses, regardless of whether the conviction was in a single trial or whether the offenses arose from a single scheme of misconduct and regardless of whether the offenses involved moral turpitude for which the aggregate sentences to confinement actually imposed were 5 years or more.

(9) Polygamists or persons who practice polygamy or advocate the practice of polygamy;

(10) Prostitutes or procurers or persons coming to the United States to engage in any other unlawful commercialized vice;

(11) Aliens coming to the United States to engage in any immoral sexual act;

(12) Aliens seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor, if the Secretary of Labor has certified to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney General that (a) sufficient workers in the United States who are able, willing, and qualified are available at the time and place in the United States to which the alien is destined, or (b) the employment of such aliens will adversely affect the wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed.

Exemptions—Parents, spouses, sons, and daughters regardless of age and marital status, of United States citizens; parents, spouses, children of aliens lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence; brothers and sisters of United States citizens; immigrants whose services are determined by the Attorney General to be needed urgently in the United States because of the high education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability of such immigrants, and to be substantially beneficial prospectively to the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States; returning alien residents, ministers of religion, employees of U.S. Government;

(13) Aliens who are likely to become public charges;

(14) Aliens who have been excluded, deported, or repatriated unless the Attorney General shall have consented to their applying or reapplying for admission;

(15) Stowaways;

(16) Aliens who have obtained or sought to obtain a visa or other documentation or to enter the United States by fraud, or by willfully misrepresenting a material fact;

(17) Aliens not in possession of required documentation;

(18) Aliens in possession of improperly issued visa;

(19) Aliens ineligible for citizenship (except nonimmigrants); or persons who have departed from or who have remained outside the United States to avoid or evade training or services in the armed forces in time of war or national emergency (except aliens who were at the time of departure nonimmigrants and who seek to reenter the United States as nonimmigrants);

(20) Aliens brought to foreign contiguous territory or adjacent islands by nonsignatory line and who have not resided for at least 2 years subsequent to such arrival in such territory or adjacent islands;

(21) Illiterates over 16 years of age, physically capable of reading, *except* returning resident aliens and nonimmigrants;

(22) Aliens who are nonimmigrants and are not in possession of required passports and visas or other documentation, unless such documentation has been waived under authority of the Act;

(23) Aliens who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest or security of the United States (Section 212 (a) (27));

(24) Aliens who are, or at any time have been, members of any proscribed Communist or other classes enumerated in Section 212 (a) (28) of the act;

(25) Aliens with respect to whom the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reasonable ground to believe would, after entry, engage in espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity subversive to the national security, or certain other activities specified in Section 212 (a) (29) of the act;

(26) An alien accompanying another alien ordered to be excluded and deported and certified to be helpless from sickness or mental or physical disability or infancy, whose protection or guardianship is required by the alien ordered excluded and deported;

(27) An alien who at any time shall have, knowingly and for gain, encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United States in violation of law.

Exemptions from Exclusion Provisions

Government officials:

A-1 (exempt from provisions of Section 212 (a) except (26) (passport and visa) and (27) (certain subversive categories)

(Continued on page 237)

Immigration Quotas

Presidential Proclamation No. 2980 of June 30, 1952 (BULLETIN of July 14, 1952, p. 83; 17 *Fed. Reg.* 6019) established quotas to become effective Jan. 1, 1953. The following table sets forth the new quotas and those previously in effect under the 1924 Act. (The subquota areas were not listed in the proclamation.) The new list is subject to revision.

The 1952 proclamation revoked the following previous proclamations regarding immigration quotas: No. 2283 of Apr. 28, 1938; No. 2603 of Feb. 8, 1944; No. 2666 of Sept. 28, 1945; No. 2696 of July 4, 1946; No. 2846 of July 27, 1949; and No. 2911 of Oct. 31, 1950.

Quota area	1952 Act	1924 Act
*Afghanistan	100	100
Albania	100	100
Andorra	100	100
Arabian Peninsula	100	100
*Asia-Pacific triangle	100	100
Australia	100	100
Austria	1,405	1,413
Belgium	1,297	1,304
Subquota: Belgian Congo		
Bhutan	100	100
Bulgaria	100	100
*Burma	100	100
*Cambodia	100	100
Cameroons (British Trust Territory)	100	100
Cameroons (French Trust Territory)	100	100
*Ceylon	100	100
*China	100	100
*Chinese	105	105
Czechoslovakia	2,859	2,874
Danzig	100	100
Denmark	1,175	1,181
Subquota: Greenland		
Egypt	100	100
Estonia	115	116
Ethiopia	100	100
Finland	566	569
France	3,069	3,086
Subquotas:		
Algeria		
Comoro Archipelago		
French Equatorial Africa		
French Guiana		
French West Africa		
Guadeloupe and dependencies		
India, French		
Madagascar and dependencies		
Martinique		
New Caledonia		
New Hebrides (If British subject, British quota)		
Oceania		
Réunion		
St. Pierre and Miquelon		
Somaliand		
Tunisia		
Germany	25,814	25,957
Great Britain and Northern Ireland	65,361	65,721
Subquotas:		
Aden		
Bahamas		
Barbados		
Basutoland		
Beechuanaland		
Bermuda		
British Guiana		
British Honduras		
British Solomon		
Brunei		
Cyprus		
Falkland Islands		
Fiji		
Gambia		
Gibraltar		
Gilbert and Ellice Islands		
Gold Coast		
Hong Kong		
Jamaica and dependencies		
Kenya		
Leeward Islands		
Malaya		
Maldiv Islands		
Malta		
Mauritius		
Nigeria		
North Borneo		
Northern Rhodesia		
Nyasaland		
Pitcairn		
St. Helena		

Quota area	1952 Act	1924 Act
Great Britain and Northern Ireland—Continued		
Subquotas—Continued		
Sarawak		
Seychelles		
Sierra Leone		
Singapore		
Somaliand Protectorate		
Southern Rhodesia		
Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian		
Swaziland		
Tonga		
Trinidad and Tobago		
Uganda		
Windward Islands		
Zanzibar		
Greece	308	310
Hungary	865	869
Iceland	100	100
*India	100	100
Subquotas:		
Andaman Islands		
Nicobar Islands		
*Indonesia	100	100
Iran (Persia)	100	100
Iraq	100	100
Ireland (Eire)	17,756	17,853
Israel	100	100
Italy	5,645	5,677
*Japan	185	100
Jordan	100	100
*Korea	100	100
*Laos	235	236
Latvia	100	100
Lebanon	100	100
Liberia	100	100
Lihya	100	100
Liechtenstein	100	100
Lithuania	384	386
Luxembourg	100	100
Monaco	100	100
Morocco	100	100
Muscat (Oman)	100	100
*Nauru (Australian Trust Territory)	100	100
*Nepal	100	100
Netherlands	3,136	3,153
Subquotas:		
Netherlands New Guinea		
Netherlands West Indies		
Surinam		
*New Guinea (Australian Trust Territory)	100	100
New Zealand	100	100
Norway	2,364	2,377
*Pacific Islands (United States Trust Territory)	100	100
*Pakistan	100	100
Palestine (Arab Palestine)	100	100
*Philippines	100	100
Poland	6,488	6,524
Portugal	438	440
Subquotas:		
Angola		
Cape Verde Island		
Guinea, Portuguese		
India, Portuguese		
Macao		
Mozambique		
Principe and S. Tome		
Timor		
Ruanda-Urundi (Belgian Trust Territory)	100	100
Rumania	289	291
*Samoa, Western (New Zealand Trust Territory)	100	100
San Marino	100	100
Saudi Arabia	100	100
Somaliand (Italian Trust Territory)	100	100
South-West Africa	100	100
Spain	250	252
Subquotas:		
Ifni		
Rio de Oro		
Rio Muni		
Sweden	3,295	3,314
Switzerland	1,698	1,707
Syria	100	100
Tanganyika (British Trust Territory)	100	100
*Thailand (Siam)	100	100
Togo (French Trust Territory)	100	100
Togoland (British Trust Territory)	100	100
Trieste, Free Territory of	100	100
Turkey	225	226
Union of South Africa	100	100
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	2,697	2,798
*Vietnam	100	100
Yemen	100	100
Yugoslavia	933	938

*Asia-Pacific triangle

(Continued from page 235)

A-2 (exempt from provisions of Section 212 (a) except (26) (passport and visa) and (27) and (29) (certain subversive categories)

A-3 (exempt *only* from provisions of Section 212 (a) (28) (membership or affiliation with certain prescribed groups)

C-3 (exempt as A-2)

International organization aliens:

G-1 (exempt as government official A-1)

G-2, G-3, G-4 (exempt as government official A-2)

G-5 (exempt as government official A-3)

C-2 (exempt as government official A-2)

Returning resident alien:

(exempt from provisions of Section 212 (a) except (26) (passport and visa) and (27) (28) (29) (certain subversive categories)

Parent, grandparent, spouse, son, daughter of United States citizen or alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, exempt from provisions of Section 212 (a) (25) (illiteracy);

Religious refugee exempt from illiteracy provision;

Person likely to become public charge under Section 212 (a) (7) or (15) if bond or other undertaking furnished to Attorney General;

Nonimmigrants exempt from provisions of Section 212 (a) (11) (polygamy) and (25) (illiteracy).

The act provides in Section 215 (a) that whenever the United States is at war or during the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President, or whenever a state of war exists between two or more states, the President may by public proclamation impose additional restrictions and prohibitions on the entry or departure of aliens.

The act also provides in Section 212 that whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.

Immigration Quota System

NATIONAL ORIGINS BASIS

The 1952 Act continues the principle inaugurated in the 1924 Act of allocating the immigration quotas among the various quota areas on a "national origins" basis.

The 1924 Act provided that a basic total of 150,000 immigration quota numbers annually should be allocated among the various quota areas into which the earth (outside of the nonquota areas of the Western Hemisphere) was divided,

according to the proportion which the inhabitants of the continental United States in 1920 owing their national origin to each quota area bore to the total number of inhabitants of the continental United States in that year, the minimum quota for any quota area being 100.

The 1952 Act provides in Section 201 (a) that:

The annual quota of any quota area shall be one-sixth of 1 per centum of the number of inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920, which number, except for the purpose of computing quotas for quota areas within the Asia-Pacific triangle, shall be the same number heretofore determined under the provisions of section 11 of the Immigration Act of 1924, attributable by national origin to such quota area; *Provided*, That the quota existing for Chinese persons prior to the date of enactment of this Act shall be continued, and, except as otherwise provided in section 202 (e), the minimum quota for any quota area shall be one hundred.

In effect, the 1924 Act divided a basic total quota of 150,000 among the various quota areas according to the proportion which the inhabitants of the United States in 1920 attributing their national origins to each such quota area bore to the total number of inhabitants of the United States in that year.

The 1952 Act uses the same figure of the number of inhabitants of the United States in 1920 as divided among the various quota areas and establishes the quotas for each such quota area as $\frac{1}{6}$ of 1 percent of each portion of the total number of inhabitants of the United States in 1920 attributable by national origins to each such quota area. The immigration quotas as calculated under the provisions of the 1952 Act are not greatly different from those in force under the 1924 Act on December 23, 1952. The total quotas under the 1952 Act will be 154,657, the quotas being in effect on January 1, 1953, as compared with a total of 154,277 under the 1924 Act.

The act provides that the annual immigration quotas shall be determined jointly by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General. Provision is made for altering the quotas in the light of changes, recognized by the United States, in national boundaries affecting quota areas, transfers of territories, or recognition of new states.

Determination of Quota to Which an Immigrant is Chargeable

An immigrant who was born in a quota area is chargeable to the quota for such area, unless he is classifiable as a nonquota immigrant, or unless he comes within a class to which a different rule for determining quota chargeability is applied.

A quota-immigrant minor child accompanied by his alien parent may be charged to the quota of the accompanying parent or, if more advantageous to the child, he may be charged to the quota for the country of his own birth.

A quota-immigrant husband or wife may be charged to the quota of the accompanying spouse if necessary to prevent their separation, if a quota number is available.

A person born in the United States who is not a U.S. citizen and is classified as a quota immigrant is chargeable to the quota for the country of which he is a citizen or subject, or if he is not a citizen or subject of any country, then he is chargeable to the quota for the country in which he last had his residence, as determined by the consular officer.

An alien born in a quota area in which neither of his parents was born and in which neither of his parents had a residence at the time of the alien's birth may be charged to the quota of either parent.

ASIA-PACIFIC TRIANGLE

The 1952 Act provides for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific triangle for quota purposes and the quota chargeability of aliens attributable by as much as one-half of their ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to quota areas situate wholly within such triangle.

The boundary line of the triangle runs from the North Pole along meridian 60° east, placing Afghanistan and Pakistan within the triangle, to a point in the Indian Ocean where the meridian meets latitude 25° south, thence in an easterly direction through the center of Australia to a point in the Pacific Ocean where the latitude meets meridian 165° west, and thence northward along the meridian to the North Pole.

SEPARATE ASIA-PACIFIC TRIANGLE QUOTA

The act provides that in addition to the quotas for separate quota areas comprising independent countries, self-governing dominions, and territories under the international trusteeship system of the United Nations situate wholly within the Asia-Pacific triangle, there shall be a separate quota of 100 annually for the triangle.

An alien immigrant born within a separate-quota area situate wholly within the triangle is chargeable to the quota for such separate-quota area.

For example, an alien who is attributable by as much as one-half of his ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to the Asia-Pacific triangle and was born in a country situate wholly within the triangle, such as Japan, is chargeable to the quota for Japan. Similarly, a Javanese born in Korea is chargeable to the quota for Korea.

A Chinese person who is classifiable as a quota immigrant is chargeable, regardless of the place of his birth, to the quota for Chinese, except that a child accompanying a parent, may be charged to the quota of such parent.

An alien, other than a Chinese person, who was born in China and who is classifiable as a quota im-

migrant, is chargeable to the quota for China except where a different rule applies.

A triangle alien classifiable as a quota immigrant who was born in a colony or other dependent area situate wholly within the triangle, is chargeable to the Asia-Pacific quota. For example, a triangle alien born in Macau, a Portuguese colony situate wholly within the triangle, is chargeable to the Asia-Pacific quota.

A triangle alien classifiable as a quota immigrant who was born outside the triangle and who is attributable by as much as one-half of his ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to a separate quota area situate wholly within the triangle is chargeable to the quota for such separate quota area. For example, a triangle alien who is attributable by ancestry to a people indigenous to Korea, and who was born outside the triangle, is chargeable to the quota for Korea.

A triangle alien classifiable as a quota immigrant who was born outside the triangle and is attributable by as much as one-half of his ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to one or more colonies or other dependent areas situate wholly within the triangle, is chargeable to the Asia-Pacific quota. For example, a triangle alien born outside the triangle, who is attributable by ancestry to peoples indigenous to New Caledonia and North Borneo, is chargeable to the Asia-Pacific quota.

A triangle alien classifiable as a quota immigrant who was born outside the triangle and is attributable by as much as one-half of his ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to two or more separate quota areas situate wholly within the triangle, or to a quota area and one or more colonies or other dependent areas situate wholly within the triangle, is chargeable to the Asia-Pacific quota. For example, a triangle alien born outside the triangle who is attributable by ancestry to peoples indigenous to Ceylon and Indonesia is chargeable to the Asia-Pacific quota.

An alien classifiable as a quota immigrant who is attributable by as much as one-half of his ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to a quota area or colony or other dependent area not situate wholly within the triangle is not subject to the provisions of the act relating to quota immigrants attributable to quota areas situate wholly within the triangle. Such alien is therefore subject to the general rule applicable to nontriangle aliens. For example, a quota immigrant attributable by ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to Australia or Eastern Siberia is chargeable to the quota for Australia or the Soviet Union, respectively, if born in such quota area.

An alien classifiable as a quota immigrant who was born in a quota area wholly situate within the triangle but who is not attributable by as much as one-half of his ancestry to a people or peoples indigenous to a quota area or colony or other dependent area situate wholly within the triangle is not subject to the provisions of the act relating to

triangle aliens. Such alien is subject to the general rule relating to quota chargeability. For example, a Portuguese who is not a triangle alien, born in Macau, is chargeable to the quota for Portugal, subquota for Macau.

NONQUOTA CLASSIFICATION FOR TRIANGLE ALIENS

Immigrants classifiable as triangle aliens may be accorded nonquota immigrant status if coming within any of the following categories:

- (a) Spouse or child of U.S. citizen;
- (b) Returning resident alien;
- (c) Child accompanying a parent (other than a triangle alien) who is classifiable as a nonquota native of a Western Hemisphere country;
- (d) Person eligible for reacquisition of citizenship;
- (e) Former citizen eligible for repatriation;
- (f) Minister of religion;
- (g) Employee of U.S. Government.

A triangle alien child may be charged to the quota of an accompanying alien parent.

A triangle husband or wife may *not* be charged to the quota of the accompanying spouse under the general rule for the chargeability of a husband or wife to the quota of an accompanying spouse provided for in Section 202 (a) (2).

A triangle alien born in the United States may not have his quota chargeability determined according to the general rule contained in Section 202 (a) (3) of the act. Such alien is subject to the general rules relating to the quota chargeability of triangle aliens.

A triangle alien born in a quota area other than that of a parent's birth or residence may not have his quota chargeability determined according to the general rule contained in Section 202 (a) (4) of the act. Such alien is subject to the general rules relating to the quota chargeability of triangle aliens.

The provisions of Section 203 of the act relating to 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th preference-quota immigrant classification² apply in the case of triangle aliens.

SUBQUOTAS

The act provides in Section 202 (c) that, except in the case of a triangle alien, including a Chinese person, a quota immigrant born in a colony or other component or dependent area of a governing country is chargeable to the quota of the governing country, but that not more than 100 persons born in any one such colony or other component or dependent area overseas from the governing country shall be chargeable to the quota of the governing country in any one year.

Exceptions—A child born in a subquota area may be charged to the quota of an accompanying parent; a husband or wife born in a subquota area may be charged to the quota of an accompanying

spouse; a Chinese person born in a subquota area is chargeable to the quota for Chinese; a triangle alien born in a subquota area is chargeable to the quota determined according to the general rules relating to triangle aliens.

The act provides that during the first 10 months of each quota year quota immigration visas may not be issued in excess of 10 percent per month within each quota.

The act, in Section 202 (d) provides that:

The provision of an immigration quota for a quota area shall not constitute recognition by the United States of the political transfer of territory from one country to another, or recognition of a government not recognized by the United States.

• *Mr. Coulter, author of the above article, is Assistant Director of the Visa Office.*

Secretary Dulles Extends Greeting to Department

Remarks by Secretary Dulles¹

Press release 50 dated January 28

I will start my brief remarks right away. I don't want to keep you out here any longer than necessary.

I had hoped to talk to you before today. We waited till today because the Weather Bureau forecast it would be a nice, warm, sunny day. So we put it off Monday, when they said it was going to rain, till today when they said it was going to be sunny. It turned out the sun was out on Monday. At any rate, President Eisenhower had good luck on his weather and, if he can have good luck, we can take tough luck now and then.

To you people, many of you at least, there is nothing very novel about seeing a new Secretary of State. Those of you who have served in the State Department or Foreign Service for 8 years have served under six Secretaries of State, so probably to you the novelty has worn off. It has not worn off for me.

I could tell you that it is a wonderful thrill to me to feel that I can be here with you as your chief and Secretary of State. I don't suppose that there is any family in the United States which has been for so long identified with the Foreign Service and the State Department as my own family. I go back a long ways—I'd have to stop and think of the date—when a great-great-uncle of mine, Mr. Welsh, was one of our early Ministers to the Court of St. James. In those days, you know, they were Ministers and not Ambassadors.

¹Made on Jan. 28 in an informal appearance before Department employees at the West entrance of the new Department of State Building.

² See BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 202.

My grandfather, John W. Foster, was for a long time in the diplomatic service and then ended up as Secretary of State under President Harrison. His son-in-law, my uncle, Robert Lansing, was Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson.

Coming down to our own generation, my brother, Allen W. Dulles, was for many years in the Foreign Service of the United States. My sister, Eleanor Lansing Dulles, is today in the State Department and has been for several years. I, myself, have had at least sporadic association with the Department of State and with the Foreign Service throughout most of my life. So you can see, from the standpoint of background and tradition, it is to me a very exciting and thrilling thing to be one with you here today, as Secretary of State. And I want you to know that I have always felt that there was no service that one could render to his country higher than, more noble, more important than to be in the State Department and the Foreign Service of the United States.

That has always been the case, and it is today the case more than ever before, because today we are the "shock troops" in the cold war which is being waged against us. Upon us depends, more than upon any other group of men and women in this country, the decision as to whether or not we will meet this threat and whether we will meet it peacefully. I cannot imagine a greater opportunity or a greater challenge that confronts anyone than confronts us and our affiliates in the Foreign Service in the Embassies all around the world. We have a tremendous task, a tremendous responsibility, and a tremendous opportunity.

I don't think anybody wants in any such group as this, or our Foreign Service, to have "yes men" or "yes women" who just try to guess what their superiors want to have done and then try to meet their wishes. We have got to have people who are upstanding Americans of integrity, who have minds of their own, and who have the courage to express their views. Only such a corps would be worthy of our great tradition and worthy of the great needs which confront our Nation today.

On the other hand, we must also recognize that once the decisions are made and made finally by the President and the Congress then we must all turn in, loyally, to support those policies. They won't be 100 percent what any of us like; they won't be 100 percent what I like or what you like. But they will become the policies of our Nation, and then our job is to carry out those policies and do our best to make them succeed, just as in time of battle, the regiment may not agree with the tactics or policy but when the decision is made then they must put forward their best effort to make them succeed.

And so I expect that you will on the one hand help us make the best policies possible, and then when those policies are made that you will carry

them out loyally. That is the great task that lies before us.

As I say, to me this is a great moment in my life, and the fact that it appears that I will be with you and with this fine body of Americans dedicated to this great task is something that is thrilling and exciting; I hope and believe that we shall go ahead together to prove ourselves worthy of the great responsibility that is entrusted to us.

That is all I have to say for myself. I would like to take advantage of the opportunity to present to you a few of the people whom so far President Eisenhower has indicated he will want to have serve with me and with you in the Department of State.

I would like, first, to ask General Bedell Smith to come to the platform. He will be known as General Smith until midnight, the 31st of January, after which he will be just plain Mr. Smith.

Donald Lourie of Chicago. There is a bill pending, which was passed in the Senate yesterday and which I hope will be passed by the House today, creating a new office, Under Secretary of State for Administration. When that office is created, President Eisenhower will nominate Don Lourie for the post. All I can tell you about him is that a few years ago, he was an all-American quarterback. And I think that that is the kind of thinking and creative action we are going to see in this job today. I present Don Lourie to you.

Carl McCardle, of Philadelphia, was for a good many years, head of the Washington Bureau of the Philadelphia *Bulletin* and who has been through almost all of the major international conferences which have been held, beginning with the San Francisco Conference of 1945. In addition to attending conferences, he was covering my trip in June 1950 to Japan, so we practically saw there the start of the Korean War. He is a veteran of international affairs, and I know will help us greatly as Assistant Secretary in charge of Public Relations.

Herman Phleger of San Francisco. Mr. Phleger is one of, and perhaps I should say the outstanding lawyer of San Francisco and the West coast. He has had lots of international experience. He was in Germany as adviser to our High Commissioner there and in private practice has had wide international experience. He has a great reputation as a lawyer not only in his home community where he was a leader but throughout the United States.

We have had some great lawyers in the Department of State, John Basset Moore, Frank Polk, and so forth, and I look forward with complete confidence to Herman Phleger's carrying forward, as my legal adviser, the great tradition of the great lawyers of the Department of State, and I am going to have a lot of comfort with him around.

One other person, who has been indicated by

the President to be an Assistant Secretary of State I am sorry is not here today, but he has already started to work, although he is not drawing his pay yet—Thruston Morton, a former Member of Congress, whom the President will designate to be Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Congressional Relations. He has a great measure of good will in the Congress, is very highly regarded there. He voluntarily retired a few years ago and will, I know, be a great strength in the very important business of maintaining close working relations with the Congress. That is one thing which we must do—Congress is a partner in making of foreign policy, and I am very happy that we will have Thruston Morton with us in congressional relations.

That is all I have to introduce today. I thank you very much for your cordial and hearty welcome and look forward to dealing and working with you over the weeks to come. Thank you very much.

Secretary Dulles To Examine Case of John Carter Vincent

Following is the text of a letter to Secretary Dulles from Judge Learned Hand, dated January 20, together with the text of the Secretary's reply of January 29:

Press release 58 dated January 31

Judge Hand to Secretary Dulles

JANUARY 20, 1953

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

As we think you know, Secretary Acheson at the end of December sent to President Truman a "memorandum"¹ asking "permission to seek the advice" of five persons whom he mentioned who should "examine the record" in the case of John Carter Vincent, and "advise" him "as to what disposition in their judgment should be made in this case." President Truman replied¹ that he thought "the suggestions . . . well taken" and that he did "authorize and direct you" (the Secretary) "to proceed in the manner which you have outlined". Secretary Acheson asked John J. McCloy, James Grafton Rogers, G. Howland Shaw, Edwin C. Wilson and me to act and we have all accepted. However, it has proved impossible to examine the very voluminous testimony and documents and to make a report before the expiration of Secretary Acheson's term of office.

We have made some progress, and are prepared to carry through the work and make a report; but, since it would in no event be more than an advisory opinion, it is obviously possible that you may think it unnecessary for us to proceed. For that reason

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 19, 1953, p. 122.

we are writing to ask whether you would like us to continue and report to you.

Respectfully yours,

LEARNED HAND
Chairman.

Secretary Dulles to Judge Hand

JANUARY 29, 1953

MY DEAR JUDGE HAND:

I acknowledge and thank you for your letter of January 20, 1953.

You ask whether I would like you and your four associates to continue to examine the record in the case of John Carter Vincent and advise me as to what disposition you think I should make of this case. This was a special mandate which you received from my predecessor, the Secretary of State, and you suggest that I "may think it unnecessary" for you to proceed.

I have looked into this matter. The facts briefly are that the procedures, established by President Truman by Executive Order 9835 to consider loyalty cases arising in the departments of the Government, have been followed in this case. The Loyalty Review Board, which under the Executive Order is charged with the duty of making a recommendation, after considering the matter and hearing Mr. Vincent, transmitted its conclusions.² Thereupon, according to established procedure, it becomes the responsibility of the head of the Department, in this case the Secretary of State, to determine whether or not to follow the advice of the Loyalty Review Board.

The procedure for dealing with these matters was determined after much consideration, and I do not feel justified in departing from it, and embarking on procedures which could be endless. Therefore, I do not think that it will be necessary for you and your associates to act as a special review group to consider this particular case. Established procedures contemplate that at this stage in the proceeding the responsibility should be exercised by the Secretary of State and I believe that the record before, and the conclusions reached by, the Loyalty Review Board are adequate to give me guidance. These I shall examine before I take action.

I greatly appreciate the public-spiritedness of you and your associates in relation to this matter.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Confirmations

Carl W. McCardle

On January 29 the Senate confirmed the nomination of Carl W. McCardle as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

² *Ibid.*, p. 121.

On January 29 the Senate confirmed the nomination of Thruston B. Morton as Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Herman Phleger

On January 30 the Senate confirmed the nomination of Herman Phleger as Legal Adviser.

Mrs. Oswald B. Lord

On January 30 the Senate confirmed the nomination of Mrs. Oswald B. Lord as U.S. representative on the Human Rights Commission of Ecosoc for the remainder of the term of 3 years expiring December 31, 1953.

Appointment of Officers

Roderic L. O'Connor as Special Assistant to the Secretary, effective January 27.

John W. Hanes, Jr., as Special Assistant to the Secretary, effective January 27.

Mrs. Burnita O'Day as Personal Assistant to the Secretary, effective January 27.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Consular Office

The consulate at Georgetown, British Guiana, was closed to the public on November 26, 1952, and officially closed on December 14, 1952.

PUBLICATIONS

Release of U.S. Treaty Series Volume 1, 1950

The Department of State announced on January 28 that *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, Volume 1, 1950, has been released. This volume, the first of the series provided for by legislation supplementing Reorganization Plan No. 20 of 1950, will be produced on a calendar year basis.

The series will, beginning as of January 1, 1950, contain "all treaties to which the United States is a party that have been proclaimed during each calendar year, and all international agreements other than treaties to which the United States is a party that have been signed, proclaimed, or with reference to which any other final formality has been executed, during each calendar year."

Treaties and agreements were previously published in the United States Statutes at Large. Reorganization Plan No. 20 transferred responsi-

bility for publication of the Statutes at Large, except with respect to treaties and other international agreements, from the Department of State to the Administrator of General Services. Public Law 821 of the 81st Congress, 2d session, gave the Secretary of State responsibility for issuance of treaties and other international agreements in a separate publication.

The texts of the documents are literal prints of the originals with sidenotes and footnotes supplying the necessary references. Each volume contains a list of the instruments and a comprehensive index. The series has blue buckram binding with gold lettering and is designed in a standard size. Volume 2 covering 1951 will be released early in 1953.

The volumes are compiled in the Office of the Legal Adviser by the staff of the Assistant for Treaty Affairs and are published by the Division of Publications. Copies of this volume may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. for \$5.75 each.

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Providing for an Under Secretary of State for Administration. S. Rept. 10, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 4 pp.

Convention and Recommendation Concerning Migration for Employment. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for the Enactment of Legislation or Such Other Action as the Congress May Consider Appropriate, an Authentic Text of a Convention (No. 97) Concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949) and an Authentic Text of a Recommendation (No. 86) Concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949), Both of Which Were Adopted on July 1, 1949, by the International Labor Conference at its Thirty-second Session. Held at Geneva from June 8 to July 2, 1949. H. doc. 65, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 35 pp.

Bills Relating to War Claims Act of 1948 and Trading with the Enemy Act. Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, Eighty-second Congress, First and Second Sessions, on Bills Amending the War Claims Act of 1948 and the Trading with the Enemy Act. October 18, 19, and 20, 1951, March 19, May 1, 2, and June 16, 1952. 318 pp.

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Overseas Information Programs of the United States. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session, on Overseas Information Programs of the United States. November 20 and 21, 1952. 227 pp.

Thirty-sixth Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission, 1952. H. doc. 30, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 82 pp.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Jan. 26-31, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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The Issue of Ideas

by Francis H. Russell

International aggressions in recent times have been carried out on four fronts: political, economic, military, and ideological. This is true of the current Communist attack upon the free world.

In the *political* area we have seen the Communist seizure of power in the Eastern European countries through occupation by Soviet troops immediately following World War II; the pressures against Turkey beginning in 1946; the *coup* in Czechoslovakia in 1948; and the continuing efforts to render the United Nations impotent by the misuse of the veto and by constant harangues for propaganda purposes.

In the *economic* field we have witnessed Communist efforts to disrupt Europe economically and to frustrate the Marshall Plan by such things as the calling of nation-wide strikes in 1947; the attempt to strangle Berlin in 1948-49 through a blockade; and the theft of properties in eastern Austria.

In the *military* area there have been the Kremlin's effort to take over Iran in 1945; the Communist guerrilla warfare against Greece in 1947; the Communist conquest of the mainland of China by force of arms from 1945 to 1949; the guerrilla warfare against Indochina; and the assault upon the Republic of Korea that is going on at the present.

In the *psychological* arena, the Kremlin has made every effort to crack the unity of the free world and the internal unity of each of its members. It has sought on the one hand to fan the legitimate aspirations of the underdeveloped and colonial areas of the world into self-consuming flames, and on the other to play upon the world-wide hopes for peace.

What Is the "Hate America" Campaign?

Most recently we have the "Hate America" move, the tempo of which steadily increased after the 1951 speech of Pospelov on the anniversary of Lenin's death, and which has now revealed itself in all its full violence.

What is this "Hate America" campaign? What does it signify? In the past, Soviet propaganda refrained from attacking the American people and their institutions *as a whole*. They lashed out at Wall Street, at our free labor unions, our press, and the State Department, and other groups of Americans, but they concentrated on them one at a time. And all the while they have insisted that they have an affection for Americans in general.

But now, beginning with their propaganda about germ warfare and atrocities, they have loosed an unprecedented flood of lies, distortions, and vituperation against the American Government, our armed forces, our political system, business, labor, journalism, art, youth—everything Americans represent and respect. As a straw in this gale, the magazine *Young Bolshevik* alleges "the torture of Communists by Americans by throwing them onto burning coals. Often their skin had been cut to shreds and their wounds filled with salt." In the face of such statements, what is the value of the denial by Soviet propagandists that they are engaging in a "Hate America" campaign? The alleged distinction between "good" and "bad" Americans, between "American imperialists," and "rank and file Americans" stands exposed to the world as a sham. Anyone can see that the Kremlin's propaganda specialists are in effect engaged in all-out psychological aggression against the entire American people and all of our institutions.

The ideological front has thus, for the moment, assumed the center of the stage. Not that the economic, the political, and the military fronts are any less important than they were 6 months ago. But perhaps the Kremlin feels it has been temporarily stalemated in its conquest of Korea by the U.N. measures of collective security; on the political front by the emerging strength of NATO in Western Europe and the progressive implementation of the San Francisco pacts in the Pacific area; and on the economic front by the production of the free world—more than twice that of the Iron Curtain countries.

Even so, how are we to explain the "Hate America" move?

The most obvious explanation is that the law of diminishing returns has set in on the Soviet hate propaganda and driven its authors to increase its virulence to this ultimate in shrillness and venom. Another possibility is that they are preparing Soviet public opinion for some future aggressive action.

Whatever its motivation, the principal byproducts of the "Hate America" campaign are clear. It shows the hypocrisy of such things as the Communists' "peace campaigns," their "world economic conference," and their protestations of the possibility of "amicable coexistence" of Communist ambitions and democratic freedom. As Secretary Acheson has said, it casts a bright light on "the fundamental hostility which is the concrete reality we must start with in thinking about foreign policy today."

We Must Know the Nature of Our Problem

It is of the first importance for us to know whether the struggle we are waging in this middle of the twentieth century is against something in the nature of another Fascist dictatorship, an old-fashioned nationalist imperialism, a "new brand of civilization," a personal dictator, or something else. If we are faced, for instance, merely with old-fashioned Russian imperialism or if we are up against a Russian-speaking Mussolini, much that we are doing makes no sense.

We must know the nature of our problem in order to make sure that all we do contributes to a forward movement by the forces of democracy. The penalty of an error in this respect is that our whole strategy and effort will be misdirected and wasted.

It has been a little over a century since Marx and his fellow Communists launched the "religion of hate" with the cry, "A specter is haunting Europe."

It was at almost exactly the same time that a man of the American frontier was saying (if I may shorten and paraphrase it slightly):

By the best cultivation of the physical world around us and the intellectual and moral world within us, we shall secure an individual, social, and political prosperity, a free society, constantly labored for, and, even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, constantly deepening its influence, augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people everywhere.

Thus, a century ago, Marx and Lincoln were defining the issue of the two ways of life which today are in mortal conflict.

A generation has passed since communism first seized the power of government in any country. It has been a decade since the Soviet Union came into control of satellite countries in Eastern Europe. It is fair at this time, therefore, for the world to draw its conclusions about the theory of communism and its practice.

A merely emotional revulsion is not enough. Today, not only a respect for the opinion of mankind but the exigencies of our cause require us to clarify, for all to see, the two competing concepts of society. We must expose the exact nature of communism while we make clear the nature of democracy.

This task is more difficult than would at first appear because the preservation and carrying forward of democracy is not only a *continuing* struggle—it is a continually *changing* struggle. The threat each generation faces is a new threat.

We must, of course, read what Isaiah, Pericles, Cicero, Milton, and Locke have to tell us. They and the other framers of the democratic approach have laid the foundations. But we shall not find the precise answers to our problems even in their writings.

Jefferson and Lincoln clarified the democratic principle in terms of the task of their times. They did not, because in the nature of the situation they could not, marshal the case against democracy's present enemies. The issues of their times are only in the broadest way the issues of our times. We shall have to be our own philosophers.

To Understand—Search for the Communists' Goal

To understand Communist theory, search first for the Communists' goal, because Communist theory is not the path which leads to the Communist goal. It is instead a cloak to provide an aura of moral and intellectual respectability for the goal.

The Marxists' goal is to destroy all existing political societies as we have known them. This ultimate in revolutionary objectives was the answer of a group of neurotics to society's problems of their time, or, more exactly, to the psychological problems of the individuals who propounded and took up the idea.

So it is no surprise to find that the Communist creed has many of the characteristics of a Rube Goldberg invention operating in a world without gravity, substance, or time; or, in the case of Communist theory, without regard to the march of history, the present state of world society, or the needs and wants of living human beings. World-wide revolutionary action is justified by a theory of class war; the class war is supported by an economic theory of surplus value; this, by an economic interpretation of history; this, by the Hegelian dialectic; and the dialectic by a metaphysical concept glorifying the social entity over the individual.

The Communists say the accumulation of capital, in the form of labor-saving devices, reduces the use of human labor and thus increases the profits of the capitalists. Capitalists will continue to exploit the workers by holding their wages down to the subsistence level. The workers, however, who eventually will comprise more and more

of the population, will become increasingly miserable and will finally combine to destroy the whole system.

The interest of mankind is equated with that of the proletariat, which in turn is equated with that of the Communist Party and this with the interests of the Soviet Union—but all only as interpreted by the Politburo.

The Communist Party has fashioned its propaganda to appeal to a wide variety of disparate elements: the embittered and ruthlessly ambitious; the victims of discrimination, injustice, and oppression; the desperately impoverished; the insecure and uncertain; the lonely, the fearful, and discouraged; those who are tired of having to make their own decisions and who yearn for easy answers to complex problems; those who are dissatisfied with their lot because of monotony or lack of opportunity or purpose in life; political adventurers looking for a vehicle to carry them to power; the inadequately intellectual who are attempting to bridge the gap between thought and “real life”—all who, for one reason or another, are prepared to desert reality and follow a mirage.

In an industrial world, where the individual is in danger of becoming a constantly smaller and less significant part of the whole, in a world of war and the threat of war, freedom may seem to some at times to be a burden, a symbol of the sense of insecurity. Communism provides a delusively easy answer to the need to believe, to find a purpose in life, to belong and feel integrated into a community, to act within a purposeful and efficient framework. The net result is the creation of a mass of robots and fanatics, totally dependent upon the Party.

We are indebted to the Communists for having proved that a dictatorship even “of the proletariat” is no different in its results from any other dictatorship. The stream of thousands upon thousands of Eastern Europeans, who can no longer stand the strain upon their minds and souls, who have left everything and fled to liberty, is eloquent testimony to this truth.

We were warned long ago that to put political power in the hands of men embittered by whatever cause is “to tie firebrands to foxes and to turn them loose amid the standing corn.” The answer to the problems of embittered men is not to attempt to disem bitter them by placing the world’s fate in their hands but to carry on with the age-long task of removing sanely, and as far as possible, the conditions that were the cause.

What has happened when such men with such theories have seized power in a country?

It would perhaps not be fair to compare what the Communist movement has accomplished since the 1840’s with what American democracy has accomplished in the same time, although it might be pertinent to point out that democracy has succeeded in doing one thing that communism has never succeeded in doing. It has convinced the

people of many nations of the worth of its principles. No people has ever freely adopted the Communist way of life.

Life in the U.S.S.R.

But what has happened under communism?

The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. “guarantees” to its citizens: “payment for work in accordance with output”; “rest and leisure” and “education”; equality of rights “between women and men” and “irrespective of nationality or race”; freedom “of religious worship, of speech, of the press, and to unite in public organizations”; “inviolability of the person and of the homes of citizens.”

What is the Soviet record on these “guarantees”?

What, for instance, has happened to “the right to payment for work”? Does the Soviet worker get fair payment for his work? Well, the average city worker in the Soviet Union gets a pound of butter for 5½ hours of work; it takes a half hour of work in the United States. A cotton dress takes 42½ hours of work in the Soviet Union, 2 hours in the United States. A pair of men’s shoes, 66 hours in the Soviet Union; 4 hours in the United States. A quart of milk, one hour in the Soviet Union; 8 minutes in the United States. A six-tube radio, 27½ hours in the Soviet Union; 18½ hours in the United States. The average farmer in the Soviet Union fares even worse.

In its early days, Soviet communism held out the promise of narrowing the wide spread between incomes of high-paid and low-paid workers. Not only has that promise not been kept, but the spread is increasing each year; today the spread in production workers’ wage rates is almost twice as great in the Soviet Union as in America, due in part to the existence of forced labor there. Forced labor, of course, has a depressive effect on the wages of other labor. As a result, the average Soviet worker has to work more hours for the means to buy his food and other commodities than workers in nearly any other industrialized country.

What has happened to “rest and leisure”? The average Soviet family lives in a single room. The average per capita dwelling space is little more than 3.5 square meters, the size of an average prison cell.

What has happened to “the right to education”? Universal elementary education has long been one of the most widely publicized features of the Soviet system. And yet, compared with 1939, when 34 million students attended school in the Soviet Union, today, despite the fact that there has been an increase of over 20 million in the total Soviet population, there are only 33 million in school. About 10 million youth of school age (24 percent of the total) are not in school.

What has happened to equality of rights of women with men? Here the Communists have

passed their goal. They are more than "equal." No work is considered too strenuous for the Soviet woman. She works as a stevedore, on road gangs, on construction crews, on railroad repair crews, in coal mines; she digs subways, logs timber, chops ice off the streets, stokes blast furnaces, puddles steel, and acts as a porter. An advertisement in one of the Communist countries recently stated that day nurseries would be kept open until 11 p. m. so that working women could leave their children until that hour.

What about equality of rights irrespective of nationality or race? Many reports, which unfortunately there are ample grounds for believing, indicate that these "rights" are no more observed in the Soviet Union than they are under other totalitarian regimes.

What about freedom of religious worship, of speech, of the press, the inviolability of the person and of the homes of citizens? They exist only as the butts of grim Iron Curtain humor. One Soviet citizen in every six is an informer for the state. Informers are recruited by suddenly bringing ordinary people before the police, charging them with some infraction of the law, and giving them a choice of disappearing from society or informing on their families, associates, and neighbors. Citizens in a Communist state are afraid to speak freely even in their own families; parents are informers against their own children and vice versa.

What about the rights of labor? With a few exceptions, the labor legislation of the satellites has either provided for or resulted in the following: (1) labor conscription; (2) transfer of workers against their will and freezing of workers to their jobs; (3) prohibition of strikes; (4) punishment of absenteeism; (5) rigid labor discipline; (6) widespread use of speed-up devices; (7) subordination of trade-unions to the government and the Communist Party; (8) elimination of genuine collective bargaining; (9) forced labor; and (10) the exploitation of youth.

What have the Communists done to eliminate class distinction? The answer is that the great inequalities in Soviet incomes have created a privileged class: privileges, for instance, in educational preferences granted to children of Party and military leaders.

A sales tax, the object of so much indignant wrath in Communist writings in other countries, constitutes the Soviet Government's primary source of revenue. It is called a "turn-over tax." It applies even to food. And, although the differences in income in the U.S.S.R. today are very great, the income tax is only slightly graduated. The maximum surtax is 13 percent, even for the highest incomes.

What about "inviolability of the person"? Forced labor, without preliminary formal trial, takes place not only in the Soviet Union but in the satellite countries as well.

What about "freedom to unite in organiza-

tions"? There are no trade-unions in the U.S.S.R. in any real sense of the word. The labor organizations which exist can do nothing toward higher wages, shorter hours, or other improvements in working conditions. They are instruments of the government and therefore have no recourse against the exploitation of the worker by the government.

Someone may, of course, point out that the Soviets would have been able to provide a higher standard of living for their people if they had not devoted so much of their industrial output to preparation for war. This may be so. The world will never know, but the essence of Soviet policy seems to have been to give priority to aggression rather than to a better life.

Some Communist Contradictions

In one of its products communism has excelled; it has produced more contradictions than any other way of life.

To summarize, here are some of them:

Soviet communism states that its goal is the improvement of the condition of the masses; yet economic and social conditions in the Soviet Union are among the worst in the world.

It says that imperialism is an inevitable result of the free way of life; yet it has itself brought more people under subservience in the last 10 years than any other power has ever done in a similar period of time in history, and all this took place while the people of India, Pakistan, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea have been attaining freedom.

It claims to have abolished group prejudices; yet they are more rampant there than in any other place in the world today.

It accuses other countries of being warlike; yet Soviet-supported Communists committed the aggression that brought on the present war in Korea.

It asserts the equality of all men; yet the differentials in pay and privileges under the Soviet system today are greater than in most other countries.

It condemns religion; yet it creates a "religion of hate" more dogmatic than any real religion in the world.

It proclaims a dictatorship of the proletariat; but the dictatorship is that of a small clique enslaving all the people.

It regards nazism as its archenemy and attempts in its propaganda to equate democracy with nazism; yet its own philosophic ancestry has much in common with that of nazism and other totalitarian ideologies.

It predicts the "withering away of the state," while it is in fact creating a monolithic state.

What, then, *is* Soviet communism?

Its goals are destruction of all existing non-Communist societies and world domination by a small band—not to cure the ills they inveigh against but using them as a means to obtain power.

Its metaphysics—economic determinism—is a glorification of all material things in life over the things of the spirit.

Its philosophy, under the name of the dialectic, forecasts inevitable and unending conflict and strife.

Its instrument is a dictatorship sustained by the rigors of a police state.

Its strategy consists of aggression, subversion, planned chaos, and confusion.

Its morality is conspiratorial expediency.

Its destiny, if today's free men are equal to their challenge, is merely that of a paragraph in history—a treacherous and costly eddy along the edge of the main stream of civilization—a movement that began as a shout of wrath at the injustices of the middle-nineteenth century and, because of its twisted philosophy, wound up as the creator of infinitely greater injustices in the middle of the twentieth century.

Let us make note that in a very real sense there is an element of hope in all this. Regardless of what actual drives for power are at work in the minds of the men in the Kremlin, their claims have had to be on the score of providing a better life for the world's people. That is a battleground which we could not better have chosen. It is in the main line of our steady advance. It is a field in which we were operating long before Marx was born.

Our Approach to Human Society

Look, for example, through our State Constitutions. You find phrases like these again and again:

All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their authority.

All men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with unalienable rights.

Among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labors, and the pursuit and obtaining of happiness.

Our national life has been primarily devoted to making a reality of these words.

The authors of these Constitutions had their eyes, not upon creating some all-powerful entity, but upon the individual and the kind of political order that would best promote his good, because they knew that the interests of society are the sum of the interests of those who comprise its citizenry.

Therefore, it is not surprising that we can find today an American business magazine telling of a current constant approach toward these goals which, be it noted, lie in the field of Marx' *purported* interest:

Every year we are adding to the store of knowledge which enables us to progress further and further toward these goals of democracy. We have found that the "happiness" our Constitution writers talked about is, in part, a matter of horizon. A worker must be an intelligent factor in the process of which he is a part, must join the

enterprise system, become an enterpriser. The basic principle in the industrial process must be the principle of *participation*.

Our approach to human society is by no means fully known abroad. Perhaps the misconception about the United States that is most prevalent is that we are crass, hard, despiritualized, materialistic, irreligious. The Soviet Union, which glorifies materialism, has been most active in its devious ways in promoting this misconception. So let us be alert to deal with it.

The Religious Spirit of America

We might refer to de Tocqueville, most perceptive of commentators upon American life (to paraphrase again slightly):

If any hold that the religious spirit is the very thing most amiss in America, I can only reply that those who hold this language have never been in America and that they have never seen a religious or a free nation.

The Americans profess their religion without shame and without weakness. The head as well as the heart brings them to the foot of the altar.

Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must be regarded as the first of their institutions. The Americans combine religion and liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to make them conceive the one without the other.

I do not know whether all Americans have a sincere faith in their religion—for who can search the human heart?—but I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the maintenance of republican institutions. This opinion belongs to the whole nation, to every rank of society.

They know that when religion is destroyed, doubt gets hold of the higher powers of the intellect and half paralyzes all others. Men cannot abandon their religious faith without a kind of aberration of intellect and a sort of violent distortion of their true nature. Such a condition cannot but enervate the soul, relax the springs of the will, and prepare the people for servitude.

That was a century ago. What about religion in current American life? The two candidates for the highest office in our land recently gave their views.

One said:

You can't explain free government in any other terms than religious. The founding fathers had to refer to the Creator in order to make their revolutionary experiment make sense; it was because "all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights" that men could dare to be free.

Said the other:

While a man's personal religious beliefs have no proper place in our political life . . . Christian faith has been the most significant single element in our history and our tradition. From the beginning it has been the most powerful influence in our national life . . . Religious faith remains our greatest national resource . . . though there are many who find it difficult to give formal expression to that faith.

We hear sometimes about the need of a modern "dynamic." If there is any force from the beginning of recorded time to the present moment that is entitled to be characterized as "dynamic," it is

man's age-long progress toward a society that will be just, free, and peaceful—enabling every individual to fulfill his innermost needs. The “dynamics” today are on countless fronts where the democratic process is at work, not in the slave camps of Siberia.

Back of the “Hate America” campaign are fears and resentments arising out of an awareness that American democracy has surged far forward in achieving the better life which the Communists can only promise, and also out of the fact that our Government has become the free world's center of resistance against the encroachments of the Kremlin's aggressive imperialism.

We are a living, dynamic refutation of Communist theories. No wonder they hate us! Few furies equal those of fanatical theorists whose theories have been proved false.

It was at one time held that progress was inevitable. In recent times that idea has been discredited. But in a basic sense it is true, true be-

cause man's basic nature embodies a drive for growth, for movement forward.

There have been heartbreaking set-backs during the past decade, but in spite of them there are more people in the world today living in independent countries, with higher standards of living and a better hope of achieving the blessings of life, than ever before in the history of the world.

The fight for democracy, however, is never finally won, just as it can never be wholly lost, because it is, in the end, nothing more nor less than a constant striving toward a fuller life for all. The preservation of this way of life, the providing of an opportunity for it to demonstrate its worth, is the basic objective of American foreign policy.

• *Mr. Russell, author of the above article, is now Counselor of the U. S. Embassy at Tel Aviv, Israel. His article is based on an address which he made in his former capacity as Director of the Office of Public Affairs before the Eastern States Conference on Religion and the Nation's Problems at Washington on Oct. 17, 1952.*

Information and U.S. Foreign Policy

by Wilson Compton

Administrator, International Information Administration¹

I am asked to talk with you this afternoon about a public information service which you never see, and seldom hear, in the United States. It is America's most significant single undertaking in public education. You never see it or hear it because what it says, is said overseas, and what it does, it does overseas. But it is “talking” every day to millions of men and women in 100 countries around the world. Those of you who know it at all know it perhaps as the Voice of America. Literally, it includes an international broadcasting service daily in 46 languages with potential listening audiences in 100 countries; a press service reaching nearly 10,000 foreign newspapers each day; a motion-picture service which last year had a total audience of over 300 million people; an exchange-of-persons program which each year brings thousands of selected foreign students, teachers, scientists, writers, artists, journalists, farmers, labor leaders, and specialists to the United States and sends half as many selected

Americans overseas; and U. S. information centers in more than 190 cities in over 60 countries. As a part of the American “Crusade of Ideas,” the International Information and Educational Exchange Program, as it is called in the Act of Congress, is around the world one of the most potent barriers between “cold war” and “hot war.”

Information in other countries is accepted as a function of government in its foreign relations. Yet it has no firm place in the tradition of America or in the thinking of Americans. The historic Voice of America, which over the years had built abroad great reservoirs of respect and good will for the United States, has been normal trade, travel, immigration, emigration, ordinary communications, and our great missionary enterprises of the last century. Some of these voices have been quieted. Some have been interrupted by the events of two world wars. In some places these reservoirs of good will have been largely drained and supplanted by suspicions, mistrusts, and now even “hates” fostered by the propaganda of an international communism, lusty for aggression and subversion, which shrinks from no political im-

¹ Address made before the Congressional Club, Washington, D. C., on Jan. 30 (press release 57).

morality. Yet America is still the world's greatest symbol of faith and hope, and around the world there are millions of men and women who every day are looking anxiously, but hopefully, for the signs of what Winston Churchill, during the dark days of Britain, referred to as the "light in the West."

We do, of course, regard the hateful and immoral propaganda of international communism as a diabolical menace to democratic political institutions and free society the world over. But I doubt that we, as a nation, are taking seriously the "cold war" as a potential means of averting a "hot war," or that as a people we are as yet really trying to win the "cold war." We are, to be sure, relying on armaments and armies to win a hot war if a hot war comes. But winning a hot war, which leaves a cold war unwon, will not win very much for very long.

The USIS and VOA Around the World

Our present facilities for the "war of ideas" should enable us to retard the advance of international communism, dull the edge of its propaganda, and help to give the free world a breathing space. This itself is important. But it will not win the cold war. Nor will even larger facilities, and larger funds, enable us to win it until as a nation, or mutually with other nations, we can couple what we say more effectively with what we are able to do overseas. All information service overseas, or "propaganda" if you prefer that term, however skillful it may be, will not be effective by itself alone. But it can be made a mighty fortress of foreign policy.

The job of what often is called "public information" or "public education" is difficult everywhere. You and I know how difficult it is for any of us to keep informed about what is going on in the world or, for that matter, even here at home. Yet there are available to us everywhere in the United States everyday extensive means of information—books, newspapers, radio, television, motion pictures, libraries. These are not provided by our Government. They are provided by the enterprise of our people. But no comparable facilities are available to us overseas. So if we want to carry the Voice of America around the world, we must to a large extent provide the facilities ourselves. That is what we are doing through the International Information Administration, and in certain crucial areas by the Mutual Security Agency, the Department of Defense, and other agencies. But we should never cease the effort to restore the normal Voice of America through ordinary trade, travel, communications, and intercourse between nations and peoples which nowadays is so sadly interrupted by the conflicts of ideologies which plague the world.

Consider for a moment the job of reaching people around the world, reaching not 160 million

Americans who speak one language, but some 2 billion people who in the aggregate speak over 200 languages, half of them unable to read any language. This is a rather formidable educational enterprise. It takes trained men, and there are not enough of them. It takes money, but not as much as some enthusiasts say. It takes time and planning; and it will take a lot of patience on the part of Americans who are accustomed to tackling a job and getting it over with quickly. The world-wide war of ideas is not that kind of a job. And yet it is the most potent single barrier between "cold war" and "hot war."

In the overseas information program, we must overcome not only the problems of distance and the perplexities of diverse languages, but the unfamiliar customs, strange traditions, and innumerable creeds which so dominate the lives of peoples throughout the world. Some people, for example, hold the cow to be sacred. We use the cow to provide us with meat. Some people prepare their entire lives for a single journey to Mecca. We go to church on Sundays. Others till the soil by scratching it with a pointed stick. We do it with mighty machines. In most countries of the world, for us to be understood at all, we must speak to their peoples in their own terms, in their own images, and, so far as possible, through their own voices. This is not a simple enterprise.

To get the context of this complex job of telling abroad the story of America's purposes, policies, hopes, and motives and especially its interest as a "good neighbor" in promoting peace, freedom, and the sense of mutual security, one must go into other countries and talk with their people. This I have just done in a 21,000-mile trip of inspections and conferences around the world. These consultations have covered more than 50 countries. Our overseas information program, I might say, is not as good as its most enthusiastic supporters claim; it is not as bad as its principal critics say, and it is making steady progress. If we are not winning the "cold war," we are at least not losing it, and time and the truth are on our side.

I have been looking into the nooks and crannies of the U.S. Information Service and the Voice of America around the world. We now have an information service on the spot in 88 countries, great and small. In the countries behind the Iron Curtain, we have no dependable means of reaching their peoples except by radio—the "Voice of America"—or at the fringes occasionally by printed information which, so to speak, "leaks" across the border. Elsewhere, we are relying on the printed page, motion pictures, information centers, exchanges of persons, or radio—whatever means of communication in each country are the best suited.

It is of no value to rely on books and pamphlets to reach peoples who cannot read, or on American books in English to persons who do not know

English, or on radio programs, however excellent, to people who have no radios or who cannot hear our signal. The means of reaching the minds of the literate French, confident of their own long history and proud of their own culture, are quite different from the means of reaching the people of Indonesia, struggling with the problems and opportunities of a new independent and determined, but inexperienced and suspicious nationalism.

Establishing a More Positive Program for VOA

We are now in the midst of a formidable world-wide effort to establish a more positive program of the Voice of America overseas—in short, to take the *offense* in the “war of ideas.” No baseball game is ever won merely by good fielding. Nor is any war, hot or cold, won merely by a good defense. Country by country, throughout the world, we are now setting up individual information programs related to local facts, local conditions, and local opportunities. These programs are initiated by our own missions in each country—subject to review by Washington—to assure that what we do overseas is properly within the framework of U.S. policy. But the initiative is overseas, the country planning is overseas, the tactics and strategy are determined overseas.

This is the most formidable undertaking in the short history of our foreign information program—to put responsibility and authority where it will count for the most, namely, on the “firing line” overseas. I am confident that it will double the effectiveness of our national investment in this world-wide program, whatever that investment may be. To do this, we must have public-affairs officers in each country competent and willing to accept responsibility and to take an initiative, who see in this “crusade of ideas” not a job but a mission, not a chore but a challenge, not a duty, only, but an opportunity to help find the way to lasting peace in the only way it can be found—through attitudes and ideas, not through armies and guns.

In this foreign information service we have men and women like that overseas. No one of you could have gone with me during these recent weeks and talked with our public-affairs officers and their staffs, literally around the world, without a sense of pride in the competence, the zeal, and the devotion of these public servants. Some are living in places where it is easy to live and are working in congenial surroundings. But some are living in places where it is difficult for Americans to live—sometimes even dangerous. Some are working in indifferent, suspicious, or even hostile surroundings. There are some weak spots in the program which must be fortified. But we know where they are and we are doing something to correct them.

Our motion-picture service is especially useful in countries with a high degree of illiteracy. We are showing motion pictures in 43 languages.

We are using hundreds of mobile units. In Thailand, in company with Siamese officials, I visited a mobile library and small motion-picture room mounted on a riverboat which goes hundreds of miles up the river to communities whose people have never seen a movie and never touched a book. This year we will have distributed overseas 2 billion pieces of printed materials, most of it adapted to the individual countries where they are to be used. More and more in this enterprise we are, so-to-speak, using the “rifle” instead of the “shotgun.”

Our information centers, translations of good American books into local languages, and the exchange-of-persons program are, in general, the least controversial of our overseas activities. Last month, just before Christmas, I visited our modest information center on a prominent corner in Vienna. It was crowded—overcrowded. I saw two young men, who couldn't find a place to sit down, using the wall as a “table” on which to copy from some well-thumbed magazines. During that day, 3,851 persons used that U.S. Information Center. A few blocks distant, the Soviet Union had a large building housing the Soviet Information Service in Vienna. At the top of the building was a huge electric-lighted sign with a slogan in German: “How the Soviet Union is remaking the world.” Its library and exhibits were attractive; the attendants were courteous. But there were fewer than 40 in the library. Strangely, the wide street in front of the Soviet Information Center that very day was being taken over as a market for the sale of Christmas trees—a curious paradox.

The “Poster War” in Vienna

Incidentally, that sense of humor is getting quite a play in the “poster war” now going on in Vienna. The Communists will put up a large poster; the typical Austrian technique is to “slap on” two or three pieces of paper which will completely change the meaning of the poster.

For example, a Soviet poster will show an American tank crushing the Austrian people. The slogan reads, “TODAY SALZBURG, TOMORROW ALL OF AUSTRIA.” (Salzburg, as you know, is an American center in Austria.) Shortly after such a Soviet poster appears in the streets of Vienna, the Austrians will make it look like this. A hammer and sickle will change the tank to a Soviet tank crushing the Austrian people. The American center of Salzburg will be changed to the Soviet center of Zistersdorf—the oil town now being exploited by the Soviets.

Now, the poster reads, “TODAY ZISTERSDORF, TOMORROW ALL OF AUSTRIA.”

I can show you another example of the Austrian technique used in this “poster war” with a Soviet poster showing a red train. The slogan says, “FOR LASTING PEACE, COMMUNISM.” It shows communism breaking up atomic diplomacy, the North Atlantic Treaty, et cetera.

With just two pieces of paper, the Austrians can turn this Soviet poster into anti-Communist propaganda. Slap on a white piece of paper to cover the bottom and put the word "SLAVERY" over the word "PEACE." Now the poster reads, "FOR LASTING SLAVERY, COMMUNISM."

However, this slap-on technique is not limited to anti-Communists in the "poster war." Our posters get hit, too. One such poster, put up by our U.S. Information Service, shows the large Soviet-owned combine called "U-SEE-A" grazing on Austria—and being milked by Moscow. A very effective poster. Shortly after this appeared in the streets of Vienna, a large piece of white paper was plastered over the top to completely blot out the meaning.

We need more book translations in Europe. Even more, we need them in Southeast Asia. Burma is a good illustration. Burma has about 20 million people. It was heavily ravaged during the war. The British left the Burmese a valuable tradition of trained civil service. Rangoon is still filled with pitiful hordes of wartime refugees. Burma has high "sights" for itself, and a spirit of determination. Its government services are dominated by about 40 young men, mostly of ages between 30 and 50 years. Most of them are well-educated—many from the University of Rangoon, whose faculty includes Americans and Burmese of American training. These young men fundamentally like and trust America. They want America's help; but they are next door to the Iron Curtain.

In Rangoon a few weeks ago, I visited two native book shops. One was in a select market area. The other was patronized by the Burmese "man in the street." In both were scores of Communist books and pamphlets—many featuring either Marx, or Lenin, or Stalin—a few featuring Mao Tse-tung. In the first shop, I found on display two American books—both mediocre. In the second shop I found one, and it was not a good one. The Burmese, although timid about us and sometimes a bit skeptical, are basically friendly to the United States. We should do more to keep them so. Good books in their own language, which they can buy at small cost, will help. In the Middle East is another great opportunity for book translations. The newly established Franklin Publications, Inc., a cooperative nonprofit undertaking of patriotic American book publishers, has this year made a start toward meeting the urgent need for inexpensive good American books in the Arab countries. But it is only a start and its enterprise should be extended to Southeast Asia where the need is equally urgent.

The Voice of America, the voice of our International Broadcasting Service, is still our most controversial activity. Yet it is perhaps our most important single service because it is not only the best, but the only dependable means available to us to reach behind the Iron Curtain. RIAS, our

potent radio service in Berlin, is coming close to blanketing Germany, including Communist-controlled East Germany. It is having a powerful political effect. Many hundreds of East Germans daily are escaping to West Germany through Berlin. In December, the rate averaged about 500 a day. On Monday of this week it was over 2,500—another indication of great ferment in Eastern Europe.

During the day that I visited RIAS, 75 East Germans came voluntarily to our station to tell the RIAS staff about the true conditions in East Berlin and in Eastern Germany. This they did at considerable risk. An interesting side light is this: RIAS is officially an activity of the United States. But it is almost universally accepted also as the voice of Free Berlin. There are 600 German employees of the station, but only 8 Americans. I talked to a large number of our staff of Germans. They were almost more resentful than the Americans, themselves, of the "Hate America" propaganda of the East German radio.

The same, on a smaller scale, may be said of our radio enterprise "Red, White, Red" in Vienna, and of the two daily newspapers which we are publishing in Berlin and Vienna, which are generally regarded as among the most influential in Western Europe—influential, I might add, largely because they are detached from local political partisanship. It is a striking commentary on our opportunities in Europe that it is the Germans and the Austrians, and not ourselves, who are the most anxious that we continue these radio and newspaper voices to their own people.

Making Truth a Rule of International Life

The American people I think should, on the whole, be encouraged over our gradual progress in the war of ideas. During the past 2 years, the International Information and Educational Exchange Program has often been referred to popularly as the "Campaign of Truth." That is a significant description. It means a great deal to Americans; and after having talked recently with hundreds of people, official and unofficial, of other countries around the world, I am persuaded that it means a great deal to them, too. The international Communists are investing in their campaigns of deception and hate more than 10 times as much as we are investing in our Campaign of Truth. If we ourselves have faith and patience we, in cooperation with other free nations, can eventually establish the truth not merely as a symbol, but as a rule of international life. We have a great opportunity and an equal responsibility to provide a leadership, a guidance, and an encouragement to the rest of the world. The President has boldly blazed the way.

Last month with Mrs. Compton, I went to church with the oldest American congregation ever established on foreign soil—the American

Church in Paris. It dates back 100 years. It now occupies a new monumental structure built 20 years ago, of Medieval Gothic—one of the finest products of the genius of the late noted architect, Ralph Adams Cram. On the wall of the chancel, under the beautiful rose window, is painted a figure of the "Great Teacher." Carved under it is this inscription: "And ye shall know the Truth and the Truth shall make you free." As we stood there in those historic surroundings, we sang that familiar old hymn, "Teach us the struggles of the soul to bear"—a solemn reminder of the uneasiness, the insecurity, the anxiety, the "struggles of the soul" of the millions of our fellowmen around the world who like ourselves want freedom and want peace.

Whatever the organization, whatever the vehicle, and whatever the auspices of the Voice of America, I hope that it will always be grounded in the truth. In the long run, the truth will be more powerful than any gun.

U.S. Extends Sympathy To Flood Victims

On February 2 President Eisenhower sent cablegrams to the Queen of England, the Queen of the Netherlands, and the King of Belgium expressing U.S. sympathy for suffering caused in their countries by recent floods and hurricanes. On February 6 the White House announced that the President had appointed a special committee to gather facts on the disaster and make appropriate recommendations as to the kind of help to be offered by the United States for relief of the flood victims.

Following are texts of the White House announcement, the President's cablegrams, and the messages sent in reply by Queen Elizabeth of England and Queen Juliana of the Netherlands:

White House Announcement of February 6

At its meeting today the Cabinet expressed a unanimous conviction that the people of the United States want to help the people in the storm-stricken areas in the British Isles and Western Europe.

The President appointed a committee composed of the Secretary of State as chairman, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Director for Mutual Security, to get together the facts on the storm disaster and make appropriate recommendations as to the kind of U.S. help to relieve the sufferings of the victims. The committee will examine the extent to which congressional action may be needed and will fully cooperate with the American Red Cross.

The Secretary of Defense, at the President's direction, has already instructed our Armed Forces in the British Isles and Western Europe to cooperate with the local authorities in giving

all possible assistance to people in the devastated areas. The Secretary of State and the Director for Mutual Security are in Holland today and will send back to the President further reports on the storm damages.

Text of the President's Cablegrams

White House press release dated February 2

To The Queen of England

My fellow Americans join me in extending to Your Majesty and to the British people heartfelt sympathy for the tragic deaths and sufferings caused by the floods and hurricanes.

To The Queen of The Netherlands

My countrymen and I are deeply shocked at the news of the devastation your people have sustained through the recent storms and floods. They and I wish to extend to Your Majesty our deepest sympathy in these tragic circumstances.

To The King of Belgium

The American people join me in extending to Your Majesty heartfelt sympathy for the tragic suffering your people have sustained in the recent violent storms.

Messages Sent in Reply

From The Queen of England

White House press release dated February 4

PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
White House
Washington, D. C.

I thank you Mr. President for your message of sympathy for the tragic losses which the recent floods have brought to my country. My very deep sympathy is with the relatives and friends of the American servicemen and their families who have lost their lives. We shall remember with gratitude the selfless cooperation of their comrades in the work of rescue and comfort.

ELIZABETH R

From The Queen of The Netherlands

White House press release dated February 5

THE PRESIDENT
The White House
Washington, D. C.

I thank you and your countrymen most sincerely for your message and many tokens of sympathy. The quick and efficient American help is of very great value and will never be forgotten.

JULIANA

U.S. Again Asks Hungary To Return Property Seized in 1951 Plane Incident

BACKGROUND FOR CORRESPONDENCE

Press release 59 dated January 31

The U.S. Minister at Budapest, Christian M. Ravndal, on January 30 transmitted a further note to the Hungarian Government concerning the matter of the four American airmen, Capt. Dave H. Henderson, Capt. John J. Swift, Sgt. Jess A. Duff, and Sgt. James A. Elam, who were seized in Hungary in November 1951. Earlier U.S. notes on this subject were delivered to the Soviet and Hungarian Foreign Offices on December 10, 1952,¹ and a further note was delivered on December 17, 1952 to the Soviet Foreign Office.²

The Soviet Government, which had seized the U.S. Air Force C-47 plane 6026 and all its contents when the plane was brought down in Hungary on November 19, 1951, failed to reply to the questions put to it in the U.S. note of December 10, 1952. Instead the Soviet Government referred to the confiscation of the aircraft by the Hungarian authorities in accordance with the judgment of the Budapest military tribunal and returned the note to the American Embassy at Moscow on the ground that it was "incorrectly addressed."³ In order to avoid any possibility that the Soviet Government had not made itself fully aware of the contents of the U.S. note of December 10, that note was again transmitted to the Soviet Government on December 17, the United States specifically pointing out that the December 10 note referred "clearly to instrumentalities of the Soviet Government which were involved in the detention of the United States plane and crew and concerns actions, material, and information which only the Soviet Government can explain or provide." The United States requested that due consideration be given to the December 10 note and that an appropriate reply be transmitted.

On December 20, 1952, the note of December 10 was again sent back by the Soviet Government to

the American Embassy in Moscow with the following statement:⁴

Inasmuch as the Embassy's note of December 17, 1952 touches upon the same question as the note of the Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim* in the U.S.S.R. of December 10, 1952, which was returned to the Embassy for reasons set forth in the letter of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Y. A. Malik of December 11, 1952, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not see any reason for new consideration of this question and returns herewith the Embassy's note of December 17 and the Embassy's note of December 10 which was attached to it.

The note delivered to the Hungarian Government on January 30 gives the Hungarian Government an opportunity to return to the United States the airplane and its contents, including the documentary evidence on board, originally seized by the Soviet authorities and indicated by the Soviet Government to have been turned over to the Hungarian Government. At the same time the new note to the Hungarian Government makes it clear, as did the note of December 17 to the Soviet Government, that the liability of the Soviet Government to the United States in connection with this matter will be in no way discharged or diminished by any Soviet action in turning the U.S. property over to Hungarian authorities or by the fact that the United States may seek to recover the property from the Hungarian Government to the extent that that Government may have possession of it.

On January 23, 1953, after the Department's instruction to Minister Ravndal concerning yesterday's note was transmitted to him, but before the note could be communicated to the Hungarian Government, the Hungarian Government delivered to Minister Ravndal a reply to the U.S. note of December 10, 1952. An examination of this Hungarian reply showed that it was not only not responsive to the U.S. note of December 10 but that it contained nothing that would call for any reconsideration of yesterday's note. The December 10 note requested the Hungarian Government to provide the United States with information and other material concerning the detention, arrest, and trial of the four airmen, while the note

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 22, 1952, p. 981.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1953, p. 51.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

delivered yesterday demands the return of the C-47 airplane and its contents to the extent that they may have been turned over to the Hungarian Government by the Soviet Government.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF JANUARY 30

On January 23, 1953, I had the honor to receive from the Deputy Foreign Minister Your Excellency's note 2123/1953 with regard to the continuing interest of the United States Government in the case of the four American airmen who were forced to land in Hungary November 19, 1951. As I orally informed Your Excellency's Deputy at the time, I immediately telegraphed this note to my government. My government does not consider the reply of the Hungarian Government responsive. In the interim I have received instructions to transmit to Your Excellency the following additional communication with reference to my note of December 3, 1952 which I handed to Your Excellency's Deputy on December 10, 1952:

From notes to the Government of the United States of America from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the respective dates of December 11 and December 20, 1952, the United States Government infers that some time after November 19, 1951, the Soviet Government turned over to the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic the C-47 type airplane USAF 6026, bearing the identification symbol 43-16026, together with the equipment, cargo, and other contents thereof, to which reference was made in the United States note to the Hungarian Government of December 10, 1952.

1. The Hungarian Government is informed that the aircraft, its equipment, cargo and other contents were at the time of the alleged turning over of them to the Hungarian Government by the Soviet Government, and were at all times theretofore and thereafter, and still are, exclusively the property of the United States Government; that neither the Soviet Government nor the Hungarian Government had any lawful interest therein; that the seizure, detention and disposition thereof by the Soviet Government were entirely without the consent or approval of the United States Government and were, therefore, unlawful; and that the receipt, detention and disposition or use thereof by the Hungarian Government were without the consent or approval of the United States Government and therefore were and are now unlawful. The Hungarian Government is, therefore, requested to make prompt return of all the property to which reference is made or to make prompt provision for the payment of the value thereof, with interest at 6 percent from the date of the acceptance thereof by the Hungarian Government from the Soviet Government, in the event that the return should not for any valid reason be possible. The property consists of the following:

(1) The United States Air Force airplane 6026, C-47 type and its equipment, value \$96,436.40.

(2) Cargo thereof, itemized in the manifests on board the airplane when seized by the Soviet authorities, value \$2,342.89.

Total value \$98,779.29.

2. In particular and apart from the foregoing itemization the United States requests the Hungarian Government to return to it specifically certain articles, property of the United States, which were on board the airplane when it was seized by the Soviet authorities on November 19, 1951, in the event and to the extent that these articles have since come into the possession of the Hungarian Government. These articles are:

(1) Aeronautical charts entitled "World Aeronautical Charts" published by the United States Government, Forms Nos. WAF 230, 231, 252, 253, 320, 321, 343, 423, 424, 425; and two aeronautical planning charts, Nos. 11 and 12.

(2) A Radio Facilities Chart of Europe, published by the United States.

(3) The flight plan, bearing the signatures of the pilot, Captain Dave Henderson, and other United States Air Force personnel.

(4) The navigation log, as filled out by United States Air Force personnel, showing the details of the anticipated flight from Erding, Germany, to Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

(5) AF Form No. 1, being the log of aircraft 6026, showing number of passengers carried, place and time of take-off, landings et cetera, kept by the engineer and the pilot.

(6) AF Form 35, being the log kept by the radio operator, Sergeant James A. Elam, and all notes of the same radio operator, whether or not in the log.

(7) AF Form 75, being the retained copy of the pilot, Captain Henderson, of the clearance form issued by American authorities at Erding, Germany, on the aircraft's leaving that place November 19, 1951, showing the persons carried, the weather briefing, the route to be flown, the estimated time of flight, the amount of fuel carried by the plane and other flight information.

(8) Navigation computer, described as Form E6B.

(9) Pilot's Handbook, published by the United States.

(10) AF Form 15 and pad, showing the condition of the plane on departure.

(11) Leather brief case, called a navigator's kit, and all other contents thereof in addition to those described above.

(12) One portable United States Air Force emergency radio transmitter.

(13) Twenty-one blankets.

3. The Hungarian Government is further informed that should it fail promptly to effect the return of the property requested the United States Government will consider itself entitled to take such substantive action on account of such failure as it may then find appropriate, and also to rely on and produce secondary evidence, to the extent available to the United States, in any proceedings hereafter in which the property, the documents, or the information, as original or best legal evidence, may be relevant. The United States Government reserves the right to proceed upon the premise that return of the articles, so requested and not made, would be unfavorable to the Hungarian Government and the United States Government will consider and contend whenever and

wherever appropriate that the Hungarian Government should be estopped from producing as evidence in its behalf the original or best legal evidence thus concealed from the United States or from contesting the admissibility or value of the secondary evidence.

4. The United States wishes to make clear that the requests made herein of the Hungarian Government are not intended to condone the illegality of the Soviet Government's conduct with respect to the seizure, detention and disposition of the property in question or to relieve that government from legal liability with respect thereto. The United States wishes also to make clear that the return of the airplane, its equipment and its cargo, or their value, and the documents and other property taken by the Soviet Government in connection therewith, will not be considered by the United States to relieve the Soviet Government or the Hungarian Government in any way of liability for damages caused by either government to the United States or its nationals in this matter and remaining unsatisfied.

5. For the information of the Hungarian Government there are transmitted herewith copies of the United States Government's notes to the Soviet Government of December 10 and December 17, 1952, and copies of the Soviet Government's replies dated December 11 and December 20, 1952, respectively.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my high consideration.

TEXT OF HUNGARIAN NOTE OF JANUARY 23

Following is the substantive portion of the note delivered by the Hungarian Government to Minister Ravndal on January 23:

It is a generally accepted principle of international law that each sovereign state has exclusive jurisdiction by way of its own courts, in cases of criminal actions committed within its own territory, be the perpetrators nationals of the respective or of a foreign country. In accordance with this principle paragraph 3 of Law Number 2 of 1950 provides: "Hungarian law is to be applied in case a crime is committed either by a Hungarian or a foreign national within the territory of Hungary." As a consequence of this basic manifestation of sovereignty, the Government of the United States shall not form a right—as it attempts to do in the note referred to above⁵—to exercise control on proceedings carried out by a court of the Hungarian Peoples Republic and concluded by a final sentence.

The right of appeal for convicted persons of whatever nationality is guaranteed by the Hungarian laws in force. The convicted American flyers, however, did not avail themselves of the right of appeal in spite of the fact that the court

had drawn their attention to this right, whereby the sentence became final. Consequently it is incomprehensible why the note has asked for the circumstances of the appeal. In this connection I have the honor to invite your attention to paragraph 326 of Law Number 33, of 1912 providing that waiving of the right to appeal means that "no possibilities whatever exist to revoke" this statement.

As Your Excellency's note fails to put forward but a single fact which could in any way challenge the legality of the court's proceedings and as the claims contained in the note are void of any legal basis either of Hungarian or of international law, I on behalf of my government most categorically reject them as an attempt of interference into the sovereignty of Hungary.

U.S. Again Invites U.S.S.R. To Discuss Austrian Treaty

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT OF JANUARY 28

Press release 53 dated January 28

The U.S. Government through its Embassy in Moscow received a reply on January 27 to its note of January 12.¹ The U.S. note had urged that, in compliance with the U.N. General Assembly resolution of December 20 calling upon the Four Occupying Powers to conclude an Austrian treaty as soon as possible, a meeting of the treaty deputies be held at an early date. Subsequently invitations were issued for such a meeting to be held at London on January 30.

While the text of the Soviet reply was partly garbled in transmission to the Department,² it nevertheless makes clear that Soviet attendance at this meeting is conditional upon the withdrawal of the Western proposal for an abbreviated treaty. Any such proposal should properly be discussed at the meeting. The United States does not feel that any limitation should be placed on the possible means of arriving at a treaty before a meeting is held. As Benjamin V. Cohen, U.S. alternate representative in Committee I of the U.N. General Assembly said in the discussion on the Austrian treaty on December 18, 1952, the United States remains ". . . willing to accept any treaty in terms adequate to insure the restoration of Austria's independence and its freedom from foreign domination."³

There has been no meeting of the treaty deputies since December 1950. The United Nations has called for a "renewed and urgent effort" to con-

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135.

² A corrected copy was received Jan. 28; see below.

³ For text of Ambassador Cohen's statement and of the U.N. resolution on the Austrian treaty, see BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 67.

⁵ I. e., the U.S. note of Dec. 10, 1952.

clude an Austrian treaty. The U.S. deputy will be present in London and this Government continues to maintain its position that it is prepared to discuss any relevant proposal which may lead to a Four Power agreement and thus to a speedy conclusion of an Austrian treaty.

U.S. NOTE OF JANUARY 29

The Department announced on January 29 (press release 54) that on that date the American, British, and French Embassies in Moscow delivered to the Soviet Government similar notes indicating that they do not consider it appropriate to impose prior conditions as proposed by the Soviet Government as to the scope of these discussions. The Governments reiterate their readiness to discuss, without prior conditions, any and all matters relevant to the speedy conclusion of a treaty, and to that end the U.S. Government, as chairman, repeats the invitation to the Soviet deputy to attend a meeting on January 30, or if the Soviet Government prefers, will postpone the meeting until February 6. The text of the U.S. note follows:

The United States Government acknowledges the receipt of the Soviet note of January 27 and wishes to reaffirm its desire to comply with the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 20, 1952 which called upon the Four Powers to make a renewed and urgent effort to reach agreement on the terms of an Austrian treaty with a view to an early termination of the occupation of Austria and the full exercise by Austria of the powers inherent in her sovereignty.

With this purpose in mind, the United States Government called a meeting of the treaty deputies for January 30 in London in order to conclude an Austrian treaty. The United States Government notes that the Soviet Government declares its readiness subject, however, to certain conditions, to take part in a meeting to discuss the Austrian problem. The United States Government for its part does not consider it appropriate to impose prior conditions, as proposed by the Soviet Government, as to the scope of these discussions. It reiterates its readiness to discuss, without prior conditions, any and all matters relevant to the speedy conclusion of a treaty. To that end, it repeats the invitation to the Soviet deputy to attend a meeting on January 30, but is prepared if the Soviet Government should prefer, to postpone the meeting until February 6.

SOVIET NOTE OF JANUARY 27

[Unofficial translation]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., acknowledging receipt of the note of the Government of the U.S.A. of January 12⁴ of this year on

the Austrian question, has the honor to state the following:

In its note the Government of the U.S.A. refers to the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly of December 20, 1952, regarding the Austrian question and to obligations allegedly resulting from this resolution with regard to Austria for each of the Four Powers, the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France. In connection with this, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to call attention to the fact that both raising the question in the United Nations and the resolution adopted on this question are illegal, inasmuch as the Austrian question, in accordance with article 107 of the U.N. Charter does not fall within the competence of the United Nations, but lies exclusively within the competence of the Four Powers—the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France, which took upon themselves the obligations with regard to Austria provided for in agreements concluded among themselves.

As concerns the proposal contained in the U.S. Government's note regarding calling a meeting of the Foreign Ministers' deputies on the Austrian question, the Soviet Government, as is known, has already more than once approached the Governments of the U.S.A., England, and France with the proposal to hasten the conclusion of the preparation of a state treaty with Austria on the basis of principles earlier agreed to between the Governments of the Four Powers. In its notes on this question of August 14⁵ and September 27, 1952, the Soviet Government proceeded from the fact that the above-mentioned draft state treaty with Austria rests on the Moscow Declaration of 1943 which provides for the reestablishment of a free and independent Austria, and on the Potsdam Agreement of the Four Powers which defined the principles of their general policy with relation to Austria, as well as on decisions concerning Austria on important political and economic questions which were adopted in the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France in June 1949.

However, the Government of the U.S.A., as well as the Governments of England and France, evaded the acceptance of the proposal indicated by the Soviet Government, trying to substitute for a state treaty with Austria a so-called "abbreviated treaty" and thus continuing its policy of disrupting the conclusion of a state treaty with Austria.

Meanwhile, the "abbreviated treaty" does not agree with the decisions of the Potsdam Conference and with other agreements of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., England, and France regarding Austria. The "abbreviated treaty" does not provide for any decisions whatsoever which could promote reestablishment of a really independent and democratic Austrian state. The "abbreviated treaty"

⁴ BULLETIN of Jan. 26, 1953, p. 135.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 322.

also does not assure the Austrian people of democratic rights and freedoms and opens wide scope for restoration of the Fascist regime in Austria and for use of her for purposes of implementation of the aggressive plans of the North Atlantic Organization. In the "abbreviated treaty" the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France completely disregard the obligations regarding German assets in eastern Austria which they took upon themselves in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement.

In this connection, one must also not overlook the fact that the Austrian Government, as is evident from its memorandum of July 31, 1952⁶ and also from official statements of its representatives, opposes the draft state treaty with Austria and fights for the so-called "abbreviated treaty," which, however, can not assist the matter of settling the Austrian question and in no measure whatsoever answers the national interests of the Austrian people.

For the purpose of hastening the conclusion of the treaty with Austria, the Soviet Government has twice—in a note of August 14 and a note of September 17, 1952—expressed its readiness to take part in a meeting of representatives of the Four Powers on the Austrian question. At the same time the Soviet Government considered it necessary to clarify in a preliminary manner whether the Government of the U.S.A., as well as the Governments of England and France, agrees to withdraw its proposal regarding the "abbreviated treaty" for Austria and to affirm its readiness to conclude consideration of the state treaty with Austria.

Up to this time the Soviet Government has not received an answer to this question from the Government of the U.S.A., or from the Governments of England and France. In their notes of January 25 [*January 12*], the Governments of the U.S.A., England, and France again pass over in silence the above-mentioned question raised by the Soviet Government.

The Soviet Government, reaffirming its position set forth in notes of January 18,⁷ August 14, and September 27, 1952, again states its readiness to take part in meeting with representatives of the Four Powers on the Austrian question. Moreover, the Soviet Government considers it necessary in a preliminary manner to receive an answer from the Government of the U.S.A., and from the Governments of England and France, to the above-mentioned question regarding their readiness to withdraw the proposal of the "abbreviated treaty" and to conclude consideration of the state treaty with Austria, thus fulfilling obligations taken upon themselves to promote the reestablishment of a free and independent Austria.

Similar notes have also been sent to the Governments of England and France.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 221.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Mar. 3, 1952, p. 326.

North Korean Broadcasts

At a news conference on January 28, Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, in reply to questions concerning a North Korean radio broadcast offering land, money, education, and citizenship to deserters from the Republic of Korea Army, made the following statement:

I have been getting queries concerning some broadcasts from the Korean Communist radio station at Pyongyang. I think their first broadcast on this subject was about January 19 and there have been any number since. That broadcast purported to give the text of a "decision" of the "Military Committee." The broadcast was aimed at persuading the U.N. soldiers, particularly soldiers of the Republic of Korea, to desert. The decision formally promises land, monetary rewards, education, and even citizenship to all who will surrender.

Unable to crack the magnificent Republic of Korea Army by military means, the Communists are attempting to achieve the same end with honeyed words and promises which will certainly not deceive the free men resisting Communist aggression in Korea. This propaganda device offers to prisoners of war treatment that is in glaring contrast to the stand taken formerly by the Communist authorities in Moscow and their mouthpieces in Peiping and Pyongyang. This stand, of course, has been that all prisoners must be repatriated, by force if necessary. In effect, the broadcast says clearly that those who surrender will not be repatriated, that they will be welcomed into "citizenship" in the Communist areas and, significantly, into the Communist army if they so desire.

It is well known that the warfare in Korea is being prolonged by the Communists, who have repeatedly rejected the principle of nonforcible repatriation of prisoners of war. The world cannot forget the vicious and illogical Communist attack on the recent U.N. resolution which embodied this principle and which represented an earnest effort by 54 nations to bring about an armistice on just and reasonable terms.¹

Dr. Conant Takes Oath of Office

*Statement by James B. Conant*²

Press release 73 dated February 7

I have just taken the oath of office as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. I had a conference with President Eisenhower yesterday. I have been asked to proceed to Bonn as soon as possible. Therefore, I plan to fly to Frankfurt via London Monday afternoon. The news from Europe of the

¹ For excerpts from the Chinese Communists' reply to U.N. proposals on prisoners of war, see BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 75.

² Made on Feb. 7 on taking the oath of office as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.

last few weeks makes evident the urgency of my mission.

I enter upon my new duties with a sense of humility and a feeling of the heavy responsibilities that rest upon one who represents the President of the United States in Germany in this crucial period of history. The tasks awaiting me in Germany have world-wide implications. The security of all free nations is closely linked to the continued development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which in turn requires the formation of a European defense force as provided in the EDC [European Defense Community] treaties. There must be a continual progress in bringing to fruition the plans already laid, and I trust that progress will be made in the coming months.

Within the near future, the German people and their representatives will be called upon to make a number of significant decisions—decisions which will affect their future political status and their membership in the council of free nations. The outcome of these decisions will also have direct bearing on the nature of the relationship between the United States and Germany. It is not for me to suggest, or to predict, the course of action which Germany will decide to take. But I am anxious to be in Germany to represent the U.S. Government during the coming critical weeks. I shall meet with leaders of the major political parties and offer such assistance to the Federal Government as may be desired by the Chancellor and his associates, and as is warranted by the general purposes of my mission.

My predecessors as U.S. High Commissioners for Germany have laid the sure foundations on which we must build as rapidly as we can. They established the basis for that happy relation which now exists between the peoples of the free, democratic Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. It is my hope that my efforts may be of some avail in strengthening still further the cultural and political ties between the two nations.

German Public Service Employee Claims

Press release 64 dated February 3

As a matter of particular interest to residents of the United States, who were formerly in the German public service, the Department of State invites attention to a "Law Concerning the Redress of National Socialist Wrongs to Former Employees of the Public Service Residing Abroad" which has been enacted by the Bundestag (lower house of the German Parliament).

The significance of this law is that it gives legal recognition to claims for pensions payments by former employees of the German public service now residing outside Germany and establishes the machinery and conditions under which such claims may be entered and satisfied. In brief, it provides

that former employees of the German public service with legal or permanent residence abroad, predating May 23, 1949, may file their claims for pensions through the Diplomatic Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany in the country of residence. Claimants in the United States may submit their applications for redress to the Diplomatic Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1742 R Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., prior to March 31, 1953. In view of the imminent deadline, claimants are urged to communicate with the Diplomatic Mission without delay.

The law only makes provision for payment of benefits into blocked accounts in the Federal Republic. The transfer of such benefits abroad is subject to existing foreign exchange control regulations. However, an administrative regulation issued recently by the Federal Ministry of Economics establishes regulations for the transfer of such benefits out of Germany. The Department suggests that claimants to such pensions payments inquire of the Diplomatic Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany the possibility of transferring their funds to the United States and the procedure to be followed in effecting such transfers.

New Investment Program For West Berlin

The following announcement was issued jointly at Berlin, on January 19, by the Mutual Security Agency, Office of the Special Mission to Western Germany, and the Federal Ministry for the Marshall Plan:

West Berlin will receive DM 200,000,000 in investment funds under a new long-range program aimed, among other things, at creating additional permanent jobs.

The money will come from counterpart funds derived from U.S. dollar aid by agreement between the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) Special Mission to Western Germany and the Government of the Federal Republic. At the same time, the procedure for approving Berlin investment projects has been simplified so that the new funds will find their way into the economy rapidly.

The new program brings to DM 874,000,000 the total amount of investment funds made available to Berlin out of counterpart derived from U.S. aid.

The new program is part of a Berlin long-term investment program, and sectors and projects are to be allocated funds in accordance with the extent to which they can be expected to provide additional permanent working places in Berlin, and the extent to which they will help Berlin to overcome its adverse payments position and its requirements for external assistance.

Loans will not be limited to enterprises already in existence but may be used to assist in the establishment of new firms.

Furthermore, insofar as possible, funds are to be allocated in such a manner as to further the objectives of the Benton amendment.¹ Thus, consideration will be given to the encouragement of free private enterprise, competition, and productivity.

Under the simplified procedure for acting promptly on investment projects, a new committee operating in Berlin will have full power to approve applications on behalf of the Berlin Senat, the Federal Republic, and the M_{SA} Mission. The establishment of this committee, which will meet in Berlin every 2 weeks, eliminates the old procedure. The Berlin Industriebank will be represented on the committee ex-officio.

Applications for loans under the new program should be submitted in accordance with the directions issued by the Berlin Senat.

In determining the extent to which a project will help overcome Berlin's unfavorable trade balance, consideration will be given to the degree to which an enterprise will supply items exportable to the Federal Republic, or foreign countries at competitive prices, and the degree to which it will supply items for Berlin consumption which are now being imported.

Supplemental Agreement on German Industrial Controls

The following was released to the press at Bonn on January 12 by the Allied High Commission for Germany:

The High Commissioners of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and France, on behalf of their respective Governments, have concluded an agreement on limitations on industry which supplements the Agreement on Industrial Controls concluded by them on April 3, 1951.²

The 1951 agreement continued certain of the prohibitions and limitations on industry. After the restrictions on steel-production capacity and steel production were lifted on July 25, 1952, the remaining limitations related solely to the production capacity of the shipbuilding, synthetic rubber, synthetic oil, and precision ball-and-roller bearings industries.

Under the new agreement, which does not affect existing controls related to items of a military nature, these few limitations will remain in effect, but only until the Parliaments of the Republic of France and the Federal Republic of Germany have finally voted on the laws for the approval of the Bonn conventions and of the European Defense Community.

¹ See Public Law 400, 82d Cong., ch. 449, 2d sess., H. R. 7005.

² For texts of the agreement of Apr. 3, and of a letter from the Allied High Commission to Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany summarizing provisions of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1951, pp. 621-623.

During the remaining period of validity of these limitations, the High Commissioners will take account of the increased needs of industry in the Federal Republic when considering applications for exemptions.

The text of the new "Agreement Supplemental to the Agreement on Industrial Controls" is attached.

Agreement Supplemental to the Agreement on Industrial Controls

The High Commissioners of France and of the United Kingdom and the Acting High Commissioner of the United States of America, duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, hereby conclude on behalf of those Governments the following Agreement pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article I of the Agreement concerning Industrial Controls signed at Bonn-Petersberg on the 3rd April, 1951.

Article 1

Except as may subsequently be agreed among the Governments parties to the present Agreement, the limitations laid down in the Agreement concerning Industrial Controls signed on the 3rd April, 1951, (as amended by the Agreement signed on the 25th July, 1952) shall continue in force after the 31st December, 1952, and until 21 days after the later of the following two dates, whereupon they shall cease to have effect:

- (a) the date on which the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany shall finally vote on the Laws for the approval of the Conventions signed at Bonn on the 26th May, 1952, and of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community signed at Paris on the 27th May, 1952;
- (b) the date on which the Parliament of the French Republic shall finally vote on the Laws for the approval of the said Conventions and of the said Treaty.

Article 2

This Agreement shall enter into effect on the 1st January, 1953.

DONE at Bonn-Mehlem on this thirty-first day of December, 1952, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the French Republic	For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	For the Govern- ment of the United States of America
ANDRÉ FRANÇOIS-PONCET	IVONE KIRKPATRICK	SAMUEL REBER

Completion of Credit to Austria for U.S. Cotton

Arrangements have now been completed for the operation of a credit of 6 million dollars for the purchase and export of cotton to Austria recently authorized by the Export-Import Bank,¹ it was announced on February 9.

The credit bearing interest at 2¾ percent per annum and repayable in 18 months is extended to the Republic of Austria, which has authorized the Creditanstalt-Bankverein and the Oesterreichische Laenderbank A. G. to operate this line of credit. These Banks will in turn utilize the

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 900.

services of 14 U.S. commercial banks which they have designated for this purpose.

The credit is to be used to finance the purchase of raw cotton, including spinnable waste, which has been purchased under contract entered into subsequent to November 28, 1952, and shipped subsequent to the date of the contract. The purchases and shipments are to be made in the customary manner with the order being placed directly by the textile mills in Austria or their agents with U.S. shippers. Financing of purchases will be effected through letters of credit under which 18-month drafts will be drawn on the Austrian Commercial Bank at whose request the letters of credit were issued and shall not exceed the C.I.F. cost of the cotton foreign-ocean port, plus insurance to destination in Austria. The letters of credit issued for this purpose are to expire not later than June 30, 1953.

U. S., U. K. To Exchange Views on Economic Matters

Press release 67 dated February 5

The following announcement was made in London and Washington simultaneously on February 5:

During his visit to London the Secretary of State extended on behalf of himself and the Secretary of the Treasury a cordial invitation to the Foreign Secretary and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to visit Washington for an informal and exploratory exchange of views with members of the new administration on the matters discussed at the recent Commonwealth Economic Conference.

Mr. Eden and Mr. Butler will accordingly visit Washington for a few days at the beginning of March for the purpose of this exchange of views. There is no intention at this stage to negotiate any agreement with the U.S. Government.

Mr. Eden will combine this visit with the visit he will be making to the forthcoming Assembly of the United Nations.

Sterling Available to Commonwealth Countries

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on February 6 made the following announcement:

The Chancellor of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom (R. A. Butler) has informed the House of Commons that the Government of the United Kingdom has agreed to make a substantial amount of sterling available for lending by the Bank on suitable projects in the Commonwealth countries

of the sterling area. The Chancellor stated that it was the intention that the sterling should come from the U.K. subscription to the capital stock of the Bank.

Eugene R. Black, president of the Bank, stated that the arrangements which had been discussed between the United Kingdom and the Bank envisaged funds of the order of £60,000,000 (equivalent to \$168 million) as suitable projects were forthcoming. Such funds would be disbursed by the Bank over a period of at least 6 years. "Actual disbursement of loan funds," explained Mr. Black, "takes place as the execution of the project progresses, and normally a loan is not fully disbursed until several years after the actual loan commitment is made."

Mr. Black added:

These arrangements are a demonstration of the part that can be played by nondollar capital in world economic development. The availability of nondollar capital to the Bank can enlarge the Bank's lending operations, especially in countries whose foreign exchange earnings and capacity to repay external debt are mainly in currencies other than dollars.

The Bank obtains its lendable funds from two main sources: from the capital subscriptions of its member governments, and from the sale of Bank securities in the capital markets of the world. The consent of a member government is, however, necessary before the Bank can use that part of a member's capital subscription paid up in domestic currency, or before the Bank can raise funds by a sale of its own securities in a member's capital market.

Previously, the United Kingdom has released to the Bank approximately £4.1 million from its sterling subscription of about £83.6 million. In addition, with the consent of the U.K. Treasury, the Bank raised sterling from the sale of £5 million of its securities in the London market in May 1951.

Agreement With British Guiana on Atkinson Field

After a series of consultations at Georgetown, British Guiana, representatives of the U.S. and British Guiana Governments on December 12, 1952, signed a Memorandum of Agreement settling outstanding matters arising from agreements concluded in 1949 on the use and disposition by British Guiana of certain buildings and installations at the Atkinson Field leased area. The memorandum also dealt with the provision of signal and radio navigation services to American military aircraft using the field. William P. Maddox, American Consul General at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, B. W. I., signed the memorandum for the United States.

Following is a summary of the provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement:

1. The British Guiana Government, disclaiming any

further need from a civil aviation standpoint for certain items of real and personal property loaned for use under the Interim Transfer Document of August 1, 1949, was relieved of responsibility for maintenance thereof. Since the items in question, with two exceptions, were not deemed potentially useful to the United States, nor of sufficient scrap value to warrant salvage operations, they were declared abandoned, under authority inherent in the Secretary of the Air Force, and turned over for the disposition of the British Guiana authorities. The two exceptions were the control tower and a generator set, both of which will be retained for such disposition as the Air Force may choose to make.

2. All other items of real and personal property, held by the British Guiana Government under the Interim Transfer Documents, are to be incorporated in the Schedules to the proposed Civil Aviation Agreement on the understanding that the maintenance obligation with respect thereto shall be modified as indicated in the present Agreement.

3. It was agreed that, with respect to the Contract of Sale of August 24, 1949, there should be an interchange of certain items of property between Schedule A (purchased by British Guiana for use in place) and Schedule B (purchased for salvage). These items are listed, respectively, in Schedules II and III of the present Memorandum of Agreement. Special conditions were attached to the disposition of the Station Dispensary, now transferred from Schedule A to B.

4. Signal and radionavigational services at Atkinson Field shall be provided to American military aircraft free of charge, so long as the traffic continues to be of an occasional nature. If the traffic increases substantially, a further agreement between the two Governments shall be concluded.

Mission To Survey British Guiana's Economy

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced on January 30 that a general economic survey mission would leave on January 31 for British Guiana. It will undertake a study of the territory's economic potentialities, and will make recommendations designed to help the Government formulate and carry out a long-term development program. The mission was organized by the Bank at the request of the Governor of British Guiana. It will arrive in Georgetown on February 1 and is expected to stay in British Guiana about 6 weeks.

Three of the mission members are American, two are British, two are Dutch, and one is French. E. Harrison Clark, of the Bank's Department of Operations for the Western Hemisphere, will be the mission chief.

The mission also includes two other members of the Bank's staff, Cyril H. Davies (U.K.), assistant to the mission chief, and Kenneth A. Bohr (U.S.), an economist; W. F. Eysvoegel (Netherlands), an expert on water resources; E. R. Hondelink (U.K.), a transportation expert; and three agricultural specialists—Maurice Guillaume (France), an expert on agricultural production; Johannes H. L. Joosten (Netherlands), an agricultural economist; and Eugene C. Reichard (U.S.), an expert on forest products. The Food

and Agriculture Organization nominated the agricultural specialists and is sharing the cost of their services.

Semiannual Report of International Bank

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported a net income of \$7,639,743 for the 6-month period ended December 31, 1952, compared with \$8,071,486 for a similar period in 1951.¹ Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$20,696,715 compared with \$16,637,921 in 1951.

The net income was placed in the Supplemental Reserve Against Losses on Loans and Guarantees, increasing this reserve to \$65,667,843. Loan commissions, which amounted to \$4,536,682, were credited to the Bank's special reserve, as required by the articles of agreement, increasing this reserve to \$32,221,336. Total reserves on December 31, 1952, were \$97,889,179.

During the second quarter of the fiscal year, the 3 months ended December 31, 1952, the Bank floated two bond issues: 60 million dollar 19-year 3½ percent bonds due October 15, 1971, and Swiss franc 50,000,000 3½ percent 10-year bonds due December 1, 1962. Expenses for the 3-month period, totaling \$7,885,582, included bond issuance and other financial expenses of \$2,331,480 in connection with the two issues. In the comparable period of 1951 such charges were nominal.

During the 6-month period ended December 31, the Bank made six loans totaling \$112,133,464 in Australia, Colombia, Finland, Iceland, India, and Peru. These loans increased total loans signed by the Bank to \$1,524,266,464. Disbursements on loans were \$120,004,529, bringing total disbursements to \$996,508,662 on December 31, 1952.

Repayments of principal were received from borrowers as due; they totaled \$514,432. During the 6-month period, the Bank also sold to private investors \$9,293,220 of securities from its loan portfolio: \$4,978,400 with its guarantee and \$4,314,820 without. These transactions brought total portfolio sales to \$65,669,908: \$46,477,401 with the Bank's guarantee, and \$19,192,507 without.

France gave the Bank permission to use French francs equivalent to \$180,000 from its paid-in franc subscription to the Bank's capital for any loan the Bank has made to Iceland. Italy gave similar permission for the use of its lire subscription in an amount equivalent to \$519,000 for any loans made to Turkey. Sweden approved the use of 18,000,000 Swedish kronor (\$3,479,464) from its paid-in subscription for the supplemental loan to Finland for the wood-products industries, signed in November 1952.

¹ For memorandum relating to the financial statements, see International Bank release of Feb. 6.

755 More Tube Wells To Be Drilled in India

Press release 70 dated February 6

The Department of State announced on February 6 that contracts have just been signed in New Delhi and Lucknow, with Harold T. Smith, Inc., of Washington, D.C., for drilling 300 tube wells in the State of Pepsu, 255 in Punjab and 200 in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The contracts are between the states and the Smith Company.

The wells involved in these contracts are part of the 2,000 provided for under the Indo-American Point Four Program. A contract for 500 tubewells, as they are called in India, was made in November 1952 with the German Water Development Corporation. All these are to be drilled in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The other 745 wells will be drilled by other agencies of the state government or by private companies under contracts with the states.

The Point Four tube-well program, for which \$13,700,000 of American funds and Rs. 44,450,000 (about \$9,300,000) have been set aside, is designed to achieve an immediate increase in India's food production and help to overcome the food deficit of the nation.

The three states of Northern India—Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Pepsu—already have thousands of tube wells in operation, a type of development that has been going on for years, particularly since the early 1930's.

A tube well is what is known in this country as the "bored well," used in irrigation throughout the southwestern United States. The rich agricultural area of Madera County, Calif., alone has more than 2,000 now in use.

The Gangetic Plain of northern India is an especially favorable location, since it has a 12-month growing season and since the water table is replenished from snows on the Himalaya mountains, highest mountain range in the world. The Indian climate permits two crops a year, but parts of the area, depending only on rainfall, can raise only one crop at the time of the summer monsoon. Canal water from rivers also is used for irrigation in the dry season from September to June but even this tapers off during the dry season. Tube wells, therefore, serve a supplementary role in this case.

Crops in the area are chiefly wheat, millet, sugar cane, and rice.

Each individual tube well is capable of delivering 750 gallons of water per minute and will irrigate from 300 to 400 acres of land. Depth ranges from 200 to 400 feet and due to the good water table, there is a low pump lift. Electric

motors and some individual Diesel units will be used to pump water.

Under the Indo-American agreement, the wells become the property of the states, which will operate and maintain them and collect water charges. Construction costs of the wells are treated as a loan to the states and return payments will go into a special fund for further development purposes.

The 2000-well program is one of the 11 projects agreed on by India and the United States under the 1951-52 Point Four Program. Additional wells are planned in another project agreement under the 1952-53 program and a separate project is planned for exploratory wells in untested areas, where good possibilities are known to exist and where irrigation should be greatly aided.

Rubber Working Party Prepares Draft Agreement

Press release 48 dated January 28

At its meeting in Ottawa May 5-9, 1952, the International Rubber Study Group established a Working Party¹ whose terms of reference were:

To consider whether measures designed to prevent burdensome surpluses or serious shortages of rubber are necessary and practicable; to prepare drafts of any agreements required to implement such measures; and to report back to the Study Group as soon as possible.

The Working Party has concluded its second session in London, at which it continued the work, begun at its first session held last summer, July 30-August 15, 1952, in London, of examining the various types of international arrangements which, within its terms of reference, might be applicable to natural rubber. It decided to concentrate on the buffer stock type of agreement, and has prepared a draft of such an agreement for the consideration of the International Rubber Study Group at its meeting in May 1953 in Copenhagen.

The delegates to the Working Party, representing both consuming and producing countries, were of the opinion that, subject to final agreement on a number of points, a buffer stock agreement on the lines of the draft would be practicable.

The Working Party considered that the question of necessity for such an agreement could best be discussed at the next meeting of the International Rubber Study Group.

The preparation of the draft does not in any way imply acceptance in principle, or otherwise, by any member government.

¹ BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 913.

The United States, the United Nations, and Africa

by *Vernon McKay*¹

The choice of Africa as a subject for this session of the Cleveland Institute is a source of real satisfaction to those of us in the Department of State who work on African problems. As public servants we are anxious to learn what the public is thinking about Africa, and we are confident that meetings such as this will lead to the development of a broader public interest and knowledge. The United States also needs a larger number of trained experts who specialize on African affairs. American universities have many area-studies programs on Europe, Latin America, the Far East, and the Near East, but African studies are only just beginning, and we have no journals, either academic or popular, devoted to this rapidly emerging continent. Your participation in this Institute shows that public awareness of these needs is growing, and leads us to hope that they will soon be filled.

Those of you who have made even a cursory study of Africa realize its enormity and diversity, and you therefore appreciate the fact that it is dangerously misleading to generalize about a continent so complex and varied. This is a point which also constantly impresses us in the Department of State. We operate on the basis of certain general principles and objectives which are difficult enough to formulate, but our task becomes immeasurably more complicated when we try to apply these general principles to specific problems. You can readily understand the difficulties in formulating a U.S. policy for Africa if you stop to think for a moment. North of the Sahara is a Mediterranean world where nearly two million Europeans live alongside Hamitic and Semitic peoples, the Berbers and the Arabs, who outnumber them ten to one, and I do not include the population of Egypt in this total. At the southern end of the continent in the Union of South Africa

live another two and a half million Europeans and a third of a million Asians, who are outnumbered about four to one by Negro peoples. A significant fact about this area was once called to my attention by a South African who pointed out to me that his ancestors went from Europe to his home in the Union several generations before my ancestors came to the United States.

A third great area of Africa is the East-Central belt lying between the Sahara and the Union; here Europeans and Asians in much smaller numbers are trying to make their homes in territories where the ratio of African to European varies from well over 1,000 to 1 in Uganda, to perhaps 175 to 1 in Kenya, and only 14 or 15 to 1 in Southern Rhodesia. Finally, on the western side of the continent is an overwhelmingly African world where Europeans and Asians are for the most part a tiny minority of officials, traders, and missionaries.

These four Africas together cover an area nearly four times as large as the United States and have different climates and topographies as well as different racial and cultural patterns. As a matter of fact, the variety within each of these four areas is so great that it is not even practicable to have a single policy for each of them. In any case, whether one policy or many policies are needed, I have said enough to emphasize Africa's complexity.

Despite this great variety, however, the different parts of Africa do have certain similarities, and the Department of State has been able to work out certain general principles or objectives which guide our handling of African problems. It will help you to understand these objectives if I first explain the factors and interests which we took into account in formulating them.

Let me begin with what is possibly the longest standing of these factors, namely, the traditional humanitarianism of the American people—an interest which takes many forms. One powerful factor in our ideals has always been our traditional sympathy toward the aspirations of all peoples to

¹ Address made before the 27th Annual Institute of the Council on World Affairs at Cleveland on Jan. 31. Mr. McKay is the acting officer in charge of Trusteeship Affairs, Office of Dependent Area Affairs.

determine their own destinies. Another is the idealism of the members of our churches, whose humanitarian motives are fortified by deep religious convictions, and who are now supporting more than five thousand American missionaries throughout the continent. These missionaries not only bring the Christian religion to Africa but are doing outstanding medical and educational work. Many of our great churches are at this moment engaged in a national study program to educate their membership on Africa's problems and needs.

Still another factor is the generosity with which Americans have responded to appeals for assistance in raising African health and educational standards. A striking example of the contribution made by our great philanthropic organizations is the participation of the Rockefeller Foundation in the fight against yellow fever in Africa. Our Negro leaders and organizations are another group who are playing an increasingly significant part in these efforts. These many humanitarian interests, combined with our faith in the application of technology as a means of promoting progress, have been in part responsible for our inauguration of the Point Four Program, which has raised to the level of a national policy the traditional efforts of the American people to share their benefits and skills with less fortunate peoples. This is the kind of "enlightened self-interest" which Mr. Dulles described as the guide to our foreign policy in his first major statement as Secretary of State a few days ago.²

A second major interest of the United States is what I shall call, for want of a better term, a political interest. We do not have and do not want any territory in Africa, but we do have a vital concern in its political future. It is imperative that we do all we can to help insure that the continent does not fall under Soviet domination or influence. As Secretary Dulles pointed out Tuesday night, the Communists are trying to arouse Africans to revolt.

Forestalling Communist Penetration

The direct responsibility for Africa belongs to other governments, but our position among the leading nations of the world makes it impossible for us to neglect an area of such importance. It is our hope that Africa's emerging peoples will choose of their own free will to remain associated with the democratic nations of the free world. Thus far the best information available indicates that the inroads communism has made in Africa are not of major proportions. We feel it imperative, therefore, to forestall further Communist penetration by doing what we can to help in the development of healthy political, economic, social, and educational institutions in Africa.

Of the two most popular theories on how to check communism, one maintains that Africans will turn to the Soviet Union for aid unless they are given self-government *quickly*, while the other contends that Africans will fall easy prey to Soviet domination if they are given self-government *too quickly*. Possibly there is an element of truth in both views. The disagreement centers around the word *quickly*, that is, on the element of timing. Most people have now accepted the idea that the goal for all the peoples of Africa should be self-government in one form or another. What we need today is steady progress toward that goal.

I do not need to say much about our strategic interest in Africa because it was revealed to all the world by our experience in World War II when we not only had to undertake military campaigns in North Africa but also had to develop a vitally important supply line across West, Central, and East Africa. This strategic interest, of course, also encompasses Africa's supply of strategic materials. If we are to play our necessary role in safeguarding the freedom of the democratic nations of the world, it is vital for us to stockpile and to have access to African sources of such critical materials as uranium, manganese, bauxite, copper, chrome, tin, columbite, and industrial diamonds, to mention only a few of the 95 now listed by our Munitions Board.

U.S. Economic Stake

Finally, what is our economic stake in Africa? Our trade with Africa has always been relatively small, although it is an interesting fact that in the heyday of sailing vessels our Yankee clippers were carrying about a million dollars worth of Massachusetts sheeting to East Africa every year. As late as the 1850's about half the vessels calling at Zanzibar were American, chiefly from Salem. The word "Amerikani" or "Merikani" became a Swahili word for calico, and one of the clipper captains relates—how accurately I do not know—that the trademark "Massachusetts sheeting" was especially prized in the interior of the continent and was always conspicuously displayed on cotton *dotis* or loincloths.

Today our trade with Africa is still less than 5 percent of our total world trade but is nonetheless important. Our exports to Africa totaled \$580,000,000 in 1951 and our imports from Africa \$589,000,000, with the Union of South Africa accounting for more than half the total. Practically all of our industrial diamonds, vital for our machine-tool industry, come from Africa, and I have already called your attention to our needs for many other African minerals.

You would also find some surprising changes in your everyday life if we were suddenly cut off from Africa's vegetable products. The loss of our palm-oil supplies, 90 percent or more of which come from Africa, would make soap scarce and

² For text of Secretary Dulles' address of Jan. 27, see BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 212.

would handicap our steel and tin-plating industry. Without African sisal, our cordage and twine supplies would be reduced by at least 25 percent. Our great chocolate manufacturers who import thousands of tons of cocoa beans from West Africa every year would have to cut your chocolate candy in half. Spices and wool would be greatly reduced, and even your shoes and leather goods would be affected, for we buy over 90 percent of our wattle bark and extract for tanning purposes from Africa, as well as a considerable proportion of our hides and skins.

To conclude this brief description of our economic stake, it should be noted that our businessmen have direct investments of nearly 300 million dollars in Africa, almost half of which is in the Union of South Africa in such enterprises as automobile assembly plants, tire factories, and the mining industry. In relation to our total overseas direct investments of nearly 12 billion dollars, this is a small figure. Opportunities in other areas have heretofore been more attractive to our investors.

Our Major Objectives

From this survey of the factors and interests which affect our policy toward Africa, it is clear that our interests, like Africa itself, are quite varied and full of dilemmas. Some of our critics contend that we use these dilemmas as an excuse for inaction. One of them has recently written: "While our policy-makers still talk about not crossing bridges until we get to them, we are actually crossing bridges without knowing it." The question raised by this criticism is an important one, but I can assure you that the Department of State is fully aware of its importance. In order to insure that our policy is planned in advance and that we do not take a series of isolated steps which commit us to a policy without our realizing what has happened, we have developed departmental and interdepartmental machinery to bring our African specialists into constant communication in order to concentrate their combined knowledge and skills. Through this process we not only keep our African policy under continual review, but we have succeeded in hammering out certain guiding principles or objectives which are sufficiently precise yet sufficiently flexible to meet our needs. These objectives were stated by the Assistant Secretary of State responsible for African affairs [George C. McGhee] on May 8, 1950.^{2a}

First, it is one of our major objectives to see that the peoples of Africa, in their own interests, advance in the right direction and in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. We favor the progressive development of the dependent peoples of Africa toward the goal of self-government or, where conditions are suit-

able, toward independence. The attainment of this objective, in which we can play only a cooperative role with the administering powers, imposes upon all concerned a heavy burden of self-discipline and the need to undertake voluntary long-term planning of the highest order.

A second major objective, which arises out of our relations both with the metropolitan powers and with the peoples of Africa, is our desire to assure the development of mutually advantageous economic relations between them, in the interests of contributing to restoration of a sound European economy and in the interests of furthering the aspirations of the African peoples. . . .

Third, the United States wishes to preserve its rights of equal economic treatment in the territories of Africa and to participate itself, both commercially and financially, in the development of this great continent along with other nations of the world. . . .

Finally, it is a major objective of United States policy to assist in providing an environment in which the African peoples will feel that their aspirations can best be served by continued association and cooperation with the nations of the free world, both in their present status and as they advance toward self-government or independence in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

It now remains for me to describe what we are doing to achieve these objectives. Through our diplomatic channels we try to carry on a full and frank exchange of views with other governments to assure ourselves that Africa is moving toward these goals. These diplomatic channels include our embassies in the capitals of the 6 European states which have territory in Africa, as well as 4 embassies, 2 legations, 12 consulates-general and 10 consulates in the Continent of Africa. In addition, and very important indeed, is our representation in many U.N. organs, commissions, and agencies where we join with other nations in a constructive interchange of views which focus world attention on Africa's needs. Because my own work in the Department of State is particularly concerned with African issues which arise in the United Nations, I am going to devote special attention to this part of our program.

Before turning to our U.N. activities, however, I wish to call your attention to the extent and character of two other programs through which we are trying to achieve our objectives. These are our program of economic aid and our information and educational exchange program.

Until 1948 our economic and financial assistance to Africa was small. Greater assistance was made possible by the inauguration of the European Recovery Program and the subsequent development of the Point Four Program.³ An agreement signed in Paris in 1947 provided that the Economic Cooperation Administration [ECA] would furnish material and financial assistance, both loans and grants, to those European countries devastated by war "together with dependent areas under their administration." ECA and its successor, the Mutual Security Agency [MSA], have undertaken many projects for technical assistance,

³ For additional information on assistance programs in Africa, see article by Harry N. Howard, *ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 936.

^{2a} *Ibid.*, June 19, 1950, p. 1002.

for economic development, and for the procurement of strategic materials and other defense supporting activities in Africa. Similar assistance is being provided on a smaller scale by the Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State which handles our Point Four technical assistance programs for the independent states of Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya; by the Defense Materials Procurement Agency; and by the Export-Import Bank. The United States has also supplied almost 40 percent of the funds which the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development have allocated to Africa. According to the latest estimate prepared in the Department of State, the grand total of post-war economic aid to Africa by these four U.S. agencies and by the United Nations and the International Bank, through June 30, 1952, was \$635,986,000. Of this total, \$296,222,700 was in the form of loans, \$156,500,000 of which came from the International Bank. It should also be mentioned that France has allocated for its African territories the equivalent of \$202,486,000 of what are called counterpart funds in our Mutual Security Program; these are funds which France provides in its own currency to match dollar grants from the United States. You should not overlook the fact that the total amount of this American aid is relatively small in comparison with the several billion dollars the European powers are putting into African development programs of their own. MSA aid is designed to supplement these European efforts.

For what is this money being spent? In a booklet published by the Mutual Security Agency⁴ you will find two maps of Africa indicating the territories in which it operates and the projects it is undertaking. These include strategic-materials development, road and bridge construction, railway development, surveys of land and water resources and other much-needed projects which will stimulate economic development and raise African standards of living as well as contribute to the security of the United States, Africa, and Europe.

One of the most interesting examples of what can be done with a limited amount of economic assistance is the remarkable development of Liberia in the past 10 years. Until World War II the Liberian Government operated on a very small budget, most of which was derived from revenues from the rubber exports of the Firestone Company, which has a \$28,000,000 capital investment in the country. During the war an American air base was built at Roberts Field; a good harbor was begun at the capital city of Monrovia; and the United States sent economic and public-health missions to Liberia. The Technical Cooperation Administration of the Department of State has now taken over the economic and public-health missions.

In 1950 the Government of Liberia, with the assistance of our Technical Cooperation Administration, produced a notable 5-year economic development program to cost more than \$32,000,000, most of which is to be paid for by the Liberians. The port of Monrovia was completed in 1948 and is now earning substantial profits, and U.S. nationals have invested another 15 million dollars in Liberia since the end of World War II. In 1950 our Export-Import Bank extended a credit of \$5,000,000 to Liberia for roads and \$1,300,000 for sanitary facilities in Monrovia. Four of the specialized agencies of the United Nations—UNESCO, ILO, FAO, and WHO—have also joined in this cooperative venture in technical assistance, the most important objectives of which are road construction, a national system of elementary education, a national system of agricultural research and extension, a national program of public health, and improvements in public administration.

Information Program Activities

A second important means of achieving our objectives is our Information and Educational Exchange Program. This campaign in the struggle for the minds of men is trying to fill an important need in Africa, where Europeans and Asians as well as Africans have mixed feelings toward us, at times friendly and sympathetic, at other times suspicious and critical. Europeans sometimes protest over what they regard as an American tendency to give indiscriminate support to nationalists who demand immediate independence without adequate preparation, and at other times they express the fear that our economic-aid programs conceal ulterior motives to supplant European business interests. Among the Africans there are many who are deeply interested in the United States and who much appreciate the sympathy which Americans have for African aspirations. At the same time racial discrimination in the United States is often publicized in Africa with unfortunate results. There is nothing more important to many Africans than this matter of race relations, and some of them have the false idea that the Russians do better than we do in this field.

Perhaps I can best emphasize the importance of this racial factor by briefly recounting two of many incidents which have given the United States adverse publicity in Africa. Please bear in mind that I mention them not to pass judgment on our own very complex racial problems, but only to emphasize the importance of their repercussions in Africa. One of these incidents was the conviction and execution of seven Negroes for rape of a white woman. West Africa's best known newspaper on February 20, 1951, made the following editorial comment on the "Martinsville Seven":

By killing these men for a crime in which no white person had ever been condemned, America has lowered

⁴ *The Overseas Territories in the Mutual Security Program*, Mar. 31, 1952.

its prestige in the world more effectively than any Communist propaganda.

Perhaps even more remarkable in some ways is an episode which occurred in Paris in 1951 in the Assembly of the French Union. This parliamentary body—composed of 102 representatives of metropolitan France and 102 representatives of French territories overseas, mostly from Africa—is reported to have observed one minute of silence in memory of Willie McGee, another American Negro who was convicted and executed for rape of a white woman. Perhaps you will want to keep the African attitude on such incidents in mind this afternoon during your discussion of what the United States should do about its relations with Africa.

In any event it is clear that we need to give the peoples of Africa a balanced picture of American life. Our public affairs officers in Africa, some of whom are Negroes, are doing just that through press, radio, film, library, and public-speaking programs; and they include as an important part of their story the continuing forward steps made by Negro Americans. You will recall that President Eisenhower said in his inaugural address:⁵

We reject any insinuation that one race or another, one people or another, is in any sense inferior or expendable.

We must make this point clear to the Africans.

To give Africa a true picture of America it is also valuable to bring students and leaders from Africa to see for themselves, and we do this on a very small scale through our educational exchange program. Most Africans here, however, do not receive U.S. Government aid. Some pay their own way, and others come with the help of scholarships from our universities or their own governments. You will be interested to know that more than 650 of them are today studying in American colleges and universities. Their importance is greater than their numbers, for they will be leaders in their countries when they return, a fact that is well illustrated by the outstanding example of the new Prime Minister of the Gold Coast, Mr. Kwame Nkrumah. The Department of State is anxious for these Africans to enjoy and profit from their stay in the United States, and you can help by doing all you can to make their visit a pleasant one.

Importance of United Nations

I now turn to my final subject, the wide-ranging program of activities affecting Africa which the United States carries on in the United Nations. For this important work we assumed certain direct obligations and responsibilities when the U.S. Senate approved the Charter of the United Nations, three chapters of which are devoted to the needs and aspirations of those African and other peoples throughout the world who do not yet govern themselves. Our vital concern over this prob-

lem was indicated by the Secretary of State last October at the seventh session of the General Assembly, when he devoted a major portion of his opening address to those issues arising out of the legitimate aspiration of dependent peoples for a determining voice in their own affairs.⁶

The attention which members of the United Nations have devoted to Africa has steadily grown. When the Charter was signed at San Francisco in 1945, many people thought that insofar as African issues were discussed in the United Nations they would be largely dealt with in the Trusteeship Council which supervises the administration of seven trust territories in Africa and four in the Pacific. Today, however, the proliferation of U.N. activities affecting Africa has extended throughout the organization. One step of major significance has been the creation of a committee of sixteen members which examines information transmitted on more than 60 non-self-governing or colonial territories which are not under international trusteeship, a committee which is not provided for in the Charter and which is regarded as extra-constitutional if not unconstitutional by the principal colonial powers.

The Economic and Social Council discusses many other African problems, including proposals for an Economic Commission for Africa and recommendations to promote the right of self-determination for dependent peoples. The Security Council has discussed the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The International Court of Justice has considered the South-West African question and the Moroccan claims issue. The African activities of the specialized agencies in the fields of agriculture, education, health, and labor are also mounting. Most important of all, as those of you know who followed its meetings last fall, the General Assembly made African problems one of its main concerns. Its discussions and resolutions have touched upon nearly all of the continent's main areas and problems—the disposition of the former Italian colonies, the Tunisian and Moroccan questions, the Ewe and Togoland unification movements in West Africa, the eviction of Wambaru tribesmen from certain lands in Tanganyika in East Africa, the international status of South-West Africa, the problems of the Indians in South Africa and of racial conflict in South Africa, the general problem of African economic development, and many other questions.

On all of these complicated issues the representatives of the United States must vote and frequently must explain the position of their Government. Because our great power has thrust us into a position of world leadership, our vote on these questions is watched with unusual interest by the other 59 members of the United Nations, and by the many people throughout the world who take an interest in these issues. Our sense of responsibility is therefore very great.

⁵ BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 167.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 639.

Our task might not be so difficult if it were not for the fact that our friends who join us on such crucial U.N. issues as the Korean conflict are sharply divided in their views on many African questions. This cleavage was so sharp last month in New York that the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium informed the General Assembly that they would no longer participate in the Assembly's important Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories if the Assembly adopted a proposal to make this committee in effect a permanent organ—a step which in their view would be contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. The Assembly in plenary session averted this crisis by accepting a proposal originally made by the United States to review the committee for 3 years; the Assembly thus reversed a decision taken earlier by its fourth committee which would have renewed the committee indefinitely.

Conflicting Opinions

From conflicts such as these the United States has learned how very deeply our friends feel. On one side is the view of such members as the great new nations of India and Pakistan; in a notable statement at the sixth session of the General Assembly in Paris on November 14, 1951, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan of Pakistan, describing "the fierce passion" with which subject peoples resent alien domination, termed the colonial question "the biggest political problem of the day." On the other side is the view expressed in the Assembly on October 21, 1952, by the Right Honorable Henry Hopkinson, British Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, when he said, "My own feeling in this matter is one of intense pride in our achievements in what may be described as the colonial field over several hundreds of years." The emotion which underlies both these views is readily understandable. In the one instance it is the natural pride of new nations, recently emerged from colonial status and anxious to help others toward the same goal. In the other it is the natural pride of old nations, our European friends, who have made real contributions to their African territories, particularly since the end of World War II, by constitutional reform and by the outlay of several billion dollars for economic, social, and educational development.

With this knowledge of the emotional atmosphere in which certain African issues are sometimes discussed in the United Nations, you can better understand the general position which our representatives take on such issues. First of all, we firmly believe in the principles of the Charter and in the machinery which has been set up to implement them. We believe that this machinery cannot function as effectively as possible without the cooperation of all members, and, in particular, it seems to us self-evident that the recommendations of the United Nations cannot be implemented

without the cooperation of the colonial powers. Whether or not one agrees with him, Walter Lippmann, in his daily column on January 12, posed a problem which deserves thought. He wrote:

The U. N. is being torn apart by the formula that almost any one can put almost any claim before . . . [it], and then can compel all the nations to align themselves pro and con, black or white. This is a perfect formula for failing to make peace, for dividing mankind, and for fomenting bad will.

Mr. Lippmann has oversimplified the problem but he does have a point.

In any case we feel it essential for the United States to conduct itself with moderation, restraint, and a high sense of responsibility if the United Nations is to be effective in helping the peoples of Africa. Some of our critics have likened this policy to the act of a tightrope walker who spends all of his time doing nothing but keeping from falling off on one side or the other. We do not regard this as a fair criticism. We do not deny that we sometimes walk a tightrope, but we do so because we consider that statesmanship requires us to steer a steady course between the views of those impatient people who demand faster progress and those intransigent people who complain that every forward step is taken too soon and goes too far.

The Ewe Problem

To give you an example of how this policy works in practice, let me describe the position of the United States on an important question which has been before the United Nations for nearly 6 years. This is a problem raised in many petitions by the Ewe people who live in British and French West Africa. More than 800,000 of these alert and able Africans live in the two neighboring trust territories of British and French Togoland, and in the British colony of the Gold Coast. A majority of them desire to be placed under one administration in order to put an end to the political, economic, financial and cultural barriers which keep them apart. We have urged that they be given the fullest possible hearing. They have sent numerous petitioners to United Nations meetings in New York, Paris, and Geneva to present their claims in person, and the Trusteeship Council has asked two of its Visiting Missions to West Africa to go into the Ewe area and make special studies of the problem.

Out of this thorough investigation, one of the most important facts that has come to light is that other peoples in the two trust territories outnumber the Ewe people and disagree with them as to the political future. In this situation the Department of State has felt that the most constructive contribution it could make was to take the lead in proposing U.N. recommendations asking the British and French to take steps to minimize the economic, fiscal, and cultural barriers which restrict Ewe movements across the frontiers, and

to establish elected organs to bring together the peoples concerned for regular consultation and mutual exchange of views. Because of the division of opinion among the Africans themselves on the political problem, as well as the fact that their opinions seem to be in a stage of evolution, we have felt it would be unwise for the United Nations to make any definite recommendations asking the British and French to modify the international frontiers.

This case study illustrates our difficulty in developing a policy which will be reasonable and at the same time widely acceptable. Although the British and French have responded to United Nations recommendations by minimizing the frontier barriers, the Ewe people are not satisfied because they still want political unification. Moreover, our position has not pleased many of our friends in the United Nations because we have been unable to support either certain proposals of the British and French or certain proposals of noncolonial powers who have advocated the immediate unification of the two Togolands.

Our search for a solution of the Ewe problem is a part of our continual inquiry into the larger question of the future of Africa. In this age of clash between the ideals of political independence and economic interdependence, it seems essential to develop ways and means of enabling Africans to achieve their aspirations for self-government without losing the economic support which makes the full enjoyment of freedom possible. The late Dr. James Aggrey, a distinguished Gold Coast African, once said:

In the harmony of the world, as in the harmony of an organ or a piano, the black and white keys are both essential.

Whether such harmony can be achieved in Africa no one can be certain, but we in the Department of State hope that Africans, Europeans, Asians, and Americans will continue their best efforts both inside and outside the United Nations to look for new approaches to the problem.

The postwar evolution of the British Commonwealth of Nations from a white commonwealth into a multiracial commonwealth with three new Asian members, Ceylon, Pakistan and India, is one of the most promising developments in many years. It now looks as if a fully self-governing Gold Coast will soon be entering this multiracial family of nations. Another new concept, closer to home, is the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico established on July 25, 1952, by a constitution drawn up and overwhelmingly approved by the Puerto Ricans themselves. Although control over

such matters as Puerto Rico's defense and foreign relations has been left to the United States, the final declaration adopted by the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico terms the new constitution a "compact entered into by mutual consent," and concludes:

Thus we attain the goal of complete self-government, the last vestiges of colonialism having disappeared in the principle of Compact, and we enter into an era of new developments in democratic civilization.

These bold new concepts are promising examples and challenging opportunities for the future of Africa and the free world. If such patterns of cooperation and good will prevail, the emerging nationalisms of the peoples of Africa not only will profit from their contacts with other civilizations but will make a great contribution to the future of all men everywhere.

The Communist War in POW Camps

The following summary of an intelligence study entitled "The Communist War in POW Camps" was released to the press at Tokyo by the United Nations Command (UNC) on January 28:

Direct responsibility for conduct of the Communist campaign on the second front of the Korean war—the UNC prisoner-of-war camps—is charged to Communist Generals Nam Il and Lee Sang Jo in an intelligence study released today by Headquarters, U.N. Command. According to the study, the mutinies by the Communist prisoners at Koje Do and Cheju-Do were deliberately planned and masterminded by the Communist delegates at Panmunjom.

The study, which appraises the organization of Communist control and the planning and conduct of incidents in UNC-controlled prison camps, is based on hitherto secret military reports which reveal beyond a doubt that the Communist delegates at Panmunjom have dual functions. The study states that ostensibly the two Communist generals are present to represent the Communists in the armistice negotiations. Covertly, and more important, they are assigned to mastermind the incidents within UNC prisoner-of-war camps.

General Nam Il, in his capacity as Cultural Chief of Staff of the Security Agency for the North Korean Army, is responsible for insuring the loyalty of the army to the state by controlling all personnel through political officers or commissars. Nam Il is a former Soviet officer and a U.S.S.R. citizen of Korean extraction. General Lee Sang Jo, Nam Il's deputy at Panmunjom, is chief of the Collection of Military Intelligence Section for the North Korean Army.

These two generals and their fanatical followers have exploited a new area of total war, the study

The United States in the United Nations

A regular feature, will be resumed in a subsequent issue.

shows. No Communist soldier, even though a prisoner of the other side, may be permitted to withdraw his support of communism. The Communists consider all prisoners held in UNC camps to be soldiers still under their control but physically detained temporarily by the UNC.

The Communist concept of prisoners of war as "fighters" continuing the war within UNC camps is well illustrated by a hand-written Communist summary of the results of the attempted mass breakout at Pongam-Do on December 14, 1952, in the course of which 85 prisoners lost their lives and 113 were wounded. The summary recognized that heavy casualties had been expected but that "our fighting comrades . . . were determined to die a glorious death." Although the "task imposed on us by the party and the fatherland"—which was to break out—could not be fulfilled, the "main purpose" was to "develop a class fight to give the enemy a crushing defeat." The party leadership was satisfied that this had been done, summarizing that in the "magnificent effort" the prisoners "lost nothing but their lives in the fight, and these were for liberation and glorious victory." The document labeled the uprising as a "lethal fight . . . connected with the fatherland war," claiming "a great victory" because the U.N. Command "had no other alternative but to broadcast the Pongam-Do incident of December 14, 1952, by radio, without concealment, to the whole world," and "the press of the whole world devoted its attention to Compound F and the investigation of the incident."

The Geneva Convention pertaining to the treatment of prisoners of war defines certain privileges and responsibilities for both the prisoner and the detaining power. The U.N. Command's respect for this convention is not matched by the Communists whose prisoners in UNC camps and whose delegates at Panmunjom demand the privileges but shun the responsibilities. To them the Convention is applicable only when it is to their advantage to quote it.

In 1951, the study points out, the Communists began to plan action in support of this concept. Adhering to their axiom that the end justifies the means, the Communists in mid-1951 plotted to control and utilize their soldiers held prisoner by the UNC—regardless of the outcome for the participants and in complete disregard of the Geneva Convention. Their methodical and thorough planning was two-fold: (1) mass mutinies, riots, and breakouts which had as their goal an eventual link-up with the Communist guerrillas and bandits in South Korea, and (2) direct violence designed to produce propaganda which might influence the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom.

Once the plan was ready the Communists turned to reorganization. During the latter half of 1951 item 4 of the armistice conference agenda brought to the forefront the problem of prisoner-of-war repatriation. To meet the problems which they

expected to arise from this item the Communists organized a special unit to train prison camp agents and furnish intelligence to the Communists at Panmunjom. The unit was attached to the headquarters of the North Korean Army and was under the supervision of General Nam Il, senior Communist delegate at Panmunjom.

In order to establish contact with prisoners in the UNC camps and to insure coordination, the Communist high command utilized the guerrilla guidance bureau which is responsible for infiltration of agents into South Korea and control of guerrilla operations. This activity is under General Pae Chol, who also is a Soviet Army officer.

Major General Lee Sang Jo, Chief of the Collection of Military Intelligence Section of the North Korean Army, was appointed deputy to Nam Il. In this capacity he could furnish timely and accurate intelligence to the Communist delegates. Nam Il's liaison officer between Panmunjom and his command at the North Korean Army Headquarters is General Kim Pa, a former Soviet MVD agent who holds a high position in the North Korean political security department. He was reported on various occasions to be present at the armistice negotiations disguised variously as a sergeant or lieutenant.

Many prisoners captured by the U.N. Forces have admitted they were deliberate plants, dispatched to penetrate the prison camps at Kojedo where they were to establish "cell organization committees" in each camp. The cells were to carry out strikes, protests and demonstrations.

The first step in the formation of a Communist apparatus is establishment of the Communist party structure. According to the study, in May of 1951 the Kojedo branch of the Korean Labor Party (KLP-BASIN Communist Party), known as the Liberation Fighting Association, was organized in compound 92. Similar organizations with subordinate political, agitation and youth association (military) sections, were formed in most of the other compounds. Among the objectives adopted by the KLP organization in the PW camps was the following: "We must consider the possible rupture of the cease-fire talks which are now under way and be ready to liberate ourselves in accordance with orders from Kim Il Sung. All types of units must be organized to rise in revolt, simultaneously, in order to liberate all the prisoners of war and attack the Republic of Korea and American Forces that now occupy Kojedo."

Later, compound leaders advised prisoners of war not to submit to screening. They instructed their followers that the armistice negotiations were nearly completed and that all prisoners of war would be repatriated. Still later, according to the report, they spread the allegation that the UNC wanted to move all faithful Communists into compounds away from the other prisoners so that the true Communists could be killed. The prisoners were further advised that if U.N. soldiers were

to enter the compounds they would not be allowed to fire their weapons because it was against the Geneva Convention. All prisoners were told to concentrate in one place and fight the U.N. soldiers. "Each man kill one soldier before he is subdued." Any prisoners of war who might reveal information were to be killed and the blame was to be placed on the U.N. authorities.

Military administrative committees were established in all compounds under Communist control. These committees organized military units to enforce the plans and directives of the committees. "Peoples courts" were established to punish offenders who deviated from the party's policies or refused to join its militant organizations.

The leader of the political committee, or general leading headquarters, was Jeon Moon Il. Listed as a private in the NKA, he had been identified by his fellow prisoners as Pak Sang Hyon, one of the original 36 Soviet-Koreans, among whom were Kim Il Sung, Ho Kai, and Nam Il. These 36 were brought into North Korea by the Soviets in 1945 to organize the North Korean satellite state. Within the compounds Pak went by the code name of Ro Sun Saeng. Prisoners have stated he controlled all the compounds and personally ordered the capture of General Dodd. He also allegedly was responsible for instigating the riots against the screening for voluntary repatriation in compound 77 on 27 May 51 and 18 March 52. He issued instructions, directives and propaganda and sentenced to death many of the prisoners who dared to defy the party directives.

General leading headquarters issued all directives through the leading committee for party members. This committee was organized into political, organizational, military, and agitation sections. It was the special activity subsection of the military section which was responsible for punishing "by physical or other means all reactionary, destructive elements and spies who act in defiance of advice of party members, and who violate the party regulations and rebel against the fatherland and people." The members of this subsection were instructed to "perform their duties at the risk of their lives." They were the executioners or the strong-arm squads who punished, beat, and executed violators condemned by the clandestine "peoples courts." The study describes a number of the typically brutal activities of the "peoples courts."

The study points out that once the breadth and detail of the Communist prisoner-of-war plot were recognized, the U.N. Command moved to gain complete and uncontested control, dealing swiftly but fairly with all who would challenge the proper authority of the detaining power.

Once established, control was maintained by quick counteraction when required and supported by such additional measures as dispersion of prisoners into smaller and more manageable groups, provision of additional physical security

around compounds, expansion of intelligence systems covering the various compounds, and institution of a stricter regiment, more frequent inspections and searches as required.

It is realized, the study concludes, that neither these present measures nor any others permissible under the Geneva Convention will cause Pow leaders to abandon their fanatical devotion to communism or completely destroy the Communist organization within the compounds.

With communications reduced, coordination of incidents may be difficult, but leaders among the prisoners are well enough acquainted with the purposes and methods of the party and Communist army command to know without further instructions that incidents at any time can be exploited. Constant and close surveillance may deprive the prisoners of the advantage of surprise, but there can be no guarantee that control measures now in force will prevent the fanatical Communist leaders from throwing away the lives of those they dominate.

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¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FIFTY-FIFTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1-15, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2898 [Excerpts]
Transmitted January 6, 1953

I herewith submit report number 55 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 October 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1389-1403 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The Armistice Negotiations continued in recess until 8 October in order to give the Communists ample time in which to study the new proposals for resolving the prisoner of war issue put forward by the United Nations Command on 28 September. The three alternative United Nations Command proposals submitted at that time had established beyond any possibility of refutation the fact that the United Nations Command would willingly repatriate every war prisoner who desired to return to Communist control, and provided absolute safeguards against the forcible retention of any prisoner. When the main delegations met on 8 October the Communists immediately stated that after careful study they found the new proposals unacceptable, and demanded total repatriation of all war prisoners. Simultaneously, with complete illogic, they repeated time after time the obviously false charge that the United Nations Command was attempting to forcibly retain prisoners of war.

The Senior United Nations Command Delegate then questioned the Communist spokesman to determine unequivocally if the Communists definitely rejected the United Nations Command proposals, and still insisted on total repatriation of all prisoners of war. In reply

the Communists stated that the United Nations Command proposals presented no new content, and that the principles represented had been rejected long ago. They maintained, as before, that international conventions and the present draft of the Armistice Agreement required the repatriation of all war prisoners, and must be adhered to.

The Communist Senior Delegate then urged the United Nations Command to carefully consider a proposal of the Communists which is repeated here as delivered by the Communists.

. . . with regard to the changes in form as suggested in your proposal, we are willing to give them serious consideration on the basis of the principle of total repatriation of war prisoners on both sides. We consider that when the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, all of the war prisoners of each side may be sent to the agreed exchange point in the Demilitarized Zone to be delivered to and received by the other side. Thereafter, through visits by the joint teams of the Red Cross Societies of both sides, the war prisoners will be insured to return home to lead a peaceful life and not to participate again in active hostilities in Korea. Classification of the war prisoners will be carried out thereafter in accordance with our July 18th principle of reclassification according to nationality and area. The captured personnel of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the United Nations Forces must all be repatriated home. Of the captured personnel of the Korean People's Army, those whose homes are in North Korea must all be repatriated home while those others whose homes are in South Korea may return to South Korea. Of the captured personnel of the South Korean Army, those whose homes are in South Korea must all be repatriated home, while the others whose homes are in North Korea may return to North Korea. These tasks of visits, classification, and repatriation can be accomplished under the observance of inspection teams of neutral nations.

Since the Communist proposal obviously constituted no real change in the enemy position the United Nations Command Senior Delegate stated that it was clear that the Communists categorically rejected all United Nations Command proposals.²

After the recess commenced the liaison officers of both sides continued to meet for consultation and transaction

²The report here summarizes Gen. Harrison's Oct. 8 statement and quotes the last 4 paragraphs. For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 601.

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on Jan. 6. Texts of the 30th, 31st, and 32d reports appear in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1952, p. 266; the 33d report, Mar. 10, 1952, p. 395; the 34th report, Mar. 17, 1952, p. 430; the 35th report, Mar. 31, 1952, p. 512; the 36th and 37th reports, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 594; the 38th report, May 5, 1952, p. 715; the 39th report May 19, 1952, p. 788; the 40th report, June 23, 1952, p. 908; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668; the 48th report, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 795; the 49th report, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 883; the 50th report, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958; the 51st and 52d reports, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034; the 53d report, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 155; and the 54th report, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 224.

of their customary duties. The Communist Senior Delegate promptly employed their services to transmit a letter of protest to the United Nations Command Senior Delegate regarding the recess. This letter, delivered on 11 October 1952, recognized in its opening sentence that a recess had been declared, but ended with a contradictory allegation that the United Nations Command was responsible for disrupting and breaking off the negotiations. The United Nations Command Senior Delegate has prepared a reply refuting this unwarranted charge by the Communists and restating the United Nations Command position with regard to the recess. This letter will be delivered through the liaison officers in the near future.

In a meeting of the liaison officers on 6 October a letter from the United Nations Command Senior Delegate to the Communist Senior Delegate was delivered. The text of this letter is quoted.

On 5 August I addressed a letter to you requesting that your side permit the receipt by our captured personnel in your custody of individual parcels or collective shipments of relief supplies. You will recall that we have offered to make similar arrangements for those members of your forces we now hold as prisoners of war.

On 27 August in the course of a plenary session of the delegation I again requested your agreement to this proposal, to which you replied that the matter was under study by your side.

With the approach of winter and the increase in hardships which colder weather will bring, we particularly desire to make available to our personnel some comforts which will assist them. I propose a specific plan for the shipment and exchange of individual parcels by both sides to be initiated as soon as possible, leaving for future consideration the shipment of collective supplies:

Parcels will be limited to four pounds in weight, with a maximum length of eighteen inches and with thirty-six inch maximum length and girth combined.

Each parcel will be addressed to an individual whose name has been included in lists exchanged by both sides or in subsequent lists submitted by each side for additional accounting.

Each prisoner of war will be permitted to receive a maximum of two parcels per month.

Contents of packages will be limited to articles described in Article 72 of the Geneva Convention.

Packages will be delivered to the representatives of both sides at Panmunjom in the same manner as prisoner of war mail.

I hope for an early and favorable reply to this request which has as its only objective some measure of relief for those unfortunate victims of war.

At the end of the period no reply of any kind to this request had been received from the Communists.

The series of open acts of defiance which occurred during the latter part of September at United Nations Prisoner of War Camp Number Three, Cheju City, housing fanatical pro-Communist Chinese prisoners of war, were culminated on 1 October '52 by a carefully planned attempt at open rebellion.

In an attempt to restore order, two platoons forced their way into the compound at approximately 0825 hours and were immediately attacked by prisoners armed with rocks, spears, barbed wire flails and other hand-fashioned missiles. Divided into three groups the prisoners were fortified behind a partially constructed rock wall being built as part of a shower house. Firing ceased at 0835. Total casualties resulting from this incident were: fifty-six Prisoners of War dead, ninety-one injured and evacuated

to the Prisoner of War hospital at Pusan, and nine additional slightly injured. Nine United States troops were bruised by rocks or clubs.

As soon as a report of this incident was received, immediate steps were taken to provide transportation facilities for the press to Cheju City. Correspondents and photographers who arrived shortly after noon on 2 October were given factual information during a conference with the camp commander, and were given permission to question United States personnel involved. They took a number of photographs of crude weapons and prisoners of war in formation who were undergoing inspection. It is of particular interest to note that the inmates of this camp had been specifically warned the day previously that demonstrations celebrating Chinese Communist holidays during the period 1-3 October would not be permitted.

In the remainder of the camps under United Nations Command control no unusual incidents occurred during this period. New construction and improvement in existing facilities, including the furtherance of the winterization program went along well. With the implementation of Operation THANKSGIVING, in which some 11,000 South Korean civilian internees will be released during the month of October, by 13 October over 2,300 had been released to civilian authorities, and with the assistance of relief agencies of the United Nations Command, were being settled rapidly into the civilian economy.

The period opened with the enemy displaying the same degree of aggressiveness in ground operations which he had shown during September. During the second half of this period, however, the entire western and central portions of the battle line were the scene of some of the heaviest fighting in many months. This increased battle action was precipitated by the enemy during the night 6/7 October when hostile units of up to regimental strength struck a total of forty United Nations Command positions on the western and central fronts in what was the largest series of co-ordinated limited objective attacks attempted by the Communists in more than a year. Many positions changed hands, some repeatedly, as a result of this increased action. When the period closed the enemy at great cost had taken and still retained five of these positions, all of which were outpost positions. To herald the opening of this series of limited objective attacks the Communists unleashed the largest volume of artillery and mortar fire received by United Nations Command forces since the initiation of hostilities. Over 93,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell on friendly positions on 7 October. The daily average for this period increased to 24,000 rounds per day, or more than twice that of the previous period. United Nations Command forces, in addition to defeating the enemy's vigorous limited objective at all but several minor points, continued to employ groups up to company size to provide patrols and raiding parties for combat intelligence and reconnaissance activities against the enemy. No major change in enemy dispositions took place. However, because of the extremely intense action at one point on the central front east of Mabang the enemy was forced to commit, unsuccessfully, the reserve division of one Chinese Communist Army.

Along the western front enemy activity centered in the area south and east of Punji and in the area south and east

of Sanguyong. Outpost positions and hill masses were the objectives of the attacking Red forces. In the Punji area on the night of 2 October six outposts were attacked by enemy forces up to two companies in strength. Action in one instance lasted for nine hours. Five of these positions were lost to the Communists but two of them were reoccupied the following day. During the night of 6/7 October the Communists initiated a total of thirty-one actions across the western front, ranging from squad size probes to a regimental strength attack against a terrain feature four miles east and south of Mabang. As a result of these various actions five positions were lost to the enemy. Activity, although diminishing in intensity, continued sporadically for the ensuing several days with counterattacks being made by both friendly and Communist forces in an effort to gain and hold outposts in the Sanguyong area. As the period drew to a close Communist action had dwindled to brief, ineffective probes by small hostile elements. As of the end of the period four outpost positions which had been lost to the enemy attacks of 3/7 October remained under hostile control.

Along the central portion of the battle line, Communist interest was focused on only one area as the period opened. In a continuation of action which had commenced on 29 September the Communists made two company strength attacks against an outpost position one and a half miles southeast of Kumsong. The first attack, which was launched during the early morning hours of 1 October, was repulsed after a two and one-half hour engagement which included hand-to-hand fighting. The same evening the enemy was again forced to withdraw after an unsuccessful attack of one-hour duration. With the exception of a few brief scattered probes the enemy was inactive until the night of 6/7 October. The central front then received its share of the series of co-ordinated attacks made by the Communist forces. Thirteen separate actions were initiated including one in regimental strength and six by hostile battalions. During this series of actions an outpost six miles south and west of Pyonggang was lost to the Reds. This position was retaken, lost again and finally regained and held by friendly elements at noon of 8 October. Also during the night of 6/7 October the Communists occupied a hill mass one and a half miles southeast of Yulsa and a portion of another ridge located three thousand yards to the east. These same positions had been the targets for enemy attacks at various times during the month of September. United Nations Command units later retook the ridge position referred to above on 13 October. The heaviest fighting took place at the western end of the central front where a bitterly fought contest still continues over a hill mass seven miles east of Mabang. This action opened, as did many others, during the night of 6/7 October. The hill, dubbed "Whitehorse", has been taken and lost by both sides almost daily as United Nations Command and Communist battalions stormed up the slopes to gain and hold the position. The Communists employed, in succession, major elements of five separate regiments in their determined bid for control of the hill mass. Three of these hostile regiments were drawn from a reserve Chinese Communist Division. Employing human-sea tactics the Communist Commanders, as one attacking regiment became

depleted, committed regiment after regiment into the action. Prisoners of war and battlefield reports clearly reveal the unusually heavy punishment inflicted on the attacking units by the gallant Republic of Korea defenders. Prisoners also reflect a continued determination to seize this hill mass; however, at last reports, United Nations Command elements remained on the position. On 14 October United Nations Command forces, in a co-ordinated attack to secure more advantageous positions, compelled two enemy battalions to relinquish their hold on two hill positions three miles northeast of Kumhwa. After dark on the same date a Communist counterattack carried the positions and necessitated a friendly withdrawal. On 15 October a renewed offensive by United Nations Command elements succeeded in retaking and securing the hills after initial stubborn resistance. All subsequent Communist assaults against these positions were successfully contained as United Nations Command defenders remained in firm possession at the close of the period.

Along the eastern portion of the front enemy action was relatively insignificant. Only one position, a United Nations Command outpost approximately three miles south and east of Mulguji, was the focal point of Communist activity. Here numerous attacks and counterattacks by platoon size elements of both sides took place as ownership of the position changed almost daily. At last report the outpost was in friendly hands. Elsewhere across the eastern front activity consisted of brief Communist probes, mostly in squad strength, all of which were repulsed.

A study of enemy activity before, during, and immediately following the series of co-ordinated attacks revealed few general offensive indications and a predominance of basic defensive indications. Therefore, it is concluded that this series of attacks were limited objective attacks. Some of the reasons for launching these attacks, as indicated by several prisoner of war reports, were believed to be: (1) a display of Communist strength and firepower motivated by a fear of a United Nations Command offensive; (2) spoiling attacks designed to keep United Nations Command forces off balance and in a defensive attitude in case the United Nations Command should be preparing for large-scale offensive action; and (3) an effort to seize certain terrain features considered important from a tactical viewpoint and for negotiatory advantage at the Pannunjon Conference. Whether one or all of these considerations motivated the hostile limited offensive, it must certainly now be clear, even to the lowest rank and file enemy soldier, that the Communist effort was not only costly but a complete failure. This failure should vividly illustrate to the Communist hierarchy the price that they must pay in any contemplated general offensive.

United Nations Command naval jet and propeller driven aircraft operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan struck pre-briefed targets and targets of opportunity throughout central and north Korea. Enemy troop concentrations and supply areas received the major attention of naval aircraft during this period. Strikes were launched almost daily against enemy transportation facilities, buildings and warehouses of military significance. Four major effort strikes were launched. First, sixty-nine

United Nations Command Navy planes hit a North Korean troop concentration and supply area. Second, a joint United Nations Command Navy-Air Force strike was conducted against an enemy troop concentration and supply area at Hoeryang. Third, a joint United Nations Command Navy-Air Force strike was made against an enemy supply area at Yongpyong-ni. Fourth, a joint United Nations Command Navy-Air Force strike attacked Kowon, a major railway and road hub, and supply center. Other heavy strikes were also launched against enemy supply areas and troop concentrations in the Wonsan area. United Nations Command naval aircraft close air support sorties for front line troops destroyed many bunkers and gun positions, and inflicted numerous casualties among enemy troops. The highlight of the close support work occurred on 9 October when ninety-one Navy planes supported United Nations Command front line troops, using a newly developed ground-air co-ordinated strike technique against dug-in enemy troops. Observed results consisted of one troop shelter, six buildings, and 100 yards of trenches destroyed, and direct hits on ten bunkers. Attacks on interdiction targets resulted in many railcuts, destruction or damage to railroad and highway bridges, locomotives, railroad cars, trucks and boats. A number of MIG-15s were encountered in the Wonsan area during this period and two Navy fighters were shot down as a result of MIG encounters.

Off the west coast of Korea, Marine Corps and Navy carrier-based aircraft continued air strikes on enemy military targets south and west of a line between Hanchon and Kaesong. Close air support missions for United Nations Command troops were also flown. The interdiction planes concentrated on troop dispositions threatening friendly-held islands, supply areas, road traffic, boats, and rail and road cuts. The prolonged effort to cut the enemy main supply routes has borne fruit and the West Coast Task Element Commander stated on 6 October that the enemy's past policy of rebuilding destroyed rail bridges has almost ceased, but that oxcart and sampan traffic has increased in the area. Aircraft sighted four groups of MIG-15 aircraft near Chinnampo on 6 October but no engagement ensued. One fighter plane crashed in the Yellow Sea, probably as a result of enemy ground fire, and the pilot is listed as missing in action.

Marine Corps aircraft based ashore in Korea continued to support United Nations Command front line troops and fly strike and reconnaissance missions over North Korea.

Naval patrol planes supported the United Nations effort in Korea by daily flights which included reconnaissance, anti-submarine, and weather data missions conducted over the waters adjoining Korea.

On the east coast of Korea the naval blockade units, led by the United Nations Command flagship with United Nations Command cruisers and destroyers assigned, besieged key enemy strong points at Songjin, Hungnam, and Wonsan, and interdicted the coastal road and rail lines. Minesweepers worked daily within range of enemy coastal guns to keep mines clear of the ships on blockade and patrol duties. In the East Coast bomblines vicinity, United Nations Command vessels supported the friendly troops ashore on a round the clock basis.

Enemy shore batteries along the east coast of Korea continued to harass United Nations Command ships. During the first thirteen days of October over 250 rounds of 76mm and 105mm ammunition were expended by North Korean shore batteries and two United Nations Command ships suffered damage. Near Songjin a 76mm shore battery scored an airburst on a Canadian destroyer. Two personnel were killed, eight were wounded, and the ship suffered superficial superstructure damage but continued her blockade duties. A minesweeper operating off Kojo received minor shrapnel damage from near misses made by a 76mm battery, and four of her crew were wounded.

On the Korean west coast United Nations Command surface craft blockaded the Korean coastline around the perimeter of the Hwanghae Province. The vessels successfully defended the friendly-held islands north of the 38th Parallel by maintaining constant watch and harassing troop positions on the mainland.

Small United Nations Command vessels conducted close inshore patrols, blockaded, and swept mines in waters off enemy shores. A new patrol was established by the United Nations Command Blockading and Escort Force Commander to warn unauthorized vessels out of waters adjacent to South Korea.

United Nations Command Naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service, and merchant vessels under contract, provided personnel lift and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces in Korea.

United Nations Command aircraft continued to attack enemy supply targets to destroy the enemy's war-making potential. An intensified operation, which was made possible by the availability of additional aircraft and favorable maintenance conditions, was begun during the period. Approximately 250 sorties per day were scheduled over the normal rate to increase the destruction of enemy material. Fighter bombers concentrated on the area south of a line between Pyongyang and Wonsan where supply targets, fuel dumps and troop concentrations were attacked daily by large formations of Air Force and Marine aircraft. Returning pilots reported destruction of warehouses, supply stacks, and other lucrative targets.

On 12 October United Nations Command aircraft flew a total of 1,428 sorties, the second highest mark reached during any twenty-four-hour period since the beginning of the war. On this date and the day following, 590 close support sorties were flown by fighter bombers and light bombers. Increased ground activity necessitated additional close support missions, particularly in the central sector. Destruction claims from these and other sorties during the period, included many bunkers and gun positions, and numerous casualties inflicted on enemy troops.

Counter-air sorties by United Nations Command jet interceptors continued to take a terrific toll of Communist MIG aircraft but the destruction claims fell far short of the record set during the first part of September. United Nations Command fighters shot down eighteen Red MIGs during the reporting period and damaged an additional twenty. Pilots reported that the enemy pilots were not aggressive unless the odds were decidedly in their favor.

The MIG pilots took advantage of cloud cover and the Manchurian border to escape from United Nations Command planes. The enemy still used his hit and run tactics against United Nations Command interceptors and slower fighter bombers but was unwilling to fight prolonged battles with the faster jet types.

On three occasions during the period, MIGs made attacks on propeller-driven United Nations Command aircraft operating in the Wonsan-Hamhung area. On 12 October, an Air Force aircraft on an armed reconnaissance mission west of Wonsan was destroyed by MIGs and the United Nations Command pilot was listed as missing in action.

These attacks by MIGs, in the eastern sector of Korea, brought about a change in the use of United Nations Command interceptor aircraft. United Nations Command jet fighters were scheduled on airborne patrol missions between the Chongchon River and the Wonsan area. These missions were flown throughout the daylight hours with four aircraft constantly in the area.

Air Intelligence was unable to draw any unusual conclusions from the operation of the enemy jets but indications are that the sporadic raids by MIGs represent only a token force and do not in any way reflect the total capability.

The medium bombers contributed to the program of increased destruction of supplies and equipment by attacking supply areas at Sopo-ri, Naewonsan-ni, Haechong, Ponchongol, Yonpo and other areas where supply buildings were destroyed, fuel and ammunition dumps blown up, and storage areas destroyed.

The largest medium bomber strike of the period was accomplished in a night attack on targets on the Haeju Peninsula. The primary target was a headquarters area for guerrilla training units operating from Haeju and the surrounding area. The day after the bomber attack, fighter bomber aircraft attacked the same area to destroy smaller targets not hit by the medium bombers.

The medium bombers flew frequent sorties in close support of United Nations Command ground units and bombed targets with the aid of radar equipment. They also flew regular leaflet missions, dropping millions of leaflets.

Light bombers were utilized primarily on night intruder missions and night attacks on supply targets. The number of vehicles sighted during the period decreased from the previous period although on the night of 12/13 October, 3,000 vehicles were sighted. A large percentage of these vehicles were attacked and a good number were destroyed by the night intruders and Marine night fighters. Several trains were destroyed during the period with the majority of the sightings in the Wonsan-Hamhung area. As a result additional night intruder aircraft patrolled the main routes on the east coast searching for rail traffic.

Combat cargo aircraft performed normal logistical missions transporting troops and equipment in support of combat operations. Meanwhile, rescue units accomplished recovery of three United Nations Command pilots who had parachuted from disabled aircraft behind enemy lines. These rescue missions were all flown within range of enemy MIG fighters, but the recovery operations were not subjected to enemy air attacks.

All United Nations Command Air Force units participated in a joint operation which was begun on the final day of the reporting period but details of the operation were not available for this report.

Employing radio, leaflets, and loudspeakers, maximum dissemination was given the 28 September proposal of the Senior United Nations Command Delegate to the armistice negotiations. The significance of this and other United Nations Command efforts to achieve a realistic peace in Korea had been seriously distorted by Communist leaders in their rigidly controlled indoctrination of troops and civilians. Radio broadcasts of recorded statements by Communist prisoners of war presented dramatic testimony to the terror which repatriation holds for many prisoners. Communist obstruction of peace in an effort to obtain forcible repatriation of these men was stressed. Psychological warfare media continued the extensive program of warnings to civilians in areas where targets of United Nations Command bombings are located.

Wage scales have been adjusted for direct-hire Korean workers employed by the United Nations forces to compensate for the increased cost of living. The Commanding General, Korean Communications Zone, has been authorized to take certain actions to provide wages at levels prevailing in private industry for the same classifications of work and to insure co-ordinated and uniform treatment of all direct-hire employees of the several military commands, United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency and the American Embassy. In conformance with the common practice in Korea, wages will be paid in won, issues-in-kind and services.

A preliminary survey of crop growing conditions and areas planted to rice and supplemental crops was conducted by a joint United Nations Command-Republic of Korea survey team during the period 29 August to 11 September. This was the first of two surveys to be conducted to determine the extent of presently planted areas and to estimate the probable yield of these areas at fall harvest time. The results of the second survey, scheduled for mid-October, will be used as a basis for determining the total food and grain import requirements for the Korean food year 1 November 1952 to 31 October 1953.

Definite steps are being taken by the United Nations Command to assist in improving the facilities for medical education in the Republic of Korea. Following the completion of a recent survey of Republic of Korea medical educational facilities by United Nations Command medical and educational advisors, certain recommendations were presented to President Rhee. To this end the United Nations Command has suggested and agreed to the relocation of certain United Nations Command advisory groups and medical units in order to free the space now occupied by the 1st Republic of Korea Hospital in Taegu Medical College. This particular change is considered to be of primary importance since it will not only return the buildings to the college but it will provide for the transfer of faculty members, nurses and students from Pusan, thus relieving the overcrowded conditions of the combined medical schools located here. In addition it will be the first step toward establishing a valuable medical center.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Inter-American Economic and Social Council (OAS)

The Department of State announced on February 6 (press release 69) that John M. Cabot, personal representative of the Secretary of State, will be the delegate of the U.S. Government at the third extraordinary meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States, which will convene at Caracas on February 9, 1953.

The other members of the U.S. delegation are as follows:

Alternate Delegates

Merwin L. Bohan, U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council
Julian C. Greenup, Acting U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council

Advisers

Willis C. Armstrong, Deputy Director, Office of International Materials Policy, Department of State
Edward G. Cale, Director, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
James C. Corliss, Adviser, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
Mrs. Elizabeth S. Enochs, Chief, International Technical Mission, Social Security Administration, Federal Security Agency
Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State
Rafael Pico, Chairman, Puerto Rico Development Board, Santurce, Puerto Rico
William H. Wynne, Financial Adviser, Office of International Finance, Department of the Treasury
George Wythe, Director, American Republics Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Executive Secretary

Henry E. Allen, Division of International Conferences, Department of State

Press Officer

Joseph F. McEvoy, First Secretary of Embassy, Caracas

The purpose of each extraordinary meeting is to enable the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to review the work it accomplished during the preceding year; to examine the plans for future action; and, in general, to consider any other topic of common interest to the member states, within the jurisdiction of the Council. In the light of the latest information on the most characteristic problems and on the economic, financial, and social conditions of the American countries, delegates to the third extraordinary meeting will review the Council's work program and the priorities to be assigned to various activities during 1953-54.

Among other subjects to be considered during the forthcoming meeting by delegations from the 21 American Republics are topics concerning current economic problems, including coordination

of transportation and materials in short supply; economic policy and development and monetary stability; and social problems, such as population movements, community organization, workers education, social insurance, and low-cost housing. The meeting will also examine the program of technical cooperation of the Organization of American States (OAS), under which projects are now being carried out in the fields of housing research, hoof-and-mouth disease, the administration of children's services, economic and financial statistics, cooperatives, and technical education for the improvement of agricultural and rural life.

Economic Commission for Asia (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on February 6 (press release 72) that the U.S. Government is represented at the ninth session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, which convened at Bandung, Indonesia on February 6 by the following delegation:

U.S. Representative

Merrill C. Gay, Minister, Economic Adviser, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Advisers

Eugene M. Braderman, Director, Far Eastern Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce
Augustus S. Chase, Chief, Division of Research for Far East, Department of State
William W. Diehl, Financial Attaché, American Embassy, Tokyo
Howard L. Parsons, Economic Officer and Attaché, American Embassy, Bangkok
Rufus Burr Smith, Economic Counselor, American Embassy, Karachi
Kenneth T. Young, Director, Office of North Asian Affairs, Department of State

Secretary of Delegation

Frederick D. Hunt, Second Secretary and Consul, American Embassy, Djakarta

The principal purposes of ECAFE are to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for economic reconstruction in the countries of Asia and the Far East, for raising the level of economic activity in those countries, and for maintaining and strengthening their economic relations, both among themselves and with other countries of the world; to make or sponsor investigations and studies of economic and technological problems and developments within territories of Asia and the Far East; and to undertake or sponsor the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of economic, technological, and statistical information.

Statistical Commission (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on February 3 (press release 63) that Stuart A. Rice, U.S. representative on the Statistical Commission

of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, is attending the seventh session of the Commission, which convened at New York on February 2, 1953. Mr. Rice is assistant director in charge of statistical standards, Bureau of the Budget. He is being assisted by the following advisers:

Harry Venneman, Principal Adviser, Economist, Office of Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget
Maxwell R. Conklin, Chief, Industry Division, Bureau of the Census
J. Edward Ely, Chief, Foreign Trade Division, Bureau of the Census
Payton Stapp, Assistant Chief, Office of Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget

During the seventh session the participants will discuss a number of questions basic to the improvement of the international comparability of statistics, including the principles for statistics of external trade, definitions for industrial statistics, concepts and definitions of statistics, principles for a vital statistics system, a system of wholesale price statistics, and standards to be used in the development and reporting of national income statistics. A review will be made during this session of recommendations for the improvement of international migration statistics, a Secretariat paper on the development of various branches of social statistics, and the report of the Subcommittee on Statistical Sampling. Participants in the seventh session will also study a general survey of developments in national and international statistics, prepared in response to a request made by the Commission at its sixth session for an overall report on the status of international statistical activities, in connection with the assignment of priorities to the work programs of the Commission. Among other subjects referred to in the provisional agenda are balance-of-payments statistics, manual on money and banking statistics, censuses of distribution, construction statistics, living standards, transport statistics, customs areas, construction of price and quantity indices in national accounting, and insurance statistics.

Committee on Industry and Trade (ECAFE)

The Department of State announced on January 26 (press release 43) that at the fifth session of the Committee on Industry and Trade of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which will convene at Bandung, Indonesia, on January 26, the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation:

Chairman

Merrill C. Gay, Minister, Economic Adviser, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs

Advisers

Engene M. Braderman, Director, Far Eastern Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce
William W. Diehl, Financial Attaché, American Embassy, Tokyo

Howard L. Parsons, Economic Officer and Attaché, American Embassy, Bangkok
Rufus Burr Smith, Economic Counselor, American Embassy, Karachi

Secretary of Delegation

Frederick D. Hunt, Second Secretary and Consul, American Embassy, Djakarta

To be considered by the Committee at its forthcoming session are agenda items relating to activities in the field of mineral-resources development in the area; the present and potential volume of trade between the ECAFE countries and the countries of Europe; trade promotion activities of the Committee secretariat; and financial aspects of economic-development programming. The Committee will review reports on the electric-power resources and needs of the area; shortages of trained personnel which are handicapping certain fields of economic development; improved methods of using indigenous regional materials in housing and building; cottage and small-scale industries, particularly in textiles, and handicraft marketing; and the mobilization of domestic capital for the economic development of the region.

A detailed summary of the Committee's discussions of these matters, together with its recommendations for future activities in the field of industry and trade in the region, will be submitted to the ninth session of ECAFE, which is scheduled to convene in Bandung on February 6.

Transport and Communications Commission (ECOSOC)

The Department of State announced on February 2 (press release 61) that at the sixth session of the Transport and Communications Commission of the U.N. Economic and Social Council, which convened at New York on that date, George P. Baker, professor of transportation, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., will head the U.S. delegation in his capacity of U.S. representative on the Commission. He will be assisted by the following advisers:

Adviser

Henry H. Kelly, Chief, Inland Transport Policy Staff, Department of State

Ad Hoc Advisers

Herbert Ashton, Transport and Communications Division, Office of Transportation, Department of Commerce
Edmund H. Kellogg, Officer in Charge, U.N. Economic Affairs, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
Robert T. Merrill, Capt. U.S.C.G. (retired), Executive Secretary, Shipping Coordinating Committee, Department of State
Jerome Sachs, Chief, Insurance Staff, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

The Transport and Communications Commission assists the Economic and Social Council in all matters concerned with the international trans-

portation of goods and persons. At its forthcoming session, participants will consider items relating to the question of a uniform system of road signs and signals, the report of a U.N. Committee of Experts on Licensing of Motor Vehicle Drivers, and customs formalities for the temporary importation of private vehicles and for tourism. They will also review a report on various aspects of the transport of dangerous goods, especially those which are considered suitable for uniform international attention at this time: consider certain maritime matters, including the ratifications of the Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, the unification of maritime tonnage measurement, and the pollution of sea water by oil; and review a number of Secretariat reports on matters in the field of international transport and communications. The Commission will transmit to the Economic and Social Council a report containing a summary of the discussion on the various agenda items, a review of the Commission's past activities and accomplishments, the problems which are expected to continue in the future, and the texts of the resolutions adopted at this session of the Commission.

by the International Labor Office, covering (1) action taken in the various countries in the light of the conclusions of the previous sessions of the Committee; (2) steps taken by the Office to follow up the studies and inquiries proposed by the Committee; and (3) recent trends and developments in the textile industry.

THE DEPARTMENT

Confirmations

Walter B. Smith

The Senate on February 6 confirmed Walter Bedell Smith as Under Secretary of State.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

Winthrop W. Aldrich

The Senate on February 2 confirmed Winthrop W. Aldrich as Ambassador to Great Britain.

James B. Conant

The Senate on February 6 confirmed James B. Conant as U. S. High Commissioner for Germany.

Textiles Committee (ILO)

The Department of State announced on February 2 (press release 62) that the U.S. delegation at the fourth session of the Textiles Committee of the International Labor Organization (ILO), which meets at Geneva February 2-14, 1953, is as follows:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

Mrs. Mary Hilton, Chief, Research Division, Women's Bureau, Department of Labor, Washington, D. C.
A. Henry Thurston, Director, Textiles Division, National Production Authority, Washington, D. C.

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

William F. Sullivan, President, National Association of Cotton Manufacturers, Boston, Mass.
Edwin Wilkinson, Executive Vice President, National Association of Wool Manufacturers, New York, N. Y.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Louis Stulberg, Vice President, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, New York, N. Y.

Delegates at this session of the Textiles Committee will discuss special problems affecting the employment of women in the textile industry, including (a) recruitment, vocational training, and opportunities for the promotion of women in the textile industry; and (b) problems relating to equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value. Various aspects of the question of a guaranteed wage for workers in the textile industry will be considered. In addition, the delegates will review a general report, prepared

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Feb. 2-Feb. 7, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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†68	2/5	Unpaid claims against Cuba
69	2/6	Inter-American Economic, Social Council
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A Report to the Nation on European Unity

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

I returned this week from a trip to Europe in company with Mr. Stassen, the Director of our Mutual Security Agency.

We have reported to the President; I have met, and shall meet further, with congressional leaders. Now I wish to report to you.

You may wonder why, with so much to do at home, we went so quickly abroad. The reason was the tremendous importance to the United States of real unity in Europe and the fact that it seemed that some of our European friends might be changing their minds about moving to this goal.

The problem in simple terms is this:

Europe is made up of people who possess an essential unity. They have given a clear and special meaning to the concept of Western civilization. Yet Europe has remained politically divided. This has led to recurrent wars, which have involved us. It has so weakened the Western European countries that today no one of them could offer strong resistance to the Red armies.

This situation both distresses and endangers us. Europe is the cradle of our civilization, and its industrial power could cruelly hurt us if it were controlled by our enemies.

It has been clear for some time that the biggest single postwar task would be to end the disunity in Europe which makes for weakness and war.

As the Second World War blazed up, I wrote "Continental Europe has been the world's greatest fire hazard. The whole structure is now consumed in flames. When the time comes to rebuild, we should not reproduce a demonstrated fire-trap."

¹Delivered to the Nation over radio and television networks on Feb. 12 and released to the press (No. 87) on the same date. Also printed as Department of State publication 4938.

Today we and the free peoples of Europe are all face to face with that very problem. Shall a demonstrated fire-trap be rebuilt? Or cannot the wit of man devise something better?

When the first program of interim aid to Europe was before the Senate in 1947, I urged, before the Foreign Relations Committee, that in granting European aid "the basic idea should be, not the rebuilding of the prewar Europe, but the building of a new Europe, which, more unified, will be a better Europe." That point of view was emphatically adopted by Congress. It was written into the policy declaration of the Marshall Plan act and into our military assistance acts, and that concept underlay the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the stationing of United States troops in Europe. None of these measures was looked upon as in itself adequate to defend Europe. But these steps, together with the creation of a unified continental Europe, would produce a strength which could deter aggression.

These are the ideas that enlightened European leaders themselves put forth. We have not been trying to impress an American scheme on Europe but to support the plans of the European leaders themselves.

What Europe Has Already Accomplished

They have already done much. As an outstanding example, they have created, under what is called the Schuman Plan, a single political authority to deal with the coal and iron resources of Germany, France, and the adjacent states. Last Sunday Mr. Stassen and I saw that authority first go into practical operation at its capital at Luxembourg.

Our European friends also tackled the vital problem of military unity. Last May the six continental countries of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a treaty to create a European Defense Community. Under that treaty each of the six countries would give up having a separate national army on the Continent and would join in building there a single European army. It was contemplated that the treaties could be promptly ratified, so that the plan could be made operative in 6 months.

We in the United States were delighted that our European friends had taken this bold step toward making Europe strong and vigorous in its own right. However, the 6 months from last May went by without any effective steps to ratify, and the 6 months has now been prolonged to 9 months. This has been somewhat disconcerting to us, because the plans for our own security are based on the assumption that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which does not include Germany, would be bolstered by the European Defense Community, which would draw on German military strength to create a solid continental European military establishment.

U.S. Contributions

During the past 7 years we have contributed about 30 billion dollars to Europe. We have tens of thousands of our armed forces in Europe. We have made the effort because the security of Europe vitally affects our own security. But our effort will not permanently serve Europe or ourselves or humanity unless it fits into a constructive program for European unity. Nothing that the United States can do will ever be enough to make Europe safe if it is divided into rival national camps.

President Eisenhower himself said recently that he was impressed with the "feebleness" of alternatives to the European Defense Community.

It was to discuss all of these problems that President Eisenhower asked Mr. Stassen and me to go to Europe. We went to seven European capitals—first Rome, then Paris, then London, then Bonn, then The Hague, then Brussels, and then Luxembourg. Our conclusion was that the project for a European Defense Community was not dead but only sleeping. We did not get any concrete promises or pledges from our European friends, and we did not give any. We did come

back with the feeling that there is a good chance that the European Defense Community will be brought into being. There are plenty of hurdles to be overcome. But we believe that there is a will to proceed. We hope that in the coming weeks this determination will be translated into concrete evidence that real progress is being made. Without that, future planning will be difficult. Candor requires us to say this.

NATO is now a far-flung organization. It includes not only countries in this hemisphere but in the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. But the core of this far-flung structure is the six continental countries of Western Europe, which have made the European Defense Community treaty. Unless their military and economic strength is to be combined, as this treaty contemplates, the whole NATO organization has a fatal weakness. The European Defense Community is needed to give the North Atlantic Treaty Organization a stout and dependable heart.

I do not pretend that it is easy to accomplish this. National habits of thought and traditions have grown strong. The countries concerned have often in recent years been enemies. They have fought each other, and there are proud memories of victories and the bitter memories of defeat. This means that greatness is needed if unity is to be achieved. That quality, however, is not lacking. We saw it in fact in the peoples of Europe as they had to face the physical disaster of the recent floods. We also found among the statesmen of Western Europe, and so far as we could judge among the peoples of Western Europe, a real determination to take the hard political decisions which would bury the evil of the past and fortify the good.

After our friendly talks, we know, and gladly report, that the political leaders in each of these countries are men of vision and stature. They look not backward but forward. They see the land of promise that lies ahead and they desire to move into it.

Having spent most of my time in talking about what we hope the European countries will do, I would like to conclude with a mention of what the governments and peoples of Europe expect of us.

Our friends in Western Europe knew, when General Eisenhower was with them in Europe, how deep and firm was his interest in European unity—political, economic, and military. On this trip we

U. S. Voices Strong Support For European Defense Community

Statement by Secretary Dulles¹

Press release 76 dated February 9

Mr. Stassen and I have just returned from a visit to Italy, France, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In each of these countries we were welcomed with warm hospitality. We had friendly and comprehensive discussions with the national leaders of these seven nations, with the civilian and military representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. At Luxembourg we met with the newly organized European Coal and Steel Community, which is a first step in European integration.

While in Europe we discussed many matters, but the most discussed topic was the proposed European Defense Community. This project originated in Europe itself. It would combine in a single force the military potentials of six European countries, including France and Germany, which form the heart of continental Europe. It would create unification where, in the past, divisions have been disastrous. This unified continental force would in turn form part of the collective system of security which is being developed within the framework of the North Atlantic community, and which includes not only other continental European countries, of which the most recent additions are Greece and Turkey, but also Great Britain, Canada, and the United States.

A treaty to bring the European Defense Community into being was signed last May, but thus far the treaty has not been ratified by any of the signatories.

The United States has strongly supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the faith that the nations forming the core of continental Europe would themselves provide the basic foundations of their own security. The European Defense Community was the method by which these continental European nations themselves decided to achieve this essential goal. It was designed, among other things, to make Germany's economic and military potential available, and this is indispensable to an effective continental defense, but to do so in terms of an integrated European defensive force that could never be used for national aggrandizement.

President Eisenhower asked us to visit Europe to talk with its leaders about common problems and, particularly, to ascertain the likelihood of

¹ Made on Feb. 9 upon his arrival at Washington National Airport from a survey trip to Western Europe. Secretary Dulles was accompanied on the European trip, which was undertaken at the request of President Eisenhower, by Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security.

were able to assure them that President Eisenhower continues to hold the same interest, the same conviction, with regard to European unity.

In each of these seven countries we visited we found good will and friendliness on the part of the governments and most of the people, but we also found some fear that the United States is not qualified to give the free world the kind of leadership which it needs at this critical moment. It is conceded that we have the material power, but it is questioned whether we have the accumulated wisdom to make the best use of that power. They are particularly concerned because they now have to deal with a new Republican administration, after having worked for 20 years in war and peace with a Democrat administration. To them, as to many Americans, a Republican administration is a novelty, and the unknown always carries a certain amount of fear.

The talks which we had with the political leaders of the countries we visited went far, I think, to dispel these fears insofar as official quarters are concerned. However, the public and the opposition parties seize upon incidents and upon statements made here which seem to them to be reckless. Unscrupulous persons use such incidents and statements as reasons why the European nations should not trust us.

It is important for us all to remember that we do carry a tremendous responsibility. Any false step could mean disaster not only for us but for our friends. Possibly our friends would suffer even more than we ourselves. Therefore, we must be sober and restrained in our national conduct.

That does not mean being timid and afraid to take the initiative, to speak frankly or to make hard decisions. Indecision, weakness, and vacillation are the qualities which most often lead to war. It does mean that in order to win and hold the confidence of those whom we need as friends and allies, we must at all times play the part of a Nation which is fully aware of the grave responsibility which it carries.

That is the kind of leadership we shall get from President Eisenhower, who is accustomed to carry heavy responsibilities and calmly make grave decisions. We shall do well to follow the example which he will set. At this dangerous time peace and security depend upon clear vision, righteous purpose, and firm performance. Let us all work together to achieve these goals.

bringing the European Defense Community into being. This knowledge is important for us, because we cannot shape wisely our own programs without knowing what are the intentions of our European friends.

Mr. Stassen and I shall report to the President and to Members of the Congress. At the moment we limit ourselves to saying that we are, on the whole, encouraged by what we have been told by the leaders of the six continental European nations which have signed the treaty to create a European Defense Community. We do not minimize the difficulties confronted by those who have undertaken this great project, but we believe that there is a responsible determination to bring the project to completion.

There were other matters which occupied our attention while we were in Europe. A great tragedy

occurred in the flooding of large parts of Holland, Belgium, and Britain. We inspected some of the devastated areas and were impressed by the magnitude of the disaster and the courage with which the governments and peoples directly concerned were acting to surmount the disaster. As members of the committee appointed by the President to study the question of American cooperation to mitigate the disaster, we shall promptly confer with the President and with the other members of the committee—the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Agriculture—with a view to making recommendations as to how we may best assist our friends and allies in their plight. The response of the American people to this tragedy has made evident once again that they are concerned, not merely with the matters of military defense, but with relief of human suffering.

Observations on NATO's Progress

by Ambassador Frederick L. Anderson

Deputy U.S. Special Representative in Europe¹

The first thing I would like to say is that, in my opinion, the Atlantic alliance is in much sounder shape than I would think if I read only the newspapers. According to many press reports in this country, one would think that the defense build-up is a failure and the Atlantic alliance is on the verge of dissolution. This is of course not the case. It is true that the goals set a year ago in Lisbon for the defense build-up have not been fully attained.² It is true that it has been decided to concentrate in 1953 somewhat more on quality—that is, on the full equipment and training, up to very high standards, of the divisions activated at the end of 1952 plus a small increase by the end of the end of 1953—rather than upon less good training and equipment for a substantially larger number. It is true that it was decided by the North Atlantic Council in December to slow down somewhat the rate at which we pro-

ceed with building common NATO facilities such as airfields, communications, and so forth. But to draw from this the conclusions that the military build-up is a failure and that the Atlantic alliance is weakening is unwarranted. Economic expansion in Europe slowed down in 1952 to the point where previously set goals in a number of countries could not have been achieved without increased sacrifices that would have had grave consequences in terms of political and social stability. By common agreement, therefore, downward adjustments have had to be made.

But I see no justification for gloom. If the NATO countries were unable to adjust their programs according to political and economic realities, we would be in a strait-jacket indeed. We would fall into one of the traps that Stalin and company hope we will fall into—namely, that we will wreck ourselves on the rocks of economic and social reality and fall into discord, confusion, and disaster. This does not mean of course that we can afford to fall into the other trap, the trap of military weakness. The NATO military build-up must go on, is going on, and will go on. I can-

¹Address made before the American Council on NATO at New York City on Feb. 10 (press release 78).

²For documents on the North Atlantic Council meetings at Lisbon and at Paris in 1952, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1952, p. 367, and Jan. 5, 1953, p. 3.

not say that I am completely happy about it or that anybody is. But I think I would begin to get very uneasy if any of us ever got complacent as far as security is concerned and satisfied with our defenses. That I would consider a dangerous state indeed.

Building NATO Defenses

I can report that I am completely satisfied with the spirit with which all are approaching the problem of building common NATO defenses. And in my opinion it is the spirit of unity in the West. The practice of unity, the continued building of institutions of unity, that is deterring the Russians from attack—and will deter them in the future—more than any particular state of armed preparedness we are able to reach at any given time. There are serious problems to be solved in each NATO country in connection with the NATO build-up. But I can assure you that they are being met with confidence, determination, and above all, in a spirit of NATO solidarity.

I am amazed at the marked difference that I often find between the tone and character of our official and informal communications with our NATO colleagues, and what I read of them in the papers.

What we are actually engaged in is an exercise in international budget-making for military purposes. And as you well know, nobody is ever very happy when budgets are made. Multiply the difficulties encountered in arriving at a national military budget by 14 and you begin to see the problem of arriving at a common NATO military program. It is natural to have a certain amount of national undercutting, to try to get other nations to carry a larger share of the burden. It is also normal to have military experts say that the resulting program is not adequate for defense, and it usually isn't. But out of all the democratic process of international budget-making, especially if it takes place in a spirit of cooperation and good will, comes a program that isn't too bad.

Our Atlantic association is truly something new under the sun, as you will realize if you try to find a precedent for it in time of peace. We look into each other's financial affairs. We look into each other's affairs of all kinds. We complain—all of us. We prod. But out of it all is growing a spirit and a practice and a structure of unity, in the building of which all of us can be proud to have a small part.

Let us consider now for a moment the progress that is being made on the continent of Europe toward building a close organic unity. There were overwhelming reasons, even before the appearance of the present threat, why the peoples of continental Europe should unite. Nationalistic wars and nationalistic economic policies had already resulted in such impoverishment and disaster that Europe was ready for a change. During the

Establishment of American Council on NATO

Press release 79 dated February 10

Following is the text of a message sent by Secretary Dulles to the American Council on NATO in New York on February 10:

I have learned with pleasure of the establishment of the American Council on NATO for the purpose of coordinating the activities of American private organizations and educational institutions, in a program of information designed to increase the knowledge and secure the support of the American public for NATO's objectives.

NATO is vitally important for the security of the United States and the other free countries of the North Atlantic Community and for the peace of the world. It is equally important that our citizens appreciate the stake each of us has in accomplishing the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. For this reason, I am glad to convey to you my best wishes for the success of your endeavor.

long and horrible night of World War II, the people of Europe were pondering the senselessness of war. And during that night was born a grim determination that nationalist aggression in Europe, and especially German aggression, must never happen again, that Europe must be so reorganized as to make it impossible.

With Germany under Allied occupation it was possible for several years following the War to avoid facing up to the problem of how and when this was to be done. And then arose the threat of Soviet aggression against the whole of Western Europe, Germany included. But how admit Germany's rearmament and industrial revival without subjecting Europe once more to the danger of German militarism? There was only one politically feasible answer and European statesmen gave it: Organic unity, with armies and economies and political authorities in Western Europe so merged as to make aggressive war by any European country against another impossible, but so merged also as to make possible the efficient building of common defenses against the threat from the East.

European Unity and the Atlantic Community

However, if you examine closely the record of the past 6 years you find that the movement toward unity in Europe had its genesis in the context of Atlantic association, and that its growth and development have been dependent upon and intertwined with the development of the Atlantic community. European leaders have recognized from the first that institutional unity on the continent of Europe could only be achieved, and could only be successful, as an integral part of the Atlantic community. For it was clear, and is still clear, that continental Europe, no matter how or-

ganized, cannot solve major problems of defense and economic viability except as part of an Atlantic community embracing also Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.

On the other hand, you will recall that the Atlantic pact is a direct descendant of the Brussels pact, and that action of the North Atlantic Council in 1950 led to the Pleven Plan for a European army as part of a NATO defense force. You also know that as the actual work of building an effective NATO defense has gone along, it has become increasingly clear that successful military, political, and economic defense of the Atlantic community requires organic unity in the heart of continental Europe.

There should not be, there must not be, any illusions that European unity can in some way be a substitute for Atlantic unity. If there are people in the United States who are promoting European unity on the assumption that a new and larger European entity can then provide for the security and economic well-being of Europe without any further responsibility on our part, then I can say that they are promoting the same kind of disaster that led to World War I and World War II. I can say the same thing about any in Europe who seek European unity in the hope that a new continental grouping can follow a neutralist course in Europe, independent of the United States and Great Britain.

No, the developing organic structure of European unity has meaning, has possibility, and offers real hope for the future only as part of a developing Atlantic community. And in this connection I might say that this only adds a powerful argument in favor of pushing ahead with Atlantic cooperation—political, economic, and military. Otherwise, we run the danger of being victims of the illusions to which I have already referred.

The European Coal and Steel Community is already a fact. Its executive and its assembly are already in operation; a common market for coal embracing the six member countries is expected to go into operation today, and that for steel will follow this spring.

The drafting of a treaty for a European political community has made substantial progress and the work is progressing.

EDC Prospects Brighter

The great problem that is immediately in front of the countries comprising the community of six is the ratification of the treaty providing for a European Defense Community (EDC). Notwithstanding the flood of press reports to the contrary, I would say that the prospects for the ratification of the EDC treaty appear brighter than they did last fall. It is not logical to suppose that such a revolutionary proposal as the giving up of national sovereignty over armed forces would sail through the ratification process in the countries concerned without a period of stop, look, and listen, without

full debate, without some voices being raised in opposition, without the rallying of political forces in support. Last fall, the EDC treaty was more or less wrapped in felt and kept on one side. Today it is out in the open. And the usual fireworks surrounding any major change in foreign policy, much less one so far reaching in character as this are taking place.

I base my confidence in the ratification of the EDC on three points. One is that there is no politically acceptable alternative to it in Europe. Second, I detect no lessening of determination among the leaders of the countries concerned to bring about ratification. And third, I can detect no lessening of popular support on the continent of Europe for the EDC treaty. Certainly there is criticism. Certainly there are attempts to clarify the treaty through additional protocols. But there is little ground for believing that the treaty will not be ratified. I say this in the knowledge that there may be juridical obstacles to overcome. But I believe that where there is government will, and popular will, such difficulties of this nature as may arise *will* be overcome.

Now, I must say some things that may seem to be at variance with my optimism on NATO progress and EDC prospects. But I think you will find that there is no real contradiction.

In my opinion, we have entered a period that is difficult and potentially very dangerous to the Atlantic alliance and to the future peace of the world. There are several reasons why I feel this to be true.

The first is that, while the danger from the East has not diminished, the more obvious pressures on the West for sacrifice and bold action have lessened.

Free and self-governing peoples have demonstrated many times in history that when faced with a powerful and immediate danger they are able to unite, make enormous sacrifices, and thus save themselves. But there is no precedent in history, as far as I know, for self-governing peoples uniting, maintaining a high level of armaments, and erecting common economic and political defenses in time of peace when danger seems a few steps removed.

The Soviet Union can choose its strategy. It can unleash an all-out war at any time, and we must be prepared to counter it. Or it can play a long waiting game such as that outlined by Stalin in his Bolshevik article last fall. Stalin believes that over a period of years the Soviet Union, compact geographically, self-sufficient economically, and with a dictatorial government, will grow economically and militarily stronger while the free countries of the West, disunited, luxury-loving, will either grow weaker or not grow strong as fast as the Soviet Union so that in the end we might be taken over without much trouble. But of course he would take advantage of weakness to start a war at any time. We on our side are there-

fore forced to build against both contingencies: We must build defenses adequate to deter or repel an all-out attack from the Kremlin. And we must also do all the things necessary to maintain our margin of economic and political strength over a long period of years. If we are not able to do so, then I think that we are in danger, sooner or later, of being attacked.

The NATO countries are much stronger militarily than they were 2 years ago. Yet we have already seen how minor reductions in the imminence of danger have lead to mounting political pressures for reductions in defense expenditures. Stalin's article and the speech at the Moscow conference made it clear that the Soviets may very well choose to use the longer-range strategy. And this has already resulted in a noticeable lessening of willingness in the West to make sacrifices. We have not slipped very far as yet in actual performance, but my opinion is that we are in danger of doing so in the period ahead. That would be very serious indeed. For as Mr. Churchill said in the House of Commons recently:

When we see that the risk of a general war seems to have receded it is because we ourselves have grown stronger and more united. If we were to weaken we would lose all we have gained.

Economic Problems

A second reason why the present period is a critical one for the unity of the West is that we have not yet taken decisive steps to solve on a permanent and businesslike basis the grave economic problems that confront us. I only need mention Europe's persistent dollar shortage, the inconvertibility of many currencies; the slow-down in Europe's economic expansion during the last year; the need of the underdeveloped countries of the world for a great expansion of capital development; the need, as outlined by the Paley Report, for a great increase in raw materials production throughout the world.

It is easy to point out the problems. It is much less easy to find politically acceptable solutions to the many and complex things that have to be done in the economic realm to pull Europe together, to pull the Atlantic community together, to pull the free world together. And yet, solutions must be found. The question is, will we act fast enough, and with enough boldness, if the immediate danger of Soviet aggression is removed.

Politically and morally we are also at a turning point. Stalin has said very clearly that Soviet propaganda and Soviet political strategy and Soviet economic warfare, which already work night and day, will work even harder to promote disunity among the free world and especially among the leading countries of the NATO alliance. We all agree upon the central importance of unity and yet I am personally convinced that

unity must be built around institutions and fast-moving projects that attract the conscious loyalty and sacrifice of peoples. I believe that in the matter of organization we have reached a point that is somewhat static, and this to my mind is not a healthy condition. I believe that unless we move forward with projects of unity, we will slip backwards and fall into the Soviet trap.

The fact that the problems of which I have been speaking are unresolved is responsible, in my opinion, for most of the tension and unrest visible in relations between members of the Atlantic alliance. I don't think these tensions are at all deep or serious. But people want to know when we are going to move ahead, where we are going, and who is going to do what next.

You can see by now why I believe that the work of you who are gathered here is of such central importance. Democratic governments simply cannot, in my opinion, move ahead with the speed and boldness necessary to solve the problems before us unless they are strongly supported by public opinion. The freedom, the democratic self-government, and the national mores of the West are our glory; but at a time when we are subject to a concentrated attack by the monolithic dictatorship of the East, these are also a handicap. They are a handicap which I think we can overcome. But we are going to have to make a vast and a conscious effort if we overcome it.

The people in our democracies are going to have to be kept, as a result of conscious effort, in a state of informed alertness. They must fully appreciate, and never be allowed to forget, the character and wide dimensions of the danger that confronts us. They must be continuously informed of the many and complex things that have to be done if we of the West are to maintain in the years ahead our margin of strength over that of the Soviet bloc. Public loyalty must be attracted to grand designs of unity; but these grand designs must also be broken down in people's thinking into the many grubby things that have to be done and individual sacrifices that have to be made, if the world is to avoid an atomic war. People must be willing to do more than die for their freedom; they must be willing to support such uninteresting and unattractive things as taxation, tariff reductions, investment guarantees and the like, and to understand the relation of these and a host of other minor sacrifices and solutions to the grand design for peace and security.

There is therefore no more important work in the world than that upon which you are embarking. It will be hard work. It will yield few startling successes and few major satisfactions. But it is work that has to be done. I therefore salute you, I congratulate you, and I fervently wish you success. We will do all that is possible to work closely with you toward the attainment of our common objectives.

Postwar Development of the German Press

by Richard Straus

Today, 8 years after the defeat of Nazi Germany, a substantial number of West German newspapers are doing an honest job of reporting facts to the people. Their performance may seem commonplace enough to Americans, but it is by no means commonplace in Germany—or in many other countries of the world. Except for the brief span of the Weimar Republic, the German press has traditionally and habitually been under the control of church, state, or party. Accordingly, the German people, until recently, have had very limited acquaintance with objective reporting.

The achievements of the postwar German press are particularly significant because they follow a period in which the German newspapers served as a puppet to Hitler's "Minister of Popular Enlightenment" and spoke only with the voice of Dr. Goebbels. After Hitler's defeat in 1945, there was an interval of a few months when there was no German press at all. Then the new press was born. It underwent a period of incubation during which its climate of development, its scope of operations, and the identity of its editors and publishers were determined by the military occupation authorities of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. The method used to develop a democratic press for Germany was extraordinary, but at the time and under the circumstances it was the only feasible one.

The fact that the German Federal Republic has many newspapers performing the primary function of a democratic press means a great deal. So, too, does the fact that it has some outstandingly courageous editors and publishers who are determined to preserve the present freedom of the press. These men are vigilant to forestall legislative attempts to limit that freedom. They need to be, for they are in conflict with a long-lived tradition of authoritarian control.

State and federal officials are not unanimously in favor of a free press. Some of them resent the quickness of the democratic press to expose incom-

petence or corruption in high places. Certain official fingers twitch with eagerness to seize control. Party leaders, bred in the tradition of rigid party discipline, make intermittent attempts to coerce independent editors into making editorial policy dovetail with party policy. Also, the new German press encounters in the people much apathy, cynicism, and ignorance about current issues.

The Press Under the Nazis

In 1932, the final year of the Weimar Republic, the National Socialist Party press consisted of only 120 of Germany's 976 political papers and claimed no more than 3,000,000 of the country's 19,000,000 circulation. It had developed unsystematically and spoke with a variety of voices. Goebbels, who had been too busy training young orators for the Party to give much attention to the press, wrote: "We have the best orators in the world but our press is our 'problem child.'" Machinery for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the party press had been lacking. Creation of the Party Propaganda Department with Goebbels as its chief provided that machinery.

Max Amann became Party Press Director in charge of press business management. Since 1921, Amann had been business manager of the party and also of Hitler's principal propaganda organ and source of income, the Munich *Völkischer Beobachter* with its vast Eher Publishing House. Otto Dietrich, a journalist in his own right and Hitler's publicity director, became Party Press Chief, responsible for policy and content of the newspapers. Under their tutelage, the party press quickly became a well-disciplined child.

Authority to control the non-party press was lacking until 1933, when the Nazis came into power. Just before the Reich elections of March 1933, Hitler and Papen obtained Hindenburg's signature on a decree that stated: "Restrictions on

personal liberty and on freedom of speech and of the press are permissible beyond the limitations placed upon them by law." A week after the elections, Hitler persuaded Hindenburg to sign a decree making Goebbels a member of the Government and establishing the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda—with Goebbels in charge.

The new Ministry took over a number of powers that had been the prerogative of other ministries during the Republic. Certain of these powers were helpful in establishing control of the press; from the Ministry of Economics, the Propaganda Ministry acquired its authority over all commercial advertising activities of the State, and from the Ministry of the Interior its supervisory powers over press and radio and also the censorship function.

Party Press Chief Dietrich became Under Secretary of State in the Propaganda Ministry, with responsibility for guiding editors politically, a function carried out by means of daily directives that had the force of law. He not only told the non-party newspapers what they should print but also provided them with the approved phraseology for use in sensitive situations.

In September 1933 the Reich Press Chamber was established with Party Press Director Amann as its president. It was Amann's job to exert economic pressures on such elements of the non-party press as the Propaganda Ministry wished to eliminate. He had the power to issue orders to the press and the orders had the effect of laws. Hitler's Editorial Law of 1933 reduced the publisher to a figurehead obliged to take his editorial policy ready-made from the State; it compelled him to pay editors whom he could neither hire nor fire and to obey all directions filtering down from Dr. Goebbels. The party had in truth become the State, and publishers who diverged from the party line quickly disappeared from the scene.

The Problem Facing the Victors

In 1945 occupation officials understandably regarded with deep suspicion all publishers and editors who had been active for any considerable period during the Nazi regime. They were scarcely the material needed for the development of an independent press that could be trusted to serve the best interests of the German people.

First, Military Government officials had to get rid of the puppet press of the Nazis. Then they had to create a new press. To accomplish the first step, SHAEF¹ issued a pre-surrender directive on November 24, 1944, suspending all German information media. On May 12, 1945, SHAEF paved the way for establishing a new press by amending

¹Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. For texts of the 1944 directive and the 1945 amendment, see *Germany 1947-1949—The Story in Documents*, Department of State publication 3556, p. 594.

the directive to provide for a licensing system operated by Military Government. Licensing appeared to be the only practicable way of keeping Nazis and Nazi collaborators out of publishing until a hand-picked fledgling press could gain experience in democratic practices and build up a substantial circulation.

To bridge the gap between the press suspension and establishment of the licensing system, OMGUS² published 10 German-language newspapers in the American zone and in the American sector of Berlin. With one exception, these Army-sponsored papers ceased publication as soon as licensed German papers could replace them. The exception was *Die Neue Zeitung*, which has been continued under the High Commission until the present time as an example of American journalism and as an instrument for explaining American policies.

Starting the New Press

Only individuals with records showing opposition to the Nazis qualified to man the new press. But prewar publishers and editors who had opposed the Nazis had long since lost their plants, machinery, and capital. The plants and machinery of publishing belonged to Nazis or to men who had found it comfortable and profitable to cooperate with them. To resolve the impasse, OMGUS required ineligible owners of plants and equipment to lease them to the eligible at the very low figure recommended by the Military Government.

Besides low-cost mandatory leases, OMGUS had to devise other ways of helping the approved but impoverished newspaper establishments. With its first authorization of a license—to the *Frankfurter Rundschau* in July 1945—OMGUS imposed a license fee of 20 percent of gross newspaper receipts. By January 1, 1948, when the fees were discontinued, a fund of more than 48 million reichsmarks had been built up. Early in 1948 OMGUS established a press cooperative bank, the *Wirtschaftliche Genossenschaft der Presse* (Wigo), with a grant of RM 36 million from this fund and authorized the bank to make low-interest loans to the licensed newspapers and agencies of the American zone. The balance of RM 12 million was distributed equitably among the 48 newspapers then operating in the zone. The object was to help them finance improvements and buy available essential equipment.

The Golden-Cage Period

Although the publisher of a licensed paper was shielded from many of the problems and hardships that normally plague an independent publisher who is up against keen competition, he had to toe a clearly marked line drawn by OMGUS to retain his advantages, including his license to

²Office of Military Government, United States.

operate.³ During the first 3 years of licensing, controls were numerous and rigid, with some variation from zone to zone. In the area of American control, applicants for licenses were carefully screened, and their selection of editors and reporters was subject to the approval of OMGUS. Both American and French authorities opposed party newspapers and during the licensing period reduced them to the status of brief information bulletins. The British, on the contrary, favored party newspapers, on the principle that political parties have a right to make their views known. The French appointed editors for the papers in their zone and also assigned a French official to each paper to supervise the German staff. The British censored copy in advance of publication but did not post a supervisor in each office. The Americans limited themselves to post-publication examination of the newspapers and close liaison with the editors.

The acute shortage of paper necessitated control of both production and distribution, and a ceiling on the number of licensed newspapers. As long as the press avoided belittling criticism of the Military Government and democratic processes, adopted certain journalistic procedures that had become standard practice in democratic countries, and kept the physical size of editions and the advertising within prescribed bounds, it could depend upon receiving a quarterly ration of paper.

Paradoxically, the paper shortage helped the licensed press to build up circulation at the same time that military control of distribution enabled the publishers to escape the worry of cut-throat competition for paper. The licensed publishers had what amounted to a monopoly on the only form of paper available to the German people. Paper bags, wrapping paper, and toilet paper were not to be had. The inflated reichsmarks bought less and less food and clothing but they were good for the purchase of newspapers, and newspapers had many uses that had nothing to do with reading.

In screening editors and publishers, OMGUS placed primary emphasis upon a record of opposition to nazism. Professional qualifications came second. The majority of those licensed had been out of the publishing business since 1933. Many had endured great hardship in concentration camps or at forced labor. Few retained their prewar vigor. Some of the younger men who qualified on the basis of their anti-Nazi records had unimpaired vitality but lacked experience in the newspaper field.

The average age of 113 licensed publishers and editors of the American zone was 49. Owing to wartime and postwar shifts in population, only 50 percent of the newspaper operators were native to the *Land*, or state, where they published. In Bavaria, stronghold of German Catholicism, the

editors were predominantly Catholic. In Hesse, most of the editors had broken away from all church affiliations, and some had turned Marxist. In Wuerttemberg-Baden, about half the editors were protestants, half Catholics. Only 43 of the 113 were university graduates; 11 had passed the *Abitur*, or qualifying examination, but had not attended a university; 22 had had only elementary school education and had taken up writing in the course of socialist activity. About 25 percent had no previous newspaper experience whatsoever.

Portents of Release

On June 18, 1948, the Western Powers invalidated the inflated reichsmark in their zones and introduced the *deutschemark*, or D-Mark, at a ratio of one of the new for ten of the old. In July paper went on the free list and Military Government stopped rationing paper among the licensed publishers. These two events made important changes in the status of the licensed press.

The publishers now had more freedom of decision but less freedom from responsibility. They could determine their edition size and frequency of issue; they could apportion space to advertising as they saw fit and introduce new features or projects without OMGUS permission. But they also had to assume new responsibilities and face problems that had not previously concerned them. For instance, they had to compete in the open market for paper. Furthermore, the new currency was scarce and people thought twice before spending it. With paper available in other forms, newspapers were once more just something to be read. People became aware and somewhat critical of content. It dawned on the publishers that reader interest was a key factor in maintaining circulation. By no means all of them were confident of their ability to create it.

In the fall of 1948, 19 of the licensed editors and publishers came to the United States for a 6-week seminar of the American Press Institute at Columbia University. This group was the first of many to benefit by the postwar exchange program. The experience helped; so did the assistance given by visiting American journalists in Germany. Nevertheless, the way ahead was uncertain.

The wind of freedom blew a bit chilly around the German press. When word passed that licensing soon would end and with it the protection from heavy competition with the legal owner of his leased press, many a licensed publisher retreated to the far side of his golden cage and tried to latch the door after him.

The End of Licensing

Shortly after the removal of controls on newspaper, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, American Military Governor, decided to end licensing. The cold war,

³ For texts of OMGUS instructions to licensees issued in 1946 and 1947, see *ibid.*, pp. 596-600.

the realization of the link between German economic recovery and European recovery, the functioning of democratic procedures in the *Laender* governments, and the plans for establishing the German Federal Republic, all contributed to hastening the transfer of responsibilities from Military Government to the Germans.

The occupation authorities had helped set up the democratic machinery, but it was the Germans themselves who had to operate it and make it work. A free press was essential to the democratic operation of the new Germany. The time had come to open the field to all comers and see how the sheltered licensed press would make out on its own. On September 30, 1948, General Clay informed his *Land* officers that licensing would end as soon as the *Laender* enacted legislation to protect the freedom of the press.⁴

Some of the officials of Military Government shared the misgivings of the licensed publishers about the outcome of this move. Both groups feared a return of the old type of nationalistic paper; both feared that Nazi owners would get back their plants and crowd the licensed publishers out of business. The publishers also feared encroachment by the Government.

Military Government provided the Minister-President of each *Land* in the American zone with an explicit statement of what legislation designed to guarantee the freedom of the press should contain. It should:

- a. . . . implement the general guarantees of the free press as expressed in *Land* constitutions and exclude the institution of any system of special licensing not required of all other business enterprises.
- b. . . . protect the press from governmental domination or domination by special interests.
- c. . . . guarantee the prerogatives of a free press in obtaining and publishing information of public interest.
- d. . . . guarantee that there be no arbitrary interference by the police or other administrative bodies in the free flow and dissemination of news and printed matter.
- e. . . . specifically exclude the revival of honor courts, press chambers, or other forms of organized press control exercised by the Nazi regime.
- f. . . . prohibit censorship or control of the content of news and published material except through legal process in the event of a violation of existing laws regarding libel, defamation, fraud, indecency or breach of the peace.

It took longer to obtain "adequate" legislation than the American authorities anticipated. The first reaction to the request for legislation to insure a free press was a resolution passed by the Bavarian Landtag in October 1948 urging transfer of licensing power from Military Government to German authorities. In fact, the initial idea of all the *Laender* Governments was to rewrite the old Press Law of 1874 with new touches that aimed at restricting the freedom of the press.

Passage of the Press Law of 1874 had been the first move made by any German Government toward freedom of the press, but it wasn't much of

a move. The law abolished censorship and provided that "freedom of the press is subject only to the limitations set forth or admitted in the present law." But what it gave in one statement, it took away in some subsequent clause. It allowed the Chancellor to keep out of journalism anybody he saw fit to exclude. Although it provided severe penalties for printing slanderous, obscene, or treasonable matter, inciting to riot, or revealing troop movements in time of war, it afforded no protection against police measures. Since police needed no court order to seize a newspaper and since there was no provision for recovery of damages against overzealous police officials, it was easy to harry a newspaper out of business.

Bismarck used the Press Law to suppress the entire Social Democrat press in 1878, after two Socialists had attempted to assassinate Emperor William I. It was not until 1890, when the 1878 Law Against Socialists was repealed, that a modicum of freedom returned to the German press. The Weimar Republic had retained the Press Law of 1874 but had rendered it harmless by means of an impressive constitutional listing of civil rights. Outmoded and restrictive, it had been pretty well forgotten when the *Laender* resurrected it in 1948 and 1949.

Actually, the first drafts of the press laws presented by the several legislatures were a shot in the arm to the licensed press. Editors and publishers stopped brooding about the hazards of competition and began a battle for adequate laws.

Editors quickly detected—and sharply denounced—dangerous loopholes, ambiguities, and subterfuges in the various drafts presented. The legislatures were loathe to give up provisions for severe penalties for press attacks against government officials, but gradually and reluctantly they crossed out the most offensive clauses. Wuerttemberg-Baden was the first *Land* to enact a press law that passed muster with OMGUS, March 24, 1949. Bremen was last to have licensing controls lifted; its press law was approved on September 5, 1949.⁵

OMGUS had safeguarded its own interests and those of the Occupation troops with its General License No. 3, of May 2, 1949, continuing in force an earlier regulation forbidding information activity which:⁶

- a. Incites to riot or resistance to Military Government, jeopardizes the occupying troops, or otherwise endangers military security;
- b. Propagates former National Socialist or related "voelkisch" ideas, such as racism and race hatred, or propagates any fascist or anti-democratic ideas, or any militarist ideas, or pan-Germanism or German imperialism;
- c. Constitutes a malicious attack upon policies or personnel of Military Government, aims to disrupt unity among the Allies, or seeks to evoke the distrust and

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 601-602.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 601, 599.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 600.

nostility of the German people against any Occupying Power;

d. Appeals to Germans to take action against democratic measures undertaken by Military Government.

The New Freedom

Just after licensing ended, Military Government gave way to the civilian administration of occupied Germany. The Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (Hicog) inherited a burgeoning crop of problems associated with the sudden opening of the press to all comers and the need to protect the protégées of the licensing system from too rough competition with the protégées of the late Nazi system.

From the moment licensing ended, newspapers multiplied at an astounding rate. In Bavaria alone, 25 new papers appeared the day that licensing was discontinued, and the first week brought more than a hundred. By October 1949, 650 new papers had appeared in the four *Laender* of the American zone. The vast majority were insignificant county or local sheets that depended upon a matrix agency for news and editorials. The total also included many local editions of larger papers.

Relations between the now "ex-licensed" press and the unlicensed press were far from cordial. The former organized a loose federation called the *Gesamtverband der deutschen Zeitungsverleger*, or National Union of German Newspaper Publishers. The post-licensing publishers formed the *Verein deutscher Zeitungsverleger*, or Association of German Newspaper Publishers, nicknamed the *Altverleger* (old publishers). They regarded the *Gesamtverband* as a group of upstarts and usurpers. For its part, the *Gesamtverband* was skeptical regarding the political probity of the *Altverleger*, who, whether or not they belonged to the Nazi Party, had managed to get through the period of Nazi domination in pretty good financial shape.

The near coincidence of the end of licensing and the currency reform severely affected the position of the ex-licensed publishers. Their capital was cut 90 percent, and the Wigo loan fund shrank overnight to 2.5 million DM.

This development brought into high relief the key problem of the leased plants. The leases were an important aid given the licensed publishers by the Occupation. The old publishers, now free to run newspapers, were without printing plants because their own were under mandatory lease to their rivals on unremunerative terms. The old publishers were thus forced to make shift with presses intended for other types of printing. The year 1950 marked the beginning of the expiration of the leases and under the circumstances renewal at any price appeared unlikely. Indeed, there was reason to think that the old publishers would not wait for expiration. With responsibility for domestic matters in German hands under the occu-

pation statute, no German court could be expected to uphold leases obtained under duress.

To safeguard the leases for their original term, OMGUS established the Newspaper Leases Review Board in May 1949. This board had sole and final authority to review leases made under the authority of Military Government. In the fall of 1949, the new Allied High Commission retained the Newspaper Leases Review Board and promulgated its Law No. 13, which provided that "No German Court shall render a decision impeaching the validity or legality of any regulation, directive, decision or order published by Military Government," and that the validity of a Military Government order must be determined by the Occupation authorities.

In practice, the Review Board proved effective in adjusting differences of opinion between owner and licensed publisher as to a fair rate on the lease for the remainder of its term.

Early in the post-licensing period, the *Gesamtverband* asked Hicog for counterpart funds to permit publishers to borrow enough money at low interest to continue in business. Hicog approved, and the Bluecher (Marshall Plan) Ministry of the Bonn Government established a new revolving press fund of 15 million DM to be handled by Wigo. This money was available to any non-Communist newspaper publisher who was considered a legitimate risk.

Wigo set up a large committee composed of *Gesamtverband* and *Altverleger* members from the three Western zones. The committee made recommendations to the *Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau*, or Reconstruction Loan Corporation (RLC), which reviewed the risk involved. If the RLC rejected a request that had committee approval, Hicog reserved the right to make the final decision. However, in the event that Hicog decided to grant the loan, the Federal Republic asked to be released from its contingent obligation to the United States for any part of the loan that was not repaid.

In November 1950, the committee went to work. By the end of February 1951, it had examined 200 applications for loans and approved 105 for a total of DM 13.5 million, leaving DM 1.5 million for the West Berlin newspapers. (The latter, because of Berlin's special status as an island in the Soviet zone, remained under licensing.) Then the RLC began its investigations and passed its recommendations on to the Marshall Plan Ministry, which asked Hicog to release the first portion of the press fund on April 5, 1951.

As requests came in to Hicog, it became increasingly apparent that all was not well with the committee's policy of distribution. Unwilling to discriminate against the politically sound elements of the old publishers and wishing to avoid charges of favoritism toward the ex-licensed press, Hicog had agreed to the proposal of the Bluecher Ministry that *Altverleger* as well as *Gesamtverband* members should be eligible for loans. However,

HICOG had been well aware that inclusion of the *Altverleger* would pose some delicate problems.

As far as HICOG was concerned, the purpose of the press fund was to safeguard the independence of the most responsible elements of the press. The committee, however, had promptly agreed on a division between *Gesamtverband* and *Altverleger*, on the basis of circulation statistics, at a ratio of seven to three, respectively. Representatives of both factions wanted as many as possible of their constituents to have loans. Consequently, to make the fund go further, the committee spread it very thin. Small papers asking for small loans had the best chance of getting what they asked. Requests from large and influential papers such as the *Frankfurter Rundschau* and the *Sddeutsche Zeitung* of Munich, which were in dire need of substantial loans to help them buy plants or buildings, were rejected at the first glance. Political integrity and high journalistic standards had little influence on the committee.

The German Federal Republic, having incurred a contingent obligation to the United States for the amount of the fund, tried to protect itself by making extremely rigid conditions for credit. The RLC demanded that local banks give 100 per cent security for the loans, and the banks in turn required high collateral from the newspapers. This raised the uninviting prospect that the papers would be placed in the power of the banks and that the independence which the press fund was intended to preserve would thus be jeopardized.

Some of the papers that HICOG wanted to help most were unable to raise the collateral demanded by the banks. As an alternative, it was proposed that such papers as could not meet the demands of the banks should obtain guaranties from the *Laender* governments. However, State domination was no more palatable to HICOG than domination by the banking interests.

HICOG to the Rescue

Until the summer of 1951, HICOG had deliberately remained on the side lines, but in that summer members of the press and members of the *Gesamtverband-Altverleger* Committee itself became so concerned over the handling of the fund that they asked HICOG to come to the rescue. The Bluecher Ministry was receptive to HICOG's proposal of a new approach to handling the fund and the establishment of new procedures. The large committee was replaced by a new committee of five, with one *Gesamtverband* representative each from the British and the American zones, one from the West Berlin press, one *Altverleger* representative, and one official from HICOG's Office of Public Affairs. From this point on, the actual grant of funds was to WIGO, with the committee serving in advisory capacity to HICOG, the granter of the fund.

The establishment of priority lists of applicants

for loans solved the problem of distribution on an equitable basis and in amounts that were large enough to do some good. The committee established the following specific criteria for making up the lists: political importance of the paper; need to purchase new printing presses and real estate for building purposes; and refinancing of high-interest bank loans required for necessary capital investments. Geographical location was also a factor. The committee agreed on the importance of helping a good paper in districts bordering the Soviet zone and also in areas where the neo-Nazi movement was growing in strength.

The new committee used the work of the old one as a basis for developing the primary and secondary lists. Because the fund was a revolving fund, repayment was carefully scheduled. Papers on the secondary list had to wait until the primary priority papers had been served and had begun to repay their loans. This method permitted meeting the substantial requirements of the best papers first and had the advantage of giving all creditable firms assurance that their needs would be served in due time. Of the first papers to receive loans, nine were Social Democrat in character, seven Christian Democratic Union, three Free Democrat, and 25 independent.

The end of licensing did not immediately provoke a circulation war. The old publishers bided their time, leaving the first foray to the small-time papers. But when the larger houses in the *Altverleger* resumed business, the war began. The *Wiesbaden Tageblatt*, for instance, began publication in mid-September 1949 by distributing 90,000 free copies for the first 3 days, 25,000 for the rest of the month, and free delivery to all subscribers until mid-October. This open-handedness cost the publisher DM 100,000, and yet, as of the end of November, he had failed to achieve his objective of 20,000 subscriptions. Other large establishments followed his example—though few went quite so far.

To meet this kind of competition, the members of the *Gesamtverband* were in many instances obliged to reduce subscription rates and sometimes advertising rates as well. Some of the *Altverleger* did what they could to discredit their ex-licensed rivals by charging that the *Gesamtverband* papers were "stooges" of the occupation authorities, while the *Altverleger* alone had the real good of the German people at heart and was free to defend "national rights."

Despite these efforts of the *Altverleger* and the outcropping of chains and syndicates, the *Gesamtverband* held and still holds the advantage in circulation and reader interest. By February 1950, after 6 months of full-scale competition with the *Altverleger*, the ex-licensed press of the American zone, although issuing only one-sixth of the newspapers then published, had three-fourths of the circulation. The *Gesamtverband* papers had been reduced from 59 to 54 in the 6-month

period, but none of the 5 dropped out for reasons directly connected with the new competition.

In the German Federal Republic as a whole, by the summer of 1950—a year after the end of licensing—the circulation of the *Gesamtverband* was approximately 6.5 million out of a total of 9.5 million. The average circulation of the ex-licensed newspapers was 76,000, that of the *Altverleger* papers was under 4,000.

The rush of wartime publishers to reestablish hundreds of little local sheets of the *Heimatblaetter* type, once so popular in Germany, turned out to be ill-advised. Times had changed. Populations, even of very small towns, had shifted. By 1949 approximately one-fifth of West Germany's population was made up of refugees without roots or traditional associations in the places of their resettlement. These refugees, by no means illiterate, had little interest in a hometown paper that slighted news of national and international affairs in favor of local gossip. If the refugees had money to buy a newspaper at all, they wanted one that gave full coverage of important news. Similarly, Germans under 35 years of age had no sentimental recollection of the *Heimatblaetter* type of paper and wanted something more up-to-date. Where the *Heimatblaetter* offered competition, the *Gesamtverband* press introduced local editions of the main issue, with two pages devoted to community news items.

Shortly after licensing ended, the march of world events served to sharpen the German readers' interest in objective and full news accounts of happenings in Germany and in the outside world. He could get the most for his money from the ex-licensed press, which, on the whole, had maintained high standards of reporting. He wanted information of changes in occupation policy, and he wanted to follow the moves in the development of European union. The participation of West Germany in the Marshall Plan for European economic recovery was one thing in which most Germans were interested; the war between Communist North Korea and independent South Korea, with its somewhat frightening analogy to East and West Germany, was another. Internally, a number of ex-licensed editors have taken the initiative in forcing investigations of unhealthy political situations.

Evidence that the ex-licensed press will continue to hold the bulk of circulation is found in the fact that the most successful old publishers are those that conform to the standards set by the *Gesamtverband*.

The Current Situation

By bringing together the leaders of the rival press organizations in a common cause, the press fund has been responsible for wiping out much of the earlier resentment and bitterness that characterized relations between the two factions. In the

fall of 1952 the rival central organizations buried the hatchet and merged into the *Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger*.

Each year brings improvement in the quality of the major newspapers. Not every paper in West Germany invariably distinguishes between news and editorial opinion, but the majority try to report events as they happen and to quote individuals accurately. Except for the seven Communist papers, the press is strongly anti-Communist.

Each year since 1948 groups of German editors, reporters, and students of journalism have come to America to study, to observe, and sometimes to work on one of our newspapers. Since January 1950, a first-class school of journalism has been functioning in Munich in connection with *Die Abendzeitung*. Large papers in other cities often provide on-the-job training for promising newcomers.

Not every editor in West Germany wants to be the first to call public attention to wrongs. Many of them, as is the case elsewhere, are inclined to wait for some more stalwart fellow to break the ice. But it is important that in these few years, with help and encouragement from the outside, Germany has produced a remarkable number of courageous champions of the democratic spirit.

Not long ago an Offenbach paper exposed the intention of the local government to prevent a Jewish doctor from opening an obstetrical clinic.

West German Newspapers

The leading papers of West Germany today, all of which were formerly licensed by the Military Government, are:

Frankfurter Rundschau. Publishers and chief editors: Arno Rudert and Karl Gerold. Press run, 135,000. Political orientation: left of center but independent, favorable to European cooperation and, for the most part, friendly to U.S. policies.

Frankfurter Allgemeine. Editors: Hans Baumgarten, Erich Combrowski, Karl Korn, Paul Sethe, and Erich Welter. Press run, 56,900. Conservative in business and economic affairs, but its independent editorial writers present a variety of positions on political issues. High standards of style and presentation.

Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung (Stuttgart). Editors: Helmut Cron, Otto Hoffmann, Rudolf Kircher, and Jürgen Tern. Press run, 50,600. Politically independent; expresses the view of the business community in political and social matters. Maintains a high level of journalism.

Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich). Editor-in-chief: W. Friedmann. Press run, 202,000. Politically independent, oriented Westward. The most important paper in Bavaria.

Hannoversche Presse. Editor-in-chief: Wilhelm Korpeter. Press run, 176,000. Hews rather closely to the Social Democrat line.

Rheinische Post (Cologne). Editor-in-chief: Dr. Frank Vogl. Press run, 215,000. Expresses the view of the left wing of the Christian Democrats.

The result was twofold: The doctor not only obtained his license to open the clinic but was appointed to the Board of Health as well. Recently in Weinheim, Baden, following a newspaper's denunciation of autocratic methods used by the local police in obtaining statistics on miscarriages, the police changed their procedures. The *Frankfurter Rundschau*, in conjunction with Radio Munich, at one point initiated an investigation of the Foreign Office, charging that former Nazi officials occupied key positions. Munich's *Sddeutsche Zeitung* entered the fray and printed a series of pictures and biographical sketches of the men in question. As a result of the concerted efforts of press and radio, some high officials saw fit to resign from the Foreign Office.

A few months ago, the democratic press nipped in the bud a proposed Federal law that would have hampered the freedom of the press. Recent attempts of an important German political party to browbeat two prominent editors into submission have been completely unsuccessful. Ordered to drop their support of German integration with the West and German contribution of troops to the European Defense Army on pain of ejection from their party, these editors have continued their vigorous support of both measures. Thus far the party has not carried out its threat.

These are typical examples of the many courageous actions taken by the new German press. They are far more significant than the imperfections which undeniably exist. Objective reporting and an interest in the public welfare may help the new press to weather a period of considerable public misunderstanding and skepticism as to its aims and services. A recent poll shows that only 42 percent of the West German people support the principle of the freedom of the press. A bare majority of the people questioned, 55 percent, believe that newspapers today are more trustworthy in their reporting than were those of the Third Reich.

The response of a cross section of the German people to the opinion poll may be discouraging to both German press and watchers abroad. From their own statements, many Germans seem unable to recognize honest reporting when they see it, and many question the propriety of publishing facts that embarrass the Government. However, the old adage, "Actions speak louder than words," applies to Germans too. What the German people have been saying about the press is considerably at variance with what they are doing about it. Circulation statistics speak tellingly. They disclose that the same individuals who criticize all newspapers continue to buy and read the best.

• *Mr. Straus, author of the above article, was with the Office of Military Government for Germany from May 1945 to January 1947. He is now public affairs specialist in the Bureau of German Affairs.*

Goals of U. S. Policy in Germany

Following is a transcript of a radio interview with Dr. James B. Conant, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, which was broadcast over the Voice of America on February 9, the date on which Dr. Conant left for his new post:

Press release 74 dated February 9

Interviewer: Dr. Conant, you are about to embark on a job that is relatively new to you. Could you give our audience some idea of your feelings about this job and your views of the problem it will bring?

Dr. Conant: In undertaking my new assignment my first thoughts concern the grave responsibilities that are inherent in the position that President Eisenhower has asked me to fill. I am aware of the tremendous scope of the new assignment. Conscious of the success of my predecessors in meeting the many problems that arose during their terms of office, I only hope that I may be able to carry on the great tradition that they established.

As you know, this is not my first visit to Germany. As a young professor of chemistry I spent 8 months visiting the German universities. This was during the period of the Weimar Republic. I was concerned mainly with examining the organization of the universities and inquiring into the sources of that spirit which had made German universities preeminent in all fields of scientific research. Nevertheless, I also learned a great deal about the economic and political problems of those difficult days so long ago. I was then impressed, and have been ever since, with the importance for the whole civilized world of what happens in Germany. As a European power its tremendous economic and industrial resources are obvious. So, too, are its great intellectual and scientific capacities and its cultural traditions.

In the last few years I have been concerned with the problem of how these resources and capacities can best be marshaled and utilized to make possible a constructive contribution to the welfare of Europe and the entire free world, and how a possible misuse of such power for destructive purposes can be prevented. I know that there are forces both inside and outside Germany which periodically try to interfere with the sound development of the nation's potential. This is a problem to which I shall continue to devote my attention in the interest not only of my Government but also of all who wish for the peaceful integration of the Western World. But I also recall from my visits in the '20's that there are democratic elements in Germany completely devoted to the cause which unites the people of the free world. These elements will find a friend in me. It is my hope that, together with their help, Germany will once more attain the position in international affairs which will permit a full and

productive use of her great resources. I am optimistic about this prospect in view of the progress which has been made since the war—progress which in large measure is due to the statesmanship of Chancellor Adenauer.

Interviewer: How do you view the current movement toward European unity that is taking place?

Dr. Conant: The movement of the European nations from national separatism to greater union is to my mind the most encouraging development of the postwar period. The survival today not only of Europe but of Western civilization depends on the success of the free nations in seeking security through cooperation.

The evolution of a true European community, with a democratic Germany in its midst, based on common political institutions, sharing the wealth of its industrial resources, and dedicated to the defense of its great cultural heritage, is the hope of free people everywhere; it is also a beacon light for those who are deprived temporarily of their liberty by a totalitarian regime.

The Council of Europe and the Schuman Plan have been the first milestones on the way to such union. With the establishment of the European Defense Community [Edc] another decisive step will have been taken not only to cement the foundation of the "New Europe" but in the words of President Eisenhower, "to advance peace and the security of the free world."

The consummation of this process is, and must remain, the responsibility of the peoples of Europe themselves. But in fulfilling this task, they can be certain that the American Government and the American people will follow their efforts with deep sympathy and with high hopes. In his inaugural message President Eisenhower said:¹

In Europe, we ask that enlightened and inspired leaders of the Western nations strive with renewed vigor to make the unity of their peoples a reality. Only as free Europe unitedly marshals its strength can it effectively safeguard, even with our help, its spiritual and cultural treasures.

As I assume the challenging obligations of my new office, I wish to assure you that my mission will be to continue the work begun by Mr. McCloy, namely, to further, to the best of my abilities, the voluntary association of the Federal Republic with the community of European nations. Thus, through Edc and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Germany will be joined with the other nations of the Atlantic community in defense of freedom.

Interviewer: Dr. Conant, as you know, there is a widespread interest among the German people in the reunification of Germany. Do you think that progress can be made toward this end?

Dr. Conant: The peaceful reunification of

Secretary Dulles Visits West Germany

Printed below is the text of a statement made by Secretary Dulles at Wahn Airport, Bonn, Germany, on February 6, during his recent tour of Europe.

[Telegraphic text]

Mr. Stassen¹ and I are grateful for the warm hospitality shown us here in Germany and for the intimate exchange of views which took place concerning matters of vital concern to us all.

I regret that time did not permit a visit to Berlin on this occasion. I recall my visit there on the airlift in 1948. We in the United States are, now as then, vitally interested in the welfare and security of this city and we share the determination of the Berliners to maintain their liberties.

In bidding you good-by, I am happy to know that we shall be able to renew our discussions with your Chancellor in Washington this spring.

¹ Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security.

Germany remains one of the major goals in American policy. I shall do everything in my power to help carry out this policy. However, the success of this policy depends entirely on Soviet willingness to permit the reunification of Germany under conditions of freedom. Current Soviet actions in Berlin and the purges in the Soviet zone have made me wonder whether the Soviet Union has any desire whatever to create the prerequisites for unification. I am appalled by the purges and arrests now taking place in the Soviet zone, by the persecution of entire population groups, and by the obvious attempt to root out any residues of political freedom and equality.

Interviewer: You mentioned Berlin, Dr. Conant, and Soviet action there. Do you believe that the American position in Berlin can be held?

Dr. Conant: Our position in Berlin can be held and must be held. Shortly after my arrival in Germany I expect to go to Berlin to familiarize myself personally with the problems of that city. I realize that the economic harassment, the increasing influx of refugees, and the attempts by the Soviet authorities to undermine West Berlin morale represent a problem that must be tackled with dispatch and determination. But, with the help of the Berliners, and the necessary support of the peoples of the free world, Berlin will continue to be the free world's outpost.

I should like to add, if I may, the following: I am looking forward to working with the German people. I know that honest cooperation based on mutual confidence will insure the success of my mission. *Auf Wiedersehen!*

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 167.

Tax Treaty Discussions With Germany

Press release 81 dated February 11

U.S. and German tax officials will meet in the early future for technical discussions to see whether a basis can be found for conventions for the avoidance of double taxation of income and of estates of deceased persons.

If the discussions are successful, draft conventions will be prepared and submitted by the participants for further consideration by their respective governments.

In preparation for the discussions, interested persons are invited to submit information and suggestions to Eldon P. King, Head, Office of International Tax Relations, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Washington 25, D.C.

Submission of Claims for War Damage in West Germany

The Department of State announced, on February 11 (press release 82), that owners of property located in the Federal Republic of Germany or the Western sectors of Berlin are eligible to file a claim, under the German law on the equalization of burdens, for physical damage to such property during World War II. Claims may be filed by natural persons only and must be submitted on or before August 31, 1953, to the Equalization Office (*Ausgleichsamt*) in the district where the property is situated. An Equalization Office exists in each city and county. In the event the claimant does not know the name of the city or county in which his property is located, he should send his application to the competent State Equalization Office (*Landesausgleichsamt*) with a request that it be forwarded to the proper local office. The address of the appropriate State Equalization Office can be obtained from the German consulates listed below. The forms for the filing of applications for the determination of damage are obtainable in Germany from the local German authorities or in the United States from the German consulates at any of the following addresses:

745 Fifth Avenue, New York 22, N.Y.
8 South Michigan Avenue, Room 901, Chicago, Ill.
1026 Hurt Building, Atlanta, Ga.
Central Tower Building, 703 Market Street, San Francisco, Calif.
3450 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif.
International Trade Mart, New Orleans, La.
1320 Bryant Building, 1102 Grand Avenue, Kansas City, Mo.
905 Securities Building, Seattle, Wash.
2711 Book Building, Washington Boulevard, Detroit 26, Mich.

While U.S. citizens and residents will be primarily concerned with the war-damage features

of the Equalization of Burdens Law, the Department of State pointed out that claims may also be made for certain types of postwar damage or loss. These concern (1) damage arising out of expulsion from German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line or from territory outside the 1937 boundaries of Germany; (2) damage sustained in Eastern Germany now under Soviet control or Polish administration; and (3) damage resulting from currency reform in regard to investments made for savings purposes. Due to residence and other requirements, U.S. citizens and residents will not in most cases be eligible to file claims for losses falling under these categories.

The Department of State has prepared the attached memorandum¹ containing basic information for the benefit of interested persons seeking advice on questions concerning their rights under the Equalization of Burdens Law. However, the Department cautions all claimants that it is not able to give advice on the merits of individual claims or to interpret the German law with respect to a particular case. Requests for information of this character should be directed to the local German authorities with whom the claim is filed. Any assistance which a claimant may require in the preparation of his application should be obtained from an attorney in Germany or one in the United States who is familiar with German laws and procedure. Since the law will be administered by German officials, the application should be prepared, if possible, in the German language and a copy retained for reference in future correspondence.

Claimants are advised that the actual payment of war-damage claims will not be made until the total amount of damage in Western Germany and Western Berlin and the total of the funds available for the payment of that compensation have been determined. Under the Equalization of Burdens Law this determination must be made not later than March 31, 1957.

Discontinuance of Current Copper Allocations

The Copper-Zinc-Lead Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on February 12 that, following a review of the supply-demand position, its member governments have agreed to discontinue the current (first quarter) international allocation of primary copper, with effect from February 15, 1953. Although it now appears unlikely that there will be need for further international allocations of copper, the Committee will review the position again in March when a further statement will be made.

¹ Not printed. Text of the memorandum may be obtained by writing the Bureau of German Affairs, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

U.S. Rejects Charges of Anti-Polish Acts

U.S. Note to Poland

Press release 75 dated February 9

On January 16, 1953, the Polish Foreign Office addressed a 19-page note to the American Embassy at Warsaw¹ protesting against alleged anti-Polish acts by the United States. The note charged "the brutal violation of Polish territory . . . by an aircraft belonging to the armed forces of the United States" and "the organizing of aggressive intelligence and subversion on Polish territory." The note represents one facet of the currently stepped-up Communist propaganda campaign, throughout the Soviet bloc, aimed at vilifying and discrediting the United States. Following is the text of the American reply to this note which was delivered to the U. S. Embassy at Warsaw on February 9:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on instructions of the United States Government has the honor to reject categorically the unfounded charges in the Ministry's note of January 16, 1953, alleging aggressive attempts by the Government of the United States on the security of Poland. With specific reference to the last paragraph of the Ministry's note of January 16, the United States Government rejects the allegations of the Polish Government that an aircraft belonging to the Armed forces of the United States violated Polish territory on November 4, 1952, and that the United States has organized aggressive "intelligence and subversion" on Polish territory.

The charges are very clearly a part of a larger pattern of accusations made with increasing vehemence during the past few months by a number of governments dominated by a single totalitarian political party. As the Polish Government is well aware, these recent charges have been leveled against Christians and Jews, Communists and former Communists, workers, peasants and intellectuals, and even against many once prominent and trusted officials occupying positions of great power in the very governments which are now making the charges.

The free world, and no doubt many in that part of the world which is not free, has viewed these accusations with profound skepticism and deep disgust, seeing in them the characteristic excesses of men hysterically fearful that they will lose the absolute power which has corrupted them. To the extent, however, that this macabre process of almost daily accusation actually reflects a genuine

struggle of men to be free and masters of their own thoughts and souls, the Government and people of the United States cannot be disinterested.

Sympathy and concern for the welfare and aspirations to freedom of peoples of other lands has been a continuing and important feature of American history from the beginning of the United States as an independent country. The names of Pulaski and Kosciuszko, of Kossuth and Krzyzanowski, of Paderewski and the elder Masaryk, all of whom found haven and support in the United States during their struggles for the freedom of their homelands bear eloquent testimony to the continuing American interest in the liberty and independence of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The Polish Government in its note of January 16 alleges that while the American nation desires peaceful relations with the Polish nation, the policy of the Government of the United States is anti-Polish. The absurdity of this contention is apparent to anyone acquainted with the democratic and representative nature of the political institutions of the United States which ensure, contrary to the situation which prevails in totalitarian regimes, the faithful reflection of the popular will in the policies followed by the Government of the United States. In any event, the question of whether the policy of the United States Government is anti-Polish is one which the United States is happy to leave to the judgment of history, confident that the record clearly shows that from its earliest beginnings as an independent country, the United States has always been, and remains, a firm friend of Poland.

It is also impossible to understand the grounds on which the Ministry bases the fantastic allegation that the United States Government desires to transform Poland into a colony of the United States. It is understandable that under the conditions which prevail in Poland at the present time many citizens of Poland might entertain legitimate fears regarding the possible reduction of Poland to the status of a colony, but it is certainly not on the Government of the United States, that responsibility for these unfortunate conditions rests.

A very few years ago both Poland and the United States fought side by side in defense of their national existence against an evil and powerful enemy. For several years after that war, the United States, through official and unofficial channels, undertook a massive and varied program of economic assistance to the people of Poland. As a part of that assistance, UNRRA, which was financed largely by the United States, delivered to Poland food, clothing, medical, industrial and agricultural supplies in the amount of \$477,927,000. This was more than was supplied to any other European country, and was one-sixth of the total assistance granted to all war-devastated countries throughout the world.

¹ Not printed.

Moreover, it was the Polish Government itself which announced in July 1947 a decision not to participate in the European economic recovery program which offered additional great possibilities for rebuilding war damage in Poland and for raising the standard of living of the hard-pressed Polish people.

In its note of January 16, 1953 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw fit to return to the subject of Section 101 of the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951, and to repeat the baseless charges contained in its note of December 19, 1951 and January 12, 1952. As the Polish Government was informed more than a year ago, Section 101 of the Mutual Security Act is intended to provide assistance to victims of oppression, where such assistance has been determined to contribute to the defense of the North Atlantic Area. The purely humanitarian program for extending care and assistance in resettlement to refugees which is now being actively carried out under this legislation is completely consistent with the policy of the United Nations of rendering assistance to people who have been forced to flee from their homelands.

With regard to the allegations in the Polish note under reference attempting to establish a connection between the Embassy at Warsaw and the murder of a Polish radio announcer, the Government of the United States states categorically that these allegations are groundless, and that the Government of Poland must be aware of that fact.

Concerning the further allegation that United States Government information activities have sown hatred toward Poland, it is to be noted that the aim of these activities with respect to Poland is to provide accurate news and commentaries on important developments to the Polish people who, cut off from such information by their own authorities, are naturally eager to be informed by other means. As the Government of the United States observed to the Polish Embassy at Washington in a note of September 20, 1951,² history abundantly proves that governments which adopt the policy of denying their peoples access to all the avenues to truth have done so at their own loss.

During the past century and three quarters Poland has several times been partitioned by powerful neighboring states, and at times has been occupied by one of them. During these tragic years of Polish history, no people and no government has had a warmer admiration for the unquenchable Polish love of liberty than the people and Government of the United States, and none has had a firmer faith in the final outcome of the Polish struggle for liberty and national independence.

² BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 652.

Austrian Treaty Deputies Suspend Meetings

In answer to questions concerning the meetings of the Austrian treaty deputies at London on February 6 and February 9, Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant for Press Relations, made the following statement on February 10:

Andrei Gromyko furnished further proof that the Soviet Union has no intention of concluding an Austrian treaty and desires that Austria continue as an occupied country. During yesterday's meeting, the Western deputies had repeated the simple fact that they had met to agree on an Austrian treaty. The French chairman [Etienne de Crouy-Chanel] suggested that anything could be discussed that would lead to a treaty. He proposed that the long draft treaty be discussed inasmuch as he assumed that the Soviet Government had expressed its readiness to conclude a treaty on the basis of this draft only.

Mr. Gromyko, however, again insisted that no discussion could take place until the so-called abbreviated treaty was withdrawn. He refused to be budged even after the Western deputies declared that they might withdraw the abbreviated treaty if a just and equitable treaty could be concluded on any other basis, including the long draft, without further delay. The Western deputies in fact formally proposed that discussion begin by going through that draft, the long draft. When the Soviet representative saw no way out, he simply said: "I have nothing to add to my previous position."

The Western deputies then agreed that no further purpose would be served in continuing discussions made futile by Mr. Gromyko's position and agreed to suspend further meetings pending submission of reports to their governments.

Accord Reached on Sudan

Press release S9 dated February 14

Secretary Dulles on February 14 sent the following messages to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom and Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi of Egypt on the occasion of the accord reached on the Sudan by the two Governments.¹

Message to Foreign Secretary Eden

Achievement of the Sudan accord by the British and Egyptian Governments is indeed gratifying to the United States. As it affects the Sudanese, it is in the best tradition of British regard for the

¹ Terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Accord, which was signed on Feb. 12, provide almost immediate self-rule for the Sudanese and self-determination of their future status within 3 years.

orderly political evolution of a people toward self-government, and is a tribute to the patient statesmanship which your Government has consistently addressed to this difficult problem!

I believe the settlement is one which the three peoples concerned—British, Egyptian, and Sudanese, can view with equal satisfaction as appropriate to their respective interests, and as providing a solid foundation for friendly, mutually beneficial future relationships.

This amicable accord may well be the first step toward the establishment of more fruitful associations in an area of critical importance to the security of the free world.

Message to Foreign Minister Fawzi

The United States is gratified that an agreement on the Sudan has been arrived at by Egypt and the United Kingdom. This is a truly im-

portant occasion. It affords an opportunity for me to express my Government's pleasure at the spirit in which these difficult negotiations were carried out.

My Government trusts that the same spirit of good will and cooperation will characterize the transitional period preceding the decision by the Sudanese people of their future status. The amicable resolution of this long outstanding question goes far toward creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust in the Near East which can only result in great benefits for all the nations of the free world.

My Government continues to follow with interest and sympathy the progressive attitude and energetic efforts of the Government of General Naguib to meet and overcome the internal problems which face the Egyptian people. The United States wishes the Egyptian Government every success in its efforts.

The United States and the Underdeveloped Areas

by Stanley Andrews

*Administrator, Technical Cooperation Administration*¹

It is more than a pleasure for me to come to Wisconsin today to talk to this important group of men and women from the farms and towns and villages of Wisconsin. It was here at the University of Wisconsin a little more than a year ago that representatives from many of the countries in which Point Four operates gathered for a study of the general problem of land reform.²

While I shall discuss this phase of Point Four work a little later, I would like to add here that in four of the countries which are now acting to improve land distribution, tenure, and credit, four of the men in charge of this effort attended the World Land Tenure Conference in Wisconsin.

In my talk here today, I shall try to report a little of what the Point Four Program of technical cooperation has been able to accomplish over the past 2 years. I shall suggest why the accomplishments of the program are important in these un-

easy days. I shall try to indicate why I think this program as it now operates is not primarily an unselfish missionary effort on the part of our country but rather a hard-headed enterprise which, if successful, must benefit not only the peoples with whom we work but will directly benefit the people of the United States who are putting up the money and sending their technicians overseas.

The Act for International Development, under which the Technical Cooperation Administration operates the Point Four Program, authorizes three basic activities. One is the sharing of know-how through technicians, plus the funds and equipment to make their work effective, with countries that want to attack some basic problem. Another activity under the act is the encouragement of private investment in these areas and the creation of the "atmosphere for investment." Third, the act provides for the training of nationals of cooperating countries in the United States—what is called the "trainee program."

In the first and third of these activities, I think it can reasonably be said that we have "a show on the road." There are some 1,400 technical per-

¹ Address made in connection with the observance of Farm and Home Week at Madison, Wis., Feb. 4 (press release 65 dated Feb. 3).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 22, 1951, p. 660.

sonnel abroad now in 35 countries. They are assisting in development and training in practically every field from labor productivity in a textile mill in Iran, or a coal mine in Afghanistan, to the better use of a wooden plow in the valley of the Jordan. There are trainees from almost all of the 35 countries in the United States, some 1,300 of them at the present time, renewing or expanding their knowledge on everything from biochemistry or tractor repair or transportation or public-health services to basic concepts of primary school education.

Yardsticks for Measuring Underdevelopment

In the field of encouraging private investment, some worthwhile areas have been explored and some valuable lessons learned. But we still have a long way to go.

This field of activity, in my opinion, deserves extended study and effort not only on the part of Government but by the leaders of private enterprise in this country. All of us need to take a more penetrating look into the whole problem, not only from the standpoint of "private interest and profit" which is important but because our national interest and our standard of living in this country depend on it. We cannot sell something to a person who has nothing.

Let's look a moment at what is termed an "underdeveloped" country. What are the norms or yardsticks that one may use to measure degrees of underdevelopment?

Here are a few statistics which might serve as a sort of yardstick. But I hasten to point out that it is not the objective of Point Four to reproduce in this great area the material standards of the more highly developed areas. I am going to compare certain figures in three categories: the so-called "underdeveloped" areas; the intermediate states; and the highly developed and industrialized areas such as the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.

Based on U.N. figures, here's about the story:

	<i>Under-developed</i>	<i>Inter-mediate</i>	<i>Developed</i>
Annual per capita income, in dollars	41	154	461
Mechanical energy, per capita horsepower per day	1.2	6.4	26.6
Life expectancy in years	30	52	63
Physicians per 1,000 people17	.78	1.06
Food consumption, calories per day	2,150	2,760	3,040
Cloth consumption, pounds per person	4.8	7.52	18.63
Population literate, in percentage	22	80	95
Elementary school teachers per 1,000 people	1.76	3.42	3.98

Now, let's look at the family unit in these areas. The chances are that the family we seek out will be dark-skinned. It will be a family with a rich heritage of culture, an ancient tradition, a well-defined concept of living, and with values far different from our own. The family will be living in a village home which it has occupied for generations.

This family will cultivate a plot of ground which has been in cultivation for hundreds of years. It may be a piece of communal land belonging to the village or to a family or dynasty, owned and operated by its various members over many years. Or it may be land owned by some landlord or corporation. It will be a small piece of land, probably from 1 to 20 acres. The house will be of stone or adobe, if in the dryer sections, or of bamboo, if in the wet torrid zones.

There will be a father and a mother with perhaps six or eight children living, and possibly a birth record or twelve or more. The others have died before maturity. The family's chief crop will be rice, or wheat, corn and barley, or sugar cane, or industrial crops like rubber, sisal, and jute. The chief diet will be rice or cereal, with some fruits and vegetables and occasionally fish.

The power on the farm will probably be a carabao or an ox with an occasional donkey or horse, camel or cow. The farm implements will be a wooden spade, maybe an iron spade, and a plow hoe. Rarely will anything resembling a breaking plow or a disc harrow be found. The harvest equipment will be a small knife attached to the two fingers of the right hand, or perhaps a sickle. The threshing will probably be done with oxen walking over the grain on a threshing floor and the grain will be cleaned by winnowing in the wind. In some areas there will be a small foot-pedaled thresher and occasionally a gasoline-driven fanning mill.

There will be no furniture in most of these homes. Bamboo floor covering, a mat spread on the floor at night, and an iron brazier for cooking and heating are the standard equipment. Clothing will be scant and for everyday wear of simplest cotton. Silk may be seen on the most festive occasions for which the inherited fine dress of centuries will be brought out.

Most of the family members will belong to and attend regularly a church of the ritualistic and formalized religion of the area, often predating Christianity by thousands of years.

If the family is fortunate enough to own any of the land on which it lives and works, that is probably its greatest material achievement. If they are nonowners, then the most cherished dream of the family may be to call some of that land its own. We have gone far enough to indicate that sheer poverty is representative of a great majority of the rural families in this so-called "underdeveloped" belt.

Raising the Standard of Living

So much then for the yardsticks on an underdeveloped country and the people and areas where our technicians are joining forces with technicians of host countries in an attack on some of their basic problems. The direct fundamental objective of the Point Four Program is to help raise the standard of living of the peoples with whom we work. There is only one way to raise the general standard of living of any area and that is by an increase in the goods and services which human beings use—in other words, increased production of food, of fibers for clothing, of materials for shelter, and of the resources of the country which may be exchanged for other goods—to the end that all may have more.

Usually this attack on increased production starts with agriculture, then with forest and mineral developments, and increased productivity and efficiency of industries or productive enterprises which the country has. It is not an effort to pick up giant factories or transport great industrial systems bodily from America to these areas. We start with what we have. If it is agriculture, the American technician must go along with a local technician or leader, begin where the farmer is with his wooden hoe, if that is all he has; with his scant acre of land, which is often all he has; with the water and the sun and the soil as it stands. In some way we must contrive by application of known principles to start increasing production. This can usually be done with the introduction of good seed. Often a simple change in the planting methods will do the trick. Sometimes it is a simple matter of planting a little earlier or later. Or maybe thinning or spacing of plants will help. But start we must where the people are and move forward and upward.

The same technique must be followed in the field of public health, in sanitation, in improved housing. It would be easy to draw up a design for an ideal house in the Nile Delta, for instance, and then to have a contractor build it and give it to the fellahin in the village in place of his mud hut. But there is not enough money in all America to do that sort of thing. Even if a way could be found to buy the materials and give them to that villager, he could not even afford to pay the hauling cost of them to his village or to hire anyone to help him put up his house. So American technicians, if they are going to help the fellahin of the Nile out of his miserable and dirty hut, must find a way to use Nile mud so that the villagers themselves can construct with the materials and skills at hand a suitable and sanitary house.

If the malarial mosquito is ever to be wiped from the Nile or from the coastal plains of Iran or Sumatra, Americans must work side by side with the local people, giving them help in forms of necessary materials and supplies and technical

training to lead them into doing a gigantic job. It will not perhaps be done by any spectacular new way but by leadership and training in the basic and known ways of tackling a problem, whether it be the choking up of a harbor, breakdown of a rail transport system, factory improvement, or some deep and long search into a scientific problem dealing with agricultural production or mineral development.

I would like to relate by the hour stories of how Americans, your friends, and some of them your neighbors, are in their common sense and unassuming way tackling problems and solving them with their counterpart technicians. There's the story of an American locomotive engineer, several years retired, who was sent to Indonesia to see if he could help in the better use of locomotive power on that nation's railroads. On arrival there, he found the repair shops in chaos, many of their locomotives on the dead line and not many pulling freight. Working with local repairmen, he crawled into boilers and fireboxes searching out the causes of trouble. He determined that the use of muddy water was causing the interiors of the flues to scale and to prevent the heat in the fireboxes from getting to the water, and the heat was going up the flues instead of into the water. The simple cleaning of water, the reorganization of repair shops, and some shifting of switch tracks and loading facilities literally revolutionized that railroad in a short time.

I'd like to tell you about new wheat our technicians assisted in introducing into areas of Iran last year and how this year the returns have come back one hundredfold; how the incidence of malaria, which for a thousand years in some villages in the Middle East and in South America has stood at about 80 percent, has been reduced to 20 percent.

There's a coal mine in Afghanistan where a couple of men from the U.S. Bureau of Mines have helped to double production in less than 1 year and at the same time get more of the coal out of the drifts and promote safety in the mine—a thing unheard of in that part of the world.

Point Four Assistance in Jordan

Let's for a moment look at one of our teams at work in a small country like Jordan. Let's see what has taken place there over the past 18 months.

Jordan, as you all know, steps right out of Bible history. Until recent years it was a part of the Palestine Mandate under the old League of Nations, administered by Great Britain. Soon after Jordan gained independence, came the Palestine war, and the area which normally carried something less than a half million population suddenly became the home of nearly a half million more people—refugees.

Then came locusts and a drought and last year

famine stalked the villages of Jordan, and the bones of the flocks of the Bedouins parched on the desert. The first U.S. aid for Jordan was not technical cooperation but three cargoes, about 30,000 tons of wheat to prevent starvation. When our technical program got under way, one of the first things it did was to see that another wheat crop was planted and produced. This year Jordan, thanks to her own efforts, our help, and weather has enough wheat to meet her normal needs.

The big job is how to carry over from the fruitful years so that in the lean years there will be food. Joseph saw that problem and solved it in his day. Jordan, with some American technicians and an engineering firm, is tackling that problem now with a new type of desert-storage arrangement which will permit the carrying over of wheat from one crop year to the other.

It sounds simple, but when you are in a land where a simple burlap sack is a luxury and where equipment to handle or store bulk grains is unknown it is not simple.

This one demonstration storage bin is being built with money from the American taxpayer. If it succeeds—and we are sure it will—Jordan plans to build enough storage bins to carry over about 300,000 tons of grain in the good years to the lean years. Then at least the threat of periodic famine will be averted.

Then there is a desert-pasture program under way. People of Jordan mostly live by their floods. It always rains at some time of the year no matter how hot and dry the desert may become later. So the object is to catch and hold the rain which falls all at once, from about November to February, to let it soak into the ground and produce grass for forage later in the year—even though the grass dries up. The Romans tackled this problem 2,000 years ago when they built great ground tanks about 60 meters square and 3 meters in depth. These tanks, 500 of them along the valley of the Jordan River, filled with water in the rainy season and stored water for irrigation. They were the watering places for the Bedouins and their families. But the wind drifts of the desert, the rains and silt of the years, have filled in these tanks and they have remained unused for 500 years. Last year, Point Four provided a second-hand dragline and an American technician to train young Jordanians to run it. They cleared out one of these giant tanks and last spring when the rains came it filled with water. One of the sights this fall that took one back square into Bible days was the Bedouins camping by that tank on the Eve of Christmas with their flocks grazing and watering around it.

But merely cleaning out those 500 tanks will not do the job that is necessary today. Some of our desert experts, with experience in our own dry lands, have worked out a system of long undulating dikes, literally terraces, thrown up to hold

the water in a strip across a vast space. The water thus held stops erosion, soaks into the ground, and sufficient water remains in the ground to produce quick growing grass. In one area right now there are some 600 acres of green lush grass growing in a strip along one of these dikes where green grass like that has not grown for centuries. Needless to say the Bedouins who must live by grazing their flocks in the desert are very excited about this project.

Since time immemorial and according to custom of the area, Jordan has kept its womanhood behind the veil and rarely have women taken part in public life or community leadership. Now a school has been established in Jordan which is training the first group of young women to become school teachers and to teach other young women. The first class will be graduated this spring.

Over the centuries, Jordan has had no such thing as a testing laboratory or any of the necessary equipment, let alone skills to fight disease, to deal with insects and micro-organisms which attack plants and animals and humans.

Point Four has filled the request of the Government of Jordan for about 175 thousand-dollars worth of laboratory equipment, equipment which constitutes the necessary machinery and utensils for a complete research and testing laboratory. This will serve not only Jordan but other areas of the Middle East. Today on one of the main streets of Amman a two-story building is going up, the land donated by the State of Amman, the work done by builders in Amman. This part of the project is locally financed. The building will house the Point Four equipment and soon four or five research and testing specialists will begin training local Jordan people to take over the work which the laboratory is designed to carry on. No state can progress today without the basic research which precedes visible improvements by some span of years. We must know things before we have anything to teach, to train, and to extend.

Value of Training Nationals

Let's turn now to the matter of training nationals of Point Four countries in the United States. Last year more than a thousand men and women, most of them leaders in their own countries, came to America at Point Four expense and spent from as little as 30 days to as long as a year studying in fields of their particular interest. These have been extension workers, farm leaders, labor leaders, road builders, industrial engineers, school teachers, government administrators, and public-health leaders.

Now and then there have been some rather cheering results, such as the young men who attended the World Land Tenure Conference here in Wisconsin and were ready to assume responsibility and leadership in their own countries when

the time was ripe. There were also the young men from Iran who attended the Cooperative Credit Conference at the University of California last year. They are now out training leaders in Iran and helping to set up credit societies and banks, to administer loans, and to give supervision to the new farm owners under the Shah's land-distribution scheme.³ We feel that more of this type of training must be done in the country where these folks live. We believe the number coming to this country should be held to a minimum.

Some of the things which these men and women see in this country are by no stretch of imagination applicable to their own countries and some of them are a little bewildered by this gadget-conscious America. However, as one of them told me, "The thing we get from America above all things is the value you place on the individual and the attention your Government gives to the opinions and the welfare of the single individual."

That idea, I think, is worth spreading. For above the physical and material needs of the countries from which Point Four trainees come, is the need to dignify the worthwhileness of the individual. So I think most of the trainees coming to this country carry back with them something which can be applied in their own countries.

I had a dramatic demonstration of this recently in a South American country when a great airliner, in which I and some 56 others rode, got into trouble and had to land in a little pasture airfield in the jungle. A young man in the control tower on that field guided us safely in. That lad had been trained by the Civil Aeronautics Administration in this country on a scholarship supplied by the American taxpayers. I was startled and somewhat reassured to find that in at least 12 other airports I visited on that South American tour, a majority of the tower operators, traffic men, radio operators, and radar operators were lads who had been trained here in the United States on these scholarships.

Private Investment on a Partnership Basis

May we turn now for a few moments to the private investment side of this Act for International Development, which authorized the Point Four Program. Frankly, I do not know how much the American Government can do to "encourage and expand private investment" in foreign lands, as the Act directed. Certainly something can be done in the way of guarantees, in tax laws, and in treaties between the United States and different countries, which give assurance of fair treatment for American capital.

Many of these countries remember the time when foreign investments were followed by fleets and

armies and colonial domination. They are suspicious of too much talk, and the Communists on the other side never let them forget it. So it appears to me that American or other foreign capital entering any of these underdeveloped areas now will have to come, first, by invitation and on the basis of the country's desires and requests rather than by the old style concession type of development; second, it will be selective rather than general.

I, for one, do not believe that the American taxpayer, through his Government, should put up the investment capital necessary in many of these countries. Neither do I think it is America's responsibility to see that the investments needed are made only by Americans. As a matter of fact, nearly all of the industrial nations can and should take part in this sort of development. I am confident that it must be on a partnership basis and of a nature which will contribute to the economic and social development of the country involved as well as to the profits and economic strength of the foreign investor.

In conclusion, then, you as interested citizens and taxpayers of the United States are entitled to ask: Where do we go from here; what does the United States get out of this effort? To begin with I would say, among other things, the satisfaction that we are accepting some of our responsibilities of world leadership; second, by helping countries to develop their human and material resources, and to raise their standards of living through increased production of goods and materials for human use and for world trade, we move toward a more stable economic situation in these areas and thus improve the outlook for peace.

Third, while the Communists charge that we are doing this in order that the United States will have a cheap source of raw materials, I will meet that challenge by saying that the future peace and well-being of the free world depends on orderly and sound economic development of all its resources, and that the people of the underdeveloped areas have everything to gain from this sort of partnership development.

Last, the increase—even the slightest increase—in the standard of living of these billion people in Point Four areas will improve trade between these areas and the free world. We cannot trade with a pauper, and the best trade the United States enjoys today is with our greatest competitors—Canada, England, France, Western Germany, Japan, and Italy. The United States sold to the industrialized countries some \$5.80 worth of goods per customer last year. We sold only 70 cents worth of goods to the man we've been talking about in the underdeveloped areas. These programs—to use a term used many years ago by a great President—are simply "enlightened self-interest."

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1952, p. 535.

How Shall a Christian Look at Point Four?

by Stephen P. Dorsey
Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs¹

The Point Four Program, as it has come to be called, was set forth formally by President Truman as a "bold new program" in his inaugural address just 4 years ago this January.² Bold though the program may have been, it was not new. As a Government we had been engaging in this type of international humanitarian cooperative action to some degree for many years, and in the other Americas to the south in very considerable volume since 1939. Long before that, private corporations and American missionaries had carried the same concept to every continent. It was in 1834, for example, that Eli Smith, a missionary from Northford, Conn., set up the first Arabic printing press in Syria.

What then is Point Four? What problems does it face? How does it seek to solve them? Why is it of special interest to us as Christians?

The appellation, Point Four, is certainly an inexact term, except that the proposed program was the fourth on President Truman's list of American foreign-policy objectives set forth in his address of January 20, 1949. Yet for want of a better name it caught the public fancy. And as such, American technical cooperation in the international field has come to be known since that date.

This fourth point was as follows:

... we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.

For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques.

¹ Address made at Washington before the Adult Group, Department of Christian Education of the Diocese of Washington, on Feb. 11 (press release S4).

² BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1949, p. 123.

The material resources which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.

... we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.

Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens. . . .

Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.

Example of Bipartisan Policy

This in itself, as I have said, was not a new concept for Americans in or out of government, or indeed for certain other nationalities. However, its announcement by the Chief Executive of the United States as a major national effort in our relations with "have-not" countries, and as an invitation to other "have" countries to join us in that effort, was certainly a bold and forward step. And the interesting fact is that, despite partisan differences regarding other American aid programs during the last 4 years, there has been relatively little dispute over this concept of sharing our wealth of technical knowledge with our less fortunate brothers elsewhere in the world. Indeed, Point Four is a living example of bipartisan foreign policy at its best.

The formal announcement of the program on a world-wide basis invited the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, and labor in this country. From the beginning, voluntary organizations, as widely separated as the National Association of Manufacturers and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, voiced their support of this concept along with the churches which have, I believe, formed its strongest foundation stone. Indeed, it was largely the example set by

our religious missions of all faiths among hungry peoples in many lands which gave us as a nation the vision to adopt as a basic arm of foreign policy a program which in simplest terms would help people to help themselves abolish misery. Our missionaries going out into the world to teach Christian religion have taught—they have not imposed. And they have not confined themselves to teaching—they have practiced Christian Democracy. In their teaching they have shown us the basic principles of working in harmony with foreign peoples as individuals. It is from their experience that we have perhaps come to know best that human understanding cannot be bought as a commodity, but that it *can* be won by the Christian precept of doing unto others as we would have others do unto us. As one observer put it "Our missionaries have lived with the people of the land and not off them, and have brought a message not only of religious salvation but of social enlightenment."

And lest we think that these acts are wasted on those of other faiths, I should like to quote a precept of one of the other two great monotheistic religions written many centuries ago. The Holy Koran states that "The attribute of those who spend their wealth in God's way is like the attribute of a grain which grows into seven ears, in each ear a hundred grains—for them is their reward with their Lord, and there is no fear on them, nor shall they grieve."

Humanitarian and Political Motives

The motives behind Point Four, I believe, are twofold and inextricably interrelated. They are both humanitarian and political. I think we can quickly reject any suggestion that the effort was designed to accelerate a new form of imperialism in the guise of economic development. While economic development is generally good, in and of itself, and while we may hope as an industrial nation for wider markets in a world with greater wealth and a higher standard of living, our record as "a wicked imperialist power" has hardly been effectual in recent years. We allowed the Philippines to obtain independence while we aided her economically. In the Marshall Plan agreements we asked for no special privileges for American citizens from members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. We have permitted much of our postwar assistance to be dispensed through the United Nations and its specialized international agencies.

The gap between the high and low standards of living in the free world today is tremendous, and not comfortable even for most of us on the high side. To many individuals it is a terrible responsibility to be a citizen of the richest and strongest country in the world, and the humanitarian urge as a compulsion for action abroad is not new. For many years, groups within the more developed

countries have sent missionaries, doctors, teachers, agricultural experts, and the like to far away lands with no thought whatsoever of recompense—at least on this earth. The very fact that you and I are here tonight, in this particular church, is in large measure, I think, due to the relatively unappreciated efforts over almost a century of the missionaries sent to these raw Western shores from England by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Ports and the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge.

The emphasis behind Point Four was clearly placed on the real benefit to our country, and to the general welfare of all countries, through the elimination of misery and suffering in substandard areas. This is both humanitarian and political.

Misery and suffering are not new phenomena. But today the contrasts within the world still free from the Communist yoke are very great. Half a billion people have already succumbed to communism. They are learning by tragic experience that promises of food do not banish hunger, nor pledges of freedom blot out the fearful shadow of the slave camps. We cannot blame these people for having been misled, unless we share the blame ourselves. I personally believe that had enough people cared about the Christian missionary program in China, it would not be behind the Iron Curtain today. More important now, however, is to help those who can still be saved.

Now, what are the facts about the free world to which we still have access? What are the facts behind the threat that the peoples of free Asia, Africa, and Latin America—more than a billion—may turn to communism in their determination to find a better daily life for themselves or at least for their children?

Fact number one—The great majority have on the average 25 percent less food than they need for good health.

Fact number two—Two out of three of these men, women, and children suffer all their lives from typhoid, malaria, dysentery, trachoma, bilharzia, and yaws—diseases that are preventable. Average life expectancy is 30 years.

Fact number three—Their annual income averages about 80 dollars—not enough to buy you a full set of Western clothes.

Fact number four—Seven out of ten of these unfortunate people cannot even read the basic teachings of their own religions.

These are the reasons why these peoples of the world are engaged in revolutions which often lack a fair sense of direction, and why they offer a fertile field for the false promises of communism. We cannot content ourselves with the thesis that the whole of the problem is totalitarian aggression. The problem is deeper; it is rebellion against hopelessness in a world of plenty, against early death in an age of miraculous cures, against

ignorance in a new age of learning. The piteous search of millions is for the dignity of man, the basic Christian Democratic principle which dialectic materialism does not recognize.

These facts indicate the humanitarian challenge which inspired the formalization of a technical cooperation program. At the same time, in and of themselves, they form the political problem which the Point Four Program with its strong humanitarian motive seeks to solve.

For they are compounded by another fact. The Soviet Government, not content with dominion over one-sixth of the land area of the earth, has embarked on a campaign to make the whole planet its own. Its system is cruel and hostile enough to pursue a policy of relentless expansion by subversion and by force. At the same time, it is so clever as to employ every false appeal to decent human desires in a campaign of uncertainty and suspicion. With tyranny its aim, materialism is its faith. In its totalitarian ideology, freedom under God has no place, and a nation such as ours cannot endure. Only eyes clouded by fear and starvation can seek food promised by such a voice.

And so, forced by the Kremlin's grim insistence on world conquest, we must forge our weapons strong and invincible. They are made by the hands and minds of men, walking straight and free, each in his own way, to become one with God. Here, production is man's servant, not his master.

But at the same time we must offer to those less fortunate than ourselves, a way. That way is one of a steadily improving material existence and an endlessly fuller spiritual life. That is the problem—the essential problem, and the motive—both humanitarian and political behind Point Four.

There are those who say that we Americans today are ourselves materialists. We, they say, have left behind a faith that inspired our forefathers to build this nation. I grant that on occasion we have swerved from the path. But I would say that we, a young people, have not finished our course. And I believe that the innate, spiritual strength of the United States is still alive and, with all our faults, the most hopeful fact in the world today.

As I have said, we are a young people and—God knows—in many ways a simple one. An agriculturist friend of mine once reminded me that there are few of us today who have not had at least one grandparent who was brought up on a farm. That is a good and healthy bond with these other peoples of whom I have just spoken. Less than four generations ago it took the labor of 85 percent of our forefathers to feed the nation. Today the process is reversed. Through science and technology, hard work and courage, 15 percent of our people feed the nation and have produced enough to keep millions elsewhere from starving. I am proud that as a people we can

speak in one voice of "three generations from shirt sleeves to shirt sleeves" and, at the same time, of the "American dream."

May we keep moving forward, within our borders, in fulfillment of the American dream! Outside it, may we lead the world along the same road! For we hold it to be a matter of God-given law that all men are created equal and that their inalienable rights are those of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. And we cannot work out alone our destiny in this contracted world of chaos today.

Skill and Knowledge To Meet the Challenge

How would the Point Four Program meet this challenge? Basically the means, in simplest terms, is our own skill and knowledge. The late Dr. Henry Garland Bennett, who gave his life on a Point Four mission, once spoke, during the year he served as the Point Four Administrator, of this skill and knowledge in the following terms:

Skill and knowledge adapted to new conditions and environments by men who believe in the brotherhood of mankind which enables Protestant Christian, Roman Catholic Christian, Moslem and Hindu to work and live in harmony according to common principles of right and wrong; skill and knowledge shared so that the man who once plowed with a wooden stick now fashions his own new steel point, so that the man who once grew one bushel of rice and had to beg half the year, now grows two.

American skill and knowledge are flowering abroad today through two principal channels. First, the sending of American experts to underdeveloped countries is affording those countries the benefits of American skills and techniques to help solve—on the ground—local problems in the fields of agriculture, public health, education, and industrial development. At the same time, promising young technicians in the same fields are being taught the latest American methods through training grants with American Government departments, universities, and corporations. There are roughly 1,000 such trainees in the United States today under Point Four auspices, and still more in American educational institutions abroad. The American University at Beirut, founded in 1868 by Presbyterian missionaries, is today training 128 young people from all over the Middle East in these fields under Point Four grants. They comprise only a part of the student body of more than 3,000 in this institution which is endowed primarily with funds contributed by private American sources, including the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations.

Moreover, through the United Nations, regional conferences have been sponsored and experts have been sent out from specialized agencies with enough initials for a lengthy session of anagrams: Wuo (World Health Organization); Fao (Food and Agriculture Organization); Ilo (International Labor Organization); Icao (International

Civil Aviation Organization); UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization); IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development); and, finally, UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East)!

Examples of Point Four Aid

There are some 1,500 Point Four workers abroad in 35 "underdeveloped" countries. (This figure excludes U.S. technical assistance to the Marshall Plan countries of Europe, for administratively speaking, they are not part of Point Four.)

Some Point Four workers abroad are administrative, but others, not included among the 1,500 Point Four workers, are members of private organizations under Point Four contract. Let me give you a few examples of what some of them are doing.

In India, known for its teeming millions and its famines, Horace Holmes, a county agent from Tennessee, has stimulated villagers in an area of 100 square miles to double their production of wheat—the staff of life. He did it primarily by inducing them to plant a different type of seed, actually a type developed not far away in the Punjab, and by suggesting a new type of plow, one with an iron rather than a wooden beam which can be produced for \$3.25 and can do four times as much work and do it more effectively.

In the dry desert land of Saudi Arabia, with its immense oil reserves, Glenn Brown, a water geologist, has traveled thousands of miles in his jeep identifying previously unknown water resources. In a land where water seems scarcer than oil, could we have a better shirt-sleeve ambassador? I might add, incidentally, that Glenn Brown's appointment in September 1950 made him the first Point Four technician in the Arab world.

In Jordan, with the aid of a giant bulldozer, Point Four has cleaned out a great Roman water tank which had been useless for centuries. Nomads may take their flocks to it for the rain water it holds, and others are now being cleaned out. Last winter when there was a cave-in on the Amman-Jericho-Jerusalem Road, Point Four's earth-moving equipment cleaned up the damage in a day or two. It would have taken several weeks by hand. The part of the bulldozer in American diplomacy is greater than is generally realized. I might add that the whole Roman cistern project, including training of Jordanians, was carried out by a private American firm under contract to Point Four.

Baby chicks have been flown to Iran. It has been demonstrated that better breeding and better feeding can increase egg production from 50 to more than 150 per hen per year. I do not pass on these statistics for your practical use, but rather as one of the thousands of examples of how Point Four is helping especially poor and fatalistic

peasants to obtain more food and more income, and to meet the Lord part way.

In Lebanon, 24 U.S. Bureau of Reclamation experts under the Point Four program are concluding a 2-year study of the possibility of harnessing the Litani River basin so that the country will have sufficient electric power to meet the expanding needs of its agriculture, industry, and individuals, and to irrigate new lands. This is not "another survey," for when it is completed this autumn it will be possible for the Lebanese to take it to the banks, and to say in businesslike fashion "What will you charge to finance part of this project?" As well as to say to engineering firms "Here are all the details. Give us a bid and we will consider you for the job."

Private Capital Needed

Point Four's monthly report gets larger each issue. I recently looked at one which required 17 pages merely to list the 35 countries and the broad nature of projects within these countries—"textile training," "babassu nut industry," "tax consultant," "handicrafts," "fishery survey," "highways," "rural education," "maternal and child health plan," "locust spraying," "vocational education," "water resources," etc.

But technical assistance in itself is not enough. Underdeveloped areas must be able to put to use new skills through the provision of capital moving through public and private channels. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development is making available, on a sound basis, capital for the basic necessities of economic development such as transportation, harbors, irrigation, and power.

Through cooperation between government and private sources, measures are being undertaken to reawaken the participation of private venture capital in many specialized applications where private initiative and management experience can open new opportunities in the fields of production and distribution. Thus, private capital can contribute to the expansion of economic opportunity and eventually carry the main burden of development.

The program offers no immediate panacea for the world's ills. It faces a long-term task. There are not enough available technicians or sufficient monies to cure the ills of centuries in a day. But, in my opinion, it offers the best means we have over the years, to establish a new community of nations that is free from fear and immune to false promises.

It has been said that "God works in mysterious ways, his wonders to perform." Can it be that the awful scourge of communism has been held over free man so that he shall at last see with new eyes the misery of his brother and rise to help him? If that be so, we may be the very humble servants called to bring closer the Kingdom here on earth.

I shall not say how a Christian shall look at Point Four. To me it is self-evident. The answer lies in the words of Jesus, who said:

Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee hungered, and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink? When saw we thee a stranger and took thee in? Or naked, and clothed thee? Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee? And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.

Unsettled and Unpaid Claims Against Cuba

Press release 68 dated February 5

On September 4, 1952, the Department of State announced that the Cuban Government had arranged for the reception of unsettled or unpaid claims against that Government that arose prior to October 10, 1940, and that have not been adjudicated in the Cuban courts.¹

The Department of State has been informed that the time for the submission of such claims (previously indicated to have been February 5, 1953) has been extended by the Cuban Government to June 4, 1953.²

It is suggested that all those who have pending claims of the above description against the Cuban Government, and who have not received a copy of a memorandum issued by the Department of State on September 2, 1952, containing instructions made public by the Cuban Government for the preparation and submission of such claims, should promptly communicate with the Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Washington 25, D. C., and it will furnish a copy of the memorandum upon request.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 22, 1952, p. 454.

² On Feb. 9 the Department announced (press release 77) that it had also been informed that the Cuban Government requires that all claims applications submitted to it shall be prepared in the Spanish language, in duplicate, and that all documents in the English language in support of the claims shall be accompanied by translations into the Spanish language, in duplicate.

Lord Ismay To Visit U.S.

Press release 88 dated February 13

Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Vice Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, will pay a visit to the United States in March at the invitation of the U.S. Government. Since his appointment in April 1952, Lord Ismay has already visited five other NATO countries: Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Italy, and the Netherlands, at the invitation of their Governments.

During his visit Lord Ismay will be accompanied by Lady Ismay and by a small staff from the International Secretariat. He will arrive in the United States on March 11. His visit will include several days in Washington where he will call on President Eisenhower and on high officials concerned with NATO affairs.

He will also visit the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (Admiral Lynde D. McCormick, USN) at Norfolk, Va. He will return to New York on March 19 and sail for Europe on March 21.

Indictment Brought Against Arms Export Violators

Press release 86 dated February 12

The Department has been advised by the U.S. Attorney at Dallas that on February 12 a Federal Grand Jury at Dallas returned an indictment charging 11 persons with conspiracy to violate the arms-export provisions of the Neutrality Act which are administered by the Department.

This indictment follows several months of intensive investigation by various U.S. agencies of the unlicensed traffic in arms across the Mexican border. These investigations were conducted by special agents of the Office of Security of this Department and the customs agents of the Bureau of Customs with close cooperation of the Mexican authorities.

It is hoped that the action instituted at Dallas and the continuing investigation of arms export violations will provide a deterrent to this traffic.

The Cold War and the United Nations

by Ernest A. Gross

Deputy U. S. Representative to the United Nations¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated February 3

Most of us have at one time or another wondered why the Soviet Government thought it useful or necessary to sign the U.N. Charter. For surely the Charter is not only the antithesis of everything international communism stands for, but it has been proved over and over again that the Kremlin leaders never had the slightest intention of complying with the Charter in the first place.

Soviet adherence to a system of international cooperation was, of course, rooted in a cynical interpretation of Soviet self-interest. For this reason, there are a few who argue that the mere fact that the Soviet Government joined is clear evidence that we were foolish to have done so, and for that matter, that we should "pull out" precisely because the Soviets have stayed in. There may be a certain allure in forming policy on the basis of doing everything contrariwise to the Soviets. However, most people hesitate to let the Kremlin navigate our ship, which they could thus do, merely by pointing our compass south if they wanted to send us north.

My reason for mentioning Soviet adherence to the Charter is not to speculate concerning their motives for doing so. The stark fact is that the Soviet system is in open revolt against the Charter. The question arises whether, under that circumstance, the United Nations has a survival value, either from the point of view of our national interest in particular or that of the free world in general.

It is necessary to appraise the United Nations in the light of its original purposes, its method of operation, and our own stake in it. But, more particularly, we must consider where the United Nations is left—and where we are left—by reason of what I have called the Soviet revolt against the Charter.

¹Address made on Feb. 4 at the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania at Philadelphia.

These are the questions with which I now propose to deal.

Nature and Purposes of the U.N.

Like all determined efforts to achieve collective security, the United Nations was born of the greatest of all "collective insecurities"; that is, a world war. One frequently hears the question asked whether it is possible to develop a workable system for collective security in the presentday world. The question is a fair one, but I suspect it means different things to different people because of the many variables of the definition of the term "collective security." I must confess that, as I define the term, the question does not arise at all. To me, collective security is merely a way of describing the objective of sharing the burdens and responsibilities of common defense. To the extent that common interests are identified and common exertions made to carry them out, there is a growing, constantly changing, dynamic creation of collective security.

The United Nations represents the high point, up to this moment of recorded history, of worldwide effort to identify common interests and to develop procedures for sharing the burdens of common defense of those interests.

The U.N. Charter does not commit the error of interpreting too narrowly the interests which men share merely by reason of being members of the human society. It recognizes the diverse and widespread enemies to these common human interests. Nor does the Charter err by giving short weight or measure to the means by which these enemies can be cooperatively faced.

To put it more plainly, the Charter counts among the enemies of decent human society not only aggression and imperialisms great and small, but also those equally ancient enemies of man: disease, poverty, illiteracy, and slavery. Therefore, when I define collective security as the means

of sharing the burdens of common defense, I include these among the enemies and perils against which we erect our defenses.

The primary specific purposes of the U.N. Charter are (1) the maintenance of international peace and security, and (2) the promotion of conditions in the world which, in the language of the Charter, are "necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations" (article 55). It is obvious these two primary purposes are interrelated. For example, we find that international disputes frequently involve differences of view regarding the method and timing for giving effect to the Charter principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Generally, with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security, the functions of the United Nations are conceived to be to assist in the settlement of disputes and to take action to prevent breach of the peace or to repel aggression.

The framers of the Charter draw a distinction between procedures for settling international disputes (as to which no organ of the United Nations was given power to make enforceable decisions) and action in the case of breach of the peace. The United Nations is a voluntary association of sovereign states. Few, if any of them, were willing to vest in an organization that degree of sovereignty which would be involved in dictating the terms of the settlement of a dispute. Would the people of the United States be willing to delegate to the United Nations, or any other body, the right, let us say, to award the Panama Canal to another state in the unlikely event that we found ourselves involved in a dispute with another state which laid claim to the Canal?

Nevertheless, the General Assembly and the Security Council may *recommend* terms of settlement of a dispute. Hence, the distinction drawn in the Charter between disputes and breaches of the peace is more theoretical than real.

With regard to action to prevent breaches of the peace (as distinguished from the settlements of disputes) or to restore international peace or security if it has been broken, the decision and enforcement powers of the United Nations were deliberately limited by the veto. I think it is important to evaluate correctly the problem created by the Soviet abuse of the veto. There is no doubt the Soviet Government has abused its reserved power, but this, along with the Soviet boycott and walkout, is merely a symptom of its general attitude of defiance and revolt against the Charter.

I think it is illusory to blame the voting procedure as the cause of difficulty, rather than as a symptom of the disease. Nor do I believe that the major powers, including the U. S. Government or people, would favor a change in the Charter leaving to majority vote decisions involving the use of force or matters closely connected therewith. That is my personal view.

It is also the view of such an expert on the Charter as Dr. Pasvolsky, who, incidentally, has pointed out the fact that the possible effect of the voting arrangements agreed upon at San Francisco was foreseen. He says:

There were no illusions as to the limitations that such an arrangement would impose upon the effectiveness of the proposed organization, nor as to the possibility that the great privilege which the major nations thus claimed for themselves might be abused. . . . The underlying theory, however, was that if one of the major nations were to prove recalcitrant, or were to refuse to abide by the rules of international behavior that were being inscribed in the Charter, a situation would be created in which the recalcitrant nation might have to be coerced; and it was apparent that no major nation could be coerced except by the combined forces of the other major nations. This would be the equivalent of a world war, and a decision to embark upon such a war would necessarily have to be made by each of the other major nations for itself and not by any international organization.

I think this analysis is borne out by the disposition of a similar question arising under the North Atlantic Treaty. It will be recalled that article 5, the heart of the treaty, provides that in the event of an armed attack against any party to the treaty, each other party will take, and I quote, "such action as it deems necessary" to restore and maintain the security of the area. This language was, of course, carefully considered, and, although it is a commitment of the highest moral value, I believe that its explicit reservation of the right of unilateral decision is relevant to an appraisal of the question whether the U. S. Government would be prepared completely to forego its veto power.

This is not to say that we, the U. S. Government, have not sought consistently to limit the area in which the veto is used. I, myself, voiced the attitude of our Government on this matter during a meeting of the Security Council in 1950 in which I said: "It is the policy of the United States to restrict the use of the veto by extending whenever possible, by example, by precedent or by agreement, the area of Security Council action in which the veto is not applicable." The fact remains that each of the major powers, without any illusions on the subject, kept in its own pocket a key with which it could lock the door to substantive decisions by the Security Council.

However, it is true nevertheless that this fact has proved to be of little significance principally for two reasons. In the first place, as has already been pointed out, the same Soviet intransigence which accounts for its abuse of the veto power would also have led the Kremlin to do what it could to obstruct the carrying out of decisions of which it disapproved. And the facts of power being what they are, an attempt to coerce Soviet compliance would involve the highest policy for each state in determining its own course of action.

Second, a U. N. *recommendation*, as distinguished from a Security Council decision, has a political and moral compulsive quality which I

do not believe was fully appreciated at San Francisco. One has to observe the vehemence, not to say violence of arguments for or against a resolution, proposed for adoption by the General Assembly relating to, let us say, human rights, self-determination, Palestine, disarmament—to give but a few illustrations—to realize how much importance is attached to recommendations by the General Assembly. And it should be remembered that the General Assembly, under the Charter, has no power to make decisions, but is limited entirely to recommendations. Moreover, it is revealing that from the very start of the aggression in Korea, both the Security Council and the General Assembly have limited themselves to making recommendations to member states. Nor was it the threat of the veto that produced this result in the Security Council in June and July of 1950, inasmuch as the Soviet representative was not present in the chamber for these meetings.

These considerations, I think, have a direct bearing upon an appraisal of the value of the United Nations in the painful and patient efforts to develop a collective-security system. The veto-free General Assembly, where the organized community of nations passes moral and political judgments, assumes more and more importance as Soviet intransigence becomes more and more obvious. It has been possible by procedural means wholly within the Charter to make the General Assembly a more workable mechanism for the purpose of dealing with disputes and threats to the peace. This was, of course, done through the Uniting for Peace Resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1950.

I turn now to the second major purpose of the United Nations; that is, the promotion of world conditions necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations. The work of the specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and the like, as well as the work of the Technical Assistance program, the activities of the Economic and Social Council in the field of human rights, and the supervision by the Trusteeship Council of areas of the world which do not govern themselves—all these activities I shall not do more than mention. Their basic importance is too well understood to require argument.

The point I wish to stress here, however, is that the framers of the Charter were aware that such matters as higher standards of living, full employment, health, cultural and educational problems, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms—that all these matters are basic to conditions of stability and well being which, and I again quote the words of the Charter, are “necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations.” It is in this way that the Charter identifies that common interest which must underlie common effort.

The fact that the Soviet Government fails to

cooperate or to contribute toward efforts to deal with common problems does not diminish the necessity for facing them. I do not suppose anyone would argue that the World Health Organization should be disbanded because the Russians are not members. Yet, this is precisely what would happen if the advice were heeded of those who advocate disbanding the United Nations on the ground that the Soviet Government is not carrying out its Charter obligations.

Our Stake in the U.N. Future

This leads me to consideration of the future of the United Nations and our stake in it, keeping in mind the nature and purposes of the organization as I have attempted to outline them above.

It has become somewhat fashionable to say that part of the difficulty faced by the United Nations at home arises from the fact that it was “oversold” to the American people. Perhaps this is the right word—I do not wish to quibble about the word—but I wonder whether it would not be more accurate to say its nature and purposes were *misunderstood*, rather than *overvalued*.

It is true that certain assumptions, or I should say hopes, were in the air at San Francisco. These included the hope that the peace treaties would be speedily settled, that those who suffered so grievously, including the Soviets, would be willing to cooperate to restore their economies and rebuild their cities, and that the horrors of the war would have taught even the Communists the values of collective measures against aggression. The frustration of these hopes, however, has not, in my judgment, invalidated the premises upon which the United Nations was founded. To the contrary, I believe the very frustration of these hopes has underscored the necessity for carrying on the effort. I say this because the United Nations was not born of these hopes, but as a response to a perceived need, created by what I have referred to as the “collective insecurity” of two world wars. The hopes I have mentioned generated a degree of enthusiasm in support of these efforts. And it is natural that the frustration of the hopes has diminished the enthusiasm.

However, it is a dangerous *non sequitur* to argue from this that the abandonment of the hopes justifies the abandonment of the organization. I think we would all agree that if Soviet obstruction in the United Nations outweighed the advantages we derive from carrying on the organization as now constituted, we should indeed withdraw. The answer depends, among other things, upon an analysis of what are the objectives of our leadership, and what is our national self-interest in this matter.

Starting from the definition of collective security, which strikes me as a realistic one—the objective of sharing the burdens and responsibilities of common defense—it follows that it is in our en-

lightened self-interest to develop this community of interest and effort to the maximum practicable extent.

I do not believe it is a digression to consider at this point the nature of our system, particularly as contrasted to that of the international Communist conspiracy. Our society is, of course, based upon a moral and legal structure. This is exemplified by the Constitution with its Bill of Rights, the device of the truly secret ballot to select our leaders and the tradition of accountability of those leaders. Ours is a society which reflects the optimistic assumption that human beings by nature desire to cooperate with each other to their mutual benefit, and that the creation of conditions in which such cooperation can be carried on is the first duty of a society. Free exchange of ideas and information, the maintenance of conditions of health and welfare, and loyalty to a code of ethics and morality form the sinews of our social structure.

The totalitarian system, classically illustrated by Soviet communism, is, on the contrary, founded on pessimism. The urge to unrestrained power, to aggression, and to dictatorship may be explained as an expression of a philosophy which I would call the "expectation of evil." It is not enough to explain Soviet imperialism as being based on a fear of encirclement. The question is why do totalitarian systems characteristically fear encirclement? Why, in particular, does the Soviet ideology base its system not only upon a preconceived hostility to our way of life, but also upon an inner compulsion as well as an avowed commitment to destroy it?

Dictatorships can only be maintained by suspicious and fearful men who expect evil from their fellow men. Success in the competition for power goes to him who most ruthlessly acts on the basis of fear and suspicion, who most cleverly rationalizes his ruthlessness, and who never for a moment relaxes his expectation of evil from his colleagues. These he regards as fellow-conspirators rather than as friendly associates.

A contrast between the assumptions on which their system and ours is based goes to the root of the problem as how best to organize the international society to deal with the menace with which our own way of life is confronted.

There is an important principle to be deduced from the fact that both their system and ours, contrasting as they may be, have one attribute in common; that is, that they as well as we are driven by a law of human conduct to apply the same standards in their dealings abroad which they apply in their relationships at home. We have all observed the practice of Soviet representatives in the United Nations of putting forward positions which are, in themselves, extreme. We have seen that they put forward these extreme positions with an air of finality which discourages negotiation

and often with attacks on motive as well as with a violence of expression which offends the listener.

Visitors to the U.N. debates often wonder why the Kremlin leaders ordain the use of these techniques and whether they hope or expect to convince anyone by them. However if one follows, even casually, the methods of expression used by the ruling group within the Soviet Union itself—in speeches by party leaders, in periodicals, and radio broadcasts—one finds exactly the same manner as is employed by Soviet representatives in international forums such as the United Nations.

The objective both at home and abroad is not to convince, but to coerce. Coercion and fear are woven into the police-state fabric as part of its very nature.

Soviet representatives to the United Nations are themselves driven by fear with a close checkrein.

Now, with respect to our own system, there is a healthy and inevitable demand that our spokesmen well and truly reflect the American tradition and way of life. The public opinion which guides and restrains the government of a democracy forbids governmental spokesmen in international forums, even for short periods or on specific issues, from putting up a false front.

Accordingly, for quite different reasons, we find that both in the case of a democratic society and of a police state, there is an apparently inexorable "law of consistency" which can be simply stated: It is impossible for a society to reserve one set of standards to be used at home and apply another set of standards in its dealings abroad.

The identity between the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Constitution of the United States is often overlooked or forgotten. The principles of the Charter are not only a direct reflection of our own culture and traditions, but they are at the same time principles to which men of all races, places, and religions respond and lay claim. It is to our clear advantage that governments throughout the world be committed to them.

Why We Should Support and Strengthen the U.N.

I would list the following four principal reasons why it is in our national interest to support the United Nations and seek to strengthen it.

1. It is probably the most potent and certainly the most convenient method of identifying interests common to the free world and of stimulating common effort to meet dangers confronting those interests.

The United States, richly endowed as it is, has acquired a position of leadership in the world by reason of forces beyond its control—forces which shape the destinies of nations as well as of man. The power, which is ours by nature, and which we constantly generate by reason of the excellence of our system and our attributes, is one of the important facts of international life. However, as Pres-

ident Roosevelt said in his last message on the state of the Union (January 1945):²

... in a democratic world, as in a democratic nation, power must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good.

Our whole system is based upon the proposition that power is not an end in itself and that force, like fire, is a friend of man only when it is managed and controlled. As the historian, Bagehot, said: "It is the function of force to give moral ideas time to take root."

The United Nations is therefore the link between power and responsibility.

For a democracy, world leadership can be maintained only by following the rules of behavior—the code of responsibility—which shapes its own society at home. The essential bond is moral unity, and this can only be based upon a knowledge of common objectives and confidence in our integrity. The U.N. Charter defines the common objectives of a free society. Our commitment to carry them out builds confidence in our sense of responsibility. Moreover, the United Nations is one of a set of mechanisms, however imperfect, designed to carry out these common objectives.

I stress the fact that the United Nations is but one mechanism. It was never intended to supplant other forms of diplomatic, political, and economic intercourse.

2. The second important consideration, which flows from what I have just said, is that the United Nations provides the framework and the foundation for regional organizations and other collective activities to keep the peace.

As one looks back, for example, to the debates in the Senate which attended the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and as one reads the report of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, one is struck by the close relationships which were perceived between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations.

Thus, the Foreign Relations Committee was at pains to emphasize that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not what it called "an old-fashioned military alliance," but that, if it could be called an alliance at all, it is, in the words of the Committee, "an alliance against war itself." Truly this is a concept which is justified, but which I submit can be justified *only* on the basis that NATO is designed as a fortress to defend the Charter.

The United Nations is the rock upon which this and other regional fortresses are built. It is, moreover, important that we should not become confused as to which is the rock and which the fortress.

The foundation supplied by the United Nations

for collective action is, of course, most dramatically illustrated by Korea. The United Nations, during the current session of the General Assembly, achieved its greatest moral unity with regard to the Korean aggression when 54 nations voted for a resolution sponsored by the Government of India.³ In supporting this resolution, the entire free world rallied around the moral principle that the prisoners of war should not be forced against their will to return to slavery or death.

The Communist aggressors in Korea, together with their Soviet sponsors and supporters, have been morally isolated by this unanimity. The consequences are bound to be far reaching, particularly in those areas of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East which have now declared their allegiance to the standards of morality in which they have such a deep and common interest. For, in the last analysis, it must be clear that the Communist aggression in Korea, if it had been permitted to go unchecked, would have extinguished one of the oldest and proudest nationalist movements in the world—that of the Koreans. The preservation of this nationalism is therefore symbolic of the principle of self-determination, which is both the goal and the aspiration of populations in many areas of the world. Korea is an example of how a common interest can be identified and supported. For here we have seen the growth of a realization among 54 nations of the world that they have a common interest not only in resisting aggression, but also in supporting a nationalist movement which has survived a history of oppression and subjugation.

3. A third consideration justifying our support of the United Nations is the importance of developing methods to aid in settling international disputes.

I do not believe this point requires an extended justification. However, it is an objective which takes on a particular urgency in the face of Soviet attempts to exploit all disagreements and disputes arising in the free world. This is, of course, particularly true with respect to disputes involving national aspirations for self-government and independence. The relative ease with which these moves can be subverted has always been recognized in Communist dogma. In 1924, for example, Marshal Stalin said: "The national movements for the freeing of the oppressed countries from the imperialist yoke contain unexhausted revolutionary possibilities."

Similarly, with respect also to disputes not involving so-called "colonialism," the Soviet Government passes up few opportunities to fish in troubled waters. A year ago, the Soviet representative in the Security Council suddenly intervened in a debate concerning the dispute between India and Pakistan over the disposition of the

² BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1945, p. 26.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1952, p. 916.

State of Kashmir.⁴ The burden of the Soviet intervention was to attack the honored and respected U.N. representative as a "tool and spy of Wall Street imperialism." He also assailed the motives of the United States and the United Kingdom, professing the absurd belief that it was our objective to gain control of the State of Kashmir for some sordid purposes of our own.

We are preoccupied quite understandably with problems caused by the tensions between the Soviet system and the free world. However, we should not permit ourselves to disregard the fact that the problems which divide and separate the free world, within itself, are serious and that some of the greatest successes of the United Nations in its short history have been the settlement of these conflicts or the bringing about of the end of armed warfare. Illustrations may be found in Indonesia, Palestine, and Kashmir.

4. Finally, it is essential for us to support the constructive work of the United Nations in the economic and social fields. These are the problems which form the highest common denominators of interest in binding together the peoples of the world—those who are free and those who wish to be free.

"Kicking the Russians Out"

I concede that one may accept everything I have said up to this point as justifying our continued participation in and support of the United Nations, and yet ask whether it would not be better from our point of view if the Soviet Government and its satellites were not in the organization. This is more popularly referred to as "kicking the Russians out." It is a legitimate question, and I should like to deal with it, expressing purely personal views.

I have already said that if we should conclude that Soviet participation in the United Nations is disadvantageous to our enlightened self-interest, it would be foolish for us to continue to support the organization as presently constituted. It is my contention that the interests of the free world and the principles of the Charter, which reflect those interests, are better served by our not disbanding and destroying the organization. That would, of course, be the result of our withdrawal. There is no way of expelling the Soviet Government, even if this should be desired, inasmuch as the Soviet Government could veto an attempt to deprive it of U.N. membership. But I assume that when people talk about "kicking the Russians out," they realize this, and what they really mean is that we should withdraw and, so to speak, "take the United Nations Charter with us." Incidentally I am not certain whether, under such

circumstances, our copyright would be universally recognized!

Now, as I see it, there are a number of advantages which accrue to the free world from Soviet membership in the organization. And this, despite the fact that the Soviet Government and its satellites have failed to participate in the constructive work of the organization, have abused their veto power, and have in other ways carried on their revolt against the Charter system. Indeed, I think it may be said fairly that in any real sense of the word the Soviet Government has never really "joined" the United Nations. But they are members and, except for a relatively brief period of general walk-out on the Chinese representation issue, they attend meetings of the Security Council, of the General Assembly, and of other principal organs of the United Nations.

I think one may list the following advantages to us in their continuing to do so, if it is in fact their intention to do so.

In the first place, their commitment to the Charter is a convenient and I should say important method of holding them accountable. It is important to realize that the Charter is a code of conduct which is inconsistent with, and excludes the ideology of, international communism. Although, of course, they only pay lip service to the Charter, nevertheless, whatever the reason they may have had in signing the Charter, they did sign a covenant at San Francisco which is an anti-Marxist "manifesto." They find themselves now either in open revolt against the Charter, or forced to resort to fraud and distortion in their pretenses at carrying it out.

It is of some significance that they have never, so far as I am aware, admitted to departing from the requirements of the Charter. They have always, on the contrary, gone to extreme lengths to profess adherence to it and pay lip service to it.

It would serve no useful purpose that I can see to release them from their pledges, however much they may violate them in practice.

Second, they are subject to psychological, moral, and political pressures in the U. N. forum. The United Nations is inherently what might be called an "open system." There is no room within the United Nations for secret conspiracies, plots, or hiding places. The pressures of the forum are intangible but nevertheless real. And I believe that the proof of this may be found in the extreme lengths to which Soviet spokesmen often go in attempting to rationalize or justify courses of action, however false their explanation may be.

Third, and I would in many ways regard this as the most important consideration of all—they are constantly forced to reveal the true nature and purposes of the Soviet system. The debate on the Korean question which took place in the first part of the seventh session of the General Assembly illuminates this point.

Mr. Vyshinsky, at one point while arguing

⁴ For an account of Jacob Malik's intervention in January 1952, see *ibid.*, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 665.

against the principle that prisoners of war should be free to decide whether they wished repatriation, startled the Political Committee by baldly proclaiming that the prisoner had no will other than the will of the state.

It is difficult to dissemble in an open forum, and Soviet lies are easily unmasked. The United Nations is the supreme forum of self-revelation and I do not believe the Soviet system comes out of this market place for trading ideas with better bargains than we do.

Fourth, their presence in the organization and the processes of the organization itself enable weak or wavering states to cooperate with us without the appearance of choosing sides. It is perhaps unfortunate that neutralism or tendencies toward "third force" positions exist, but they do constitute facts of international life.

I have no doubt that it was considerably easier for the small states represented on the Security Council to vote in 1946 to call upon the Soviet Government to withdraw troops from Iran than it would have been for those states to have made separate diplomatic representations to the Soviet Foreign Office on this issue.

Finally, I think it is of value that the Soviet representatives are available for discussion. The example which leaps to mind is of course the informal discussions which led to the lifting of the Berlin blockade. I think it is unlikely that we shall, at least for a long time, be able to conclude so-called "general settlements" with the Soviet leaders. It is much more likely that the discussion and exploration of specific issues may perhaps over a long period produce a certain measure of agreement. Accordingly, it is of value to have a forum in which constant contact of individuals representing the respective governments may facilitate the exploration of these matters in a routine fashion.

The question is sometimes asked why, since the Soviet Government has unquestionably sponsored and supported the Korean aggression, they should be permitted to retain membership in the United Nations. I have already pointed out there is no way of expelling them, since they can veto a decision of that sort.

Even if this were not so, I think it does not take full account of the realities of the situation to regard membership in the United Nations as a sort of badge of merit. There are advantages in universal membership, even including recalcitrants, for reasons which I have just attempted to explain. However, one must distinguish here between the problem presented by the application of certain states for membership in the United Nations, since here the standards for admission are prescribed in article 4 of the Charter. So long as article 4 provides, as it does, that membership in the United Nations is open to peace-loving states which accept the Charter obligations and in the judgment of the organization are able and willing

to carry out these obligations, such a judgment must be made in good faith. It is indeed difficult to say that states such as Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania are "peace-loving" or "are able and willing to carry out the obligations of the U. N. Charter."

It may be that it would have been wiser to omit these qualifications for new membership. Personally, I find it a cause of some regret that the Charter was written in this way. However, so long as these conditions for membership are imposed, I see no alternative but to honor them. Subject to this, I believe that the wider the membership of the United Nations, the more advantageous to the interests of the free world.

I should like to conclude by quoting remarks which I set down in print about 2 years ago, which I believe were timely then and, if anything, more timely now:

The United Nations is not a mere Charter of Containment. It is, potentially, a Charter of Liberation. It pledges liberation from the age-old enemies of poverty, disease, and fear of conquest.

The Charter is a magnet drawing vast populations who see in the Charter the expression of their hope and determination to live their own lives in well-being and freedom.

Our purpose is to make the magnet irresistible, strongly charging it with our own support and our own strength.

Even within the slave world of the Soviet Union and its satellites, there is now unrest and ferment. When national aspirations are subverted, when human aspirations are suppressed, an explosive force is built up. What that force can do when it generates sufficient pressure, we have already seen, and seen with encouragement, in the successful effort of Yugoslavia to free itself from Soviet domination. These same forces are at work in Eastern Europe and we may expect that in the course of time they will assert themselves in China, too. The free world will expand because men everywhere want to be free.

Every advance we make in the struggle for liberation is a step toward a world in which the Soviet leaders will be compelled to practice as well as to preach the doctrine of peaceful co-existence. When this has been achieved, peaceful co-existence may develop into mutual cooperation. Then the people of Russia as well as those in the satellite states, will once again take their rightful place in the family of mankind.

U.S. Transmits Report on Katyn Forest Massacre to U.N.

U.S./U.N. press release dated February 10

On February 10, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. representative to the United Nations, transmitted the following communication to Secretary-General Trygve Lie:

EXCELLENCY: On September 18, 1951, the House of Representatives of the United States Congress provided for the establishment of a Committee to conduct an investigation and study the facts, evidence, and circumstances of the Katyn massacre, committed against thousands of Polish Army officers and civilians during World War II.

The Committee held hearings in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy. In the course of its inquiry into the responsibility for the massacre the Committee heard testimony from 81 witnesses, studied 183 exhibits, and studied and received 100 depositions taken from witnesses who could not appear at the hearings. In addition, the Committee staff has questioned more than 200 other individuals who offered to appear as witnesses but whose information was mostly of a corroborative nature. The account of the Committee's inquiry is set forth in the seven volumes entitled "Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", two sets of which I have the honor to transmit with this communication. The findings and conclusions on this phase of the Committee's inquiry are contained in the Interim Report.

I am enclosing 70 copies of the Interim Report¹ with the request that you transmit a copy of the Interim Report together with a copy of this communication to the Representative of each Member of the United Nations as a matter pertaining to United Nations objectives in the field of Human Rights.

It will be noted that the Interim Report contains references to the "Hearings" referred to above and enclosed herewith. May I ask you to make these volumes available to any Representative who may wish to refer to them.

Accept, Excellency, etc.

HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Mexican Agricultural Workers. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2328. Pub. 4432. 15 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico—Signed at México Mar. 9, 1951; entered into force Mar. 9, 1951.

Agricultural Experiment Station in Bolivia. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2353. Pub. 4469. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—Signed at La Paz Dec. 30, 1946, and May 16, 1947; entered into force May 16, 1947; operative retroactively Jan. 1, 1947.

Education, Cooperative Program in Bolivia. Treaties

¹ H. Rept. 2430 (82d Cong., 2d sess.) dated July 2, 1952.

and Other International Acts Series 2465. Pub. 4697. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—Signed at La Paz July 24 and Dec. 13, 1951; entered into force Dec. 13, 1951.

American Dead in World War II, Hamm Military Cemetery. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2445. Pub. 4703. 6 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Luxembourg—Signed at Luxembourg Mar. 20, 1951; entered into force June 11, 1952.

Aerial Mapping, Pacific Area Project. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2407. Pub. 4712. 28 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and France—Signed at Paris Nov. 27, 1948; entered into force Nov. 27, 1948.

Weather Stations, Pacific Ocean Interim Program. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2488. Pub. 4717. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada amending agreement of Feb. 16, 1951—Dated at Ottawa Jan. 22 and Feb. 22, 1952; entered into force Feb. 22, 1952.

THE DEPARTMENT

Confirmation

Donald B. Lourie

The Senate on February 13 confirmed Donald B. Lourie as Under Secretary for Administration.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Feb. 9-14, 1953

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

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†80	2/10	WHO discussions at Geneva
81	2/11	Tax treaty with Germany discussed
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†83	2/11	Cabot: Inter-American Ecosoc
84	2/11	Dorsey: Review of Point Four
*85	2/12	Point 4 technicians graduate
86	2/12	Indictment of arms export violators
87	2/12	Dulles: Report on European trip
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† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Berlin: Outpost of Western Civilization

by James B. Conant

*U.S. High Commissioner for Germany*¹

Only a week ago, I assumed the office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. Mrs. Conant arrived in Bonn last Friday. We have come to Berlin as soon as possible, because we believe that this city has deep significance for the future of free men and women all over the world. I bring to the citizens of Berlin heartfelt greetings from the people of my country, the United States of America.

At the ceremony yesterday, when I signed the Golden Book, I congratulated Mayor Reuter on the boldness and vigor with which this city has carried on. I told him how, during the Berlin blockade, all of us in the United States eagerly scanned news each day from this city and how we admired the steadfast spirit of its citizens. For us, Berlin became a symbol of courage. In my youth, Berlin was famous as a center for music, art, and science, as well as being a great industrial center. In recent years it has acquired still another crown of glory. Today, it is famous as an outpost of Western civilization. It is the home of brave men and women who continue the tradition of European culture in the face of the attempts of the Soviets to enforce a new type of alien culture and fasten a tyranny upon free people.

Speaking as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, let me make plain at the outset the position of my Government. The new administration in Washington will not abandon Berlin. The United States is pledged to do its part to see to it that this city continues as an unshaken outpost of the Western world. We shall continue to insist on the free circulation throughout the entire city. We shall continue to fulfill our duties and to maintain our rights. Our rights as a joint occupying power in Berlin derive from the defeat and surrender of Germany and are defined in the agreements of the Four Powers.

Unfortunately, neither the spirit nor the letter

¹ Translation of an address made in German over RIAS on Feb. 18; printed from telegraphic text.

of these agreements is being carried out in one sector of this city. The United States, in cooperation with the other two Western Powers, is determined to keep open the lines of communications with Berlin. I can assure you there will be no faltering in our determination.

I have come to Berlin to remind the Berliners once again that they are in no sense inhabitants of a forgotten city, quite the contrary. Everyone in the United States knows full well that here the two contending forces of this mid-twentieth century stand face to face. The refugees who are daily crossing from the East zone to the West provide tragic evidence of what all Germany could expect if Germany were unified on Soviet terms. You here in Berlin need not be told that the reunification of Germany, which is an objective of my Government, can only be contemplated in terms of extending, not limiting, the freedom enjoyed by three sectors of this city. Unity in freedom is our goal.

Problem of Refugees

The increasing number of refugees presents a grave problem. My Government has asked me to confer with Mayor Reuter and Chancellor Adenauer with a view to determining what additional measures might be taken by the U.S. Government to assist in the situation.

President Eisenhower has asked me to thank Mayor Reuter for his message in which he has explained the urgency of the problem. I shall during the next few days discuss with Mayor Reuter and Chancellor Adenauer the exact nature of the present emergency requirements and the ways in which the U.S. Government might assist in dealing with them.

I am going to study as rapidly as I can how the conditions of life of this city can be improved and its economy made more healthy and how the unemployment may be drastically reduced. That we shall work toward a goal of making this city a

healthy industrial center is the assurance I can give you at this time.

It is nearly 30 years since I last visited this city. It is nearly 20 years since I was last in Germany. On all of the terrible things that have happened since 1933 in this former prosperous and free nation I shall not dwell. But I cannot help thinking back to the period when I visited the University of Berlin, the famous Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Research, and the *Technische Hochschule*. I had already visited such famous centers as Heidelberg, Munich, and Goettingen. These I shall be able to revisit in the next few months, and I am looking forward to seeing them once again flourishing as centers of German scholarship and science.

But I cannot travel to the universities and technical high schools located in Leipzig, Dresden, and Jena, though I would like to do so because I remember well how much of German science and learning was represented in the 20's in those German cities. Moreover, Leipzig was a great publishing center for the entire world. German science and learning do not now flourish in those universities because of the actions of the Soviet leaders. No listener to my voice in the Soviet zone needs to be told how and why this has occurred. The destruction of academic freedom and the imposition of the tyranny of the one-party system are too well known to you to require a further explanation. Nor do you need to be reminded of the existence of concentration camps on German soil, nor of the failure of the Soviets to return prisoners of war nearly 8 years after hostilities have ceased. In the Potsdam agreements the Soviets joined in promising that freedom of speech, press, and religion would be permitted in Germany. How little have these promises been honored! The contrast between the Humboldt University and the Free University of Berlin is eloquent on this point.

To Eastern Listeners of the Voice of Freedom

A puppet regime backed by Soviet arms may stifle professors and may force students to study a new and alien philosophy. Travelers from outside may be halted at the barriers: books may be destroyed and letters censored. But in these days the voice of freedom can be heard even through the Iron Curtain. To those, therefore, who are enduring with patience and with fortitude the heavy hand of Soviet occupation and Communist enslavement, I bring special greetings from the United States. Because your fellow Germans of the West sectors of Berlin and in the Federal Republic are standing firm, you too will some day, I feel sure, be united with them and under conditions which insure a democratic free government of your own choosing. This is an important objective of U.S. policy.

Another objective is to assist in making Western

Europe defensible. You in the East zone have been misled as regards the aims of the European Defense Community. No instrument of aggression is being forged. It is the aim of the European Defense Community to defend Europe against aggression. When the treaties have been ratified, as I believe they will be in the coming months, the basis will have been laid for the participation of the Federal Republic in that defense. Berlin, however, will continue to be the responsibility of the United States, France, and Great Britain. But as the strength of a new Europe develops and the new idea of European unity proves its worth, changes must certainly occur. The frontiers of freedom will peacefully expand and Berlin will then no longer be an isolated citadel. Until this time comes, the insurance of its freedom and industrial prosperity must depend on the strength of the Western World, and that strength will not fail.

U.S., Germany Implementing Report on Berlin Economy

Long-range proposals, recommended by Richardson Wood and Company, looking toward continued strengthening of the Berlin economy, increased employment, and higher levels of production and economic activity have been taken up for discussion by U.S. and German officials, according to Mutual Security Agency (MSA) announcement of February 13.

As the result of intensive study by all agencies concerned, progress is already being made in implementing some of the proposals. Discussions have been held between representatives of the Federal European Recovery Program, Economic and Finance Ministries, the Berlin Senate, and the MSA special mission to Germany. These discussions will continue, and it has been decided to set up small working groups for specific measures. The working groups will make their recommendations to the Federal Government and MSA as soon as possible.

The Richardson Wood proposals for furthering the economic development of West Berlin stem from the work of an MSA technical-assistance team contracted for by the Federal Republic which made a survey of the Berlin economy in the fall of 1952 and filed a report with the Federal Ministry for the Marshall plan in December. The team was headed by Richardson Wood of New York City, a consultant on regional development, and included economic, financial, and business experts.

The report of Mr. Wood and his assistants endorses the basic economic policies and programs adopted and carried out in the past few years by the Federal Republic, the Berlin Senate, and the MSA mission to bring about the economic recovery of Berlin, but makes certain proposals for changes

in methods and emphasis in order to continue the progress already achieved.

According to the Wood report, the tremendous structural change in Berlin's economic situation due to the loss of East zone markets and of the city's status as a governmental, trading, and financial center, means that the main burden of future progress falls on the expansion of industry, and notably upon the production of goods for export to the West.

In keeping with the measures already placed in effect by the Federal Republic and the Berlin Senate in cooperation with MSA, the Wood report places emphasis upon the further reduction of the current high level of unemployment and upon the long-term program for more orders for Berlin industry, more industrial capacity, and greater efficiency in the utilization of existing capacity. It is assumed in the report that the special measures which have been employed to deal with the city's economic problems will continue to be a joint concern of the Federal Government, the Berlin Senate, and MSA.

Among the Wood proposals on which action has already been taken are the recommendations for simplifying the procedures for channeling of MSA counterpart funds to borrowers for investment in Berlin industries. A Berlin investment committee, consisting of representatives of the Federal Government, the Berlin Senate, and MSA, was established in Berlin early in January. This committee has full power to approve loans in behalf of the agencies concerned, thus eliminating the necessity for loan applications to be passed on individually by these offices.

A new 200 million deutschemark long-term investment program for the Berlin economy from MSA counterpart funds was announced by the Federal Republic and the MSA mission on January 19.¹ To date, more than 80 million deutschemarks in loans to Berlin enterprises from this fund has been approved by the Berlin investment committee.

In approving these loans, the committee will follow the Wood report's proposal that more investment money be made available to new businesses in Berlin and has adhered to the report's recommendation that increased attention be given to the production of consumer goods, especially for Berlin consumption. For example, the committee has approved substantial loans in the food and beverage processing field in the past 2 weeks.

The Wood report contains extensive treatment of the problem of marketing the output of Berlin's industry in West Germany and other areas. The report proposes that the work of the Berlin marketing council continue but be supplemented by large-scale advertising and publicity for Berlin products.

The Federal Government has plans underway for an extensive advertising campaign in Western Germany to promote Berlin exports under a newly

created federal office for promotion of the Berlin economy. The Federal Government and the MSA mission have also given consideration to proposals for the establishment of Berlin goods-exhibition houses in Western Germany to be financed in part by MSA counterpart funds.

In addition, agencies of the U.S. Government are preparing to investigate, together with German authorities, what can be done over and above the dollar-export drive of the Federal Republic to expand the sale of Berlin products to the United States.

Certain proposals of the Wood report for making changes to facilitate travel between Berlin and the West are under active consideration by Allied authorities. All of these recommendations will be implemented to the extent practicable.

Two major long-range elements of the Wood plan for the expansion of Berlin industry and the further reduction of Berlin's unemployment will require additional study and time to implement because of their relatively complicated nature. The report outlines a plan for the establishment of a new type of investment company in Berlin which would employ special methods of financing for Berlin industry. It would work closely with a management service organization, also to be established in Berlin, to lend expert advice and assistance to individual concerns in order to improve their efficiency and competitive position.

The Wood proposal for special methods of financing in order to strengthen the financial position of Berlin enterprises will require the allocation of U.S. assistance to the city, and this problem is under current study by a working group from the Federal Government and the MSA mission. The Federal Government has already decided to continue to devote interest and amortization payments from previous investment programs in Berlin to the city's economic development.

Agreement on German Debts To Be Signed

Press release 91 dated February 17

Following is a press communiqué issued in London on February 17 by the Tripartite Commission on German Debts:

The International Agreement on German External Debts, which has been worked out to give effect and international authority to the recommendations for the settlement of German debts agreed to between creditor and debtor representatives at the German Debt Conference which met last summer, is to be signed at London on Friday, February 27.¹

Proposals for this agreement were prepared in the early autumn. After further negotiations be-

¹ For text of the communiqué issued at the close of the London Conference on German External Debts and for related materials, see BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1952, p. 252.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 16, 1953, p. 262.

tween the Tripartite Commission and the German delegation on external debts, in the course of which many complex problems were dealt with, a provisional draft agreement was circulated to all the Governments concerned on December 9, 1952. A number of Governments offered comments on this draft. These comments led to further discussions between the Tripartite Commission, the German delegation, and representatives of the Governments which had offered the comments; and, as a result, a revised draft of the agreement, in the form in which it is to be signed, was prepared and transmitted on February 16 to all the Governments concerned, which have been invited to appoint representatives to sign it on February 27.

Liberation of Captive Peoples

*Press Conference Remarks by Secretary Dulles*¹

Press release 93 dated February 18

The proposed joint declaration by the Congress and by the President has two primary purposes. One is to register dramatically what we believe to be the many breaches by the Soviet Union of the wartime understandings; and, secondly, to register equally dramatically the desire and hope of the American people that the captive people shall be liberated. This document or pronouncement is not intended to be a domestic political pronouncement. It is intended to be a pronouncement in relation to foreign policy, which I hope will receive and I think should receive a substantially unanimous backing in the Congress by members of both the principal political parties.

The other signatories to these understandings are apprised, of course, of our general intention, but since the declaration does not involve any actual repudiation of any legally effective agreements, it does not affect the legal rights of any other partners in the matter. This plan has been discussed with Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee at the White House meeting where the President and I met with many of the Representatives of Congress. I would hope there would be some actual step in the matter by the end of this week or the first of next week. There are some discussions going on among Congress and between the House and Senate on the subject now.

We believe that the enslavement of these captive peoples is due to abuse and violation of the understandings. We are told, at least by those who made the agreements, that the way they have been carried out by the Soviet Union was contrary to what they understood to be the intention of the agreements.

The resolution will be suggested presumably by the White House, if it takes that form.² It will be

¹ Made on Feb. 18 in response to questions concerning possible action by the Congress with respect to secret understandings.

² For text of the draft resolution which President Eisen-

hower sent, on February 20, to Vice President Nixon and Speaker of the House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin, Jr., see p. 353.

up to Congress itself to decide what to do if it is a congressional resolution. There had been no final agreement yet as to precisely what process or form would be used to carry out the spirit of the President's statement on this subject that was made in his message to Congress.³

The resolution is still in the fluid state and I wouldn't want to attempt now to forecast its terms. But the underlying point is that the United States and the American people have, from their inception, always entertained the hope of liberation for all captive peoples. I have often quoted what Abraham Lincoln said about our Declaration of Independence. He said it meant hope not alone to the people of this country but hope for the world for all future time; that in due course the weights would be lifted from the shoulders of all men and that all men should be free. That is the hope to which America was dedicated. It is the hope that we entertain today, and this resolution will, I believe, make it perfectly clear that the United States is never prepared to buy fancied security for itself by confirming the captivity of any of the enslaved peoples.

Greetings Sent to Peoples of Baltic States

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 90 dated February 16

Thirty-five years ago the Lithuanian and Estonian nations won their independence, only to fall victim later to a ruthless Soviet imperialism. Deeply conscious of the suffering that the Baltic peoples are now enduring, I take this occasion to send warm greetings and best wishes to the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians.⁴

This year has special significance to Lithuania, as the 700th anniversary of the Lithuanian State. Seven hundred years ago Mindaugas was crowned the first King of Lithuania.

In refusing to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, the Government of the United States has expressed the conviction of the American people that justice and law must govern the relations between the nations, great and small.

It is not the number of people, nor area and wealth, which makes nations great. Rather it is their spiritual and moral strength and their love of freedom and liberty. These qualities have carried your nations over many difficulties in the past. I am confident that they will also carry you, with the help of God, over the present period of oppression to a new day of freedom.

³ BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 207.

⁴ Lithuanian and Estonian national days fall on Feb. 16 and 24, respectively.

Effecting a Strong Alliance Between Asiatic-Pacific and Western Nations

by Myron M. Cowen
*Ambassador to Belgium*¹

In one sense the strongest impression that I have received in the postwar years has been of the shrinking size of the world. We have known that the world was round for some 500 years. We have understood its geography for several centuries, that is to say we have been able to visualize its surface, its principal land masses, and its areas of water. But it has been left to men of our generation to know and understand it as a globe, and to become aware of the implications that arise from its global quality. When Tennyson wrote 100 years ago, "Better 50 years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay," he was expressing more than a preference of Western man for the society where his culture had its roots. He was also expressing an inference about geography.

Surely our grandfathers knew that the sun never set on the British Empire, and they were familiar with the exotic outposts and trailways of Western man. They were familiar enough for their time with the situation of Macau, the Maldiv Islands, and the Celebes. But they, like Tennyson, had a judgment. The center of their world was Europe, and the places that mattered were where European men and their descendants were ascendant. Their political, military, and economic thinking was controlled by this polarization. Their concepts of security were based on strengthening the homeland of Western man and maintaining pathways of commerce and communication to the exotic world of Cathay. That accomplished, our grandfathers slept securely.

It has been left for modern man, for you and me, and our children, to do our political, military, and economic thinking on a truly global basis. Perhaps it is just that we should be the first who have the discipline of appraising the detailed global consequences of our every act, for it has

been our generation that has made our globe shrink. We have been the navigators of great circles across the roof of the world in machines that daily grow faster and faster until one is left to ponder a world where everything but sound moves faster. We can only speculate on a tomorrow when man will arrive at his trip's end before we can report his trip's beginning.

I have said that one very strong impression that I have received from the combination of my postwar experience in Asia and in Europe has been of the shrinking size of our world. In our world foreign policies must be global or world-wide in their conception and execution. We do not live in a world in which we can afford to think of Europe, North America, and the British Isles as having a priority of values that can somehow be separated from Asia and the East. We can no longer think of what takes place in Asia as being far-off and of secondary concern.

India and the countries of Southeast Asia and the Pacific are our near neighbors today. Oceans and continents no longer divide us and separate our common destinies. What happens in Asia today affects us tomorrow.

Exploitation of the Pacific-Asiatic World

Since the war, there has been no doubt that back of Soviet Communist policy there has been a global strategy. We have seen its constant probing for weakness in Iran, Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Berlin. From the time when the Western nations reacted to the degree of menace revealed by the coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade in Berlin by taking vigorous steps to build their own defenses in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from that time the emphasis of Soviet Communist strategy has been in the East—in Korea and Indochina principally.

While the emphasis of Communist aggression has changed to the East since 1948, we cannot

¹ Excerpts from an address made before the Anglo-American Press Association at Paris on Jan. 21. Mr. Cowen was Ambassador to the Philippines from Mar. 2, 1949, to Nov. 18, 1951.

afford to forget how constant and extensive the previous U.S.S.R. and Communist preoccupation with Asia has been.

The end of the war found, in the vast area of the Pacific and Southeast Asia, a condition of chaos that has never existed in terms of such magnitude over an area of such extent in the time of recorded history. From Manchuria to Indonesia, to the borders of Burma and India, governments had been destroyed. The channels of trade and commerce no longer existed and even the local institutions of law and order existed haphazardly, if at all. China was a great, sprawling recumbent giant in the throes of revolution; the Japanese Empire had been destroyed; the old colonial governments of Indochina, Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia were either temporarily or permanently non-existent. The Philippines, which had resisted the Japanese bitterly, had paid a terrible price. Eighty percent of its buildings had been destroyed. Many of its bravest people had been killed.

I think I would be guilty of no exaggeration if I said that never had there existed so great a vacuum of power as there existed in this tremendous area of great population. Besides the 450 million people of continental China, there lived in Japan, Korea, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia, the Malay States, Indochina, Thailand, and Burma 283 million people.

There were three great factors that were operating in the Pacific-Asiatic world after the war; and of these, this power vacuum was perhaps the least, because the subsequent years have demonstrated the intensity and force of two other factors. These factors are the surge of nationalism among men who had not experienced the historical processes of the West, and the aspiration for equality of living standards. They are so strong that they have dominated the history of the area in these years.

Communist strategy was quick to attempt to identify itself with the tide of nationalism and the search for hope that were dominant in the area. In China this strategy has been successful. It has been a complete failure in the Philippines and has had varying degrees of failure in the rest of the area.

So far, with the exception of China, when the great crises have arisen between the free world and the Iron Curtain, there has been a loose but decided coalition of these countries with the Western free world countries. Two situations are illustrative: Their stand in the United Nations when the Republic of Korea was invaded and their willingness to sign the Treaty of Peace with Japan and bring their former enemy back into the community of free nations in the face of an explosive and vituperative Soviet Communist threat.

However, the process of decision is far from complete among these countries. The decision has not been taken finally as to whether they will

ally themselves with the West, whether they will form a neutral block, or whether they will throw their lot in with Soviet communism.

I cannot see how there can be the slightest question about the value of the decision that these countries must make to the rest of the free world. If they are an effective, healthy, and progressive part of the great alliance of free nations that alliance can continue to grow in strength. If they are not, communism will have scored another tremendous victory and the free world will be seriously, perhaps disastrously, weakened.

This decision to us, of course, appears self-evident, but we are not making the decision. It will be made by many men who have not had the privilege of education, the comfort of security, or hope for the future. The very able former Ambassador of India to the United States, B. R. Sen, recently said:

The free world must . . . enable the newly liberated people . . . of Asia to realize the values which are basic to democracy. . . . What is happening in Asia today is only a natural and healthy development which Europe has already passed through.

These are new countries and they are being propelled by the forces that work in our time through stages of development to which we were fortunate enough to be able to adjust over a much longer period of history.

The decision they are going to make will be influenced by their judgment of our actions. In the final analysis, the decision will be determined by the man in the paddy field, by the man in the barrio. Is he going to identify association with the free world with his hopes for himself and for his children?

I think it is decidedly possible that he will. His decision is not going to be determined by some mechanical force of history, unleashed like a vast Juggernaut to roll irresistibly forward. It is going to be influenced by the courses of action pursued by us and by the men back of the Iron Curtain.

I will ask you to excuse me if I speak, as an American, of courses of action that I think my country has successfully pursued; I will ask you to excuse me doubly if I speak, as a former Ambassador to the Philippines, of courses of action that I think we successfully pursued in that country.

Juan de la Cruz Views Korean War

In the month that followed the outbreak of the war in Korea, I saw evidence of an affection between sovereign countries that I feel sure few, if any, of my diplomatic colleagues have ever witnessed. For over 30 days in front of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, regardless of the frequent heavy rains that are seasonal at that time of year, there were anywhere from 50 to 100 Filipinos waiting, who wished to volunteer to serve either in the American army or in some battalion that

might be formed to fight with the American army in Korea. This was the simple Philippine citizen—Juan de la Cruz, as he is called there, or John Smith as we would call him in the United States. Sometimes he was barefooted; frequently he was soaked to the skin; and always he must have remembered how many of his countrymen lost their lives, frequently by torture, because of their assistance to the United States during one war. Yet he was patiently waiting to volunteer again to fight alongside the Americans. Because of our Mutual Security Program? Because of a technical assistance program? Because of grants-in-aid? Without question, no. The first two programs did not exist in the Philippines at this time, and what repayment he might have received from the United States for the damages his country suffered during the war could hardly be said to be an incentive to again risk his life in a cause that must have seemed to simple men far remote from their daily lives.

I think I know why he was there. Juan de la Cruz had taken a long, careful look at the American. He had not made up his mind easily or rapidly. You will recall that there was fighting in the Philippines for many years after the Spanish War had stopped. But Juan had sat in his barrio, or on his hillside, and looked long and listened hard. The American had told him that he had believed in education, that he believed in democracy, that he believed that men were created free and equal.

And after many years, the day had come to pass judgment. Juan was a free man, although a very poor man, but he was also a very proud man. There are problems in the Philippines that will take many years to settle. To develop the rich resources of the Islands so that all Filipinos have a chance to participate in a higher standard of living will take many years. But Juan de la Cruz, with all the imperfections of his own country and of ours, has his dignity as a man. He has decided that the American not only believed his own fine speeches for himself but that he practices them.

The world in which we live is smaller than that of our ancestors. We can no longer await the long departed traveler to return and tell us of far-off Cathay. The Burmese lumberman after teak, the Malayan worker in the rubber plantations, the Indonesian laborer in the tin mines at Billeton wish at least to hope for a future with some security and with some dignity. They will share their hope with us if they believe that we help and respect them. I do not mean to say that the United States has a golden key, or an easy formula, or answer for these problems. I do think that we have made some progress toward a joint approach with the Filipinos to some common problems. We and the Filipinos have the faith in each other that can only come when each has given, with no reward requested of the giving. A faith as firmly founded between the Asiatic-Pacific nations and the Western nations is essential to the survival of both.

U.S. Sends Protest to Rumania on Ploesti "Trial"

Text of U.S. Note

Press release 94 dated February 20

During the course of a show trial held at Ploesti, Rumania, between February 9 and 12, 1953, allegations of espionage and sabotage were made against certain Rumanians, some of whom had been previously employed by American oil companies in Rumania. The "confessions" of the defendants and the "testimony" of witnesses not only falsified history but attempted to hide the role of Soviet imperialism in Rumania. In the interest of keeping the record straight, U.S. Minister Harold Shantz has been instructed to deliver the following note to the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

The Legation of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and under instructions from its Government has the honor to call the Ministry's attention to the "trial" at Ploesti from February 9 to 12, 1953, of various Rumanian citizens, some of whom are former employees of the Romano-Americana Oil Company. Since, in the proceedings in the courtroom during the trial and in the commentaries published in the Rumanian press and broadcast over the official radio, various unfounded allegations and statements were made concerning the American oil companies and former American officials, the following facts are brought to the Rumanian Government's attention.

The Romano-Americana Oil Company was largely owned by citizens of the United States of America who had invested huge sums at great risk in the development of Rumanian petroleum resources. This was one of the important factors which enabled Rumania to attain the substantial production of 8,600,000 metric tons of crude oil in 1936. During the state of active war which existed between Rumania and the United States (1941-44) this company was sequestered by the Rumanian Government and administered as enemy property over which the United States owners had no control.

In these circumstances, it was axiomatic that as soon as Rumania had concluded an armistice with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain and the United States of America, representatives of these powers who constituted the Allied Control Commission for Rumania should have been restored to control of property belonging to their citizens. This was a matter of concern both to the Government of the United States and to American citizens directly concerned with the ownership and management of the Romano-Americana Oil Company.

The Rumanian Government can have no legitimate complaint regarding any steps taken by American officials and American officers of that

company to keep informed about American property and about operation of that company in the years 1945, 1946, and 1947, years in which a state of war still existed between Rumania and the United States of America. American owners had every right to know of the state of production of their company, its activities, personnel, financial status, sales, etc. Moreover, there were at that time no such laws concerning "state secrets" as now exist in Rumania, as substantially all of the information about which such slanderous statements have been made in connection with the Ploesti trial, was openly published in the *Monitorul Petrolului Roman*. If the Rumanian Government is not already aware of the fact, the Government of the United States takes this opportunity to inform it that all of the so-called espionage information of the type involved in the Ploesti trial is, insofar as the American petroleum industry is concerned, freely available in published form in the United States and can thus be openly obtained by the Rumanian Legation in Washington.

It is clear that no "sabotage" could or did take place under the auspices of the managerial staff of the oil companies. The operations of such companies in Rumania after the war were an open book in which all details were known to the three elements (Soviet, British and American) of the Allied Control Commission and to the Rumanian Government. It is true that crude oil production declined after the war and reached its lowest point in 1947. There are two reasons for this, however, neither of which has any connection with falsely alleged "sabotage" by the management of the oil companies.

The first and main reason is military. In November and December 1944 alone, Soviet occupation authorities seized about 48,000 metric tons of tubular goods such as casing, tubing, drill pipe and line pipe. This amount represented sixty (60) percent of the stocks on hand. Stocks left in the country amounted to less than that needed for one year's amount of normal drilling. Furthermore, destruction of railway and tank car equipment as well as other petroleum equipment during the fighting and bombing in 1944 sharply reduced possibilities. From the petroleum output that continued, 1,080,000 metric tons of petroleum products were taken by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as reparations between September 1944 and March 1945 alone. During 1945 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics took sixty-eight (68) percent of the total petroleum output and seized exclusively for its own use the majority of available tank cars.

Faced with such a situation, the only way to rebuild the industry out of damages resulting from over-exploitation by the Germans during the war, from military operations, and from Soviet seizures, was investment of large amounts of new capital for repairing existing plant, for replacing

lost equipment, and for exploring for new fields. This capital did not exist within Rumania in sufficient quantities, a fact which the present government admits when it claims that large quantities of equipment have been imported since 1948 from the Soviet Union at the price of giving that nation a major share in the ownership and management of the industry through so-called "Sovrom Petrol" and "Sovrom Utilaj-Petrolifer" corporations. However, in 1945, 1946, and 1947, the only practicable sources of foreign capital were the United States and Great Britain who already had invested so much to give Rumania as large a petroleum industry as it then had.

Instead of encouraging American-owned companies to invest new funds in Rumania where risk was high, the Rumanian Government, in connivance with the Soviet authorities in Rumania, after formation of Sovrom Petrol in May 1945, instituted a deliberate policy of harassing the operations of all privately owned enterprises. The Rumanian Government took no steps to assist such enterprises in the importation of desperately needed equipment, it failed to grant realistic prices, it barred, for purely political purposes, financial advances from the National Bank, it levied arbitrary taxes, forced qualified workers to resign, interfered needlessly in the day-to-day conduct of business, and allowed the General Confederation of Labor and the Communist Party to foment pointless strikes. In addition to such harmful practices it soon became painfully obvious that the ultimate intention of the Rumanian Government was to expropriate and nationalize all industrial enterprises except those that were Soviet-owned. When on June 11, 1948 the Rumanian Government did in fact pass legislation for the nationalization of industrial, banking, insurance, mining, transportation and other enterprises, with the exception of those having a Soviet interest, the United States Government pointed out that the legislation, being seriously discriminatory, was expressly prohibited by Article 31 (c) of the Treaty of Peace between Allied and Associated Powers and Rumania signed at Paris on February 10, 1947. It was further pointed out that the nationalization legislation failed to provide for equitable valuation and prompt, adequate and effective compensation. In view of the hostile attitude of the Rumanian Government after March 1945 and its obvious intentions it is not surprising that the production of American companies declined. To place the blame for such a decline on sabotage is, however, a patently obvious falsification of history.

The Rumanian Government may seek to delude its people into believing that the shortages of petroleum products in Rumania in the years 1945, 1946, and 1947 were caused by the actions of the management of the oil companies. In fact, as has been shown above, they were due to seizures of equipment and forced exports of such products to

the Soviet Union. The government will have a more difficult time explaining why in 1953, when production, according to official claims, is at the highest level in history, gasoline, oil, and lighting and heating fuels are still rationed in the country, farmers must often wait for hours in line to purchase two liters of kerosene for lighting purposes at an exorbitant price, and city residents receive only two liters of kerosene per month.

The Government of the United States can arrive at no other conclusion except that the Government of the Rumanian People's Republic has deliberately attempted by the so-called Ploesti "trial" and the propaganda connected with it to add to its general campaign of misrepresentations against the Government and people of the United States. The American people, including in their midst many thousands of Rumanian descent, have always had and continue to have friendliest feelings for the people of Rumania and the desire to contribute to their welfare. They deeply regret that the Government of Rumania does not share that desire and persists in taking actions and promoting calumnies and slanders which only aim at destroying the historical friendship between the two peoples.

Interim Report on Flood Relief in U.K. and Western Europe

White House press release dated February 12

The following interim report was submitted on February 12 to the President and to the cabinet by Secretary Dulles who is serving as chairman of the President's cabinet committee on flood relief in the British Isles and Western Europe:

At the Cabinet meeting on February sixth you appointed a Committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State, Defense and Agriculture and the Director for Mutual Security, to get together the facts on the storm disaster in the British Isles and Western Europe and to make appropriate recommendations to you as to the kind of United States help required to relieve the sufferings of the victims.¹

The Committee is paying particularly close attention to the immediate problem of rescue and evacuation and to the avoidance of further loss of life. On the basis of information supplied by the United States Commander in Chief in Europe and by our Embassies and the American Red Cross, it appears that the immediate relief problem is in hand. The Committee, however, has asked the Embassies to report at once any additional help needed for this phase.

There will be a new spring tide beginning on February 16, and this may create further emergencies. United States forces and those of other

NATO countries on the spot are alerted to help deal with them if they arise. Yesterday, the British Government asked the United States to deliver a large number of empty sandbags by this Saturday, February 14, if at all possible. These are to go forward promptly by air and by sea.

We are also discussing with the Netherlands Government the possibility of releasing for their use in connection with the disaster counterpart funds arising out of previous United States aid.

The Committee hopes to be able to report shortly on the help that might be provided by the United States in the second or reconstruction phase. It will, however, be some time before it is possible to estimate the total impact of the disaster on the affected countries.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Chairman

Blockade of the China Coast

Press Conference Remarks by Secretary Dulles¹

Press release 92 dated February 18

The question of action to interrupt or at least to minimize the flow of military valuable goods to the Chinese Communists has been, I believe, under advisement by the Department pretty continuously since the Chinese invasion of North Korea and it is still under perhaps more intensive scrutiny at the present time.

There are various ways by which that result can be accomplished, one of which is a naval blockade. Still another is a more strict enforcement of the self-denying provisions recommended by the United Nations. There are a whole series of measures of varying kinds which could be adopted. All of them are under very careful scrutiny, both from the standpoint of their feasibility, their military consequences, and the degree of political embarrassments and troubles that might be caused with our allies. As I say, all of that is under constant study.

I am not aware of any plan to bring that problem before the U.N. General Assembly. One matter that I suppose might come up is a further appeal to the member states to avoid any commercial intercourse with an aggressor. But whether or not that will be deemed wise to bring up at the Assembly I can't say. Many of these problems, of course, have been discussed with our allies because of the very strong efforts that we had been making to get all of our allies to cut off their commercial intercourse with the enemy, certainly to the extent that it is of military value—contraband of war.

¹ Made on Feb. 18 in response to questions concerning a possible naval blockade of the China coast, and whether this matter would come before the United Nations.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 16, 1953, p. 256.

The Practicing Partnership of Free Nations

by Harold E. Stassen

Director for Mutual Security¹

The Veterans of Foreign Wars have ever been alert to the security requirements of our nation. The recent address by your commander in chief at the last Veterans of Foreign Wars National Encampment in Los Angeles is a commendable statement of policy. He said then: "As a Nation we cannot live alone. In this respect, we should think internationally in terms of friends, of allies, of sources of raw materials, and markets." The members of your organization are keenly aware from personal experience and from current reflection that the mutual defensive power of the free nations is crucial in importance to the cause of peace and liberty.

May I at the opening of my remarks this evening express my deep conviction that one of the greatest assets for the future mutual security of America and the other free nations of the world is the presence in the White House of a leader of exceptional experience and understanding, President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

His task in this respect, as in others, is not an easy one. It is well to keep ever in mind key facts of the situation existing as he took the oath of office 4 weeks ago. Eight hundred million of the world's peoples were within the cruel grip of Kremlinism, that devilish doctrine of 20th century imperialism which has extended the cruelty of communism and heightened the torture of totalitarianism. Too many American soldiers were pinned down in an exposed outpost in distant Korea and 129,000 casualties had been suffered. The essential steps for an effective collective defense of Western Europe had not yet been taken. The programmed deliveries of arms and equipment from America to our Western European friends were far behind schedule. The steel strike and the administrative confusion had caused a serious

lag in defense production. The October Communist Congress had embarked on an intensified effort externally to spread discouragement and dissension and distrust between the free nations and internally to add anti-Semitism to their cowardly collection of persecution plagues.

U.S. Takes the Initiative

In these 4 short weeks since Inaugural Day, President Eisenhower has done much to change this situation.

He changed the orders to the U.S. Seventh Fleet so that this Navy arm no longer serves as a shield to Communist China while Communist Chinese soldiers attack U.S. and U.N. soldiers in Korea.²

He appointed a new Secretary of State and sent him at once to Western Europe and Britain to talk with the leaders there about the policies and programs for peace and security. I can report to you from personal observation that the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, conducted these conversations in an outstanding manner, and I believe that the days of this journey will become known as 10 great days of service by him to the cause of peace and freedom.

By these two acts, the change of orders to the Fleet and sending the Secretary of State to Europe, the President has taken the initiative in the worldwide contest versus Kremlinism.

The initiative is very important if America is to attain the objective of winning peace by peaceable means.

Other steps have already been taken by the very able Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, to speed the production of the items which had lagged. Measures have been instituted which will lead to catching up on the programmed deliveries of arms to our friends at the earliest possible date. A careful evaluation of the Mutual Security Pro-

¹ Address made before the Veterans of Foreign Wars at Washington on Feb. 17 and released to the press on the same date by the Office of the Director for Mutual Security.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 209.

gram is now under way on both sides of the globe by outstanding men serving without compensation. A review and rethinking of both immediate and long-term policies is under way by the National Security Council.

You know that this is not the time or place to discuss these matters in specific terms. But I will talk over with you a few of the principles involved.

Our Leadership Participation

Plain common sense directs our country's participation in a practicing partnership of the free nations with the objective of winning together through peaceable means both a lifting of the standards of living and a strengthening of the security of ourselves and of other peoples.

There is an understandable tendency to characterize our leadership participation in this mutual-security partnership in extreme terms. On one day it is described as domineering and on the next as servile. Sometimes different observers describe the very same act in these opposite manners. But anyone who studies the lifetime record of the President will be confident that our leadership participation in the partnership of free nations will be neither unilateral bullying nor multilateral milquetoast in its nature. It will be constructive and courageous. It will be thoughtful and thorough. It will respect the dignity and sovereignty of other nations and strive ever to serve the cause of peace and of mankind's progress toward better living.

It might well involve major increases in obtaining raw materials from other parts of the world as a part of a balanced trade and a sound economic foundation for future years.

It could encompass greater purchasing overseas of arms and equipment needed for combined defense so as to utilize productive capacity on a sound and noninflationary basis.

If the nations of Asia wish, it may expand in a coordinated manner a worth while program for Asiatic development, investment, and trade as a fundamental contribution to world progress and security.

The friendly association with other workers by American labor through its major organizations and the favorable investment in other lands of the capital earned and managed by our citizens may under proper circumstances both be desirable portions of the total development in this international, economic, and security program.

In the Mutual Security Program we will proceed with confidence that free men can outproduce and outlearn masters and slaves, provided only that they have a climate of governmental stability and economic incentive, and that free men of any continent can outfight ruthless rulers and their minions provided only that they have thorough training, effective equipment, and wise leadership.

The valiant South Koreans in their Rok divisions have been proving this in recent weeks as they have repulsed and defeated Communist Chinese divisions.

Throughout every aspect of the program, the essential soundness, stability, and solvency of the United States will never be lost sight of, and a high regard for the worth and the culture and the rights of other peoples will be ever present.

The military and material potential of our country and of our friends will be fully appreciated, but the need of power above and beyond all that will be remembered even as the President said in part in his moving personal prayer on January 20:

"Almighty God, as we stand here at this moment. . . . Give us, we pray, the power to discern clearly right from wrong and allow all our words and actions to be governed thereby. . . ."

Evaluation Teams To Study Mutual Security Program

Harold Stassen, Director for Mutual Security, announced on February 9 the appointment of a group of business and financial leaders to make an evaluation of the Mutual Security Program and personnel in 14 countries—9 in Europe and 5 in the Far East. The countries to be visited are those which involve the largest dollar expenditures in the program: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the Associated States of Indochina, the Republic of China, and the Philippines.

The evaluation group, which will serve without compensation, is headed by Clarence Francis, chairman of the board of General Foods Corporation. Mr. Francis has selected 54 associates to assist him in the study. The group will divide itself into 11 teams. The Mutual Security Program will be studied in each country by a separate team, except for Holland and Belgium which will be studied by a single team, and the Associated States of Indochina which will be studied by one team.¹

The entire study group will meet at Washington February 9 and 10 for background discussion with Government officials responsible for administration of the Mutual Security Program. The teams will then go to their respective countries. It is anticipated that the report of the various teams will be received in Washington toward the latter part of March. The preparation of the final report will be supervised by Mr. Francis, who will

¹ For a list of the names and positions of the team leaders, the team members, and the countries to be visited, see press release 28 issued on Feb. 9 by the Office of the Director for Mutual Security.

himself probably visit France, Germany, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

Each team, within the area under its study, will look into the operations of the Mutual Security Program, including the current status of the different parts—both military and economic—of the program, the effectiveness of the program, and the effectiveness of U.S. organization and personnel. The group will look into, among other matters, the military end-item and training programs, the Offshore Procurement Program, the use of defense-support goods or commodities financed by the Mutual Security Agency, the productivity program in Europe, and other major elements of the Mutual Security Program.

Mr. Stassen, in announcing the appointment of the evaluation group, said:

I am delighted that this group of distinguished Americans has agreed to take part in the evaluation project. Knowing of their many other commitments, I would not have asked them to undertake a new obligation of this kind if I did not feel this particular project to be of real importance to the successful conduct of the Mutual Security Program. As is well known, President Eisenhower and those of us who are associated with him in this Administration believe that this program is essential to the security of the United States.

The very essentiality of the program, coupled with the fact that it involves a large expenditure of public funds, requires that its operations be subjected to constructive examination by persons of competence and experience who are in position to make an objective and independent judgment.

I believe that the work of this group during the next month will be of vital importance not only to me personally as Director for Mutual Security, not only to President Eisenhower's Administration, but, in addition, to the welfare of the United States and of the whole free world.

The Value of Close Hemispheric Cooperation

by John M. Cabot¹

What policy is the United States going to pursue in its relations with its sister republics of this hemisphere? That, I have no doubt, is a very important question in your minds, and a very legitimate one, since it will affect so many of your own decisions.

The President and the Secretary of State of my country have already made clear, in public pronouncements, the purposes which will animate the new administration. In his inaugural address President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave the keynote of our policy when he said:² "In the Western Hemisphere, we join with all our neighbors in the work of perfecting a community of fraternal trust and common purpose." Secretary of State John Foster Dulles has said: "It will be the hope and aim of the new Eisenhower administration in the United States to do all in its power to strengthen and develop the mutual ties of friendship and understanding which traditionally should characterize inter-American relations."

Those are basic purposes of the new admin-

istration. You can be sure, moreover, that they are basic purposes of the United States. No other part of our foreign policy enjoys such wholehearted bipartisan support. No other part is more solidly upheld by the people of my country. I need not remind you that it was at another inauguration, 20 years ago, that President Roosevelt proclaimed the policy of the good neighbor. Whatever disputes we may have at home, the policy of seeking friendly cooperation with our sister republics of this hemisphere is not among them. Eminent Republicans and Democrats alike have made notable contributions to it, and every important segment of public opinion supports it.

You, however, are understandably interested in what we intend to do rather than in what we say. I wish on this point that I might be more specific. You realize, however, that President Eisenhower took office only on January 20. His administration has inherited a formidable burden of problems and responsibilities, both international and domestic. Upon the wisdom of its decisions rests the future of mankind—whether we shall be destroyed in a holocaust of war, whether our children shall be slave or free. It cannot afford, for your sakes as much as ours, to make major mistakes. When it does something, it must know what it is doing. Time and knowledge are essential if it is to draw up a program for specific action which

¹ Address made before the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at Caracas on Feb. 11 (press release 83). Mr. Cabot served as chairman of the U. S. delegation. On February 18 President Eisenhower nominated him to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 167.

will be wise in conception and constructive in results.

Permit me at this point a personal digression. I speak at this conference as head of the U.S. delegation, and as personal representative of the Secretary of State. It will be my duty, on my return, to recommend to the President and the Secretary specific measures to carry out the basic policy they have laid down with overwhelming congressional and popular support. I want you to know with what personal enthusiasm I return to this, my chosen field, and how earnestly I shall seek to carry out the purposes of the President and the Secretary. I have served in six of our sister republics and I think in connection with each of dear friends and fond memories. My wife was born in Mexico, two of my children in Brazil. In coming to Caracas I have fulfilled a long-felt ambition; I have at last visited every one of the American Republics. Ever since I went to Peru in 1927, as a Vice Consul, I have striven to the best of my ability to promote relations of friendship and confidence, and respect and understanding, and constructive cooperation between the nations of this hemisphere. It is for these reasons that I warmly welcome the broader task which I begin at this conference of putting into practical effect the policies laid down by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, and with humility shall hope that I may measure up to the responsibilities entailed.

You will appreciate that in the brief time I have had it has not been possible for me as yet to acquaint myself with our mutual problems, let alone to draw up a program recommending how and to what extent we should cooperate with you in executing the specific projects which you have in mind. I am, nevertheless, very pleased that I have been privileged to attend this conference since it will give me an indispensable knowledge of your needs and your views. I cannot now, as you will well understand, make commitments in my Government's name, but I can imagine no better initiation than this to the task of cooperation which evidently lies before me.

I do not need, I am sure, to remind you that there are inescapable limitations on the economic cooperation which the United States can extend to you. Great and growing though our resources are, they have been strained by the imperious necessities of defending the free world against two totalitarian tyrannies. Due to this, the citizens of the United States suffer from a grievous burden of taxation, but they will support projects to extend economic cooperation to our friends if they are convinced that these projects are well-conceived and will be soundly executed. Other limitations on the cooperation we can extend will occur to you. For my part, I realize that you, too, must have in mind similar limitations on the cooperation which you can extend to us and to each other.

In assuring you, therefore, of my Government's earnest desire to cooperate with those of its sister republics in solving their economic problems and aiding their industrial development, I bespeak your understanding and your forbearance. We shall seek to extend our wholehearted cooperation in the grave tasks which lie before us, and we are confident we shall receive yours. For cooperation is a basic Pan American ideal, it has benefited us all in peace and war alike; and it will, under God, help us to solve the problems which we now face. Through it, the American Republics have long set an example for the other nations of the world. My Government warmly desires that this conference may mark the beginning of a new period of close, constructive cooperation between us befitting our ancient friendship.

International Bank Grants \$30,000,000 Loan to Yugoslavia

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on February 12 announced a loan to Yugoslavia which will help finance the completion of key projects in seven major sectors of the Yugoslav economy.¹ The projects will bring about early increases in industrial production and substantially improve Yugoslavia's international trade position.

No dollars are to be loaned. The loan will be in 10 European currencies in an amount equivalent to 30 million dollars. The currencies are Austrian schillings, Belgian francs, British pounds sterling, French francs, German marks, Italian lire, Netherlands guilders, Norwegian kroner, Swedish kronor, and Swiss francs.

Most of the funds required for the loan are being made available by these governments from their domestic currency subscriptions to the Bank's capital. The Swiss francs, however, were obtained from the sales of Bank securities in Switzerland, which is not a member of the Bank.

The loan will pay for the import of equipment needed for 27 projects in seven sectors of the Yugoslav economy: electric-power generation and distribution; coal mining; extraction and processing of nonferrous metals; iron and steel production; other manufacturing industries; forestry and transportation.

The projects are designed to make more extensive use of Yugoslavia's considerable natural resources and to help provide supporting services such as electric power and transportation. Agricultural production is the main field of Yugoslavia's economic activity and will remain so for some time to come. The country, however, has plentiful resources of timber, coal, iron, and a wide

¹ For text of a supplemental statement describing projects being financed with the help of the Bank's loan, see International Bank press release of Feb. 12.

variety of nonferrous ores including copper, zinc, and bauxite.

Most of the projects which the Bank's loan will help to finance are expected to be completed within the next year or two, and all should be in operation by 1956. They will make important contributions to the 30 percent over-all increase in industrial production expected by 1955.

The projects being financed under the loan will increase the production capacity of iron ore by 900,000 tons annually; pig iron by 260,000 tons; steel ingots by 275,000 tons; and finished steel products by 195,000 tons. New processing plants will make it possible for Yugoslavia to produce an additional 60,000 tons of alumina and 15,000 tons of aluminum. Other plants will enable Yugoslavia to manufacture its own copper wire and cable. Agriculture will benefit by the production of 120,000 tons of phosphatic fertilizer and 30,000 tons of starch. New forest areas will be opened and a plant for the production of 20,000 tons of newsprint will be built. Increased coal production, greater availability of electric power, and small but important additions to transport facilities, will eliminate obstacles in these fields and enable Yugoslavia to keep pace with growing industrial needs.

The projects are expected to improve Yugoslavia's balance-of-payments position by the equivalent of 50 million dollars a year. Increased exports of such items as aluminum, steel tubes, copper wire, and cable and coal will account for more than half the amount; savings through reduction of imports of iron and steel products, nonferrous metals, and newsprint will account for the rest. Additional benefits will come from increased industrial efficiency, a reduction of manpower requirements, and lower production costs.

Yugoslavia has already made large investments in the projects for which the present loan was made. The total cost of the projects is estimated at the equivalent of 465 million dollars: 122 million dollars in foreign exchange and 343 million dollars in domestic currency. By the third quarter of 1952, 92 million dollars in foreign exchange had already been financed, and Yugoslavia had made domestic expenditures equivalent to 208 million dollars.

This loan is closely related to the loan made by the Bank to Yugoslavia in October 1951, in Belgian, Swiss and French francs, Danish kroner, British pounds sterling, Italian lire, and Dutch guilders amounting to the equivalent of 28 million dollars. The loans are similar in purpose and are financing part of a high priority investment program adopted by Yugoslavia in the fall of 1950.

The present loan results from recommendations of a Bank mission that went to Yugoslavia in July 1952 and remained there until early October. The mission consisted of three members of the Bank's staff and two consultants, one from the British steel industry and one from the American alumi-

num industry. In the course of their stay, members of the mission examined developments in the Yugoslav economy, reviewed progress on projects financed under the 1951 Bank loan, and investigated the projects for which the new loan was made.

The loan is for a term of 25 years with interest of 4 $\frac{7}{8}$ percent including the 1 percent commission which, in accordance with the Bank's articles of agreement, is allocated to a special reserve. Repayment of the loan is to be made in semiannual payments which begin August 15, 1956, and are calculated to retire the loan by maturity on February 15, 1978.

In the postwar years, Yugoslavia has been running a balance-of-payments deficit. Recent changes in internal economic policies, however, together with completion of the key projects investment program should result in eliminating the deficit within the next few years. Improvements in the balance of trade will be accompanied by increased supplies of consumer goods within the country.

After being approved by the Bank's Executive Directors, the loan agreement was signed on February 11, 1953, by His Excellency Vladimir Popović, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States, on behalf of the Yugoslav Government and by Eugene R. Black, president, on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Entry of Saudi Arabian Journalists into U.S.

Press release 98 dated February 20

In clarification of a recent news report that the Department of State had published a statement to the effect that under the new immigration law of the United States all newspapermen except those from Communist China and Saudi Arabia could enter the United States, a spokesman of the Department of State said Saudi Arabia had been included in error and that no comparison of the treatment of foreign newsmen by Saudi Arabia and Communist China was intended or could be made.

The Department of State understands that the Saudi Arabian Government has established special procedures for the issuance of visas which involve individual consideration of applications from journalists. The law of the United States requires that the principle of reciprocity apply in the issuance of United States visas for journalists. Inasmuch as a number of American newsmen and magazine writers visited Saudi Arabia in 1952 it would seem clear that at present there is no ban on entry of American correspondents into Saudi Arabia for temporary visits. Applications of Saudi Arabian newsmen for entry into the United States similarly will be considered individually and on their own merits on the basis of reciprocity.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned during February 1953

U. N. (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council:		
Ad Hoc Committee on Restrictive Business Practices: 4th Session	New York	Jan. 12-Feb. 6
Statistical Commission: 7th Session	New York	Feb. 2-13
Transport and Communications Commission: 6th Session	New York	Feb. 2-11
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	New York	Feb. 16-19
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Committee on Industry and Trade: 5th Session	Bandung	Jan. 26-Feb. 4
Ninth Session of ECAFE	Bandung	Feb. 6-14
Third Technical Assistance Conference	New York	Feb. 26 and 27
WHO (World Health Organization) Executive Board: 11th Session	Geneva	Jan. 12-Feb. 4
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Southeast Asia-South Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting (and limited South Pacific).	Melbourne	Jan. 13-Feb. 9
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade):		
Ad Hoc Committee on Agenda and Intersessional Business of the Contracting Parties.	Geneva	Feb. 2-13
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Textiles Committee: 4th Session	Geneva	Feb. 2-14
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Information Conference	Paris	Feb. 4, 5, and 6
Committee on Civil Defense Organization	Paris	Feb. 9-12
CFM (Council of Foreign Ministers):		
Deputies for Austria	London	Feb. 6 and 9
Inter-American Economic and Social Council:		
Third Extraordinary Meeting	Caracas	Feb. 9-21
Joint WHO/TCA/PHS Health Meeting	Geneva	Feb. 12-20
Pakistan Science Conference, 5th Annual	Lahore	Feb. 16-21
Preparatory Committee for the Caribbean Technical Conference on Education.	Trinidad	Feb. 23-27

In Session as of February 28, 1953

International Materials Conference	Washington	Feb. 26, 1951-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Council: 18th Session	Montreal	Jan. 13-
First Air Navigation Conference	Montreal	Feb. 24-
International Wheat Council:		
11th Session	Washington	Jan. 30-
Reconvening of 8th Session	Washington	Feb. 2-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Governing Body: 121st Session	Geneva	Feb. 23-
U.N. (United Nations):		
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Second Conference on Trade Promotion	Manila	Feb. 23-
General Assembly: Reconvening of 7th Session	New York	Feb. 24-
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defense Science	New Delhi	Feb. 25-

Scheduled March 1-May 31, 1953

U.N. (United Nations):		
Economic and Social Council:		
Eighth Session of the Economic Commission for Europe	Geneva	Mar. 3-
Commission on Status of Women: 7th Session	New York	Mar. 16-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Feb. 20, 1953. Asterisks indicate tentative dates.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled March 1-May 31, 1953—Continued

United Nations—Continued

Economic and Social Council—Continued		
Technical Assistance Committee	New York	Mar. 23-
Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 8th Session	New York	Mar. 30-
Fifteenth Session of the Council	Geneva	Mar. 31-
Consultative Group in the Field of Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders—Latin American Regional	Brazil	March
Fifth Session of the Economic Commission for Latin America	Rio de Janeiro	Apr. 6-
Fiscal Commission: 4th Session	New York	Apr. 27-
Commission on Human Rights: 9th Session	Geneva	Apr. 6-
Social Commission: 9th Session	New York	May 4-
Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor: 4th Session	Geneva	Apr. 17-
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East:		
Regional Conference on Mineral Resources Development	Tokyo	Apr. 20-
Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War: 4th Session	New York	May 11-
International Conference to Adopt Protocol on Limitation of the Production of Opium	New York	May 11-
Meeting of Governments who are Beneficiaries of Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan—Working Group	London	Mar. 4-
WMO (World Meteorological Organization):		
Commission for Climatology: 1st Session	Washington	Mar. 12-
Commission for Synoptic Meteorology: 1st Session	Washington	Apr. 2-
International Congress of Mediterranean Studies and Exchanges	Palermo	Mar. 15-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization):		
Coordinating Committee: 3d Session	Rome	Mar. 16-
Committee on Relations with International Organizations	Rome	Mar. 30-
Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 3d Meeting	Rome	Apr. 21-
Latin American Seminar on Land Problems	Brazil	May 25*-
ILO (International Labor Organization):		
Committee on Work on Plantations: 2d Session	Habana	Mar. 16-
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):		
Council: Ministerial Meeting	Paris	Apr. 23-
Conference on European Inland Transport	Paris	Mar. 18-
International Tin Study Group: 7th Meeting	London	March
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization):		
Executive Board: 33d Session	Paris	Apr. 8-
Executive Board: 34th Session	Paris	May 15-
Second Extraordinary Session	Paris	May 18-
Mining and Metallurgical Congress, 5th Empire	Australia and New Zealand	Apr. 12-
ICEM (Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration):		
Finance Subcommittee	Geneva	Apr. 13-
Fifth Session of Committee	Geneva	Apr. 16-
Inter-American Seminar on Adult Education	Ciudad Trujillo	Apr. 14-
South Pacific Conference: 2d Session	Nouméa	Apr. 16-
PASO (Pan American Sanitary Organization):		
Executive Committee: 19th Meeting	Washington	Apr. 20-
Inter-American Council of Jurists: 2d Meeting	Buenos Aires	Apr. 20-
South Pacific Commission: 11th Session	Nouméa	Apr. 25-
Conference on Caribbean Timbers	Trinidad	April
ICSU (International Council of Scientific Unions):		
Joint Commission on Physiological Optics	Madrid	April
Central and South Africa Transport Conference	Lourenço Marques	April
ITU (International Telecommunication Union):		
Administrative Council: 8th Session	Geneva	May 2-
International Telegraph Consultative Committee: 8th Plenary Assembly	Arnhem	May 26-
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 12th Plenary Meeting	Washington	May 4-
WHO (World Health Organization):		
6th Assembly	Geneva	May 4-
UPU (Universal Postal Union):		
Executive and Liaison Committee, Meeting of	Bern	May 4-
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):		
Standing Committee on Aircraft Performance: 4th Session	Paris	May 6-
Caribbean Commission: 16th Meeting	Surinam	May 11-
International Rubber Study Group: 10th Meeting	Copenhagen	May 11-
International Symposium on Neurosecretion	Naples	May 18-
International Seed Testing Association: 10th Congress	Dublin	May 25-
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 3d Annual Meeting	New Haven	May
Horticultural Congress and Exposition	Hamburg	May
Southeast Asian Conference	Baguio	May

Progress Toward Easing World's Food Shortage

MEETING OF THE FAO COUNCIL, ROME, NOVEMBER 17-28, 1952

by Clarence J. McCormick

The 18-member Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) met from November 17 to 28, 1952, at its Rome headquarters to review the Organization's program and budget for 1953, assess the world food situation, approve the progress of FAO's technical-assistance program, and take up a number of other problems. The U.S. delegation to this session of the Council was headed by Under Secretary of Agriculture Clarence J. McCormick and included several representatives from the Departments of Agriculture and State.

This was the first session of the Council to take the place of meetings of the full Conference of 68 member nations which have been held annually until this year. Conferences are now held biennially. Thus, as emphasized by FAO's Director General Norris E. Dodd and Council Chairman Josue de Castro in their opening statements, this Council session was of more than usual importance.

The Council noted considerable improvement in the world food and agriculture situation over a year ago, since production was up 2 percent over the previous year. At its 1951 Conference¹ FAO had adopted an objective of increasing food and agriculture production 1 to 2 percent above the rate of population increase. However, the Council noted that most of the increase was in fibers and other nonfood crops rather than in food and that most of the increase occurred in the more developed areas of the world, such as North America, rather than in areas where the need is greatest. After reviewing the situation for each commodity, the Council concluded that the tight rice situation is the most serious food problem facing the world.

The Council's discussions that were perhaps of widest general interest were those on the food sit-

uation in Yugoslavia and on the proposal to establish an international famine emergency reserve.

Food and Feed Problem in Yugoslavia

The Council had a unique and challenging problem to deal with in the report by an FAO survey mission on the effects of a drought on food and feed production in Yugoslavia. This report was prepared in accordance with a resolution of the 1951 Conference that asked FAO to keep a close watch on developing food shortages and investigate the magnitude of the problem and the aid that might be required. Yugoslavia had asked FAO to investigate the effects of its drought, and the survey mission completed its report in time to have it presented to the Council by the chief of the mission, Prof. M. J. L. Dols of the Netherlands.

The mission's report concluded that, with a reduction in the average daily food consumption in Yugoslavia to 2,300 calories and with a reduction in livestock numbers, Yugoslavia would still need imports of food and feed costing about 65 million dollars to insure its food supply in 1952-53.

The action to be taken by the Council on this report posed a particularly difficult problem. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France already are operating a tripartite aid program for Yugoslavia.² The survey mission mentioned that some of the requirements it listed might be made available under this program.

Another difficult aspect of the problem was how to define it. It was not a famine which could be made the basis of an emergency appeal to the people of the world. Although total crop output was estimated to be 40 percent below average production of the previous 5 years, there was no imme-

¹ For an article on the 1951 FAO Conference, see *BULLETIN* of Feb. 11, 1952, p. 195.

² For an article on this program, see *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1952, p. 825.

diate shortage. The actual shortage is likely to occur in the spring before the new crop is available.

The Council set up a subcommittee with Under Secretary McCormick as chairman to consider what action should be taken on this report. After several inconclusive sessions the subcommittee established a working party of the United States, India, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia to work out a mutually acceptable line of action. This working party met at intervals throughout the Council session.

The working party, in the light of the mission's report, considered what measures could be taken to reduce Yugoslavia's food deficit further. Among the possibilities discussed was a more general reduction in the slaughter weight of pigs. Some members of the working party also felt that a further reduction of the grain deficit by additional livestock slaughter might be more fully explored. On both possibilities the view of the Yugoslav Government, which was generally supported by the mission, was that such measures would prejudice the country's basic agricultural economy, reduce its future export potential and increase its future import needs, thereby prolonging the period of dependence on external aid.

As to the possibility of increasing the resources available for external food purchases by reductions in other categories of imports, the opinion of the Yugoslav Government was that such transfers would entail a reduction in the country's expenditure on defense and a curtailment of the necessary raw material supplies for industry, and that neither of these could be safely reduced.

The working party, the subcommittee, and the Council agreed that, in the circumstances, the Yugoslav problem was essentially one of balance of payments, which the Council was not technically competent to appraise or to act on.

Therefore the Council instructed the Director General to transmit a copy of the Council's report to the U.N. Secretary-General in accordance with procedures adopted by the Economic and Social Council and by the last FAO conference. It urged all member governments of FAO to consider any assistance they can render and to inform the Secretary-General or the Director General of any action they take. It also asked the Director General to continue to assist the Yugoslav Government insofar as he is able.

Emergency Food Reserve

The discussion of the food shortage in Yugoslavia had an important bearing on that of the emergency food reserve. It pointed up many of the difficult questions that the proposed reserve raises. For instance, there is the ever-present one of how to define a famine. Another, brought out clearly by the Yugoslav case, is whether a country asking for famine relief would be required first

to use all its available foreign exchange by restricting imports of items other than food.

The Council reviewed the report of the working party which had met in September to consider the practicability of the various ways of setting up an emergency reserve. This group had concluded that a physical reserve of food stocks was impracticable, whether owned nationally or internationally, but that a financial reserve might be practicable if governments wanted to establish one.

In the discussion of this subject at the Council the delegations expressed three basic points of view: (1) favorable to the idea of international machinery for providing assistance, of which a famine reserve would be part. This was advanced most positively by India and Yugoslavia.

(2) opposed to the idea of international machinery involving advance commitments, and preferring the *ad hoc* approach of dealing with each famine as it arises by appealing to the generosity of governments. The delegations which took this stand made the point that it would be wrong to tie up money which might be used currently to help increase food production; (3) neither favorable nor opposed, but feeling that more study is needed, particularly of the problems of a financial reserve, before any decision can be reached. The majority of the delegates, including the United States, expressed this point of view. The Brazilian delegate pointed out that starvation was dramatic, but that chronic malnutrition was no less urgent, and the real solution was to provide food for all. He said that there might be surpluses in some countries where undernourishment also existed, and that means of providing effective demand and proper distribution were needed.

The French delegate suggested the formation of a study group to analyze the problems involved in an international fund. He felt that the members of the group should be primarily financial experts and that they should examine the possibility of combining the international fund idea with that of nationally held stocks.

The Council approved this proposal and set up a working party of seven members, one each to be appointed by Argentina, Australia, France, India, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The members are to be technically competent in financial problems and in procurement and marketing; they are to serve as individuals but should be able to reflect the policies of their governments. The working party is to report to Council members by March 1953, so that the next session of the Council can decide what action to take or to recommend to the next session of the conference. Many delegates expressed the belief that a final decision on this proposal would have to be taken by the full conference, which meets in November 1953, rather than by the Council.

In connection with this discussion, the Council pointed up the need for countries to study the

likely incidence of crop failures and the transportation and storage facilities that are needed, in order to be better able to deal with food shortages. Governments were urged to ask for technical assistance on these problems.

Technical Assistance Program

The Council heard a report on the current status of the technical-assistance program by its chief, Sir Herbert Broadley. He said that technical-assistance agreements already signed with 52 countries provide for 890 experts, of whom 243 have completed their work and 399 are either in the field or are being recruited; the remaining 248 vacancies will be filled as soon as possible. Expenditures for technical assistance in 1952 were expected to total \$6,300,000. Requests for technical assistance may soon outstrip the funds available; therefore more attention will henceforth be given to priorities.

The fellowship program is active. At the time of the Council session, 97 students were participating in fellowships; 42 had already completed their courses; and 367 additional fellowships were being arranged.

Sir Herbert's report dealt with a wide range of organizational and administrative developments on the program, such as the appointment of a full-time chairman of the U.N. Technical Assistance Board, the cooperative arrangements that FAO has worked out with other U.N. agencies and with the U.S. and other programs, and the matching of FAO's expenditure by the countries receiving assistance.

The Council welcomed the progress that FAO is making on its technical-assistance program. It agreed that priority should be given to projects which will contribute to increasing the food supply and which governments are prepared to back up by contributing a substantial part of the local costs. It warned against FAO's making commitments for technical assistance greater than available funds would permit.

Some concern was expressed that the reorganization of the Technical Assistance Board might cause delays in the operation of FAO's program.

The Council asked that its appreciation for the job that was being done be sent to everyone who is working on the program, both at headquarters and in the field.

Other Council Actions

In addition to these discussions, the Council examined many of FAO's day-to-day operations on locust control, efforts to combat foot-and-mouth disease, work on improving national statistics, and a number of constitutional and administrative problems. It did not undertake a detailed review of the program of work and budget, since these are approved for 2-year periods by the biennial conferences.

These issues do not make headlines, but each required the same advance preparation and careful thought and discussion, both on the part of the FAO staff and of the member governments, as did the issues that attracted widest attention. Each is an integral part of the operation of an international organization and a part of the total effort of FAO to create better production, distribution, and consumption of food and agricultural products for the benefit of the people of the world.

Nomination of U.S. Representatives to the U.N.

Press release 95 dated February 20

The President on February 20 nominated the following persons to be representatives of the United States of America to the second part of the seventh regular session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to convene at New York, beginning February 24, 1953:

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., of Massachusetts, chairman of the delegation
Ernest A. Gross of New York
James J. Wadsworth of New York

William Sanders, of Virginia, has been nominated by the President to serve as the U.S. alternate representative at this session.¹

As occasion requires, the Secretary of State will attend meetings of the General Assembly, and, when in attendance, will be *ex officio* head of the delegation.

The first part of the seventh session of the Assembly met at New York from October 14 through December 22, 1952, at which time meetings were suspended until February 24, 1953. The delegation for the second part of the session is smaller because of the limited scope of the agenda as compared with the agenda at the beginning of the session.²

Ambassadors Lodge and Wadsworth, in their official capacities as representative and deputy representative to the United Nations, will normally serve on all such delegations. The presence of Mr. Gross on the delegation, at Ambassador Lodge's request, will tend to facilitate an orderly transition by virtue of his intimate knowledge of the very complex and difficult agenda items together with his broad experience in diplomatic negotiations with other member delegations in New York. Mr. Sanders, a Foreign Service officer and special assistant in the Bureau of United Nations Affairs of the Department of State, has had many years' experience in international political matters both through his regular duties in the Department of State and as an adviser or delegate at many international conferences.

¹ On Feb. 23, the Senate confirmed the nominations of all these members of the U.S. delegation.

² For the list of remaining agenda items, see BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1953, p. 39.

Public Health Conference

Press release 80 dated February 10

International discussions of problems of public health will be held at Geneva February 12 to 19 to foster greater efficiency and coordination. Joint participants will be the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA), the World Health Organization (WHO) of the United Nations, and the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), which is the operating agency for the Point Four Programs in health and sanitation efforts.

This will be the largest effort thus far made to tie together the bilateral health programs of the United States and individual countries and multilateral programs carried on through the United Nations and other world groups.

In addition to field representatives of 15 TCA country programs of the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America—giving broad geographical coverage to specific problems—the conference will be attended by Stanley Andrews, TCA administrator and staff members of TCA and PHS.

Joint chairmen of the conference will be Dr. H. van Zile Hyde, director of the TCA health and sanitation staff, and Dr. Arnoldo Sutter, assistant director general of WHO.

It is anticipated that the meeting will result in increased coordination of the joint efforts of the

U.S. technical-cooperation programs and those of the international agencies, particularly WHO, which already have produced such encouraging results in the control of several endemic diseases: malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis, and yaws, which hold back economic, political, and social progress in many parts of the world.

Mr. Andrews remarked that:

Poverty, malnutrition, and overcrowding are chief among the root causes of health problems. They are all part of a vicious circle blocking the proper self-development and hopes of many countries.

The basic approach of Point Four is to fight key problems directly while trying through technical assistance in other fields to improve general economic conditions. The governments are themselves keenly interested and are participating actively and financially.

This conference will supply a focal point for clarifying, first, the nature of existing problems and, second, their solution in the most effective and economical way.

It is in line with the act for international development, the law governing TCA, which provides for participation in multilateral technical-cooperation programs of the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and other international bodies.

TCA health technicians attending the conference will represent country programs in Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, India, Iran, Iraq, Ethiopia, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Libya, Liberia, Brazil, and Chile.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Trade Promotion Conference (ECAFE)

The Department of State announced on February 20 (press release 96) that the second Regional Conference on Trade Promotion of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) will be held at Manila, Republic of the Philippines, February 23-March 4, 1953.

The United States will be represented at that conference by the following delegation:

Chairman

Engene M. Braderman, Director, Far Eastern Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Members

Ivan F. Baker, Member, Board of Directors, Westinghouse Electric International, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Edmund F. Becker, chief, Commercial Intelligence Division, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Daniel M. Braddock, Economic Counselor, American Embassy, Manila

Joseph H. Rogatnick, American Consul, Singapore

Merle D. Thompson, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Elmira Bank and Trust Company, Elmira, N.Y.

Secretary of Delegation

Charles G. Wootton, Second Secretary and Consul, American Embassy, Manila

The first Regional Conference on Trade Promotion, which was held at Singapore, October 9-18, 1951, provided an opportunity to representatives of governments and of private businesses from more than 20 countries to come together for the purpose of discussing methods of expanding the trade of Asia and the Far East. This second Regional Conference has a similar aim.

The first part of the forthcoming conference will be devoted to the presentation and discussion of statements by the various delegations regarding the trade and market outlook in the various countries represented and regarding the actions taken in those countries to carry out recommendations made at the first Regional Conference. The second part of the conference will be devoted to

consideration of the following topics: (1) marketing research as an aid to trade; (2) methods of increasing trade, both within the region and with countries in Europe and the Americas; (3) methods of improving trade promotion machinery, such as the development of regional trade associations, the development of improved reporting forms for trade representatives abroad, and the establishment of training programs for trade representatives; and (4) the problems impeding the procurement of import goods required by countries of the region for development projects, as well as the problems handicapping the export marketing of specific products of the region.

Air Navigation Conference (ICAO)

The Department of State announced on February 20 (press release 97) that the first Air Navigation Conference of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) will be held at Montreal, February 24–March 31, 1953.

The U.S. Government will be represented at that Conference by the following delegation:

Delegate

Claude H. Smith (chairman), Chief ICAO Officer, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Alternate delegates

Reuben H. Clinkscales (vice chairman), Flight Operations Specialist, Air Carrier Division, Bureau of Safety Regulations, Civil Aeronautics Board

Henry S. Chandler, Chief, International Standards Branch, Airways Operations Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Nels E. Johnson, Chief, International Aviation Section, Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce; and Aviation Meteorology Liaison Official, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce.

James L. Kinney, ICAO Representative, Air Carrier Safety Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Advisers

James F. Angier, International AGA Specialist, Establishment Engineering Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

E. Thomas Burnard, Operations Division, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

Benarthur C. Haynes, Acting Chief, Station Facilities and Meteorological Observations Division, Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce

Walter Jensen, Radar Consultant, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

Thomas A. Kouchnerkavich, Electronics Engineer (International), ICAO Staff-COM, Establishment Engineering Division, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Charles D. McCarty, Major, U. S. A. F., Chief, ICAO Branch, Directorate of Operations, Hq. Air Weather Service, United States Air Force

John J. McCne, Chief, Station and Frequency Utilization Section, Aviation Division, Federal Communications Commission

Hugh H. McFarlane, Regional ICAO Representative, Airways Operations Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Allison E. Menbennick, Aeronautical Communications Specialist-ICAO, International Standards Branch, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Eli B. Rogers, Commander, U. S. N., Head, Airspace Section, OP-53, Flight Services Division, Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy

Gilbert V. Tribbett, ICAO Adviser, Air Carrier Safety Division, Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of Commerce

Vernon I. Weihe, Electronic Consultant, Air Transport Association of America, Inc.

The topics for discussion at the forthcoming Conference have been selected for the purpose of resolving problems in the technical fields of operations, communications, meteorology, and rules of the air and air traffic control. The specific agenda items are (1) visibility, and the height of the cloud base, on and in the vicinity of aerodromes; (2) aircraft position, operational, and meteorological reports; (3) the use of meteorological broadcasts and other meteorological transmissions to aircraft in flight; (4) amendments in the Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) relating to instrument approaches to land; (5) the development of standard holding patterns; (6) the development of radar procedures for en route, approach, and landing operations; and (7) coordination of existing aids to approach and landing, as well as consideration of the need for and methods of improving those aids.

Heretofore, meetings of the technical divisions of the ICAO Air Navigation Commission have provided the foundation for many of the actions taken by the organization to promote safe, regular, and efficient international air navigation. Those technical divisions, which have been concerned with the particular problems arising within their respective fields, are (1) Aerodromes, Air Routes, and Ground Aids; (2) Accident Investigations; (3) Airworthiness; (4) Aeronautical Information Services; (5) Communications; (6) Meteorology; (7) Aeronautical Maps and Charts; (8) Operations; (9) Personnel Licensing; (10) Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control; and (11) Search and Rescue.

The ICAO Assembly, at its fourth (1950) session, requested that the organization of the technical divisions be reviewed in an effort to increase their efficiency and to effect all possible economies. Studies carried on by the Air Navigation Commission, in consultation with ICAO member states, indicated (1) that the large number of meetings required by the system of 11 compartmentalized technical divisions could be reduced by holding a smaller number of conferences with consolidated or grouped agenda items and (2) that such a practice would result in better integration of the associated technical subjects concerned with the safe and efficient flight of aircrafts.

Report of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

FIFTY-SIXTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 16-31, 1952¹

U.N. doc. S/2920
Dated February 2, 1953

I herewith submit report number 56 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 October 1952, inclusive. United Nations Command communiqués numbers 1404-1419 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

There were no meetings of the Armistice Delegations during the period. On 16 October 1952, the Senior United Nations Command Delegate answered the Communist Senior Delegate's letter of 11 October 1952,² referred to in United Nations Command Report Number 55.³ The Senior United Nations Command Delegate's reply is quoted.⁴

On 16 October 1952, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command received a letter from the Communist military commanders in Korea—Kim Il Sung, Supreme Commander of the North Korean People's Army, and Peng Teh Huai, Commander of the Chinese Communist People's Volunteers.⁵ The letter was a continuation of Communist propaganda and contained completely false and unfounded charges. The letter again repeated the so-called new proposal as presented by the Communist Delegation on 8 October 1952, which was rejected by the United Nations Command Delegation because it did not comply with the

¹ Transmitted to the Security Council by the representative of the U.S. to the U.N. on Jan. 30. Text of the 40th report appears in the BULLETIN of June 23, 1952, p. 998; the 41st report, June 30, 1952, p. 1038; the 42d report, July 21, 1952, p. 114; the 43d report, Aug. 4, 1952, p. 194; the 44th report, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 231; the 45th report, Aug. 18, 1952, p. 272; the 46th report, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 495; the 47th report, Oct. 27, 1952, p. 668; the 48th report, Nov. 17, 1952, p. 795; the 49th report, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 883; the 50th report, Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958; the 51st and 52d reports, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034; the 53d report, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 155; the 54th report, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 224; and the 55th report, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 276.

² For text of the letter of Oct. 11, 1952, see *ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1952, p. 751.

³ For text of the report, see *ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 276.

⁴ For text of this letter, see *ibid.*, Nov. 10, 1952, p. 752.

⁵ For text of the Communists' letter, see *ibid.*

United Nations Command's condition of no forced repatriation. That portion of the Communists' letter which repeated this proposal is quoted:

On the basis of the just demand that war prisoners of both sides shall all be repatriated home to lead a peaceful life, our side proposed that when the armistice agreement becomes effective, all war prisoners, may be brought to the agreed exchange point in the demilitarized zone as soon as your side has proposed, to be delivered to and received by the other side. After they are delivered and received, the Joint Red Cross Teams will visit the war prisoners of both sides in accordance with paragraph 57 of the draft Korean Armistice Agreement as your side has proposed, to explain to them that they are insured to return home to lead a peaceful life and not to participate again in hostilities in Korea. Thereafter considered classification of the war prisoners will be carried out in accordance with the above-mentioned principle of classification according to nationality and area as proposed by our side. Repatriation will be carried out immediately after the classification; these tasks of exchange, visit, classification and repatriation may be accomplished under the observation of Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.

General Mark W. Clark, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, dispatched the letter quoted below,⁶ to the Communist Commanders in reply to their letter of 16 October 1952.

A series of scattered incidents throughout the pro-Communist camps indicated continued effort by Communist prisoners of war to embarrass the United Nations Command by carefully laid plans to contest the authority of camp commanders. The United Nations Command is fully aware of the explosive nature of each of the pro-Communist camps and the carefully concealed control which is exercised by fanatical leaders. Equally, there is some evidence to indicate that agitators, posing as anti-Communists, have infiltrated the anti-Communist Prisoner of War camps for the sole purpose of creating unrest and, if possible, incidents of violence.⁷

In order to reduce the opportunity of prisoners of war

⁶ For text of General Clark's letter, dated Oct. 20, 1952, see *ibid.*, p. 754.

⁷ For a summary of this evidence issued by the U.N. Command, see *ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 273.

to create incidents, and so that the safety of visitors to the Prisoner of War camps could be insured, the Commander-in-Chief issued the following directive to the Commanding General, Korean Communications Zone:

Confirming my previous instructions, regulations will be issued and rigidly enforced at all prisoner of war and civilian internee installations under your command, which will prevent entrance into an occupied inclosure or compound by any person, military or civilian, whose official duties in connection with the administration, custody, control, welfare, and security of enemy prisoners of war and civilian internees do not require his or her presence inside the inclosure or compound.

By the end of October, almost 10,000 civilian internees had been released under Operation THANKSGIVING and the remaining group of about 1,000 will be set free during early November. To all evidence, these South Koreans were, with the help of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command in Korea and the Republic of Korea, being absorbed rapidly into the civilian economy and were encountering no particular difficulty in settling into civilian pursuits.

There was little slackening in the determination and frequency of Communist attacks during the period. However, enemy aggressiveness was confined to several specific locations and was not as widespread as during the previous period. The main hostile effort was expended against the central front in an attempt to grasp key terrain features in that area. The enemy pursued his tactics of hurling wave after wave of men in local attacks aimed at overwhelming United Nations Command forward positions. The great majority of these hostile attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Initial hostile gains, when made, were almost without exception eliminated by United Nations Command counteraction. Enemy artillery and mortar fire were utilized at every opportunity in support of his major attacks with an approximate daily average of over 18,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire falling on United Nations Command positions during the period. This figure, which is a substantial decrease from the previous period, reflects the fact that hostile aggressiveness was limited to several specific areas and does not necessarily reflect any serious diminution of enemy ammunition supplies. United Nations Command forces along the entire battle line continued to seek out hostile defenses by continual patrolling and small-scale raids against forward enemy positions. There was no major change in Communist troop dispositions along the line of contact although indications strongly point to the early relief of the two easternmost Chinese Communist Armies on the battle line by two armies formerly in reserve.

Along the western front there were only two hostile attacks of appreciable size both of which resulted in temporary penetrations of United Nations Command main defensive positions. In both instances, immediate retaliatory attacks by United Nations Command units expelled enemy penetrations. In one case, on 23 October, a position near Kigong was obliged to withdraw under pressure imposed by a reinforced enemy battalion. Counterattacking United Nations Command elements erased the hostile salient within several hours. To the

southwest, in the Punji area, a string of five outposts along a 4,000 meter front was the objective of a series of small hostile exploratory attacks on 25 October. The two positions on the east were unable to hold and the enemy committed a battalion in an attempt to exploit his initial success. The partial penetration of main defenses which was achieved by this Communist attack was negated by subsequent counterattacks, and all positions, including the two outposts, were back in United Nations Command hands by 28 October. In other areas of the western sector, action was characterized by many patrol clashes and small-scale raids in which positions on the outpost lines were occupied alternately by the opposing sides. Near Sangyong on 18-19 October, the enemy tested United Nations Command security elements by launching eighteen small units against outposts in the area. Although five positions were lost in the first phase of the fighting, later United Nations Command counteraction recaptured all positions.

The central front was the scene of a vicious and as yet unended battle for control of three commanding terrain features. The Communists have sacrificed numerous units in attempts to seize and hold these vantage points. For the most part, action has been indecisive with the Communists being unable to achieve any substantial inroads within the United Nations Command defensive structure. In one area six miles southwest of Poyonggang two enemy companies secured a United Nations Command-held outpost on 16 October. United Nations Command forces reacted with a series of counterattacks, one of which gained the hill on 23 October. This success was short-lived as the enemy stormed back the next day in sufficient numbers to regain the hill on which they are still dug in at the period's close.

Another disputed area three miles northeast of Kumhwa was the site of the heaviest ground fighting of the period which is still in progress. The action centered around two commanding hill features which were initially wrested from the Communists by a United Nations Command attack on 14 October. One of these hills located on the western edge of the contested area has become known as Triangle Hill. This position after being subjected to three days of continued attack was struck by an enemy regiment on 19 October which netted the Communists the extreme northwestern portion of the hill feature. Several United Nations Command counterattacks failed to regain the lost ground. The Communists continued to attack the remaining United Nations Command positions on the commanding portion of the hill and at the close of the period an additional regimental-size attack had forced United Nations Command defenders from the southern positions of Triangle Hill.

Immediately to the east of Triangle Hill is located the other denuded slope which was seized by United Nations Command elements on 14 October. This position, commonly known as Sniper Ridge, has also been the daily target of Communist assaults from company to regimental strength. Republic of Korea troops conducted a sterling defense of the hill trading blow for blow with the Communists attempting to retake their former positions. The crest of the hill changed hands many times in swirling hand-to-hand fights which resulted in the Communists

holding the northern portion and United Nations Command units controlling the southern and dominating portion of the ridge at the close of the period.

Another hill position southeast of Yulsa was featured in hostile aggressive intentions. The position, known as Finger Ridge, was the target of numerous enemy attacks in September. United Nations Command defenders conducted a successful defense against almost daily hostile assaults. Several of the enemy attempts involved units of battalion size and were well supported by mortar and artillery fire. However, the determined Republic of Korea defenders did not give ground at any time and the position remained firmly within the United Nations Command outpost system at the close of the period.

Along the eastern front, significant ground action was confined to the Tupo area. A relative calm along the eastern front was interrupted on 25 October when two enemy companies hit the United Nations Command main battle position three miles south of Tupo. The attempt was an abrupt failure and a thirty minute engagement resulted in the withdrawal of hostile elements. An enemy battalion attacked other United Nations Command defenses immediately to the east on 26 October. Here, hostile troops advanced to the main line of resistance but were repulsed after a one and a half hour firefight. Two days later the attempt was repeated by two enemy companies. In this attack hostile elements penetrated the forward positions but were thrown back by United Nations Command counterattack. The balance of the eastern front was devoid of any major action with ground combat being confined mostly to small ineffective hostile probes and numerous patrol clashes initiated by United Nations Command units along the line of contact.

The majority of indications during the period pointed toward a continued active defense by the enemy including limited objective attacks against forward United Nations Command positions. The majority of recently captured prisoners of war state that the mission of their units is to defend. Other prisoners of war state that their units are to launch attacks in the near future which appear to be limited in objective and scale. These same prisoners of war have failed to profess any knowledge of preparations for general offensive action.

United Nations Command naval aircraft operating from fast carriers in the Sea of Japan struck pre-selected targets and targets of opportunity from the bomblines to the Manchurian border. Railroad repair and shop facilities, marshalling yards and supply areas were hit in a major strike on Hyesanjin, located on the Manchurian border. Enemy troop concentrations and supply build-ups in the beleaguered Wonsan, Pyonggang, Yongpyong-Ni and Yangdok areas received special attention. Strikes were launched almost daily throughout eastern and northeastern Korea against enemy transportation facilities, supply areas, gun positions, factories and warehouses of military significance.

Attacks on interdiction targets resulted in numerous rail cuts and destroyed or damaged railroad and highway bridges, locomotives, railroad cars, trucks and boats.

Close air support sorties flown in direct support of front line troops destroyed many bunkers, mortars, gun

positions and trenches and inflicted numerous casualties on enemy troops.

United Nations Command Joint Amphibious Task Force Seven operations provided bombardment of enemy positions in the Kojo area by Navy and Air Force planes and United Nations Command warships. An amphibious invasion demonstration was conducted under completely realistic conditions against well prepared enemy defenses. Hundreds of rounds of heavy caliber ammunition were expended by United Nations Command combat ships during the three-day preliminary bombardment. This shelling resulted in destruction or damage to sixty-five gun positions and twenty bunkers, with many other bunkers and assorted targets fired on with unassessed results. Intermittent enemy shore gunfire resulted in minor damage to two United Nations Command naval vessels with one KIA and eighteen WIA.

United Nations Command carrier-based aircraft operating in the Yellow Sea continued their offensive strikes against enemy installations in central west and northwest Korea as far north as Hanchon. Throughout the Hwanghae Province attacks were pressed against enemy transportation facilities, supply and storage areas, troop billets and troop concentrations, gun positions, transformer stations, and warehouses and buildings of military significance. Many troops were strafed in the open, resulting in many enemy casualties. The strafing of trucks and oxcarts resulted in a number of secondary explosions. The sluice gates in the Yonan area were hit again causing additional breaches and damaging the gate machinery.

Shore-based Marine aircraft provided front line units with close air support and flew combat and reconnaissance sorties deep into enemy territory. These sorties destroyed or damaged numerous gun and mortar positions, bunkers, buildings, personnel and supply shelters, warehouses, railroad cars, railway and highway bridges and made many rail and road cuts. Numerous personnel and troop casualties were also inflicted.

Naval patrol planes supported the United Nations Command effort in Korea by daily flights which included reconnaissance, anti-submarine and weather data missions conducted over the waters adjoining Korea.

On the Korean west coast, United Nations Command surface units blockaded the Korean coastline around the perimeter of the Hwanghae Province. The vessels successfully defended the friendly held islands north of the 38th Parallel by maintaining constant watch and harassing enemy troop and gun positions on the mainland. Small United Nations Command vessels conducted close inshore patrols, blockade operations, and swept mines in waters off enemy shores. Firing on enemy coastal positions destroyed gun positions, communication and transportation facilities, supply build-ups, troop concentrations and troop billets.

The naval blockade continued along the Korean east coast from the bomblines to Chongjin. Surface units on day and night coastal patrols fired on key targets along the coastal main supply route daily to maintain rail cuts, destroy bridges and block tunnels at several points. Locomotive and rail targets between Chaho and Songjin were kept under constant surveillance during the period. On 28 October a United Nations Command destroyer inter-

cepted a locomotive and thirteen cars south of Tanchon. With assistance from another destroyer and a naval air strike, the locomotive and eight cars were destroyed and the remaining five cars were severely damaged. The tracks were also cut in a number of places. Two battleships with cruisers and destroyers assigned, rendered direct support for front line troops at the bomblines, destroying enemy gun positions and bunkers and inflicting many troop casualties. Supply areas, warehouses, factories and other targets of military significance were damaged or destroyed at various coastal points from the bomblines to Chongjin.

The enemy was denied the use of his coastal waters for shipping. All craft detected were taken under fire and either destroyed or driven ashore. Enemy coastal movements were kept under constant surveillance.

Enemy shore batteries along the east coast of Korea continued to harass United Nations Command ships. On 21 October while operating near the coast southeast of Wonsan, a United Nations Command destroyer was hit by two 76mm shells out of about fifty fired. Seven personnel were killed and one was wounded. One of the ship's boilers was damaged and other minor material casualties were suffered. On 24 October another destroyer was the target for about fifteen rounds of 76mm from an enemy shore battery in the vicinity of Wonsan. However, no damage or casualties resulted.

United Nations Command minesweepers continued operations to keep channels, coastal waters and anchorages free of mines of all types.

United Nations Command naval auxiliary vessels, Military Sea Transportation Service and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistic support for the United Nations Command naval, air and ground forces in Japan and Korea.

United Nations Command aircraft continued to maintain air superiority over North Korea and to destroy Communist supplies and equipment. Jet fighter interceptor aircraft flew patrols in the Chongchon and Yalu River areas on each day of operational weather, but the sightings of enemy jet aircraft continued to decline as they had since September. However, Sabrejets destroyed eight of the Russian-built MIGs and five other MIGs were damaged.

The main force of the medium bomber effort was directed toward the destruction of supplies in several large storage areas. Small formations were used in order that more areas could be attacked, and returning missions were scheduled to hit new build-ups and supplies dispersed over a large area. The medium bombers opened the period with an attack on the Sopo-ri supply area northeast of Pyongyang, destroying equipment and supplies in this area while other medium bombers hit similar targets near Yongyu. The Sopo-ri target complex was hit five times during the reporting period with excellent coverage reported by United Nations Command air crews.

A military headquarters at Tosong, west of Sinanju, was attacked by medium bombers on 17 October, and on the same date supplies at Hukkyo-ri and Sopo-ri were destroyed. On the following night Superforts again returned to the northwestern sector of Korea to destroy a supply area at Namsidong. Two days later the ore processing plant at Tasyudong was bombed with good

results. The processing plant was reportedly producing twenty-five tons of ore concentrates daily which were being shipped to industrial plants in Manchuria. A lead and zinc processing plant near Okung was also attacked with good coverage on 22 October.

In addition, the medium bombers flew fifteen leaflet sorties over enemy rear areas and provided close air support for ground units with twenty-three sorties flown under control of ground radar.

United Nations Command fighter bombers struck enemy supply points and other lucrative targets, including bridges, gun positions, vehicles, repair shops and troop concentrations. The bulk of this effort was flown in the area south of a line from Pyongyang to Wonsan. Besides supply targets, the fighter bombers hit rail lines.

The general pattern of operations was for approximately 100 fighter bombers to attack a troop concentration or storage area deep in enemy territory while Sabrejets flew close cover and provided a fighter screen for the slower aircraft. While these attacks were being carried out the bulk of the fighter bombers were hitting targets nearer the bomblines. One of the most important targets attacked by the fighter bombers was the Military School located at Kungang. Post strike photography showed that the aircraft which hit this target started numerous fires and almost completely destroyed the installation.

Destruction claims for the fighter bombers during the period included numerous supply buildings, rail cuts and gun positions and 488 casualties inflicted on enemy troops.

Close support for United Nations Command ground troops was also furnished by extensive fighter bomber sorties. At the beginning of the period most of the attacks were against enemy positions in the central sector where the ground action was heaviest. Later in the period, close support sorties were again spread across most of the front line area.

Throughout the reporting period the light and fighter bombers coordinated on operations to trap Communist vehicles and supply trains. Fighter bombers flew armed reconnaissance of main supply routes just before darkness and made road blocks to slow or stop the regular night traffic moving supplies to the enemy front lines. The light bombers then entered the area during darkness to destroy any Red vehicles stopped on the roads. Just before daylight the light bombers created rail and highway blocks and the fighter bombers took up the attack at first light on any vehicles or trains sighted.

During the period, the light bombers gave particular attention to the supply routes on the east coast of Korea since reconnaissance missions and agent reports showed an increase of traffic in that area. They also bombed supply targets in the area north of Hamhung and in the Wonsan area. Most of the 1,441 vehicles reported destroyed during the period were credited to the light bombers on night intruder missions.

United Nations Command transport aircraft continued to fly logistical missions airlifting many passengers and a heavy tonnage of cargo between Japan and Korea.

In connection with United Nations Day, 24 October, leaflets and radio broadcasts gave extensive publicity to the meaning of the United Nations and to the significance of the action to repel Communist aggression in Korea.

During the same period, continuing emphasis was given to the fair and reasonable proposals made by the United Nations Command in an effort to bring peace to Korea. These subjects were treated to a large extent in the manner of an educational program. Reports indicate that peoples under the domination of the Communist leaders in North Korea are denied access to such information through normal channels and are subjected to intensive state-controller propaganda which gravely distorts the truth.

Announcement of the results of the first phase of the joint United Nations Command-Republic of Korea crop survey was made during the latter part of October. The conduct of the survey, agreed upon by both United Nations Command and Republic of Korea survey personnel, was based on the recognition of four categories of rice land: (a) land under control of irrigation associations, (b) the land under controlled irrigation, (c) land partially irrigated, and (d) non-irrigated land. Upon completion of this phase of the survey, it was jointly agreed that 96% (362,095 acres) of the land controlled by irrigation associations and that 97% (682,002 acres) of other land under controlled irrigation had been planted to rice. It was further agreed that at least 75% (407,264 acres) of land under partial irrigation had been planted to rice. It should be noted that normally land in the first two categories accounts for about 68.5% of the total amount of rice produced and that land under the third category normally accounts for about 23% of the total rice produced. Land not irrigated (fourth category) normally accounts for only about 8.5% of the total amount of rice produced. It was jointly agreed that a large portion of this land is unsuited to the production of rice and should be reclassified as suitable only for dry land crops. Acreages under partial irrigation and non-irrigated land are currently being rechecked during the second phase of the crop survey which began 10 October.

Crop growing conditions were generally good in the Republic of Korea as a result of August and September rainfall. Local flood damage in limited areas is not expected to seriously affect the rice production of the country. Estimates of the fall grain crop are now being compiled.

A Joint United Nations Command-United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency Supply Program for Korean Economic Aid for the fiscal year 1953 is now being formulated. Approximately \$26 million of the \$133 million dollar program for the remainder of the fiscal year will be furnished by United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Fifty thousand dollars of this amount has already been obligated by United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for an Agriculture and Vocational Training School. Supply programming procedures have been published by the Unified Command for those United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency supplies which may be procured and/or shipped through military channels.

The United States in the United Nations, a regular feature, will be resumed in a subsequent issue.

Current United Nations Documents A Selected Bibliography¹

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- Rules of Procedure of the Economic and Social Council. E/2336, Nov. 21, 1952. 34 pp. mimeo.
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- Calendar of Conferences for 1953. Statement made by Representative of the Secretary-General at the 670th Plenary Meeting of the Council, circulated at the request of the President of the Council. E/L.467, Dec. 17, 1952. 4 pp. mimeo.

THE DEPARTMENT

David K. E. Bruce To Serve As U.S. Observer in Europe

White House press release dated February 18

In view of the importance which the United States attaches to the progress being made in Europe toward developing a unified six-nation community, the President has asked David K. E. Bruce, former Under Secretary of State, to serve as U.S. observer to the Interim Committee of the European Defense Community and U.S. representative to the European Coal and Steel Community. Mr. Bruce will also follow work which is going forward for the creation of a European political community.

In carrying out these duties, Mr. Bruce will report to the Secretary of State. He plans to depart for Europe next week.

Resignation

Carlisle H. Humelsine

Carlisle H. Humelsine as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, effective February 13, 1953.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

President Submits Declaration on Captive Peoples to the Congress

White House press release dated February 20

The following letter, and its attached draft resolution, was sent by the President to Vice President Nixon and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Joseph W. Martin, Jr., on February 20.

TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
MR. SPEAKER:

In my message to Congress of February 2, 1953, I stated that I would ask the Congress at a later date to join in an appropriate resolution, making clear that we would never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people in order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves, and that we would not feel that any past agreements committed us to any such enslavement.¹

In pursuance of that portion of the message to Congress, I now have the honor to inform you that I am concurrently informing the President of the Senate (the Speaker of the House) that I invite the concurrence of the two branches of the Congress in a declaration, in which I would join as President which would:

(1) Refer to World War II international agreements or understandings concerning other peoples;

(2) Point out that the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party who now control Russia, in violation of the clear intent of these agreements or understandings, subjected whole nations concerned to the domination of a totalitarian imperialism;

(3) Point out that such forceful absorption of free peoples into an aggressive despotism increases the threat against the security of all remaining free peoples, including our own;

(4) State that the people of the United States, true to their tradition and heritage of freedom, have never acquiesced in such enslavement of any peoples;

(5) Point out that it is appropriate that the Congress should join with the President to give

expression to the desires and hopes of the American people;

(6) Conclude with a declaration that the Senate and the House join with the President in declaring that the United States rejects any interpretations or applications of any international agreements or understandings, made during the course of World War II, which have been perverted to bring about the subjugation of free peoples, and further join in proclaiming the hope that the peoples, who have been subjected to the captivity of Soviet despotism, shall again enjoy the right of self-determination within a framework which will sustain the peace; that they shall again have the right to choose the form of government under which they will live, and that sovereign rights of self-government shall be restored to them all in accordance with the pledge of the Atlantic Charter.

I am enclosing a form of draft resolution, which, in my opinion, carries out the purposes outlined above, and in which I am prepared to concur.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, During World War II, representatives of the United States, during the course of secret conferences, entered into various international agreements or understandings concerning other peoples; and

WHEREAS, The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, who now control Russia, have, in violation of the clear intent of these agreements or understandings, subjected the peoples concerned, including whole nations, to the domination of a totalitarian imperialism; and

WHEREAS, Such forcible absorption of free peoples into an aggressive despotism increases the threat against the security of all remaining free peoples including our own; and

WHEREAS, The people of the United States, true to their tradition and heritage of freedom, are never acquiescent in such enslavement of any peoples; and

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 207.

WHEREAS, It is appropriate that the Congress join with the President in giving expression to the desires and hopes of the people of the United States: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate and House concurring,

Join with the President in declaring that the United States rejects any interpretations or applications of any international agreements or understandings, made during the course of World War II, which have been perverted to bring about the subjugation of free peoples, and further

Join in proclaiming the hope that the peoples who have been subjected to the captivity of Soviet despotism shall again enjoy the right of self-determination within a framework which will sustain the peace; that they shall again have the right to choose the form of government under which they will live, and that sovereign rights of self-government shall be restored to them all in accordance with the pledge of the Atlantic Charter.

President Requests More Facts Concerning Tariffs on Brier Pipes

White House press release dated February 18

The President today moved to obtain additional information from the Tariff Commission before he makes a final decision on its recommendations that import duties on low-priced brier pipes be increased.

He is sending, simultaneously, a letter to the Tariff Commission, requesting that it conduct a further study of the brier pipe situation, and outlining several points in the case concerning which he feels information is essential. He also is sending identical letters reporting on his action to the Chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee [Representative Daniel A. Reed], and the Senate Finance Committee [Senator Eugene D. Millikin].

The President, in his State of the Union message,¹ recommended that the Congress "take the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act under immediate study and extend it by appropriate legislation," which does not ignore the "legitimate safeguarding of domestic industries, agriculture, and labor standards."

In his letters to the chairmen of the congressional committees, the President points out that earnest consideration is being given to the policies and actions required for our helpful economic cooperation with the free world but that basic to decisions in this field is the constant necessity that we preserve our own economic strength while being helpful to others.

The President considers the brier pipe case to

be one part of the general problem of foreign trade. He does not wish to make a final decision in this particular case until he has reviewed the additional facts, which he has requested from the Tariff Commission, and has developed at an early date recommendations on basic trade policies for the consideration of the Congress.

Texts of the President's letter to the Chairman of the U. S. Tariff Commission [Oscar B. Ryder] and to the chairmen of the congressional committees follow.

The President to the Chairman of the Tariff Commission

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have examined with care the report of the Commission dated December 22, 1952, making recommendations pursuant to Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, for adjustments in the duties of brier wood pipes valued at \$5.00 per dozen or less. As a result of my examination, I have today advised the Chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and of the Committee on Finance of the Senate that I shall not, at this time, disturb the existing tariffs on these products.

In order to make an appropriate final decision I am anxious to have the help of the Commission in developing further facts which seem to me to be significant.

I am advised that during the postwar period, large quantities of pipes acquired by our armed forces for sale through Ships Stores and Post Exchanges were placed on the market as surplus stocks. I should like to know the relationship of these sales to the industry's recent difficulties. I should also like to have any information which can be reasonably obtained by the Commission concerning the relevant foreign and domestic production costs for such pipes and bowls, including comparative labor costs. In addition, I should like to have the Commission's view of the significance of invoice data not heretofore available to the Commission which suggests that a large part of United States imports may have consisted of pipes of a quality and price range not generally produced by the domestic industry. Finally, there have been recent statements by leaders of the industry indicating a recent upturn in the domestic pipe business which would bear further investigation.

May I, therefore, request the Commission to proceed with a further study of the problems of this industry especially those I have outlined above. Upon receipt of this further report, I shall reexamine the case and make such final decision as may be necessary and appropriate.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Department of State Bulletin

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 207.

The President to Senator Millikin and Representative Daniel A. Reed

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In December 1951, representatives of the brier pipe industry of the United States, pursuant to Section 7 (a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, applied to the United States Tariff Commission for an investigation of the imports of brier wood pipes and bowls, contending that such imports into the United States were occurring in increased quantities and were causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products. The Commission during the months of January and February 1952, held hearings and carried out staff investigations on the problem.

On December 22, 1952, the Commission issued a report of its findings and recommended certain increases in the duties on brier wood pipes valued at \$5 per dozen or less. Pursuant to Section 7 (c), I may "make such adjustments in the rates of duty, impose such quotas, or make such other modifications as are found and reported by the Commission to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury to the respective domestic industry." Since I am not taking such action within the 60-day period provided by Section 7 (c), I am submitting this report.

In reviewing the findings of the Commission, I have decided that I should like further assistance from it in developing additional facts which seem to me to be significant.

I am advised that during the postwar period, large quantities of pipes acquired by our armed forces for sale through Ships Stores and Post Exchanges were placed on the market as surplus stocks. I should like to know the relationship of these sales to the industry's recent difficulties. I should also like to have any information which can be reasonably obtained by the Commission about the relevant foreign and domestic production costs for such pipes and bowls, including comparative labor costs. In addition, I should like to have the Commission's view of the significance of invoice data not heretofore available to the Commission which suggests that a large part of the United States imports may have con-

sisted of pipes of a quality and price range not generally produced by the domestic industry. Finally, there have been recent statements by leaders of the industry indicating a recent upturn in the domestic pipe business which would bear further investigation.

The Administration is giving earnest consideration to the policies and actions required for our helpful economic cooperation with the free world. Basic to decisions in this field is the constant necessity that we preserve our own economic strength while being helpful to others. I expect to develop at an early date recommendations on these important matters for the consideration of the Congress. The tariff problem typified by this case is one part of the whole question.

So as to assist me in reaching an ultimate decision on this case, I am requesting the Commission to proceed with a further investigation of the problems of this industry, especially those I have outlined. I shall review its further report and make such final decision as may be necessary and appropriate.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

**Check List of Department of State
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Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Press releases issued prior to Feb. 16 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 80 of Feb. 10 and S3 of Feb. 11.

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Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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The Problems of Tunisia and Morocco in the Seventh Session of the General Assembly

by Harry N. Howard

Whether designed to handle such problems, the United Nations, from its very inception has been confronted with difficult and complicated issues of trusteeship and non-self-governing territories, as was the League of Nations before it. Since 1951, in particular, the General Assembly has been faced with the question of Morocco, which has raised all kinds of issues from that of its competence to deal with this question to that of whether, in any case, the United Nations is an appropriate forum through which to find viable solutions. But whatever the immediate or ultimate answers to be given to such questions, the problems of Tunisia and Morocco may serve as illustrations of the type of issues which are increasingly coming before the General Assembly from the Arab-Asian-African world.

Tunisia became a protectorate of France under the treaties of Bardo (May 12, 1881) and La Marsa (June 8, 1883). Under the General Act of Algeciras (Apr. 7, 1906) the independence and integrity of Morocco were reaffirmed, and by the Treaty of Fez (Mar. 30, 1912), the Sultan accepted a French protectorate.¹ The problems which have arisen, both in Tunisia and in Morocco, along the North African shores of the Mediterranean, are essentially a development of the growing nationalist sentiment among the Arabic-speaking peoples of this area.

During 1950 France and Tunisia entered into negotiations looking toward reforms which would advance the latter along the road toward self-government, although it did not prove possible to satisfy the Tunisian nationalist leaders who attempted to bring their differences before the Security Council in April 1952. The tension between Morocco and France was brought formally to the notice of the General Assembly on October 4, 1951,

¹ For texts see (1) Bardo (Martens, *N. R. G.*, 2d series, 6:507); (2) La Marsa (*ibid.*, 9:697); (3) General Act of Algeciras (*ibid.*, 34: 238); (4) Fez (*ibid.*, 3d series, 6: 332).

when the Egyptian Government requested that the alleged "Violation of the principles of the Charter and of the Declaration of Human Rights by France in Morocco" be placed on the agenda of the Sixth Session in Paris. The Egyptian request was soon followed by similar action on the part of the other members of the Arab league.²

When the problem of placing the Moroccan item on the agenda came before the General Committee, the representative of Canada proposed that the matter be "postponed for the time being." The French representative questioned the competence of the General Assembly to consider the problem at all, and Ambassador Warren R. Austin, U.S. representative to the United Nations, expressed doubt that discussion of the complex issue would promote the cause of the Moroccan people. In the end, the motion to postpone the question was carried on November 9, by a vote of 6 to 4, with 4 abstentions.³ The question of inclusion came before the plenary session on November 13, 1951, when the representative of Egypt once more sought inscription of the Moroccan item. The representative of France, however, denied the allegations involved, stated that the policy of France in Morocco had always been consonant with the Charter, and repeated that the question was one within the essential domestic jurisdiction of France and, therefore, not within the competence of the General Assembly under article 2 (7) of the Charter.

At the suggestion of the Egyptian representative, and in view of the French statement, the question was postponed, and discussion was not resumed until December 13 when Sir Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan, among others, supported inclusion. Sir Zafrulla reminded the General Assembly that "the dependent areas and peoples are all of Asia and Africa; the dominant peoples are

² U.N. docs. A/1894, A/1898, 1904, 1908, 1909, 1918, 1954, 1980. For a brief review, see U.N. doc. A/2141, pp. 44-47.

³ U.N. docs. A/BUR/SR. 75, 76; A/BUR/127; A/1950.

of Europe and America" and declared that the manner in which the question of Morocco, involving "the independence of 9 million human beings," was handled would provide "a measure, a standard, a yardstick" by which Arab-Asian-African representatives could judge other items to be placed on the agenda of future sessions. Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, U. S. representative to the General Assembly, indicated that the United States would support postponement, as it had done in the General Committee, because of its view that the interests of both parties would be served better by direct negotiations than by animated discussion in the General Assembly. By a vote of 28 to 23, with 7 abstentions, it was finally decided that discussion of whether to include the Moroccan issue should be deferred.⁴

When 11 Arab-Asian-African States sought to place the Tunisian issue on the agenda of the Security Council, Ambassador Gross, on April 10, 1952, indicated that the French reform program offered a basis for the resumption of negotiations "looking toward the establishment of home rule in Tunisia." He expressed the hope that France would "bring about far-sighted and genuine reforms in Tunisia," emphasized the desirability of direct negotiations, declared that the Security Council would "remain open to any member of the United Nations to bring the question to the Council's attention again," and stated that the United States would "naturally re-assess the situation if that is done."⁵ The vote on April 14 was 5 to 2, with Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United States abstaining. Since the required 7 affirmative votes were not obtained, the question was not inscribed. Secretary Acheson reaffirmed the American position on April 16, stressing that "the sound way to proceed here is to give time for the French authorities and the Tunisian authorities to discuss, negotiate, and find a solution," and adding: "Now if they can't, another situation is created."⁶

On June 20, 1952, Secretary-General Trygve Lie received a request from 13 Arab-Asian States that a special session of the General Assembly be called to consider the Tunisian problem.⁷ However, by July 21 this move had failed, since only 23 States favored it, whereas a majority was required. The same delegations on July 30 requested that the question be included in the provisional agenda of the Seventh Session. The accompanying memorandum recalled that in April, 11 Arab-Asian members had brought the problem to the attention of the Security Council as a threat to international peace and security and declared that the situation

had further deteriorated since the Council's refusal to consider the matter. The memorandum declared that the expected Franco-Tunisian negotiations had not materialized, that tension had increased, and that there was now "a deep sense of frustration among people in many countries of the world, and especially in Asian and African countries."⁸

Iraq asked for inscription of the Moroccan item on the agenda on August 7; this request was superseded on September 3 by a joint request from 13 Arab-Asian delegations. An explanatory memorandum stated that "in the face of the rising tide of nationalism in Africa," continuation of the French protectorate in Morocco could not "but constitute a mounting threat to the peace," and contended that the Treaty of Fez had been imposed on the Sultan of Morocco. It also charged that human rights were denied in contravention of the principles of the Charter.⁹

The Problems of Tunisia and Morocco in the General Debate

INSCRIPTION ON THE AGENDA OF THE SEVENTH SESSION

When the General Assembly convened on October 14, 1952, it seemed all but certain that the Tunisian and Moroccan items would be included on the agenda of the Seventh Session, despite the announcement of the French Cabinet on October 7 that France would "accept no interference in these questions, which relate essentially to the national competence of France." The General Committee discussed the provisional agenda on October 15, and when it came to the Tunisian and Moroccan items, Henri Hoppenot of France, "protested indignantly" against the accusations, stated that he would not take refuge in procedural argument, declared that his Government found "the interference of the United Nations in matters which were exclusively within its national jurisdiction wholly unacceptable," and announced that he would not take part in any discussion or in any vote on the inclusion of these items.¹⁰

On the other hand, the United States upheld the Assembly's competence and voted for inscription, without prejudice as to its subsequent substantive position concerning the issues. The General Committee recommended inclusion. Two days later, on October 17, without discussion or opposition, the General Assembly approved inscription.¹¹

SOME WESTERN POINTS OF VIEW

In view of the serious implications involved, a number of speakers in the general debate during the early plenary meetings took particular note of the problems of Tunisia and Morocco. Already,

⁴ U.N. docs. A/PV.342, 348, 353, 354; A/C.1/SR.450.

⁵ U.N. docs. S/PV.574, S/PV.575, pp. 1-30; S/PV.576, pp. 11-20. See also S/2508, S/2574-2584, and S/2598.

⁶ BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1952, p. 678. See also *ibid.*, May 19, 1952, p. 799, for criticism, and Senator Hill's statement, *Cong. Rec.*, vol. 98, No. 69, pp. 3724-3725.

⁷ U.N. docs. A/2137, 2143.

⁸ U.N. doc. A/2152.

⁹ U.N. docs. A/2153, 2175, and 2175/Add. 1, 2.

¹⁰ U.N. docs. A/BUR/SR.79, p. 3; A/2225/Rev. 1.

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/PV.380, p. 51.

in his 1952 annual report, the Secretary-General had referred to the problem of political, economic, and social adjustments between the more advanced Western nations and the underdeveloped nations, which was especially acute "in parts of Asia, the Middle East and North Africa" and constituted "one of the greatest challenges to contemporary civilization."¹²

Similarly, the President of the General Assembly, Lester Pearson, emphasized these issues and declared that the United Nations should meet the tests "without violating the Charter." Secretary Acheson, mindful of the great achievements in the field of self-determination since 1945, particularly in Asia, suggested in his address of October 16 that there were differences only as to method and timing, not of purpose, and that problems of this kind could be "solved through wise statesmanship."¹³ T. Clifton Webb of New Zealand, who counseled patience, also pointed to the significant role which the United Nations had already played with respect to non-self-governing territories "in their development of international status," but he was concerned about the competence of the United Nations.¹⁴ His Commonwealth colleague, Sir Richard G. Casey of Australia, who spoke on October 20, was also troubled by this aspect of the problem.¹⁵ The Foreign Minister of Belgium, Paul van Zeeland, developed the same point of view when the general debate was resumed on November 10, following the U.S. elections. He stressed that in the last several years discussions on these subjects had taken a form which was "in ill keeping with the spirit of cooperation that the members of the United Nations pledged themselves to maintain among themselves. The resulting uneasiness might, in the long run, even injure the United Nations itself."¹⁶

Foreign Secretary Eden of the United Kingdom dwelt in more detail on the problems at issue in his address of November 11.¹⁷ Mr. Eden had few apologies to make, as the representative of a "colonial power," and indicated that he was "very well aware of the wide desire for self-government in Asia and Africa," pointing to the long British record in advancing the development of dependent areas. But he was disturbed lest the terms of the Charter be stretched beyond recognition. He said:

... Either these lands can continue, with the help of countries like my own, their orderly progress towards self-government. Or they can be prematurely abandoned by us and exposed to anarchy or despotism, so that all liberal tendencies are smothered, perhaps for generations. There is no question in my mind as to which of these

courses most closely fits the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations. . . .

... If we attempt to stretch the meaning of the Charter and extend the areas in which the United Nations has jurisdiction, we run grave risks—unless we can carry all our fellow members with us—of weakening the very structure of the United Nations. For this reason I regard it as very dangerous that this Organization should attempt to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states, or that it should in any way contravene the terms of article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter.

The object of our Organization is to promote general international co-operation and good feeling. It was never intended to be an agency for controlling the domestic policies of its various members or for intervening between them and the territories for which they are internationally responsible.

THE POSITION OF FRANCE

It remained for Robert Schuman, the Foreign Minister of France, to set forth the position of France precisely and in detail. M. Schuman said on November 10¹⁸ that he considered the essential thing was "to abide strictly by the Charter," and that he was—

compelled to warn this Assembly' not only against the injustice which some persons would have it commit, against the insult which this accusation represents to his country, against the repercussions which any intervention, whatever form it took, would inevitably have outside the United Nations, but also and above all against the harm which would thereby be done to the Organization itself.

M. Schuman indicated that France was performing a task in North Africa which it would continue to perform and pursue "with faith and pride." He dwelt at length on the subject of competence, under article 2 (7) of the Charter, declaring that "the only eventuality in which the United Nations could be led to intervene is that provided for in Chapter VII, that is, in the case of 'threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression,'" although no one had seriously contended, he said, that there was a threat to the peace. In the absence of such a threat or breach, the United Nations was "not competent to examine the situations brought about by the two treaties or to intervene to any extent whatever in the relations existing between the two North African States and France."

M. Schuman described some of the problems of Tunisia and Morocco, going back to the treaties involved, and stating that the two countries were "included in France's national defense perimeter and plans." He added that, with the aid of France, they were developing, and finding markets and economic assistance within the more extensive French economic system. Moreover, the nationals of Tunisia and Morocco had "access to the cultural heritage of France on the same terms as French citizens," while France "scrupulously respected their traditions, institutions, civilization, and religion." At the time the treaties establishing

¹² U.N. doc. A/2141/Add. 1.

¹³ U.N. docs. A/PV.377, p. 10; A/PV.380, p. 42. See also BULLETIN of Oct. 27, 1952, p. 639.

¹⁴ U.N. doc. A/PV.350, p. 36.

¹⁵ U.N. doc. A/PV.384, pp. 107-108.

¹⁶ U.N. doc. A/PV.392, pp. 188-189.

¹⁷ U.N. doc. A/PV.393, p. 210.

¹⁸ U.N. doc. A/PV.392, pp. 193-200.

French protectorates in Tunisia and Morocco were signed, according to M. Schuman, both countries, politically and administratively, were "crudely organized and almost in a state of anarchy," with low standards of living. The sovereignty of the reigning dynasties had been strengthened and stability restored. Among the first concerns of the French were to raise living standards, improve social conditions, and establish law and order so that the people might have that "hope and confidence without which no human effort is possible."

M. Schuman pointed to the agricultural development of Tunisia, where 90 percent of the farmland was owned by Tunisians; in Morocco 94 percent of the land was cultivated by Moroccan owners. Steps had been taken in both countries to improve health and sanitary conditions and to enact social legislation modeled directly on that of France. In both countries the system of communications had been vastly improved, and the port of Casablanca had developed to the point where it handled some 7,500,000 tons of goods annually. There was a systematic program of education in both Tunisia and Morocco, France having taken the initiative to educate both peoples in democracy. Recent negotiations with the Bey of Tunis, M. Schuman remarked, had been carried on in the open, and both the Sultan of Morocco and the Bey of Tunis were "perfectly free to make their attitude known" and could "state it formally in public." He thought it "extremely rash" to attempt to burden the United Nations "with the responsibility for determining the future organization of two rapidly developing countries," and declared that France was "not going to let itself be ousted."

What was the policy of France in Tunisia and Morocco? On French initiative, both countries had been admitted without opposition to associate membership in the World Health Organization of the United Nations. France had been flexible in its position and had kept in tune with the times. With particular reference to Tunisia, M. Schuman stated that France had—

submitted to the Bey a detailed programme of new reforms which would constitute a step forward toward internal self-government. They would bring about extensive participation by Tunisians in public affairs. Our purpose is that the Tunisians should be able to assume ever-increasing responsibilities. We particularly want the support of young Tunisians, who are given priority in all the administrative careers in their country. In this way we are trying to spread democratic organization at all levels, starting at the bottom, in the municipalities and other local communities. Then, as these reforms are gradually put into effect and tested in practice, France will be prepared gradually to give up the powers which it holds under the treaties and exercises at present on behalf of sovereign Tunisia by virtue of a contractual delegation.

The development in Morocco had begun 30 years later than that in Tunisia and had moved along different lines. M. Schuman pointed out, however, that—

the final objective . . . is the same: to establish Morocco with its dynasty as a sovereign State, to develop its political and social institutions on democratic foundations within a progressively expanding area of self-government, to protect all interests, and to make the best use of all resources and help, so that, working harmoniously together, we may insure the welfare of Morocco and all its inhabitants. We have recently given an assurance of those aims to His Majesty the Sultan, and we are always prepared to reach an understanding on these principles and the methods of applying them, just as we have been and still are prepared to do in Tunis.

As M. Schuman concluded his statement, he reminded the Assembly again that more than the interests of France was involved in this sphere, for the United Nations itself was "threatened by a distortion which would be pernicious to itself, to the member states and to the cause of peace." Like other nations, France had risen above "the out-moded concept of colonialism." As an illustration of French progress in the administration of overseas territories, M. Schuman noted the broad concept of the French Union, with its provisions for self-government and responsibility. On the other hand, it was "an all-too-common fallacy" to think that "the supreme good for a people" lay "in unlimited and absolute independence," especially in the modern world. For all these reasons, the French Government declared itself—

compelled in all conscience to warn the Assembly against the consequences of an interference to which in no case and under no conditions could it consent. Consequently my Government can agree to discuss neither the principle nor the manner of such interference.

France will not be failing in the respect it owes the United Nations, or in the loyalty which it has pledged and still pledges in respect of all its international commitments, if it feels bound to protest against what it regards as a fatal mistake and a dangerous misunderstanding of one of the fundamental principles of the Charter.

THE ARAB-ASIAN-AFRICAN POSITION

The Latin American States, which had an anti-colonial tradition, were inclined to take a moderate view of these problems, while the Soviet Union and its satellites sought, as usual, to exploit the Tunisian and Moroccan issues for Communist purposes.¹⁹ The Arab-Asian-African States professed a very direct interest in the issues and were not inclined to accept either the general Western European approach as to the competence of the General Assembly, or the French position.

Fadhil Al-Jamali, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, for example, on October 16²⁰ paid particular attention to Tunisia and Morocco, noting, among other things, that the great democratic principles of the West provided "lofty aims and ideals which await not local, continental or partial observance, but full and universal application." He felt that there was little hope for peace in the world "if the nineteenth-century ideas of colonialism, superior-

¹⁹ See U.N. docs. A/PV.382, pp. 74-83, A/PV.383, pp. 90-100, for the addresses of Mr. Stanislaw Skrzesewski (Poland) and Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.).

²⁰ U.N. doc. A/PV.379, pp. 27-31.

ity of the white man and the 'white man's burden' were "not finally abandoned by the colonial Powers." He had no doubt of the growing political consciousness of the peoples of North Africa, and declared that the General Assembly was at a crucial stage in world history, since a "testing point" had been reached in international relations "between the European nations, on one side, and the Asian and African peoples, on the other."

He added:

... For over two centuries, Europe has dominated many parts of Asia and Africa. Now both Asia and Africa are rising. Political consciousness, the desire for freedom and independence, the desire for a place in the sun, and the rejection of foreign domination and exploitation, are the order of the day in Asia and in some parts of Africa. . . . The independence of India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ceylon, Burma and others certainly points in the right direction. We sincerely hope that other colonial Powers will follow suit and contribute to a friendly and pleasant atmosphere of international understanding between Europe, on the one hand, and the Asian and African peoples, on the other.

More particularly, Dr. Jamali believed that balanced discussion of the Tunisian and Moroccan problems could help France in reaching "a friendly and liberating settlement." To him it appeared useless to argue the question of "domestic jurisdiction," for he pointed out that Tunisia and Morocco were "sovereign States," in treaty relationship with France, and that there was an international interest in the problem. In the end, he expressed hope that "the people of France will come to appreciate the fact that the peoples of North Africa have their national aspirations and that the principles of *liberté, égalité, fraternité* apply to the peoples of North Africa as well as to those of France."

Mohammed Kabir Ludin of Afghanistan, and Secretary of State Gabriel L. Dennis of Liberia, expressed similar views, although within a much more general context.²¹ Mme. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, who led the Indian delegation, on November 11 alluded to India's achievement of independence, as well as to Indonesia and Libya, and stated:²²

We deeply sympathize with the peoples of Tunisia and Morocco in their desire for self-government. It is their legitimate aspiration, and we had thought that the political wisdom and sense of history of the great Power governing their destinies would lead to a statesmanlike approach to the problems arising out of their demands. . . .

I should like to emphasize the fact that new life is stirring in the continents of Asia and Africa, of which the General Assembly should take due note. In the first half of the present century, we saw the emergence in Asia of a movement for self-expression and self-development. It was handled by the parties concerned with realism and statesmanship, and the results are seen today both in terms of good will and in the awakening of the other peoples of Asia to their new responsibilities. We hope that similar realism and statesmanship will be applied to similar movements in other areas.

²¹ U.N. docs. A/PV.380, pp. 39-40; A/PV.382, pp. 73-74.

²² U.N. doc. A/PV.393, pp. 206-207.

James Barrington of Burma also hoped that it would be "possible for France to make the readjustment demanded by the times without too much difficulty or delay."²³

Ahmed Mohamed Farrag of Egypt carried the discussion forward on November 12,²⁴ stressing that the Tunisian and Moroccan peoples deserved the support of the United Nations, and declared that a solution "in conformity with the principle of self-determination and in the interests of international peace and security" must be found.²⁵ Sir Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan expressed similar sentiments; he emphasized that "political domination of one people by another is today an anachronism and a destructive one," although it was "not possible to get rid of it at once." He saw no reason why the process of adjustment could not "be carried out in complete friendliness between the parties primarily concerned in each case," and, as the only alternative, saw sharp and bitter conflict.²⁶ Foreign Minister Ato Abte-Wold Aklilou of Ethiopia touched generally on the principle of self-determination.²⁶

The general debate ended on November 13, with Foreign Minister Zafer Rifai of Syria continuing the Arab-Asian protest against "colonialism" and charging that Morocco, Tunisia, and other Arab principalities, which historically had enjoyed an "organized and acknowledged sovereignty," were dependent countries.²⁷ By granting Tunisia and Morocco full independence, Dr. Rifai declared, France would be "taking a worthy step, consistent with its liberal traditions." Moreover, he felt that peace itself depended on "the liberation of peoples."

Dr. Jamali of Iraq, who intervened a second time in the debate to reply to M. Schuman,²⁸ thought it inconsistent that the latter, on the one hand, should invoke article 2 (7) of the Charter, in the matter of domestic jurisdiction, and on the other, state that France was in treaty relationship with the two sovereign communities of Tunisia and Morocco. He could not accept the rest of the French thesis, either, and appealed to the French Government to make "the national liberation of Tunisia and Morocco quick, peaceful and friendly." This was also the essential theme of Fouad Ammoun of Lebanon, who stressed the right of peoples to self-government and self-determination.²⁹ Nasrollah Entezam of Iran said he supported the national aspirations of non-self-governing peoples, despite his more immediate concern with Iran's own particular problems.³⁰

²³ U.N. doc. A/PV.394, pp. 229-231.

²⁴ U.N. doc. A/PV.395, pp. 233-234.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 234-237.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 244.

²⁷ U.N. doc. A/PV.396, pp. 254-256. See also the statement of K. C. Yeh of China, *ibid.*, p. 248.

²⁸ U.N. doc. A/PV.397, pp. 281-285.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 266-268.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-277.

The Tunisian Problem

THE ARAB-ASIAN-AFRICAN POSITION

The discussion of the Tunisian issue began in Committee I (Political and Security) on December 4 and concluded on December 12, 1952. At the outset, Chairman João Carlos Muniz of Brazil read a letter from M. Hoppenot stating that the French Government "could not accept any interference by the United Nations in its relations with Tunisia and Morocco," repeating the warning of M. Schuman against such "interference," and declaring that the French delegation would not participate in the Committee's deliberations.³¹

Thirteen Arab-Asian delegations then submitted to the Committee a proposal which, among other things, recommended the resumption of negotiations between France and "the true representatives of the Tunisian people" to implement "the right of self-determination and the fulfilment of the national aspirations of the Tunisian people." Moreover, it called for the appointment of a "commission of good offices," composed of three members, to arrange and assist in these negotiations and report to the General Assembly.³²

Sir Zafrulla Khan opened the Arab-Asian case with an extended statement, along lines foreshadowed by his remarks in the plenary session, in which he traced the historical development of the problem.³³ He charged the French Government with belatedly offering only municipal reforms to the Tunisian people and adopting repressive measures when they had not been accepted, since, he said, the Tunisians had lost confidence in French promises. Sir Zafrulla believed that the 140,000 French citizens in Tunisia should not have equal political representation to that of the more than 3,000,000 Tunisians. He asserted that good government was no substitute for self-government and urged accelerated progress toward the latter end. Deploping the absence of the French delegation from the discussions, and pointing to the recently achieved independence of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Libya, Sir Zafrulla considered the case for the restoration of Tunisian sovereignty "unanswerable."

The discussion continued on December 6 with a further exposition of the Arab-Asian viewpoint, with Abdel Monem Mostafa (Egypt), L. N. Palar (Indonesia), and Ambassador Entezam (Iran) supporting the Arab-Asian proposal, which they had cosponsored, and arguing that the General Assembly was fully competent to consider the Tunisian question.³⁴ All regretted the absence of the French delegation from Committee I, and deplored the assassination of Farhat Hached, the Tunisian labor leader. Messrs. Mostafa and Palar

gave their version of the historical development of Tunisia, the former asserting that the history of French rule since 1881 had been that of conflict between the nationalism of a dominated people and French colonialism, and asserting that in Tunisia France had worked "very much for the French and very much less for the Tunisians." Ambassador Entezam declared that the peace of the world would not tolerate continued colonialism and maintained that continuation of the present situation in Tunisia was likely to endanger international peace and security; he urged resumption of negotiations between Tunisia and France.

Emilio Núñez-Portuondo of Cuba adopted a moderate position with respect to the essence of the problem but did not doubt the competence of the General Assembly to deal with the Tunisian question. On the other hand, Selwyn Lloyd of the United Kingdom did not believe the Assembly competent to deal with the matter and set forth certain legal considerations to substantiate his position, since he felt that the Arab-Asian sponsors of the resolution had brushed aside the legal principles involved.³⁵ The representative of the United Kingdom invoked the principles of article 2 (7) as to domestic jurisdiction, emphasizing, as Mr. Eden had, that the United Nations had not been established to intervene either in the domestic affairs of states or between metropolitan powers and the territories for which they were internationally responsible. He pointed out that the relations between France and Tunisia were governed by a convention and a treaty.

The claim of the complaining states, in Mr. Lloyd's view, was tantamount to a request that the United Nations intervene for the purpose of revising bilateral treaties, although, unlike the League of Nations, which under article XIX of the Covenant might advise the reconsideration of outmoded treaties, the United Nations had no general powers to do this under the Charter. He then stressed that, under the treaty of 1883, France was to direct the external affairs of Tunisia, thereby placing the matter within the realm of the domestic affairs of France, since, in fact, Tunisia was only partly sovereign. No one, he declared, could contend seriously that the problem under discussion actually threatened peace and security, but even if that were the case, under article 11 (2), the United Nations could take action only to the extent that the problem affected international peace and security. Therefore, Mr. Lloyd asked that members "think again" before going further with the Tunisian discussion. Ambassador Fernand van Langenhove of Belgium, who spoke briefly, was in thorough accord with this position. He stressed that a solution had to be found by the parties directly concerned.

Finn Moe of Norway felt that the question of competence ultimately came down to the issue of how and to what degree the General Assembly

³¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/737.

³² U.N. doc. A/C.1/736.

³³ U.N. docs. A/C.1/SR.537, pp. 187-193; A/C.1/PV.537.

³⁴ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.538, pp. 195-201, 202-203.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 201-202.

could assert its general right to influence peaceful development in dependent areas, in this particular territory, and in this particular situation.³⁶ Should the General Assembly avail itself of this right in this situation? The delegation of Norway, he said, had "serious doubts" as to the application of article 2 (7), and it was unable to accept the contention that article 2 (7), as Mr. Lloyd had implied, rendered null and void all implications of Chapter XI of the Charter, dealing with non-self-governing territories, as to the legitimate concern of the United Nations for conditions to which Chapter XI related. Moreover, this article could not deprive the General Assembly of the right to investigate for itself whether it was competent.

THE LATIN AMERICAN PROPOSAL

Eleven Latin American States, on December 8, presented a proposal³⁷ which expressed confidence that France, "in pursuance of its proclaimed policies," would "endeavour to further the effective development of the free institutions of the Tunisian people, in conformity to the purposes and principles of the Charter." It also expressed the hope that the parties would "continue negotiations on an urgent basis, with a view to bringing about self-government in Tunisia, and appealed to the parties to conduct their relations and settle their disputes "in accordance with the spirit of the Charter and refrain from any acts or measures likely to aggravate the present tension."

Henrique de Souza Gomes (Brazil) and César Charlone (Uruguay), who spoke in behalf of the resolution, had no doubt as to competence. The former stressed that there was no question of "placing France in the dock of the accused" or of passing judgment on the political and moral aspects of the French administration; the Committee was simply faced with "a question of an international nature," and should deal with it constructively.³⁸

In extending his support for the Latin American proposal, Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, U.S. representative to the General Assembly, stated that the problem related essentially "to the fulfillment of national aspirations," and was not an immediate or direct threat to the peace.³⁹ Ambassador Jessup stated that the United States had recognized and continued to recognize "the existing treaty relationship between France on the one hand and Tunis on the other," that it supported "the evolutionary development in the relations between France and Tunisia contemplated by the Treaties of Le Bardo and La Marsa" and believed that "any development interfering with this orderly process would be the wrong way to deal with the situation." The function of the dis-

cussions in the General Assembly "should be to facilitate the task of France in achieving its announced goal." The United States, he said, trusted France and wished "to support and not in any way to make more difficult the achievement of the high purpose to which France has pledged itself." Both "the tendency of the Tunisian Nation" and that of the French Nation were "right," and Ambassador Jessup felt that the peoples and Governments of France and Tunisia "must work out their destinies." For these reasons, the United States supported the Latin American proposal, since it recognized that "the responsibility and the opportunity" for settlement lay with France and Tunisia directly.

When the discussion was continued on December 9, Mme. Pandit (India), Shaikh Ali Alireza (Saudi Arabia), and Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo (Philippines) reaffirmed their convictions as to the competence of the General Assembly and supported the Arab-Asian proposal, which they had cosponsored.⁴⁰ Mme. Pandit stressed that the people of Tunisia should not be "denied what their neighbors have so happily secured." Shaikh Alireza declared that the essential aim in placing the problem before the General Assembly was to try to find a solution to the question of Tunisia. General Romulo thought three important principles were involved—free discussion, the peaceful adjustment of a dangerous situation, and the principle of freedom—all of which were embodied in the Charter.

Victor A. Belaúnde of Peru supported the Latin American proposal and stressed the "admirable achievements" of France in Tunisia. Neither Tingfu F. Tsiang of China nor Vladimir Popović of Yugoslavia had yet decided which proposal to support; the latter indicated that he would keep in mind the need for a basis of equality and provisions which might lead to agreement between the peoples of France and Tunisia.⁴¹

CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION

The representatives of Czechoslovakia, the Union of South Africa, Canada, Greece, and Norway continued the discussion on the evening of December 9.⁴² The Czechoslovak representative, Frantisek Komzala, advanced the usual Communist thesis, stressing the "aggressive plans" of the United States with regard to Tunisia. Ambassador G. P. Jooste of South Africa, who welcomed the "sober tone" which had generally prevailed in the discussion, considered the General Assembly incompetent under article 2 (7) and hoped that nothing would be done or said which would militate against the progress already being made, under difficult circumstances, in Tunisia. Paul Martin of Canada could not on moral, if on

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

³⁷ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.S.

³⁸ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.539, pp. 205-206, 208-211.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 206-208; BULLETIN of Dec. 22, 1952, p. 986.

⁴⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.540, pp. 213-214, 217-221.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-217.

⁴² U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.541, pp. 223-230.

legal, grounds, share the view that the administering power should be the sole judge of the interests of the inhabitants of a non-self-governing territory and "refuse to permit even a discussion of the principles involved," or that a single political movement could presume fully to represent all the inhabitants of a territory. He felt that the Latin American proposal represented a conciliatory approach to the problem and supported it. Ambassador Athanase Politis of Greece favored a "very broad" interpretation of article 11 of the Charter, and felt that a discussion could only promote the cause of peace. Nor would it serve any useful purpose to close the door of the United Nations to disputes which might act as "slow poison." Greece, he said, was linked to the Arab world, on the one hand, and, on the other, the bonds which united it to France were both very old and very profound. He hoped for a "reasonable solution."

Mr. Moe of Norway, in a second intervention in the debate,⁴³ expressed the opinion that the absence of the French delegation was not helpful in finding a solution of the Tunisian problem, and said he hoped the French Government would not be "unduly influenced" by the "unjust criticism" which some delegations had leveled against it. It would be unwise, he felt, to take the principle of "self-determination" out of its proper context and carry it either to "pure nationalism" or even to xenophobia. The movement in Tunisia was part and parcel of the great national movements in Asia and other areas, and he believed that, indeed, the future historian might well find the most important development in these troubled times had been the emancipation of hitherto dependent peoples. It was in this light that he viewed the Tunisian problem, with the point at issue the peaceful achievement of self-government. He appealed to the people of Tunisia to take the essential interests of France into account, and stated that he would support the Latin American proposal, which did not go beyond the Charter, and he appealed to both parties to reopen negotiations looking toward a peaceful solution.

On December 10 Committee I dealt with a proposal submitted by S. Itaat Husain of Pakistan on the previous day, expressing regret that the French delegation was not present in the deliberations on Tunisia, appealing to it to reconsider its decision, and inviting the Bey of Tunis to send a representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote. After an extended discussion, in a paragraph-by-paragraph recorded vote, the resolution was defeated by 21 to 2, with 34 abstentions.⁴⁴

In the vote on par. 1, as to the French delegation (19-16-22), the Arab-Asian delegations voted in the affirmative, while the United States and the Soviet bloc

abstained. The Arab-Asian States all voted affirmatively, as did the Soviet bloc, to invite a representative of the Bey of Tunis; the United States voted in the negative (26-24-2). The Arab-Asian States and the United States abstained on the resolution, minus the second paragraph, as did the Soviet bloc. For the U.S. position, see the remarks of Ambassador Jessup setting forth the technical arguments against an invitation (BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1953, p. 34).

In the discussions which followed on December 10,⁴⁵ both Marian Naskowski (Poland) and A. A. Sobolev (U.S.S.R.), the latter a former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, repeated the Soviet thesis without variation denouncing the United States, the "aggressive Atlantic bloc," and the "undisguised apology of colonialism of France and the United Kingdom." Leslie Knox Munro of New Zealand announced his support of the Latin American proposal. He stated that, in the absence of an opinion of the International Court of Justice, the delegation of New Zealand would continue to study whether any of the proposals before the Committee exceeded the competence of the United Nations, as, in fact, intervention in Tunisia at that time would. The representatives of Paraguay and Bolivia fully supported the conciliatory Latin American proposal, as did Luis Quintanilla of Mexico, who felt that no people could be "condemned" to perpetual dependence, although he recognized the difficulties of the French position in Tunisia, and declared that "the cause of freedom is in good hands when it is in the hands of France." On the other hand, Adnan Tarceici of Yemen and Mohammed Kabir Ludin of Afghanistan, who supported the Arab-Asian proposal, felt that, although France had been a leader in the cause of democratic freedom, it has also engaged in "colonial exploitation." Both hoped that France would quicken the Tunisian pace toward self-government.

In his remarks on December 11, Secretary of State Dennis of Liberia spoke of the right of self-determination, the evil of racial discrimination, and the desires of the peoples of Africa which, he said, were still being ignored to a large extent.⁴⁶ He observed that the Charter had been of "little use" to dependent peoples and stated that the Tunisians were "craving moral support" from the United Nations. In supporting the Arab-Asian proposal, Mr. Dennis indicated that the record of "certain powers" did not arouse any hopes that they would voluntarily renounce their historic rights in dependent areas.

Fadhil Al-Jamali of Iraq pursued this theme, wondering why Tunisia, like other states which had recently acquired independence, could not have complete freedom.⁴⁷ He suggested that France had moved slowly in its "civilizing mission," because the French people were divided on

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-230.

⁴⁴ U.N. docs. A/C.1/SR.542, pp. 236-237, A/C.1/L.9/A/2512, pp. 3-4.

⁴⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.543, pp. 239-247.

⁴⁶ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.544, p. 251.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 253-254.

the subject, and because 150,000 French citizens lived in Tunisia. The Tunisian people, he said, were politically mature and demanded the "status of an independent and sovereign country" with a constitutional monarchy, united to France by a freely negotiated alliance guaranteeing France its strategic, economic, and cultural interests. In his view, there were only three alternatives ahead: (1) "an indefinite period of enslavement and subjugation which is tantamount to enslaving a nation"; (2) a revolt for independence; or (3) conciliation and mediation through the United Nations, along lines set forth in the Arab-Asian proposal. Fouad Ammoun of Lebanon, also firmly supported the Arab-Asian position, considered the French reform program not very fundamental or substantial, and had no doubt on the subject of competence.⁴⁸ Victor Manuel Perez Perozo of Venezuela supported the Latin American proposal. Emile Najjar of Israel had not yet finally determined his position, although he was convinced that the General Assembly could not make decisions incompatible with the treaties involved. On the other hand, both Sir Percy Spender of Australia and D. J. von Balhuseck of the Netherlands had grave doubts as to the competence of the General Assembly, as had been made clear earlier during the plenary sessions, and both called for "extreme caution."

As the debate came to a close on December 12, Ambassador Farid Zeineddine of Syria discussed the history of the problem at length, noting that the nationalist movements were "irrestibly marching" across Asia and Africa.⁴⁹ Application of the right of self-determination, he declared, was "the only way to emerge from imperialism to liberty" and the only way in which the "potentialities" of the peoples of Asia and Africa could be released. He hoped that France, "faithful to its noble traditions," would act accordingly.

Ato Gabre-Heywot Zande of Ethiopia also announced his support of the Arab-Asian proposal, basing his position on the principle of self-determination and on the contention that the "predominant international character" of the question could not be disputed. On the other hand, the Turkish representative, Ambassador Selim Sarper, stressed the "excellent and friendly" relations between Turkey and Tunisia, noted that the progress and prosperity of Tunisia had the greatest sympathy in Turkey. He earnestly hoped that the conflict would soon be settled on a just basis. But the question was whether direct intervention on the part of the United Nations was legally admissible and would serve the objective sought. Ambassador Sarper was in serious doubt as to both matters, and could not, therefore, support any resolution or amendment which implied direct intervention by the United Nations. Similarly,

Oscar Thorsing of Sweden was unable to support the Arab-Asian proposal.⁵⁰

THE VOTE ON THE TUNISIAN QUESTION

Committee I was now ready to proceed to a vote on the resolutions with respect to Tunisia, as it did on December 12,⁵¹ in a number of paragraph-by-paragraph roll-call votes. The Arab-Asian proposal was rejected by a vote of 27 to 24, with 7 abstentions. In favor were all the Arab-Asian-African States, including both Liberia and Ethiopia. The United States opposed the draft resolution, along with the United Kingdom and France, while the Soviet bloc voted solidly in favor of it.

In the vote on the Latin American proposal which followed, the Committee rejected an Indian amendment⁵² to delete the fourth paragraph which provided that the General Assembly express confidence that, in pursuance of its proclaimed policies, France would endeavor to further the effective development of the free institutions of Tunisia, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and add a new paragraph requesting the President to keep the negotiations under observation and to give such assistance, in his discretion, as might be useful or necessary. The rejection was by a vote of 31 to 21, with 6 abstentions, with the United States in the negative.

The Latin American draft resolution, calling for direct negotiations between the Governments of France and Tunisia and expressing confidence that France would endeavor to further the effective development of free institutions in Tunisia, was carried by a vote of 45 to 3, with 10 abstentions. All the Arab-Asian-African States joined with the United States and others in supporting this resolution, although they did so largely in the belief that "half a loaf is better than none", having seen their own proposal defeated.

The Moroccan Question

THE ARAB-ASIAN-AFRICAN POSITION

The Moroccan Question, which was presented to Committee I immediately following the vote on the Tunisian problem, was discussed in seven meetings between December 13 and 17, 1952, and took on a pattern similar to that which had been established in the case of Tunisia. Jamil Mikaoui of Lebanon opened the deliberations on December 13⁵³ with a statement to the effect that Lebanon and the other Arab-Asian States believed it

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 270; U.N. doc. A/2512.

⁵⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.546, pp. 270-271; U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.8.

⁵¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.547, pp. 275-278.

highly necessary to discuss the Moroccan issue frankly, in view of the international interest in the matter. Referring to the General Act of Algeiras (1906), to which there were 13 signatories, he asked how the Moroccan problem could possibly be considered as essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of France. Mr. Mikaoui indicated that both the attempts of the Sultan of Morocco to reach an understanding with France and those of the Arab States to bring about a more receptive attitude toward the aspirations of the Moroccan people had proved unavailing. He thought it clear that, although Morocco was a sovereign state in the *de jure* sense, the *de facto* situation was that the rights of Morocco had been progressively infringed, and the most recent French proposals, which would have placed, in his view, some 500,000 French citizens on the same plane with 10,000,000 Moroccans, were quite unsatisfactory.

Abdel Monem Mostafa of Egypt expressed similar views, dwelling on the "merciless repression" and "brutal measures" which, he alleged, had been employed by France in Morocco.⁵⁴ Moreover, he contended that despite the sovereignty of Morocco under the treaties of 1906 and 1912, it had become a French "colony" in the hands of the French residents of Morocco, while an anachronistic feudal regime had been maintained under a policy of "divide and rule." Condemning the social and economic policies in Morocco as well, Mr. Mostafa asserted that the time had come for a change and declared that the people of Morocco were determined to regain both their sovereignty and their independence.

When the Committee reconvened on Monday, December 15, it heard statements from the representatives of Indonesia, the United Kingdom, Poland, Iraq, and Belgium.⁵⁵ Mr. Palar of Indonesia stressed the existence of anti-colonial sentiment as a factor which had to be taken into account in the Moroccan problem, and he emphasized his view that France's position, both in Tunisia and in Morocco, was being safeguarded in the Committee because of the membership of France in NATO, since the Western Powers did not want to be weakened in the cold war. He supported the Arab-Asian-African view of the problem generally. Both Mr. Naszkowski of Poland and Mr. Sobolev of the Soviet Union, as in the discussion of the Tunisian question, used the opportunities provided them to exploit the problem, for propaganda purposes, stressing the "terror" in Morocco and the evil doings of the "aggressive Atlantic bloc."⁵⁶

On the other hand, Selwyn Lloyd of the United Kingdom, who considered the problem broadly similar to that of Tunisia, thought that the Committee—largely in view of article 2 (7) of the

Charter—was incompetent to go into the question. Ambassador van Langenhove of Belgium was in thorough agreement with this position and was fearful lest the discussion make solution of the problem all the more difficult.⁵⁷

In the afternoon, the Arab-Asian delegations introduced their draft resolution⁵⁸ requesting—

the Government of France and His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco to enter into negotiations to reach an early peaceful settlement in accord with the sovereignty of Morocco, the aspirations of her people and the Charter of the United Nations.

The preamble recalled the judgment of the International Court of Justice on August 27, 1952, as to the sovereignty and independence of Morocco and the retention of its personality as a state in international law.⁵⁹ The preamble also stated that Morocco had entered into agreements in the exercise of its "sovereign rights," and that France respected solemn covenants, and the rights and desires of people as to liberty and equality, as well as the rights of peoples and nations under the Charter. Moreover, the Sultan and the people of Morocco had proclaimed their desire for early attainment of their national aspirations by peaceful negotiation and settlement, and the preamble concluded that the existing situation had caused deep concern and adversely affected both "Franco-Moroccan relations and peaceful conditions in the world."

Ambassador Jessup stated that the American attitude toward both the Tunisian and Moroccan questions had been determined by the belief that the Committee could not usefully concern itself with specific problems which could be solved only by direct negotiations between the parties.⁶⁰ He was aware of the differences between Morocco and Tunisia; the ethnic pattern in the former was "more intricate," and the Treaty of Fez granted to France "far more extensive powers" than did the Treaties of Le Bardo and La Marsa in Tunisia. Moreover, the French Protectorate in Morocco covered "only a portion of the territory within the

⁵⁷ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.548, pp. 285-286, 288-289.

⁵⁸ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.12.

⁵⁹ *Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco. Judgment of August 27th, 1952: I. C. J. Reports 1952*, p. 176. Among other things, the Court stated: "It is common ground between the Parties that the characteristic of the status of Morocco, as resulting from the General Act of Algeiras of April 7th, 1906, is respect for the three principles stated in the Preamble of the Act, namely: 'the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and economic liberty without any inequality. . . .' (p. 183).

"It is not disputed by the French Government that Morocco, even under the Protectorate, has retained its personality as a State under international law. The rights of France in Morocco are defined by the Protectorate Treaty of 1912. . . ." (p. 185).

For an article summarizing the judgment, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 621.

⁶⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.549, pp. 291-292; BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1953, p. 33.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 278-280.

⁵⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.548, pp. 283-289.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 286-288; A/C.1/SR.549, pp. 292-293.

sovereign domain of the Sultan of Morocco, other states having legal rights and interests in other parts of that domain.” In both Tunisia and Morocco, the General Assembly was faced again with “a question which relates to the fulfillment of national aspirations.” The Treaty of Fez was “recognized as a valid international obligation.” Neither it nor the treaties with respect to Tunisia were dedicated “to the freezing of the *status quo* but to continuous progressive change through the development of free and vital national institutions,” and there was “need for wisdom in the contacts between the parties.” Ambassador Jessup expressed “faith that the peoples and Governments of France and Morocco” could work out their destinies together.

The representative of Guatemala, Guillermo Toriello-Garrido, who had supported the Arab-Asian position in the Tunisian case, expressed “very deep concern” as to Morocco and hoped that the Committee would take a firmer position than it had in the Tunisian instance.⁶¹ Sir Percy Spender of Australia, however, considered the Committee incompetent to deal with the Moroccan problem, for reasons which he had already explained in connection with Tunisia.⁶²

LATIN AMERICAN PROPOSAL ON MOROCCO

The pattern already established in the Tunisian discussion was carried further on December 16 when 11 Latin American States submitted a joint draft resolution⁶³ proposing that the General Assembly (1) express confidence that, in pursuance “of its proclaimed policies,” France would endeavor to “further the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter”; (2) express the hope that the parties would continue negotiations on an urgent basis toward “developing the free political institutions of the people of Morocco with due regard to legitimate rights and interests under the established norms and practices of the law of nations”; and (3) appeal to the parties to conduct their relations in an atmosphere of good will, mutual confidence and respect, and to settle their differences in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, thus refraining from any acts or measures likely to aggravate the situation.

Soon thereafter, the delegation of Pakistan submitted an amendment⁶⁴ to the Latin American proposal which would substitute a new paragraph expressing the hope that the parties concerned would “continue negotiations on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government for Moroccans in the light of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”

In submitting the Latin American draft resolu-

tion on behalf of his colleagues, Mr. de Souza Gomes of Brazil stated that the question of competence was similar to that in the case of Tunisia.⁶⁵ Among other things, the Brazilian representative, who felt that the General Assembly could be helpful, declared that the joint draft resolution was aimed at having the French and Moroccan parties continue their negotiations with a view to promoting the free institutions of the Moroccan people.

On the other hand, both R. H. Coaton of South Africa and Mr. von Balluseck of the Netherlands, who agreed that the Tunisian and Moroccan cases were very similar, questioned the competence of the General Assembly and felt that discussion might be harmful rather than constructive in its results. Mr. von Balluseck added that while Morocco retained its international personality as a state, as reaffirmed by the International Court of Justice, it did not have full sovereign powers.⁶⁶

CLOSURE OF THE DEBATE

As the discussion moved toward closure, the Communist thesis was amply expounded by the representatives of the Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia, both constituent republics in the Soviet Union, and of the Czechoslovak Republic, who made the usual references to “the monstrous exploitation” and the “state of slavery” in Morocco, not to mention the evil doings of the West in general.⁶⁷ V. K. Krishna Menon of India, who had introduced the Indian proposals for an armistice in Korea, stressed the history of the Moroccan “struggle” against imperialism, traced the cultural contributions of Morocco to civilization, especially since the 13th century, contended that the situation in Morocco threatened international peace and security, and appealed to the Latin American States to join with the Arab-Asian States in order to obtain a resolution which would be “adequate.”⁶⁸ The morning discussion on December 16 was brought to a close with an extended statement from Dr. Jamali of Iraq, who reviewed the history of the Arabic-speaking people of Morocco over a period of 1,000 years and then plunged into an account of the “tragedy of Morocco” since 1830, stressing the diplomacy of the Great Powers during the period of 1904–06 and 1911–12, which had solidified the French position on the North African shores of the Mediterranean. After denouncing the French position in Morocco, Dr. Jamali appealed to the Latin American States to join hands with the Arab-Asian group and urged France, “the home of the French revolution,” to satisfy the Moroccan aspirations in the interests of France, the people of Morocco, East-West relations, and world peace.⁶⁹

⁶¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.549, pp. 293–294.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 294.

⁶³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.13.

⁶⁴ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.14. The amendment was submitted at the evening session on Dec. 16.

⁶⁵ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.550, p. 295.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 295–296.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 296, 297–298; U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.551, pp. 305–306.

⁶⁸ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.550, pp. 298–300.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 300–303.

Jeptha B. Duncan of Panama, who supported the Latin American proposal, felt that the United Nations, since it was hardly a court of law, could not sit in judgment, although it might help in finding a solution of problems.⁷⁰ Mr. Duncan believed that a "conciliatory agreement" would be reached in the Moroccan issue, and expressed hope that a solution, which would recognize the aspirations of the Moroccans and the interests of France, would be achieved.

Ato Gabre-Heywot Zaude of Ethiopia agreed that the Moroccan issue was no longer one of internal jurisdiction.⁷¹ While he did not want the Ethiopian attitude to be misunderstood as a weakening of Ethiopian-French friendship, he believed the Arab-Asian proposal offered the best possibility as a solution. Ambassador Entezam of Iran who also supported the Arab-Asian proposal, which he considered "moderate, perhaps even too moderate," appealed to the Committee not to disappoint the Moroccan people. Salvador P. López of the Philippines stated that the aim of the proposal was "to get the Moroccan people started on the long road toward self-government," while Shaikh Ali Alireza of Saudi Arabia declared that between the "negative" attitude of France and the attitude of "postponement" in the General Assembly, the independence of Morocco would be bypassed. Both Mr. Ludin of Afghanistan, who had a "feeling of despondency" as to Tunisia and Morocco, and Dr. Tarcici of Yemen, who felt that France had not used the time since the sixth session to find a solution of the problem, supported the Arab-Asian proposal.⁷² Ambassador Farid Zeineddine of Syria spoke in similar vein on December 17, stressing that there were no "ulterior motives" against France and that the Arab-Asian group was "acting out of friendship for France and out of a sense of duty." Sir Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan closed the general debate, emphasizing the right of self-determination, the desire of the people of Morocco to be "their own masters in their own home," and the necessity for the West to meet such problems with intelligence and responsibility.⁷³

As Committee I prepared to vote on December 17, it is interesting to note that Dr. Quintanilla of Mexico, who supported the Latin American proposal, considered that both draft resolutions were "excellent" and pursued the same ends, and remarked that the Arab-Asian draft resolution was more in accord with the international status of Morocco.⁷⁴ Moreover, he welcomed the absence from the Arab-Asian proposal of paragraphs like those in their draft resolution on Tunisia, which had been unacceptable to the Mexican delegation. On the other hand, Mr. Munro of New Zealand,

who declared that, for the purposes of discussion in the Committee, Morocco was "a protected state with residual sovereignty," thought the Arab-Asian proposal placed "a false emphasis" on the situation and beclouded the issue.

THE VOTE IN COMMITTEE I

Committee I thereupon proceeded to a paragraph-by-paragraph vote on the Arab-Asian draft resolution. The first two preambular paragraphs being rejected by a vote of 25 to 20, with 10 abstentions, while the third preambular paragraph was approved by a vote of 26 to 21, with 7 abstentions. All the operative paragraphs were rejected, by votes of 25 to 20, with 10 abstentions (pars. 4-5); 27 to 18, with 9 abstentions (par. 6); and 27 to 25, with 3 abstentions (par. 7). All the Arab-Asian-African delegations supported the resolution; the United States voted in the negative; the Soviet bloc voted affirmatively only on the final paragraph, which called for negotiations looking toward an early settlement of the problem.⁷⁵

There followed a paragraph-by-paragraph vote on the Latin American proposal, the favorable votes on the first three preambular paragraphs being 50 to 3 with 3 abstentions, that on paragraph 4 being 28 to 23 with 4 abstentions, and that on paragraph 6, 45 to 3 with 9 abstentions. However, the controversial amendment to paragraph 5, introduced by Pakistan, expressing hope for the continuance of negotiations on an urgent basis "with a view to bringing about self-government for Moroccans in the light of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations," was also approved, by a vote of 28 to 23 with 4 abstentions; the United States cast a negative vote. The resolution as a whole, as amended, was approved by a vote of 40 to 5, with 11 abstentions. Because of the amendment, the United States opposed the resolution as a whole.

In his explanation, Ambassador Jessup recalled the differences between the Tunisian and Moroccan cases, stating that the Latin American proposal had been carefully drafted to apply to Morocco, whereas the amendment of the delegation of Pakistan "beclouded and obscured" the issue. This amendment, he said, which had never been explained, had seriously obscured the meaning of the Latin American proposal, and for that reason the United States had opposed the amended resolution as a whole.⁷⁶

The Plenary Action on Tunisia and Morocco

THE QUESTION OF TUNISIA

Committee I having taken action on the Moroccan question at its morning session on December

⁷⁰ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.551, p. 305.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 306.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 309-311.

⁷³ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.552, pp. 313-317.

⁷⁴ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.552, p. 317.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 318-319; A/2325, pp. 2-3.

⁷⁶ U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.552, p. 318.

17, the plenary session that evening approved the proposal originally sponsored by the Latin American States with respect to Tunisia by a vote of 41 to 3 with 8 abstentions. As already noted, the resolution expressed confidence that France would endeavor to further the effective development of the free institutions of the Tunisian people in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter, and trusted that negotiations would continue on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government in the light of the relevant provisions of the Charter.⁷⁷

Although all the Arab-Asian-African States supported the resolution in the plenary session, as did the United States (only three states—Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Union of South Africa—actually opposed it), they did so with reservations.⁷⁸ Mme. Pandit, for example, thought the resolution hardly reflected the gravity of the situation in Tunisia, and she appealed to France to ameliorate conditions in Tunisia and to enter into the negotiations in the spirit of giving self-government to the Tunisians, thereby permitting an era of Tunisian-French co-operation to develop. Abdel Monem Mostafa of Egypt, in explaining his affirmative vote, lamented the lack of any provision for a U.N. Commission of Good Offices such as had been envisaged in the Arab-Asian proposal. Dr. Jamali contended that the Tunisians wanted the status of a free and independent community, united with France in a freely negotiated agreement, and he felt that the resolution, as approved, had “no teeth.” These were also the sentiments of Ambassador Zeineddine of Syria, although he felt that the resolution had its merits in that it had established the competence of the General Assembly and the need for the United Nations to make a move toward assisting in the achievement of a settlement. Dr. Tarcici of Yemen voted for the resolution because he wanted to adopt a positive attitude with regard to action by the United Nations, while Shaikh Ali Alireza of Saudi Arabia supported the resolution with reluctance and reservations. On the other hand, Mr. Sobolev of the U.S.S.R. abstained allegedly on the ground that the resolution was both “weak and inadequate,” which ignored the situation in Tunisia, while Sir Percy Spender of Australia explained his abstention on the ground of incompetence. He believed that wisdom dictated that “we observe at all times and with circumspection” the precise terms of the Charter, lest “what we may do today may remain to plague us tomorrow.”

⁷⁷ U.N. doc. A/2312.

⁷⁸ For the vote and the explanations, see U.N. doc. A/PV.404, pp. 377-384.

Two days later on December 19 the plenary session took action on the Moroccan resolution along similar lines.⁷⁹ During explanations of vote, the representative of Guatemala expressed his regret that Committee I had not approved the Arab-Asian proposal, since he felt it stronger than the Latin American resolution, on which he would abstain. Similarly, members of the Soviet bloc announced their abstention. Ambassador Zeineddine, as in the case of Tunisia, felt that the resolution on Morocco recognized the international character of the issue and implied the validity of the Act of Algeciras, which in his view was the basis of the problem. Sir Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan repeated his sentiments as to self-determination and independence and expressed disappointment that the General Assembly was not willing to do more than had Committee I. These were, generally, the sentiments of Dr. Jamali, Dr. Tarcici, and Mr. Palar of Indonesia, who indicated that he was “most definitely not satisfied” with the resolution, although he had voted for it because it established the competence of the United Nations on the question.

Although all the Arab-Asian-African States had supported the Pakistani amendment to the Latin American proposal, at the plenary session of December 19 the sponsoring states introduced an amendment to delete it from the resolution approved by Committee I, and to substitute their original language expressing the hope that the parties would “continue negotiations on an urgent basis toward developing the free political institutions of the people of Morocco, with due regard to legitimate rights and interests under the established norms and practices of the law of nations.”⁸⁰

As the voting began, the Latin American amendment was adopted by 29 votes to 8 with 22 abstentions. The United States supported it, along with the Latin American and other States; the Arab-Asian-African States abstained (with the exceptions of Yemen and Pakistan, which opposed the amendment); and the Soviet bloc and Guatemala voted in the negative. The resolution as a whole was then approved by 45 to 3 with 11 abstentions. Despite their reservations, the Arab-Asian-African States supported the resolution, (except for Pakistan which abstained), while Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Union of South Africa voted in opposition.

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⁷⁹ U.N. doc. A/PV.407, pp. 421-428.

⁸⁰ U.N. doc. A/L. 135.

Purpose of Resolution on Captive Peoples

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*¹

Press release 105 dated February 26

The resolution proposed to the Congress by the President has one crucial, compelling aim. That aim is to make totally clear the integrity of this Nation's purpose in relation to the millions of enslaved peoples in Europe and Asia. The resolution speaks to those who yearn for national and personal freedom and who fear that we may forget them. The resolution also speaks to the Soviet despots who have contrived this enslavement and who hope that we may come to accept it.

To those enduring enslavement, and to those inflicting it, we would make our position clear and firm. We, as a people, never have acquiesced and never will acquiesce in the enslavement of other peoples. Our Nation, from its beginning, was and is inspired by the spirit of liberty. We do not accept or tolerate captivity as an irrevocable fact which can be finalized by force or by the lapse of time. We do not accommodate ourselves to political settlements which are based upon contempt for the free will of peoples and which are imposed by the brutal occupation of alien armies or by revolutionary factions who serve alien masters.

The facts we must face can be simply summarized. Some dozen people in the Kremlin are seeking to consolidate their imperial rule over some 800 million people, representing what *were* nearly a score of independent nations. The methods of the despots can be judged by the fact that there are some 15 million in forced labor camps in Soviet Russia. Their number amounts to double the total membership of the Soviet Communist Party itself.

This tyranny has been extended far beyond the frontiers of Russia by the cold, calculated subjugation of free nation after free nation. The list is a tragic one: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, Outer Mongolia, Tannu Tuva, China, Korea (in part), and Japan's northern Habomai and Shikotan islands.

But even the massive machinery of totalitarianism has not found it easy to rule these nations and peoples. Since World War II, the Kremlin has found it necessary to purge more than one-third of their original puppet leaders within the satellite countries of Europe. In Asia, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, have been slaughtered in a publicized exhibition of terrorism.

We must face these facts. It is a *moral* obliga-

tion to do so—for all peoples have a right to know whether the United States acquiesces in this assault on freedom. It is a *practical* matter—for the ultimate fate of these peoples can gravely affect the future of freedom in Europe, in Asia, and through all the world, including our own United States.

In the glaring light of these facts, the nature of this resolution defines itself. It is a straightforward statement of American principle and American peaceful but firm purpose.

Some of you may think that American purpose is already clear, so clear that this resolution is superfluous. Let me assure you that that is *not* the fact. The captive peoples are oppressed by a great fear that at some future time the United States may agree to a partition of the world whereby we would accept and support Soviet dictatorship of alien peoples in the hope of gaining greater security for ourselves. This is not difficult to understand. Soviet propaganda vigorously spreads this fear and there are within the free world some who would countenance such a bargain. The resultant fear is not something to which we can be indifferent. It generates a sense of hopelessness and futility among the captives, which paralyzes the strivings which could operate peacefully to dissolve the unnatural unity of Soviet despotism and return it to its natural and historic parts.

So long as there is doubt as to the attitude of the United States, and I repeat that today there is such doubt, the captive peoples feel that they have no choice but to be passive victims allowing themselves to be made into tools of further aggression. If we want to maintain and stimulate the spirit of freedom which eventually will peacefully frustrate the oppressive design of Soviet despotism and disintegrate that overextended despotism, the first and indispensable step is to make clear, on the highest authority of the President and Congress, that:

One, the United States does not countenance the violations by which Soviet leadership has perverted past agreements and understandings into chains of bondage. That is a result which the American people never intended and which they will never accept.

Two, the United States will never be a party to any international "deal" or "trade" confirming the rule of Soviet despotism over the alien peoples it dominates in Europe and Asia.

Three, the United States seeks, as one of its peaceful goals, that these enslaved national groups of Europe and Asia shall recover genuine independence.

That is the purpose of the resolution now before you.

President Eisenhower proposes that our nation should reaffirm its awareness that the struggle in the world today is, above all, a moral conflict. We propose to attest our fidelity, without compromise

¹ Made on Feb. 26 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Secretary Dulles was testifying in favor of the draft resolution on captive peoples which President Eisenhower sent on Feb. 20 to Vice President Nixon and Speaker of the House, Joseph W. Martin, Jr. For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Mar. 2, 1953, p. 353.

or vacillation, to the principles of honor and political freedom upon which the nation was founded and which have made us always the dread of the oppressor and the hope of the oppressed. We propose, in the spirit of the early days of the Republic, to do what we peacefully can do, in order to revive the hopes of those now enslaved.

This resolution is no call to bloody and senseless revolution. On the other hand, it is no idle gesture. It is an act of great historical importance and many consequences will stem from it. As its purpose becomes more and more widely understood, it will, over the coming years, revive the inherent longing for freedom which persists within the captive peoples so that that longing becomes a mounting spiritual power which will eventually overcome the material power of Soviet dictatorship to rule what it has, or to subjugate more.

This resolution looks to the future, rather than to the past. The past is controversial. Should past administrations have made the agreements which they made? Were they foolishly beguiled by Soviet promises? Were they too much moved

by considerations of short-term expediency, so that they sacrificed basic principles? Did they exceed their power in what they attempted; for these wartime agreements were never subjected to the constitutional processes of our Government? All of these questions have been, and long will be, debated.

The resolution which President Eisenhower has proposed would avoid this realm of controversy. It validates nothing that is invalid. It gives up no rights, if we choose to assert them. It also leaves us free to pursue other courses and take other steps in the future, as circumstances may indicate their desirability.

What the President seeks is a solemn act of dedication for the future. It is an act which needs, and deserves, the support of both great parties. It will provide the indispensable foundation upon which future foreign policies can again build a structure of peace, justice, and freedom. Therefore, I beg, let us not on this occasion divisively debate the past. Let us unitedly move on to mold the future.

Settlement of Germany's External Debt

SIGNING OF AGREEMENTS

Press release 107 dated February 26

The Department of State announced that a series of agreements will be signed on February 27 in London which after ratification will provide for the settlement of the external debt of Germany held by creditors in some 30 countries involving payments totaling 3.27 billion dollars. The agreements represent the culmination of negotiations which have been in progress for over 24 months and are based upon agreements unanimously reached by the creditor countries and the Federal Republic of Germany in a report submitted to governments on August 8, 1952 (Department of State publication 4746).

Four agreements are being signed on behalf of the United States by Ambassador Warren Lee Pierson, who has been head of the U.S. delegation during the course of the negotiations. These agreements cover payments to the United States and its nationals totaling 1.75 billion dollars payable on an annual basis of 56 million dollars for a period of 5 years and rising to 90 million dollars thereafter. The agreements and the estimated amounts due the United States covered by each agreement are as follows:

- | | |
|--|----------------|
| 1. Intergovernmental Agreement on German External Debt----- | \$450 million |
| 2. Agreement between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the settlement of the claim of the United States of America for postwar economic assistance (other than surplus property) to Germany----- | \$1 billion |
| 3. Agreement between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the settlement of the obligation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States of America for surplus property furnished Germany-- | \$200 million |
| 4. Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America relating to the indebtedness of Germany for awards made by the Mixed Claims Commission, United States and Germany ----- | \$97.5 million |

The Intergovernmental Agreement on German External Debts will, when ratified, enable the Federal Republic of Germany to proceed with the implementation of the plan for the settlement of Germany's prewar external debts worked out at the Conference on German External Debts held at London during February-August 1952.¹ Under its terms the agreement will come into force when

¹ For text of the communiqué issued at the close of the Conference, see BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1952, p. 252.

ratified or approved by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Approval of the agreement by the Parliament of the Federal Republic will be necessary. The agreement will also be submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification. Whether similar action is taken by the Governments of the other creditor countries will depend upon their constitutional requirements.

There will be attached to the agreement as annexes the reports of the four negotiating committees of the London conference.² These reports contain agreed recommendations on the terms and procedures for the settlement of the various categories of debts included in the settlement plan. There will also be annexed to the agreement the terms of settlement of certain miscellaneous German external debts which were not fully dealt with at the Conference.

In the intergovernmental agreement the signatory Governments approve the settlement terms and procedures contained in the agreement and the several annexes and the Federal Republic agrees to take such legislative and administrative action as may be necessary to carry out the settlement plan. The Federal Republic further agrees to make the necessary payments and transfers on the debts, for which it is liable, and to make the necessary provisions for the transfer to the creditors of payments which will become due on the debts of other governmental agencies and private German nationals. The agreement also contains provisions for the settlement of disputes arising out of the agreement or the annexes and for intergovernmental consultation in the event that any new German default is threatened.

There are also provisions in the agreement prohibiting discrimination and specifying the manner in which debts containing currency options and gold clauses may be settled. Provision is also made for the tolling of the statute of limitations on debts included in the settlement plan and for the enforcement in Germany of creditors' rights. Debts of the city of Berlin and of public utility enterprises owned or controlled by Berlin are specifically excluded from the settlement plan under the terms of the agreement. Reparations and analogous claims against Germany arising out of the First and Second World Wars are deferred until a final settlement with Germany. Provision is also made for an intergovernmental review of the agreement upon the reunification of Germany.

The agreement will not impair the legal right of American creditors under American law and will require no implementing legislation in the United States.

²The four committees dealt respectively with Reich debts and debts of other public authorities, medium and long-term German debts resulting from private capital transactions, standstill debts, and commercial and miscellaneous debts. For the text of the first committee's report, and summaries of the reports of the other three committees, see *ibid.*, p. 254.

The following are the annexes and appendices to the agreement:

- Annex I—Agreed Recommendations for the Settlement of Reich Debts and Debts of other Public Authorities.
- Annex II—Agreed Recommendations for the Settlement of Medium and Long-Term German Debts Resulting from Private Capital Transactions.
- Annex III—Agreed Recommendations for the Settlement of Standstill Debts.
- Annex IV—Agreed Recommendations for the Settlement of Claims arising out of Goods and Services Transactions, of certain Claims arising from Capital Transactions and of various Other Claims.
- Annex V—Agreed Recommendations for the Treatment of Payments made to the *Konversionskasse*.
- Annex VI—Agreed Recommendations for the Utilization of Blocked Deutsche Mark Accounts.
- Annex VII—Agreement on Goldmark Liabilities and Reichsmark Liabilities with a Gold Clause having a specific foreign character.
- Annex VIII—Agreed Interpretation concerning paragraph (2) of Article 5 of the Agreement on German External Debts.
- Annex IX—Charter of the Arbitral Tribunal for the Agreement on German External Debts.
- Annex X—Charter of the Mixed Commission.
- Appendix A—Exchange of Letters embodying the Agreement of 6th March 1951, between the Governments of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.³
- Appendix B—Report of the Conference on German External Debts.

Under the terms of the agreement, payments on the debts included in the settlement plan are to commence on varying dates beginning April 1, 1953, depending upon the category of debts involved. While the intergovernmental agreement may not have entered into force by that date the Federal Republic has agreed to hold itself ready to transfer to the creditors any accumulated payments which may have come due at the time the agreement comes into force.

Concurrently with the signing of the intergovernmental agreement the United States, United Kingdom, and France also entered into bilateral agreements for the settlement of their claims for postwar economic assistance extended to Germany. The terms of settlement of these claims are contained in appendix 7 to the report of the Conference on German External Debts.

TEXT OF DEBT COMMISSION'S STATEMENT

Press release 106 dated February 26

Following is the text of a press release issued by the Tripartite Commission on German Debts in London on February 27, 1953:

The signing of the agreement on German external debts and of a number of related agreements, which took place in London this morning at Londonderry House, brought to a conclusion the negotiation of one of the most comprehensive debt settlements of recent times. The signing took

³BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1951, pp. 446-447.

place exactly 1 year since the beginning of the London conference on German external debts, which made recommendations to governments on which the agreement on German external debts is based.

The agreement on German external debts establishes terms and procedures for the settlement of German prewar debts. Included in its ten annexes are the terms of settlement worked out by the London conference. In addition to the agreement on German external debts the following agreements on claims for postwar economic assistance furnished to Germany were also signed:

(1) Anglo-German agreement on the claims of the United Kingdom for postwar economic assistance to Germany.

(2) Franco-German agreement on the claims of France for postwar economic assistance to Germany.

(3) U.S.-German agreement on the claims of the United States for postwar economic assistance to Germany.

(4) U.S.-German agreement establishing terms of payments for surplus property sold to Germany by the United States in the postwar period.

Further, a U.S.-German agreement relating to mixed claims commission awards, the terms of settlement of which were worked out by the London conference, was signed by the representatives of the Governments of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. The total of the obligations of the Federal Republic of Germany under all these agreements is about 13,730 million DM (\$3,270 million). This will entail the payment by the Federal Republic of annuities amounting to about 555 million DM (\$132 million) during the first 5 years after the entry into force of the agreement rising thereafter to about 735 million DM (\$175 million).

At the time of signing these agreements, the Tripartite Commission on German debts, representing the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the German delegation for external debts, whose four Governments must ratify the agreement on German external debts before it comes into force, announced that their Governments intended to initiate the necessary action, as required in their respective countries, to bring the agreement into force as quickly as possible. It was pointed out, however, that it may prove impossible to complete the procedure required to bring the agreement into force before the date on which, under the settlement terms, the first payments on certain bonded debts are due. In that case, such payments will

be made as soon as the agreement comes into force. In this connection Herr Abs, the head of the German delegation called attention to the fact that the budget now under consideration by the German Parliament provides for resumption of service on the external debts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, the Bank Deutscher Laender has already announced that the foreign exchange necessary for payments due during the first 6 months has been earmarked. Thus, if any foreign-exchange payments become due before the agreement comes into force, such payments will be made immediately on the entry into force of the agreement.

The names of the representatives signing the agreement for the Governments represented on the Tripartite Commission are as follows:

United Kingdom Sir George Randel
France M. René Massigli (French
Ambassador in London)
United States Ambassador Warren Lee Pierson

The following countries may also become signatories to the agreement: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia.⁴

⁴The Department of State announced on Mar. 3 (press release 119) that the following countries had become signatories to the Intergovernmental Agreement on German External Debts. Persons signing on behalf of their countries are as indicated:

Belgium: Vicomte Obert de Thieusies (Belgian Ambassador)
Canada: Norman A. Robertson (High Commissioner)
Ceylon: Sir Velupillai Coomaraswamy (Deputy High Commissioner)
Denmark: Count Eduard Reventlow (Danish Ambassador)
Greece: M. L. V. Melas (Greek Ambassador)
Republic of Ireland: F. H. Boland (Ambassador of the Republic of Ireland)
Liechtenstein: Dr. Walter Stucki (Minister Plenipotentiary)
Luxembourg: M. A. Clasen (Luxembourg Minister)
Norway: M. Per Preben Prebensen (Norwegian Ambassador)
Pakistan: M. A. H. Ispahani (High Commissioner)
Spain: The Duke de Primo Rivera (Spanish Ambassador)
Sweden: M. Gunnar Hagglof (Swedish Ambassador)
Switzerland: Dr. Walter Stucki (Minister Plenipotentiary)
Union of South Africa: Dr. A. L. Geyer (High Commissioner)
Yugoslavia: M. Jaksa Petric (Minister Plenipotentiary)

The agreement was also signed on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany by Herr Hermann J. Abs, chairman of the German delegation on external debts.

Agreement for Validation of German Dollar Bonds

Press release 108 dated February 26

The Governments of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany signed an agreement on February 27 at Bonn, Germany, establishing procedures which will be introduced in the United States in the near future for the validation of German dollar bonds.¹ The negotiations which culminated in the agreement were conducted concurrently with those on the agreement on German external debts which was also signed today at London.²

The purpose of validation is to separate valid bonds from those which were looted in Germany during World War II. Under the terms of the agreement on German external debts, only obligations which are validated are eligible for payment. The validation procedure agreed to at Bonn provides the bondholders with the mechanism for meeting this requirement. In addition it will enable German securities to be restored to the U.S. markets from which they had been banned for more than 10 years.

The arrangements for placing the validation procedure in effect in the United States are moving forward, and it is anticipated that bondholders will soon be able to register their securities and apply for validation. For the information and convenience of bondholders, public announcements and notices will be issued concerning registration forms, the time and place where they should be filed, and the list of the issues of German dollar bonds which are required to be validated.

The text of the agreement is attached, together with a background memorandum explaining the principal features of the validation procedure.

¹ For an article on the Validation Law enacted by the Federal Republic of Germany on Aug. 25, 1952, and the text of relevant portions of the schedule annexed to the law, see BULLETIN of Oct. 20, 1952, p. 608.

² See p. 373.

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Regarding the Validation of Dollar Bonds of German Issue

WHEREAS there are outstanding numerous German public and private foreign currency bonds including dollar bonds payable through corporate trustees or through paying agents in the United States;

WHEREAS a large number of these bonds, including such dollar bonds, were acquired for eventual retirement and thus no longer represented valid obligations;

WHEREAS such acquired bonds were retained in Germany and never presented to the trustees or the paying agents for cancellation;

WHEREAS a great many of the bonds so acquired or otherwise held in Germany disappeared during hostilities in Germany or soon thereafter;

WHEREAS these bonds may have fallen unlawfully into the hands of persons who will seek to negotiate them, or to make claim under them against the debtors, trustees or paying agents, or otherwise to profit from their unlawful acquisition;

WHEREAS any payment on bonds which are illegally held and which no longer represent valid obligations of the issuers, not only would be inequitable to the German debtors, but would necessarily reduce the amount of foreign exchange or other funds available to make payments to their legitimate creditors, a large number of whom are nationals of the United States;

WHEREAS the free and open trading in the United States of all German dollar bonds is impeded by the uncertainties arising from the situation described above;

WHEREAS in order to avoid these consequences it is necessary that such German foreign currency bonds, including dollar bonds, which are illegally held should be declared invalid;

WHEREAS almost all such German bonds are in the form of bearer instruments so that generally the most practical method of accomplishing such invalidation of bonds is a procedure which will require that all German foreign currency bonds, including dollar bonds, be submitted for a determination of their validity;

WHEREAS the Federal Republic of Germany has enacted for this purpose the Law for the Validation of German Foreign Currency Bonds of August 25, 1952, published in the Bundesgesetzblatt of 1952, part I, page 553, (hereinafter referred to as "the Validation Law"), which is the basis of this Agreement and an English translation of which, agreed by the two governments, is attached hereto;

WHEREAS the Federal Republic of Germany desires this Law be implemented within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States as well as other countries;

WHEREAS the Government of the United States (hereinafter referred to as "the United States Government") recognizes that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany embodied in the Validation Law is in conformity with the policy of the United States, and that the procedure of validation prescribed therein is in the interests of an orderly and appropriate determination of the validity of claims of itself and its nationals based on bonds of Germany and German debtors and will protect itself and its nationals against payments out of the limited available foreign exchange being made by German debtors to holders of bonds which no longer represent valid obligations;

WHEREAS the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter referred to as "the German Federal Government"), in accordance with the terms of the Occupation Statute, gave due notice of the intended enactment of the Validation Law to the United States, British and French High Commissioners for Germany, who are charged with responsibility for the protection of foreign interests in Germany, and whereas the said High Commissioners duly examined the said Law and raised no objection to this enactment;

WHEREAS the German Federal Government has approved a "Second Implementing Ordinance under the Validation Law for German Foreign Currency Bonds" in the form attached hereto (hereinafter referred to as "the attached Ordinance"), and English translation of which, agreed by the two governments, is also attached hereto, and has informed the United States Government that it will promulgate this Ordinance as soon as the United States Government has consented to its provisions as required by Article 77 (1) of the Validation Law;

WHEREAS the United States Government deems the provisions of the said Validation Law set forth a reasonable basis for the adjustment of these post war difficulties and for the settlement of claims, and therefore wishes to implement the same within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States; and

WHEREAS such implementation requires agreement of the two Governments signatory hereto in order to make provision mutually satisfactory as to procedures therefor within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States;

Therefore, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany have entered into the following Agreement:

Section 1

For the purpose of this Agreement,

(1) the term "Dollar Bond" shall mean any bond of the types which are listed in the Schedule to the Validation Law of a supplement of such Schedule and in respect of which such Schedule or supplement describes the United States as the Country of Offering and shall include coupons, dividend warrants, renewal certificates, subscription warrants and any other secondary instruments issued in connection with such bond (Article 5 of the Validation Law);

(2) the term "the Foreign Representative" shall mean the Foreign Representative for the United States appointed by the German Federal Government pursuant to Article 8 of the Validation Law.

Section 2

a. The two Governments hereby establish jointly a Board for the Validation of German Bonds in the United States (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the Validation Board"), as contemplated by Article 9 (5) of the Validation Law.

b. The said Board shall have its seat and office in the City of New York in the State of New York.

c. The said Board shall consist of two members and a chairman. The Foreign Representative shall be one of

the members; the other member shall be appointed by the United States Government after consultation with the German Federal Government. The chairman shall be appointed by the two Governments jointly and shall be a national of the United States.

d. Each Government may remove for cause the member appointed by it, after consultation with the other Government. If there is danger in delay, it may suspend such member temporarily. The chairman may be removed for cause by joint action of the two Governments. A vacancy arising by such removal or otherwise shall be filled in accordance with sub-section c.

e. The United States Government consents to the said Board's conducting its operations within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

f. The said Board shall take its decisions by joint action of its two members if they are in agreement. If they are not in agreement, they shall refer the matter to the chairman, whose decision in such case shall constitute the decision of the Board.

g. The German Federal Government shall make available such staff and shall provide such office space and equipment for the said Board as the two Governments consider to be needed for the efficient and expeditious handling of the large volume of registrations which may be received by the Board.

h. The two Governments agree that the appointment of the Foreign Representative will be subject to the consent of the United States Government and that he will be recalled should the United States Government so request. The United States Government agrees that the Foreign Representative shall be accorded such privileges and immunities normally accorded by it to diplomatic representatives of foreign Governments as may be necessary to enable him properly to carry out his responsibilities as Foreign Representative and as member of the Validation Board and, subject to the provisions of this Agreement, consents to the discharge by the Foreign Representative of his functions within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

i. The provisions of this Agreement concerning the Foreign Representative shall also apply to his permanent deputies appointed pursuant to Article 8 (7) of the Validation Law. Any permanent deputy appointed by the United States Government may act as member of the said Board in the place of the member appointed by it.

Section 3

a. The United States Government will notify the German Federal Government from time to time of any Federal Reserve District or Districts in which a need for establishment of an Arbitration Board pursuant to the attached Ordinance exists, and the German Federal Government will establish such Board or Boards upon receipt of such notification.

b. The United States Government consents that the Arbitration Boards established pursuant to the attached Ordinance exercise their jurisdiction within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

c. The two Governments agree that the appointment of the arbitrators will be subject to the consent of the United States Government and that an arbitrator will be removed upon agreement by the two governments that he is seriously violating his duties. Subject to the foregoing, the two Governments are in agreement that, in respect of each Arbitration Board, each government will designate one arbitrator and both governments jointly will designate a national of the United States as chairman.

Section 4

a. The United States Government hereby consents to the provisions of the attached Ordinance, as required by Article 77 (1) of the Validation Law.

b. The German Federal Government agrees not to amend, modify or repeal the attached Ordinance or promulgate any additional Implementing Ordinances under the Validation Law applicable to Dollar Bonds

without the concurrence of the United States Government.

c. The German Federal Government confirms that upon the promulgation of the said Ordinance and upon effectuation of the notices and announcements specified in Section 5, the Validation Law and the attached Ordinance shall become applicable to all matters and proceedings implementing the Validation Law within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

d. The German Federal Government agrees that it will not take any steps towards amending, modifying or repealing the Validation Law without prior consultation between the two Governments.

e. The two Governments agree that, in the event that the attached Ordinance should not be promulgated forthwith, or that the Validation Law should be amended, modified or repealed without the concurrence of the United States Government, or that the said Law or Ordinance or any part thereof should be found to be invalid as conflicting with any other provision of German Law, the United States Government may terminate this Agreement and withdraw any consent given by its terms.

Section 5

a. The German Federal Government agrees that it will take all steps necessary to ensure that holders in the United States of German foreign currency bonds are given adequate and timely notice of such action as is necessary under the Validation Law to secure validation of their bonds and, in particular, that it will cause notice of such required action to be published three times in at least one newspaper of general circulation in each Federal Reserve District, territory and possession of the United States, in at least three periodicals of general circulation throughout the United States, and in at least six financial journals in the United States, and cause appropriate announcements to be sent to such other institutions and individuals as may be designated by the United States Government. Such notice and announcements shall be effected at such times and in such manner as the United States Government shall designate after consultation with the German Federal Government.

b. Similar notice shall be given and similar announcements be made by the German Federal Government of any amendment of the Validation Law or of the attached Ordinance as well as of the promulgation of any additional Ordinance applicable to Dollar Bonds unless the United States Government deems such notice or announcement unnecessary.

Section 6

a. The two Governments will jointly determine whether the Opening Date established by Article 19 (1) of the Validation Law should be advanced or deferred, in the manner authorized by Article 19 (2) thereof, in respect of Dollar Bonds.

b. The German Federal Government agrees to extend, in the manner authorized by Article 21 (2) of the Validation Law, the registration period (Article 21 (1) and Article 37 (2) of the said Law) for such period or periods, not exceeding the maxima set forth in Article 21 (2) of the said Law, and such types of Dollar Bonds as may be requested by the United States Government.

Section 7

The German Federal Government confirms that

- (1) any decision of the Validation Board,
- (2) any decision reviewing a decision of the Validation Board
pursuant to a legal remedy allowed by Article 29 (2) of the *Validation Law*, and
- (3) any decision of a German court or agency rendered pursuant to the provisions of Part III or Article 51 of the Validation Law and concerning the validation of Dollar Bonds

shall, upon becoming final pursuant to the provisions of the said Law, be binding upon all persons concerned pro-

vided that nothing in this section shall restrict any right or remedy granted or allowed by the said Law.

Section 8

The German Federal Government agrees that if appropriate representation is made by the United States that the provisions or administration of the Validation Law or of the Ordinances issued thereunder have imposed or appear likely to impose undue hardships upon the United States or its nationals, or prove to be impracticable or unworkable, the German Federal Government will take all action within its powers as may be required to eliminate such hardships or make the validation procedure practicable and workable.

Section 9

Should the German Federal Government admit certain types of documents or of other evidence as sufficient for validation of foreign currency bonds offered in a Country of Offering other than the United States, the action thus taken by the German Federal Government shall also be made applicable to Dollar Bonds held at the time of their registration within such Country of Offering, provided that the German Federal Government notifies the United States Government of such action and that the United States Government thereupon finds such application to be appropriate and so notifies the German Federal Government.

Section 10

The German Federal Government agrees that it will seek to conclude agreements similar to the present agreement with the Government of any other country in which German foreign currency bonds have been marketed and which the Schedule to the Validation Law describes as a Country of Offering, or to make other appropriate arrangements with the competent agencies of the countries of offering, for the purpose of implementing the Validation Law within the territorial jurisdiction of such country and causing decisions rendered in accordance with the terms of the Validation Law to become binding upon all persons concerned.

Section 11

The two Governments agree that the Validation Board and the Foreign Representative may utilize such services of any persons or public or private agencies within the United States as they may deem necessary for the purpose of carrying out the validation process expeditiously and effectively, and may enter into contracts with such persons or agencies with respect to such services and the compensation to be paid therefor.

Section 12

The German Federal Government agrees that any expenses reimbursable to the registrants, trustees and paying agents of Dollar Bonds pursuant to Article 63 of the Validation Law will be paid to them by the Foreign Representative on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany, without prejudice to the right of the German Federal Republic to claim reimbursement from the issuers of such bonds.

Section 13

a. The German Federal Government agrees that the entire cost of the validation procedure resulting from the implementation of the Validation Law in the United States will be paid by the Federal Republic of Germany including, but not limited to the salaries, fees or other remuneration of the members and chairmen and any other personnel of the Validation Board and Arbitration Boards, office rent and other operating expenses of the said Boards, and the cost of notices and announcements pursuant to Section 5 hereof.

b. The salary of the member of the Validation Board appointed by the United States Government and the

remuneration of the Chairman of the Validation Board shall be determined jointly by the two Governments. The initial appointment of such member shall be for a period of two years.

Section 14

The German Federal Government agrees that it will make available the foreign exchange necessary to effectuate the payments pursuant to Section 12 and 13 and that it will cause to be issued such licenses as may be required under German law to permit the carrying out of any acts required under the Validation Law or this Agreement.

Section 15

The two Governments agree that the employment of collective validation as provided in Article 13 and Articles 55 to 58 of the Validation Law will promote the orderly and expeditious operation of the Law and that the collective validation should be used wherever it appears that the amount of bonds of a given issue which have disappeared is not sufficiently large to warrant the expense to the issuer and the burden upon the bondholders of specific validation.

Section 16

a. The German Federal Government agrees that, as far as Dollar Bonds are concerned, it will not exercise after February 28, 1953 its power to supplement the Schedule of Foreign Currency Bonds pursuant to Article 1 (2) of the Validation Law, unless the United States Government should consent thereto.

b. The German Federal Government confirms that the Validation Law does not affect the validity of any issues of German bonds denominated in dollars which are not listed in the Schedule to the said Law and are not added thereto by way of supplement.

Section 17

This Agreement has been executed in two original texts, in the English and German languages. The English and German texts of this Agreement are the official texts thereof.

Section 18

This Agreement shall become effective upon its being signed by the duly authorized representatives of the two Governments.

Background Information

The primary reason that holders of German dollar bonds are being requested to submit their holdings for validation arises out of an event which occurred in Germany in the closing days of the last war. For several years prior to the outbreak of hostilities, particularly in the middle 1930's, the German Government, taking advantage of depreciated prices resulting from German securities being in default, reacquired a significant portion of outstanding dollar bonds for purposes of amortization. For various reasons they did not present them to the trustees and paying agents for cancellation, and thereafter the war rendered presentation impossible.

During the war years, the major part of these securities, along with German securities denominated in other foreign currencies, accumulated in vaults of financial institutions and other depositories in Berlin. They were so deposited when the Soviet armed forces invaded the city in 1945. When Berlin fell, the Soviet authorities systematically expropriated the securities and, except

for reports indicating that attempts are being made to negotiate them in the European markets, no information has since been obtained regarding their whereabouts. The total amount of outstanding German dollar bonds is approximately 510 million dollars. The validation program will ultimately determine what portion of this sum is represented by the looted securities; present estimates indicate that the looted bonds may comprise approximately 50 percent of this sum.

In addition to recognizing the accepted principle that a debtor should not be charged with paying the same obligation twice, the U. S. Government, as a matter of national policy, has a direct interest in seeing that the Soviet Government is not permitted to obtain dollar exchange through the negotiation of these looted instruments. The U. S. Government also has an obligation to the American investor to insure that no bonds except those which would constitute good delivery are afforded a market in the United States. Furthermore it is in the interest of the American bondholders that the limited dollar resources of the Federal Republic of Germany be conserved to service only valid obligations in accordance with the terms of the agreement on German external debts.

The primary purpose of validation is to sort good bonds from bad. The mechanics of achieving this, however, are complex, and it was recognized at the beginning that neither the United States nor the Federal Republic of Germany acting alone could accomplish this purpose in a manner which would adequately protect the legitimate interests of the American holders and the German issuers. Accordingly, a series of coordinated measures were undertaken by the two Governments which combine to create the basis upon which the validation procedure rests. The first of these is the law concerning the validation of German Foreign Currency Bonds, popularly known as the Validation Law, which was enacted by the Federal Republic of Germany on August 25, 1952. The second is the agreement signed today which permits the validation procedure to be introduced in the United States. Finally the two Governments have agreed on an implementing regulation under the German law, which the German Government will issue shortly, on the details of the validation procedure.

The Validation Law requires that all German dollar bonds, which are listed by issue in the schedule to the law, be validated in order to remain valid obligations of the issuers. There are a number of ways in which this will be accomplished, depending upon the circumstances surrounding a particular bond. The great majority of American holders will be concerned with only one of these methods. Under this method, bonds which were outside Germany on January 1, 1945, will be validated in the United States. There will be established a three-man Validation Board composed

of American and German representatives, which will sit in New York City, and which will be vested with authority to grant or deny validation of all German dollar bonds which satisfy the requirement of having been outside Germany on this key date. Holders of German dollar bonds who can satisfy this requirement may obtain a registration form from the Validation Board which they may fill out and submit to the Board giving the pertinent facts surrounding their holdings. They must also submit such evidence as is available to them, including their sworn affidavits, establishing that they or their predecessors in interest held the bonds outside Germany on the required date.

In submitting their application for validation, bondholders will also be required to surrender their bonds either to the Validation Board or to a depository appointed for the purpose. Bonds which are validated are eligible for the benefits provided under the Debt Settlement and also may be traded in the U.S. market. To facilitate trading, the Validation Board, unless otherwise instructed by the bondholder, will issue a validation certificate which will be attached to the bond and which must accompany the bond in all public transactions. Where the Validation Board denies validation, the bondholder may at his election file an appeal either with a special Arbitration Board which is established in the United States, or with the German courts or with the U.S. courts. In these cases, the Validation Board will retain possession or control over the affected bonds pending the outcome of the appeal.

To assist and advise bondholders, suitable publicity will be given in due course in newspapers of general circulation in the principal centers throughout the United States, financial journals, and by appropriate announcements through brokers and dealers. This publicity will acquaint bondholders with the general provisions of the validation program, the procedure for obtaining and filling out the registration forms and the date upon which they may apply for validation to the Validation Board. It is expected that the Validation Board will be able to assume its responsibilities in the near future.

Where a bondholder cannot establish that his holdings were outside Germany on January 1, 1945, he must apply for validation before a German agency in the Federal Republic of Germany under one of the other procedures mentioned above. His application in this instance will be based upon the fact that he lawfully acquired the bonds before January 1, 1945, or, if he acquired them after that date, that he can trace his title back to a person who was the owner on January 1, 1945.

The Validation Law also provides for cases where bonds were lost or destroyed as a result of the war. In these situations, which will also be handled in Germany, the German agency, upon

the submission of competent evidence, will grant a "declaratory decree" in lieu of a substitute bond. This declaratory decree grants to the applicant the right to receive compensation from the issuer under certain conditions.

Bondholders are cautioned that not all German dollar bonds are subject to the Validation Law. The law itself has a jurisdictional as well as substantive limitations. It does not apply to dollar bonds issued by public or corporate entities having their seat in that part of Germany which is under Soviet control or Polish administration. Moreover, the law deals only with those bonds which are identified by issue in the schedule. Accordingly, bondholders are requested to study carefully the public announcements, giving particular attention to such matters as where registration forms are obtainable, the time and place where they should be filed, and the listing of the various issues of German dollar bonds which are required to be validated.

Emergency Grant-in-Aid for Berlin Refugees

The following announcement was issued jointly at Berlin on January 29 by the Mutual Security Agency, Office of the Special Mission to Western Germany, and the Federal Ministry for the Marshall Plan:

[Telegraphic text]

Emergency aid in the amount of 250,000 deutschemarks [approximately \$60,000] was given today to assist in meeting the urgent needs of Soviet victims crowding into Berlin from Russian-occupied Germany.

The funds will be used for the purchase of such urgently needed items as bedding and bed clothing, medical and surgical equipment, special food for the children of refugees in West Berlin temporary centers, children's clothing, and other emergency requirements.

The allocation is a grant-in-aid from GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) counterpart funds, derived from U.S. dollar aid, and was agreed on by the Federal Ministry for the Marshall Plan, the Ministry for Expellees, and the MSA Special Mission to Germany.

The funds will be turned over to the Berlin authorities and disbursed by them in accordance with their on-the-spot assessment of the most urgent needs.

The Ministry for Expellees stated that the aid was particularly welcome at this moment when the stream of refugees into West Berlin is so great.

Allotment Made to U.K. for Promotion of Productivity

The United Kingdom has been allocated 9 million dollars of a special appropriation made available under the Mutual Security Act of 1952 to encourage a healthy and expanding economy by promoting productivity of industry and by stimulating competition, Lincoln Gordon, chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission to the United Kingdom announced on February 25.

"I am confident," Mr. Gordon said, "this program will make a significant contribution to the improvement of productivity and the competitive ability of British industry—an improvement vital to the long term soundness and vigor of the British economy and therefore to our common objective of a strong free world." Sterling equivalent or the counterpart funds, as they are called, of the dollar grant will be spent on programs designed to foster the ability and willingness of British industry to produce, under fully competitive conditions, to the mutual benefit of employers and employed and of consumers.

The 9-million-dollar special allocation is in addition to previous allotments of Msa defense support funds totalling 400 million dollars for the 1953 fiscal year.

Great Britain is the first country participating in the mutual security program to conclude an agreement with the U.S. Government for allocation of a portion of the 100 million dollars appropriated under a special provision of mutual security legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress in June 1952. Negotiations to conclude similar agreements are presently under way with several other participating countries in Europe.

The program for the United Kingdom will be put into effect as soon as possible and is expected to be completed within 2 or 3 years.

Specific projects are to be worked out under the agreement in each of the following categories:

1. An advisory service for small business concerns on reorganization and production techniques with a view to increasing productivity and lowering prices.

2. The expansion of research into factors affecting the efficiency of the national economy, including research into relative efficiency of competitive and monopolistic enterprise, effects of restrictive practices and incentives in industry, and social psychology of relationships between employees and management.

3. The promotion of studies in technological subjects at various universities, training of a staff for courses for supervisors, and provision for scholarships in management subjects.

4. A revolving loan fund will provide short-term loans to industry for reorganization and modernization. Producers, processors, and distributors of foodstuffs and agricultural supplies will also be eligible.

5. The program will make provision for spreading knowledge of productivity through conference exhibits and the showing of instructional films in factories, local halls, and at conferences. The British Government also indicates in the agreement that it is prepared to play a part in the Europe-wide productivity agency in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation establishment which is currently under discussion in that organization.

U.S. To Make Full Settlement for Korean Currency Advances

Press release 103 dated February 25

The United States has agreed to pay \$85,800,000 to the Republic of Korea in full settlement for all outstanding local currency advances by the Republic of Korea to U.S. forces prior to February 7, 1953. In addition it was agreed that the United States will in the future purchase won from the Republic of Korea for military use and for sale to military personnel at a rate related to local price indices.

The local currency for which payment will be made has been advanced to the United States forces under the financial agreement of July 1950¹ between the United States and the Republic of Korea, in which the Republic of Korea agreed to advance local currency in return for a settlement at a mutually agreeable time in the future. The present agreement will not affect arrangements between other U.N. countries and the Republic of Korea for settling past won drawings and obtaining future hwan (new currency) requirements.

With the funds thus made available by the settlement and those arising from sale of hwan in the future, the Republic of Korea will be able to increase materially its importation of consumer and capital goods.

Letters of Credence

Chile

The newly appointed Ambassador of Chile, Anibal Jara, presented his credentials to the President on February 24, 1953. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 101 of February 24.

Nepal

The newly appointed Ambassador of Nepal, Shanker Shum Shere Jung Bahadur Rana, presented his credentials to the President on February 24, 1953. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 102 of February 24.

¹ For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Nov. 6, 1950, p. 734.

The Facts of the Korean Situation

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated February 25

To appear before this gathering of statesmen from all over the world as the representative of my country is a unique distinction. It is an honor to be associated here with all of you—an honor of memorable significance to me.

Since the last meeting of the General Assembly, there has been a change in the Government of the United States—a change in which the losers have neither been disgraced nor, I may say, liquidated.

The American people wish to establish a lasting peace and regard the United Nations as a vital means to that end. As President Eisenhower said:

Respecting the United Nations as the living sign of all people's hope for peace, we shall strive to make it not merely an eloquent symbol but an effective force. And in our quest for an honorable peace, we shall neither compromise, nor tire, nor ever cease.²

Every element of American life is eager for peace. For the sake of peace we have put up our resources; we have sent our men. Even the most fanatic critics of the United States are unable to point a finger at any group having the slightest weight or importance in America which does not believe in peace.

This love of peace exists in all Americans regardless of party. It was for that reason that my predecessors at the last Assembly voted for the Indian resolution—a resolution which spared no effort to meet the issues; which declared unequivocally for peace; which was passed by a vote of the General Assembly which was overwhelming. If ever an action represented the conscience of the world and the striving of suffering humanity for peace it was the passage of that resolution.

It seemed impossible that there could be rulers

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on Feb. 25. The meeting at which Ambassador Lodge spoke was the first held following the resumption of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly on Feb. 24.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 169.

President's Welcome to Assembly Delegates

Following is the text of a message sent on February 24 by President Eisenhower to Lester B. Pearson, President of the General Assembly, and read by Mr. Pearson at the opening meeting of the Assembly's resumed Seventh Session on the same date:

It is a pleasure to welcome to the United States the delegates to the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The United Nations has already accomplished much. I hope that it will grow in strength and become an increasingly effective instrument of peace.

The achievement of a just and durable peace is essential to all the values which make life worth living. This task involves not only the building of collective security; it challenges our intelligence and our idealism on the whole broad front of human activity. The delegates to this Assembly have a great opportunity to advance the cause of peace. The world will watch your deliberations with deep interest and high hopes.

I wish you Godspeed.

in this world who would object to this offer, but it soon appeared that there were. The regimes of China and of North Korea have turned it down, and, of course, when they did it, they must have known that they were telling the world in effect: "We wish to continue the bloody struggle in Korea; and, therefore, tell you that you can only solve the Korean problem on our terms." We, who are determined to end the war on a just basis, must all note this development with regret and seek the reasons for it.

Chinese Words and Soviet Acts

Therefore, we should first ponder the statement of Mr. Chou En Lai, the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime, who in his political report of February 4, 1953, spoke of the Korean war and said that it "has greatly reinforced the strength and influence of the world camp of

peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union"—an unwittingly candid admission, by the way, as to the identity of those whose word he heeds.

Mr. President, for many generations Americans have had close relations with China and have learned to esteem the wisdom of the Chinese people. We realize that there are genuinely democratic forces at work throughout the world, which have been suppressed in some areas including China. These forces reflect the human desire for a richer, freer life. Forces of this same kind built our own country.

There is no doubt that some Chinese believed the promise of progress which was made to them by their present rulers. Such promises are always attractive. But being an intelligent people with a long tradition of wisdom, they certainly cannot approve of the present situation in which young manhood of China is being slaughtered in response to a policy which appears to be admittedly dictated from Moscow.

Apparently the Soviet Union, with its own special brand of magnanimity and generosity, is determined to carry on the war to the last Chinese.

Mr. Chou En Lai's description of the Korean war as a positive good to communism shocks us. We repudiate it. We are sure the Chinese people would repudiate it if they were free to do so.

This brings me naturally to another somber truth. This is that the Soviet Union is actively assisting the aggressors in Korea on a scale which makes possible the continuance of that aggression and determines its scope. The following facts, therefore, should be placed clearly and frankly before world opinion.

Ten Facts

Here are 10 facts which the world should face:

Fact number one is that Soviet planning instigated the original aggression, which was subsequently maintained by Soviet training and equipment, notably Soviet aircraft, Soviet artillery, Soviet T-34 tanks, and Soviet automatic weapons.

Fact number two is that the North Korean forces which were virtually destroyed after the Inchon landing in the fall of 1950 fled across the Yalu River, behind the screen of the Chinese Communists who were then entering Korea. They reappeared on the battlefield in late winter reconstituted, reorganized, and almost completely equipped with weapons of Soviet manufacture.

Fact number three is that the flow of Soviet equipment is constant and steady, and accounts for the increase of combat effectiveness of the enemy over the past year.

Fact number four is that the Chinese Communists who entered the fighting with normal light equipment are now fighting with heavy equipment supplied by the Soviet Union.

Fact number five is that naval mines in large number which have been picked up or washed ashore off the Korean coast have been mines of Soviet manufacture.

Fact number six is that the planes which the U.N. Command has been encountering over North Korea have been MIG-15's and other aircraft manufactured and supplied by the Soviet Union.

Fact number seven is that recently U.N. forces have encountered a new type of Soviet plane, the IL-28, which is now a part of the air forces of the Communist aggressors over North Korea.

Fact number eight is that in spite of heavy losses, the Chinese Communist and North Korean air forces have grown until they today have some 2500 aircraft of which half are jets, all manufactured and supplied by the Soviet Union.

Fact number nine is that the Soviet Union provides the replacements for these aircraft which U.N. forces shoot down over North Korea. Our experts estimate that the Soviet Union has contributed in excess of 4400 planes to fight against the United Nations in Korea.

Fact number ten is that the anti-aircraft guns in North Korea, including many which are radar-controlled, are of Soviet origin.

The Soviet representatives are hereby challenged to disprove these facts. They show how far the Soviet Union has gone to broaden the war—how, since the fall of 1950, the United Nations has not been fighting a local enemy, but the vast manpower resources of Communist China supported by the material resources of the entire Soviet world.

And then, Mr. President, there are people who have the crudity to come here and make sanctimonious speeches about world peace.

The whole world knows the truth: That except for the active aid furnished to the North Korean and Chinese Communist aggressors by the Soviet Union, the war in Korea would now be over. Like the ostrich who sticks his head in the sand and thinks that no one sees him, the rulers of the Soviet Union are so bemused by their own propaganda that they do not recognize the extent to which world opinion holds them responsible for aiding and abetting this great crime against the peace of the world.

The rulers of the Soviet Union can stop the war whenever they want to—and Mr. Vyshinsky knows it.

To Build Peace

Mr. President, peace not only depends on collective security—it must also be based on equal treatment of human beings. As long as there is racial or religious discrimination, just so long is the day of peace postponed. Conditions are not perfect in any country in this regard, but in many lands—I know this is true in my own—great and successful advances are being made.

U.S. Makes Pledge to U.N. Technical Assistance Program

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.,
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated February 26

This conference on the annual renewal of life for what is surely one of the most important of the U.N. activities is a significant international occasion at which I am happy to represent the United States.

Equally significant is the fact that represented here are the Governments of Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Laos, Monaco, Spain, Switzerland, and Vietnam. Although not members of the United Nations, these countries show by their cooperation and presence that the idea of technical assistance is powerful and promising. The United States welcomes their presence.

We may also note the absence of a number of governments who habitually speak so loudly of their interest in assisting underdeveloped countries and who are strangely absent and silent when the chance comes actually to do something helpful.

The statesmen of Southeast Asia were not deluded by the words of the representatives of such governments at the recent meeting in Bandung, Indonesia. At the Economic Commission for Asia, and the Far East, Mr. Ahmad Khaleli of Pakistan asked the U.S.S.R. to stop shedding crocodile tears, and Mr. D. B. Karmarhar of India said, "The Soviet Union has done practically nothing to help the region and has attributed malicious motives to other countries that have helped."

In spite of this use of propaganda, instead of action on their part, we look to the time when we who are here today will be joined by the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in pushing forward this important work of bettering the life of hundreds of millions throughout the world.

Technical assistance has been called an act of faith in the ability of people to help themselves. It can be a powerful force for the development of latent resources, both human and physical. It is one of the things President Eisenhower undoubtedly had in mind when he wrote to Assembly President Pearson on Tuesday² that the task of achieving a just and durable peace involves not only the building of collective security: ". . . it challenges our intelligence and our idealism on the whole broad front of human activity."

The response of the United States to this challenge is not new. The record of our missionaries,

¹ Made before the U.N. Technical Assistance Pledging Conference on Feb. 26.

² See p. 382.

We have, however, observed with indignation the persecution of Christians, Moslems, and Jews that has been taking place in the Soviet Union for some time. That discrimination is not only wicked; it will also in the end prove to be totally ineffective because there is an undefeatable quality in human nature which will always resist totalitarian attempts to destroy religious and ethnic freedom.

To build peace there must, of course, be collective security.

To build peace there must be equal treatment of people without discrimination as to race, creed, or color.

To build peace there must also be freedom from the specter of want. There is no use in talking to a starving man about freedom or democracy. We stand ready to work for peace along all these lines too.

Finally, we believe that peace, like every other great human problem, is best solved by governments which are controlled by the people, in which public officials are the servants of the people—countries in which the word "dictatorship" is a bad word, and not countries in which officials proudly boast of dictatorship and give it the misleading title of "Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

We believe that the counsel of many men of good will produces more collective wisdom than that of a few. We believe in the people; we have faith in the people. We believe the people are competent to make their own decisions, and that a man is not rendered all-wise by being made all-powerful.

Mr. President, the facts I have just presented concerning the words of the Chinese Communists and the actions of the Soviet Union are a monstrous answer to the adoption by this Assembly of the Indian resolution. For these reasons there is little point in reformulating at this session the principles on which that resolution was based. The Indian resolution, in the words of a great American on another occasion, raises a standard to which the wise and honest can repair. When the day comes that the aggressors in the Far East have a change of heart—for whatever reasons, and they can be many—it will not be difficult for them to show it. Failure to end the fighting in Korea is not due to any lack of cleverness with words here in the United Nations. It is due to the frankly announced desire of the Communists to continue the war.

Mr. President, I reserve my right to speak further on the Korean item at a later point in the debate.

The U. S. in the U. N.

A weekly feature, does not appear in this issue.

the work of our great foundations, the long experience of our agricultural extension services in our individual states—all of these testify to our faith that people will accomplish big things by collaborating on common problems for their own advancement.

The United States has for some 25 years, therefore, been engaged in its own programs of bilateral technical assistance. Since the early days of the United Nations, the United States has supported the idea of multilateral technical assistance under U.N. auspices.

Today, after 2½ years, the necessary administrative machinery has been set up and put into operation. Agreements negotiated with Governments have enabled projects to start in some 65 countries and territories. Approximately 1,000 U.N. experts are now in the field and at work.

Already this work is producing results. In the Near East, where the seasonal swarming of locusts has destroyed the crops and has often discouraged farmers from even planting crops, international and national efforts are today combined to limit the depredations of this ancient enemy of man.

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, animal diseases which have deprived millions of people of animal agriculture products and of draft animals are, thanks to this program, being eliminated.

In the great arid and semiarid areas of the world, exploration and technical operations are bringing water to the surface for the livelihood of countless men, women, and children. In other areas, swamps and lowlands are being drained and controlled—with a resulting drop in malaria and a rise in food production. Extension programs are bringing the findings of agricultural science to the individual farmer and showing him how to put them to work.

These are results that can be seen, that can be measured—results that make life worthwhile, that make peace worth working for.

There is also the long-range work. The meaning of village sanitation, with all it implies for increased health and energy, is now being taught in rural communities around the world. Governments are learning how to strengthen their health services.

This is a moving record which the U.S. Government is proud to help establish.

Today, let me emphasize our interest in the U.N. Technical Assistance Program by quoting a statement of our colleague, Prof. A. S. Bokhari.³ He once told a group of students that “a hungry

man will choose four sandwiches instead of four freedoms.”

In other words, the idea of human freedom can only advance if the free governments of the world conduct a program of action in which people can see with their own eyes that their lot is improving. The United Nations is accomplishing this in many places in the world.

But the program, although substantial, is not yet operating at its full effectiveness. Undoubtedly one reason for this is that every government represented here has been prevented from contributing as much as it would like because of demands—demands arising from a basic threat to our peace and security by aggressive action by a small group of states. These threats limit our participation in some of the most worthwhile U.N. activities.

The U.S. Government is acutely aware of the heavy defense burdens which we and many other nations of the free world carry. We are currently engaged in a detailed review of all of our expenditures, both domestic and international, and this review will of necessity extend not only to expenditures for 1953 but also to the projection of expenditures for future years.

Thus, while I am authorized to reaffirm the pledge of the representative of the United States made before the Negotiating Committee on Extra-Budgetary Funds at the first part of this session of the General Assembly, it should be understood that this pledge involves no commitment, expressed or implied, of the executive branch of the Government of the United States beyond the current year. The Government will wish to consider the amount of its pledge for 1954 in the light of the degree of support given the program by other governments, the results accomplished under the program, the competing demands upon the U.S. Government for funds, and the basic general budgetary policy of the Government. The statement of pledge which I am happy to confirm for this year is as follows:

The United States is prepared to pledge a maximum of \$14,708,750 to the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance for the calendar year 1953 provided that the United States pledge does not exceed 60 percent of the total pledges made by all governments for this period.

An existing law of the United States authorizes an appropriation of \$14,708,750, and \$8,171,333 of this amount has been appropriated and is now available for payment to the special Technical Assistance account.

The Executive has requested action by the Congress to make an additional \$6,537,417 available for this purpose. This figure will be revised to whatever amount is justified within the total authorized by the pledges made by other governments in support of the 1953 program. Insofar as an amount in excess of \$8,171,333 is required this pledge is authorized by the Executive of the United States Government and is subject to Congressional action.

³ Representative of Pakistan.

Democracy and Communism in the Modern World

by Ernest A. Gross

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U. S./U. N. press release dated February 21

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It seems to me that any fair attempt to deal with the problems involved in my subject should consider (a) the nature of the modern world; (b) an analysis of the principal forces in conflict; (c) the method of international communism; and (d) the method of the democratic society. . . .

Broadly speaking, what are the principal characteristics of the modern world and the major facts of international life today? The first and most obvious is, of course, the immediate pervasive threat of Communist imperialism. The second is that, in many thickly populated portions of the planet, there exist large areas of revolutionary change and great unrest. We see at least two fundamental drives emerging in these areas: The one toward the abolition of the age-old enemies of man—poverty, disease, and hunger; the other is those national aspirations for self-government or independence, dramatized by the fact that 13 new sovereignties have been born since the end of the war—almost all in that ancient territorial sweep of land from the shores of the Mediterranean eastward to the South Pacific.

Another prime fact of international life is the generation of destruction, loss of manpower, exhaustion, and disillusion which is the legacy of two world wars, several local ones, and a series of revolutionary movements.

The conflicts and the crosscurrents in such a world, and I shall discuss some of these in more detail, have inevitably created doubts, disunity, and confusion. Peoples everywhere have felt themselves to be "tempest-tossed." The practice of subversion and infiltration, characteristic of

the international Communist movement, has brought the enemy within the gates in every corner of the world and, although this tactic has achieved varying degrees of success, the net effect has been to lead many people in large areas to believe that there is no durable "safe haven" in which democracy is assured a permanent sanctuary. This, of course, is a calculated objective of the Communist leadership.

At the same time, it produces a situation in which it is difficult, if not impossible, for the democratic societies to draw precise chalklines either of geographical boundaries or of rules of conduct. Any attempt to do the former would in effect certify the right of the enemy to hold gains already made, no matter how ruthlessly. Indeed, this is the basic objection voiced by many to the so-called "containment" theory. Any attempts to prescribe rigid rules of conduct would bring us face to face with what I believe to be a fundamental truth: That it is impossible to codify precise rules of human behavior without diminishing the very essence of democracy. It is the apparent weakness, but the actual strength of the democratic society, that it does not carry well the external trappings and glitter of the police state. The difference was well described some years ago by a writer who said that "Despotism sails by like a beautiful ship under full sail, and democracy like a raft with your feet always in the water—but the raft never sinks."

Principal Forces in Conflict

At the outset, it is important to distinguish on the one hand between the conflicts which inevitably exist between what I would call "divergent points of view," and on the other hand the conflicts which exist between "ideologies" or, as some prefer to call them, philosophies of life.

¹ Excerpts from an address made on Feb. 21 at Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, N. Y.

The distinction becomes particularly important when intensely divergent viewpoints arise between those who adhere to the same basic philosophy of life. The best example I can think of is what has come to be called the problem of "colonialism."

In a plea for better understanding of this matter, a distinguished U.N. representative of a country belonging to the so-called "Asian-African group" explained in a speech one day several reasons why he thought the point of view of his Government on the colonial questions arising in the United Nations often was so vehemently presented. In the first place, he said, this was often what he described as an emotional response to a history of "racial discrimination on a large international scale." Secondly, he pointed out that member states of the Asian-African group contained more than half of the world's people, many of whom have been recently under colonial domination. He said that "apart from pure material exploitation that may be going on, there is a psychological twist given to the nature of human beings under colonial domination which destroys the dignity of men and makes them unworthy of the humanity to which they profess to belong." I quote this sentence from his speech without comment other than to point out the interesting fact that in the very formulation of his thought, he demonstrated the deep emotional conviction which moved him. And finally, he pointed out the significance of the grave economic inequalities which exist in large parts of the area by saying that there were countries in this group where the annual income was less than 50 dollars, where the life expectancy was 27 years, and where the literacy rate was only 5 to 10 percent. I do not vouch for these figures, but whether or not they are statistically accurate they are of significance if only because they are accepted as facts by many leaders in the area.

Nevertheless, despite his deeply felt conviction on these matters, this Asian leader urged that the people of the free world avoid the error of treating the serious, and often bitter, differences of viewpoint arising within the free world on the colonial question as if they reflected different ideologies or philosophies of life.

I think the essential point is that there is a bond perceived, however dimly, and that this bond rests upon the acceptance of certain fundamental concepts of individual dignity, liberty, and justice. This was well stated in the Inaugural Address of President Eisenhower:²

The faith we hold belongs not to us alone but to the free of all the world. . . . We know, beyond this, that we are linked to all free peoples not merely by a noble idea but by a simple need.

In discussing the major forces in conflict between the two worlds, we must constantly keep in mind that in some areas of the world the original

concept of communism has a latent appeal. The picture of man against nature, the vision of freedom from physical want, the false premise and the false *promise* of so-called "stateless, classless, and complete democracy"—all this lures some who, in despair of any better future, are tempted to turn toward a false faith.

At the same time, it is becoming clearer to the people of these very areas of the world that whatever the original theoretical concept of communism may have been, the false Utopia which it promised has been betrayed.

Last month in Rangoon representatives of Asian Socialist Parties from nine countries met to discuss problems of common concern. They adopted a declaration of principles and objectives which, among other things stated:

Communism as practiced today in its totalitarian form in the Soviet Union and its satellites has degenerated into a regime of complete subordination of the individual and the group to the centralized power of the leadership of the ruling party.

Under the Soviet system, state power imposes absolute domination and exacts blind obedience. Man is expected to give up his freedom and individuality, obliterate himself as an abstract part of an all-powerful state, in which only one will prevails.

Communism therefore stands for the negation of all concepts of freedom, individual self-expression, and genuine mass responsibility, which are the very breath of democratic socialism.

I think this resolution confirms three of the points which I have discussed:

(1) You will notice this group referred to the "degeneration" of communism, thus revealing a latent attitude that Soviet communism is, in a sense, something of a "good thing gone wrong."

(2) A definite awareness of the fact that, even taking this attitude as a premise, communism as practiced has at best the aspect of a "fallen angel," and that there has been a reversal and a betrayal of anything which might have had an appeal even to the despairing and downtrodden.

(3) That there does exist in fact what General Eisenhower described in his Inaugural Speech as a "noble idea" which links all free peoples. This "noble idea" rests on the fundamental principles of freedom, on individual dignity, and of a responsible sense of "community."

The problem of developing a "sense of community" deserves discussion. This is another way of describing the attempt to define common objectives and to work out agreed methods of cooperative action toward those objectives. One might say indeed that the principal task confronting the United States in its essential effort to maintain and develop the leadership of the free world is to create a sense of common interest. In the last analysis, this is the indispensable basis of moral unity. It is also the major element of a "free world" concept. The sense of community which binds together the family, the city, and the nation is not different in essence from the sense of

² BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 168.

community which must be forged in order to maintain in fact as well as in theory a "free world."

To my mind this truth is best summarized in several sentences from President Eisenhower's recent State of the Union message:³

We must be strong, above all, in the spiritual resources upon which all else depends. We must be devoted with all our heart to the values we defend. We must know that each of these values and virtues applies with equal force at the ends of the earth and in our relations with our neighbor next door. . . .

I would point out, in this connection, that the U.N. Charter in fact provides an important method of identifying common interest as well as a framework for cooperative action. Although wisely it does not attempt to define and codify rigid rules of conduct, it does at the same time expound those general interests which men share merely by reason of being members of the human society. . . .

The Method of International Communism

. . . free inquiry is always the first casualty of the police state. The essence of such a system is to "educate" out of people's minds the ability to make choices, except within a set pattern. This I believe to be the most frightful and frightening aspect of that system. It consists, as one writer has put it, in "obliterating the questions," by altering the outlook which gives rise to the questions in the first place.

From my own experience in observing and dealing with Communist representatives at the United Nations, I have often wondered whether they are in fact psychologically capable of making objective judgments concerning matters in issue between us. Even some of those whose duties have kept them in this country for extended periods, who have talked to many Americans, who have read the press and heard the radio, appear to be incapable—rather than merely unwilling—to recognize facts and to draw inescapable logical inferences from those facts.

This is indeed the very objective of the training and indoctrination of persons subject to the Communist system. It is also, of course, the fundamental explanation of the Iron Curtain.

One of the inevitable consequences of thought control is the destruction of moral values. An essential premise of our philosophy of life is that only the free man can be the responsible man, and that morality in the last analysis rests upon the choice by the free man of the right alternative.

The contrast between the fundamental points of view of the two systems is well demonstrated, I think, by setting side by side the following sentences—one from Lenin and one from the Englishman, John Bright. John Bright wrote: "There is no permanent greatness in a nation except it be based on morality." Lenin, discussing the Com-

munist state, wrote in 1920: "Our morality is deduced from the class struggle of the proletariat, and Communist morality is the morality which serves this struggle."

As was perceived by the representatives of the Asian Governments at the Rangoon Conference, and as we should continually stress—the deadly fallacy of the Communist system is that complete tyranny can give birth to what they call "complete democracy."

The principal method used in the Communist system to destroy the ability of men to make free and rational judgments, is to attack diversity and separateness. The individual is attacked as the symbol of the free mind. The minority group is attacked as the symbol of the free culture. Nationalism is attacked as the symbol of the free political entity. I should like to discuss each of these in turn.

First, the attack on the individual. The human person is the subject and the property of the state. I should like to cite some examples within my own experience. You recall that in August of 1948 the Russian school teacher, Mrs. Kasenkina, sought freedom at the risk of her life by leaping from the window of the Soviet Consulate in New York City. The Soviet political machinery rolled into high gear in a genuine attempt to reclaim her even while she lay near death in a New York hospital. The American Ambassador was called to the Kremlin at midnight; the Soviet Ambassador at Washington made several calls on the Department of State. Having attended these meetings myself, I can attest to the urgent and importunate manner in which demand was made for the custody of this lone Soviet subject, whose crime was her desire not to return to the Soviet Union. Of course we rejected the demand as being contrary to the ethical and legal code by which we are governed.

I thought of this incident several times during the debate in the U.N. General Assembly a few months ago concerning the Korean prisoners of war. Our refusal to agree to repatriate by force, against their will, prisoners of war held by us was violently attacked by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Vyshinsky. At one point in his argument, Vyshinsky flatly and baldly proclaimed that the prisoner of war had no will other than the will of the state. In other words, the individual does not exist as such, but his whole purpose and meaning consist in his relation to the all-powerful tyranny of the state.

The attack on the minority as a symbol of the free culture includes the persecution of ethnic, national, and religious groups. The most shocking current example is, of course, the anti-Semitic atrocities which have aroused the indignation and anxious concern of the world.

What started out as the fallacious Marxist doctrine of stateless freedom in a classless society now has been corrupted to an even lower level

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 211.

into the racist, power-hungry, and imperialist practices of Stalinism.

The third target I have mentioned is that of nationalism as the symbol of the free political entity.

The Soviet-sponsored aggression against the Republic of Korea is one of the most ruthless attempts in history to extinguish a proud and ancient nationalism. It is true that whole states and peoples have been subjugated by Soviet imperialism since the war. But this has for the most part been done by the hatchet and the rope rather than by military conquest. Korea is the symbol of nationhood standing against overt aggression.

It is natural that peoples who have newly won their own independence should feel a concern in similar aspirations on the part of others.

Surely there is all the more reason for them to make common cause with a nationalism fighting for its very life against the armed Communist aggressor. For if a living nation is allowed thus to be destroyed, what is the prospect for nations yet waiting to be born? Communist dogma has always recognized the fact that, as Stalin wrote in 1924, national liberation movements "contain unexhausted revolutionary possibilities." Could any warning be more explicit?

The satellite system is another proof of the mockery of Soviet pretensions of support for self-determination. "Satellitism," the new colonialism, is in the ancient line of the despot.

Taken altogether, the factors I have mentioned show the contrast between Communist promise and performance. It promised "equality," yet it has formed what has been called a "highly organized inequality." As against its slogan of "anti-imperialism," the Communist objectives have been described as "differing from the traditional aims of the Tsars only in being more ambitious." And Lenin's promise of freedom—"the withering away of the state"—has built itself a monolithic monument in the form of the most elaborate total state in history!

The Method of Democratic Society

It is not sufficient to define democracy simply as the opposite of everything communism stands for. Nor is it enough to dismiss the subject by talking of "freedom" alone.

For many people in the world, "freedom" is a vague and distant dream. Nothing in space which has only one dimension can be perceived by the human senses. So, likewise, "freedom" remains an abstract idea until it is perceived as a dimension of something else. We must therefore make clear that what we seek is a free and a just society—freedom with a sense of community, freedom and responsibility.

This must be the objective of our leadership, since we shall not be able to build confidence on any other basis.

Woodrow Wilson said in his essay on "Leaders of Men," that "persuasion is accomplished by creeping into the confidence of those you would lead."

To that end, there is needed a practical and understandable approach. Our foreign policy must, in President Eisenhower's words, be "clear, consistent, and confident." Confidence will not be built on a foundation of mere words and phrases, however eloquent.

We must demonstrate by "practical politics" that we understand the values of diversity and that we sympathize with local needs, pressures, and sensitivities. We do not hold to the same views as the Asian Socialists to whom I have referred. Yet their Rangoon resolution shows how much we have of common interest. We must not be strangers to any who seek to be guided by democratic procedures and a humanist philosophy.

At the same time, even though the American forum of democracy may not be exportable, the American ideal is . . .

Lincoln saw the value of the gift we have to offer, and he saw that its highest value was in the sharing of it. He long had sought to find what great principle or idea it was that had kept this country together. He finally found it, he once wrote, in

that sentiment in the Declaration of Independence which gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men and that all should have an equal chance.

It may be that the greatest contrast between the Communist system and ours is that they have betrayed their revolution, while we have been faithful to ours. After all, when the new state of Indonesia was born a few years ago, with our help and that of the United Nations, the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights was written into their Constitution—not the Communist manifesto. And on their currency and stamps appeared not the faces of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin—but those of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln!

Ambassador Gross Commended for Services to U.N.

U.S./U.N. press release dated February 21

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations made public on February 22 a letter, dated February 24, from President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Ambassador Ernest A. Gross, accepting his resignation as deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations, as deputy representative of the United States in the Security Council, and as U.S. representative in the Peace Observation Commission. In addition, President Truman's letter of Janu-

ary 16 to Ambassador Gross, commending him for his service, was also made public.

Ambassador Gross has been nominated by President Eisenhower to be U.S. Representative to the second half of the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, which opened on February 24.

Following are the texts of the letters sent by President Eisenhower and Mr. Truman to Ambassador Gross:

THE DEPARTMENT

Congressional Investigations of the Department

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 109 dated February 27

I should like to anticipate some probable questions. They relate to my attitude toward congressional investigations of the Department of State.

As President Eisenhower pointed out in his State of the Union message, the primary responsibility for personnel rests, as he put it, "squarely upon the Executive branch."¹ Much is being done in that respect. A new security program is being worked out primarily by the Department of Justice. Within the State Department we are going about the matter in an orderly and, I believe, effective way.

Mr. Lourie, the new Under Secretary of State for Administration, has the primary responsibility for this. In order that he might have a degree of authority commensurate with the task, Congress passed a special law to create his new office. This, however, entailed some delay so that Mr. Lourie has only been in office for about 10 days. He has selected a new security officer, Mr. McLeod, who has had long and distinguished service with Mr. Hoover in the FBI, and has more recently served as administrative assistant to Senator Styles Bridges. He is recognized in congressional circles as being eminently qualified for his new task. He will take office next Monday.

Obviously, however, the work of the Under Secretary of State for Administration and his security officer is only just getting under way, and it will be a matter of months before the personnel situation within the State Department is in satisfactory shape. Remember that there are about 42,000 people involved.

While this situation is being worked out from within, there are also congressional inquiries going on.

As President Eisenhower pointed out in his press conference the day before yesterday, Congress is a coordinate branch of the Government. It has broad powers of investigation. These powers must be respected and so far as I am concerned, they will be respected.

I am prepared to defend what I know to be sound and defensible. I am not prepared blindly to defend a situation which was created under my

DEAR AMBASSADOR GROSS: In accordance with your request, I regretfully accept your resignation as the Deputy United States Representative to the United Nations, Deputy United States Representative in the Security Council, and the United States Representative in the Peace Observation Commission. I have been informed that you have for some time been desirous of returning to private life and that your remaining in office has involved personal sacrifice.

You have rendered many valuable services during your tour of duty at the United Nations, and you deserve the hearty appreciation of your fellow citizens.

I am pleased to learn from Ambassador Lodge of your willingness to continue to serve as United States Representative to the Seventh Session of the General Assembly, and I know that in so doing you can be of great assistance in facilitating the work of Ambassador Lodge and your successor.

Sincerely yours,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

DEAR MR. GROSS: I have received your letter enclosing the copy of your resignation which you are submitting to President-elect Eisenhower.

I appreciate your kind words about my support of the United Nations. As you know, I have always regarded the Charter of the United Nations as the cornerstone of our foreign policy and I am sure that the American people will continue to give it their strongest support and fullest confidence.

I have closely followed your efforts of the past three years to carry out, in close association with Ambassador Austin, the policies of the United States Government in the United Nations. I am well aware that the critical decisions facing the United Nations during these years have imposed upon you particularly weighty responsibilities. You have had to work constantly at a grueling pace involving great personal sacrifice. In these difficult circumstances you have done an outstanding job and earned the gratitude of your country.

I know that you can be depended upon, whether or not you have public office, to continue your support for the United Nations and its aims of international peace, security, and welfare. I offer my best wishes for the future and once again my appreciation for your faithful and diligent services.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY TRUMAN

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 210.

predecessors and which I have taken office with a mandate to change.

I welcome any disclosures resulting from congressional inquiries that will help to make the Department of State more competent, loyal, and secure.

That, however, does not mean that the State Department policies or procedures are being dictated by other than the responsible officers of the State Department itself. The responsibilities for the conduct of the State Department fall squarely on my shoulders, and I expect to exercise them in a just and fair manner. I do not intend to take precipitate action. The Department will act only after the facts have been fully and fairly developed, and on the basis of what they disclose.

I frankly concede that the present months are months of difficulty, since it will necessarily take considerable time before the new administration through its own orderly processes can correct the accumulated errors of the last 20 years. It is a time when exposure through congressional action is to be expected. I point out that, so far, the congressional inquiries into the Department of State have had the support not only of the Republican, but the Democrat, members of the investigating committees.

Personnel Announcements

Press Conference Statements by Secretary Dulles

Dr. Johnson Becomes Head of IIA

Press release 110 dated February 27

As I think it has been announced briefly,¹ Robert L. Johnson, the head of Temple University, will be starting in here on March 2 to head the work of the International Information Administration, which includes the Voice of America. He will not only assume the operational responsibilities but he will also become part of the study which is going on as to the future of that organization.

A number of studies are already under way, as you know, being conducted primarily by the committee which is headed up by William Jackson, as to how best to organize our psychological activities,² and Mr. Johnson, as Director of the Information Service and Voice of America, will participate in those discussions about the future of that work. Whatever the future is, it will of course remain under the policy guidance of the Department of State.

¹ See White House press release dated February 24.

² For text of an announcement relating to the appointment of this committee, see BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 217.

Appointment of Assistant Secretary for Administration

Press release 111 dated February 27

Another personnel announcement that I am making today is the selection of Edward Thompson Wailes to be Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. He will have under his immediate jurisdiction the Office of Budget and Finance, the Office of Operating Facilities, the Management Staff, the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Foreign Buildings Operations, and the Division of Foreign Reports.

These were part of the functions formerly performed by the Deputy Under Secretary of State, Mr. Humelsine, who has now resigned. As you know, the other part of Mr. Humelsine's functions relating to security have been transferred to the new Administrator for Security and Consular Affairs, Robert Walter Scott McLeod, whose appointment was announced on February 25.

Confirmation

The Senate on February 27 confirmed John M. Cabot as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

Appointment of Robert W. S. McLeod

The Department of State on February 25 (press release 104) announced the appointment of Robert Walter Scott McLeod, of Concord, N. H., as Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Mr. McLeod, a former member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and administrative assistant to Sen. Styles Bridges, is cutting short his vacation to assume his new duties on March 2.

Mr. McLeod will have responsibility for security and consular affairs, as well as personnel. These responsibilities were formerly under the general supervision of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. As Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Mr. McLeod will have general supervision over the operations of the Office of Security, the Passport Office, the Visa Office, the Office of Protective Services, and the Munitions Office. In addition he will have supervision over the Office of Personnel. He will be directly responsible to Under Secretary of State for Administration Donald Lourie and, through Mr. Lourie, to the Secretary of State.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on February 27 confirmed Karl L. Rankin as Ambassador to China.

The Senate on February 27 confirmed James Clement Dunn as Ambassador to Spain.

The Senate on February 27 confirmed C. Douglas Dillon as Ambassador to France.

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The Department of State

Bulletin

Vol. XXVIII, No. 716

March 16, 1953



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U.S. and U.K. Discuss Economic Problems, Political Developments

COMMUNIQUE ON ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS

Press release 132 dated March 7

Representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom today concluded their discussions on measures for creating the economic and financial conditions under which the countries of the free world may be better able to earn their own living by their own industry. These conversations were informal and raised questions on which it was understood in advance that no commitments would be made.

The U.K. representatives explained the suggestions which emerged from the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, held in London in December of last year,¹ for measures which might be taken to restore balance in the world economy through the channels of commerce and to develop, by progressive stages, an effective multilateral trade and payments system over the widest possible area. These measures would involve action by the Commonwealth countries, the United States, the countries of continental Western Europe, and the countries that are members of existing international trade and financial institutions.

The discussions covered the internal and international conditions which would have to be established in order that each country might enjoy the human and material benefits of freer and dependable currencies and a larger volume of trade and commerce.

They also included a review of the over-all economic and fiscal situation of the United States. Note was taken of the significant U.S. defense expenditures overseas, including offshore purchases.

From these conversations, certain conclusions have emerged:

There is full agreement between the two Governments that the solution of the economic problems of the free world is vital to its security and well-being.

They also agree that the essential elements of

a workable and productive economic system within the free world should include

(a) *Sound internal policies*: International economic policies cannot succeed unless they are based on sound internal policies, by debtor as well as creditor countries. During the course of the conversations, the U.S. representatives made it clear that the Government of the United States welcomes the intention of the Commonwealth Governments, expressed in their December communique, to follow the internal financial and economic policies needed to achieve a freer exchange of currencies and trade.

(b) *Freer trade and currencies*: The freeing and expansion of world trade must cover currencies as well as trade. On the financial side the objective should be the eventual convertibility of sterling and other currencies and the gradual removal of restrictions on payments. On the trade side the objective should be to bring about the relaxation of trade restrictions and discriminations in a way which, in the words of President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message, "will recognize the importance of profitable and equitable world trade."² It is in the interest of the United States to take such measures as are exemplified in the President's message in order that the members of the free world may the better pay their way by their own efforts.

(c) *Development*: The creation of conditions, both by creditor and by debtor countries, which will foster international investment and the sound development of the resources of the free world. In this connection, the Government of the United States emphasized its intention to encourage the flow of investment abroad.

(d) *Organization*: International institutions should be constructively used to promote these policies.

The Government of the United States welcomes the initiative taken by the United Kingdom Government in connection with these problems of common concern.

The two Governments believe that there is

¹ For text of communique issued at the conclusion of this Conference, see p. 408.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 208.

reason to hope for continued progress toward a better balanced, growing world trade and toward the restoration of a multilateral system of trade and payments. The nature and scope of the measures which may be taken by governments to further such progress, and the timing of such measures, will require further study.

The Government of the United States will undertake, and continue over the next several months, an intensive examination and review of the general subjects discussed at the present meetings, including the suggestions resulting from the Commonwealth Economic Conference, and possible alternative suggestions, in order to arrive at a sound judgment with respect to the specific courses of action which might be taken. The two Governments intend to have further discussions with each other, with other governments, and with the international organizations concerned, including the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

The representatives of the two Governments participating in the discussions were as follows:

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
R. A. Butler, Chancellor of the Exchequer
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to the United States
Sir Pierson Dixon, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office
Sir Leslie Rowan, Second Secretary, Treasury
Sir Edwin Plowden, Chief Planning Officer, Treasury
Sir Frank Lee, Permanent Secretary, Board of Trade
D. H. F. Rickett, Economic Minister, British Embassy, Washington, D. C.

For the United States:

John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
Lewis W. Douglas, Alternate for the Secretary of State
George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury
Harold E. Stassen, Director for Mutual Security
Winthrop W. Aldrich, American Ambassador to the United Kingdom
Randolph Burgess, Deputy to the Secretary of the Treasury
Harold Linder, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Richard M. Bissell, Consultant to the Director for Mutual Security
Andrew N. Overby, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Gabriel Hauge, Special Assistant to the President

COMMUNIQUE ON POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS

Press release 131 dated March 7

In addition to the discussions on economic and financial problems, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, and Secretary of State Dulles discussed the international political developments that have taken place since their conversations in London early in February.

1. They exchanged views regarding developments in the Soviet Union.
2. With respect to Europe, particular attention was given to the subject of the proposed treaty

for a European Defense Community. Both the United States and United Kingdom Governments are concerned that the treaty be ratified as speedily as possible, so as to provide further continental unity which is essential to the most effective operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

3. They also considered the situation in the Middle East with particular reference to the major problems in the area, and were in agreement on the urgency of furthering constructive solutions in the interest of all concerned.

4. With respect to Iran, Mr. Eden said that Her Majesty's Government were decided to stand on the proposals presented to Prime Minister Mossadegh on February 20, 1953. These proposals were the result of many conversations and careful study of all the factors involved. In the opinion of the United States Government these proposals are reasonable and fair. If agreed to:

(a) Iran would retain control of its own oil industry and of its own oil policies.

(b) The problem of compensation would be disposed of in such a way that there would be no sacrifice of the principles which form the very basis of international intercourse among free nations, and the payment of compensation would be fully compatible with the rehabilitation of Iran's economy.

(c) Iran would have full opportunity to enter into arrangements whereby it could sell its oil in substantial quantities at competitive commercial prices in world markets.

(d) There would be placed at Iran's disposal sufficient funds, to be repaid in oil, to meet its immediate financial problems pending resumption of the flow of revenue from its oil industry.

5. The two Secretaries of State also considered the Far Eastern situation. They reaffirmed the importance of preventing the shipment of strategic materials to the mainland of China. Mr. Eden stated that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in addition to the system of controls already in force, had decided:

(a) To introduce a new system of licensing vessels registered in the United Kingdom and colonies so that strategic materials from non-British sources could not be carried to China in British ships;

(b) To take additional steps designed to ensure that no ships of the Soviet bloc or other nationality carrying strategic cargoes to China should be bunkered in a British port.

The United States and British Governments will concert their efforts to secure the cooperation of other maritime and trading nations in the measures designed to exclude the shipment of strategic materials to the mainland of China.

6. Under arrangements made for the common defense the United States has the use of certain

bases in the United Kingdom. The prior understanding was confirmed that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

Commonwealth Economic Conference Communique

The following communique was issued at London on December 11, 1952, at the conclusion of the Commonwealth Economic Conference:

1. The Commonwealth Economic Conference which ended today was convened with the aim of concerting measures for increasing the economic strength of the Commonwealth countries, including the Colonial Territories, and creating conditions in which their peoples can play their part in securing prosperity and contentment for themselves and for the world.

2. In recent years the Sterling Area has been faced with recurrent economic crises which have forced its members to take emergency measures of trade and exchange restriction. These measures were necessary but they have inevitably tended to frustrate long-term economic expansion on which our hopes and opportunities for the future are founded. This was recognised at the January meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers. Measures taken in accordance with the conclusions of that meeting have, however, enabled the present Conference to decide that a more positive policy can now be adopted, both by the Commonwealth countries themselves and in concert with other friendly countries, to promote expansion of world production and trade.

3. The Conference agreed that the Commonwealth countries would work together to achieve certain broad common objectives. They have no intention of seeking the creation of a discriminatory economic bloc, rather their object is by strengthening themselves to benefit the world economy generally.

Accordingly, the following principles were agreed upon as governing the approach to a whole range of subjects under discussion:

(a) Internal economic policies designed to curb inflation and rises in the cost of living should be steadily followed.

(b) Sound economic development should be encouraged with the object of increasing productive strength and competitive power, providing employment and raising standards of life.

(c) A multilateral trade and payment system should be extended over the widest possible area.

4. Application of these principles will require individual action by the Commonwealth Governments, cooperation among them and international action with other trading nations and existing international organisations.

Internal Measures

5. All Commonwealth Governments have agreed to persevere in their efforts to curb inflation. Inflationary conditions frustrate the progress of sound development both by increasing its cost and by destroying savings necessary to finance it. Moreover, they damage the external balance by stimulating excessive imports and by diverting to internal use goods which would otherwise be available for export.

6. An adequate and stable external balance must be a first objective for all Governments. Failure to achieve this means repeated crises, a continuously rising cost of living, a constant threat to employment and failure to develop resources effectively. The Conference welcomed the improvement which had taken place in the balance of payments both of the individual Sterling Area countries and of the Sterling Area as a whole, following upon the conclusions reached by the Commonwealth Finance Ministers at their meeting in January, 1952. It noted with satisfaction that the Sterling Area would achieve balance with the rest of the world in the second half of this year. It was agreed, however, that the achievement, while reassuring, was only the first step towards a stable balance for the Sterling Area. Policies were agreed upon for 1953 which it is hoped will lead to further improvement in reserves during that year. Nevertheless, while there has been steady improvement, the level of reserves is as yet too low to warrant any substantial relaxation of restrictions on imports from outside the Sterling Area.

7. The Conference considered the extensive restrictions which some countries of the sterling Commonwealth have needed to impose upon imports from the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth sources. There was agreement that restrictions imposed because of the balance of payments problems should be relaxed as the external financial position of the countries improved. In considering the whole problem the Governments concerned would have clearly in mind the difficulties which restrictions have raised for export industries affected.

8. The economic and social objectives of the Commonwealth countries, individually and in association, depend upon their ability to produce and supply under competitive conditions and expanding flow of exports. There was, therefore, general agreement in the Conference on the vital need to expand the earning power of all the Sterling countries.

Development Policy

9. Throughout the Commonwealth there is wide scope for expanding production of essential supplies which the whole world needs—food and agricultural products, minerals and engineering products—and improving the means for trans-

porting them. This development of the basic essentials has on occasion been impeded by other development of a less sound and permanent kind, which has overtaxed the countries' resources and has failed to contribute to the building of economic strength. The Conference agreed that in the Sterling Area countries development should be concentrated on projects which directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of the area's balance of payments with the rest of the world. Such projects should strengthen the economy of the countries concerned and increase their competitive power in world markets and so, by improving their balance of payments, bring increasing prosperity to their peoples. In some countries of the area, however, development plans have been or are being made to provide for some basic improvement in standards of living which is a necessary foundation for further economic development. Some social investment is also urgently needed in the more developed countries, certain of which have rapidly increasing populations. The Conference recognized the need in such cases for these types of investment.

10. To enable development to go forward, a sufficient flow of savings must be provided in the countries undertaking the development and also in other countries which are ready to invest their savings there. The amount of savings which will be available from external sources will at best be small in relation to the size of the development programmes of countries of the Sterling Commonwealth and it is therefore essential that these countries should themselves adopt policies which increase the flow of savings. Although this is inevitably a slow process for countries with low incomes and little margin above the basic needs for existence, the process of development will itself increase income and increase the flow of savings.

11. The United Kingdom is the traditional source of external capital for Commonwealth investment and has special responsibilities in the Colonial territories. The United Kingdom Government are determined that the flow of capital from London for sound development throughout the Commonwealth shall be maintained and increased. This will only be possible if the United Kingdom can sustain the necessary level of internal savings and can achieve a surplus on overseas account additional to that required to meet its heavy existing commitments.

12. The United Kingdom Government have however undertaken to make a special effort to provide additional capital for Commonwealth development by facilitating the financing of schemes in other Commonwealth countries which will contribute to the improvement of the Sterling area's balance of payments. The Conference took note that the United Kingdom Government would wish before making any of this additional finance available for Commonwealth development

to be sure that the country concerned was itself devoting an adequate part of its resources to investment designed to improve the Sterling area's balance of payments, and was ready to make a sufficient contribution towards the particular scheme in question to ensure that both countries had an interest in seeing that it was carried through as efficiently and economically as possible.

13. The Conference welcomed the proposal by a group of important financial, industrial and commercial concerns in the United Kingdom to form a company to further development in other countries of the Commonwealth and the colonial empire. It was pleased to note that an announcement by this group is being issued today. The Conference also welcomed a statement by the United Kingdom representatives that the United Kingdom Government intend to discuss with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development arrangements to give effect to their decision to make sterling available for lending by the Bank, for projects designed to improve the sterling area's balance of payments.¹

14. The Conference recognised the important contribution which investors outside the sterling area, particularly in the United States, can make to economic development in the sterling area and agreed that every effort should be made to create conditions which would encourage such investment. It further agreed that all sterling area Governments should strive to attain this by reducing such obstacles as controls over the movements of capital across the exchanges. The United Kingdom Government have reviewed the right which is now enjoyed by residents outside the sterling area who have invested capital in approved projects in the United Kingdom and colonial empire since 1st January 1950 to transfer their capital across the exchanges. At present this right only extends to the sterling equivalent of the initial investment. The United Kingdom Government informed the Conference that they have decided that henceforth it shall extend also to capital profits.

15. *Commodity policy.* The Conference recognised that there was no one universal remedy for the problem of instability of prices for primary commodities. Each commodity must be considered on its merits in the light of the conditions prevailing at the time, and the circumstances must determine what form of arrangements would be appropriate. The Conference agreed that violent fluctuations and an uneconomic level of prices for primary commodities were against the interest of consumers as well as producers. All Commonwealth Governments are therefore ready to cooperate in considering, commodity by commodity, international schemes designed to ensure stability of demand and prices at an economic level. They

¹ For text of the International Bank's announcement relating to these arrangements, see BULLETIN of Feb. 16, 1953, p. 264.

also recognise the need for an agreed procedure for calling together the Governments concerned to consider emergency action in the event of rapidly developing conditions of surplus or shortage of commodities entering into international trade.

16. There was general recognition at the Conference of the value of existing preferences. On the initiative of the United Kingdom a discussion took place on a proposal that all Commonwealth countries should join in seeking release from the "No new preference" rule in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G. A. T. T.), and this United Kingdom proposal was supported by the representatives of some countries. The representatives of other countries felt that such an approach would not advance the agreed objective of restoring multilateral world trade and the Conference was therefore unable to support it. All Commonwealth Governments agreed, however, to co-operate with the United Kingdom Government in an approach to the other contracting parties to the G. A. T. T. to meet particular difficulties arising on the United Kingdom tariff. The object would be to enable the United Kingdom, consistently with the basic provisions of the G.A.T.T., to continue the duty-free entry for Commonwealth goods notwithstanding any increases that might from time to time become necessary in duties designed to protect domestic industry and agriculture in the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth Governments also agreed to consider sympathetically certain special tariff problems affecting the Colonies.

International Action.

17. Resolute action in accordance with the conclusions recorded above will in itself do much to strengthen the economies of the sterling Commonwealth countries, but this is not enough. Action in a wider sphere is also necessary. The Conference therefore agreed to seek the co-operation of other countries in a plan to create the conditions for expanding world production and trade. The aim is to secure international agreement on the adoption of policies by creditor and debtor countries which will restore balance in the world economy on the lines of "Trade not aid" and will by progressive stages and within reasonable time, create an effective multilateral trade and payments system covering the widest possible area.

18. *Trade.* The plan envisages positive international action for the progressive removal, as circumstances permit, of import restrictions imposed for the purpose of bringing a country's external accounts into balance. Action will be required by both creditor and debtor countries. The rate of progress in removing discrimination will depend upon the advance towards equilibrium between the United States and the rest of the world.

19. The sterling Commonwealth countries will not all be able to remove restrictions at the same time. In particular the representatives of some countries have emphasised that they must continue to use their exchange resources in the manner which enables them to carry out their planned development programmes most effectively, and that they are likely to continue to need import restrictions for this purpose.

20. *Finance.* The Conference agreed that it is important not only for the United Kingdom and the sterling area but also for the world that sterling should resume its full role as a medium of world trade and exchange. An integral part of any effective multilateral system is the restoration of the convertibility of sterling but it can only be reached by progressive stages. The achievement of convertibility will depend fundamentally upon three conditions:

- (a) the continuing success of the action by sterling Commonwealth countries themselves, as outlined above;
- (b) the prospect that trading nations will adopt trade policies which are conducive to the expansion of world trade, and
- (c) the availability of adequate financial support through the International Monetary Fund or otherwise.

Procedure.

21. It is proposed to seek acceptance of this plan by the Governments of the United States and of European countries whose co-operation is essential, and to work as far as possible through existing international institutions dealing with finance and trade.

22. The timing of the successive stages of this plan cannot be decided at present. This can only be judged as the necessary conditions are satisfactorily fulfilled.

Conclusion.

23. The Conference is happy to be able to present this account of the confident understanding which exists between members of the Commonwealth, and the wide measure of agreement which they have been able to achieve over the whole range of economic policy. The aims of their co-operation are entirely consistent with their close ties with the United States and the members of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. The Commonwealth countries look outward to similar co-operation with other countries, not inward to a closed association. It is their common purpose by their own efforts and together with others to increase world trade for the mutual benefit of all peoples.

U.S. Representatives To Attend Queen Elizabeth's Coronation

White House press release dated March 6

The President has designated the following to attend the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II on June 2, 1953, as his representatives:

George Catlett Marshall, former Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army during World War II, has been named as the President's special representative

Earl Warren, Governor of California, assistant representative

Mrs. Gardner Cowles, of Cowles Publications, assistant representative

Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to represent the three U.S. Services

The President named the representatives at the invitation of Queen Elizabeth II. At the coronation ceremony in Westminster Abbey they will be seated with the special representatives of other governments.

Netherlands Foreign Minister Visits Washington

Press release 125 dated March 4

The Netherlands Foreign Minister, J. M. A. H. Luns, visited Washington on March 10 and 11. During his visit to Washington he met with Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Smith for an exchange of views. Mr. Luns arrived in the United States on March 2 to attend the U.N. General Assembly meeting and is planning to return to the Netherlands on March 13.

Messages Relating to Illness and Death of Joseph Stalin

Message to the Russian People

Statement by the President

White House press release dated March 4

At this moment in history when multitudes of Russians are anxiously concerned because of the illness of the Soviet ruler the thoughts of America go out to all the people of the U.S.S.R.—the men and women, the boys and girls—in the villages, cities, farms, and factories of their homeland.

They are the children of the same God who is the Father of all peoples everywhere. And like all peoples, Russia's millions share our longing for a friendly and peaceful world.

Regardless of the identity of government per-

sonalities, the prayer of us Americans continues to be that the Almighty will watch over the people of that vast country and bring them, in His wisdom, opportunity to live their lives in a world where all men, women, and children dwell in peace and comradeship.

Message of Official Condolences

White House press release dated March 5

The President requested the Secretary of State to send the following message to the American Embassy at Moscow for transmission to the Soviet Foreign Office by Jacob E. Beam, Chargé d'Affaires of the American Embassy:

The Government of the United States tenders its official condolences to the Government of the U.S.S.R. on the death of Generalissimo Joseph Stalin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union.

Council of Free Czechoslovakia Receives U.S. Messages of Hope

Following are the texts of messages sent by President Eisenhower and by Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Smith to the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. The messages were read on February 22 at New York on the occasion of the opening of a New York headquarters for the Council.

Message From President Eisenhower

For 5 years your country has been terrorized by alien misrule. Communist tyranny has sought to destroy the values of Christianity and Western civilization on which the national traditions of the people of Czechoslovakia are based. Equitable material rewards for their labor have been denied them and their standard of living has sharply declined as a result of Soviet plundering.

The United States has always stood and stands now for the freedom of nations from oppression. The American people have never been indifferent to suffering humanity anywhere. Your people, though now enslaved, may be assured that America remains true to its great traditions, and firm in its conviction that tyranny cannot long endure in a world where free men are strong, united, and resolute.

Joint Message From Secretary Dulles and Under Secretary Smith

You are meeting now to honor the democracy which was destroyed 5 years ago and to express again the world's condemnation of that act and the means by which it was brought about. The Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia and developments in your country since that time have laid bare again the true nature of Soviet imperialism. These events have made clear once

more than one country, however much the great majority may cherish the preservation of national independence, cannot in isolation retain freedom in the face of an aggressive and ruthless totalitarianism.

Today that totalitarianism is engaged in a hate and falsification campaign of vast proportions. In Czechoslovakia it seeks to extinguish the love of liberty among the Czechs and Slovaks, their friendship for the United States, and the common civilization which binds them to the West.

The regime devotes itself to poisoning the international atmosphere upon the requirement of its foreign masters. Internally the judicial murders, the concentration camps, the naked exploitation of workers and farmers, the oppression of religion, and the inflaming of group prejudices are manifestations of alien rule over Czechoslovakia today.

The present ordeal of the Czech people cannot be permanent. A regime so incompatible with the right of nations to be free contains elements of weakness which must eventually destroy it.

So long as the historic antipathy of your people to foreign domination continues and the national traditions are kept alive by those abroad and by the silent millions at home, there is sustaining hope that the Czechs and Slovaks will once again take their rightful place as a constructive force in the community of free peoples.

Of this we are confident as we move forward in the task of adding to the strength and solidarity of the free world.

Deadline For Filing Claims For German Public Service Pensions

Press release 120 dated March 3

The Department of State wishes to remind residents of the United States who were formerly in the German public service and who are eligible claimants under the "Law Concerning the Redress of National Socialist Wrongs to Former Employees of the Public Service Residing Abroad" that they must submit their applications for redress before March 31, 1953.

As stated in the Department's previous announcement on this subject,¹ this law gives legal recognition to claims for pension payments by former employees of the German public service now residing outside Germany and establishes the machinery under which such claims may be entered and satisfied. In brief, it provides that former employees of the German public service, with legal or permanent residence abroad predating May 23, 1949, may file their claims for pensions with representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany in the country of residence. In view of the imminent deadline, claimants are urged to file their claims without delay with the German

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 16, 1953, p. 262.

consulates general and German consulates at any of the following addresses:

German Consulate General, 745 Fifth Ave., New York 22, N.Y.

German Consulate General, 703 Market St., San Francisco 3, Calif.

German Consulate General, 8 South Michigan Ave., Chicago 3, Ill.

German Consulate, 1026 Hurt Bldg., Atlanta, Ga.

German Consulate, 2711 Book Bldg., Washington Blvd., Detroit 26, Mich.

German Consulate, Bryant Bldg., 1102 Grand Ave., Kansas City 6, Mo.

German Consulate, 3450 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles 5, Calif.

German Consulate, International Trade Mart, New Orleans 12, La.

German Consulate, 905 Securities Bldg., 3d and Stuart Sts., Seattle 1, Wash.

The "Law Concerning the Redress of National Socialist Wrongs to Former Employees Residing Abroad" makes provision for payment of benefits into blocked bank accounts in the Federal Republic of Germany. A recent administrative order issued by the Ministry of Economics of the Federal Republic of Germany, however, specifically provides for the transfer of pension payments to qualified claimants residing abroad. Pursuant to this order, it is no longer necessary in approved claims to make payments into blocked deutsche-mark accounts. Under the present order when the transfer has been approved, payments may be made to a German foreign trade bank or postal agency for direct remittance to the claimant residing abroad. Residents of the United States may wish to inquire of the German consulates and consulates general the procedure to be followed in effecting the transfer of their pension payments to this country.

International Bank To Send Study Mission to Germany

A mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will arrive in Bonn, Germany, on March 19, 1953, it was announced on March 5. The mission is visiting the Federal Republic of Germany, in response to an invitation from the Government, to study the general economic situation and Germany's investment plans.

S. R. Cope, Assistant Director of the Department of Operations for Europe, Africa, and Australasia, will head the group; the other members are Benjamin B. King and Badri Rao, of the same Department.

This is the Bank's first mission to Germany. The mission will start its discussions with Government officials in Bonn. At a later stage it will visit other important centers to obtain at first-hand an appreciation of the situation in the main sectors of the economy. The mission will be in Germany for about 5 weeks.

An Expression of Faith in the United Nations

Remarks by Secretary Dulles¹

Press release 116 dated March 2

Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be with you here tonight because I fully agree with what you have just said; namely, that any efforts which I may make in the field of international relations will be almost sure to fail unless I can have the support of those who are represented by the organizations here tonight.

Under our form of society foreign policy is not a matter just for diplomats, however astute they may be. Foreign policies to be successful must be understood and supported by the people. And I have stated that it will be my purpose, as far as it is possible, to see to it that our foreign policies are simple, so that they can be understood; that they are made public, so that people will have a chance to understand them; and they will, as far as possible, conform to the moral standards which I know are held by the great bulk of our people, so that they will, I hope, deserve their support.

I told your director some 3 months ago, I think, that if it were at all possible I would meet with you here tonight. I told him I could not come with any formally prepared address, but that I would hope by the very fact of my presence here with you to bear witness to the great faith which I have in the United Nations, and my hope that you will carry on your own efforts to support it and to bring about a better understanding of it by the American people. That is probably the most that I can do by being here tonight.

I do have a few thoughts which I would express inadequately and without the preparation which perhaps ought to attend any statements that are made by a Secretary of State. But I hope that my demonstrated faith and belief in the United Nations over the past 8 years, and the principle of the United Nations long before that, is such that any inaccuracies will be forgiven.

I suppose that the United Nations at the present time is going through its most difficult period.

¹Made before the opening plenary session of the American Association for the United Nations at Washington on Mar. 1. For text of an address made before the Association by James J. Wadsworth, U.S. representative to the General Assembly, see p. 417.

Words of Appreciation From the President

Following is the text of a telegram sent by President Eisenhower to Clark M. Eichelberger, executive director of the American Association for the United Nations, on the occasion of the Association's conference, which convened at Washington on March 1.

The conference of the American Association for the United Nations, which opens in Washington on March first, marks another year of remarkable service by your organization.

I know you are proud of this service. You have every reason to be.

As its name implies, the American Association of which you are executive director is for the United Nations. In scores of ways, you and your colleagues have furthered the cause of this great international organization. Your commission to study the organization of peace has contributed valuable ideas and suggestions to United Nations delegates. Your information program has not only informed American citizens of United Nations activities, but has created thousands of United Nations supporters—men and women eager to help make the U.N. an effective force for peace. The delegates from 110 national organizations which have accepted your invitation to this year's conference are living evidence of your success.

For your efforts you have, I know, the appreciation of delegates to the United Nations. I want you to know that you have mine, too. My warmest greetings to you and to the other members of the American Association for the United Nations.

Certainly, I hope it will not have a more difficult period. We had its launching at San Francisco nearly 8 years ago, in which I had the opportunity to share. At that time the United Nations embodied the hopes of many people throughout the world—hopes that were to a large degree exaggerated hopes. It is almost always the case, I suppose, when a new organization is launched that it carries more hope than it can, in fact, support. Certainly that was the case with the United Nations. Many people thought that the United Nations was automatically going to supply the answer to all the international problems of the world and that none of us would thereafter have

to carry any burden of our own. Well, of course, the United Nations isn't that kind of an organization. The United Nations is just a place where we all meet together and whatever is done has got to be done by us and the other nations who make up the membership of the United Nations.

A Place for Collective Work

There is no new force magically brought into existence. The United Nations is merely a place where we can collectively work together more effectively than if we each work separately.

Now the United Nations was launched at the time when we were well aware of the importance of working with others. The name "United Nations" was, of course, the name given originally to a military alliance. It was organized by the so-called United Nations Declaration which was signed on January 2, 1942. And we saw that through that alliance, through working together—there were then 45 nations working together—it was possible to achieve results which we could not have achieved if we had all worked separately. Out of that experience of working together to win a terrible and desperate war, we had a very clear, dramatic demonstration of the importance of unity. And so the thought was why not preserve that unity and carry it on, so that we should continue to get the benefits of working together? That was the simple thought, really, which underlay the organization at San Francisco 8 years ago of the United Nations.

Well, as I say, that organization at its inception carried many hopes, many exaggerated hopes, and since then there has been a period of very considerable disillusion. Today there are some people who believe that the United Nations does not really serve any useful purpose; that we had better wind it up. That, I think, represents only a small minority of the peoples of the world and the peoples of the United States. A great majority still believe that the United Nations is a worthwhile experiment, but their faith is not as hot and burning as it was 8 years ago.

It is necessary, I think, to bring people to a better understanding of what the United Nations really is; what it can do, so that people will not continue to be disappointed and disillusioned by expecting from the United Nations something that in the present state of the world it cannot do.

We had hoped that the United Nations would guarantee all of us security. Well, article 43 of the Charter was set up with a view to establishing under the Security Council military contingents from the various member states which would act at the direction of the Security Council to prevent any aggression. That article has never been operative because the veto power is applicable to it. The Soviet Union has never permitted the organization of those military contingents.

When the attack on Korea occurred, it was pos-

sible to function under the Security Council at first because the Security Council at the moment was being boycotted by Soviet Russia. It was possible, as a result of that accident—I guess it was an accident—to get through a resolution which enabled the members of the United Nations to act together and act promptly to repel that act of aggression. After that initial action by the Security Council, the work was carried on through the Assembly where there is no veto power. And at first, at that time, there was a great wave of belief that we had at last found the answer to international aggression.

But as that effort bogged down in a military way, and as it became impossible to recruit large forces from any country other than the United States, gradually disillusionment arose and the feeling grew that the United Nations would not, in fact, be able to provide security. And I recall that in 1950—I was then a delegate at the United Nations Assembly—we had the so-called Uniting for Peace Resolution and the Peace Observation Commission Resolution, which were designed to try to apply the lessons of the Korean War and to organize the Assembly, where there would be no veto power, so it could have contingents and have the machinery to detect aggression promptly. By the very fact that it could detect aggression promptly, and could act immediately to prevent aggression, it has proved, so far at least, very difficult to give any substance to those two major resolutions that were adopted in 1950—the Uniting for Peace Resolution and the Peace Observation Commission Resolution, although the Peace Observation Commission is doing some work today in the Balkan areas, particularly in Greece.

Security Through Regional Organizations

But by and large I think the feeling has grown that security may have to be achieved primarily through regional organizations which are authorized by the United Nations Charter, but which to some extent function outside of the scope of the United Nations' direct authority. Consequently we have had a series of regional organizations develop. There was the Rio Pact for the Americas and the North Atlantic Pact—the scope of which has been extended so that it now includes Greece and Turkey. Then we negotiated—I had some part in that—the Pacific Security Treaties involving Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. We had the signing yesterday of the pact between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, and there is thought of creating a Middle East Organization.

Well, in a sense you may say that involves a departure from the principles and the hopes that are embodied in the United Nations Charter. But I have a feeling that after you get all these regional organizations made—they are all of them interlocking—and you finally put them all to-

gether, you may end up with just about what is contemplated by the United Nations Charter.

We may be going about it through the back door, but as long as we come out at the right place that is the important thing. I do believe that there is increasing recognition today of the principle upon which the United Nations was founded; namely, that security is a matter of interdependence.

These regional associations are so interlocking and more and more covering different areas of the world, so that now you have—I don't know how many—I suppose about 40 of the nations of the world tied together really by a series of interlocking regional security arrangements. That is actually a demonstration of the basic principle of the United Nations, and a realization of that principle in the ways which perhaps are at the moment the most practical, having regard to the exercise of the veto power by the Soviet Union in the United Nations through the Security Council.

Now we also had hopes that the United Nations would quickly realize great results in the social field and in the field of human rights. Well, there, too, there have been gains, and there have been delays, if not disappointments.

The United Nations developed and adopted without dissent in Paris in 1948—very largely Mrs. Roosevelt contributed to that result; we were together at that time in Paris—the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a very splendid statement of the high ideals of the nations of the world with respect to human rights. That was a beacon which we set up in the hopes that all the nations of the world would be inspired by that to follow in the way that it pointed out. I believe that was a fine and worthy act on the part of the United Nations. Whether or not the time has yet come when that can be translated into treaties of international force is a more debatable question, and there may be delays and some disappointments in that respect.

Treaties are laws, and laws to be effective must represent the judgment of the community to which they apply. Laws which merely reflect the effort by one community to impose its views on another do not conform to our conception of law as stemming not from above but from the judgment of people, the mores of people, the feeling of the community as to what is the right thing to do. Laws which reflect an effort of some, and impose their will upon another, seldom operate unless by force or by war. And the primary need at the moment is to develop within the nations of the world the kind of sentiment so that, if and when there is a covenant on human rights and things of that sort, that treaty will be acceptable because it is what the people want to do.

I am not sure today that that is the state of the world; that there is a sufficient unity of judgment, of education, religion, so that we take a com-

mon view as to what are the rights of individuals. And perhaps the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not purport to be a legal instrument, but merely a statement of ideals. It may have to be supported in the first instance primarily by campaigns of education, publicity, increased knowledge, and an example of what goes on in other parts of the world so as to create a foundation for what may ultimately be a law that stems from the will of the community itself.

Great Changes May Come Slowly

Well, now, however these things may be, they do not prove that the United Nations does not have a great purpose, a great function in the world. What it proves is a thing which we really should know; namely, that great changes, great developments, usually come about slowly and not by a very sudden development. Sometimes they seem to come about by a sudden development, but only if a great deal of preparatory work has already been done so that the ground has been laid.

I believe that we are moving toward a world of greater security through collective effort. I believe we are moving toward a world where there will be a greater respect for human rights. But I think we must recognize that these things are not going to come about by a stroke of the pen, through some act which may be signed by the United Nations. There has to be preceding that a great deal of effort, education, and the United Nations is the way by which we can readily carry on, and more readily carry on, that campaign of national and international education so that we have a better understanding of what is in our common interests.

One of the weaknesses perhaps of the American people is that we want things to happen very quickly, and if they don't happen very quickly we become disappointed and turn away and try something else. This is a time to realize that the United Nations has goals which are very much worthwhile, but like most worthwhile goals they are not going to be achieved without effort miraculously overnight. There is a long hard road ahead. We must pursue that road with courage, determination, and with high hope. If we do, I am sure we shall reach the goals—perhaps not this year or next year—but maybe in 5 years, or maybe 10 years. The fact that it takes a long time to get to a goal, a vital goal, is no reason for not starting. It is all the more reason for starting quickly and pursuing it with resolution and determination.

I am sure that that is the conviction of you who are here today. I know that you have an opportunity to influence great masses of our fellow citizens, and I hope that you will persevere in the faith to which you are dedicated, and that you will spread that faith, because the United Nations does represent something which is sound, which is

bound in the long run to prevail. It represents an effort which men have had as their goal generation after generation. Sometime it will be reached. If there isn't the time to reach it, it will only be because great disaster intervenes, because of our lack of courage, lack of hope, lack of faith.

So you have a great responsibility. I can assure you that your Government under President

Eisenhower, as he said in his message to you here tonight, is dedicated so far as it is concerned to achieve that goal. But also I can say to you that we know that we cannot achieve that goal without the kind of help and support which only you can give us. So I come here merely to tell you of our faith, of our hope in the United Nations, and our faith and our hope that you will help us to achieve those goals.

Developing and Consolidating Western Europe's Defenses

by Lincoln Gordon

Chief of the MSA Mission to the U.K.¹

In presenting my credentials this afternoon, I want to talk about our common problem in the Atlantic community of taking effective action, in the face of unprecedented external dangers, to secure our freedom in what President Eisenhower termed last week this "century of continuing challenge." That problem focuses on the common defense and its economic foundations.

In recent months, and especially since the NATO Ministers' meeting at Paris in December,² the public prints have taken to viewing with alarm the position and prospects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We read that the effort is letting down, that the Allies are divided over objectives and strategy, that economic pressures have led country after country to cut its defense program, and the like. This is a faulty picture. I believe it arises from failure to understand properly both the actual status and the nature of NATO's current efforts in the development and consolidation of Western European defenses.

NATO represents an historic departure in several ways. The adoption of the treaty was the most striking formal symbol of the end of American isolationism, with the declaration that aggress-

sion anywhere in the treaty area will be regarded as an attack on all the members.

It is unique in another way as well. Starting simply as a traditional type of alliance, it has now been transformed into an operating coalition. It possesses military forces integrated under Supreme Allied Commands. It provides for systematic cooperation in the planning of national defense contributions to the common cause, in the development of airfields and other military construction, and to some extent in the planning of defense production and the formulation of broad political policies of common concern.

Three years ago, NATO policies were the responsibility of a series of intermittently meeting ministerial committees in the respective fields of foreign affairs, defense, and finance. The basic pattern was, to use an Americanism, buck passing; finance ministers waiting for defense ministers to state their needs and desires; defense ministers waiting for finance ministers to say what could be afforded; and foreign ministers waiting for both.

Today we see the civilian and military authorities looking simultaneously at military requirements and economic resources and working together on a full-time basis to push forward a realistic program for the buildup of forces, construction, and production. There is continuous review of where we actually stand, and continuous development of specific do-able measures for moving forward in creating real forces backed by adequate reserves.

This process of meshing military requirements and economic capabilities into a specific program

¹ Address made before the American Chamber of Commerce at London on Jan. 28 and released to the press by the North Atlantic Treaty Information Service. Mr. Gordon, who also serves as U.S. Minister for Economic Affairs in London, participated in the U.S.-U.K. economic discussions held at Washington Mar. 4-7; see p. 395.

² See BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1953, p. 3, for the text of a communique summarizing the results of the meeting.

of action was undertaken first at the end of 1951 by the Temporary Council Committee, in which I had the honor of assisting the chairman, Averell Harriman. The job was admittedly a crude one, but it dealt with the right questions, and the Lisbon agreements which flowed from it represented a major forward step in the realistic strengthening of Western defense.

Now in a more thorough-going manner, NATO is coming to grips with the hard day-to-day complexities of a modern defense buildup—something which is well understood by national authorities in the major nations but which has never before been put on an international basis in peacetime.

Discussions at Paris Meeting

In this field, the Paris meeting of ministers in December, which I attended also, was an interim session to review progress since Lisbon, and to fix certain guidelines for the further buildup whose definitive size and content will be determined this spring. As you know, we ended 1952 with results very close to those projected at Lisbon. It has been said in uninformed quarters that decisions were taken in the December meeting to call a halt to a further buildup. This is simply not true. The size of the force goals for this year and next was not even a subject of consideration. That matter will be determined at the spring meeting.

The December session did give new emphasis to quality, as compared with quantity of forces. Public attention has unfortunately been riveted on the single factor of numbers of ground divisions. Such numbers catch the public eye, and can be seriously misleading. Divisions can vary enormously in real fighting capacity, depending on their state of training and equipment, the speed with which reserves can be mobilized, the strength of supporting units, the volume of ammunition reserves, and other factors. I only wish there were some ready way of summarizing all these factors in a headline phrase, since they are the substance of effective, as against mere paper, ground forces. If there is such a phrase no one has been able to come up with it. In any case, Western defense does not depend only on armies; it is a balanced collectivity of ground, air, and naval strength.

The decisions on military construction, or "infrastructure," have also been misunderstood. Provision was made in December for the immediate financing of 80 million pounds' worth of most urgent requirements. This, although a good deal less than the total high priority needs put forward by the Supreme Commander, did not mean scraping of the remainder. It meant simply an immediate decision to finance promptly what must be covered to avoid loss of a construction season, the rest being dealt with as part of the total plans for further buildup being developed for the spring meeting.

I know of no responsible participant or observer

concerned with these matters who does not view a continuance of the defense buildup as a sheer necessity, in view of the existing and potential Soviet military threat. The problem is of course political, economic, and psychological, as well as military, but I stress the side of physical security as still the most urgent and critical before us.

There are, of course, differences of opinion as to the pace and extent of the further buildup which is desirable and possible. But there is no doubt whatever that a further buildup is proceeding and will continue. As was stated in the British White Paper reporting on the Paris meeting:

If the risk of a general war today appears to have receded, this is because the NATO countries are resolved to resist aggression by combining and developing their armed strength. Any slackening in this effort could only defeat their purpose; the process must go forward until our strength is in itself a solid deterrent to any temptation to attack us.

Regarding the defense program of the United Kingdom itself, the White Paper pointed out that

The recent modifications in our program reflect a change of emphasis in some fields, but in no sense a reduction in the present scale of our rearmament effort. Indeed, next year we intend to spend more on defense than this year. This is broadly true of the NATO effort as a whole.

NATO Planning on Flexible Basis

How long and how far this necessity will have to take us it is impossible to estimate. Having no aggressive intent ourselves, we cannot simply build to a fixed target by a fixed date. Security can only be relative in any case, and we are seeking security against a potential threat which is itself fluid in character and which must be met by at least equal resiliency and resourcefulness in defense. Hence the wisdom of NATO's decision to put its forward planning on a continuous and flexible basis, projecting each year revised plans for the coming 3 years.

Certainly there is no cause to fear that the situation calls for eternally growing defense burdens, compelling the free world to convert to a garrison state as the price of survival. After all, the ratio of free world to Soviet resources is 4 or 5 to 1. If this effort, which now absorbs 10 to 15 percent of our national output, seems burdensome to us, how must a parallel effort weigh upon them, despite all the machinery of slavery at their command?

Of course, a defense buildup of this kind is costly, not to say painful. This is especially the case for peoples of wholly peaceful intent, who desire only to beat their swords into ploughshares, and who hoped in 1945 that this consummation would become immediately possible.

Today we are in the process of making up for the grave disparity we unwisely permitted to develop when the free world demobilized so rapidly

after the war, so rapidly, at least in our case, that General Marshall described it as "disintegration, not demobilization." There is every reason to believe that the effort can be leveled off, and perhaps tapered down, when this disparity has been further reduced or eliminated. Then, as our total resources continue to increase, the burdens of defense should become proportionately lighter. But, frankly, I see no magic formula by which these burdens can be conjured away in the now foreseeable future.

Given the free world's vast superiority in resources, these burdens should certainly be economically tolerable. But they are not automatically so. They will be so only if we can create and maintain an expanding world economy and economic as well as political and military unity in the free world.

There is of course some conflict between these economic and security objectives. It would be far easier to recreate normal trade and exchange relations if the world were not divided by the cold war and if internal financial stability were not endangered by heavy expenditures on arms. Our task must nonetheless be to accomplish both, to maintain the common defense and to strengthen our economic foundations at one and the same time.

The European Dollar Problem

There are, fortunately, certain long-term economic developments which should ease this task. The European dollar problem, which is obviously of as great concern to you as businessmen as it is to governments on both sides of the Atlantic, has had its counterpart in the chronic international-payments surplus of the United States. The recent report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the very interesting final communique of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference³ alike stressed the need for constructive action on the part of both debtor and creditor countries if the imbalance in the free world's trade and payments is to be righted.

One major source of increase in the supply of dollars available to the rest of the world should result from the increasing need of the United States to import raw materials. The remarkably thorough report published last summer by the President's Materials Policy Commission (the Paley Report)⁴ showed that a decade ago we crossed the watershed from a materials surplus to a materials-deficit nation, and that over the next 25 years we might expect to increase our net imports of materials to over three times the present volume.

Some reviews of this report have expressed alarm at the prospect of the United States "gob-

bling up" an even larger share of the world's materials. Such critics are quite prepared for us to be damned for not making more dollars available abroad and also to be damned for making them available by buying more abroad. But we do not accept the implied premise—that supplies are so limited that what comes to us is necessarily unavailable to others. We would rather bring about the expansion of supplies, an expansion essential to a growing world economy, and in the interests alike of exporters and importers of materials. Such expansion will involve a much greater volume of dollar investment in underdeveloped areas.

Additional dollars from increased American purchases and investment abroad will, of course, not flow automatically to Britain or other nations of Western Europe. They must be earned, and they can be earned only if prices, delivery terms, and sales effort on manufactured goods will earn them. In this connection, frankly I was shocked and amazed at a comment in a responsible British journal to the effect that Europe could hope to earn few of the dollars resulting from greater American imports of materials. It argued that these additional imports would come in large measure from Canada and Latin America, and that propinquity and taste would lead these countries to buy more American manufactured goods rather than European. But these are markets in which there is no tariff preference for American manufactures; in one of them, indeed, there is Imperial preference. If in free and fair competition Britain and the Continent are unable to compete with American exporters, if Europe is unable either to convert Latin American tastes to European goods or to convert European goods to Latin American tastes, then the international economic outlook is indeed gloomy. I refuse to be so pessimistic.

As to the outlook for American trade policy itself, I am of course not in a position to speak for the new Administration or the new Congress. I should, however, like to call your attention to the careful factual review of recent experience with the American tariff contained in an article by my associate, Winthrop Brown, in your own publication, the *Anglo-American News* of last December. In my view, Mr. Brown has shown conclusively that the American tariff and the so-called "escape clause" in the reciprocal trade-agreements act are far more feared than they deserve, that these obstacles are indeed often more psychological than real. I do not suggest that the American market is easy to compete in; it takes ingenuity, resolution, and drive. But an increasing number of British and other European businessmen have pointed the way. Their successful efforts warrant much wider public knowledge and emulation.

Even the common defense effort itself, which on balance certainly makes our economic problems more rather than less difficult, is not wholly with-

³ For text of the communique, see p. 408.

⁴ For excerpts, see BULLETIN of July 14, 1952, p. 54.

out advantages in tempering the short-term dollar problem. It results in very considerable American military expenditures abroad, including our contributions to NATO construction. One new element of increasing importance, moreover, is the program of offshore procurement of material for NATO forces, which is being vigorously pursued at the present time. This program of offshore procurement accomplishes a 3-fold purpose. It provides arms and equipment for Western European defense; it helps build up Western European capacity for defense production; and it creates a dollar market of substantial magnitude.

Over 700 million dollars' worth of offshore procurement orders were placed in Britain and other NATO countries during the 12 months ending last June. You are, of course, all familiar with the recently placed contract in the United Kingdom for 90 million dollars to provide the fine British Centurion tank in substantial quantity for use by Dutch and Danish forces. During our fiscal year ending this coming June, the total volume of offshore procurement for the NATO countries is expected to be a thousand million dollars or more.

While offshore procurement cannot be regarded as a permanent arrangement any more than economic aid, it can be a most helpful element indeed in bridging the difficult transition from our present position to a more stable and normal international system of trade and payments.

The Outlook for the Future

Finally, I should like to comment on another often expressed fear—the fear not that defense burdens are too large, but that their reduction, especially in the United States, may set off a depression which will pull the economic rug out from under the free world. At the moment the American economy is operating at very high levels indeed, with virtually full employment, and yet no signs of excessive inflationary pressure. I have seen too many bad guesses to venture one of my own, but I can report with pleasure a consensus of private and official opinion that the signs all point to maintenance of a high and stable level of activity at least through this calendar year.

The fears mainly concern the longer run, when American defense expenditures are expected to decline. But again, past experience gives reassurance. Expenditures on our national-security programs as a whole are now running at a rate of about 52,000 million dollars per year. As forecast by the Truman administration, they would reach a peak in 1954 of 55 to 60,000 million dollars, and then fall gradually to a plateau of 40 to 45,000 million dollars per year. This would involve a drop between peak and plateau of 10 to 20,000 million dollars per year, or 3 to 6 percent of our gross national product. By contrast, from the wartime peak of 1944 to the year 1946, the equiva-

lent drop in present-day prices was from 142 to 25,000 million dollars per year, or over 40 percent of the then gross national product. That drop, although almost 10-fold of the reduction anticipated over the next few years, was absorbed with remarkably little disturbance.

While the situations are by no means entirely parallel, since there was then a tremendous backlog of civilian needs to be filled, it seems reasonable to expect that this much more moderate prospective decline in defense expenditures, assuming that it takes place, can be smoothly absorbed. Certainly the opportunities for expanded consumption and civilian investment markets, both in the United States and abroad, make such a smooth readjustment possible.

I would conclude, then, that the tasks facing the free world, while difficult and challenging, are not unmanageable given the will to do them, the understanding by both governments and peoples of what must be done, and above all, the resolution to maintain mutual cooperation as the basis of our policies. In this cooperation, Anglo-American unity has a special place, since history and geography have placed on our shoulders the foremost responsibility for leadership in this effort. I feel confident that under President Eisenhower's guidance the United States will continue to play its proper part.

EDC Foreign Ministers Meet at Rome

Following is the text of a communique issued at Rome on February 25 at the conclusion of a meeting of the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg:

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of the European Community met on February 24 and 25 at Rome under the presidency of M. Van Zeeland, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The six ministers first discussed the problem of economic integration within the framework of the European community on the basis of proposals presented by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Beyen.

These proposals are based upon the principle of the collective responsibility of the community in creating progressively a tariff union as one of the essential elements of a common market. In the spirit of the Luxembourg resolution the six ministers reaffirmed that the progress of the community of the six countries is tied to the establishment of common bases of economic development and to a fusion of the essential interests of the member states.

The six ministers unanimously recognized that vast economic integration and notably the creation of a single market would contribute to the

reinforcement of the economy of the community and to the betterment of the standard of living of their populations and that this would constitute an essential element of the countries desiring to create among themselves a European Political Community.

This market should be created progressively taking into account the need to avoid disequilibrium or serious difficulties in economic and social fields. To this end safeguarding clauses as well as compensation measures could be provided.

The ministers decided to undertake without delay with the assistance of experts the study of measures for the application of the above-mentioned principles.

The ministers then examined the state of progress of ratification of the Ebc Treaty and unanimously declared themselves convinced that in order to afford concrete proof of their determination to realize the European idea and to take into account the dangers which weigh incessantly upon

free Europe it is necessary to achieve the creation of the European army without delay.

The ministers noted that the treaty instituting the Ebc has been placed before the parliaments of all member countries and affirmed that their respective governments intended to support the project before their parliaments emphasizing its extreme urgency.

The ministers noted the discussions which have recently taken place in the permanent interim committee, within the framework of the mandate conferred upon it at the time of the signature of the treaty relating to certain proposals put forth by the French Government. The ministers charged the interim committee to continue its work, taking into account the responsibilities that certain of the parties assume overseas, and to reach conclusions relative to the interpretative texts of the treaty as quickly as possible without hindering the procedures under way in the different parliaments.

U. S. Again Attempts To Enlighten Czechoslovakia on Provisions of the Mutual Security Act

The American Embassy at Prague on March 4 transmitted a note to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in reply to a Czechoslovak note of January 30, 1953, making various false charges about activities of the U.S. Government under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act.

Following is the text of the U.S. note together with the Czechoslovak note of January 30:

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 4

Press release 123 dated March 4

The American Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note of January 30, 1953 concerning various false charges about activities of the United States Government under the Mutual Security Act.

The United States Government has examined the contents of this note and finds that the Czechoslovak Government has added nothing new, except certain propaganda elaborations, to the same familiar allegations as to aggressive policy and interference in Czechoslovakia's domestic affairs which the United States rejected in its note of November 18, 1952¹ and which it categorically rejects again. It will be recalled that similar charges against the Mutual Security Act by the

Soviet Union were rejected overwhelmingly by the General Assembly of the United Nations in January, 1952.²

The United States has seriously endeavored to explain the purpose of the MSA to assist, in accordance with principles of the United Nations Charter, the organization of collective defense and the preservation of international peace. The United States has also clearly shown in its note of November 18 that the United States has not carried on aggressive activity under Section 101 (a) of the MSA but has operated instead a broadly constructive and purely humanitarian program for reception, care and resettlement of refugees from Communist oppression. This program is an expression of a fundamental part of the American character to extend sympathy and asylum to political refugees who seek freedom abroad which they cannot obtain at home.

Unalterably wedded to its own distorted conception of the outer world, the Czechoslovak Government chooses to see only subversion in humanitarian assistance to the victims of oppression and only aggression in the efforts of the free world at collective defense. If in spite of the factual account of the MSA and activities under it which has been given in previous United States notes,

² For text of a statement made on these Soviet charges by Mike J. Mansfield, U.S. delegate to the General Assembly, see *ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1952, p. 128.

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 1, 1952, p. 850.

this Communist delusion remains, the United States must leave to world opinion where credence is to be placed.

The United States is confident that the note of the Czechoslovak Government will be recognized for what it is as part of a frenzied campaign throughout the areas sealed off from freedom to maintain a tyrannical rule by means of savage police controls, trumped up show "trials", vicious propaganda attacks and other measures to impose absolute conformity of behavior and opinion. The Czechoslovak Government apparently considers anyone who does not willingly accept such conformity as an "American agent" and one who seeks escape from it by a "Freedom Train", a "Freedom Duck" or by any one of the many other vehicles which human ingenuity has utilized for reaching freedom as either an agent or a victim of kidnapping. In accord with its traditions the American nation feels profound sympathy for any people who, deprived of its freedom, remains devoted to its lost liberties.

The purpose of the Czechoslovak Government's note is revealed in the numerous propaganda clichés contained in the text, the falsity and calumny of which are transparent to all. The question arises how seriously the recipient, other Governments or even the people in Czechoslovakia can take a diplomatic note which attempts to establish a connection between Hitler's policies and those of the United States, or which charges that efforts of the United States to help European countries achieve economic stability and security against aggression bring only economic chaos and American occupation. The United States is content to leave the answers to such questions and the proper judgment of such accusations to other nations.

The United States Government itself condemns this attempt of the Czechoslovak Government to discredit the MSA and the worthy purposes it serves. The United States also regards as totally unwarranted and unacceptable the Czechoslovak Government's act of arrogation in interpreting, to suit its wishes, the nature of Section 101 (a) of that Act and the activities carried on under it. Convinced that the entirely humanitarian program maintained under this authorization for the relief of the victims of Communist oppression will be recognized by world opinion as the very antithesis of the pursuit of aggressive purposes, the United States is determined to continue this vitally needed assistance to refugees from the countries behind the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe.

TEXT OF CZECH NOTE OF JANUARY 30

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the U.S. of America and with reference to the Embassy's note Nr. 166 of November 18, 1952, has the honour to advise the following:

In its earlier notes addressed to the Embassy of the U.S. of America in Prague, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs quoted a number of irrefutable facts, proving interference into Czechoslovakia's domestic affairs by the Government of the U.S. From the instances listed in these notes it is evident that the American authorities, and in particular the American espionage agencies, are carrying out their hostile activity in the first place by sending out their paid agents, spies, diversionists and murderers to Czechoslovak territory, that these so-called "selected persons" are financed and equipped in accordance with the provisions of the U.S. Mutual Security Act, by means allocated under this act, and finally that the subversive activities of these criminals are carried out under instructions by these same authorities.

The Government of the U.S. chose to make an evasive reply to the sharp protest addressed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Embassy of the U.S. on October 13, 1952³ in connection with certain particularly outrageous crimes of American terrorist agents. This is easily understood. The American weapons and the documents found in the possession of the American agents who murdered two members of the local national committee in Revnicov, district Nova Straseci, American grenades and noiseless pistols specifically designed for purposes of assassination—the usual equipment of diversionist agents sent to Czechoslovak territory by the American espionage service—and in particular the number of American agents rounded up by the Czechoslovak security organs constitutes such documentary proof that it is impossible for the Government of the U.S. to escape responsibility for flagrant violations of the most elementary principles of international law, regulating the peaceful co-existence of nations.

In its note the Government of the U.S. has passed over in silence a series of very concrete charges made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and did not take position with respect to them, nor did it condemn the crimes committed by American agents or deny the evidence as to the direct connection between these agents and the U.S. occupation authorities and espionage organs in Western Germany and Austria. Instead, the Government of the U.S. attempted to substitute slander and insult for its lack of arguments and to disguise the true nature of its aggressive policy by general declarations as to its peaceful intentions.

In its note the Government of the U.S. claims that the so-called Mutual Security Act "is designed to strengthen the defense of the free world, to support the freedom of Europe through assistance to the defense of the NATO countries . . .".

This simulated concern for the freedom of Europe is but one of the forms of American interference into the domestic affairs of the nations of Europe and a pretext for America's policy of war preparations which instead of freedom and security, only brings American occupation, the loss of national sovereignty and economic chaos to the countries of Western Europe. The spontaneous and determined resistance of the peoples of Western Europe as well as in other parts of the world against this policy of the U.S. Government is proof of the ever growing awareness among the peoples of the entire world of the aggressive aims of the policy.

Under the so-called general agreement with Western Germany and the treaty of the so-called European Defense Community of May 1952, which the Government of the U.S. forced upon the countries of Western Europe, the German Fascist army is to be revived under the leadership of former Hitlerite generals and is to be integrated into the North Atlantic Pact system as an assault force against the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other peace-loving countries of Peoples Democracy and at the same time as a gendarme against the peoples of Western Europe, whose resistance to the American policy of war and to American occupation the Government of the U.S. intends to break with the assistance of those proven oppressors of the

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 851.

freedom of the peoples of Europe—the German militarists and revanchists. There is need for more eloquent proof as to the aggressive nature of the Atlantic Pact, of the so-called Mutual Security Act and of the entire policy of the U.S., aimed at the unleashing of a new world war.

The Government of the U.S. attempts to justify its aggressive policy by references to the alleged threat from “the aggressive tendencies of international Communism.”

The people of Czechoslovakia, taking a lesson from the experiences of Munich and the second world war, in the same way as the peace-loving people all over the world, have no doubts as to the true objectives of this pretext, designed to justify the aggressive policy of the U.S. Government.

This slander, taken over from the arsenal of Hitlerite propaganda, is a proof of a closer political relationship. It is a well known fact that under the slogan of “saving Europe from Communism” Hitler unleashed a world war, enslaved the peoples of Europe and caused mankind untold sufferings. The results of Hitler's policy, masking its criminal designs behind anti-Communist slanders, are equally well known. The North Atlantic war alliance, as is apparent even from the Embassy's note, is but continuation of the Hitlerite anti-Comintern pacts. Today the serious danger to world peace, the freedom and independence of nations stems from American imperialism, preparing a new world war.

The Embassy attempts to designate the act, which allocates the sum of a \$100 million to finance hostile activities directed against Czechoslovakia and other countries as a “humanitarian program” and as a measure of a purely charitable character. This allegation is fully disproved by the text and wording of the act itself. In its earlier notes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also referred to the debate of this act and in particular of the Kersten amendment. The members of the U.S. Congress and in the first place, Mr. Kersten, author of the amendment, declared quite openly that the act was intended to finance aggressive activities, the incitation to organized terror and the setting up of military units for aggression against a number of states, among which Czechoslovakia was explicitly mentioned.

The true fact of this American “humanitarian program,” however, is best demonstrated by the American agents themselves—the murderers of peace-loving Czechoslovak citizens in Babice, in Revnicov and elsewhere. Their crimes are an inseparable component of the total balance of the Mutual Security Act. The Government of the U.S. of America denies responsibility for these crimes of American agents only in diplomatic notes, while in its official propaganda it openly proclaims that it is striving for a change of government in the Peoples Democracies and for the breaking of their alliance with the Soviet Union. Foremost representatives of the U.S. have declared quite unambiguously that they are striving for a change of regime in the Peoples Democracies.

One of the aspects of American policy is the organizing and utilization of Zionist and Titoist-Trotzkyite espionage centers and conspiracies.

The recent trial of the group of conspirators led by Rudolf Slansky has clearly demonstrated that also in Czechoslovakia such a plot against the people and the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic had been planned by American agents.

In the course of the trial it was proved beyond any doubt that the espionage, sabotage and subversive activities of this group had been prepared over a long period of time, that since the time of World War II already its principal members had been agents of the American intelligence service and of other espionage organizations, cooperating with it and that American intelligence agencies had served themselves of the espionage organization of the Tito clique and of the espionage activity of Zionist organizations as a means for directing their agency in Czechoslovakia.

The trial further demonstrated that in their anti-

Czechoslovak activities the American intelligence organs enlisted the services of war criminals and agents of the Gestapo, who had caused the death of many of the heroes of the Czechoslovak peoples' struggle for freedom.

The relations between the American intelligence service and this group of conspirators are eloquently illustrated by the fact that, at a time, when Slansky, the head of the conspiracy, was about to be unmasked, the American intelligence service through its agent Kauders attempted to save him and organize his escape abroad. In this attempt, once again, the American broadcasting station bearing the name “Free Europe” was used. This is but one more confirmation of the fact that the broadcasting stations in the American zone of occupation in Germany are in the service of the hostile espionage and subversive activities of the American intelligence service—for which purpose they were quite openly set up by the American authorities. Thanks to the vigilance of the Czech security organs and of the entire Czech people however, this treacherous conspiracy, too, was frustrated and crushed.

The significance of the defeat which the American war program has suffered through the crushing of the American agency in Czechoslovakia is illustrated by the circumstance that the President of the U.S. of America considered it necessary to state his position re the trial with the espionage center in Czechoslovakia in an insulting and slanderous message addressed to the so-called Jewish Labour Committee.

The vigilance of the Czech people, which the U.S. Government in its note terms as “congenital suspicion of the Communists,” and of which it complains quite understandably, is a serious obstacle in the way of the activities of American agents. It is, nevertheless, surprising that the U.S. Government's note speaks of “suspicion” at a time when this same government by its boundless panicked suspicion is arousing the indignation of world public opinion and the protests of its own allies.

In its note the Government of the U.S.—quite inappropriately—went so far as to criticize the domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia. The enthusiastic endeavor of the Czech people in the construction of its country, the constant and progressive increase of its economic, social and cultural level convincingly disprove these slanders.

In its note the Embassy alleges that a “hate campaign” against the U.S. is being conducted in Czechoslovakia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs absolutely rejects this allegation and refers to the consistent endeavor of the Czech Government for a lasting peace and friendship among nations. It is of course only natural that the hostile acts of the American authorities, the sending out of terrorist groups, spies and murderers, the hostile statements of American Government officials, as well as the direct plots of the U.S. Government against the peaceful construction and sovereignty of the Czech Republic arouse the deep scorn and contempt of the Czech people towards those who attempt to disrupt its work and are the enemies of its independence.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers absurd and unfounded the Embassy's allegations that the Ministry's protests against the hostile activities of the American authorities contribute to intensify international tensions. Not the Czech Government's justified protests calling for a discontinuation of the hostile activities of the American authorities, but these very activities and the U.S. policies of cold war, of aggression and intervention, are the source of international tensions and the cause of justified indignation on the part of the Czech people.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the name of the Czech Government therefore categorically rejects the note of the Embassy of the U.S. and once again resolutely protests against the aggressive provisions of the so-called Mutual Security Act and against the hostile activities of the American authorities against the Czech Republic.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the U.S. of America the assurance of its consideration.

The Question of War or Peace in Korea

by Gen. Omar N. Bradley

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

The most difficult subject which was suggested by your members [for discussion at the meeting] is the question: *War or Peace?* It is the top issue of the day—not only an issue here in the forum, but in every free nation in the world. The greatest and the most humble men and women in the world have devoted weeks, months, and years to the study of this question. Unfortunately no one has yet found a positive solution.

The ultimate decision of whether it will be total war or total peace seems to rest with a small group of men in the Kremlin over whom we have little control. On the other hand, I earnestly believe that the actions we Americans take will have considerable influence over these men. From a strictly military viewpoint, we already influence these realists by our possession of the atomic bomb and the ability to deliver it. In that way—through armed strength—if by no other means, I am sure that we can influence *their* final answer to this question which concerns the whole world: Will it be total war, or will it be total peace?

I take no pleasure in the discussion of this subject, in spite of its importance. I know something of war—its terror, its courage, and its unlimited cost. I would prefer to speak about the absence of war, the duties of citizens, the privileges and rights of free men, and the greatness of America. These are more constructive ideas.

But I would not evade this issue. If it can be solved by thought and discussion, I will gladly contribute what I can. At best, I can only present the situation as I see it from a military point of view. Today, in our discussion, I am not proposing a solution to this difficult question. I believe there is a solution; I believe that the world will

some day find an answer; I know that our President is dedicated to finding a solution to this problem if it can be found.

The question of war or peace would certainly appear to be academic when we face the fact that Americans, South Koreans, and units of 14 other nations are fighting—and have been fighting for over 2 years—on the peninsula of Korea. Frenchmen are fighting alongside the Vietnam forces—and have been for over 7 years—in Indochina. The British have been opposing Communist aggression in Malaya for an interminable time.

In spite of these conflicts, however, today's question of war or peace deserves our careful attention when we realize that a third world war would be far more terrible than the present combined crises in Korea, Indochina, Malaya, and the other trouble spots around the globe.

Since I am not a philosopher, I have neither the qualification nor the inclination to treat the matter of war academically. As a soldier, and one who has visited our battlefronts in Korea recently, I know that *the war in Korea* is far from being an academic subject. No matter how we limit its geographical boundaries, or curtail its casualties—for the man in the frontline, the airman who dog-fights a MIG-15, or the navy man who bombards the shoreline—it is as real and as dangerous as any total war could be. His only comfort lies in the fact that so far his people at home have not borne the brunt of the attack. I also know from talking to these men that it is of considerable comfort to them that the war in Korea has not spread into a total war with its atomic overtones.

But the fighting men in the Far East, as well as the people at home, are tormented by the worry and sacrifice which this war against Communist aggression in Korea continues to demand. Although the peoples of the free world realize that Korea must be viewed in its proper perspective—

¹ Address made before the Palm Beach Round Table at Palm Beach, Fla., on Mar. 2.

that Korea is just one small part of the greater Communist aggression and imperialism toward free men—we derive little comfort from viewing our present struggle in Korea as a small part of a regional or global situation. To me, as to many other Americans and South Koreans and Frenchmen and Canadians and Britishers and Turks and other allies, Korea is a war which is costing us large sums of money and much of our resources. Americans are losing their lives over there, and even though the casualties are low in comparison to a greater world war, we can take no comfort from that fact. We entered this war to stop aggression and we want a decision for peace.

War by Satellite

Personally, I feel that the war-by-satellite technique which communism has adopted is the most irritating, frustrating method they could choose. It causes the free nations of the world to expend lives and resources without getting to the real cause of trouble or the fundamental source of Communist power. At the same time, I know that we will not provoke a third world war even to reach these troublemakers. I am equally sure that we will not default our freedom to the Communists by appeasement. We must resolutely take issue with Communist aggression wherever it forces its way.

Peace and good will are hard to come by. There is no magic carpet on which men can ride into a warless world. If we are to reach an accord between nations, we shall do so by climbing painfully up a ladder toward the resolution of difficulties that bar peace in this world.

We shall always be tragically in need of ideals in attaining a peaceful world, but those ideals are at the top of the ladder; they do not make up the rungs. Our progress up the ladder toward that goal must be steadfast; the rungs of the ladder consist of difficult situations which we must meet and resolve in favor of freedom.

Korea is one of these difficult situations.

There was no other choice for us in June 1950. We had to draw the line against Communist aggression; the decision was hailed throughout the free world as a most courageous one, and one that was properly timed.

I believe that that decision—as much as it has cost us—saved Southeast Asia from being overrun in 1950 and 1951. I also believe that our brave and courageous resistance gave a new breath of life and a new meaning to the authority of the United Nations.

And further, I believe that our action in Korea may have prevented—or at least forestalled for some time—the Soviet Union's step-by-step aggression leading to world war III.

But that decision—as right as it was—has not made our problem easier. The question of war or peace—if we mean total war or total peace—is

still before us, and the future courses of action we choose—in Korea and elsewhere—can only be milestones on the road to that ultimate decision.

Four Courses of Military Action

What I have to say now about Korea is only my personal opinion, and from a strictly military viewpoint. In broad perspective, I believe that the United Nations have four courses of military action open to us in Korea:

One course of action—but one which I believe the American people and their allies would not condone—would be to withdraw our forces and get out of Korea. This would greatly jeopardize the authority of the United Nations. And all of our allies would begin to lose confidence. Furthermore, our great efforts and sacrifice would appear to have been in vain. Finally, communism in Asia would have a free rein and the tyranny which accompanies communism—already so vividly painted in blood in China—would spread like a plague across all of Asia to include our friends in Southeast Asia and India and Pakistan.

Second, we could continue the present pressure in Korea, keeping our casualties to a minimum, and causing the greatest casualties to the enemy that we could inflict.

The third course of military action open to the United Nations is of greater scope than the second: We could continue the present pressure in Korea, causing the greatest casualties possible to the enemy; and we could take the additional military steps, from time to time, where a military advantage might accrue. We would hope that the Communist Chinese, because of increasing pressure, would get tired and eventually quit. But even some of these additional measures in Korea might require high-level international decisions, for all of them are not entirely within the present scope of military authority.

The fourth course of action is a big step beyond the third: It involves taking any one, or any combination, of military steps open to us *in order to get a decision in Korea* even while we realize that it might eventually involve us in an all-out war with Communist China. We must realize that broadening the war in this way might pin down the bulk of our military power on the continent of Asia, and could eventually develop into world war III.

We would have to assess the risk with each step taken. We would have to be prepared for the countermeasures the Communists could take and the countermeasures that eventually the Soviet Union might take because of the Sino-Russian treaty.

Preliminary to this course of action, it would seem to me that the United Nations, and especially the United States, would have to make long-term foreign-policy decisions on future relations in the Far East.

Other Possible Steps

The additional military steps referred to in the many discussions of these third and fourth courses of action are divided into many possibilities. Some could be taken alone, or several could be taken in combination. You have undoubtedly read about some of them in your newspapers and have heard many of them discussed in public:

1. By adding to our forces in Korea—which would call for a much greater mobilization of men and industry—and taking the necessary casualties, U.N. Forces could drive to the Yalu River and free Korea of the Communist Chinese.

2. We could extend the air war into Manchuria. This would require bombardment of the Communist airbases across the Yalu and would have to include the devastation of the communications centers and military targets in the manufacturing centers of Manchuria, if it were to be effective.

3. The United Nations could intensify the economic sanctions. Everyone realizes that some strategic materials are still being delivered to the enemy.

4. To augment this the United Nations could declare a naval blockade. This course of action is complicated by the status of the British colony Hong Kong. Naval experts tell us that to be most effective this action would have to include the blockade of two Chinese ports now under control of the Soviet Union: Dairen and Port Arthur, and the blockade of coastal shipping.

5. Another course of action—which could advance our line to the narrow waist of Korea—would be a combined ground, air, and navy offensive.

6. We could also continue the improvement and enlargement of the Republic of Korea forces so that fewer American divisions are in the line. We have already started on this, and only the economic and manpower limitations involved set a practical limit on this course of action.

7. Another factor which could be added to the war if a practical opportunity should present itself is the use of atomic weapons.

All of these possibilities—and many others—have been studied and considered in the past and are constantly being considered as ways and means of reaching a decision for the United Nations in Korea. Many of them have not been taken in the past because we didn't have the power to do them effectively; many of them were not taken—and are not taken now—because a military advantage does not accrue. Many of these actions could only be taken if the larger, high-level policy decisions were made.

I must make it clear at this point—and I hope that every newspaper and radio that reports this discussion will emphasize this for me—that I, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, am recommending neither for nor against any of these ac-

tions. It is not within my authority to decide such issues. My purpose is to discuss the situation rather than to urge a particular solution. I feel that we can arrive at a better solution if the public has as many of the facts as military security permits.

In this situation, and in the area of the larger decisions which future action might require, I would urge you to exercise all of your patience. I believe that we should give our new Administration—these newly elected and appointed leaders who are charting the international strategy that this Nation will follow—that we should give them time to reveal our policy in well-coordinated action. These men deserve our greatest support and patient understanding.

Role of Joint Chiefs of Staff

It is easy for the armchair strategist to choose a resolute and bold course of action for his country. I know that I have many acquaintances who urge upon me one or several of these military actions which I have discussed. I know that many people would like to ask at this point: What do the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that we do? What should be our national strategy and national policy in this perplexing situation?

I believe it is important for all of us to understand the role that the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in our national policy making, because many people believe that during times of stress like these “the military,” as we are loosely labeled, have dangerous and undue powers in the influencing of our national policy. Actually, the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by law and by practice, is a subordinate role, and one which we zealously observe.

I would like to state my own personal views on what recommendations are actually in order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have outlined these views to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and to congressional committees, and in all quarters they have seemed to meet with general civilian approval.

It is important to remember—and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff we are constantly reminding ourselves—that military policy, and its included strategic planning, is *not* separate and distinct from our foreign policy. The two of them are part and parcel of our over-all policy for the safety and security of our Nation.

Under the National Security Act, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are charged with several specific duties. Among these is listed “the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.” We are charged with making strategic plans, and providing for the strategic direction of the military forces of the Nation in peace and war.

When the Government is considering the establishment of policy, the President receives recommendations from the Department of State from

a foreign policy view. He considers domestic political advice, including guidance from the Congress and existing laws. He studies the economic implications of the specific problem, considers the psychological aspects of the policy, and from the Department of Defense he gets military advice in connection with the proposed policy. The agency with which he discusses all the factors and which assists him in arriving at a decision is the National Security Council.

As the military advisers of the Government, we feel that our job is to take the various courses of action that are suggested in the problem and analyze them from the military viewpoint, telling the President, through the Secretary of Defense, what our *capabilities* are and as far as we know, what risks are being taken when we pursue either this course or that course.

Generally, however, I do *not* feel that it is Joint Chiefs of Staff responsibility to *recommend specifically* which course of action the Government should take. We should confine our part to pointing out the military implications and military capabilities. Then, of course, after a decision is reached, we make recommendations on the military action required to carry out such decisions. No matter what the decision becomes, once it is made we do our utmost to carry out the military responsibilities which it involves.

Perhaps some people might feel that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should stand up and resolutely and strongly recommend a national policy which *we* would prefer, but to date I have not been convinced that this is the proper role of a military leader. I do not believe that military strategists should choose the course of government action, and I do not believe that we should publicly, or before congressional committees, fail to support the decisions made by our civilian superiors.

In congressional hearings we feel free to give our personal opinions and to point out the same capabilities and risks that we had pointed out before any decisions were made—so that the legislators will have as full and complete information as the Secretary of Defense, and the Commander in Chief, and the Secretary of State—but I do not believe that we should go beyond this.

U.S. Responsibility for World Leadership

The responsibility of our President and his National Security Council for war or peace cannot be minimized. Our friends as well as our enemies recognize the responsibility for leadership in world affairs that has been thrust upon us.

When we consider the responsibility that befalls the American people, we must remember that America's strategic position in the world today is the outgrowth of the strength we demonstrated in World War II. In both Europe and Asia political boundaries have been largely drawn on the lines where armies met and defeated the Axis.

If we are to keep our position, we must maintain our strength.

The United States is respected in the world today, not because she is rich but because she is strong. During the incubator period of World War II, our wealth was ridiculed as a sign of decadence. It was not until our people put that wealth to work in the manufacture of arms, the construction of ships, and the production of food that the vigor and strength of America became apparent throughout the world.

As long as nations know that our strength persists, as long as they are assured of our determination to use it against aggression, which in the end would menace us, the stronger our hand shall be in writing the terms for future living. For unless we show the capacity and willingness to sustain our commitments with adequate armed strength, we shall be forced to give up those commitments in the face of opposing power.

Even though we disapprove of the use of force in the settlement of international disputes, we cannot renounce that force while other nations cling to theirs. Our pleas for peace are measured not by the sincerity with which they are spoken but by the strength we can array to enforce them.

The greatest danger to our future would be the failure of our American people to understand precisely what strength means. More than ships, planes, and guns, we need an intelligent and well-informed public opinion—based on facts, not emotions; on realities, not dreams.

We dare not forget that there is nothing man can invent with his science, nothing man can devise from his knowledge, nothing man can create by his genius that war, if it comes, cannot destroy.

But I believe there is no such thing as an inevitable war. If wars can be provoked, they can also be averted. But they can be averted only if the peace-loving peoples of this world love peace enough to oppose aggression in whatever form it may recur. We cannot ignore the kindling sparks if we hope to avoid a conflagration. We cannot halt imperialism with moral indignation. If the United States is to exercise its conscience in world affairs, it must be prepared to back its moral indignation with realism, resources, and credits.

We must recognize that it is even more difficult to avert wars than to win them. The achievement of peace in this shattered world is a task requiring greater intellect, more daring, and perhaps even sterner sacrifice than we showed in helping to win World War II.

Armed Strength Essential for World Security

To meet this challenge, the American people must be prepared to sustain a bold foreign policy equal to our responsibilities in a world from which we cannot retreat. And we must contribute willingly to the maintenance of armed strength essential to the security and stability of this world in which we live.

I believe that there is an immediate need for support of the concept that combines military power and peaceful intention without unnecessary recourse to war. If we have the military power which will bring respect for our ideas, and our voices at the Council table, there is hope that we will never have to exercise that military power in all-out war. It is a mistake to assume that national military power is important only in case of coercion. The nation with strength is the nation with the power of persuasion, the power of purchase, and the power to bargain.

A military man especially dislikes prediction. However, since we are discussing the alternative of war or peace, I will venture that if we ever provide ourselves with the military power appropriate to our responsibilities, and then maintain it, we will achieve some of the peace of mind with less fear of war—and perhaps the actual peace in the world—that we all hope for and seek.

If we don't face this issue properly, we will be forced to deal inadequately from crisis to crisis with each problem that arises. And when a nation is relatively weak, even the smallest problem—which we would ordinarily take in stride—becomes a major difficulty.

A case in point today is Korea. It is my personal belief—and I have stated it many times before—that if we had not so completely demobilized our military power between 1945 and 1950, Korea might never have occurred.

I hope that all Americans have learned this lasting lesson: weakness invites attack. The Soviet Union, master mind of the Communist aggressions all over the world, watched the departure of our forces from South Korea and took this as a sign that the United Nations were not interested in protecting the South Koreans and were willing to let the Communists go ahead in Asia. The military realists in the Kremlin also must have smiled grimly as they watched the further demobilization of our American armed strength in 1949 and 1950.

I stated earlier that I believed the U.N. action in Korea had saved Southeast Asia, preserved the United Nations, and had perhaps prevented a world war III. As I conclude this discussion, I must say honestly to the American people—as unwelcome as it may be—that one of the greatest contributions which the Korean war has made to the world is the compulsory remobilization of some of our armed might. Even after World War II we had not learned that a nation as great as ours cannot be weak. We still had some idea that the United States had been given a special privilege among nations: that we could travel the sealanes of the world, travel the airways of the world, influence the actions of all of the free nations of the world and aid them to resist communism, without establishing and maintaining the military strength to back up the world leadership which had become our role.

I am still not sure that we have learned the lesson completely, and sometimes I wonder if the American people sufficiently recognize the continuing need for adequate military power, and would maintain their military strength even if the war in Korea were concluded.

I have every confidence that if we have learned our lesson from Korea and from our past experiences, the ultimate decision on this mighty question will be in favor of freedom over tyranny, democracy over dictatorship, and will finally bring us *lasting peace* instead of *total war*.

Netherlands Expresses Gratitude To U. S. Military Forces

Press release 12S dated March 5

On March 5 Dr. J. H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands, called on Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith and presented him with an aide mémoire expressing the gratitude of the Netherlands Government for the assistance rendered during the floods by American military forces. In acknowledging the expression of gratitude, the Under Secretary said the U.S. Government was glad to have been of assistance and hoped conditions were improving. The text of the Ambassador's aide mémoire follows:

As the Secretary of State is aware, the Queen of the Netherlands, on February 18, 1953, issued an Order of the Day to the Netherlands Armed Forces in which Her Majesty mentioned the excellent help received from Army, Navy, and Air Force units of various foreign powers by the Netherlands military forces in carrying out their duty in connection with the recent floods; a message to the same effect was communicated by the Netherlands Minister of War and Navy to his American, British and French colleagues.

The Netherlands Ambassador has now received instructions, with reference to the above statements, formally to express to the Government of the United States the heartfelt gratitude of the Netherlands Government for the assistance rendered during the floods by American military forces which were assigned so spontaneously for this purpose.

The tireless efforts of these American and other foreign troops contributed substantially to mitigate the initial consequences of the floods, and rendered invaluable assistance in effectuating preliminary repairs where these were needed most urgently, and thereby alleviated to a considerable degree the impact of the critical phase of the floods.

The Netherlands Government is deeply appreciative of this spontaneous and effective demonstration of international cooperation.

Mobilizing for a Just and Lasting Peace

by James J. Wadsworth

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated February 28

Instead of starting out by telling you who I am, I'd like to start by telling you who you are—just in case you don't fully appreciate yourself and your own power.

You represent more than 100 national organizations with a combined membership of more than 75 millions of members. That's a sizeable chunk of Americans—enough to swing an election—enough to tip the ship of state pretty heavily to one side or another—or to keep it riding steady. You, here, are the chosen leaders, the leadership group (in the language of the social scientists) among this impressive number of your fellow Americans, and the leadership group in the country which now carries the responsibility for the leadership of the free world is a very important group of people.

As good Americans I'm sure that you hold a great many opinions and that there have been some pretty hot discussions in and out of your meetings. There are probably organizations here who disagree completely on several important issues. But you are gathered here under the enterprising auspices of the American Association for the United Nations because there is one thing on which you all do agree: vigorous support for the United Nations. You know that the United Nations gives us all our best chance to work for a decent, peaceful world, and you've started working.

I started working—full time, that is—at the United States Mission to the United Nations just a week ago today. They tell me that if you want to be an expert on a foreign country you have to stay there either 3 days or 10 years. I guess it's the same for the United Nations, so my one week cuts me out as an expert. I can only give you some of my first impressions. At this point they are really just the impressions of a layman who's had

the valuable chance to get into the middle of things.

Of course I brought some ideas about the United Nations with me when I came. I've thought about it as a citizen, and I've done a lot of concentrated thinking about it since I heard I was named for this job almost a month ago. I've even gotten into a few discussions from time to time with all sorts of people—taxi drivers and Congressmen, students and businessmen.

Some people seem to have the idea that the United Nations would be all right if only the Russians and their satellites were thrown out. They complain that the Russians are holding up progress—as an example, their 55 vetoes in the Security Council—and even more important, that Soviet guns and planes are killing U.N. soldiers in Korea. They say that the United Nations is a very expensive loudspeaker for Russian propaganda, and that helping the United Nations helps to spread Kremlin lies.

Now I thought I knew the answers to those worries pretty well, before I came here. The chief value of the United Nations is that it is the only place in the world where 60 nations can sit down together and talk over the problems that are troubling us all. If the Russians weren't there, the talk might be a lot more enjoyable but it wouldn't have anything to do with the real problems of the real world in which the Russians play a very large and a very dangerous part.

Secretary of State Dulles in his book *War or Peace* says: "They"—the Russians, that is—"have power in the world, and if the United Nations gets away from the reality it becomes artificial and exerts less influence. The United Nations should mirror more accurately, not less accurately, the reality of what is."

You don't make any danger disappear by setting up a nice social organization in which you talk only to people who agree with you. You *do* something—and something important—to cut down the danger of Soviet expansion when the peoples of the world are given a chance to see it for

¹ Address made before the American Association for the United Nations at Washington on Mar. 2. For text of remarks made by Secretary Dulles before this association, see p. 402.

what it really is. We, the United States, could have the best propaganda outfit in the world telling people on all five continents that the Russians lie, that their peace talk is all lies, that they won't listen to reason, that they won't listen—period. But that would be just American propaganda, and most people would think we were exaggerating.

But in the United Nations they can see for themselves what the Russians are like. The United Nations is the one big hole in the Iron Curtain that they can't plug up. Certainly it gives the Russians a chance to make long blasts at the United States full of lying charges. But the lies are answered in the United Nations, not by one nation, but by many nations. If people learn through the U.N. debates that Russians are making ridiculous charges about American atrocities, they also learn that those charges were rejected by the General Assembly by a vote of 54 to 5. It has always seemed to me that that fact ought to be added up on our side.

The Russian Idea of Debate

As I said, I knew all this in theory before I came. Then this week I sat in on my first meeting of the Political Committee on Korea and had my first close-up view of the Russian idea of debate. I was amazed—to tell you the truth. How could they be so stupid? Couldn't Vyshinsky see for himself the skepticism and boredom on the faces of delegates who had heard the same preposterous charges dozens of times before? He didn't even try to be plausible. How could he expect this talk about a U.S. aggression in Korea to make any impression, when every delegate in that room knew that the United Nations' own Commission in Korea saw for itself the criminal Communist sneak attack from the north upon the young Republic of Korea? As a trial lawyer he must know that once a witness has been caught in one lie, the rest of his testimony doesn't carry very much weight.

I think that anyone who attends a few U.N. meetings is struck as I am by the value of the United Nations as a great mirror of truth—to use Mr. Dulles' phrase. It reveals the Russians as they really are. At the same time the Russians can see for themselves how their outrageous lies and inconsistencies are failing to weaken the essential unity of the free world. Only if they can convince themselves that this tactic won't work, will they ever be persuaded to give it up and get down to the business the United Nations was designed for.

Because this is so plain to all visitors, I have been thrilled to see the number of people who come to U.N. Headquarters every day. A week ago yesterday, when I was over there for a television broadcast with Ambassador Lodge, there seemed

to be thousands of them streaming into the Assembly building. And they're more than sightseers. The bookstore there is crowded with people who want to know more about the United Nations. I understand that the bookstore sells—not gives away, but *sells* more than 1,400 pieces of literature a day.

Again I've had a chance to see for myself a thing I've believed in for a long time; and that is the wide support the United Nations enjoys in the United States and the seriousness of public interest in the United Nations.

Of course, there are attacks on the United Nations, too, in various parts of the country. We can't ignore them but we can put them in their proper perspective, and stop giving them more attention than they are worth.

A great cause is judged by its enemies as well as its friends. On both counts the United Nations has a high score. Against it, we have a small group of small organizations with histories of extreme isolationism and hate-mongering. On the other hand, among the organizations which have declared their support for the principles of the United Nations and for strong U.S. participation in the United Nations, you have the distinguished group of organizations represented here today.

Critics vs. Enemies of the U.N.

Now I need hardly remind you that when I talk of enemies of the United Nations, I'm not talking about critics of the United Nations. I know that if the chairman of this meeting asked right now for criticism and suggestions for improving the United Nations, he'd be kept here all night. I might have a few suggestions myself.

I am not including in that group the troubled people who are misinformed or uninformed about the United Nations. Many of them are counted in the opinion polls as supporters of the United Nations, but they fall into the category of "yes but"-ers. They're for the United Nations—but.

Those "buts" are very important. It's part of my job, and it is part of your job too, to answer as many of them as we can.

Some people are in favor of the United Nations, but they're worried about the expense. I've never heard this complaint from anyone who knew the fact that the U.S. assessment for the United Nations, and for all of its specialized agencies this year, costs each American taxpayer exactly 16 cents. One speaker on the United Nations tells of an experience with a man who stood up in a meeting to complain about the U.N. drain on the American taxpayer. When he heard the 16-cent figure, the same man stood up and started thumping the table harder than ever. But this time he was complaining because he thought it was a disgrace that we each didn't spend a whole lot more than 16 cents a year on peace!

Some people are afraid that the Russians are learning our Korean battle plans at the United Nations. Actually the Unified Command sends the United Nations reports on the Korean action only after the event has taken place and at the same time as the report is released in the newspapers. Neither the United States, nor any other member Government, sends the United Nations any classified security information at all. It seems to me nothing short of disgraceful to let such a tragic piece of misinformation add to the trouble in the hearts of the families of soldiers in Korea.

There are some people who thoroughly understand and approve of the U.N. action to resist aggression in Korea, but criticize the United Nations because they think the United States is doing all of the fighting.

Actually, according to the latest reports, 75 percent of the frontline troops in Korea are non-Americans, and even the American divisions who are holding the other 25 percent of the line contain many elements of South Korean troops. *Who Says They Won't Fight?* is the title General Van Fleet gave to an article he wrote not so long ago about non-American United Nations troops in Korea. Let me quote one of the things he says.

"Fight? I'll say our allies will fight", says General Van Fleet. "Ask any American combat veteran who had a U.N. unit—any of them—on his flank during an offensive. Or ask him if he was confident or scared when he knew a U.N. unit adjoining his own was under heavy attack.

"'No sweat,' he'll say. 'They're good soldiers.'"

The facts on most of these most prevalent "buts" are so clear and so reassuring that people welcome the truth. As that truth gets wider and wider circulation around the country, I'm sure we'll find that more people are more in favor of the United Nations than they think they are.

This leads me back to my statement earlier this evening about the importance of this audience. It is by your energy, your organizational skill, your influence with all of the media of mass communication, that we can get the truth about the United Nations and its accomplishments spread across the nation and incorporated into the thinking of every single American citizen. We don't have to sell the United Nations idea to the American people. They bought that long ago. The ideas and principles of the Charter are fundamental to our whole American philosophy. What we have to do is get out the facts and when the facts are known those of us who believe in the United Nations must believe that the truth will sell itself.

Perhaps it is not too much to say—and I say this in all humility—national humility as well as personal humility—that the issue of war or peace, freedom or slavery, poverty or human fulfillment, are in your hands and will finally be decided by the people in this room.

Peace in Korea does not lie in our hands alone.

As Ambassador Lodge has so forcefully stated just this last week in the General Assembly,² only the Kremlin can name the day when the fighting in Korea is to come to an end, on honorable terms.

But our enlightened leadership of free men everywhere can hasten the day when the Kremlin will be forced to recognize that violent lawlessness is no longer practical.

For I am one of those who believe that this country derives its strength not so much from its rich land as from its free institutions. For the same reason I believe that time is bound to be on the side of the free world. The one element without which all power eventually defeats itself is the vitality of free men. Of this element of strength, the free world enjoys a complete and unchallenged monopoly.

We have the opportunity to mobilize this un-failing power, shared with free men everywhere, to mobilize on behalf of a just and lasting peace.

Not by what we say here, but by what we say and do after we leave this room.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 382.

U.S.S.R. Offers Nothing New on Korea

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 2

The Soviet representative has admitted that the Soviet Union has been assisting the Chinese Communist forces. They are, therefore, assisting those whom the United Nations has branded as aggressors, those who have been found guilty by the Security Council and by the General Assembly. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, the Security Council resolution of June 27, 1950, and the General Assembly resolution of February 1, 1951, as regards the Chinese Communists. In all the utterances which the Soviet delegate made considering the matter of aggression, he talked all around the subject but he did not get to the heart of the matter, which was the early report by the United Nations Commission on Korea. That Commission consisted of India, as Chairman, Australia, China, El Salvador, France, the Philippines, and Turkey, which clearly and finally found that North Korea had launched the attack. I quote from the report; it is a brief quotation:

The invasion launched by the North Korean forces on June 25 cannot have been the result of a decision taken suddenly in order to repel a mere border attack or in retaliation for such an attack. Such an invasion involv-

¹ Made before Committee I (Political and Security) on Mar. 2. For Ambassador Lodge's initial statement on Korea, challenging Andrei Vyshinsky to deny charges of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists and North Koreans, see BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 382.

ing amphibious landings and the use of considerable numbers of troops carefully trained for aggressive action, and in relation to the area of great quantities of weapons and other war material presupposes a long premeditated, well-prepared and well-timed plan of aggression. The subsequent steady advance of the North Korean forces supplies further evidence, if further evidence is needed, of the extensive nature of the planning and preparation for the aggression. It is the considered opinion of the Commission that this planning and preparation was deliberate and an essential part of the policy of the North Korean authorities. The objective of this policy was to secure by force what could not be attained by any other means. In furtherance of this policy, the North Korean authorities on June 25, 1950, initiated a war of aggression without provocation and without warning.

Mr. Chairman, those are not the words of the United States. Those are the words of the U.N. Commission which was composed of the nations whose names I have just read.

I think that clears up pretty well the question of who is the aggressor, a question which has been decided by this organization on several occasions.

Then the Soviet representative accused the United States of wanting to continue the Korean

Soviet Assistance to Chinese Communists

The following is an excerpt from the verbatim text (U.N. doc. US/A/C.1/2552 dated Mar. 2, 1953, pp. 46 and 49-50) of Soviet delegate Andrei Vyshinsky's remarks before Committee I on March 2:

. . . He [Mr. Lodge] did not say anything new when he said that the U.S.S.R. was selling armaments to China. . . .

The Soviet Union has never concealed the fact that it sold and continues to sell armaments to its ally, China. As is well known, the Soviet Union concluded with China in 1945, even before the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic had come to power, a treaty of friendship and alliance. That treaty was confirmed in 1950 in a new treaty with the new Government of China. It was a treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance, concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese People's Republic. In line with these treaties the Soviet Union has sold and continues to sell armaments to China, while China sells to the Soviet Union various types of raw materials, including strategic raw materials; and this is quite natural. . . .

We do sell weapons and we have sold weapons to our friend and ally, the Chinese People's Republic; of course we do and of course we did. There was a treaty to that effect concluded as early as 1945 and re-concluded in 1950. We never concealed that. It is on the record and is an open book. . . .

action, of rejecting his so-called peace proposals. He referred to my quotation from the speech of Chou En Lai and, as he read the text of Chou En Lai's statement of February 4, he probably unwittingly read the statement from Chou En Lai that I had quoted, so I think that that statement can stand as quite accurate.

The Soviet representative says now, as he has

said before, let us have a cease-fire and talk about prisoners of war later. He said everybody who wants to end the Korean war hold up their hands. Nobody holds their hands up so, therefore, everybody except him favors a continuation of the war. You saw that.

Of course, his proposal, the proposal which the Soviet representative made at the first part of the session as part of the Soviet resolution, also set up a commission to consider the prisoner question and other political questions in such a way that the Soviet camp would in effect have a veto. You will recall that he called for a commission of 11 states of whom 4 would be Communists, and insisted that there be a two-thirds vote to reach a decision. You can remember that, and you can figure what is two-thirds of 11. The Soviet delegate doesn't have to be a clever mathematician to figure that out and we have figured it out, too.

The Soviet representative talks about a cease-fire now—have a cease-fire now and leave the question of prisoners to be decided later. It reminds me of the Communist willingness to have a cease-fire after their forces had overrun most of the territory of the Republic of Korea during the early days of their aggression. They knew then, as they know now, that there could be no cease-fire which leaves the fruits of aggression in their hands, or which is otherwise inconsistent with the principles for which we are fighting. Even if we took them at their word and assumed that they would in fact agree to a cease-fire now, what would it mean? As the Australian Ambassador so eloquently pointed out, it would be a cease-fire on condition that we leave in Communist hands thousands of United Nations and Republic of Korea soldiers as hostages; that we allow them to hold these hostages indefinitely; that we give the Communists the opportunity to use these hostages to blackmail the United Nations into agreeing to return the Communists by force—tens of thousands of prisoners who would violently resist efforts to return them to the fate which awaits them at the Communists' hands. And while they held these hostages and bargained over their fate, the Communists would be building up their airfields and maintaining a constant threat that if the prisoner question is not settled to their satisfaction they might start their aggression over again.

No, Mr. Chairman, no country participating in the fighting in Korea wants to abandon its prisoners and leave them as hostages. If Russian soldiers were involved, we do not believe the Soviet delegate would want to abandon them. But it is they and not we who have Asian soldiers as cannon fodder. I quote what the Soviet delegate said. They have Asian soldiers as cannon fodder and not we. And, of course, they are indifferent as to what happens to them.

The United States in the United Nations

[February 24–March 5]

General Assembly

The second part of the seventh session was opened on February 24 by General Assembly President Lester Pearson, who read a message of welcome from President Eisenhower¹ and then made a short statement urging that remaining items be considered in an expeditious manner. Since Committee I was the only main committee which had items remaining on its agenda, Mr. Pearson said that meetings would be scheduled only for this Committee unless budgetary questions came up which required the convening of Committee V.

He noted that the People's Republic of China and the North Korean authorities had replied to his message of December 5² and proposed that his report containing these replies be considered the starting point for resumed discussions on the Korean item. The item on personnel policy will be taken up in plenary at a later date.

Committee I (Political and Security)—The Committee on February 25 resumed the debate on the Korean question which was suspended on December 2, 1952, pending President Pearson's report on the replies to the proposals for settling the prisoner-of-war issue.

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (U.S.) declared that the "somber truth" was that the U.S.S.R. was "actively assisting the aggressors in Korea on a scale which makes possible the continuance of that aggression and determines its scope." The world should face the facts of the situation, he said, citing evidence that war equipment and planes had been supplied by the U.S.S.R. to the Chinese Communists fighting in Korea. He challenged the Soviet representatives to disprove these facts and declared: "The rulers of the Soviet Union can stop the war whenever they want to—and Mr. Vyshinsky knows it."³

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 382.

² For text of the message and excerpts from the Chinese Communists' reply, see *ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1953, p. 74. Text of the North Korean reply appears on p. 422 of this issue. For text of the resolution adopted on Dec. 3, 1952, containing proposals for settling the prisoner-of-war issue, see *ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1952, p. 916.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1953, p. 383.

Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) said he accepted Mr. Lodge's challenge and would answer fully the points raised. He insisted, however, as he had at the first part of the session, that any serious debate of the Korean question would be impossible without the presence of representatives of North Korea. He again introduced a motion for an invitation to the representatives of North Korea to attend the Committee's discussion. During the subsequent discussion, Ambassador Lodge pointed out that the North Koreans had no status in the United Nations; that if they wanted peace, they had only to resume negotiations at Panmunjom and accept the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 3.

The Soviet motion was rejected by a vote of 16 in favor to 35 against, with 6 abstentions.

In addition to the original Korean item, "Reports of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" (UNCURK), Committee I now has before it the item, "Reports of the United Nations Agent General for Korean Reconstruction" (UNKRA), which has been re-allocated from Committee II (Economic and Financial). On a motion by the Colombian delegate, it was decided at the beginning of the February 25 meeting to discuss the UNKRA reports simultaneously with the UNCURK reports.

In addition to the Korean question, the other agenda items, listed in the order in which the Committee voted to discuss them, are—

Repatriation of members of the Greek armed forces;

Report of the Collective Measures Committee;

Interference of the United States in the internal affairs of other states (item introduced by Czechoslovakia);

Measures to avert the threat of a new world war and measures to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations (item introduced by Poland);

Question of impartial investigation of charges of use by U.N. forces of bacteriological warfare (item introduced by the United States).

Chairman João Carlos Muniz (Brazil) noted that the Committee still had three draft resolutions on Korea before it: the 21-nation draft

resolution⁴ and the drafts introduced by Mexico and Peru. Also before the Committee was President Pearson's report on the Communist response to the resolution adopted at the first part of the session.

On March 2 Andrei Vyshinsky replied to Ambassador Lodge's charges of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists and North Koreans. He told the Committee in the course of a 90-minute statement that the Soviet Union had never attempted to conceal the sale of armaments to its Chinese "ally." In an immediate rebuttal, Mr. Lodge pointed up this admission that the U. S. S. R. was aiding those judged by the United Nations to be guilty of aggression. (See p. 419.)

On March 4 Poland accused the United States of using the Indian resolution as an umbrella for "even more feverish attempts" to extend the war, exterminate the Korean people, and terrorize the Far East. Renewing charges of mistreatment of prisoners of war and use of germ warfare, the Polish representative also alleged increasing U. S. pressure on other countries to supply "cannon fodder."

Ambassador Lodge observed that the Polish speech did not justify reconsideration of the Indian resolution. The renewed bacteriological warfare charges would be dealt with under the appropriate item, he said, adding that the United States strongly favored investigation of these charges by an impartial commission. Recalling that the U. S. S. R. had vetoed a proposal for such a commission when his Government had introduced it in the Security Council, he questioned the usefulness of making charges and refusing honest efforts to have them investigated. "Bad faith" was the only term for such a practice.

Mr. Lodge noted that the Communist bloc spoke of peace but what they wanted was peace for themselves and war for others. The "cannon fodder" in the Korean fighting was not to be found on the U. N. side.

Technical Assistance Conference

The third Technical Assistance Conference took place at U.N. Headquarters on February 26-27. During the meetings, 64 Governments pledged \$20,863,575 toward the expanded program's goal of \$25,000,000. Many of these offers represented increases over contributions for earlier years. Ambassador Lodge confirmed the U.S. pledge of a maximum of \$14,708,750, with the proviso that the U.S. pledge would not exceed 60 percent of total pledges and subject to congressional appropriation of funds.⁵ At 60 percent of the total pledges made during the conference, the U.S. pledge amounts to \$12,518,145. Technical Assistance Administrator David Owen said three more

countries were considering contributions, which he hoped would bring the final total to within \$4,000,000 of the target figure. The final act of the conference remains open for signature until April 1, 1953.

North Koreans' Reply to U.N. Resolution on Prisoner Issue

Telegram dated December 17, 1952, addressed to the President of the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea

[Original: Russian]

U.N. doc. A/2354
Dated December 20, 1952

We have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the telegram dispatched by you concerning the adoption at the 399th plenary meeting of the seventh session of the General Assembly of the United Nations of the so-called draft resolution on the Korean question of 3 December 1952 in connexion with item 16 of the agenda. In this connexion I am empowered to state that the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea considers that not only does the above-mentioned draft resolution lack the legal basis which a genuine draft resolution on the solution of the Korean question must have but is also an unjust decision resulting from the hypocritical policy of the U.S.A. which is aiming at intrigues behind the scenes designed to secure a further continuation and expansion of the criminal and aggressive war in Korea. The resolution is therefore absolutely powerless to bring about an immediate end of the criminal and aggressive war which the United States is waging in Korea and a peaceful and just settlement of the Korean question. The Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, acting in accordance with the peaceful desires and insistent demands of the Korean people and of peace loving peoples throughout the world who have raised their voice against war and in defense of peace considers this draft resolution to be unacceptable.

On the instructions of the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea a statement was sent by me on 17 October to the effect that the Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea requests that the interested party—the legal representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea—be given an opportunity of participating in the discussion of the Korean question at the General Assembly and at the same time stating that it will regard as illegal any discussion and any decision taken without the participation of its representatives. It is an elementary truth to every educated person of today that the grant to the interested parties and legal representatives of an opportunity to express the views of their people at an international conference at which the fate of interested states and peoples is being discussed is not only a basic prerequisite for a just solution of the question but is a principle which is fundamental to international conferences claiming to defend freedom and democracy. The so-called majority group in the United Nations, acting upon instructions of the ruling circles of the United States has nevertheless declined to permit our legal representatives and the representatives of the Chinese People's Republic an opportunity to participate in the discussion of the Korean question, despite the just request of our government and has invited only representatives of the puppet regime of Syngman Rhee, who have absolutely no legal right to represent the Korean people and are an object of hatred to the entire Korean people.

What is the explanation for the fact that the majority

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 3, 1952, p. 680.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Mar. 9, 1953, p. 385.

group in the United Nations, obedient to the dictates of the United States, declined to admit representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea to the General Assembly despite the fact that the presence of both interested parties is essential to a just solution of the Korean question? The explanation is first, that the majority group in the United Nations is not interested in a just solution of the Korean question; second, this group fears that representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea will expose the crimes committed by the Americans in Korea under the United Nations flag. In those circumstances the draft resolution on the Korean question manufactured behind the scenes in the United Nations by means of American dollars not only has no legal force but is an unprecedented document in that it constitutes a crime against the moral principles and conscience of mankind; I therefore protest against this illegal draft resolution fabricated on the instructions of the United States in order to deceive public opinion and all people of goodwill throughout the world. The decision you have adopted cannot be accepted by our government from the standpoint of a solution of the question of the repatriation of the prisoners of war. Contrary to established international standards and despite the existing principles clearly laid down in the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, the decision taken by you is based on the principle of so-called voluntary repatriation dictated by the Americans. This unprecedented demand, as the whole world now knows, in fact signifies the use of force and the exertion of pressure on our country's patriots now in captivity. It means compulsory "screening" and "interrogation" by the use of severe repressive measures, even the mass shooting of unarmed men. The purpose of this inhuman principle is merely to retain a large proportion of the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war on their side by any method. Such a principle corresponds to the aggressive purposes and intentions of the United States and its satellites which are aiming at ending the Korean war not by peaceful means but by a military decision. It is time it was realized that no deception and no military threat on the part of the United States military speculators can ever intimidate or subjugate the Korean people, which knows full well that it is fighting for its freedom and independence. If the United Nations really intends to do everything possible to achieve the rapid conclusion of the war in Korea, as emphasized in your cablegram, this should not be merely a good intention (? of no practical value) but a real effort must be made to achieve a genuinely just solution of the Korean question and, above all, to secure an immediate cease-fire in Korea.

In view of the foregoing I request you, as President of the present session of the General Assembly, to take the following appropriate steps forthwith: 1. To revoke the above-mentioned "resolution" illegally adopted by the General Assembly to camouflage the aggressive United States policy of prolonging and extending the Korean war; 2. To condemn the fighting in Korea and to take the necessary steps to bring about an immediate cease-fire in Korea and achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the U.S.S.R. proposals of 10 and 24 November 1952 which are wholeheartedly supported and approved by all peace-loving nations; 3. To give representatives of the PDRK [People's Democratic Republic of Korea] an opportunity to participate in the discussion on the Korean question in the organs of the United Nations, as the true representatives of the Korean people; 4. To call to account the representatives of the American side who are responsible for the breakdown of the Panmunjom negotiations, having unilaterally broken off indefinitely

the truce negotiations in Korea which had succeeded in settling the fundamental issues except for the sole remaining question of prisoners of war; 5. To put an end to the barbarous bombing of the peaceful populations, towns and villages of North Korea by the American aggressors under the flag of the United Nations; 6. To cease immediately the barbarous procedure of forcibly detaining our prisoners of war and the inhuman treatment and mass murder of and brutality towards the inmates of prisoner-of-war camps; 7. In accordance with international law and the conscience of mankind, to punish severely the American war criminals who, hypocritically trampling upon the standards of international law and the principles of human morality, are using bacterial, chemical and other weapons for the mass slaughter of the peaceful inhabitants of North Korea, so that a repetition of such barbarous crimes may be impossible in the future. If these just proposals which accord with the aspirations of the Korean people and of all peace-loving nations are rejected by the (majority) group in the United Nations, may the entire responsibility for the continuation of the war in Korea rest with those members of the United Nations which overtly or covertly are supporting the United States aggression in Korea.

I have the honour, Mr. President, to request you to make this statement known to all members of the United Nations.

I have the honour to be, etc.

PAKH HEN EN
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PDRK
[People's Democratic Republic of Korea]

THE DEPARTMENT

Statement by Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

Press release 122 dated March 3

The following statement was made by Robert W. S. McLeod on March 3, after he was sworn in as administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

This is a very complex job and the area of responsibility is extremely wide. While I have some definite personal convictions, I have no preconceived conclusions regarding the task which confronts me. I plan to proceed in a calm, orderly way in accordance with the policies of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. I would much rather tell the press what I have done than what I plan to do.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

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The Senate on March 2 confirmed Mrs. Clare Booth Luce as Ambassador to Italy.

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appreciated.

NATO: the Right Road to Peace

by Lord Ismay

Secretary-General of NATO¹

It is a great privilege for me to be permitted to address you, and through you to give an account to the American people of my stewardship as Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). You may not be acutely aware of the fact, but the United States is one of my 14 masters, in my present capacity as an international servant of NATO, and I am very proud of the fact.

During the last war, I visited Washington on a number of occasions as Chief of Staff to Mr. Churchill. We were then working desperately hard to win the most costly, the most devastating war in history. Now, in peacetime, or what passes for peacetime today, we are all working together once more; but our object this time is to prevent a war which would be catastrophic for the whole world.

World Wars I and II casualties gave us a sample, a mere taste, of what the next world war would cost. Allied losses in World War I were more than 5 million killed. The French losses alone, over a million dead, were more than the United States have lost in all their wars.

The full balance sheet is not yet in, even now, on World War II. The total dead have been computed at more than 20 million, without counting an additional 20 million civilian dead from war-spread epidemics and famine. The financial cost was astronomical; far beyond the comprehension of the average man making out his income tax return, even though, in the long run, he is the one who pays. The figure is more than a million million dollars—I think you call it a trillion.

It is my conviction that it depends primarily upon ourselves; upon what we do or what we fail to do that will determine whether or not this disaster, which exceeds the capacity of man's imagination to grasp, is allowed to come to pass.

The cost will be heavy not only to the taxpayers of the United States, but to the taxpayers of all their Allies. I submit, however, that if we succeed in deterring aggression the price we pay will be trivial. We shall indeed have bought a bargain.

We have two alternatives—either to make this united effort in full partnership together, or to proceed unwarily on the assumption that the Soviet will not attempt aggression. Our choice is clear.

Soviet Russia has already demonstrated its mastery of the Hitler technique of gobbling up its enemies one by one. One after another, Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, and finally Czechoslovakia were dragged behind the Iron Curtain. You have only to pick up a Communist paper anywhere or listen to a Communist broadcast to be aware of the frantic efforts that are being made to divide the members of NATO, and particularly to drive a wedge between the countries of Europe on the one hand, and the United States on the other. Because of latent prejudices and even some current but minor grievances on both sides, some of this propaganda unfortunately falls on fertile soil. We must be on guard against it at all times.

I would like to speak to you today about some of our work and some of our problems in NATO. First, I ought to say a few words about how we are getting on at NATO Headquarters. You will remember that at Lisbon two important decisions were taken on organization: One, that the Atlantic Council should be in permanent session in Paris, with effective powers of decision; and, two, that there should be a secretary general, assisted by an international staff.

In order to enable the Council to be in permanent session, each member country appointed a permanent representative. Ever since April we have been meeting, once or generally twice, a week. Of course, if there was any urgent problem for consideration we could meet on any day at a

¹ Address made before the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., on Mar. 12.

moment's notice, just as a national cabinet does.

I want to emphasize that the Council have effective powers of decision. That is to say, the authority of the Council is not altered by the presence or absence of ministers. The permanent representatives can, of course, on instructions from their cabinets, take any decisions, however important.

Importance of Ministerial Meetings

Ministerial meetings are not necessarily summoned merely to decide important points, because the permanent representatives are quite capable of deciding them. But it is obviously right that the ministers principally concerned with NATO, that is to say Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Finance, should meet together periodically round the same table for the discussion of their mutual problems. I cannot overemphasize the importance which I attach to these meetings. It is so much easier to do business with a man face to face. And you must also remember that many NATO countries have responsibilities outside the North Atlantic area which affect their NATO partners.

It was laid down at Lisbon that there should be three ministerial meetings a year, but this is under review. Anyway, there is to be a ministerial meeting on the 23d April, at which one of the principal matters for discussion will be the annual review, which will set agreed force goals for 1953 and provisional goals for 1954.

I confess to being always a little nervous about these ministerial meetings for one reason, namely that the world and the press get it into their heads that, because ministers meet, something spectacular is going to emerge. They are disappointed correspondingly when it does not.

The staff under me are, like myself, truly international. They are drawn from 12 different nations and I hope to get recruits from the other two very shortly. Our total number is 146. Of these, 12 are American. We are still, for our sins, in the Palais de Chaillot, a temporary building that was put up for the U.N. General Assembly in Paris in 1951; but the French Government have bought us a plot of land near SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe), and the building of our new headquarters is about to commence.

The Military Committee and its executive, the Standing Group, are the military advisers to the Council, in the same way as the Chiefs of Staff of any nation are advisers to the cabinet. The Standing Group is in permanent session in Washington and contact is maintained by a Standing Group Liaison Office in my headquarters in Paris.

Underneath the Military Committee and Standing Group are the Supreme Commanders—General Ridgway (SHAPE), Admiral McCormick (SACLANT), and Admiral Edelsten (Channel

Command). As there appear to have been misunderstandings on the subject, I should like to state categorically that the relations between the civil and military powers are admirable.

People often say to me: "It is quite clear what the military authorities do, but what does the Council do?" To put it very briefly, I should say that the Council acts as a North Atlantic Cabinet insofar as NATO business is concerned. It gives political guidance to the military, it tries to provide them with the forces, both men and equipment, that they require, and it supports and sustains them in any way that it can in such matters, for example trying to insure that the morale of the civil populations in NATO countries is sound and that they understand the reason for the exertions and sacrifices that NATO demands of them. As another example, the Council has assumed responsibility for the coordination of civil defense, especially in the countries which might be the scene of active operations.

I should mention a word about infrastructure, that is, the construction of commonly financed facilities, such as airfields, communications, and so forth. At the last ministerial meeting, General Ridgway asked for an additional infrastructure program amounting to nearly 450 million dollars. The Council at that time made provision for about one half of this total, taking into account particularly those projects which had to be got under way early in the spring to take advantage of good building weather. Decision on the other half was postponed.

This was unfortunately misunderstood by some sections of the press as a denial by NATO of one half of General Ridgway's requests for the defense of Western Europe. In fact, the amount of money involved amounts to less than three-tenths of one percent of the total being spent on defense.

In principle, the Council has now agreed that the remaining number of projects requested by General Ridgway last December will be financed, although no agreement has yet been reached as to the exact share to be assumed by each country. That is now being worked out. The NATO countries will be spending nearly 700 million dollars in 1953 on infrastructure, two and a half times what was spent in any previous year and we expect to complete an average of an airfield a week in 1953.

I hope I may be excused at this point if I cite a few pertinent facts to you about your European partners. Obviously I do not come here as a special pleader for any individual NATO country or group of countries. I am bound to serve all impartially. Indeed, when I was taking leave of Mr. Churchill nearly a year ago, to move to Paris with NATO, he said to me "I hope you won't find it necessary to put Britain absolutely last on every possible occasion."

However, for the good of the partnership, it is important that the members should realize that they are in it not in any spirit of charity, but in "enlightened self-interest," to use an American phrase. Living in your rich and extraordinary inventive and productive country, with broad oceans to the East and West, it may sometimes be difficult for you to realize how drastically the balance of power in the world would shift if the manpower and productive capacity of Western Europe should fall under Soviet exploitation.

NATO's Industrial and Manpower Resources

European NATO members have a total population of more than 200 million, including the greatest reservoir of skilled labor in the world. In the major indices of industrial production, coal, crude steel, electric power, for example, they substantially exceed the Soviet bloc. In steel alone the United States and Canada have a combined production of roughly a 100 million tons. Western European production is about 56 or 57 million tons, a little more than half of North America's production, but still considerably greater than the 40 million tons of the Soviet bloc. The North American and Western European production together give a great potential in time of emergency, nearly four times the production of the Soviet bloc. But subtract Western European production and add it to that of the Soviet bloc, then the two figures are nearly equal.

But let me sound another note of warning. Recent studies indicate that Soviet industrial expansion is proceeding at a rate which is cutting down the margin of Western European supremacy and giving added force to my argument. The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe recently reported that by 1960 the Soviet Union will be producing more of the major industrial raw materials than the seven most industrialized countries of Western Europe, if the present rate of Soviet expansion is maintained. By 1955 the Soviet Union will have more oil available than Western Europe is consuming at the present time. This is an ominous note, particularly when we realize that the U.S.S.R. is estimated to be producing this year over twice as much steel as it needed per year to wage the last war.

I have been speaking of the industrial and manpower resources of your Allies and making the obvious point that with their resources and yours pooled on the same side, the Atlantic Community is potentially strong enough to discourage any aggressor. The corollary, which I believe is inescapable, is that with Europe's potential added to the growing industrial capacity of the Soviet bloc, America would in time be forced to give up the political institutions and way of life to which you are all so devoted today.

To demonstrate that there has been no slackening off in the defense effort of your European

Allies, I am today releasing NATO defense expenditure figures, country by country, for the years 1949-50 to 1952-53. I will not read them to you in detail, but you will find them attached as an annex to the advance text of my speech.

Buildup in Defense Effort

You will find there, I hope, clear-cut evidence of a steady, year by year, buildup in the defense effort of these European countries. From the year 1949-50 up to the current year, defense expenditure in the European countries has increased by 120 percent. The first year after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, these countries devoted 20 percent more to defense. Defense expenditure figures for 1951-52 jumped more than 47 percent over 1950-51. And the current year shows a further increase amounting to 24 percent.

These defense figures are reflected, partially, also in an over-all increase in the number of men under arms in the NATO countries. In 1949 the European members of NATO had a total of approximately 2,450,000 men under arms. Today that global figure has risen to nearly 3,300,000. In addition to a net increase in numbers, there has also been a steady improvement in equipment, quality, and training.

Through the combined efforts of European defense production and end-item aid deliveries from North America, air forces of European countries will by the end of 1953 be equipped with over 4,000 planes, more than double the number on hand at the beginning of 1952. Furthermore, most of these planes will be modern jet types. Similarly, in a key naval item like minesweepers, the total available to European forces by the end of this year will be almost 75 percent greater than the number in existence in mid-1952.

Just before I left Paris a fortnight ago, that wise and accomplished officer, General Gruenther, who accompanied General Eisenhower on his mission to Europe as Chief of Staff, and who is still Chief of Staff to General Ridgway, told me that we are much further ahead today than he and General Eisenhower had estimated that we would be at the end of 2 years. He told me that when he and General Eisenhower arrived in Paris early in 1951 to set up Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, they had little more to build on than the United States, British, and French Occupation Forces then stationed in Western Germany, Austria, and Trieste. By the end of last year, the Lisbon goals of 50 divisions had been substantially met.

By the end of 1953 these divisions will be increased in number, not as much as we or the military would like to see, but increased nonetheless. More important, there will be a very substantial increase in the quality of the existing forces and in their logistic support.

Let me conclude with a testimony of my own

faith. I believe with every fiber of my being that in the North Atlantic Treaty lies the best, if not the only hope of peace. I believe that we are on the right road and that we are gaining every day in strength, in purpose, and in unity. I have no doubt that there is a long way still to go and that the road may be rough. That we shall have our little quarrels is very likely. This happens in the best regulated families. But that there will be persistent efforts to drive a wedge between us is certain. There is nothing that the Soviets are more anxious to accomplish. That prolonged exertions and sacrifices will be required from us all goes without saying. Nevertheless, I am wholly convinced that given continued patience and increasing power, given fortitude and faith, given unity and unselfishness, we shall secure for our children and our children's children peace, justice, happiness, and prosperity.

ANNEX

NATO Defense Expenditures

The following table represents the defense expenditures of member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, year by year, from 1949-50 to 1952-53. Except where noted otherwise, the figures are calculated on the NATO year (July 1 to June 30). Because they have been adjusted to an agreed NATO definition of what constitutes defense expenditures and because in many cases they have been adjusted also to the NATO year, the figures given do not necessarily agree exactly to defense budgets voted in member countries:

TOTAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES
NATO Year (July 1-June 30)
(in millions of dollars)

Country	1949-50	1950-51	1951-52	1952-53
Belgium . . .	155.04	196.95	346.56	483.82
Canada . . .	441.20	763.30	1,643.40	a 2,125.70
Denmark . . .	53.00	56.04	87.75	131.33
France . . .	1,458.20	2,041.00	3,219.88	4,047.02
Greece . . .	124.09	172.16	203.96	206.18
Italy . . .	520.29	613.33	813.06	996.51
Luxembourg.	2.79	4.15	8.16	9.82
Netherlands.	230.83	228.45	309.80	423.75
Norway . . .	49.59	67.07	96.22	146.13
Portugal . . .	45.66	48.06	50.91	75.83
Turkey . . .	274.35	284.27	315.99	324.13
United Kingdom . . .	2,450.00	2,750.00	4,095.00	a 4,995.00
United States . . .	12,809.00	21,947.00	43,374.00	b 49,500.00
Total NATO Europe . . .	5,363.84	6,461.67	9,547.29	11,839.52
Total NATO Countries .	18,614.04	29,171.78	54,564.69	63,465.22

^a National Fiscal Year April-March.

^b U. S. Defense Expenditure figures do not include economic aid or defense support assistance (the amount of which in 1952-53 will be approximately 1 billion dollars for NATO countries). The bulk of the local currency counterpart of current defense support assistance is included in the defense expenditure figures of recipient NATO countries.

Beginning of the Eisenhower Era

*Press Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 9

I have often been to the United Nations as a delegate of the United States. This is the first time that I am here as Secretary of State. I am proud to be here in that capacity under the new Administration of President Eisenhower.

The Eisenhower era begins as the Stalin era ends.

For 10 years the world has been dominated by the malignant power of Stalin. He capitalized on the prestige which was won by the Red army defenders of Stalingrad, and when the Red armies moved into Eastern Europe, Stalin used them to establish his Communist satellite regimes. In Asia, Stalin's plans, laid 25 years ago, achieved a dramatic success through the Communist civil war which brought 450 million Chinese under Stalin's sway.

Now Stalin is dead. He cannot bequeath to anyone his prestige.

As Stalin dies, General Eisenhower, the man who liberated Western Europe, has become President of our great Republic with a prestige unmatched in history. A new era begins, one in which the guiding spirit is liberty, not enslavement, and when human relations will be those of fraternity, not one-man domination. Then, in the words of our Charter preamble, the nations, large and small, may come to enjoy equal rights and dignity and peace.

That is the Eisenhower faith which I share and seek to serve.

The Duties of Free Peoples

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*²

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 10

Those who know war best are the ones who hate it most. It is therefore natural that you, the AMVETS, should dedicate your efforts to prevent any repetition of the ghastly event which was World War II. I am deeply honored that you feel that I may have contributed somewhat to the preservation of peace and that you deemed me worthy of receiving your Annual Peace Award.

There is no art more difficult than that of preserving peace. That is proved by the fact that throughout the ages men have sought it and never yet have won it, except for brief passing intervals.

The task is complicated by the fact that peace is not an end for which all else should be sacrificed. There are things even more precious than peace. Peace, of a kind, is usually obtainable by always giving in to the threats of the bellicose. Peace, of

¹ Made at U.N. Headquarters, New York.

² Made on Mar. 10 at U.N. Headquarters, N.Y., on receiving the third Annual World Peace Award of AMVETS.

a kind, can perhaps be had if human beings are turned into a species of domesticated animals seeking only survival and indifferent to the preservation of human dignity within the framework of moral law. However, indignity and injustice are not tolerable to those who take a spiritual view of the nature of man and who believe that men have a duty to comprehend and apply moral principles.

Today, vast power resides in the hands of a few men who deny the existence of moral law, who conceive that peace is a condition where the great mass of human beings surrender their dignity and individuality in order to achieve conformity. They believe that world peace depends upon subjecting all men to that cruel and materialistic discipline.

In the face of such a threat, the free peoples have three clear duties:

1. They must show strength both in military ways and in ways which proclaim strikingly the richness—material, intellectual, and spiritual—of a free society.

2. They have the duty to make sacrifices in order to create the conditions necessary for the defense of their heritage of freedom.

3. They have the duty to make their intentions so clear that they will thus reduce the risk that war might come about through miscalculation on the part of the aggressors.

It is not very profitable to try to guess the future and to act on the basis of such guesses. It is more profitable to concentrate on playing our part in shaping the future.

The American people are, I believe, prepared to do their part in this great endeavor. By so doing they can make an indispensable contribution toward the achievement of a just peace.

Secretary Dulles To Visit the Near East and South Asia

*Press Conference Statement by the Secretary*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 9

President Eisenhower is keenly aware of the importance of the Near East and South Asia. The peoples of that part of the world have a rich culture on which we of the United States have largely drawn. The President has, therefore, asked me to go personally to the Near East and South Asia to show our friendship for the governments and peoples of these areas.

¹ Made at U.N. Headquarters, N.Y.

I hope to find it possible to leave the United States in May and spend as much time as my schedule will permit in the area. Final details of the trip will be announced later.

I should like to mention, however, the underlying approach which will guide me during this trip. I am going to get firsthand information. I shall listen carefully to what I am told and consider the problems presented to me with utmost sympathy. I shall not bring with me any specific plan or program, nor do I expect to ask the governments I visit for any decisions. I am going to renew old friendships and, I hope, make new ones.

Needless to say, I am looking forward to this trip with keen anticipation. I shall be the first Secretary of State to visit these countries. I look upon this trip as an opportunity to dispel misunderstandings and to develop close relations between the United States and these friendly nations.

Consultants To Serve With National Security Council

White House press release dated March 11

The President has asked seven prominent citizens to come to Washington on March 11 to serve for a short time as consultants to the National Security Council on general problems relating to its policies and programs.

The President emphasized that these citizens will be coming as individual consultants rather than as a committee, because, as the President said, "What is desired is the individual view of each person on a particular problem or problems, rather than the collective view of the group."

The seven consultants, representing many fields of endeavor and different parts of the country, are:

Dillon Anderson, Houston, Tex.
James B. Black, San Francisco, Calif.
John Cowles, Minneapolis, Minn.
Eugene Holman, New York, N. Y.
Deane W. Malott, Ithaca, N. Y.
David B. Robertson, Cleveland, Ohio
Charles A. Thomas, St. Louis, Mo.

An administrative assistant to the President will be in charge of all arrangements for the consultants, which will include conferences with representatives of the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Defense, Mutual Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, Civil Defense Administration, the Bureau of the Budget, and others.

Problems of Trade With the Middle East

by Arthur Z. Gardiner

*Economic Adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs*¹

I welcome this opportunity to think aloud with you on some of the problems, political and economic, that underlie all that you are doing in furthering trade between countries of the Middle East and the West. I cannot give you the answer to these problems. At this time it is difficult to do more than indicate to you the probable policies which may guide the efforts of your Government in this area. On the other hand, I think that, if we can identify some of the problems and suggest possible methods by which peoples and governments may move to solve them, we may have made a contribution to the very important work of your association at its midyear meeting.

What is the area of our concern? For our present purposes, I would suggest that it starts at its westernmost point with Egypt, where the Suez Canal is the gateway for most of your cargoes that move from Asia to Europe and to North America, and that it extends eastward through the subcontinent to Indonesia. Problems of Egypt are involved with other problems of concern to peoples living in the Arab countries of the Middle East, and the relations of the Arab peoples to us affect your daily living. Still more directly, you are concerned with problems of Pakistan, of India, of Ceylon, and of Indonesia, where so much of the material wealth which passes through your hands originates.

Peoples in the countries of this region have many points in common. In the first place, they have newly acquired independence. The political independence of 7 countries of this region dates since the conclusion of World War II, and of 4 more since the conclusion of World War I—this of a total political aggregation of 15 countries.

This region represents, by and large, an area of neutralism as between the forces of Communist Russia on the one hand and the strength of the free world on the other.

In the region are found the natural resources that underlie a very substantial proportion of the foreign trade of the United States and of Europe. Aside from tea, I would mention rubber, tin, manganese, mica, jute, and other fibers, and, perhaps as important as any of the foregoing, petroleum reserves of the Arab States of the Near East. All these nations, if they are to prosper, are bound to link their economies in greater or lesser measure with the economy of the West. Like us, they have in common a vital interest in such trade.

Tensions Created by Newly Won Independence

A further factor which all these peoples have in common, 600 millions of them, is the fact that by and large the populations are categorized by the economist as "underdeveloped." This means that neither their human nor their material resources are being used to anything approaching capacity. The fact that this great mass of peoples, now becoming politically conscious, looks for greater material benefits to follow in the wake of newly won independence is a factor with which not only the Government of the United States must reckon but is one which you in the business community also must ponder. New found political consciousness leads on the one hand to friction with the West, on issues which rightly or wrongly are often linked with such "isms" as colonialism, imperialism, and commercialism.

Whatever may be the merits of such characterizations, the attitudes of the people who give voice to them are factors which must be taken into daily account on the international balance sheet. On the other hand, this new political consciousness has also led to deep-seated friction between neighboring states in the region and to quarrels which in many cases have defied patient efforts to conciliate them. Tensions with the Western World have been conspicuous in Egypt and in Iran; issues of conflict between states within the

¹ Address made before the Tea Association of the United States at New York on Mar. 3.

region, nevertheless of worldwide concern, are conspicuous in the Palestine and Kashmir incidents.

What a region! 600 millions of people—great potential resources—the prize in the current struggle between totalitarian states and the democratic nations of the free world.

In facing the political and economic problems, it may sometimes seem that the United States speaks with two voices. This is because, on the one hand, we are a conservative people, rooted in conservative trading practices, rooted in established commercial habits which are closely akin to the practices of our friends in Europe. This side of our nature craves stability and looks, frequently, longingly, back at the days when the issues of nationalism had not appeared to make life more difficult.

Sympathy With Struggles for Independence

But there is another side to our nature, and it has been expressed over the past few decades in increasing measure in our approbation of the struggles for independence of these new nations of the Middle East and of other parts of the world, and our efforts to make sure that their voice is given due weight in the community of nations, in sessions of the United Nations, and elsewhere. Following the traditions of the founding fathers of our own Republic, we feel that political independence must be a good end in itself. In the tradition of Washington's Farewell Address, we understand what our friends in the Middle East mean when they seek the opportunity to be left in peace to develop their own newly won institutions underlying their national independence.

We know that, in the long pull, our security—and their's—lies in the growth of maturity and responsibility in the entire family of nations, and that we cannot set back the political clock. In the United States there is increasing realization of the grave risk that all of this region may be lost to other forces alien to our nature, those with whom we cannot see any present way to cooperate in the commercial field or in other fields of human activity. On our side, we are going to be called upon to summon reserves of patience, will, determination, and strength to maintain our association with the Middle East. We must preserve for ourselves and for our children the basis of freedom of interchange of goods, of ideas, and of peoples.

We cannot hope to be successful in this effort unless we join in full and friendly cooperation among the leaders of Middle Eastern countries with whom we now have such friendly contacts and from whom you will hear representative voices speaking to you this afternoon. Part of our joint task may well be to reconcile with these friends the relationships between political independence on the one hand and economic realities

on the other. On our side we have a task to lend our moral and material strength to the efforts of the leaders of Middle Eastern countries to assist their peoples to achieve that degree of hope in their future—political future and economic future—which will serve to justify their continued leadership of independent nations.

While I am not qualified to speak on the merits of the recent arrangements which have been made by the Tea Association of the United States on the one hand, representing the importing and distributing trade, and the Governments of certain Asian countries, on the other, representing the producing countries, to take positive measures here to improve the marketing of tea, such a cooperative effort certainly appears to be a positive step in the right direction. I can only express my own personal and devout wish that it will not only be successful in its immediate purposes but that it will still further forge solid links in our relations with the countries of Asia through the joint effort made by representatives of all the nations concerned in meeting a common problem and in working to a single end.

It may be worthwhile to view briefly some of the likely steps that our own Government may be taking in the course of the next few years to provide you and other traders with a background in which your ventures can prosper.

U.S. Policy in the Middle East

In the first place, I think it has been made clear by the leaders of the new Administration that the United States interest in the improvement of our relations with the countries of Asia in general and the Middle East in particular will continue to be genuine and real. While lines of action in all phases of Middle Eastern affairs may not yet have been clearly established, I would hope that we could rely on certain policies which have been practiced by the Government in the past and will probably continue to be guidelines in the future.

We can, for convenience, separate the issues primarily political in nature from those primarily economic. Turning to the political side, we are aware of several burning issues. Perhaps the most significant today are those concerning Egypt, Israel-Arab relations, Iran, and Kashmir.

In the cases of Egypt and Iran, our concern is to assist in establishing rapprochement with the West as a friend of both parties to disputes of long standing. A very signal advance has been made in Anglo-Egyptian relations through recent agreement on the issue of the Sudan. What lies ahead is a solution to the problem of the Suez and the establishment of new agreements to provide for the defense not only of this vital installation but of the political independence of all the friendly states of the area. I am certain that our Government will continue to lend friendly counsel and support to such understandings. We cannot,

today, be as hopeful in commenting on the difficulties which face Iran, but if we fail it will not be for lack of trying.

In the cases of Kashmir and Palestine, our efforts have been centered and will most likely continue to be centered in the appropriate organs of the United Nations. And here I think it fair and just to emphasize to you that the organization of the United Nations has proved an indispensable vehicle for presenting the issues in these two cases to world opinion, and in providing to the parties in dispute the moderating counsel of able and wise statesmen of nations not directly concerned in the special issues. There can be no substitute for an orderly clearinghouse of debate in such cases. In providing the means of conciliatory attempts in these two instances alone, the United Nations has justified its existence. The fact that issues in Palestine and Kashmir are still unsettled, and will probably continue to test the good will and ingenuity of all interested parties for some time to come, need not detract from this tribute to a nobly conceived instrument of international policy. I would predict that we will continue to support the U.N. organization in its efforts to solve the outstanding problems of Palestine, Kashmir, and of other issues. And I am equally certain that you who are concerned with the trade of the Middle East, be it tea or any other item of international trade, have a vital interest in the peaceful settlement of all these disputes.

"Trade—Not Aid"

Now what of the economic side? We can separate out several fields of activity. In the first place, we can hope for continued interest on the part of our Government in the negotiation of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. These treaties are designed to create conditions under which trade between nations can be conducted more freely, and to improve the prospects of the investment of private funds in enterprises abroad. If we analyze thinking in this country today, when the slogan "Trade—Not Aid" is a current catchword, it may be fair to assume that this is a policy which the United States is likely to continue. It is a policy that offers attractive possibilities to all friendly countries of Asia. Without adherence to the principles embodied in these treaties, how can the capital required to develop their economy be attracted in any volume? A basic aim of the standard treaties is to provide safeguards for investors against the many non-business hazards of foreign operations. While the investor must take economic risks of loss to which venture capital is always subject, it is believed that agreements on the international level can overcome other risks which presently cause private capital to shy away from investment overseas. These hazards assume many forms, with which you are more familiar than I. They may arise

from inequitable tax statutes, confiscatory expropriation laws, rigid employment controls, special favors to state-owned businesses, drastic exchange restriction, and other discriminations against foreign capital. It is hoped that both the investment climate and the trading climate can be improved if some of these risks are removed by treaties which establish mutually agreed upon standards of treatment for the citizens and enterprises of both contracting parties.

We also look to the programs of investment guarantee and of reciprocal tax treaties to improve the investment outlook.

Effort To Eliminate Trade Barriers

In the second place we may hope for a continuation of the policy which originated in the thirties and which looks to the removal of restrictions in our own import program, and in the import programs of other countries; to the elimination of barriers to trade, which provide an undesirable and unwarranted degree of protection for domestic markets. If other countries are to earn the dollars which they need to enable them to purchase our exports, they must be able in turn to sell more freely to the United States. Failure to give practical application of this truism in our own policies will set back the clock of world cooperation. Positive steps, administrative and legislative, to liberalize our trading practices can go far not only to provide the basis for expanded trade but also to help by our own example to improve investment climate abroad which is a desideratum of substantially all of our heterogeneous national interests.

Technical Assistance Programs

A third element of the economic policy of our Government, and also of the United Nations, is found in the programs of technical assistance which have such widespread support today throughout the Nation. While this program has been a long time getting on the road, so to speak, it is now becoming a firmly established arm of foreign policy. On the U.S. rolls alone we count 1,500 technicians serving with their colleagues in various countries abroad, 35 nations altogether having agreed to join in this cooperative effort. Here people of high principle and good intent are endeavoring to work alongside their colleagues in other countries in order to adapt the most suitable methods and practices in the fields of agriculture, health, education, and other basic fields to conditions which they find on the spot. We have in a sense made the medical missionary and the agricultural missionary a part of national policy, both through our programs of aid rendered directly by the United States and through our support of the programs of the United Nations. While this is necessarily bound to be a long-term

effort, and its results will not always be immediately apparent, it is in the long run a basis on which we can hope for better things, better living, more stable political conditions throughout all of Asia. In the short run the demonstrable fact of our interest has already gone far to counteract the design of the enemies of the West. Appreciation of the benefits of this program and a clear understanding that it is not to be confused with such terms as imperialism have been forcefully expressed recently by many delegations to the Conference of the Economic Commission of the Far East. The idea is catching on and doing good. This is not to say it is all plain sailing or that a program of such wide scope can be wholly successful and always conducted to best advantage.

In addition to the programs of technical assistance, but closely connected with them, are programs involving the use of governmental capital funds abroad for large-scale developments mainly centered in the fields of water utilization, land reclamation, and transportation. Tools at hand include the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, to which the United States has made a large subscription and whose obligations are marketed in the money market of the United States as well as the market of Western Europe. These institutions are technically equipped to make very substantial contributions to the economies of the Middle East. While we have seen on occasion frustrating delays in the application of their funds, these delays largely stem from considerations of a technical nature. The engineering homework must be done first before construction can start and capital be put to work. These well-managed and highly regarded institutions will have an increasingly important role to play in the days to come.

Extension of Grant Aid

Another and more controversial element in our policy has been the extension of grant assistance to the underdeveloped countries. Over and above technical assistance, and over and above the borrowing capacity of the countries with whose interests we are associated, there can be made a case in certain instances for direct grants. This is admittedly a dangerous field, as it is unsound and unwise to permit grants to be a substitute for resources which otherwise might be turned into capital account. If "borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry," grants may dull it more. On the other hand, temporary grant assistance can be justified in certain special cases where emergencies cannot otherwise be met. Technical services cannot always be effective without ready sources of supply. Therefore the element of judicious grant aid is one to which I am certain that the Government will continue to give its attention.

In closing, let me repeat that the new Administration is working out the emphasis and the detail of these and other policies. My remarks are not intended to convey any impression of finality, but are merely to paint a broad picture. Our Western community is faced with a great challenge in joining its moral and material interests with the interests of the Middle East. It is going to take all our will, all our strength, all our determination, and the wise use of our human and material resources to meet this challenge.

East-West Trade Controls To Be Tightened

The Director for Mutual Security, Harold E. Stassen, on March 3 announced a 7-point program to tighten up East-West trade controls under the Battle Act. The text of Mr. Stassen's announcement follows:

Communist-made weapons and munitions are now being used in the Korean war to commit aggression against the United Nations and to kill and wound men of the United Nations forces including soldiers of the Republic of Korea, United States, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Australia, Greece, France, the Netherlands, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

Communist-made weapons and munitions are being used in the Indochinese war against the Vietnamese and French forces in a violent illegal action seeking to overthrow the established Government.

Under these circumstances every possible effort should be made to prevent strategic supplies from reaching the Soviet bloc. Much has been done by the free and sovereign nations, including the United States. Much more needs to be done. Much more will be done under President Eisenhower's new Administration.

Our increased efforts will include these measures:

(1) Special moves against what I call the "Triple C Men." These are the "Capitalist-Communist-Collaborators" who operate beyond the law and, in a greedy drive for profits, carry on an underground trade sending strategic materials into the Communist area.

(2) Peaceable but effective measures to stop the sly movement of ships carrying strategic materials on a transshipment basis from the West to the Communist area. Special attention will be given to ships originally built and owned by the United States and later sold to foreign nationals or registered under foreign flags.

(3) Cooperation with the appropriate investigating committees of the Congress to develop the facts and devise any remedies necessary.

(4) Study and consultation with the Foreign

Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees of any further legislative measures needed to carry out more effectively the intent of the Battle Act.

(5) Appropriate participation in the negotiations conducted by the Department of State with other free nations for the more effective control of strategic materials and of shipping.

(6) Coordination with the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, and other Departments and Agencies in a combined program of pertinent administrative action.

(7) Appointment of Gen. William J. Donovan as special consultant in East-West trade control.

“A Trade and Tariff Policy in the National Interest”

SUMMARY OF THE BELL MISSION'S REPORT¹

A Trade and Tariff Policy in the National Interest is the title of a 119-page report received by President Eisenhower from the Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security. This report was presented to the President on behalf of the Board by its acting chairman, Daniel W. Bell, president of the American Security and Trust Company, Washington, D. C., and former Under Secretary of the Treasury.

In releasing the report on March 5, Mr. Bell quoted the President as expressing his appreciation to the members of the Board for their work in the preparation of the report. The President indicated further that he would refer it to various departments of the Government for consideration.

The report warns that “if this country does not soon take measures to facilitate an increase in imports, U.S. exports will decline and American industry and agriculture will be seriously affected.” Moreover, the report finds certain U.S. trade policies to be in conflict with U.S. foreign policy, thereby weakening American leadership and threatening the strength of the free world.

The report recommends 10 steps to encourage an increase in imports to help pay for exports:

1. That decisions on trade policy be based on national interest, rather than the interest of particular industries or groups; that in cases where choice must be made between injury to the national interest and hardship to an industry, the industry be helped to make adjustments by means other

than excluding imports—such as through extension of unemployment insurance, assistance in retraining workers, diversification of production, and conversion to other lines.

2. That a new simplified tariff act be adopted, providing for general reductions of duties and eliminating present uncertainties in the classification of goods by consolidating the many hundreds of present tariff rates into seven basic schedules: a Free List, four groupings of commodities bearing duties of 10, 20, 30, and 40 percent ad valorem, a Specific List for basic agricultural and mineral raw materials, and an Extraordinary List where commodities might be placed whose importation, for security or other reasons, should be limited by quotas or other restrictions, or by exceptionally high rates; that Congress establish appropriate standards for such an act and authorize the President to develop and carry out its details.

3. That the President be authorized to enter into reciprocal trade agreements without limit of time and with power to reduce tariffs, within specified limits, in return for reductions in tariffs or restrictions by other countries.

4. That, as an interim measure, customs procedures be simplified by prompt passage of a bill similar to that recommended by the Treasury and passed by the House of Representatives in 1951; that a commission be created to study and propose further measures of customs simplification.

5. That tariffs be reduced, and quotas on agricultural products be liberalized to allow the freer import of goods that are not produced in this country in sufficient quantity at world prices; that Section 104 of the Defense Production Act,

¹ This summary was released to the press on March 5 by the Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security. Copies of the report may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents.

For text of President Truman's letter of July 13, 1952, requesting the Board to undertake a survey of U.S. trade policies, and a list of the Board's members, see BULLETIN of July 21, 1952, p. 104.

restricting the import of certain agricultural products, be repealed.

6. That tariffs be reduced and in some cases ultimately eliminated on metals and minerals of which imports are a major part of U.S. supplies; that, where necessary for defense reasons, domestic production be encouraged through special purchases or contracts rather than tariffs.

7. That import excise taxes now applying to petroleum products be dropped; that, if imports reach a level where they impede domestic exploration and development, other measures be taken to assure a domestic industry adequate to defense needs.

8. That cargo preference, by which 50 percent of the cargo on aid and loan shipments is reserved to domestic carriers, not be applied to countries that let American shippers compete on a fair basis.

9. That the procurement policies of the Government which raise the cost of goods bought by the Government be reconsidered in the light of the principles and objectives of a foreign trade policy in the national interest.

10. That the Congress take the necessary steps to enable the United States to join in establishing an international organization to promote the objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); that active participation be continued in other international organizations to promote fair exchange and fair labor practices and the flow of investment capital.

The Choice Before Us

The report points out that from 1946 to 1952 the rest of the world received 34 billion dollars more goods from the United States than it sold here. While the gap has been reduced, it is still so large as to pose this problem: Shall this country accept a decline in its foreign sales, or shall it attempt to maintain these sales by taking more goods from abroad in payment? That is the choice before the American people—unless they are willing to pay taxes to continue large-scale aid programs.

There is no question which answer other countries would prefer. They want to continue to buy from us and would like to pay their way by selling more to us.

The Board suggests that it is equally in the U.S. interest to sell more by buying more. The U.S. stake in world trade is large. Exports of manufactures amounted in 1951 to 10 billion dollars while agricultural exports for the same period were 4 billion dollars, or nearly one-eighth of total cash farm receipts. Were this trade to be diminished substantially, the whole economy would suffer. The report warns

The inability of other countries to earn more dollars will compel them to restrict imports from the United States as aid is reduced. . . . The free world, if the dollar

problem continues, will be divided into dollar and non-dollar blocs; the economic situation of the nondollar regions will deteriorate; the exports of the United States will be sharply reduced; and restrictions and discriminations against American exports will inevitably be intensified.

How Can Imports Be Increased?

The Board believes that imports by themselves cannot be expanded sufficiently within the foreseeable future to close the entire dollar gap. It suggests, however, that prompt enactment of its recommendations would enable foreign countries to expand their sales to us by 700 million to 1 billion dollars annually within 3 to 5 years. Together with measures that should be taken by other countries, this would make possible a constructive solution of the free world's dollar payments problem.

The Board does not believe that completely free trade is feasible in the immediate future. Its proposal for consolidating, simplifying, and reducing tariffs is suggested as a practical means of achieving trade policy objectives. "A widespread but moderate reduction in tariff rates could have a substantial effect in encouraging imports," it points out. "At the same time, its moderation would avoid extreme needs for adjustment" in domestic industries.

As for customs laws and regulations, the report observes that "many goods take longer to pass through customs than it took Columbus to discover America." A customs simplification law is urgently needed. Other restrictions, such as quotas on certain agricultural commodities which U.S. farmers do not produce in sufficient quantity to meet domestic needs, should be reduced or removed. This country should offer to remove the 50 percent cargo preference provision on aid and loan shipments where other nations permit Americans equal competitive opportunities with their own merchant marine. The "Buy American" Act, which adds a 25 percent supertariff to the cost of goods bought by the Government, should be reconsidered.

Adjustment to Increased Imports

The report, in arguing for a foreign-trade policy in the interest of the nation as a whole, points out that the "Escape Clause" and "Peril Point" provisions of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act are concerned exclusively with the interest of domestic producers faced with threat of competition from imports. The study states:

There is nothing to indicate that consumers have a right to buy the goods they prefer whether domestic or imported. There is nothing in the law to indicate that American business, agriculture and labor have a right to export the goods they produce and that a penalty on imports is a penalty on exports. There is nothing in the law to indicate that a higher level of trade and better balance in international payments and the effect of trade on foreign relations are relevant matters for considera-

tion in determining whether imports are to come into the United States.

The report recognizes that an increase in manufacturing imports might "displace the output of 60,000 to 90,000 workers" or less than one out of 1,000 workers, and well under the normal displacement occurring from a variety of other factors. The actual displacement, however, might well be less than half this figure because many industries would convert to other products.

The report recommends that the Federal Government help with the reconversion problem by retraining workers and longer-than-ordinary unemployment insurance benefits, and that consideration also be given to loans for industries for adjustment purposes. While there are problems in reconciling a liberal trade policy with the objectives of domestic agricultural programs, ways should be found to accomplish the latter objective without prejudicing the former. Agriculture's interest in export markets is particularly great.

The conclusion reached by the report is that the choice the United States should make is one which recognizes its interest in continuing its present export program by increasing imports. This means that the United States, which for years has been hobbled by inconsistencies between its trade and foreign policies, must undertake a new trade policy.

That policy must be based on the interest of the nation as a whole, not alone on the special interests of any small groups of producers. High and unnecessary tariffs on many goods discourage imports. The complexity of the tariff structure and the cumbersome customs procedure made importing an expensive and uncertain business. And there are quotas and prohibitions on imports of agricultural products which severely limit and even exclude goods that should be imported. These restrictions do great harm to the American economy. The reduction of such barriers to trade would be an essential part of any trade policy based on the national interest.

MSA Submits Report on Formosa's Postwar Development

The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) reported on March 3 that one of the "great difficulties" facing the Chinese Government on Formosa is "the continuing problem of supporting the heavy military burden."

In its latest monthly report to its Public Advisory Board released on March 3, MSA said that the problem of supporting the military effort is one of three economic difficulties which the Government of the Republic of China "recognizes . . . remain ahead." Describing the other two as the problems of meeting the needs of a steadily increasing population and warding off the ever-present pressures of inflation, the report added: "But the Chinese have taken a constructive step forward toward overcoming these difficulties by developing a specific plan of action to guide the

efforts of both the Government and the people on Formosa."

A special section of the new MSA report is titled "The Republic of China on Formosa—Economic Problems and Progress." Highlighted with statistical graphs and charts, it traces the agricultural and industrial development of the Chinese island since it became the headquarters for the Government of the Republic of China.

As a result of its need to maintain a strong military position, the report said Formosa has faced four major economic problems—financing the military budget, raising production levels, overcoming a trade deficit, and combating inflationary pressures.

The Chinese Government, the report noted, has drawn up a 4-year plan under which the island can become economically self-supporting. Covering the period 1953–56, the plan, based on annually decreasing amounts of American aid, calls for (1) further expansion of agricultural and industrial output; (2) budgeting annual export and import requirements; (3) increasing national income; (4) balancing the national budget; and (5) greater encouragement to private investment.

Elaborating on the last point, the MSA report said:

Realizing that neither Government funds nor MSA assistance, by themselves, can fully develop Formosa's resources, the Chinese are trying to encourage greater private investment—both domestic and foreign—in Formosan industry. To aid these efforts, the MSA industrial guaranty program—which guarantees American investors against inability to convert foreign currency receipts and against loss from expropriation or confiscation—was made applicable to Formosa in June 1952.

In its detailed discussions of the various programs, the report listed accomplishments of the agriculture-development program carried on through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, with emphasis on land-reform progress.

As one phase of the industrial-development program, the report noted, the Chinese are stressing output of a number of items which the Japanese had previously supplied to Formosa from their own homeland resources. For example, particular emphasis has been put on textile and fertilizer manufacture. Textile industries now have almost 130,000 spindles where virtually none existed before the war. Production of chemical fertilizer has reached more than 135,000 tons annually, as compared to about 30,000 tons in 1941.

The report pointed out that "although Formosa's products in 1952 were sold to some 30 countries, Japan continued to remain the island's largest trading partner." Almost half of Formosa's foreign trade is with Japan.

The MSA defense-support program finances such items as petroleum for the military forces, cloth for uniforms, equipment for military hospitals, and construction materials for military installations.

In addition, the report said:

MSA has also helped strengthen Formosa's military potential by promoting the construction and improvement of basic facilities—such as highways, bridges, and harbors—which can be used jointly by the armed forces for strategic purposes.

Giving a statistical report of MSA aid to Formosa for the period between June 5, 1950, and December 31, 1952, the report said that authorizations for commodity purchases totaled 236.8 million dollars, of which 41.9 million dollars was for military-support items. The total also included 56.3 million dollars for commodities in the field of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. Another major classification was 23.7 million dollars for the field of transportation, power, and other public works. These figures are exclusive of about 27 million dollars of American aid to Formosa prior to June 5, 1950.

Working Committee To Discuss Transfer of Japanese Assets

Press release 115 dated March 2

Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan requires that Japan transfer its assets in countries which were neutral during World War II or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee for the Red Cross for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families. Ways and means of carrying out the provisions of article 16 will be discussed by a Working Committee, composed of representatives of the principal beneficiary countries, which is to meet at London on March 4, 1953. These beneficiary countries are Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Vietnam, United Kingdom, and the United States.

The U.S. representative on the Working Committee will be Arthur R. Ringwalt, First Secretary of the American Embassy at London. Mr. Ringwalt will be assisted by Mayte B. Greene, of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, and Stanley D. Metzger, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State.

The full text of article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan reads as follows:

As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14 (a) 2 (II) (ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the

first coming into force of the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions.

Terms of Settlement of German Obligations for Austrian Debts

Press release 118 dated March 3

*Following is the text of a press release issued at London on February 27, 1953, by the Tripartite Commission on German Debts at the time of the signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement on German External Debts:*¹

Terms of settlement regarding the obligations of the German Federal Republic in respect of debts due under Austrian external loans and certain other Austrian debts, which accrued during the period of the *Anschluss*, have been agreed by the parties concerned. Under the terms of the Agreement on German External Debts signed today these agreements on Austrian debts have to be approved by the Governments represented on the Tripartite Commission on German Debts. These three Governments have indicated their approval of these agreements subject to the completion of satisfactory validation procedures, where such procedures are applicable.

The following is a summary of the terms of settlements referred to:

Seven percent International Federal Loan 1930 of the Republic of Austria

The Federal Republic of Germany will pay to the paying agents, in the currencies required for the various *tranches*, the sums necessary for the 75 percent redemption of the coupons of the 7 percent International Federal Loan of the Federal Republic of Austria, 1930, which has become due for the period between 12th March 1938 and 8th May 1945. These funds will be allocated for the

<i>Coupon maturity dates</i>	<i>on</i>
1 July 1938	1 July 1953
1 January 1939 and 1 July 1939	1 July 1954
1 January 1940	1 July 1955
1 July 1940 and 1 January 1941	1 July 1956
1 July 1941	1 July 1957
1 January 1942 and 1 July 1942	1 July 1958
1 January 1943	1 July 1959
1 July 1943 and 1 January 1944	1 July 1960
1 July 1944	1 July 1961
1 January 1945	1 July 1962

At the same dates the Federal Republic of Germany will reimburse the paying agents and the trustee for the costs, fees, and expenses for the coupon maturity dates concerned, calculated according to the amounts actually disbursed.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar 9, 1953, p. 373.

Austrian Credit-Anstalt Bonds 1936

The Federal Republic of Germany will pay to the paying agents in the currencies required for the various *tranches* the sums necessary for the redemption of the amortization coupons of the Austrian Credit-Anstalt-Government Bonds 1936 which have become due for the period between 12th March 1938 and 8th May 1945. These funds will be allocated for the

<i>Redemption maturity dates</i>	<i>on</i>
1 September 1938, 1 March 1939 and 1 September 1939	1 July 1953
1 March 1940, 1 September 1940 and 1 March 1941	1 July 1954
1 September 1941, 1 March 1942 and 1 September 1942	1 July 1955
1 March 1943, 1 September 1943 and 1 March 1944	1 July 1956
1 September 1944 and 1 March 1945	1 July 1957

Austrian Loans Serviced through the Caisse Commune

- (i) Austrian Government Gold Rentes, 4 percent;
- (ii) Austrian 4½ percent redeemable Treasury Notes 1914;
- (iii) Austro-Hungarian Chartered State Railway (STEG) Bonds

The Federal Republic of Germany will pay to the Caisse Commune, in settlement of all claims which could be advanced against it for any reason regarding the above-mentioned loans, a total amount in the currencies involved to the equivalent of:

4,154,213 DM

which shall be paid by yearly instalments at the rate of exchange ruling on the appropriate date as follows:

equivalent of 689,895 DM on 1st July 1953
" 749,120 DM on 1st July 1954
" 818,663 DM on 1st July 1955
" 900,323 DM on 1st July 1956
" 996,212 DM on 1st July 1957

Five Percent Guaranteed Funding Bonds 1923 and 1926 of the Republic of Austria

The Federal Republic of Germany will pay, to the paying agent, in full settlement of all claims which can be advanced against it in respect of the above-mentioned bonds in French hands, a total amount in French francs equivalent on the basis of the rate of exchange ruling on 1st July, 1953 to 135,795 DM plus expenses.

Austrian Government International Guaranteed Loan 1933 and the Austrian Guaranteed Conversion Loan 1934

The German Federal Republic will pay, in settlement of all claims of whatever nature due to the Guarantor Governments (with the exception of Czechoslovakia), arising out of the above-mentioned loans, in respect of the period 12th March, 1933 to 8th May, 1945, a global sum in

various currencies which, expressed in sterling at the present rates of exchange, amounts to £3,600,000. The foreign currency quotas in which this amount will be payable will be communicated to the German Delegation in due course.

The resultant amounts, established in accordance with the rates of exchange at present ruling between the £-sterling and the various currencies, will be payable in fifteen annual instalments on 1st July of each year, beginning on 1st July, 1953.

Contributions to Netherlands Disaster Fund

Press release 117 dated March 3

At a meeting in Secretary Dulles' office on March 3, the Secretary received a report from Clarence G. Michalis, national chairman of Holland Flood Relief, Inc., that cash contributions to his organization now total more than \$750,000. Mr. Michalis said that the personal property losses of flood victims are still many times the amount that has been contributed to date to the Netherlands Disaster Fund by his and other organizations, and that the cost of rehabilitating farms and homes may reach the equivalent of \$100,000,000.

Secretary Dulles said that the strength of the free world solidarity had been demonstrated by the immediate wave of sympathy by people everywhere for the personal tragedy that had struck thousands of Dutch, Belgians, and British.

Contributions to the Dutch from many countries, through the League of Red Cross Societies, now total more than 6 million dollars. In addition to the money and many tons of clothing contributed through Holland Flood Relief, Inc., Americans have contributed to the three countries, through established relief agencies, at least \$550,000. The agencies involved include the American Red Cross, CARE, Church World Service, National Catholic Welfare Conference, American Baptist Relief, Foster Parents Plan, Save the Children Federation, Mennonite Central Committee, Salvation Army, and the Lutheran World Relief.

Mr. Michalis is president of the Seamen's Bank for Savings, New York. He was accompanied by Albert Balink, national executive secretary of Holland Flood Relief, Inc.

Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia Makes Courtesy Calls

White House Call

White House press release dated March 2

The President received His Royal Highness Prince Faisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia on March 2 at the White House. During the meeting matters of mutual interest to Saudi Arabia and the United States were discussed. The President expressed his great pleasure at having

the opportunity of receiving so distinguished a representative of a country with which the United States enjoys especially close relations. He expressed his concern over some evidence that there had lately occurred a deterioration in relations between the Arab nations and the United States. He stated that it would be his firm purpose to seek to restore the spirit of confidence and trust which had previously characterized these relations and he hoped that the Arab leaders would be inspired by the same purpose.

The President alluded to the many strong educational and cultural ties which had developed between the Arab world and the United States over a period of many decades and stated that he was confident that this provided a foundation of good will on which to build during the coming years to mutual advantage. The President also emphasized his great personal interest in the welfare and progress of Saudi Arabia and the other States in the Near East. The President requested Prince Faisal to convey his cordial greetings to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud.

Call on Secretary Dulles

Press release 114 dated March 2

His Royal Highness Prince Faisal Al Saud, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, called on Secretary Dulles on March 2.

Prince Faisal, second son of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, is Viceroy of the Hejaz as well as Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia. He arrived in the United States to act as chairman of his country's delegation to the Seventh General Assembly, and since the close of the first part of the session has made an extensive tour of the United States.

He called on Secretary Dulles to pay his respects on behalf of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, and to discuss matters of mutual interest between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Dr. Adenauer To Be Guest of the President

White House press release dated March 6

Dr. Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, will be in Washington as the guest of the President from April 7 to 9. The Secretary of State during his recent trip to Europe conveyed the President's invitation to the Chancellor for a visit to the United States. Since the Secretary's return to the United States, the dates of April 7, 8, and 9 have been agreed upon as satisfactory by the two Governments.

During Dr. Adenauer's stay in Washington he will be the guest of the President, staying at Blair House and attending a luncheon at the White House. It is also expected that President Eisenhower will participate in talks with the head of

the Government of the Federal Republic insofar as his schedule may permit. No agenda for the talks has yet been determined, but broad problems of mutual interest will be covered.

Visit of French Ministers

White House press release dated March 6

On behalf of the President, the Secretary of State, during his recent trip to Europe, conveyed an invitation to the Prime Minister of France, M. René Mayer, and to the Foreign Minister, M. Georges Bidault, to visit the United States. The dates for this visit have now been set for March 26, 27, and 28. The Prime Minister will also be accompanied by the Minister of Finance, M. Maurice Bourges-Maunoury and the Minister for the Associated States of Indochina, M. Jean Letourneau.

During the French Ministers' visit, they will stay at Blair House and attend a luncheon at the White House. It is expected that President Eisenhower, insofar as his schedule may permit, will participate in the talks of the French Ministers with officials of his administration. No agenda for the talks has yet been determined, but broad problems of mutual interest will be covered at that time.

Belgian Foreign Minister Visits U.S.

Press release 136 dated March 14

Paul Van Zeeland, Foreign Minister of Belgium, will arrive at Washington on March 14 and will remain until March 18.

During his stay here he will meet with the Secretary of State and other Government officials. He will be entertained by the Secretary at dinner on Monday evening and at lunch by Representative Robert B. Chipfield on Tuesday, March 17. He will address the National Press Club at a lunch on Wednesday, March 18. Baron Silvercruys, Ambassador of Belgium, will give a dinner in his honor on Tuesday evening.

On leaving Washington, M. Van Zeeland will go to U.N. Headquarters in New York where he intends to spend a few days.

U.S., Canada Sign Halibut Fishery Convention

Press release 113 dated March 2

Representatives of the Government of the United States and of Canada on March 2 signed at Ottawa a Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea. The convention was signed on behalf of the United States of America by the

Chargé d'Affaires *ad interim*, Don C. Bliss, and by the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Under Secretary of State, William C. Herrington, and on behalf of Canada by the Minister of Fisheries, James Sinclair, and the Minister of Veterans Affairs, Hugues Lapointe.

The Prime Minister of Canada, L. S. St. Laurent, presided at the ceremony which celebrated the 30th anniversary of the signing of the first halibut fishery convention between the United States and Canada. This convention established the International Fisheries Commission, now to be known as the International Pacific Halibut Commission.

Military Assistance Agreement With Dominican Republic

The Departments of State and Defense announced on March 6 that a bilateral military-assistance agreement was concluded with the Government of the Dominican Republic.

The agreement was signed in Washington on behalf of the United States by John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State, and on behalf of the Dominican Republic by Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic. Negotiations looking toward the conclusion of this agreement were commenced in Ciudad Trujillo on September 22, 1952.¹

The agreement is the eighth bilateral military-assistance agreement which the United States has concluded with another American Republic. The other agreements, all very similar, are with Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay. The program of grant-aid military assistance to be carried out under these agreements was authorized by the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and is designed to assist the countries concerned in developing their capabilities to join in hemisphere defense missions which are important to the security of all the American Republics.

The agreement concluded with the Dominican Republic is consistent with, and conforms to, inter-American instruments already in effect, such as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio treaty), the resolution on inter-American military cooperation approved at the Washington Meeting of Foreign Ministers of 1951, and the continuous planning of the Inter-American Defense Board.²

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1952, p. 537.

² For text of the agreement, see Department of State press release 129 of Mar. 6.

Credit to Brazil To Assist Liquidation of Commercial Arrears

The Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington on February 21 announced the extension of a line of credit of up to 300 million dollars to assist Brazil in liquidating its past due U.S. dollar accounts.

The granting of the credit follows months of negotiation between the Governments of the United States and Brazil subsequent to the visit to the United States in September 1952 of Minister of Finance Lafer of Brazil. These negotiations were conducted on behalf of Brazil by Ambassador Walther Moreira Salles. In December 1952, technical experts of the Banco do Brasil spent several weeks in Washington with representatives of the Export-Import Bank discussing and analyzing Brazil's foreign-exchange position, including its arrearages on U.S. dollar accounts. In the first 2 weeks of January of this year two representatives of the Export-Import Bank went to Brazil and had further discussions with representatives of the Bank of Brazil and the Ministry of Finance on the details of the problem.

During the course of these lengthy negotiations, Brazil was engaged in setting the stage for instituting a free exchange market. In December the Congress of Brazil enacted legislation providing for such a market, which legislation was approved by President Vargas on January 7, 1953. Appropriate regulations have been promulgated providing for the institution of the free exchange market on February 21, 1953. While the free exchange market will be a limited one, particularly at the outset, it is hoped that it will play a vital part in increasing Brazil's exports and the flow of private capital into Brazil.

The credit is being extended to the Banco do Brasil and will bear interest at the rate of 3½ percent per annum and will be repayable over a period of 3 years beginning next fall.

By supplementing the credit with its own resources, Brazil will undertake to be current on U.S. dollar account by July 1, 1953, and to institute and maintain a prompt remittance system for current imports from the United States.

Brazil is carrying forward a broad program to solve its economic problems and the payment of the commercial backlog is essential to the success of this plan. The liquidation of commercial arrears and the institution of a prompt payment system represents the determination of Brazil to re-establish normal and healthy relations with the U.S. business community. The success of the loan negotiations is also in the best tradition in the long history of friendly political, economic, and military cooperation between the two countries.

The Free World's Responsibility for Korean Reconstruction

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 7

In the brief remarks which I shall make, I shall speak first of the resolution on economic assistance to Korea² and then conclude with a few observations on the broad underlying proposition of ending the fighting.

The Communist aggression in Korea has not only caused great military burdens. It has also created grave economic problems. Destruction, hunger, sickness, grief, and misery have overwhelmed millions of South Koreans. Both military commanders and U.N. agencies early recognized that extraordinary steps would be necessary to combat these ravages. Fifty-two countries, both members and nonmembers of the United Nations, have contributed to that end, and I shall review briefly some of the achievements because they are impressive.

In the first weeks of the Communist onslaught, the U.N. Civil Assistance Command in Korea comforted more than 2 million refugees and war sufferers. Special feeding stations and medical teams were established along the main refugee routes to provide emergency rations and medical care. Special provisions were made for housing. In preparation for the winter, tents for the civilian population were ordered by the thousands, blankets by the hundreds of thousands, dried milk and soap by the ton.

As the U.N. armies turned the tide and moved northward, another 900,000 refugees from Communist aggression increased the size of the multitude needing care. Later, when the Chinese Communists joined the aggression, the U.N. Command was faced with the movement of stricken humanity unprecedented in modern times, which according to the military relief authorities' report of September 30, 1951, was greater even than that in Europe at the end of World War II. That is

¹ Made in Committee I (Political and Security) on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

² U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L. 21 dated Mar. 5. The Committee approved the resolution on Mar. 9 by a vote of 55 to 5 (Soviet bloc).

a fact I think that many people do not realize. Nearly 5 million persons, including hundreds of thousands who fled from North Korea, required outside help in order to survive.

One of the remarkable international emergency human-welfare operations of our day occurred at this time. While the U.N. forces were still locked in battle in the Pusan perimeter, medical and sanitation supplies were taken in by airlift from Japan. Teams of Korean doctors, nurses, and technicians were organized to use them. Later, in a 7-month period in 1951, 67 percent of the Korean population were immunized against typhus, 87 percent against typhoid, and 70 percent against smallpox. By the end of the summer of that year, 75 percent of the population had been protected against communicable diseases by being dusted by DDT powder.

In the critical first 9 months of 1951, inpatient care was provided by special medical units to over 1,750,000 persons, and outpatient care to more than 5,250,000 persons. This 9-month total exceeds the combined population of Boston, Milan, Cairo, New Delhi, Valparaiso, and The Hague.

These are the facts, in sketchy form, covering only the early critical months of the Korean conflict. But, moving as they are, they represent simply a support operation for the Korean people themselves. The Korean people have been sturdy under a great trial. They have been resourceful in using the materials at hand. They have been patient in extreme adversity. Their contribution to the defense of freedom in this bitter struggle can never be computed nor can the free world calculate its debt to them. By their incalculable sufferings they have earned our confidence and profound admiration.

As the war continues, their resistance requires our continued aid. We must be alert to the danger that by the sapping of civilian strength the aggressors might achieve the goal they have failed to win by military assault. The United Nations has played and must continue to play a vital role in this operation.

From the very first, the United Nations has been the vehicle and the agent by which extensive amounts of relief have been funneled to the Korean people from both governments and private organizations. In the early days the Security Council by its resolution of July 31, 1950, put all emergency relief in the hands of the Unified Command. By the end of 1952, more than 30 governments, both members and nonmembers of the United Nations, had contributed to the program. Contributions since the outbreak of hostilities have totaled \$358,000,000. Of this sum, \$321,688,000, exclusive of services, was contributed by the U.S. Government, and \$17,389,000 by other governments. In addition, the U.N. specialized agencies and private voluntary organizations in many countries have contributed almost \$20,000,000 through gifts of funds, clothing, medicines, and other supplies.

This is what is called the emergency program. Through it the U.N. Command prevented mass starvation and epidemic disease under extremely difficult conditions. This is no small feat in a country where a large proportion of the people have been displaced and where active military operations continue.

In addition, the U.N. Command has made substantial repairs to mainline railroads, bridges, and highways, to municipal water systems, and to power generating and distributing systems. These are considerable accomplishments. But they have not been enough to secure for the Koreans that rehabilitation of their economy which is the only real answer to the Communist destruction.

The Korean Rehabilitation Program

The need for such rehabilitation was seen by the General Assembly as early as December 1950. To fit that need the Fifth Assembly created the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency. This reconstruction program was to be undertaken as a supplement for the general recovery program of the Korean people. Emphasis was to be placed on rehabilitation. Its purpose was to get them back to the point where they could stand on their own feet and develop their own country in their own way.

Upon the passage of the resolution creating the Reconstruction Agency, a Negotiating Committee was set up by the General Assembly to solicit contributions toward an initial fund of \$250,000,000. Pledges were received totaling \$205,000,000, of which the United States offered \$162,500,000.

In the meantime, the continuation of the Korean conflict has severely restricted the scope of operation of the organization. All of the peninsula is a war area. In these circumstances, the full-scale rehabilitation work of the Reconstruction Agency could not be undertaken. With the aid of the specialized agencies it has, however, provided extensive assistance to the Civil Assistance Command

by supplying teams of experts in specialized fields such as agriculture, health, and sanitation. Some 130 of these experts are now in Korea with the U.N. Command, all paid for with Reconstruction Agency funds.

In recent months it has been possible to undertake an expansion of U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency activities, and, in cooperation with the Unified Command, a program of \$70,000,000 has been approved, some of which is now under way. Under it, grain and consumer goods are being imported to help combat inflation. The rehabilitation of the Taegu Medical College and Hospital is in progress. Supplies are being purchased for the production of vaccines at the National Veterinary Laboratory; preparations are under way for dredging and restoring the harbor of Kunsan, thereby relieving other ports. Engineers are surveying the possibilities of increasing coal production, and work has been started in housing, education, vocational training, school repair, and health clinics.

This is only a beginning but it is symbolic. In the struggle for freedom, those who pay the greatest price, whose native land bears the scars of conflict—these, the valiant, must not be abandoned to the barren prospect of a victory of devastation. The totalitarian aggressor is the enemy of democracy; no less an enemy is starvation, disease, and despair of the future.

The sober truth is that no free nation anywhere is immune to attack by the same callous force that has chosen hapless Korea as a testing ground for violent aggression. Let us thank God that the Korean people had the courage to hold the line until other free men could come to their aid—and that they have persevered and have not lost faith.

We must justify that faith by proving that the collective resources of the free world truly stand behind those who do resist. We cannot afford to allow free Koreans to suffer destruction and desolation without aid in the reconstruction of their economy any more than we could allow them to be overrun without coming to their assistance.

If we furnish this necessary help, lovers of freedom everywhere can take hope in the face of the colossal Communist design for tyranny which the world confronts.

The U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency is symbolic of our collective international concern and responsibility to supply the means by which the Korean people can begin to rebuild their unhappy land, to bind up their wounds. It will require continued contributions and sacrifice on the part of every nation and every people. But it is worth the sacrifice since it is indispensable toward the goal of lasting peace.

It is with this purpose that the United States, in collaboration with Canada, Denmark, France, the Philippine Republic, Thailand, and the United Kingdom, has introduced the resolution now before this Committee. Since this resolution was

introduced, an amendment has been offered and circulated by the delegation of Egypt.³ This amendment the sponsors gladly accept.

That concludes the statement that I wish to make about economic assistance. I will conclude my remarks completely with a few words on the basic issue of ending the fighting in Korea.

Waiting for the Soviets

Let me say that one of the enlightening results, to me that is, of our deliberations here in this Committee in the past 10 days has been the clear evidence of the apparent contempt which the delegates from the Communist bloc have not only for us who are assembled in this room, to which I imagine we are accustomed, but a similar contempt for the intelligence of the everyday men and women throughout the world. It is obvious, of course, that they do not expect any of us here to believe the things which they say, and it is also obvious that they do not much care whether we believe them or not. Therefore, the only possible inference that can be drawn is that they do expect someone outside of this room to believe them.

Yet, even when this proposition is submitted to a careful analysis, it becomes manifestly absurd. How could any person in any part of the world believe, for example, that the United States was the aggressor in Korea when within 2 weeks after the Korean war broke out the handful of U.S. forces which were rushed to Korea pursuant to the Security Council appeal were almost pushed back into the sea?

You know, that reminds me of an anecdote which was written by an American humorist who lived back in the 1860's, at the time of our Civil War when Abraham Lincoln was President. In fact, Abraham Lincoln used to read some of his works to give himself some relaxation from the horrors of our Civil War. This man's name was Artemus Ward, and one of the things that he wrote described a contest, in which the man said, "Inserting my nose carefully between my opponent's teeth, I felled him to the floor."

Well, to accuse us of being the aggressor is on a par with that. No one could believe that.

How could anyone believe all this talk about ruling circles? I hear this phrase "ruling circles" all the time. I do not know what the phrase is in Russian, and I can't help but wonder whether it is being translated correctly. There aren't any ruling circles in this country. Anyone who followed the election last November, when there was a complete change of government, knows that there are no ruling circles. Anyone who knows anything about America, which you all do as you all live here in New York, knows that there are no ruling classes and that the Government in this country is operated in accordance with the opinions

of the people and the aspirations and the aims of the people.

I think perhaps the greatest absurdity of the many absurdities which I have heard in the last 10 days is the idea that the American people want war in Korea. I just suggest, and I speak with some personal experience, to the Soviets that any of the delegates of the Communist bloc here ask one single American family who have a son or a brother or a husband in Korea whether they want peace in Korea. It is the craving of the American people for peace in Korea that is in considerable measure responsible for the election of the new Administration. And it is to satisfy that ardent desire for peace that the U.S. Government, which I have the honor to represent here, is dedicated.

I mention this not because I think the statements by the representatives of the Communist bloc do us any harm. They do not do us any harm because they are too fantastic, but they do not do anyone any good. I just suppose they must fill some obscure mystic need in the Communist dream world.

Now, I close by first summarizing the position of the Soviet Union as it was revealed here in the last 10 days, and then reiterating the stand of the free world. This position I think can be summarized this way:

The Soviet Union will not agree to peace in Korea. It will not allow the Chinese Communists and the North Koreans to make peace in Korea. It insists that the war continue to the last Korean and the last Chinese. It insists on continuing the program of subjugating a free Asian nation to foreign tyranny and continues its futile attempt to garb the aggressors in sheep's clothing. It is the stark truth that there could be peace in Korea tomorrow if the Communists accepted the Indian resolution and dropped their insistence that force must be used against prisoners.

At least 95 percent of the 10 facts which I submitted here in my opening speech⁴ concerning the help which the Soviet Union is giving to the aggressors in Korea was admitted by Mr. Vyshinsky—a really staggering admission of guilt which has already had a resounding effect on world opinion and the fundamental nature of which will grow and become more and more evident as the months go by. The figures and facts which I gave about the guns and the tanks, the naval mines and the radar equipment, the conventional planes, and even the most modern and the latest jetplanes, have been admitted by Mr. Vyshinsky to be about 95 percent. That is a very stark contemplation.

On the other hand, the free world remains determined to stand by the Indian resolution and the principle that no prisoner should be returned against his will—a human principle if ever there was one; a principle which clearly delineates the difference between us because it shows where man

³ U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L. 22 dated Mar. 6.

⁴ BULLETIN of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 382.

is considered to be the master of the state and where man is considered to be the servant of the state.

We refuse to support a cease-fire which leaves thousands of U.N. prisoners as hostages in Communist hands. Communist intransigence compels us to face the facts with courage and determination and to continue to strive against aggression until the moral and physical power of the United Nations has had its inevitable effect, which I think will be soon in coming.

We, therefore, are resolved that the action in Korea must be brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible and with a minimum of bloodshed. The United Nations is ever ready to solve the Korean problem honorably by peaceful means.

Soviet Foreign Policy Based on Fear

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 11

It has been obvious from the foundation of the United Nations that it cannot, alone, create peace as long as one of the major powers is dead set the other way. At the last session, the United Nations adopted the Indian resolution which made an extremely fair offer for ending the fighting in Korea—an offer which was acceptable to all of the members of the United Nations except the Soviet Union and its satellites. The Indian resolution, representing the opinions of 54 nations, was contemptuously rejected by the Chinese Communists.² Chou En Lai, the Foreign Minister of the Chinese Communist regime, even went so far as to say in his political report of February 4, that the Korean war “has greatly”, and I quote, “reinforced the strength and influence of the world camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union.” This extremely damaging statement showed first, that Chou En Lai approves of the Korean war and second, it shows the place from which he gets his instructions.

At the opening of the present resumed session, I submitted 10 facts showing that the Soviet Union was actively assisting the aggressors in providing guns, tanks, radar, naval mines, conventional planes, and jet planes. And somewhat to my astonishment, the truth of virtually all of these statements was admitted by the then representative of the Soviet Union; a staggering event, the effects of which on world opinion will become more and more evident with the passage of time.

This morning we have heard the representative of the Soviet Union attack the U.S. Army and

speak of alleged crimes and acts of terror committed by the U.S. Army. I would like to say to him here that the U.S. Army, which you have sought to smear here today, is the same U.S. Army that stood beside the Russian Army to defeat nazism in World War II. The men in the U.S. Army in Korea today are the sons and the younger brothers, and in some cases they are the same men, who made up the U.S. Army in World War II. The U.S. Army was good enough for you in 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1945. It has not changed. It should be good enough for you now, and would be if your Government's position had not so tragically changed.

Millions of Americans remember the time when the Germans made their last great offensive through the so-called Bulge in Belgium and Luxembourg. Throughout the whole front American troops were at that time constantly alerted to German attack. And many of us can well remember the relief with which they heard the news that a few days later on the German eastern front the Russians were again attacking. We remember that with appreciation. In those days, Mr. Representative of the Soviet Union, your country was held in great respect. You had many friends, but you have lost a great deal of that friendship and respect in the years that have gone by.

You have lost them because of the fear which seems to motivate everyone in an official position in your country. This fear is not a rational fear of attack from the outside. The Soviet leaders know full well that they need not have any fear of any aggression against Russia by the free world. It must be a fear of their own people, a fear that stems from the tyranny which they impose on the Soviet people. It is this fear which motivates Soviet imperialism and which gives to the Kremlin leaders these dreams of world dominion.

In 1950, as a delegate to the Fifth General Assembly, I urged the Soviet Union not to be afraid. The more I study the subject, the more I am convinced that fear is at the bottom of all the violent words and violent deeds which distinguish the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. And yet you are trying to block the irresistible onward march of the human race because that onward race is in the direction of increased human rights and increased belief in the dignity of the individual.

At the Political Committee meeting last week, the Soviet representative said to me, “You are going to lose Asia anyway.” That astounding remark made me realize how far apart his view of humanity is from mine. The United States is not trying to get Asia. We have never thought of Asia as some sort of object inhabited by slaves which was to be won or lost by outsiders. We believe that the people of Asia, like the American people and like all other people, have the right to live their own lives and to develop themselves in

¹ Made on Mar. 11 in a plenary session on Korea.

² BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 75. For text of the North Korean rejection of the resolution, see *ibid.*, Mar. 16, 1953, p. 422.

their own way. If, instead of talking about Asia as a prize in some game of power politics, the Soviets would join us in the economic and technical-assistance conferences to help the people of Asia in eradicating disease, in draining the swamps, in irrigating the deserts, in increasing the food supply, then we would be taking a big

step toward peace. But their only answer, so far, is a foreign policy consisting entirely of violent words and violent deeds. This kind of foreign policy will never bind up the wounds of the world, and we look for the day when this truth will be apparent to all, even to the rulers of the Russian people.

Developing the Skills of Pacific Settlement

*Statement by William Sanders
U. S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 12

The 11-power draft resolution now before us² carries forward the program of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. It merits the support of every nation which voted for that resolution. Perhaps it is not too much to hope that it would receive the support it should have from every signer of the Charter of the United Nations.

The draft resolution sponsored by the 11 powers merely confirms and reinforces the program on which, during the last 2 years, we have achieved a wide measure of agreement. I think our discussions in the interval have greatly increased our understanding of the meaning and implications of the Charter idea of collective security contained in the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

The draft resolution now before us offers to the member states and to the Collective Measures Committee a program solidly founded on certain principles expressed in the Uniting for Peace Resolution, all of them inherent in the Charter itself.

These principles are:

1. That the temporary incapacity of the Security Council to fulfill its Charter obligations

¹ Made on Mar. 12 before Committee I (Political and Security) on "Methods Which Might Be Used to Maintain and Strengthen International Peace and Security in Accordance With the Purposes and Principles of the Charter: Report of the Collective Measures Committee."

² U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.27, dated Mar. 12. The 11 powers which sponsored the resolution were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, the Philippines, Turkey, the U.K., the U.S., Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

The General Assembly on Mar. 17 approved the resolution by a vote of 50 to 5 (Soviet bloc). India and Indonesia abstained from voting.

to maintain the peace must not be allowed to incapacitate the whole United Nations.

2. That the General Assembly must develop its own Charter resources for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. That each Member State has an obligation to develop its own capacity to deter or to suppress aggression.

4. That, pending the conclusion of the agreements provided for in Article 43 of the Charter, the United Nations must develop means whereby the Member States can effectively and promptly act together in defense of the peace.

The draft resolution we are now considering, like the Uniting for Peace Resolution, expresses the Assembly's recognition that it must assist member states to prepare themselves to meet the challenge of an interdependent world.

The interdependence of nations, like a small house which shelters a large and growing family, is an argument for peaceful cooperation. It is at the same time a breeder of difficulty and dissension. In such a world, any threat of violence or act of violence is a worldwide danger. Our geographic connection or separation from the potential victim is irrelevant.

The meaning of the U.N. action in Korea goes beyond the fact that aggression in Korea was met by collective action. Additional significance lies in the warning that in the future a would-be aggressor must take into account not only the strength of the immediate victim but the combined strength of the United Nations.

The Uniting for Peace program makes it plain to would-be breakers of the peace that U.N. collective action in Korea is not an accident. It is a precedent.

Program's Sole Aim To Deter Aggression

The resolution and the report³ now before us deal with instruments of peace. The increased capacity of the members of the United Nations to combine their strength in case of need will act as an incentive to pacific settlement. Would-be aggressors are tempted to commit aggression only when they think they can get away with it. We are not faced with a choice between collective security and the pacific settlement of disputes. Collective security protects the road to the conference table.

At San Francisco, when we agreed to take "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace," the aggressor we were organizing to deter and to resist was a nameless, faceless, unidentified figure. By late 1950, when this Assembly approved the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the United Nations had been forced to take the field to put an end to a specific act of aggression. Nevertheless, the Uniting for Peace Resolution was not directed against the North Koreans nor against their allies. It was not directed against any specific nation or nations. The resolution was directed solely against the act of or the threat of aggression.

The resolutions which develop the Uniting for Peace program have no punitive clauses. They say no derogatory word about any member nation. Their whole purpose is the defense of the peace, and they contain no provision which is not directed to that purpose.

The Soviet Union, however, attacked the Uniting for Peace Resolution, and last year's related resolution, as illegal.

The tragedy is that the Soviet Government should actually see, or claim to see, enmity against themselves in this action. They see threats where there is no threat. The face of the enemy seen by the men in the Kremlin can only be their own reflection cast back upon them by the barrier they have raised between themselves and the rest of the world.

It would be less than honest to deny that the present policy of the Soviet Union, as it reveals itself here and around the world, does give a special urgency to the defensive planning of all free nations—in our own capitals, in our regional arrangements, and here in the United Nations. And yet, I must repeat, neither on paper nor in purpose is the resolution before us, nor previous resolutions of the General Assembly, directed against anyone. They are directed only against aggression. Their whole job is to devise methods, in the words of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which "might be used to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and the principles of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defense and regional arrangements." A careful reading of these res-

olutions, and of the two reports of the Committee, cannot help but convince any free mind that no one who plans to live within the framework of the Charter need fear the Uniting for Peace program.

Any nation which feels itself threatened need only join with fellow members of the United Nations in our efforts to mobilize our power to prevent the abuse of power.

In our electronic age, decisive units of time are no longer measured in weeks and days, but in hours, minutes, and even seconds. A 2-day delay in Korea might have seen the aggressor triumphant. We must use the time, bought at such high cost in men and goods in Korea, to develop the means to strengthen universal peace.

The need for speed in mustering resistance to sudden attack obviously puts a premium on advance planning, or at least on preliminary and preparatory thinking of the kind reflected in the two reports of the Collective Measures Committee.

If this is true for a single nation, how much more important it is to discuss and think through in advance the complicated preparation required for the united and coordinated action of many nations. The preparatory work done in advance by individual members or the Committee can be counted as a timesaving asset for all of us, which may some day be converted into lifesaving time for the cause of peace.

In its second report, noted in the resolution now before us, the Committee presents a series of concrete suggestions. It does not ask of states the impossible. Their varying capacities are recognized. While member states are expected to accept their responsibility to unite their strength and effort in furtherance of Charter principles, each state determines for itself, in accordance with its own constitutional procedures and its own capacity, the contribution it can make to the common cause.

During the past year, the Collective Measures Committee gave particular attention to preparatory steps which might be taken by states in respect to armed forces, assistance and facilities, and legislative and administrative arrangements which would enable them to cooperate effectively in collective measures. It considered the role of specialized agencies in a collective-security program. It explored further the problem of the equitable sharing of burdens and of economic assistance to the victims of aggression.

Maximum Participation in Minimum Time

The report suggests the possibility of establishing an *ad hoc* negotiating committee to deal directly with states at the time of collective action by the Security Council or the General Assembly. This is an excellent example of the kind of flexibility that must characterize the work of the Collective Measures Committee, which is necessarily directed toward a wide variety of unspeci-

³ U.N. doc., A/2215 dated October 1952.

fied and unpredictable situations. It does not call upon states to make decisions in advance of the events which must determine these decisions. It does establish a method available to the Council, or to the Assembly, of expediting the slow business of decision and coordination in order to achieve maximum participation of members in minimum time.

The list prepared this year by the Committee, of arms, ammunition, implements of war, and of other strategic items, is another timesaving device now available to speed up the effectiveness of any embargo which may be decided upon or recommended by the Security Council or the General Assembly.

The Committee this year once again reemphasized the importance of mutual assistance in the application of collective measures. Cases may arise in which economic and financial assistance may have to be provided to relieve inordinate burdens on cooperating states. In my Government's view, help should be provided on an equitable basis by all cooperating countries.

So far, the Committee has been able to give no more than preliminary consideration to the Secretary General's proposals for a U.N. Voluntary Reserve. The proposals envisage reserves within national military establishments which could be made available to the United Nations. They were designed to overcome some of the difficulties involved in the creation of a U.N. Legion completely outside national military establishments. The Committee has not been able to explore the proposals sufficiently to take any decision on the merits of their political possibilities or military feasibility. This is a problem to be further explored, and it points up the usefulness of having a Committee which can give such proposals the careful study they require.

In our view, Mr. Chairman, the work of the Collective Measures Committee has been of great value in outlining the problems which confront the General Assembly and the member states in developing and maintaining an effective collective-security system and in pointing ways toward their solution.

We believe that it is important for the Collective Measures Committee to continue its studies of ways and means for strengthening the capacity of the United Nations, particularly in light of the problems revealed by the information received and to be received from states. It is already obvious that some states, which genuinely desire to cooperate in a collective-security system, find it difficult to maintain particular forces available for U.N. action anywhere. It is possible that further study by the Collective Measures Committee might reveal other and more flexible means for such nations to develop the armed assistance which would, under varying circumstances, be promptly made available for collective U.N. action.

The Uniting for Peace program is a long-range

program. It will take time and mutual encouragement for each state to become fully aware of the meaning of its responsibilities to an effective system of collective security. A full acceptance of responsibility cannot help but reveal new ranges of practical difficulties. The Collective Measures Committee can be of continuing help to all of us in thinking through our problems and preparing to meet our responsibilities.

The Committee can also learn much from a study of the preparatory work undertaken in the several states. New ideas may be expected to emerge from the lessons of experience. Such an expanded view of the meaning and possibilities of collective action should encourage wider participation. Thus, regional and collective self-defense arrangements can make important contributions, and even nonmember states are enabled to join their strength with that of the United Nations. In this way, the purpose of the Charter to combine the efforts of *All* peace-loving states in an effective system of coordinated collective security is carried forward.

We welcome the opportunity to join with our colleagues in every active effort to build and reinforce the structure of a just peace. If we deplore the suspicion with which a few of our fellow members look upon these efforts and their refusal to add either their labor or their good will, it is not because we intend to belittle in any way the accomplishments of the Collective Measures Committee in the past, nor its possible usefulness in the future. It is because we recognize the unhappy fact that the achievement of real security must wait until the day when all states are ready to work actively together to fulfill the promises of the Charter.

Meanwhile, we can work with what we have. The better the system we develop, the less likely we are to have to use it. Any system of collective security will have fulfilled its real purpose only if all of our soldiers remain at home, our planes pursue only the commerce of peace, and all of our studies remain in the inactive files.

We cannot escape the paradox inherent in this reality. As has been said: "Justice without force is impotent, force without justice is tyranny." The United Nations is organized to reserve all force for the service of justice, but this aim cannot be achieved until we all assume our full responsibility to see that justice is not impotent.

Looking upon the world as it is, we cannot help but recognize the urgent need to develop the most effective means we can find to prevent the unlawful use of force and to develop the skills of pacific settlement.

For all of these reasons, my Government supports the resolution continuing the constructive work of the Collective Measures Committee. We do so in the fervent hope that it will help us to act together with foresight and with energy to achieve a world devoted to peaceful activities.

U.N. Consideration of Greek Repatriation Issue

*Statement by James J. Wadsworth
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 9

The question now before us in this Committee, like the tragic problem of Greek children, is not new. As pointed out in the explanatory memorandum submitted by the delegation of Greece, the General Assembly adopted a separate resolution on this problem on December 1, 1950. That resolution was adopted after consideration of the unanimous conclusions of the U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans concerning those members of the Greek armed forces who were captured by the Greek guerrillas and taken into countries north and east of Greece where, with the exception of Yugoslavia, they are still being detained.

The Special Committee on the Balkans, in its 1950 report to the General Assembly, pointed out that the members of the Greek armed forces in question cannot be regarded as prisoners of war of the states by whom they are detained and that there is, in fact, no valid basis under international law for their continued detention. In its 1950 resolution on the subject, the General Assembly recommended the repatriation "of all those among them who express the wish to be repatriated," and called upon the states concerned to take the necessary measures for speedy implementation. The International Red Cross Organizations were requested to insure liaison with the national Red Cross Societies of the states concerned with a view to implementing the resolution.

The Cominform countries have refused all cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross which sought to ascertain from them the names and whereabouts of the Greek military personnel within their territories. The sole exception to this sorry picture is the course followed by Yugoslavia, which has rendered the necessary cooperation and has repatriated to Greece a number of these individuals. The central point, of course, in the General Assembly's efforts to resolve this basically humanitarian problem is that those among the Greek military personnel concerned who "express the wish to be repatriated" should be freely allowed to do so. No other procedure is admissible or defensible. Of course, it was contemplated by the General Assembly that the true wishes of the individuals concerned, once they could be clearly identified and located, would be verified where necessary by the impartial representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The detaining countries of the Cominform bloc, whatever their motives may be, have rejected or ignored the at-

¹ Made on Mar. 9 in Committee I (Political and Security) on Repatriation of Greek Military Personnel Retained in Various Countries of Eastern Europe.

tempts made to ascertain clearly who and where these members of the Greek armed forces are, and to provide them with an opportunity to state freely their desire as to repatriation. This behavior constitutes not only contemptuous defiance of the will of the General Assembly but cynical disregard of fundamental humanitarian principles and of accepted international practice.

In Korea the Soviet-Communist position is that hostilities must continue unless all prisoners of war, regardless of their wishes, are forcibly repatriated. In the present case, the persons concerned cannot be considered as prisoners of war since at no time during the Greek guerrilla fighting were any of the detaining powers engaged in direct belligerent action against Greece. Despite this fact the Soviet Communists maintain in practice that none of the members of the Greek armed forces should be repatriated, and they block all steps which might help to determine the true wishes of the Greek military personnel. Under no possible interpretation of international law is there any right to continue the detention of those members of the Greek armed forces who wish to return to their homeland.

During the sixth General Assembly, this problem was not discussed except for the statement, which was fully accepted by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on January 31, 1952, that the pertinent General Assembly resolution of 1950 was to be considered as continuing in force until or unless the Assembly were to take contrary action. More than 2 years have passed since the Assembly recommended the proper and humane procedure to be followed which would permit those of the Greek military personnel who wish to do so to return to their native land and their families. The United States fully agrees that the General Assembly "cannot remain silent in the face of such a negative attitude towards a resolution with so high a humanitarian purpose. . . ." The guerrilla war was concluded in 1949; the Greek soldiers concerned have been arbitrarily and illegally detained in the various countries of Eastern Europe with the exception of Yugoslavia, for from 3 to 4 years. What is the purpose of this inhuman and cruel policy on the part of the Eastern European states within the Soviet system? Perhaps they will seek to pretend that these individuals (as was argued by them on the subject of Greek children) can lead freer, happier, and more prosperous lives behind the Iron Curtain behind which they have disappeared. Surely they will not expect us to take such arguments seriously. Or perhaps they may argue that, because these people have been gone for several years, the Greek Government might treat them severely if they were to be returned. May I remind the Committee that all that has been sought is the return of those who definitely desire repatriation and who are enabled freely (and I emphasize the word *freely*) to express that wish. It would be absurd to imagine

that such individuals would be received in Greece other than with rejoicing of their families and with the warm welcome of their own national government.

The U.S. delegation believes that the Secretary General and the International Red Cross Organizations deserve our sincere appreciation for the continued efforts they have made in this humanitarian cause. It is consistent that the General Assembly should address an earnest appeal to the Governments concerned to conform their attitude in this question with the generally acknowledged principles of international law, for this will serve to buttress the recent request, reported in General Assembly document A/2365 of February 17, 1953, of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the National Red Cross Societies of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. urging them to inform the International Committee "of their governments' intentions with regard to the problem of the Greek nationals and of any conditions which their Governments might wish to place on the repatriation of these persons." It is consistent also that the General Assembly should request its President to consult to this end with the Cominform Governments in question, and that the Secretary General should keep this humanitarian issue under review and notify member states of important developments in this issue.

My delegation believes that the draft resolution sponsored by Denmark, New Zealand, and Peru² is consistent with the moral, humanitarian, and legal position which the General Assembly has always taken on this problem and will therefore wholeheartedly support that draft resolution.

General Clark Denounces Revived "Germ Warfare" Charges

Following is the text of a statement made on February 24 by Gen. Mark Clark, United Nations Commander in Korea:

Lest silence regarding it be misinterpreted in any way, I feel under compulsion to denounce the word-warring Peiping radio's latest attempt to revive the totally baseless and totally discredited allegation that the United Nations Command has engaged in so-called germ warfare.

Instead of meaningless jargon of pseudo-scientists, it now introduces incredible statements linked with the names of captured American personnel. Whether the statements ever passed the lips of these unfortunate men is doubtful. If they did, however, too familiar are the mind-annihilating methods of the Communists in extorting whatever words they want for there to be any mystery as to how they were fabricated. The men them-

²U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L. 23 dated Mar. 9. The General Assembly on Mar. 17 approved the resolution by a vote of 54 to 5 (Soviet bloc).

selves are not to blame, and they have my deepest sympathy for having been used in this abominable way.

The only possible explanation for this broadcast is that the Communists, in anticipation of new outbursts of disease among their miserable people with the spring thaws, must be seeking desperately to conceal their own criminal responsibility for chaotic public-health services by making these fantastic and utterly false charges against the United Nations Command. They will see to it, we can be sure, that no reputable and qualified authorities from outside the Iron Curtain will be allowed within to reveal the truth.

I reaffirm with the utmost emphasis that neither the United Nations Command nor any component of its forces ever has engaged in bacteriological warfare, or anything that might be mistaken for it in Korea or anywhere else.

Current United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

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¹Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

The United States in the United Nations

Security Council

[March 6-12]

The Security Council met in private on March 11 to consider the question of the recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The United States proposed that the Council should recommend the appointment of Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo (the Philippines); the representative of the U.S.S.R. proposed Stanislaw Skrzesezewski (Poland); and the representative of Denmark proposed Lester B. Pearson (Canada).

General Assembly

On March 11 the General Assembly adopted a resolution reaffirming the objective of the United Nations "to provide relief and rehabilitation in assisting the Korean people to relieve their sufferings and to repair the great devastation and destruction in their country" and calling upon all to help, within their financial and constitutional limitations, in meeting this "great and continuing need."

The vote was 55-5 (Soviet bloc)-0. A Soviet proposal "to discontinue the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea as being incapable of discharging the tasks assigned to it" was then put to a vote and rejected by a vote of 5-54-0.

Anthony Eden (U.K.), in an explanation of vote, said that history might show that "by taking up the challenge in Korea," the United Nations had "averted the horrors of a third world war." North Korea and Communist China would have no real interest in prolonging the Korean conflict, and must in time realize that it did not pay to pursue a policy that united the free world against it.

If there were evidences of a change of heart, he went on, "there will be no lack of response from our side," for the United Nations was "resolutely and absolutely sincere in its desire to end the war." It lay in the power of "those who began the conflict" to agree now to an armistice; the opportunity and responsibility were theirs.

Andrei Gromyko, explaining the U.S.S.R. delegation's vote, renewed Soviet charges of U.S. reluctance to end the war and of atrocities committed

against prisoners of war by the U.N. Command. His statement was immediately refuted by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., who pointed out that the Indian resolution for ending the war had been acceptable to all but the Soviet Union and its satellites, who had "contemptuously rejected" it.

Mr. Lodge went on to say:

... we have heard the representative of the Soviet Union attack the U.S. Army and speak of alleged crimes and acts of terror committed by the U.S. Army. I would like to say to him here that the U.S. Army, which you have sought to smear here today, is the same U.S. Army that stood beside the Russian Army to defeat nazism in World War II. The men in the U.S. Army in Korea today are the sons and the younger brothers, and in some cases they are the same men, who made up the U.S. Army in World War II. The U.S. Army was good enough for you in 1942, 1943, 1944, and 1945. It has not changed. It should be good enough for you now, and would be if your Government's position had not so tragically changed. (For full text, see p. 446.)

At the first plenary meeting of the resumed seventh session, held on March 10, President Lester B. Pearson (Canada) informed the delegates that he had found unanimous support among the members of the General Committee for immediate consideration in plenary session of the Secretary-General's report on personnel policy. Discussion would begin at once if there was no objection to this procedure. No objections were raised, and Mr. Pearson called on Secretary-General Trygve Lie to present his report.

Mr. Lie began his statement by explaining that he had proposed the personnel policy item for the agenda because he believed that the Assembly should consider the situation, particularly with respect to U.S. nationals on the Secretariat. Reviewing his 7 years as Secretary-General, he noted that he had "exercised and firmly defended the political responsibilities that the Charter and organs of the United Nations conferred" upon his office. All U.N. members except the Soviet Union and its satellites

have respected my right as Secretary-General to speak and act as I did, while exercising their own right to support or oppose me either privately or publicly. . . . Because of the stand I took in support of the United Nations action against armed aggression in Korea, these five member governments have refused since 1950 even to recognize me as Secretary-General. For almost 3 years I have

borne with this situation in silence, overlooking the many violations of established procedure that followed. Now, however, I believe the time is appropriate for me to say that this action, in my opinion, is by far the most serious violation of article 100 of the Charter that has occurred. The policy of the Soviet Government and its allies has been, and continues to be, a policy of the crudest form of pressure, not only against me but against any future Secretary-General who may incur the displeasure of the Soviet Union for doing his duty as he sees it under the Charter. It is to a large extent because of this Soviet attitude that I have offered my resignation and requested the General Assembly to appoint my successor during the present session.

Mr. Lie then outlined the problem of the U.N. Secretariat as it relates to the United States, with particular reference to the hearings of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Because of the complexity of the problem, he had appointed a Commission of Jurists to advise him. It was because of his reservations about some aspects of their report that he had not placed it before the Assembly for discussion but had submitted a report of his own.

As the Security Council began its consideration of the appointment of his successor, he concluded, he would say, "God bless your endeavors to find the best person for Secretary-General of the United Nations."

Committee I (Political and Security)—At the opening of the March 6 meeting, Chairman João Carlos Muniz (Brazil) asked the Soviet delegate to convey to his Government and people the Committee's condolences on the death of Joseph Stalin, and at the chairman's request members of the Committee rose for a minute of silence. Andrei Vyshinsky, expressing his gratitude, noted that Stalin had been a founder of the United Nations and declared that the foreign policy he had inspired "has been and continues to be" one of international cooperation.

Continuing debate on the Korean item, Ben C. Limb, representing the Republic of Korea, as an observer, reminded the Committee that the troubles in Korea had not been caused by the Korean people. The war was not the fault of the Republic nor even of "the unfortunate captive people" of the North; the leadership of "the Communist puppet regime in the North" had been identified as being composed primarily of citizens of the Soviet Union, "operating directly under the orders of the Kremlin."

Describing the economic plight of his people, Mr. Limb said, "Our whole population has been reduced to a state of absolute desperation." Reconstruction is badly needed, and needed now. Restoring the means of self-support is "essential to winning the war, for successful battles cannot be fought in the midst of a dying citizenry." He added that "the slow strangulation of a population" was as tragic and final as a deliberate attempt to destroy it.

The representative of the Republic of Korea

paid tribute to the nations and the specialized agencies that had helped his people and are helping them now in relief and rehabilitation. He urged support for the joint draft resolution calling for U.N. aid in "resurrecting" Korea; the record of assistance thus far was "impressive indeed," but the need was ever-growing.

At the March 7 meeting, during which the Committee completed general debate on the Korean question, Valerin A. Zorin (U.S.S.R.) reverted to the theme stressed earlier by Andrei Vyshinsky: that "Syngman Rhee troops," aided and abetted by the United States, had been the real aggressors in Korea. He declared that Ambassador Lodge had not refuted any of the evidence to this effect adduced by the Soviet delegation. The main question, however, was how to put an end to the bloodshed, he went on. The claim that the "just, precise, and simple" Soviet proposals had the hidden aim of using the prisoners of war for purposes of a "political horse-trade" was a "slandorous invention," he declared.

The most important pre-condition for the reconstruction of Korea, according to Mr. Zorin, was an immediate cease-fire and the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops. He concluded: "The Soviet delegation will tirelessly continue to struggle to put an end to this criminal war, because, as was said by the great banner-leader of peace, Generalissimo Stalin, the U.S.S.R. is interested in the liquidation of the war in Korea."

Speaking for the U.S. delegation, Ambassador Lodge enumerated the various forms which aid to Korea had taken thus far. This reconstruction work was only a beginning, but it was symbolic of the collective international concern and responsibility in Korea. He then turned to the Soviet position as revealed in the current debate. Mr. Vyshinsky had admitted practically 95 percent of the "10 facts about Soviet aid to the aggressors"—"a staggering admission of guilt" which had already had an effect on world opinion. (For full text, see p. 443.)

On March 9 the committee adopted the 7-power draft requesting all governments, specialized agencies, and nongovernmental organizations to assist in meeting the needs of the Korean people. An amendment introduced by Egypt and accepted by the sponsors added the phrase, "within the limits of their financial possibilities and in accordance with the provisions of their constitutions and statutes." The vote was 54-5 (Soviet bloc), with no abstentions. A last-minute Soviet proposal to abolish UNCTRK was rejected by a vote of 5 (Soviet bloc)-54-0. Mr. Zorin, in introducing the proposal, charged that both UNCTRK and UNKRA were subsidiaries of the "U.S. Command." The reconstruction and rehabilitation being carried out under UNKRA auspices were aimed at meeting the military needs of the United States.

Debate on the Greek Armed Forces item began at the afternoon meeting March 9. Alexis Kyrou

(Greece) opened the discussion by paying tribute to efforts of the Secretary-General and the International Committee of the Red Cross to implement the General Assembly resolution which recommended "repatriation of all those detained members of the Greek Armed Forces who expressed the wish to be repatriated." But these efforts had so far been of no avail, he noted, and lately even the rare opportunities originally accorded the detained soldiers to exchange correspondence and receive relief parcels were being suppressed.

The number detained is estimated at about 3,000, Mr. Kyrout went on. The Greek Army General Staff knows the identity of many of these and, in most cases, their whereabouts in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and the U.S.S.R. He emphasized that the captured soldiers are not prisoners of war and hence the detaining states are obligated under international law to release them. His Government was asking for the repatriation only of those who "freely" expressed the wish to return, Mr. Kyrout pointed out, adding that there should of course be adequate safeguards for this expression.

Victor Belaúnde (Peru) then introduced the Danish-New Zealand-Peruvian draft resolution, which notes the latest Icrc efforts, appeals to the governments concerned for their cooperation, and asks the president of the General Assembly to consult with them to this end and to report back before the close of the present session.

James J. Wadsworth (U.S.) declared that the retention of the Greek soldiers by the Cominform States revealed contemptuous defiance of the General Assembly's will and cynical disregard for humanitarian principles. He observed that in Korea the Communists insisted on forced repatriation but took the opposite stand in this instance, despite the fact that the detained men were not even prisoners of war. The 3-State draft was consistent with the Assembly's moral, humanitarian, and legal attitude, Ambassador Wadsworth concluded, and was also in line with the latest Icrc effort. (For full text, see p. 450.)

In a brief statement on March 12, shortly before the vote which concluded the Committee's work on this item, G. N. Zarubin (U.S.S.R.) asserted that the Greek complaint was completely groundless and intimated that the persons referred to were "political refugees." The real aim of the item, he contended, was the propagation of slanderous attacks on the U.S.S.R.

The vote on the draft, which meanwhile had been slightly amended by Lebanon, was 54-5 (Soviet bloc)-1 (India).

Discussion then turned to the report of the Collective Measures Committee. Speaking for the U.S. delegation, William Sanders said that both the report and the joint draft under consideration, which would continue the Committee's work until the ninth regular session of the General Assembly, were concerned with the defense of peace. The

draft resolution was not directed against anyone; no one who planned to live within the framework of the Charter need fear the Uniting for Peace program.

The need for speed in mustering resistance to sudden attack put a premium on advance planning, Mr. Sanders commented, citing the proposed establishment of an *ad hoc* negotiating committee as an excellent example of a flexible, time-saving plan. The Collective Measures Committee's work had been of great value, and its studies (including the voluntary reserve) should be pursued. Real security must wait until all states were ready to work together to fulfill Charter promises, he concluded; meanwhile, the better the system that is developed, the less likely the need to use it. (For text, see p. 447.)

THE DEPARTMENT

Secretary Dulles' Memorandum on John Carter Vincent

Press release 124 dated March 4

I. Background

Among the inheritances which the present Administration took over from the past Administration is the so-called "Vincent Case."

John Carter Vincent, a Foreign Service officer, with the rank of career minister (the highest rank), has since 1951 been the subject of inquiry and controversy because of his conduct in relation to China and Japan, particularly during the war and postwar period (1941-47).

Charges of disloyalty against Mr. Vincent, made in November 1951, were heard by the Department of State Loyalty Security Board. It unanimously decided that no reasonable doubt existed as to Mr. Vincent's loyalty to the Government of the United States and that his continued employment did not constitute a risk to the Department of State. This decision was twice reconsidered by the Department's Board, to take account of new evidence. In each case the original decision was confirmed. When, however, the matter was reviewed by the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board, it found, by a 3-2 decision rendered December 12, 1952,¹ that there was reasonable doubt as to Mr. Vincent's loyalty to the Government of the United States. Accordingly, the Board recommended that his services should be terminated.

This conclusion of the Loyalty Review Board

¹ BULLETIN JAN. 19, 1953, p. 121.

was merely advisory to the Secretary of State. The then Secretary set up a special panel to examine the matter again and advise him as to what disposition they thought should be made of the case.²

After I became Secretary of State, I received an inquiry on behalf of the members of the special panel as to whether I wished them to continue to study the case under the mandate they had received from my predecessor in office. In reply I said that I felt it unnecessary for them to continue their advisory study.³ Both law and Executive order placed the ultimate responsibility on me and I saw no way to shed that responsibility.

Since then, I have carefully studied the record with a view to discharging my legal responsibility in a way which will both protect the interests of the United States and do personal justice.

II. Jurisdiction

My jurisdiction in this case stems from three sources:

1. I have authority to terminate Mr. Vincent's services on "security" grounds (Public Law 733, 81st Cong., Aug. 26, 1950).

2. I have authority to terminate Mr. Vincent's services on "loyalty" grounds (Ex. Order 9835, Mar. 21, 1927, as amended by Ex. Order 10241, Apr. 28, 1951).

3. I have authority in my "absolute discretion" to terminate Mr. Vincent's services if I deem this "necessary or advisable in the interest of the United States" (Public Law 495, 82d Cong., July 10, 1952).

III. The Facts

Mr. Vincent served in China almost continuously from 1924 to 1936 in consular capacities or as a Chinese language officer. From 1936 to 1947, except for a short interruption, he served in key positions in China and in Washington in relation to Chinese, Japanese, and Far Eastern matters. During this later period he was largely relied upon by his superiors, notably the President, the Secretary of State, and General Marshall, when he headed a special Presidential mission to China in 1945 and 1946.

Mr. Vincent's part in these matters and his associations during this time are brought out in detail in the records which I have examined. They have led me to conclude that Mr. Vincent's employment as a Foreign Service officer should not be continued.

² *Ibid.*, p. 122.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 241.

IV. Reasons

Under Public Law 495 I am not required to give reasons for my decisions under that law. They are a matter of "absolute discretion." However, in view of the public interest which attaches to this case, I feel that I should state:

1. I do not believe the record shows that Mr. Vincent is a "security" risk within the usually accepted meaning of that term and within the meaning which up to now has customarily been given to that term in Public Law 733.

2. I do not find that "on all the evidence, there is reasonable doubt as to the loyalty" of Mr. Vincent to the Government of the United States within the meaning of Executive Order 10241.

3. I have, however, concluded that Mr. Vincent's reporting of the facts, evaluation of the facts, and policy advice during the period under review show a failure to meet the standard which is demanded of a Foreign Service officer of his experience and responsibility at this critical time. I do not believe that he can usefully continue to serve the United States as a Foreign Service officer.

Public Law 495 recognizes the special responsibilities which, at this time of dangerous international tensions, devolve on the Secretary of State and reflects an intent that he should act to safeguard what he, in his discretion, deems the interests of the United States. I believe that that legislative purpose is sound and I am responding to it according to my best judgment.

V. Conclusion

While this memorandum was in course of preparation, I talked with Mr. Vincent and told him generally of my views. Subsequently, Mr. Vincent submitted his resignation as Minister to Morocco and Diplomatic Agent at Tangier and placed in my hands his application for retirement. I am granting his application for retirement effective March 31, 1953.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

George V. Allen

The Senate on March 11 confirmed George V. Allen as Ambassador to India and to Nepal.

Francis White

The Senate on March 11 confirmed Francis White as Ambassador to Mexico.

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†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

The Department of State

bulletin

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APR 30 1953



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Developing Relations of Mutual Trust and Respect

*Address by Secretary Dulles*¹

I am happy to meet with this distinguished group of representatives of the American Republics. Our Council, where all of our 21 countries meet as equals, symbolizes the unity and fraternity of our inter-American fellowship.

This fellowship holds a special place in the international relations of the United States. Hemispheric solidarity was our earliest major foreign policy, and it remains central with us. Today, that solidarity is illustrated by this building in which we meet [the Pan American Union] and by what goes on within it.

I have on many occasions, notably at Assemblies of the United Nations and at the Japanese Peace Conference, enjoyed and profited by the opportunity of working with representatives of your countries. Now, as Secretary of State, I shall have an even wider and more continuous opportunity.

The profit which we derive from that relationship relates not merely to our fellowship in time of war as comrades in arms. We also profit from the achievements of the peoples of Latin America in many fields of endeavor. The artists, musicians, and writers of Latin America contribute greatly to our culture. Your statesmen, jurists, and men of other professions have greatly promoted the science of human relations. As a lawyer, who has long devoted himself to international affairs, I have studied with admiration and advantage the work of your international lawyers and the doctrines of international law which they have espoused, and which the civilized world has largely accepted.

The Organization of American States constitutes one of the outstanding achievements in the history of our 21 countries. It reflects the highest aspirations of our people for peace, liberty, and well-being. In its manifold activities, it gives expression to the political, economic, and cultural

aspects of our national lives. Finally, its success in establishing a system of cooperation for security and welfare cannot fail to strengthen our faith that an equally effective and beneficial relationship may be established among all the nations of the world. That is indeed the purpose of the United Nations, a purpose to which we all subscribe.

Because the United Nations does not yet realize all the hopes of its founders, and because abuse of the veto power has weakened its capacity to provide security, it is necessary to have regional collective-security organizations. The first and most embracing of such regional associations is that which was created by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance concluded at Rio de Janeiro in 1947. I well recall the struggle at San Francisco to eliminate from the Dumbarton Oaks proposals the clause which would have prevented, or at least given the Soviet Union a veto power over, such a regional and collective-security arrangement as was created by the Rio Pact. For that result, the late Senator Vandenberg, one of your great friends, is entitled to lasting recognition.

It is good that, at San Francisco, we opened the way to regional associations for collective security despite the strong objection of the Soviet Union. That prime objector of 1945 has now become a source of grave danger. That danger makes it vital that there be intimate and strong pan-American solidarity. We must demonstrate in terms of the lives of our peoples that the free nations can provide a better way of life. Also we must strengthen our capacity to defend ourselves from a foe that can attack both from without and from within—by open aggression or by subversion. Subversion, we should remember, has been the preferred method which has already brought some 800 million people into bondage, which is degrading and which denies the spiritual nature of man.

You may be confident that the Government of

¹ Made before the Council of the Organization of American States at Washington on Mar. 23 (press release 153).

the United States will seek to do its part to invigorate the spirit of solidarity and cooperation, which has joined our people in the past, and on the continuance of which the future of human dignity so largely depends.

I can assure you that President Eisenhower has a deep interest in the development of good relations between our nations. His interest in NATO

and in Korea is matched by his interest in the Americas. I recall his visit to Brazil and Mexico when he was Chief of Staff. He and I often talk together about hemispheric solidarity and I can say with assurance that it is the purpose of this administration to pursue with increased vigor and effectiveness the development of relations of mutual trust and respect with our sister Republics.

U.S. Capital Investment in Latin America

by John M. Cabot

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

You have asked me to speak to you as the recently appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and I deeply appreciate your invitation. You want to hear my thoughts about our relations with our sister Republics, and I should like to give you some idea of the perplexities I am aware of as I assume office. I hope that nearly 20 years of varied experience in this field may tend to light my path and not to obfuscate my vision.

Practically everybody in the United States agrees on our policy objectives in this hemisphere. We want good relations with our sister Republics. We want to cooperate with them. We want peace and democracy and continental solidarity and due process of law and sovereign equality and mutual assistance against aggression. Amid such noble sentiments and overflowing good will my job ought to be easy—but it isn't. For these lovely phrases conceal but do not destroy a great many hard ugly facts which make it difficult to attain our objectives in this hemisphere. In other words, any fool can see what we want to do; the question is in what way, practically speaking, can we go about doing it, and how do we get people to give up their own interests and prejudices for the common good?

One of the difficulties of diplomacy is that in public we must generally deal in mellifluous

phrases, but in our work we must deal with hard facts. If they admit of an easy solution it is fine—practically no one ever hears of the incident and that's that; but if there is no easy solution, then everyone jumps to the conclusion that the diplomats have put their foot in it again, and in the ensuing public uproar the diplomats' task becomes yet harder. I might add that diplomats aren't paid to solve easy problems. Let me illustrate.

At the recent Caracas conference² our delegation was confronted by a series of more or less strongly expressed views. Many other delegations felt that their countries had been unfairly treated in terms of trade; that over a period of years the raw materials they produced had tended to fall in price in relation to the prices of manufactured goods they had to import. Others wanted to stop the development of synthetics which competed with their natural products. A number felt that it was unfair that the dollar reserves they accumulated during the war by selling to us should have dropped sharply after the war in terms of what they then wanted to buy from us.

You would probably say that these positions were unreasonable. Perhaps they were; but other points made by our Latin friends in Caracas were not so unreasonable. They complained of our

¹ Address made before the Joint Meeting of the Export Managers Club and the Export Advertising Association at New York on Mar. 17 (press release 139).

² Mr. Cabot headed the U.S. delegation to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council's conference at Caracas in February. For text of an address which he made there on Feb. 11, see BULLETIN of Mar. 2, 1953, p. 338.

customs barriers, which keep out their products and force them to send us raw materials rather than semimanufactured items. They wanted us to give some tax advantage to American investments abroad to encourage such investments. And they frankly found it hard to understand that we gave them practically no grant aid. I do not think they quite approved the blunt appeal of one delegate: "*divisas, no sonrisas*" (foreign exchange, not smiles), but they unquestionably felt that those who made a nuisance of themselves were better rewarded than those who cooperated.

To give another illustration of the kind of thing that disturbs them: In September 1952, we signed a trade agreement with Venezuela. From our viewpoint it was intended to protect an important export market and incidentally to safeguard important American investments. From the Venezuelan viewpoint it was intended to secure a vital foreign outlet on which the entire economic life of the country depended. Today there are some 21 bills before Congress which would in effect repudiate this agreement. I am not going to describe to you at length what is likely to happen if one of these bills should pass; you yourselves will readily appreciate that if we should thus break an international commitment it will not only damage your business in Venezuela but also prejudice our interests throughout the Americas.

Cooperation—A Two-Way Street

In other words, cooperation is a two-way street, and we must be sure it is kept so. I know how keenly you here appreciate that, and how hard you are working to see that the paths of international trade are not blocked. Whatever we do to hamper trade will not only be reflected in our trade with our sister Republics, it will be reflected in their political orientation, and in the defense of the free world against Communist aggression. We simply cannot afford to take a narrow view of our national interest.

We had a striking illustration at Caracas of the willingness of other republics to cooperate with us when benefits to both sides were apparent. At the very beginning of the conference, the Colombian delegation, strongly backed by several others, said that they were disturbed by the effects on the confidence of foreign investors of recent attacks on foreign capital in various countries and by the reaction in the United States to a recent U. N. resolution. Heartened by President Eisenhower's statement in his State of the Union message that foreign investment should be encouraged, they insisted on introducing a special resolution emphasizing, with no qualifying phrases, the importance of instilling confidence in foreign investors. They wanted to make it clear that the great majority of our sister Republics welcome American capital, because they

have discovered that on the balance it brings them very substantial benefits.

The resolution passed with but one abstention. Our sister Republics grasped the hand which President Eisenhower had extended. And what happened? Practically nothing. The people of the United States—even the business community—were apparently too busy.

Benefits of Foreign Capital Investment

Practically everyone in North and South America alike agrees on the importance of foreign capital investment in underdeveloped countries. That isn't the question. From the viewpoint of the investor, the question is: "Will my capital be safe, and will the rate of return be adequate considering the risks involved?" Unless he considers the circumstances favorable, he is not going to put his capital in unfamiliar surroundings. By the same token, the country in which the investment is to be made will ask: "Will this investment be to our national advantage? Will it develop our economy and raise our living standards, or will it merely mean that greedy foreigners will despoil our national resources, gouge our people, and oppress their employees?"

In candor let us say that both sides can point to horrible historical examples. At the same time, let me say—and I think you will agree with me—that investments of foreign capital can bring great benefits both to the investor and to the country in which the capital is invested. More and more foreign countries and American investors are working together to produce such situations.

To this end we have sought to negotiate investment treaties with a number of countries. Such treaties can serve a very useful purpose by laying down agreed rules under which American investments in foreign countries may operate. I want to emphasize, however, that it is the spirit rather than the letter which really matters in the protection of American investors. The most solemn treaties and constitutional guarantees can be torn up, and have been torn up. A foreign company is not even protected by the fact that it is demonstrably benefiting the country in which it is located. Its real and ultimate protection is a *belief* among the people of that country that it is to *their* advantage that the company should continue to operate.

This is a very real challenge. In our sister Republics there is much poverty and illiteracy; ideas cannot, as with us, find their own price level in a free market. The peoples to the south of us are aflame with determination to improve their material lot—stimulated alike by the, to them, fabulous American living standards and by strident Communist agitation. They realize the need for social reforms to correct age-old abuses, and it is not surprising that foreign companies are among the earliest victims of such programs of reform. Obviously they are immense aggregations of

wealth, their American employees enjoy a much higher standard of living than their local employees, and they are foreign. Note that each of these points leaves a corroding impression on the unwary mind, and none of them is at all pertinent to the real question: "Is it really beneficial to the country to have the company operating in it?"

Safeguards for Investors

There, I feel, is a field in which American companies operating in Latin America still have a great deal to do. We must not only prove to ourselves that those operations are benefiting the countries and are enlightened in a social and labor sense. It is increasingly important that the broad masses in Latin America should be convinced that it is to their direct interest that foreign companies operating in their countries should have proper safeguards. Our companies are aware of the importance of public relations in the United States. In Latin America, where the swings in public emotion—and action—are so vastly wider and the hazards to invested capital correspondingly greater, the importance of favorable public opinion is vital.

For the most part American companies operating in Latin America have nothing to be ashamed of; on the contrary, they usually pay better wages, provide better housing and working conditions and, in general, give their employees more benefits than local employers. If some are less far-sighted than others—if some, for example, do not realize that developed, responsible trade unionism is one of the best guarantees against violent economic radicalism—few of them today can be accused of exploitation. On the contrary, American companies operating in Latin America are often leading the way to that higher standard of living to which Latin Americans aspire. I do not, I am sure, need to tell you that nationalization has hurt rather than helped Latin America; it has not produced the national benefits either for the workers or national economies as a whole that private enterprise could have produced. On the contrary, by disturbing the confidence of investors, both foreign and domestic, it has tended to perpetuate those lower living standards in our sister Republics which we are seeking to cooperate with them to raise.

Let me nonetheless reiterate to you the vital need of convincing public opinion in the other American Republics of the benefits accruing from American investments. Social reform is coming.

It may come by evolution or by revolution. There are reactionary elements in every country in this hemisphere which do not want social reform. They are willing to tie down the safety valve and to wait for the boiler to burst. In many countries, liberal elements, confronted by such intransigent opposition, have more and more fallen under Communist influence. To my mind there is nothing more dangerous from the viewpoint of long-range American policy than to let Communists, with their phoney slogans, seize the leadership of social reform. We simply cannot afford to identify ourselves with the elements which would tie down the social safety valve. That wouldn't protect our national interests; it wouldn't even for long protect our investments.

The problems of Latin America today are largely economic. A vital element in their solution must be a flow of capital into our sister Republics in an atmosphere of mutual confidence. That is the way that the United States developed, and that is the best and surest way for them to develop. Today the atmosphere is somewhat poisoned. The Communists and their allies, witting and unwitting, have made American companies the target of their agitation, despite the fact that American companies have often been spearheads of social progress. It is essential that they be identified with social progress not only in fact but also in the public mind.

A vital job, then, confronts us. It is to convince the peoples of the other American Republics that the way of life we practice and recommend has definite, tangible benefits for them. Your Government is doing its best to put that thought across, but it cannot do it alone. We need the cooperation of every American who has any business with our sister Republics. This is one facet of the implacable challenge we face today. With your pride in individual enterprise, I am sure that you will help us to meet it worthily. Let us work together to solve this important problem, and let us take a long-term view of it.

Letter of Credence

Mexico

The newly appointed Ambassador of Mexico, Manuel Tello, presented his credentials to the President on March 18, 1953. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 143 of March 18.

Military Assistance to Latin America

1. *There has been some criticism of the military assistance program in Latin America on the grounds that it violates the best interests of the Latin American countries themselves. Is this charge valid?*

2. *100 percent of our vanadium imports come from Latin America. How many other strategic materials in short supply do we get from our Good Neighbors?*

3. *Enemy submarines scored heavily in this hemisphere during World War II. What steps are being taken to prevent this from happening again?*

4. *A major problem of hemisphere defense is the military weakness of most Latin American nations. What are we doing in this important area to create stronger defensive forces?*

This survey provides the answer to these and other questions relating to cooperative military assistance arrangements in the Western Hemisphere.

During World War II, the security of the Western Hemisphere was safeguarded by the collective efforts of the American Republics. A submarine offensive against American shipping early in World War II came perilously close to driving American vessels from the Atlantic sea lanes. Its success would have resulted in the virtual isolation of every American country, and in the modern world no nation can survive in isolation.

The economies of many American Republics were in danger of collapse. Those nations, for example, which depend on petroleum from the United States and Venezuela would have been without oil. Those which depend on wheat imports would have been short of bread. Despite its wealth of natural resources, the United States would have faced economic problems of extreme gravity.

The American nations were spared these disasters only because they united to build strong defenses. When the Axis threat was turned back, these countries resolved that they would set up permanent defenses to guard against future aggression. They had learned that the preservation of peace and security in the Americas depends on cooperation.

The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics who met at Washington in 1951 laid the

EDITOR'S NOTE: This survey is also available as Department of State publication 4917. For text of a typical agreement in the series which comprises the program of military assistance to Latin America—the agreement signed with Ecuador on Feb. 20, 1952—see BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 336.

foundation for effective military cooperation by putting the lessons of World War II to valuable use. They directed the Inter-American Defense Board, on which each country is represented, to plan for the general defense of the hemisphere. They also recognized that preparations for defense, in the event of attack, would require self-help and mutual aid on the part of American Republics in the military and economic fields.

The United States mutual security program includes provisions for assisting Latin American countries to carry out their responsibilities with

1. To recommend to the American Republics that they orient their military preparation in such a way that, through self-help and mutual aid, and in accordance with their capabilities and with their constitutional precepts, and in conformity with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, they can, without prejudice to their individual self-defense and their internal security: (a) increase those of their resources and strengthen those of their armed forces best adapted to the collective defense, and maintain those armed forces in such status that they can be promptly available for the defense of the Continent; and (b) cooperate with each other, in military matters, in order to develop the collective strength of the Continent necessary to combat aggression against any of them.

—From Resolution III of the Final Act of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, Washington, D. C., March–April 1951.

respect to these decisions of the Foreign Ministers. In the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Congress voted \$38,150,000 for direct military assistance to Latin America. In 1952 the Congress added \$51,685,750 to that sum. The money will be used to provide U. S. military assistance to those American Republics whose participation in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere has been found by the President to be required in accordance with defense plans. Before providing assistance to any country, the United States enters into a bilateral military assistance agreement with that country.

Reasons for Military Assistance

The United States is giving military aid to Latin American countries because of three fundamental facts:

1. This hemisphere is threatened by Communist aggression from within and without;
2. The security of strategic areas in the hemisphere and of inter-American lines of communication is vital to the security of every American Republic; and
3. The protection of these strategic areas and communications is a common responsibility.

A major problem of defense is the present limited military capability of the nations of Latin America. Although many are willing to do their share of the defense job, they are unable to develop and support adequately equipped and trained forces. Therefore, if these American Republics are to assume a greater share of the burden of continental defense, we must help them strengthen their forces. By doing this we can release thousands of U.S. soldiers for other duty.

Types of Military Assistance

We have offered three types of military assistance to Latin American nations:

1. Direct grants of equipment and other assistance to certain countries to prepare their forces for specific hemisphere defense missions;
2. Opportunities for purchasing U.S. weapons and equipment which Latin American countries require for their own and hemisphere defense; and
3. The establishment of U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force missions to help train Latin American armed forces.

The money which the Congress has appropriated for direct aid to Latin America will provide training and military equipment to protect key installations and communications and help to assure the production and delivery of strategic materials in emergency periods. This aid is granted only for specific programs consistent with the defense plans of the Inter-American Defense Board. Our mili-

tary advisers will assess the military and equipment requirements in each of the countries.

Latin American countries receiving equipment have specifically agreed to use it exclusively for missions important to the defense of the hemisphere. It consists of specialized items for air and marine antisubmarine patrol; for defense of coastal regions against naval, air, and submarine attack; and for the protection of strategic installations.

Agreements with five American Republics—Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, and Peru—have already entered into force. Agreements with Brazil and Uruguay have been signed but require ratification before they become effective. Negotiations for an agreement with the Dominican Republic are in progress.

The second type of assistance permits purchases of our military equipment for cash when approved by U.S. officials, as authorized in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Procurement help in filling military requirements is also offered. For example, in 1951, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile each bought two light cruisers. Peru acquired three destroyer escorts and Uruguay, two. Colombia bought a U.S. frigate. These and other sales of equipment from excess U.S. stocks, at low prices, were permitted after explicit assurances that the vessels purchased would be devoted to hemisphere defense requirements. The presence of stronger naval forces in South American waters will free U.S. naval units for North Atlantic patrol and convoy duties, if the need arises.

The third form of military assistance is the establishment of U.S. training missions in Latin America, at the request of the other governments. Training missions are now operating in most countries. These missions are purely advisory, and the principal costs are borne by the local governments.

The over-all cost of these programs is small compared with our total foreign commitments. But these comparatively small programs make a major contribution to free-world strength by preparing Latin America to defend itself.

The security of the peoples of Latin America and their political independence would be gravely endangered by an attack on any one of them. No country in the Western Hemisphere is self-sufficient; none could survive cut off from its neighbors and the rest of the free world. Each has a stake in the security of one of the world's richest storehouses of strategic materials. Thus the economic and political vulnerability of our Latin American neighbors imposes the burden of hemisphere defense on them as well as on us.

Peace in the Americas

Peace in the Western Hemisphere depends not only upon peaceful relations among the American Republics but also upon their peaceful relations

with other nations. The first requisite for peace in the Americas has been established and guaranteed by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty of 1947) and by other inter-American agreements. Through these agreements, the American Republics have pledged themselves to settle their disputes by negotiation rather than by war. They have forbidden the use of force or the threat of force in bargaining for economic or other concessions from a neighbor government. Each American state is equal under law, and the rights of each are respected by the others.

The second requisite—world peace—is yet to be realized. There is no guaranty of world peace so long as the Soviet Union and its satellites refuse to honor their international commitments

under the United Nations Charter. It is therefore essential that the Americas keep their guard up and their defenses strong.

Continental Defense in World War II

As early as 1936, at Buenos Aires, the American Republics realized what an Axis attack would mean to this hemisphere. At other inter-American meetings from 1938 to 1942, they agreed to act together to repel any threat to the American continents.

It was not long before events showed the decision to be wise. Although the battle lines of World War II never penetrated Latin American shores, the fighting spread to hemisphere waters. Axis submarines sank thousands of tons of mer-



chant shipping vital to the war effort and to the American economy.

On February 16, 1942, a Nazi submarine shelled shore installations on the Caribbean island of Aruba. On the same date, in the vicinity of the island, enemy raiders torpedoed two British tankers, one U.S. tanker, one Dutch tanker, and three light draft tankers from Venezuela. All seven vessels carried Venezuelan oil urgently needed for hemisphere defense.

To the south, after losing a dramatic engagement with two British cruisers, the crew of the German pocket battleship, the *Graf Spee*, scuttled her in the Rio de la Plata.

Ashore, Axis agents engaged in espionage and sabotage and evoked vigorous countermeasures from Latin American governments. The hand-writing on the wall became apparent even to the doubters.

The torpedoing of a Mexican vessel in the Gulf of Mexico, May 13, 1942, was followed within a few days by Mexico's declaration of war. After losing five ships to Axis torpedoes in early August 1942, Brazil also declared war on August 22.

Defense Measures

To meet the threat, the United States diverted to Latin America a substantial part of its merchant marine and segments of its fleet and air force. During the early days of the war that diversion meant great sacrifice because of the shortage of merchant carriers, warships, and planes. Many ships and a large number of lives were lost. For months no one was certain that we could maintain all the vital lines of communication. It was only with the military assistance of a number of the other American Republics that the submarine campaign was stopped.

With the consent of the nations concerned, over 100,000 members of U.S. military forces were stationed south of this country during World War II. Our southern neighbors freely volunteered the use of important air and naval bases as part of their contribution to the Allied cause. (These bases, incidentally, were just as freely returned to their owners by the United States at the conclusion of the war.)

The best-known air bases were on the southern air route to Africa and Europe, particularly those on the Brazilian "hump." The North African and Mediterranean campaigns could hardly have been so successful without them. The naval bases were a significant factor in beating off the Axis submarines that, in 1942, had threatened to cut surface contact with Europe.

Latin American armed forces were strengthened with the assistance of U.S. military and naval missions. A Brazilian infantry division fought valiantly in Italy, and Mexico made an air unit available for action in the Pacific. Latin American naval forces and facilities also contributed to the Allied war effort.

In short, security was a hemisphere concern in World War II. All the American Republics were fully aware that none could be safe without the support of the others. Nothing has happened since to alter that principle.

The Communist Threat

The actions of the Soviet bloc show little promise of an early end to the obstructionist tactics of the Communists. They refuse to comply with traditional democratic standards of fair play and honest compromise of disagreements. They pay lip service to the United Nations Charter, but they violate its spirit. They talk of negotiation but refuse to honor their pledges to refrain from aggression. They frequently speak of their desire for peace, but they persist in using naked force in Korea.

Although the Soviet armies may not pose an immediate military threat to this hemisphere, we must always be prepared to meet naval and air attacks. Such attacks would seek to destroy, by blockade and isolation, the economy of every American Republic. Furthermore, the agents of communism, active throughout the Americas, constitute an internal menace.

The Communists can, with tongue in cheek, endorse any aspiration of the Latin American people without fear of involving the Soviet Union. They can back any program, however irresponsible, because they will not have to carry it out while they are not in power. Their purpose is to promote neutralism and break up the unity of the hemisphere.

One of their main targets is the United States military assistance program. Their propaganda against it has been loud and long. They have even convinced some responsible Latin American leaders that it violates the interests of the American Republics. Our best method of countering both propaganda and opinions based upon inadequate facts is to explain the military assistance program to the people of Latin America and to coordinate it with technical assistance for economic development. In this way the people can judge for themselves how much they have to gain through inter-American cooperation.

Charges Against the Program

Numerous false charges have been leveled against the program of military assistance to Latin America. Some critics make these charges because they do not understand the nature and scope of the program; others, because they hope to profit from a propaganda campaign of distortion and misrepresentation. Among the charges most frequently heard are the following—

The Charge: The military agreements will require the sending of Latin American troops to Korea.

The Truth: The commitments are limited strictly to hemisphere defense.

The Charge: They oblige Latin American troops to defend the United States.

The Truth: They relate only to defense problems south of the United States.

The Charge: They are solely for the convenience of the United States.

The Truth: They directly involve the highest national interests of every American Republic, since their purpose is to protect communications, to defend coastal areas, and to protect strategic areas vulnerable to enemy attack.

The Charge: The military agreements invite aggression.

The Truth: They deter potential aggressors and help preserve the peace, because they increase the ability of the American Republics to repel aggression.

The Charge: The agreements expand the obligations assumed by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty.

The Truth: They merely increase the ability of the countries receiving aid to carry out those obligations.

The Charge: The United States is acting contrary to the principles of inter-American solidarity in entering into these agreements.

The Truth: None of these agreements runs contrary to the principles, practices, or obligations of hemispheric solidarity.

The Charge: Our military assistance will give some of the countries of Latin America an unfair advantage over others.

The Truth: The program is directed toward encouraging unity among the American Republics and strengthening them for a common defense against aggression.

U.S. military assistance is no one-way street. The guiding principle of inter-American military relations is that defense must be a collective responsibility. The aim is to raise the ability of Latin American states to carry their share of the load. Every Latin American patrol vessel, every anti-aircraft battalion, every fighter squadron which is committed to hemisphere defense and adequately equipped and trained is a step toward full security.

This is not a question of whether the Latin American countries or the United States gain more from such cooperation. Just as security is indivisible, so are its specific benefits. For Latin America, it is important to protect the flow of essential civilian supplies. For the United States and the rest of the free world, the strategic materials of Latin America are vital.

Latin American countries import from the

United States machinery, iron, steel, chemicals, foodstuffs, vehicles, electrical and agricultural equipment, and textiles. Our four major imports from Latin America are coffee, sugar, copper, and petroleum. In addition, Latin America supplies us with many other strategic materials necessary to defense production.

Percentage of Total U. S. Imports of Selected Strategic Materials in Short Supply Received from Latin America (1950)

<i>Percent</i>	<i>Material</i>
100:	vanadium, quebracho
Over 90:	quartz crystals
Over 80:	castor bean oil, crude petroleum, fuel oil
Over 70:	cordage sisal
Over 60:	antimony, copper
Over 50:	beryl, bismuth, lead, cadmium
Over 40:	tungsten, zinc

NOTE.—A significant percentage of imports of chromite, manila fibers, manganese, tin, wool, iron ore is also received from Latin America.

The adjacent table shows a few of these vital materials we get from Latin America. It illustrates graphically why sizable U.S. forces were diverted during World War II to protect hemisphere sea lanes and key installations. We and our neighbors in countries south of the Rio Grande are working hard to insure the future safety of these strategic areas and shipping lanes. This is the goal of current hemisphere defense arrangements.

The Rio Treaty of 1947 provides the basis for inter-American mutual defense. The Washington meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1951 applied the concept of collective defense to the realities of the present critical world situation. The actual putting into force of practical military measures for assuring adequate defense requires that the American Republics continue to work closely together. This is the essence of the U.S. military assistance program—to make it possible for the American Republics to play an increasingly active role in collective measures for the preservation and security of the hemisphere.

Evaluating Speeches of Soviet Premier

Press Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 150 dated March 20

I have been asked about the speeches of the new Soviet Premier who succeeded Stalin. I can say that we evaluate these speeches and we also try to evaluate the speeches of the top Russian leaders to see if we can find in them any hope of peace and any change in their past hostile intentions. I can say that we have evaluated these speeches but we do not receive any great comfort and we have not received any overtures through diplomatic channels.

Brazil Signs Torquay Protocol to GATT

Press release 130 dated March 9

The Department of State has been informed that on February 19, 1953, the Government of Brazil signed the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York. The provisions of the Protocol require that the tariff concessions negotiated between the United States and Brazil, which have been withheld pending Brazil's signature of the instrument, be put into effect 30 days after Brazil's signature, on March 21, 1953.

The scope of U.S. negotiations with Brazil at Torquay in 1951 was limited because the two countries had concluded much more extensive negotiations at Geneva in 1947. The concessions exchanged at Torquay, however, supplement those previously negotiated at Geneva and should therefore be considered as a part of a comprehensive whole.

The new concessions which Brazil will make effective on March 21 include reductions in duty on preserved asparagus from 2.80 cruzeiros to 2.40 cruzeiros per legal kilo, and on electric motors, dynamos, alternators, and closely related electrical equipment from 5.40 cruzeiros to 4.56 cruzeiros. The present favorable import duty on wrapper leaf tobacco was bound against increase.

On its part, the United States will make the following new concessions effective on March 21: Reductions in duty on parana pine plywood from 40 to 25 percent ad valorem, on certain cerium and thorium compounds from 35 to 30 percent ad valorem, and on copaiba balsam from 5 to 2½ percent ad valorem. The United States bound tucum nuts on the free list.

Following is a copy of a letter sent by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury¹ giving notice that the specified concessions negotiated by the United States with Brazil at Torquay will not be withheld after the day indicated:

MARCH 6, 1953

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Reference is made to the President's Proclamation of June 2, 1951 (16 F. R. 5381) carrying out the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and for other purposes.

As Brazil signed the Torquay Protocol on February 19, 1953, I hereby notify you that the following item and parts of items in Part I of Schedule XX annexed to the Torquay Protocol shall not be withheld pursuant to paragraph 4 of that Protocol on or after March 21, 1953:

¹ 18 Fed. Reg. 1347.

Item

10—so much as relates to copaiba balsam

87—all

405—so much as relates to parana pine plywood

1727—so much as relates to tucum nuts

Sincerely yours,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Mexican Mines To Deliver Manganese to U.S.

Signing of four contracts which call for delivery to the United States of 230,500 tons of manganese ore from 30 to 40 small Mexican mines was announced on March 6 by Howard I. Young, Deputy Administrator of the Defense Materials Procurement Agency (DMPA).

These contracts are part of a 3-year project to assist in the development of new deposits of manganese in Mexico, and this project, in turn, is part of a larger program aimed at developing additional sources on this continent.

Mr. Young said that the Mexican project calls for the production of 550,000 tons of manganese ore from a number of areas below the border. The ore will be delivered to a depot at El Paso, Tex., for later processing to meet requirements of the steel industry. DMPA plans to negotiate with a private concern for the construction and operation of a processing plant.

With 50,000 tons already under contract, the agreements bring the total thus far signed for to 280,500 tons. Contracts for the remaining 269,500 tons are under negotiation. The whole 550,000 tons are expected to be delivered to the El Paso depot within the next 3 years.

When the entire project is under way, ore will be coming from 60 to 100 mines employing upwards of 2,000 Mexican miners.

The price to the Government under the contracts will be \$19.30 per long ton for 25 percent ore (equivalent to 77.2 cents per long ton unit), f. o. b. freight ears at the depot, with a premium of 70 cents per ton for each 1 percent of manganese content above 25 percent and a penalty of \$1 per ton for each 1 percent below 25 percent, down to and including 20 percent. Ore containing less than 20 percent manganese or more than 20 percent silica will not be accepted. The shipments will be inspected at the border.

Mines as far as 1,000 miles below the border are involved in the program. The ore will come from five States in Mexico—Chihuahua, Durango, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi, and Jalisco.

Growth of European Unity

by James B. Conant

U.S. High Commissioner for Germany¹

I am speaking to you tonight as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, but I hope that before long this position will disappear and be replaced by that of Ambassador. I should like to bring to my hearers the best wishes of the people of the United States and to assure you that I shall do everything within my power to build further on the sure foundations laid by my predecessors in this office. I pledge you that I shall do all I can to further the good relationship between the United States and Germany and to help solve the difficult problems that confront us both.

These are critical days for the future of freedom in its struggle against the Communist menace, and I have already discovered in the less than a month that I have been here in Germany in how many vital ways the German people are proving the vitality of the Federal Republic, as well as gallantly holding Berlin as an outpost of freedom.

I have been impressed by the spirit of the German people and the healthy growth of the German economy and by the success of the German Government in the last few years. But what has interested me even more as a newcomer to Germany since the war is the fact that everyone I have spoken to has been so seriously concerned with European unity. It is not too much to say, perhaps, that I have found a movement so strong that it might be called a genuine "*Drang nach einem europaischen Zusammenschluss*." This feeling is not restricted to Germany but is likewise widespread among the industrial and cultural leaders of other European countries. That that is so is not only of interest to me as an American but is a most hopeful omen for the future.

The evidence of a strong movement toward European unity is steadily mounting. First, the Schuman plan is already a functioning reality.

¹Address made over the Bavarian radio at Munich, Germany, on Mar. 11.

I have received reports from more than one business group which has traveled throughout Europe of the great interest of industrial leaders in some form of closer integration of the economy of the European nations. The ties that bind the free trade unions of Europe together are being steadily strengthened, and through a common effort the free trade unions are beating back the attempts of Communists to disrupt their movement.

Plan for Political Union Completed

I would also call your attention to the work of the Council of Europe: Only the day before yesterday a historic event occurred in Strasbourg. The temporary committee which has drawn up a political constitution for Europe has completed its work and has just presented this plan to the foreign ministers of the six states who have already agreed to the Schuman plan union. I need hardly refer to the Epc (European Defense Community) treaties whose signature by the foreign ministers somewhat less than a year ago was a matter of so much importance, and whose ratification the nations concerned believe must be accomplished within a relatively short time. I believe they will be ratified because there is no practical alternative that can be envisaged. That we in the United States are deeply interested in this whole problem of defense of Europe goes without saying, for the security of all free nations, including our own, is closely linked to the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This in turn requires the formation of a European defense force as provided in the Epc treaties.

As regards the aims of the Epc, no instrument of aggression is being forged. Let me make this plain. It will be the aim of the Epc and the supporting nations, among which the United States and Great Britain will play an important role, to

defend Europe against aggression. . . .² When the treaties have been ratified, the basis will have been laid for the participation of the Federal Republic in the defense of Germany. For the moment the defense line of the free world against Soviet tyranny here in South Germany is manned by American troops, farther north by British and French troops, but I cannot believe that the German people would desire for any length of time to have their freedom depend solely on foreign troops.

Cultural Unity

But far more fundamental, though for the moment not more important than the military defense of Western Europe, is the realization of European unity. There are many historical reasons for the belief that the six nations which signed the EDC will knit more and more closely the economic, political, and military ties amongst them. I should like to point especially to the cultural unity of Europe which deeply impresses the visitor from overseas. This cultural unity has developed over more than a thousand years, and we in the United States are the inheritors of the great tradition which has been made here in Western Europe.

It is about this tradition that I want to speak particularly tonight, and I think I might do so appropriately from the city of Munich, which is a symbol of one part—and a very important part—of the German contribution to this cultural tradition. For generations people from all over the world have come to Munich to study art, music, and all manner of scientific subjects. Indeed, I was here myself in 1925 for a considerable period of time because for so long Munich has been one of the great centers of the physical sciences.

The fact that this unity has persisted in spite of the increased nationalism of the 18th and 19th centuries gives historical grounds for believing in the possibility of a political and economic union of Europe in the 20th century. We in the United States are especially concerned in the development of a closer union between the European nations because we share in the cultural tradition of these countries. So if the tide of Communist ideology and tyranny should spread over Western Europe and Communist troops should be on the Atlantic coast, then we realize that this would represent the end of all creative cultural life in Europe. For us, too, this would be an irreparable loss.

What are the hallmarks of this European cultural tradition? What are the characteristics of the world outlook which we in America have in common with you here in the free nations of Europe and which we both hold so dear? Might it not all be summed up by saying that what we are concerned with is the dignity and the freedom of the individual?

² Garbled in transmission.

From this belief in the sacredness of human life come our accomplishments of the last few hundred years; namely freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and freedom to elect a government which really represents the people. This same respect for the importance of the individual is the foundation of Western literature, of our art, and of all those studies which we rightly call humanistic. . . .² It seems doubtful to us Americans that Western culture can survive in Europe if Europe does not take the road to political unity. If European culture cannot survive here but succumbs to the Soviet wave, then all over the world there must be a tremendous change in the cultural orientation.

With some such thoughts in mind I accepted the post as High Commissioner for the United States in Germany when it was offered to me by President Eisenhower. With such thoughts and anxieties I came to Germany, and I was deeply impressed and delighted to find how many manifestations there were of this "*drang nach einem europaeischen Zusammenschluss*." Unless I am much mistaken, we are already seeing the beginnings of a new era. The organization of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Schuman plan, the signing of the EDC treaties, and now, to repeat, the completion of the work of the Political Committee, all adds up to a new hope for us today. That I, as High Commissioner for Germany, may be able to do something to further this great movement is my sincere hope. Anyone who can take a part, however small, in furthering European unity will be furthering the cause of our common civilization.

With a firm confidence that you, with the other European nations, will make still further progress, I bring you once again the greeting of the free people of the United States.

Germany Ratifies Contractuals and EDC Treaty

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 146 dated March 19

I am indeed happy that the Bundestag, or lower House, of the German Federal Republic has ratified the contractuals and the European Defense Community Treaty. This marks a truly significant step forward in the cause of European strength and unity.

While the Bundesrat, or upper House of the Parliament, must now pass on the agreements, the historic Bundestag action means that the agreements have at last been sanctioned by a continental European lawmaking body for the first time.

There is now increasing likelihood that the European Defense Community will become a reality.

Creating an Effective Free World Economy

by Myron M. Cowen
Ambassador to Belgium¹

It is fitting and appropriate that we should discuss today the reduction of the barriers to international trade because this subject has been receiving increasing attention on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. It is one of the major parts of the great problem before the nations of the free world—the creation of an effective and integrated economy on this side of the Iron Curtain.

It is the common awareness of this problem, both in Europe and in the United States, that has been responsible for the wide acceptance of such phrases as “trade, not aid.”

As you know, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles have expressed the views of the new Administration about barriers to international trade. In the State of the Union Message,² the President recommended to Congress that the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act be extended, and he asked for revisions of our customs regulations to remove procedural obstacles to trade.

Since he has taken office Mr. Dulles has told a Senate committee that it should be a policy of the United States to “encourage the volume of world trade on a mutually advantageous basis.”

The Thinking of U.S. Business Groups

Within the last 6 months some of the most powerful and influential business and industrial groups in the United States have taken an active leadership in speaking for the revision of our tariff laws and the reduction of trade barriers. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce in one of its recent Washington reports called for “a program for removing actual as well as psychological barriers facing the European exporter.” The chamber’s report said:

If the United States is to strive for balance in trade based on a freer access to American markets, it is reason-

¹ Excerpts from an address made on Mar. 4 before the Brussels Chamber of Commerce at Brussels, Belgium.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 207.

able to ask whether we can’t do more to encourage European producers to compete.

The very influential Detroit Board of Commerce recently issued a statement of policy in which they said:

... we advocate a complete revision of the Tariff Law of 1930 and the establishment of a tariff law consistent with the economic facts of our time—leading towards the eventual elimination of all tariff barriers in the United States and the world.

I have cited these last two statements because I believe them illustrative of a trend in the thinking of business and industrial groups in the United States. In addition, when we consider the American attitude today toward a general reduction of trade barriers, it is also worth recalling that the Democratic Party has been for years the consistent sponsor of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

The great and broad problem that we are faced with today is the creation of an effective and integrated economy among the nations of the free world. It is only by making the maximum use of our physical assets and our productive capacity that we can create among the free nations the strength which alone is the guaranty of their security.

To build this strength, we must work for the achievement of the maximum circulation of raw materials, processed goods, and services among various parts of our free-world economy. To achieve this, one of the very important steps is to reduce the barriers to international trade. This problem is receiving much attention at this time, and I believe we are going to see increasing signs of tangible progress toward its solution.

But there is another problem equally important in building up our strength. That is to work toward the achievement of the maximum productivity among the nations of the free world.

A phenomenon of the last 50 years that distinguishes them from any other similar period of history has been the fantastic increase in the

amount man has been able to produce. This is generally measured in terms of productivity of man-hours of work. Especially since the First World War, the United States has been able to increase the productivity of an hour of man's work until today we have far surpassed the standards that exist anywhere else in the world. To cite just one example, in 1950 one half a million coal miners in the United States dug more coal than all of Europe's two million coal miners.

I have said that the United States has achieved greater output per man-hour than exists in any other part of the world, not because we have any childish desire to boast but because a high level of output per man-hour is essential to the free world. I think that we in the United States have some experience in productivity that is valuable. And the free world must maintain a higher productivity than the slave world back of the Iron Curtain or the free world will perish.

Many reasons are advanced to explain the high level of American productivity: The size of the United States; its wealth as it is measured in terms of natural resources; and sometimes the size of what is called our internal market. This reasoning is, I think, mistaken. There are larger areas and more populated ones, and we do not control a preponderance of the world's physical assets.

America's High Level of Productivity

The answer lies in other factors and one of the most important of these is the relationship that exists between labor and management.

This I would particularly like to emphasize today for three reasons: *first*, because the development of good relations between labor and management has contributed tremendously to the high level of productivity in the United States; *second*, because we have learned from mistakes in such relatively recent years that the experience is fresh in our consciousness; and *third*, because I believe that some of the lessons we have learned in our own social relations have value in other industrial economies similar to ours.

We have, in a relatively very short time, gone through an extreme evolution in the relationship between labor and management. Well into the 19th century labor organizations were still regarded as "conspiracies" and "unlawful combinations." It was not until the middle of the 1930's that there was general recognition in our industrial society of the right of workers to be represented by unions of their choice in their negotiations with management. And it has been within the last 15 years that there has been mutual recognition that labor, through its union organization, and management can both make constructive contributions to industrial enterprise.

For 100 years one of the driving forces in the American economy has been the feeling on the part of the worker that he could share in its

profits. By the middle of the 1920's, the American industrialist had taken the initiative in the expression and working out of a philosophy of industrial society. As technical improvements and new inventions added to the productivity of industry, this formula was expressed as being a division of the gains from increased productivity between three groups: the manufacturer, the consumer, and the worker.

The formula was there, and it had been expressed in the 1920's, but it worked very unevenly. For the average worker the formula was forgotten under the pressure of the great depression of 1929. But with the new resurgence of business activity in the middle thirties, the formula was remembered. The competitive pressures upon the American manufacturer in the years after the first great war made him constantly seek a higher level of consumption in order to get a greater volume of trade. To achieve increasingly greater consumption he kept trying to cut prices of his product and to make luxuries available for a mass market.

Thus it became true in the United States in the 1920's that what had been luxuries to one generation became necessities to another. Two examples will illustrate this: the telephone and the automobile.

In the 1930's, the United States experienced a series of bitter labor-management struggles. Labor, on its part, remembered the cut wages and layoffs of the depression while at the same time wishing to share in the fruits of American productivity. Labor organized itself rapidly in these years into unions, and there were long and bitter fights while unions fought for recognition by management. For a long time management fought stubbornly against the new unions. It regarded them as a threat to the rights to manage.

Slowly at first, but increasingly rapidly, this struggle has changed as management has come first to accept the existence of labor unions and then to encourage their cooperation.

Today the acceptance of the labor union as an important institution in American industrial life can be measured "by the estimated 100,000 or more" agreements that are in effect that have been negotiated between labor and management.

Confidence Between Labor and Management

But more important than any quantitative measure of the value of labor's participation in America's industrial life is the qualitative measure of the climate of confidence that is increasingly developing between labor and management.

We have not reached Utopia in our labor-management relations, but we have been able to establish bearings on a course that we wish to pursue. Each year American industrial society produces more examples of honest, creative cooperation between management and labor; examples where the industrial process is construed as

a partnership to which each contributes skill and techniques.

I have talked to you frankly about the progress we have made in labor-management relations because I believe we can share our common experience in this field as we share it in others like finance and business.

Our Embassy here has followed with great interest the new approach that you have developed in the postwar years to secure labor participation in the making of economic policy. We have been interested in the machinery that you have established under your "Reforms of Structure Program" for joint labor and industry participation in industrial problems. Your institutional process calls for meetings between labor and industry at the plant level in your Works' Council; at the industry level, and at a national level in the Central Economic Council.

I have been very interested to learn that the Central Economic Council is now making a study of the "Green Pool" project for the integration of Western European agricultural production.

Your recognition that labor can make a constructive contribution to the resolution of broad, international economic problems is another example of the progressive quality of Belgian society.

Your free unions, like ours, have taken an active role in the support of your foreign policies. As our unions gave vigorous support to the Marshall plan and the Mutual Security Program, your unions gave strong support to Belgian participation in the European Coal and Steel Community.

I have emphasized the part that organized labor has played in building up our productivity and the contributions that it has made, here and in the United States, to the development of foreign policy. These values are real and are not to be underestimated. But organized labor has had another role to play that is vital to the future of our civilization.

Our industrial age has had some great defects. It has brought large quantities of men away from the community life of the village and the country. It has dropped them as rootless and friendless transients in great cities. It is always a risk of our machine age that it may value man only as a machine. For many years our industrial society valued man for his hands and forgot to value him for his head and his heart.

We have never been so rich that we could afford this poverty that we forced upon ourselves. One of the great roles that our unions have played has been to bring back the participation of man as a thinking as well as a toiling unit of society, and

perhaps the greatest role the unions have played has been to allow our workers to regain their dignity as equals among equals.

Secretary Dulles and Belgian Foreign Minister Exchange Views

Press release 142 dated March 17

The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul Van Zeeland, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles have had a very cordial exchange of views, March 16 and 17, regarding the several questions of common interest to their two Governments. This was a continuation of the talks which they had when the Secretary of State was in Brussels in February.

During the course of their conversations they reviewed among other questions, the following:

1. The developments in the common defense action within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
2. The progress in connection with European military, political, and economic integration.
3. The economic and financial problems of interest to the two countries.

The position of Belgium within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as the steps which Belgium has taken to date to achieve ratification and to further the establishment of the European Defense Community have been accorded the special attention of Mr. Van Zeeland and Mr. Dulles. They have recognized the importance of an early ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty which, although of European inspiration, is of great interest to the United States.

President's Message to Turkey on Earthquake Disaster

Press release 148 dated March 20

On March 19 President Eisenhower sent the following message to Celal Bayar, President of the Republic of Turkey:

I am deeply grieved over reports of the earthquake which has brought disaster to so many of your countrymen. Please accept my heartfelt sympathy, and that of the American people. The American Red Cross stands ready to assist in any way that it can. Best personal regards.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Strong Protests Made Against Czechoslovak Attack on U.S. Aircraft

On March 11 Ambassador George Wadsworth delivered a note to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Prague in protest of an attack by Czechoslovak aircraft upon U.S. aircraft in the U.S. Zone of Germany on March 10. The Czechoslovak Government replied on March 11 to this note, whereupon the United States sent a second note categorically rejecting the Czechoslovak reply. This second U.S. note also: 1) requested assurances that such incidents would not be repeated; 2) expressed the expectation that prompt disciplinary measures would be taken to assure against repetitions; and 3) requested immediate compensation for the U.S. plane destroyed.

Following are the texts of the first U.S. note dated March 10 and communicated on March 11, the Czechoslovak reply of March 11, and the second U. S. note of March 13:

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 10

Under instructions of my Government, I have the honor to protest, in strongest terms, the action of Czechoslovak military aircraft in violating the United States Zone of Germany and attacking United States military aircraft at 5:08 A. M., EST, March 10, 1953 at 12 degrees 25 minutes east longitude, 49 degrees 15 minutes north latitude.

TEXT OF CZECHOSLOVAK REPLY OF MARCH 11

On instructions from its Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protests most strongly against the violation of the Czechoslovak border and of Czechoslovak airspace by United States military aircraft, which occurred on March 10, 1953.

On March 10, 1953, two United States jet aircraft F 84 entered the Czechoslovak state territory. At 11:05 a. m. they met with Czechoslovak fighters on patrol at a distance of 18 km. south-southeast of Plzen, at a distance of 40 km. from the state frontiers. The United States planes were called upon to land. They did not comply with this challenge. In the engagement which ensued one of the United States planes took flight to the West, the second plane was hit, caught fire, and, falling constantly, disappeared to the Southwest.

The Czechoslovak Government has on several occasions already sharply protested against the systematic and deliberate violations of the Czechoslovak airspace by United States military aircraft. At the same time, the Czechoslovak Government pointed out categorically that the full responsibility for the overflights of Czechoslovak territory by United States aircraft, as well as for the consequences of these overflights, rests solely with the Government of the United States.

Faced by irrevocable facts and irrefutable proof, the Government of the United States in numerous instances was obliged to admit the violation of Czechoslovak airspace and repeatedly assured the Czechoslovak Government that it has taken measures to prevent the violation of the Czechoslovak aerial border. The Embassy of the United States even stated that the pilots of high-speed aircraft were under instruction not to fly within 10 miles of the United States zonal boundary bordering on Czechoslovakia. In spite of the urgent warnings of the Czechoslovak Government as to the consequences of the violation of the Czechoslovak border by United States aircraft, and in spite of the repeated assurances on the part of the Government of the United States, the systematic and deliberate entries by United States aircraft of Czechoslovak territory have continued.

The new penetration of United States military aircraft over Czechoslovak state territory on March 10, 1953, is only a continuation of the provocations committed hitherto.

The Czechoslovak Government protests most strongly against the violations of Czechoslovak territorial integrity by United States aircraft and affirms once more that the full responsibility for the overflights of United States planes over Czechoslovak territory and for the consequences of such overflights rests solely with the Government of the United States of America.

The note of the Ambassador of the United States, No. 2 of March 11, 1953, is but an unsuccessful attempt to distort the true facts and thus to escape responsibility. On instructions from its Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, categorically rejects this note.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs assures the Embassy of the United States of America of its consideration.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE OF MARCH 13

Press release 134 dated March 13

I am further instructed by the United States Government, in supplement to my Government's protest of March 10 communicated to Your Excellency in my note of March 11 to reject the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated March 11 concerning the incident of March 10 in which two United States F-84 planes were attacked by Czechoslovak MIG aircraft over the United States Zone of Germany.

Further investigation of this incident immediately protested by the United States shows that the two F-84 aircraft in question were under United States radar surveillance at all times. The radar reports indicate conclusively the following facts:

The American aircraft did not cross the Czechoslovak border at any time.

The United States planes were sent up to investigate after unidentified aircraft were detected on the radar scope. They were met by two MIG aircraft approaching from the east at 12 degrees 25 minutes east longitude and 49 degrees 15 minutes north latitude. A MIG plane closed on the tail of one of the F-84 aircraft to less than 100 yards and opened fire. The American plane was hit in the right stabilizer and the tip tank was knocked off. The plane which could no longer be controlled crashed immediately afterwards in the United States Zone, and the pilot also came down by parachute in the United States Zone.

It is thus established beyond question that the MIG planes crossed the border into the United States Zone and attacked the United States aircraft and that the actual shooting occurred within the United States Zone.

The Czechoslovak Government's attempted explanation of this provocative incident is a falsification of facts designed to cover its responsibility for this inexcusable action.

The United States in the interest of border tranquillity and international amity, has always taken strict measures to avoid violations of the Czechoslovak border by the United States aircraft. In the same spirit, if after careful investigation it has been found that an inadvertent violation had in fact occurred in spite of such measures, the United States acknowledged the violation and took renewed precautions. In the great majority of Czechoslovak protests of frontier violations investigation has disclosed that the Czechoslovak charges were false.

On its side the United States has not issued any protest of the repeated Czechoslovak violations of the zonal frontier without firm assurance of the correctness of the facts presented in the protest. The United States has had frequent occasion in the past to call the attention of Czechoslovakia

to its attitude of not recognizing a violation on its part no matter to what extent its representatives were culpable and of failing to state what measures were being taken to prevent such incidents. After repeated representations along these lines the Embassy elicited a statement from the Ministry in a note dated August 10, 1951 that the Czechoslovak Air Force was instructed to keep at a distance of 20 kilometers from the United States Zone of Germany, and the Ministry admitted thereafter several incidents of violations of the frontier by Czechoslovak aircraft.

The flagrant incident of March 10 indicates, however, that the Czechoslovak Government has reverted to its previous practice of misrepresentation. The facts in this case indicate that the assurance that the Czechoslovak Air Force does not fly within 20 kilometers of the frontier and that precautions are taken not to violate the frontier is no longer operative. Moreover, it is incontrovertible that in the present incident Czechoslovak aircraft, acting recklessly and without giving warning of any kind, opened fire on a United States aircraft engaged in normal and peaceful patrol activity over the United States Zone of Germany.

In view of this attitude of the Czechoslovak Government, the United States authorities in Germany will take the measures necessary to prevent any further violations of the border of the United States Zone by Czechoslovak aircraft and any repetition of the present incident.

The United States Government calls upon the Czechoslovak Government for an expression of regret for this irresponsible action and an assurance that no such incidents as this will occur again. It furthermore expects that the Czechoslovak authorities will take prompt disciplinary measures to insure against wanton actions of this kind in the future. Since the Czechoslovak Government is clearly responsible for the destruction of the United States aircraft shot down, the United States Government expects immediate compensation for the value of the property destroyed.

Sulphur Allocations Discontinued

The Sulphur Committee of the International Materials Conference announced on March 2 that its member governments have accepted its recommendation to discontinue international allocations for sulphur, effective March 1, 1953.

The Committee noted that the substantial improvement which had taken place in the sulphur position over the last 6 months of 1952 was continuing in the current half year. The Committee's review of the situation also indicated that there are prospects for a reasonable balance between world supply and demand for the remainder of 1953.

Disarmament As One of the Vital Conditions of Peace

Statement by Ernest A. Gross

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 18

This session of the General Assembly, like those before it, is concerned with some of the great issues of war and peace. We live in a world in which armed aggression is being employed as an instrument of national policy, in which whole nations are subjected to foreign tyranny, and in which despotic governments use the weapons of secrecy, hatred, and fear to poison men's minds and to paralyze their will to resist tyranny.

In such a world, as the President of the United States said in his Inaugural Address:

... we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop the strength that will deter the forces of aggression and promote the conditions of peace. . . .

The problem of first priority is, of course, to deal vigorously with issues involving life and death of men on the battlefield. The aggression in Korea casts black shadows on all the other issues which demand solution. There is no room in the modern world for conquest of others, whether by arms or by stealth. We shall not forsake those who have been put under bondage by foreign masters. It remains our purpose also to make the most determined efforts to preserve and expand free institutions and individual liberties everywhere.

Under these circumstances, what is the true significance of our efforts to achieve disarmament? To some, it may seem foolish to press onward with these efforts at a time when we are necessarily devoting so much of our energy and resources to the creation of strength in the free world. We do not hold to this point of view. As the means of waging war steadily increase in deadly effectiveness, it is the highest part of responsibility to continue efforts toward disarmament.

This we regard as one of the vital conditions of peace. It is proof of the fact that the Ameri-

can people have an abiding concern in attaining a peaceful world.

The work of the Disarmament Commission and its obstruction by the Soviet Government sharply reveals conflicting attitudes toward peace. As we see it, peace is a relationship between nations in which they can practice tolerance and live with one another as good neighbors. There is no room in this conception for surrender by one nation to threats or domination by another.

The Soviet Government, both under its past and present leadership, has talked much about "peace." I hope that in Prime Minister Malenkov's speech the word "peace" is used as it is understood by the rest of the world.² There are many ways by which this can be put to the test by deeds. Disarmament is one of the clearest testing points of all.

It seems to me right and proper to ask two simple questions of the Soviet representative sitting here with us. To these questions we want no quick debaters' answers. Instead, we would prefer the considered reply of the Soviet Government. Here, then, are my two questions:

1. Is this a time when the Soviet Government is willing to discuss constructively the subject of disarmament which the Charter recognizes is so important for the attainment of conditions of peace?

2. Is this a forum in which the Soviet representative will negotiate with his colleagues in order to give tangible form in this particular field to what the Soviet rulers claim is their "tried and tested policy of peace"?

The Soviet Government should recognize the challenge in our renewed suggestion that they negotiate in good faith on the problem of disarmament. An effective system of disarmament

¹ Made on Mar. 18 in Committee I (Political and Security).

² Reference here is to Georgi Malenkov's address before the Supreme Soviet on Mar. 15.

will provide the best insurance against aggression by anybody against anybody, for it will remove the armed strength which makes aggression possible.

We are proud of our own record in the Disarmament Commission and of the useful contributions made to its work by all of its members, excepting alone the Soviet Government. Let me summarize the honest and practical proposals we advanced, in several instances, along with the United Kingdom and France. Then, contrast this with the attitude of the Soviet Union.

Résumé of U.S. Proposals on Disarmament

(1) *Essential Principles*—Obviously, considerable progress could be made in the field of disarmament if there could be agreement upon the essential principles of a disarmament program. The General Assembly in its resolution of January 11, 1952,³ approved certain general principles.

Plans for disarmament should provide for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduction of *all* armed forces and all armaments. They should make possible the elimination of *all* major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. Disarmament plans should provide for effective international regulation and control of atomic energy to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. Also, a genuine system of disarmament must include all kinds of armed forces and armaments. It must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system. And it must include safeguards to ensure the compliance of all such nations.

Although the adoption by the General Assembly of these principles was a good start, we felt that there were certain additional principles which must underlie any program. We therefore introduced such principles in the Disarmament Commission in April 1952.⁴

In the first place, we pointed out that the goal of disarmament is to prevent war, not merely to regulate the armaments to be used in war. All nations, and most particularly those who use aggression as an instrument of policy, should be deprived of the temptation to wage war by removing the means of waging war.

This goal can be achieved only through cooperation of all states to establish an open and substantially disarmed world. In such a world, the level of armed forces and armaments would be so low that no state would be in a condition of armed preparation sufficient to start a war. An open world is one in which no state could make preparations for war without other states knowing about it.

In addition, we have to keep in mind the kind

of international agreements needed to achieve disarmament.

We start with a situation in which the Soviet Union has a large preponderance of arms and of armaments in many fields. This superiority is dangerous to international peace and security. Any disarmament program which fails to take this fact into account would be a peril to peace rather than progress toward peace. What is essential is a full and coordinated program, balanced throughout the process of reduction so as to avoid tilting the scales against peace. This has as its objective a drastic reduction of national armaments and the complete elimination of mass armies and other instruments of mass destruction, including atomic and bacteriological weapons.

But we insist that during the entire process of disarmament there shall be no unbalancing of armed strength dangerous to international peace and security. In other words, we insist that any program must at all stages be fair to all countries—to the free world as well as to the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Soviet Union insists upon a program which if carried out would completely upset the balance of armed strength. Their proposals would make the rest of the world helpless to resist Soviet aggression during the period when the program was being carried out. It would be an incentive to aggression rather than a deterrent.

(2) *Disclosure and Verification*—In the resolution of January 11, 1952, the sixth General Assembly directed the Commission to consider from the outset plans for progressive and continuing disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments. This was recognized as the necessary first step in carrying out the disarmament program. It simply means telling the truth and giving proof that what you tell is true.

We submitted to the Commission on April 5 specific proposals on this matter.⁵

We do not, and we never have, regarded revealing the truth concerning armaments as a substitute for disarmament. On the contrary, it is an essential part of a reduction program. You don't know how to get where you're going unless you know where you're starting from. We regard information as the starting point—not the destination.

Then we suggested that disclosure and verification should be carried out progressively, step by step. We did this because we wanted to speed up the disarmament program. In the existing world tension it would not be possible for states to disclose at the outset their most secret weapons and installations. This must wait for the development of greater international confidence. Accordingly, we believe that disclosure and verification should proceed from the less secret to the more secret information. This would prevent

³ BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1952, p. 507.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 12, 1952, p. 752.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1952, p. 586.

premature disclosure of more secret information until substantial good faith and cooperation had been demonstrated. Moreover, it is a good place to start because the less secret information is easier to verify.

However, we suggested a very sizeable disclosure in the first state. It is our opinion that in the field of atomic energy, upon the successful completion of the first stage of disclosure and verification, as outlined in our proposals, all governments would have a clear, although general, indication of the existing atomic strength of all other states. It goes without saying that all governments would also have a clear indication of the existing strength in armed forces and nonatomic armaments of all other states. We believe that the successful completion of this first stage would do much to inspire international confidence and good will. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of any step in the armaments field which would contribute more to international peace and security.

At all stages, the disclosure and verification of atomic weapons would roughly parallel the disclosure and verification in nonatomic fields. We made clear that these proposals are not to be considered as final and unchangeable in any sense of the word. . . .

(3) *Numerical Limitation of Armed Forces*—Along with the United Kingdom and France, we submitted in May 1952 proposals to fix numerical ceiling on the armed forces of all states.⁶ The Three Powers emphasized that limiting the numbers of armed forces was only a part of the Disarmament Commission's task. It is necessary, for example, also to limit the types and quantities of armaments which should be allowed to support permitted armed forces. In our view, however, even tentative agreement on ceilings for permitted armed forces would greatly ease the way to agreement on other fundamental matters.

The essence of our proposals was the suggestion that there should be equal maximum ceilings for the United States, the U.S.S.R., and China of, say, between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000; that the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France should be equal, say between 700,000 and 800,000. As for all other states having substantial armed forces, there should be agreed maximum ceilings fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon by the Five Great Powers. We thought these ceilings might be normally less than one percent of the population and normally less than current levels.

These proposals differ considerably from the Soviet scheme, which calls for a reduction by an arbitrary percentage of one-third from unknown levels. Our proposals would lead to reduction in the armed forces of the United States and of the Soviet Union far in excess of the 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ percent reduction proposed by the Soviet Union. Moreover, they differ from the Soviet proposals in suggesting fixed ceilings in balance with each other, so that

none of the Five Powers would have cause to fear attack from the other. And they cover all states with substantial armed forces, while the Soviet scheme deals only with the Five Powers. In other words, our plan would have the effect of eliminating the imbalance of armed strength which causes some nations to fear that they live only at the whim of a more powerful neighbor.

(4) *Control of Atomic Energy*—The General Assembly, in its resolution of January 11, 1952, suggested that the Disarmament Commission be guided by the following principle in regard to control of atomic energy:

Unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan for international control of atomic energy and the prohibition of atomic weapons should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy and to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

In the light of this resolution, we continued to support the U.N. atomic energy plan, reaffirming our willingness to examine seriously and with an open mind any other proposals for atomic control which might be presented.

As I have stated, our proposals for disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments expressly provide for the disclosure of atomic armaments. This was a new proposal.

We recognize that the disclosure and verification system, in and by itself, is not enough to protect the world against the danger of violation of agreements eliminating atomic weapons. However, it is obviously impossible to have an effective system of controls of atomic energy which does not include the disclosure and verification of atomic installations and atomic weapons.

The Soviet Government has so far rejected our proposal for an effective system of disclosure and verification. They have refused to explain the meaning of their vague proposals. They have been utterly silent regarding the kind of international inspection which would be acceptable to them and yet not subject to Soviet veto in its application. In the light of this attitude, which we hope will change, we saw little point in going into detailed discussions of other controls.

(5) *Bacteriological Warfare*—We also presented to the Disarmament Commission our views favoring the elimination of bacteriological weapons from national armaments, the method of achieving this result, and the relationship of this problem to the broader problem of disarmament.

(6) *Summary of United States Proposals*—Our proposals covered the main topics with which we must deal if we are to have an effective disarmament program. We did not go into minute detail in the Commission; we did not pretend that our suggestions represented the last word that could be spoken.

I affirm, however, that our proposals were a sincere and constructive effort to reduce inter-

⁶ *Ibid.*, June 9, 1952, p. 910.

national tensions and to advance the cause of lasting peace. If, in the future, we make real progress toward removing the causes of mutual fear and distrust among nations, so as to make possible drastic reduction in armed forces and armaments, the framework for such reduction will bear a great similarity to the proposals which we advanced in the Disarmament Commission.

All members of the Disarmament Commission, with the exception of the Soviet Government, welcomed every one of our proposals. I do not imply that they endorsed the proposals in their entirety. To the contrary, they criticized certain of the proposals and made suggestions to improve them. However, they recognized the genuine efforts which we were making to break the logjam leading to the constant increase in size and fearfulness of all armed establishments.

The Soviet Attitude

Only the Soviet Government rejected our efforts to secure international cooperation in a constructive approach to the disarmament problem.

There is nothing new about the pattern of obstructionism which the Soviet Union pursued in the Disarmament Commission: the pattern of bringing up irrelevancies and seeking to prevent international organizations from carrying out the responsibilities assigned to them.

Outside the United Nations, in the meetings of the Austrian Treaty deputies, Soviet delegates meet concrete proposals for the reconstruction of Austrian independence with irrelevant demands concerning Trieste or denazification. The U.N. Commission to investigate conditions for free elections in Germany is an example of a commission created by the General Assembly, and continuing in existence, which has been completely thwarted in the performance of its mission solely by the obstructive tactic of denying the Commission access to the Soviet Zone in Germany. The tactics initiated by the U.S.S.R. in the Disarmament Commission were strikingly similar.

During the same meeting of the Disarmament Commission, in which we appealed to all nations to join in honest efforts toward disarmament, the Soviet representative responded by making the utterly false charge that the United Nations was waging bacteriological warfare in Korea. All members of the Commission were outraged. They at once protested that this charge was intended merely to poison the atmosphere of the Commission and to prevent any real progress.

A similar example of Soviet obstruction came up in connection with the adoption by the Commission of a plan of work. As if to boast of its contempt for the work of the Commission, the Soviet Government proposed as a so-called "plan of work" nothing more or less than the same old proposals which they have been advancing for years and which the General Assembly has con-

sistently rejected. Far from being a "plan of work," it was an ultimatum. For, if the Soviet suggestion had been adopted, the Disarmament Commission would have been able to consider only the Soviet proposals—nothing different and nothing more.

The Soviet Union submitted nothing to the Commission beyond this so-called "plan of work." It is true that the Soviet Government used slightly different language than it had previously used. In particular, the Soviet representative spoke of an appropriate system of guarantees for the observation of the General Assembly's decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments to conduct inspections on a continuing basis without the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of states.

What do these phrases mean? Repeated efforts were made by members of the Disarmament Commission to find out. The Soviet representative described all these efforts to determine the meaning of his proposal as "playing at questions and answers." He flatly declared that unless the U.N. atomic energy plan were withdrawn "there is no need for me to give any details."

Despite this attitude, we feel a responsibility to persevere in our efforts to find a solution. It is a good and useful thing that the governments of the free world, and their peoples behind them, should understand the issues involved and reach agreement upon them. The assembled might and the moral unity of the free world will provide the unshakeable foundation of peace.

We have therefore joined with other states in cosponsoring a resolution continuing the Commission and requesting it to report again to the General Assembly and to the Security Council no later than September 1, 1953.⁷ We believe that the General Assembly, in this resolution, should reiterate its desire that constructive proposals be submitted to the Commission.

In concluding, let me repeat the basic policies to which my Government has pledged itself through its adherence to the U.N. Charter. All members of the United Nations have agreed "to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." In itself, this commitment is a pledge against aggression with any weapon or in any form. It is a pledge against the use of armed force "save in the common interest."

The United States reaffirms this pledge. It is a commitment not merely to avoid the use of any particular weapons, but to refrain from the use of force in any form contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. That is why we loyally support the work of the Disarmament Commission. We look forward to the day when the blind and reckless forces which now obstruct it will be brought to a realization of their error.

⁷ U.N. doc. A/C. 1/L. 30, dated Mar. 17, 1953.

Spreading the Doctrines of Freedom

by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 10

Sometimes it takes practical people, the people who make things run, a long time to learn how to use ideas that poets and prophets have always known. The brotherhood of man, the oneness of all people, has been recognized for thousands of years in schools and churches and temples and mosques. Now it has become the working principle upon which all wise and free governments, and of course only free governments can be wise, must base their policies.

In his inaugural address² President Eisenhower showed his profound understanding of this great basic truth; and he brought it, alive and inspiring, into practical politics in the best sense of the word—of both words.

He showed us a world in which some countries are richer, much richer than others—our own the richest of them all—but we are all bound together by common needs as well as by common dangers. The telephone, on whose wires all of our lives seem to be strung these days, requires raw materials from 17 different countries. That's just one of many material facts that bind us all together into one big round package.

He showed us a world in which not only people and places are tied together. All of our problems and all of our policies are interconnected, too. His speech talked of natural resources but it also talked about faith. He talked about the enemies of freedom and the terrible conflict which "strikes directly at the faith of our fathers and the lives of our sons." But in dealing with this conflict and America's leadership of the free world, when he talked of armaments he also talked about food. He spoke of economic health, but that led immediately into the importance of equal rights for all mankind.

¹ Address made before the Philadelphia *Bulletin* Forum at Philadelphia on Mar. 11. Mrs. Lord was confirmed on Jan. 30 as U.S. representative on the Commission on Human Rights.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 167.

In such a world we could not possibly get along without a world organization which was designed to tackle all of these problems on a worldwide basis. Some people think the United Nations should concentrate on political problems and stop fooling around with what they call its idealistic, or charitable, or even do-goodish social and economic problems. Others think the United Nations should stick to the economic and social problems—where the Russians won't help, but can't stop the work—to get more food to more people, and leave the political questions to power politics where they've always been.

It seems to me that the Charter of the United Nations makes sense just because it sees the interdependent world as it is and sees it whole.

Any attempt to consider problems of human rights apart from political problems, or strategic problems apart from human problems, couldn't be any more successful than the old magician's trick of cutting a woman in half. It might fool the audience but it never fools the woman.

As we cannot tackle any problems apart from all problems, so we cannot tackle them alone. Any attempt to do so would be foolhardy and extravagant. Since Aesop told the fable of the quarreling brothers trying in vain to break a bundle of fagots, men have realized that in union there is strength.

In this city Benjamin Franklin said that: "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately." Both Aesop and Franklin talked primarily of the value of unity in self-defense. Unity, common effort for a common cause, is equally valuable in the offensive against hunger, poverty, disease, and violence.

Once we have faced the fact that it is in our national interest to have strong allies, prosperous and loyal, we see that all U.N. programs to increase food supply, to eliminate crippling disease, to end the desperate terrors of poverty, are programs which support the fundamental purposes of our foreign policy.

The Preventive Medicine Approach

Let us look at one example of a U.N. economic program from this point of view. In 1946 the great workshop of Europe had stalled on dead center. The United States embarked on the unprecedented Marshall plan in order to start the wheels turning once again. But while it was getting under way, experts of the Economic Commission for Europe, a Commission under the U.N. Economic and Social Council, were analyzing the basic continuing causes of the difficulties Europe faced.

They concluded that the economy of Europe was trapped within a vicious circle. Weak and undernourished, many European miners were unable to produce coal in the volume needed. The shortage of coal held back steel production; and without steel, farm implements could not be produced in quantity. Agricultural production in turn was held back to a considerable extent by the shortage of farm machinery. Without more food, the coal miners could not produce more coal.

An analysis revealed, however, that much high-grade coking coal, coal of strategic value in making steel, was being wasted on less important uses, such as heating houses which could be done as well with a lower grade of coal. Upon the recommendation of the Commission, the countries of Western Europe agreed on a system of allocating high-grade coal. The result was an increase of steel production amounting to hundreds of thousands of tons, a major contribution toward European recovery.

This kind of preventive medicine costs almost nothing. Representatives of governments sat around a table. They talked, they decided, and they acted. Their decisions and the result was a substantial improvement in their way of life, and in the strength of their economy and of their governments, and thus in the strength of the whole free world.

But the free world these days extends far beyond Western Europe. It includes 15 nations which only since the war have gained their independence, are running their own domestic affairs, are fixing their own foreign policies. Six hundred million people live within these countries—India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Jordan, Israel, Korea, Libya, to name a few.

Unity with these nations must be a part of our foreign policy. Indonesia is withholding strategic rubber from Communist China in response to a U.N. embargo. Should Indonesia change its mind and decide that its best friends are the Communists, we might soon notice the difference in Korea.

It is important to us that these countries, now in their formative years, learn and adopt the practices of freedom and democracy. Communism is fighting hard for the minds of the people

of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. In many ways we are handicapped in this struggle, for Western civilization is identified with colonialism to many people in these regions. Colonialism, while bringing advancement in many ways, also left deep scars of resentment against past practices.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the United Nations General Assembly at Paris in 1948, has been of tremendous value in spreading the doctrines of democracy. Sections of it which express the basic principles of our own Bill of Rights—freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of worship—have been incorporated into the constitutions of several of these new States.

The significance of this fact cannot be underestimated. It means that millions upon millions of children are now being taught to honor the fundamental tenets of liberty in their own basic legal structure, just as our own children are taught to honor our own Bill of Rights. The Declaration of Human Rights is doing more to advance the cause of freedom, which must always be the American cause, than thousands of American teachers could ever do, even if we could afford to send them.

It is important not to undervalue the creative constructive power of the Declaration of Human Rights, even though it is without legal force. It is doing an important job right now in preparing the world for the time when it may be possible to agree on an actual legal covenant or covenants in the field of human rights. The educational job of preparing the minds of men everywhere to understand the meaning and responsibility of freedom must make real progress before any covenant can hope to stand up as law. A law which does not have its roots in the popular will has no more vitality than a plant in a thin soil.

As the Secretary of State said in Washington last week "great changes, great developments, usually come about slowly and not by a very sudden development. Sometimes they seem to come about by a sudden development, but only if a great deal of preparatory work has already been done so that the ground has been laid."³

Benjamin Franklin had another expression which we might appropriately apply to foreign affairs. In *Poor Richard's Almanac* he wrote "It is hard for an empty bag to stand upright." He meant that poverty places a man's honesty to a severe test. Adapting this adage to our foreign relations, we might say that it is difficult for democracy to survive in the abysmal conditions of poverty, disease, and ignorance prevailing among two-thirds of the people of the globe. A starving man will take four sandwiches before the four freedoms, as it was so aptly put by the Pakistan delegate to the United Nations.

The necessity of spreading the doctrines of

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 16, 1953, p. 402.

freedom is one of the main reasons for our foreign-economic programs. In executing them, we have found that the greatest possibilities for improving living conditions lie in the people of the countries needing help.

In the mountainous areas of Greece there was fertile land, uncultivated, and willing farmers with weeks of idle time each year and all because there were no roads to take extra produce down to the markets. If they planted more potatoes than they could eat, the potatoes rotted. Through a program set up by a member of the U.N. Social Advisory Board, in cooperation with the Greek Government, tens of thousands of men and women organized their own voluntary road building projects. Using picks and shovels made in their local blacksmith shops and bought with their own money, they constructed over 1,500 kilometers of roads in 18 months.

The cost to the United States was a little more than a third of the salary of one man. Value to Greece: more work and more food for years and years to come, grown by willing workers on their own land. Enough food for its people is essential to the stability of the free Government of Greece, as of any government. Value to the United States: a more stable economy in a strategic part of the world.

Thus a small investment, a small amount of assistance, can act as a catalyst stirring to life the innate skills, ingenuities, and energies of large numbers of people.

These are long-range matters, however. One may rightfully ask, what is the evidence of U.N. effectiveness in urgent questions of the hour? Let me answer with another illustration.

Focusing World Public Opinion

In 1946 the Soviet Union declined to honor its treaty with Iran and withdraw its occupation troops after American and British forces had retired. The diplomacy of another day might have required a show of force, warships to the eastern Mediterranean, bombing planes concentrated at Near East bases.

Instead, the United States sent its Secretary of State to the Security Council of the United Nations. His attack, and that of others, on the conduct of the Soviet Union caused the famous walk-out of Mr. Gromyko. That walkout became symbolic, for the censure of the peoples of the world became so strong that Russian forces marched out of Iran.

Again in 1948, after a 2-week "police action," Dutch armies were in complete control of Indonesia. The Republic's forces were defeated. Their leaders were in jail. One year later, Indonesia was a free republic. Its leaders were ruling their people. A treaty had been signed with the Netherlands. Dutch troops were withdrawing in an orderly fashion. Yet no outside armies had intervened.

Again, world public opinion, focused through the United Nations, had gone to work. The conciliations of a U.N. Good Offices Committee had speeded the result. In two urgent cases, armies were made to retreat without a shot being fired. The United Nations played a key role in both cases. Can there be any question that it is a tool of extraordinary usefulness in foreign policy? I think not.

We cannot measure the value of these accomplishments in terms of the million and even billions of dollars saved. Surely it makes each U.S. citizen's 16 cents per year for his share of the assessment for the United Nations and its specialized agencies seem like the greatest tax bargain of all time.

I think the U.N. idea is just beginning to come into its own, just beginning to be appreciated by the American people. The flurry of frightened attacks on the United Nations and the whole idea of international organization have gotten far more attention than they deserve not because they represent American opinion, but because they represent the unusual, and it's the unusual that makes news.

Support for the United Nations doesn't make news because it has become a fundamental of sound American thinking about the world and our place in it. Both parties included support for the United Nations in their platforms. In the last opinion polls, 77 percent of the American people expressed their continued belief in the United Nations. Thousands of visitors pour through the new U.N. buildings every week. Last year, more than 5,200 communities celebrated U.N. Day.

And here's the thing that's most encouraging to me as I read my mail and talk to visitors at the U.S. Mission and at headquarters. This support is not the wide-eyed, slightly naive optimism that too many people entertained for a while after San Francisco. They don't expect to work magic and pull a peaceful solution to all man's problems out of a table of organization and some rules of procedure.

They know that the United Nations is good and important because it gives us all an organization, an instrument, to work with which has just begun to prove its usefulness. Every kind of a tool or instrument, from a hoe to a tractor, grows rusty if it isn't used and if it isn't used properly, but that doesn't mean that there's anything wrong with hoes and tractors.

Almost everyone has some sort of an idea for improving the United Nations, and that's good, too. Of course it can be improved, and I won't start worrying about the vitality of the United Nations until people stop thinking of ways to improve it.

These people seem to me to be showing the highest kind of patriotism. They know that patriotism is blind which cannot see beyond the

borders of our own country. When we love our country, just as when we love our friends, or our husbands, and our children, we must see it as it is. And when we see it as it is, an interdependent part of a big round spinning world, we see that true patriotism requires us to work for our country by working for a just and peaceful world in which all free nations can flourish.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

Climatology and Synoptic Meteorology Commissions (WMO)

The Department of State announced on March 10 (press release 133) that at the invitation of the Government of the United States, the Commissions for Climatology and for Synoptic Meteorology of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) will hold their first sessions at Washington March 12-30 and April 2-29, respectively.

These are two of eight technical commissions created at the First Congress of WMO, held at Paris in March and April 1951, to keep abreast of and promote meteorological developments both in the scientific and applied field and to standardize methods, procedures, and techniques in the application of meteorology. Each member of WMO may designate technical experts to participate in the work of the commissions.

WMO was established, in the words of the WMO convention of 1947, "with a view to coordinating, standardizing, and improving world meteorological activities and to encouraging an efficient exchange of meteorological information between countries in the aid of human activities," such as aviation, shipping, and agriculture.

Climatology is the study of the weather in particular areas of the world over long periods of time. Under the terms of reference adopted for it at the First Congress of WMO, the Commission for Climatology is required to study such matters as the meteorological observations and networks required for climatological investigations of surface and upper air conditions, and of the application of climatological data to the activities and well-being of the peoples of the world.

The terms of reference will be reviewed by the Commission for Climatology at its first session. Reports will be made on recent scientific developments in the field of responsibility of the Commission. Questions relating to the organization of the Commission, and of working groups to carry on its work between sessions, will be considered. Provision is also made in the agenda for the study of several special technical questions: (1) observational and recording procedures, including networks of climatological, aerological, and hydrological stations, the classification and outfitting of stations, the elements to be observed, forms of record; (2) the processing of data; (3)

the dissemination of data through such means as national and international publications, climatological broadcasts, and world weather records; and (4) the application of climatological data, particularly to hydrology.

The U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation:

Delegates

H. C. S. Thom, *Chairman*, Assistant Chief, Climatological Services, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce
Woodrow C. Jacobs, Director, Military Climatology, Air Weather Service, Department of the Air Force

Advisers

Joseph W. Berry, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce
J. J. Keyser, Department of the Navy
J. P. King, Lieutenant Commander, USN, Department of the Navy
W. F. McDonald, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce
Franklin Newhall, Department of Agriculture
W. C. Spreen, Department of the Air Force
C. K. Vestal, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce

The Commission for Synoptic Meteorology will be concerned with the provision and standardization of means for the study of the weather, as of any given time, in widely scattered areas of the world. Under its terms of reference, it is responsible for such matters as the formulation of observational requirements for synoptic meteorology, the preparation of code forms and tables of specifications for all meteorological purposes, meteorological identification systems and index numbers, and the coordination of international requirements and arrangements for the exchange and dissemination of data, including analyses, forecasts, and warnings. The agenda for its first session contains some 80 items on such specific topics as synoptic code forms, upper wind reports, international analysis code, representation of wind speed on charts, weather analysis symbols, meteorological telecommunications, and frequency of synoptic and aerological observations.

The U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation:

Delegates

I. R. Tannehill, *Chairman*, Chief, Division of Synoptic Reports and Forecasts, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce
Frederick A. Berry, Jr., Captain, USN, *Officer in Charge*, Fleet Weather Central, Department of the Navy
Robert D. Fletcher, Director of Scientific Services Division, Air Weather Service, Department of the Air Force

Advisers

C. J. Callahan, Department of the Air Force
V. S. Hardin, Department of the Air Force
Norman A. Matson, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce
W. B. Paulin, Commander, USN, Department of the Navy
C. G. Reeves, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce
A. K. Showalter, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of Commerce

The United States in the United Nations

[March 12-18]

Security Council

Consideration of the recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary General continued at the Council's March 13 meeting. In the voting, conducted by secret ballot, all three proposals placed before the Council failed of adoption. The U.S. proposal for the recommendation of Carlos P. Romulo received five affirmative votes, two negative votes, and four abstentions; the Soviets' candidate, Stanislaw Skrzesezewski, received one affirmative vote, three negative votes, and seven abstentions. Thus, neither received the required seven affirmative votes. The Danish proposal for recommending Lester B. Pearson received nine affirmative votes, one negative vote, and one abstention, but since the negative vote was cast by a permanent member, this proposal also failed of adoption.

The permanent members were requested to hold consultations concerning the recommendation and to report to the Council by March 19. On March 18 the permanent members announced that they had exchanged views on the following candidates:

Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, chairman of the Indian delegation to the General Assembly;

Sir Benegal N. Rau of India, a judge of the International Court of Justice;

Prince Wan Waithayakon, permanent representative of Thailand to the United Nations;

Nasrollah Entezam, chairman of the Iranian delegation to the General Assembly and president of the fifth session of the General Assembly;

Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo, Foreign Minister of Mexico, until recently Mexico's permanent representative to the U. N., and president of the sixth session of the General Assembly;

Eduardo Zuleta Angel of Colombia, who was president of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations and a representative of Colombia to various sessions of the General Assembly;

Prof. Ahmed S. Bokhari, permanent representative of Pakistan to the United Nations;

Dr. Charles Malik, chairman of the delegation of Lebanon to the General Assembly and Lebanon's representative on the Security Council;

Erik Boheman, Swedish Ambassador to the United States and a past representative of Sweden to the General Assembly.

They had, however, come to no agreement as to what proposals to make to the Council.

General Assembly

Without debate, the Assembly on March 17 confirmed Committee I's resolutions on the repatriation of Greek soldiers and on the extension of the Collective Measures Committee's (Cmc) work until the ninth regular session. The votes were, respectively, 54-5-0 and 50-5-3 (Argentina, India, Indonesia). In both cases the negative votes were cast by the U.S.S.R. and its associates. Alexis Kyrou (Greece) expressed gratitude to the sponsors of the resolution on the Greek item, and to Committee I itself, and indicated that settlement of this humanitarian issue was simply a matter of good will.

The only vote explanation on the Collective Measures Committee's resolution was that of Valerian Zorin (U.S.S.R.), who reiterated his delegation's views that collective-security efforts were in contravention of the Charter and the Security Council.

Committee I (Political and Security)—During the Committee's debate on the 11-power resolution noting the Collective Measures Committee's report and requesting the Cmc to continue its work until the ninth regular General Assembly session, David M. Johnson (Canada) on March 13 noted that nothing in the Cmc report nor in the joint draft went beyond the framework of principles enunciated in the Uniting for Peace Resolution. Neither was there anything which could be interpreted as committing any government to undertake anything more than it was already pledged to do under the Charter itself. The purpose of the Cmc's studies was to facilitate rapid action by governments in the event of aggression. However, the decision as to what any particular government might do in any particular case remained in the final analysis entirely up to that government.

The establishment of an international collective-security system was incumbent on every U.N. member, Mr. Johnson emphasized, pointing out that a few countries could not continue indefinitely to bear nearly all the burden. He had little doubt that the resolution, and the work of the Cmc, would again be attacked by that small group of countries which would apparently prefer that the world outside its own borders should have no collective security at all.

Pointing to the incorrectness of the Soviet argu-

ment that the General Assembly had no business meddling in the peace and security field, the Canadian representative said he failed to see what was so "sinister, illegal, and aggressive" about steps taken in the United Nations toward the eventual building of a universal collective-security system. He also failed to see why it was incompatible with U.N. membership for any group of members, in exercising the right of collective self-defense under article 51, to organize supplementary regional pacts and agreements such as NATO. He concluded by observing that it was not just a committee which would be kept alive by the joint resolution but "the kernel of a great idea."

On March 16 Committee I approved the 11-power draft by a vote of 52-5 (Soviet bloc)-2 (India, Indonesia). Several of the Arab States expressed reservations, chiefly concerning the imposition of measures on a state without its consent. In a vote explanation, Valerian Zorin repeated Soviet objections to the "illegal" activities of the CMC, which he claimed was established in violation of the Charter as a substitute for the Security Council. It was not the veto, he claimed, but the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom to circumvent the Security Council that had caused the present situation in the Council.

Ambassador Ernest A. Gross (U.S.) opened discussion of disarmament on March 18 with a challenge to the Soviet Union to back up the peace protestations of its leaders with good faith in negotiations in the Disarmament Commission. The field of disarmament, he suggested, provided an excellent testing-ground for the U.S.S.R. to give tangible evidence of what the Soviet rulers claimed was their policy of peace. (For text, see p. 476.)

Current Legislation on Foreign Policy

Seventh Semiannual Report of United States Advisory Commission on Information. Letter from Chairman, the United States Advisory Commission on Information Transmitting The Seventh Semiannual Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Information Dated January 1953, Pursuant to Section 603 of Public Law 402, 80th Congress. H. Doc. 94, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 pp.

International Agreements or Understandings. Communication from the President of the United States Relative to An Appropriate Resolution, Making it Clear That We Would Never Acquiesce in the Enslavement of any People in Order to Purchase Fancied Gain for Ourselves, and That We Would Not Feel That Any Past Agreements Committed Us To Any Such Enslavement. H. Doc. 93, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 pp.

Studying the Escapee and Refugee Situation in Western Europe. Report (To accompany S. Res. 68). S. Rept. 40, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 p.

Extending Authority For the Investigation With Respect to the Effectiveness of Foreign Information Programs. Report (To accompany S. Res. 44). S. Rept. 44, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 pp.

Second Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1953. Report (To accompany H. R. 3053). H. Rept. 46, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 pp.

Report of Activities of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message From the President of the United States Transmitting A Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems Covering Its Operations From April 1, 1952, to September 30, 1952, and Describing in Accordance With Section 4 (b) (5) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, the Participation of the United States in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development For the Above Period. H. Doc. 60, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 74 pp.

Copper Import-Tax Suspension. Minority Views (To accompany H. R. 568). S. Rept. 35, Part 2, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 pp.

The State of the Union. Address of the President of the United States Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives Relative to the State of the Union. H. Doc. 75, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 pp.

Copper Import Tax Suspension. Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on H. R. 568, An Act To Continue Until the Close of June 30, 1954, the Suspension of Certain Import Taxes on Copper. February 3 and 4, 1953. 73 pp.

Nomination of Walter Bedell Smith. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on the Nomination of Walter Bedell Smith To Be Under Secretary of State. February 4, 1953. 39 pp.

Nomination of James B. Conant. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on the Nomination of James B. Conant To Be United States High Commissioner for Germany. February 2 and 3, 1953. 111 pp.

Under Secretary of State for Administration. An Act To amend Public Law 73, Eighty-first Congress, first session (63 Stat. 111), to provide for an Under Secretary of State for Administration. Public Law 2-83d Congress, Chapter 2-1st Session, S. 243. Approved February 7, 1953. 1 p.

Copper Import-Tax Suspension. Report (To accompany H. R. 568). S. Rept. 35, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 pp.

Overseas Information Programs of the United States. Interim Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations Pursuant to the Provisions of S. Res. 74, 82d Congress, 2d Session. Presented by Senator Fulbright. S. Rept. 30, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 pp.

Providing For an Under Secretary of State for Administration. Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, First Session on S. 243 and H. R. 1377, Bills To Provide For an Under Secretary of State for Administration. January 28, 1953. 20 pp.

Inaugural Address of Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, Delivered at the Capitol, Washington D. C., January 20, 1953. S. Doc. 9, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 pp.

Extension of Investigation of Overseas Information Programs. Report (To accompany S. Res. 44). S. Rept. 24, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 pp.

Overseas Information Programs of the United States. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, Second Session on Overseas Information Programs of the United States. November 20 and 21, 1952. 227 pp.

Institute of Pacific Relations. Composite Index to Hearings and Report Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, Second Session on the Institute of Pacific Relations. Part 15. 251 pp.

Tidelands Legislation and the Conduct of Foreign Affairs

Statement by Jack B. Tate

Deputy Legal Adviser¹

I appear at the request of the Committee to testify on questions concerning the international relations of the United States which have arisen in the course of the hearings of this Committee on control and development of mineral resources in submerged lands off the coasts of the United States.

I should make it clear at the outset that the Department is not charged with responsibility concerning the issue of Federal versus State ownership or control. It is concerned solely with the effect which the legislation might have upon the conduct of foreign affairs.

I shall summarize first the historic position of the United States with respect to the question of control which a coastal state may exercise in the waters adjacent to its coasts. I shall review briefly the policy reasons which lead this Government to follow and maintain this position. And I shall finally examine the points which appear to involve a possible conflict with our traditional position in this field of foreign relations.

The position of the United States with respect to the control which a coastal state may exercise involves three areas: inland waters, territorial waters, and high seas.

The relevance of considerations concerning inland waters is this. The belt of territorial waters is measured from the coast. On the land portion of the coast, the line from which territorial waters are measured is the low water mark of the tide. Since bodies of waters such as bays, gulfs, rivers, etc., also open on the coast, it is necessary in such cases to use a fictional line from which to measure territorial waters. The position of the United States is that the waters of bays and estuaries less than 10 miles wide (or which are, at the first point above such openings, less than 10 miles), are inland waters of the United States, and the territorial limit is measured from a straight line drawn across these openings. A strait, or channel, or sound

which leads to an inland body of water is dealt with on the same basis as bays. But the waters of a strait which connect two seas having the character of high seas are not inland waters.

It is an essential feature of inland waters that they are assimilated for all intents and purposes to the land territory of the coastal state, and foreign vessels may not claim in such waters a right of innocent passage. Foreign vessels may, however, claim a right of innocent passage through straits connecting high seas. A detailed review of the traditional position of the United States regarding the determination of territorial waters was furnished by the Department to the Attorney General in a letter dated November 13, 1951, and a copy of this letter, as well as of a supplementary letter dated February 12, 1952, has been furnished, I believe, to the Committee.

Jefferson's Position

As early as 1793, this Government had to face the question of the breadth of territorial waters. At that time Jefferson, while reserving a final decision, took the position that the United States should consider territorial waters "as restrained for the present to the distance of one sea league or three geographical miles" from the seashore. This position has never been changed. The United States supported the 3-mile limit at the 1930 Hague Conference for the Codification of International Law. And in the last few years, this Government has on a number of occasions reaffirmed this position and protested the claims of other states to limits broader than 3 miles, including the claim of the Soviet Union to 12 miles.

In adhering to the 3-mile limit, the United States does not preclude itself, of course, from taking all steps necessary to prevent or repel threats to its national security.

Preventive measures such as the establishment of Defensive Sea Areas for national defense purposes have been established in the past, and some

¹ Made on Mar. 3 before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives.

are still in effect under current legislation. (62 Stat. 799, 18 U. S. C. 2152, deriving from the Act of Mar. 4, 1917.)

Nor does the United States preclude itself from exercising jurisdiction on the high seas, beyond the 3-mile limit, for certain purposes. A good example is the legislation, enacted as early as 1790, providing for the exercise of jurisdiction within 12 miles from the coast for purposes of customs control. Legislation for the same purpose is in effect (Anti-Smuggling Act of Aug. 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 517, 19 U. S. C. 1701-1711).

The claim made by the United States in the Presidential Proclamation of September 28, 1945,² to jurisdiction and control of the national resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf off its coast is one more example of the compatibility between the U.S. position on the 3-mile limit and the protection of its interests. This Government did not claim sovereignty, or an extension of its boundaries beyond the limit of 3 miles of territorial waters. Indeed it specified in the proclamation that the character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way affected.

Freedom of the Seas

I now turn to the reasons for the adoption and maintenance of this position. The purpose of this Government has been, and still is, to give effect to its traditional policy of freedom of the seas. Such freedom is essential to its national interests. It is a time honored concept of defense that the greater the freedom and range of its warships and aircraft, the better protected are its security interests. Likewise, the maintenance of free lanes and air routes is vital to the success of its shipping and air transport. And it is becoming evident that its fishing interest depends in large part upon fishing resources in seas adjacent to foreign states.

The maintenance of the traditional position of the United States is vital at a time when a number of foreign states show a tendency unilaterally to break down the principle of freedom of the seas by attempted extensions of sovereignty over high seas. A change of the traditional position of this Government would be seized upon by other states as justification for broad and extravagant claims over adjacent seas. This is precisely what happened when this Government issued its proclamation of 1945 regarding jurisdiction and control over resources of the continental shelf. It precipitated a chain reaction of claims, going beyond the terms of the U.S. proclamation, including claims to sovereignty extending as much as 200 miles from shore.

The Department is concerned with such provisions of proposed legislation as would recognize

² BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1945, p. 485.

or permit the extension of the seaward boundaries of certain States beyond the 3-mile limit. In international relations, the territorial claims of the States and of the Nation are indivisible. The claims of the States cannot exceed those of the Nation. If the Nation should recognize the extension of the boundaries of any State beyond the 3-mile limit, its identification with the broader claim would force abandonment of its traditional position. At the same time it would renounce grounds of protest against claims of foreign states to greater breadths of territorial waters. This is without reference to the question as to whether the States should be permitted to exploit the resources of the continental shelf beyond State boundaries.

The Department believes that the grant by the Federal Government of rights to explore and develop the mineral resources of the continental shelf off the coasts of the United States can be achieved within the framework of its traditional international position.

THE DEPARTMENT

Office of Under Secretary for Administration Established¹

1. Public Law 2, 83rd Congress, establishes in the Department of State the position of Under Secretary of State for Administration. The Office of the Under Secretary for Administration was created:

a. To relieve the Secretary and the Under Secretary, to the greatest extent possible, of the management problems of the Department in order to allow them to concentrate on Foreign policy problems and negotiations; and,

b. To insure that the Department of State is organized and operated so as to promote maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

2. Mr. Donald B. Lourie has been appointed Under Secretary of State for Administration. It is the Secretary's desire that Mr. Lourie have responsibility for the management and organization of the entire Department. He will give particular attention to policy problems with respect to loyalty and security. In carrying out these responsibilities, Mr. Lourie will be assisted by the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.

3. The following officers are primarily responsible to the Under Secretary for Administration:

The Technical Cooperation Administrator (TCA)

The International Information Administrator (IIA)

The Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (H)

The Legal Adviser (L)

The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (P)

The Special Assistant for Intelligence (R)

The Science Adviser (O/SA)

6. The routing symbol for the Under Secretary for Administration is O.

¹ Excerpt from Department Circular No. 12, dated Feb. 20.

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†145	3/19	Point Four in Egypt expanded
146	3/19	Germany ratifies Epc treaty
†147	3/20	Technical assistance committee (Ecosoc)
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† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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