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# The Department of State

Vol. XXXIV, No. 875

April 2, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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## A Report on Asia

*Address by Secretary Dulles*<sup>1</sup>

I have just returned from a 19-day trip which took me to 10 countries of Asia. It gave me the chance to talk intimately with the leaders of each of these 10 countries. That is a great aid to good international relations. We can, of course, write each other notes. But talking face to face is the best way yet invented for enabling men to understand each other.

I also took part in the annual meeting, held this year at Tokyo, of the heads of our 14 United States missions in the Far East area.<sup>2</sup> I discussed our policies with them and answered their questions and received their suggestions.

The particular reason why I took this trip at this time was that the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—SEATO, for short—was meeting in Pakistan. That treaty, you may recall, was made at Manila in 1954<sup>3</sup> to deter Communist aggression which was then threatening ominously in Southeast Asia. We have a Council meeting each year, attended by the Foreign Ministers of the eight member countries. Last year our Ministerial Council met at Bangkok.<sup>4</sup> This year we met in Pakistan.

We had a good meeting which further developed the organization and gave it increased stature. We feel confident that our combined strength and vigilance will safeguard the treaty area against open armed aggression. We also be-

lieve that this shield will make it more possible for the member countries to develop, individually and collectively, their economic and social welfare.<sup>5</sup>

After 4 days in Pakistan, I went on to visit India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Philippines, Formosa (Taiwan), Korea, and Japan. These 10 countries I visited have a total population of over 700 million people, or almost one-third of the total population of the earth. More than 600 million of these people were colonial people until as recently as the close of World War II. Now they are independent nations.

Several of them are only now completing their new political institutions. For example, while we were in Pakistan that country adopted its first constitution. In Indonesia the first government based on national elections was in process of formation. On the day I left Viet-Nam, a popularly elected Constituent Assembly was meeting to frame a constitution.

This building and testing of new political processes is the outstanding and exciting characteristic of the area I visited.

Another characteristic is the determination to develop the economic potentials of the area. So far, productivity is low. The average income amounts to about \$100 a year. The people expect their new governments to improve their living conditions.

There are some who doubt the determination or ability of these free Asian nations to preserve and develop their political independence and also

<sup>1</sup> Made to the Nation over radio and television on Mar. 23 (press release 159).

<sup>2</sup> For text of communique issued at close of Tokyo meeting, see p. 543.

<sup>3</sup> For text of treaty, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1955, p. 371.

<sup>5</sup> For text of communique issued at Karachi, see *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 447. For the First Annual Report of the Council Representatives, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403.

to make that independence serve to improve social and economic conditions. I do not share that doubt. But I do come back with the strengthened conviction that the United States can help the Asian countries to achieve both of these goals. Also, I feel sure that it is in our own interest to provide that help.

I should like to give you a country-by-country report. But there is hardly time for that. So I shall give some general conclusions.

### **Political Independence**

Let me speak first of the problem of political independence in Asia. We need to be aware of how proud the peoples of Asia are to be free of foreign domination and how sensitive they are to any hint of encroachments from without. Also, let us remember that, while *we* think first of the danger that stems from international communism, many of *them* think first of possible encroachments from the West, for that is the rule they have actually known at firsthand.

But I found that the leaders are quite aware of the danger of penetration by international communism and of the fact that Soviet and Chinese Communist economic lures generally go with a hook and line that leads to Moscow or Peiping. Some take more effective precautions than others to avoid being caught. But none of the leaders is blind to this danger.

They all desire help which will in fact preserve their independence and develop their free institutions. But they want to be very sure that that help does not subtract from their sovereignty or retard their development by involving them in controversies that do not directly concern them.

The United States is able sympathetically to understand that attitude. We ourselves were once a colony. Our struggle for independence is the first chapter of history that is learned by every American boy and girl. Also, in our early days we too saw our first task as that of internal development, and only changed conditions have made it apparent that international security is best assured by collective efforts.

That story of America is well known in Asia. George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln are honored names, and it is significant that the President of Indonesia, in his opening address to the Bandung conference, invoked the memory of Paul Revere and the principles of the American Revolution.

All of this creates a bond of sympathy and helps to make possible a good understanding between us and them. Our historical experience is an asset of priceless value in Asia.

Many of the countries of Asia feel that their independence is better assured if they participate with us in arrangements for mutual security. Then we help them develop their national forces and they share the deterrent of our mobile military power. There are such arrangements—bilateral or multilateral—with 7 of the 10 countries I visited—Pakistan, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Philippines, free China, Japan, and Korea. Three of the countries I visited—India, Ceylon, and Indonesia—have preferred not to join regional security arrangements. That choice also we respect. The United States does not seek ties of mutual defense with any country whatsoever unless that country believes that this application of the principle of collective security will better assure its independence.

### **Economic and Social Development**

Let me turn now from the problem of political independence to the problem of economic and social development. Here, too, the conduct and example of the United States provide an inspiration and a responsibility.

The United States has itself realized an economic miracle. Our population of about 165 million produces nearly half of all the goods that are produced in the world.

When contrasted with our example, the production of forced labor pales into relative insignificance.

There is, of course, no magic formula for reproducing elsewhere economic productivity like ours. It is not to be had merely for the wanting, or merely by the installation of machines. It is a product of widespread education, of an ingrained spirit of enterprise, and of savings which provide more efficient tools for labor.

I did not find that the Asian leaders expect that either they, or we, or all of us in combination will be able to change their economies overnight. But I did find in Asia a natural and powerful urge to get on a path which surely, even though slowly, leads upward to better economic and social conditions.

If we wish to see the free world preserved and enlarged, we must help, or forces of despotism will take control. The day is past when the

peoples of Asia will tolerate leadership which keeps them on a dead center economically and socially, and when each generation merely ekes out a bare subsistence, with a brief life expectancy, and passes on to the next generation only the same bleak prospect.

### **U.S. Mutual Security Programs**

The United States has already come to see that its own self-interest is served by helping others improve their economic condition. Our Nation provides this help in many ways, public and private, throughout the free world. For 10 years now we have had mutual security programs, and for the last 3 years, following the completion of the Marshall plan for Europe, much attention has been given to Asia.

One component of our mutual security program is technical assistance. It helps others to develop new techniques. This is a good program manned by loyal and competent persons. But it is a program which could be enlarged and improved.

For example, I found a widespread desire in Asia to learn the English language. This knowledge is eagerly sought for as opening the door to a valued literature in both cultural and technical fields.

The Soviet Union has been specializing for many years on training technicians. These technicians are at the same time thoroughly indoctrinated in communism so that they can serve also as political agents. All of these technicians are at the command of the Soviet Government, which can direct them to go wherever it wills. It is trying to insinuate them into key posts in lands which they hope to dominate.

In the case of the United States the Government can appeal, but it cannot command. Also it cannot match the financial rewards of private business. The answer, it seems to me, must be found in a greater recognition on the part of our people of the inner or spiritual satisfactions to be gained by public service and aiding in the cause of human welfare.

In the past, missionaries, doctors, and educators in large numbers carried our faith and our knowledge to other people under conditions involving great hardship and sacrifice. There are many Americans today who are doing that very thing. In the 38 countries which I have visited since becoming Secretary of State I have almost always talked with gatherings of the Americans of our

Foreign Service and related services. I have often found them serving under conditions of hardship. But also I have found that they derive satisfactions which are not readily to be found under conditions of greater ease and material prosperity at home.

It is my earnest hope that more of our young men and women who are specially qualified to help others to help themselves will engage in this great adventure.

In addition to technical assistance we have economic programs of other sorts. We have programs which help our allies to bear the cost of their defense establishments, which vitally supplement our own.

Then we have surplus commodity programs which under proper conditions can do much good. It is necessary to avoid unfair competition with countries which historically depend upon the sales abroad of their own agricultural surplus. But I was impressed with the fact that, subject to this qualification, our surpluses can do much to bring a better life to Asian people. For example, we have just concluded an agreement with Indonesia for delivery of surplus commodities of a value of some \$95 million,<sup>6</sup> and we are just beginning a milk program for the children of Ceylon.

These programs involving military support, technical assistance, and surplus commodities are of great importance and contribute to preserving and developing the Asian economies. But by themselves they are not sufficient to enable the free Asian countries to make their economies more diversified or lessen their dependence on others for manufactured goods. The present lack of diversification and industrialization is the weakness which Asian leaders above all want to cure. That aspect of the matter requires more emphasis. Japan should be able to help in this respect as one Asian nation, indeed the only Asian nation, which has found the way to industrialization.

President Eisenhower has just sent to the Congress his message on the mutual security program, including economic assistance.<sup>7</sup> On the basis of my trip I am more than ever convinced of the vital importance of this program. It can be improved in ways the President has suggested. There is need for greater flexibility in the use of the funds appropriated. In addition, the United States

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

<sup>7</sup> See p. 545.

should be able to back long-range projects requiring several years for completion. This will importantly strengthen our program.

To meet defense costs and dietary needs is important. The one preserves independence; the other preserves life. But also there is need for more water, more fuel and electric power, more development of mineral resources, and more industrial plants so that, hereafter, the people can, by their own efforts, raise their own living standards.

To share with others our own blessings accords with the best and most deeply rooted of American traditions. George Washington, in his Farewell Address, said,

It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that in the course of time and things the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it?

Our mutual security plan conforms to Washington's prescription. Even though, to use Washington's phrases, it loses us some temporary advantages, the fruits of that plan will, in the course of time, richly repay us. That plan provides the margin of difference between a world environment which is friendly and healthy and one which is corroded by massive discontents dangerous both to us and to the discontented.

### **Profound Desire for Peace**

Throughout most of the countries I visited there is a profound desire for peace. In the case of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China the leaders and the people would be willing to make almost any sacrifice to restore freedom to their countries as a whole. However, even there the will to sacrifice is tempered by knowledge that modern war creates such widespread devastation and so many evils that it provides no clear solution to any problem.

Communist propaganda has sought diligently to create the impression that the United States seeks war and that its collective security arrangements are aggressive in purpose. I had no opportunity to judge the impact of that propaganda upon the people generally. But so far as concerns the leaders with whom I talked I found no evidence whatsoever that they believe that the United States wants war.

The spot in the Far East where, at the moment, conflict most threatens is the Taiwan (Formosa) area. I reported to our Asian friends how, at our Geneva talks with the Chinese Communists, we were patiently but persistently striving for a reciprocal renunciation of force with particular relation to this Taiwan area.

I found in India some fear lest our arms supplied to Pakistan, which feels endangered from the north, might be turned against India. I received the most categorical and convincing assurances from the highest authorities of Pakistan that they have no belligerent intentions whatsoever as against India. In India I publicly called attention to the fact that the Southeast Asia security pact expressly prohibits any use of force except in defense against aggression. Also the agreements under which we are supplying arms to Pakistan explicitly provide that these arms shall not be used for any aggressive purpose. I expressed my conviction that Pakistan would scrupulously observe these solemn engagements.

I found uniformly that the Asian leaders with whom I talked desire the United States to be strong and that that strength should continue to be a sort of protective umbrella over other free nations. That was the clearest single impression that I received. Repeatedly I was asked whether it was our purpose to maintain that protective cover, affording new freedoms the opportunity to sink deep their roots and grow strong. Each time my reply was emphatically affirmative. And this reply was received with profound satisfaction.

There is of course a great desire for disarmament, particularly since it is felt that armament limitation would release funds which, in part, would inure to the benefit of the less economically developed countries of the world. President Eisenhower's letter to Chairman Bulganin of March 1,<sup>8</sup> discussing disarmament, was made public while I was on my trip. It gave much satisfaction as evidence of our purpose to seek limitation of armament which could be verified and controlled. I found no one who wanted unilateral disarmament by the United States or disarmament which might in fact turn out to be unilateral because of evasions by others.

I believe that there is general realization of our ardent dedication to peace as well as respect for our determination to have the strength to insure

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.



that no one need feel that peace has to be bought by surrendering freedom to despotism.

### **Asian Culture**

There is throughout the Asian peoples a desire for Western recognition of their dignity.

We need to remember that although we have developed more rapidly than Asians in some directions, notably in industrialization, they have preceded us in finding many of the ways to make life richer. Their culture and art long antedate our own and in many respects have not yet been equaled by our own. Their handicraft is outstanding. They have an exceptional love and appreciation of beauty. They possess in full measure those human qualities which all admire—devotion to family and to country, courage, and willingness to sacrifice. They possess unusual qualities of patience, reflection, and repose.

Therefore, let us not forget that, while we have material and technical things to give, they also have things to give. And if we are wise enough to perceive and to take what Asia has to offer, the balance struck between us will not be one-sided by any true measure of values.

I come back from this trip encouraged. Of course, Soviet and Chinese economic tactics are a danger. Of even greater danger are their tactics of stirring up hatred as between free nations. But I feel that conditions which we wish for will prevail in the area I visited, if only we play worthily our part.

### **The Goal We Seek**

What is it that we seek? It is not conquest or domination. If that were our goal, I would have to conclude that it is doomed to failure. Our desire is a world in which peoples who want political independence shall possess it whenever they are capable of sustaining it and discharging its responsibilities in accordance with the accepted standards of civilized nations. That condition of independence is developing throughout non-Communist Asia, and I believe that it will continue to develop as against assault from any quarter.

But we also realize that political independence is not enough. It is a means to certain ends. One of these ends is the infusing of men with reasonable hope that, if they strive, they can build a better world for their children and their chil-

dren's children. That reasonable hope we can help to provide without any encroachment whatsoever on the political independence of others. Under those conditions help will be welcome. Under reverse conditions, it would, I am glad to say, be rejected.

Also, there is need for a new attitude toward the diversity that Asians provide. Differences of race and of culture are not measures of superiority or inferiority. Indeed, uniformity and conformity are conditions to be abhorred. The great richness of our universe is due above all to its diversity. We may take honorable pride in our own distinctive accomplishments. But we should equally be aware that the accomplishments of others are a proper subject for their pride and our appreciation.

The future belongs to independence, not domination; to freedom, not servitude; to diversity, not conformity. Acceptance of that fact will create between the Asians and ourselves a solid basis for fellowship. It will enable us, as mutual friends and helpers, to pursue hopefully the destiny that we share in common.

## **Chiefs of Mission in Far East Meet at Tokyo**

*Following is the text of a communique issued at Tokyo on March 21 after the final session of the 3-day conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Far East.<sup>1</sup>*

United States Chiefs of Mission in the Far East met under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson from March 19 to 21 in Tokyo. They reviewed the present situation in Asia, the progress made over the past year, and the prospects for the future. Secretary Dulles presided over the first session, summarizing developments in connection with his recent trip through Asia.

The meeting revealed a general feeling of confidence based on the political, social and economic advances made during the past year in the free countries of Asia, the growing strength and vigor of collective security efforts against the still powerful threat of Communist aggression, and the developing sense of partnership in free Asia.

<sup>1</sup>For an announcement of the meeting, see BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 278.

Among the significant developments during the past year in East Asia have been the series of free elections and the increasing association and practical cooperation among free Asian nations.

The Chiefs of Missions expressed their confident belief that the free Asian nations will continue to consolidate their independence and make progress in their national programs to their mutual advantage and the greater security of the free world.

## Philippines Chosen as Site for Asian Nuclear Center

Press release 137 dated March 15

The United States Embassy at Manila announced on March 15 that Secretary Dulles has informed President Magsaysay that the Republic of the Philippines has been chosen as the site for the new Asian Nuclear Center. This center was proposed by the United States at the Colombo Plan meeting held at Singapore last October.<sup>1</sup> The United States is now preparing to move rapidly with initial plans for the establishment of this center as a means of putting atomic energy to work for the economic and social progress of Asia. This action will represent an important step toward the further advancement of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 7, 1955, p. 747.

<sup>2</sup> The International Cooperation Administration announced on March 15 that the U.S. Government, with financing provided from the President's Fund for Asian Economic Development, is now arranging for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's Brookhaven National Laboratory to develop preliminary technical proposals as to how the center can best serve the needs of the region and as to what facilities would be required. The Brookhaven Laboratory, an institution with unique competence in the field of nuclear science, is a cooperative regional center uniting the facilities of nine American universities. In developing its proposals, the Brookhaven Laboratory shortly will send survey teams of experts to consult with scientists and government officials in Asia. The Brookhaven group is expected to assemble in Washington within the next month for a brief period of orientation. The survey team will then proceed to Manila to inspect possible sites and facilities before visiting the various participating countries to discuss with them their principal fields of interest and plans for using the center. It is expected that detailed plans for the center will be presented at the Colombo Plan meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, next October.

## Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1956

### A P R O C L A M A T I O N <sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS the sixty-sixth anniversary of the founding of the Pan American Union, nucleus of the inter-American system of mutual co-operation and good will, now known as the Organization of American States, will be observed by the twenty-one American Republics on Saturday, April 14, 1956; and

WHEREAS the observances commemorating this auspicious event in the history of the Western Hemisphere will be held throughout the week of April 8 to April 14, 1956; and

WHEREAS the American Republics stand together in furthering the maintenance of peace and the defense of freedom through the Organization of American States, which they have built together and together uphold; and

WHEREAS the Government and the people of the United States of America are steadfast in adhering to the friendship uniting them with the other American Republics:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Saturday, April 14, 1956, as Pan American Day, and the period from April 8 through April 14, 1956, as Pan American Week; and I urge that the people of this Nation on that day and throughout that week give expression to their cordial good will toward the peoples of the other American Republics and of their intention to maintain the principles of freedom and equality fundamental to all.

I also invite the Governors of the States, Territories, and possessions of the United States of America and the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to issue similar proclamations; and I call upon all our citizens and all interested organizations to join in appropriate observance of Pan American Day and Pan American Week, in testimony of the steadfast friendship which unites the people of the United States with the people of the other American Republics.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fifteenth day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.



By the President:

HERBERT HOOVER, Jr.

Acting Secretary of State

<sup>1</sup> No. 3126; 21 Fed. Reg. 1763.

# Recommendations for 1957 Mutual Security Program

## MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

For almost a decade the United States has moved, year by year, with growing success, to help fortify the economies and military strength of nations of the free world. Over the years this effort has changed in size and character in keeping with changing world affairs. Today it remains as indispensable to the security of every American citizen and to the building of an enduring peace as on the day it began 9 years ago.

Today this great Nation, at the peak of its peacetime military and economic strength, must not hesitate or retreat in this vital undertaking. Nor can we subordinate this program to local concerns or collateral issues, on the unsound premise that steady progress through this program for 9 years makes it no longer necessary.

We cannot now falter in our quest for peace.

The need for a mutual security program is urgent because there are still nations that are eager to strive with us for peace and freedom but, without our help, lack the means of doing so.

The need is urgent because there are still forces hostile to freedom that compel the free world to maintain adequate and coordinated military power to deter aggression.

The need is urgent because there are still peoples who aspire to sustain their freedom but confront economic obstacles that are beyond their capabilities of surmounting alone.

These facts are as fundamental to our own security and well-being as the maintenance of our own armed forces.

Our goal is clear—an enduring peace with jus-

tice. To achieve it will continue to require effort, skill, patience, and sacrifice. Toward it we must and will strive constantly by every means available to us.

We must continue to work with other countries to insure that each free nation remains free, secure from external aggression and subversion, and able to develop a society marked by human welfare, individual liberty, and a rising standard of living. We must continue to maintain our economic and military strength at home. We must continue to stimulate expansion of trade and investment in the free world. We must continue helping to build the productive capacities of free nations through public loans and guarantees of private investment. We must continue to provide technical knowledge and essential materials to speed the advance of other nations in peaceful uses of the atom. We must continue our cultural and educational exchanges to expand mutual knowledge and understanding. We must continue and intensify our information programs so that the peoples of the world may know our peaceful purposes and our love of human liberty. And through our mutual security programs we must continue helping to create in the free world conditions in which freedom can survive and develop, and free nations can maintain the defensive strength necessary to deter aggression.

Peace with justice remains the sole objective of our mutual security programs. We have no other interest to advance. We have no desire or intent to subjugate or subvert other peoples—no purpose to change their chosen political, economic, or cultural patterns—no wish to make any of them our satellites. We seek only to further the cause of freedom and independence and to develop the military strength necessary to protect and defend it, in the interest of peace.

To help a free country to maintain forces necessary for the protection of its freedom and inde-

<sup>1</sup> H. Doc. 358, 84th Cong., 2d sess., transmitted on Mar. 19. For the section on the mutual security program in President Eisenhower's budget message for the fiscal year 1957, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 150.

pendence but beyond those which it can alone support may mean foregoing some domestic expenditure. To help a less developed nation in its initial steps toward an economy that can sustain freedom and independence and provide opportunity for higher living standards may mean postponement of desirable projects here in this country. We must continue willing to make these sacrifices, for the benefits we gain in the interests of peace are well worth the price. The mutual security program is a demand of the highest priority upon our resources.

Because our people and the peoples of other nations in the free world have been willing to make the necessary sacrifices, the past mutual security programs have achieved a real measure of success. By combined effort the free world has advanced toward stability and toward economic strength. It has achieved the power and the will to resist aggression. Collective security arrangements have brought into existence free world defense forces and facilities far greater than those which we, by our unaided efforts, could have raised and maintained from our own resources without a crushing burden of taxation on our people. In their economic aspects, our programs have made significant advances toward the solution of many problems of the free world. Without this assistance many other nations, beyond doubt, if existing at all, would exist today only in the grip of chaos. Moreover, we ourselves are more secure, more prosperous, better fitted to go forward in the common enterprise of freedom than ever before.

Significant testimony to the success of our mutual security programs appears in the new turns and developments of Soviet policy. Aggression through force appears to have been put aside, at least temporarily, and the Communists are now making trade approaches to many nations of the free world.

The Soviet maneuver, which is still developing, includes offers of bilateral trade arrangements which may involve provision of arms and capital goods as well as technical assistance. Had we any reason to believe that the Soviet leaders had abandoned their sinister objectives, and now shared our own high purpose of helping other nations to develop freedom and independence, we would welcome the new Soviet program, for it appears to have aspects of normal trade expansion and

business competition. Its danger for us and for other free nations, however, lies in the traditional Soviet objectives and in the entanglements to which acceptance of their offers may lead.

Even while we welcome respite from the Soviet policy of threat and violence, we must take careful stock of what still remains of it. The vast Soviet military establishment has not been scrapped. On the contrary, the Soviets and their Communist allies are increasing the strength and effectiveness of their armed forces and are providing them with equipment of the most modern design. The threat implicit in this huge aggregation of military power still casts an ominous shadow over the world. There is nothing here to warrant a slackening of our efforts to strengthen the common defense of the free world.

In its new departures in foreign policy, we see that the Soviet Union continues in its familiar pattern of ceaseless probing for opportunities to exploit political and economic weaknesses. We cannot view otherwise the arms traffic in areas where tensions are high and the peace is in danger. We cannot view otherwise the extension of credits hand in hand with exploitation of ancient animosities and new hatreds in a world already overburdened with them.

We must therefore assume that Soviet expansionism has merely taken on a somewhat different guise and that its fundamental objective is still to disrupt and in the end to dominate the free nations. With Soviet leaders openly proclaiming their world aim, it would be folly for us and our friends to relax our collective efforts toward stability and security.

Needless to say, we do not intend to permit specific Soviet moves to control our activities. Our mutual security program, conceived in the common interests of the free nations, must go ahead affirmatively along tested lines to meet the common need. Where changes now give promise of making the program more responsive to the need and more effective, I am recommending changes.

The authorizations and appropriations I am recommending for fiscal year 1957 are designed to carry forward the program toward the goal we seek.

I recommend that the Congress authorize appropriations of \$4,672,475,000 in accordance with the schedule attached. In a separate letter to the

Speaker of the House of Representatives,<sup>2</sup> I am requesting the appropriation of \$4,859,975,000 for the same fiscal year to cover these recommended authorizations together with authorizations granted but not fully used in prior years. Certain aspects of this program require special attention.

#### **Continuity and Flexibility**

We should be able to assure the nations of the free world that we will continue to participate in particular nonmilitary projects and enterprises which will take a number of years to complete. Such assurance from us will help these nations to mobilize their own funds for projects which will contribute to an important degree to their economic strength, to enlist public and private loans and investment, and to plan ahead intelligently. It will be difficult for these nations to organize such projects unless mutual security program support can be relied on for more than a single year.

I request authority of the Congress to make commitments up to ten years in length to assist less developed countries in long term projects important to their development. Funds to fulfill such commitments would come from appropriations for nonmilitary mutual security, and would not exceed an aggregate of \$100 million in any year.

The mutual security program, in a world in which events move with great rapidity, requires that flexible authority exist for the use of funds made available by the Congress. Section 401 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, provides such flexibility with respect to the funds appropriated, or transferred, for use pursuant to that section. It provides a valuable means of meeting numerous unforeseeable requirements for assistance without the necessity for postponing or reducing other urgently needed programs.

A year ago the Congress appropriated a special Presidential fund of \$100 million to be used under section 401. For fiscal year 1957, I request the authorization of an appropriation of a further \$100 million for this special fund. I also ask that the authority of the President to transfer other mutual security funds for use under the provisions of section 401 be increased. With respect to at least \$100 million in this special fund, I urge that the maximum degree of flexibility be authorized for its expenditure whenever the Presi-

dent determines that the use of sums in this manner is important to the security of the United States.

The Middle East and Africa are areas in which it is especially important to build new strength friendly to us. There is need for an adequate fund which can be used to assist in meeting special economic problems that may arise in those regions. The United States must be in a position to act promptly to help the governments in this area in their efforts to find solutions for economic and social problems. I therefore recommend creation of a special fund of \$100 million to be available for use in any part of the Middle East or Africa for nonmilitary mutual security programs which will advance the cause of free world security and economic strength.

In 1955, the President's fund for Asian economic development was established. The sum of \$100 million was then appropriated for it and authorization was given for the appropriation of a further \$100 million. It is now desirable that the whole of the funds authorized be made available, and I shall request the appropriation of the remaining \$100 million.

#### **Advanced Weapons Systems**

I recommend that about \$530 million be made available to enable the Department of Defense to begin a program of aiding our allies in developing an even more effective defense based on an improved and better coordinated early warning and communications system and utilizing advanced weapons systems, including missiles, now being procured for our troops.

These advanced weapons, which are purely defensive in character, pose no threat to any nation which does not initiate aggression. They are designed to give warning of, and repel, such aggression—and by their potential effectiveness to deter it.

The sum of \$195 million has been included initially for NATO countries in the fiscal year 1957 program. The eventual distribution of the balance of the advanced weapons included in the 1957 program will be made on the basis of later judgment as to their most effective employment worldwide.

Our defense methods cannot be static in view of the constant growth of the military potential of the Communists. We and our allies must keep our defenses adequate to meet new methods of

<sup>2</sup> H. Doc. 360, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

attack. Because of the rapidity of scientific advances, it is likely that the content of this advanced weapons program will be modified from time to time.

### **Europe**

The program for the NATO countries of Europe (excluding Greece and Turkey) is primarily one of military assistance. This includes the advanced weapons I have mentioned. Although our allies have made great progress in building up their defense forces, military grant assistance is still necessary in most countries to assist them in maintaining equipment and replacing materiel lost by attrition. No economic assistance is proposed for any European country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A small amount of technical exchange assistance is proposed.

Continued economic support is required for Berlin, and military and economic support for Spain and Yugoslavia.

### **Middle East, Africa, and Asia**

In Asia and the Middle East, serious risk of aggression still exists. The program recommends aggregate military assistance of approximately \$1,640 million for countries in these regions which must maintain substantial forces in the field to resist possible attacks. The military assistance which we propose will support the objectives of various mutual defense pacts, including SEATO, to which the United States is a party.

In these areas, the problems of building security are economic as well as military. Many of the nations in the area do not now have the resources required for a minimum rate of economic growth. They are striving to create the standards of living under which their economies can develop. This is a long-term process, in which their own efforts will play the major part, but in which our help can be crucial.

The program, accordingly, proposes economic help to those of our allies whose own resources cannot support their essential defense effort. This help is designed, as in former years, in part to assist projects of a nonmilitary character which further defense activities, in part to help build internal resources and economic stability, and in part to contribute to the recipient's programs of economic development.

Provision is also made for economic assistance

to nations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, which receive no military assistance, where such economic assistance will contribute to their economic strength and thus to their ability to retain their independence. This program is of the utmost importance to the security of the free world.

The program for fiscal year 1957 also provides for continuing our technical cooperation and assistance in less-developed countries.

### **Latin America**

We propose to strengthen further the friendly relationships which exist with our sister Republics to the south. I recommend that we continue to encourage by technical assistance the programs, initiated by Latin American nations, to make better use of their own resources. We should also continue our participation in the technical assistance activities of the Organization of American States.

In special circumstances, when loans from the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank are not available to countries facing critical situations, the mutual security program has assisted in meeting temporary economic problems, as in the case of two countries where it is proposed that such assistance be continued in the next fiscal year.

Military assistance in Latin America should be continued where needed in order to provide standardized equipment, maintenance of equipment already furnished, and training in the use of such equipment.

### **United Nations and Other Special Programs**

The United States should continue its support of the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, which provides relief and rehabilitation of the Arab refugees from Palestine.

Provision is also made for continuing our support of the program of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the work of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. Authorizations for continuing our own Government's program for care and resettlement of escapees from communism, and our program of paying the ocean freight costs of shipment both of relief supplies donated to our voluntary relief agencies and of surplus agricultural commodities, are also recommended.

## Size of the Program

The request for military assistance authorization in fiscal year 1957 is substantially larger than the requests and appropriations for this purpose for the past 2 years. The lower level of appropriations for fiscal years 1955 and 1956 will, by the end of the current fiscal year, have brought about reduction in unexpended balances over the 2-year period by approximately \$2½ billion to \$3 billion. Now, however, in order to maintain the flow of military assistance in 1958 and 1959 an increase in the appropriation for fiscal year 1957 is required.

A substantial period of "lead" time is required to translate appropriated funds into actual payment for, and deliveries of, nearly all items of military equipment. This year, for the first time, more than \$500 million are included in the military assistance program for advanced weapons. These weapons, because of their complexity, have even longer lead times.

On the economic side of the program, appropriations for the last 2 years have been approximately at the same rate as expenditures. The amounts requested this year for economic assistance are larger principally because of the new fund proposed for the Middle East and Africa and because of heavier emphasis on programs in Asia.

## Other Aspects of the Program

The mutual security program for fiscal year 1957 proposes continued procurement within the United States of surplus agricultural commodities for use abroad. In addition, large amounts of such commodities are moving abroad under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act for the mutual benefit of this and other countries. This latter effort has been considered in the development of the 1957 mutual security program requirements, and every effort is being made to coordinate the two programs.

In the request for appropriations to carry out the fiscal year 1957 program, I am urging that Congress permit greater flexibility in the obligation of appropriations, in order that there may be more thorough planning of expenditures and more time allowed for necessary negotiation of contracts with suppliers and of arrangements with other nations.

## FY 1957 MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM

### Authorization and Appropriation Request<sup>a</sup>

Title and Section	FY 1957 Authorization Request	FY 1957 Appropriation Request
<i>Title I—Mutual Defense Assistance:</i>		
<i>Chapter 1—Military Assistance</i>		
Sec. 103 (a) (3)—General Authorization . . . . .	\$2,925,000,000	\$2,925,000,000
Sec. 104—Infrastructure . . . . .	b (75,000,000)	b 75,000,000
Total—Chapter 1 . . . . .	2,925,000,000	c 3,000,000,000
<i>Chapter 3—Defense Support</i>		
Sec. 131 (e):		
(1) Europe . . . . .	78,700,000	78,700,000
(2) Near East and Africa . . . . .	170,000,000	170,000,000
(3) Asia . . . . .	882,000,000	882,000,000
TOTAL—TITLE I . . . . .	4,055,700,000	4,130,700,000
<i>Title II—Development Assistance:</i>		
Sec. 201 (c)		
(1) Near East and Africa . . . . .	63,000,000	63,000,000
(2) Asia . . . . .	80,000,000	80,000,000
(3) Latin America . . . . .	27,000,000	27,000,000
TOTAL—TITLE II . . . . .	170,000,000	170,000,000
<i>Title III—Technical Cooperation:</i>		
Sec. 304 (b)—General Authorization . . . . .	140,500,000	140,500,000
Sec. 306—Multilateral Technical Cooperation:		
(a) United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance . . . . .	15,500,000	15,500,000
(b) Organization of American States . . . . .	1,500,000	1,500,000
TOTAL—TITLE III . . . . .	157,500,000	157,500,000
<i>Title IV—Other Programs:</i>		
Sec. 401 (b)—Special Presidential Fund . . . . .	\$100,000,000	\$100,000,000
Sec. 403 (b)—Special Assistance in Joint Control Areas . . . . .	12,200,000	12,200,000
Sec. 405—Migrants, Refugees and Escapees:		
(a) Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration . . . . .	d (12,500,000)	12,500,000
(c) United Nations Refugee Fund . . . . .	2,300,000	2,300,000
(d) Escapee Program . . . . .	7,000,000	7,000,000
Sec. 406 (b)—Children's Welfare . . . . .	10,000,000	10,000,000
Sec. 407 (b)—Palestine Refugees in the Near East . . . . .	e (45,300,000)	e (45,300,000)
Sec. 408—North Atlantic Treaty Organization . . . . .		
Sec. 409—Ocean Freight Charges:		
(c) Voluntary Relief Shipments . . . . .	1,400,000	1,400,000
(d) Surplus Agricultural Commodities . . . . .	14,000,000	14,000,000
Sec. 410—Control Act Expenses . . . . .	1,175,000	1,175,000
Sec. 411 (b)—Administrative and Other Expenses (Other than Chapter 1 of Title I, and Sec. 124) . . . . .	35,250,000	35,250,000
Sec. 418 (b)—President's Fund for Asian Economic Development . . . . .	(100,000,000)	100,000,000
Sec. 420—Special Authorization for the Middle East and Africa . . . . .	100,000,000	100,000,000
Sec. 10—Foreign Reactor Projects . . . . .	5,950,000	5,950,000
TOTAL—TITLE IV . . . . .	259,275,000	401,775,000
GRAND TOTAL—ALL TITLES . . . . .	\$4,672,475,000	\$4,859,975,000

<sup>a</sup> Title and section references are, with one exception, to the Mutual Security Act of 1954 as it would be cumulatively amended by the proposed Mutual Security Act of 1956. The exception is the section reference for "Foreign Reactor Projects", which is to the proposed Mutual Security Act of 1956.

<sup>b</sup> 1957 authorization not being requested as Sec. 104 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 authorized the appropriation of \$321 million in installments prior to June 30, 1958. In FY 1955 \$100 million was appropriated. An additional \$122 million was appropriated in FY 1956 leaving an unappropriated authorization of \$99 million. The 1957 appropriation request will leave an unappropriated authorization balance of \$24 million.

<sup>c</sup> For FY 1957 Direct Forces Support has been consolidated with "Military Assistance".

<sup>d</sup> Continuing authorization provided under Sec. 405 (a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

<sup>e</sup> Estimated unobligated balance of FY 1956 funds for which carry-over authority is requested.

## Conclusion

The mutual security program is vitally important to our people. Its cost is not disproportionate to our Nation's resources and to our national income. That cost is a low price to pay for the security and vastly greater chances for world peace which the program provides.

The mutual security program is an indispensable part of our national effort to meet affirmatively the challenge of all the forces which threaten the independence of the free world and to overcome the conditions which make peace insecure and progress difficult.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
*March 19, 1956.*

## STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY HOOVER<sup>3</sup>

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I come before your Committee this morning in support of the President's program for mutual security. I do not intend to go into any great detail. The Secretary of State, who is returning to Washington tomorrow, plans to appear before you shortly to report on the SEATO meeting in Karachi and his trip through 10 of the countries in the Near and Far East. He will undoubtedly touch upon the importance of this program in the areas he has visited. Mr. Hollister, the Director of ICA, who is with me this morning, will discuss the details of the proposed program which is before your Committee. I do, however, wish to take this opportunity to express my conviction that the mutual security program is a fundamental and essential aspect of the conduct of our foreign policy today.

### Importance of the Mutual Security Program

Many of the members of this Committee have recently visited the areas whose problems and needs will be considered in connection with this program, and I am sure that no one on the Committee is unaware of the tremendous importance of the program. It is vital to the security of the United States and of the whole of the free world. We are looked upon for leadership in the free world, and the consequences of what we do or fail

<sup>3</sup>Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 20 (press release 150).

to do with respect to the mutual security program reach far beyond our own national frontiers.

The world today is one in which we and our friends cannot relax our collective efforts for stability and security. There is no basis for any hope that the long-range objectives of international communism for world domination have been abandoned. We must, therefore, place continued reliance on the mutual security program and its provisions for continued economic and military assistance.

We seek, on the one hand, to make outright aggression unprofitable, and thus unlikely. To this end, we have supported mutual defense agreements throughout the world and have supplied arms, materiel, and training to assist in the defense of friendly nations.

Without abandoning defensive efforts, we seek, at the same time, to help the construction of healthy economies and free institutions and thus to promote stability and minimize the threat of subversion.

### The Soviet New Look

The Soviet Government continues to pursue its overall aim of Communist domination. The Committee will recall that Mr. Khrushchev stated frankly to the Supreme Soviet 2 months ago that "we never renounced and we will never renounce our ideas, our struggle for the victory of communism." But we need to keep in mind in our consideration of the program this year that the emphasis on Soviet tactics has shifted from primary reliance on force to a campaign of political and economic blandishment.

In this campaign the Soviet Union and its satellites have expanded their trade relations with the free world, they have offered their technical and advisory services to the less industrialized countries, and they have provided long-term low-interest loans for economic development. By themselves these activities are more or less legitimate, but they are being carried on in combination with efforts to stir up local controversies and strife and with pressures to disrupt and destroy the security arrangements that have been constructed in the free world. The immediate Soviet goal is quite clearly one of isolating the countries of the free world from the U.S. This much accomplished, the goal of outright conquest or subversion would be greatly advanced.



We must view the new Soviet campaign with concern for it is aimed at the welfare and freedom of all the independent countries. We are not presenting the mutual security program as an answer to the Soviet activities, but we do need to make our own program, which is of long standing, as effective an instrument for aiding the cause of independence and freedom as is possible.

### **Key New Provisions**

Our own security depends upon the security of the free world. This security, in turn, depends directly upon the ability of the free nations to maintain their independence and to strengthen their free institutions. These continue to be our aims. From the founding of our country we have been deeply devoted to the cause of freedom. In this new phase of our struggle to achieve an environment of freedom, when many nations of the free world desperately need assistance in their efforts to achieve security and healthy economic development, it is vital that we have in the mutual security program a larger measure of flexibility.

Changes occur in the world at a very rapid pace. We cannot forecast them in advance, but it is vital to our national security that we have the ability to adapt the mutual security program to reflect changes. That presents a major dilemma. Because of the long lead time necessary to the effective administration of this program, the proposals we are making today for fiscal year '57 will not be implemented before early 1958. That is a period of almost 2 years. It is obvious that, to meet the conditions existing then, there be a degree of flexibility in the legislation now.

The President has accordingly requested a greater flexibility in his authority to use funds made available for this program by the Congress. Some measure of flexibility is provided in the present legislation. But we consider it of the utmost importance to the efficient and economic accomplishment of our objectives that the President be given even wider discretion for future years.

The President has also asked the Congress for authority to make certain commitments of a longer-term nature in assisting countries to carry out a restricted number of important projects. These commitments would be met from nonmilitary mutual security appropriations. We are not asking for additional appropriations. It is contemplated that this kind of assistance will be fur-

nished in special cases where the recipient country cannot carry out a major project with its own resources. I have in mind such projects as river development, improvement of ports, highways, railroads, or other means of communication, and important large industrial projects. Works of this kind generally require a number of years for completion. Where we provide aid for these purposes, it is essential that the recipient country be given reasonable assurance that our aid may be continued for the period of time necessary for completion of the projects and so long as the purposes of the free world are served thereby. Only with assurances of this type of support will these countries be able to develop additional financing from other sources.

### **Rate of Expenditure**

The purpose of the proposed program is to carry on at approximately the same rate of expenditure as last year and the year before. In view of the increased threat of Communist economic penetration in the free world, we cannot afford to reduce our efforts at this time.

The requested increase in appropriation from \$2.7 billion in fiscal year 1956 to \$4.9 billion in fiscal year 1957 does not imply a corresponding increase in expenditures. The details of this situation will be brought out later in the hearings. But I wish to make the basic facts clear at this time.

The \$4.9 billion figure is made up of two parts: First is the defense-support and economic program amounting to \$1.9 billion. This compares to a fiscal 1956 request of \$1.8 billion and a final appropriation of \$1.7 billion. The second part is the military and direct-forces support program of \$3 billion. This compares to a fiscal 1956 request of \$1.7 billion, and a final appropriation of \$1 billion, which was less than half of the annual rate of expenditure.

To recapitulate, the increased request this year of \$4.9 billion, as compared to the appropriation last year of \$2.7 billion, or a difference of \$2.2 billion, is made up as follows:

- (a) increase in defense support and economic aid—\$200 million;
- (b) increase in military and direct-forces support—\$2.0 billion.

The increase of \$200 million in defense support

and economic aid is requested to cover a prudent and moderate increase in the program for the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and the Far East. This represents an increase of approximately 12 percent in the size of the program for this year. One-half of this increase, or \$100 million, is requested for use as a special fund in the Middle East and Africa, with emphasis on the Baghdad Pact countries, while the other half is needed in Asia and the Far East.

The increase of \$2 billion in military and direct-forces support will bring to \$3 billion the amount requested for these purposes for fiscal year '57. This sum is designed to provide for one extra year's military expenditures at the average annual rate at which the Department of Defense is now expending funds for military assistance. In addition, there is requested authorization of \$530 million for advanced weapons, for most of which there have been no prior appropriations.

A detailed explanation of the various programs will be given, of course, in the hearings that are to follow. My purpose in presenting the basic figures at this time is to place the major aspects of the program in their proper perspective.

Again, I would like to reiterate that the purpose of the proposed program is to maintain approximately the same rate of expenditure during fiscal year 1957 as in the years 1955 and 1956. The fact that increased authorizations are required in order to maintain the same expenditures, particularly in the military program, will be brought out later by Mr. Gray and other witnesses from the Department of Defense.

### **Conclusion**

Mr. Hollister plans to discuss with you the detailed legislative provisions which we are requesting for this 1957 program. Altogether we believe that these appropriations, subject to the approval of Congress, will:

- (1) provide adequate means to continue to strengthen our allies;
- (2) continue soundly and affirmatively our economic program, which in itself is the best answer to new Soviet activities;
- (3) achieve a greater measure of flexibility so urgently needed;
- (4) supply a limited element of continuity in our aid program.

I have presented in very brief outline the prob-

lem we face and the proposal of the executive branch for the solution of that problem. It is our earnest hope the Committee will approve this program.

## **Visit of Deputy Prime Minister of Rhodesia and Nyasaland**

The Department of State announced on March 24 (press release 160) that Sir Roy Welensky, Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, will visit Washington March 25-30, under the auspices of the International Exchange of Persons Program. Principal purpose of the tour is to familiarize Sir Roy with the United States and particularly with its transportation and manufacturing industries as well as to afford him the opportunity to confer with U.S. Government transportation, labor, and business leaders.

Deputy Prime Minister Welensky arrived in New York March 17 and has just completed visits to Pittsburgh and Chicago. While in Washington he will confer with officials of the Departments of State, Commerce, and Labor, Members of Congress, and labor and transportation officials. Following his stay here, the Deputy Prime Minister will fly to California via Denver, Colo., and will also visit the Grand Canyon, Texas, and the Tennessee Valley. After another visit in New York, from April 12-21, he will fly to Canada.

## **Congratulatory Messages on Signing of French-Tunisian Protocol**

### **Message From U.S. Consul General to Bey of Tunis<sup>1</sup>**

Press release 154 dated March 22

My Government wishes to convey to His Highness the Bey, to the members of the Tunisian Government, and to the people of Tunisia its congratulations on the signature of the Protocol of Agreement of March 20 between the Governments of Tunisia and France, and on the recognition of Tunisian independence as embodied therein.

My Government desires to express its particular

<sup>1</sup> Delivered on Mar. 22 by Morris N. Hughes, Consul General of the United States in Tunis, to Sidi Mohammed Lamme Pasha, Bey of Tunis.

admiration for the courage and realism of those who once again have proven steadfast in adhering to the principle of peaceful negotiation. In following the paths of friendship which have led to the signature of this solemn act, the leaders of Tunisia give proof to the world of their devotion to the real welfare of the inhabitants of their country.

<sup>2</sup> Delivered on Mar. 22 by the American Embassy at Paris.

### Message From U.S. Ambassador to French Foreign Office <sup>2</sup>

Press release 155 dated March 22

My Government desires to pay new homage to the realism and magnanimity of those who have made possible the Franco-Tunisian Protocol of Agreement, signed on March 20, and to the role of France, which has proven once again her dedication to the progress of North Africa and to the aspirations of its people.

## Clarification of U.S. Policy Toward North Africa

by C. Douglas Dillon  
Ambassador to France <sup>1</sup>

I am glad to have the opportunity to speak to you today. Recently I have noticed in France an increasing misunderstanding of United States policy toward North Africa. Such misunderstanding is a matter of serious concern to us all and should not be allowed to continue. In an attempt to clarify this situation I am going to describe briefly the basic views of my Government regarding the problems which France is facing in that area.

I think you will all agree that there are today a number of people in France who seem to feel that the United States has not been adequately supporting France in North Africa or, worse still, that we have even contemplated the possibility of replacing her in that area. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Ever since I have been here in Paris my Government has loyally supported the French Government in its search for solutions to North African problems—solutions that will make possible long-term, close cooperation between France and the Moslem communities of Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. The United States has consistently supported France when North African subjects have been discussed in the United Nations. The most recent instance was our strong support last fall of the position that Algeria is an internal French problem and therefore not appropriate for discussion by the U. N. <sup>2</sup> In addition, when last year the important

question of helicopters was brought to our attention, we responded promptly and favorably to the requests of the French Government. Never once since I have been in Paris have I had a specific complaint from any member of any French government or, for that matter, from any informed Frenchman regarding any action taken by the United States Government in North Africa.

I say "United States Government" advisedly, because I do not mean to say that Frenchmen have not occasionally spoken to me about the actions of a few private American citizens in the North African area. But I have two observations to make on this score: First, if one looks at the overall picture, any actions taken by the few private American citizens who have had anything to do with North Africa are clearly of very minor importance in the drama of the past few years; second, and even more important, I am sure that you will all agree with me that in free countries such as France and the United States, where there is no governmental control over the thoughts and words of our citizens, it is most important to distinguish clearly and sharply between the action of the nation as such taken by its government and the actions or words of private individuals. There has been a tendency in France to confuse the two when talking of American policy in North Africa, and I ask you to help in guarding against this error.

<sup>1</sup> Translation of address delivered in French before the Diplomatic Press Association at Paris, France, on Mar. 20.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546.

With this background, how is it possible that so much misunderstanding should have arisen? Misunderstanding between peoples almost inevitably means that there must be some fault on both sides. I have looked hard at the American position in this matter, and I think that I may have found one of the causes. That is that, until now, there have been very few public expressions of United States policy in this area. On the one hand we have felt that Algeria was primarily a French affair and on the other that the relationships between France and Morocco and Tunisia were matters to be settled between the French Government on the one hand and the Moroccan and Tunisian Governments on the other. We thought that public expression of our views would be considered to be undue interference in other people's affairs, and accordingly we have kept silent. While we have repeatedly given assurance in private to the French Government that we supported their efforts to reach liberal and mutually acceptable solutions in the area, our policy of avoiding public expression of our views may have contributed to a misunderstanding of our position.

I hope today that I can do something to rectify this situation. May I suggest, on the other hand, that we Americans, when judged by the record of our longtime friendship and cooperation as well as our sacrifices on the fields of France during the last two wars, may deserve a greater degree of confidence than has been shown us by certain circles of public opinion.

#### **Tunisia and Morocco**

Now let me elaborate a little on our policies. First, let us look at Tunisia and Morocco. With these two countries the French Government, animated by the liberal traditions for which France is justly famous, has concluded agreements. In the first agreement—that with Tunisia—a long step was taken toward independence. There followed the recent agreement according full independence to Morocco.<sup>3</sup> And we have just learned that new negotiations perfecting the independence of Tunisia have been successfully completed. These agreements should usher in a new era of close interdependence between those two countries and France. They have been greeted with applause and thanksgiving throughout the free world.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466.

What does this newly acquired status of independence mean? It simply means that henceforth the relationships between France on the one hand and Morocco and Tunisia on the other will be freely negotiated as between sovereign equals. We certainly hope that these new relationships will not weaken but rather will strengthen the close ties that have bound France and these two lands together in a common destiny. I am certain that the Tunisian and Moroccan people must realize that they owe their remarkable economic and social development of recent years to French initiative and to French investment.

My Government was particularly happy to learn that the recent negotiations with Tunisia and Morocco opened up the prospect of a continued close relationship between the Governments and people of France and these two countries. The United States wholeheartedly supports such a relationship of freely negotiated interdependence. We believe it is a necessity in the world of today, when it has become difficult if not impossible for any country to stand alone.

You have all heard that the people of the United States are anticolonialist by tradition. That is true, and we are proud of it. But what does this mean? It means that we believe, as I am sure the people and Government of France believe, that the less-favored peoples of the world should be brought forward as rapidly as possible to a state of freedom in which they can freely and rationally choose their own destiny. Such freedom of choice can take many forms. It by no means requires a rupture between the peoples that have newly acquired their freedom and those that have led them along the path to this freedom. May I point, for example, to the decisions of the peoples of Pakistan, India, and Ceylon to stay on as members of the British Commonwealth in their capacity as sovereign nations? May I point to the free decision of the people of Puerto Rico to maintain an even closer relationship with the United States?

Therefore, it should come as no surprise when I say that the United States hopes for and favors the continuation of the closest possible interdependence between France and Morocco and Tunisia. May I also say, once and for all, and with the greatest clarity and force, that the United States has no desire to interfere in any way with the close relationship between France and these

two countries—a relationship which we look upon as one of the bulwarks of the free world.

### **Algeria**

Now let me turn for a moment to Algeria. Here the problem is quite different and the solution must undoubtedly be different. The four departments of Algeria are French territory. There are 1,200,000 Frenchmen living in Algeria alongside 8,000,000 Moslems, and this coexistence in itself poses a most complex and difficult problem.

While my Government has been, and is, well aware of this problem, it is fair to say that public opinion in the United States has not been adequately informed regarding the French community in Algeria. The size of this community, the extent of its participation in all phases of Algerian life, and the length of its history in Algeria are now becoming better known to the American people, and with this knowledge is coming greater understanding and sympathy for the problems you face in Algeria. I can assure you that France has our profound sympathy and support in its attempt to work out a liberal solution to this difficult problem of coexistence.

The French contribution in North Africa, the great advances in hygiene and public health, the building of roads and hospitals, the multitude of costly and ingenious programs that have made barren areas fruitful—these are all elements of a dramatic story that is not well enough known abroad. The soaring population increases in Algeria and throughout North Africa over the past decades are in themselves testimony to these achievements. France can and should be proud of her efforts in North Africa. It would be helpful if she were to make a greater effort to spread the knowledge of these good works throughout the world.

Now, to return again to Algeria, there the French Government has proposed a liberal program, the basic element of which is a search for new arrangements for the continued coexistence of the French and Moslem communities—new arrangements to be freely arrived at by discussion between the chosen leaders of the Moslem community and the representatives of France and the French community in Algeria. The French Government has solemnly promised free elections for the purpose of choosing these leaders. Such elections are wholly consistent with the ideals of

liberty and justice which are held so dear by both the French and American people. But we all know that elections cannot take place while disorder reigns. Hence, we in the United States fervently hope that peace and order will come soon to the Algerian countryside so that progress can be made toward the liberal solution sought by the French Government.

### **U.S. Support for France**

My countrymen have always been shocked by blind acts of terrorism, and those who take part in such activity should not for a moment imagine that they have the support of my Government or of any segment of our public opinion. May I repeat so that there can be no possible misunderstanding: The United States stands solidly behind France in her search for a liberal and equitable solution of the problems in Algeria.

We recognize that there have been external influences at work trying to undermine the French position throughout North Africa. I hope that what I have just said will be of help in enabling the people of France to differentiate sharply between her friends and her foes, between the friends and allies who support her in her search for liberal and fair solutions, and those who have sought to destroy every possibility of a continuing relationship between France and the Moslem communities throughout North Africa.

Finally, I would like to ask your help in one concrete matter which I feel is in the best interests of France as well as of my own country. It is undeniable that the terrorists and those who seek simply to drive France from North Africa are encouraged by any indication that there may be differences between France and her allies, in particular the United States, regarding North African policy. There have been articles in the press stressing that differences of opinion exist in this matter between France and the United States. Such articles can only serve to encourage the enemies of France. I hope that after the explanation which I have just given of United States policy in North Africa you will feel able to join with me in an effort to dissipate the misunderstandings of the past and to let everyone realize that France, in its search for liberal solutions that will insure the continuance of its presence in North Africa, has the wholehearted support of the United States Government.

## A Crucial Contest With the Communist World

*by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy<sup>1</sup>*

The part George Washington University plays in this community more than bears out the wisdom of the first President of our country in sponsoring the idea of a university located in the Capital of the Nation. Of course, George Washington's wish was not for a university devoted exclusively to the training of civil servants, important as that is. His desire also was for a university providing "education in all branches of polite literature: in arts and sciences. . . ."

The 14 colleges, schools, and divisions of the University, including medicine, law, engineering, education, pharmacy, and government, as well as the 4-year course in liberal arts, have fulfilled his wish more completely than he might have dreamed. The graduates of these schools and disciplines, whether or not they go into the Government, contribute richly to the life and wealth of our area and Nation.

We sometimes fail to appreciate the contribution made by our system of higher education, not only to the internal needs and culture of our country but to our understanding of foreign affairs. The strength of our society depends in large part on the intelligence and training of our people, on the mixing of technical and professional skills, and on the ability of all our people to analyze and comprehend the economic, political, and social forces at work in the world today.

We not only rely on technical training and on scientific skills for the enrichment of our society. The liberal arts, the inquiring mind, the well-rounded individual are perhaps of more fundamental significance in our kind of country. The

Founding Fathers who drew up the charter for our Nation reflected in high degree this attitude of inquiry, this wide variety of skills, intelligence, and experience. Our higher education today is devoted to the idea of the well-rounded man.

By comparison we note that the Soviet system does not have this breadth of purpose. It is producing technicians, engineers, and men of science in growing, if not disturbing, abundance. The broad intellectual needs of a developed and well-balanced society are seemingly neglected and even repressed in the Soviet Union. In this way it accomplishes the purpose of the state to progress rapidly in technical and economic fields. This oneness in Soviet education and training represents a certain danger to the free world. It results in almost complete acceptance of dogmas and of opinions handed down from above usually without question and without understanding.

### **Recent Communist Party Congress**

We have witnessed a further startling example of this oneness at the recent 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at Moscow. This relates to the Stalin story, about which we are still lacking factual information. The news of this apparent development has leaked to the outside world in a peculiar fashion. We still do not possess the text of the speech said to have been made by Khrushchev at the Party Congress meeting in February, but it is reported that Khrushchev delivered a lengthy denunciation of his former master. As a result of that speech Joseph Stalin apparently has now become an outcast, a pariah, where but a very few short years ago he was the demigod, the physical and spiritual ruler of all the Russians. If reports are accurate, this

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the George Washington University Alumni Luncheon at Washington, D. C., on Mar. 24 (press release 157 dated Mar. 23).

rewriting of history, which the 200 million people of the Soviet Union may be reluctantly forced to accept, is a spectacle we have seen before and one that makes us cherish more dearly than ever our system of free inquiry and broad education.

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party was in many respects a valuable performance for us to watch, even though we do not as yet know the entire story or understand its implications. During the 3 years and 4 months since the 19th Communist Party Congress, many changes had occurred on the Soviet scene. The most important, of course, was the death of Stalin in 1953, ending a 29-year rule and paving the way for a new phase in Soviet history. In this same period collective leadership in top party organs, or perhaps more accurately collective dictatorship, a form of oligarchy, became the guiding principle of the Government. At the same time, Khrushchev succeeded in moving to the forefront of the ruling group.

The purge of Beria brought the police under firmer party control. The armed forces received a greater share of prestige and recognition. Agriculture remained a weak point and became the target for sustained special attention. A new stress on consumers' goods was short-lived as the regime reaffirmed the priority of heavy industry.

The first Soviet thermonuclear test explosion, the appearance of new long-range bombers and supersonic fighters, the development of guided missiles, the modernization and reequipping of ground forces, the continued emphasis on new naval construction—all testified to the further increase of Soviet military power since 1952.

In foreign affairs, the Soviets moved toward new international relationships which gave them more flexibility, whether or not they reflected any fundamental change in Communist strategy. This new posture was most dramatically expressed at the "summit" meeting last summer in Geneva. The Soviets sought to create an image of the U.S.S.R. as a peace-loving power by a number of diplomatic gestures and by offering to remove a few barriers to communication with the non-Communist world. The wars in Korea and Indochina were ended, an Austrian treaty was signed, relations with West Germany were established. The U.S.S.R. warmed up its approach to Yugoslavia and to a number of non-Communist countries stretching from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean. They employed new means—arms, credits, machines, and technicians—in a new political

offensive against less-developed non-Communist countries.

Against this background, more than 1,400 delegates to the 20th Communist Party Congress, as well as delegates from 55 foreign Communist Parties, assembled in the Great Hall of the Kremlin in February.

The highlight and main innovation of the 20th Congress was the first formal public criticism of Stalin by his successors. In the nearly 3 years since his death, Stalin's stature had been progressively reduced by withholding adulation from him and concentrating it on Lenin, but previous to the Congress there had been no official public criticism.

The criticism of Stalin centered on methods of rule, but it also involved policy decisions. Caustic references were made to one-man decision-making, leader-worship, overcentralization, mistakes in economic policies, ossified conduct of foreign relations, distortions of ideology, propaganda in Soviet history, unhealthy developments in Soviet law, and arbitrariness in law enforcement.

A second important result of the conference was to put the official stamp of approval on the present organization of rule as well as on recent policies. The emphasis on collectivity in leadership plus the criticism of one-man rule may have been designed to make it more difficult for any Soviet leader to set himself apart from the other members of the ruling clique. Nevertheless, it may be significant that the new Central Committee expanded the party presidium to include members with ties to Khrushchev. In addition, it enlarged the party secretariat, which is directed by Khrushchev, and tied that body and the presidium even more closely together through overlapping of membership.

#### **"Peaceful Coexistence"**

In the field of foreign affairs, the Soviet rulers claimed success for their new policies and promised that they would be pursued even more vigorously. Their basic premise they defined as peaceful coexistence as the only alternative to "the most destructive war in history."

Their apparent plan is to cultivate friendly relations with most countries, including the major Western Powers, but not at the cost of concessions. They apparently will make special efforts in less-developed areas and among foreign socialist groups.

Their immediate aim was made clear: to undermine Western defense efforts and further to extend Soviet influence. Their ultimate goal was expressed by speaker after speaker with even greater optimism than in the past: "The ideas of communism will triumph without war."

The Soviet rulers gave a number of reasons for their confidence. They cited growing Soviet military power as a deterrent to Western aggression. They depicted increasing Soviet economic strength as a symbol of the success of communism. They lumped into a "zone of peace" the neutral countries, which together with the Sino-Soviet bloc they consider as proof that a majority of mankind is moving toward "peace" and socialism.

The speeches at the Communist Congress showed awareness of the contradiction between coexistence and continuing Communist-capitalist conflict. Unwilling to discard either, the Soviet leaders sought to appear both respectable and revolutionary by adjusting their ideological garb. The doctrine of the inevitability of war was modified to stress the preventability of war. The doctrine of the necessity of the violent overthrow of capitalism was shaded to sanction a "nonviolent" parliamentary seizure of power. These adjustments were intended to reassure non-Communists of the seriousness of Soviet ideas on coexistence and to make clear to Communists that coexistence means neither relaxation nor reformism. Coexistence, it was stressed, is a state-to-state concept, which involves no reconciliation with "bourgeois" ideas.

Within the U.S.S.R. the priority of heavy industry and the maintenance of a high level of armaments continue to demand sacrifices from the population, since the threat of war is assumed still to exist. Outside the U.S.S.R., the Soviet speakers declared, Soviet efforts to improve relations with foreign governments are not to be interpreted by local Communists as undercutting their efforts to come to power. A period of coexistence, they maintain, will still provide chances for revolution.

As we see it, these were the highlights of the Soviet Congress. These are the features which the Communist leaders themselves thought most significant about the Soviet Union. Now we might try to look at the world scene more objectively.

Several important elements in combination have been instrumental in bringing about the changes in Soviet policy and strategy dramatized by the 20th Communist Congress. The death of Stalin

opened the door for new leaders to try out new ideas and to get out from under Stalin's dead weight. Very real increases in Soviet industrial capacity have given them both greater confidence in their power of control and the ability to expand their economic operations. The development and testing of thermonuclear weapons in the hands of both sides perhaps has persuaded some that the prospect of another world war is more remote. Finally—and this is most significant—we must bear in mind that, if the Soviets have in fact shifted to new methods and new points of attack, it is because the strength and firmness of the free nations frustrated their old methods of intimidation and aggression.

### **Challenge in Western Europe**

The primary aim of the Soviets from 1945 until rather recently was to take over Western Europe through dividing and weakening it by subversion and threats. Europe is the site of the world's most highly developed industrial plant outside the United States. The combined industrial capacity of Western Europe and the United States is greater by a ratio of seven to two than the capacity of the Communist empire. Control of Western Europe, however, would give the Communists a lead of five to four. In population, in geography, in military power, and in political, economic, and cultural leadership, Western Europe was and is the most valuable prize in the world for the Communist imperialists.

To meet their challenge, we and our allies in Europe built our military capacity to a point where it was sufficient to deter an attack. Our foreign aid at first prevented economic collapse and has now produced record prosperity. The North Atlantic Treaty provided a warning system against any Communist attempt to move against the European nations one by one.

The joining of a rearmed and prosperous Germany with a unified and strong NATO was the signal that the 10-year Soviet effort to weaken, divide, and conquer the richest prize in the world had failed. The problem now is to retain that unity and strength.

In addition to their efforts at conquest in Europe, the Communists also attempted, by violence, threats, and subversion, to forward their aggressive aims in the Far East.

In Korea 3 years ago the Communists were made to understand that, if they failed to reach



an agreement for an early cease-fire, they would run the risk of retaliation massive enough to cost them far more than war could gain. Today Korea is at peace.

In the Formosa Strait a year ago, the Chinese Communists were aggressively pressing their claims to the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu and to Formosa. The President sought and obtained from Congress the overwhelming assurance that the might of this country would be used if necessary to guard the peace. War has not broken out in the Formosa Strait.

### Appeal to Colonial Peoples

It is said that a good general forces his opponent to meet him on ground that is favorable to him. The Soviets are now appealing to colonial and former colonial peoples who are searching for economic strength and political prestige. As a former colony which won its own freedom and has helped other nations to achieve theirs, the United States can make a strong case for our system against the "new colonialism" of the Communist empire. We are challenged, in effect, to live up to our own heritage. I believe we are meeting that challenge.

The Soviets are now imitating our efforts to help other countries build economic strength. Our efforts in this field have enjoyed much success during the past 10 years. There is no ground upon which we are better equipped by experience and productive capacity to place our efforts up against theirs. Our 160 million people, working in freedom, produce over three times as much as do the 220 million of the Soviet Union, working in servitude. Again we are meeting the challenge, and I am confident we will succeed. It is an expensive and trying experience for our Nation because our competitor's tactics involve deceptive practices. The Stalinist open military aggression is supplanted by political and economic subversion cloaked in language of peace and friendly cooperation. We have known how to deal with military aggression. We are even better equipped to deal with the present form of competition.

We are on the high ground in this crucial contest with the Communist world. Our reserves—military, economic, and political—are vast. Our methods have been tested and proven through 10 years of post-war competition. As President Eisenhower has said,

The sum of our international effort should be this: the

waging of peace, with as much resourcefulness, with as great a sense of dedication and urgency as we have ever mustered in defense of our country in time of war. In this effort, our weapon is not force. Our weapons are the principles and ideas embodied in our historic traditions, applied with the same vigor that in the past made America a living promise of freedom for all mankind.<sup>2</sup>

Those party bosses who oppose us, by contrast, are on the low ground, on the quicksands and broken terrain of Soviet colonialism in all its brutality, bad faith, and oppression. Neither materially nor morally can they match our potential. We enjoy the support of our people in our efforts. I should doubt that the Communist leadership is entirely confident of support of the masses. We do not intend that they shall outwit or outdistance us in this crucial test.

We will hope and work for the day when conflict of any kind may cease, when all may join in peaceful efforts toward peaceful ends, when Russia itself will be governed by men who put the welfare of the Russian people above world conquest. But as long as there is to be conflict, we are on the high ground, and if we have faith in ourselves and our system, if we are brave, resourceful, and patient, we will win through. I know that we here today, as graduates of a university with a proud record in our Nation's history, will play a vital part in this epic struggle.

### Soviet Payment of Damages for U.S. Navy Plane

Press release 148 dated March 19

*The following is the text of a note delivered by the Soviet Embassy in Washington to the Department of State on March 16, 1956, in reply to the United States note of January 6, 1956,<sup>2</sup> requesting payment of damages for the destruction of a United States Navy Neptune plane on June 22, 1955.*

[Translation]

The Embassy of the U.S.S.R. presents its compliments to the Department of State of the U.S.A. and, referring to the State Department's note of January 6 of this year, has the honor to state the following.

The State Department's note asserts that the

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 94.

American military aircraft of the "Neptune" type referred to in the note did not violate the state frontier of the U.S.S.R.

In this connection, the Embassy considers it necessary to recall that on June 25, 1955, in the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., V. M. Molotov, to the Secretary of State of the U.S.A., Mr. Dulles,<sup>2</sup> factual data were communicated regarding the violation of the U.S.S.R. state frontier by an American military aircraft of the "Neptune" type.

The present note reaffirms the above-mentioned statement concerning the circumstances of the violation of the U.S.S.R. state frontier by an American military aircraft.

In accordance with the agreement which has been reached and with the request contained in the State Department's note of January 6 of this year, there is enclosed a check in the amount of \$724,947.68 in reimbursement for 50 percent of the total amount of the damages borne by the American side.

## Visit of Prime Minister Costello of Ireland

*Following are texts of statements and addresses made during the visit to Washington of John A. Costello, Prime Minister of Ireland, from March 14 to 17.*

note in Washington, in the fields of statesmanship and politics.

So welcome, and we trust that your visit, though it is brief here, will be one of warmhearted friendship every place you go.

### WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT

Press release 136 dated March 14

#### Statement by Vice President Nixon

Mr. Prime Minister, it is a very great privilege and honor for me to welcome you to Washington, D.C., and the United States on behalf of President Eisenhower and on behalf of all the American people.

It seems to me rather symbolic that you are arriving in this season of the year, because, as you will note, in just a few days you will find virtually all Americans blossoming out in the green, and not only those of Irish persuasion and descent but others who have great affection for those who are Irish. Consequently, perhaps, it is not too inappropriate that you are arriving on a day on which the rain is falling very heavily in Washington, because that means that we will have rain today and a very green and happy St. Patrick's Day on Saturday of this week.

In any event, may I say that, as you know, we have many bonds of friendship between our two countries and our peoples. Those of Irish descent have contributed tremendously to the United States in many fields and particularly, as you will

#### Response by Prime Minister Costello

Mr. Vice President, when I was listening to your very kind words of welcome, I felt that you should have been in my position as having kissed the Blarney stone. I appreciate the warmth of the welcome that has been extended to me this morning and appreciate that that welcome is given from the American people to the Irish nation and the Irish people.

Of course, even the great American Nation which has achieved so much can as yet not control the weather. We have a saying in Ireland, going back for many centuries—I will give you the English and not the Irish expression—that St. Patrick took the cold stone out of the water. The old legend was that the water was heated by hot stones, and of course they grew cold and the water grew cold. But St. Patrick took it out and, accordingly, after St. Patrick's Day the weather will get fine.

I regret I can't promise you the weather will get fine before St. Patrick's Day.

The reason that I have come here to the United States once again, where I have so many friends and where there are so many people friendly to my country, is one not as coming to a foreign country but as coming to a country in which we have

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, July 18, 1955, p. 100.

much in common and in which we are really part of the American race. We always remember the welcome that was given to our people in bad times, and we hope that they gave, as your Vice President has said, good and substantial and ample return for the warmth and welcome and the shelter they got here in bad times in building up this great American Nation.

You have given me a welcome as representative of the Irish Government and the Irish people. On their behalf and as their representative, I thank you for the warmth of your welcome and bring you their affectionate greetings and the warmest admiration for this great United States of America.

**ADDRESS BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO THE SENATE, MARCH 15<sup>1</sup>**

I wish to express my appreciation of the honor you have done me by inviting me to appear here and address you today. Your invitation is but another of the many friendly gestures which your great country has extended to mine, gestures which spring from, and go far to perpetuate, those close and intimate ties which bind our countries. It is my earnest desire—and my firm intention, insofar as any effort of mine can bring it about—that my short stay amongst you will help to nourish and foster those ties, so that in the future, as in the past, there may exist between our two countries full community of sympathy and interest notwithstanding the 3,000 miles of ocean that separate but paradoxically unite us.

The ties which unite our countries spring from a common outlook and from common ideals, based on a Christian, democratic, and free way of life. This is not surprising, as Ireland's spiritual empire, consisting of many millions of persons of Irish birth or descent scattered in every corner of the globe, is nowhere so powerful as in your country. It is this sense of basic community of the spirit between our two countries which serves to keep alive today the older historical ties which for centuries past have constituted a bond between us.

In the United States of America, we see the mightiest upholder of the traditional values of the West. In the veins of this great people flows the

blood of many European races, and the Irish have contributed a more than proportionate share. It is not long, in historical time, since America was created as a new Nation, "conceived in liberty," but even then predestined to greatness. In her growth and in the achievements of her people, she has, however, far outstripped the older nations from which she drew her origins. She has become a giant among the nations of the world, splendid in her youth and majestic in her strength.

I bring to you the greetings of a very old nation, though one not long emerged into the light of freedom from centuries of darkness and near despair. We are proud to claim our place as a people who contributed not a little to the creation and development of your great country, and we gladly acknowledge that our contribution has been abundantly repaid in the sympathy and support which we have always received from you in time of need.

At a time when freedom seemed for us, at home, a dissolving dream, Ireland's sons played a significant part in the attainment of liberty in this land of yours. It is, I think, pardonable for us to feel some of the pride that gladdens a parent whose son has grown to manhood in strength and fame and good repute.

Ours is a small country, yours a mighty one. But we have much in common. We, like you, have a tradition of devotion to those principles of freedom, Christian justice and humanity which are facing, in the world of today, a challenge more powerful and menacing than any that has opposed them in the past. It can scarcely be doubted that the almost miraculous development of your country is a manifestation of God's providence, which never leaves His people without a defender strong enough to meet the evil forces of the time. We see in you a Nation, magnificent in its youthful vigor, well fitted to bear the tremendous burden which, in the course of history, has fallen upon its shoulders. Yours is the power and yours, therefore, the responsibility to insure that, in these days of great danger, freedom "shall not perish from the earth."

Ireland may claim to be qualified, better perhaps than any other nation, to serve as a link between the Old World and the New. She is herself an ancient European nation, and her people are steeped in the Christian traditions of European culture. Once situated at the edge of

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of Mar. 15, p. 4307.

the known world, she now finds herself rather at its center, between Europe and America. Such influence as she possesses cannot, in view of her size, be founded in material strength. Rather is it a spiritual influence, which, though without the support of big battalions, has an importance which the Christian democracies of the world will not ignore. How fortunate these democracies are that in your great country they have found a happy alliance of the big battalions with that same spiritual strength.

Millions of our people have found here a second home. In the recent as well as in the more distant past, many of her sons have fought and died for America. I want, however, to mention an Irishman who, nominally, at least, fought against your country. His name was Richard Fitzpatrick.

I seek through you the permission of Congress to present to the Library of Congress five unpublished letters which Fitzpatrick wrote to his brother, the Second Earl of Upper Ossory, during your War of Independence. These letters are a small Irish contribution to the study of the history of the United States, but they have a wider significance, which is my excuse for bringing them to your attention today.

The outbreak of the War of Independence found Richard Fitzpatrick a captain in the British Army. As an intimate friend of Charles James Fox, the great Whig leader, his whole inclinations were against the attempt to subdue the American people, but when ordered abroad to war his sense of duty forbade him to resign his commission.

His letters do not concern themselves much with the incidents of the campaign. They are for the most part a series of reflections on the merits, conduct, and probable issue of the war.

Fitzpatrick, as a member of Parliament, must have many times listened to the rolling periods of his fellow Irishman Edmund Burke, the greatest mind of the age, and one of the greatest political thinkers of all time. Burke had not yet declared the age of chivalry to be gone, and it is not surprising that a man of feeling and intelligence who lived and moved in such an environment as did Fitzpatrick should detest a situation which made him the instrument of an ignoble cause, "a situation," says Fitzpatrick, "where I am obliged to be constantly acting in direct opposition to all my feelings, principles and opinions."

"I grow every day," he cries, "more and more disgusted with the folly and iniquity of the cause in which I am condemned to serve."

Neither is it surprising that Fitzpatrick's experience of the American character and temper should lead him to the conclusion that the war could have only one outcome.

Shrewd though many of his judgments were, they pale into insignificance beside a remark which he made when Congress struck a medal in commemoration of the Convention of Saratoga. On that occasion, he said:

There is a greatness and a dignity in all the proceedings of this people that makes us contemptible indeed. I am well convinced they will be the first and greatest people there ever was an example of in the history of mankind.

I doubt if history holds a comparable instance of such prescience. It was this near prophecy on the part of a private and comparatively obscure observer of the scene 180 years ago that first prompted the trustees of the National Library of Ireland and myself to feel that the proper custodian of these historic manuscripts should not be the National Library of Ireland, whence I am their bearer, but the Library of Congress.

Gentlemen, today the world looks to you as "the first and greatest people there ever was an example of in the history of mankind." May your actions always be worthy of the responsibility thus thrust upon you, and may there always be a "greatness and dignity in your proceedings" that will match those shown by your stouthearted forefathers in their critical hour.

That is my wish for you in presenting you with this gift from a small nation which is deeply in your debt but, you will permit me to say, whose sons and daughters have played their part in making you what you are—the greatest Nation in the world.

#### **ADDRESS TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 15<sup>2</sup>**

I am deeply honored by the invitation to address your assembly. I am sensible that you are honoring not me but the Irish Government and the whole Irish people, whose spokesman I am today.

I bring a message of good will from a young

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4236.

republic, which is an old nation, to your young Nation, the oldest republic on earth.

At the outset of my remarks, and before I address you on the topics I wish to cover in my address today, I seek your permission to present to the Library of Congress five unpublished letters which Richard Fitzpatrick wrote to his brother, the Second Earl of Upper Ossory during your War of Independence. These letters were purchased by the trustees of our National Library of Ireland and were lodged in the National Library. The originals of these letters go back to 1777. Richard Fitzpatrick, who wrote those letters, the originals of which are in this small case, was an Irishman fighting with the British Army against the army of the forthcoming United States of America. He did not like this task, but as a soldier he felt bound to obey the orders to fight in a cause of which he did not approve. During the course of his campaigning against the soldiers of the American Republic, he wrote some letters to his brother in which he expressed the opinion that the British people were fighting a battle in which they should not be engaged. He also indicated what his view would be of the outcome of the struggle.

I ask you to permit me to present the originals of these letters to the Library of Congress. They are remarkable for the fact they are so old, still more remarkable for the fact they are the candid and self-critical expressions of a soldier who was fighting against an army who were themselves struggling for independence, but they are really remarkable, outstandingly remarkable, for one particular passage which I ask your permission to read to you and which in itself furnishes me with an excuse, if an excuse were needed, and certainly with a justification, for asking that your Library shall have custody of these historic documents rather than our National Library of Ireland.

In one of his letters, giving expression to his views after Congress had struck a medal in commemoration of the Convention of Saratoga, he said:

There is a greatness and a dignity in all the proceedings of this people that makes us contemptible indeed. I am well convinced they will be the first and greatest people there ever was an example of in the history of mankind.

I am presenting you with this small gift as the representative of a small nation to this Nation which has fulfilled the prophecy Fitzpatrick made 180 years ago.

I take leave to express the conviction that your

actions will always be worthy of the responsibility which has been thrust upon you and that there will always be in the proceedings of this great Nation a "greatness and dignity in your proceedings" that will continue to keep you "the first and greatest people there ever was an example of in the history of mankind."

Your countrymen are well aware that they occupy a very special place in the hearts of all Irishmen, a position due as much to Irish admiration of the achievements and attainments of the United States as to the many associations our two countries have in common.

You have been the world's exemplar of liberty and the course you have so brilliantly traveled many in the rest of the world have been content but to follow. Your magnificent political institutions, the creation of your youthful genius, have been the model not less for us in Dublin than for the other centers of the civilized world. Yours has been the idea of a fundamental document protecting, with a carefully balanced arrangement of political power, the fundamental human rights. What a noble conception of man has inspired your Constitution, yet how well founded it is on the earth. The idealism has not vanished like a dream but has remained the angelic part of a truly human institution.

For your Founding Fathers, to whose broodings political philosophers of every age return for inspiration, were not merely thinkers but men of action, too: If theoretical, practical also. They knew the nature of man, so wittily disclosed by G. K. Chesterton, who said:

There is one little defect about man, the image of God, the wonder of the world and the paragon of animals, he is not to be trusted.

This fine distrust, a lawyer's shrewdness, is writ large over your Constitution. The men who made it built well on sound foundations: and what they built has endured.

It has been said that growth is the only evidence of life. What amazing, unexampled growth has not your history shown. What abounding life does not your country display. May your future repeat the miracles of your past and well will humanity be served. Your present hospitality is but another happy instance of those many friendly gestures toward Ireland which the United States has made in the past. It is not very many years ago since it was my pleasant duty to ex-

press our thanks for the generous help which we received under Marshall aid. But the help which America gave Ireland did not start with Marshall aid. Long before Marshall aid was thought of, American support sustained the Irish people.

Agas ago, long before America was discovered by Europe, it was imagined by Irish seers as I-Breasail—The Island of Great Desire—a fertile land of alluring loveliness; in the terrible centuries of Ireland's misfortune when "Hope had grown gray hairs, Hope had mourning on," this memory remained. Then out into the miraculous sunsets of the west coast of Ireland went many an Irish family to reach this Island of Great Desire, and truly were they not mistaken in their journeys, for abounding hospitality and consolation in plenty awaited them and a fine future of noble living. And it is our boast that our emigrants have contributed not insignificantly to the building up of America. We allow ourselves, therefore, to feel that we, too, may to an extent share your greatness.

All small nations owe a special debt of gratitude to the United States for its strong and unceasing efforts for world peace. Through your efforts we have been spared the unlimited horrors of modern war and have thereby been able to maintain unscathed our Christian, democratic, and free way of life.

It has been your honor to have exercised the greatest power on earth in accordance with the high principles of justice. It has, indeed, been well said that you are apt for power. If you do but maintain your power as the servant of your rectitude, the world's future will be in good hands. I pray that it may be so. You will not need encouragement from me to ignore the misunderstandings and misrepresentations with which your foreign policy has been met in certain lands, for ingratitude is the first of the sins of man. But I can assure you that the free critical intelligence of my countrymen has not faulted your intention.

History has inextricably intertwined the fortunes of our two countries, and it is an easy task to come on such a mission as mine. I have the sense of having traveled far only to find myself at home. It was the Irish statesman, Henry Grattan, who said that the ocean unites, and in the west of my country we say that the next parish is America.

Time has not fulfilled nor realized the optimist's dream. Its passage has not exclusively brought

improvement to the human situation. Indeed, some of the developments we have witnessed have confronted mankind with the ultimate decisions about life. Nevertheless, it was your great American judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, who said:

I think it not improbable that man, like the grub that prepares a chamber for the winged thing it never has seen but is to be—that man may have cosmic destinies that he does not understand.

This has been the heart of the Christian message, imparted to all of us, that man has such cosmic destinies; and it is good that the people of America and of Ireland can share together the Christian hope.

### **Atoms-for-Peace Agreement Signed by Ireland and U.S.**

On March 16 the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 141) announced that representatives of Ireland and the United States had on that day signed a proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.<sup>1</sup> The agreement was negotiated within the framework of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.

The agreement was signed for Ireland by Ambassador John J. Hearne. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, C. Burke Elbrick, and Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, signed for the United States.

Under the proposed agreement, the Government of Ireland will receive information as to the design, construction, and operation of research reactors and their use as research, development, and engineering tools. It is contemplated that private American citizens and organizations would be authorized to supply to the Irish Government, or to authorized private persons under its jurisdiction, appropriate equipment and services.

The proposed agreement further provides that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission will lease to the Irish Government for use in research reactors up to 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) of contained U-235 in uranium enriched up to a maximum of 20 percent U-235. Ireland assumes responsibility for using and safeguarding the fissionable material in accordance with the terms of the proposed

<sup>1</sup>For text of a similar agreement with Turkey, initiated on May 3, 1955, see BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 55.

agreement. The agreement provides for the exchange of unclassified information in the research reactor field, related health and safety problems, and on the use of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological research, medical therapy, agriculture, and industry.

Looking to the future, the agreement expresses the hope and expectation of the parties that this initial agreement for cooperation will lead to consideration of further cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

This proposed cooperative agreement will enable the Irish to enhance their own country's training and experience in nuclear science and engineering for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, including civilian nuclear power within the framework of the atoms-for-peace program.

Under the provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, certain procedural steps must be taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government before the agreement signed may enter into force.

## Earthquake Disaster in Lebanon

*Following are the texts of messages sent to President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon by President Eisenhower on March 19 (White House press release dated March 20) and by Acting Secretary Hoover on March 17 (press release 149).*

### Message From President Eisenhower

News of the tragic consequences of the earthquakes in Lebanon has been received with sorrow and concern throughout the United States. On behalf of the American people I send deepest sympathy to Your Excellency and to all those who are suffering in this disaster.

### Message From Acting Secretary Hoover

The news of Lebanon's earthquake disaster has been widely reported in the U.S. On behalf of this Government and the American people, I hasten to send Your Excellency heartfelt condolences on the loss of lives that has resulted and deepest sympathy to the bereaved families and others in distress, particularly in Chauf and the villages of Mt. Lebanon and South Lebanon.

## Prime Minister of India To Visit United States

White House press release dated March 20

The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, has accepted the President's invitation to visit the United States. It has now been found that a visit immediately following the conclusion of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London would be mutually agreeable.

It is expected that Mr. Nehru will arrive in the United States on July 6 or 7 and will depart on July 10 or 11. The visit will be an informal one, and discussions between the President and Prime Minister Nehru will cover matters of mutual interest between the two countries.

The President has offered to have the Presidential plane bring the Prime Minister from London and return him there upon completion of his visit.

## Congratulatory Messages to Pakistan on Republic Day

### MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

White House press release dated March 22

*The President sent the following letter on March 21 to General Iskander Mirza, President of Pakistan, on the occasion of the celebration of Republic Day, Pakistan's new national holiday, March 23, 1956.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On the occasion of Pakistan's establishment as a Republic within the Commonwealth, I send my greetings and best wishes, as well as those of the people of the United States, to you and through you to the people of Pakistan. The United States will be represented at the attendant ceremonies by the United States Ambassador to Pakistan [Horace A. Hildreth] and by a Special Representative, the Honorable Jefferson Caffery, one of our most distinguished citizens.

The inauguration of Pakistan's constitution represents an important milestone in Pakistan's development as a modern, democratic state, responsive to the needs and aspirations of its people. The long efforts of Pakistan's leaders in drafting a

constitution based on democratic principles have culminated in well-deserved success. Because of the close ties of friendship between our countries, the people of the United States are particularly happy to send expressions of good will on this memorable day in Pakistan's history.

I am confident that under your inspiring leadership Pakistan will continue to make progress in advancing the welfare of its people.

May I express my good wishes for success in these worthy endeavors.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### MESSAGES FROM SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 156 dated March 22

*Secretary Dulles on March 21 addressed the following congratulatory messages to Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohamad Ali and Foreign Minister Hamidul Huq Choudhury of Pakistan.*

##### Secretary Dulles to the Prime Minister

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I want to extend to you my warmest congratulations on the coming into effect of Pakistan's constitution and the establishment of Pakistan as a Republic within the Commonwealth. Despite formidable difficulties Pakistan has established an impressive record of achievement in many fields since its independence but a few years ago. The adoption of a constitution represents another important stride in Pakistan's advance. It is our belief that the establishment of a Republic in Pakistan marks the beginning of a new era of progress and growth for your country.

I greatly enjoyed my recent visit to Pakistan on the occasion of our successful SEATO meeting. I shall long cherish the kindness and hospitality extended to me by the people of Pakistan.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

##### Secretary Dulles to the Foreign Minister

DEAR MR. MINISTER: On the occasion of Pakistan's establishment as a Republic within the Commonwealth I offer my best wishes to you and to the people of Pakistan. The adoption of a constitution guaranteeing the preservation of fundamental human rights is evidence of your country's deep attachment to democratic principles and is an

event of which all the people of Pakistan may be truly proud.

The United States looks forward to a continuation of the close cooperation which has characterized our common exertions for safeguarding the peace. Pakistan's contribution to the collective defense efforts of the free world is a reassurance to its friends and I am sure it is also a source of pride to Pakistan's own leaders and people.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

#### Note to Japanese Government on Pacific Nuclear Tests

Press release 158 dated March 23

*Following is the text of a note concerning the forthcoming nuclear tests in the Pacific which was delivered by the Department of State to the Embassy of Japan on March 19.*

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Japan and has the honor to refer to the note from the Embassy of Japan dated January 25, 1956,<sup>1</sup> requesting assurances of compensation in the event of damage or economic loss arising from the forthcoming nuclear tests in the Pacific, and the Embassy's note dated February 14, 1956,<sup>1</sup> transmitting the resolutions of the Japanese Diet urging suspension of nuclear tests and expressing the strong wish of the Government of Japan that earnest consideration be given to the realization of the desire of the people of Japan as expressed in these resolutions.

The United States is second to none in its desire for the safeguarded control and reduction of armaments, including nuclear weapons. President Eisenhower has led the way toward world cooperation to achieve this goal. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on December 8, 1953,<sup>2</sup> he stated,

... the United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world—its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma—to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

At the Summit Conference in Geneva last sum-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.



mer, President Eisenhower proposed an exchange of blueprints and a system of aerial inspection.<sup>3</sup> Most recently, in his letter of March 1, 1956, to Premier Bulganin of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,<sup>4</sup> the President stated that:

In my judgment, our efforts must be directed especially to bringing under control the nuclear threat. As an important step for this purpose and assuming the satisfactory operation of our air and ground inspection system, the United States would be prepared to work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. With this could be combined my proposal of December 8, 1953, "to begin now and continue to make joint contributions" from existing stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic agency. These measures, if carried out adequately, would reverse the present trend toward a constant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the world. My ultimate hope is that all production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

The United States recognizes and strongly sympathizes with the humane motivations which inspired the resolutions of the Japanese Diet, but is constrained to point out that the problem of suspending nuclear weapons tests cannot be treated separately from the establishment of a safeguarded and controlled disarmament program.

The United States Government is convinced that the proposed nuclear tests are vital to its own defense and the defense of the free world because the possession and competence in the use of nuclear weapons by leading nations of the free world are the chief deterrent to aggression and to war. International agreement to abandon tests without effective safeguards against the clandestine development of new weapons would involve a reliance by the United States upon the good intentions of certain nations not justified by the record of their actions in the past.

The United States Government is convinced that no world-wide health hazard exists from the past or planned tests. In this connection the United States proposed a resolution<sup>5</sup> unanimously adopted by the United Nations Tenth General Assembly establishing a scientific committee on radiation, of which Japan is a member, to facili-

tate pooling and distribution of all available scientific data on the effects of radiation upon man and his environment. During the forthcoming tests the United States will make every effort to eliminate any danger and to minimize any inconvenience to maritime commerce and fishing.

It cannot be regarded as established on the basis of present information that substantial economic losses will result from the establishment of the danger area. Military exercises are a traditional use of the high seas, and the Government of the United States considers that inconvenience for other traditional uses which may result therefrom is not compensable as a matter of right.

In view of precautions which will attend the tests and the widespread dissemination of information with respect to maximum permissible levels of radiation, the United States Government anticipates no economic losses from radioactive contamination of marine life.

The United States Government is prepared, however, in the interest of the fullest understanding and cooperation between the two countries:

1. To examine with the Japanese Government the consequences for Japanese maritime activities resulting from establishment of the danger area, to which end consultations have already begun;

2. To make its experts available for any further consultations which the Japanese Government may desire upon radiation standards and maximum permissible levels of radiation, and to consider arrangements for maximum feasible exchange of information on the effects of radiation on marine life; and

3. If after the test series has ended, any evidence is officially presented that substantial economic losses for Japan or Japanese nationals have been incurred as a result of establishment of the danger area and the tests, to give further consideration to the question of compensation in the light of any such evidence.

In conclusion the Acting Secretary wishes to give the assurance that the United States continues only such tests as are essential to the strength of the free world defense and security. It has sought and will continue to seek with renewed efforts a system for a safe-guarded and controlled disarmament program which ultimately may lead to the type of action envisaged by the resolutions of the Japanese Diet.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 855.

## Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees Indigenous to Far East

Press release 147 dated March 19

Because of the heavy oversubscription for the 3,000 visas allotted by the Refugee Relief Act to refugees who are indigenous to the Far East, the Department of State announced on March 19 that it will accept no new applications for such visas after midnight March 26, 1956.

As of March 9, 1956, 1,863 of the 3,000 visas had been issued and the number of applications on hand greatly exceeds the number of visas remaining to be issued.

In instructions to the consulates, Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the act, emphasized that:

1. The cutoff would not apply to orphan applicants residing in the Far East who are processed under another section of the act.

2. The cutoff would not apply to nonindigenous refugees residing in the Far East or to refugees of Chinese ethnic origin who have passports endorsed by the Chinese Government. These cases are processed under other sections of the Refugee Relief Act.

3. Since assurances for refugees indigenous to the Far East received after the cutoff date will not be processed under the Refugee Relief Act, such assurances will be sent to the appropriate consular authorities to permit the applicant to establish a priority registration date under the normal annual quota of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Similar cutoffs have been announced by the Department of State for Greece and Italy,<sup>1</sup> where sufficient cases are on hand to cover the 17,000 visas allocated to Greece and the 60,000 visas allocated to Italy under the Refugee Relief Act.

As of March 9, 1956, the total worldwide issuance of visas under the Refugee Relief Act was 89,742. Despite the assured success of the program in Greece, Italy, and in the indigenous refugee category in the Far East, sponsors continue to be needed for refugees in Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, as well as for refugees in Italy and Greece who have been processed but are still lacking sponsors.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 917, and Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

## Eximbank Credit to Philippines for Industrial Growth

A credit of \$65 million for development of the economy of the Republic of the Philippines was announced on March 8 by Samuel C. Waugh, president of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, at a joint press conference with Miguel Cuaderno, governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines.

The credit was authorized by the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank for the purpose of contributing to the industrial growth and financial progress of the Philippines through a series of loans for expansion and diversification of the economy of the Republic. The Board also expressed its particular pleasure, in view of the close friendship which exists between the Philippines and the United States, in being able to make this financial assistance available as an expression of confidence of the U.S. Government in the future prospects of the Philippines.

The loans will be made to either public agencies or private concerns and will provide for purchase in the United States, for export, of machinery, equipment, material, and services required for various projects.

Fifty million dollars will be made available directly in favor of public and private entities to assist them in financing large-scale projects that may be approved on a case-by-case basis by the Eximbank.

Fifteen million dollars will relate primarily to small private industrial-expansion projects and will be made available either directly in favor of the Central Bank of the Philippines or upon recommendation of the Central Bank and approval of the Export-Import Bank, to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, Philippine National Bank, and commercial banks in the Philippines. These credits are for the purpose of enabling the Central Bank to assist Philippine enterprises in meeting dollar requirements of appropriate transactions and for the purpose of enabling the Central Bank and public and private Philippine lending institutions to assist Philippine enterprises in connection with purchases in the United States.

The Export-Import Bank indicated it is prepared to consider the following general types of developments for financing under the credit authorization:

1. Projects designed to reduce Philippine dependence on imported raw materials and find outlets for its growing labor surplus;

2. Development of timber and mineral resources in order to reduce the country's dependence on a few agricultural products as the chief source of foreign exchange;

3. Expansion of basic service industries, such as power and transportation, to service a growing economy; and

4. Reduction of future foreign-exchange requirements through development of industries consuming domestic materials or imported materials at an earlier processing stage.

Terms of the loans will vary, depending upon the nature of each. Smaller loans, coming under the \$15 million aspect of the program, will run in general for 5 years, while loans in the \$50 million part of the program, for larger projects, will be of longer duration. Interest rates also will vary slightly, case by case.

Mr. Waugh advised Governor Cuaderno that, in establishing the \$65 million credit, it is the Eximbank's hope that the Philippine Government and private enterprises in the Philippines will be able to make use of credit through specific loans in the immediate future to the mutual advantage of both nations.

Under the administration of President Magsaysay the Philippine Government has encouraged an industrial development program which will greatly strengthen the economic stability of the Republic. Under this program the hydroelectric potential of the Agno River in northern Luzon is under development and the proposed Binga Dam is now under consideration.

The new \$65 million credit is in addition to \$5 million Eximbank credit extended in 1954 to lending institutions in the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Central Bank.

## **U.S. Proposal to Burma To Exchange Technicians for Rice**

The U.S. Government has proposed to the Government of the Union of Burma an agreement under which the United States would exchange the services of American technicians for about 10,000 tons of rice, the International Cooperation

Administration announced on March 12. The new technicians-for-rice agreement proposed by the United States would enable Burma to pay for the services of needed technicians which, because of a shortage of dollar reserves, it could not otherwise obtain.

Upon conclusion of such an agreement, the United States would immediately make \$1 million available to Burma to enable its Government to hire U.S. technicians. Burma would then repay the United States in local currency. It is anticipated that this local currency would then be used to provide up to 10,000 tons of rice for shipment to Pakistan to help avert a severe food shortage in East Pakistan. The United States has already agreed to provide about 165,000 tons of U.S. surplus rice to Pakistan under titles I and II of Public Law 480 to meet the food shortage.

Recently Burma concluded an agreement with the United States under which it will buy about \$21 million worth of U.S. surplus cotton, dairy products, tobacco, and fruit.<sup>1</sup> Payments for these commodities, too, will be in Burmese currency. This agreement, under title I of Public Law 480, will permit Burma to increase consumer imports without drawing on its limited dollar foreign-exchange reserves.

There is no U.S. aid program in Burma at present. From 1950 to 1953, however, about \$19 million was spent by the United States in technical cooperation programs there. Since that time the Burmese Government has continued to employ the services of several groups of U.S. technicians originally sent to Burma through the U.S. technical cooperation program.

## **Escape-Clause Relief on Acid-Grade Fluorspar Held Unnecessary**

White House press release dated March 20

### **White House Announcement**

The President on March 20 announced that he has acted on the United States Tariff Commission's report of its escape-clause investigation relating to acid-grade fluorspar by accepting as the findings of the Tariff Commission the findings of the three Commissioners who concluded that the

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 308.

domestic industry is not presently experiencing serious injury, that it is not faced with a threat of serious injury, and that escape-clause relief is not warranted. The other three Commissioners found no present serious injury but did find a threat of such injury and recommended that the 1951 concession on acid-grade fluorspar, reducing the tariff from \$5.60 per long ton to \$2.10 per long ton, be withdrawn in full.

Under present law, in escape-clause cases where the Tariff Commission is equally divided, the President is authorized to accept the findings of either half of the Commission as the findings of the Commission.

The President's decision was taken only after he had consulted with interested departments and agencies in the executive branch of the Government.

This application for escape-clause relief is separate and distinct from the domestic industry's application under last year's so-called national security amendment to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. The latter application is still pending before the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.

The Tariff Commission's report was submitted to the President on January 18, 1956.<sup>1</sup>

The text of the President's letters to the Chairmen of the Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means Committees [Senator Harry F. Byrd and Representative Jere Cooper] is as follows:

#### **Text of President's Letter to Chairmen of Congressional Committees**

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The United States Tariff Commission on January 18, 1956 submitted to me a report of its escape clause investigation relating to acid grade fluorspar. The Commission's investigation was made pursuant to Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended.

The members of the Commission are equally divided on the question of whether relief is warranted. Under present law, I am authorized to consider the findings of either group of Commissioners as the findings of the Commission.

The three Commissioners who concluded that escape clause relief is warranted found no existing serious injury to the domestic acid grade fluorspar

<sup>1</sup> Copies may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

industry but did find a threat of such injury. These three Commissioners recommend that the tariff on imports of acid grade fluorspar, which was reduced in 1951 from \$5.60 per long ton to \$2.10 per long ton, be restored in full.

The other three Commissioners do not find that the domestic industry is currently experiencing serious injury, nor do they find it threatened with serious injury. They report that they do not detect any strong probability that the conditions of the industry in the immediate future will be less favorable than at present. They conclude that no basis exists for granting escape clause relief.

After full consultation with interested departments and agencies of the Executive Branch, I have decided to accept, as the findings of the Commission, the findings of the three Commissioners who held no escape clause relief to be necessary at this time.

This application for escape clause relief is separate and distinct from the domestic industry's application under last year's so-called national security amendment to the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951. The latter application is pending before the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### **Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 84th Congress, 2d Session**

- Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act. Report to accompany H. R. 7763. H. Rept. 1809, February 23, 1956. 15 pp.
- Situation in the Middle East. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February 24, 1956. 73 pp.
- Further Amending Section 20 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, Relating to Fees of Agents, Attorneys, and Representatives. Report to accompany S. 1146. S. Rept. 1603, February 27, 1956. 4 pp.
- Cargo Preference and Its Relation to the Farm Surplus Disposal Program. Report pursuant to section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public Law 601, 79th Congress. H. Rept. 1818, February 27, 1956. 30 pp.
- Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. S. Rept. 1604, March 1, 1956. 25 pp.
- Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report to accompany S. 3340. S. Rept. 1605, March 1, 1956. 8 pp.
- Exemption of Certain Foreign Travel from Tax on Transportation of Persons. Report to accompany H. R. 5265. S. Rept. 1607, March 1, 1956. 12 pp.
- Amending the United States Information and Exchange Act of 1948, as Amended. Report to accompany S. 2562. S. Rept. 1608, March 1, 1956. 5 pp.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of Meetings<sup>1</sup>

#### Adjourned During March 1956

U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . . .	New York . . . . .	Jan. 3-Mar. 31*
ICAO Special North Atlantic Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . .	Paris . . . . .	Feb. 20-Mar. 3
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative Unions.	New York . . . . .	Feb. 21-Mar. 31*
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 2d Meeting of Permanent Exec- utive Committee.	Lima . . . . .	Feb. 27-Mar. 3
International Telecommunication Union: Meeting of Chairmen of Seven CCIT and CCIF Study Groups.	Geneva . . . . .	Feb. 29-Mar. 8
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	New York . . . . .	Mar. 5-18
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 12th Session . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 5-29
SEATO Council . . . . .	Karachi . . . . .	Mar. 6-8
ILO Governing Body: 131st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 6-10
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power . . . . .	Bangalore . . . . .	Mar. 7-12
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 1st Meeting of Technical Advisory Council.	Turrialba (Costa Rica) . . . .	Mar. 8-10
UNICEF Executive Board and Program Committee . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Mar. 12-23
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 2d Session . . . . .	Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia) . . . .	Mar. 12-24
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: 10th Session . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 12-28
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 1st Session.	New York . . . . .	Mar. 14-24
Inter-American Specialized Conference on the Conservation of the Natural Resources of the Continental Shelf and Marine Waters.	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic) . . . . .	Mar. 15-28
U.N. ECE Coal Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 21-22
U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 4th Session . . . . .	New Delhi . . . . .	Mar. 25-31
Meeting of Canadian-Mexican-United States Heads of Government	White Sulphur Springs (W. Va.) . . . . .	Mar. 26-28
U.N. ECE Timber Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Mar. 26-28

#### In Session as of March 31, 1956

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Nov. 28-
International Fair for Peace and Progress . . . . .	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic) . . . . .	Dec. 20-
GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 18-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 17th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Feb. 7-
U.N. International Wheat Conference: 2d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Feb. 20-
International Atomic Energy Agency: Working Level Meeting on Draft Statute.	Washington . . . . .	Feb. 27-
U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee of Five (recon- vened).	London . . . . .	Mar. 19-
8th International Congress of the Vineyard and Wines . . . . .	Santiago . . . . .	Mar. 21-
4th International Exhibition of Drawings and Engravings. . . . .	Lugano (Switzerland). . . . .	Mar. 29-
U.N. ECAFE: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians. . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Mar. 29-

#### Scheduled April 1-June 30, 1956

ICAO: 3d Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting. . . . .	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic). . . . .	Apr. 3-
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<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Mar. 23, 1956. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places. Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; CCIT, International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international télégraphique); CCIF, International Telephone Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international téléphonique); ITU, International Telecommunication Union; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international des radiocommunications); ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organization, ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; CIGRE, Conférence internationale des grands réseaux électriques; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization.

# Calendar of Meetings—Continued

## Scheduled April 1–June 30, 1956—Continued

ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	London . . . . .	Apr. 3–
ILO Petroleum Committee: 5th Session (reconvened)	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 4–
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 11th Session	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 5–
International Exhibition on Instrumentation-Automation	Osto . . . . .	Apr. 9–
UNESCO Executive Board: 43d Session	Madrid . . . . .	Apr. 9–
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	The Hague . . . . .	Apr. 10–
6th Inter-American Travel Congress	San José (Costa Rica) . . . . .	Apr. 12–
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party of Consultative Subcommittee on Rice.	Rome . . . . .	Apr. 16–
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 9th Session	New York . . . . .	Apr. 16–
WMO Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 17–
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session	New York . . . . .	Apr. 17–
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (CCIT): Study Group IV, Phototelegraphy and Facsimile.	London . . . . .	Apr. 17–
UNESCO Conference on Asian-U. S. Cultural Relations	United States . . . . .	Apr. 19–
ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 21–
9th International Film Festival	Cannes . . . . .	Apr. 23–
South Pacific Conference: 3d Session	Suva (Fiji) . . . . .	Apr. 23–
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee: Study Group V, Joint CCIT/CCIR Committee on Phototelegraphy.	London . . . . .	Apr. 23–
U.N. International Law Commission: 8th Session	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23–
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23–
UNESCO Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America.	Lima . . . . .	Apr. 23–
Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference	San José (Costa Rica) . . . . .	Apr. 25–
WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee: 4th Session	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic). . . . .	Apr. 25–
U. N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 7th Session.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 27–
5th International Philatelic Exhibition	New York . . . . .	Apr. 28–
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session	Istanbul . . . . .	Apr. 30–
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee	Bern . . . . .	Apr. 30–
International Sugar Council: 8th Session	London . . . . .	April
2d International Congress of Tribunals of Accounts	Brussels* . . . . .	May 1*–
Inter-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting	Lima . . . . .	May 3–
Inter-American Ministers of Education: 2d Meeting	Lima . . . . .	May 3–
NATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council	Paris . . . . .	May 4–
South Pacific Commission: 15th Session	Suva (Fiji) . . . . .	May 4–
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on International Principles Governing Archeological Excavations.	Palermo (Italy) . . . . .	May 4–
U. N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 3d Session.	New York . . . . .	May 7–
U. N. <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on the Establishment of SUNFED: 1st Meeting.	New York . . . . .	May 7–
U. N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions	New York . . . . .	May 7–
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Plenary Meeting	Washington . . . . .	May 8–
9th World Health Assembly	Geneva . . . . .	May 8–
UNESCO Regional Seminar on Curriculum for Latin America	Lima . . . . .	May 9–
ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 14–
U. N. ECE Housing Committee and Working Parties	Geneva . . . . .	May 14–
U. N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 5th Meeting	Santiago . . . . .	May 19–
Inter-American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting	Salvador (Brazil) . . . . .	May 20*–
UNESCO Conference on Cultural Integration of Immigrants	Caracas . . . . .	May 20–
4th International Congress of Mediterranean Citrus Growers	Israel . . . . .	May 20–
U. N. International Sugar Conference	New York . . . . .	May 21–
Caribbean Commission: 22d Meeting.	Cayenne (French Guiana) . . . . .	May 21*–
U. N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo . . . . .	May 22–
WMO Working Group on International Radiosonde Comparisons	Payerne (Switzerland) . . . . .	May 23–
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 6th Session.	Rome . . . . .	May 23–
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session	Geneva . . . . .	May 23–
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Radioisotopes	Paris . . . . .	May 25–
WMO Executive Board: 18th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 28–
ILO Governing Body: 132d Session (and Committees)	Geneva . . . . .	May 28–
UNREF Executive Committee: 3d Session	Geneva . . . . .	May 28–
34th Padua International Fair.	Padua (Italy) . . . . .	May 29–
16th International Conference on Large Electric High Tension Systems (CIGRE).	Paris . . . . .	May 30–

## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### Scheduled April 1–June 30, 1956—Continued

U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Minerals Resources Development: 2d Session.	Tokyo . . . . .	May 30–
U.N. ECE Steel Committee.	(Undetermined) . . . . .	May
Inter-American Commission of Women: 11th General Assembly . . . . .	Ciudad Trujillo (Dominican Republic).	June 1–
International Seed Testing Association: 11th Congress (Executive Committee Meetings June 1 and 10).	Paris . . . . .	June 4–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 18th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 4–
PASO Executive Committee: 28th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 5–
International Labor Conference (ILO): 39th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 6–
International Commission for Criminal Police: 25th General Meeting.	Vienna . . . . .	June 7–
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 6th Annual Meeting.	Halifax . . . . .	June 11–
World Power Conference: 5th Plenary Session. . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	June 17–
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 27th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 18–
ICAO Assembly: 10th Session. . . . .	Caracas . . . . .	June 19–
5th International Congress on Bridge and Structural Engineering . . . . .	Lisbon . . . . .	June 25–
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 25–
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 25–
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 25–
U.N. ECE Coal Classification Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 26–
International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	June

## Progress in the Territory of French Togoland

*Statement by Benjamin Gerig<sup>1</sup>*

The most important single development in the life of the Togolese people under French administration is the imminent, fateful, and far-reaching choice which they will soon make concerning their political future.

We were aware, of course, that following upon the events in the Gold Coast and British Togo a similar development in French Togo would necessarily take place. But until we heard the statement of the distinguished representative of France a few days ago we were still thinking in terms of years rather than months.

Now, however, we are confronted with a situation which in the very near future will require the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly to cooperate with the Administering Authority in presenting to the people of French Togo the freedom to choose their destiny.

We cannot but pause a moment to reflect what all this means to the people of Togo, to the Administering Authority, to the United Nations, and to the world. Freedom to choose one's destiny is

a tremendous opportunity. It is an opportunity which in the past has sometimes been too long delayed, or perhaps denied altogether. Indeed, there are vast multitudes of people today who still hope to be able to make such a choice—and, I may add, they are not all in Africa.

But to those who are given the opportunity it is also a tremendous responsibility. For a decision of this kind once made cannot easily be undone, and, indeed, it has elements of finality which will affect a people for all time to come. We feel, therefore, that as far as the Trusteeship Council is concerned in the matter we at least will want to exercise our part with the greatest care, conscious that we are dealing with destiny.

### New Technique of International Cooperation

There will be many practical details to be worked out as experience in the case of British Togo has shown. We are undoubtedly developing a new technique of international cooperation, or, if you like, a kind of jurisprudence which, as our experience accumulates, will enable us to smooth the way for other people who, in their turn, will emerge to take their places among the free peoples of the world.

Mr. President, as we listened to the thoughtful remarks of the two distinguished representatives of France, we were impressed with the way in

<sup>1</sup> Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on Feb. 28 (U.S./U.N. press release 2360). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council.

which the Administering Authority is laying the groundwork for the people of this territory. No one knows, of course, what the people of French Togo will choose as to their future: association with France, with neighboring territories in Africa, or with some other state. We ourselves were not altogether clear as to what the status of a trust territory is, or would be, with respect to the French Union. We therefore appreciated the clear-cut answer of the distinguished representative of France to our question on this point when he said that an act of association between trust territories and the French Union would provide for the right of withdrawal. Thus, one of the choices which the Togolese people will have to make will permit them to exercise a relationship which is not only freely chosen but which will give them the basic attribute of independence. Indeed, Mr. President, my delegation considers that at the moment freedom of choice is offered to a people in a trust territory it is in fact as well as in theory exercising for that moment an act of independence. We know, of course, of a number of territories whose people have considered that complete independence is less desirable than some form of association with another state or group of states—an association in which they may voluntarily transfer certain powers to another state to be exercised on their behalf. But whether this choice or any of the five outlined by the distinguished representative of France is made, the occasion will be a momentous one for the people of Togoland.

On the question of the time and method of granting freedom of choice, my delegation has only one comment. We consider that, when a people has shown itself to have the capacity to determine its future, the choice should be offered even before such people have all the institutions and attributes of a fully self-governing nation. We believe that in most cases self-determination should precede full self-government or independence and that self-government or independence, or even the rejection of these goals, is a matter which people should freely be given the opportunity to choose. Thus, we believe that the experience which the United Nations has already gained in this matter tends to support the thesis put forward so logically and forcefully by the French delegation.

And now I wish to comment, but only briefly, on several matters in the political, economic, social, and educational field.

### **Political Reforms**

The efforts of the Administering Authority to introduce political reforms throughout the Territory of French Togoland during 1955 have been noted by my delegation with approval, and we would urge the progressive extension and expansion of the powers of the Territorial Assembly, as rapidly as possible, so that it may become a truly effective legislative organ representing the indigenous population. Likewise, we look forward to an extension of the powers of the Government Council—which is at present considered by the Government of France as a forerunner of a Cabinet—so that the Council may soon acquire the status of an executive body responsible to the Assembly.

It is urged, moreover, that continued efforts be made to expand the powers of the District and Municipal Councils and to make them more representative of the indigenous inhabitants by the application of universal suffrage in the very near future.

### **Economic Development**

As a supplement to the important developments in the political field which have occurred during the past year, the United States wishes to commend the Administration generally on its continued efforts to improve the economy of the territory. It is a well recognized fact that, without economic progress, developments in the political, social, and educational fields would have little meaning since it is only with an adequate standard of living that the population will have the desire or capacity to progress in other fields.

We were encouraged during the debate on economic conditions to learn that recent discoveries in the territory of deposits of phosphate, bauxite, iron, and other minerals may be an important factor in the territory's more rapid economic advancement. We shall await with interest further details of these developments as well as efforts of the Administration to provide a port for the territory. Recognition by the Administering Authority that industries should be increased and expanded has likewise been noted by my delegation as an encouraging sign. In this connection, we would suggest that attention be given in the near future to the establishment of a meat industry which would be of benefit to the inhabitants. Further efforts worthy of mention and commenda-



tion are the introduction of more protein into the indigenous diet by the development of a fish-farming industry, measures taken to increase the development of crops, to protect plants, and to improve generally the yield and methods of cultivation.

Moreover, the increase of indigenous participation in the economic life of the territory through small rural development schemes—including works in the field of agriculture, irrigation, drainage, soil conservation, and markets—have been noted with approval. We should like to suggest that, in addition to the measures already taken to improve the road network, attention should be given by the Administering Authority particularly to improving and developing secondary and feeder roads which will be extremely important to the overall progress and development of the territory.

Lastly, my delegation would urge that the Administration continue to give serious consideration to the possibility of following up the Ten-Year Plan, which will end in 1957, by another plan on the same line so that there will be no stoppage of progress in the field of economic development.

#### **Health and Medical Services**

Steps taken in the field of health and medical services have been noted with approval by my delegation—and especially the measures taken to combat various diseases throughout the territory. The adoption of a family allowance plan during 1955 pursuant to the labor code of 1952—as an aid in helping to reorganize the family structure and to improve the status of women—is also considered as a constructive measure. My delegation would like to suggest in the field of social progress that further attention be devoted by the Administering Authority to the suggestion of the Visiting Mission to improve the conditions in the penal institutions throughout the territory.

On the unduly protracted discussion as to what is meant by the term “elite,” it is our opinion that the differences of view which are expressed reflect a difference in semantics rather than of substance. French and English usages of the term “elite” are markedly different. But we believe that in every society leaders in every walk of life will emerge. And this leadership will become entrusted with the political, economic, and social life of the people. It cannot be otherwise in French Togoland.

In conclusion, my delegation believes that the rapid political progress now under way in the territory reemphasizes the urgent need for better facilities for higher education. We were pleased to note that 69 scholarships for study in France were awarded to pupils from secondary schools in 1954. In view of the territory’s growing need for qualified African personnel, however, we hope that ways and means will be found to provide additional higher educational facilities for Togoland-ers, both in France and in Africa.

On the whole, we consider, therefore, that the outlook for the Territory of French Togoland is one of hopeful progress in all major fields; and while we realize that much remains to be done, we consider that the Administering Authority merits the sympathetic support and commendation of the Trusteeship Council for the constructive guidance which it is giving to the peoples of this territory.

### **Attainment by Trust Territories of Self-Government or Independence**

*Statements by Benjamin Gerig*<sup>1</sup>

#### **U.S. VIEWS ON COLONIALISM**

U.S./U.N. press release 2361 dated February 29

The trend of the present-day aspects of colonialism was clearly brought out at the Bandung conference, to which the representatives of the Soviet Union just referred. There it was pointed out by a number of speakers, and rightly, that, while colonialism was receding in other parts of the world, a new and worse form of colonialistic imperialism was developing in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

We agree with the Soviet representative that we cannot overlook the problem of colonialism. As to one type of colonialism, the Trusteeship Council is doing constructive work—not always, I am sorry to say, with the amount of disinterestedness which would be desirable. But on the whole I believe our work has been effective.

Now as to the proposal of the Soviet delegate on attainment of self-government, we adopted a resolution at our previous session on this question, the main paragraph of which instructs the Draft-

<sup>1</sup> Made in the U.N. Trusteeship Council on Feb. 29 and Mar. 1.

ing Committee to prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations on this subject.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. President, the General Assembly in its later resolution<sup>3</sup> requested the Council to insure that the procedure devised by it should be fully complied with and called on the Council to implement our own resolution. We have certainly begun to do that, but our new method has not yet even had the time to prove itself in one session, while the Soviet representative is now proposing that it be set aside for something else.

The U.S. delegation thinks that the present resolution now on the books should be given time to work out, and we believe that the method proposed will work effectively. Therefore, my delegation proposes that the Council take note of the General Assembly resolution.<sup>4</sup>

With respect to the reference which the Soviet delegate made on the question of nuclear testing, I don't know whether the Council considers that that subject has any relevance to the item now under discussion. We feel that there is no relation, but the Council may wish to decide on this matter and we will have an opportunity to discuss it at that time.

## NUCLEAR TESTS IN TRUST TERRITORIES

U.S./U.N. press release 2363 dated March 1

Everyone, of course, understands the propaganda motives which lie behind the proposal of the Soviet representative regarding the holding of nuclear tests in trust territories. When the proposal was made yesterday, I said that we could not see what relevance a proposal concerning nuclear testing could have with the item of attainment of self-government or independence, which was then under consideration. We believe his proposal was, and still is, out of order. However, we will waive this point, reserving our position on

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. T/Res/1254(xvi).

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. A/Res/946(x).

<sup>4</sup> A U.S.-sponsored resolution (T/L.640/Rev. 1) was adopted by the Council on Mar. 16 by a vote of 10-2-2. It takes note of General Assembly resolution 946(X), instructs the drafting committees on the annual reports of Trust Territories to prepare "appropriate draft conclusions and recommendations concerning the question of the attainment by the Trust Territories of self-government or independence," and requests the Secretary-General to prepare a separate section of the Council's report to the General Assembly "containing the information indicated in the General Assembly resolutions referred to above, and the conclusions and recommendations of the Council thereon."

the procedure, and we are fully prepared to deal with the subject forthwith.

Let me state first of all that we of this Council must continue to hope that those organs of the United Nations which are working to bring about an effective plan of armaments control will reach a basis of agreement so that the testing of such weapons now being carried on by the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., and which were conducted within the last 4 months by the Soviet Union, will become unnecessary.

Mr. President, let me repeat what everyone knows, that in the absence of effective international agreement, safeguarded by adequate inspection to limit or control armaments, preparations must still be made to develop methods of defense against nuclear attack, and for the maintenance of international peace and security.

It is not my purpose—and we think the Trusteeship Council would in any case not be the place—to debate the broad issues involved in the question of nuclear tests as they are being carried on by various countries. Other organs of the United Nations are dealing with the disarmament problem, of which this question is a part, and the United States will contribute everything within its power in these bodies to achieve an effective solution.

Indeed, since 1946, when the general question first came before the United Nations, my Government has urged the adoption of an effective and dependably controlled program of disarmament. The day this program becomes a reality, nuclear testing will become unnecessary.

Mr. President, certain aspects of this question were before the Trusteeship Council in July 1954 in connection with nuclear testing at the Pacific Proving Grounds. At that time this Council recommended that "if the Administering Authority considers it necessary in the interests of world peace and security to conduct further nuclear experiments in the Territory, it take such precautions as will ensure that no inhabitants of the Territory are again endangered. . . ."<sup>5</sup>

With respect to the forthcoming tests, my Government, in conformity with the resolution which the United States unreservedly supported, will see to it that all feasible precautions are taken to avoid endangering any inhabitants of the territory or any other peoples and will notify air and

<sup>5</sup> BULLETIN of July 26, 1954, p. 139.

sea traffic of the details of the warning area well in advance of the commencement of the operations.

For these reasons my delegation considers that the proposal of the Soviet Union should be rejected. As far as the trust territory under U.S. administration is concerned, the question is entirely covered by the previous resolution to which I have referred. My delegation will consequently vote against the Soviet draft resolution.<sup>6</sup>

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Technology Agreement With Japan

Press release 153 dated March 22

The Department of State announced on March 22 the signing of an agreement with Japan to facilitate the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes. The agreement was signed in Tokyo, March 22, 1956, by Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by John M. Allison, United States Ambassador. It will enter into force upon receipt by the United States of notification that Japan has approved the agreement in accordance with its legal procedures.

The agreement is expected to foster the exchange of technology for defense purposes between the two Governments and between the private industries of the two countries. Thus it should be of reciprocal benefit in providing for national defense and in contributing to mutual defense.

The agreement is the latest to be signed of a series being negotiated with the NATO countries and with Japan. Other agreements of this nature have been signed with Italy,<sup>1</sup> the United King-

dom,<sup>2</sup> Belgium,<sup>3</sup> Norway,<sup>4</sup> the Netherlands,<sup>4</sup> Greece,<sup>4</sup> and the Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>5</sup>

These agreements recognize that privately owned technology should, to the greatest extent practicable, be exchanged through commercial agreements between owners and users. They also stipulate that rights of private owners of patents and technical information should be fully recognized and protected in accordance with laws applicable to such rights. Other provisions are intended to assure fair treatment of private owners when they deal directly with a foreign government and also in cases in which private information communicated through government channels might be used or disclosed without authorization. The agreements also provide for the establishment of arrangements by which owners of patentable inventions placed under secrecy by one government may obtain comparable protection in the other country.

The agreements also provide that, as a general rule, government-owned inventions shall be interchanged for defense purposes on a royalty-free basis.

Each of the agreements provides for the establishment of a Technical Property Committee to be composed of a representative of each Government. The Technical Property Committee is charged with general responsibility for making recommendations to the two Governments on any matters relating to the agreement which are brought before the committee by either Government, either on its own behalf or on behalf of its nationals. One of the specific functions of the committee is to make recommendations to the Governments, either in particular cases or in general, concerning disparities in their laws affecting the compensation of owners of patents and technical information.

Policy guidance for the United States representatives on the Technical Property Committees is provided by the Interagency Technical Property Committee for Defense, which is chaired by the Department of Defense and includes representatives of the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Government Patents Board. This committee is assisted by an industry advisory group representing major sectors of American industry concerned with defense production.

<sup>6</sup> On Mar. 2 the Soviet representative withdrew his proposal (U.N. doc. T/L. 642 dated Feb. 29).

<sup>1</sup> Oct. 3, 1952; provisionally in force.

<sup>2</sup> Jan. 19, 1953. For text see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2773.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 8, 1954, p. 712.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, July 11, 1955, p. 84.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 104.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the repression of the trade in white women. Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. Entered into force July 18, 1905. 35 Stat. 1979.  
*Adherence deposited:* Mexico, February 21, 1956.

### BILATERAL

#### Bolivia

Agreement providing for an informational media guaranty program pursuant to section 1011 of the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended (62 Stat. 6; 68 Stat. 862). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz February 27 and March 10, 1956. Entered into force March 10, 1956.

#### Germany

Arrangement concerning the exchange of information relating to the illicit traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 17 and August 24, 1955, and March 7, 1956. Entered into force March 7, 1956.

#### Iceland

Agreement relating to the addition of tuna to the types of fish excepted from item 718 (b) of schedule II of the trade agreement of August 27, 1943 (57 Stat. 1075). Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik March 5 and 6, 1956. Enters into force April 14, 1956.

#### Ireland

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington March 16, 1956. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall receive from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

#### Japan

Agreement to facilitate interchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes. Signed at Tokyo March 22, 1956. Enters into force upon receipt by the United States of notification that Japan has approved the agreement in accordance with its legal procedures.

#### Pakistan

Agreement amending article II of the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of January 18, 1955 (TIAS 3184). Signed at Karachi February 9 and 25, 1956. Entered into force February 25, 1956.

#### Peru

Agreement extending for a period of 4 years from July 31, 1956, the naval mission agreement of July 31, 1940 (54 Stat. 2344), as extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 27 and March 14, 1956. Entered into force March 14, 1956.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Equipment and Materiel.** TIAS 3447. Pub. 6244. 3 pp. 5¢.

Understanding between the United States and Iraq. Exchange of notes—Signed at Baghdad December 3, 1955. Entered into force December 3, 1955.

**Technical Cooperation, Program for Economic Development in the Departments of Caldas, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca.** TIAS 3451. Pub. 6249. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá July 29 and November 15 and 28, 1955. Entered into force November 28, 1955.

**Mexican Agricultural Workers.** TIAS 3454. Pub. 6252. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico, extending agreement of August 11, 1951, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at México December 23, 1955. Entered into force December 23, 1955.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3455. Pub. 6253. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain, amending agreement of April 20, 1955—Signed at Madrid October 20, 1955. Entered into force October 20, 1955.

**Air Transport Services.** TIAS 3456. Pub. 6254. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada, amending schedule 2 of agreement of June 4, 1949. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ottawa November 22 and December 20, 1955. Entered into force December 20, 1955.

**Technical Cooperation, Additional Assistance for Artibonite Valley Project.** TIAS 3457. Pub. 6255. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Haiti. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 27 and 28, 1955. Entered into force December 28, 1955.

**Defense, Use of Practice Bombing Range Near Cuxhaven (Germany) by United States Air Force.** TIAS 3458. Pub. 6258. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, supplementing agreement of August 6 and 28, 1954, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn November 7, 14, and 29, 1955. Entered into force November 29, 1955.

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# The Department of State

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# Freedom and Slavery in a Divided Germany

by James B. Conant

*Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany*<sup>1</sup>

When I last had the honor of being the Charter Day speaker 16 years ago, I spoke as a college president and I spoke about education. Having deserted the ranks of university administrators 3 years ago, I now find myself speaking as the United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany on the topic "Freedom and Slavery in a Divided Germany."

If anybody had predicted in March 1940 that I should once again be invited to be a Charter Day speaker, I would have been highly flattered by the suggestion. But if anyone had predicted that I should be speaking as ambassador to a sovereign German nation with which we were bound in a military alliance, I would certainly have proclaimed the would-be prophet an utter idiot! For in 1940 Adolf Hitler's grip on Germany seemed unshakable; he had already invaded Poland after having overrun Austria and Czechoslovakia; World War II was in its first stages. I was among the many Americans who had long detested and loathed everything that Hitler and his cohorts stood for in Germany, and I was among those who were fearful that Germany under his control would soon conquer and enslave all Western Europe. Therefore, in those days any suggestion of my being an ambassador to Germany would have seemed not only ridiculous but highly repugnant.

Now, I must confess that my knowledge of Germany in 1940 was incomplete. I did not realize that there existed at that very moment a not inconsiderable number of important Germans who felt exactly as I did about Adolf Hitler, his methods and his goals. But even if I had been

better informed about the internal situation in Germany, I could not have foreseen that, within two decades, from the ranks of the then dissenters from national socialism would come the leaders of a free Germany and that these leaders would determine the mood of a large proportion of the German people.

In 1940 few Americans had ever heard of one Konrad Adenauer, who had bravely defied Adolf Hitler shortly before the Nazis seized the government and, as a consequence of his stand, had been driven out of office as Mayor of Cologne. Today everyone knows and honors the name of Chancellor Adenauer; but I suggest that it is important to remember that he, the present Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Theodor Heuss, and not a few of the political leaders in the separate states and in the Federal Republic, were during the entire Nazi period literally in danger of their lives. To me it is the first prerequisite for understanding Germany today to realize that these facts have had enormous influence on the history of that country since 1945.

## **The Spirit of Germany Today**

The spirit of Germany today is the spirit of a people who have repudiated the tyranny and brutality of the period of the Nazi rule. Perhaps some of my audience, still thinking in terms of 1945, may question this generalization. If so, I suggest you have failed to understand how Hitler and his followers completely discredited themselves by their actions during the last few years of the total war.

The barbarous revenge which Hitler took after the attempt to destroy him by a bomb on July 20, 1944, his senseless last-ditch resistance in Berlin

<sup>1</sup> Charter Day address made at the University of California, Berkeley, Calif., on Mar. 23 (press release 146 dated Mar. 19).

when the war was clearly lost, his repeated statements that he would bring all Germany down in ruins about him, his orders to flood the mines and destroy the industry (orders which were never carried out), all of these things are well known in Germany and have left their mark. So too have the revelations of the horrors of the concentration camps and the slaughter of the Jews. Therefore, speaking as a reporter of the German scene, I think it correct to state that the legend of Hitler and the Nazis is completely dead. If there should be another significant right radical movement in Germany, such a movement, I feel sure, will not employ the symbols of the Nazis or claim any connection with their history, their slogans, or their goals.

I have dipped back into the history of the terrible years between 1933 and 1945 because I believe that in order to understand Germany today one must first of all understand the mood in which most articulate Germans regard their immediate past. The second prerequisite for understanding our new ally, the Federal Republic of Germany, is to realize what has happened and is now happening in the Soviet Zone. In other words, one must realize that, while some 50 million Germans are enjoying freedom, another 17 million are suffering under the slavery of an imposed communistic system. Not only does the Iron Curtain run right through Germany, but the city of Berlin itself is split between a free Berlin protected by American, British, and French troops and an Eastern Sector ruled as is the zone by a puppet regime subservient to the Soviet masters.

### **Contrasting Political Systems**

If one wants to study the contrast between a free society and the modern form of tyranny which finds its prototype in Soviet Russia, one cannot do better than to examine Germany today. Indeed if one wants to examine the situation in miniature, the city of Berlin provides the best example, for here the Iron Curtain is transparent; one can see for oneself in the Soviet Sector what communism in action is really like. Whether one is interested in political science, economics, education, or the arts and letters, the contrast between the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Sector of Berlin on the one hand, and the Federal Republic of Germany and free Berlin on the other, is the contrast of night and day.

Take, for example, the two political systems. In the Federal Republic freely elected state legislative assemblies and a freely elected national assembly, the Bundestag, successfully govern a democratic society; rival political parties wage election campaigns much as they do here in the United States. In the Soviet Zone the government is in theory based on an elected assembly and, in addition to the Communist Party, in theory there are parties with other labels. Actually all political activity is but a puppet show with the controls in Soviet hands; there is neither freedom of assembly, of speech, nor of the press.

The regime in the Soviet Zone carries the name "The German Democratic Republic," but what a travesty of democracy is actually in operation is evident from the election of a year ago. Like all elections in Soviet Russia and the satellite states, this election was a farce. A single ballot with a single list of candidates was handed to each voter as he entered the election booth; he or she was expected to deposit it forthwith in a ballot box; the only opportunity the voter had for registering a dissent was to go over to a special corner and ask for a piece of paper and pencil to indicate disapproval of the list. It is hardly necessary to point out that the officials in the booth were certain to report any voter who acted as if he were living in a free land. Everyone in a police state is under duress; it is not surprising that a vast majority of the population of the Soviet Zone went to the polls and cast the required ballot. Whether, as reported, 99.9 percent of the voters voted yes, no one can say, but, when one considers the penalties of failure to toe the line, the figure may be factually correct.

If there were free elections in the zone, there is little doubt that the communistic regime would be repudiated by an overwhelming vote. You will recall that on June 17, 2 years ago, a spontaneous uprising in East Berlin could only be put down by the Soviets' bringing in troops and tanks. The spirit of freedom which was symbolized by those young men who threw stones at the Soviet tanks still burns strongly, not only in East Berlin but throughout the zone—of that fact there can be no doubt.

Over the last 3 or 4 years more than a million Germans have left the Soviet Zone—the refugees still swarm through Berlin at the rate of nearly a thousand a day. In an attempt to diminish this flood the government of the so-called "German

Democratic Republic" recently condemned to death two of its citizens because they were alleged to have advised their compatriots to migrate to the Federal Republic of Germany. This barbarous sentence was denounced by a unanimous resolution of the Bundestag, the elected assembly of the Federal Republic of Germany. As a consequence of this protest and the incensed public opinion in the free world, the sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment, but they still remain an example of the ruthlessness and brutality of a government of Soviet agents.

If time permitted, I would like to tell you of the way the schools and the universities in the Soviet Zone have been remodeled to fit the Communist pattern, how all publications must conform to the official line, how the industries have been nationalized and agriculture reshaped to conform to Communist ideology. Nationalization of industry, for example, has proceeded ahead of plan, and 85 percent of industrial output now comes from nationalized plants. In heavy industry the percentage is even higher—94 percent. I only wish that those who in some free nations appear still to harbor illusions about the nature of communism would go to Berlin and visit there for a few days and talk to the refugees who have come from what the Communists declare to be a workers' paradise but which, in fact, is a terrorized society of slaves.

### **Prosperity in Western Germany**

In terms not only of freedom but also in terms of material prosperity there is a striking contrast between the Soviet Zone and the Federal Republic of Germany. What private initiative can do under a stable political system with a stable currency has been demonstrated once again by the rebuilding of Western Germany. Recovery has proceeded at a most astonishing pace. Today there is little if any unemployment in Western Germany, the factories are running full blast, the export markets are expanding. Prosperity is to be seen at every turn.

In the Soviet Zone, on the other hand, there are recurrent crises and food shortages: Despite the Five-Year-Plan promise to discontinue food rationing by 1953, rationing of meat, fats, sugar, milk, and potatoes continues, and shortages of these and many other food items are chronic, sometimes so severe that even the basic ration requirements cannot be covered for certain prod-

ucts. This is partly due, of course, to the use of Communist methods in agriculture, whose failure is reflected by the fact that crop yields in the zone are an average of 20 percent lower per hectare than in West Germany. Luxury goods are high priced and scarce; automobiles, in comparison to Western Germany, are rarely to be seen.

When one realizes that these contrasts are before the eyes of the German voters, one is not surprised that the Communist vote in West Berlin and in the Federal Republic of Germany has been almost negligible. The Soviet model of so-called "democracy" has no appeal to the Germans who can freely express their view.

The Bundestag election of 1953 was highly significant in this regard. Neither the Communist Party nor the right radical parties polled enough votes to place a single member in the national legislative assembly (the Bundestag). The election in free Berlin of the State Assembly in December 1954 was equally decisive as showing a repudiation of radicalism of the right and left. There can be no doubt about the fact that a vast majority of the citizens of Germany who are free to vote have repeatedly demonstrated their commitment to a political system based on the dignity of the individual, private ownership of property, and parliamentary democracy which insures freedom of speech, religion, and the press.

Many Americans who have reported on Germany in the last few years have emphasized the remarkable prosperity of the Federal Republic. Indeed those who last saw the ruined German cities in 1946 can hardly believe their eyes when they revisit the same spots today. How was the amazing recovery accomplished, many ask. The answer is that several factors were involved. The currency reform of 1948—an act of the three Western occupying powers—was the first essential; closely related was the creation of a government with a banking system that issued a stable currency. Indeed, if anyone ever needed evidence as to the importance of sound money, the recent history of Germany provides the material. From the close of the war until the summer of 1948 very little progress was made in rebuilding the cities and industrial plants, trade was largely on a barter basis, the stores were almost empty. But as soon as the new currency was introduced into the three Western zones, conditions changed almost overnight; people began to work, trade to function, recovery began.

A year after the currency reform the first elections under a new constitution were held, and shortly thereafter Adenauer was elected Chancellor by the Bundestag. The economic policy of his government—the policy of his Minister for Economics, Professor Erhard—proved admirably suited for the tasks which lay ahead. Private initiative and competition were encouraged, socialization of industry was rejected, tax laws were passed which enabled industry to put back its profits into plant reconstruction. And it has been largely by plowing back profits that the industrial recovery has taken place.

Of course, the impetus given by American aid through the Marshall plan was of the greatest importance, and that this is so is freely acknowledged by Germans in all walks of life. All told, the American taxpayer has contributed some \$3.5 billion to the reconstruction of Germany. But I might note that no new aid has been given for the last 4 years except for the city of Berlin, whose situation as an outpost of freedom presents us with special problems.

To the factors I have mentioned should be added three others in explaining German recovery. First, the attitude of the labor leaders who during the critical years refrained from pushing demands for increased wages. Second, the esprit de corps of the technical staff and working force in many factories which enabled these plants to start functioning again as soon as equipment could be put in order and raw materials obtained. Third, the well-known desire of the German people to work hard and effectively once a sound basis is at hand.

### **Political Developments**

To describe the material reconstruction and economic recovery of Western Germany without mentioning the political developments of the critical years, 1946 to 1951, would be to present a distorted picture. For unless there had been a rapid and satisfactory building of representative government, there would be no sovereign Germany today. The process started in the Western zones with the election of state legislative assemblies, which elections gave an opportunity for rival political parties to present programs to the voters. Early in 1948 the three Western occupying powers authorized the governments of the separate states (then 10 in number) to convene an assembly charged with the task of drafting a constitution,

or Basic Law, for a federated republic. A year later such a Basic Law was submitted to the separate states and ratified by a majority of the assemblies. Then followed in the summer of 1949 a national election of representatives of the lower house, the Bundestag, which in turn elected Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor that fall. The Basic Law provides for a national election every 4 years, and the second election took place in 1953, returning Chancellor Adenauer and his coalition government to power with a large majority.

It would take too long to describe in detail the federal structure of the German Government. But there are one or two points of special interest. The upper house, the Bundesrat, is composed of delegates from the state governments, who vote as the state governments direct, each state having a certain number of votes allocated to it which are always cast as a unit. But not all laws passed by the lower house require the concurrence of the upper house—only those which affect the individual states. A supreme court has the power of declaring unconstitutional laws which in the opinion of the majority of the judges are contrary to the provisions of the Basic Law. Thus, this federated governmental structure is somewhat analogous to our own.

At the same time, the Basic Laws provide for a parliamentary government, not a government of divided powers as in the United States. But in order to avoid that plague of rapidly changing governments which has disturbed other European countries, the Basic Law contains a unique provision. It is provided that a vote of no confidence in the Chancellor can only be presented as part of a motion which names his successor, and this motion must be adopted by a majority of the Bundestag by secret ballot. There is little doubt that this provision gave stability to the first government of Chancellor Adenauer, which came into power by only a one-vote margin.

The political history as well as the economic history of the last 10 years in West Germany is thus the story of the successful efforts of a free people. But even more striking is the record of the assimilation of more than 11 million expellees and refugees. When the war ended, about 40 million Germans were living within the area now under the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic. Into this portion of Germany came within a few months nearly 8 million Germans from the East. The job of finding living quarters and work for

this influx can be imagined. In addition, more than 2 million Germans have fled from the Soviet Zone, many literally in danger of their lives.

The danger that all these displaced families and individuals would form an unassimilated and hence dissatisfied fifth of the population was great. If this occurred, a breeding ground for radicalism of the right or left would clearly be at hand. Recognizing what was involved, the problem of the refugees was given high priority by the Federal Government and the separate states, each of which took its quota. Just as a bit of "social engineering," if I may use the term, the work of the officials involved in the gigantic task of resettlement deserves the highest praise. Today it is estimated that well over three-fourths of the refugees are fairly well integrated into new communities and have found suitable employment.

### **Our New Ally**

Earlier in my remarks I spoke of the Federal Republic of Germany as our new ally. I referred, of course, to the fact that last May Germany became sovereign and entered the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The process of building up a German armed force as part of this organization is now under way. And I may remark in passing that all the political parties are endeavoring to see to it that this army will not be a "state within a state." There is much concern with how a free democratic nation can have a large armed force which is both effective, completely loyal, and under civilian control. If concern with a problem will produce the right solution, this difficult question will be correctly answered by free Germany today.

Though our formal partnership with Germany as fellow members of NATO only began last May, we have been in fact allied with the free Germans in resisting Soviet aggression since the days of the Berlin blockade in 1948 and 1949. The success of the airlift and the brave stand of the inhabitants of Berlin made possible a significant victory for the free world. Furthermore, the struggle transformed the relationship of the American Armed Forces to the population. Legally our status continued to be that of an occupying power. Actually, it was clear to all, we were in Berlin as a defending power. A partnership between Germans and Americans developed in the beleaguered city, and after the blockade was

lifted the new relationship continued and gradually spread to cities and towns in the American Zone.

After the invasion of Korea more than one high ranking official begged us to increase our military strength in Germany. We did so early in 1951, and this fact in itself was evidence that, while the legal status remained unchanged, our soldiers henceforth could only be regarded as defenders. Discussion soon started as to how the Germans themselves could participate in the defense of Europe by once again organizing military forces. In the meantime the formal relation remained unchanged, but the spirit was altered; the German Government agreed to continue to pay what was known as occupation costs but which were recognized as in fact the Federal Republic's contribution to the defense of Europe.

I am told by those who were then in Europe that the winter of 1950-51 was a period of great fear. The possibility the Soviets might overrun an almost defenseless Germany and France was evident for all to see. Then came the strengthening of our forces, the appointment of General Eisenhower as Commander in Chief of NATO; anxiety gradually diminished. But it has taken far longer than anyone then imagined to end formally the occupation of the territory of the Federal Republic and provide a legal basis for a German armed contribution.

At the moment it is only in the Soviet Zone that any large number of Germans are in uniform and carrying arms. The puppet government has armed and trained some 100,000 of its youth. One may well doubt whether these soldiers are either honored or respected by the population. Yet because the power of the police state in the Soviet Zone is backed by the presence of Russian troops, there can be no question but that the regime has *physical* domination of the unfortunate inhabitants of the enslaved part of Germany.

### **The Future of Germany**

What of the future, you may ask. We are allied to the free peoples of Germany today in defense of Europe. The only government entitled to speak for them, the freely elected Government of the Federal Republic, is by its own declaration a provisional government, for it has been elected by only the inhabitants of what were once the American, British, and French Zones. While praising its accomplishments and welcoming it as

a partner, we must at the same time hope for its replacement by an all-German government freely elected by the inhabitants of the Soviet Zone as well as by those of the Federal Republic. This is the paradox of the present, a result of the tragic split of Germany today.

As the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France have repeatedly declared, there can be no hope of lasting peace and security in the world until German reunification is achieved, until an all-German government is established in Berlin. When that day comes, the history of the Federal Republic will have been concluded.

I have tried to tell you something of its present achievements, material, political, and spiritual. It has restored the German people to a position of respect among free nations; it is now our ally in the gigantic struggle of our times; its problems are our problems. To cooperate effectively the United States and the Federal Republic must seek to understand each other.

## **Tasks and Responsibilities of the Foreign Service**

*Remarks by Secretary Dulles*<sup>1</sup>

I am happy by my presence here to testify to the tremendous importance which I attach to the Foreign Service of the United States and my gratification that so many persons, some for the first time and others in midcareer, are going out into it with the special qualifications that you get from the Institute.

As perhaps many of you know, my family has been identified with the Foreign Service of the United States for a long time, going back several generations. But when I recall some of those earlier days, I think how different the tasks and responsibilities were then from what they are today. They are just totally incomparable.

I have traveled about a good bit, as you may have heard. I have been to a total, I believe, of 38 foreign countries, and in each of those countries I have made it a practice to ask the Ambassador to bring together the members of the Foreign Service and of the related United States

services in that country. I have tried to take advantage of my presence to have a little talk with them and to tell them what I think about the Foreign Service and its responsibilities today.

To a greater extent than ever before in our history, the fate of our own national future—and I think one can fairly say of the future of most of the free world—rests upon the group of people who make up the Foreign Service of the United States. In time of war that responsibility rests upon the military services primarily. In time of assured peace the task of the diplomat—of the Foreign Service officer—may be an amiable one, reflecting what it was in the earlier days to which I referred. But in times like these the responsibilities of representing the United States abroad have become immense. There is today what is called a “cold” war. There is a struggle going on which is worldwide in scope. The danger constantly exists that that struggle could break from the so-called cold war into a hot war. We must realize that in every post the loss of the so-called cold war could have grave consequences not only in that country but in adjoining countries.

As I was just saying to Secretary Henderson as we were coming down here from my office—there is no single post today that is not of great importance. I think there are about 80. The number is increasing as new countries come into being. We have a few new countries every year now. At every one of these posts the problems are major and important, and a loss there—a breakthrough there—could have serious consequences, just as in time of war a breakthrough by the enemy at any point could have serious consequences all along the line. So it is today.

Now, it used to be said that the practice of diplomacy for the people in the field is not complicated—that all they need to do is to deliver notes and to receive notes. But nothing could be further from the truth today. I believe that we perhaps went through a period when that was the case. But as things are now, on the basis of my observation, the personal qualities of the members of our Foreign Service are often the decisive element. It is particularly important that they develop the ability to make decisions, to report their observations and opinions in an understandable way, and to understand the point of view of their own Government or that of the Government to which they are accredited, as the case may be.

I find that on my trips abroad it is most helpful

<sup>1</sup>Made on Mar. 29 at graduation exercises for Foreign Service officers graduating from the Foreign Service Institute (press release 167).

to talk face to face with the Foreign Ministers of other countries. After such talks I am able to understand better their point of view and to obtain a better understanding of the despatches and cables that come to me. I can do that kind of thing in a certain number of countries once in a while. But the big task of helping me to such an understanding, of assisting me in obtaining the proper background, rests upon our Foreign Service officers. They have the task not only of understanding and interpreting accurately the point of view of the country to which they are accredited but equally the task of understanding the United States point of view and transmitting that in an acceptable way.

It is sometimes easy for a Foreign Service officer to get to feel that his job is to please the country to which he is accredited. It is of course his job to keep on good relations with the peoples of the country to which he is accredited. But he must never forget that he is serving the United States. And it is vital that he have the capacity to understand United States foreign policy and to realize that that foreign policy is, as far as we can make it so, a coherent one. We don't make our foreign policy just to please the people of country "X," or country "Y," or country "Z." It may please country "X" and it may not please country "Y." Well, that is tough on the Foreign Service people that live in country "Y." But it is a part of their job sometimes to face a tough situation.

We receive reports—reports of the kind that some of you people who are graduating here today will be making from different posts. We put those reports together with similar reports that come in from other posts and use them in formulating our policy. When our policy decision goes out, it may not be the thing that you recommended. You may feel disappointed about it. It may make your job harder. But remember that the overall strategies and policies are made by giving consideration to many factors. If something comes to you that you don't like, it's because we in the Department have received information from other sources which has led us to believe that the policy upon which we have decided is the best policy in the interest of the United States. Your job is to understand and make that policy understandable to the leaders of the governments to which you are accredited. That is a task which cannot be performed merely by delivering written notes or by

receiving written notes. A personal element has reappeared today in these relationships to a very marked degree indeed.

An illustration of the importance of personal relationships is the meeting which I attended the last 2 or 3 days at White Sulphur Springs, where for the first time in history the President of the United States has met with the Heads of Government of the two countries to the north and south of us. What was our purpose? It was not to solve any problems. We had no concrete problems on our agenda. It was to create conditions which would make problems which may arise more solvable. You who are in foreign posts will find that your task is not just to solve some concrete problem, although there will be plenty of problems, but that you may also have the task of creating relationships, creating understanding, so that when particular problems arise the atmosphere will be such as to make those problems more solvable. This will be a tremendously exciting job.

Those of you who are in the midcareer group already know the fascination, the burdens, the tasks, the responsibilities of the Service and are better qualifying yourselves to solve them as you go into senior positions. Some of you are just completing your beginning course and will be assuming these tasks and responsibilities for the first time.

I congratulate both groups. I congratulate you not only on what you have accomplished to date but upon the future that lies ahead of you, the future which will not always be easy.

In the talk I made last Friday night, after I came back from Asia,<sup>2</sup> I emphasized that we must have more people who are willing to take on tasks of this sort, recognizing that the sacrifices are considerable, recognizing that they cannot be rewarded in material things since they are not selling themselves in a market place to the highest bidder. We must have more people who recognize that it is the great American tradition to carry the American message, the knowledge of the American way of life and our ideals, to the four corners of the globe. That is what our Nation was founded for, really.

The opening paragraphs of *The Federalist* papers point out that it seems to be reserved for the American people by their example to show the other peoples of the world how a free form of so-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539.

ciety can be organized and that upon the success or failure of our experiment will depend the welfare of all humanity. That has been the concept of our Nation since its earliest days. It is the task of those of you who are graduating today to carry out that great American tradition. In this Institute you have been qualifying better to perform this task. I am sure that in carrying it out you will have satisfactions which can be gained in no other way.

## **Canadian-Mexican-U.S. Meeting at White Sulphur Springs**

At the meeting of the Canadian-Mexican-United States Heads of Government at White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., March 26 to 28, the three countries were represented by the following delegations:

### *Canada*

Louis S. St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada  
Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada  
Arnold D. P. Heeney, Ambassador of Canada to the United States  
John W. Holmes, Assistant Under Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada

### *Mexico*

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, President of the United Mexican States  
Luis Padilla Nervo, Minister of Foreign Relations of Mexico  
Manuel Tello, Ambassador of Mexico to the United States

### *United States*

Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States  
John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States  
Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State  
Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State  
Francis White, Ambassador of the United States to Mexico  
R. Douglas Stuart, Ambassador of the United States to Canada

## **U. S. Makes Final Payment to U. N. Refugee Fund**

U.S./U.N. press release 2377 dated March 27

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on March 27 transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a check for \$261,000 representing the final pay-

ment by the United States on its 1955 pledge to the U.N. Refugee Fund. This brings to \$1,006,000 this country's 1955 contribution to the program which is designed to find permanent solutions to the problem of the European refugees made homeless by war and the political upheavals which followed.

The U.S. pledge was for \$1,200,000 for the calendar year 1955, but this was made on the understanding that the U.S. contribution should not exceed one-third of all governmental contributions to the fund.

The President has recently asked Congress for an appropriation of \$1,500,000 for the program for 1956 on a similar basis and has also requested that the unexpended balance for 1955 be carried over for use in 1956. In addition, the President has requested \$800,000 for the first 6 months of 1957; if appropriated, these funds would facilitate advance planning for the program.

## **Atoms-for-Peace Agreement With Thailand Signed**

*Following are the texts of statements made at Bangkok on March 13 by Secretary Dulles and Prince Wan Waithayakon, Foreign Minister of Thailand, on the occasion of the signing of a Thai-U.S. agreement on the civil uses of atomic energy.*

### **STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES**

Today, with the signing of this agreement on the civil uses of atomic energy, Thailand and the United States have forged yet another link in their partnership for peace and human well-being. As we all know, this partnership goes back over a century. I am proud that American doctors, educators, and experts in many fields have worked with Thai doctors, nurses, teachers, and technicians to put to use the scientific advances in medicine and other fields. These Thai and American pioneers built the Thai-American partnership on the solid foundations of mutual help and mutual respect as they labored together. With the inception of the Thai-U.S. economic cooperation program, this Thai-American joint effort was expanded and accelerated as new scientific discoveries and new skills were brought to bear in Thailand in the fields of agriculture, public health,



education, and transportation. Thai and American experts, working side by side, have evolved improved breeds of rice, rid wide areas of malaria and other diseases, expanded water supplies and communications, and made higher education available to many. In turn, Thailand has shared its skills in many of these fields with its neighbors and fellow members of the United Nations while in turn receiving aid in certain fields from international organizations as well as the United States. We can look with deep satisfaction upon our joint achievements while pushing forward with the task of continuing to improve the conditions under which men live.

Now science has put a wonderful new force within our grasp—the untold energy of the atom. The President of the United States, by his personal sponsorship of the atoms-for-peace program, has shown the United States desire to share this knowledge and help provide equipment to its friends so that by pooling efforts the benefits of atomic science may be sooner and more effectively realized. To this end the United States has worked earnestly with the other nations principally involved toward the establishment of an international atomic energy agency. Representatives both of Thailand and the United States have attended and contributed to a very successful international conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy held under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva last summer. The United States has concluded a series of bilateral agreements with other nations of the free world providing for cooperative efforts in this vast new field. In signing this agreement here today, Thailand joins in this program designed to advance the frontiers of science for the benefit of mankind. This program is imaginative, exciting, and realistic. The agreement lays a basis for further cooperation between Thailand and the United States in this important field, including the establishment of an experimental reactor in Thailand. Radioisotopes to fight the ravages of disease can thus be made available to Thai hospitals and medical schools. A major source of training in this important technology would thus be set up in Thailand; eight Thai scientists have already gone to the United States for training in the fundamentals of atomic science.

We must not expect atomic science to work any sudden far-reaching miracles. We must carefully build up common knowledge, work out common

problems, develop and share skills. Progress may well be slow in the beginning as we explore the complexities of atomic science. Here or anywhere it is a long path from the scientific laboratory to the engineering drawing board and to the completion of any project in this field. Yet explorations in this field of atomic energy to date give stirring indications of the potential benefits to all men which we may some day realize. As we strive forward, we must display those characteristics of resourcefulness, devotion to duty, industry, and mutual assistance and cooperation which characterized the work of those Thai and Americans who pioneered in the fields of medicine and applied sciences here in Thailand.

#### **STATEMENT BY PRINCE WAN**

It was indeed a great day in history, pregnant with unlimited possibilities of benefit to mankind, when President Eisenhower announced to the world through the United Nations his atoms-for-peace program. It stands as a landmark in history because it marks the determination of man to harness this new potential source of energy for peaceful uses. It opens up a wide vista of untold benefits that will accrue to mankind. With the lofty spirit that inspires the American people your Government now offers to let the world share in the knowledge and experience you have gained in this new field of science.

In this spirit your Government has already opened up your institutes to provide training for scientists from other countries. As you mentioned, eight Thai scientists have already gone to the United States for this purpose and more will follow. An atomic research library is also being made available free to Thailand. I understand that the materials are already here and will shortly be presented by your Ambassador to His Majesty's Government.

And now comes this agreement for cooperation between our two Governments in the establishment of an experimental reactor in Thailand and in making available to Thailand the requisite materials for experiments in research in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to the end that diseases may be fought and other uses in agriculture and industry might follow later on.

We recognize that, in your offer to let the world share in the program for peaceful uses of nuclear

energy, your Government is moved purely by the noble desire to promote the happiness of mankind. As you aptly put it, Mr. Secretary, the program initiated by the agreement which we have just signed is designed to advance the frontier of science for the benefit of mankind. It is indeed imaginative, exciting, realistic, and, I might add, also extremely generous. We are deeply grateful for this assistance and gladly accept it in the spirit in which it is offered, for we know that no sinister motive lies behind it. It is offered to us in the same selfless spirit that moved American missionaries and other humanitarian workers, men and women, to devote their untiring efforts, for well over a century now, to help our people in the promotion of their health and welfare.

Mr. Secretary, this agreement is yet another testimony of the unshakable resolve of your Government to promote the progress of mankind so that men can live in freedom and have the necessary conditions to develop their freedom. It is also another landmark in the history of Thai-American relationships which have grown and are growing ever closer and firmer every day. I am indeed proud and highly honored to be able to participate with you, Mr. Secretary of State, in this historical event.

### **Sale of 129 Tons of Heavy Water in Atoms-for-Peace Program**

The Atomic Energy Commission on March 13 announced approval of the sale of 129 tons of heavy water to six nations for assistance in their peacetime applications of atomic energy. Sixteen tons of the material have been shipped abroad.

The initial consignments of 11 tons to Great Britain and 5 to France were manufactured at the Commission's plant at Dana, Ind. Heavy

water also is produced at its facilities in South Carolina. All sales are at the price of \$28 per pound announced August 8, 1955.

Included in the 129-ton total was an additional 11 tons for the Government of India. An original order of 10 tons for India, announced February 12, 1955,<sup>1</sup> was the first to be approved for this special reactor material under the President's atoms-for-peace program. The 21 tons will be used by the Government of India in a research reactor which the Government of Canada has announced it plans to give India under the Colombo Plan.

The total amounts approved for sale are as follows: United Kingdom, 50 tons; France, 30; India, 21; Australia, 11; Italy, 10; and Switzerland, up to 7, with 2 tons to be delivered by August 1957.

Britain will use the material in several of its civilian research reactors. The Swiss order is to go to Reactor, Ltd., the private group which carries on nuclear research in Switzerland and operates the pool-type research reactor purchased from the United States at the close of the atoms-for-peace conference in Geneva last August.

Heavy water is used as a moderator in several types of reactors to slow down the speed of neutrons emitted in the splitting of atoms of the fissionable uranium-235.

### **Mr. Allyn To Be U.S. Representative to Eleventh Session of ECE**

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Stanley C. Allyn to be a representative of the United States to the 11th session of the Economic Commission for Europe.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1955, p. 396.

# The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1955: Part III <sup>1</sup>

by Harry N. Howard

## MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAMS AND U.S. TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

### Broad Character of United States Programs

There was continued recognition, during the course of 1955, of the positive necessity of technical and economic assistance, especially in such underdeveloped areas as those of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. Although the Soviet Government spoke much of technical and economic assistance, particularly during 1955, it had not participated in the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, hitherto condemned as a design for colonial exploitation, until 1953 and then under restrictions and with a very small contribution.<sup>2</sup> On the contrary, the United States has long engaged, both directly and through the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and regional organizations, in constructive programs of assistance. U.S. participation is based on the realization that the maintenance of international peace and security, the preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of states, the promotion of political stability, and the processes of orderly change are all interconnected.

The record of the United States in this field is an impressive one. Between July 1, 1945, and September 30, 1955, the total of United States grants and credits to other nations reached \$52,287,000,000, of which no less than \$41,340,000,000 was in net grants. Some \$17,248,000,000 went for economic and technical assistance, famine relief, and other urgent relief. Of these amounts, grants and credits in the Near East and Africa totaled \$4,466,000,000, the net grants reaching \$3,934,000,000 and credits \$532,000,000. In South Asia, grants and credits totaled \$548,000,000, with the net grants standing at \$280,000,000. A more detailed picture of the situation in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa as a whole may be seen from the accompanying table.<sup>3</sup>

Summary of Net U.S. Grants and Credits in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (1945-1955) <sup>4</sup>

	Net Grants	Net Credits	Net Total
Greece . . . . .	\$1,208,000,000	\$81,100,000	\$1,289,000,000
Turkey . . . . .	226,000,000	94,000,000	320,000,000
Iran . . . . .	147,000,000	54,000,000	201,000,000
Egypt . . . . .	26,000,000	4,000,000	30,000,000
Israel . . . . .	233,000,000	137,000,000	370,000,000
Jordan . . . . .	25,000,000	.....	25,000,000
Liberia . . . . .	6,000,000	19,000,000	25,000,000
Unspecified (Near East and Africa) . . . . .	189,000,000	-7,000,000	182,000,000
Afghanistan . . . . .	3,000,000	26,000,000	29,000,000
India . . . . .	116,000,000	228,000,000	344,000,000
Pakistan . . . . .	142,000,000	15,000,000	157,000,000
Unspecified (South Asia) . . . . .	19,000,000	.....	19,000,000
<b>Totals by Area</b>			
Near East and Africa . . . . .	\$1,967,000,000	\$532,000,000	\$2,499,000,000
South Asia . . . . .	280,000,000	268,000,000	548,000,000
Near East, South Asia and Africa . . . . .	\$2,247,000,000	\$800,000,000	\$3,047,000,000

<sup>3</sup> This article does not cover the contribution of the Department of State International Educational Exchange Service in this area. For a brief account of activities under this program, see *The International Exchange Program, 15th Semiannual Report to Congress* (Department of State publication 6293, 1956).

<sup>4</sup> Department of Commerce, *Foreign Grants and Credits by the United States Government*, September 1955 quarter, tables 1 and 2. Net figures cited here differ from certain of the individual country figures cited below because they are computed on another basis.

<sup>1</sup> For Part I of this article, dealing with political issues, see BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 452; for Part II, on problems of regional security, see *ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 510. Mr. Howard is United Nations adviser for the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.

<sup>2</sup> For a U.S. statement on Soviet participation, see BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 395.

A potentially important phase of the broad U.S. program was the initialing of a series of atom-for-peace agreements with Turkey (May 3), Lebanon (June 2), Israel (June 3), Pakistan (June 15), and Greece (June 22). Under these agreements, the governments concerned were to receive information concerning the design, construction, and operation of research reactors and their use as research, development, and engineering tools; the United States Atomic Energy Commission was to lease up to 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) of contained U-235 in uranium enriched up to a maximum of 20 percent U-235. The agreements also provided for exchange of unclassified information in the research reactor field, and on the use of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological research, medical therapy, agriculture, and industry. The agreements would enable the countries involved to acquire valuable training and experience in nuclear science and engineering for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, including civilian nuclear power.<sup>5</sup>

#### Assistance Programs During 1955

The programs of economic and technical assistance during 1955 were within the broad framework which had been elaborated over the years. As President Eisenhower explained in his foreign economic policy message to the Congress on January 10, the self-interest of the United States required "economic strength among our allies" and "economic growth in underdeveloped areas" in order to "lessen international instability growing out of the vulnerability of such areas to Communist penetration and subversion."<sup>6</sup>

President Eisenhower's theme was carried forward in his recommendations for the 1956 mutual security program, transmitted to the Congress on April 20, in which there was considerable stress on the problems of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.<sup>7</sup> All told, the President recommended that Congress approve funds totaling \$3,530,000,000 for the mutual security program, of which \$712,500,000 was for economic programs, including \$172,000,000 for a continuation of technical

cooperation programs, \$175,500,000 for special programs, and \$165,000,000 for development assistance; \$179,000,000 was to be allocated to the Middle East. In all, about \$812,500,000, or about 25 percent, was requested for nonmilitary programs. In a statement of May 5 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Secretary Dulles declared:

International communism is pressing hard to extend its influence in Asian countries which lack the economic strength to support an adequate defense establishment and to provide the necessary foundation of political stability and steadily improving living standards.<sup>8</sup>

Mr. Dulles was convinced that a continuation of this "investment of strength" under the mutual security program could meet the Soviet challenge.

In the end, the Congress appropriated some \$2,700,000,000 for fiscal year 1956, including \$1,700,000,000 for defense support, development assistance, technical assistance, and other programs. It may be observed that, of these funds, some \$113,700,000 was designed for defense support in the Near East and Africa, \$73,000,000 was to go for development assistance in that area, and the general authorization for technical cooperation amounted to \$127,500,000. Other items of interest were the appropriations of \$14,500,000 for the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), some \$62,000,000 for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and \$100,000,000 for the President's Fund for Asian Economic Development. For all purposes except direct military assistance, approximately \$317,000,000 was allocated to the Near East, South Asia, and Africa during 1955.<sup>9</sup>

#### Assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Iran

Greece and Turkey had been the subject of special American assistance, designed to strengthen

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, May 23, 1955, p. 855. See also the Secretary's statement of May 25 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *ibid.*, June 6, 1955, p. 911, and that of Harold E. Stassen before the House Committee on June 8, 1955, *ibid.*, July 4, 1955, p. 29.

<sup>6</sup> For a summary of the uses to which mutual security funds were put in individual countries during the first half of 1955, see *Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1955*, H. Doc. 266, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 20 (Pakistan), p. 21 (India), p. 22 (Afghanistan and Nepal), p. 25 (Greece and Turkey), p. 26 (Iran), p. 27 (Arab States and Israel), and p. 32 (Africa).

<sup>7</sup> For text of the agreement with Turkey, which entered into force on June 10, see BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 55. The agreement with Lebanon entered into force on July 18; that with Israel on July 12; Pakistan on Aug. 11; and Greece on Aug. 4, 1955.

<sup>8</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 119.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, May 2, 1955, p. 711.

their defensive positions and to preserve their political independence and territorial integrity. Despite serious difficulties between Greece and Turkey concerning Cyprus, Greek and Turkish armed forces continued to constitute an essential element in the Western defense system. Both were members of NATO and the Balkan Alliance, and Turkey was a signatory of the Baghdad Pact (1955).

Among the noteworthy undertakings for strengthening the Greek economy was an electric power project, which provided Greece for the first time with a unified electric power generating and grid system, more than doubling the prewar output.<sup>10</sup> It was announced on June 24 that new aid totaling \$19,200,000, partly in the form of a loan, had been made available to Greece to help meet the economic pressures arising from earthquake damage.<sup>11</sup>

The United States also continued to assist Turkey during 1955. Under an agreement of November 1954, supplemented on April 28, 1955,<sup>12</sup> \$29 million worth of American surplus agricultural products was to be shipped to Turkey, in view of a crop failure and diminished foreign exchange, the effects of which were felt during 1955. In order not to jeopardize either Turkey's military position or its achievements under the program since 1950, the United States agreed in June to increase the defense-support program in fiscal 1955 from \$70 million to \$100 million, the additional \$30 million to assist Turkey during the emergency period and to provide for imports of raw materials, basic commodities, and spare parts for its industrial establishment.

It was announced on January 17, 1956, that, at the request of the United States and the Republic of Turkey, Clarence B. Randall, the eminent industrialist and special consultant to President Eisenhower on foreign economic policy, had agreed to visit Turkey late in January to discuss economic problems of interest to both countries. It was expected that Mr. Randall's visit would greatly contribute to the further development of American-Turkish economic relations and to the

<sup>10</sup> Direct American participation in the project ended on July 15, 1955. On June 10 Greece signed an agreement with the United States for defense use of technology, designed to foster the exchange of technology for defense purposes (BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 84).

<sup>11</sup> BULLETIN of July 18, 1955, p. 100.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, May 16, 1955, p. 814.

advancement of mutual understanding in this realm.<sup>13</sup>

Although the oil settlement of October 1954 had started the flow of substantial oil revenues to Iran by 1955, financial assistance was still necessary to meet urgent needs. The Foreign Operations Administration (now the International Cooperation Administration), for example, made a loan of \$32 million for defense purposes, government employee payrolls, and other expenses. There was increasing evidence of the success of technical assistance in Iran during 1955. A program for the control of malaria had been launched 4 years before by U.S. health technicians; by 1955, the Iranians themselves were carrying on most of the work. Similarly, U.S. technicians had taught the techniques of livestock crossbreeding to Ministry of Agriculture employees, who in turn were spreading the knowledge to rural areas. A teacher-training program was now being carried out by the Ministry of Education, involving some 12,000 teachers, or about 40 percent of the Iranian teaching staff. There was also progress in the field of public administration, and an Institute of Administrative Affairs was opened at the University of Tehran in January 1955.<sup>14</sup>

#### Assistance to the Middle East

The United States has also engaged in significant development projects in the Middle East. In the case of Egypt, which had initiated a comprehensive 10-year economic development program, for example, the United States made available a total of \$40 million in development assistance during fiscal year 1955, and, in addition, \$2 million was allocated for technical cooperation. The American program stressed, among other things, railway and highway improvement. A loan agreement provided for repayment of \$7 million of the

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 171. Since the beginning of 1948 Turkey has received \$463 million in economic assistance from the United States for development assistance related to the upkeep of its armed forces and for technical assistance. During the same period, Turkey has borrowed some \$25 million from the Export-Import Bank and about \$63 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, while short-term government and commercial debts in Europe were estimated at about \$150 million.

<sup>14</sup> For text of a U.S.-Iranian agreement signed on Feb. 20, 1956, on surplus agricultural commodities, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3506*. On Feb. 26, 1956, the Export-Import Bank signed a \$14 million credit agreement with Iran for railroad improvement.

\$40 million, and, as its share of the cost of the projects, Egypt was to spend the equivalent of \$43 million from its resources.

In addition, the United States, together with the United Kingdom and other countries, was much interested in the project for the construction of the High Aswan Dam on the Nile River, both for hydroelectric and for irrigation purposes, the total cost of which, over a 20-year period, was estimated at some \$1 billion. During a visit to the United States by the Egyptian Minister of Finance, Abdel Moneim El Kaissouni, the problem of the dam was discussed, and on December 17, 1955, it was announced that the United States and the United Kingdom had assured the Egyptian Government of their support of the project, "which would be of inestimable importance in the development of the Egyptian economy and in the improvement of the welfare of the Egyptian people." The assistance was to take the form of grants toward defraying foreign exchange costs of the initial stages of the construction, involving the coffer dam, the foundations for the primary dam, and auxiliary work. Assurance was also given, subject to legislative authority, that the United States and the United Kingdom were prepared "to consider sympathetically in the light of then existing circumstances further support toward financing the later stages to supplement World Bank financing."<sup>15</sup>

The problem of assistance to Iraq differed from that of aid to Egypt both because of the former's signature of the Baghdad Pact and because of its oil revenues of about \$140 million a year. However, the United States has assisted in developing Iraqi military potential under the mutual defense agreement of 1954.

The primary key to Iraqi development lies in harnessing the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates river system; construction is now under way on a series of dams. Iraq initiated its second Five-Year Plan on April 1, 1955, and the Iraqi Development Board proposed that the equivalent of some \$800 million be made available from petroleum to finance the program, much of the emphasis of which was on projects to raise living standards. Under the technical cooperation program in Iraq an agricultural college was estab-

lished at Abu Ghraib with the assistance of technicians from the University of Arizona, while the Technical Institute at Baghdad was established with similar assistance from the Bradley Institute of Technology.

With its limited resources and the presence of some 450,000 Arab refugees from Palestine, Jordan continued to be confronted with serious economic problems. During 1955 the United States made \$5 million available to the Jordanian development program, \$3.6 million of it in the form of local currency purchased with pounds sterling generated from the sale of American coal to the United Kingdom. The assistance took the form of road construction, afforestation, and water-spreading activities; some 50 miles of roads were completed, about 5,000 acres of formerly unproductive land were brought under cultivation, and many thousands of new trees were planted. Some \$2,200,000 was provided for technical cooperation, with projects in agriculture, natural resources, health, and education. Nineteen agricultural centers serving 300 villages are now in operation in Jordan. Sound beginnings have been made in education, and about 100 Jordanian trainees in the field of education have been sent abroad.<sup>16</sup>

During 1955, a large part of the program in Lebanon was designed to assist in improving the Lebanese road system, in view of its importance to the country's economic development. An agreement in June 1955 provided for \$5,700,000 to help finance construction of a modern highway from Beirut to the Syrian border, connecting with the road to Damascus, one of the important highways in the Middle East. While the Lebanese Government was to pay the major cost, \$5 million of American assistance was to be in the form of a 15-year loan at 3 percent, which the Lebanese Government has not yet taken up. The remaining \$700,000 was to be used to purchase American road-building equipment and to finance an engineering survey by an American firm. Other forms of assistance included provision of \$1.4 million for improved agricultural equipment, the establishment of 30 agricultural extension offices under

<sup>15</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1050. For the agricultural commodities agreement with Egypt signed Dec. 14, 1955, see *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* 3439.

<sup>16</sup> On Oct. 30, 1955, the Jordanian Parliament approved an agreement permitting Edwin W. Pauley, an independent American petroleum producer, to explore Jordan for oil. It provided for 50 percent sharing after payment of exploration expenditures and for cancellation after 8 months if oil was not found; all oil wells were to become the exclusive property of Jordan after 55 years.

the guidance of American extension specialists, the establishment of the Lebanon Industry Institute, and the setting up of the National Litani Board for the development of the Litani River.<sup>17</sup>

The United States also continued to support the program of assistance to Arab refugees under UNRWA. Some 900,000 refugees were involved, about 300,000 of whom were completely supported by UNRWA in camps, while the rest received both food rations and basic medical services, at an average cost of \$28 per annum.<sup>18</sup> It is partly in connection with the refugee problem that the United States has sought to promote the development of the Jordan River Valley, which would permit the irrigation of some 225,000 acres of land in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel and make possible eventual settlement of some 200,000 refugees.

At the same time, the United States continued its assistance to Israel, with special attention to programs for orderly industrial development. The program for 1955 centered on projects designed to make maximum use of local raw materials, without neglecting agriculture.<sup>19</sup> On April 29 an agreement was signed with Israel providing for the sale of \$8.3 million worth of surplus commodities, including 50,000 metric tons of wheat and 40,000 metric tons of feed grains. The Israeli pounds derived from the purchase of these commodities were to be used for various purposes, including American expenditures in Israel; some were to be loaned for the purpose of economic development in Israel.<sup>20</sup>

Neither Yemen nor Saudi Arabia received economic or technical assistance during 1955 from the United States. By 1954, however, Saudi Arabia was receiving royalties from the Arabian American Oil Company at the rate of about \$260 million annually. As President Eisenhower declared on August 11, 1955, when receiving the credentials of Saudi Arabian Ambassador Sheikh Abdullah al-Khayall, "from the earliest years of our coun-

try, traders, doctors, and educators have gone [to the Middle East] to contribute, through their careers, to the growth and development of the area."<sup>21</sup>

On November 22, it was announced that Yemen had granted a concession to the Yemen Development Corporation, the first oil and mineral concession in the history of the country. The 30-year agreement provided for exclusive exploration and development rights over 40,000 square miles, or the northern two-thirds of the country, with the exception of the narrow coastal strip (Tihana). All net profits were to be divided equally, but the agreement could be voided if commercial quantities either of petroleum or minerals were not found within 6 years.

#### Assistance in Africa

Among the projects of economic and technical assistance in Africa, examples may be cited from Liberia, Ethiopia, and Libya. Classes began in the new Booker T. Washington Institute in Liberia during August 1955. The project was launched under a contract with Prairie View (Texas) Agricultural and Mechanical College, which provided assistance in improving teaching methods and planning an educational curriculum. A project for demonstrating the techniques of growing swamp rice was completed in 1955, with the results disseminated in many parts of Liberia through an agricultural extension system organized with American assistance.

A joint Ethiopian-American educational commission made a thorough examination of Ethiopian educational needs, through the technical assistance program. The educational program in agriculture and the mechanical arts was already showing results in Ethiopia. The 3-year-old Jimma Agricultural Secondary School and the Handicraft School at Addis Ababa, were financed entirely by the Ethiopian Government, except for the cost of American technicians. In addition, an apprentice trade school was established at Addis Ababa by technicians from the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, as part of a program for developing agricultural and mechanical training. On October 3 the Export-Import Bank announced that it would establish a \$24 million credit in Ethiopia's favor for the develop-

<sup>21</sup> Department of State press release 486, Aug. 11, 1955 (not printed).

<sup>17</sup> It was announced on Mar. 2, 1956, that an Export-Import Bank loan of \$105,000 to Syria would assure the beginning of a program to bring a dependable supply of drinking water to various parts of Syria.

<sup>18</sup> See also U.N. docs. A/2978 and Add. I. A/2989, A/3057.

<sup>19</sup> Israel also receives large-scale assistance from unofficial sources in the United States. During 1955, for example, some \$42,318,500 was subscribed in Israel bonds, bringing the total sold since 1951 to \$216,594,450.

<sup>20</sup> BULLETIN of May 16, 1955, p. 815.

ment of commercial airfields and aviation facilities throughout the country.<sup>22</sup>

On presenting his credentials as Ambassador, Sayyid Saddiq Muntasser, on May 6, 1955, noted that the Libyan people had placed much trust in the friendship of the United States and recalled the role which the United States had played during the consideration of the future of Libya in the United Nations. Ambassador Muntasser also noted that the decision to recognize the legitimate right of self-determination had been made on American soil. But independence had not solved all problems, and Libya still counted on the assistance of the United States to overcome some of its difficulties to insure its complete independence in all fields. President Eisenhower replied that he was aware of the complex problems facing Libya and indicated that the United States was "deeply sympathetic" with the efforts which were being made to raise Libyan standards of living.<sup>23</sup>

The Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission, with an American as executive director, was established to help supervise American economic assistance. Under a revised technical assistance agreement, projects were being integrated within Libyan government departments to pave the way for Libya to assume greater responsibility for project activities. Preventive and other public health services were introduced by the Libyan-American Joint Service in Public Health.

The International Cooperation Administration announced on August 1 that it would ship 6,800 tons of surplus American wheat to Libya in an emergency move to relieve distress occasioned by a poor grain harvest, and on September 2 a further agreement was signed covering an additional grant of 6,000 tons and bringing to 45,000 tons the total of wheat shipments authorized over a period of some 20 months.<sup>24</sup>

### Assistance in South Asia

In South Asia, where the Soviet Union made considerable propaganda with large offers of assistance during the fall of 1955, the United States

<sup>22</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617.

<sup>23</sup> Department of State press release 244, May 6, 1955 (not printed).

<sup>24</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 263, and Sept. 12, 1955, p. 427. For a U. S.-Libyan agreement on relief supplies and equipment, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3480.

had long been active under the United Nations and its own bilateral programs.

Both military and economic assistance has been rendered to Pakistan, which has taken a firm position on the side of the free world, within the framework both of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Baghdad Pact. In the 6 years ending on June 30, 1955, the United States provided Pakistan with some \$361,850,000 in economic assistance. Because of its urgent need for assistance, some \$71.8 million—\$20 million on a loan basis—was provided during fiscal year 1955, of which \$40 million was for commodity imports. The program also included \$20 million for defense support, \$5.5 million for flood relief, \$5.3 million for technical assistance projects, and \$1 million for freight costs in ocean transport of surplus agricultural commodities.

The technical assistance program in Pakistan during 1955 included projects directed toward improvement of transportation and industry. Among other things, Pakistan International Airlines and Pan American World Airways signed an agreement in May providing for American technical assistance in expanding Pakistan's air transportation system, and a group of American technicians assisted in this work. American technicians also cooperated in agricultural production, land reclamation, public health, vocational education, and the community development program. The United States assisted in designing a multipurpose hydroelectric dam to be constructed on the Karnafuli River in East Pakistan, electric power from which will stimulate industrial development and also contribute to flood control and irrigation. In May the United States and Pakistan signed an agreement making possible guarantees for private investments in Pakistan, designed to encourage private industry.<sup>25</sup>

During the latter part of 1955, India was visited by Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and also received tantalizing offers of Soviet economic and technical as-

<sup>25</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 157, and June 20, 1955, p. 1018. Greece, Israel, and Turkey have signed similar agreements with respect to the protection of private investments.

For a U.S.-Pakistan agreement on mutual security signed Jan. 11, 1955, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3183; for an agreement on surplus agricultural commodities signed Jan. 18, 1955, see TIAS 3184; for a technical cooperation agreement signed Jan. 18, 1955, see TIAS 3185.



sistance.<sup>26</sup> The United States, for its part, had long engaged in programs of economic and technical assistance in India. Indeed, since 1951, the United States had provided India with gross assistance totaling more than \$500 million, divided almost equally between grants and loans. In all there were more than 50 joint projects, toward the completion of which India was contributing about \$400 million. In addition, American foundations and voluntary agencies have contributed some \$48 million to various projects in India.

While the problems with regard to India were complicated, results were already evident in a number of fields, involving both agriculture and industry. During fiscal year 1955, the United States allocated \$84.3 million to Indian projects, of which \$45 million was on a loan basis. Of \$69.1 million in development assistance funds made available during 1955, \$30 million was programmed for cotton and wheat purchases in the United States; the rupees acquired by the United States from these purchases were part of the \$45 million loan and were to be utilized for the development of power, river valley projects, and other joint projects.

Technical assistance projects continued to stress community development and increased agricultural production. Contracts were negotiated with five American universities and colleges for technical support to several Indian states and agricultural institutions. A village water supply and sanitation system was inaugurated and attention given to small irrigation projects, soil conservation, and farm management. The University of Tennessee was to assist Indian women's colleges in home economics; the University of Texas was to cooperate in the establishment of teacher-training institutions in the field of secondary education.

There were also other forms of assistance. Up to June 1955, for example, some \$38,875,000 had been earmarked for the purchase of railway rolling stock and locomotives, and early in September 450 freight cars were received under the American aid program. On October 4 the United States and India announced an exchange of notes covering the extension of emergency assistance totaling \$4.7 million in the form of 10,000 tons of wheat

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<sup>26</sup> India and the Soviet Union had signed a loan agreement on Feb. 2, 1955, for the construction of a 1-million-ton steel plant in central India at a cost of some \$91 million to be completed by 1960.

and 10,000 tons of rice from the stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation to help relieve victims of flood disaster in northeast India.<sup>27</sup> On January 5, 1956, the fourth anniversary of the assistance program in India, a new agreement was signed, providing \$10 million for importation of 100,000 tons of steel and 6,000 tons of DDT for malaria control.<sup>28</sup>

During the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Afghanistan in December 1955, much was made of the announcement of a \$100-million Soviet loan to Afghanistan and of the reaffirmation of Afghanistan's "neutral" policy.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, the United States has endeavored over the years, although on a relatively small scale, to assist Afghanistan in a variety of ways. Through the Export-Import Bank, loans totaling \$39,500,000 were made for the multipurpose Helmand Valley project for irrigation, flood control, and power development. In addition, some \$4 million had been granted in the form of technical assistance.

During 1955 stress continued to be placed on the Helmand River project, and a group of American experts assisted in such technical projects as engineering, agriculture, health and sanitation, community development, and public administration. Moreover, under contract with the Foreign Operations Administration, Columbia University Teachers College sent a group of four specialists to Kabul to assist the Ministry of Education in teacher training and general education. The University of Wyoming sent 23 specialists to assist in technical education and agriculture; helped in the establishment of the Afghanistan Institute of Applied Science, with two subsidiary schools, the Afghan Institute of Technology and the Vocational Agricultural School; and aided the Ministry of Agriculture in research and demonstration. The Near East Foundation, long experienced in such matters, assisted in a project for community development in Afghan villages.

Work in Nepal during 1955 looked primarily

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<sup>27</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617.

<sup>28</sup> The steel import brought to 700,000 tons the total which India had obtained from the United States. The first 4 of 100 locomotives arrived at Bombay on Jan. 3, 1956; for an address by Ambassador John Sherman Cooper on that occasion, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 205. For text of air transport agreement signed with India on Feb. 3, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 264.

<sup>29</sup> Since 1954 the Soviet Union had loaned some \$14 million to Afghanistan for road construction, storage tanks, flour mills, etc.

toward reparation of flood devastation, and a project for reclamation in the Rapti Valley, where an area of some 130,000 acres was to be opened for resettlement, was undertaken. The village improvement program involved six development centers, which have trained more than 175 Nepalese to demonstrate more effective use of insecticides, fertilizers, and farm implements. Assistance was also given in the field of public health. The University of Oregon assisted in an educational project, under which more than 100 villagers were trained as teachers to work in schools throughout Nepal. Since 1951 approximately \$6 million in

U.S. aid has gone to Nepal, including \$1.5 million in flood relief.

### Export-Import Bank Loans

Even before the inauguration of the American program for technical and economic assistance, the Export-Import Bank of Washington had authorized a number of loans in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa for the economic development of countries in that area. By July 1, 1955, these loans were substantially as shown in the accompanying table.

*Export-Import Bank Loans, 1945-1955*<sup>30</sup>

Country	Date	Authorized Credit	Purpose
<b>Egypt</b>			
Fertilizer and Chemical Industries of Egypt.	7/16/47	\$7, 250, 000	Construction of fertilizer plant
Egyptian Spinners (Barelays Bank D. C. O.).	5/6/55	60, 000	Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works)
United Spinning and Weaving Co., S. A. E.	6/13/55	25, 000	Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works)
Total . . . . .		\$7, 335, 000	
<b>Greece</b>			
Kingdom of Greece . . . . .	1/9/46	\$25, 000, 000	U. S. products and services. Some \$10,436,-687.39 cancelled
Kingdom of Greece . . . . .	6/13/55	300, 000	Crawler tractors with angle-dozers and motor graders
Piraiiki-Patraiki Industrie de Coton, S. A.	12/16/54	625, 000	Textile machinery
Total . . . . .		\$25, 925, 000	
<b>Iran</b>			
Government of Iran . . . . .	11/11/54	\$53, 000, 000	Economic development
<b>Israel</b>			
State of Israel . . . . .	1/19/49	\$70, 000, 000	Agricultural production
State of Israel . . . . .	3/9/49	9, 535, 243	Transportation. Some \$544.52 cancelled
State of Israel . . . . .	3/16/49	25, 000, 000	Housing materials
State of Israel . . . . .	3/23/49	5, 000, 000	Telecommunications equipment. Some \$1,256.10 cancelled
State of Israel . . . . .	9/7/49	5, 464, 757	Development of ports
State of Israel . . . . .	10/26/49	20, 000, 000	
Total . . . . .		\$135, 000, 000	
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>			
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . . . . .	1/3/46	\$25, 000, 000	Raw materials and equipment. Some \$15,000,000 cancelled
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . . . . .	7/20/50	15, 000, 000	Public works and development projects. Some \$10,232,483.60 cancelled
Total . . . . .		\$40, 000, 000	
<b>Turkey</b>			
Sumer Bank (Republic of Turkey) . . . . .	10/13/48	\$417, 584. 33	(International General Electric Co.)
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	1/26/46	431, 263. 64	State seaways and harbors
Etibank (Republic of Turkey) . . . . .	3/16/49	104, 000	Ingersoll Rand Co.
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	5/25/49	3, 750, 000	State railways. Some \$37,155.58 cancelled

<sup>30</sup> Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Twentieth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January-June 1955*, appendix C. Loans in Africa as a whole totaled \$198,669,661.60 and in Asia \$632,676,462.89.

Country	Date	Authorized Credit	Purpose
<b>Turkey—Continued</b>			
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	5/25/49	\$4, 250, 000	State seaways and harbors
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	11/19/54	500, 000	State seaways and harbors
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	8/31/49	999, 524. 92	U.S. rails and accessories
Etibank (Republic of Turkey) . . . . .	9/28/49	500, 000	Earth-moving equipment
Etibank (Republic of Turkey) . . . . .	3/17/55	785, 000	Materials, equipment and service for coal washing plant (McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Corp.)
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	11/26/47	8, 000, 000	Reconversion of vessels. Some \$819.74 cancelled
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	11/4/54	4, 235, 000	Equipment, storage and handling of grain (Colombian Steel Tank Co.)
Cukurova Itholat ve Ithracat, T. A. O. . . . .	1/6/55	1, 020, 000	Spare parts for tractors (Caterpillar Tractor Co.). Some \$1,020,000 cancelled
Total . . . . .		\$24, 992, 372. 89	
<b>Afghanistan</b>			
Royal Government of Afghanistan. . . . .	11/23/49	\$21, 000, 000	Construction of dam and canal
Royal Government of Afghanistan. . . . .	4/29/54	18, 500, 000	Helmand River Valley Development
Total . . . . .		\$39, 500, 000	
<b>Ethiopia</b>			
Ethiopian Empire. . . . .	6/22/50	\$1, 000, 000	Aircraft and spare parts. Some \$27,731.82 cancelled
Ethiopian Empire. . . . .	7/10/46	2, 000, 000	Communication equipment and industrial machinery. Some \$250,027.57 cancelled
Total . . . . .		\$3, 000, 000	
<b>Liberia</b>			
Republic of Liberia . . . . .	1/11/51	\$5, 000, 000	Highway improvement and construction
Republic of Liberia . . . . .	6/14/51	1, 350, 000	Water supply and sewerage system
Republic of Liberia . . . . .	1/20/55	15, 000, 000	Highway construction projects
Total . . . . .		\$21, 350, 000	

**U.S. Support for U.N. Assistance Programs**

The United States continued during 1955 to contribute in major degree to United Nations programs of technical assistance, many of which were concentrated in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.<sup>31</sup> It also maintained its contributions to various United Nations agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and UNICEF which have given basic assistance to underdeveloped areas in a wide variety of ways.<sup>32</sup>

The United States on December 5, 1955, completed the action required for membership in the International Finance Corporation, established

under Resolution 823 (IX) of the General Assembly.<sup>33</sup> This country, as in the past, made a large contribution to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which assisted

<sup>32</sup> In general see U.N. docs. A/2943: *Report of the Economic and Social Council covering the period from 7 August 1954 to 5 August 1955, passim*; E/2740 (ST/ECA/32): *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945-1954, passim*; ST/TAA/SER.C/21: *Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East* (Baghdad, 6-21 March 1954); ST/TAA/K/Israel/4: *United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, Revenue Administration and Policy in Israel* (Second Report); *Seeds of Progress: Stories of Technical Assistance* (1955); E/CN.5/303/Rev. 1/ST/SOA/26: *Social Progress Through Community Development* (1955).

<sup>33</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 54. The charter of the International Finance Corporation requires a subscription of \$75,000,000 before the corporation can come into being; by Jan. 10, 1956, \$56,761,000 had been subscribed. Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to complete action for membership (Dec. 16, 1955).

<sup>31</sup> See *U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1954* (Department of State publication 5769), pp. 235-39, for tables of contributions.

in a number of development programs in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. By June 30, 1955, out of an authorized capital of \$10,000,000,000, some \$9,028,000,000 had been subscribed.<sup>34</sup> The United States had subscribed \$635,000,000, with 31,750 shares in the amount of \$3,175,000,000. By

<sup>34</sup> Afghanistan and Israel became members of the IBRD during 1955.

September 30, 1955, effective loans reached \$1,837,262,494, of which \$317,310,000, as illustrated in the table below, were for development purposes in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. A development survey was completed in Syria during 1955 and one was organized in Jordan.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup> See also U.N. docs. A/2906 and A/3065 for material on the proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.

*Loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1949-1955*<sup>36</sup>

Country	Date	Original Amount	Purpose
Ceylon . . . . .	7/9/54	\$19, 110, 000	Electrical power development
India . . . . .	8/18/49	34, 000, 000	Railway rehabilitation. Some \$1,200,000 cancelled or refunded
	9/29/49	10, 000, 000	Agricultural development. Some \$2,796,187 cancelled or refunded
	4/18/50	18, 500, 000	Electric power development. Some \$690,000 cancelled or refunded
	1/23/53	19, 500, 000	Electric power development, flood control and irrigation. Some \$9,000,000 cancelled or refunded
India (Guarantor)			
Indian Iron & Steel Company. . . . .	12/18/52	31, 500, 000	Expansion of iron and steel production facilities
Tata Hydro, Andhra and Tata Power Companies	11/19/54	16, 200, 000	Electric power development
India (Guarantor)			
Industrial Credit and Investment Corp. of India	3/14/55	10, 000, 000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry
Iraq . . . . .	6/15/50	12, 800, 000	Construction of a flood control project. Some \$6, 506, 054 cancelled or refunded
Lebanon (Guarantor)			
Litani River Authority . . . . .	8/25/55	27, 000, 000	Electric power development and irrigation
Pakistan (Guarantor)			
Sui Gas Transmission Co. . . . .	6/2/54	14, 000, 000	Construction of natural gas transmission line
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd.	6/20/55	13, 800, 000	Electric power development
Karnaphuli Paper Mills, Ltd. . . . .	8/4/55	4, 200, 000	Construction of paper and pulp mill
Trustees of the Port of Karachi . . . . .	8/4/55	14, 800, 000	Port construction and development
Turkey . . . . .	7/7/50	3, 900, 000	Construction of grain storage facilities
First Tranche . . . . .	7/7/50	12, 500, 000	Port construction and development
Second Tranche . . . . .	2/26/54	3, 800, 000	Port construction and development
	6/18/52	25, 200, 000	Electric power development, irrigation and flood control. Some \$2,356,000 cancelled or refunded
Turkey (Guarantor)			
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey .	10/19/50	9, 000, 000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey .	9/10/53	9, 000, 000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry
Ethiopia . . . . .	9/13/50	5, 000, 000	Highway rehabilitation
	9/13/50	2, 000, 000	Foreign exchange for Development Bank
	2/19/51	1, 500, 000	Rehabilitation and extension of telephone and telegraph systems
Total . . . . .		\$317, 310, 000	

<sup>36</sup> International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Tenth Annual Report 1954-1955*, appendix F. See also International Bank for Reconstruction and Development press release 427 (Nov. 3, 1955), Financial Statements for First Quarter ending September 30, 1955. In addition to the above, the IBRD on Aug. 26, 1955, made a loan of \$10 million for electric power in Algeria and on Mar. 5, 1956, announced that it was sending a survey mission to the Trust Territory of Somaliland.

## Reflections of United States Policy

That the United States continued to look upon the problems of stability and security in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa from a broadly based point of view, and that it was prepared to meet the new challenges which had arisen, was indicated by a number of developments toward the end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956. The American attitude was reflected in the unanimous view of the United States delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that economic and social questions were "assuming increasing importance on the international scene" and had moved to the forefront in "the struggle between Communism and freedom," particularly since the Soviet Union was using "economic and social collaboration as a means for jumping military as well as political barriers," as in India, Egypt, and Burma, for example. The delegation believed that the United States should counter the Soviet efforts, not by outbidding it in sheer amounts of economic assistance but "by making newly independent and newly articulate peoples feel that they can best satisfy their wants by becoming and remaining part of the community of free nations." The delegation warned that the United States was "in a contest in the field of economic development of underdeveloped countries which is bitterly competitive" and that defeat in this contest "could be as disastrous as defeat in an armaments race."<sup>37</sup>

President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles endorsed these views. Mr. Dulles had already declared, on December 20, that the United States sought no monopoly in the field of economic assistance and welcomed "any grant of economic aid" which invigorated less developed countries and made them more independent, as had been the aim of American policy since the Second World War. Not one country had "lost any particle of freedom or independence" as a result of American assistance. Mr. Dulles hoped that Soviet assistance was "not offered as a Trojan horse to penetrate, and then take over, independent countries"; he felt that the experienced statesmen of the areas concerned were well aware of the dangers.<sup>38</sup>

President Eisenhower sounded a similar note in his state of the Union message on January 5, 1956, declaring that the mutual security program must be sustained and fortified and noting that "because the conditions of poverty and unrest in less de-

veloped areas make their people a special target of international communism, there is a need to help them achieve the economic growth and stability necessary to preserve their independence against Communist threats and enticements."<sup>39</sup>

## THE OUTLOOK IN UNITED STATES POLICY

Such were the major developments in United States policy during 1955. As the year drew to a close and another dawned, it was clear that the problems were as manifold, complex, and persistent as they had been in the past and that there were no simple or easy solutions to any of them. There was a recognition of the basic elements in the situation in the discussions between Prime Minister Eden and President Eisenhower, January 30 to February 1, 1956, in which the problems of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa were both broadly and specifically discussed.

It was agreed that every effort should be made to reduce the sources of misunderstanding between the Middle Eastern nations, whose peoples should be helped to achieve "their legitimate aspirations." Similarly, an Arab-Israel settlement was considered urgent, but possible only if both sides were "willing to reconcile the positions" hitherto taken. The United States and the United Kingdom reiterated their willingness to contribute to a settlement through financial assistance on the Arab refugee problem and guaranties of "agreed frontiers," reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, and announced arrangements for discussions, with French participation, as to "the nature of the action" to be taken in the event of violence. It was also clear that security in the Middle East could not rest upon arms alone but must be based on the establishment of good neighborly relations. Soviet policy in arms supplies to Middle Eastern countries was viewed as adding to

<sup>37</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.

<sup>38</sup> For transcripts of the Secretary's news conferences of Dec. 20, 1955, and Jan. 11, 1956, see *ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1956, p. 8, and Jan. 23, 1956, p. 118. Mr. Dulles indicated that mutual security requests for the next fiscal year would total about \$4,900,000,000, of which about \$1,900,000,000 would be for the economic part of the program. See also the transcript of the Secretary's press conference of Jan. 17, 1956, *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 155.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79. See also excerpts from the President's budget message, *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 147, and his message transmitting the 1957 mutual security program, *ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545.

the tensions and increasing the risk of war—a risk which the United States and the United Kingdom desired to mitigate. In that interest they fully supported the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization and were ready favorably to consider “recommendations for any necessary enlargement . . . and improvement of its capabilities.” They were also agreed concerning the significance of the Baghdad Pact, and the United States indicated that it would “continue to give solid support to the purposes . . . of the Pact” and that its observers would “play a constructive part in the work of its committees.” The belief was expressed that difficulties in Arabia and the region of the Persian Gulf could be solved through “friendly discussions.”

The Declaration of Washington, which emanated from these discussions, reaffirmed the goal of self-government and independence of “all countries whose people desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence” and noted that, in striking contrast to the Soviet record in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 600 million people “in nearly a score of lands” had attained nationhood since World War II with American and British assistance and that many more millions were “being helped surely and steadily toward self-government.” Since political independence alone was insufficient, the need for technical and economic assistance was recognized, and it was stressed, again in contrast to Soviet aggrandizement, that the United Kingdom and the United States had “not sought nor desired extension of either economic or political power.” It was also pointed out that Soviet aims had not changed, that “military and political force” had been used in the past, and that now “economic inducements” had been added to the “methods of penetration.” There were a warning lest underdeveloped nations lose their independence through “threat, promise or enticement” and a notice that some 50 nations which cherished their freedom had “drawn together in voluntary associations for their collective security.”<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup> For texts of communique and Declaration, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 231.

The policy of the United States was reconfirmed both generally and specifically on a number of occasions in the period immediately following the Anglo-American discussions, whether with regard to North Africa, Middle East security and the shipment of arms, South Asia, the Soviet challenge in the area, or the problems of economic development. Secretary Dulles suggested to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24, 1956, that Israel's security could be better assured, in the long run, through measures—including reliance on the United Nations—other than the acquisition of additional arms in circumstances which might “exacerbate the situation.” He did not exclude the possibility, however, of arms shipments, either to Israel or to the Arab States, at a time when it would “preserve the peace.”<sup>41</sup>

President Eisenhower reiterated this position at his news conferences on March 7 and 15, emphasizing that the United States was trying to avoid the initiation of an arms race in the Middle East, stressing the need for action under the United Nations and for the avoidance of incidents, and noting continued adherence to the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950. At the same time, the President indicated that the conflict between the Communist and the free worlds was now undergoing a “very great broadening” into the economic and political fields, a very serious development which demanded “flexibility” in the American foreign assistance program.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368. See also the Secretary's statements of Feb. 7, *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 279, and of Feb. 28, *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409. See also the correspondence of Secretary Dulles with certain members of Congress, *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 285. For the Department's statement of Feb. 18, concerning the shipment of 18 tanks to Saudi Arabia under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, see *ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1956, p. 325.

<sup>42</sup> See also Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, “First Annual Report of the Council Representatives, March 1956,” *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403, and the final communique of the SEATO Council meeting at Karachi, Mar. 8, 1956, *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 447.

## An Outline of the Mutual Security Program for 1957

*Statement by John B. Hollister  
Director, International Cooperation Administration<sup>1</sup>*

I am glad, Mr. Chairman, to have the opportunity to appear before you in support of the President's request for authority for funds to carry out the mutual security program in fiscal year 1957. This request, as the President has indicated in his message,<sup>2</sup> is for the national defense and for a program which is a vital part of the foreign policy of the United States.

As you know, I became Director of the International Cooperation Administration in June 1955. Full realization of the scope of the mutual security program in all its aspects has come only by 8 months' experience in day-to-day operations and by visiting each of the principal regions in which the program is carried out in cooperation with our foreign allies and friends. I have held regional meetings with the chiefs of our missions in Europe, the Near East and Africa, and in Latin America. I have personally visited each Far Eastern country in which we carry on a mission and have seen some of the work being conducted in representative nations in other parts of the world. Altogether, I have visited personally 17 of the 50 countries where the ICA has missions.

These meetings and visits were essential to a proper understanding of what this Government was trying to do in various parts of the world, and it has given me a basis for appreciating the many problems which confront us. I am glad that a number of members of this committee, since the Congress adjourned last summer and in prior years, have been able to see some of the mutual security programs in actual operation, for I am sure that such firsthand observation is a great help to understanding the need of the assistance and the problems that beset us in furnishing it.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 20.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545.

The mutual security program is a large global operation. No industrial company in the United States spends anywhere near as much to deliver as many varied items and services in as many different places abroad.

### Administrative Setup

The program, as this committee well knows, is both military and nonmilitary. In this program, the Director of ICA performs two distinct roles. One of these is as head of a semiautonomous *operating* agency within the State Department. This agency is charged with the development and execution of most of the nonmilitary aspects of the program. With respect to the nonmilitary phases of the mutual security program, ICA administers the operations through a planning and administrative staff in Washington and through several thousand representatives in the field.

The other role of the Director is that of coordinator of the whole program. This is not by virtue of his position as head of ICA but by special delegation of the Secretary of State. Under this delegation it is the duty of the Director of ICA to coordinate all elements of the mutual security program. In all foreign policy matters, I take guidance from the Secretary of State.

The Director in his coordinating activities must see that the whole problem in each country is examined and is taken into account and that the program in all of its aspects—policy, economic, and military—is properly designed to accomplish the objectives of the program. Accordingly, in presenting our requests for funds for your consideration, we will try to describe fully to you the problems of each region and country as a whole, in all its aspects. We will plan to have here at all times (1) a representative of the State Depart-

ment for the region under discussion who can answer your questions on foreign policy; (2) a representative of the Department of Defense who can inform you about the military situation and program; and (3) a regional representative of Ica to explain the economic and nonmilitary programs.

#### **Program To Meet All Aspects of Problem**

We feel that the program should be viewed as a whole, as a balanced effort to meet the Communist challenge for world domination which today threatens the peace and security of the United States and the rest of the free world. This challenge has existed since World War II and now for nearly a decade has been the major problem confronting the United States, to which many other problems of our Government are related in one way or another.

In meeting the Communist threat affirmatively, we must recognize that the threat itself will continue to have many different aspects despite the Soviet tactics of shifting from time to time the emphasis from one form of offensive to another. In the period 1947 to 1953 the Soviets aroused well-founded fears of armed aggression through all the free world. Today, although their primary effort appears to be economic, there is no indication that the war preparations have ceased. There can, therefore, be no relaxation in our own military effort, nor in those of our allies, nor in our support of those allies. At the same time we must go forward with our own foreign economic aid program, the success of which will be the best answer to the new Soviet economic activities.

The total program (to be met out of new appropriated funds) presented for fiscal year 1957 is \$4.86 billion. Of this, \$3 billion is for military assistance. The balance of \$1,860 million is nonmilitary, although much of it directly supports military effort.

I refer you to a chart which shows the approximate distribution of the fiscal year 1957 program by function. The military assistance funds (\$3 billion) will go for administration and expenditure to the Department of Defense. The items for defense support, development assistance, and technical cooperation will be allotted for administration and expenditure by the International Cooperation Administration.

*Military assistance* now includes what was for-

merly called direct-forces support—that is, the furnishing of consumable supplies, services, commodities, etc., to allies' military forces, as well as the provision of equipment, weapons, and training.

*Defense support* is furnished to certain countries eligible for military assistance. It is the name which, as a result of previous congressional history, is applied to all forms of nonmilitary assistance (except technical cooperation) in countries where there is a substantial military assistance program. It includes aid for civilian-type projects and activities which directly support the military program of the country (for example, highways, ports, communications) and also more general assistance which makes it possible for a country to maintain agreed force levels without seriously adverse economic or political consequences. At the same time, defense support is designed to contribute to building up the recipient country's internal strength, making possible progress toward improved living standards.

*Development assistance* is the term generally used to define all forms of aid, except technical cooperation, which are furnished in countries where we have no substantial military aid program. It is furnished to certain countries with which we have no military agreements to promote their economic development.


*Technical cooperation* consists of programs for sharing technical knowledge and skills with less developed countries. These programs are carried on through direct arrangements between the United States Government and individual governments usually referred to as "host" governments, as well as through the United Nations and through the Organization of American States. Under the technical cooperation programs, technicians and experts are sent from the United States to work overseas with host government officials and to help host governments develop their own technical resources for economic and social development. Our technicians are supported, when necessary, by supplies and equipment sent from the United States for demonstration purposes. Foreign nationals are also brought to the United States (or other countries) for training or advanced study in technical specialties. This technical exchange program is operative equally in countries which are eligible for military aid and those which are not. Much of it is carried on through contracts with American universities




# MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAMS BY FUNCTION

## FY 1956 APPROPRIATIONS

## FY '57 APPROPRIATION REQUEST



\$ 2,703 MILLION



\$ 4,860 MILLION

NOTE: The figure of \$4,860 million for the 1957 appropriation request excludes programs of \$105 million to be financed from reappropriations or funds remaining available in 1957.

under which technicians and specialists are supplied. All of it is on a joint basis.

There are some further circumstances which should be mentioned in this connection, as failure to understand them may lead to confusion about the total of the figures just mentioned. In addition to the new funds requested for appropriation, we expect to have on hand on June 30, 1956, an unobligated balance of \$45 million in the Palestine Refugee Fund, which we ask be carried over. We estimate that there will be an unobligated balance in the Asian fund of about \$60 million, which is available for 2 more years. We expect that this sum will be programed and wholly obligated in fiscal year 1957.

### The Military Program

For the description and details of the purely military part of the program, you will hear from representatives of the Department of Defense. However, as coordinator of the mutual security program, there are some aspects of that program on which I wish to comment.

1. The military program has been developed

country by country, with careful consideration of the entire situation in each region and country.

(a) In determining the military assistance to be furnished to a country, we have tried to consider all aspects of that country's status, including the nature of the risks and dangers to the country itself and the relationship of such risks and dangers to the security position of the free world.

(b) We have considered what nonmilitary projects are necessary to give direct support to the military effort.

(c) We have considered the capacity of the country to produce internally or to procure elsewhere and pay for equipment which it needs.

(d) Equally, if a country cannot, without either injury to its economy or outside aid, maintain agreed forces and adequate political stability important to the security of the United States and the free world, we must frame our nonmilitary programs in a way which helps to make possible the maintenance of the desired defense strength.

(e) We must give attention to the very practical consideration which exists in many coun-

tries—What is the maximum defense expenditure which the country can make without endangering the economic health and progress of the country? In countries with low per capita incomes, this is important because the peoples of the less developed countries have reasonable aspirations for better conditions which should be satisfied as fully as practicable if the countries are to remain stable components of the free world.

(f) The military-assistance program in each country, and action in carrying out the programs of prior years, must be related closely to the current U.S. foreign policy with reference to that country and to developments in the general world situation.

We have met with great cooperation from all the agencies involved in trying to tie all aspects of the program together.

2. The military program has a new aspect this year—the commencement of a major effort to equip the forces of our allies with very advanced weapons. This will involve the provision of about \$530 million worth of advanced weapons for those countries receiving military assistance who can use them effectively in defense of the free world.

A portion of the funds for these advanced weapons has already been earmarked for NATO countries in the illustrative fiscal year 1957 program. The balance has not been distributed in such specific fashion but will be allocated after further study of their most useful and effective employment.

While the problems of each country are different, it is more convenient to discuss them in regional categories, which is the historical method of treatment.

#### **Europe: NATO**

Our earliest mutual security problems in the period following World War II were encountered in Europe. The Marshall plan, inaugurated in 1947, helped put Europe on the road to economic recovery, and that recovery continues. At the same time the military forces of the NATO countries have been strengthened rapidly.

The aid request for NATO countries (excluding Greece and Turkey) in fiscal year 1957 is almost entirely military. For the second successive year no defense support or related aid, with the exception of a small amount for technical exchange, is being requested for any of these countries.

The need for military assistance is based primarily on two main considerations.

The first consideration is *strategic*. The security of Western Europe is vital to the security of the United States. Western Europe is a first line of our defense, and our divisions stationed there are testimony to this fact. Western Europe has the largest reserve of skilled manpower and, next to the United States, the greatest industrial potential in the world. It has a large pool of trained forces under arms. Its air and naval bases are vital to the defense of this country.

The second consideration is *economic*. Notwithstanding Western Europe's economic improvement, the heavy expense of creating and maintaining an adequate defense in the area imposes a severe strain on the resources of many of the NATO countries. The high cost of advanced weapons, coupled with the annual recurring costs of maintaining the defense establishment already built up, therefore, make the continuation of some United States military assistance to them desirable. Without this assistance, the effectiveness of their forces would not be maintained. Equipment would deteriorate and fall into disrepair for lack of spare parts, or become obsolescent.

In their own defense expenditures NATO countries have continued at a high level despite the fact United States economic aid to these countries has ceased.

The expenditures which the European countries are now undertaking for their own defense are very substantial indeed. The total outlay for European defense establishments from 1949 to 1955 amounts to about \$72 billion. Of this total, about \$10 billion is represented by United States aid. In other words, the NATO countries are footing the bill for about 85 percent of their total defense expenditures. Moreover, since troop pay in Europe is very much lower than in the United States, the human and material resources actually devoted to defense by the Europeans are substantially larger than these figures would indicate, by our yardstick. Likewise, the forces actually maintained through this expenditure are significantly larger than those that we could maintain for the same expenditure.

In the coming fiscal year, of the military assistance proposed for Western Europe, the greater part will go to the NATO countries. This will be increased by the amount of any of the unallocated reserve of advanced weapons which may be as-

signed for use by NATO forces. In the light of all the circumstances, including the advantage to the free world of maintaining force strength and quality of equipment, the help proposed to the European nations in NATO is not disproportionate to the benefit to us as a nation, nor does the European effort as a whole represent less than a reasonable share of the common defense effort.

Although no defense support or economic aid as such is proposed for these countries in fiscal year 1957, we are requesting \$1½ million for support of the European Productivity Agency, an arm of the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation]. Through this agency, the OEEC countries are working together to adapt and apply the best American and European technical experience to the development of more dynamic economies in Europe, thereby strengthening the economic base for Western defense.

#### **West Berlin, Spain, Yugoslavia**

The second group of European countries with which we are concerned comprises West Berlin, Spain, and Yugoslavia. All three of these lie, politically and geographically speaking, on the periphery of Western Europe. They are not members of NATO and OEEC although Spain and Yugoslavia are observers in the latter organization. Spain and Yugoslavia have not benefited as fully from the European recovery as the other countries, and their standards of living are appreciably below those of other European areas. Yet each of these countries is making a substantial contribution to the military, political, or psychological defense of the West, and each is joined with us in strong mutual security interest.

*Spain* is cooperating with us in the construction of important air and naval bases;

*Yugoslavia*, despite a common frontier with four Iron Curtain countries, continues to set an important example by guarding its independence from Soviet domination, and is a member of the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey—both NATO members, though generally considered “Near East” countries;

*West Berlin* stands as an outpost of the free world—a symbol of freedom far behind the Iron Curtain.

These are the three special situations for which defense support and related assistance is proposed. Along with the \$1½ million for the European Productivity Agency, the nonmilitary aid pro-

posed comes to \$90 million. This is a slight reduction from funds available for similar programs for fiscal year 1956 and a reduction of more than 50 percent from similar programs for fiscal year 1955.

#### **Middle East, Africa, and Asia**

Turning from Europe to the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, the situation becomes much more complex and much more varied. In these areas we have a large number of new nations, some of them recently emerged from colonial status. In most of these countries the levels of living standards, annual gross national product, industrial capacity, and per capita income are low in comparison to the more prosperous parts of the free world.

Some of these nations, such as Korea, Laos, Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Taiwan, have recently suffered from the effects of war or are faced by large Communist forces at their borders, or both. There is great need for many of them to maintain substantial defense forces. This poses an economic problem of substantial proportions, for the military expenditure in many cases is totally beyond their resources. Nevertheless, they and the free world need this military effort so that they can remain free of external aggression and can put down armed internal subversion.

Many of these allies of ours, and also other nations of the free world not receiving military assistance, are faced with internal economic problems which would confront them even if they made no military effort. Their peoples, with unsatisfactory living conditions, are aspiring to a level above an austere subsistence standard. They look to their leaders for a degree of economic progress which is beyond their powers to achieve unassisted. We thus must face the problem of nonmilitary assistance of an economic character:

(a) To maintain the defense efforts of our less prosperous allies at desired levels, and

(b) To assist some of our allies, and also various less developed, uncommitted free nations, to strike at those conditions of poverty, disease, and low living standards which tend to create unrest and instability and which, if not improved, can lead to disorder or collapse which would threaten world peace.

Our allies want to be strong. If they are to be strong, we cannot see them bowed by an unbearable defense burden beyond their capacities and

unable to meet the reasonable aspirations of their peoples for progress.

In the case of uncommitted nations, we achieve an important objective in the interests of the security of the United States and the free world if we can succeed in helping them to make the progress which will keep alive their desire for independence as responsible and developing members of the free world. We have no desire to impose our way of life upon them. Our sole purpose is to help them to develop the internal economic conditions in which free institutions can prosper. We hope to keep them from throwing their weight into the balance against the free world and on the side of communism.


The problem has been greatly complicated by the increased economic activities of the Soviet bloc in relation to the free nations. Communist offers of economic, military, and technical help have a strong appeal for nations which need assistance badly, and we, therefore, must expect many of these offers, where they are sufficiently attractive, to be accepted. Such acceptance involves dangers as well as material benefits. It increases the op-

portunities for Communist penetration; it frequently places the Soviet Union in a falsely favorable light; it may tie the recipient unduly to the Communist bloc; it will be capitalized upon by the Communists to proclaim their unselfish interest in the economic welfare of others.

We must take this danger with the utmost of seriousness. Some of the peoples throughout the Middle East and Asia are all too likely to accept the Communist propaganda line, which puts the blame on free-world nations for the existence of obstacles between present hard economic realities and their own economic aspirations. For many leaders in the region, the first direct contact with the Soviet Government itself has been with the new 1956 model of Soviet "traveling salesman" diplomat who smilingly and seductively offers on easy terms the capital and technical and military help they desire. These Soviet offers have included arms to Egypt, Afghanistan, and other countries and machinery, food, industrial plants, and technicians to many other countries around the world. While we have no intention of competing with the U.S.S.R., offer by offer—for to

## **TOTAL MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM BY REGION**

(MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY COMBINED)



NOTE: The figure of \$2,943 million for fiscal 1956 includes programs of \$240 million financed from reappropriation of funds. The figure of \$4,965 for fiscal 1957 includes programs of \$105 million to be financed from reappropriations or funds remaining available in 1957.

do so would be to abandon independence and judgment—yet we must take account of the new approach which Soviet tyranny has adopted to court the Moslem, Asiatic, and African worlds.

Our policy, I believe, should be to continue to support projects and programs which, in the light of our best judgment and experience, contribute to freedom and sound development in these areas. We should not be stampeded into proposing projects beyond the capacity and energies of any nation—for, unlike the Soviets, we care about their future and will not deliberately entice a nation into the quicksands of overexpansion or inflation. We must recognize that pressing human misery has made many a nation nearsighted to the human tragedy of the concentration camps, slave labor, and brutal rigidity that lies back of the Soviet offers of arms and aid and Soviet methods of obtaining industrial advances. We must understand that responsible leaders in the newly developing region, no matter how moderate or how free-world they may be themselves, must make substantial deliveries on programs of development in order to continue as leaders in their nations. Our program must recognize such circumstances. It in fact does so by helping to provide the kind of aid needed to carry forward sound development programs at a rate and in a volume adapted to the capacity of countries to maintain effectively, and in terms of the economic and political circumstances that these countries, their peoples, and their leaders face.

Before discussing the various countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia in more detail, I want to make two points which affect our programs in these areas.

1. *Great flexibility of action* on the part of the United States is needed to meet situations as they arise.

These areas are in a volatile stage of development and change. New problems are arising daily, and old problems are constantly taking on new aspects. We should be in a position to take prompt action to deal with those situations where assistance is wise, before others, hostile to free-world objectives, exploit them dangerously.

2. Some of these problems are *long-range*. To be most effective, we should be in a position to make reasonable nonmilitary commitments extending beyond the span of a single fiscal year. The President mentioned this problem in his message, and I shall discuss it later.

I turn now to the situation in the Middle East and Africa in greater detail. As examples of some of our problems, let me mention a few individual situations.

*Turkey's* assumption of an extraordinarily large military burden—she is presently contributing a substantial part of the ground forces of NATO—merits our continued support. The combination of the demands of the defense establishment and the costs of accelerated development has brought about serious economic strain. The Government of Turkey has recently announced a stabilization program containing those elements of economic reform which can contribute to financial balance if properly carried out.

The oil of *Iran* is beginning to add substantially to that country's capital development, but in the next year or so Iran will still need help in meeting the heavy costs of government that are occasioned by large military expenditures and the needs for development.

We support the *Egyptian* Government's determination to build a better life for her people. To bring fruition to their strivings for the common decencies of life, Egyptians need aid to provide long-range buildup of their resources, such as the High Aswan Dam will accomplish. At the same time, Egypt must satisfy immediate needs so that there will be a "long-range" future with which we can cooperate. Our relationship with this great Moslem state depends on our understanding of both future and present economic requirements in connection with which Egypt needs external help.

In the *Arab States* and in *Israel*, we hope that our programs, which are designed to accelerate desperately needed economic development and to provide a partial answer to the pitiful plight of the refugees from Israel, will also help in the solution of the bitter controversies that now plague the whole Near East. We are prepared to support any programs or projects that hold real promise of constructive progress on these problems, including broad support for regional projects that will harness the energy and equitably distribute the waters of the Jordan River or facilitate the resettlement of refugees.

#### MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA FUND

Three factors in particular create a special need for the capacity for flexible action on the economic

front in the Middle East and Africa. The *first* is the increased Soviet activity in the area. The *second* factor is a past pattern, which there is every likelihood will continue to repeat itself in the future, of frequent and sudden economic crises in certain countries of the region. The *third* consideration is the fact that many of the major problems of the region with which our aid programs must deal are of a kind which concern two or more countries. This means, when given the sensitive political issues involved in the relationships among some of these countries, that the exact timing and character of the eventual solutions to these problems cannot be accurately forecast, nor the precise manner in which our aid can contribute.

We need to have available a fund which is not programed in detail, far in advance and country by country. This should be available during the coming fiscal year for carrying out major country and regional projects which seem of particular importance in solving economic problems and in maintaining peace and stability. Such a fund would place the United States in a position to give highly desirable economic assistance, without having to divert funds earmarked for some other specific purpose. Such a fund would avoid the necessity of transferring funds to high-priority projects suddenly developing, at the expense of soundly conceived country programs which have been carefully presented for your approval as illustrative programs.

The President suggests a fund of \$100 million. We would expect to have it obligated in the course of the coming fiscal year. Some of it would doubtless be applied in aid of projects which we are already considering but which have not at the moment developed to a point where we are able to present them as part of our specific illustrative programs. Some of the fund would doubtless be applied to meet emergency situations.

#### **SOUTH ASIA**

In the light of *Pakistan's* commitment to the free world both in the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] and the Baghdad Pact, her efforts to maintain adequate defenses and to build economic strength deserve our strong support, for *Pakistan's* strength and freedom are a center link to a chain that guards free Asia.

Consistent with our policy of helping to

strengthen free nations which are striving to maintain their independence and which require help in achieving a rate of economic growth adequate for the minimum needs of their people, we plan to assist *India* in carrying out its second 5-year development program, which is to be initiated this year. It is important for the United States to give continued assistance as evidence of our interest in and friendship for the Indian people, thus helping a great nation, devoted to the principles of freedom, to make the economic advances which are essential to its welfare.

#### **FAR EAST**

The mutual security program in the Far East currently includes programs for Korea, Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Laos, and Indonesia. In general, the reasons which I have already advanced for assistance to the less developed countries of the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia apply with equal force to all our Far Eastern friends and allies, except, in part, in the case of Japan, which is the only highly industrialized country in the Far East.

The major part of the total aid proposed for the Far East would go to Korea, Taiwan, Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Each of these countries is now maintaining large military forces which it requires for its self-defense. These forces are larger, in some cases many times larger, than those which these countries can raise and support with their own resources alone. Over the past several years we have helped them to develop and maintain these forces through the provision of all types of aid. As a result, the strength and effectiveness of these forces has increased very greatly, but this strength and effectiveness cannot be sustained without continuing aid of considerable magnitude. Modern forces are far more expensive to maintain than primitive ones. Moreover, expanded forces require new facilities such as airfields, naval bases, and barracks. These countries, with their very limited resources, cannot meet the high costs involved out of their own revenues.

Some of these same nations, like Korea and Viet-Nam, have also faced the problem of recovering from the effects of war and of caring for and absorbing a great influx of refugees. They lack the foreign exchange to import consumer goods, industrial raw materials, machinery and

spare parts which their present economies need. They also face the necessity of increasing their own capacity for self-support and of making a beginning at the long task of economic development to raise living standards.

These countries will necessarily receive substantial military assistance under the 1957 program. The threat of further Communist aggression is not by any means removed, and it is unfortunate that, in countries with so much need for economic progress, it is necessary for the free world to spend such large amounts for military purposes. In the present state of the world this cannot be avoided.

The aid program for Korea continues to be the largest single aid program currently being conducted by the United States. This is true of both its military and nonmilitary components. This is partly because Korea has the largest single army in the Far East and one which is well beyond the capacity of Korea to support unaided. This army is largely composed of battle-trained veterans, and it has been created, and then maintained, at its present effective strength only by huge volumes of continuing military aid and defense support.

#### **PRESIDENT'S FUND FOR ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

A year ago, the Congress authorized appropriations of \$200 million for Asian economic development, but only \$100 million was appropriated. This year the President has requested appropriation of the remaining \$100 million. This committee is not called upon for any action now upon this request since the appropriation has been authorized.

The Congress knew that planning the expenditure of this money would take some time, and the funds appropriated were therefore made available for a 3-year period.

The first major expenditure from this fund will probably be for a regional nuclear research and training center to be located in the Philippines for the benefit of Asians. This was announced only last week.<sup>3</sup> The Brookhaven National Laboratory will start off a comprehensive survey of this next month. Other projects under study involve communications, mineral-resources development, production improvement, rail and water transportation, and various regional technical training centers.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 544.

#### **Latin America**

The fiscal year 1957 program recommends continuance of our technical cooperation programs in Latin America. These are effective in assisting the self-reliant governments and peoples of Latin American countries in their own development activities. These governments are striving to achieve higher health, social, and economic standards, and the technical assistance we have been able to furnish has been warmly received and generously acknowledged.

The programs are designed to assist the peoples in each country to develop and utilize more effectively their tremendous human and natural resources. The programs are cooperative in that our representatives and those of the host government work side by side and are supported by the pooled contributions of both countries.

In a recent trip to several Latin American countries I gained the impression that the broad objectives of the mutual security program are being achieved in generous measure. In each country, whether it was in the palace or the foreign office or in some jungle area of the interior, the answer to the question "Who is carrying out this program?" was invariably—"we"—"your people and our people." This is the partnership spirit with which our people are carrying out the program, and it is gratifying to me to find that it is shared by those with whom we work. I think you can feel assured that these technical assistance programs are a source of genuine good will between the United States and Latin America.





#### **Other Activities**

We assist, as you know, various projects handled through U.N. agencies. In dollar amount our contributions to these agencies are included in the fiscal year program for a total of \$27,800,000.

Witnesses directly concerned with supervising and operating these programs will testify about them. They are in general comparable in size to the programs of earlier years.

It has been the policy of the United States to participate in these efforts of the United Nations as well as those of other international organizations to deal with certain problems of economic development and to meet the serious difficulties of certain especially needy people whose problems are best handled through multilateral action. We propose support of (a) our own program for

# FREE ASIA'S IMPORTANCE



escapees from communism, (b) the work of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), and (c) the program of paying ocean freight costs on donated relief supplies. These humanitarian programs are part of this Government's general support of collective action in the solution of important world social and economic problems, some arising out of World War II.

#### The Need of Flexibility

I have already referred to the need of flexibility to deal with the problems which confront us. This need will be apparent if I review for you briefly our planning and program cycle.

Ordinarily we come before your committee in the late spring. Incidentally, we are here before you earlier this year than in any year since 1952.

Hearings before this committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the two Appropriations Committees are thorough and complete, and we develop for your benefit illustrative programs which indicate the purpose for which we are asking very large sums of money.

These illustrative programs, when they reach you, have gone through a long process. Already the country teams in the countries involved are working on the early stages of the planning for the fiscal year 1958. Much of the planning at the country level for the 1957 fiscal year program was done a year ago. These country programs, both military and economic, then receive a very thorough screening in the field and in Washington. Priorities among the projects are then determined. Those least useful and with least promise are eliminated, and the program requirements are reconciled with fiscal needs. The Bu-



reau of the Budget thereafter participates in extended hearings on the programs as developed, and they are again further refined. Thus, funds actually appropriated in the late spring or early summer of 1956 for the fiscal year 1957 program will be based on planning which started in the spring of 1955.

Appropriation of funds does not end our planning process. The Congress frequently makes changes in the program. This necessitates an extended further program review to adjust the illustrative programs to congressional action and to changes in the general world or country situation. It takes time to make allocations of funds to particular programs and situations. Usually we do not get the funds in form to be used until November or December of the calendar year in which the appropriations are made. After that, we must begin the long process of negotiation, first with other governments and later with contractors, designed to insure that we spend the money you have granted to us with wisdom and frugality. The negotiation cannot be started (particularly with foreign governments) until we know we have money to spend. This is particularly true with respect to country programs, including the sale of agricultural commodities or the use of loans as part of the program, for, in general, the agreement with such a country is on a "package" basis. Both for the Defense Department and for ICA, this puts us on a very tight time schedule—and forces active negotiation work by a busy staff just at the time when it is preparing to present the program of the next succeeding fiscal year to you.

This presentation is a very intricate task indeed. The large presentation documents which come to you each year do not write themselves. They involve a vast amount of careful writing, checking of figures, interdepartmental coordination and clearances, and editing. The Defense and Ica program and operating staffs have been working steadily on the documents which you have before you for over 2 months and at the same time have been pressing to carry out the obligating of fiscal year 1956 funds. The same people must work on both tasks, for they are the only people who have the detailed knowledge to do this. The situation is particularly difficult because section 106 of the appropriation act provides that not more than 20 percent of the funds made available under the act may be obligated or reserved during the last 2 months of the fiscal year.

I wish to make two principal points on the basis of this description of the cycle.

*First*, a period of 1½ years to 2 years thus elapses between (a) initial planning and (b) obligation of funds. This means a substantial time lag between ascertainment of requirements and obligation of funds. New and substantial requirements can develop rapidly in the interim. We can meet these new requirements under present legislation in two ways.

1. We can transfer funds from other carefully prepared programs. This is undesirable because it means abandonment or postponement of carefully planned programs of assistance which are badly needed.

2. We can use the \$100-million President's contingency fund under section 401. This is our most valuable flexible asset in carrying out mutual security objectives, and we should save this for the most serious emergencies and unprogramed calls on our funds. The proposal of an additional Middle East and Africa fund, which I have already mentioned, in essence would give us a further available source of emergency funds for use in this region. Although this fund would be earmarked for use in a particular area of the world, it is a region in which unexpected need for funds is especially likely to arise.

*Second*, the planning and program cycle which I have described shows that the time available for obligation of mutual security funds is very short indeed, especially when 80 percent of them must, under the provisions of the present appropriation law, be obligated during the first 10 months of the fiscal year. I believe the taxpayers would get better value for their money and the conduct of the mutual security program would be improved if the Congress were to adopt the following recommendations:

(a) Make military assistance funds available on a "no year" basis as in the case of most other military procurement funds expended by the Department of Defense;

(b) Provide that at least 25 percent of nonmilitary Mutual Security Act funds shall remain available until September 30 following the end of the fiscal year (i. e. be 15-month funds).

I feel sure that the present provision limiting obligations in May and June to 20 percent of appropriations for the year exerts undue and unnecessary pressures for early obligation of funds which inevitably lead to hasty action. In essence,

the present provision moves the pressure for last-minute obligation of funds forward from June 30 to April 30, thus worsening the situation instead of improving it. I hope that the appropriations committees will see fit to relieve us of this requirement.

Further flexibility is needed in another wholly different direction. At the present time, the President is authorized to use under the provisions of section 401 of the Mutual Security Act (President's Special Fund), without regard to the provisions of the act itself or of any other statute for which funds are appropriated under the act:

(a) \$100 million specifically appropriated under the act for fiscal year 1956; and

(b) \$50 million of any other mutual security funds appropriated for fiscal year 1956.

This provision has enabled us to move promptly to carry out the purposes of the act in a number of critical situations where these purposes could not otherwise be accomplished within one or more of the normal restrictions of the Mutual Security Act and of certain other statutes.

We believe that the ability to act rapidly in an unrestricted fashion will prove to be even more necessary in the year which lies ahead. Accordingly, the President has recommended the broadening of the valuable authority provided by section 401 in three respects.

*First*, he has requested that the amount which is subject to the provisions of section 401 should be increased from \$150 million (composed of a specific appropriation for fiscal year 1956 under section 401 of \$100 million and any other \$50 million of fiscal year 1956 mutual security funds) to \$300 million (composed of a new specific appropriation of \$100 million for fiscal year 1957 under section 401 and any other \$200 million of fiscal year 1957 mutual security funds). This would mean that \$300 million, or about 6 percent, of the total mutual security funds requested for fiscal year 1957 would be subject to the high degree of flexibility now afforded by section 401.

*Second*, the President has requested that he be given authority to use not in excess of \$100 million of the funds available under section 401 without regard to the requirements of any act, if the President determines that such use would be important to the security of the United States. This provision would be similar to the broad exemption already furnished by section 404 of the act with respect to the funds provided under that section.

*Third*, he has requested that the amount of funds which may be allocated under section 401 to any one nation in any one fiscal year be increased from \$20 million to \$40 million.

These three changes would be an important addition to the authority of the Department of Defense and of ICA to move rapidly and flexibly to take necessary action in cases which may arise.

### **Long-Term Commitments**

The President has recommended that, for non-military projects of significance or importance, the President be authorized to make commitments for not over 10 years. The funds to fulfill such commitments would come from appropriations for nonmilitary purposes and would not exceed \$100 million in any one year.

The significant feature of the requested authority would be that the President would be able to give to other nations assurance, backed by congressional approval, that annually an agreed United States contribution to the projects in question will be made within and subject to the limits of the funds made available annually.

The Aswan Dam has frequently been cited as an example of the type of project in contemplation. Although in the initial stages of this project use of the requested new commitment authority may not be involved, it does serve to illustrate the possible use of the requested authority.

This project is a large river development involving many facets (irrigation, power, transportation, flood control, related agricultural enterprises, and service activities) all of which in the aggregate constitute a long-range development project, partly to be financed by the country to be benefited and partly by assistance programs and international loans. All these elements of such an enterprise must be pulled together into a sound arrangement for its financing. To obtain one part of the financing there must be assurance of the availability of the balance. The government of the country concerned must know that the project is financially feasible before it can safely go forward or even plan on a firm basis.

Other types of projects for which such a power would be useful involve harbor development, road systems, inland waterways, power systems, communications systems, industrial and educational centers, with their respective related and subsidiary schemes. If these are to be carried out over a period of years, there is no need of actual ap-

propriations until the year in which the funds are actually to be obligated approaches. However, we do request the authority, at an earlier date, to make commitments *not* amounting to binding *contract authority* but backed by the assurance of the Congress that these are undertakings for which we expect later to make appropriations. This authority may prove to be a very powerful and useful mutual-security instrument in the difficult years lying immediately ahead.

From personal experience in the House of Representatives, I know and understand the congressional reluctance to permit long-term arrangements. The Congress likes to review proposed appropriations on an annual basis and to check on the expenditure of previously granted funds before granting new authority. This opportunity to review will not be completely lost under the proposal, for annual appropriations must be made.

In the face of greatly increased Communist activity in the economic field, those charged with the execution of our mutual security programs are


going to need every reasonable tool to accomplish their objectives. The Communist leaders can act on dictatorial fiat without accountability to anyone. They need not give thought to any wishes of their own people or to their crying need for consumer goods. We seek no such autocratic power.

**Agricultural Commodities**

Under section 402 of the 1954 act, as amended, \$300 million is to be used in the current fiscal year to finance the export and sale for foreign currencies of surplus agricultural commodities produced in the United States. If we fail to arrange for such exports in the full amount, to the extent of our failure we cannot use our appropriations. To that extent the mutual security program of the United States and its allies is curtailed, and carefully planned projects must be scrapped or postponed.

In fiscal year 1956 we hope to reach the \$300-million mark, but may fall short. Whatever figure we reach will be only after much effort and

# PROGRAM BY REGION



in the face of many difficulties. In these situations, we must always try to avoid hurting normal export markets for United States agricultural products or for the products of our allies and friends. If we did cause such injury, we would do damage to the very cause of free-world security and stability we are trying to serve. This limits our opportunities. The 50-50 shipping provision also sometimes makes the problem difficult, particularly our efforts to work out triangular arrangements. The shift of the mutual security economic program toward less developed countries, which are predominantly agricultural and therefore need our surpluses less, also accentuates the problem.

I therefore ask that the requirement of section 402 for the coming fiscal year be set at \$250 million. We shall do our utmost to carry out the purposes of section 402, but we do not want to see useful projects abandoned for lack of funds, merely because under current world conditions we find it impossible to reach some arbitrary goal.

#### **Loans**

In the administration of the mutual security program it has been this Government's policy to encourage the financing of nonmilitary projects and activities by private investment or through public lending institutions such as the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This policy has been considered and applied in formulating the program for fiscal year 1957. Unfortunately, loan financing of this character has not been available in adequate amounts to meet the requirements for capital even in many countries whose economies are sufficiently stable to indicate capacity for repayment.

Under the mutual security program, we have provided our assistance in the form of loans rather than grants, so far as this was consistent with the attainment of mutual security objectives. We have tried to make sure that loans did not supplant those which might be available from the public lending institutions or replace potential private capital investment, if that possibility exists. Consequently, we have restricted the use of mutual security loans to situations in which the transaction would not take place at all unless on terms substantially more liberal than those available from the public lending institutions. The efforts

this year to increase the volume of loans actually made under the mutual security program have been disappointing. It has been found that the attempted substitution of a loan for a grant is frequently, either for political or economic reasons, inconsistent with the attainment of mutual security objectives, unless the terms of such loans are so liberal as in effect to constitute partial grants.

#### **Unexpended Balances**

At a later stage of these hearings, the appropriate accounting officers of the Defense Department and of ICA will discuss in detail the status of past appropriations and the unexpended balances of prior appropriations which we anticipate at the end of fiscal year 1956.

My present estimate, on the basis of information furnished by the Department of Defense, is that the balance of unexpended military assistance appropriations on June 30, 1956, will be about \$4.8 billion. This balance will represent a decline in the 2-year period since June 30, 1954, of about \$2.9 billion. It will be equal to about 2 years of military assistance expenditures at the average rate for the fiscal years 1955 and 1956.

On the nonmilitary side, on June 30, 1956, there will probably be a slight decline in unexpended balances from the levels prevailing at the end of June 1955 and June 1954. This balance will be equal to about 1 year's expenditure at the average rate now prevailing.

The new military assistance authorization requested is equal to about 1 year of expenditures (\$2.4 billion) at the present rate plus the \$530 million requested for advanced weapons of a type for which, in general, no previous appropriations have been made. The nonmilitary authorization requested is equal to about 1 year of expenditures at the current rate.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is a summary of my views on this vast program. The needs for such a program were never greater. The usefulness of it seems to me to be borne out by the news we read in each day's newspapers. We shall try to give you in the days to come a full picture of every aspect of the program. We think that the facts which you will hear in testimony and will find in written form in the presentation books will be more convincing than any expression of opinion anyone can give you.

## East-West Trade

*Statement by Under Secretary Hoover*<sup>1</sup>

You have asked me to appear today to give information on the matter of East-West trade.

At the outset there should be a clear understanding of the type of East-West trade with which we are here concerned. We do not refer to trade between the United States and the Communist bloc, for controls on our trade with the Communists are not in question. What we are dealing with here is trade between our allies and the Communist countries. The only effective way in which we can control that trade is through the power of persuasion.

We have offered to give your subcommittee—and we repeat our offer—all necessary and appropriate information about such trade. The issue between us seems to be that the subcommittee insists that all of this information be given in public session. We, on the contrary, feel that certain portions should only be given to the Congress on a classified basis. To make this information public would violate our agreements with our allies and would be prejudicial to our national security interests.

In any consideration of our system of international controls it is essential to remember that these controls depend entirely upon a system of voluntary cooperation among the free nations of the West. Thus, the 1954 revision of the International Control List had to be negotiated and agreement reached with all 14 of our allies.<sup>2</sup>

In those negotiations neither the United States nor any of the other participants got everything they wanted. The State Department, as well as the other interested Departments, was not happy

to see many items deleted from the control list. By the same token, some of our allies were not happy to see some items retained. We did succeed in retaining on the list highly strategic items which could not be controlled successfully without international agreement. We also succeeded in achieving our other major objective, the setting up of a more effective enforcement system. Without agreement among all 15 nations it would not have been possible to have any International Control List at all.

Thus all the responsible agencies are in full support of Governor Stassen's statement that the 1954 negotiations achieved a net security advantage for the United States, under all the circumstances then prevailing, and that the results were in the best interests of the United States.

Some criticism has been directed, during the course of these hearings, at our allies for the position taken by them with regard to East-West trade controls. They, as well as we, were seeking to achieve a balance between the beneficial effects of peaceful trade and the dangers of unrestricted trade in strategic items. Sometimes we disagreed, as free nations often do, as to where to strike that balance. Our negotiations in 1954 were on the whole a successful effort to resolve this problem.

It has been suggested that we might have been more successful if we had used more than the power of persuasion. President Eisenhower answered that contention on December 2, 1953,<sup>3</sup> as follows:

The easiest thing to do with great power is to abuse it, to use it to excess. This most powerful of the free nations must not permit itself to grow weary of the processes of negotiation and adjustment that are funda-

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1953, p. 811.

<sup>1</sup> Made on Mar. 26 before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (press release 161).

<sup>2</sup> For a Foreign Operations Administration announcement on the 1954 revisions, see BULLETIN of Sept. 13, 1954, p. 372.

mental to freedom. If it should turn impatiently to coercion of other free nations, our brand of coercion, so far as our friends are concerned, would be a mark of the imperialist rather than of the leader.

During the course of this investigation, complaints have been made that the executive branch has withheld information about the 1954 negotiations which the Congress has a right to know. I do not think the record will sustain that point.

On February 14 I appeared before your subcommittee in executive session. I offered full cooperation to the subcommittee and explained that much of the information sought could only be given in executive session in order to protect our national security. The subcommittee did not respond to that offer but instead proceeded with open hearings.

Therefore, on February 20 a letter was sent to the chairman on behalf of the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce and the International Cooperation Administration.<sup>4</sup> That letter is in the record of these hearings. It pointed out that most of the documents involved in these international negotiations were classified and highly sensitive and that they involved our relations with other governments. It was further stated that in many instances we had given a specific commitment to keep the participation of a particular nation in this program secret. The letter concluded that, for these reasons, the International List could not be made public but full information as to items on the List could be offered to the subcommittee in executive session and on a classified basis.

In a further effort to clarify our position a letter was addressed to the chairman on March 23,<sup>4</sup> pointing out that the information already offered would give the subcommittee, on a classified basis, every item on the International List. I would like to enter that letter into the record at this time. It stated we were ready to give the subcommittee the List itself on a classified basis and to discuss the 1954 revisions of that List with the subcommittee in executive session.

Our request is not unusual. We are only asking to follow the same procedure followed by the other committees of the Congress. In matters involving foreign relations, officials from the responsible Departments meet in executive session on frequent occasions with the appropriate congressional committees to testify on classified mat-

ters that affect the national interest. That is all that is being requested in this instance.

We believe that this position is essential if a system of international trade controls is to be maintained. That system rests on a voluntary agreement among ourselves and 14 of our allies. When the agreement was negotiated in 1954, it was decided by the 15 negotiating countries that the International List and the negotiations which established it were to be classified. Some of our allies would only consent to participate in the negotiations on the basis of a specific commitment to that effect. Pursuant to that agreement and under security regulations issued by the Secretary of State, the International List and the documents on which that List was based were classified.

I have personally examined the documents involved, and it is my considered judgment that to declassify the material would not only be a breach of faith which would be prejudicial to our foreign relations but that it could seriously risk destroying the entire agreement upon which our system of controls now rests. Furthermore, it would jeopardize our ability to conduct further negotiations on this or any other subject in the future. For these reasons the executive branch must respectfully decline to declassify the International List. It is, however, as stated previously, available to the subcommittee on a classified basis.

In arriving at this conclusion a number of other factors had to be considered. Our allies know that they must trade if they are going to survive. Many of them have had a substantial trade pattern with countries now within the Communist bloc, extending back over a period of a century or more. They are under constant pressure from their parliaments, trade unions, and industrial interests to expand their trade. They regard trade-control lists as an obstacle to such expansion. That attitude is reflected in their negotiations with us. We have done our best to resist those pressures. Our task would be made far more difficult if the International List were published at this time.

Another factor has to do with Communist propaganda. East-West trade controls are a major target area today for Red propaganda. The Communists are seeking every opportunity to divide the free nations on this issue. Were the Inter-

<sup>4</sup> Not printed here.

## Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty With Netherlands

Press release 164 dated March 27

A treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands was signed at The Hague on March 27. The American Ambassador, H. Freeman Matthews, signed on behalf of the United States. The Netherlands signers were Dr. J. W. Beyen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. J. M. A. H. Lums, Minister Without Portfolio.

The new treaty affirms the friendly and cooperative spirit prevailing between the two countries and reflects the important business and commercial interests which have developed in their economic relations. The broad and liberal provisions embodied in the treaty represent a set of principles designed to promote the continued growth of those relations along mutually beneficial lines.

The new treaty contains 27 articles, together with a protocol and exchange of notes, and covers a wide range of subject matter. In brief, each of the two countries:

(1) agrees to accord within its territories, to citizens and corporations of the other, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to engaging in commercial, industrial, and financial activities;

(2) formally endorses standards regarding the protection of persons, their property and interests, that reflect the most enlightened legal and constitutional principles;

(3) recognizes the need for special attention to stimulate the international movement of investment capital; and

(4) reasserts its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping.

This treaty is the sixth of its type to have been concluded between the United States and European countries since World War II. It represents another step in a program pursued by this Gov-

national List to be published, it would become a target for attack by Communists and left-wing groups within the participating countries. The combination of parliamentary, trade union, and business pressures, spurred on by subversive groups directed by the Communists, could, in our judgment, jeopardize the entire international system of controls.

It has been claimed that the International List is already public and known to the Soviets. What is known to the Soviets is, of course, a matter of speculation. No doubt they do have some information as to items which are controlled. That does not seem to be a valid reason why they should be given all the information.

It has also been contended that the British Board of Trade List is identical to the International List. That contention is not correct. The items on the British list vary in significant details from those on the International List. The British list does not include the surveillance list nor the amounts of the quantitative control list. National lists are published by a number of other countries—among them the Italians, the Canadians, and ourselves. None of these lists are the same, and none of them are the International List.

There is one other aspect of this problem that should be mentioned. It is referred to in our letter of March 23. The working papers of the Joint Operating Committee are internal communications and working papers of an advisory nature which are historically retained within the executive branch. These files and working papers we are not in a position to make available to the subcommittee. The Secretary of Commerce is prepared to discuss this aspect of the matter later in the hearing.

We regret that the balance of the information now being requested by your subcommittee can only be furnished on a classified basis. To declassify it would jeopardize our foreign relations and be prejudicial to the national interest. There is no effort on our part to withhold from the Congress any information which it should rightfully have. Our only interest is to see to it that the information is made available in such a way as to protect the best interests of the United States.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may we repeat that we desire to cooperate with your committee to the fullest extent possible in your consideration of this important subject.

ernment for the modernization of its commercial treaty structure and the establishment of legal conditions favorable to foreign investment.

Similarly, the treaty is responsive to the important interest which the Netherlands has in international commerce and investment, both as receiver and as supplier of goods and capital, and reflects the policies which that country has developed to attract American capital. A large number of American firms have established branches or factories in the Netherlands in recent years, and Netherlands firms likewise have substantial and expanding investments in the United States.

The treaty will be transmitted as soon as possible to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification and, when the ratification processes of both countries have been completed, will enter into force one month after exchange of ratifications. Provision is made regarding the extension of the treaty to Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles upon the election of those territories communicated through the Netherlands Government.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948.<sup>1</sup>  
*Accession deposited:* Afghanistan, March 22, 1956.

#### Labor

Convention (No. 80) for the partial revision of the conventions adopted by the General Conference of the International Labor Organization at its first 28 sessions. Done at Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force May 28, 1947 (TIAS 1810).  
*Ratification deposited:* Bulgaria, November 7, 1955.

#### North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Signed at Paris June 22, 1955.  
*Notification of being bound by terms of the agreement:* Turkey, March 29, 1956.  
*Entered into force:* March 29, 1956.

#### Safety at Sea

Convention on safety of life at sea. Signed at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2195.  
*Acceptances deposited:* Brazil, January 17, 1956; Venezuela, February 8, 1956.

Regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 2899.

*Acceptance deposited:* Uruguay, August 18, 1955.

#### Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956.  
*Proclaimed by the President:* March 16, 1956.

#### Trade and Commerce

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955. Will enter into force on the day it has been signed by all the contracting parties to the general agreement.  
*Signatures:* Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, United States of America,<sup>2</sup> December 3, 1955; Union of South Africa, December 5, 1955; Finland, January 4, 1956; Belgium, February 16, 1956.

## BILATERAL

#### Italy

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 23, 1955 (TIAS 3249) by providing that funds may also be used for the purchase of corn and feed grains. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome August 30 and September 2, 1955. Entered into force September 2, 1955.

#### Netherlands

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, with protocol and exchange of notes. Signed at The Hague March 27, 1956. Enters into force one month after the day of exchange of ratifications.

#### Philippines

Agreement providing for disposition of equipment and material furnished by the United States under the military assistance agreement of March 21, 1947 (TIAS 1662). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila July 27, 1953, and March 3, 1956. Entered into force March 3, 1956.

#### Spain

Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of March 5, 1956 (TIAS 3510) by providing for the exchange and use of funds acquired from the purchase of fertilizer by Spain from Austria. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid March 16 and 17, 1956. Entered into force March 17, 1956.  
Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of March 5, 1956 (TIAS 3510) by providing for the resale of wheat to Switzerland. Signed at Madrid March 20, 1956. Entered into force March 20, 1956.

#### Thailand

Agreement for the sale and purchase of tin concentrates. Signed at Bangkok March 12, 1956. Entered into force March 12, 1956.  
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Bangkok March 13, 1956. Entered into force March 13, 1956.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> With a reservation.



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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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## **Security Council Agrees Unanimously on U.S. Proposal To Send Secretary-General Hammarskjold to Middle East**

*Following is the text of a letter of March 20 from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to the President of the Security Council, Sir Pierson Dixon, requesting a meeting of the Council to consider the Palestine question, together with a series of statements by Ambassador Lodge during the Security Council debate. On April 4 the Council adopted unanimously a U.S.-sponsored resolution on this agenda item (see box).*

### **LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL**

U.S./U.N. press release 2372 dated March 20

I have the honor on behalf of the Government of the United States to request you to convene a meeting of the Security Council as soon as possible to consider the following agenda item:

The Palestine Question: Status of Compliance Given to the General Armistice Agreements and the Resolutions of the Security Council adopted During the Past Year.

The Government of the United States has become increasingly concerned over recent developments in the Palestine area which may well endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Information relating to the build-up of armed forces on either side of the Armistice Demarcation Lines leads the United States to believe that the parties may not be fully complying with the provisions of their Armistice Agreements which stipulate limitations upon armed forces in or near the Demilitarized Zones and the Demarcation Lines.

The instances of firing across and otherwise violating the Demarcation Lines are recurring at a dangerous rate. Despite the earnest efforts of the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization the parties have not agreed to proposals

which he has put forward to them on his own initiative or as a result of the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955,<sup>1</sup> 8 September 1955,<sup>2</sup> and 19 January 1956.<sup>3</sup> These three resolutions had the unanimous support of the Security Council and it should therefore be a matter of genuine concern to each of its Members to ascertain the extent of compliance being given to them. It is a matter of deep concern to the Government of the United States and it, therefore, requests urgent and early action by the Security Council to consider the situation now prevailing in the Palestine area.

### **STATEMENT OF MARCH 26**

U.S./U.N. press release 2376 dated March 26

The United Nations has been dealing with the Palestine question almost continuously since April 2, 1947.

Since August 11, 1949, when the last of the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab States had been signed and all had been approved, the Security Council has met on the Palestine question 90 different times. No other question has so occupied the attention of the Council. No other question has so persistently challenged United Nations efforts.

Today, the 26th of March, 1956, 7 years since the armistice agreements were signed, the Palestine question is still unsolved. In fact, during recent months the situation has deteriorated and the world is alarmed at the prospects which it sees in the Near East.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of APR. 18, 1955, p. 662.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1955, p. 459.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 183.

## Resolution on Palestine Question<sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council.*

*Recalling* its resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956,

*Recalling* that in each of these resolutions the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization and the parties to the General Armistice Agreements concerned were requested by the Council to undertake certain specific steps for the purpose of ensuring that the tensions along the Armistice lines should be reduced,

*Noting* with grave concern that despite the efforts of the Chief of Staff the proposed steps have not been carried out,

1. *Considers* that the situation now prevailing between the parties concerning the enforcement of the Armistice Agreements and the compliance given to the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council is such that its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security,

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the Council's resolutions under reference;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff he considers would reduce existing tensions along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, including the following points:

(a) Withdrawal of their forces from the Armistice Demarcation Lines;

(b) Full freedom of movement for observers along the Armistice Demarcation Lines and in the Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas;

(c) Establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violations of the Armistice Agreements;

4. *Calls upon* the parties to the General Armistice Agreements to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of this resolution;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council in his discretion but not later than one month from this date on the implementation given to this resolution in order to assist the Council in considering what further action may be required.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/3575; adopted unanimously by the Security Council on Apr. 4.

This need not have been the case. In the opinion of the United States progress had, until recently, been made, and we thought that most of the basic issues underlying the uneasy truce in Palestine were coming nearer to a solution. United Nations efforts in the General Assembly,

in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, in the Security Council, and in the Truce Supervision Organization were producing hopeful signs of progress, and the trend was toward peace. That trend, unfortunately, has recently been reversed.

It would be wrong to conclude that the United Nations has failed in its responsibilities. War has not come again to the Holy Land, and we trust that it never will. The indispensable factor in preventing hostilities thus far has been the United Nations. The present alarming situation challenges this organization again to find new means of arresting the present grave trend. This organization cannot fail to accept that challenge—which has certainly never been more serious than it is at this moment.

The United States, having taken fully into account all of the circumstances of the present situation, is convinced that through this organization the present tensions must be eliminated and the prospect for peace restored. We have not sought to come before the Council at this time with any indictment or bill of particulars, or any detailed assessment of the blames and shortcomings of one or the other of the participants in or outside of the area of conflict. We have felt instead that the situation is much too serious for us to lose any time in setting into motion the full authority of the United Nations to deal with the present ominous drift.

We propose, therefore, that the Council request the Secretary-General to undertake immediately a personal investigation of ways and means of settling the numerous problems which stand in the way of peace.

In these circumstances it is clear that the United Nations cannot be inactive or indifferent. The United States believes that in the first instance United Nations efforts should be concentrated on full compliance with the armistice agreements by Israel and the Arab States and on the carrying out in detail of the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956. Each of these resolutions had the unanimous support of the members of this Council. They represent the combined judgment of the members as to the essential steps to be taken to reduce the tensions. There is no question in our mind that, if these steps had been carried out, we would not now have the serious situation which confronts us. All the more reason, therefore, that they should be carried out.

We therefore propose in the draft resolution before the Council<sup>4</sup> that the Secretary-General undertake as a matter of urgency discussions with the parties and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Burns, to find ways and means to put these resolutions and the proposals which they embody into immediate effect.

We feel that these measures can and must be given special consideration. The Chief of Staff has repeatedly emphasized the primary importance of several of these measures. We feel that they deserve an honest chance. General Burns' efforts must therefore have our continued and full backing, and the proposal that we have placed before this Council would give him exactly that.

The draft resolution proposed by the United States is not intended in any way to derogate from the overall responsibility of the Security Council in this question. We would expect the Council to continue to follow with the greatest concern the developments in the area and to hold itself in readiness to deal at any time with any problem which might arise.

We have therefore proposed in the draft resolution that the Secretary-General should report to the Security Council not later than one month from the date of the adoption of the resolution, at which time the Council would consider what further steps might be necessary or desirable for it to take.

Mr. President, the United States believes that each member of the Council will recognize the need for the kind of action which we have proposed. We trust that each member of the Council and the parties will recognize the good faith with which this proposal is brought forward and will lend to the Secretary-General their full support. Clearly this is in the mutual interest of us all. Anything less can only lead to our mutual detriment.

#### STATEMENT OF MARCH 28

U.S./U.N. press release 2381 dated March 28

Let me first thank the representatives of Cuba, of Belgium, and of China for yielding to me for these few moments so that I may make this statement. I appreciate their courtesy.

Mr. President, when we adjourned on Monday,

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. S 3562 dated Mar. 21.

it was the Council's understanding that after today's meeting we would meet again on Tuesday, April 3. I trust that on April 3 we will come to a vote after having heard further statements by the members of the Council or such statements as the parties care to make. That is my understanding of the sense of the meeting last Monday.

In view of certain remarks which have been made to me since then, it may be helpful if I now make a few words of explanation.

Frankly, the United States draft seemed to us to be so simple and clear that there could be no misunderstanding as to our intention. Indeed, it has come as something of a surprise that anyone could find in it any hidden meaning. That would be a baseless suspicion indeed.

Our draft resolution speaks for itself. Its meaning is right on the surface. The course which we advocate is a normal procedure. It is what we would expect to have done in our case if we were in a similar situation. I do not believe I can put it any more plainly than that.

Note also, please, gentlemen, that each member of the Council has supported the resolutions on which the United States draft is based. In other words they have been unanimously endorsed. That is a significant fact. And note also that the parties to the Palestine question have themselves in recent months expressed growing concern at what they feared to be developments on the part of the other side inimical to themselves.

Now, feeling as we did that this concern was shared by all, we believed there would be—and that there should be—prompt approval of our initiative to bring about discussions between the Secretary-General and the parties to find agreed measures for reducing the tensions and carrying out the armistice agreements.

Now, let me repeat, there are no hidden meanings in this, and if you search from now until doomsday with a magnifying glass the only purpose you will find is to prevent war. That, after all—I need hardly say it in this room—is the first purpose of the United Nations.

As I said on Monday, we do not propose to review the issues in the Palestine question, and we do not feel that others would wish to do so in view of the urgent need for action. This, too, is reflected in the very limited nature of our text.

We wanted two things: to act promptly in the face of a gravely worsening situation, and, in act-

ing promptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's endorsement, certain steps which the Secretary-General and the parties might take to carry out the provisions of the armistice agreements. These are not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions of the Security Council, to which our draft resolution refers, likewise had as their purpose the effective functioning of the armistice. That is our sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that, unless the armistice agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result.

We had hoped that at the end of today's meeting the Security Council would have approved the mission by the Secretary-General which we propose, and that he could pack his bags and leave right away. But we did not wish to give ground for anyone to say that he had been rushed—even though the proposal is so simple that the more than 8 days which have elapsed since it was given to the Council members and to the parties seems more than enough.

Mr. President, we hope that the Security Council will act speedily and that our resolution will be approved by the Council and the parties. It is in all truth a good-faith effort for peace.

### **FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 3**

U.S./U.N. press release 2384 dated April 3

I am confident that there is no basic misunderstanding, either by the parties to the armistice agreement or by the members of the Security Council, as to the intention of the United States in bringing the pending draft resolution before the Council.

But certain questions have been asked which I am glad to answer and which may, I believe, be summarized as follows:

a) Are the measures which the Secretary-General might recommend for discussion with the parties and the Chief of Staff to be within the framework of the General Armistice Agreements?

b) Is the proposal contained in paragraph 3 (a) of the draft resolution to be considered applicable in general, or where appropriate and in accordance with local conditions?

c) Are the demilitarized zones and defensive areas referred to in paragraph 3 (b) those zones and areas as defined in the armistice agreements?

d) Do the various aspects of compliance with

the General Armistice Agreements which the Secretary-General is requested to survey refer to matters outside the General Armistice Agreements or only to those matters with which the Truce Supervision Organization is expected to deal?

e) Is it intended that the Secretary-General should undertake to amend the armistice agreements?

f) Are the arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 (c) arrangements in the nature of agreements by the parties or in the nature of added forces and machinery?

g) Does the request to the Secretary-General to report in his discretion refer to the timing or to the nature of the report?

These questions can first be answered by recalling my original statement to the Council on Monday, March 26th. In describing the objectives of the United States I stated that, in the present circumstances, it is clear that the United Nations cannot be inactive or indifferent. I went on to say, therefore, that "the United States believes that in the first instance United Nations efforts should be concentrated on full compliance with the armistice agreements by Israel and the Arab States and on the carrying out in detail of the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956." I pointed out, moreover, that "each of these resolutions had the unanimous support of the members of this Council. They represent the combined judgment of the members as to the essential steps to be taken to reduce the tensions." I said further that "there is no question in our mind that, if these steps had been carried out, we would not now have the serious situation which confronts us. All the more reason, therefore, that they should be carried out." I said in this same connection that "we therefore propose in the draft resolution before the Council that the Secretary-General undertake as a matter of urgency discussions with the parties and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Burns, to find ways and means to put these resolutions and the proposals which they embody into immediate effect. We feel that these measures can and must be given special consideration."

These quotations from my statement introducing the draft resolution are the core of the United States position, but, to make that position unmistakably clear, I spoke again at our last meeting



to emphasize our concern and to place our proposal in its proper perspective. Thus, at the meeting of Wednesday, the 28th of March, I again summarized our position as follows: "We wanted two things: to act promptly in the face of a gravely worsening situation, and, in acting promptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's endorsement, certain steps which the Secretary-General and the parties might take to carry out the provisions of the armistice agreements. These are not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions of the Security Council, to which our draft resolution refers, likewise had as their purpose the effective functioning of the armistice. That is our sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that, unless the armistice agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result."

I believe that it is fair to say that this adequately summarizes the United States position. In reviewing the questions which have been placed before the Council by the parties, it seems to us each of these questions is answered by the statements I have referred to.

The representative of the United Kingdom put the case even more simply when he said "first things must come first." In speaking of those matters which must receive immediate attention, Sir Pierson Dixon went on to say that these were problems in which "if one cannot move forward, one finds one's self slipping back."

It has been this backward trend which the United States wished to halt. We see no other way of preventing such a backward trend at this moment than by providing for strict compliance with the armistice agreements between the parties and the resolutions of the Security Council to which I have referred.

What we are dealing with now are the immediate problems standing in the way of peace and which concern the compliance of the parties with the General Armistice Agreements and the carrying out of measures which the Security Council has already endorsed, in its recent resolutions, for insuring compliance with those agreements.

I repeat that this is the immediate problem, and this is the immediate purpose of the United States initiative.

Now to be even more specific: the draft resolution envisages that the Secretary-General should arrange, after discussion with the parties and the Chief of Staff, for measures entirely within the

framework of the General Armistice Agreements and the resolutions under reference.

Such measures would, of course, be applicable where, by agreement between the Secretary-General and the parties, they consider conditions warrant.

The references in the draft resolution to the demilitarized zones and defensive areas are naturally those defined in the armistice agreements.

The various aspects of compliance with the armistice agreements which the Secretary-General is requested to survey refer only to matters which would come within the natural purview of the armistice machinery and the Truce Supervision Organization.

The arrangements referred to in paragraph 3 (c) would, of course, be arrangements as agreed between the parties and the Secretary-General.

It would not be a service to the Secretary-General or to the parties directly concerned to enumerate further the problems or the measures with which together they might wish to deal or those with which he should not deal. We feel that, with the clear understanding that the mission of the Secretary-General is governed by the Security Council's resolutions and the armistice agreements, such a spelling out is not necessary nor indeed desirable. The kind of undertaking which we are asking the Secretary-General to undertake becomes quite clear when seen in this context.

I hope that these explanations will be received by the parties in the same spirit of cooperation as they are given. It lies with the parties in the end to determine the success or the failure of the Secretary-General's mission. It will be for them to determine in the final analysis the steps to be taken.

The Secretary-General naturally cannot amend or set aside the undertakings of the parties in the General Armistice Agreements. As members of the United Nations and as sovereign nations the parties share with the members of the Security Council the responsibility for determining what can best be accomplished.

The Security Council is, of course, not relinquishing its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security in adopting the draft resolution proposed by the United States.

The resolution requests the Secretary-General to report not later than one month from the date of its adoption. He may report sooner if he considers

it desirable. This is what the phrase "in his discretion" refers to.

In the light of the Secretary-General's report and of the situation then prevailing, the Council would have to consider whether any further action was required and what that action might be. The United States would not presume to say what the Council should do a month from now. We can and do hope that further action concerning compliance with the armistice agreements and the carrying out of these resolutions will not be necessary.

This attempts to be a completely categorical and responsive reply to the questions which have been raised by representatives of the parties to the armistice agreement.

### **SECOND STATEMENT OF APRIL 3**

U.S./U.N. press release 2385 dated April 3

In accordance with the custom whereby the sponsor of a proposition is expected to express himself on amendments, and as a matter of fact in response to at least one request which has been made, I make this statement on the subject of the amendments which have been introduced by the representative of the Soviet Union.

The amendments to the draft resolution which have been put forward by the Soviet Union are not only in the opinion of the United States not in any way necessary; they also do not seem particularly desirable. Without making a detailed analysis now, it is perhaps enough to say that these amendments are not improvements. This is, I think, an understatement.

Amendment No. 1 goes back into the past without accomplishing anything constructive thereby.

Amendment No. 2 is fallacious because it is clear that failure to comply with three unanimous resolutions of the Security Council is in the words of the resolution "likely" to endanger peace. Now surely it is not exaggerated to say that noncompliance with three unanimous resolutions is "likely" to endanger peace. It seems none too strong.

Amendment No. 3 seems to us to put the cart before the horse. Obviously there must be discussion before there is concordance. To say that concordance must precede discussion seems to us to be a non sequitur. Paragraph 3 as drafted clearly means that agreement of the parties will

be necessary for the adoption of measures for reducing tensions.

The words "in the defensive areas" as now included in the draft resolution make quite clear that the defensive areas are those areas provided for in the armistice agreements. The Soviet representative's amendment in this respect is unnecessary, I submit, and I understood the Soviet representative to say he would not insist upon it.

The objectives of the pending proposal have, I think, been made clear beyond any shadow of a doubt. The draft resolution is addressed to a clear and present danger. Our sole intent is to dispatch the Secretary-General to the area so as to reduce the growing tension. We believe that the present text of the draft resolution is sufficient in its present form, and, as every member here knows, it was very carefully written.

We also believe that the governments in the area are prepared to accept the resolution as it is, and we think that the debate that has taken place here today and in preceding days has made that clear.

As the sponsor of the draft resolution, therefore, we believe it is desirable not to accept amendments.<sup>5</sup>

### **FIRST STATEMENT OF APRIL 4**

U.S./U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4

There of course is nothing wrong with the Government of the United States communicating with 3 countries or 30 countries in an effort to keep the peace—and I note that the Soviet representative did not say there was anything wrong with it. This proposal we have here today is not a 3-nation proposition. We hope it will soon become an 11-nation proposition.

Gentlemen, in view of the fact that yesterday I gave my arguments against the Soviet amendments, and in view of the fact that the objections to these amendments have been very eloquently explained by the representatives of Peru, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia, I will not take any more time of the Council to argue against them further.

I perhaps might say that the capitalizing of the phrase "Defensive Areas" is not an amendment. It is a typographical rectification. The position

<sup>5</sup>The amendments proposed by the U.S.S.R. (U.N. doc. S 3574 dated Apr. 3) were rejected on Apr. 4.

of the United States is still in opposition to amendments.

## SECOND STATEMENT OF APRIL 4

U.S./U.N. press release 2386 dated April 4

Before we adjourn this meeting, perhaps the members of the Security Council will forgive me if I express my appreciation to the members and to the representatives of the parties for the tone which they have all observed here; for the high level and the high plane on which this vitally important and delicate matter has been discussed.

To be President of this Security Council is one of the great honors that can come to a man, but for me, in this particular case, it is something more than an honor.<sup>5</sup> It has been a very precious experience indeed to have the cooperation of all of the distinguished men who are seated around this table. I shall always remember it and wish to express my thanks to you for it.

Let me finally say to you, Mr. Secretary-General, and I feel sure I speak for everyone present when I do so, that as you leave on this mission you carry with you not only good wishes and our hopes, but our heartfelt confidence and high regard and great expectations for your success.

## Visit of Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Department of State announced on April 5 (press release 175) that Alberto Martin Artajo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, and Señora de Martin Artajo would be accompanied by the following party during their visit to the United States from April 9 to April 18:

José M. de Areilza, Count of Motrico, Ambassador of Spain to the United States  
Countess of Motrico  
General Francisco Fernandez-Longoria Gonzales, Chief of Staff, Spanish Air Force  
Señora de Fernandez-Longoria  
Juan de las Barceñas, Director General of Foreign Policy  
Señora de las Barceñas  
Juan José Rovira Sanchez-Herrero, Director General of Economic Cooperation  
Aurelio Valls, Press Section, Foreign Ministry

<sup>5</sup> Mr. Lodge became President of the Security Council for the month of April.

## The Message of America

*Remarks by President Eisenhower*<sup>1</sup>

I think it was last year, gentlemen, when I met with the Advertising Council,<sup>2</sup> that I made the request that the Council would try to do something about extending their good work to helping the Government solve some of its problems in the foreign field.

Not only has the record of the past year shown that they took me seriously, but I am particularly delighted that this year they brought some of their bosses along with them so that they can get educated also, because we are talking about one of the most pressing problems with which the Government—indeed with which the whole Nation—is confronted constantly. There is nothing that takes place at home of any great importance—if it is a difficult problem, at least—that is not caused by or at least is colored by some foreign consideration.

During this past year the Advertising Council got together a team of experts and went over the whole series of factors involved in these problems and came up with some very fine suggestions. The one I want to mention particularly—a product of their imagination—was the exhibit of “People’s Capitalism.” I don’t know how many of you have seen it, but to me it is the kind of message that America ought to be carrying abroad. I would have liked to have seen some kind of adjective put between “people’s” and “capitalism”—something of the order of—if not “democratic,” something of the order of “competitive” or something of that kind. But in any event, the exhibit itself shows what the system of capitalism will do for a people. What it has done in this country in a very, very short time, measured by historical units, is a very telling thing.

I actually could hope that the truth that it exemplifies and shows could be brought home to our own people as well as to those abroad for whom it was designed. Because I think too often we forget some of the features of our own system that have been so responsible for the place this Nation has reached. So before I leave that part of what I

<sup>1</sup> Made before the 12th annual Washington Conference of the Advertising Council on Apr. 3 (White House press release).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1955, p. 609.

wanted to say to you, my thanks to the agencies for the time and talent they have contributed and are continuing to contribute through the media—enlisting the space on radio and television—and for the good work of all, particularly to the businessmen supporters of what the Council has been doing, with the Government as its principal beneficiary.

Now, when we consider this system of which we are so proud, we recognize that, like all things human, it is neither perfect nor does it sustain itself forever without the people who are living in it and are part of it doing something about it. Internally and externally any form of government, and particularly self-government, is always subject to some kind of attack, particularly successful government that has brought material prosperity in the measure which ours has. Internally we watch that government, we watch it very carefully. We watch particularly the Federal Government to see that it doesn't transgress into fields from which it should abstain, except only in those cases where the changing miracle of industrial life brings about problems that are not solvable by communities, by private enterprise, or by individuals.

There we try to stick to the old Lincolnian dictum that it is the function of government to do for people those things they could not do for themselves and to stay out of things in places where the people can do things for themselves. We would hope, therefore, to have wisdom in government to help distinguish this line beyond which government should not go and yet be courageous in doing those things that it should do.

Likewise, we should hope always for more wisdom in business leadership, not only in the business man and in business management but in their concert with labor, so that in the individual company or the corporation—particularly the influential ones—we do not make decisions that damage us and the kind of system that we are trying to run. That can easily be done within the corporation just as well as it can within the Congress or within some regulatory commission.

#### **Using Our Influence Abroad**

Now, let us turn our eyes abroad. There is an old story about the man in a town who owned the factory on which the living of the community depended. He built a great house on the hill, and all the rest of the people lived in the plain below in fairly meager circumstances. The climax of

the story was, when things began to go bad, that the man on top found that he was not safe except only as the people below were contented and believed that they were advancing. When they became depressed and lost their morale, and the company began to fail, this man fell further than the others because he had a greater distance to go.

Within a certain degree, that story has applicability in the world today. The United States cannot live alone—a paragon of prosperity—with all the rest of the world sinking lower and lower in its standards of living.

There are many ways in which we can use our influence to make certain that other peoples recognize the virtues of a free, competitive capitalistic system rather than take the shortcut—the spurious and false road that is offered them by the communistic ideology.

You see, in many of these less developed areas of the world, there is a very great ambition to industrialize themselves. Now the Communist comes along and says: well, you see what we were 40 years ago? Look what communism has done for us. And today we can bring to you this steel mill or help you with this dam, or do this or that.

There is a very great appeal, because of the very rapid transformation that on the surface, at least, and under forms of dictatorship has been accomplished in Russia. The man who is listening to the story doesn't understand that underneath this great facade of industrial organization there is slavery, human misery, rather than human happiness—no opportunity for a man to realize his own spiritual, moral, physical, and economic aspirations through his own efforts. He obeys. He is regimented. But they don't say that. As a matter of fact, it is not of importance at the moment, because it is only in such a society as ours, based upon the dignity of man, that the importance of that kind of thing to humans is recognized and catered to.

And so we must carry not only a material message to the world of what the kind of enterprise we have—the kind of system—can do for a people. We must carry those moral values, spiritual values of the worth of man—what he is entitled to as an individual. We must say not merely what this or that state would do if they would follow that line, because I think it is not to be denied, if you would give the communistic system to any backward country, with a complete dictator who could direct everything without question, he could make,

on the short run, more rapid progress than could we by the cooperative method that is inherent in democracy.

So I think that we must realize that, unless we do these things in the world, someone else will do them through false doctrines. And we finally will reach more and more that place where we are isolated from the rest of the world, with the whole world in a position possibly of envy and then of hatred, open antagonisms, that will reflect itself in first, let us say, refusal to trade, then breaking off relations, and finally and ultimately in a very, very serious thing.

There is plenty of time for us to do it if we start now and keep doing it. That is the reason that I am so delighted that the Advertising Council has directed itself in its efforts along this path.

Governmental officials are busy. They are constantly putting out "fires." They are on the Hill answering why they need this money or that money, or sometimes why they don't need this or that that someone is trying to give to them. This is a new phenomenon, and ordinarily applies only to election year.

The need in government is time to think, with the ability of people to do it. Now by the selection of these people of the Advertising Council they are able to supplement the work of government and so to assist it, to point out new, imaginative ways of how the message of America can be carried.

### **Promoting Better Understanding**

I assure you that that message must be carried, not only in the ways I have indicated but it must be expressed also in the readiness to help wherever possible on good, sound business arrangements. In other words, let us not forget for one instant that, when we are putting \$36 or \$37 billion of expenditures every year into arms and armaments, those arms and armaments alone, remember, can never take us forward—they will merely defend what we have got.

But when you talk about something that promotes a business arrangement—trade—when you can talk about something that promotes a better understanding between us and the people of the Middle East, or the people of Africa, or anybody else, then you are talking about something constructive, something that yields results over the

years to come. It will not be merely something essentially sterile and negative so far as our capacity for raising human standards is concerned. We will not be merely acting like a policeman to protect what we already have. Of course, protection is necessary. It is just as necessary in this day and time as it can possibly be. But let us not make the ignorant, uninformed decision that only in armaments are we going to find the solution of our foreign problems.

And since we have been favored by the system that our forefathers gave us, by the resources that God gave us, by the good fortune we have of having been born and raised here through the finest educational and health systems in the world, and so on, let us use our brains to make certain we sustain our position by helping everybody else to realize their own aspirations and legitimate ambitions. Not necessarily in the exact pattern of this country—of course not. Nobody starts from the same place, and no other nation would possibly reach the same end.

But we can preach and show that we believe in the dignity of man, in the independence of nations, the right of people to determine for themselves their own faith. We can help. Every dollar we put into this kind of thing, if it is intelligently spent, is to my mind, in the long run, worth any five we put just in sheer defense because in the long run it is a constructive thing. It is a developing thing, the kind of development America has done at home and which we must help do abroad.

So, all of these words, all of these thoughts, my friends, give you the depth of my sincerity when I say thank you for coming here, thank you for helping. The people that talk to you today will come not merely to give you a briefing of what they are doing, but in doing so would hope that from you they will get reactions—in other words, what would you do?

Government is nothing but individuals. Every one of the individuals in government belongs to you. He is your "boy" in some form or other. You put him there directly or indirectly. So the job is still that of the American people, and I couldn't conceive of any job in this world being in better hands than that of the American people.

Thank you very much.

## Crusade for Freedom

White House press release dated March 27

*The following letter from the President was handed by Mrs. Dwight D. Eisenhower to William A. Greene, President of the Crusade for Freedom, in a ceremony at the White House, March 27, 1956.*

DEAR MR. GREENE: The captive European peoples behind the Iron Curtain—Poles, Czechoslovaks, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Albanians, and residents of the Baltic States—are constantly bombarded by Communist propaganda designed to break their will to resist and destroy their hope for a better future.

In the continuing work of combating such propaganda, Radio Free Europe, the radio arm of the Crusade for Freedom, plays a major and effective role. Day in and day out its broadcasts extend the hand of friendship and hope to the people behind the Curtain, assuring them that their plight has not been forgotten by the free world and fortifying their devotion to liberty.

To the National Committee for a Free Europe, I extend congratulations on this and the other valuable activities of the organization, with my best wishes for success in enlisting, through the Crusade for Freedom, the support of the American people. I am confident they will respond generously and thus forward this vital work for the cause of freedom and peace.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## Exchange of Messages Following White Sulphur Springs Meeting

*The White House on April 2 made public the following exchanges of messages, one between President Eisenhower and Louis St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, and the other between the President and Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, President of Mexico.*

### President Eisenhower to Prime Minister St. Laurent

MARCH 31, 1956

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: Thank you for your warm and thoughtful letter on our meeting with the President of Mexico at White Sulphur Springs.

I hope you enjoyed the occasion as much as I

did, and I am confident that all three of us profited from the friendly and informal talks that we had. These talks will surely bring even closer the intimate relations between our three countries.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Right Honorable

LOUIS ST. LAURENT

*Prime Minister of Canada  
Ottawa*

### Prime Minister St. Laurent to President Eisenhower

OTTAWA, March 28, 1956

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Immediately on my return I want you to know how much I enjoyed our informal meeting and how delighted I was to see you looking so well and in such good spirits.

We had a pleasant, smooth flight home and arrived in Ottawa at 3 p. m.

Thank you for affording me the opportunity of the talks with you and the President of Mexico and may you continue to enjoy your present good health.

With warm personal regards, I am,

Yours sincerely,

LOUIS ST. LAURENT

### President Eisenhower to President Ruiz Cortines

APRIL 2, 1956

His Excellency

ADOLFO RUIZ CORTINES

*President of Mexico*

I am deeply grateful for the kind message which you so thoughtfully sent me on your return to Mexico City from White Sulphur Springs. It was a source of great satisfaction to me that you and the Prime Minister of Canada found it possible to join me in our recent informal meeting and that you gave me the opportunity to renew our personal friendship. I feel sure that such contact will further strengthen the friendly ties which have so long and happily been maintained through the usual diplomatic interchange.

In extending my every wish for your continued well-being, I renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my personal consideration and highest esteem.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

## **President Ruiz Cortines to President Eisenhower**

MEXICO CITY, *March 29, 1956*

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

*President of the United States of America*

On returning to my country I have the honor to convey to Your Excellency the expression of my deep satisfaction at the friendly personal contacts which upon your happy initiative we have just had at White Sulphur Springs and which inaugurate an era of personal relationship between the American Chiefs of State to the benefit of our countries. I take particular pleasure also in expressing to you my sincere gratitude for the innumerable manifestations which I received of your very cordial hospitality and your sincere and wholehearted friendship. I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my cordial consideration and sincere regards.

ADOLFO RUIZ CORTINES

*President of the United Mexican States*

## **Letters of Credence**

*Liberia*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Liberia, George Arthur Padmore, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on April 7. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 181.

## **Delegation to Baghdad Pact Council Meeting**

Press release 180 dated April 6

The United States has demonstrated in many ways its desire to cooperate in the achievement of the objectives of the Baghdad Pact, which coincide with our objectives in this area and elsewhere—of peace, security, and welfare. While the United States has not itself adhered to the pact, we have, at the request of the members—Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom—maintained continuing liaison with the organization and have had observers in attendance at its various meetings.

In line with this policy, the United States is

sending a delegation to the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council in Tehran from April 16 to 20. The American delegation will be headed by Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy W. Henderson.

Mr. Henderson will be accompanied to Tehran by a special economic adviser and will be joined by Selden Chapin, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, and by Waldemar J. Gallman, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, together with advisers drawn from the staffs of the American Embassies in Tehran and Baghdad.

The group of U.S. military observers at the meeting will be headed by Adm. John H. Cassady, Commander in Chief of the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Forces, who attended the last meeting of the Council.<sup>1</sup> He will be accompanied by senior representatives of each of the military services.

## **Significance of New Soviet Line Concerning Stalin Era**

*News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 171 dated April 3

The official Soviet line, which seems to repudiate the last two decades of Stalin's rule, is highly significant. It is too early to judge its full meaning, but some important conclusions are now possible.

The Soviet rulers must know that the brutal and arbitrary rule of the Stalin era led to a great yearning by the subject peoples for legality and personal security, for tolerance of differences of opinion, and for government genuinely dedicated to the welfare of the governed.

Also the Soviet rulers must now see that their foreign policies encounter effective resistance when they are identified with the use of violence.

The essential question is this: Are the Soviet rulers now attacking the basic causes of this domestic discontent and foreign distrust, or is their purpose merely to allay this discontent and distrust by blaming them on the past? The downgrading of Stalin does not of itself demonstrate that the Soviet regime has basically changed its domestic or foreign policies. The present rulers have, to be sure, somewhat modified or masked the harshness of their policies. But a dictatorship is a dictatorship whether it be that of

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of JAN. 2, 1956, p. 16.

one man or several. And the new Five-Year Plan shows a continuing purpose to magnify the might of the Soviet State at the expense of the well-being of most of the people who are ruled.

In the field of foreign policy the Soviet rulers have taken a few forward steps, notably the belated liberation of Austria. But they continue other predatory policies. They forcibly hold East Germany detached from Germany as a whole. The East European nations are still subjugated by Soviet rule. They have not renounced their efforts to subvert free governments. In Asia the present Soviet rulers seek to stir up bitterness and, in the Near East, increase the danger of hostilities. In the Far East they are seeking to coerce Japan to accept a peace treaty on Soviet terms. These and other current actions fall far short of the accepted code of international conduct.

Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviet rulers now denounce much of the past gives cause for hope, because it demonstrates that liberalizing influences from within and without can bring about peaceful change. If the free world retains its strength, its faith and unity, then subversion cannot win where force and brutality failed. And the yearnings of the subject peoples are not to be satisfied merely by a rewriting of past history. Thus we can hope for ultimate changes more fundamental than any that have so far been revealed. The United States, and indeed all the free nations, will eagerly welcome the coming of that day.

## Visit of French Foreign Minister

*News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 170 dated April 3

I am very pleased to announce that the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Christian Pineau, has accepted an invitation to visit Washington. I have had the possibility of such a visit in mind for some time and first discussed it with Minister Pineau when we met recently at Karachi. The dates for the visit have now been set, and Minister Pineau will be here from June 18 to June 20 inclusive. We will have a further exchange of views on subjects of mutual interest to our two countries. The visit will also provide an occasion for high officials of the United States Government to meet the French Foreign Minister.

## Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 172 dated April 3

*Secretary Dulles:* I have two prepared statements to make.<sup>1</sup> . . . Now if you have any questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether there has been any change in our policy on Israel's request for jet fighters and other armaments?*

A. The policy in that respect remains substantially as it was when I explained it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about a month ago [February 24].<sup>2</sup>

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is the new version of the Bricker amendment, which is known as the Dirksen version, acceptable to the administration?*

A. The President has not made, as far as I am aware, any definite statement on that subject, and until he does I would prefer not myself to speak of it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a story out of Tokyo yesterday indicated that the Japanese Embassy here has been directed to protest to the State Department about the enactment of State laws which are apparently designed to boycott Japanese goods. Have you heard of this, first; and, secondly, what can you do about it?*

A. Well, I am aware of the problem that you refer to. We have not yet received any protest, as far as I am aware, from the Japanese Government. There is involved a question of trade treaties, discrimination, and there is a possibility of setting up forces here which could be very inimical to the operation of our most-favored-nation policy with respect to trade. But, as I say, until we receive the protest, until we have had a further chance to study the matter in the light of our treaty engagements and in the light of our policies, I wouldn't want to say what our final conclusion will be.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a UP report the French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, said yesterday that the United States was taking the wrong approach to German unification refusing to put*

<sup>1</sup> These statements were also issued separately as press releases 170 (see adjoining column) and 171 (see p. 637).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368.



*disarmament first. I was wondering whether you have some comment on that.*

A. Well, you know, I find as I go around the world, and as I read the papers, that there is a good deal of criticism in other countries, big countries, little countries, of United States policy in various of its phases, and I feel that the fact that those criticisms are made, freely made, is one of the greatest tributes to the United States that could be made. Because all those countries know that they can criticize the United States without any fear of any reprisals or that we will change the principles which actuate us. We are not trying to run a popularity contest, and we don't give or withhold assistance on the basis of whether people say nice things about us or not. I think the finest tribute that could be paid to a country as powerful as the United States is that nobody fears to criticize us.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you return to the Bricker amendment? I believe the President said that he was not going to discuss it with us at the press conference until he talked to you about it. Has he talked to you, and have you taken a position on it?*

A. Well, he has talked to the Attorney General, but whether he has taken a final position yet, I don't know.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what is the legislative status of the Bricker amendment? Does the administration have to decide very soon its position on it?*

A. I understand that the present version of the Constitutional amendment has been reported out of committee. I do not think that it is as yet on the calendar, nor do I know what the action will be about whether to put it on the calendar and, if so, when. So that I will just say that as far as I am now aware it is not on the calendar, and it is not a matter of immediate urgency.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the freedom to criticize us seems to have taken a tangible form in Iceland. Could you discuss the resolution of the Icelandic Parliament in favor of moving American forces out of Iceland?*

A. Well, I think that the resolution reflects an understandable desire on the part of the Members of Parliament to reduce to a minimum the presence

of foreign troops there. Of course, the resolution itself, as you know, has no operative effect internationally, and I do not anticipate that there will be any decisive action now taken in that matter. Certainly, there is no occasion for any for, I think, a year and a half. But the problem of Iceland has always been a difficult one because Iceland is a quite small country. It has a population of, I think, about 160,000, and in that small population even a modest amount of forces from a foreign land makes a considerable impact. If you were to put it into relative terms, I would say that the situation is as though there were 6,000,000 foreign, non-English-speaking troops in the United States. Well, as the years go by there would, naturally, grow up a desire perhaps to reduce that, and a desire to be sure that the Government did not continue it beyond the time that it was necessary. There is, I think, a feeling in Iceland that perhaps the recent Soviet moves make this less necessary. Undoubtedly, that whole problem will be discussed over the coming months. But I do not think that it is reflective of anything other than a desire to minimize the presence of foreign troops insofar as it can safely be done. The question of how safely it can be done is a matter which would probably be discussed at some of our NATO meetings.

#### **Situation in Near East**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you discuss your views on the present situation in the Middle East with respect to the chances of avoiding a war?*

A. It is, of course, basic to United States policy, first, that war in that area should be avoided, and, secondly, that nothing should happen to subvert the genuine independence of the countries of that area. Peace and independence for that area are two basic points of our policy.

I have the feeling that the resolution which is up before the Security Council now, and which was introduced by the United States, will contribute appreciably to minimizing the risk of war in the area.<sup>3</sup>

When I spoke on this subject before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time that I have already alluded to, I emphasized my thought that the United Nations had a very peculiar responsibility toward Israel and the maintenance of

<sup>3</sup> See p. 628.

peace, because the State of Israel had to an extent been sponsored by the United Nations and the truce and armistice agreements had been sponsored by the United Nations. I felt, therefore, that the United Nations should assume increasing responsibility.

The resolution that we introduced, if it is adopted, as I am hopeful it will be (perhaps today or more likely tomorrow), will, I think, add appreciably to the assurance of peace in that part of the world, and to that extent it will mark, I think, real progress.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the British Foreign Office has criticized Premier Nasser of Egypt on the ground that he has become rather anti-Western and has particularly made difficulties for Britain and France in the area. Are you aware of any such conduct on Nasser's part?*

A. In so far as I have been aware of Nasser's public and official statements, I would say that he was actuated primarily by a desire to maintain the genuine independence of the area—the same desire that I expressed. Of course, it is never possible to make final judgments merely on the basis of what people say. But I am not disposed to feel that there is any irrevocable decision on the part of the Government of Egypt to repudiate its ties with the West or to accept anything like vassalage to the Soviet Union.

*Q. May I ask one more question on this area: There have been reports published within the last day or so that the United States Government is considering separating from Israel's arms requests certain requests for electronic equipment, chiefly radar, and approving that on the ground that it is purely defensive. Can you comment on these reports?*

A. No, I'm afraid not. If that analysis is under way, it is at a level which hasn't yet come to my attention.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, getting back to your previous answer, does your answer mean that Israel's arms requests have been turned down?*

A. No.

*Q. Does it mean they are still open?*

A. I would have to ask you to let me stand pretty much on the statement which I made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in public

hearing about a month ago. My difficulty, ladies and gentlemen, is this: that whenever I speak on that subject I find that every single word and phrase that I use is compared very, very closely with something I may have said a month ago, and if I don't use precisely the same words then it is inferred that we have changed our policy.

Now it is not possible for me—my memory isn't good enough—to repeat exactly in verbatim terms what I said a month ago. And if I try to repeat it in approximately the same terms, that wouldn't be good enough because the differences, however slight, would be studied with a view to seeing if they don't hide some change of policy.

Now, broadly speaking, our policy is as I expressed it at that time, and I think rather than attempt to restate it in what might be slightly different words from which inferences might unjustifiably be drawn, I would just rather stand on that previous statement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to tell us who makes this interpretation?*

A. I would say that those interpretations—I am not criticizing them—those interpretations are made by the interested parties who, quite properly, are seeking to detect, if possible, any changes in our policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please comment on the exception that the Netherlands appears to have taken to some of your statements in Djakarta?*

A. Well, I had a friendly talk, yesterday I think it was, with the Dutch Ambassador here and, I think, clarified the situation. I believe that the position which I took at Djakarta was a position which, by and large, is in the interest of the United States and all of the free nations, and I hope that there will be a better understanding of what I said and did there.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment specifically on the Jungschlaeger<sup>4</sup> case, particularly the charge that an American Embassy plane had been used to fly ammunition to the rebels?*

A. It is not our practice to comment in general upon cases that are pending before courts. There are a great many of these cases all around the

<sup>4</sup> Leon Jungschlaeger, retired Dutch naval captain on trial in Indonesia for alleged subversive activities against the Indonesian Government.

world, and, in the main, it is our policy to avoid comment on cases either at home or abroad that are pending before the courts. As far as the reference to the use of a United States plane is concerned, I understand that has been publicly and officially denied by the United States Embassy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee [in executive session on March 23] you spoke of the Japanese talking about the use of American foreign aid to help them in their payments program both in the United States and Asia. Has anything further developed on that?*

A. No. That theme has been reported by me to our economic people here in the State Department and to the ICA [International Cooperation Administration], and they are studying it to see what they may conclude as to feasibility of a practical application of that general thesis that we should seek to coordinate our economic aid with such economic aid as may result from Japanese reparation payments and the like.

#### **Free-World Unity**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your prepared statement you said something about if the free world maintains its unity in the face of the Soviet changes. We talked a lot here about criticism from a variety of nations. Do you have any apprehensions the free world will maintain its unity in the face of the Soviet change?*

A. I am convinced that the free world will maintain its unity. Now unity is something which has to be carefully differentiated from conformity. That is the difference between our system and the Soviet Communist system—at least, as it has been expounded up to the present time. Whether they will change that or not I don't know. But the old Soviet Communist line has been that there had to be complete conformity and that no differences of opinion were tolerated. In a free society the situation is the reverse of that. We tolerate and welcome differences of opinion, and, indeed, if there were no differences of opinion in a free society there would be something badly wrong with it. Therefore, the unity and vigor of a free society is not to be judged by the absence of criticism and comments; on the contrary, I think it is a sign of vigor that these comments and criticisms occur.

Now, there is of course some danger always that a change of tactics such as is now going on in the Soviet Union, where—as I put it—it may be that old policies are merely being masked, may temporarily have a deceptive effect. But one of the encouraging impressions that I gained from my trip to Asia is that there is a very large measure of alertness to the possibility of danger from new Soviet tactics. Therefore, I returned from this trip convinced that, at least in so far as that part of the world was concerned, there is a very good hope that the unity of the free nations will be preserved. Not, as I say, in the form of a conformity, or domination, or some nations being satellites to others—goodness knows we don't want any satellites. But the kind of unity which means that they are free from Soviet Communist or Chinese Communist domination and within that freedom each lives its own independent life. I believe that situation is going to prevail.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the United States would not oppose other Western countries selling arms to Israel. Would you explain to us the difference—whether the arms come from the United States or other Western countries?*

A. The United States is following its policy in relation to that area for reasons that seem to us to be most conducive to our particular ability to exert influence for the peace and independence of the area of which I spoke. But the same considerations which apply to the United States do not necessarily apply to other countries, and there is certainly no desire on the part of the United States to dictate to other countries what their policy should be.

#### **Policy on Use of Troops**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on that same subject how do you interpret the May 25, 1950, declaration in so far as it may involve the use of our own troops to put down any acts of aggression in that part of the world? Are you free, for example, without congressional sanction?*

A. Whether we are free or not is a Constitutional question. It is very strongly the disposition of President Eisenhower, as I think you all know, to resolve any of those doubts in favor of going to Congress, assuming that Congress is in session and can be expected to act promptly, or

could be called into session promptly. I would think that, in the absence of an emergency of such a character, congressional consultation and action would be impractical and the President would not be disposed to act without such consultation and concurrence by the Congress.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, didn't the 1950 declaration commit Britain, France, and the United States to follow a common policy?*

A. It laid down certain principles which each accepted as a broad guide to its policies. Those principles were, however, so general in their terms that it is not easy to apply them to particulars, and of course the situation has changed since that time in view of the fact that the Soviet Union is now a large purveyor of arms in that area.

*Q. Would the consultations you were talking about be of the kind that took place before the Korean War or at the time the Korean War occurred with congressional leaders, or are you speaking of some other kind of consultations with Congress?*

A. Well, I thought I coupled two words—I thought I said consultation and approval, although possibly if Congress was not in session and an emergency arose then there might be consultations alone. But I would think, in the light of what the President has said in the past, that he would not normally expect to use the armed forces of the United States in the area where there has been no congressional approval given either through a resolution or through a treaty.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Government believe that the shipment of some small arms to Israel by other countries would contribute to the stability of the area?*

A. It might do so. That is a difficult question to answer in the abstract, but certainly the United States has no view to the contrary which would lead it to interpose any objections.

#### **“Problems of Leninism”**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been indicated to us in the past you regarded Stalin's Problems of Leninism as one of the basic texts in Soviet policy. I wonder if recent events would lead you to subscribe to that in the light of recent events.*

A. I still have it on my desk both here and at my house because, in so far as I am aware, the

Soviets, while they have attempted to disavow much of Stalin's program and many of his acts, have not themselves come up with any substitute. There is this to be observed—that the portion of Stalin's rule which is apparently being most vigorously disavowed is, roughly speaking, the last 20 years. The *Problems of Leninism* runs up—as I recall—to 1939, and most of the book embraces statements, speeches, etc., made by Stalin prior to 1937. It may be, therefore, that the greater part of that book will be preserved. Certainly, I don't think one is justified in assuming that it all will go, particularly as the book purports in large part to be a statement of Lenin's doctrine.

Lenin wrote so voluminously that one can delve into his books and arrive at almost any conclusion you wish by picking and choosing. Stalin picked and chose, but much of the book is a quotation from or an elucidation of Lenin's writings. Therefore, I think it is not possible yet to conclude that that volume, or the greater part of it, may not be preserved as a working model for the Communists.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has this Government ever been able to get hold of the text or a summary of the secret Khrushchev speech or any party instructions on which you perhaps based your original statements?*

A. We have not as yet been able to get a full text or written excerpts from it. We do think we have, through indirection, a pretty good idea as to what was said there. But obviously it is incomplete because it was a very long speech and the recollections which we are able to draw upon are secondhand and somewhat fragmentary.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, about Premier Nasser's statement, how do you regard Premier Nasser's statement in the New York Times that he still was weighing the Soviet offer to build the Aswan dam; secondly, are you aware of a change in heart in Egypt in making a prompt start on the dam?*

A. In so far as I am aware, there is no program for making a prompt start, and, indeed, some of the preconditions to a start are still under discussion.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in reply to an earlier question you said that you thought the President would want congressional approval by either a resolution or a treaty in order to use forces in some foreign area—*

A. In the absence of an emergency in which the national interest was involved, and there wasn't time to get congressional action.

*Q. I would like to ask a question. Do you have any plan or does the President have a plan to ask Congress for such a resolution applying to the Middle East or, alternatively, do you know of any emergency which might require action in the absence of congressional approval?*

A. I will answer those questions in reverse order because it is easier. The first is that we do not know of any such emergency, and since we do not know of it we do not have any present plans to seek congressional action.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier you said, I believe, in answer to a question that Israel's request for arms has not been turned down. Has the United States decided to meet this request on the part of Israel?*

A. No, it has not made an affirmative decision.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you said regarding Stalin's writings on Problems of Leninism, are you implying there is primarily a change of methodology in the Soviet administration and, if so, could not a change of methodology, willingly or unwillingly, lead to a change of substance in their policies?*

A. Yes, I believe so, and that is the basis for the hope which I expressed in the next-to-last sentence of the statement which I read to you.

#### **U.S. Policy Toward Indonesia**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the friction between the Netherlands and the United States, could you answer these two questions: A Christian Science Monitor editorial recently suggested that the United States should be careful not to take over economic responsibilities in Indonesia where the Netherlands is forced to leave off, and the second question is this: There is a growing sentiment in the Netherlands that the neutrality of the United States regarding Netherlands New Guinea is about to be over. Could you comment on that one?*

A. Well, as far as economic assistance is concerned, the United States has no desire or intention of taking over the Dutch industrial position in

Indonesia, if that is the subject of your question. Indonesia was a colony, and there was a very large amount of Netherlands capital which was in there. There is no desire or purpose on the part of the United States, governmentally or through encouraging private business, to take over that dominant economic position which the Dutch enjoyed.

We are giving a certain amount of economic assistance to Indonesia. Just before I was there we signed a Public Law 480 arrangement with Indonesia which involved approximately \$95 million worth of agricultural surplus goods.<sup>5</sup> So we are sympathetic to assisting Indonesia where it desires such assistance. But certainly we do not expect to take over the Dutch commercial position in Indonesia.

I think there were two parts of that question. I have forgotten what the second part was.

*Q. It concerned Netherlands New Guinea. So far the United States delegation to the United Nations, at least in recent years, has taken a position of absolute neutrality. Some fears are being expressed that is no longer the case.*

A. We expect to continue to take a position of neutrality because that is our general policy with relation to these highly controversial matters which involve countries both of whom are friends and where we ourselves are not directly involved.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what does the administration expect Congress will do on long-range foreign aid programs? Are you doing anything about it—trying to sell the idea?*

A. Yes, I am doing a good deal publicly and privately. You will find I made two public speeches of a nationwide character, within the last 6 weeks I think, which dealt with that subject.<sup>6</sup> I emphasized it in my appearances before the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees after I returned, and I have talked privately to a number of Senators and Congressmen about it. My belief is that there will be congressional action in this respect which will enable us to go forward on long-range projects with confidence.

<sup>5</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1956, p. 363, and Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539.

## The Foundations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

*by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy*<sup>1</sup>

This coming Wednesday it will be exactly 7 years since that April 4, 1949, when the representatives of 12 nations gathered in Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty. It is fitting that we pause on this occasion to see what progress we have made and to look forward to some of the problems facing the Atlantic community.

It is particularly fitting that this symposium be held here in Norfolk. Your city is one of the first to which our ancestors came from across the Atlantic 300 years ago. Today Norfolk may be described as one of the capitals of the Atlantic community, since one of NATO's two major integrated command systems is located here. The other is the NATO headquarters in Paris. Just 2 weeks ago I had a chance to talk over the situation in Europe with General [Alfred M.] Gruenther, the Supreme Commander for Europe stationed in Paris, and I look forward today to renewing my long acquaintance with Admiral [Jerould] Wright, the distinguished Supreme Allied Commander in the Atlantic.

We in Washington feel special gratitude to the College of William and Mary and to the Norfolk Chamber of Commerce for your sponsorship of these meetings—the one last August and the one beginning today—on the organization and purposes of NATO. Through this kind of discussion and study we will all better understand one of our country's most important activities in the international field. By your example you can help other Americans appreciate the significance of our Atlantic alliance.

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<sup>1</sup>Address made at a symposium on NATO sponsored by the College of William and Mary and the Norfolk Chamber of Commerce at Norfolk, Va., on Apr. 2 (press release 168).

This symposium is an important step in that direction, and I am honored that you asked me to introduce your valuable discussions. Rather than dwell on the general outline of NATO's organization and development, with which we are fairly well acquainted, we might talk about some of the principles and concepts which lie behind the North Atlantic Treaty and some of the reasons why NATO has become a vital force in world affairs.

It is important that we keep in mind these fundamental facts about our Atlantic alliance. We will then be better able to meet some of the questions we have been hearing recently about NATO. And it is worth remembering that much of the talk about NATO comes from greater public interest and a wider knowledge about our security problems. This is all to the good and in our national interest.

All of us are familiar with some of the doubts and questions raised during the last few months. Some people complain that the United States is devoting a great deal of money and manpower to protecting Europe and is not getting enough in return. Others argue that NATO—and in fact the whole concept of collective security—is being rendered obsolete by the development of the hydrogen bomb and other weapons of massive destruction. Still others suggest that the recent shift in Soviet tactics has greatly lessened the danger of war and therefore reduced the need for programs and relationships which have developed through NATO.

In my opinion, all these doubts and questions have their roots in misconceptions about the premises of the Atlantic alliance and about the true character of the international situation now con-

fronting this country. The best way to clear up these misconceptions is to take a good look at NATO's background—to review some of the basic considerations which led to its formation and which make it so valuable today.

NATO has not arisen from a single foundation but rather from several firm-bedded foundations. The main building blocks of NATO are three: the awareness of a common heritage, the presence of a common danger, and a common determination to resist it. These three elements have blended to provide a solid basis for the most extensive and most powerful association of free peoples that history has ever known.

### **A Common Heritage**

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of what we might call the "human" foundations of NATO. By this, I refer to the multiplicity of spiritual, cultural, and personal ties that link the North Atlantic peoples. We should always remember that NATO did not create the Atlantic community. Rather, it was the fact that a community already existed which made NATO possible. The common heritage underlying NATO began nearly 500 years ago with the voyages of discovery and exploration, and the passing centuries have steadily tightened the attachment of North America to Europe. Let me give you a few examples.

According to the 1950 census, there were more than 33 million people living in the United States who either were born abroad or had parents born abroad. Of this number, nearly half came from the 14 other NATO countries. Of the remainder of our population, an even larger percentage can trace their ancestry back to one of the NATO nations.

We Americans have developed over the years a political and constitutional structure that is peculiarly our own. But its basic principles, including representative government, restraints on governmental authority, and guaranties of human and property rights, had European origins. Most of our European allies, despite varying political structures, still govern themselves under these basic principles. In simple terms, we and our allies share a devotion to the concepts of human freedom and political liberty. These concepts are what set the free nations apart in the world today.

A look at the content of our educational programs shows even more concretely our common

heritage with Western and Southern Europe. Here at William and Mary, the second oldest university in the country and one of our best, we find as in other American universities numerous studies in literature, science, art, and the social sciences. If we forget for a moment the portion of this accumulated knowledge that has been produced by the minds and hands of our own countrymen, we will quickly recognize that the greatest part of the remainder has come from the NATO countries of Europe. Our whole culture is an Atlantic culture.

It would be possible to offer many additional examples, but those I have given are sufficient to illustrate my thesis that the Atlantic community was a living reality long before the relationship was formalized by intergovernmental organizations. Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of this community relationship was provided by our experience in the First and Second World Wars. In both instances the American people, after trying to avoid involvement in military hostilities, discovered painfully that the fate of Europe was indissolubly linked with our own. The bonds of blood, friendship, and tradition are not easily broken.

### **A Common Danger**

In the period after 1945, another crisis arose. This danger threatened every one of the Atlantic nations. The Nazi dream of world empire was shattered, but in the process a large part of the Eurasian land mass fell into the hands of the ruthless Communist dictatorship. Within a matter of months, Western hopes that the Soviet Union would restore freedom to the areas occupied by its armies and would cooperate in the establishing of a lasting peace were dashed.

Not only did the Soviet rulers make clear their determination to hold fast to their conquests and to exploit the newly acquired resources and peoples for the aggrandizement of Soviet power, but they made equally clear their intention to continue the expansion of Communist power into other areas. Moreover, it was evident that the Communist bloc possessed powerful capabilities for carrying out these intentions. The external pressures of Soviet imperialism were reinforced by the internal pressures exerted by pro-Communist elements within free societies. Guns were supplemented by propaganda. The specter of political chaos was magnified by the risk of economic col-

lapse. Communism attacked on all fronts at the same time. Its purpose was to destroy every vestige of resistance to a Communist-dominated world. The situation in 1948 and 1949 was desperate. Something had to be done.

### **A Common Response**

The common civilization of the Atlantic community was challenged by a common danger, and this inspired a common response. The Atlantic nations cooperated in various ways to meet the danger. Through the Marshall plan and the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, they labored to restore Western Europe's economic health and thereby lay a basis for political stability. Through the Brussels Treaty, five European nations began the construction of a common defense system. But it was painfully evident that even the utmost toil and sacrifice on the part of the Brussels Treaty powers would not be adequate to produce defenses capable of holding the Soviet colossus in check. Just as North American support had proved necessary to European economic recovery, so did North American participation prove essential to an effective defense arrangement. The North Atlantic Treaty was the result.

The North Atlantic Treaty was negotiated by the United States and the 11 other original signatories: Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, and Italy. Since that time Greece, Turkey, and most recently the Federal Republic of Germany have acceded to the treaty, making a total of 15 members. The main deterrent to aggression, completely apart from the military strength which was later assembled, lay in the unity of purpose which the treaty demonstrated. Secretary Dulles, then a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations, clearly set forth this view when, during the hearings on the ratification of the treaty, he said:

The treaty takes away from an aggressor one choice that he used to have: the choice of making war on the parties singly, one by one. If he chooses to fight one party to this pact, he must fight them all, and all at the same time.

### **The Principle of Collective Security**

It is clear that the common danger confronting the Atlantic nations provided the immediate stimulus for NATO. But the existence of a com-

mon danger is only a part of the story. Even more important is the fact that the Atlantic powers, *in combination*, possess a capacity for responding to this danger far greater than any one of them possesses alone. Of all the tangible and intangible elements that have joined together to produce NATO, the most significant is the simple fact that Western Europe and Northern America need each other—that an amalgamation of their human and material resources is vital to the safety and well-being of both.

Since the end of World War II, there has been little question in the minds of most Europeans about the need for American cooperation and support. Most of them have found it painfully obvious that collective security is the only real security available. But among Americans the need for Europe's cooperation and support is sometimes less clearly understood. Old-style isolationism has virtually died out in America, but there are still a number of our people who are inclined to doubt that we get much out of collective security arrangements and who suspect that the United States protects and assists others while receiving little or nothing in return. This is a fallacy and probably engenders more mistaken thinking about foreign policy than any other single misconception. I think it would be useful, therefore, to examine the strategic value of the combination of NATO resources primarily from the standpoint of America's own national self-interests.

Stripped to its essence, the justification for NATO is a simple exercise in elementary arithmetic. North America and free Europe combined now produce about 70 percent of the world's manufactured goods, while the entire Soviet bloc, including China, produces only about 20 percent. On the other hand, Soviet control of the territory and resources of Western Europe would give the Soviet bloc 50 percent of the total world's industrial production, as against North America's 40 percent. The Atlantic nations, so long as they are joined together, are in a position to maintain decisive industrial superiority over the Soviet bloc for an indefinite period of years. Soviet domination of Western Europe would rapidly shift the industrial balance to the Communist side.

One of our great deficiencies in the global struggle with communism is manpower. The population of the Communist bloc outnumbers the American population by a margin of 5 to 1. But with free Europe and North America joined together,



this margin is reduced to approximately 2 to 1. The extent to which the manpower of our European allies supplements the manpower of the United States is vividly illustrated by the armed forces of the two areas. The United States has about 3 million men under arms. Our NATO allies are now adding another 3½ million to the total military manpower available for free-world defense. We do not know exactly how many men the Communist countries have under arms, but a fair estimate would be about 10¼ million.

Our European allies also contribute substantial sea and air strength, as well as naval and air bases, to the common defense. There are now more than 150 NATO air bases in the European area. These bases are indispensable for defense and retaliation against aggression. We should note that our NATO allies have not only contributed the land for these bases but have paid most of the cost of their construction.

Not the least of free Europe's potential contributions to the strength and well-being of the Atlantic community is Europe's scientific and technological capacity. It is worth recalling the nationalities of the scientists who contributed to the original development of the atomic bomb. The list reads almost like a NATO rollcall; for example, Fermi of Italy, Bohr of Denmark, Cockcroft of England.

Finally, I think it is time to lay at rest the myth that the cost of the NATO program rests primarily upon the shoulders of the American taxpayer. It is true that our defense expenditures are much greater than those of other countries, but it is also true that our national income is nearly three times as great as that of all the other NATO nations combined. Americans know that the United States has made very large contributions to the equipment and training of the military forces of our European allies. But relatively few Americans realize that these allies are now spending \$6 from their own budget to match every dollar's worth of U.S. assistance they receive from us. All told, they are contributing about \$12 billion a year to the common defense program. And \$12 billion "ain't hay," even in this age of astronomical budgets. It is a very substantial contribution to the common defense.

These are some of the facts which explain the origin of the North Atlantic Treaty and why it is important to us. And just as significant as the series of commitments which the member nations

have given to assist one another in the event of aggression is the wide range of collective activity in which they are already engaged. While most of this activity is directed toward the maintenance and improvement of military defense, there have been significant advances toward closer political and cultural cooperation as well.

NATO, with its 15 members, is a cornerstone of our foreign policy, linking the power of North America with that of Western and Southern Europe. We have other important alliances. In this hemisphere we have the Organization of American States, the oldest regional system in the world, and the Rio Pact, which bind us together with 20 Latin American Republics for cooperation and joint defense. In Asia we are members of SEATO, still a new organization, which is steadily gathering strength. We have important bilateral pacts with the Republic of China, Korea, the Philippines, Japan, and Spain, and we have a trilateral security treaty with Australia and New Zealand. The U.S. today is fortified by security arrangements with more than 40 countries. Although we are not members of the Baghdad Pact, which is the very newest defense organization, including Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, we have a deep interest in its success. The United States has entered into these defense alliances to meet the danger we and our friends face in many parts of the world. Our ability to meet this danger is much more powerful than it was even a few years ago. But the danger has not significantly abated.

#### **Shift in Soviet Tactics**

This is true even though during the last year we have witnessed what appears to be a rather striking shift in Soviet tactics. While the Communist leaders have always employed a variety of techniques to pursue their objective of world domination, up until recently they had relied largely on the use or threatened use of military force. As a result of the increasing unity and strength of free nations, there are indications that they have now reached a better appreciation of the suicidal risks of warfare and are beginning to place much more emphasis on the use of political, economic, and psychological techniques in the unending Communist struggle against the free world.

There is a lot we still do not know about what is going on in the Soviet Union. We do not know whether they are changing their policies. In certain vital areas like the unification of Germany, they appear to have made no change. On the other hand, they appear to be trying to change their approach and diplomatic methods, particularly as they deal with South Asia and the Near East. They seem to be stepping up their overtures toward Western Europe. Toward Japan, however, they are still using the heavy hand and their old technique of diplomatic coercion. They have not in the slightest relaxed their control over the satellite nations.

The Stalin story is currently the most spectacular example of the Soviet enigma. We know that Stalin's disciples and collaborators are now blackening his name. *Pravda*, on March the 28th, told the world that Stalin lacked personal modesty, that he did not cut short the glorifications and praises addressed to him, and that all this violated the principles of Marx and Lenin, who, according to *Pravda*, taught that the people must have the right to elect their responsible leaders.

There are a lot of good reasons why the present Soviet rulers would want to push Stalin off his pedestal. They may well have found it necessary to revitalize the political and economic machinery of the Soviet Union, and by attacking Stalin they may hope to shock the Communist Party and the people of the Soviet Union into an awareness that a new response is expected, that the people on down the line in the Soviet hierarchy must take on greater initiative and responsibility. They probably want to stimulate the productive and creative abilities of Soviet engineers, scientists, and artists, who were never sure that Stalin might not change the line and put them out of business. And we cannot forget that the men in Moscow probably feared the wrath of Stalin, knowing what they knew about the purges and the secret police. They may also feel this new line will be appealing to non-Communists and especially to socialists abroad, and that it will get them out from under the domineering rigidities of Stalin's foreign policy.

Time will tell us more about the "cult of the individual" and about the adjustments going on in Russia.

It would be foolhardy, however, to assume that the Communists have changed their objective. We

have almost no evidence that the basic totalitarian features of the Soviet state have changed in any way. Nevertheless, we can hope that they have decided to reduce their emphasis on military strength and threat of force as major instruments of policy. Such a shift would be an advantageous development from the standpoint of the United States and other free nations. The objective of U.S. policy is to achieve in peace the blessings of liberty, and thus any genuine indication that the danger of armed Communist aggression has diminished would be welcome. We have no reason to doubt the fundamental capacity of free societies to compete with communism by peaceful means. At the same time, there are two things we should keep firmly in mind when we try to figure out where we stand today.

### **Communist Capability for Aggression**

First, we should remember that the Communist bloc still retains a tremendous *capability* for military aggression. It has a substantial superiority in military manpower. It is rapidly developing more modern weapons and a modern technology, including an ominous atomic potential. The Communists possess the capacity to engage in new military adventures at any time, either on a general or local scale. As long as this *capacity* exists, it is obvious that the United States and other free nations must be watchful of their freedom and safety.

Second, even if the Communists remain cautious about military adventures, we cannot afford to discount the enormous stakes involved in the bitter political and economic contest which they are determined to continue waging against the free world. In terms of the ultimate fate of free civilization, this new strategy is no less dangerous than the old. In some ways, it is even more difficult to combat, because it is more subtle, more complex, and geared to a longer time period. We should not make the fatal mistake of assuming that a seeming Communist de-emphasis of military methods of conquest will allow us to take a holiday from the struggle for freedom. On the contrary, this struggle may become more intense and will certainly tax our imagination, energy, and patience to the utmost. Our ability to achieve success in this struggle, like our ability to maintain an adequate defense posture, will depend in large measure upon our cooperation with other free nations. The principle of collective security is as valid to-

day in the political field as it ever was in the military field.

I think it is clear that the NATO countries have no reason to de-emphasize their defense programs. Actually, these very programs have been a principal factor in bringing about the recent shift in Soviet tactics. Our current situation reminds me of a story I once heard about a highway that went through a mountain village. There was a very high cliff at a sharp turn in the highway, and quite a number of travelers failed to make it. There was considerable agitation for a project to build a fence at this point, and this was eventually done. After several years had gone by, however, a traveler happened to be passing through the village and noticed that the fence had been removed. He stopped to ask one of the natives about it and received a very simple explanation. "We kept the fence there for about 3 years," the old fellow said, "but nobody fell off the cliff any more, so we took it down."

#### **Maintaining Our Guard**

I feel sure that both the United States and its allies recognize that this is no time to take down our fences. We must maintain our guard as long as a threat exists. Even though we hope that the Soviet rulers have come to recognize the horrors of modern warfare, we have no guaranty that they will indefinitely desist from military adventures, especially if they are tempted by military weaknesses in neighboring nations.

As I said in the beginning of this discussion, this examination of NATO's background will help us to give positive answers to any of the doubts or questions raised about the NATO relationship. NATO remains vital to the interests of Americans and Europeans alike. The onrush of modern technology has not lessened the need for collective strength and collective effort. The new wind blowing from Moscow remains chilly. We must always be prepared for stormy weather.

To those who express concern about the occasional differences of opinion among our NATO allies, I would like to say this. I have never known even a closely knit family that did not have an occasional quarrel. There will be disagreement among individuals and nations as long as independent thinking survives, and independence of thought is one of the things we Americans and our allies are most determined to preserve. It is true, of course, that frictions and disagree-

ments could weaken the effectiveness of an alliance. We must do everything we can to minimize and resolve differences of this kind, but we must never exaggerate their importance. Even the most important differences among the Atlantic nations cannot begin to match the significance of our common interest in peace and survival.

I do not propose at this time to speculate about the direction which NATO may take in future years. You here today, with your interest and expert knowledge about NATO, are well qualified to do this. I will confine myself, in conclusion, to expressing my deep conviction that the Atlantic relationship, whatever the fluctuations of circumstance, will endure and grow. NATO's foundations are solid, and its accomplishments are substantial. I know that you here in Norfolk will continue your efforts to help it grow even stronger.

#### **NATO Fellowship Awarded to American Woman**

The Department of State announced on April 4 (press release 173) that M. Margaret Ball, professor of political science, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Mass., is the U.S. winner of one of the 11 NATO research fellowships offered by the North Atlantic Council. Simultaneous announcement of the award was made at NATO headquarters in Paris.

The NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Program was announced last July in implementation of article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for cooperation in nonmilitary fields. It is designed to promote the study of historical, political, constitutional, legal, social, cultural, linguistic, economic, and strategic problems which will reveal the common heritage and historical experience of the Atlantic countries, as well as the present needs and future development of the North Atlantic area considered as a community. Candidates for these first awards to be made under the program were selected by a committee under the chairmanship of Ambassador L. D. Wilgress, Canadian Permanent Representative to NATO, who is also chairman of the NATO Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Other members of the committee were James B. Conant, U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and formerly president of Harvard University; Robert Marjolin, professor at Nancy University and formerly Secretary-General of the Organiza-

tion for European Economic Cooperation; Alberto Tarchiani, formerly Italian Ambassador to the United States; and H. U. Willink, master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, and formerly vice-chancellor of Cambridge University. The Conference Board of Associated Research Councils assisted the Department in recommending a panel of American candidates to be considered by the selection committee.

Miss Ball's research will be on the general subject of NATO and the Western European union movement. She expects to leave this coming autumn to spend the 4-month period of the fellowship in London, Paris, Bonn, and other European capitals.

## **U.S., Netherlands Begin Negotiation of Air Transport Agreement**

Press release 176 dated April 5

The Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States began negotiation of an air transport agreement in Washington on April 5.

The chairman of the delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands is Dr. J. J. Spanjaard, Director of the Netherlands Department of Civil Aviation. The delegation also includes representatives of the Governments of Surinam and of the Netherlands Antilles. The opening session was also attended by the Netherlands Ambassador to the United States, Dr. J. H. van Roijen.

Chairman of the U.S. delegation is Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The vice chairman is Har-mar Denny, member of the Civil Aeronautics Board. The U.S. delegation is composed of officials from the Department of State and the Civil Aeronautics Board.

There has never been a bilateral air transport agreement between the United States and the Netherlands. At present Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) operates from Amsterdam to New York and from Curaçao to Miami under permits granted directly to the airline by the U.S. Government. Similarly, Pan American Airways operates from New York to Amsterdam and beyond to Frankfurt, Germany, from New York to Surinam and beyond, and from New York and Miami to Cu-

raçao and beyond under permits granted directly to the airline by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

## **Transfer of Escapee Program to Department of State**

White House press release dated March 24

### **WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT**

President Eisenhower on March 24 issued an Executive order authorizing the Secretary of State to carry out the functions pertaining to the United States Escapee Program through any officer or agency of the Department of State.<sup>1</sup> It is contemplated that this program, which is presently being administered by the International Cooperation Administration, will be transferred to the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs in the Department of State. The Escapee Program is designed to provide immediate assistance for people fleeing from behind the Iron Curtain and for their eventual reestablishment in Europe or overseas. During its 4 years of operation the program has assisted nearly 25,000 persons to resettle in the free world.

The contemplated transfer will consolidate this humanitarian program with the related refugee functions already administered by the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. The Deputy Administrator of the Bureau, who is responsible for the administration of the Refugee Relief Program, will also direct the Escapee Program and represent the United States on the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.

Within the International Cooperation Administration the Office of the Deputy Director for Refugees, Migration, and Voluntary Assistance has been abolished. Those functions in this field which remain the responsibility of the Director of the International Cooperation Administration have been transferred to the Office of the Deputy Director for Technical Services. These functions are concerned with registration of and relationships with U.S. voluntary agencies which participate in international relief and rehabilitation proj-

<sup>1</sup> For an article on the Escapee Program by Mrs. Dorothy D. Houghton, see BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1955, p. 415.

ects, and with staff support for the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid.

This change was recommended by a joint State-ICA task force studying organizational relationships concerning these activities. The proposed transfer has the approval of the Secretary of State and the full concurrence of John B. Hollister, Director of the International Cooperation Administration.

## EXECUTIVE ORDER 10663 <sup>2</sup>

### ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESCAPEE PROGRAM

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Mutual Security Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 832), as amended, including particularly sections 521 and 525 thereof, it is ordered as follows:

SEC. 1. Section 104 of Executive Order No. 10610 of May 9, 1955 (20 F. R. 3181),<sup>3</sup> is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof a new subsection (c) reading as follows:

"(c) The Secretary of State may carry out the functions now financed pursuant to section 405 (d) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, through any officer or agency of the Department of State."

SEC. 2. There is hereby terminated the duty of the Director of the International Cooperation Administration (under section 103 (c) of Executive Order No. 10575 of November 6, 1954 (19 F. R. 7251),<sup>4</sup> as affected by Executive Order No. 10610) to assist the Secretary of State in formulating and presenting the policy of the United States with respect to the assistance programs of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, the United Nations Refugee Fund, and the United Nations Children's Fund.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of State is hereby authorized to transfer or assign to any agency or agencies of the Department of State such offices, officers, and personnel, and so much of the property and records, of the International Cooperation Administration as he may deem necessary for the administration by the said agency or agencies of the functions referred to in section 104 (c) of Executive Order No. 10610, as amended by this order.

SEC. 4. This order shall become effective on the first day of the first month commencing after the date hereof.



THE WHITE HOUSE,  
March 24, 1956.

<sup>2</sup> 21 Fed. Reg. 1845.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of May 30, 1955, p. 889.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 13, 1954, p. 914.

## Foreign Service Institute Advisory Committee

Press release 177 dated April 6

The Department of State announced on April 6 the appointment of the following persons to serve as members of an advisory committee to the Foreign Service Institute:

Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, U. S. House of Representatives  
Ellsworth Bunker, President, The American National Red Cross

Robert D. Calkins, President, The Brookings Institution,  
Washington, D.C.

Robert Cutler, Director, Old Colony Trust, Boston, Mass.  
Clyde K. Kluckhohn, Director, Laboratory of Social  
Sciences, Harvard University

William L. Langer, Chairman, Committee on Regional  
Studies, Harvard University

Charles E. Saltzman, Henry Sears & Company, New York,  
N.Y.

Henry M. Wriston, Director, The American Assembly,  
Columbia University

The Foreign Service Institute has statutory responsibility for training in the Department of State. It is concerned with indoctrination and training of newly commissioned Foreign Service officers in the intricacies of a diplomatic and consular career and also with the responsibility of preparing officers in mid-career for positions of greater importance in the Service. Additionally, the Institute provides training in many languages, conducts courses in economics and administration, and is responsible for university assignments in pursuit of greater proficiency in such areas as political science, management, and economics. It also furnishes to other officers and employees of the Government such training in the field of foreign relations as is needed.

The committee will meet periodically for the purpose of advising the Director of the Institute on all phases of training.

## Negotiations Concerning Debts of City of Berlin

Press release 169 dated April 3

Final arrangements have now been completed to permit the opening of negotiations for the settlement of the external debts owed by the City of Berlin and by public utility enterprises owned or controlled by Berlin.

These arrangements amplify the agreement referred to in the Department of State's press release 8 of January 5, 1956,<sup>1</sup> which lifted the restrictions of article 5 (5) of the Agreement on German External Debts of February 27, 1953,<sup>2</sup> on the settlement of the Berlin external debts. The arrangements were made in similar exchanges of notes between the United States, British, and French Embassies at Bonn and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany. The text of the note sent by the United States Embassy to the Foreign Ministry and an unofficial translation of the reply follow.

#### **Note From U.S. Embassy at Bonn**

No. 386

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to refer to the Ministry's note number 507-519-746-71284/55 of the 13th of August, 1955, and to the Embassy's note number 94 of August 29, 1955 on the subject of the settlement of the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises.

In the opinion of the United States Government, the exchange of notes referred to constitutes the agreement provided for in Article 5 (5) of the London Debt Agreement that negotiations on the settlement of these debts are now considered to be practicable. The Ministry has now raised informally with the British, French and American Embassies the question of the form of the negotiations provided for in Article 5 (5).

The United States Government considers that, with the lifting of the exclusion provided in Article 5 (5), the terms of the London Debt Agreement and the appropriate annexes are applicable to the settlement of the external debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises; and in particular, that the external bonded debts of the City of Berlin fall under Annex I, the bonded debts of the public utilities under Annex II and the miscellaneous debts of the City and of the public utilities, under Annex IV. It, therefore, believes that no further intergovernmental conference is required, but that negotiations may now be undertaken between the debtors and the creditor representatives.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 93.

<sup>2</sup> S. Exec. D, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

The question of the actual terms of settlement of these debts will naturally be one of the principal objects of the proposed negotiations. The United States Government believes that the text of the Agreement and the annexes provides ample flexibility to take into account the special political and economic position of Berlin.

If the Federal Government is in agreement with the views presented above, it is suggested that this note, the identical notes from the British and French Embassies and the replies of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs constitute an interpretation of the London Debt Agreement, and that certified copies of these notes be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom.

The Embassy of the United States of America avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs the assurance of its highest consideration.

AMERICAN EMBASSY, Bonn, Bad Godesberg, February 29, 1956.

#### **Note Verbale From German Foreign Ministry**

507-519-746-5-5-73835/56

The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to acknowledge to the Embassy of the United States of America the receipt of its Note Verbale No. 386 of February 29, 1956 concerning the debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises and to reply as follows with reference to the Note Verbale of the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs of August 13, 1955—507-519-746-71284/55—and to the Note of the Embassy of the United States of America of August 29, 1955—No. 94—concerning the same subject:

In the opinion of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany the exchange of notes mentioned above constitutes the agreement provided for in Article 5 (5) of the London Debt Agreement that negotiations on the settlement of these debts are now considered to be expedient. The Embassy of the United States of America, the Royal British Embassy and the French Embassy have in the meantime informally discussed with the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs the question of the form in which the negotiations provided for in Article 5 (5) are to take place.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany considers that, after the lifting of the deferment provided by Article 5 (5), the terms of the London Debt Agreement and the appropriate an-

nexes are applicable to the settlement of the external debts of the City of Berlin and of the Berlin public utility enterprises. It is, in particular, of the opinion that the external bonded debts of the City of Berlin are to be dealt with under Annex I, the bonded debts of the public utilities under Annex II, and that the miscellaneous debts of the City of Berlin and the Berlin public enterprises come under Annex IV. It, therefore, believes that no further intergovernmental conference is required, and that negotiations can now be opened between the debtors and the creditor representatives.

The question of the actual terms of settlement of these debts will naturally be one of the principal subjects of the proposed negotiations. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany believes that the text of the Agreement and its annexes provides an ample margin to take into account the special political and economic position of Berlin.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is in agreement with the opinion of the Government of the United States of America that the three identical notes of the United States Embassy, the Royal British Embassy and the French Embassy, dated February 29, 1956, and this Note as well as the two identical notes to the Royal British Embassy and the French Embassy constitute an interpretation of the London Debt Agreement, and that certified copies of these Notes should be deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom.

The Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurance of its highest consideration.

Bonn, *March 2, 1956*

## **Question of Amending Proclamation Limiting Dairy Imports**

White House press release dated March 21

The President announced on March 21 that the proclamation limiting imports of certain manufactured dairy products could not, on the basis of the United States Tariff Commission's recent limited investigation, be amended to include certain imports of cheeses not now considered subject to the terms of the proclamation. The President agreed with the majority of the Tariff Commission

that the amendments requested by the Department of Agriculture could be considered only after a full-scale investigation under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. The Tariff Commission's investigation of last year was made pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22, which provides only for the modification of existing proclamations when "changed circumstances" so require.

Proclamation 3019, which was issued on June 8, 1953,<sup>1</sup> established annual import quotas for certain manufactured dairy products, including specified types of cheeses. Some imports of Italian-type cheeses, either because of the ingredients they contain or because of the way in which they are packaged, have not been regarded by the Bureau of Customs as subject to Proclamation 3019. The Department of Agriculture has viewed these cheeses as indistinguishable from those admittedly covered by the proclamation and has sought to have such importations brought within the purview of the proclamation. On April 7, 1955, the President, pursuant to a request from the Department of Agriculture, directed the Tariff Commission to make a supplemental investigation pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22 to determine whether modification of Proclamation 3019 was warranted.<sup>2</sup>

The Tariff Commission reported its findings and conclusions to the President in July 1955.<sup>3</sup> The majority and minority of the Commission divided on a legal issue, namely, whether the requested amendments to the proclamation to include cheeses not now considered under restriction could be accomplished pursuant to subsection (d) of section 22, or whether such amendments should be the subject of a new, full-scale investigation under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22. The President requested the advice of the Attorney General on this question, and it was his opinion that the requested amendments should not be made on the basis of the limited investigation under subsection (d). This was also the view of the majority of the Tariff Commission. After reviewing the case further, the President concurred with the conclusion of the Tariff Commission majority.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of June 29, 1953, p. 919.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, May 16, 1955, p. 815.

<sup>3</sup> Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington, 25, D.C.

The advisability of requesting a new investigation under subsections (a) and (b) of section 22 is currently under study in the Department of Agriculture.

## Increased Duty on Imports of Canned Tuna in Brine

### WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated March 17

The President on March 16 issued a proclamation providing that the duty on imports of tuna canned in brine shall automatically increase from 12½ percent to 25 percent ad valorem whenever in any year such imports exceed 20 percent of the previous year's U.S. pack of canned tuna of all varieties.

The proclamation gives effect to an exchange of notes with Iceland<sup>1</sup> which withdraws tuna canned in brine from the 1943 trade agreement with that country and to an invocation of the right reserved by the United States in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to increase the duty on tuna canned in brine.

In any calendar year the increased duty would apply only to those imports in excess of the stated 20 percent and only for the remainder of that year. Imports in any year up to the 20 percent break-point would be subject to the 12½ percent ad valorem rate. Because the President's proclamation will become effective on April 14, 1956, it provides that the increased rate of duty will apply this year if and when imports of tuna canned in brine after the April 14 date exceed 15 percent of last year's domestic pack of canned tuna.

In the 1943 trade agreement with Iceland, the United States reduced from 25 percent ad valorem to 12½ percent ad valorem the duty on certain miscellaneous canned fish, including such fish canned in brine, dutiable under tariff paragraph 718 (b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. This concession was intended primarily to cover certain speciality canned fish produced in Iceland. When tuna canned in brine became an article of international trade after the war, United States imports of this product were classified as miscel-

laneous canned fish under tariff paragraph 718 (b) and subject to this reduced rate in the Icelandic agreement. The withdrawal of this item from the Icelandic agreement in no way affects the concession granted on other fish specialties of primary interest to Iceland.

In the 1955 trade agreement negotiations involving Japan's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the United States agreed not to increase the existing rate of 12½ percent ad valorem applying to imports of tuna canned in brine, subject to the reservation of a right to impose a higher rate of duty on imports in any calendar year in excess of 20 percent of the domestic pack of canned tuna during the preceding year. This reservation has now been invoked. Because annual imports of tuna canned in brine are not at present amounting to 20 percent of the domestic tuna pack, no immediate application of the increased duty will follow upon the President's action.

### PROCLAMATION 3128<sup>2</sup>

#### TERMINATING IN PART THE ICELANDIC TRADE AGREEMENT PROCLAMATIONS AND SUPPLEMENTING PROCLAMATION NO. 3105 OF JULY 22, 1955

1. WHEREAS, under authority of section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on August 27, 1943, entered into a trade agreement with the Regent of Iceland, including two schedules annexed thereto (57 Stat. 1078), and by proclamation of September 30, 1943 (57 Stat. 1075), he proclaimed the said trade agreement, which proclamation has been supplemented by proclamation of October 22, 1943 (57 Stat. 1098);

2. WHEREAS item 718(b) of Schedule II of the said trade agreement reads as follows:

United States Tariff Act of 1930 paragraph	Description of Article	Rate of Duty
718 (b)	Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than fifteen pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances): Any of the foregoing (except herring, smoked or kippered or in tomato sauce, packed in immediate containers weighing with their contents more than one pound each, and except salmon and anchovies)	12½% ad valorem

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>21 Fed. Reg. 1793.



3. WHEREAS the Government of the United States and the Government of Iceland by an exchange of notes dated March 5 and 6, 1956, have agreed to the withdrawal, effective April 14, 1956, of tuna from said item 718(b), with the result that the said item shall thereafter read as follows:

United States Tariff Act of 1930 paragraph	Description of Article	Rate of Duty
718 (b)	Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than fifteen pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances; except herring, smoked or kippered or in tomato sauce, packed in immediate containers weighing with their contents more than one pound each; and except salmon, anchovies, and tuna)	12½% ad valorem

4. WHEREAS, under the authority of the said section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on June 8, 1955, entered into a trade agreement providing for the accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,<sup>3</sup> which trade agreement consists of the Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement, including Schedule XX contained in Annex A thereto, and by Proclamation No. 3105 of July 22, 1955 (20 F. R. 5379),<sup>4</sup> he proclaimed the said trade agreement, which proclamation was supplemented by a notification of August 22, 1955 from the President to the Secretary of the Treasury (20 F. R. 6211);<sup>5</sup>

5. WHEREAS item 718(b) in Part I of the said Schedule XX reads as follows:

United States Tariff Act of 1930 paragraph	Description of Article	Rate of Duty
718 (b)	Fish, prepared or preserved in any manner, when packed in air-tight containers weighing with their contents not more than 15 pounds each (except fish packed in oil or in oil and other substances): Tuna . . . . .	12½% ad val.
	NOTE: The United States reserves the right to increase the rate of duty on fish of the foregoing description which are entered in any calendar year in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 20 per centum of the United States pack of canned tuna fish during the immediately preceding calendar year, as reported by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service.	

6. WHEREAS on March 16, 1956 the Government of the United States notified the Executive Secretary to the CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General Agreement on

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of June 27, 1955, p. 1053.  
<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1955, p. 226.  
<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 397.

Tariffs and Trade that it invoked the reservation contained in the note to the said item 718(b) set forth in the fifth recital of this proclamation, effective April 14, 1956; and

7. WHEREAS the first general note to the said Schedule XX specified in the fourth recital of this proclamation provides that the provisions of that schedule are subject to the following general note to Schedule XX to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of October 30, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A1362):

4. If any tariff quota provided for in this Schedule, other than those provided for in items 771, becomes effective after the beginning of a period specified as the quota year, the quantity of the quota product entitled to enter under the quota during the unexpired portion of the quota year shall be the annual quota quantity less ½ thereof for each full calendar month that has expired in such period:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the said section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, do proclaim as follows:

Part I

In accordance with the exchange of notes specified in the third recital of this proclamation, I hereby terminate in part the proclamations of September 30, 1943, and October 22, 1943, referred to in the first recital of this proclamation, insofar as such proclamations apply to tuna provided for in the said item 718(b) set forth in the second recital of this proclamation, such termination to be effective at the close of business on April 14, 1956, with the result that the rate of duty specified in the said item 718(b) shall thereafter apply only to the articles provided for in the said item as set forth in the third recital of this proclamation.

Part II

In accordance with the notification specified in the sixth recital of this proclamation I hereby terminate in part, effective at the close of business on April 14, 1956, the said proclamation of July 22, 1955, and the said notification of August 22, 1955, referred to in the fourth recital, insofar as such proclamation and notification apply to tuna provided for in the said item 718(b) set forth in the fifth recital which are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in the calendar year 1956 after April 14, 1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 15 per centum of the United States pack of canned tuna during the calendar year 1955, as reported by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and in any calendar year after 1956 in excess of an aggregate quantity equal to 20 per centum of the United States pack of canned tuna fish during the immediately preceding calendar year, as so reported, with the result that such tuna in excess of such 15 or 20 per centum of the United States pack shall be dutiable at 25 per centum ad valorem, the full rate provided for in paragraph 718(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (46 Stat. (pt. 1) 633).

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this sixteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.



By the President:

HERBERT HOOVER, JR.

*Acting Secretary of State*

## **U.S. Presents Atomic Energy Library to the United Nations**

### **STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N.<sup>1</sup>**

U.S./U.N. press release 2379 dated March 28

When speaking of atomic energy, we have become accustomed to talking in terms of reactors and megatons, kilograms of fissionable materials, and millions of dollars for equipment and research. Today we are talking only of books—but books are the bedrock of scientific progress.

The library which the United States Government has the honor of presenting to the United Nations today contains 45 volumes of information on basic research in atomic energy as well as many thousands of articles and technical reports published in this country and abroad. There are also many thousands of cards which index and describe all the nonclassified literature of the Atomic Energy Commission. This library will be kept up to date by the Atomic Energy Commission as new material becomes available.

In a statement made on the floor of the General Assembly on November 5, 1954,<sup>2</sup> I announced that the United States was prepared to make available to other countries the vast amount of documentation on atomic energy that was already freely published—totaling more than 200,000 pages of information. I suggested that we would be able to give 10 libraries containing these documents to countries interested in using them.

<sup>1</sup> Made at U.N. Headquarters on Mar. 28 on the occasion of the presentation of an Atomic Energy Library to the United Nations.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 15, 1954, p. 742.

Since that time, not 10 but more than 40 countries have requested these libraries; 33 have already been presented, and the others are on their way. Several more have been given to regional and international organizations interested in atomic energy development.

Our only request in return is that other cooperating nations send us their collections of official nonsecret papers to be placed in appropriate libraries in the United States.

The United States program of using the atom for man's betterment rather than for his destruction has proceeded along two lines of action: making facilities available and making information available. As President Eisenhower has said, our purpose is to spark the creative and inventive skills, to put them to work for the betterment of the conditions under which men must live. The President has also stressed that this must be a joint effort—"a continued partnership of the world's best minds."

For these reasons, it is a pleasure for me today to present to the United Nations Headquarters this library, symbolized by this one volume, for the use of the United Nations Secretariat and the delegations of member countries.

### **DESCRIPTION OF LIBRARY**

U.S./U.N. press release 2380 dated March 28

This is a technical library of nonclassified data on nuclear energy and its applications. It is a comprehensive collection containing the equivalent of about 300 feet of library shelving and was developed by the Technical Information Service of the Atomic Energy Commission as one of the several Commission projects supporting the President's atoms-for-peace program. In it is to be found not only information unique to nuclear reactor technology and nuclear physics but also the recorded impact of atomic energy in such fields as chemistry, metallurgy, ceramics, electronics, biology, medicine, and agriculture.

The library, which weighs approximately 1,000 pounds, consists of about 10,000 Atomic Energy Commission research and development reports, 6,500 of which are on microcards; 34 bound volumes of scientific and technical texts on nuclear theory; and 11 bound volumes of abstracts of some 50,000 reports and articles published in this country and abroad. Also included are approximately

55,000 index cards. The library will be kept current and additional reports will be supplied as they are issued.

The library is one of 44 that have been presented or are in the process of being presented by the United States under the atoms-for-peace program. Previous recipients are:

Italy	Netherlands	The Council for Euro-
Spain	New Zealand	pean Nuclear Re-
Australia	Portugal	search (Switzerland)
Sweden	Peru	Chile
Greece	South Africa	Republic of China
Egypt	Israel	Dominican Republic
Burma	Norway	Haiti
Denmark	India	Lebanon
Austria	Argentina	Pakistan
Philippines	France	Switzerland
Finland	Japan	Thailand
Turkey	Brazil	Uruguay
		United Nations Library (Geneva)

Other libraries are in transit to:

Ceylon	Guatemala	Venezuela
Korea	Costa Rica	Iceland
Luxembourg	Iraq	

## U.S. Requests ECOSOC Study of Economic Uses of Atom

U.S./U.N. press release 2375 dated March 26

The United States on March 26 requested the inclusion of a new item on the agenda of the 21st Session of the Economic and Social Council relating to "Studies on Atomic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development."

Text of the note follows:

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary General of the United Nations and has the honor to propose, in accordance with Rule 13 of the Rules of Procedure of the Economic and Social Council, inclusion of the following topic as a sub-item to Item 5 (Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries) of the agenda of the Twenty-first Session of the Council: *Studies on Atomic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development*.

The United States is proposing this item, as a matter of urgency, with a view to having prepared for submission to the Council at an early session an analysis and evaluation of reports and materials available concerning the possible uses of atomic energy for purposes of economic development, particularly of the underdeveloped countries.

The United States will in due course submit a draft resolution on this matter for consideration of the Council.

Dr. John C. Baker, the United States Representative to the Economic and Social Council, ex-

plained the purpose of this proposal in the following statement:

"A number of public, private, national, and international agencies and organizations are interested in the applications of atomic energy to economic development. It would be a help to realistic economic planning by private and public bodies if information on the economic aspects of this new and challenging subject could be coordinated and brought into one place.

"The United States believes that the Economic and Social Council at this stage is the appropriate organ for taking stock of the many reports and studies which are being made on the potentialities of atomic energy for economic development. The United States Government, therefore, has requested that the above item be placed on the provisional agenda of the 21st Session of Ecosoc."

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Inter-American Travel Congress

The Department of State announced on April 5 (press release 174) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the Sixth Inter-American Travel Congress, which will meet at San José, Costa Rica, April 12-22, 1956, by a delegation composed of the following representatives of U.S. Government agencies and of private groups concerned with travel matters:

#### Chairman

Henry H. Kelly, Special Assistant on International Travel, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce

#### Vice Chairman

Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

#### Members

Malcolm Hope, Chief, General Engineering Program, Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, U.S. Public Health Service

Godfrey Macdonald, Vice President, Grace Lines, Inc., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y.

William F. McGrath, Executive Vice President, American Society of Travel Agents, New York, N.Y.

Parks B. Pedrick, Vice President, Mississippi Shipping Co., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Norman J. Phillion, Colonial Airlines, for the Air Transport Association of America, New York, N.Y.  
 Russell E. Singer, Executive Vice President, American Automobile Association, Washington, D.C.  
 Knud Stowman, Special Consultant, Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service

The Sixth Congress will consider reports of its technical committees on (1) research and organization, (2) removal of travel barriers, (3) travel plant (i. e. hotels), and (4) tourist-travel promotion.

**Current Treaty Actions**

**MULTILATERAL**

**Automotive Traffic**

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratification deposited:* Austria, March 30, 1956.  
 Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratification deposited:* Austria, March 30, 1956.

**Slave Trade**

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956.  
*Signature:* Burma, March 14, 1956.

**Telecommunications**

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.  
*Ratifications deposited:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, February 21, 1956; Jordan, February 23, 1956.  
*Notification by Federal Republic of Germany of extension to:* Land Berlin (effective date to be the same as that for the Federal Republic, i. e. July 26, 1955).

**Trade and Commerce**

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva, March 7, 1955.<sup>1</sup>  
*Signature:* Dominican Republic, March 6, 1956.  
 Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>  
*Signature:* Australia, March 2, 1956.  
 Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>  
*Signature:* Australia, March 2, 1956.  
 Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>1</sup>  
*Signature:* Australia, March 2, 1956.

**War Criminals**

Penal administrative agreement. Concluded at Bonn and deemed to have entered into force May 5, 1955.  
*Signatures:* France, September 29, 1955; Federal Republic of Germany, November 1, 1955; United States, December 20, 1955; United Kingdom, December 22, 1955.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

**Austria**

Agreement outlining the procedure for financing the delivery of nitrogenous fertilizer to Spain pursuant to the agricultural commodities agreement of February 7, 1956 (TIAS 3505). Effected by exchange of letters at Vienna March 5 and 6, 1956. Entered into force March 6, 1956.

**Finland**

Agreement supplementing the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248) by providing for the purchase of additional commodities, and exchange of notes. Signed at Helsinki March 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956.  
 Agreement amending articles II and III of the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248). Effected by exchange of notes at Helsinki March 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956.

**Netherlands**

Agreement extending the agreement of April 11, 1947 (TIAS 1777) relating to American war graves in the Netherlands. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague January 14 and August 29, 1955, and March 9, 1956. Enters into force on the date of receipt by the United States of notification of constitutional approval by the Netherlands.

**Spain**

Parcel post agreement. Signed at Madrid July 16 and at Washington August 30, 1955. Ratified and approved by the President September 23, 1955.  
*Entered into force:* January 1, 1956 (the date "mutually settled between the Administrations of the two countries").



THE DEPARTMENT

**Resignations**

On March 21 President Eisenhower accepted the resignation of Christian A. Herter, Jr., as General Counsel of the International Cooperation Administration. The effective date of the resignation was March 19. For the texts of Mr. Herter's letter of resignation and the President's reply, see White House press release dated March 21.



FOREIGN SERVICE

**Confirmations**

The Senate on March 28 confirmed Dempster McIntosh to be Ambassador to Venezuela.  
 The Senate on March 28 confirmed Sheldon T. Mills to be Ambassador to Afghanistan.  
 The Senate on March 28 confirmed Jefferson Patterson to be Ambassador to Uruguay.

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171	4/3	Dulles: Soviet repudiation of Stalin.
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*179	4/6	Japan credentials.
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181	4/7	Liberia credentials (rewrite).

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# The Department of State

Vol. XXXIV, No. 878

April 23, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 878 • PUBLICATION 6326

April 23, 1956

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# Fifty Years of Progress in International Law

by Herman Phleger  
Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>

There is a special significance in this regional meeting of the American Society of International Law. It was in this city, and at the New York Bar Association, that the Society was organized on January 12, 1906.

This is therefore the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Society.

Birthdays are not only times for celebration; they are also times for appraisal.

In this case the appraisal might be of two kinds: one as to how well the Society has achieved the objectives of its founding; the other as to what progress has been made in the field of international law during the life of the Society.

I know we will all agree that the Society is to be congratulated on its achievements during its first 50 years. Having in mind the aphorism that the first 50 years are the hardest, I know that the Society can confidently look forward to an ever-increasing contribution in its chosen fields.

## Progress in International Law

What has been the progress of international law during the past 50 years? My comment must be brief and general.

I recall some years ago hearing Sir Norman Birkett observe that in an early edition of *Anson on Contracts* the illustration given of contracts void because of impossibility of performance was "as though one were to undertake to fly the Atlantic."

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<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York at a regional meeting celebrating the 50th anniversary of the American Society of International Law at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 9 (press release 178 dated Apr. 6).

I have myself seen in a 1919 edition of *Anson* the illustration given thus:

Suppose the defendant had promised to pay 100 pounds, but only on condition that X shall reach the moon. Here the act to be performed by the defendant is quite possible, but the act to be performed by X is not. Here no duty or liability is created.

By the passage of a short span of years the impossible has become possible.

A promise to reach the moon replacing an undertaking to fly the Atlantic, as an example of a promise impossible to perform, will no doubt in turn give way to a new example.

This progression does not represent progress in law but progress in science. The legal principle has remained the same. Only the application of the principle has changed with the changing times.

But there are legal principles which do change, and the last 50 years have witnessed a fundamental change in one principle of international law that affects us all.

Fifty years ago war was accepted as a legitimate instrument of national policy. Learned writers asserted its legality. Collective efforts were largely devoted to ameliorating the harsh conditions of war—agreeing on the rules of the game, so to speak. The Hague Conventions and the later Geneva Conventions regulating the treatment of prisoners of war represented efforts to make war endurable, since its abolition seemed impossible.

But two world wars and the harnessing of nuclear energy have progressively convinced the world of the necessity for providing an effective means of preventing aggressive war. The attempt to reach this objective has resulted in the establishing of a new principle of international

law and the taking of steps to implement that principle.

The new legal principle is that aggressive war is illegal. The implementation has taken various forms: the League of Nations, the United Nations, and tribunals to apply and administer international law, to name the more obvious.

### **Aggressive War Becomes Illegal**

The experience of World War I resulted in the League of Nations and its principle of collective security with its objective "to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security." It was intended to replace the system of the balance of power by a system of collective responsibility for the future peace.

In the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 the parties condemned recourse to war and renounced it as an instrument of national policy. They agreed not to seek to settle conflicts by any but pacific means. Sixty-five nations have ratified this treaty, and it is in force today.

From the standpoint of international law this treaty was a revolutionary development. At face value it was the agreement of the world community that aggressive war would be a breach of solemn treaty obligations.

Yet 10 years later World War II was under way.

I cannot refrain from quoting the following from Senator [George Wharton] Pepper's admirable autobiography. He wrote, speaking of the spring of 1928:

During our brief sojourn in Paris, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed at the French Foreign Office in an atmosphere of optimism. Mrs. Pepper and I were guests at the Embassy at a brilliant dinner given by Ambassador Herrick to Ambassador Kellogg. My incurable lack of faith in international promises made me less enthusiastic than the rest of the company. They felt, or pretended to feel, that war had at last received its death warrant.

Then came the Second World War and—from its ashes—the United Nations. By its charter its members agree to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

I think it can be fairly said that the charter confirmed the fact that the principle accepted in 1900 that war was a legitimate instrument of national policy had been replaced by the principle that aggressive war is illegal under international law.

This was a fundamental change in international law, and it has taken place during the 50-year existence of this Society.

But those years have witnessed more than a fundamental change in a principle of international law. They have also witnessed persistent attempts to provide the means of carrying that principle into effect.

These attempts have taken, in general, two forms. One, to provide a system of collective security with sanctions against an aggressor. The other consisted of an attempt to provide a system of international tribunals available for the adjudication and settlement of disputes between states.

In addition international tribunals were established for the trial of war criminals. I refer to the Nuremberg tribunal established in 1945 by the agreement of 23 nations and to the international tribunal for the trial of Japanese war criminals.

Modern developments in warfare and the atom bomb have made clear how ineffective as a deterrent to war is the postwar punishment of individuals. Indeed, if we were to have another world war, there would be few left to act as judges, even if there were enough vanquished still alive to stand in the dock.

This emphasizes the necessity of settling differences peacefully when they arise, so they will not develop into controversies which nations believe can only be honorably settled by war, and the necessity of having machinery to settle such disputes.

### **Adjudication of International Disputes**

But machinery is not enough, just as treaties renouncing war were not enough. If we are to settle international disputes by peaceful means, we must not only have the machinery to settle them, but states must use this machinery.

That there now exist fully adequate and available means for settlement of disputes by these means is obvious.

For a half century we have had the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

The United Nations Charter, in chapter VI, offers an array of remedies, through the Security Council and the General Assembly, for states involved in disputes or situations whose continuance is likely to endanger international peace.

Commencing in 1921 with the Permanent Court of International Justice, succeeded in 1945 by the International Court of Justice, a court has been available for the adjudication of disputes between states. Some 33 states, including the United States, have now accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court.

In addition, there has been available traditional *ad hoc* arbitration which has served so well over the years to resolve disputes between nations.

### Reluctance of States To Adjudicate Disputes

With this wealth of machinery for the settlement of international disputes, I would like to report that their utilization is customary and a matter of course. But the contrary appears to be the case. There seems to be a natural reluctance on the part of foreign offices to submit differences to judicial examination and adjudication, or to arbitration.

In 1937 John Bassett Moore wrote:

In spite of all suppositions and postprandial boasts to the contrary, it is a fact that nations have not during the past half century shown an increasing disposition to submit to judicial determination disputes involving what they conceive to be their important interests.

Today, almost 20 years later, the same observation could be made with equal truth. In the past 2 years the United States has filed four applications with the Recorder of the International Court of Justice, one against Hungary,<sup>2</sup> one against Czechoslovakia,<sup>3</sup> and two against Soviet Russia,<sup>4</sup> arising out of the shooting down of planes. In each instance the respondent government has refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court.<sup>5</sup>

In another instance, where the United States proposed resort to the Court, it was met with the suggestion that friends should not litigate their differences but should compose them. A sound philosophy, but there has been no composition and none seems likely.

I would suggest that if we wish to establish the rule of law we must not only have the law, which we do have, but we must also establish the habit and custom of being willing to be bound by it according to the judgment of an independent tribunal. What good does it do to say we agree

with the law and then refuse to submit our differences to impartial adjudication of the facts and the agreed law?

Much has been done in this field, but much more could be and must be done if the adjudication of international disputes is to make a significant contribution to our goal of international peace and the rule of law.

### U.S.-U.K. Record of Submissions

Our guest of this evening [Sir Lionel Frederick Heald, M. P., former Attorney-General of the United Kingdom] comes from a nation that has a long and distinguished record of submission to arbitration and adjudication in the international field.

The arbitration of the Alabama Claims in 1872 is a landmark in this field. It was followed by the arbitration of the Venezuela dispute in 1904 and then by the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration in 1910.

The docket of the International Court of Justice records that the United Kingdom has been a party to more proceedings there than any other state. It has had 13 contentious cases before the present Court and its predecessor. It has participated in 12 of the advisory-opinion proceedings before these two Courts. It has had 7 cases before tribunals of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

I might at the same time note that the United States has been a party to 6 contentious proceedings before the present World Court, has participated in all 10 of the advisory-opinion proceedings there, and has had 6 cases before tribunals of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

That the United States and the United Kingdom have been disposed to engage in a relatively sizable volume of international litigation does not mean that our two countries are contentious by nature. It is simply indicative of a belief that differences should be dealt with on their merits. Where differences on legal questions have resisted settlement by discussion, we have preferred to have them decided by impartial arbiters.

This has not been the practice in the conduct of foreign affairs by many governments. Unsettled disputes have not been referred to an international tribunal for decision and have been allowed to trouble the relations of the parties for an indefinite length of time. The rule of law

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1954, p. 449.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 18, 1955, p. 648.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 22, 1954, p. 449, and July 11, 1955, p. 65.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, July 26, 1954, p. 130, and Mar. 26, 1956, p. 513.

will not be established so long as governments insist on "waging their law" through economic, political, and other pressures, and are unwilling to submit to impartial adjudication.

I believe it can be fairly said that relations between our country and the United Kingdom have long been conducted on the basis of law and justice. This happy tradition has certainly been favored by the ties of history and language, by the heritage of our legal system, and by a common disposition to view situations on their merits and find practical solutions to difficulties. Our two countries have been associated for common ends in war and in peace. Today they are working together in many areas to preserve peace and advance the realization of human values.

### **Problems of the Future**

We cannot honestly be satisfied that the United Nations system as it operates today creates a working regime of law throughout the world. But the present organization of the international community must, of course, be appraised as a stage in development and not as a final condition to be accepted or rejected.

The problem of keeping international peace is currently being approached from the direction of control over armaments and control over national military capabilities in such a way that no nation will feel it desirable to embark on aggressive adventures.

The task of raising worldwide levels of economic development and standards of living is being pursued today in various cooperative international enterprises, soon to be increased by the addition of a new one—the International Atomic Energy Agency.

As we look ahead, the next 50 years promise no diminution of difficult problems to cope with. Doubtless some that most concern us now will have disappeared or receded in importance by the end of another half century. New problems are likely to come to the forefront. The achievements of science and technology constantly demand a redoubling of effort in politics and law to avoid a fatal lagging behind. There can already be discerned future problems in means of subsistence for the earth's growing population and in the development of exploration and travel beyond presently known terrestrial limits.

The world will have increasing need for wider

understanding of international relationships and for intelligent designs to promote general well-being. This Society and its counterparts the world over will not want for ample opportunities of useful employment.

## **Conversations With Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs**

*Following are the texts of statements made at Washington on the arrival of Alberto Martin Artajo, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, on April 9 and of a communique issued on April 12 at the conclusion of his talks with Secretary Dulles.*

### **WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT**

Press release 185 dated April 9

#### **Statement by Secretary Dulles**

Mr. Minister, it is indeed a very great pleasure to welcome you here with your wife and the other members of your party. The last time that I saw you was in Madrid about 6 months ago [November 1, 1955], and I shall never forget the great cordiality of the welcome which I received there from the Head of your State, General Franco, and from yourself and the other Ministers and from the people of Madrid, who made known their cordial reception of me.

I asked then that you should, if possible, come to visit us, and I am delighted indeed that that hope of mine has now come to pass. I think that perhaps my visit to Madrid did a little something to evidence the esteem in which the American people hold the great nation of Spain. I believe that your visit here, Mr. Minister, you, your wife and daughter, and the other members of your party, will enable us still further to build the type of friendship and good relations which now exist so happily between our two countries.

We welcome you here and we are glad you will see something of our country. And we are confident that out of this trip will come further good will between us.

#### **Response by Spanish Foreign Minister**

The last time I was in America was when I was a young man and I came to visit Washington and

New York with the International Congress of Students.

Today I come to return the visit to Madrid of Secretary of State Dulles, who has proven how much can be accomplished when diplomats sit down face to face and talk plainly.

Friendship between the American and Spanish peoples increases as personal knowledge increases, and that is one of the reasons why I have come to you.

I think this friendship between Spain and America is important. As you know, we signed agreements in the fall of 1953. I would like to examine with members of your Government their application so far, and also to discuss various aspects of world problems which affect our two nations.

And now, to work!

### **TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE**

Press release 193 dated April 12

During the official visit to Washington of Señor Don Alberto Martín Artajo, the Foreign Minister of Spain, conversations were held between him and the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, and other officials of the United States Government. These talks were on matters of specific mutual interest to both countries as well as on questions of general interest to their respective foreign policies, including the situation in the Near East.

The conversations, which were conducted in an atmosphere of understanding and cordiality, have rendered a valuable contribution to the strengthening of the ties of friendship and cooperation that happily already exist between the two countries. Among other topics, the Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State reviewed the results of the mutual defense and economic aid agreements signed between Spain and the United States on September 26, 1953. They noted with satisfaction the progress made in implementing these agreements, which constitute a significant contribution to western security. The Minister also reviewed for the Secretary's information the recent negotiations in Madrid between the Spanish Government and that of the Sultan of Morocco. The Secretary of State expressed his satisfaction with Spanish recognition of the unity and independence of Morocco.

## **Spanish-Moroccan Declaration**

Press release 186 dated April 10

### **Department Announcement**

On April 7, 1956, the Foreign Minister of Spain and the Prime Minister of Morocco signed a joint declaration which recognized the independence and unity of Morocco and defined the basis for future relations between the two countries.

The U.S. Government has instructed its representatives in Spain and Morocco to express our sincere congratulations for the success of the recent negotiations and our hope for an era of fruitful collaboration between the two nations.

### **Message to Acting Foreign Minister of Spain<sup>1</sup>**

My Government desires to express its congratulations to your Government on the occasion of the signing April 7 of a joint declaration which recognizes the independence and the unity of Morocco. It is gratifying to pay tribute to the realism and statesmanship which has made possible a new era of collaboration between the two nations.

### **Message to Sultan of Morocco<sup>2</sup>**

I have been instructed to convey to His Majesty the Sultan, to the members of his Government and to the Moroccan people my Government's congratulations on the successful conclusion of negotiations with the Spanish Government and to express the hope for an era of fruitful collaboration between the two nations.

### **Text of Declaration<sup>3</sup>**

[Unofficial translation]

The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, in the desire of establishing an especially friendly relationship, on a basis of reciprocity; of strengthening their relations of secular friendship and of consolidating peace in the area in which their respective countries are located, have agreed to make public the following declaration:

1. The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty Mohammed V, Sultan of Morocco, considering that the

<sup>1</sup> Delivered by the American Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid on Apr. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Transmitted to His Cherifian Majesty Mohammed V on Apr. 10 in the name of the U.S. diplomatic agent in Morocco.

<sup>3</sup> Signed at Madrid on Apr. 7 by Foreign Minister Alberto Martín Artajo of Spain and Premier Embarek Bekkai of Morocco.

regime established in Morocco in 1912 does not correspond to present reality, declare that the agreement signed in Madrid on November 27, 1912, cannot determine Hispano-Moroccan relations in the future.

2. In consequence, the Spanish Government recognizes the independence of Morocco, proclaimed by His Imperial Majesty Sultan Mohammed V, and its full sovereignty, together with all the attributes of the same, including its own diplomatic service and army; reiterates its wish to respect the territorial unity of the Empire, which is guaranteed by international treaties; and undertakes to take the necessary measures to effectuate it. Moreover, the Spanish Government undertakes to lend to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan the aid and assistance which will be determined as necessary by common agreement, especially with regard to foreign relations and to defense.

3. The negotiations entered upon in Madrid between the Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty Mohammed V have as their objective the conclusion of new agreements between two sovereign and equal parties, with the purposes of defining their free cooperation in the field of their common interests. These agreements will also guarantee, in keeping with the above-mentioned particularly friendly spirit, the freedoms and rights of the Spaniards residing in Morocco and of the Moroccans residing in Spain, in the private, economic, cultural and social domains, on a basis of reciprocity and of respect for their respective sovereignties.

4. The Spanish Government and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan agree that, until the above-mentioned agreements come into effect, relations between Spain and Morocco will be determined by the additional protocol to the present declaration.

#### ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

1. The legislative power is exercised in sovereign manner by His Majesty the Sultan. The representative of Spain in Rabat will be advised of all proposed *decrees* and decrees which affect Spanish interests and may make appropriate observations.

2. The powers exercised up to now by the Spanish authorities in Morocco will be transferred to the Moroccan Government, in accordance with the modalities which are fixed by common agreement. The prerogatives of Spanish officials in Morocco will be preserved.

3. The Spanish Government will lend its assistance to the Moroccan Government toward the organization of its own army. The present status of the Spanish Army in Morocco will be preserved during the period of transition.

4. The present status of the peseta will not be altered until the conclusion of a new agreement on this matter.

5. As of the time of the present declaration, visas and all administrative formalities required up to now for the travel of persons from one zone to the other will be eliminated.

6. The Spanish Government will continue to assume the protection abroad of the interests of Moroccans native to the zone formerly defined by the agreement of November 27, 1912, and residing abroad, until such time as the Government of His Majesty the Sultan assumes this responsibility.

## U.S. Policy in Middle East

*Statement by James C. Hagerty  
Press Secretary to the President*

White House Office (Augusta, Ga.) press release dated April 9

Before leaving the White House, the President met with the Secretary of State for a discussion of repeated incidents of hostility in the Middle East.

The President and the Secretary of State regard the situation with the utmost seriousness.

In their discussions concerning the area, they are guided by fundamental principles of United States foreign policy which are designed to promote and strengthen world peace. Therefore:

1. The United States will support in fullest measure the mission of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the area pursuant to the unanimous action of the Security Council,<sup>1</sup> the body on which all the members of the United Nations have conferred primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The United States trusts that all United Nations member countries, including particularly the states directly involved, will similarly support that mission of peace.

2. The United States, in accordance with its responsibilities under the charter of the United Nations, will observe its commitments within constitutional means to oppose any aggression in the area.

3. The United States is likewise determined to support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression. The United States is confident that other nations will act similarly in the cause of peace.

## NATO Atomic Information Agreement Enters Into Force

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization announced at Paris on April 10 that the NATO Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information went into force on March 29, 1956, with the completion of notifications by all NATO governments that they were bound by the terms of the agreement. The agreement, signed at Paris on June 22, 1955, by representatives of the NATO nations, provides that the United States and other NATO members may make various categories of atomic information available to the organization.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 627.

## A Report on Germany

by James B. Conant

*Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany*<sup>1</sup>

The title of my remarks is "A Report on Germany." That may sound as if I proposed to deliver a lecture on the history of the nation to which I am accredited as Ambassador of the United States; and since college presidents are not noted for the brevity of their remarks you may conclude you are in for at least an hour's session. But have no fear. What I have to say can be said in less than 30 minutes for I propose to consider primarily the present situation and the problems which we and the German people face together. To this audience, so well informed on world affairs, it is unnecessary to describe in detail the developments of the last 10 years which have resulted in the Germany of today.

I have said, the Germany of today. Yet it would have been more accurate to say, the *three* Germanys of today. For there is first of all the Federal Republic of Germany, a sovereign nation of 50 million, with which we are allied as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the territory of this Federal Republic comprises what were once the American, British, and French zones of occupation. The second part of Germany is the part that lies to the east of the frontier which separates the Soviet zone of occupation from the Federal Republic of Germany. Within this area lies the Soviet zone of occupation, a land where some 17 million Germans are ruled by the Communist puppet regime set up by the Soviet authorities; this is the land of tyranny, whereas the Federal Republic of Germany is the land of freedom. And then there is Berlin, that city with which we Americans have had such close relations since the days of the blockade, a city which itself

is divided between the three Western sectors—the American, the British, and the French—still in occupation status but nevertheless governed by a freely elected German Government, and the East sector controlled, like the zone, by the Russians through their henchmen.

I could devote a very long speech indeed to the history of the Federal Republic of Germany; yet this history is very short. The Federal Republic itself is less than 7 years old; its sovereignty dates only from last May. The phenomenal industrial recovery of this part of Germany is well known; so too is the remarkably rapid rebuilding of the cities. What is less well known, perhaps, are the steps by which a stable representative system of government has evolved. Separate states with freely elected legislatures were created in the zones of the three Western powers. Then in 1948 delegates from the states met to draft a constitution, or Basic Law, for the federal system. This Basic Law, approved by the three Western occupying powers, was then adopted by the state legislatures in 1949. That summer the first national parliament, or Bundestag, was elected, which in turn elected Konrad Adenauer as Chancellor. He was reelected 4 years later by the second Bundestag, which came into being following the second national election. The third national election, by the way, will be held in the summer of 1957, and this future event is already casting its shadow over German politics. Parliamentary democracy in the federal government and the states has provided a stable political framework within which a free competitive economy has flourished and the basic rights of citizens have been protected. Whatever may be the currents and crosscurrents of German internal politics in the coming years, I have no worry that the framework will be endangered.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on Mar. 28.

Last May, you will recall, the Federal Republic of Germany, when it became a sovereign nation, joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In so doing it undertook the responsibility of sharing with the other members, including the United States, the burden of defending Europe. To fulfill this responsibility an armed force is in process of formation. The process has been slower than many imagined it would be 18 months ago when the treaties were signed in Paris. But it is well to remember that the Germans had to start the building of their armed forces completely anew. There was no vestige of the old German Army, Navy, or Air Force left after the surrender; furthermore, for the first few postwar years few, if any, thought of rearming Germany. Quite the contrary. Indeed, the opposition party in the Bundestag (the Social Democrats) questioned the legality of a military force even as part of a European army; only in 1954 was the Basic Law amended so as to clarify this point. (An amendment of the Basic Law requires a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag as well as the upper house, the Bundesrat, where the states are represented.) Within the past month the Government and the opposition have agreed on certain further amendments to the Basic Law which will provide the legal basis for the German armed forces and insure that the ultimate control is in civilian hands. These amendments have just been adopted. In this task of drafting the necessary laws almost all political leaders have had the same ideal in mind: They have wanted to create a military establishment very different from those of the past; they desire that the new army, navy, and air force shall be firmly under the control of a parliamentary government.

We, the United States and the Federal Republic, are now partners on an equal basis; we partake in the defense of Europe and indeed the Atlantic community. This means we share military and economic problems; we must each do our part in keeping the free world sturdy and healthy and ever on the alert. This is no easy undertaking, and differences of opinion among allies are proverbial, but the NATO organization has already proved its ability to reconcile conflicting views. The same procedures can be used, if needed, to make any adjustments required when a year from now numbers of German youth begin to stand side by side with American, British, French, and other soldiers of the Atlantic community in the defense of Europe. So I shall not report further

on our common problems as members of NATO but rather direct your attention to our common problems that exist because of the division of Germany and the position of Berlin.

### **German Reunification**

As President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles have said on more than one occasion, there can be no hope for lasting peace and security in Europe until a reunification of Germany is achieved. This same point of view has been repeatedly emphasized likewise by the heads of the British and the French Governments. It is hardly necessary to state that reunification is the number-one goal of all the inhabitants of Germany, whether they be in the Federal Republic of Germany or in the Soviet Zone itself. To be sure, in making this statement I must add that a small percentage of the East Zone inhabitants who are convinced Communists or who have thrown in their lot irrevocably with the Soviet authorities envisage a reunification of Germany in terms quite different than do the vast majority of their countrymen. These Soviet agents would like a reunified Germany which in fact would be another Soviet satellite state.

To interpret properly the present attitude of the Russians toward reunification, one must bear in mind their policy of supporting the satellite regime in the Soviet Zone. Their immediate goal appears to be to force the recognition by the free world, in law or in fact, of the legitimacy of their so-called German Democratic Republic, which at present has standing only among Russia's satellite nations. The Communist regime, completely subservient to the Soviets, claims to represent the inhabitants. But, as everyone knows, the so-called elections by which this government was put in power were travesties of free elections. What the unfortunate Germans who must suffer under the tyranny of this communistic rule really think of their German rulers was evidenced by the uprising of June 17, 1953. This spontaneous protest, starting in East Berlin, was ruthlessly put down by Russian tanks and soldiers, but there is every reason to believe that the spirit is by no means dead. When free elections are held in the Soviet Zone, you may be certain that the Communist Party and its allies will receive not more than a very small fraction of the votes. I say, when free elections are held, for such free elections of an all-German government are the first necessary step to



reunification. This is the firm position of the three Western powers and the Federal Government. But I shall return to this subject in a moment. Let me ask you to direct your attention to Berlin.

Ever since the blockade, the people of Berlin and the people of the United States have been partners in their resistance to Soviet aggression. The successful breaking of the blockade was due to the brave stand of the Berliners and the effectiveness of the American Air Force aided by our British and French allies. This was accomplished, you remember, in '48 and '49. The Soviets then solemnly agreed that access to the city should be unhampered, and for the last 7 years traffic between free Germany and free Berlin by means of rail, water, and road has been relatively unhindered. But within the last year the Russians claim to have transferred to their puppet regime, the so-called German Democratic Republic, all control and jurisdiction over traffic to Berlin. This claim has been strongly rejected by our Government, the British, and the French. We have pointed out on more than one occasion that the Soviet Government cannot in this fashion escape responsibility for carrying out the solemn undertakings which they themselves have entered into. Therefore we shall continue to hold the Soviets to their promise. We shall insist that there be no hindrance to the flow of goods and people from free Germany to Berlin.

Not only have the Soviets claimed they could and would transfer to their German agents their authority over the roads to Berlin, but they have made a similar claim as to the Soviet sector of Berlin itself. Here again their international obligations are quite clear: free circulation throughout all the sectors of Berlin was a firm agreement when Berlin was first occupied by the Four Powers. That the Soviets see to it that this continues is a matter on which the three Western powers insist.

#### **Unique Position of Berlin**

I am glad to report that, in spite of its strange position, a unique position I might say, of being an island of freedom in a sea of tyranny, free Berlin—that is, West Berlin—has prospered since the days of the blockade. Thanks in no small measure to American initiative and American aid, industries have expanded, trade has increased, unem-

ployment has steadily diminished. The spirit of the Berliners continues bold and confident. Those who can freely express their opinion, the 2 million in West Berlin, are quick to demonstrate their realization of what Communist tyranny really means. One has only to cross the sector border into East Berlin to see communism at work, and it is a most depressing and disquieting spectacle, I can assure you. Indeed, I have often said that Berlin was a city that should be visited by any who had illusions about what communism is in fact. A short visit to Berlin would demonstrate to all but convinced members of the party that the Soviet system is a system of brutal suppression of freedom, a police state based on fear.

In Berlin one can readily compare the economic, political, and cultural aspects of the two parts of the world which are divided by the Iron Curtain. In this city the curtain is transparent. And this is one of the reasons why Berlin is so important. Here at least some of the unfortunate Germans who live under the Communist dictatorship can view an example of the world of freedom. From here, uncensored news flows through the American radio station RIAS to the inhabitants of the zone, most of whom can listen, in spite of Soviet attempts at jamming. The Iron Curtain between the zone and the Federal Republic, on the other hand, is not transparent. There are only four border crossing-points; everywhere else armed guards, barbed wire, plowed strips separate the enslaved Germans from their friends and relatives in the West. In some communities the sealed border runs right through a village. In one spot I visited, a town lies in the zone and the railroad station is in the Federal Republic and hence no longer of any use; for in order to go from the town to the station one would have to travel many miles to the one border crossing in that area and then, if the necessary papers were in order, one could cross and again travel back along the border to the station.

Yet the Soviet Zone is far more accessible than any other territory lying the other side of the Iron Curtain. A great number of Germans travel back and forth through the four crossing-points in order to visit relatives and friends. And this traffic is at present encouraged by the Soviets and their agents since they are trying to win the respect if not the affection of all Germans. They are trying particularly to convince the workingman that they are in the process of creating a

"workers' paradise" in their so-called Democratic Republic. Last summer buses were sent through one of the crossing-points to pick up children in border towns who were invited for a 3-week vacation at no expense in this "workers' paradise." And the camps where these youths were entertained—propaganda centers in fact—I have heard were extremely good. How lasting will be the effects of such exposure to Soviet Zone propaganda is an open question.

### **Soviet Formula for Reunification**

Unless I am much mistaken, we are going to see many such efforts; more propaganda will flow from the East to the West. It will be claimed that the German Democratic Republic provides more opportunities for the worker and farmer, more cultural developments, and, above all, is working for peace and a unified Germany in contrast to the Government of the Federal Republic. One of the slogans that is painted on the walls of the official buildings of the Soviet sector of Berlin demands that "Germans sit around one table." This is the Soviets' formula for reunification; they demand that representatives of their puppet government meet with representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and work out a formula for reunification. To anyone who knows the history of what happened in Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and the other satellite countries it is quite clear what the real aims of such a conference would be. Such a meeting of Russian agents and free Germans could make no progress toward reunification in freedom; it could only serve to build up the prestige of the puppet government and thus be one step toward a kind of reunification that would be an extension of the Soviet system of tyranny well into the heart of Western Europe.

But the propaganda line embodied in the slogan "Germans around one table" has certain disadvantages from the Soviet point of view and, consequently, certain advantages for us in the free world which we should endeavor to make apparent. It means that the border crossing-points where Germans from the West can visit their relatives in the East and vice versa must be kept open by the Soviets. This in turn means that what goes on in the Soviet Zone of Germany is far more exposed to the view of the entire world than what goes on in such satellite countries as Poland or

Czechoslovakia. In other words the Iron Curtain in Germany is at a few points somewhat porous. This fact we must make the most of. It behooves us to follow very carefully all that transpires in the Soviet Zone and to direct world opinion to the shocking contrast between the Soviets' professed intentions and their actual deeds. For when one examines the true situation in the Soviet Zone, one encounters a record of brutal disregard of human rights which must shock all except those who are hardened by long years of exposure to Communist discipline.

Let me give you one example: Nearly a thousand Germans leave the Soviet Zone every day, mainly through Berlin, preferring to abandon all their worldly goods than to suffer longer their loss of liberty. This fact is in itself ample proof of the real situation in this so-called democratic land. Refugees are a double embarrassment to the Soviet henchmen. They regret to see their labor force diminished by the departure of able-bodied youth and they realize the refugees are clear evidence of the hate and mistrust with which the government is regarded by the people. As a consequence measures are being taken to check the flow. Recently two individuals were prosecuted for having allegedly advised some of their neighbors to migrate to the Federal Republic of Germany. These unfortunates were found guilty by an authoritarian court and condemned to death—condemned to die for the supposed crime of asking a fellow German to move from one city to another! The outcry from West Germany and from the free world seems to have shaken the authorities in East Berlin a bit, for the sentences have now been commuted to life. But even prison terms for such offenses, or the fact that the alleged advice was regarded as an offense, is hard to square with the slogan "Germans around one table!"

### **Soviet Zone—the Achilles Heel**

The Soviet Zone then is to my mind the Achilles heel of the Soviet satellite system. We in the free world should take advantage of this fact. We should use every occasion to expose the fact that the Russians are exploiting this portion of the German population, and exploiting is the proper word. The living standards are low; the economy is arranged for the benefit of the Soviet system and not for the Germans who do the work; the uranium mines are being depleted; the youth are

being forcibly recruited for an army which will reinforce the other satellite contingents. Brutal sentences are still meted out; the tales of the refugees are tales of a terrorized population. How can this day-by-day behavior of the Soviets' agents in East Germany be squared with the present Soviet words about peace and friendly relations with the West? The simple answer is, it cannot. And this fact to my mind should be continually emphasized in every discussion of international problems. The conscience of the free world must be quickened to the injustice of a divided Germany.

Let me conclude by turning your attention once again to the city of Berlin. This city has stood out boldly against Russian threats for 10 years and more; today it is remarkably strong considering its past ordeals. But the future of Berlin is as a capital city of a reunited Germany. For the long run this is the only solution of the so-called Berlin problem, for the Western powers will certainly never desert the Berliners as long as they are in danger, which means as long as Germany is divided. The free Berliners, the three Western occupying powers, and the Federal Republic of Germany work closely together to support Berlin; we share the common task of preparing for the day when the present capital of the Federal Republic at Bonn will cease to exist and a new freely elected all-German government will take up its quarters in Berlin.

I have spoken of a new, freely elected, all-German government because the present Federal Republic of Germany is, by its own declaration, only a provisional, caretaker government. It is the only government today which can speak for all the German people, as it is the only freely elected government. Nevertheless, its competence is restricted by its own desires and in agreement with the three Western powers. Because it has not derived its mandate from the voters in the Soviet Zone as well as from those in the three former Western zones, it cannot speak for Germany in a discussion of such matters as the final boundaries of Germany and the terms of a peace treaty. These are affairs which must be left to an all-German government which can speak for all the German people. Therefore, today in talking about Germany we meet a paradoxical situation. We welcome the opportunity of cooperating on a most friendly basis with the German government

in Bonn, we look forward to its military contribution to the defense of the free world, but at the same time we hope for its replacement by an all-German government in Berlin.

We have a strong and reliable ally in the German people—of that I have not the slightest doubt. Those who can now speak for the free population speak in terms of a close alliance with the West. I have no fear that if the free world remains strong economically, politically, and militarily there will be any reversal of this policy. The peoples of the free European nations, of Great Britain, and of the United States are now united. In this unity there is strength. This strength constitutes a bulwark against further Soviet aggression. In the not too distant future I believe this strength, coupled with a continued exposure of the true conditions in the Soviet Zone, must bring about a reunification of Germany; and with that reunification will come hope for a more peaceful world.

## **Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 84th Congress, 2d Session**

- Technical Assistance Programs. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part 2, January 23, 1956. 35 pp.
- Operation and Administration of the Cargo Preference Act. Hearings before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on Public Law 664, 83d Cong., 2d sess. January 31, February 1-16, 1956. 601 pp.
- Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services to review, for the period December 1, 1954, to November 30, 1955, the operation of article VII of the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces. February 9, 1956. 47 pp.
- International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3116 and S. 3172, bills to provide for the promotion and strengthening of international relations through cultural and athletic exchanges and participation in international fairs and festivals. February 21, 1956. 39 pp.
- Regulation of Exports. Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 9052. February 23, March 5 and 6, 1956. 182 pp.
- Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93, 84th Cong. Part 2, February 29, 1956. 33 pp.
- Reorganization of the Passport Office. Report to accompany S. 3340. S. Rept. 1605, March 1, 1956. 8 pp.
- Joint Economic Report. Report of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report on the January 1956 Economic Report of the President with supplemental and minority views and the economic outlook for 1956 prepared by the committee staff. S. Rept. 1606, March 1, 1956. 116 pp.

## The Mutual Security Program for Europe

*Statement by C. Burke Elbrick  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Acting Secretary Hoover has already discussed with you the concepts underlying the mutual security program as a whole.<sup>2</sup> My purpose today is to discuss in somewhat more detail the aspects of the program that relate to the European area.

With relatively minor exceptions, the proposed mutual security program in Europe is devoted entirely to military defense. More specifically, it is primarily designed to maintain and strengthen the defensive power of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Apart from a minor technical exchange program, no economic aid, defense support, or other economic-type assistance is being proposed for any of the NATO countries covered by the European section of this legislation. Economic-type assistance is requested only for two non-NATO countries—Spain and Yugoslavia—which face unusual economic difficulties in connection with their defense efforts. A moderate sum is also requested to meet special circumstances connected with the maintenance of our vital position in West Berlin.

This program is being put forward at a time when the contest between the Communist bloc and the free world has entered a new phase. Mr. Hoover has already described the rather striking shift in Soviet strategy and tactics, which seems to involve a de-emphasis of military techniques of aggression in favor of a stepped-up campaign to spread Communist power and influence by non-military means. This change in tactics will have

significant implications for our policies throughout the world. Free nations will be required to give greater attention to erecting and maintaining adequate political, economic, and psychological defenses against communism, and to preserving the unity which the Soviet bloc is trying so hard to shatter. A large part of the mutual security program now proposed, as Mr. Hoover has pointed out, is designed to assist friendly nations of Asia, Africa, and South America in economic development. At the same time, we should not make the fatal error of assuming that we can now ignore the military potentialities of the Soviet bloc. The Soviet military threat is still with us and is likely to remain with us for a long time.

If we are correct in the supposition that the Soviet rulers have indeed become more reluctant to assume the suicidal risks of modern warfare, we have every reason to be pleased. American interests will be served by doing whatever we can to make sure that Soviet thinking continues along these lines. While we have no present grounds for believing that basic Soviet objectives have altered, nor for assuming that the struggle to check Communist political, economic, and psychological penetration is likely to be short or easy, I think we all agree that this kind of struggle is infinitely preferable to all-out military hostilities. Since the change in Soviet tactics has largely been induced by the growing strength and unity achieved under our collective security policies, it is imperative that these policies be continued without any modification of purpose or relaxation of effort.

However charming may be the smiles that adorn the faces of Soviet diplomats, however melodious may be the siren songs of Communist propaganda, and however tempting may be the economic bait

<sup>1</sup> Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 27.

<sup>2</sup> For President Eisenhower's message to the Congress on the mutual security program for 1957 and a statement by Under Secretary Hoover, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545. For a statement by John B. Hollister, see *ibid.*, Apr. 9, 1956, p. 605.

which they are holding out to some of the less developed nations, we cannot ignore the hard fact that the Soviet Union and its satellites are maintaining enormous military capabilities. They have an overwhelming superiority in military manpower, and they are making rapid strides in developing their potential for nuclear warfare. They are also making other ominous technological advances. All told, they possess the capacity to launch a dangerous military attack at any time, either general or local. We have no assurance whatever that they will indefinitely refrain from military adventures, particularly if military weaknesses in neighboring nations should appear to offer them attractive opportunities for cheap conquests. So long as the Soviet rulers retain and increase their *capacity* for military aggression, we cannot afford to base U.S. policies on their announced *intentions*. We cannot gamble our very survival upon the mysterious mental processes of the men in the Kremlin.

Every Member of the Congress is already familiar with the size and cost of the national defense establishment which the U.S. is maintaining for the purpose of deterring aggression. But we recognized long ago that the preservation of security and peace is not a task for the United States alone. It is neither possible nor desirable that the burdens of free-world defense should be borne exclusively by the American soldier and American taxpayer. Therefore, it has been a major objective of our foreign policy to supplement and reinforce American defensive power by securing the cooperation of other free nations who share our determination to preserve peace and freedom and who are willing and able to contribute to the attainment of this objective. In brief, we have recognized that the only real security available to ourselves or to anyone else is collective security.

The free nations of Europe represent a most important source of support. The peoples of these nations are skilled in modern technology and are capable of developing and using modern weapons. They possess substantial industrial and economic resources. Because of their geographic position they are in a position to provide bases strategically situated for deterring or countering a Soviet attack. Most important of all, in my opinion, is the fact that these nations share our belief in freedom, our cultural and moral traditions, and our determination to make all reasonable sacrifices to assure peace. We have

therefore joined together with 14 nations in a common defense system, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Through this alliance, we are seeking to achieve an efficient combination and utilization of our individual resources in a manner that will increase the security of all.

#### **Progress Under NATO**

I have no hesitation in saying that NATO has been a highly successful undertaking. Within a relatively short period of time, the potential European contribution to international peace and security has been translated into actuality. We have faced many complex problems and difficulties, of course, and have many problems still ahead of us. When we look at the NATO program in the perspective of the past 7 years, however, we can see that remarkable progress has been made. This progress is reflected not only in the number of men under arms, the availability of weapons and equipment, the establishment of bases, the improvement of organization, training, and deployment, and similar advances of a strictly military nature, but also in the growth of general political cohesion. It is also noteworthy that the NATO defense buildup has been accomplished without producing an intolerable economic strain on any of the member governments. In fact, it has been accomplished during a period when the overall European economic position has been steadily improving.

On balance, 1955 has been a good year for NATO. Despite political difficulties encountered by certain governments and occasional disagreement among members of the alliance, the basic military operations of NATO have moved forward smoothly. These operations receive few headlines, since they are rarely spectacular. Once the major political and strategic decisions have been made, the day-to-day job of building, maintaining, and improving Western defenses has tended to become more routine and less exciting. But this job has lost none of its importance, and it is being done.

Probably the most notable event of 1955 was the final ratification of the Paris Agreement which restored sovereignty to the German Federal Republic and brought this great nation into the NATO family. The same agreements established the Western European Union, closely linked to NATO, to exercise special armament controls among the seven member countries. The signifi-

cance of this achievement goes beyond the addition to NATO of Germany's sizable military potential. Equally important was the fact that the Paris Agreements afford a new foundation for friendly and cooperative relations between France and Germany, which should do a great deal to consolidate the unity of the Atlantic community as a whole. It is not a coincidence that the radical transformation of Soviet tactics which paved the way for the two Geneva conferences began concurrently with the ratification of the Paris Agreements, thus affording a striking demonstration of the validity of our policies.

There have been other gratifying developments in the European area during 1955, some of which are only indirectly connected with the NATO program but all of which are intimately related to our overall policies of building strength and unity. One of the most important was the signing of the Austrian Treaty, after 8 years of wearisome negotiations with the Soviet Government. This treaty not only restored Austrian independence but had added significance as the first concrete indication of a change in Soviet tactics. It marked the first time since World War II that Soviet troops have taken a backward step.

Special attention is also being given to the political ties that bind the Atlantic allies. There were five NATO ministerial meetings during 1955, the largest number ever held in any one year. Three of these meetings were devoted primarily to general political consultation—to a broad exchange of views on international problems and individual attitudes toward these problems. I believe the consultations held before the two Geneva conferences, in particular, contributed materially to the solidarity of the Western governments in dealing with the issues considered at these conferences.

#### **Soviet Efforts To Destroy Atlantic Alliance**

It is no secret that the Soviet bloc is engaged in a major effort to divide and destroy the Atlantic alliance. The dissolution of NATO stands high on the Communist list of objectives, as demonstrated by their words and actions in nearly all recent international negotiations, including the summit conference. They are using every available means to stir up old rivalries and to magnify and exploit the minor differences that inevitably arise even among the closest allies. They are also seeking to delude members of the alliance into a relaxation of

their defense efforts, both military and nonmilitary, and to persuade them that neutrality offers a cheaper and more comfortable course than continued adherence to the Atlantic system.

It would be an excess of optimism to assume that these Communist maneuvers have no prospect of achieving results. There *are* differences among allies. There *are* pressures in allied countries, as in every democratic country, to relieve the taxpayers of some of the burdens of defense. There *is* a certain amount of neutralist sentiment in Western Europe. To some extent, all these things lend themselves to Communist exploitation. But in terms of the policies and actions of allied governments, it is noteworthy that the Soviet campaign of division and enticement has not yet produced any significant impact upon the solidarity of the Atlantic alliance. Not only did the three Western governments at Geneva maintain unshakable harmony on fundamental issues, but their general viewpoint was also supported by the other Atlantic partners. Nor have the new Soviet tactics yet caused any noticeable relaxation in allied defense efforts. The combined defense expenditures, for example, of the European NATO countries are expected to remain at approximately the same levels next year as this year.

#### **European Integration**

One very hopeful development in Europe is the revival of the movement toward political and economic integration among the European nations themselves. The Congress is already familiar with the successful establishment of supranational authority over the production and marketing of coal and steel. The movement received something of a setback when the plan for a European Defense Community failed to receive parliamentary approval, but is now showing new signs of life. Several eminent European statesmen are currently working on proposals for a multinational pooling of atomic power and also for further steps toward a broad common market. As you can understand, we are watching these efforts with the greatest interest and sympathy. There can be no doubt that the achievement of a closely integrated European community would tend to consolidate and strengthen the Atlantic alliance as a whole.

As Secretary Dulles has pointed out on more than one occasion, the most significant thing about

the Atlantic alliance is not so much what has happened as what has *not* happened. Before NATO began, we were harassed by a long series of crises in Europe, such as the Communist war in Greece, the Berlin blockade, the Czechoslovak coup, military threats against Norway and Turkey, and so forth. Since NATO came into being there have been no military hostilities of any kind in the European area and the Communists have not gained a single inch of additional territory. I think this speaks for itself.

In reciting the progress made through NATO, it is not my purpose to imply that all our difficulties have suddenly vanished. We will continue to face a great many problems. NATO is not the kind of operation that we can ever expect to wrap up and forget about. It requires constant attention and constant effort by all members of the alliance, including ourselves.

### **Maintenance of Military Defenses**

The mutual security program proposed for fiscal year 1957 is directed toward two of NATO's most pressing and most continuous problems—the maintenance and the progressive modernization of its military defenses. Even the best military system cannot stand still. Weapons and equipment wear out or become obsolete, and military plans require constant revision. These problems have always existed, but they have been greatly magnified by the incredible sweep of modern technology. While our information about the rate of Soviet scientific and technical advancement is not as precise as we would like, we know enough to be certain that the continued value of free-world defense forces will depend largely upon our collective ability to maintain up-to-date equipment and facilities, to replace wornout or obsolete items, and to keep pace with the furious advances of science and technology.

Another current defense problem receiving NATO attention, of course, is the buildup of German military contingents. Since this buildup is beginning from scratch, many different things have to be done, ranging from the enactment of basic legislation to the actual recruitment, organization, equipment, and training of military forces. This process will necessarily be gradual, but steady progress is being made. The mutual security program recommended for fiscal year 1957 contains no additional funds for the German buildup, since

the currently planned U.S. contribution to this program has already been obligated from previous appropriations.

The military problems I have mentioned are now receiving intensive attention by NATO military planners. The Defense Ministers of all member countries, including Secretary of Defense Wilson, held a meeting in October to consider some of these problems, and a subsequent meeting of senior military authorities and the NATO commanders was completed in Paris around March 1. The central problem upon which both these meetings focused is the adaptation of the NATO defense system to the ever-changing requirements and techniques of modern warfare. This problem is gravely complicated by the limited financial resources available. While it is clear to all that this adaptation is essentially evolutionary and that no sudden and drastic displacement of either plans or machinery is in prospect, it is necessary that the process move forward with minimum delay.

Most of the funds requested for NATO during fiscal year 1957 fall under the heading of "maintenance." They will be used to service, repair, and replace facilities and equipment already produced and to provide training in the use of such equipment and facilities. Some of the funds, in addition, are designed to make more modern weapons and equipment available to our allies, with particular emphasis on the improvement of European air defenses and early warning systems.

### **Modernization of Military Defenses**

There are approximately \$525 million in this program set aside for advanced weapons, of which \$195 million have already been planned for allocation to Europe. The value to the Europeans, both in military and in psychological terms, of acquiring guided missiles and more advanced types of aircraft and electronic equipment cannot be overestimated. Furthermore, it is to our own benefit that we make these more modern weapons available as a means of insuring that American troops in Europe will have at their side well-equipped forces equally able to mount an effective defense.

There is no question but that the Europeans have become increasingly concerned about the rapid changes in the technology of modern warfare and their limited ability to keep pace with the newer developments. Apart from the British and,

to a lesser extent, the French, our European allies do not have the resources necessary to devote to the large-scale research and development of new weapons. Consequently, most European countries are looking primarily to the United States to help them keep pace with the growing capabilities of the Soviet bloc forces. By sharing the newer weapons as they are developed and produced, we can make it possible for them to participate more effectively in the defense of Western Europe and thus to strengthen the deterrent power of the alliance.

Officials of the Department of Defense will be prepared to give you more detailed information about the projected use of these funds and the military purposes to be served. I will confine myself to a few general observations. First, I think it is obvious that the NATO alliance, one of the mainstays of our security, can be preserved over a long period of time only if our European partners remain convinced that it offers them real protection and that their own contributions to the common defense serve a useful purpose. This conviction, in turn, will depend upon a reasonable assurance that their defense efforts will actually be meaningful within the context of modern instruments and techniques of warfare. Our allies already know that there are certain key items that they cannot produce for themselves and cannot readily accumulate the dollars to buy. Unless they are able to secure, maintain, and replace these things, they will feel that a large part of what they are able to do for themselves would be waste effort.

#### **European Contribution to Mutual Security**

I want to emphasize the fact that the things our allies are doing for themselves add up to a very substantial total. Two years ago Secretary Dulles pointed out that our European allies were spending for defense purposes the equivalent of three dollars from their own budgets for every dollar's worth of aid received from the United States. A recent analysis by my staff indicates that these countries are now spending the equivalent of *six* dollars of their own money for each dollar of U.S. aid received. Their total defense expenditures last year came to more than \$12 billion, which is an altogether creditable showing for a group of nations whose combined gross national incomes add up to less than one-half of the U.S.

national income. These expenditures, together with the men they have placed under arms, the output of their factories and laboratories, and the bases they have provided, add substantially to the security of the United States as well as the security of Europe. It seems to me a matter of ordinary common sense—a sound business proposition, if you will—for the United States to continue providing certain weapons, equipment, and training which will multiply the effectiveness of these European efforts and produce more total defense than would otherwise be available.

This is the fundamental justification for the whole program. Without the program of the character and magnitude being requested, some of these countries would undoubtedly feel that they just couldn't accomplish enough to make their efforts and sacrifices worth while. Some would lack many key items of equipment and would face insuperable difficulties in trying to build balanced forces capable of effective action under modern conditions of warfare. The real defensive power produced by their own commitments of money and manpower would be greatly reduced and there would be almost irresistible temptation to reduce these commitments. The final result would be a drastic weakening of the whole Atlantic system. In terms of the total defensive power available to America and the free world, we would clearly lose more than we would save by not having this military assistance program being requested.

Please understand that I am not making gloomy predictions. On the contrary, I believe the general outlook in Europe is fairly bright. I only want to emphasize the fact that NATO represents a tremendous asset for the security of the entire free world, including our own country. We have already made a large investment in protecting and increasing the value of this asset. The program now being presented to you is designed to make certain that neither the investment nor the asset itself is lost.

#### **Spain, Yugoslavia, Berlin**

I mentioned earlier that a moderate portion of the assistance proposed for the European area in fiscal year 1957 is designed to provide economic-type support to certain non-NATO areas. The largest amount is proposed for support of the Spanish defense program. Spain's defense efforts are



closely related to the U.S.-Spanish agreements for the construction and joint use of a series of important strategic air and naval bases. Therefore, we have a considerable interest in the effectiveness of these efforts. We also recognize that Spain, which did not participate in the Marshall plan nor the early military defense assistance programs, faces unusual economic difficulties in carrying out its defense plans.

A smaller amount is proposed to support Yugoslav defense efforts. While Yugoslavia is not allied with the U.S., we have a definite interest in Yugoslavia's ability to maintain the independent position which it has achieved with great risk and sacrifice. Yugoslavia is the only country that has successfully broken away from the Soviet camp. The measure of this success is best illustrated by the fervent campaign which the Soviet rulers are now waging to entice Yugoslavia back into the Soviet spider's web. But the Yugoslavs know from experience what this means, and their nation stands today as a vivid reminder to the satellite areas that it is still possible for enslaved peoples to regain national existence. Yugoslavia is already spending a larger percentage of its national income for defense than any other country in free Europe, and the moderate assistance contemplated in this program is intended to help Yugoslavia continue to maintain this defense program without unbearable economic strain.

As in past years, we are also requesting special economic assistance for programs in West Berlin. The strategic and psychological importance of this key Western outpost is well known, especially to those Members of the Congress who have had an opportunity to visit the area. West Berlin will continue to face extraordinary economic difficulties because of its geographic position, and we are determined to provide all necessary support to alleviate these difficulties and assure West Berlin's survival.

In conclusion, I merely want to repeat my conviction that the European section of the proposed mutual security program represents a good investment in our own national security. It has paid off in the past and we have every reason to antici-

pate that it will pay handsome dividends in the future.

## **Appointments to Advisory Group on Refugee Relief Program**

The Department of State announced on April 9 (press release 182) that George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Joseph Gimma, partner in the New York investment firm of Hornblower & Weeks, had been appointed to the Public Advisory Group of the Refugee Relief Program.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Meany will be the official representative of the AFL-CIO; Mr. Gimma will serve as a public member.

Other members of the group are:

Msgr. Edward E. Swanstrom, National Catholic Welfare Conference, Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service

Roland Elliott, Director, Immigration Services, Church World Service, First Vice Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service

Miss Cordelia Cox, Lutheran Refugee Service, Second Vice Chairman of the Refugee Relief Program Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service

Arthur Greenleigh, Executive Director, United Hias Service, Inc.

Dr. William S. Bernard, Executive Director, American Federation of International Institutes, Inc.

Dr. Jan Papanek, President of the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc.

Abram G. Becker, Executive Director, International Rescue Committee

Walter H. Bieringer, Canton, Mass., Vice President, Plymouth Rubber Company, and Chairman of the Massachusetts Governor's Committee for Refugees

Mrs. Dorothy D. Houghton, Red Oak, Iowa, former Deputy Director of the International Cooperation Administration

The Rev. Clyde N. Rogers, Columbus, Ohio, Ohio Council of Churches, and Chairman of the Ohio Governor's Committee for the Refugee Program

Clark L. Brody, Lansing, Mich., Executive Vice President of the Michigan Farm Bureau

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 29, 1955, p. 363.

## **Hungary Accepts U.S. Offer of Emergency Food Aid**

Press release 191 dated April 12

Under the President's authorization, an offer of emergency food aid to victims in Hungary of the effects of the recent European cold wave was presented to the Hungarian Government on February 23, 1956.<sup>1</sup> The offer was not accepted at that time. In view of the increasing severity of flood conditions in that country and the consequent widespread hardships, it was renewed on March 23 by the American Minister to Hungary, Christian M. Ravndal.

The Hungarian Government informed Minister Ravndal on March 27 of its acceptance of the United States offer of food aid.

The U.S. Government is taking prompt steps, with the cooperation of the League of Red Cross Societies, to determine what existing need may be met under the emergency food-aid offer and to institute appropriate arrangements for carrying out such aid as soon as possible.

In undertaking this program, the U.S. Government is motivated by its friendly regard for the Hungarian people and by the traditional desire of the American people to alleviate suffering wherever it may occur.

## **Triangular Sales of Farm Products to Italy and Austria**

The International Cooperation Administration announced on March 31 that it has arranged two "triangular" transactions involving sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to Italy and Austria. The local currencies generated by the sale of the agricultural commodities will finance the purchase of goods in Italy and Austria needed by other countries participating in the mutual security program.

Under agreements signed recently with Italy and Austria, each of the two nations will purchase up to \$5 million worth of agricultural commodities, paying for them in local currencies. The lira and schilling proceeds of the sales will be deposited to the account of the U.S. Government. ICA will make these funds available to countries where the United States has defense or economic

assistance programs which require commodities available in Italy and Austria. When purchases of such goods in Italy and Austria are agreed upon, they will be financed with the U.S.-owned lira and schilling funds and the "triangular" transaction will be completed.

Procurement authorizations for the agricultural commodities to be sold to Italy and Austria will be issued later by ICA.

The agreements with Italy and Austria were made under section 402 of the Mutual Security Act. This section requires that at least \$300 million of the funds authorized for the mutual security program during the current fiscal year be used to finance the sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. The local currency proceeds are to be used for mutual security purposes.

To date this year, more than \$200 million of these commodities have been authorized by ICA to more than a dozen countries.

## **U.S. Aid to Libya**

Press release 184 dated April 9

In extended support of Libyan economic development projects, to which it has been contributing since 1954, the U.S. Government will grant Libya \$5 million from this fiscal year's mutual security funds. This is in addition to the \$12 million in aid which the United States has provided Libya since 1954.

The United States has also informed Libya that it will grant that country another 5,000 tons of relief grain, bringing the total help of this nature in fiscal year 1956 to 25,000 tons.

The Government of Libya has also been told that in fiscal year 1957 the U.S. Government would be prepared, subject to congressional authorization, to provide an additional \$7 million in economic development assistance, relief wheat as needed up to 25,000 tons, and the military equipment for expansion of the Libyan Army by an additional 1,000 men after a U.S. military survey team has determined the requirements.

On being informed of the U.S. decision outlined above, the Libyan Prime Minister stated publicly on April 7:

"While making with pleasure and satisfaction this announcement of American aid, I feel it is

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN OF MAR. 5, 1956, p. 367.

my duty to emphasize the spirit of understanding shown by the American Government toward Libya's needs and the sincere collaboration extended for meeting them.

"In the name of the Libyan Government and people I extend my sincere thanks to the Government of the United States of America with our deep appreciation for their valued assistance which will not fail to have far-reaching effects on the progress of our country and on raising the standard of our people."

## **New ICA Loan to Turkey**

A loan of \$25 million to Turkey was announced by the International Cooperation Administration on April 8. This brings the total of U.S. aid to Turkey during the 1956 fiscal year, including grants and a gift of emergency food supplies, to \$54,885,000. These funds are being used as follows:

—\$37.5 million, composed of the \$25 million loan and a grant of \$12.5 million, to finance the import of commodities such as alloys, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and spare parts for industrial, mining, agricultural, and highway equipment and vehicles.

—\$2 million in technical cooperation grants.

—\$14 million worth of emergency food supplies donated by the United States to stave off shortages resulting from recent floods, an earthquake, and a disastrous fire. The food includes 40,000 tons of wheat and quantities of butter, cheese, powdered milk, flour, and rice taken from U.S. agricultural reserves.

—\$1,385,000 as a grant to pay the costs of ocean transportation for the emergency food shipments.

The agreement covering the loan was signed for Turkey by Ambassador Haydar Gork. Signing for the United States was Samuel C. Wagh, president of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, which administers Ica loans.

In announcing the \$14 million gift of food supplies on March 26, Ica said that, since January, 25,000 tons of Turkey's grain supply had been distributed free to disaster victims; an additional free distribution was to be made during March and April. The wheat included in the U.S. gift

would be used to replenish Turkish stocks from which the free distribution was made.

The other gift foods from the United States—3,600 tons of powdered milk, 2,615 tons of butter, 2,615 tons of cheese, 1,000 tons of flour, and 250 tons of rice—will be distributed free to needy persons. The food is being supplied under title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P. L. 480).

The new loan agreement brings total economic aid to Turkey since the United States began providing such assistance in 1947 to more than one-half billion dollars. The United States has been helping Turkey in its efforts to improve the standard of living of its people and, at the same time, to assume increasing responsibility for the support of its defense efforts.

The greater part of U.S. aid to Turkey has been directed toward such projects as development and improvement of transportation, communications and power facilities, mineral resources, and the increase of industrial capacity. Aid also has been given in various agricultural fields, including improvement of farm management.

In the field of technical cooperation, a recent major project has been assistance in helping Turkey establish a new university at Erzurum in the eastern part of the country. This project is being carried out under contract with the University of Nebraska. Emphasizing education in the agricultural sciences, the new institution has been named Ataturk University in honor of Turkey's first president, Kemal Ataturk.

## **Vice President of Brazil To Visit U.S.**

The Department of State announced on April 13 (press release 196) that Vice President João Goulart of Brazil will visit the United States during the period April 30–May 17, 1956. The invitation was extended on behalf of the U.S. Government by Vice President Nixon during Mr. Nixon's recent trip to Brazil.

Mr. Goulart will be an official guest of the U.S. Government in Washington during the period April 30–May 3 and will stay at Blair House. He then expects to make a private tour of several major U.S. cities.

## The Inter-American Partnership

by Milton S. Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>

Three years ago, in this beautiful House of the Americas, President Eisenhower expressed his profound personal dedication to doing all he could to perfect the understanding and trust upon which the American community of nations must rest.

He stated also his desire to visit the other American Republics and know them better. Since he could not himself make a prolonged tour, he sent me as his personal representative to South America. Soon afterward he asked Vice President Nixon to make a similar good-will visit to Middle America.

I look upon my own tour of Latin America as one of the most rewarding experiences of my life. I had abundant opportunity to deepen my understanding of major problems in candid discussions with leaders of government, labor, business, agriculture, and cultural institutions. I observed and studied Latin America's remarkable achievements and thus came to appreciate Latin America's determination to be a mighty, progressive factor in the defense of freedom and the extension of peace. On the basis of a continental perspective developed on the trip I submitted, upon my return, numerous recommendations for strengthening hemispheric solidarity—recommendations which met with approval and were incorporated into United States policy.<sup>2</sup>

It is therefore with a renewal of the pride and pleasure I felt during the period of intensive work in 1953 that, again as the President's personal representative, I come here today to participate in these Pan American Day ceremonies.

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., on Pan American Day, Apr. 14 (OAS press release). Mr. Eisenhower spoke as the personal representative of the President.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 23, 1953, p. 695.

It is especially gratifying to be with you when the Council is honoring a distinguished fellow citizen who worked so diligently for hemispheric cooperation, Cordell Hull. For him, continuous cooperation among the Americas was a pilot project for all nations. Speaking of the inter-American system on this day 13 years ago, in this same House of the Americas, Secretary Hull declared that "the practice of equity is not a design for a hemisphere but is a *rule for living* in a free and peaceful world."<sup>3</sup>

Implicit in Mr. Hull's statement is a concept that is fundamental to the foreign policy of the United States as it applies to the other American Republics. It is the conviction that mutually helpful, friendly, and abiding relationships among all the American peoples are of transcendent importance and that these relationships do indeed afford a working model for the rest of mankind.

### Historical Nature of Inter-American Cooperation

It is not especially remarkable that one of our Secretaries of State voiced this belief; but it is significant that our Secretaries have been saying it generation after generation. Whichever of our political parties has been in power, whoever has been the incumbent of the White House, whatever has been the state of world affairs, we have adhered firmly to the belief that on the hearth of the American family of nations must burn a steadfast flame to warm and illuminate mankind.

Our first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, said, "We have the same object, the success of representative government. Nor are we acting for ourselves alone, but for the whole human race."

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 17, 1943, p. 322.

Secretary Elihu Root, at the Third International Conference of American States in 1906, urged the American peoples to show the world that liberty is the twin sister of a just peace. "Let us unite," he urged, "in creating . . . and making effective an all-American public opinion whose power shall influence international wrong, [and] bring us ever nearer to the perfection of ordered liberty."

In 1925 Secretary Charles Evans Hughes emphasized that hemispheric cooperation, while based on mutual self-interest of the American Republics, does not isolate our peoples from the rest of the world. On the contrary, he said, our hemispheric cooperation "in itself constitutes a most important contribution to world peace."

And only last year Secretary John Foster Dulles expressed this truth in another way here at the Pan American Union, saying: "This great inter-American system, which was first a vision and a dream and then an expression of faith, has become in our time the most solid international organization of free peoples on earth . . . beneficial to all mankind."<sup>4</sup>

#### **Abiding Family Relationship**

This persistent view of our Secretaries of State—that the family relationship among the American nations is of an abiding nature and is an example for all mankind—has long been shared by our Congress and our Chief Executives. Presidents Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, Abraham Lincoln, Herbert Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower—all have been inspired by the power, the peaceful achievement, and growing potential of the inter-American fraternity of nations.

I have thought it worth while to emphasize the historical nature of our friendship and cooperation, for the overt propagandists and the covert subversives of today contend that ours is an ephemeral solidarity; that there does not really exist a solid basis for continuing harmony; and that our mask of pretension will one day be cast aside to reveal the real creature, the hostile imperialist. Nearly everyone in the Americas recognizes this kind of talk for what it is: a calculated, malicious misrepresentation to serve the purposes of a clever world conspiracy which holds our deepest spiritual convictions in contempt and

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, May 2, 1955, p. 728.

#### **Solidarity of the Western Hemisphere**

Press release 195 dated April 13

President Eisenhower has issued a proclamation<sup>1</sup> designating the period April 8-14 as Pan American Week, and Saturday, April 14, as Pan American Day. In his proclamation, the President calls attention to the fact that April 14 will mark the sixty-sixth anniversary of the founding of the Pan American Union, the forerunner of the great inter-American system now known as the Organization of American States.

During the past year there have been many examples of the friendly cooperation and common purpose which has been traditionally a hallmark of United States relations with the countries of this hemisphere. Several friendly visits were exchanged by representatives of our respective governments. A number of important new agreements were signed looking to the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy in the Western Hemisphere and providing for mutual economic and technical assistance.

The efficacy and great moral influence of the peace machinery of the OAS were again demonstrated when it was used successfully to bring about a solution of a difficult situation which had arisen between two of our neighbor governments.

Further progress was made in the construction of the Inter-American Highway in Central America, which now is expected to be completed within 2 years.

The United States on its part was privileged to lend assistance in connection with the floods which struck in parts of Mexico and Honduras, and the polio epidemic in Argentina. We ourselves received aid from several of our neighbor republics when floods and hurricanes hit our northeast coast in the summer of 1955.

The solidarity of the sister republics of this hemisphere is based on faith. First and foremost, it is faith in the institutions all are pledged to defend. Secondly, and equally, it is faith in one another. It is in such spirit that the governments and peoples of the 21 American Republics join together to celebrate this Pan American Week.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 544.

which seeks, by coercion and subversion, to control the destiny of mankind.

Our cooperation not only has a proud, long history; it also possesses the assurance of a beneficial future. For it is grounded firmly on mutuality in our relations. As I stated in my report to my brother and his associates in the Federal Government, our solidarity is based, *first* upon a genuine understanding of one another—an understanding that permeates not only governments but also the

great masses of all our peoples. It is based, *second*, upon the closely related requisites of mutual respect and the sovereign equality of states. This is especially important in relations between large and small, powerful and weak nations, for nations, like people, have dignity and pride; only if each respects the rights, aspirations, cultures, sensibilities, and equal legal rights of the others can there be permanence in their friendship. Our cooperation is based upon *another* fundamental: mutual security. This is imperative in our threatened world. This concept, indeed, originated among the American family of nations and was formalized, as all know, in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro of 1947. And the *other* great requisite for our continuing cooperation is firm adherence to common goals—the goals of peace, liberty, independence, rising levels of well-being, and the attainment of spiritual values.

But while we may be satisfied that the elements of our hemispheric unity are correct and firmly established, we recognize that much remains to be done, and no doubt always will remain to be done, if our unity is to yield the constructive results we all desire.

Fortunately, much has been accomplished in the past several years to improve relationships; especially has a great deal been done to improve mutual understanding and to strengthen economic cooperation.

### **Heightened U.S. Interest**

Never has interest in my country in all phases of inter-American relations been so widespread as it is now. This heightened interest was no doubt caused to some extent by the anxiety our people felt for a time at the Communist threat that was so narrowly averted in one American nation.

But it is due also, I am sure, to an increasing awareness of our economic, political, military, and cultural interdependence; to the widespread publicity given to the inter-American conferences at Caracas, Rio, and Ciudad Trujillo; to the swift steps taken by the Organization of American States to settle quickly three serious disputes among member nations; to a tremendous increase in the exchange-of-persons programs, and to the modest additional support of American schools in Latin America; to the most welcome visits to the United States of the President of Uruguay, the

President of Guatemala, the President-elect of Brazil, the President of Mexico, and the Prime Minister of Canada; to the visits of our Vice President to Middle America and Brazil; and to the visits of our Assistant Secretary of State to every Republic of Latin America.

In addition to meetings at high official levels, genuine mutual understanding is being continually enhanced by the exchange of literally thousands of students, business and professional men and women, and a rising tide of tourists.

The United States Information Agency has expanded its programs of intellectual and cultural cooperation in Latin America. More books than ever before are being translated from Portuguese and Spanish into English, and vice versa. Latin American music has invaded the theaters, clubs, and homes of my country as a welcome retaliation for the infiltration of United States jive and rock-and-roll into every nook and corner of the Latin American Republics. And at this moment, exhibits of Argentinean, Chilean, Peruvian, Venezuelan, and Caribbean arts are being shown in many parts of the United States.

Most of all, however, mutual understanding is being increased through the growing volume of material in the press and on the radio and television; in every country of the American community our people are being exposed to information and ideas about all the other countries of the hemisphere.

Increased understanding and mutual respect, valuable in themselves, have also effectively strengthened economic cooperation—the real key to better relations among our countries and peoples.

### **Consistent Economic Programs**

The most important recommendation I made in my report to the President nearly 3 years ago was that the United States adopt and adhere to trade policies with Latin America which possess stability and a minimum of mechanisms permitting the imposition of increased tariffs or quotas. I emphasized that real cooperation in this hemisphere can flow only from intelligent adherence to consistent economic programs, honorably and continuously observed.

I can proudly say today that both by congressional enactments and by firm policies established by the executive branch of the United States Gov-

ernment, greater stability has been infused into our trade, financial, and other economic relationships. Assurance of access to the great market of the United States, with a minimum of changes in the rules, is the most effective guaranty of economic stability in Latin America. Similar assurance that the other nations of this hemisphere can continue to buy much of our surplus production is an essential of economic prosperity in the United States.

In the last several years, too, the United States Government has recognized that public and private lending for sound development projects must go forward on a substantial scale. Production and productivity are increasing more rapidly in Latin America than anywhere else in the world. This advance creates an insatiable demand for capital.

We of the United States are placing greatest reliance, as we should, upon a flow of private capital for investment. That flow can be encouraged best by the Latin American nations themselves. Nonetheless, the United States has announced repeatedly in the last several years that it favors public loans to finance those sound projects for which private financing is not available. Indeed, we have assured all nations of Latin America that we will do everything we can to satisfy all applications for sound economic-development loans for which capital is not reasonably available either from private sources or from the International Bank. Both the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank, I am told, have ample funds to lend; indeed, they are prepared to process applications greatly in excess of those now on hand.

Since its creation in 1934, the Export-Import Bank has authorized loans totaling more than \$2,500,000,000. Some 20 months ago the Bank announced a new policy designed to expand its activities in Latin America. In the next full year, loans to Latin America increased by more than 500 percent to \$284,000,000, or 58 percent of the Bank's total loans. The Export-Import Bank can be counted on to continue to make important contributions to the economic development of this hemisphere.

Inter-American cooperation is developing programs of atomic energy for peaceful purposes—cooperation which may one day be recognized as a significant turning point in history. For nuclear science may bring productive energy to many nations which now suffer a serious deficiency

and which are constantly having difficulty with foreign exchange because of the imperative need to import oil, coal, and other fuels.

Truly impressive progress has been made on the construction of the Inter-American Highway; through greatly increased appropriations the United States is contributing a major share of the cost of what may soon become the most traveled artery of the Americas. Additional programs of technical assistance have been worked out in education, agriculture, public health, and related fields.

Many of our countries, the United States among them, have suffered in recent years from such natural disasters as floods, hurricanes, and epidemics of disease; all countries, including the United States, have received prompt and generous assistance from other American peoples. This aid has been, indeed, a persuasive demonstration of the heart of America.

It is a long story, this story of inter-American cooperation for better health, better education, better living conditions; for peace, for freedom, for order, and for independence.

It has been said, and justly said, that inter-American neighborliness is not only the policy of the American governments but also a state of mind of all our peoples. I am sure this is so. But while we have made traditional the practice of proclaiming this fact anew every year on Pan American Day, I believe all of us here would agree that this attitude must in fact guide our actions every day of every year.

#### **Good Partners**

So far as the United States is concerned, I think I may confidently say that our state of mind in this regard is better than ever before. The development is sufficient that we have had to find words to describe our thinking. We have gradually dropped the phrase "good neighbor" and have substituted, with sincerity, the phrase "good partner."

This signifies much more than a difference of words. It underscores a new approach to the problems we share.

As neighbors, each American Republic tried in the economic field to adopt policies and follow courses which would not prejudice the interests of the other members of the total community. Each sought in good faith to respond construc-

tively to requests for cooperation and assistance from others. In the United States the good-neighbor policy gave a new and meaningful direction to our hemispheric programs and relations.

That policy has logically carried us to the relationship that exists and must exist between us today—a relationship which is so close that it can no longer accurately be described as that of neighbors. So interdependent are our destinies today that each American Republic must recognize its direct, continuing, and even selfish interest in the solution of the critical problems of every other member of the family. We must now be dependable, honorable *partners* in a great and lasting enterprise—the peaceful independence, the prosperity, and the happiness of all our peoples—peoples with great and marvelous cultural diversity but with equally great and inescapable interdependent goals.

In the spirit of partnership we have in recent years made substantial progress toward better understanding and mutual respect, and improved political, military, and economic cooperation. That must give us all deep satisfaction. As I said in concluding my report on Latin America to President Eisenhower:

“Working together, the nations of this Hemisphere can, if history should so decree, stand firmly against any enemy in war, and prosper mightily together in times of peace.”

## World Trade Week, 1956

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS it is the continuing desire of the people of the United States to strengthen our ties of friendship with all nations of the free world and to foster understanding and cooperation among them; and

WHEREAS international trade, travel, and investment make vital contributions to international stability and the mutual development of resources, security, and culture; and

WHEREAS the expansion of international social, cultural, and business relationships promotes the unity and solidarity of the nations of the free world; and

WHEREAS the national interest requires that we join with friendly nations in dealing with our trade problems on a cooperative basis:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 20, 1956, as **World Trade Week**; and I request the appropriate officials of the Federal Gov-

<sup>1</sup>No. 3130; 21 *Fed. Reg.* 1953.

ernment and of the several States, Territories, possessions, and municipalities of the United States to cooperate in the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, and civic groups, as well as people in the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities designed to promote continuing awareness of the importance of world trade to our economy and our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have herewith set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-fourth day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
*Secretary of State*

## Western Europe Cuts Curbs on Dollar-Area Imports

The International Cooperation Administration announced on March 28 that substantial progress in relaxing restrictions on imports into Western Europe from the dollar area had been reported that day by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. As of January 1, 1956, some 54 percent of all private imports by the 17 OEEC member countries from the United States and Canada, based on their dollar value, were free of quantitative restrictions. This compares with only 11 percent free of such restrictions at the beginning of 1953.

The progress report brought an expression of approval from John B. Hollister, Director of the International Cooperation Administration, who headed the U.S. delegation to the recent OEEC Council meeting at Paris.

“This report,” said Mr. Hollister, “constitutes positive evidence that Western European countries are following through on their commitment under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to remove restrictions on imports as their external financial position improves. The United States Government is pleased to note this progress in Western Europe.”



On the whole, the level of liberalization has been higher for food and feedstuffs and for raw material than for manufactured goods.

For the first 9 months of 1955, member countries' total imports from the United States and Canada were 40 percent above those of the corresponding period in 1954, while their total imports from all sources showed a 15 percent rise.

The increase in dollar imports contributed to an enlargement of the trade deficit with the United States and Canada, since member country exports did not increase correspondingly. However, there was an overall increase in gold and dollar holdings in 1955 by more than \$800 million, due primarily to American military expenditures.

With regard to so-called "invisible" transactions, such as payments for services and warehousing charged for goods in international trade, returns on foreign investments, business travel, etc., the report indicates that liberalization with respect to the dollar area is more general and more extensive than in the case of commodity trade.

The OEEC report is entitled *Liberalization of Europe's Dollar Trade*. It is based on replies of member countries to a questionnaire, on documents relating to commercial policies, and on discussions between government representatives from the United States, Canada, and the Western European countries.

OEEC member countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Canada and the United States are associate members.

## **Tariff Negotiations With Finland, France, Dominican Republic**

Press release 194 dated April 12

The United States has concluded negotiations with the Dominican Republic, Finland, and France whereby these countries withdrew or modified under article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade a number of tariff concessions previously granted to the United States. Although no changes in U.S. tariff rates were involved, the negotiations permitted the United States to obtain new concessions from the three countries designed to offset the concessions with-

drawn or modified and to maintain the previous level of reciprocal concessions.

At specified but infrequent intervals and in accordance with established procedures, the contracting parties of the general agreement are permitted to withdraw or modify tariff concessions previously granted. These concessions are either reductions in tariff rates or agreements not to increase these rates. In such cases, the contracting party with whom the concession was originally negotiated or any other contracting party having a substantial trade interest in the concessionary item has the right to negotiate for new concessions with the objective of reestablishing the previous level of concessions.

In such negotiations a variety of factors is considered in assessing the compensatory concessions offered for those withdrawn or modified. The trade value of the products affected is one item. Another is the extent and severity of modifications and withdrawals contrasted with the probable trade-expansion potential of the compensatory concessions which might be granted. The existence and operation of quantitative restrictions may also be significant, as well as different methods of valuing the same product, i. e., whether as an import on the one hand or as an export on the other. An examination of all pertinent factors is, therefore, conducted before a new balance is struck in order to assure that compensatory offers in reality maintain the existing level of reciprocal concessions.

United States participation in these negotiations was guided by the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements, the group which advises the President on trade agreement matters.

A summary of the principal changes involved in the present set of negotiations follows.<sup>1</sup>

*Dominican Republic.* The Dominican Republic modified three concessions made to the United States relating to paints and varnishes. With regard to varnishes, the modification consisted wholly in revising the Dominican tariff classification of this commodity, breaking up the previous "basket" item into a number of categories,

<sup>1</sup> For details, see Department of State publication 6324. Results of similar negotiations with 16 other countries will be found in Department of State publications 5881, 6001, 6201, and 6291.

without increasing the duty for any of the component parts. The paint and pigment category was similarly revised, but duties in this instance were, in general, increased. Imports by the Dominican Republic from the United States for this latter group of paints and pigments were \$559,000 in 1954.

To compensate for these increases, the Dominican Republic reduced concessionary rates already granted on six items and provided new concessions on five items. Imports from the United States of these 11 items by the Dominican Republic in 1954 amounted to \$543,000, of which the most important were cigarette tobacco and wheat semolina.

*Finland.* Finnish rates of duty on 17 items, directly negotiated with the United States, were increased and rebound at the higher rates. In 1954 Finland imported nearly \$600,000 of all of these items from the United States, the most important being certain varieties of fruit preserves and preparations, compressors and air pumps, and miscellaneous machinery and apparatus.

In return, Finland made concessions on 11 items. In four instances duties were reduced and rebound; in seven, concessions on new items were granted. Imports from the United States of these 11 items by Finland amounted to \$819,000 in 1954. Lubricating oils and tinned sheet iron and steel comprised the principal part of this trade.

*France.* Of the 14 tariff concessions modified by France, six were originally negotiated with the United States. All of these modifications increased French import duties. According to French statistics for 1953, the latest data supplied, imports of these items from the United States amounted to \$283,000, the preponderant part being unsweetened fruit and vegetable juices. United States trade data showed exports of \$238,000 for all 14 items to France in 1954.

As compensation, France reduced duties on four items and bound rates on two others. French statistics indicated imports of these items from the United States to be \$1,791,000 in 1953, most of them being fresh oranges. United States statistics for 1954 listed exports of \$466,000 for all of these items, fresh oranges again ranking as the principal item. As an additional concession, France agreed not to seek compensation for the United States withdrawal in August 1955 of its tariff concession on bicycles.

## Continuation of Rate of Duty on Imports of Hatters' Fur

White House press release dated March 29

The President on March 29 concurred with the Tariff Commission's recent finding that no formal investigation should be instituted at this time to determine whether the tariff should be reduced on imports of hatters' fur.<sup>1</sup> The President found, with the Tariff Commission, that there is no sufficient reason at this time to reopen the escape-clause action which resulted in an increase of the duty on imports of hatters' fur. The President's decision means that the increased rate of duty established in 1952 as a result of escape-clause action will continue to apply without reduction or other modification.

The President's action was taken after the views of all interested departments and agencies of the executive branch had been received and studied. The Tariff Commission's report was made pursuant to Executive Order 10401, which requires periodic review of actions taken under the escape clause. It was transmitted to the President on February 6, 1956.

The tariff on hatters' fur was reduced as the result of trade agreement negotiations in 1935 and again in 1948. Effective February 9, 1952, the tariff on imports of hatters' fur was increased as the result of an escape-clause action to its present rate of 47½¢ per pound but not less than 15 percent nor more than 35 percent ad valorem.

The Tariff Commission's report constitutes its third periodic review of the escape-clause action taken on this product.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference

The Department of State announced on April 11 (press release 187) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference, which will meet at San José, Costa Rica, April 25-May 6, 1956, by a

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the Tariff Commission's report may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

delegation composed of the following representatives of U.S. Government agencies and of private groups concerned with port administration and maritime transportation:

*Chairman*

Charles P. Nolan, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

*Vice Chairman*

Howard J. Marsden, Chief, Division of Port Development, Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce

*Advisers*

Benjamin P. Clark, Commander, USCG, Chief, Port Security Section, United States Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury

J. Eugene Kennedy, Assistant Collector of Customs, Baltimore, Md., Department of the Treasury

George J. Leovy, American Merchant Marine Institute, New York, N.Y.

Robert E. Mayer, President, Pacific American Steamship Association, San Francisco, Calif.

Matthew C. O'Hearn, American Merchant Marine Institute, Washington, D.C.

Jerrold P. Turner, President, American Association of Port Authorities, Mobile, Ala.

The purpose of the meeting is to bring together qualified technical experts of the American Republics to discuss matters relating to port administration, port practices and regulations, terminal operation (including warehousing), cargo handling, cargo loss prevention, port congestion, port modernization, and free-trade zones.

## **Marshall Islanders' Petition on Nuclear Tests in Pacific**

### **STATEMENT BY BENJAMIN GERIG<sup>1</sup>**

The United States delegation has just been informed by the Department of State that a petition concerning the forthcoming nuclear tests to be held at the Pacific Proving Grounds was received by the chairman of the Visiting Mission from the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee.

In accordance with rule 84, paragraphs 1 and 2, the original was sent to the Secretary-General

<sup>1</sup> Made in the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 20 (U.S./U.N. press release 2371). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council.

and a copy to the United Nations Acting High Commissioner of the Pacific Trust Territory. We assume that the original has been or will shortly be received by the Secretary-General and will be made available to the Trusteeship Council.

The petitioners in effect reiterate their petition of April 20, 1954,<sup>2</sup> expressing the desire that the nuclear tests should cease or that, if considered necessary in the interest of world peace and security, should be conducted with all feasible precaution. I may say parenthetically that all such precautions are being taken.

Mr. President, we can all understand the feelings of these people, and we share with them the hope that a fully safeguarded disarmament program, including an "open sky" agreement, will be reached which will make such testing unnecessary. Although we have already discussed the essentials of this problem and although the petition raises no new questions, the United States delegation wishes to make clear that it is prepared to have the Council discuss the petition at the present session if it desires to do so.<sup>3</sup>

### **OBSERVATIONS OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AS ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY<sup>4</sup>**

Nothing would please the Administering Authority more than to be able to comply with the wishes of the Marshallese people that nuclear tests be discontinued in their islands, but this is not yet possible. The Marshallese people can, however, be assured that the decision to hold further tests in these islands was considered a matter of such gravity that it was taken by President Eisenhower himself. Moreover, it was not taken until very careful and comprehensive studies were made that

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of June 7, 1954, p. 887.

<sup>3</sup> On Mar. 29 the Council, by a vote of 9 to 4, approved the proposal of its Standing Committee on Petitions (U.N. doc. T/L. 649) that the Council draw to the petitioners' attention the observations of the Administering Authority; reaffirm its resolution of 1954; and recommend that all necessary measures should be taken "to guard against any possible dangers," "to settle forthwith all justified claims by the inhabitants of Bikini and Eniwetok relating to their temporary displacement" in connection with the earlier nuclear tests which were held in the Pacific Proving Grounds in 1954, and "to compensate the families which may have to be temporarily evacuated, for any losses which may result from further nuclear weapons tests."

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. T/OBS.10.5 dated Mar. 26.

convinced him that there was at present no practicable alternative.

Under President Eisenhower's leadership, the United States is earnestly seeking, along with other Governments, a fully safeguarded disarmament agreement which would make such tests unnecessary. Until such an agreement has been reached and as long as there is the threat of aggression, elementary prudence requires the United States to continue its tests. It is the conviction of the United States that it has a responsibility not only to its people but to all the peoples of the free world to maintain at a maximum its capacity to deter aggression and preserve peace. Thus it believes that, under present circumstances, further tests are, in the words of the petitioners, "absolutely necessary for the eventual well being of all the people of this world".

The question remains as to whether such tests could not be conducted elsewhere than in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. An exhaustive examination of alternative sites in the United States and in other parts of the world was undertaken. The conclusion reached was that there was no other technically suitable site available to the United States where such complete safeguards against possible hazards could be taken.

Even after this conclusion was reached, there was no decision to hold further tests in the islands until a system of precautionary measures was worked out that gave convincing assurance that no human being, inhabitant of the Trust Territory or otherwise would be in any way endangered by the tests.

Thus the Administering Authority believes that, although the United States Government is regrettably unable to comply with the first request of the petitioners, so far as is humanly possible the authorities are complying with the second, namely that "all possible precautionary measures be taken before such weapons are exploded".

To begin with, a danger area has been established. The boundaries of this area and the date they become effective have been continually publicized since 1 March by all available means, not only in the Trust Territory but to all parts of the world. Every effort has been made to see that the people of the Trust Territory, as well as all other people, are aware well in advance that it will be dangerous to enter this area after 20 April. Such warnings alone will not be relied on. Elabo-

rate sea and air patrols before each test will be conducted to make sure that no vessel or aircraft has strayed into the area.

The Administering Authority would like to refer to the statement on 12 January 1956 of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to the effect that

The forthcoming series of nuclear tests at the Eniwetok Proving Grounds, as announced today by the Commission and the Department of Defense, will involve weapons generally smaller in yield than those tested during the 1954 test series.

It is anticipated that the energy release of the largest test will be substantially below that of the maximum 1954 test.

The timing of all test shots will be governed by the judgement of weather experts assisted by new devices and techniques. The precautions that will be taken will ensure that "fallout" will occur only in the danger area, which does not include inhabited islands.

Among the steps that will be taken are the following:

1. Improved techniques will provide for more reliable weather predictions. The number of weather stations in the Pacific will be increased, aircraft will fly at high altitude to collect weather data and new type weather balloons and rockets will ascend to greater altitudes to gather weather data. Recently developed computers have mechanized most of the computational problems of predicting *fallout* patterns, permitting forecasts to be made much more rapidly than heretofore.

2. Following each detonation, aerial flights will be initiated to accomplish a quick radiological survey of the islands and surrounding seas.

3. There will be U.S. Air Weather Service and U.S. Public Health Service personnel present on sixteen islands for monitoring purposes. They will be equipped with adequate radiological monitoring devices and two-way radios. These islands are as follows: Rongerik, Tarawa, Wotho, Utirik, Majuro, Kusaie, Ujelang, Midway, Kwajalein, Iwo Jima, Guam, Johnson, Truk, Wake, Ponape, and Rongelap.

4. Radioactive clouds caused by the tests will be tracked by airplanes to check on their course.

In paragraph 2 (a) of their petition the Marshallese request that "all human beings and their valuable possessions be transported to safe distances first, before such explosions occur". It will not be necessary to evacuate any of the Marshallese

people from their present homes prior to the tests. It is fully expected that no evacuation will be called for during or after the tests, but in conformity with good planning complete plans have been prepared for emergency evacuation of the inhabitants.

In paragraph 2 (b) the petitioners request that "all the people living in this area be instructed in safety measures", and in paragraph 2 (d) they ask that "courses be taught to Marshallese Medical Practitioners and Health-Aides which will be useful in the detecting of and the circumventing of preventable dangers". These requests are being met in the following way: Scientific personnel who are trained radiological monitors equipped with radiation detection devices and two-way radios and fully acquainted with the necessary safety precautions will be stationed on the sixteen islands mentioned above. Medical doctors will also be in the area. Prior to and during the new series of tests training will be given to Marshallese medical practitioners and health aides in all necessary precautionary measures.

In paragraph 2 (c) the petitioners request that "adequate funds be set aside to pay for the possessions of the people in case they will have to be moved from their homes. This will include lands, houses and whatever possessions they cannot take with them, so that the unsatisfactory arrangements for the Bikinians and Enewetak people shall not be repeated." It is not anticipated that any of the inhabitants will have to be moved from their homes; however, should this prove necessary or should the inhabitants suffer any other hardship as a result of the tests, adequate funds as well as other facilities will be available to make appropriate compensation.

The United States is pleased to note the petitioners' opinion that the people of Rongelap, who were evacuated from their homes after the last tests, have been well cared for by the Administering Authority in their temporary location at Ejit. The United States Special Representative described in some detail to the sixteenth session of the Council<sup>5</sup> the measures being taken to care for the displaced Rongelapese. He made clear that the Administration is at the same time acutely aware that these temporary arrangements do not provide a normal existence for these people. He indicated that it was the Administration's intention to re-

<sup>5</sup> BULLETIN of July 25, 1955, p. 153.

patriate them as soon as scientific surveys indicate that there will be no danger to the inhabitants in so doing. Several such surveys have been made, one very recently, and it is now hoped that this move can be made in the early autumn.

One of the most difficult questions referred to by the petitioners is that of the land claims in the Marshall Islands, including those of the people of Bikini and Eniwetok. It is true that in the complicated process of settling land claims in the Territory greater progress has been made in other districts than in the Marshall Islands District. This situation results from greater availability of land in these other areas than in the Marshalls. Recently, however, agreement has been reached within the United States Government on general terms under which compensation in the Marshalls and elsewhere will be possible. Administrative arrangements are now being worked out pursuant to this agreement in order to permit early satisfaction of the claims. It should be recalled, however, that both the Bikini and Eniwetok people have been relocated on other land that has been deeded to them and have been given considerable assistance in their resettlement and readjustment.

The Administering Authority deeply appreciates the friendly sentiments towards the United States expressed by the petitioners, all of them members of the Marshallese Congress. The Administering Authority hopes that, despite the hard decision that the United States Government has felt obliged to make, the other measures described will reassure them that the Administering Authority is exercising its trust with the highest possible sense of responsibility, conditioned only by its broader responsibility for world peace and security.

#### **PETITION FROM MARSHALLESE CONGRESS HOLD-OVER COMMITTEE<sup>6</sup>**

#### **Letter From Sir John Macpherson<sup>7</sup> to U.N. Secretary-General**

*Majuro, 11 March 1956*

In accordance with rule 84 paragraph 1 of the rules of procedure of the Trusteeship Council, I have the honour to transmit to you a communication dated 9 March 1956 from the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee which was received by the Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in the Pacific.

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. T/PET. 10/29 dated Mar. 20.

<sup>7</sup> Chairman of U.N. Visiting Mission.

A copy of this communication has been transmitted to the Acting High Commissioner of the Trust Territory.

In transmitting the present communication to the Secretary-General, the Mission wishes to record the circumstances in which it was received.

On 8 March 1956, the Mission held a meeting at Majuro with the members of the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee in the course of which a wide range of matters came under discussion. The Committee stated that the people of the Marshall Islands had been informed officially that further nuclear tests would take place in the near future in the Trust Territory. The Committee wished to go on record before the Visiting Mission that they reiterated the position they had taken when they presented their petition in April 1954, namely: (a) that nuclear explosion tests in the Marshalls be discontinued; (b) that if these experiments were absolutely necessary for the eventual well-being of all the people of the world and could not take place elsewhere, all measures enumerated in their petition (T/PET. 10/28) should be taken.

On the following day the Mission held a private meeting of its own to discuss several matters. During this meeting, doubts were expressed as to whether it was the intention of the Hold-Over Committee that their statement should be brought to the attention of the Trusteeship Council prior to the completion of the Visiting Mission's report. In order to clarify the situation, the Mission called in a representative of the Hold-Over Committee who stated that the Committee wished to have its views brought to the immediate attention of the Trusteeship Council and was prepared to put them in writing. On 10 March the Mission received the present communication.

The Mission also desires to record that during a discussion with him, the Acting High Commissioner informed the Mission that all possible precautions were being taken to ensure the safety and the well-being of the people in the vicinity of the test area.

It is requested that the present letter be transmitted to the members of the Trusteeship Council at the same time as the attached communication.

JOHN MACPHERSON

### **Text of Petition**

*March 9th, 1956*

To: The United Nations Visiting Mission  
From: The Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee  
Subject: Re-iteration of the Marshallese people's petition to the United Nations, dated April 20th, 1954, regarding the explosion of lethal weapons within our home islands.

In view of the official announcement to the Marshallese people of the coming nuclear test in this area in the not too distant future, we, the members of the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee and other interested leaders of our people re-iterate our petition of April 20th, 1954, which dealt with the explosion of lethal weapons within our home islands.

Our petition emphatically stated that:

1. All the experiments with lethal weapons within this area be immediately ceased.

2. If the experiments with said weapons should be judged absolutely necessary for the eventual well being of all the people of this world and cannot be stopped or changed to other areas due to the unavailability of other locations, we then submit the following suggestions:

(a) All possible precautionary measures be taken before such weapons are exploded. All human beings and their valuable possessions be transported to safe distances first, before such explosions occur.

(b) All the people living in this area be instructed in safety measures. The people of Rongelab would have avoided much danger if they had known not to drink the waters on their home island after the radio-active dusts had settled on them.

(c) Adequate funds be set aside to pay for the possessions of the people in case they will have to be moved from their homes. This will include lands, houses and whatever possessions they cannot take with them, so that the unsatisfactory arrangements for the Bikinians and Enewetak people shall not be repeated.

(d) Courses be taught to Marshallese Medical Practitioners and Health-Aides which will be useful in the detecting of and the circumventing of preventable dangers.

Our request Number 1 was not heeded, another test will soon be made. Request Number 2, to some degree, has been taken care of to the satisfaction of the Marshallese people. The Rongelab people are well subsisted and housed, and the medical care rendered them is excellent, yet, they are still on the small island of Ejit: but together with the Administering Authority, the responsible Rongelab leaders, and other Marshallese realize that long living in an abnormal existence is detrimental to their society. They were told that they will soon be going back to their home island, Rongelab, and with them, the other Marshallese are looking forward to the fulfillment of this promise.

Bikini and Enewetak, like all the other land claims in the Marshall Islands, have not been compensated for, or returned to the owners. We should like to repeat here that, "Land means a great deal to the Marshallese. It means more than just a place where you can plant your food crops and build your houses; or a place where you can bury your dead. It is the very life of the people. Take away their land and their spirits go also."

Therefore, we, the members of the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee, who are empowered by the Marshallese Congress to act in its name when it is not in session and which is in turn a group of members representing all the municipalities in the Marshalls, due to the undiminishing threat to our life, liberty, happiness and possession of land, do hereby submit this document to the United Nations Visiting Mission with the request that they send this on to the United Nations Trusteeship Council as soon as possible, which with its knowledge of our great concern may then act on our urgent plea and take all steps within its power to help remedy the situation.

In closing, we, the members of the Marshallese Congress Hold-Over Committee want to make it very clear to

the United Nations Visiting Mission that this should not be interpreted as a reflection of the Trust Territory Government's deliberate ill-treatment of the Marshallese people or be misconstrued as a repudiation of the United States as our governing agency for the United Nations under the trusteeship Agreement, for aside from repeating our plea to have the nuclear tests within our home islands stopped as we are fearful of the danger these lethal weapons can and have inflicted on people living in the Marshalls, and the deep concern we have for the number of people who have been dispossessed of land, we have found the Administering Authority the most agreeable one we ever had.

Respectfully submitted,

- |                         |                            |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| 1. KABUA KABUA          | 7. HENRY SAMUEL            |
| 2. ATLAN ANIEN (absent) | 8. JIBLOCK                 |
| 3. DWIGHT HEINE         | 9. AISEIA DAVID            |
| 4. ROBERT REIMERS       | 10. AMATA KABUA            |
| 5. C. DOMINICK          | 11. LAZARUS SIMON (absent) |
| 6. NAMU ERMIS (absent)  | 12. LAJIBILI (absent)      |

## Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

### Security Council

- Letter Dated 21 January 1956 from the Minister of External Affairs of the Sudan Addressed to the Secretary-General Concerning the Application of the Sudan for Admission to Membership in the United Nations and Declaration Accepting Obligations Under the Charter. S/3543, January 30, 1954. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Letter Dated 10 February 1956 from the Representative of Saudi Arabia Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3548, February 10, 1956. 2 pp. mimeo.
- Letter Dated 6 March 1956 from the Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3554, March 7, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo.

### General Assembly

- UNREF Executive Committee. Revised Plan of Operations (1956) (Submitted by the High Commissioner). A/AC.79/21, November 28, 1955. 131 pp. mimeo.
- Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Indian Ocean Territories. A/3107, December 22, 1955. 90 pp. mimeo.
- Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Asian Territories [Brunei, Federation of Malaya, Hong Kong, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore.] A/3108, February 15, 1956. 138 pp. mimeo.
- Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Central African Territories [Belgian Congo, French Equatorial Africa, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland]. A/3109, January 16, 1956. 132 pp. mimeo.
- Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. East African Territories [British Somaliland, French Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar]. A/3110, February 1, 1956. 109 pp. mimeo.
- Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Sum-

- mary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. West African Territories [French West Africa, Gambia, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone]. A/3113, January 23, 1956. 149 pp. mimeo.
- Information From Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Other Territories [Aden, Cyprus, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Saint Helena]. A/3114, February 8, 1956. 90 pp. mimeo.
- Application of the Sudan For Admission to Membership in the United Nations. Letters dated 21 and 12 January 1956 from the Minister of External Affairs of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-General. A/3117, January 31, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo.

### Economic and Social Council

- Rural Electrification. Propaganda (sales promotion) methods at present applied in the various countries. E/ECE/219, E/ECE/EP/177, November 1955. 48 pp. mimeo.
- Forced Labour. Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Labour Office. E/2S15, December 15, 1955. 356 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Information Concerning the Status of Women in Trust Territories (Report by the Secretary-General). E/CN.6/273, January 10, 1956. 20 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The Proposed Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (The International Drug Convention). Views of Governments on (i) the procedure for amending the Single Convention, and (ii) the question of reservations. E/CN.7/308, January 17, 1956. 20 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Status of Women in Family Law. Report of the Secretary-General based on replies from Governments to Part III of the Questionnaire on the Legal Status and Treatment of Women. E/CN.6/185/Add. 15, January 19, 1956. 27 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Technical Assistance: Summary of Selected Projects Affecting the Status of Women and Selected List of Materials. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/274, January 24, 1956. 63 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Opportunities for Women in Handicrafts and Cottage Industries. Progress Report prepared by the International Labour Office. E/CN.6/282, January 26, 1956. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Report of the Eighth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on Human Rights. New York, 3 to 20 January 1956. E/CN.4/721, E/CN.4/Sub.2/177, January 31, 1956. 71 pp. mimeo.
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- Statistical Commission. General Conclusions Concerning Statistical Aspects of International Definition and Measurement of Levels of Living (Memorandum prepared by the Secretary-General). E/CN.3/214, February 2, 1956. 19 pp. mimeo.
- Statistical Commission. Observations Made by a Study Group on Measurement of Levels of Health, in Connection with International Definition and Measurement of Standards and Levels of Living (Summary account prepared by the World Health Organization). E/CN.3/213/Add. 4, February 7, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo.

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Statistical Commission. Statistics of the Distribution of Income (Memorandum prepared by the Secretary-General). E/CN.3/208, February 10, 1956. 50 pp. mimeo.

Slavery. Draft Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery: Report of the Committee Appointed by Resolution 564 (XIX). New York, 16 January to 6 February 1956. E/2824, February 15, 1956. 76 pp. mimeo.

International Co-operation with respect to Water Resource Development. Report by the Secretary-General. E/2827, February 23, 1956. 43 pp. mimeo.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Bills of Lading

International convention for unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading, and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 1931. 51 Stat. 233.  
*Accession deposited:* Turkey, July 4, 1955.

##### Cultural Property

Convention for protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratifications deposited:* San Marino, February 9, 1956; Burma, February 10, 1956.

Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratifications deposited:* San Marino, February 9, 1956; Burma, February 10, 1956.

##### Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.<sup>2</sup>  
*Ratification deposited:* Burma, March 14, 1956.

#### BILATERAL

##### Chile

Agreement providing an interim arrangement for certain transactions pending the entry into force of the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of March 13, 1956. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago March 20 and 26, 1956. Entered into force March 26, 1956.

##### China

Agreement regarding passport visas and visa fees. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei December 20, 1955, and February 20, 1956. Entered into force February 20, 1956.

##### Colombia

Agreement providing for disposition of equipment and materials furnished by the United States under the military assistance agreement of April 17, 1952 (TIAS 2496), and no longer required by Colombia. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá February 22 and March 14, 1956. Entered into force March 14, 1956.

##### France

Agreement relating to the grant of plots of land located in France for the creation of permanent military cemeteries or the construction of war memorials, with annexes. Signed at Paris March 19, 1956. Entered into force March 19, 1956.

##### Uruguay

General agreement for a program of technical cooperation. Signed at Montevideo March 23, 1956. Will enter into force on date Uruguay notifies the United States of its ratification.

##### Viet-Nam

Agreement providing for direct forces support pursuant to economic cooperation agreement of September 7, 1951 (TIAS 2346). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon February 21 and March 7, 1955. Entered into force March 7, 1955.

Agreement relating to the disposition of equipment and materials furnished by the United States found surplus to the needs of the Vietnamese armed forces. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 1 and May 10, 1955. Entered into force May 10, 1955.

## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

### First Career Ambassadors Sworn In

In simultaneous ceremonies at Washington, The Hague, and Rio de Janeiro, the United States' first four Career Ambassadors took the oath of office on April 9. They are: James Clement Dunn, Ambassador to Brazil; Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration; H. Freeman Matthews, Ambassador to the Netherlands; and Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State. All four are veteran career Foreign Service officers. (For biographic details, see press release 181 dated April 9.)

The class of career ambassador was created by Public Law 250, 84th Congress. Under the terms of the law, nominees for appointment to the class must have had at least 15 years of Government service in a position of responsibility, including at least 3 years as a career minister, and must have rendered exceptionally distinguished service to the Government.

### Confirmations

The Senate on April 12 confirmed Lowell C. Pinkerton to be Ambassador to the Sudan.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.



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193	4/12	U.S.-Spanish communique.
194	4/12	Negotiations under GATT.
195	4/13	Pan American Day and Week.
196	4/13	Visit of Brazilian Vice President.
*197	4/13	Holland: "The Soviet Policy of Peaceful Coexistence."

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# The Department of State

. XXXIV, No. 879

April 30, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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# Our Quest for Peace and Freedom

*Address by President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>*

Three years ago, when I last talked to you, stories from battlefields and fighting fronts crowded the front pages of our press. Human freedom was under direct assault in important sectors by the disciples of communistic dictatorship. Violence and aggression were brutal daily facts for millions of human beings. Fear of global war, of a nuclear holocaust, darkened the future. To many, the chance for a just and enduring peace seemed hopeless.

Today, only 3 years later, we have reason for cautious hope that a new, a fruitful, a peaceful era for mankind can emerge from a haunted decade. The world breathes a little more easily today.

The prudent man will not delude himself that his hope for peace guarantees the realization of peace. Even with genuine good will, time and effort will be needed to correct the injustices, to cure the dangerous sores that plague the earth today. And the future alone can show whether the Communists really want to move toward a just and stable peace.

Yet not for many years has there been such promise that patient, imaginative, enterprising effort could gradually be rewarded in steady decrease in the dread of war; in an economic surge that will raise the living standards of all the world; in growing confidence that liberty and justice will one day overcome statism; in the better understanding among all peoples that is the essential prelude to true peace.

This week marks the anniversary of one of the most important events in freedom's progress.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and broadcast over radio and television at Washington, D. C., on Apr. 21 (White House press release).

One hundred eighty-one years ago on April 19th, our forefathers started a revolution that still goes on. The shots at Concord, as Emerson wrote, were heard "round the world."

The echoes of Concord still stir men's minds.

The Bandung meeting, last year, of Asian and African leaders bears witness to Emerson's vision. There, almost two centuries after Concord, and halfway round the earth, President Sukarno of Indonesia opened the conference with an eloquent tribute to Paul Revere and to the spirit of the American Revolution.

Why do the musket shots of a few embattled farmers at the Concord bridge still ring out in far-off lands?

The reason is clear.

Concord was far more than a local uprising to redress immediate grievances. The enduring meaning of Concord lies in the ideas that inspired the historic stand there. Concord is the symbol of certain basic convictions about the relationship of man to the state.

Those convictions were founded in a firm belief in the spiritual worth of the individual. He must be free to think, to speak, and to worship according to his conscience. He must enjoy equality before the law. He must have a fair chance to develop and use his talents. The purpose of government is to serve its citizens in freedom.

Our forefathers did not claim to have discovered novel principles. They looked on their findings as universal values, the common property of all mankind.

These deep convictions have always guided us as a Nation. They have taken deep root elsewhere in the Western World. In the 19th century they inspired a great surge of freedom through-

out Western Europe and in our own hemisphere.

These ideas of freedom are still the truly revolutionary political principles abroad in the world. They appeal to the timeless aspirations of mankind. In some regions they flourish; in some they are officially outlawed. But everywhere, to some degree, they stir and inspire humanity.

The affairs of men do not stand still. The ideas of freedom will grow in vigor and influence—or they will gradually wither and die. If the area of freedom shrinks, the results for us will be tragic. Only if freedom continues to flourish will man realize the prosperity, the happiness, the enduring peace he seeks.

### **Newly Independent Nations**

The appeal of the ideas of freedom has been shown dramatically during the past decade. In that time, 18 nations, totaling some 650 million people—a quarter of the human race—have gained independence.

In manifold ways these nations differ widely from each other and from us. They are the heirs of many ancient cultures and national traditions. All of the great religions of the world are found among them. Their peoples speak in a hundred tongues.

Yet they share in common with all free countries the basic and universal values that inspired our Nation's founders.

They believe deeply in the right of self-government.

They believe deeply in the dignity of man.

They aspire to improve the welfare of the individual, as a basic aim of organized society.

The new nations have many of the sensitivities that marked our own early years as a free Nation. They are proud of their independence and quick to resent any slight to their sovereignty. Some of them are concerned to avoid involvements with other nations, as we were for many years.

Certainly we Americans should understand and respect these points of view. We must accept the right of each nation to choose its own path to the future.

All of these countries are faced with immense obstacles and difficulties. Freedom and human dignity must rest upon a satisfactory economic base. Yet in many of these new nations, incomes average less than \$100 per year. Abject poverty blinds men's eyes to the beauty of freedom's ideals.

Hopelessness makes men prey to any promise of a better existence, even the most false and spurious.

Ofttimes the peoples of these countries expected independence itself to produce rapid material progress. Their political leaders are therefore under heavy pressure to find shortcuts and quick answers to the problems facing them.

Under these conditions, we cannot expect that the vision of a free society will go unchallenged. The Communists, aware of unsatisfied desires for better conditions of life, falsely pretend they can rapidly solve the problems of economic development and industrialization. They hold up the Soviet Union as a model and a guide. But the Communists conceal the terrible human costs that characterize their ruthless system of dictatorship and forced labor.

We have a vital interest in assuring that newly independent nations preserve and consolidate the free institutions of their choice.

The prospects for peace are brightest when enlightened self-governing peoples control the policy of nations. Peoples do not want war. Rulers beyond the reach of popular control are more likely to engage in reckless adventures and to raise the grim threat of war. The spread of freedom enhances the prospect for durable peace.

That prospect would be dimmed or destroyed should freedom be forced into steady retreat. Then the remaining free societies, our own among them, would one day find themselves beleaguered and imperiled. We would face once again the dread prospect of paying dearly in blood for our own survival.

In every corner of the globe, it is far less costly to sustain freedom than to recover it when lost.

Moreover, our own well-being is bound up in the well-being of other free nations. We cannot prosper in peace if we are isolated from the rest of the world. If our economy is to continue to flourish and grow, our Nation will need more trade, not less. The steady growth of other nations, especially the less developed countries, will create new and growing demands for goods and services. It will produce an environment which will benefit both them and us.

Indeed, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Seattle—every American town and farm—has a stake in the success or failure of these new nations—a stake almost impossible to exaggerate.

If these new nations are to achieve economic progress with freedom, they will have to provide

many of the necessary ingredients for themselves.

Only these peoples and their leaders can supply the initiative and determination essential for success. And they must mobilize the larger part of the resources they require.

But these nations are gravely lacking in trained men for management, production, education, and the professions. Their institutions for such training are limited. Hence they are handicapped in trying to extend modern techniques to agriculture, industry, and other fields.

They also face shortages of capital and foreign exchange, even though they strain to mobilize their own resources. Private foreign investment should be utilized as much as feasible; but, for many areas, it will clearly fall far short of the requirements. Moreover, their task of improving conditions of life is made the more difficult by their large and steadily increasing populations.

Inevitably these nations must look abroad for assistance, as ours did for so many years. They want help, first of all, in real and enduring friendship. They want help in training skilled people and in securing investment capital to supplement their own resources. For such help they will look to us as the most prosperous and advanced economy of the world.

Foresight will compel an understanding response from us. In our own enlightened interest we can and must do much to help others in pursuit of their legitimate aspirations.

Further, we must recognize that economic and technical assistance cannot be a transitory policy. The problems of economic progress are not to be solved in a single spurt. Our efforts must be sustained over a number of years.

To do the most good, some part of our material help will have to be furnished on a long-term basis which these nations can plan on. For some purposes, commitments on a strictly annual basis are not sufficient. It takes time to complete major projects like hydroelectric and reclamation developments. If the new nations can plan on some part of our help for several years, they will be better able to mobilize resources of their own and assistance from others.

Furthermore, our assistance must be used flexibly to fit needs and plans as they develop. We must be ready to adapt our help promptly to meet changing conditions.

The development program for mutual security now before the Congress is based on these consid-

erations. It seeks from the Congress the additional authority that would add essential flexibility and continuity to a part—a modest part—of the program. The amounts requested are the practicable minimum. In its entirety it is not, I assure you, an excessive program. It is in our national interest, in the fullest sense of that term.

#### **“Collective” Dictatorship in U.S.S.R.**

The ideas of freedom are at work, even where they are officially rejected. As we know, Lenin and his successors, true to Communist doctrine, based the Soviet State on the denial of these ideas. Yet the new Soviet rulers who took over 3 years ago have had to reckon with the force of these ideas, both at home and abroad.

The situation the new regime inherited from the dead Stalin apparently caused it to reappraise many of his mistakes.

Having lived under his one-man rule, they have espoused the concept of “collective” dictatorship. But dictatorship it still remains. They have denounced Stalin for some of the more flagrant excesses of his brutal rule. But the individual citizen still lacks the most elementary safeguards of a free society. The desire for a better life is still being sacrificed to the insatiable demands of the state.

In foreign affairs, the new regime has seemingly moderated the policy of violence and hostility which has caused the free nations to band together to defend their independence and liberties. For the present, at least, it relies more on political and economic means to spread its influence abroad. In the last year, it has embarked upon a campaign of lending and trade agreements directed especially toward the newly developing countries.

It is still too early to assess in any final way whether the Soviet regime wishes to provide a real basis for stable and enduring relations.

Despite the changes so far, much of Stalin's foreign policy remains unchanged. The major international issues which have troubled the post-war world are still unsolved. More basic changes in Soviet policy will have to take place before the free nations can afford to relax their vigilance.

#### **Guidelines for Future**

At Concord, our forebears undertook the struggle for freedom in this country. History has now called us to special tasks for sustaining and advancing this great cause in the world.

As we take stock of our position and of the problems that lie ahead, we must chart our course by three main guidelines:

*First: We must maintain a collective shield against aggression to allow the free peoples to seek their valued goals in safety.*

We can take some cautious comfort in the signs that the Soviet rulers may have relegated military aggression to the background and adopted less violent methods to promote their aims. Nevertheless, Soviet military power continues to grow. Their forces are being rapidly modernized and equipped with nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems.

So long as freedom is threatened and armaments are not controlled, it is essential for us to keep a strong military establishment ourselves and strengthen the bonds of collective security.

Without help from us, many of our allies could not afford to equip and maintain the forces needed for self-defense. Assistance to them is part of our proper contribution to the systems of common defense. If those systems did not exist, we would have to bear much greater costs ourselves. Thus, in aiding our allies the mutual security program also advances our own security interests.

We hold our military strength only to guard against aggression and to insure that the world remains at peace. War in our time has become an anachronism. Whatever the case in the past, war in the future can serve no useful purpose. A war which became general, as any limited action might, could only result in the virtual destruction of mankind.

Hence our search must be unceasing for a system to regulate and reduce armaments under reliable safeguards. So far, the Soviet Union has refused to accept such safeguards. But even now we are earnestly negotiating toward this end. The problems involved are difficult and complex. We cannot afford to underestimate them. But we cannot slacken our efforts to lift the burden of armaments and to remove their threat.

If effective measures of disarmament could be agreed upon, think how the world could be transformed! Atomic energy used for peace—not war—could bring about the development of a new industrial age. Far more human energy and output could be devoted to reducing poverty and need. To that end, as I said to you 3 years ago, we would “join with all nations in devoting a substantial

percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction.”

Of even more importance, the pall of mutual suspicions, fear, and hatred that covers the earth would be swept away in favor of confidence, prosperity, and human happiness.

*Our second guideline: Within the free community, we must be a helpful and considerate partner in creating conditions where freedom will flourish.*

Beyond defense, the crucial task of the free nations is to work together in constructive ways to advance the welfare of their peoples. Arms alone can give the world no permanent peace, no confident security. Arms are solely for defense—to protect from violent assault what we already have. They are only a costly insurance. They cannot add to human progress. Indeed, no matter how massive, arms by themselves would not prevent vital sections of the world from falling prey to Communist blandishment or subversion.

If we are to preserve freedom here, it must likewise thrive in other important areas of the earth. For the welfare of ourselves and others, we must, therefore, help the rest of the free world achieve its aspirations. For our mutual benefit, we must join in building for greater future prosperity, for more human liberty, and for lasting peace.

Within the Atlantic community, our aim must be to strengthen the close bonds which have steadily developed since the war. On Monday next the Secretary of State will speak on this topic.

In the less developed nations, the urgent need is for economic and social progress for their peoples. Tonight I have spoken particularly about the newer nations of Asia and Africa which face such urgent problems. Of equal importance is continuing progress in other areas, especially by our neighbors in Latin America, who are our fast friends. These developing nations need the full measure of our help in understanding and resources.

The steady progress of the free world also depends on the healthy flow of peaceful trade. Our example will be of crucial importance in freeing the channels of such trade from wasteful restraints. We can take an important step to that end by joining the Organization for Trade Cooperation. Our national interest will be served by passage of the legislation for that purpose now pending in the Congress.



Another important task is in helping to resolve disputes between friends we value highly. Such disputes impair the unity of the free nations and impede their advance. In these situations, each side would like the United States to back its point of view without reservation. But for us to do so could seldom contribute to the settling of the disputes. It would only sharpen the bitter enmities between the opposing sides and impair our value in helping to reach a fair solution.

Our aim and effort must be to assist in tempering the fears and antagonisms which lead to such disputes.

My words apply with special force to the troubled area of the Middle East. We will do all in our power—through the United Nations whenever possible—to prevent resort to violence there. We are determined to support and assist any nation in that area which might be subjected to aggression. We will strive untiringly to build the foundations for stable peace in the whole region.

In these and many other constructive ways, our Nation must help to build an environment congenial to freedom.

*Our third guideline is this: We must seek, by every peaceful means, to induce the Soviet bloc to correct existing injustices and genuinely to pursue peaceful purposes in its relations with other nations.*

As I have said, many of the wrongs of Stalin against other nations still prevail under his successors. Despite the efforts of the West at Berlin and Geneva, Germany is still divided by the Soviet veto of free all-German elections. The satellite nations of Eastern Europe are still ruled by Soviet puppets. In Asia, Korea remains divided and stable peace has not yet been achieved.

We must be tireless in our efforts to remedy these injustices and to resolve the disputes that divide the world. These knotty problems will yield to patient and sincere effort. We stand ready to explore all avenues for their just settlement. We will not grow weary in our quest for peaceful remedies for the enslavement or wrongful division of once-free nations.

The interests and purposes of the United States and of the free world do not conflict with the legitimate interests of the Russian nation or the aspirations of its people. A Soviet government genuinely devoted to these purposes can have friendly relations with the United States and the

free world for the asking. We will welcome that day.

#### **Need for Devoted Effort**

We cannot doubt that the current of world history flows toward freedom. In the long run dictatorship and despotism must give way. We can take courage from that sure knowledge.

But as a wise American, Mr. Justice Holmes, once said: "The inevitable comes to pass through effort." We should take these words to heart in our quest for peace and freedom. These great aspirations of humanity will be brought about—but only by devoted human effort.

Concord is a symbol of the faith, courage, and sacrifice on which the victory of freedom depends. We in our day must strive with the same dedication that brought the militiamen to the Concord bridge. If we do so, freedom will surely prevail.

[After the President went off the air, he spoke to the society as follows:]

To give you my feeling about what I would like to say now, I will tell you a story of when I was a young lieutenant in a regiment on the Mexican border. There was not a great deal to do in those days, and some people indulged in acquaintanceship with John Barleycorn more than they should.

One morning a couple of us young second lieutenants were up as usual long before the captains were, and we were standing by one captain's tent as he got his feet out of the bunk. He was sitting there on the edge of it with his head in his hands, and he says: "I am nothing but a mountain goat. All I do is jump from jag to jag."

Now any man who through 35 minutes or 30 minutes has been trying to hit the high spots of the world today, and America's position in the international situation, certainly feels that he has been jumping from jag to jag on the mountain tops.

So I wanted rather to come off the summit of those high spots and talk with you for just a few minutes about some of the very great intricacies in this problem that we call developing foreign policies and in implementing them throughout the world.

Now I think there is no use explaining the cold war. We all have pretty clear ideas of what is going on. But one thing that we do worry about is: Who is winning and who is losing?

Well, I don't think anybody knows, because the situation differs in every single corner of the

globe. I have heard many people at home here say that we are losing the cold war every day. Others take exactly the opposite view, and these more hopeful ones can point to some facts rather than merely allegations about our prestige abroad, or how many friends do we have, and that sort of thing.

### **Change in Soviet Policy**

For example, why was there such a sudden change in the Soviet policy? They are out—their basic aim is to conquer the world—through world revolution if possible, but in any way. Their doctrine—anyone that has read any of their books knows that their doctrine is lies, deceit, subversion, war if necessary, but in any way: conquer the world. And that has not changed.

But they changed their policies very markedly. They were depending on force and the threat of force only. And suddenly they have gone into an entirely different attitude. They are going into the economic and political fields and are really wearing smiles around the world instead of some of the bitter faces to which we have become accustomed.

Now any time a policy is winning and the people are completely satisfied with it, you don't change. If you change policies that markedly, you destroy old idols, as they have been busy doing. You do it only when you think a great change is necessary. So I think we can take some comfort; at least we can give careful consideration to the very fact they had to change their policies.

And I think the whole free world is trying to test and determine the sincerity of that plan, in order that the free nations themselves, in pursuing their own policies, will make certain that they are not surprised in any place.

But from the Communists—we look at some of the advances we think they have made, but let us remember: They did not conquer Korea, which they announced they were going to do. They were stopped finally in the northern part of Vietnam, and Diem, the leader of the southern Vietnam, the southern Vietnamese, is doing splendidly and a much better figure in that field than anyone even dared to hope.

The Iranian situation, which only a few short years ago looked so desperate that each morning we thought we would wake up and read in our newspapers that Mossadegh had let them under

the Iron Curtain, has not become satisfactory, but that crisis has passed and it is much better.

The difficulty in Egypt between our British friends and our Egyptian friends over the big base was finally settled.

The Trieste problem, which had plagued the world for many years, if not an ideal solution, has had a practical solution.

The first bridgehead that communism had succeeded, or practically succeeded, in establishing in our hemisphere has been thrown out.

These are cold-war victories, because the purposes of the Russians were defeated.

Now they have attempted to go into economic fields, and here their unity of action, brought about by the fact they are a single government, is creating new problems.

### **Free-World Economic Problems**

A group of free nations can stay together fairly easily when you have got a definite threat to their very existence right in their faces. As long as the Germans, for example, were powerful and aggressive in Europe in the Second World War, there was no great trouble in keeping the other nations pretty well together in policy and in action. But when those are lifted and you go into the economic field, each of us—each country—has its own economic problems of itself; now it becomes very difficult for a group of free nations through spontaneous cooperation to achieve a unity to oppose the other man.

Let me take one example, just to show you how these things work out. Let us take Japan. There is no one in this room that needs a blueprint of how important it is to us that Japan stay outside the Iron Curtain. A nation of 90 million industrious and inventive people, tied in with Communist China and with the Soviets, would indeed pose a threat to us that would be very grave indeed.

Japan is 90 million people living on fewer arable acres than there are in the State of California. How are they going to live? Well, they have got to trade. They have got to deal with other people outside. We won't trade with them. Every day—well, if not every day, every week—there come to government, including to my desk, pleas for greater protection against Japanese goods.

Now this is not wholly one-sided, because some

of our citizens have found out that last year—I think my figures are correct—while we were buying 60 million dollars' worth of cotton textile goods from Japan, they bought 120 million dollars' worth of our cotton. So even that problem is not clear in exactly what you should do.

But anyway, we won't trade with them, so they can't make a living with us except on a minor scale. But we get tired, properly—we can't be trying to sustain any other nation just with our money. So we don't just give them the millions by which they can go and buy all the things they need abroad.

But the next thing we come up against: We are very certain in our own minds that some of these nations—not all the United States people, but some of them, are very loud in their denunciation of any country that trades with the Communist countries. So the Japanese can't trade with their natural markets, with Manchuria and China. So finally all of those southeastern markets, all the southeastern Asian markets, have been largely destroyed; they are so poor they can't support Japan.

So what does Japan do? Where are we chasing her? Chasing her to one place. She has to look less and less to us and more to her mainland next to her. She has to, now, begin to look rather longingly unless something is done. Now that is the kind of cross-purpose that comes up, and this goes on around the world. Britain and France and Germany, indeed every country with which we deal has some problem different economically from our own.

So we have a real job in trying to get agreed policies among the free nations and then to implement them.

### **Need for Information**

And I come, then, to the real purpose for asking you people to listen to me for a few minutes more after my rather long, prepared address.

It is this: Our Nation is called to leadership—and I am not going to argue the point, I know you all understand—leadership in the world, to lead it toward freedom, to keep expanding our areas of freedom and not allow the Communist cloud to engulf us little by little.

Now when a nation leads, it is not enough that even an entire government, legislative and executive, should see this problem as one. That doesn't make it a truly national policy in anything that is

as long-term, as vital, as is required in national leadership of the whole world. Every citizen has a job that he cannot delegate. He cannot delegate it to the most powerful and the most influential political leaders. He must take his part in getting himself informed.

What I want to say is this: There is nothing more important in the world today than that America—167 million Americans—shall be informed on the basic facts in this whole struggle.

We ought to get it as far away from demagoguery, from political partisanship, from every extraneous influence that we possibly can. Just get the naked truth to these people with interpretation through editorial pages, and so on, to let them see the relation of one fact to another.

There are no easy panaceas. You can't say, "We simply won't trade with the Communist nations"—make that work for all of us. In fact, to make such a statement is, to my mind, giving up one of the great strengths for which the Yankee has always been noted—he is a good trader.

In that kind of trade, who gets the best of it?

We should think of those things and not try to pull out any slogan, any single idea, that will meet this situation. All that is necessary is to get the facts to the American people.

The other is to get, so far as we possibly can, the facts of America's purposes—her intentions, her disinterested motives, her lack of ambition for other territory and increased domination—to the world. We must get it out to the world.

This is difficult because all over the world we don't have you people. We don't have American newspapers. Some of our wire services reach part way, but very inadequately. The United States Information Service is merely to help. It would be far better did we not have to depend on it at all. It should even itself depend on private media wherever it can reach them in other countries.

This information should go out abroad, just as at home, through the processes of a free people so far as possible, and government should only support that effort.

One more point, and I am finished.

The world changes, and in these days it changes rapidly. A policy that was good 6 months ago is not necessarily now of any validity. It is necessary that we find better, more effective ways of keeping ourselves in tune with the world's needs

and helping to educate the world to know that it itself—each nation—must do the major part of the job. Any outsider can merely be helpful, can give moral and some little physical support—material support.

But the sums that we put out are a bagatelle compared to what is needed and what these people, most of them impoverished, must provide for themselves if the whole free world is to advance.

Now there are different kinds of means, one of which, I should think, would be getting together and keeping a sort of rotating advisory body of citizens, who are not burdened with the general

and never-ending cares of office, to devote their brains to the job in partnership with government. We must constantly keep “up to snuff” because if we don’t we are bound to lose. We must be ahead of the problem. We must see its major parts. We must get its critical factors set up so that we understand them thoroughly in simple fashion, and then we must pursue a common course vigorously, persistently, and with readiness to make whatever sacrifices may be demanded.

And then, I say, we will be worthy of the farmers of Concord.

## Developing NATO in Peace

*Address by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

I feel honored to speak before this important gathering of our free press. We share a great responsibility. I believe that the public should be as fully informed as possible about what we are doing in the State Department and what our foreign policy is. Under our form of government the effectiveness of our Nation’s foreign policy depends in large measure upon public understanding and support. And our free society would indeed be in trouble without the diligent reporting and alert appraisal of world events that you make possible.

We are at a point in time when important events occurring in rapid succession change the scene in Europe, in the Near East, in Asia, and in Russia. It seems that this second postwar decade upon which we have entered will mark a new phase in the struggle between the forces of despotism and the forces of freedom.

The first postwar decade was marked by two sharply contrasting trends. In those parts of the world where the West had been politically dominant, freedom flourished and independence spread. Over 650 million people who were non-self-governing in 1945 have now become 18 independent and sovereign nations.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the annual luncheon of the Associated Press at New York, N. Y., on April 23 (press release 210).

On the other hand, during that decade the Soviet type of Communist despotism, which in 1945 ruled only 200 million people, aggressively extended its rule to an additional 700 million people belonging to what had been 13 independent nations.

Inevitably these opposing trends to freedom and to despotism led to a sharp cleavage of the world. In response to the Soviet policies of violent expansion, the free nations drew close together. They submerged any differences of their own in the face of the threat of open aggression from without. Since they could not depend on the United Nations Security Council, because of Soviet veto power, they created their own collective security associations. Forty-five free-world nations joined with others for collective defense.

These arrangements, backed by United States mobile striking power, have constituted a great deterrent to the open use of violence.

Also, the free peoples built moral bulwarks. They unitedly condemned the violent and intolerant practices of Soviet communism and made manifest their repugnance of Soviet despotism and its tactics. They subjected the Soviet and Chinese Communists to a kind of moral, social, and—to some extent—economic ostracism.

By such measures the free world found the

ways to halt the Soviets in their hot pursuit of the free nations one by one.

But the policies of the free world were never designed to be purely defensive. Freedom is inherently dynamic and expansive. We renounce the use of force and violence to promote freedom. But we have sought in manifold other ways that Russia should be governed in accordance with civilized standards.

We reject the idea that we are dedicated to perpetual hatred of Russia. What we hate is the evil that Russia's rulers do. The arbitrary despotism of a police state, governmental intolerance and enforced conformity, the enslavement of people for the magnification of the state, the use of violence and the threat of violence in international relations, the use of fraud and trickery to corrupt and overthrow free governments—these are the things which we abhor and against which we stand. But United States foreign policy is not merely negative. We seek, above all, to advance the inevitable day when the historic friendship between the Russian and American peoples can again be fully manifested. Therefore, we take deep satisfaction from the fact that we can today see within Russia some signs of light which could mark the dawning of that new day.

#### **Soviet "New Look"**

The Soviet rulers who have replaced Stalin seem to have concluded that the time had come to present a "new look" at home and abroad.

In much of the world the Soviet rulers now seek to present an aspect of conciliation. They talk softly of "peaceful coexistence" and often gear their diplomatic activity to economic "aid"—so-called—rather than to threats of violence.

Within the Soviet Union there is a change which is even more significant because, while Soviet foreign policy is readily reversible, it is not so easy to erase the consequences of internal liberalization.

Stalin, the brutal demigod, has been dethroned. "Collective leadership" now replaces one-man despotism. Violence is no longer preached as the only way. The sway of the secret police has, it seems, been curtailed. There is greater tolerance of independent thinking, and even the heresy of "Titoism" has been made respectable. There is an obvious effort to give individuals a sense of greater freedom and security and to respect the demands inherent in the higher and broader education of many of the Russian people.

Vicious doctrinal works such as Stalin's *Short History of the Communist Party* have been withdrawn from circulation, and the fate of Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* remains in doubt. Those are the two works which for the last 20 years have been the "bible" of Soviet and world communism. Soviet doctrine and history are currently being rewritten.

This must please at least the Russian school children, for they are excused from taking examinations in history. No one yet knows the "correct" answers.

#### **Appraisal of Soviet Shift**

It is important to appraise what these changes mean and also what they do not mean.

They mean, I think, that unity and strength of the free nations have shown the Soviet rulers the futility of their policies of violence. Also they must mean that forces for liberalization are at work within the Soviet bloc and are powerful enough to require some response, or at least the appearance of response.

All of this is immensely important. It is more than the free world dared hope for a few years ago.

But satisfaction must be restrained.

True, Stalin has been demoted. But we do not yet see, in the Soviet bloc, the reality of representative government or respect for the basic aspirations of the peoples.

The Soviet rulers profess to have renounced violence. But they press feverishly to develop their military establishment, particularly nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery.

The countries of Eastern Europe, including East Germany, are still under the iron heel of Soviet force.

In Asia and the Near East the Soviet rulers have become merchants of hatred and fomenters of violence.

In relation to Japan, Soviet foreign policy is still ugly in its aspect.

In some places Soviet foreign policy is baited with economic lures which may superficially seem attractive. But close scrutiny shows that the bait is attached to a hook and that the hook is attached to a line and that the other end of the line is purposefully held by Moscow.

And, if they have admitted some of the lies and false testimony which marked political trials of the Stalin era, they have failed to repudiate two

of the most outrageous lies ever perpetrated by any government, and both perpetrated by Stalin—the lie that South Korea was the aggressor in the Korean War and the lie that the United Nations forces in that war used germ warfare against the Chinese Communists.

Khrushchev said last December, “We never renounced and we will never renounce our ideas, our struggle for the victory of communism.” So long as that victory is the Soviet goal; so long as it is backed by a vast military establishment and the underground apparatus of international communism; so long as these instruments are at the absolute disposal of despots who repudiate moral principles as restraint upon their conduct—so long as this combination exists, it would be folly for the free nations to consider that they can safely lower their guard and fall apart.

I have often said in relation to the Soviet Communist problem that the moment of greatest danger would be the moment when we relaxed. Never was that statement more relevant than it is today. If we treat the *prospect* of success as being itself a complete success, that could turn into an ultimate disaster.

### **The Task of the Free Nations**

To say that is not to say that we should act as though nothing had happened. We cannot and would not set the clock back. There is no longer the mood of fear that gripped the free world when in quick succession there occurred the Communist guerrilla war against Greece, the seizure of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea. We would not, if we could, smother the hope that a benign transformation may have begun.

Our new task is to build more on hope and less on fear. That is, of course, a more difficult task.

Fear makes easy the tasks of diplomats, for then the fearful draw together and seek the protection of collective strength.

Soviet rulers and their agents, in their new garb, have somewhat greater acceptability and therefore more chance for mischief.

Allies no longer feel the same compulsion to submerge differences as when they faced together a clear and present danger.

Collective security arrangements, born primarily out of fear of armed aggression, seem to some less important now than 5 years ago.

Neutrality can now be plausibly portrayed as a safe and even profitable course.

Under these conditions our tasks are harder—so much so that some people deplore the recent developments because they confuse what, until then, had been a rather simple scene.

That is not our view. Of course war, and danger of war, is a simplifier. When the issue is “who dies and who lives?” all other issues seem unimportant. But we do not want simplicity at that price. Nor do we intend to invoke needless fears and a sense of emergency because that would make our tasks more simple.

We cannot undo the changes that have come upon the world. And we do not want to reverse what holds so much of promise, merely because it also holds some risk of loss. Our task is not to seek to reverse change but to build constructively upon all the changes that hold a possibility of good. In that way we may make our hopes come true.

Because Soviet military capabilities remain so vast and because their intentions are subject to rapid change, we must maintain our vigilance and our strength. But also we must increase the unity and dynamism of the free world by greater emphasis on cooperation *for* something rather than merely *against* something. Let us exalt freedom by showing better what freedom can do.

President Eisenhower, speaking day before yesterday, outlined the task which lies before the free nations of the world. He emphasized that task as it relates to the newly independent and newly developing nations of the world.

There is also need to maintain and develop the strength and vitality of the older free-world nations. Here, too, there is vast opportunity. Our peoples have many common aspirations and interests that go far beyond the instinct of self-preservation and which we can more surely achieve if we work together than if we work apart. We can, in association, form major steppingstones along the path to universal peace and justice and human welfare.

We had all hoped that the United Nations would establish order on a universal basis. It has indeed done much in this respect, and certainly we should do nothing to detract from the United Nations. It remains the cornerstone of United States foreign policy.

But the United Nations was never expected to be an exclusive means for developing world order.

The charter itself looks to regional and collective defense organizations to play a major role in this great task.

### **Exploring the Possibilities of NATO**

The Organization of American States illustrates the possibilities of a regional organization. It takes account of external perils. But it concentrates primarily upon its own positive accomplishments.

That Organization traces its origins back 66 years to when the Pan American Union was founded. It is held together by considerations which long preceded, and which will long succeed, the fear of Soviet armed attack.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is another organization which, in its own distinctive way, contains the possibilities of great development. It was, to be sure, conceived primarily as a military alliance, and that aspect of the organization remains vitally important. But the organization can and should be more.

The Canadian Government has notably espoused this point of view, and at last December's ministerial meeting of the Council both the French and Italian delegations introduced resolutions along this line. I expect that this matter will be dealt with further at next week's ministerial meeting to be held in Paris.

We basically have so much in common that we should be able to do more in common.

All of our peoples embrace a religious faith which makes atheistic materialism abhorrent to them. We have a common sense of moral values.

Our political institutions predominantly reflect democratic conceptions which had their origin in Greece and legal institutions which had their origin in Rome.

Our economies are similar. We all believe in and encourage the private ownership of property, and there is a large and flourishing private trade between our countries.

Our educational systems are much the same and provide a broad basis for the free exchange of views and the gaining of common understanding.

Not only do we have this firm and broad foundation, but also we hold in common many guiding principles of action which should enable us to develop practically our fellowship.

We all believe that the days are past when any part of the world, or any particular civilization, should dominate others. Several of the members

of NATO are more than Atlantic countries. The United Kingdom, for example, is a member of the British Commonwealth. The United States is a nation of the Americas and a Pacific nation. We are today members not only of NATO but of the Organization of American States, of the South-east Asia Treaty Organization, and several other collective defense treaties in the Pacific. We are associated with the Baghdad Pact. All NATO members would, I think, agree that NATO should not attempt to represent the totality of their policies.

We all believe that no government has just powers except as it derives them from the consent of the governed. At the same time we all recognize that political independence is illusory unless those who obtain it are able to sustain it and carry its responsibilities. Also we reject the conception which would prevent different races from freely uniting in one political system. Under these conditions we all strive to advance the historic evolution of non-self-governing peoples to self-government or independence.

We believe that the spirit which in the last decade has provided so many non-self-governing peoples with political independence ought also to operate peacefully to stimulate independence for those subject to the ruthless colonialism of Soviet Russia. Peace and welfare in Europe require that East Germany should be allowed to unite in freedom with the Federal Republic and that the nations of Eastern Europe should once again be independent.

We believe in the closer integration of some Western European countries, such as is represented by the Coal and Steel Community, by the Western European Union created by the Brussels Treaty, and by the prospective development of "Euratom," the means whereby the members of the Coal and Steel Community would apply like community principles to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Such European integration, and the development of NATO, are complementary and not mutually exclusive processes.

The NATO members believe in the principle of political consultation between allies and are increasingly practicing it in the NATO Council. Every NATO country, of course, has certain vital national interests that may sometimes require independent judgment. Some of us have grave worldwide responsibilities that cannot be effectively discharged unless there is a capability of

prompt decision and corresponding action. Our consultations must be designed to assure essential harmony in our viewpoints on fundamentals. But the processes of consultation should never enmesh us in a procedural web so that we fall victim to the ability of despotisms to act suddenly and with all their might.

None of our governments is predatory. We want military power to be used as a community force to prevent aggression and not as a national force for aggrandizement. Indeed, the amended Brussels Treaty for Western European Union already sets an example in armament limitation that we can ask the whole world to follow.

No NATO member, I suppose, wishes to drift into some new and ill-defined relationship which could be provocative of future misunderstandings. But the unanimity of our thinking upon the great basic issues makes it apparent that the time has come to advance NATO from its initial phase into the totality of its meaning.

### **The Mission of the West**

Western civilization has made an immense contribution to the welfare of the whole world. It has been a dynamic force which, like everything human, has made its mistakes. But on the whole it has reflected an enlightened view of the nature of man and of his God-given right to enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Furthermore, the Western view of the nature of man has made it inevitable that its influence should on the whole be a liberalizing influence. Some nations take pride in the size of their domain and the number of people under their rule. But the Western nations can feel that their greatest success was to have brought to much of the world a knowledge, a political freedom, and an economic opportunity which it had never enjoyed before.

But the mission of the West is not completed. More independence needs to be perfected. More economic development needs to be planned and supported throughout the world. More sense of equality and human brotherhood needs to be developed. Also, the West needs to appreciate better how rich are the gifts other civilizations have to offer.

The historic weakness of the West has been its disunity. Out of this disunity came wars which have taken the lifeblood of its finest youth and weakened its economies. A major task of postwar

statesmanship was to find ways whereby the West can maintain its solidarity. Much—indeed, very much—has been done. But more can still be done to make sure that the good in Western civilization is not again negated by differences.

The peoples who make up the Atlantic community ought, in increased unity, to resume their greatness; and true greatness is not to be measured by ability to impose on others what they do not want but by ability to find new ways whereby all men can better realize their aspirations.

The North Atlantic Treaty already serves as an indispensable and vital instrument of the Atlantic community. But the time has, I believe, come to consider whether its organization does not need to be further developed if it is adequately to serve the needs of this and coming generations. If that be the common desire of the NATO member nations, the United States will join eagerly in exploring the possibilities which now beckon us forward.

### **Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference**

Press release 198 dated April 17

*Secretary Dulles:* I have no statement of my own to volunteer, so I am ready for questions.

#### **Middle East**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any comment on an announcement from the Soviet Foreign Office that the Soviet Union is prepared to support United Nations measures for peace in the Middle East?*

*A.* That was brought to my attention about 15 minutes ago, and I do not yet have the full text of the Soviet statement, and we have learned in these matters that it is important to read the fine print. That I do not yet have. But I would say this: The United States took the position some time ago that this was properly a matter of concern for the United Nations. I emphasized that very strongly in my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24,<sup>1</sup> and since then the United States introduced the resolution into the Security Council which was unanimously adopted<sup>2</sup> and pursuant to which Secre-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1956, p. 627.



tary-General Hammarskjold is now on his mission in the Near East. Last week the President issued his statement from Augusta<sup>3</sup> emphasizing our full support of the United Nations and of the Hammarskjold mission and calling upon all members of the United Nations also to give that support. If it turns out that this Soviet statement is responsive to the President's appeal and that there is a genuine Soviet desire to support and back up the United Nations in this matter, that would, of course, be welcomed by the United States.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any diplomatic effort on the part of this Government to contact the Russians in the aftermath of the President's statement to get their reactions to U.N. action?*

A. There has been no specific diplomatic procedure of that kind. Of course, our Embassy at Moscow was advised of the President's statement.

*Q. It was not conveyed to Premier Bulganin in any personal message or anything like that?*

A. No.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been much speculation in this connection with the so-called downgrading of the Three-Power Declaration of 1950. Will you tell us what the United States Government's position is on that declaration today?*

A. Well, the position is the same, I think, as it has always been. The declaration of 1950 itself called for action—I think it said—consistently with the obligations of the parties as members of the United Nations, and called for action within or without the United Nations. Now the United Nations Charter itself provides that the Security Council has “primary responsibility” for the maintenance of international peace and security. So when the 1950 declaration said the action would be taken “consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations,” it made it quite clear, I think, that we looked upon the U.N. Security Council as the primary means of avoiding hostilities and maintaining peace and security. That is the interpretation the United States has always put upon it and we believe that it is preferable to act within the United Nations. That is, as I say, the way which I think the declaration itself indicates as the preferable way to act. Now if that shouldn't work, then we would have a new

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1956, p. 668.

situation. But, generally speaking, the action which is now being taken through the United Nations we regard as consistent with the 1950 declaration and not in derogation of that declaration.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have the reports of Mr. Hammarskjold's mission thus far indicated to you a sense or indication of success in stopping the hostilities so that it might be possible now to move forward along the lines suggested in the Russian statement toward the actual settlement of the Palestine problem?*

A. Well, I think it would be overoptimistic to feel that the immediate troubles have been so fully cleared away that we are yet at the point of dealing with the problem broadly along the lines of, for example, my August 26 speech.<sup>4</sup> I think that Mr. Hammarskjold feels that he has made good progress, but he has by no means completed yet the first phase of his activity, which is to establish procedures and dispositions there which will exclude the likelihood of future border incidents, commando raids, and the like, which build up tension and ill will on both sides to a point where long-range settlements are almost out of the immediate question. Now the mandate from the Security Council contemplated he should work out such things as arriving at a greater freedom of movement for the armistice observers there, for perhaps a drawing apart of the forces along the armistice line so they would not be in direct contact with each other. And while he has, I think, made a good start, it would be premature to say that that phase of his work has been completed or even that successful completion is definitely assured.

*Q. Sir, when the time comes, if it does, when it is possible to think in terms of permanent settlement, is it our position that this is primarily a U.N. responsibility or one between Israel and her neighbors directly?*

A. Well, obviously the problem is one in which the parties at immediate interest are Israel and the neighboring Arab States, and no one could or should try to impose forcibly any solution upon them. On the other hand, it is certainly a situation where the United Nations can play a considerable role. There was established, you may

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

remember, some years ago—I think it was in 1948—a U.N. commission, which has been rather inactive, which was composed of Turkey, France, and the United States, to play a role in this conciliation effort between the two sides.<sup>5</sup> In the speech of mine of August 26 which outlined a plan which had been previously discussed with a number of other nations, we indicated there that there would be an important role for the United Nations to play. We spoke of a United Nations role, in which the United States would participate, designed to accomplish the dual purpose of helping to solve the refugee problem and also to produce more land which could be cultivated. Those are, in a way, two sides of the same coin. That, we thought, would be a United Nations operation in the first instance, although it would require financial support from member countries like the United States. We also spoke of a guaranty of the result and a situation in which we suggested there would be a United Nations guaranty participated in by member nations. So we have always assumed that, while the solution would, as I say, in the first instance be a direct problem for the parties, it might in fact not be possible for them to arrive at a solution without assets from outside—financial assets and assets in the form of strong guaranties. Those would be necessary ingredients of any final settlement and they could best be contributed by or through the United Nations.

#### **Communism in Latin America**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, two of the officials of the Government, Mr. Brownell and your own associate, Mr. Holland, have discussed the Communist situation this week in speeches to the Inter-American Bar Association. Does that mean that there is a growing concern about communism in that area, and will you give us your views on the Communist situation in Latin America?*

A. I am not aware of any growing concern. Indeed, my concern today is not nearly as great as it was at a time when international communism had virtually gotten control of Guatemala. The Caracas Declaration of 1954, which provided that, if international communism got control of the

<sup>5</sup> For text of the General Assembly resolution establishing the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, see *ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1948, p. 726, and Dec. 26, 1948, p. 793.

political institutions of any American state, that would be a threat to the peace and security of us all, has created a political background against which Communist activity has become less. Now they realize that if they should succeed in any one country all the rest of the countries would be prepared to work against them. We saw the influence of that resolution shortly afterward in what happened in Guatemala. I want to inject here that, as perhaps you know, just a day or two ago [April 5] the Government of the Argentine, which had abstained on that resolution at Caracas, declared its adhesion to that declaration, and that is very warmly welcomed by the United States. Now that Caracas resolution provided, among other things, for certain implementing machinery in the way of exchange of information between the countries about subversive activities and the like. There has not been as effective a buildup of that exchange mechanism as we would have hoped, and we are trying constantly to keep that antishubversive exchange of information growing. It is not because we have any new fears of the situation, but because, as I have said time and again, the moment of greatest danger would be the moment that we relaxed. We do not intend to relax.

#### **Japanese Textile Imports**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Japan has expressed concern at laws in two of our sovereign states which they feel are aimed at Japanese textile imports, and they feel that it is a violation of our treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation. Can you say if the United States intends to reply shortly to that and what our feeling is about it?*

A. We are replying to the note.<sup>6</sup> We share the concern that you refer to. It seems to us that the action could be a very serious threat, not just to Japanese trade but to our own foreign trade. Our trade all over the world—and it is, as you know, huge—is protected against discrimination and boycott by these very same treaties. These treaties are what enable our own business to operate with dependability throughout the whole world. If there should be violations of those treaties on our side, we would have to anticipate that there would perhaps be reciprocal action on other sides and that it would seriously imperil the

<sup>6</sup> For text of Japanese note and U.S. reply, see p. 728.

whole world structure of multilateral trade which the United States has supported for quite a few years now and upon which we believe a great deal of the prosperity of the United States and the growing strength of all the free world is based. Therefore, we do look on the situation with very great concern.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a report of Representative Celler which says the Egyptians are due to buy six submarines from the Soviet bloc. Has any such report about submarines from the Communists reached the State Department?*

A. We have heard the same reports that probably have come to Representative Celler, but whether, in fact, there is an arrangement for submarines and whether it has been carried out we do not know.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you given any indication of your views on the Israeli request for jet planes made to Canada? Have the Canadians been informed whether you would appreciate their filling that request?*

A. The Canadians are aware of the fact that there is no intention or desire of the United States to try to establish a worldwide boycott of the Government of Israel as far as arms are concerned. Our own policy is based on certain considerations which are, in some respects at least, distinctive to ourselves and not necessarily a pattern which we think all the world should follow, certainly not a pattern which we are trying to impose upon other countries of the world.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you just mentioned reference to some machinery to implement the Caracas Declaration. I wonder if you propose to use this machinery to keep watch on the recent Soviet trade offers made to Latin Americans to see that they are not accompanied by political penetration.*

A. We have to rely primarily upon the vigilance of the countries concerned where the subject matter is one which is out in the open, as it is when trade agreements are involved. The United States doesn't try to impose its views on others in those respects. The type of machinery I referred to is designed to counter underground activities by international communism.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some talk the past several days of the United Nations Security Council meeting in Geneva or Rome or some place*

*in Europe to hear Mr. Hammarskjold's report on his mission and take the next step. What is the United States position on that?*

A. The United States position on that is that it is entirely a matter for the Security Council itself to decide where it wants to meet. It can meet other than in New York. It has met, as I recall, both in London and Paris in the past, and, if it is the desire of the members generally to meet somewhere else, the United States would not oppose that.

*Q. We don't take a strong position one way or another?*

A. No.

### **Cyprus**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you regard putting Cyprus under NATO as a feasible temporary arrangement?*

A. No, I would doubt that would be feasible because, you see, NATO is not, I might say, a corporate entity. NATO is an organization where a lot of sovereign states gather to discuss things but it has no corporate existence, you might say. It is like the United Nations. When the United Nations exercises its trusteeship, it always does it through some one or more countries. It picks one of the member countries to exercise the trusteeship on its behalf because the United Nations does not act of itself. It isn't a supergovernment which has itself authority, with operating functions and responsibilities. The same is true of NATO. There is a group of what we call "permanent representatives" that meet and exchange views. But that is a group which can take no action except by unanimous consent of all the governments concerned. And to put a situation like Cyprus under the administration of a council of—what is it now—15 nations acting through representatives who have to discuss everything at great length, and cannot agree on anything except after lengthy discussion, is not an effective form of government.

*Q. Has that been suggested to you?*

A. I have heard of the idea, but it has not been suggested as far as I am aware in any official way by any government.

*Q. Both you and the President have talked recently of the necessity of gearing our sights for longer-term foreign aid, but opposition on the*

*Hill seems to be more rather than less. What is the administration doing at this point to push the program of foreign aid? Or is it?*

A. Yes, we are working actively on that matter. The presentations have begun before the Foreign Affairs Committee and I discussed the situation with Chairman Richards of the committee a few days ago. He felt the presentations had been effective although of course he did not attempt in any way to forecast the committee action. The President may be discussing this problem in his talk that he is making on Saturday although that talk has not yet been finalized. But I know he has had in mind at least referring to the subject at that time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it will be possible to reach a solution of our problems in the Middle East without the consultation and participation of the Soviet Union?*

A. Well, to the extent we work this problem out through the United Nations and the United Nations Assembly, or Security Council—presumably the United Nations Security Council—that automatically does involve a certain participation with the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union is inescapably a member of both those bodies.

*Q. The Sudanese have indicated they are asking the Russians for technical assistance. Do you anticipate a widespread and successful Soviet drive through the technical assistance program?*

A. Well, I would expect there will be a Soviet drive, but I have no reason to think it will be successful. Recently the efforts which they made in relation to Libya have received a setback, and I think there is the same skepticism in most of the African countries that there is in other countries of the “hookers” in Soviet technical assistance.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Spanish Foreign Minister said in New York yesterday that he thought the United States would supply the Spanish Army with the most modern weapons. Did he make such a request while he was here?*

A. Not to me. He did have talks, I believe, with some of the defense people and Admiral Radford. I don't know what he said there.

*Q. Would you comment on the visit this week to London of Bulganin and Khrushchev, with particular reference to talks on the kind of question we have been discussing here?*

A. No, I think it would not be appropriate for me to comment on that matter.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing Chairman Richards presented a somewhat new concept of handling foreign aid, that is, that the United States follow somewhat in the footsteps of the Soviet. For instance, the Soviets come to Sudan or Libya—come to these countries and say, “We will put up so much money to build a dam,” etc., and the United States says, “Go ahead and take that and then we will come along and we will supply you with what the Russians don't make up and when they let you down,” etc. What is your thought on that? Mr. Richards seriously presented that in a hearing now going on.*

A. Well, I am not familiar with that presentation of that point of view, and I would prefer not to comment on it. I presume all these hearings have been in executive session, haven't they?

*Q. No, not all that I know of.*

A. Was this presentation made at a public hearing?

*Q. No. Well, as you well know, Mr. Secretary, a lot of things that go on behind closed doors later become public.*

## **Germany**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does this Government favor the diplomatic talks on reunification that Germany intends to begin soon with the Soviet Union through its Ambassador in Moscow?*

A. I don't understand that there is any German proposal to negotiate with the Soviet Union for reunification. I understand that what Foreign Minister von Brentano said was in answer to a question as to whether they thought of inviting Bulganin to come to Bonn to discuss reunification. He said there was no necessity to invite him to come now that they have diplomatic representation—they have embassies in both places. But, as I read what he said, I did not interpret it as meaning there was any present intention of carrying on negotiations; in fact, I think he expressly said that any steps in that direction would only be taken in agreement with the Western powers.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Western powers were wrong at the last Foreign Ministers meeting to put German reunification ahead of German security as you did?*

A. No, I think we were right in doing that. Excuse me. I think perhaps I misinterpreted your question, or did not answer it quite responsibly. I thought you were referring to putting German reunification ahead of disarmament.

*Q. Yes. I incorrectly stated the question. That is what I meant to say.*

A. That is what I thought, and my answer goes to what you meant to say.

*Q. I didn't know you were a mind reader.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Yugoslav Ambassador said last week he thinks war will be avoided in the Middle East. Do you think that is an overoptimistic statement, or do you share that view?*

A. I will certainly accept one-half of it, that war can be avoided.

*Q. You think it will be, and you have reason for believing so?*

A. I certainly am not going to be said to feel that I think there will be war in the Near East because I think that the chances are that there will not be war. But I think it would be rash to say now that there was no risk whatever of hostilities in that area.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back a minute to the Soviet trade offers, it was said in Geneva last week that they are considerably more realistic now than they have been in the past. I wonder, if that is the case, whether you think the same as you indicated—that Soviet trade offers will continue, especially in Latin America?*

A. I don't feel that I can make a very clear answer to that question. All that I can say is that we have been having occasional talks here with the Ambassadors of the other 20 American Republics, and we talk about these problems and there seems to be a general consensus of thinking that there are dangers in this situation and the need to approach the problem in a very cautious way. But I couldn't speak for all and each of these countries as to what they will do.

#### **Special Study of Foreign Aid**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I understand that Chairman George proposed over the weekend the creation of some sort of special high-level group to study foreign aid. Do you think this will be a good idea?*

A. I think that the time has probably come when it would be useful to have a comprehensive study made of this whole problem, both from the standpoint of our own machinery for conducting the aid and the effectiveness of the present machinery, and also from the standpoint of the Soviet activities and the extent to which those may be relevant to our program. There is the question, for example, of whether more should be done in terms of loans and less in terms of grants. There is the question of whether or not more should be given through international agencies like the United Nations or whether they should be done wholly on a bilateral basis or done through regional organizations. There is a great mass of serious problems of that sort which have been growing up over the past few years. The administration, I may say, is itself making plans to explore that problem and Senator George's thinking actually parallels thinking that has been going on within the administration itself. I would think that we would be receptive to working out some program of that sort which would, I hope, command the confidence of the country and of the Congress. The question of just how to set it up raises questions but I do believe that the time is here when a comprehensive examination of that program is due.

*Q. Would that be by a commission outside the administration?*

A. I don't want to express myself at this time as to the machinery which would be best adapted because we have no clear conclusions within the administrative or executive department on that subject ourselves. And, whatever we did, we would want to concert with the thinking of Congress so, as I say, the result would carry a good deal of confidence not only in the country as a whole but in the Congress. So I don't want to pronounce today on the machinery.

*Q. When would it be held, Mr. Secretary?*

A. I would think the studies ought to be, as Senator George has I think indicated, carried on between the present, or whenever the committee, commission, or whatever it is, is set up, and next January when the Congress would reconvene.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports Paul Hoffman came to you a few weeks ago and asked you for your opinion about setting up a citizens'*

*council on foreign aid and you turned it down. Is that correct?*

A. It is true that Mr. Hoffman did come to me and did talk about that subject but it has not been

turned down. That is one of the ideas that is in the hopper and which we are thinking about in line with what I described as the thinking of the administration on this subject.

## **United States Foreign Policy in Africa**

*by George V. Allen*

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The problems confronting United States foreign policy in the vast continent of Africa are at least as varied and manifold as the different stages of evolution of the various countries making up that continent. I would not presume to add to the information about Africa which has been proffered to you by the specialists in this field during the past 48 hours. Instead, I believe the most useful contribution I can offer to this symposium is to attempt to place the policy problems confronting the United States in Africa in perspective as we see them and then to analyze for you briefly and in broad strokes the unique aspects of the problems confronting us in Africa and the basic principles from which we approach their solution.

A responsible foreign policy toward Africa requires of the United States a deep understanding of the aspirations and problems of the individual African countries both in their relationship with the European powers and in their urge toward self-determination so that we may lend our good offices and assistance in promoting an orderly progress toward independence and nationhood.

### **Africa in World Perspective**

In recent years the principle that the developed countries have a moral obligation to aid the less developed countries, such as those of Africa, has become almost universally recognized, even taken

for granted. There is a sound basis for the validity of this principle. In a world wherein all countries and continents are becoming next-door neighbors, glaring disparities in living standards can produce tensions and animosities easily fanned into conflict. In its postwar policies the United States has been actively pursuing peace by trying to mitigate such tensions. More recently even the Soviet Union has begun belatedly to make gestures of cooperation and assistance toward the underdeveloped countries. While this constitutes an important change in Soviet tactics, it remains to be seen whether the change is consistent with the basic Communist objective of world domination.

All this is highly pertinent to the consideration of African problems. Besides the disturbing element introduced in the Middle East by the Czech arms deal with Egypt, the Soviets, either directly or indirectly, have made overtures to Libya, Ethiopia, and Liberia; and there is evidence of Communist activity in areas as widely separated as the Sudan and the Union of South Africa. We would be betraying our position of leadership of the free world if we assumed that these initiatives are in the pursuit of normal, responsible foreign relations. The old familiar pattern of exploiting and championing local dissent and grievances to create chaos and confusion is too fresh in our minds.

The terms "imperialism" and "colonialism" can be correctly used to describe a relationship, which existed more in the past than at present, between

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 21 (press release 206 dated Apr. 20).

the metropolitan powers and their colonies, a relationship which most of the free-world powers have already rejected in principle.

Hardly a day passes that some further evidence of the passing of colonialism does not appear in the press. Morocco and Tunisia both obtained their independence last month. A Moroccan Government is now operating in Rabat, and an all-Tunisian Government in Tunis. This month Tunisia held its first national elections. As for Morocco, the United States has never ceased to recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan and the United States alone has always maintained a diplomatic representative in Tangier.

### Colonialism

The United States attitude toward colonialism is known. In the light of our historical origins and our traditions this attitude could hardly be different. But the application of this principle to present-day foreign-policy problems all over the world requires patient understanding and a high sense of responsibility regarding the ultimate and basic security interests of the United States. All of the so-called colonial powers represented on the continent of Africa are our friends and allies in the worldwide contest between the free and Communist worlds. Relationships established by them with countries in Africa date from an era when the concepts of international relations were different. No one but a demagogue would deny that basic advantages were brought to the African territories by this process of opening wider horizons and that, in fact, the impetus toward modern nationhood grew out of these contacts with Western civilization.

Furthermore, in the course of this relationship between the metropolitan powers and the African territories, there grew up interlocking economic relations, the violent disruption of which would seriously weaken our European allies. Similarly, a sudden break of these lifelines would create conditions of political and economic instability most harmful to our African friends. It is more largely a question of transforming this relationship into a cooperative endeavor by which the newly emerging states in Africa achieve and *maintain* their national self-respect and apply in their own way the benefits of their national resources to improving the lot of their own people. A strong, free, and friendly Africa is extremely important to

United States security. Our security interests and our moral interests are both effectively served by the same general line of action—we need friendly and cooperative relations with Europe and Africa, just as their own interests require the maintenance of intimate ties with each other.

In Africa our allies are aware of the basic attitude of the United States toward colonialism, but they are equally aware of our intention to work as friends of both sides toward an orderly solution of these problems. Great Britain has publicly announced its policy of helping the countries of Africa toward independence, and its record in Asia is an earnest of its sincerity. In line with its policy as a responsible power, however, it does not wish to create perhaps greater problems by precipitate action which granting of immediate independence might create. This is a time when political vacuums are a great danger to world peace.

In North Africa, France has recently recognized the independence of Morocco and Tunisia<sup>2</sup> and is engaged in trying to find a liberal solution to the problem of Algeria. Spain has also recognized the independence of its zone of Morocco,<sup>3</sup> and that country has now the opportunity to become unified. Both Spain and France are engaged in working out arrangements by which the mutual economic benefits derived from their past association with Morocco can be continued in the light of the new relationship. In other areas of Africa, France is also looking toward creating a new relationship with the groups which are gradually developing a higher degree of political consciousness. The Belgians have recently established two universities in the Belgian Congo to meet the educational needs of the Congolese.

### Nationalism

The United States attitude toward nationalism is not so easily definable. After World War II, when the threat of international communism endangered our security, United States opinion was inclined toward promoting a greater faith in federations in Europe which cut across—and, we hoped, would eventually obliterate—nationalistic rivalries. But in other areas of the world we recognized the strength of nationalism in resisting

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466, and Apr. 2, 1956, p. 552.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1956, p. 667.

the threat of international communism. Communism cynically exploits the passions of revolt for the sole purpose of creating unrest, chaos, and revolution so that the small organized minority may seize power and permanently bury the instincts of healthy nationalism under the requirements of blind and absolute obedience to Moscow. This issue assumes a special importance in Africa, where the varying degrees of political experience, the large amount of illiteracy, and the insecurity of the individual in the process of exchanging his old loyalties for new ones make the population particularly vulnerable to exploitation of this issue by unprincipled demagogues.

Again the principle of understanding and responsibility in the conduct of foreign relations should guide us and other nations in relations with the countries of Africa so that the elements of nationalism which contribute toward genuine independence and stability will be encouraged and those which tend to be purely negative, anarchic, and disruptive be curbed.

### **Racialism**

In the light of experience which the United States is undergoing domestically in developing harmonious race relations, I think it behooves us to approach the problem of race elsewhere in the world in all humility. This aspect of relations between people of different races living together in multiracial states involves deep-seated emotions and prejudices which can only be overcome gradually. The principle for which the United States stands and is known throughout the world is perfectly clear: it is embodied in our Constitution and in our Bill of Rights. But it is equally clear that the application of force and oppression can only exacerbate the issue.

The vast continent of Africa illustrates this problem in all its facets, from countries in which the intermingling of races on an equal basis has become an accepted and unquestioned fact to countries in which an attempt is being made to legislate segregation down to its last logical consequence. The problem is infinitely complicated in Africa by the presence of groups who wield political and economic power but who are not otherwise identified with the country and people among whom they live. This tends to confuse the issue of racialism with questions of political, economic, social, and cultural discrimination and makes the

approach to a solution of the problem more difficult by making it virtually impossible to isolate the issue from all the other problems.

Again it behooves us not to become identified with any of the conflicting factions but rather, while preserving our adherence to our own basic principle of racial equality, to attempt to exert a moderating influence upon the extremists and to oppose those who are exploiting these tensions for ulterior purposes.

### **Challenge to U.S. Diplomacy**

The continent of Africa presents a wide variety of foreign policy problems to the United States, as varied as the number of countries and territories it comprises and as complicated as the degree of emergence toward independent statehood and the complexity of relationships with the different metropolitan powers with which the various states are associated. Yet there is a unifying factor in this diversity: the entire continent is undergoing simultaneously, even if in varying degrees, a transformation along political, economic, sociological, and racial lines. The substitution of new ties for old tribal or family relationships in order to assure security for the individual, the exchange of old values for new ones in the attempt to obtain social and economic status, the growing desire for political self-expression, and the need for developing new approaches to produce stability in multiracial groups devoted to common economic and political goals—all these combine to create a condition of ferment and potential progress which is a real challenge to American diplomacy.

The United States, as a nation, has no selfish interests in Africa except the preservation of our own security, which we consider, in present world circumstances, inextricably bound up with the kind of future the African countries desire for themselves. We are dedicated to the preservation of world peace, which we consider an indispensable corollary to the kind of development Africa needs. Because of our origins and traditions we are basically in sympathy with the desire for independence and nationhood of the emerging states, but we are also friends and allies of the powers who must help to shape this new status. This places us in a position from which we hope and believe our influence can be exerted to make the transformation of Africa a process of orderly evolution and not one of violent revolution.



## The Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin

by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy<sup>1</sup>

Your society was founded in 1922, and at that time I was a young officer in the Foreign Service of the Department of State. During the years which have elapsed, we have witnessed tremendous improvements in the coverage and dissemination of news. At my first post in Bern, Switzerland, at the end of World War I, we had only sketchy and infrequent reports on developments in Washington and elsewhere. The contrast between those days and the present—with the almost instantaneous coverage that you give to world affairs today—is enormous, as is its impact on the conduct of our foreign affairs. Perhaps no other single item has affected the techniques of diplomacy as has the tempo and completeness of your activities in the information field.

In our small way, we in the Department of State are indebted to you for your valuable coverage of international affairs. Our modern society would be hard pressed to maintain its strength and its freedom without the intelligent reporting and keen appraisal of world events that you make possible.

Perhaps the greatest difference between our form of civilization and that of the Communist-controlled powers is in our respective concepts of the role and function of news media. To us full information and freedom of expression are primary. Without them we would not have the informed public opinion on which our society depends. Communist countries by their structure are unable to have full and free information. Their leaders cannot tolerate it. Their media of expression are designed to present the views of the ruling group. Only carefully selected items of

news are disseminated, and the important items are scrupulously edited either to generate public confidence in the governing group or to inflame resentment against enemies of the state, real or imaginary. The people of Russia and Communist-dominated countries live in a world that closely resembles the nightmare described by George Orwell in *1984*. What news they are allowed to read and hear is presented to them to develop a state of mind or point of view carefully chosen for them in advance by the ruling group.

We have recently witnessed a rather ostentatious reappraisal of Stalin, resulting in his denigration and downgrading. In this performance we have an exceptionally clear example of Soviet treatment of the news and their concept of the role of the news media in Communist society.

### Rise and Fall of Stalin Cult

For 25 years all members of Communist-controlled countries, whether within the Soviet Union or without, had been increasingly conditioned to the acceptance of Stalin as the all-wise and the always-right. Any outward manifestation of less than complete belief in Stalin's wisdom and correctness led to unpleasantness. For 25 years Communists at home and abroad were indoctrinated in this credo. Stalin's views of history and science, Communist doctrine, the arts, and literature were the only views possible for Soviet or Communist-controlled citizens to have or at least to express. Cities and mountains, factories and industrial plants, theaters, stadiums were named in his honor. Art galleries, public buildings, offices, and private homes were decorated with his pictures and his statues. What was deemed good in the Communist world was associated with Stalin. And what was evil and what was danger-

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington, D. C., on Apr. 19 (press release 205).

ous was deviation, no matter how slight, from any view on any subject that Stalin might have had or was likely to have.

In the course of the 3 years since Stalin's death the present Soviet oligarchy decided to "shrink" Stalin, to devalue him and to change the worship of his name. The process of Stalin's devaluation provides a spectacular example of the difference in the ways in which our respective systems of news dissemination function.

You are no doubt weary of references to the February meeting in Moscow of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Before this meeting there had been hints and suggestions that Stalin was no longer regarded by the Politburo with the traditional worshipful reverence. There were innuendoes on occasion that some parts of Stalin's foreign policy had been less than perfect. But the symbol of Stalin, the all-wise and the impeccable, had been treated gingerly. On his birthday anniversary last December all of the important Soviet news media referred to him as enjoying a secure and lasting place in the trinity. His name was, as always, coupled with those of Marx and Lenin. In January, at a series of lesser Party congresses, this treatment of him continued.

#### **Denunciation at Party Congress**

Just as the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was to meet, there came an indication that the dam was about to break. The Congress opened with a minute of silent remembrance for three comrades who had died since the 19th Congress. The three were Stalin, Gottwald, and Tokuda. The pairing of the great Stalin with these lesser foreign figures was in itself an insult. Then, during the Congress, his name was mentioned less than a half dozen times during the 11 days of speechmaking. In one speech by Mikoyan, Stalin was mentioned only once, though his policies were severely criticized. When the texts of the speeches made at the Congress were published, it was obvious that he had been under severe attack. But the detailed denunciation of Stalin was saved for a climax speech by Khrushchev at a closed session on the last day.

Seven weeks have elapsed since then, and the Soviet press has not yet printed the Khrushchev speech. Nor have they printed all the charges made in the speeches, nor the widespread criticism

that has since been made of Stalin by satellite leaders. Khrushchev's speech was made on February 25th and is said to have lasted for 2½ hours. You have seen public reports that the text runs to 60 pages. Yet up to now the people of the Soviet Union have not been told of the speech or even of the fact of its delivery. I am sure the Soviet Ambassador will not mind if I say that I expressed to him our interest in seeing the text.

#### **Campaign of Defamation**

As you know, Khrushchev's secret speech was apparently the signal for a general campaign of defamation of Stalin throughout the Communist satellite countries. In almost all these countries there has been severe, definite, and personal criticism of Stalin and his policies, yet it was not until March 28 that *Pravda* denounced some of the evils of the Stalin regime. While the satellite countries have been allowed to be free in their post-Congress criticism and while foreign correspondents in Moscow have been allowed to refer to the Khrushchev speech since March 17, the Russian press has been under heavy wraps.

The manner in which the devaluation of Stalin has been handled by the Soviet press is hard for Americans to conceive. In our eyes this treatment of news verges on the burlesque, yet we know and understand that the leaders of the Soviet Union do not embark on any such major change in the accepted dogma of their system without the most careful and calculated preparation. It is usually done with all the abandon of a careful chess player. The Soviet leaders had to make a major and dangerous decision when they started their process of devaluation. Apparently they are willing to risk the consequences of a period of confusion and doubt. Apparently they are confident that they will be able to use their news media for persuasion and at the same time their various means of coercion to keep their people in line until a new mythology has been established. We even have reports that examinations in Soviet history are being suspended in Russian schools because the teachers do not know what history is correct.

Why are the Soviet leaders doing this? Does it mean any real change in Soviet policy? The answers to these questions gradually unfold. It is our opinion that this is a carefully planned operation conducted largely for internal, domestic reasons. Its impact abroad is incidental and may even risk losses and Party discomfort. But the

major stakes in this instance are inside the Soviet Union, where the dead weight of the Stalin apparatus and heritage had to be lifted in order that the Party program could breathe again and move forward. The Soviet leaders are not easily embarrassed by criticisms or ridicule from abroad, but they are relentlessly vigilant to protect their primary source of power at home. The cult of Stalin was corrupting that power. It had to be destroyed. On the foreign front they move blandly ahead, with successive maneuvers—a new disarmament proposal, an announcement of the dissolution of the Cominform which is really a long overdue obituary, a dramatic plug for credit in the Middle East, a Bulganin and Khrushchev visit here and there. They are confident in the ability of the free world soon to forget the purge of Stalin as the purge of the old Bolsheviks was forgotten. But the leadership never forgets its source of power.

Perhaps you may recall a celebrated passage from Sir Winston Churchill's speech at Massachusetts Institute of Technology back in 1949, at a time when the power of the Soviet threatened the whole of Western Europe. Sir Winston, speaking in parables, wanted to make the point that unforeseen events mitigate the course of history, and he did it in this way:

Four or five hundred years ago Europe seemed about to be conquered by the Mongols. Two great battles were fought almost on the same day near Vienna and in Poland. In both of these the chivalry and armed power of Europe were completely shattered by the Asiatic hordes. It seemed that nothing could avert the doom of the famous continent from which modern civilization and culture have spread throughout the world. But at the critical moment the Great Khan died. The succession was vacant and the Mongol armies and their leaders trooped back on their ponies across the 7,000 miles which separated them from their capital in order to choose a successor. They never returned 'til now.

Now I would not imply from this that the inheritors of the power of Josef Stalin (he was once described as Genghis Khan with a telephone!) have fallen out to any crippling degree—although the death of Beria and his friends and the rehabilitation of many both living and dead indicate deep subsurface disturbances. We can be sharply aware of the fact that the Soviet Union is in process of radical transition from one-man rule to group dictatorship. This might be called a process of institutionalizing a dictatorship. This is perhaps the essence of the counterrevolution going on in Russia today.

Rule by committee instead of by single dictator inevitably has brought about a certain loosening in the chain of command. The differing ways the satellites have reacted to the anti-Stalin campaign is just one case in point. Official rehabilitation of Stalin victims—as in Hungary and Bulgaria—is one end of the spectrum. A tendency to blame all past excesses on officials of the Beria stripe is another. The dissolution of the Cominform, long since a fact but only announced 2 days ago, is an index of a trend.

In the Department of State we do not assume that the Communists have changed their basic objectives. We have no evidence that they have. We recall that Karl Marx, nearly 100 years ago, aptly said that "the policy of Russia is changeless . . . its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star."

Nevertheless, the Soviet leaders today are reducing their emphasis on military strength and threat of force as major instruments of policy. They are shifting and diversifying their methods. Such a shift may be an advantageous development from the standpoint of the United States and other free nations.

#### **Implications for U.S. Policy**

A principal objective of United States foreign policy is to prevent a devastating war. We would welcome any genuine indication that the danger of armed Communist aggression has diminished. We have no reason to doubt the fundamental capacity of free societies to compete with communism by peaceful means. At the same time, there are two facts we should keep firmly in mind when we try to figure out where we stand today.

First we should remember that the Communist bloc retains a tremendous capability of military aggression. It has a substantial superiority in military manpower. It is rapidly developing more modern weapons and a modern technology, including, of course, an ominous atomic potential. The Communists possess the capacity to engage in new military ventures at any time, either on a general or local scale. As long as this capacity exists, it is obvious that neither the United States nor other free nations can afford to risk their freedom and safety on an optimistic reassessment of Communist intentions.

Secondly, even if the Communists remain cautious about military ventures, we cannot afford to

discount the vast stakes involved in the bitter political and economic contests which they are determined to wage against the free world. In terms of the ultimate fate of free civilization, this new strategy is no less dangerous than the old. We assume it to be equally hostile but more deceptive to combat. It is more subtle, more complex, and geared to a longer time period. We should not make what could be the fatal mistake of assuming that a Communist deemphasis on military methods of conquest will allow us to take a holiday. On the contrary, the struggle to protect our freedom may become more intense and will certainly tax our imagination, our resources, and our patience. Our ability to achieve success, like our ability to maintain an adequate defense posture, will depend in large measure upon our cooperation with other free nations. The principle of collective security is as valid today in the political-economic field as it ever was in the military field.

We are interested in what may have changed within the Soviet Union. It is even more important to remember what has not changed in the Soviet Union.

*First:* The power for political decision is still vested in a few men. The people of the U.S.S.R. have no voice in political decisions.

*Second:* The U.S.S.R. is the most heavily armed nation in the world, and it is continuing to develop new weapons.

*Third:* The power structure of the U.S.S.R. is bolstered by an ideology that is basically hostile to any system it is unable to control.

It is still much too soon to make any final appraisal of what this internal change means. Stalin has been criticized for his domestic mistakes. He has been criticized for not preparing the Soviet Union against attack from Germany. His foreign policy, the injustices committed abroad, have not been subject to the same withering reexamination. There has been no indication that a free Germany will be allowed to unite. There is little indication of a new attitude toward Japan. There has been no indication that the satellite countries will be free.

There is one development that clearly seems to stem from the emerging Soviet system of institutionalizing, of group dictatorship. That is a return to the *processes* of diplomacy.

You have perhaps seen the announcement just made by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld that

Egypt and Israel have agreed to an unconditional cease-fire on their borders. This is indeed a welcome development. It reflects credit upon the parties immediately concerned, upon the efforts of Mr. Hammarskjöld, and, if I may say so, on the President and the Secretary of State, because the United States wanted this dispute settled through the United Nations. In the course of this talk I have not had the occasion to touch on the Middle East, although I can assure you I am not unaware of a certain focusing of interest there on your part and by others. But I suggest that the methods by which the new economic-political conflict is being waged are increasingly through diplomatic channels, and in the Middle East that is especially true.

And because the prevention of war is the ultimate goal of the diplomat, the lifelong purpose to which his life is dedicated, perhaps we may hope that this may be progress, even though very small progress, toward the true peace for which you in your important field and we in the State Department all long and for which we all strive.

## **Israel and Egypt Agree To Observe Armistice**

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.  
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*

U.S./U.N. press release 2390 dated April 19

The United States pointed out in the Security Council on April 3<sup>1</sup> that unless the armistice agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result.

It is heartening evidence of the good faith of the parties that it has been possible for the Secretary-General to announce that both Israel and Egypt have notified the Chief of Staff of the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization of orders issued in implementation of assurances for the observation of article 2 (2) of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement.

This word of progress coming from the Secretary-General is most welcome and shows that he is discharging well the mandate given him by the Security Council on April 4.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 630.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 628.

## Objectives of the Mutual Security Program in Asia

*Statement by Walter S. Robertson  
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I appreciate the opportunity to appear in support of the Far East portion of the proposed mutual security program for the fiscal year 1957.

In the area with which we are concerned today, the United States is extending aid under the mutual security program to nine countries—Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. I should like to make a general statement highlighting the situation in the region and the political considerations that make it so important for the United States to continue these programs. After that, the specific programs will be summarized for you by Dr. Raymond Moyer, ICA [International Cooperation Administration] Regional Director for the Far East, and by Deputy Assistant Secretary McGuire of the Department of Defense.

The area we are talking about—the free-world Far East—is a region only in a geographical sense. There are greater differences than similarities between the countries except that they, all but one, share the common problem of being underdeveloped by Western standards. In the area are nearly 300 million people, most of whom are small farmers with an average holding of about one to two acres. The variation in population density is dramatic, ranging from 16 per square mile in Laos to 1,000 or more in some parts of Java and Japan. Nobody really knows what the per capita income is, but the best estimates we have run from about \$50 a year in the poorest country to \$300 a year in the richest country.

The area provides the free world with about 92 percent of its abaca, 88 percent of its natural

rubber, 41 percent of its rice, 66 percent of its copra, and 65 percent of its tin. There is still a tremendous potential of available minerals—oil, bauxite, iron ore, chromium, tin, manganese, sulfur, nickel, etc.

Politically the area is characterized by a very strong spirit of nationalism and independence. These nations are determined no longer to be regarded at home or abroad as second-class citizens. To many of them the colonialism they have experienced appears to be more of a menace than the threat of communism.

The primary objective of our policy in the Far East can be stated quite simply. It is to strengthen the free world and to curb the power and prevent the expansion of communism. The mutual security program is an increasingly essential factor in the attainment of that objective.

The people of these countries have aspirations for a better life which they are determined to fulfill. This program, through technical and economic-development assistance, is helping them to achieve these objectives. The military assistance part of the program is assisting them in maintaining internal order and security and in creating a first line of defense against aggression while they build up in a nonmilitary sense internally. But it is the success or failure of this mutual security program, in giving these nations hope that they will be more secure and better off tomorrow than they are today, that will determine whether they succumb to the blandishments of communism. This hope, if it is to last, must be firmly grounded in their own experience that progress is being made; that they are, in fact, better off today than they were yesterday; and that, when tomorrow becomes today, the same thing will be true.

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on Apr. 11.

As Secretary Dulles said upon his return from his recent trip to the Far East:<sup>2</sup>

The day is past when the peoples of Asia will tolerate leadership which keeps them on a dead center economically and socially, and when each generation merely ekes out a bare subsistence, with a brief life expectancy, and passes on to the next generation only the same bleak prospect.

As you know, I had the privilege of accompanying Secretary Dulles on his recent trip. The situation in this part of the world is still serious; there are still many points of tension; but there is general improvement in free-world competence to deal with these tensions. Doubtless there will be setbacks from time to time, but the general course is one of progress.

The Asian leaders whom we saw uniformly desired to preserve the independence of their countries. They too recognized that political independence of itself is not enough. Eight out of ten countries we visited were anti-Communist. Those two which call themselves neutrals, however, were also appreciative of United States aid and the help that United States policy affords them in preserving their independence. Faith and hope are the stuff of which free nations are made. Our aid programs are assisting the governments of free Asian countries in making such faith and hope possible.

For well over a year the forces of armed aggression in the area have been held in check. This fact, and the radical change in Soviet tactics in recent months, are, in my opinion, evidence of the effectiveness of the courses of action we have been following. Millions of free Asians have, in consequence, enjoyed a measure of peace even though living under the constant threat of a renewal of armed aggression. That threat remains deadly serious throughout the region as it did a year ago. Let us look at it squarely.

#### **Nature of Communist Threat**

In Korea the Communists have not slackened the buildup of their combat capability in the north. Chinese Communist troops are still in occupation of North Korea. They have introduced, in flagrant violation of the armistice agreement, a modern jet air force and new types and larger quantities of other equipment that greatly increase their striking power. The experience with aggres-

sion in 1950, the enormous stake which the United States and the United Nations have in a free and independent Korea, and this threat posed by the Communists to the north make it essential that we maintain our guard in Korea. We cannot be complacent in this situation.

Opposite Taiwan, the Chinese Communists are building 10 airfields between Shanghai and Canton to accommodate jet planes, multiplying their gun positions, and constructing a military railroad into the port of Amoy.

The Korean story is repeated in Viet-Nam, where, in callous violation of the Geneva agreement of 1954, the effective strength of the fighting forces of the Viet Minh has approximately doubled since the cease-fire and it is reported that artillery firepower has been increased some sixfold. Equipment and training are being furnished by the Chinese Communists.

In other parts of the region the Communist tactics are more insidious, but the threat is nonetheless real and menacing.

In Japan, that industrial powerhouse which is a prime Communist target, the Communist Party is a legal entity with a following estimated at close to 1 million. One of the few gestures in the Far East toward the spirit of Geneva was made by this organization when in July 1955 it renounced past "errors" of violence and extremism. This lipservice would have meant more if the Party had not maintained an underground organization with a paramilitary arm which they have used for purposes of espionage, sabotage, and the instigation of mass violence.

In Laos, the Pathet Lao, flaunting the Geneva agreement, continue to occupy the major parts of two northern provinces. They send their agents into other parts of the country to stir up trouble and subvert the legitimate government.

In Thailand, the people recognize the potential threat to them of continued occupation of these Lao provinces and see beyond in adjacent Red China the "Greater Thai State" created by the Communists. There they see a former Thai premier calling upon people of the Thai race living in Thailand, Laos, and Burma to overthrow their free government and substitute communism.

In Singapore, Communist elements have made disturbing advances particularly in the fields of education and labor with their tactics of violence and subversion. In the Federation of Malaya, the

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 539.

British are still fighting their long war against Communist guerrilla terrorism.

In Indonesia, a country which 8 years ago put down forcefully an attempted Communist military coup, the Communists have succeeded in reestablishing themselves in the political sphere and in the recent general elections polled 16 percent of the vote and emerged as Indonesia's fourth largest party. However, on the plus side, a new non-Communist government coalition has been formed which includes all major non-Communist elements.

In Burma, the Soviet bloc has moved swiftly and adroitly to exploit the situation there. Faced with a large, burdensome surplus of rice, Burma has been forced to find markets in any quarter. In consequence, Burma is one of the neutrals that were singled out for special courtship by Bulganin and Khrushchev with offers of technicians, equipment for agricultural and industrial development, schools, and cultural exchanges. During a recent visit, Mikoyan initialed an agreement with Burma by which the Soviets will supply capital and other goods as well as "technical services" in exchange for 400,000 tons of rice annually for 4 years.

Finally, throughout the area, internal pressures in the form of subversion and economic and psychological warfare are being brought to bear in every country in the Far East.

#### **Progress Made in Last Year**

It is clear that there is much to be done. It is also true that much has been done and that genuine progress has been made in the last year.

A little less than a year ago, when the aid program for fiscal year 1956 was presented before this committee, you were informed of the tremendous odds against which the newly independent Government of Viet-Nam was fighting. It was faced with the military and subversion threat of the Communists to the north of the 17th parallel; it was confronted with internal strife. There was the ominous challenge to the government's control posed by the armed, self-seeking, political-religious sects; there was the urgent necessity for resettling hundreds of thousands of refugees who had fled Communist domination following the military partition. The problems were well-nigh overwhelming. The program you approved at that time has made possible our continued support of this new republic in the economic and military sphere. We can, I believe, take great satisfaction

in the remarkable improvement in the situation which without our contribution, we believe, would have been impossible.

We now find a firmly entrenched nationalist government under the leadership of President Diem. This government has proved its capacity not only to survive in the face of Communist subversive efforts but to assume the responsibilities of independence. The Diem government has achieved a decisive victory in the recent elections for the Assembly, which is now meeting to ratify a constitution for free Viet-Nam.

Our own efforts in Viet-Nam are directed in the first place toward helping to strengthen internal security forces. These consist of a regular army of about 150,000 men, a mobile civil guard of about 45,000, and local defense units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on the village level. We are providing budgetary support and equipment for these forces and have a mission assisting in the training of the army. We are also helping to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese police forces. Some 600,000 refugees who fled to South Viet-Nam to escape the Viet Minh are being resettled on productive lands with the assistance of funds made available by our aid program. In various ways under "defense support" our program also provides assistance to the Vietnamese Government designed to strengthen the economy and provide a better future for the peoples in that area.

In Korea, we are demonstrating with other nations of the United Nations that a free nation can successfully be defended against Communist aggression and can be reconstructed and built up to defend itself. Our aid program is the major factor in the support of the Korean Army, which is now the fourth largest in the world and the largest among the free nations of Asia. That army has obviously become an effective deterrent against further aggression by the Red Chinese and North Korean armies entrenched beyond the 38th parallel. Korea's 21 divisions, which we believe continue to be essential, are far beyond its ability to support. Even without the burdens of this military force, Korea would need outside economic assistance for several years to come to complete the rehabilitation of the country and develop the economy so that it can ultimately become self-supporting.

Taiwan continues to occupy a position of key importance in the free world's island chain of

defense in the western Pacific. We continue to regard its defense as essential to the non-Communist countries of the Far East, as well as of the United States itself. As the Communists continue to improve and expand their military establishment on the mainland, the defensive significance of Taiwan assumes even greater importance than heretofore.

The Government of the Republic of China provides a source of hope for the mainland Chinese and an alternative focal point for their loyalty. It also furnishes a political alternative to Communist influence for some 13 million overseas Chinese residing in strategic parts of Southeast Asia. As the Peiping regime intensifies its repression and murder at home and subversive actions abroad, the maintenance of a China that is free and independent assumes an ever-increasing importance.

During the past year good progress has been made in strengthening the defensive capability of the forces on Taiwan and in stabilizing the economy. Substantial assistance from the United States continues to be necessary, however, since the economic resources of Taiwan are still limited in relation to the increasing population and the large defense establishment.

#### **Economic Value of Defense Support**

At this point, let me interpolate a moment. It should be clear to all of us that the term "defense support" covers programs important to economic development as well as to military objectives. A highway, an airport, a harbor, a bridge, a factory may in the first instance be vital for the military purposes, but its construction in most instances also contributes a much-needed economic item. Furthermore, as in Taiwan, the necessity for capital development to support military requirements goes hand in hand with an important objective we all have very much in mind—to reduce the burden on the U.S. taxpayer. As the economy of a country strengthens, it is self-evident that it can do more for itself and the need for grant aid correspondingly declines.

Turning to Japan, while much remains to be done, during the past 2 years Japan's self-defense forces have grown in size and have obtained useful training. The ground forces, numbering 150,000, are regarded as adequate for the maintenance of internal security but are not yet either quantitatively or qualitatively adequate for the defense of Japan. The Japanese Government, strengthened

by the merger of the two conservative parties last fall, has under study specific plans which would improve the country's ability to defend itself unaided. These plans have not yet been approved. The assistance for Japan contemplated under the mutual security program will continue the help given heretofore in the organization, training, and equipping of Japan's self-defense forces. Japan's economic recovery and its growing self-defense capabilities have already made it an asset to the free world. Further advance and development should enable Japan to assume a greater share of its own defense responsibilities and will permit redeployment of certain American forces presently stationed in Japan.

We regard the Philippine Republic as an increasingly important partner in the collective defense arrangements in the Pacific area. The internal threat of armed communism has been generally overcome, thus making it possible for President Magsaysay to proceed with his plans for the economic development of his country. Through continued U.S. aid programs we are assisting Philippine efforts to strengthen the main weakness of the economy—the rate of industrial development and backward rural conditions. We are also providing help to improve the defensive capabilities of the armed forces.

Cambodia has made good progress in dealing with elements inside the country which had been a threat to internal stability. Our aid is assisting Cambodia to strengthen its armed forces in accordance with the expressed desire of the Cambodians to defend the independence of their country and to build up an effective internal security force to thwart subversion. Our program is assisting in strengthening the civilian economy by improving inland waterways, irrigation, and land reclamation and constructing a highway from the capital city to a port on the Cambodian coast.

Regionally in the Far East, the mutual security program for fiscal year 1957 seeks to advance the objectives of the network of mutual-defense treaties that has been created in the Pacific area. The program provides equipment, training, and economic support essential for the military and police forces, as well as aid for economic development purposes. Our mutual-defense treaties are designed to deter the aggressor and to give greater assurance and confidence to the participating governments. Those arrangements are mak-



ing a real contribution to the security of the area and to the hopes and aspirations of Asian people generally. This was deeply impressed on all of us who accompanied Secretary Dulles to the Karachi meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers. After a most thorough review of the activities carried forward during the first year under SEATO—a year devoted necessarily to preparatory measures—it was apparent on all sides that a high sense of optimism, based on solid achievements, prevails among the treaty members.<sup>3</sup>

We can anticipate that during the months ahead many of the free people of Asia, especially those in the newly independent countries, will receive a variety of enticements from the Soviets masquerading as their bounteous benefactor. The Soviets will hold themselves out as ready, willing, and able to solve all their problems with the Soviet brand of military, economic, and technical assistance. We propose to meet this challenge by continuing our own constructive aid programs in the Far East on the same sound principles that have been the foundation for those programs in the past. While not departing from the main course we have charted, we will be better equipped to help the free countries of Asia deal with this new Soviet drive, as well as with other situations that may well develop, if the requested authority for increased flexibility can be written into the legislation.

On the whole, I believe we can all derive genuine satisfaction from the collective strength that the free nations of Asia have been able, with our help, to achieve. The job is by no means finished, however, nor have the threats to security lessened. In our own interest, as well as theirs, we must continue our help to them at a rate and in a manner adequate to the needs of the developing situation.

## U.S. Policy Toward Cambodia

Press release 204 dated April 19

*Following is the text of a letter from Secretary Dulles to Foreign Minister Nong Kimmy of Cambodia delivered on April 19 at Phnom Penh by American Ambassador Robert McClintock.*

DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER: I am disturbed to learn that recent statements from various quarters have given increasing publicity to allegations

<sup>3</sup> For text of the Council's first annual report, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403.

that the United States has been attempting to coerce Cambodia into the SEATO alliance under the penalty of withholding economic aid, and that the United States has obliged the independent and friendly nations of Viet-Nam and Thailand to impose measures of economic warfare upon Cambodia for the same alleged end.

I regret that these allegations have been made since they are utterly false and could harm the friendly relations existing between our two countries.

The American Ambassador on April 2 officially advised Their Majesties the King and Queen of Cambodia that the United States at no time had made any official public observation on Cambodian foreign policy. United States policy in Cambodia is based on a simple precept: That is, the United States through its military and economic aid programs seeks to assist the Cambodian Government in its endeavor to maintain the sovereign independence of the Kingdom. This assistance is extended only at the wish of the Royal Cambodian Government, which officially requested military aid on May 20, 1954 and military and economic aid on September 1, 1954.

Although the United States believes that the free nations can most effectively meet the threat of Communist aggression through collective defense, nevertheless United States policy recognizes that certain countries, though determined to defend themselves against aggression or subversion of their independence, have preferred not to join regional security arrangements. That choice we respect. The United States does not seek ties of mutual defense with any country unless that country believes that this application of the principle of collective security will better assure its independence.

Recognition of the position of these countries in no way prevents the maintenance of close and cordial relations with them. In giving economic and military assistance to friendly countries to improve their capacity to defend themselves against aggression or subversion, the United States is guided primarily by consideration of its own national interests. It considers it to be in its national interest to help in the economic and social advancement of all free nations.

I trust that this letter will dispose of the false allegations concerning our policy, which, I venture to repeat, aims only at assisting free nations to preserve their liberty and independence.

May I take this occasion to extend warm personal greetings and best wishes for success in the new mission to which you have been called.<sup>1</sup>

## State Legislation Regarding Japanese Textiles

Press release 199 dated April 17

*Following are the texts of a Japanese Embassy note of April 4 concerning legislation in South Carolina regarding Japanese textiles, and of the Department of State's note of April 16 in reply.*

### Japanese Note

The Ambassador of Japan presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of State and has the honor to draw the attention of the latter to the following facts.

The Senate and the House of Representatives in the State of South Carolina passed a bill on March 6, 1956 which requires all wholesale and retail establishments in the State dealing in Japanese textile goods, or garments made therefrom, to display a sign "Japanese Textiles Sold Here". The bill was approved by the Governor of the State on March 8, 1956 and has since become effective. Furthermore, it is reported that the State legislature by resolution has requested the other southern and New England states, where the textile industry is prominent, to take similar steps.

The above-mentioned legislation discriminates against the sale of Japanese textile goods in the State of South Carolina. Such discrimination, in the view of the Japanese Government, is in contravention of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States which provides, in Article 16, that products of either party shall be accorded, within the territories of the other party, national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment in all matters affecting internal taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use.

As the Secretary of State already knows, the Government of Japan and the Japanese textile industries concerned, in view of strong complaints by the American cotton textile industries against increased imports of Japanese products and motivated by the sincere desire to settle the problem

<sup>1</sup>Mr. Nong Kunny became Foreign Minister in early April.

amicably, voluntarily started to control the export of cotton goods to the United States in January 1956.<sup>1</sup> The voluntary initiation of this control required great sacrifice on the Japanese side. It resulted in the cancellation of a considerable number of outstanding contracts, which had been concluded before the export quota was set, with the consequent serious economic impact upon the textile industries concerned, particularly the medium and small enterprises. Yet these efforts have now been met by the discrimination imposed in the State of South Carolina. Furthermore, it is feared that similar steps might be taken by other states. The Government of Japan is deeply concerned about the adverse effects such discriminatory action might have upon the friendly relationship between the two nations.

In view of the foregoing, the Ambassador, under instructions from the Government of Japan, has further the honor to request the Government of the United States urgently to take appropriate measures to meet this regrettable situation and to prevent similar situations from arising in other states.

EMBASSY OF JAPAN,

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1956.

### United States Note

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Japan and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his note of April 4, 1956, concerning legislation enacted by the State of South Carolina which requires all wholesale and retail establishments in that State dealing with Japanese textile goods or garments made therefrom to display a sign "Japanese Textiles Sold Here". The views of the Japanese Government that this legislation discriminates against the sale of Japanese textile goods in South Carolina and that such discrimination is in contravention of Article XVI of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan have received the most careful consideration.

It is the policy of the United States Government to effect the orderly elimination of unnecessary

<sup>1</sup>For an exchange of correspondence between Secretary Dulles and Senator Margaret Chase Smith on cotton textile imports from Japan, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1064.

and artificial restraints on international trade. The United States Government has made continued efforts to bring about a full acceptance of Japan as a member of the world trading community. The considerable degree of success that has attended these efforts is a source of deep satisfaction to this Government, which regards the healthy and sound expansion of Japan's commerce as beneficial to the economies not only of the United States and Japan but of all the countries of the free world. In addition, the United States Government has contributed to a higher level of trade between the two countries, notably through the negotiation of mutually advantageous tariff reductions, the absence of quantitative restrictions on imports and the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation to which the Ambassador's note refers. The results of this policy are reflected in the expansion of trade between the United States and Japan during recent years.

The United States Government has noted the action taken by the Government of Japan which voluntarily imposed quotas on the export of cotton goods to the United States starting from January 1956. It is aware that this voluntary action involved difficulties for an important segment of the Japanese economy.

Because of its conviction that a higher level of trade on a mutually beneficial basis between the United States and Japan is advantageous not only from an economic but also from a political and security point of view, this Government is opposed to attempts to frustrate that development. With respect to the South Carolina law referred to in the Ambassador's note and the recently enacted law in Alabama, the United States Government must depend upon proceedings brought by interested parties in appropriate courts to uphold the validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. The fact that this is the regular procedure under the constitutional system of the United States for securing authoritative determinations regarding the consistency of state laws with treaties is always pointed out by the United States representatives during the negotiation of such treaties.

The Government of the United States shares the concern of the Government of Japan about the adverse effects which laws such as those now enacted in South Carolina and Alabama might have upon

the friendly relations between the two nations. Accordingly, the Secretary of State has the honor to inform the Ambassador of Japan that he communicated with the Governor of Alabama concerning the political, economic and legal problems connected with such laws in order to make the Governor aware of the adverse effects of the bill while it was awaiting his signature. The Secretary of State has the honor further to inform the Ambassador of Japan that he is forwarding an expression of concern to the Governor of South Carolina together with a copy of this note and the Ambassador's note referred to above.

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 16, 1956.*

## **Conclusion of 12-Nation Talks on Atomic Energy Agency**

### **FINAL COMMUNIQUE DATED APRIL 18**

The twelve-nation Working Level Meeting today unanimously adopted the text for a Statute for the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency which will be presented for consideration at an International Conference to be convened in September at U.N. Headquarters in New York.

While several delegations participating in this meeting reserved their positions on certain details, all delegations voted in favor of the Statute as a whole.

The twelve-nation group is composed of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States. It met for eighteen sessions from February 27 to April 18, 1956 to consider a previous draft Statute circulated on August 22, 1955<sup>1</sup> in the light of comments received from other countries during discussions at the Tenth General Assembly of the United Nations and subsequently.

This Working Level Meeting is the most recent in a series of negotiations on an international atomic energy agency which grew out of a proposal made by President Eisenhower to the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 8, 1953.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666.

Detailed arrangements for the September Conference will be worked out at meetings of the negotiating group at the adviser level.

## Progress in the French Cameroons

*Statement by Benjamin Gerig*<sup>1</sup>

The general impression gained by the United States delegation after reviewing conditions in the French Cameroons is that substantial progress has been made in the economic, social, and educational fields. We are confident that within the very near future the Administering Authority will be able to raise the political status of the inhabitants to the level existing in the economic, social, and educational fields.

It is our feeling that the inhabitants of the territory are capable and willing to accept new responsibilities in the political field. As a first step, my delegation would like to urge that the Administering Authority take positive and energetic steps to implement as soon as possible the constitutional improvements elaborated in the bill on constitutional reform drafted in 1953. We believe that a reappraisal of this bill might be well warranted to determine whether its various provisions envisaged to reform the political situation in the territory are, in view of the important developments of the past year, adequate to allow the inhabitants to assume sufficient political responsibility.

We hope, moreover, that the feeling of increased antagonism and hostility between the north and south which resulted from the May riots will soon be eliminated as the result of continued efforts by the Administering Authority to develop the territory in all fields, and particularly by increased educational efforts of the inhabitants of all sections of the population. We realize that in this "hinge of Africa," where many races and cultures merge, there is likely to be some friction among the different groups. However, we feel confident that such a situation may be solved by the continued efforts of the Administering Authority to foster a national consciousness.

In this connection, we should like to pay tribute to the measures already suggested by the Admin-

istering Authority to remove the differences between the two sections of the territory. In short, these include a program to increase the contact between all people of the territory and to raise the standard of living and education of the people in the north in order to diminish the misunderstandings which have occurred toward those of the south. We feel that these efforts, which are elaborated on page 41 of the Visiting Mission Report (T/1231), should be commended by the Council as realistic efforts on the part of the Administering Authority to assist the development of the territory toward self-government or independence.

The notable achievements of the Administering Authority to develop and spread municipal and local government institutions should also be commended by this Council. In the field of local government, while it has been noted that much progress has occurred in the southern forest areas and in the progressive Bamileke and Bamoun tribal areas, my delegation feels that continued and additional efforts of the Administering Authority—despite initial opposition by the population—are warranted in order to democratize the local government institutions in the predominantly Moslem north.

We look forward with expectation to the institution of the single electoral college which the representative of France informed us would be effective in the very near future. We should also like to associate ourselves with the expression of satisfaction voiced by the Visiting Mission at the steps taken to date by the Administering Authority to broaden the base of the electorate in the territory. We feel that the Council as a whole has been pleased by the increase in the number of the electors during the last 6 years from 50,000 to 750,000 and hope that the Council of the Republic will soon take action on the draft law which would give universal suffrage to the territory.

The United States delegation has taken note with satisfaction that in almost every phase of its economic life the Cameroons under French Administration is making solid advancement despite the difficulties presented by the land and the climate. From the new hydroelectric plant at Edea, which we understand is the third largest in the French Union, down to the small sawmills, progress is evident everywhere in this agriculturally rich, yet sparsely populated, territory.

We note especially the intensive measures being

<sup>1</sup>Made in the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 22 (U.S./U.N. press release 2314). Mr. Gerig is Deputy U.S. Representative in the Trusteeship Council.

taken by the Administration to acquaint the African with modern methods of cultivation, marketing, and the maintenance of quality through the "Sociétés Africaines de Prevoyance" (SAP), the "Secteurs de Modernisation," and the "Postes de Paysannat." In this connection, we noted the findings of the Visiting Mission that, in the south, dependence of whole regions on such single crops as coffee and cocoa was currently causing widespread hardship due to the low world-market prices for those commodities. To meet this hardship, we believe that the Administering Authority should consider the formation of stabilization funds and that further efforts should be made to diversify the food crops.

We realize the difficulties encountered by the administration in establishing an effective forest conservation policy because of the noncooperation of the population with respect to classification of forests. We feel nonetheless that the Trusteeship Council should once again draw the attention of the inhabitants to the wisdom and necessity for urgent action by the Administering Authority in attempting to implement this policy of reforestation and classification of forests. It is our hope that, as a result of a continued educational program, the inhabitants will cease their resistance to such a commendable program of activity.

Other noteworthy efforts undertaken by the Administering Authority in the economic field and worthy of commendation by the Council are its efforts to increase the standard of living of the population, the promotion of cotton and rice cultivation, improvement of livestock and pasturage, evidences of new progress in the promotion of small industries, efforts to develop the cooperative movement, agricultural experimentation, stockbreeding, road and bridgebuilding, the introduction of fish farming, and improvements in communications. It is our hope that, as a result of the operation of the new electrical plants, there will, in the near future, be an increase in the establishment of secondary industries throughout the territory.

My delegation was pleased to learn of the developments in medicine and public health throughout the Cameroons. The generous cooperation of the Administering Authority in subsidizing hospitals and dispensaries of the religious missions—which has set a record rarely equaled in Africa—should be commended. At the same time we are

concerned over the scarcity of medical supplies in the hospitals and dispensaries in the territory.

Further developments in the social field of which the Council should take note are the advances in the field of public and cooperative housing, attempts to hold down the cost of living, the encouraging inroads being made against the "bride price" practice, and the many new community centers for teaching domestic science. As a requisite to complete abolishment of the "bride price," we feel that continued education of girls with this view in mind is necessary. We should like to urge that the Administering Authority continue its campaign to reduce alcoholism throughout the south and that efforts be made to improve sanitary conditions in the prisons. In this connection also, we hope that increased attention may be given to the necessity of bringing offenders more quickly to trial.

Generally speaking, few African territories can equal the record achieved by the French in the Cameroons for the percentage of school-age children actually enrolled in schools. The overall average is an impressive 55 percent, a figure which is, however, unevenly distributed geographically, ranging from 86 percent in parts of the south to 6 percent in parts of the north. Yet it will be noted that everywhere in the north where the Mission visited it was met by demands for new schools. This must be considered as a promising omen, and we should like to support the suggestion of the Visiting Mission that the Council "commend the Administering Authority for its successful educational campaigns in the north and to urge it to continue to make every effort to satisfy this keen desire for knowledge by apportioning, in the future, more funds for schools and teachers in the northern area and to apply regulations regarding school-age as flexibly as possible."

Finally, we should like to express our appreciation for the successful efforts of the administration to adapt education to the local environment, particularly with respect to curricula, textbooks, and teaching methods, and to promote technical training of the inhabitants. The notable increase in schools and teachers throughout the territory as well as a substantial increase in the number of pupils enrolled in the schools, including girls, is indeed an encouraging sign.

## **Ray T. Hickok Appointed Chairman of U.S. Committee for U.N.**

Press release 201 dated April 18

Secretary Dulles on April 18 announced the appointment of Ray T. Hickok of Rochester, N. Y., as 1956 chairman of the U.S. Committee for the United Nations. Mr. Hickok is chairman of the board of directors and president of the Hickok Manufacturing Company.

Prior to this appointment, Mr. Hickok has served for the past 2 years as a member of the executive committee of the U.S. Committee for the United Nations. He is a member of the finance committee of the Committee for Economic Development and holds office in a number of business and civic associations, including the Young Presidents' Organization, of which he was founder and first president.

In inviting Mr. Hickok to serve as chairman, Secretary Dulles pointed out the importance of the program of the U.S. Committee for the United Nations as evidence of our firm support of the United Nations in the United States.

Mr. Hickok, in accepting the appointment, said he did so because he is "deeply convinced that the United Nations constitutes a major hope for an orderly and peaceful world." He said: "Every effort that can be made to increase public awareness and education about the United Nations is both worth while and necessary."

The U.S. Committee for the United Nations was established in 1948 by the U.S. Government in response to a U.N. General Assembly resolution which called upon member nations to observe October 24 annually as United Nations Day. The Committee is composed of more than 130 national organizations representing civic, business, labor, agriculture, veterans, religion, education, welfare, youth, women, and trade. Its primary purpose is to promote and coordinate citizen programs across the Nation in observance of United Nations Day in an effort to increase public understanding and support of the United Nations.

The chairman of the Committee is appointed annually by the Secretary of State. Mr. Hickok as the ninth chairman succeeds James S. McDonnell, Jr., president of the McDonnell Aircraft Corporation of St. Louis, Mo. Chairmen in the 3 previous years were Morehead Patterson, president, American Machine and Foundry Com-

pany; Thomas J. Watson, Jr., president, International Business Machines Corporation; and Frank L. Weil, Weil, Gotshal and Manges.

## **Senate Confirms Deputy Representative in U.N. Security Council**

The Senate on April 12 confirmed James W. Barco to be a deputy representative of the United States in the Security Council of the United Nations.

## **U.S. Delegations to International Conferences**

### **South Pacific Conference**

The Department of State announced on April 21 (press release 208) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the third session of the South Pacific Conference, which will meet at Suva, Fiji, April 23-May 4, 1956, by the following observer delegation:

#### *United States Commissioner*

Knowles A. Ryerson, Dean of the College of Agriculture, University of California, Berkeley, Calif.

#### *Advisers*

Edna H. Barr, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

Arthur S. Osborne, M. D., International Health Representative, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

The Conference, an auxiliary body to the South Pacific Commission, meets every 3 years in one of the territories of the area and is composed of delegates, alternates, and advisers from the 19 dependent territories. It was provided for in order to associate with the work of the Commission representatives of the local inhabitants and of official and nonofficial institutions in the South Pacific area. These representatives meet together to consider their common problems of health, education, and general economic and social welfare, and to make recommendations for solving these problems on a regional basis. The commissioners and advisers from the member governments attend as observers for the purpose of advising the delegates from their respective dependent territories.

Guam and American Samoa are the only U.S. possessions that fall within the scope of the South

Pacific Commission. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, under U.S. administration, also has been brought within the scope of the Commission.

The first session of the South Pacific Conference was held at Suva, Fiji, in 1950, and the second session was held at Nouméa, New Caledonia, April 15-27, 1953.

The substantive items of the agenda for the third session provide for consideration of (1) topics in the field of industrial and commercial progress and development, such as (a) progress of indigenous industries, (b) problems of modernizing and mechanizing industrial and commercial enterprises, (c) processing of agricultural and marine products; (2) farming systems, including the place of livestock, in the South Pacific; (3) cooperative societies and credit unions as a means of promoting the welfare of the South Pacific people; (4) infant and maternal welfare, having regard to social services, community organizations, and the improving of living conditions; and (5) encouragement and retention, where useful, of indigenous arts, customs, and culture.

At the close of the third session of the South Pacific Conference, the commissioners and advisers of the member governments of the South Pacific Commission will meet to consider the recommendations made at the Conference.

## TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Germany

Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London February 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 1953. TIAS 2792.

*Ratification deposited:* Yugoslavia, March 15, 1956.

#### Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

*Adherence effective:* Monaco, April 29, 1956.

#### Shipping

International loadline convention. Signed at London July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47 Stat. 2228.

April 30, 1956

*Notification by France of extension to:* Overseas France, from February 28, 1956.

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance withdrawn:* Greece, March 26, 1956.

### Trade and Commerce

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Luxembourg, March 2, 1956; Sweden, March 6, 1956; United Kingdom, March 8, 1956; Austria, March 9, 1956.

## BILATERAL

### France

Agreement relating to the establishment and operation of a rawinsonde observation station on the island of Guadeloupe in the French West Indies. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris March 23, 1956. Enters into force on the date representatives of the Weather Bureau and the Météorologie Nationale sign a memorandum of arrangement embodying the technical details.

### Germany

Air transport agreement, and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington July 7, 1955.

*Entered into force:* April 16, 1956 (date of receipt by the United States of notification of approval by the Federal Republic of Germany).

## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

## Resignations

Homer Ferguson as Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines, effective April 8.

## PUBLICATIONS

## Foreign Relations Volume

Press release 190 dated April 12

The Department of State on April 21 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, Volume V, The American Republics*. This is the final volume of the *Foreign Relations* series of five volumes for the year.

The first part of this volume consists of a general section treating multilateral subjects. These

<sup>1</sup>Not in force.

include the Eighth International Conference of American States at Lima, the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, conciliation of differences between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, a dispute between the United Kingdom and Guatemala with respect to British Honduras, and boundary disputes between Argentina and Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and Honduras and Nicaragua. The Conference of American States was notable for the adoption of the Declaration of the Principles of the Solidarity of America, generally known as the Declaration of Lima.

The remainder of this volume deals with bilateral relations of the United States with individual American Republics, the topics being arranged under country headings. The subject given most attention is that of trade agreements, negotiations of that nature being recorded with 10 countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Other topics treated include military missions, protection of business interests, exchange restrictions, debts, and claims.

Copies of volume V (v, 995 pp.) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$4.25 each.

## Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3459. Pub. 6259. 18 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Argentina—Signed at Buenos Aires December 21, 1955. Entered into force December 21, 1955.

**Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses.** TIAS 3461. Pub. 6257. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands—Signed at Washington July 18, 1955. Entered into force December 30, 1955.

**Technical Cooperation, Program of Housing.** TIAS 3462. Pub. 6264. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Colombia, extending agreement of June 24 and 30, 1954. Exchange

of notes—Signed at Bogotá December 1 and 21, 1955. Entered into force December 21, 1955; operative retroactively April 26, 1955.

**Passport Visas.** TIAS 3463. Pub. 6267. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan, revising agreement of October 10 and 18, 1949, as revised. Exchanges of notes—Dated at Karachi August 4, October 20, November 25 and 29, 1955. Entered into force December 1, 1955.

**Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses.** TIAS 3465. Pub. 6269. 26 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan—Signed at Washington November 14, 1955. Entered into force December 27, 1955.

**Mutual Defense Assistance, Return of Unusable Materiel.** TIAS 3467. Pub. 6276. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Norway. Exchange of notes—Dated at Oslo December 12 and 28, 1950. Entered into force December 28, 1950.

**Mutual Defense Assistance, Disposition of Surplus Equipment and Material.** TIAS 3468. Pub. 6277. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Norway, supplementing agreement of December 12 and 28, 1950. Exchange of notes—Dated at Oslo May 15 and June 26, 1953. Entered into force June 26, 1953.

**Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses.** TIAS 3476.<sup>1</sup> 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Uruguay—Signed at Washington January 13, 1956. Entered into force January 13, 1956.

**Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses.** TIAS 3477. Pub. None. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Sweden—Signed at Washington January 18, 1956. Entered into force January 18, 1956.

**Financial Arrangements for Furnishing Certain Supplies and Services to Naval Vessels.** TIAS 3479. Pub. None. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cuba—Signed at Habana January 10, 1956. Date of entry into force: April 9, 1956.

**Relief Supplies and Equipment, Duty-Free Entry and Exemption From Internal Taxation.** TIAS 3480. Pub. None. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Libya. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tripoli December 6 and 22, 1955. Entered into force December 22, 1955.

**Atomic Energy, Cooperation for Civil Uses.** TIAS 3483. Pub. None. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Washington January 25, 1956. Entered into force January 25, 1956.

<sup>1</sup> Assignment of publication numbers to the TIAS series pamphlets was discontinued with TIAS 3474.



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 Press release issued prior to April 16 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 190 of April 12.

No.	Date	Subject
198	4/17	Dulles: news conference transcript.
199	4/17	Notes on State legislation on Japanese textiles.
†200	4/17	Henderson, Seager: statements at Baghdad Pact Council meeting.
201	4/18	Hickok appointed Chairman of U.S. Committee for U.N.
*202	4/19	Pinkerton sworn in as Ambassador to Sudan.
*203	4/19	Warren sworn in as Ambassador to Turkey.
204	4/19	Dulles letter to Cambodian Foreign Minister.
205	4/19	Murphy: "The Soviet Reappraisal of Stalin."
206	4/20	Allen: "U.S. Foreign Policy in Africa."
†207	4/21	Delegation to UNESCO education conference.
208	4/21	Delegation to South Pacific Conference.
†209	4/21	Delegation to Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education.

\*Not printed.  
 †Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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***The United Nations: Some New Perspectives After Ten Years***

This address before the National Press Club, January 13, 1956, assesses the implications for U.S. foreign policy of recent developments affecting the United Nations. Among its topics are the impact of the Bandung conference and the Geneva summit conference, the admission of new members to the United Nations, peaceful uses of atomic energy, disarmament, economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, and review of the United Nations Charter.

Publication 6047

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***The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations***

This address was made before the Annual Convention of the American Association of Junior Colleges at New York City, March 9, 1956. It deals with the new look in Soviet tactics which became manifest at the Geneva summit conference and was shown in the rewriting of some of the Stalinist dogma by the Soviet 20th Congress. The pamphlet discusses why Soviet tactics have changed, what the challenge of the new Soviet strategy means to the United Nations, and what colleges and universities can do about it. It emphasizes that study of the United Nations is of great importance in the teaching of international affairs, and examines facts and fallacies about the United Nations.

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# The Department of State

Vol. XXXIV, No. 880

May 7, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

VOL. XXXIV, No. 880 • PUBLICATION 6331

May 7, 1956

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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# The Institutionalizing of Peace

*Address by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

It is a conspicuous honor to address this 50th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law. The first meeting was addressed by the then Secretary of State, Elihu Root, the initial president of your society. Mr. Root possessed one of the finest legal minds this country or any other country has ever known, and he made outstanding contributions to the development of international law. Two of the original vice presidents of the society were former Secretaries of State—John W. Foster, my grandfather, and Richard Olney. That tradition of close association of the society with the Department of State has been continuous. It is due to that tradition that I am today an honorary president of your society and afforded the opportunity of speaking on this important anniversary.

Before coming here, I reread Secretary Root's address and I was struck by the way in which history repeats itself. That address discussed authoritatively the treaty-making power and concretely the relation of that power to a State law which seemed to violate our treaty of 1894 with Japan. Today we are still discussing the treaty-making power, and much the same issue that Mr. Root discussed is raised by recent State laws which seem to contravene our 1953 treaty with Japan.

Secretary Root concluded his address with a powerful plea for a spirit of international friendship and treaty observance without which, he said, "there can never be a world of peace."

I turn now to the broad problem of achieving the "world of peace" of which Secretary Root spoke. That problem today overshadows all other

problems, because the instruments of war have become so powerful that their full use would destroy vast segments of the human race.

It is particularly fitting that this problem should be considered in this society of international lawyers, because the problem will never be solved without the help of those members of the legal profession who are also students of international affairs. Lawyers have always had a special aptitude in the formulation of political institutions; and that is an art which is demanded at this juncture in world affairs. Peace should not depend upon the winds of emotion being friendly and fair; or upon the deterrent of fear; or upon the skills and improvisations of diplomacy. Now, as never before, peace must be solid, and to be solid it needs to be an institution.

Until recent years it has been war, not peace, that has been an institution. It has been the means whereby international change has been effected. Not only has war been lawful, but the concept of the "just war" has been deeply rooted in our moral and political code.

By the latter part of the 19th century, statesmen began to take note of the heavy economic burden of armament and of the increasing destruction that could be wrought by armament. This led to the calling of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. These conferences did not, however, attempt to abolish or replace the war system. Rather they sought to assure that war would continue to be a tolerable institution. It was sought that war should interfere as little as possible with the lives and with the businesses of civilians; that private property should be immune from seizure in time of war; that blockade should be used only in exceptional circumstances; that contraband be limited so that peaceful trade could

<sup>1</sup> Made before the 50th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 25 (press release 216).

go on; and to "prohibit the discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons."

Mr. Foster attended the second Hague Peace Conference, and through him I became one of the junior secretaries of the conference. I well remember those days, and particularly the debate which took place between various of the delegations as to whether or not humanizing war tended to reduce resort to war. I recall that it was then the German delegation that held the thesis which reappears today—that peace is more apt to prevail if war is terrible, because then all will avoid it.

You may recall that a third Hague conference was planned for 1914. But World War I came instead. At its close, an exhausted world sought for the first time to institutionalize peace.

### **The League Effort**

The League of Nations was designed to establish, at least in rudimentary form, those institutional elements which enable mature democratic societies to preserve order and observe justice.

In the national state, order is maintained and violence is prevented primarily (1) by laws, written or unwritten, which reflect the moral judgment of the community subject thereto; (2) by political machinery to change these laws from time to time so that, as conditions change, laws will continue to meet the test of justice and not perpetuate obsolete concepts; (3) by an executive body to administer law; (4) by courts which settle disputes of a justiciable character in accordance with law; (5) by superior public force which deters violence by its ability to apprehend and punish adequately any who breach or defy the law; and (6) by a state of public well-being sufficient so that the people heed the dictates of reason and of prudence and are not driven by a sense of desperation to follow ways of violence.

The League of Nations had, in its Assembly, the rough equivalent of a broadly based legislative body, but requiring unanimity for most action. That Assembly was authorized to advise a reconsideration of treaties which might become inapplicable and of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace. The Council and the Secretariat of the League represented a form of executive power. There was a Permanent Court of International Justice to hear and settle international disputes. A measure of police power was to be found in the provisions for

sanctions to be applied in the case of illegal resort to war. There was a call for "equitable treatment for commerce."

### **The Pact of Paris**

The United States, although it largely inspired this effort to institutionalize peace, did not join it. We initiated another project which superficially seemed easier and simpler—that was to abolish war. By the Pact of Paris of 1928 over 60 nations of the world, including all the great powers, renounced war as an instrument of national policy and agreed to settle all disputes or conflicts by pacific means.

This pact marks a milestone in history in that for the first time war was made illegal. But also that pact demonstrated the futility of attempting, merely by the stroke of a pen, to abolish an institution as deeply rooted as the war system, when no adequate compensating institutions were brought into being to replace it.

In an effort to put "teeth" into the Pact of Paris, Secretary Stimson in 1932 proposed the doctrine of nonrecognition of "any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928." But aggressors continued to find the fruits of their aggression to be quite palatable, even though others denied their right to such enjoyment.

### **Limitation of Armament**

Another field of endeavor during the interwar period was that of the limitation of armament. It was argued that, since modern war cannot be waged without armament, the likelihood of war is reduced as armaments are reduced. Guided by that simple proposition, the victors of World War I sought first of all to disarm and keep disarmed the defeated nations. At the same time they kept up a search of ways and means to lessen armaments for everyone. The League of Nations was active in the field of disarmament, with the United States participating in certain phases of its work. In addition, there were efforts at naval disarmament undertaken largely on the initiative of the United States. There resulted a certain measure of agreement among the leading naval powers on limitations of specific categories of ships. But the broader problems of disarmament proved baffling.

## The United Nations

All of these efforts became engulfed by World War II. When that war was nearing its end, 51 nations gathered at San Francisco in a new effort to institutionalize peace so as to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

The pattern of this new effort followed the pattern of effort after the First World War. The League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations, and the covenant by the charter. There is, as under the League, a Council and an Assembly. The Permanent Court of International Justice is replaced by the International Court of Justice. This time the renunciation of war, which was found in the Pact of Paris but not in the League Covenant, is in substance written into the charter of the United Nations (article 2 (4)). The quasi-legislative function, which was embodied in the authority of the League's Assembly to consider the revision of treaties and international conditions, is replaced by articles 13 and 14 of the charter which, among other things, call for "the progressive development of international law and its codification" and which authorize the General Assembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations." The charter makes limitation of armament a goal, as did the Treaty of Versailles.

Of course, no constitution is self-executing. The League provisions were inadequately implemented. We may properly and usefully ask: How well are the charter provisions being implemented?

## The Development of International Law

First of all, there is the problem of law. The charter itself establishes some basic international law, notably by article 2, which deals with sovereign equality, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and the renunciation of the threat or use of force. Chapter XI, dealing with non-self-governing territories, also contains an important enunciation of legal principle.

Article 13, as we have noted, calls for "development of international law and its codification." Under this provision the General Assembly has established the International Law Commission, which has since 1949 met annually to carry out this provision of the charter. Much useful work

has been accomplished by the Commission. But progress in incorporating its proposals into the body of international law has so far been minimal.

There is, as you well know, a considerable body of so-called treaty law, represented by treaties as between the nations. But not all treaties represent "law" in the sense we here use the term. Some treaties are multilateral and prescribe agreed rules of conduct in relation to such matters as the treatment of aliens and international trade. Other treaties, usually bilateral, represent merely bargains and are not law in the sense of being a rule of conduct formulated in response to a community sentiment. They are somewhat the counterpart of private contracts within a national society. There has occurred a healthy growth in the multilateral, lawmaking type of treaty.

There is also a body of world opinion which, when it is crystallized and brought to bear on particular situations, plays a role equivalent to our "common law." There has been gratifying progress in developing this kind of community judgment, and the gatherings of the nations at the General Assembly of the United Nations greatly promote this result. There international conduct is judged, sometimes formally but more often informally; and even the most powerful nations feel it expedient to be able to represent their conduct as conforming to this body of world opinion.

While there is good progress, it must be admitted that the total of international law still falls far short of what is needed to institutionalize peace.

## Peaceful Change

Then there is the matter of peaceful means to effect international change. We have referred to article 14 of the charter, which authorizes the General Assembly to recommend change. Of course, power to *recommend* change is considerably less than power to *enact* change. Nevertheless, the power to recommend, when exercised in a responsible way by a great majority of the nations of the world, is a considerable power, and many Assembly recommendations have been transformed into fact.

It must, however, be recognized that debates in the General Assembly in relation to resolutions calling for change tend to be emotional, and votes are sometimes cast not on the basis of impartial study and judgment of the facts but rather on the basis of the political alinement of the members

and sometimes on the basis of what one might refer to as international "logrolling." Sometimes Assembly debate is counterproductive and makes change less likely because it arouses nationalistic sentiments. Indeed, it sometimes seems that world opinion is more powerful when it is sensed than when the United Nations tries to formulate it in an Assembly resolution.

There are vast potentialities in article 14, but these potentialities are not yet sufficiently well developed so that peaceful change is a well-ordered function of the Assembly.

### **Change to and From Independence**

World opinion bears particularly upon the conduct of those peoples who, in the words of our Declaration of Independence, feel they owe "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." It is largely through this force, which found expression in chapter XI of the charter, that there has occurred the greatest peaceful evolution that history has ever known. During the 11 years since World War II ended and the United Nations Charter came into force, over 650 million people have gained a new political independence, now represented by 18 newly sovereign nations. Other non-self-governing peoples are at the threshold of independence.

It is highly encouraging that these vast changes should have come about peacefully. It demonstrates dramatically that a very large measure of peaceful change is possible. But also we must record the fact that these changes only took place within the free nations and that elsewhere there has been an obstinate resistance to the moral pressure for change toward independence and self-government.

There is not, in the world as a whole, any adequate assurance of peaceful change.

### **Enforcement of Law and Order**

Let us turn now to the problem of the administration and enforcement of law. We have in the United Nations Security Council a body which, by the charter, is given primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The charter contemplates (article 43) that the Security Council shall have at its disposal armed forces necessary for maintaining peace.

Unfortunately, the charter scheme for a Security Council action backed by an international

police force has, up to now, not been realized because of the so-called veto power. Thereby confidence in the Security Council has been badly shaken and its usefulness impaired.

In an effort to meet that situation the General Assembly adopted in 1950 a resolution known as "Uniting for Peace." It asked the members voluntarily to hold in readiness armed contingents available for United Nations use in maintaining international peace and security. Also the Assembly set up a procedure for meeting on 24 hours' notice in the event of a threat to the peace and a paralysis of the Security Council through exercise of the veto power.

This partially compensates for the undependability of the Security Council as a law enforcement body. However, the General Assembly is primarily a deliberative body and includes so many members that it cannot serve effectively as an executive or enforcement agency.

As further moves to reinforce the processes for peace, 45 nations have joined in collective security arrangements under article 51 of the charter, which acknowledges the inherent right of collective self-defense against armed attack. Most of these collective security arrangements are backed by the mobile striking power of the United States. These arrangements go far to deny aggressors the opportunity to follow the typical pattern of aggression which consists of picking up weaker nations one by one.

### **The Judicial Process**

Let us turn now to the judicial process. Here we find that, despite much lipservice to that process, most nations prefer to seek the settlement of their disputes by diplomatic means, or perhaps they prefer to keep the disputes open for domestic political reasons. In the 10 years since the new International Court of Justice has been in being, there have been 21 contentious cases brought before the Court. There have been only 9 judgments on the merits; 2 cases are pending; and the remaining 10 have been disposed of without a decision, principally because the respondent has denied jurisdiction and refused to appear. During the same period of time there have been 8 advisory opinions delivered, and 2 requests for advisory opinions are pending. This post-World War II record, as far as contentious cases are concerned, approximates the record of the Per-



manent Court of International Justice, which sat for 23 years between the First and Second World Wars and dealt with 22 cases on the merits. However, relatively more advisory opinions were rendered by the Permanent Court.

It is significant that, with all the disputes which exist in the world, there are only two contentious cases now on the docket of the International Court of Justice. It is demonstrated that nations are reluctant to settle serious disputes on the basis of rules of law.

### **Economic Well-Being**

There remains to consider the conditions of human welfare.

On the whole there has been a vast improvement in economic conditions throughout the world during the first postwar decade. Much of this is due to the fact that the economically mature states have practiced an enlightened self-interest whereby they have assisted others and have encouraged multilateral trade on a most-favored-nation basis. Thirty-five nations work through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to promote world trade on a multilateral basis. The United Nations has economic commissions for Europe, Asia, and South America.

On the other hand, it must be recognized that all of this effort rests upon a fragile international basis. It is open to the nations to escape from their present tariffs and to create obstacles which would seriously interfere with world trade and gravely disrupt the economic life of many countries.

The danger of this is increased by the fact that the domestic impact of imports is always plain and identifiable and the role of such imports in paying for exports is not so readily apparent. World economy is in no sense organized to a point where any one nation can feel that the welfare of its people is free from grave hazard at the will of other nations.

### **The Present Inadequacy**

If one were to summarize the present state of affairs, it could permissibly be concluded that considerable progress, even unprecedented progress, has been made in some of the essentials of an international order. There is more international law than ever before. There are greater enforcement possibilities than ever before, particularly in terms

of deterrence to open armed aggression. There is more peaceful change than ever before.

But even if we recognize, as we gladly do, that international society is moving in a sound direction, we must, I think, seriously ask ourselves whether we have adequately learned, and are with sufficient rapidity applying, the lessons of history. Humanity survived through World War II, despite the failure after World War I. But we cannot be sure that we shall be given a second reprieve. The new nature of warfare, as exemplified by the atomic bomb which burst upon a startled world just after the United Nations Charter was signed, gave notice that there may not be an amplitude of time with which to seek progress by the timid route of pragmatic trial and error.

### **The Need for More International Law**

The foregoing analysis suggests that there are certain areas which particularly require development at the present time.

One such area is the field of international law. There needs to be a greater and more significant body of such law. Popular attention tends to focus upon the police functions of an international order. These are more spectacular than law itself. But law is absolutely essential to prevent despotism. A policeman must know whom he is to apprehend and why, and a citizen must know when he can count upon the policeman to protect him and when he must fear arrest. Without law a policeman, whatever uniform he wears, is a despot or a tool of despotism.

This necessity for law creates a perplexing problem because so much of the world is ruled by those who do not believe in law in our sense of the word. "Law," within the Communist bloc, is considered the means whereby those in power maintain their power and destroy their enemies. Since communism is materialistic and atheistic, its leaders cannot accept the view that law represents man's efforts to apply to human affairs principles of justice which derive from a higher being. For them there is no natural or moral law. Neither can they understand the concept of rulers being themselves subject to law since, by their creed, the rulers are themselves the source of law.

Nevertheless, there is some glimmering of hope in this respect. Recent developments within the Soviet Union indicate an effort to provide greater personal security than existed when everyone was

subject to liquidation through the secret police at the will of an enemy who possessed the greater power. Vyshinsky's code of "trial by confession" rather than by evidence is being repudiated. So, despite the Communist doctrinal rejection of our concept of law, there may be emerging a de facto acceptance of law as a protection of the individual against the capricious will of those in authority.

It is also a fact that on the international plane the Soviet rulers, if only grudgingly and as a matter of expediency, take some account of the opinions of mankind. And these, as we have observed, can form a body of common or unwritten international law.

Therefore, it is not hopeless to seek to develop a greater body of law even on a universal basis.

In view, however, of the great difficulty of gaining multilateral acceptance of formal codifications of international law, we shall have to place much reliance upon unwritten law. This, in turn, requires constant education of public opinion, so that it will reflect a sound judgment about international conduct. There needs also to be improvement of the processes of the United Nations General Assembly so that, when it acts in a quasi-legislative or judicial capacity, it will comply with such high standards as evoked the Anglo-Saxon concept of the King's conscience which the Equity Chancellor was to apply.

There can also be a useful development of law among the free-world nations as a whole and also among those groups of free nations as naturally draw together. The Organization of American States has already done much to develop a body of American law and precedent which helps to keep peace and order in the new world.

### **The Need for More Peaceful Change**

When we consider the question of law, we must always consider it jointly with the problem of peaceful change. Law does not conduce to peace if it merely perpetuates the status quo after that status has ceased to serve the needs of a vital and changing community. So far, force or the threat of force has been by far the most effective means of bringing about change. If force is to be eradicated, adequate means for peaceful change must exist. While, as we have seen, peaceful change has already occurred to an unprecedented degree in the evolution of subject peoples to independence, there still remains danger of war from efforts to perpet-

uate situations which by any standard of equity ought to be changed.

This makes it of the utmost importance that nations be responsive to informed world opinion and that the "peaceful adjustment" article of the United Nations Charter (article 14) should be put to better use.

### **The Stabilization of International Trade**

Another area which needs concentrated attention is the area of international trade. There is often a lack of appreciation of the close relationship which exists between international trade and the problem of war or peace. That relationship seems better understood by Soviet political students. They consider that the vicissitudes of trade under the capitalistic system are its greatest weakness and provide them with their best chance to overthrow that system.

The last important publication of Stalin before he died<sup>2</sup> argued that war between the Communist world and the capitalistic world might not be inevitable because the capitalistic world would almost surely war within itself. This, Stalin contended, would take place as a result of the quarrels which would develop out of the need of the industrial countries of the West to find markets for their goods, given the addition of Germany and Japan as major industrial producers and the subtraction of the Soviet-Chinese Communist world as free markets for the West.

One of the most recent and authoritative Soviet Communist publications is that brought out in 1954 under the title of *Political Economy*.<sup>3</sup> It deals thoroughly with the relationship of trade to international relations and the issues of war and peace.

When we think of the causes of the Second World War, we tend to identify them with the personalities of Hitler and the Japanese war lords. But we would do well to go behind them to the economic condition that brought Hitler and the Japanese war lords into power in the early 1930's. Edmond Vermeil, an outstanding French student of Germany, in his book, *Germany's Three Reichs*, said that the economic crisis "suffices in itself to

<sup>2</sup> *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (Oct. 30, 1952).

<sup>3</sup> Textbook published by the Academy of Sciences, U.S.S.R. (1954).

explain the final triumph of Hitlerism in 1930." John Wheeler-Bennett, outstanding British historian, in his book, *Munich—Prologue to Tragedy*, wrote, "The forces of nationalism . . . revived with renewed vigor under the influence of economic disaster." And G. C. Allen of the University of London, writing in the book, *The Industrialization of Japan*, said, "The sufferings incidental to the depression brought discredit on the [liberal] government"; and Hugh Borton of Columbia University in his book on *Japan*, speaking of the Japanese Premier's efforts in 1931 to keep the war lords under control, wrote, "Unfortunately for him and for liberalism in Japan, he came to power just when the world depression struck Japan. . . . The cry of the militarists that Japan's economic ills could be cured only by direct action in China and by the exploitation of Manchuria fell on sympathetic ears."

As we pointed out, economic conditions since World War II have, on the whole, been sound within the free world and there has been a definite rising of standards of living. But there seems as yet no adequate popular or even political realization of how vital it is for peace that this trend should continue.

Any serious interruption of international trade could readily again bring reckless men to power in hard-hit countries, demanding for their countries the resources and markets needed for economic well-being. This could precipitate world war III.

We have noted the need for peaceful change. Of all forms of change, that of national boundaries is the most difficult to effect peacefully. But the need for change of boundaries becomes less if boundaries are not barriers to the reasonable flow of trade and movement of persons and ideas. The more boundaries are barriers, the more need there is to change them and the more difficult it is to accomplish the peaceful change which is the only alternative to violent change.

#### **Armament as Community Power**

I have left to the last the problem of armament. This is in some ways the most important and in many ways the most complex of the components of institutionalized peace.

There exists today, primarily in the possession of the Soviet Union and the United States, vast power of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

However, these two nations do not possess a monopoly. The United Kingdom also is developing nuclear weapons. And as atomic energy becomes used for peacetime purposes, others will have opportunity to get the weapons material which is a byproduct of the production of nuclear power.

Nations are working today on several fronts in an effort to bring nuclear power under international control. There is the Disarmament Subcommittee of the United Nations, now negotiating at London, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, in process of formation pursuant to President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace proposal of 1953.

The task of controlling atomic power to exclude the possibility of diversion to military use of the byproduct material is, however, very difficult. Science has yet to devise means to assure effective supervision, control, and accounting for byproduct fissionable material.

I do not intend to go into the highly complicated problem of general limitation of armament, a problem found insoluble after World War I. Here, I think, we must rely, in part at least, upon a lessening of political tensions and such reciprocal fear-dispelling knowledge as could result from President Eisenhower's "open skies" plan. If it be possible to create an atmosphere free of fear, that will facilitate arms limitation because nations will no longer feel it necessary or expedient to spend vast sums upon their armament. Indeed, under these conditions, it would be practically impossible to prevent substantial reductions of armaments.

There is, however, one aspect of the matter which I would touch upon tonight. That is the relationship between the powerful new weapons and the establishment of an effective international force to deter and, if need be, punish violations of international law.

How will it be possible to make community power superior to that of the lawbreaker if individual nations possess atomic and nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery?

The answer, it seems, must be found in growing recognition that destructive power such as that now represented by atomic and nuclear weapons is so great a power that it is clothed with a public and community interest. Such power ought never to be the tool of any single nation, to promote its national objectives or to permit it to defy community law and order. Unless that concept

is accepted, it is impossible for peace ever to become a stable and dependable institution.

The United States has already made clear its own purpose never to use the vast new power which comes from new weapons and new means of delivery except in the defense of principles which the whole world accepts. These principles are established by the charter of the United Nations, which requires that "nations shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force," and which also recognizes that nations have an "inherent right of individual and collective self-defense" as against armed attack.

It is generally accepted by the free-world peoples that the United States means what it says in these respects. They believe it not merely because we say it but because what we say conforms to the traditions of our Nation and to the moral principles which our people and their government generally espouse.

The same cannot be said of the Soviet Union, where power is despotic and exercised by those who deny the existence of moral law or of principles superior to the self-interest of the dictators. Nevertheless, the time must come when the Soviet rulers, if only as a matter of expediency and in deference to what should be incessant demands of world opinion, will be prepared to take steps to assure that the new power of modern weapons is in fact subjected to the will of the community.

It may seem that this prospect is remote. But when we consider the many startling changes which from time to time have occurred within the Soviet Union, we need not regard this particular prospect as wholly visionary.

In the meantime, and in order that we may set an example which will be influential, the United States itself, I suggest, should increasingly make clear, by word and deed, through the United Nations and through collective-defense associations to which we belong, that it is our intent that this new power be used only in defense of principles to which the community of nations subscribes.

Paragraph 5 of the Vandenberg Resolution (1948) called for progress along two fronts, "maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces" and also "agreement . . . upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments" of member nations. Progress along these two lines, building community power and diminishing purely national

power, is necessary to the establishment of international law and order.

### **The Task Is Imperative**

When we review the task of making peace a stable institution through processes of law and justice, and enforcement thereof, it is easy to become discouraged. We must not, however, admit of discouragement, because the task is much too important. The fact that the task is difficult, and that the road to the goal may be long, is a reason not for delay or for despair but rather for greater urgency and for greater effort.

There is much to be done and much that can be promptly done. Where universality may not be practical, we can find in regional and collective-defense associations an area where notable progress can be made. These associations can serve as important steppingstones toward a universal order. They can, as between their own members, develop such principles of conduct as we have referred to, and they can make force into a sanction for these principles, thus making it serve the community.

The essential thing is not that the ultimate goal be immediately reached but that the peoples of the world demonstrate the vision and the capacity to move steadily and hopefully toward that goal. The spectacle of men working together in fellowship on great tasks of creation is itself a powerful influence for peace and order. That activity deters the unruly from seeking by violence to interrupt a process which carries with it the hopes of all mankind.

We need not assume that we are set to run a hopeless race with time. We can gain time by intermediate efforts such as I describe. Also, what may seem to be far away today may be reached much more quickly than we might suppose. There has been a great evolution in thinking in the last three decades. Already there is progress such as the world has never known before. Also, never before was there such an awareness of the need as now flows from a knowledge of the nuclear menace. Whereas, in the past, it seemed reckless to take chances for peace, today it is reckless not to do so.

We must assume, as our working hypothesis, that what is necessary is possible. And we must prove it so.

## Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 212 dated April 24

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of interest and speculation on your remarks in New York yesterday about expanding the operation or purpose of NATO.<sup>1</sup> This interest has been increased by the fact that in this conference several weeks ago you talked rather negatively about what can be done. Will you give us some of your further ideas on this subject?*

*A. I do not feel that I can properly at this time fill in very much what I said yesterday. Broadly speaking, it is our view, and I think has been our view, that an organization of this kind either grows or tends to dry up. And we believe that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ought to be in the class of organizations which grow rather than those which dry up because they only were designed to serve a limited purpose which may in due course be fulfilled.*

*As I indicated yesterday, I believe that there is a basis for continuing vitality in the Atlantic community comparable to that which brought into being the Pan American Union and the Organization of American States, which have been in existence for over 66 years and which will go on, I guess, for a great many more years.*

*Now, I do not think that there was an inconsistency in what I said yesterday with what I said in my earlier press conference.<sup>2</sup> I did say at that earlier press conference that I felt that certain types of activity in relation to economic trade as between the members of NATO could perhaps be better carried on through the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation], which includes in the main the members of NATO and also one or two other countries who are not members of NATO. But I did not intend in that particular remark, which I still stand by, to indicate that there was no opportunity for the growth and vitality of NATO.*

*Now, I don't want to discuss the details because we are only one of 15 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This matter will undoubtedly be discussed rather actively next*

*week in Paris, and I think that it is appropriate that we should have an exchange of views around the Council table with our partners and learn more of their views before we attempt to refine and define our own.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, NATO is essentially operated as a military organization. It would appear that political and economic possibilities are the only other two. Are you thinking more, broadly speaking, in the economic or the political line in your latest remarks?*

*A. Well, I would say we are thinking on both.*

*Q. But you do feel that OEEC is the more proper way to handle economic matters?*

*A. Economic matters as within Europe. But there are also economic problems which could conceivably relate to activities between NATO countries, or some of them, and non-European countries.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether the United States Government plans to take to the next NATO meeting any specific plans or proposals for expansion or development of NATO or whether we are just going with an open mind on the matter?*

*A. Well, we will go with some thoughts to exchange, yes. I may say that the general concept of my speech was discussed with the permanent representatives at Paris, who make up the NATO permanent Council there, about a week ago, before I made my speech, because I wanted to be sure there would be a general receptivity to that point of view, and I found that there was.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you thinking of the kind of political development of the organization, for example, that might make it possible, for instance, to consider such problems as Cyprus, and so on?*

*A. Well, now you're pinning me down a little bit more closely than I care for.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when you said economic questions and non-European countries, had you in mind underdeveloped areas which might be assisted by NATO or areas such as the Middle East upon which NATO is dependent for its fuel?*

*A. I would think that both of those aspects of the matter should be considered. Whether there is agreement to deal with them or not I wouldn't*

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 706.

<sup>2</sup> For transcript of Feb. 28 press conference, see *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409.

know. But I think probably they should be discussed. It is certainly relevant, I would think, to the Atlantic community and to NATO that much of its economy depends upon oil that comes from the Middle East and if that was cut off you would be cutting off an element upon which NATO is very dependent as a military organization. That is one aspect of the matter.

There are also possibilities of joint efforts which might include all or some of the NATO countries to assist in neighboring areas such as North Africa. The French have made proposals along that line. I don't want to imply that those proposals would be acceptable, but I merely mention them as indicating the possible range of thinking.

### **NATO and OAS**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in general terms when you point out OAS as an organization which NATO may grow to be like, do you have in mind agencies like the Inter-American Peace Commission, which deals with regional disputes, and the Economic and Social Council?*

A. Well, again, I prefer not to go into that at this time. I would say this: I do not suggest that there should be any exact patterning of NATO to correspond with the Organization of American States. I was careful in my remarks yesterday to say, after speaking of the Organization of American States, that NATO or the Atlantic community might grow in its own distinctive way. I used the word "distinctive" for the very purpose of indicating that it would not necessarily be exactly the same pattern.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the characteristics of the Organization of American States in this hemisphere has been within the limit of the area and its universality. Do you anticipate any change in the basic character of NATO which would make it have appeal to all the non-Communist countries in the European area? I mean such countries, specifically, as Switzerland and Sweden.*

A. Well, I do not contemplate the membership of such countries in NATO because NATO is a defensive military alliance. Its military activities are major and for some time probably will be a major phase of its activities, and in view of the neutral status which those countries have elected to take I could hardly expect that they would actually join NATO.

*Q. How about Spain? Do you envisage Spain as being a partner?*

A. Well, as far as the United States is concerned, we would be very happy to see Spain a member of NATO. And if the broadening of NATO activities makes that easier, that would, from our standpoint, be one of the good byproducts of it. But, of course, there is some difference of opinion within NATO about Spain, and we are not trying to press our views, or force our views, upon other countries.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why there is a feeling among NATO countries today that there is a danger of its drying up?*

A. I don't think I said that they felt that there was a danger of its drying up. What I said referred to a law of nature that it is inevitable that things either grow or they do tend to dry up. And an organization which is created to meet an emergency or a special situation tends to diminish in vigor as it is judged that the occasion for its coming into being disappears.

Now, then, the question is, do we consider NATO as an organization which was created and which has its life only for the duration of the threat that brought it into being? If so, you do not look ahead through long vistas of time. Or you consider that NATO is an organization which reflects the spirit of Western civilization, which has been a great and vital factor in the world for a great many years but the efficacy of which, as I pointed out in my speech, has been greatly diminished by the disunity as between its members. A great task of postwar statesmanship is to heal the disunities which in the past have so often been the cause of war. We have had wars which have come out of the West almost every generation for a good many years.

Now, a great deal has already been done to heal that breach—through bringing the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO; through the Brussels Treaty, which now creates what is called Western European Union. But if the divisions of Western Europe are healed by organizations which themselves are looked upon as emergency and temporary organizations, then you have not got the element for a permanent healing of those divisions and the creation of unity. So I think it is important, from the standpoint of the long-range future of Europe and the avoidance of

what has in the past been a frequent cause of war, that the things that tie together the countries of Western Europe have the quality of permanency and not be merely emergency ties.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good deal of criticism at home and abroad to the effect that our approach to world affairs has been over-militarized. Could it be that your speech yesterday indicates that you are at least exploring the possibility of a different emphasis without sacrificing the military—that you're thinking of increasing the accent on the economic and political approach?*

A. I think that that would be a fair interpretation of what the President said on Saturday<sup>3</sup> and what I said on Monday. In certain parts of the world, at least, it seems that the Soviet activities are putting less emphasis upon violent means and more emphasis upon other means. Perhaps that appraisal needs a little adjustment, in the light of Khrushchev's outburst in London yesterday. But in the main there is an effort to eliminate from their doctrine, and perhaps to some extent from their practice, the Stalin thesis that only violence would serve. As I perhaps have quoted or paraphrased here before, Stalin said that anybody who believed that communism, Soviet communism, can achieve its goal without resort to violence has either gone out of his mind or else does not understand the basic fundamentals of Communist philosophy. Well, now apparently they are trying to get away from that point of view, both doctrinally and to some extent, I believe, in practice. And it's necessary and appropriate that we should, I think, adapt our tactics to the changes in Soviet Communist tactics.

### The Cold War

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, it was the consensus of a group of American newspaper editors in Washington last week that the United States is losing the cold war. On the same day, the President expressed the opinion that exactly the opposite was true. Can you spell out for us some of the ways in which we may be countering the cold war?*

A. Well, of course, when you approach the question of whether we are winning or losing the cold war, I suppose the first thing to determine is, what

do you mean by the "cold war"? As I tried to point out yesterday, the cold war is not simply a defensive operation. If by cold war you mean merely to keep alive hatred of Russia, or to keep the Russians permanently ostracized and to deny them any access to the free world, then I suppose it could be judged that we are not winning the cold war. But that is not my concept at all of what the cold war is.

The cold war basically is an effort, first of all, to do away with the great danger of hot war. I notice that the same people who said we were losing the cold war also agreed that there was very much less danger of war than there has been before. Well, if you call that losing, it's not my definition of losing. And we also, of course, primarily are looking to the day when Russia will be something that we can be friends with and not have to treat as enemies. And there has developed a beginning at least of a change within the Soviet Union. The change that has happened outside, which causes some to fear, is responsive to what the world judges has happened inside. It is widely judged, rightly or wrongly, but the fact is it is widely judged by responsible people, that the Soviet Union is not to be feared as much now as it was before. And if, in fact, the Soviet Union is not as much to be feared as it was, if it has become more tolerant, if it has put aside the use of violence, if it is beginning to move in a liberal way within, then I would call that progress toward victory in the cold war.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your last press conference<sup>4</sup> you pointed out that the fine print has to be read on the Moscow statement on the Middle East. I wonder if that reading of the fine print has been completed and you can give us your assessment of that statement.*

A. Yes, I can say I have now read the fine print and my impression is about the same as I expressed last week. It does seem to me that the statement is responsive to President Eisenhower's statement.<sup>5</sup> Now, when I say responsive to, I don't mean to say that it is in response to, which is slightly different. I don't mean to say that the Soviets made their statement because President Eisenhower made his statement. But the Soviet statement does, it seems to me, fit in with and

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 710.

<sup>5</sup> Issued at Augusta, Ga., on Apr. 9; see *ibid.*, Apr. 23, p. 668.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1956, p. 699.

in that sense is responsive to President Eisenhower's statement, which called upon all of the member nations to support the Hammarskjöld mission and the efforts of the United Nations in this respect. And I think to the extent that the statement seems to commit the Soviet Union to the support of the Hammarskjöld mission and to the handling of this matter in the United Nations, and we can hope a handling which would exclude its use of the veto power in the Security Council, that is all in the right direction.

### Relations With the Philippines

*Q. Mr. Secretary, reports from the Philippines, including an AP dispatch, tell of the dissatisfaction with the prospective nominees for United States Ambassador there. Other reports tell of a rising anti-American sentiment. We are accused of treating the Philippines as an orphan. The New York Times recently described the situation as "serious, if not critical." The question is, do we give weight to Philippine public sentiment and its impact on friendly United States-Philippine relations in our diplomatic and other dealings with them?*

A. We attach the greatest of importance to good relations with the Philippines, and I believe that the relations at the present time are basically good, although I am not unaware of the fact that some are critical of the United States because they do not feel that we are cutting the Philippines in sufficiently upon our economic aid program.

When I was in Manila on my last trip, a month ago, I was quite aware of the criticism that was made in that respect. There was a good deal of attention paid to a chart which was drawn from a United States newspaper which, for example, showed a list of the countries that had received the greatest aid from the United States. The chart gave 10 countries, and the Philippines was last on that list. That was interpreted in some quarters as indicating that we were, as you put it, treating it as an "orphan." Well, the chart did not mean that. It picked the 10 countries that have gotten the most aid and merely lumped together the others, some 45, who had gotten less aid. The whole purport of the chart was to show that the Philippines was among the 10 who had gotten the most aid out of the approximately 50 who had

been aided. And even there the chart was inaccurate because it showed the total aid as approximately \$1 billion, whereas the actual amount of economic aid, including loans and U.S. expenditures in the Philippines, is about \$2.5 billion.

Also there is—very naturally, perhaps—misunderstanding as to the nature of our aid. We don't give foreign aid like a generous grandparent to his grandchildren on Christmas Day, who passes out checks to the favorite grandchildren and gives the biggest check to the one that he loves the most. This is a serious business—where we are trying to build up defenses against the dangers of Soviet communism. In Asia there is still a very considerable military danger, and the trend to renunciation of violence which I spoke of in relation to the Soviet Union is not fully apparent yet as far as Communist China is concerned. The great bulk of our aid in that part of the world is going to Korea, to Taiwan, and to Viet-Nam, which are three danger points. There are there actual wars suspended by armistices but not suspended by formal peace, and there is actual shooting going on sporadically around Taiwan. When we give help to those countries to hold back the military threat of the Chinese Communists, we are by that very fact helping the Philippines, which itself is in an exposed position. If we didn't help Korea, Taiwan, and Viet-Nam, as we are doing, the Philippines would be very much worse off. So that our program in those countries is also in aid of the Philippines. These things are not fully understood. We are trying to make them more clearly understood, because we greatly value Philippine friendship.

I think you made some reference at the beginning of your question to the acceptability of our new Ambassador.

*Q. Yes.*

A. Well, I understand that the *agrément* on him has been received.<sup>6</sup>

*Q. Mr. Secretary, testimony before a congressional committee last week about the Soviet sailors who have gone back to the Soviet Union indicated that Mr. Sobolev and his associates of the Soviet delegation in the United Nations may have indulged in activities not necessarily consistent with his position as a United Nations representative*

<sup>6</sup> Albert F. Nufer was nominated to be Ambassador to the Philippines on Apr. 25.



here. Does the State Department plan to protest action in that respect?

A. Well, that depends upon what the facts develop to be. I understand that situation is being examined by the Department of Justice and the FBI. It falls within their jurisdiction, and I do not yet have any report. Of course, if the report justifies it, we would make protest. [See p. 765.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you made any investigation to find out why these five seamen went back to Russia?

A. Well, that investigation is what is going on. But that investigation is conducted not by the State Department but by the Department of Justice.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to the changes in Russia, is there any evidence of any kind that the Russians are modifying their hold on the satellites?

A. There is no evidence that they are voluntarily modifying their hold. I would say that there is a little evidence that their hold is getting somewhat weaker, not because they want it to be so but because the changes that have occurred in the Soviet policy have put a certain premium now upon Titoism. And while we think always in terms of the effect of Soviet policy in creating neutralism in the free-world camp, the acceptance now of Titoism in the Soviet camp has a certain disturbing influence upon the Soviet hold over the satellites who think that perhaps Tito is getting the best of both worlds and that seems to be entirely acceptable now to the Soviet Union; therefore, why shouldn't they follow on that same path? So I do think that, while the Soviets have not indicated any policy of relinquishing their hold, their hold is becoming looser.

#### **Proposed Advisory Board**

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower Saturday night suggested some sort of rotating advisory board for foreign policy. Have you given any thought to a plan like that? Do you know what he meant?

A. Yes, I think I know what he meant. I spoke here last week of the fact that we recognized the desirability of having a study made of the foreign aid and whether it is being conducted along

the most effective lines, and so forth. That statement of the President was in pursuance of the same thought. We are studying that whole question rather intensely at the present time, and I hope that within a few days we may be able to come up with some concrete proposals in that sense. We are, of course, in that respect, taking account of the point of view which has been expressed in Congress by Senator George in relation to the Foreign Relations Committee. We know that, also, Congressman Richards and the Foreign Affairs Committee are interested in that problem.

Q. Will this board be confined strictly to foreign aid, Mr. Secretary, or a broader range?

A. Well, it is primarily conceived of in terms of foreign aid. Did you mean to imply economic aid as distinguished from military?

Q. No. It seemed to me that the President was suggesting a board which would consider a wider range of foreign problems rather than—

A. No, I think he was only thinking of it in terms of the foreign aid, and perhaps primarily the economic aspect of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back, if we may for a second, to the Middle East, are we or would we attempt to discourage Israel from resuming digging in the so-called demilitarized zone on the Jordan River project?

A. Well, the situation still is, I suppose, juridically the same as it was when that project was interrupted about 3 years ago, at the behest of the United Nations, of General Bennike, then the Chairman of the Armistice Commission, on the ground that it was a violation of the armistice. And I don't know of anything that has happened to change that juridical position since then.

#### **Policy Toward U.S.S.R.**

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your discussion of the cold war, you say you reject—if I heard it correctly—the idea of keeping alive the hatred of the Soviet Union. The President has said, I believe, that the Russian basic concept of world communism has not changed despite these surface changes. And you attach a number of "ifs" to the possibility of changes within the Soviet Union. What, sir, should be the attitude of the average American

toward the Soviet Union in this context? What do we do about exchange of students? The University of Chicago wanted to invite a Russian student, which was not permitted, according to the story. Do we have, as yet, a new concept of the American posture, so to speak, toward Russia?

A. We are adopting a somewhat more liberal policy in that respect than was the case a year or more ago. On the other hand, we do in the application of our policy consider not merely the question of whether or not a particular action would be good or even tolerable, as between our two countries, but we also take into account the effect of our example upon other countries who perhaps might not be able to have the same relationship without their getting into difficulties. The Soviets are very prone to turn to a smaller, weaker country, and say, "Well, we had this kind of relationship with the United States. Why don't you do the same? If the United States does it, well, why not you?" Now, it may very well be that the Soviet Union has projects to ensnare that smaller and weaker country which would be promoted if that country had the same kind of relationship which we could have with impunity. Therefore, we take into account not merely the question of whether or not what we do would be tolerable as between our two countries, but what use the Soviet Union can make of that example when it turns to a third country and says, "Well, now, the United States set the example; why shouldn't you follow it?"

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in London the other day Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Bulganin reportedly said that that was the half-way stop on the way to America and that they would like to come here after the election. Has any thought been given to asking them?*

A. Well, I am not aware of any such thought being given to their coming here, and possibly after they have had this experience with the half-way stop they might not want to go all the rest of the way. (Laughter)

*Q. Have we given any thought to inviting Mr. Zhukov here?*

A. Not that I know of.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when do you plan to leave for Paris?*

A. On next Tuesday afternoon.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to certain changes in the Soviet Union as putting a premium on Titoism. Could you specify for us which particular changes you have in mind?*

A. Of course, the most important characteristic of Titoism is the fact that it recognizes that communism can be a national organization, not necessarily an international organization. That was the thesis which was held in Russia by Bukharin and his associates, who were purged and executed in the 1930's because they took the view that you could have communism within a country but did not necessarily have to be a part of what is commonly called international communism.

The view then held by Stalin was that you could not have communism just within one country but that you had to have communism as a dynamic movement which was trying to get control of all countries. In that sense Stalin's communism was incompatible with nationalism. Indeed, Stalin himself said that Soviet communism is the most international of all organizations because it tries to break down all of the national boundaries. As against this some people held the view that communism could be a national phenomenon rather than an international phenomenon. That was the view that Tito held, and he broke with Stalin on that issue because Moscow did not admit his right to have a national communistic state which would primarily be dedicated to the welfare of Yugoslavia.

If the Soviet Communists now say that it is all right to have communism on a national basis, that offers a great prospect to the Poles, the Czechs, and so forth, who would much rather have their own national brand of communism than be run by Moscow.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev seems to have created some excitement in Britain yesterday with a remark about working on a guided missile with an atomic or hydrogen warhead. Do you have any comment on this remark of his?*

A. Well, that is not primarily within my area. I think it is no secret that they have been working on this for some time. I just checked, for curiosity, this morning to see what the interpretation of Mr. Khrushchev's remark was as being given out by the Soviet press, because there was some question as to just what he had said. And I just was

given, as I came down here, a note which says that the Soviet radio reports it as follows: "I also think that we are not behind in the development of guided missiles," which is a slightly more moderate statement than what was reported by some as the version of what he said.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe Isaac Stern, a young American violinist, is going to the Soviet Union next Saturday for a 4-week tour. This is in return for some very successful Russian appearances here. Do you think this favors the thawing of relations, or does it create some erroneous impressions here—the way you felt, I believe, about the agricultural mission at one point?*

A. No, I would think that the exchange of genuine artists would probably be a good thing. Of course, if the artists are spies in disguise, that's another matter. But a genuine artist, I believe, can go about the world, and it is good for everybody to have fine music made available.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*

## **Second Meeting of Council of Baghdad Pact Organization**

*Following are texts of statements made by United States observers during the second meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council at Tehran, April 10-20, together with the final communique issued on April 20.<sup>1</sup>*

### **STATEMENT BY LOY W. HENDERSON<sup>2</sup>**

Press release 200 dated April 17

I take this occasion to express on behalf of the delegation of the United States our deep appreciation of the courtesies and consideration which we are receiving from our kind hosts, the Government of Iran, and of the effective measures which have been taken for the organization of this meeting.

I take pleasure in bringing to you today the greetings of the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of De-

<sup>1</sup> For text of the communique issued after the Council's first meeting, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Made before the Council on Apr. 16. Deputy Under Secretary Henderson headed the U.S. delegation to the meeting.

fense on this occasion of the second meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact Organization.

It means much to me personally again to be in the Middle East and to have the opportunity to meet so many old friends and to make new friends from countries whose friendship my own country values so highly.

Our delegation considers it a privilege to be able to sit with such a distinguished group of representatives of friendly nations which, like the United States, are so deeply interested in the maintenance of the peace and security of the Middle East on a basis which would assure the preservation of the territorial integrity and the independence of the various nations of the area and would afford the peoples of the area maximum opportunities for political, economic, and social development.

Ambassadors Chapin and Gallman, Admiral Cassady, Mr. Seager, and I, together with the staffs which accompany us, are prepared to contribute to your deliberations and to assist in the work of your committees. We are anxious to do here all that is possible and appropriate to promote the achievement of our common objective.

At a time when the peace of the world is threatened in numerous areas by divisive conflicts, we look with hope toward those groups of nations which have banded together for their common security and welfare. We desire to work with such groups and so to strengthen them that they will demonstrate to other nations in the area that such cooperation is the true road to the achievement of national aspirations.

The American people are increasingly happy to work with the nations grouped in the Baghdad Pact in their cooperative efforts in the Middle East. In planning for the bilateral programs of economic and military assistance which we have with each of the Pact nations, we are taking strongly into account the courageous and unequivocal steps you have taken in forming this association. We have come prepared to discuss the supplementing of these bilateral programs through a program of broader economic cooperation coordinated through the Pact Organization. We will be pleased to carry back with us to our Government any suggestions which you may make for closer cooperation in the many fields of common endeavor which the Pact has opened.

We are certain, however, that we express the feelings of all who are here represented when we

say that it is our sincere desire to retain close, friendly, and effective ties with other nations of the area. We believe the Pact, based as it is on friendship toward all and hostility toward none, serves the interests of the area as a whole and provides no reason for impairing the good relations we all wish to maintain with your neighbors. In our relations with the other nations we shall continue to make clear our firm support for the Pact and our belief that it represents an effective organization for area cooperation and defense.

My colleagues and I look forward to a rewarding and stimulating conference with you during this meeting.

### **STATEMENT BY CEDRIC SEAGER<sup>3</sup>**

Press release 200 dated April 17

The United States is deeply interested in the countries of the Baghdad Pact and their economic and social advancement. The United States will continue its assistance to these and other Middle East countries to raise their standards of living and safeguard their freedom and independence. Significant steps are being taken by all the Pact members to strengthen their internal economies. The economic progress which is being made holds encouraging promise for the future.

The United States believes that the work of the Economic Committee of the Baghdad Pact is contributing effectively toward the advancement of development programs which will bring greater prosperity and greater economic stability for all. The United States has followed with great and sympathetic interest the work of the Economic Committee and its subcommittees. They have assessed a broad range of subjects of common interest on which cooperative action is desirable. At its current session the Economic Committee has given stimulus to the progress which is being made in the economic development of the countries of the Pact. The United States looks forward with pleasure to a continuation of its cooperation with the members of the Pact, and I feel assured from this meeting that the Economic Committee is determined to carry forward the task it has

<sup>3</sup> Made at the closing session of the Council's Economic Committee on Apr. 11. Mr. Seager is Regional Director for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, International Cooperation Administration.

undertaken. I congratulate the Economic Committee on its excellent work.

### **CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. HENDERSON, APRIL 20**

On behalf of the United States observers I again desire to express our appreciation to His Imperial Majesty, the Shahinshah, and his Government for the warmth of their welcome, their hospitality, and for the excellent facilities made available to us.

Prime Minister Ala has chaired our meetings with the statesmanship and ability for which he has long been famous. We wish to congratulate the Secretariat which, under the capable direction of the Secretary-General, has done a superb job in its reporting and in making the necessary arrangements to permit the meetings to run smoothly.

Our participation in this meeting has been stimulating and inspiring. We have been deeply impressed by the restraint, wisdom, and understanding displayed by all of the delegations. We are firmly convinced that any area which can produce the statesmanship which has been evidenced at this meeting is certain to play a significant and beneficial role in world affairs.

As we bid you adieu we have the warm feeling which comes from being among friends. You may be sure that we, the United States observers, will faithfully convey to our Government the views which have been expressed to us. We wish all of you continued success in the implementing of this Pact which means so much to the security and welfare of the peoples of this area.

### **TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE**

The Council of the Baghdad Pact held its second meeting of Ministers in Tehran from 16th to 19th April, 1956, under the Chairmanship of His Excellency Hussein Ala, Prime Minister of Iran.

2. The meeting was attended by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey and by the Minister of Defence of the United Kingdom. The United States were represented by a delegation of observers headed by the Hon. Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

3. The Council emphasised that their several Governments adhered firmly to the principles that inspired the United Nations Charter. The Baghdad Pact was

fully in conformity with those principles. Its object was to assist in achieving the Charter's primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security and promoting human welfare. The Pact was wholly defensive in character. While its members were determined to defend themselves against aggression, they desired at the same time to live in peace with all Governments and all peoples.

4. The Council had before it the task of considering the reports and recommendations of various committees of the Baghdad Pact Organisation, and of reviewing the international political situation especially from the point of view of its repercussions on the Pact area.

5. In the light of their thorough review of the political situation, the Council considered that although there was a change of tactics, the basic objectives of international communism remained unchanged. Its activities in the area required that the free world continue to exercise unceasing vigilance if its solidarity was to be maintained and freedom and peace were to be preserved. There could be no relaxation of measures designed to strengthen the defensive capacity of this area. In the view of the Council, the criticism and attacks from neutralist and other sources directed against the Baghdad Pact and other similar organisations created to provide for the legitimate defence and peaceful development of their member nations, spring largely from lack of knowledge and misunderstanding of its true purposes. It is the hope of the Council that as these purposes become better known, these criticisms will give way to sympathetic and active co-operation and that the Baghdad Pact will become, as it is intended to be, a unifying factor among the peoples in the region who wish to preserve a free and democratic way of life. Meanwhile, these criticisms and attacks can only help to keep the region divided and weak and member countries decided to counter them actively and resolutely.

6. Specific problems which were causing tension in this area were also discussed thoroughly and frankly in a spirit of mutual comprehension. In particular, the Council emphasised the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes.

7. In the midst of this troubled political situation, it was the Council's conviction that the Baghdad Pact offered the best means of safeguarding the peace and stability and of promoting the welfare and unity of the area, whilst at the same time it effectively served the cause of world peace. Urgent steps must, therefore, be taken to strengthen this Pact. For this purpose, member countries in this area must be equipped with the means for developing their military and economic strength and the Pact must yield positive visible results. At the same time, systematic efforts should be made to create a better understanding of the Pact among the nations which are opposing it.

8. The Council adopted the report of the Economic Committee and the various resolutions submitted by it. These provide for the establishment of a Centre for imparting training in the use of agricultural machinery and in methods of soil and water conservation, for establishing joint training centres for anti-malaria operations and health education, for undertaking jointly by two

or more countries surveys in the field of locusts and pests, for co-ordination of research in certain fields, and for exchange of technical personnel and of information on scientific and technical subjects. The Council agreed that it was necessary to implement the resolutions without delay, particularly those relating to projects which are likely to yield early and visible results and to promote the well being of the people in the Pact area. The Council noted with satisfaction that the Atomic Energy Centre was expected to open at Baghdad in January, 1957.

9. The Council drew special attention to the importance of joint projects of mutual interest to one or more member countries. It was decided that a technical Committee comprising members of each of the interested Governments should take place at Ankara to make a preliminary study of the possibility of a joint development plan of the water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates basin and to make recommendations for the carrying out of any further detailed studies which may be required. The possibilities of development of mineral resources in the eastern parts of Iran and the timber reserve in Caspian provinces by the joint efforts of Iran and Pakistan were noted. The Council also decided to set up a working party to meet in June, 1956, at Tehran to consider the means whereby regional projects of interest to two or more members of the Pact could be studied and implemented through economic and technical assistance. The Council recognised the far reaching need for regional co-operation and joint projects in the fields of industry and communications.

10. The Council noted that the Economic Committee would undertake a detailed study of the pattern of production and trade between member countries with a view to promoting trade within the Pact area. The Council considered that notwithstanding the fact that the needs of the member countries in the Pact area were at present similar, there was scope for expansion of trade in this area in the immediate future. In this connection, Pakistan's recent offer to buy dates from Iraq was welcomed.

11. The Council recognised the importance of technical assistance between member countries. The Council agreed that the Secretariat should co-ordinate this work on the basis of the offers already received by the Economic Committee. It noted that the United Kingdom and Pakistan had offered technical assistance.

12. The Council welcomed the active participation of the United States in the work of the Pact Organisation. The Council considered that the active and continuing support of the United States for the Pact and its objectives was an essential factor in the strengthening and development of the member countries and in the realisation of their peaceful aims. The United States reaffirmed its solid support of the Pact and stated that it would continue to lend support to the individual and collective efforts of the Member nations to attain the political, defensive, economic and social objectives of the Pact.

13. The United States, on the invitation of the Council, became a full member of the Economic Committee and the Counter Subversion Committee. The terms of reference of these two Committees provide for the extension of membership to non-signatory governments at the discretion of the Council.

14. The United States delegate to the Economic Committee reaffirmed the intention of his country to continue its bilateral technical and economic assistance to the member nations, and indicated that the United States would consider ways of assisting joint projects undertaken by members of the Economic Committee of the Pact.

15. The United States observer to the Military Committee offered to establish a Military Liaison group at the permanent Headquarters of the Baghdad Pact, headed by a Flag or General Officer. The Council welcomed and accepted this proposal.

16. The United States observers expressed their Government's intention of continuing its military assistance to the member countries.

17. The Council considered that there is a threat of subversion in this area and agreed that it can be met most effectively by co-operation among members of the Pact. To this end the Council decided to establish a permanent organization under the administrative control of the Secretary General. The Council recognized that while the threat of subversion could be countered with measures designed to expose its real nature and give the widest publicity to the aim and activities of the Pact, the essence of combating subversion lay in the eradication of the conditions in which it thrives, namely, economic under-development and defensive weakness. Both must be remedied as soon as possible.

18. In the light of the common determination that the territorial integrity of the Member states of the Pact shall be defended the Military Committee decided to expedite all necessary further measures for the defence of the Baghdad Pact countries. The Council considered the report of the Committee and noted that considerable progress had already been achieved in the military sphere.

19. The Council decided that its next meeting at Ministerial level should be held at Karachi in the month of January, 1957, and that in the meanwhile the Council will continue to meet regularly at the Deputies' level.

## Visit of Vice President of Brazil

The Department of State announced on April 26 (press release 220) that the members of the party of João Goulart, Vice President of Brazil, who will visit Washington from April 30 to May 3, will be as follows:

João Goulart, Vice President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil; Senhora Goulart

João Lima Teixeira, Senator from the State of Bahia

Fernando Ferrari, Federal Deputy from the State of Rio Grande do Sul

Roberto Silveira, Lieutenant Governor of the State of Rio de Janeiro

Geraldo Eulálio Nascimento e Silva, Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Eugenio Caillar, Executive Secretary to the Vice President Yara Vargas Lopes, Secretary to Senhora Goulart

The party will leave Washington on May 3 for

a 2-week private tour which will include visits to the King Ranch in Texas, Kansas City, Detroit, and New York.

## Change in NATO Command

*Following are texts of statements and documents relating to the retirement of Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the appointment of Gen. Lauris Norstad as his successor.*

### WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF APRIL 13

White House Office (Augusta, Ga.) press release

The White House today announced that the President has with deep regret accepted the request of General Alfred M. Gruenther for retirement from the United States Army toward the end of this year.

General Gruenther is at present serving as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, under appointment by the North Atlantic Council. The Council has acceded to the President's request that General Gruenther be released from this NATO Command upon retirement.

The White House also announced that, in response to a subsequent request by the North Atlantic Council, the President has nominated and the Council has approved the appointment of General Lauris Norstad, United States Air Force, as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in succession to General Gruenther. The appointment will take effect at a date to be decided later.

In a letter to General Gruenther, the President said, "The announcement of your decision to request relief as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and to retire from active military service will be received with great disappointment by our European Allies and by the American people. All appreciate the magnificent contribution you have made toward the fulfillment of the objectives of NATO and, I am certain, will wish to join with me in congratulating you on your performance. You have been intimately associated with NATO since its inception. To your task as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, you brought a wealth of military experience and a unique quality of leadership which you have unselfishly and with great distinction employed in improving the effec-

tiveness and solidarity of the forces under your command."

In the letter nominating General Norstad, the President said, "General Norstad is an officer of outstanding ability. He has the special qualification of long years of experience in Europe, culminating in almost three years of devoted service as Air Deputy to SACEUR. The confidence placed in him by the Member Nations has been amply demonstrated. It is our common purpose to deter and, if need be, defend against aggression so that mankind may live and prosper in freedom. I am confident that under General Norstad's leadership this high resolve will continue to be steadfastly upheld."

#### **ANNOUNCEMENT BY NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, APRIL 13**

1. The North Atlantic Council have been informed of the contents of a communication from the President of the United States of America to the Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the Council, in which he asked that the member governments should agree to the release at his own request towards the end of this year of General Alfred M. Gruenther from his assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe in order to permit his retirement from active duty.

2. The Council agreed with great regret to release General Gruenther from his assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. They recognised that General Gruenther had fully discharged the trust reposed in him by the Council when, in May 1953, they appointed him as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. They expressed to General Gruenther, in the name of the governments represented on the Council, lasting gratitude for the distinguished service rendered by him.

3. The Council then unanimously decided to request the President of the United States of America to nominate an officer of the US Armed Forces for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander Europe to succeed General Gruenther. The request was immediately transmitted to the President of the United States, who informed the Council of his nomination of General Lauris Norstad for consideration by the Council as successor to General Gruenther.

4. The Council at a meeting this afternoon

unanimously adopted a resolution declaring that they reposed the greatest faith in General Norstad and appointed him Supreme Allied Commander Europe, as successor to General Gruenther, with the same powers and functions. The appointment will become effective towards the end of this year.

ANNEX I. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO LORD ISMAY

10TH APRIL, 1956

DEAR LORD ISMAY,

I am addressing you as Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council with the request that appropriate action be taken at an early date to secure the release toward the end of this year of General Alfred M. Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. In making this request through you to the Member Nations who appointed him, I ask that they give favorable consideration to his release.

Personal considerations have led General Gruenther to request retirement from active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States toward the end of this year. I believe his distinguished career of dedicated national and international service has earned for him the right to have his request granted.

The steady growth of Communist armed strength, compelling the NATO Nations to maintain their deterrent and defensive strength, emphasizes the continued necessity for outstanding leadership at SHAPE. The Council will shortly proceed to appoint an able officer to the vacancy created by General Gruenther's retirement. Surely the Nation invited to nominate a successor will propose its most eligible officer available.

Afforded the same high degree of trust and cooperation that Nations have extended to General Gruenther, the new SACEUR will, I am confident, be successful in carrying out his vital responsibilities.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Right Honorable LORD ISMAY, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.,  
*Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,*  
*Palais de Chaillot,*  
*Paris.*

ANNEX II. COUNCIL RESOLUTION ACCEPTING THE RELIEF OF GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER AND REQUESTING NOMINATION OF A US OFFICER TO BE HIS SUCCESSOR

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

Having considered a communication by the President of the United States to the Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the Council requesting him to initiate appropriate action to secure the release of General Alfred M. Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe,

Agrees with great regret to the release towards the end of this year of General Gruenther from assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe;

Recognises that General Gruenther has fully discharged the trust reposed in him by the North Atlantic Council

when in May 1953, the Council appointed him Supreme Allied Commander Europe;

Expressed to General Gruenther, in the name of the Governments represented on the Council, lasting gratitude for the distinguished service rendered by him;

Unanimously requests the President of the United States to nominate an officer of the Armed Forces of the United States for appointment by the Council as Supreme Allied Commander Europe to succeed General Gruenther, at a date to be decided later.

ANNEX III. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO LORD ISMAY

13TH APRIL, 1956

DEAR LORD ISMAY,

Pursuant to the request of the North Atlantic Council that I nominate an officer of the Armed Forces of the United States for appointment by the Council as Supreme

Allied Commander, Europe, to succeed General Alfred M. Gruenther, I hereby nominate General Lauris Norstad.

General Norstad is an officer of outstanding ability. He has the special qualification of long years of experience in Europe, culminating in almost three years of devoted service as Air Deputy to SACEUR. The confidence placed in him by the Member Nations has been amply demonstrated.

It is our common purpose to deter and, if need be, defend against aggression so that mankind may live and prosper in freedom. I am confident that under General Norstad's leadership this high resolve will continue to be steadfastly upheld.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Right Honorable LORD ISMAY, G.C.B., C.H., D.S.O.,  
*Secretary General of the  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.*

## The Purge of Stalinism

*by Allen W. Dulles  
Director of Central Intelligence<sup>1</sup>*

There is never a dull moment in my job as Director of Central Intelligence. Events which seem to defy analysis happen somewhere in the world every day. Few trends seem to follow a predictable course.

These last few weeks there have been developments in the Soviet Union which have puzzled all the experts who generally have ready answers—sometimes more ready than accurate—to explain Soviet conduct. Just at a time when some are saying that everything is going wrong with foreign policy in the free-world countries but that everything in the Soviet Union is progressing according to some great master design, the Soviet collective leadership, as they call it, comes forward to beat their collective breasts and indulge in the most extreme self-criticism.

The men in the Kremlin now tell us that all they said earlier about events in the U.S.S.R. during the 20 years preceding Stalin's death is quite wrong; that in fact this was an era of in-

famy, crime, and shame. They admit that their past adulation of Stalin was based on fear, not on fact. The man they themselves used to call the "glorious Stalin, genius of mankind" is now being publicly accused of "grave errors" and privately described as a malicious monster.

The Soviet leaders do not very clearly explain why the new collective leaders waited for 3 years after Stalin's death to tell it to their people. They do not make a very satisfactory showing as to why they themselves sat acquiescent in the seats of the mighty during all the period of Stalin's dictatorship, exercising great powers as members of his inner circle.

Possibly, as Khrushchev is reported to have admitted, the price of nonconformity was a bullet in the head. This is a very human excuse but a poor qualification for high office on the part of those who now assert the rights and prerogatives of leadership. In the free world, where we aspire to build on the great traditions of the past, not to repudiate them, we revere as our heroes and leaders those who refused to conform, whatever the risks, when the principles of liberty were at stake.

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on Apr. 13.



In the U.S.S.R., evidently, acquiescing in crime as the price of simple survival under a political tyrant is sanctioned as legitimate conduct. As they put it: "The point was not to save one's own life; the point was to save the revolution."

### **Years of Stalin's Power**

Before going further into the details of this strange development in the Soviet Union it may be worth while to review briefly what had been taking place there during the years of Stalin's power. Here we may find clues as to why the men in the Kremlin now take the serious risks of repudiating their late hero for having put the individual above party and substituting a personal dictatorship for a collective one.

Stalin himself ran through a series of revolutionary combinations, somewhat akin to collective leaderships, during the 1920's. For example, in 1924-25 he combined with Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky. From 1925-27, a new alliance between Stalin, Bukharin, and Rykov was formed and routed a Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kamenev combination. And finally, from 1927-29, Stalin worked with Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and others to crush Stalin's recent allies, Bukharin and Rykov.

It was during the 10 years which preceded Russia's entry into World War II that Stalin completed the consolidation of his control over the Communist Party machinery. By that time he had placed his loyal stooges in all important positions of authority throughout the Soviet Union and the army was brought under political control.

Among the major charges said to have been leveled against Stalin by Khrushchev is the charge that in the late thirties he deliberately liquidated Marshal Tukhachevsky and thousands of the best officers in the Soviet Army, presumably to insure his political control of the military apparatus. Certainly today there is good reason to believe that Marshal Tukhachevsky was falsely accused of conniving with the Germans. There is some evidence that there was a clever German plot to discredit Tukhachevsky, which happened to fit in with Stalin's own plans.

We do know that during and after the war there was burning resentment among the Soviet professional soldiers at Stalin's interference in the conduct of the war, his unjust and capricious belittling of heroes such as Zhukov, and his arrogant

claims to personal credit for Soviet victories. A senior Soviet general, for example, is recently reported as having privately branded their so-called documentary film, "The Fall of Berlin," which shows Stalin as the great military mastermind, as a "tissue of lies."

Today the collective dictatorship is assiduously repairing the injured dignity of the military and incorporating its leadership into Communist Party membership. They must realize that, following the usual pattern of revolutions, the military leaders might tire of being the pawn of dictators, whether individual or collective.

But whatever the faults of Stalin in the prewar decade, one can hardly ascribe them to his old age or senility. Stalin was then in his prime. Furthermore, one can hardly believe that the acts of the dictator in a war from which he emerged as a hero are the motivating causes for the present attempt to liquidate his memory. In fact, the most recent Soviet pronouncements are tending to refer to "good" and "bad" Stalin eras. Naturally, there is no desire to repudiate such measures as farm collectivization and the rapid industrialization under the Five-Year Plans, which are so closely associated with his name. The beginning of the "bad" period was in 1934, when the great Stalin purges began. If they denounce his war record, the purpose here must be to eliminate him from the hero class and to give the military some of the credit he had arrogated to himself.

But to find the real reasons for the de-Stalinization campaign, we must, I believe, look to the more recent past, particularly to the hard autocratic period during the last 6 or 7 years of Stalin's life. Here we find two major motivations for cutting away from Stalin worship.

Internationally, from about 1947 onward to the time of his death, Stalin's often bellicose policy in the international field had been a failure and had tended to unite the free world against international communism. Domestically during this period his police state was meeting ever-increasing disfavor, not only with the helpless people but with the top politicians, generals, and industrial managers who were essential to the working of the Soviet system. This began to create problems for the regime.

### **The International Problem**

First, let us look at the international picture. In the immediate postwar era, riding the crest of the common victory and maintaining military

strength and power, Soviet policy had notable successes. It consolidated the grip on the European satellites and helped the Chinese Communists to victory.

But beginning with about 1947 in Europe, somewhat later in Asia, the free world at last began to realize the implications of the forward drive of international communism and started to take countermeasures, and the tide began to turn.

What happened in these years? The Marshall plan, which Stalin and Molotov indignantly rejected and tried to defeat, was put into effect, and Europe was saved from economic chaos. In Greece, the Soviet effort to take over by guerrilla tactics was thwarted.

When the Soviet attempted to take over Berlin and destroy this outpost of Western freedom, the Berlin blockade was frustrated by the airlift, and West Berlin remains a show window of what the free world can do. Tito survived his ejection from the Cominform and the wrath of Stalin and struck back with telling criticisms of Stalinist policy—almost identical with what Soviet leaders are now themselves saying.

Later the North Atlantic alliance was organized, and despite Soviet threats the way was opened for German rearmament in close union with the West.

Thus frustrated in the European field Stalin turned to the Far East and, working with the North Korean and Chinese Communists, attempted to take over Korea as the first step toward driving America from the western Pacific. Again the Communists were blocked, and, most important of all, an alarmed and awakened American public opinion proceeded to the defensive rearmament of this country. Our nuclear power was vastly increased.

It is understandable that Stalin's successors should have found it convenient to place upon him the blame for Greece, Berlin, Korea, Yugoslavia, German rearmament, and the like and, in particular, for the generally hard Soviet line which has led to the buildup of American defense forces and NATO. It was these successes which led the Soviet Union to conclude that a peace treaty with Austria was necessary to build up their badly shattered reputation as peacemongers and to prepare the way for a summit conference, their pilgrimage of penitence to Belgrade, and their effort to line the Socialist parties into new popular fronts.

## The Domestic Situation

But the foreign scene alone by no means explains the urge the present Kremlin leaders felt to break with the hard Stalinist past. They were already making progress in allowing the memory of Stalin to fade in international recognition and prestige without going to the extreme of total destruction of the Stalin myth with their own people. Thus the clue to their present policy lies more in the internal Soviet situation than in the requirements of their foreign policy.

Domestically they have been caught in a dilemma. In order to compete with the Western World in the fields of science and industry, which was vitally important for their economic growth and their rearmament program, it was essential for the Soviet to speed up the education of their people, especially in the scientific and technical field. After Stalin's death the regime encouraged more objectivity in scientific inquiry and put on the shelf some pseudoscientists such as Lysenko. After all, they had found out early in the game that in the present nuclear age one could not fool around with scientists who tailored their art to the whims of Marxism.

Obviously, the Soviet leaders could not limit their educational processes to the scientific fields, and more and more young men and women are graduating from schools which correspond to our high schools and colleges and are taking advanced degrees comparable to our degrees of Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy. Even with all the indoctrination in Communist teachings which they give to their young students it is impossible to prevent education from developing the critical faculties which every thinking human being possesses.

Furthermore, as part of their new campaign of sweetness and light, they have found it wise to take down some of the bars which have impeded travel between the Soviet Union and the free countries; and while the Iron Curtain still remains and there is a careful selective process as to those who are permitted to leave the Soviet Union or to visit it, it is obvious that today there is far more contact between the people of the U. S. S. R. and outside countries than at any time in recent years.

All this has tended to build up pressures upon the Soviet rulers to create an impression, not only internationally but also domestically, that a dictatorship of the Stalin type was dead forever.

The Soviet leaders are trying to meet their external and internal dilemmas by finding a convenient "devil" which they can use to explain away past Soviet sins to the world abroad and to their own people, as well as to demonstrate that the present rulers of the Soviet are different mentally and morally than they were under Stalin. Thus they hope that their own people will accept their protestations that the days of government by arbitrary policymaking, secret trials, deportations, and prison camps are over. Furthermore, they are again promising that they will do something to raise the standard of living so that the promise of individual freedom will be seasoned with a greater share of consumers goods and a more abundant life.

### **Threat to Communist Party**

The extent of the opposition to the Stalinist-type regime must have been gaged by the Kremlin as far stronger and deeper among the Russian people than we had dared to hope. Nonetheless, the destruction of the Stalin myth carries with it a very real threat to the internal discipline and unity of the Soviet Communist Party and the international Communist movement.

That calculated risk must have been taken deliberately by men who knew they had to have a scapegoat if they were to hope to preserve the dictatorship on which their own power and very survival rested. By attacking the personal symbol of Stalin and the worst excesses of his rule, they hope to be able to preserve many of the essentials of the Stalinist system—now labeling it Leninism—the monopoly of all power by a single party, the complete subordination of the courts and individual rights to arbitrary Party decree, the governmental control of the press and of all organs of public information.

### **Basic Structure To Be Preserved**

This basic structure is meant to be preserved intact. Already the regime has publicly warned that some "rotten elements" have taken the de-Stalinization campaign too literally and are "trying to question the correctness of the Party's policy." This, *Pravda* thundered, is "petty bourgeois licentiousness" of a kind the "Party has never tolerated and will never tolerate." A dead and dishonored Stalin, therefore, is likely to be merely a device—here possibly a Trojan corpse

rather than a Trojan horse—with which the long-suffering Russian people are, I fear, to be deceived in their expectation of a freer and better life.

Obviously the Soviet rulers concluded that it would take something more than a mere repetition of the old clichés to have any effect. Apparently this necessity was deemed to be urgent and compelling. They had tried to do the trick with the liquidation of Beria, but the secrecy surrounding his execution was hardly a persuasive bit of evidence of a new dawn of liberty. It was in the worst tradition of the Stalin era—and he, after all, generally gave his victims at least a drumhead public trial.

The degradation of Stalin, if the Soviet program had worked as the leaders had apparently planned it, was to be under strict Party discipline. But it seems to have got out of hand. When Khrushchev briefed the Party leaders assembled at the 20th Congress in Moscow at a secret meeting on February 25th, the representatives of foreign Communist Parties were excluded but the Party leaders from all parts of the U.S.S.R. were there. They were to take the gospel by word of mouth to the local precinct leaders. What was planned, apparently, was a gradual process of burying the dead leader's memory. Different medicine was to be reserved for the faithful followers of Stalin in the satellites, each according to their needs.

Something may have gone wrong with this careful planning. It is possible that difficult questions were posed by those Party workers who had been taught for decades to worship Stalin and who knew that Khrushchev, Bulganin, and the whole Politburo owed their positions to him. On the other hand, Khrushchev may have deliberately planned to give the Party the "shock treatment" to give more conviction to the "new men" and "new times" theory.

At any rate, whatever may have been the plan, the reports are unanimous, as published in the press of every free country without effective denial from Moscow, that Khrushchev ended up by branding Stalin not only as a heartless dictator but as a tyrant and murderer, an incompetent military leader whose bungling in both war and peace had brought the Soviet Union to the verge of ruin. In the same breath, Stalin, the leading theoretician of communism for the past 25 years, was labeled a heretic and his interpretations of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy were rejected.

It may be well at this point to consider the position and character of the men who have now brought these charges. All of them had been for many long years prominently associated with Stalin's policies. Some had been his hatchetmen in many of the less savory acts of his checkered career. Certainly no leader in history ever took such elaborate precautions as Stalin to insure that the men around him were loyal beyond the shadow of a doubt. That his henchmen, now that he is dead, so bitterly repudiated Stalin is a commentary on the totalitarian system of government itself and the leaders it breeds.

#### **Position and Character of the Accusers**

The main attack on Stalin's record was made by the Party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev. He had held key jobs under Stalin since 1935 and had organized and carried through, for Stalin, the purges in the Ukraine. In January of 1938, he was named as alternate member of the Politburo and has been a full member of that body since 1939. Without wavering, he followed the Stalinist lines and on the dictator's 70th birthday, December 21, 1949, he had this to say:

Hail to the father, sage teacher, and brilliant leader of the Party, the Soviet people, and the toilers of all the world, Comrade Stalin.

The number-two man in the anti-Stalin crusade has been Anastas Mikoyan. In fact, he was the first at the recent 20th Congress to criticize Stalin by name. Mikoyan held key jobs under Stalin for approximately 30 years. Stalin installed him as Commissar of Trade and made him candidate member of the Politburo in 1926, when Mikoyan was 31—the youngest person ever to attain Politburo rank. He has adjusted to every turn of the Soviet policy line and remained in the front political ranks ever since.

Others who have been parties to this great debanking exercise were, of course, Bulganin, who had worked with Stalin since 1931; Kaganovich, who had been at his side since 1924; Malenkov, who had been a member of his personal secretariat for some 25 years, whose career was made by Stalin; and, finally, Molotov, the longest Stalin associate of them all. He had worked with the dictator since about 1912 in the early days of the illegal Communist conspiracy.

There is good reason to believe that Molotov has

joined the ranks of Stalin detractors with reluctance. Certainly a Stalinist at heart, he must have viewed recent events with a heavy heart and with the knowledge that the recent deviations of which he has been openly accused are a prelude to his gradual retirement from the duties of his office. I incline to believe that Molotov's real sentiments are those he expressed at Stalin's grave and then more recently when, after Malenkov's demotion in 1954, he exuberantly reaffirmed his faith in Stalinist principles.

All of these men, while they now find it convenient to dissociate themselves from the dead tyrant, show no intention of accepting the normal consequences of long association with a repudiated leader and a discredited policy nor of relinquishing the benefits they acquired under Stalin and the power which they are now enjoying as his pupils and successors.

The leaders of the Soviet Union today are walking a dangerous tightrope. They are trying to discredit Stalin without discrediting the Communist Party, which he led so long, or the men who worked with him. Human memories are short and perhaps they may succeed in this maneuver. But surely many a Communist will question the good faith of these leaders. The reversal is too abrupt to invite confidence. After all, it was only a little over 3 years ago, on March 9, 1953, that Stalin was buried. At that time these men who are now castigating him joined in the most lavish tribute and they brought together in Moscow the Communist leaders of China and the European satellites to do him homage.

This is what his short-time heir, Georgi Malenkov, had to say:

The policy of Stalin will live for ages and thankful posterity will praise his name just as we do. . . . Comrade Stalin, a great thinker of our epoch, creatively developed in new historical conditions the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin's name justly stands with the names of the greatest people in all the history of mankind—Marx—Engels—Lenin.

The Chinese Communists and the Moscow-designated rulers of the European satellites who attended Stalin's funeral must now have some question in their minds today as to the forthrightness of the present Kremlin leaders who induced them to join in this homage. Recently, the Chinese Communists spent several weeks before publishing their acceptance of Moscow views of the late Soviet dictator.

### **Basis for Questioning Their Sincerity**

Certainly it is not for us to defend the Stalinist dictatorship, its cruelties and perversions, as against its present detractors. We do have a right, however, to question the sincerity of those who today tell us that for 20 years and more they were a party to foisting on the world a tissue of lies and deceit.

Their sincerity is basically to be questioned on three counts. First, they have been willing to criticize and condemn only carefully selected faults of the Stalin regime. They have specifically endorsed acts that both within Russia and in the world at large caused the most widespread and terrible human suffering: for example, the deliberate starvation of the Russian peasantry during the collectivization campaign of the early thirties; and the exploitation of the captive peoples of the eastern European satellites, where proud and independent nations were crushed in defiance of solemn international obligations. Mikoyan at the 20th Congress even had the effrontery to boast of the Czech coup as an example of how Communist parties can come to power by "peaceful" and "parliamentary" means.

Secondly, they have failed to repudiate the arbitrary dictatorial rule that allows life and death issues to be settled by a handful of men—whether by one or a half-dozen matters not to the Russian peasant.

The 20th Congress in its unreal and sheep-like unanimity was an example of the fact that the present four-, five-, or six-man leadership intends to permit little real debate and criticism of basic policy. Not one voice was raised to protest the decree designed to force the peasants on the collective farms to devote all their efforts to the collective by severely limiting the time allowed for work on their private plots. The widespread opposition to this decree that must exist among the Russian farmers went unrepresented and unheard as the last Party Congress proceeded to rubberstamp every resolution put before it.

Thirdly, whatever improvements have been made in assuring the personal security and welfare of the individual Russian, that progress is dependent on the whim of the Presidium, popularly known as the Politburo. The stick can be used later if the carrot doesn't work.

What we now have is a kind of "mutual protective association" among a few men who suffered

under Stalin so long that they are willing to cooperate to keep the full police power of the state out of the hands of any one man. There is no hint that any ordinary Russian who tries to dissent against the regime will escape the wrath of Servo's gunmen any more than he would have escaped when Beria was alive. If necessary to preserve their own skins, these men might return to unrestricted terror like ducks to water. It was their native element for years.

The final and real test of the intentions of the Soviet leaders will remain their willingness to accept those basic institutional changes that can give the Russian people and the world in general genuine assurance that a one-man—or three- or four-man—dictatorship cannot again plot in secret the massive domestic or international crimes of the recent past.

In the end, opposition parties, an independent judiciary, and a free press are the only real safeguards against successive dictators, each with his own power lust and a new cult of personality.

### **Problems the Communists Face**

The problems which this right-about-face presents for the worldwide Communist movement both within and outside of the U.S.S.R. are immense. Here are a few of them:

Stalin was not only the dictator of his country for more than two decades; he was also hailed as its great military leader in war, its prophet, and the interpreter of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. His writings, particularly the *Problems of Leninism* and the *Short History of the Communist Party*, are scattered in tens of millions of copies throughout the Communist world. It will be years before they can be removed from circulation. In fact, all Soviet history for the past 30 years must now be rewritten. They won't be able to handle this quite as they did in the case of Beria. Here they sent to all holders of the Soviet encyclopedia instructions to excise the pages praising Beria and insert a puffed-up story on the Bering Straits (which fitted in in proper alphabetical order).

Stalin's name is on thousands of streets and squares. Cities and towns bear his name throughout the Communist world. For the people of the Soviet Union, Stalingrad stands as the symbol of their victory over Hitlerism. Will his name remain here and elsewhere, or will the attempt be made to blot it out?

Stalin's henchmen were put in key positions throughout the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. They hold key places in the European satellite regimes. Each and every one of these appointees must today fear not only for his future but for his life.

Already political idols are toppling or at least swaying in the wind from Moscow—in Bulgaria, in Hungary, in Poland. Names of former leaders who crossed Stalin are coming back into repute daily, and political circles in the satellites are plainly in confusion and near panic trying to figure out where the line of propriety will be drawn next.

As Alfred Robens, a leader of the British Labor Party, recently remarked, "How do you correct the mistake of having shot a man? Do you restore him to the history books or give him a posthumous reward?"

The problem of justifying past crimes is especially difficult in the foreign Communist parties, such as those in France and Italy, where local leaders elung to Stalin's coattails and did his bidding without having the excuse of the pistol at their head. These men could have denounced Stalin's crimes earlier and lived—unlike the men in Moscow. Why did they not do so? This is the question we ought to keep asking every Italian tempted to play ball with Togliatti.

And what about the reputation of Trotsky, a key Stalinist victim, still on the Soviet blacklist? Here and there, in places as far distant from each other as Ceylon and Bolivia, his followers are meeting to stage a comeback, and the view is being tolerated, at least, in the satellites that he was not a traitor but merely a misguided and erroneous would-be leader.

And what about the numerous violations of those international agreements signed by Stalin? Was he a "devil" when he made them, or when he broke them, or both?

The Soviet people well remember that Stalin himself started as one of a triumvirate not very different from the collective leadership of which the Soviet leaders now boast. How can the Soviet people themselves be sure that this small group of men in the Politburo who exercise complete and arbitrary control over the lives of all the peoples of the U.S.S.R. will not, in the course of a few years, again lead to a personal dictatorship with all the vices that they now attribute to Stalinism? Is it not the system itself rather than

the "cult of personality" that breeds tyranny and cruelty and ends in the revolution devouring its own children?

And, finally, is it not possible that the Soviet people, with the leaven of education they are receiving, will demand some decisive share in the selection of their own leadership and some checks and balances against the danger of tyrannical dictatorship and the "cult of personality"?

All Marxists have been trained in the dogma that human beings are the products of their environment. Might not Soviet Marxists begin to think there is something wrong with a political environment in which, over the years, an incredible percentage of the most influential leaders—including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Beria, and now Stalin—have turned out to be criminals? Might not the Soviet people, and even some of their present or future leaders, come to believe that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely"?

In Moscow the pictures of Stalin are gradually disappearing. I am told that the Red Army theater has solved the problem of filling the space formerly occupied by an enormous portrait in an ingenious way that may be symbolic. On the wall where Stalin's picture used to hang is now a huge mirror. Any ambitious leader can see himself in Stalin's place. Might this not prove to be the curse of the Stalinist system—one which cannot be easily escaped by pious resolves?

The only element of power in the Soviet Union which is not directly implicated in the excesses and atrocities of Stalin, namely the military leadership, may have something to say about all this. While there is nothing concrete to suggest it now, some day a "man on horseback" might fancy himself in that mirror.

### **Weighing the Issues**

When the present Soviet leaders took the risks involved in their present policy, they must have carefully weighed the consequences. They must have realized the grave issues it would raise in the Communist world outside of the U.S.S.R., among the Party faithful in every free country, and among their own peoples.

Abroad they probably hoped there would be some counterbalancing advantages. If it would bring about a feeling of relaxation in the free world, defensive rearmament here and among our

allies might slow down, defensive alliances might tend to weaken, the possibility of peaceful coexistence, for which everyone yearns, might be more and more accepted. All this they hoped would give them time to build up their own strength, economic and military. If we are naive, then the Soviet Union may get some international benefits from their present tactics.

But there is another side to the picture which bears pondering. The Soviet leaders may have had no real alternative and took the course which they felt held out the best chance of keeping their own power. The Kremlin leaders, as I mentioned, were under heavy domestic pressures to do something to persuade their people that a new era was in the making. During recent years the leavening process of education has developed the critical faculties of millions of Russians. The Kremlin can no longer sell the old line to all of their people. They must now not only rewrite the history of Stalin but rewrite the story they have been telling their people about the outside world.

These leaders—Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Kaganovich—have got over the hump of Stalin's death without losing their grip on his power. They profess a great deal of confidence in their ability to perpetuate the system of collective dictatorship they have instituted by basing it more broadly on the top layer of elite Party managers, generals, engineers, and intellectuals who have a stake in the Soviet regime.

Only time can tell whether the present leaders with their past close association with Stalinism really can do this and make the Soviet dictatorship work without going much farther and giving their people something more than mere lipservice in the direction of the right to free speech, free worship, and protection for the individual from arbitrary action.

Possibly what we are seeing will end up as a temporary period of attempted fraud on the Russian people, a cloak to sell them a collective dictatorship as against a personal dictatorship. Possibly it is a first hesitant step toward giving a greater number of the Russian people a chance to share in the decisions which shape their destinies. I am sure the Russian leaders themselves do not know how their effort to "de-Stalinize" the Soviet Union will turn out. I am also sure they would be dismayed if they thought they were paving the way for the establishment in Russia of

what we could call a decent and responsible government.

The Communists, despite their self-confidence, do not and will not control the fate of mankind. In the face of firm free-world resistance to their international barbarities and exposure of their political frauds and malpractices, at home and abroad, and under the pressure of their own people, there may be a gradual move toward more normal modes of life and behavior. If so, then hopes of world peace will be given a mighty impulse forward. This possibility the free world must watch prayerfully, alert to opportunities for peace provided by progress in this direction. We must be equally alert to perceive and denounce the dangers implicit in the fraud of a mere attempt to bury a shabby past.

## Departure of Former Seamen of Soviet Tanker

Press release 217 dated April 25

At the request of the Department of State, Soviet Ambassador Georgi Zaronbin called on Assistant Secretary Livingston Merchant this afternoon. The Ambassador was handed a note concerning the departure from the United States of five former seamen of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*.<sup>1</sup> The text of the note follows:

"The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the circumstances surrounding the departure from the United States for the Soviet Union on April 7, 1956 of five former seamen of the Soviet tanker *Tuapse*.

"It has been determined after thorough investigation that members of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations assumed authority and engaged in activities with respect to the seamen which are incompatible with the status of the Soviet Delegation. In this regard the conduct of Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin was particularly objectionable. Ambassador Arkady Sobolev himself insisted on intervening, despite the presence of an accredited representative from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, during the interview conducted at Idlewild by the authorities

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 12, 1954, p. 51; July 26, 1954, p. 131; and Aug. 22, 1955, p. 302.

of the Immigration and Naturalization Service prior to departure of the seamen.

"It is considered that members of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations thereby performed acts of an improper character exceeding the scope of their official capacity and thereby abused the privilege of their residence in contravention of the terms of the Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations.

"It is requested that the Soviet Government instruct Ambassador Arkady Sobolev and his staff henceforth to adhere to their recognized functions. In view of the special character of the activities of Aleksandr K. Guryanov and Nikolai Turkin, the Soviet Government is informed that their presence in the United States is no longer desirable. It is accordingly requested that Aleksandr K. Guryanov make expeditious arrangements to leave the United States. On the same grounds the request for a return visa for Nikolai Turkin to reenter the United States is hereby refused."

### **Export Controls Simplified for European Soviet Bloc**

The Department of Commerce announced on April 27 the simplification of certain export controls by the establishment of a new general license order under which shipment from a select roster of peaceful goods can be made to the U.S.S.R. and its European satellites without the filing of export license applications.<sup>1</sup> The action came in the form of an initial listing of some 700 nonstrategic items in over 57 commodity categories which U.S. exporters may now ship under general license to the European Soviet bloc.

All of the goods included on the new roster are of the type that would be approved for export under existing licensing policy. The new general license procedure in no way reflects a change in the policy of banning strategic goods to the Soviet bloc. The main purpose is to reduce the paper burden on the American export community and the Government by eliminating the previous requirement of separate forms for each shipment, and thereby to facilitate increased peaceful commerce.

In announcing the action, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks said:

<sup>1</sup>For detailed announcement, see *Bureau of Foreign Commerce Current Export Bulletin* 763.

Today's simplification in licensing procedures in respect to the European Soviet bloc is designed to carry out the Government's objective, first announced by President Eisenhower at Geneva last July, "to create conditions which will encourage nations to increase the exchange of peaceful goods throughout the world." This objective subsequently was advanced at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva last October when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles indicated the intention of the United States Government to simplify export control procedures on shipments of peaceful goods to the Soviet bloc.

The new arrangement will broaden opportunities for increased trade by providing U.S. exporters with a roster of peaceful goods which will not require the granting by the Commerce Department of individual, specific licenses for shipment to the Soviet bloc.

It should be noted that our ban on strategic exports continues and that U.S.-origin commodities not on the new general license roster will continue to require individual licenses for shipment to the U.S.S.R. or its satellites and may not be reexported to Communist-controlled areas without clearance from the Bureau of Foreign Commerce. Also, the total embargo against all shipments to Communist China and North Korea remains unchanged. All shipments to the Communist-controlled areas of Viet-Nam and Laos, as well as the maritime provinces of the U.S.S.R., continue to require individual export licenses.

Included in the new general license list are selected items in the following categories: beverages, rubber products, drugs and pharmaceuticals, fibers, wood, paper products, glass, clay products, cutlery, hardware, cork, electrical household appliances, commercial refrigerating equipment, office machines, dyes, leather, hides and skins, pigments, paints, chemical specialties, soil improvement compounds, soap and toiletries, photographic equipment, plumbing fixtures, optical goods, musical instruments, toys, dental equipment, jewelry, lamps, sponges, notions, beauty and barber supplies, and shoe findings. The listed items may be shipped under general license to the following destinations: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia, Poland and Danzig, Rumania, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, except the maritime provinces (Far Eastern seaports) of the U.S.S.R.

A substantial increase in the volume of licensing to the Soviet bloc took place in the first quarter of 1956, according to statistics prepared for inclusion in a forthcoming report by Secretary Weeks on export control operations. Licenses granted for Soviet-bloc destinations totaled \$8,788,543 in the first quarter of 1956, compared with \$1,624,856 in the fourth quarter of 1955, and \$4,968,322 in the



initial quarter of 1955. The bulk of first-quarter 1956 licensing to the bloc consisted of agricultural products and equipment, which together accounted for \$7,294,844 of the total licensed.

Actual shipments, however, have not as yet reflected the increase in licensing. U.S. exports to the European Soviet bloc totaled \$1,151,000 in the fourth quarter of 1955, compared with \$1,051,000 shipped during the third quarter of 1955.

## The U.S. Stake in World Trade

*by Sinclair Weeks*  
*Secretary of Commerce*<sup>1</sup>

Whenever I come to New Orleans I cannot help reflecting on the stroke of destiny which, in the early days of the Republic, brought New Orleans and the trans-Mississippi Valley into the United States.

But for a twist of fate on the international chessboard, but for Napoleon's colonial ambitions which made Louisiana French, but for those far-off European events which turned Napoleon's mind away from the New World, this great country as we know it today might never have been.

What good fortune it was for us to have had in Paris at the critical moment a skilled and courageous negotiator ready to strike, in his country's interest, while the iron was hot. And—if a New England Republican may make so bold as to praise a Southern Democrat—what a magnificent vision of the future moved Thomas Jefferson bravely to accept the challenge of the moment and lead our country toward its destiny.

This is your annual Mississippi Valley World Trade Conference, and as we gather here today I need not remind you that one of the principal functions of the Commerce Department is to foster, promote, and develop world trade. Presumably, this relationship is what prompted you to invite me.

It is stating the obvious to repeat that the

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the Mississippi Valley World Trade Conference at New Orleans, La., on Apr. 10 (Department of Commerce press release).

For the year 1955, U.S. exports to the bloc were valued at \$7,248,000, as compared with \$6,120,000 for 1954, and \$1,776,000 for 1953. The 1955 and 1954 totals included \$4,743,000 of food grains, insecticides, and drugs shipped to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany under the President's flood-relief program for the Danube basin. In 1947 and 1948, U.S. exports to the bloc were valued, respectively, at \$339,857,000 and \$123,241,000.

United States has a tremendous stake in world trade in economic terms as well as in security terms. Forty million acres of American farmland today find overseas markets for their products. Ten percent of U.S. manufactured goods are exported. Upwards of 4 million American workers and their families rely on foreign trade. On the import side, we must look abroad for many essentials, including manganese, chrome, and tin. Eighty percent of our newsprint, 100 percent of our industrial diamonds, 100 percent of our vital nickel supply must be imported. Food products too are important items in the import list. They include almost 100 percent of our coffee, tea, cocoa, and bananas.

The United States stake in exports continues unabated. For example, last year, without considering at all the impact of foreign aid, United States manufacturers alone sold abroad a wide range of products, in the total amount of approximately \$10 billion. This, of course, reflects the fact that we can and do compete successfully in markets throughout the world.

But in this process American industries are confronted in many foreign markets with restrictions which continually limit the opportunities to sell their products. In the absence of such restrictions, which include, among other things, quotas, special taxes, and exchange restrictions—in other words, under conditions of normal commercial competition—American manufacturers

would have sold abroad even more than the \$10 billion figure just referred to. Our industries do not seek special governmental advantages in selling their products in foreign markets; they seek only to be allowed to compete fairly in foreign markets on the commercial merits of their products.

These are all among the factors which influence the dynamic foreign-trade policy of the President and his administration. Let me summarize the main elements of this program:

1. In accord with the terms of H. R. 1,<sup>2</sup> adopted last year, the reciprocal and modest reduction of unnecessary barriers to world trade and payments.

2. The creation of a healthy business climate for stimulating investment abroad, particularly in the less developed areas of the world.

3. The encouragement of tourism to enable the peoples of the world to get to know and understand each other better.

4. The participation by the Government and American businessmen in trade fairs throughout the free world to carry the message of the American way of life and the products of free enterprise to foreign shores.

One of the most useful devices we have found for carrying through this program is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

#### Objectives of GATT

What does the GATT stand for? The GATT—the largest and most comprehensive trade agreement in history—is an agreement among 35 nations reflecting principles which have for good reason been cardinal points of United States trade policy. The Department of Commerce plays an important role in the policy formulations of United States-GATT relations.

First of all, GATT contains for each member country an item-by-item list of tariff rates which that country agrees not to exceed in charging duties on imports from the remaining GATT countries. Collectively, these lists cover almost 60,000 items, embracing a large share of world trade. The remainder of the agreement consists of a set of "general provisions" which each country agrees to observe in international trade. An important

<sup>2</sup> Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955.

purpose of these general rules, which restrain the use of such things as taxes, quotas, subsidies, and administrative procedures, is to insure that these devices will not be used to nullify the intended value for members of the tariff-rate agreements.

GATT objectives closely correspond to established principles of American commercial policy—principles which include the most-favored-nation treatment, for example, which the United States in its own interest has long urged upon other nations. Generally speaking, however, as far as GATT is concerned, it is better from every standpoint to have 35 nations join in one agreement than to have to go through the motions 35 separate times with 35 separate agreements finally arrived at. For example, Department mathematicians tell me that, if we had to negotiate entirely through bilateral agreements, it would require approximately 595 separate treaties.

The combination of such negotiations produces results not possible in a series of separate bilateral agreements and, to my mind, certainly makes it possible for the United States to obtain greater trade benefits than could otherwise be achieved.

#### The OTC

There is now pending before the Congress a bill (H. R. 5550) to authorize the President to accept United States membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation (Orc).<sup>3</sup> The main function of this organization would be to administer the GATT. In addition, it would provide a forum for discussion of other trade problems, with each government remaining entirely free to adopt or reject recommendations growing out of such discussion. It would also assemble and publish data on world trade.

The Department of Commerce has an important interest in Orc, and because of this I have carefully reviewed the proposal for it from every angle. Both as a member of the President's Cabinet and as a former manufacturer I earnestly hope that the Congress will approve this vital legislation promptly.

So long as it is the policy of this Government to carry on foreign trade under the aegis of recip-

<sup>3</sup> For a Department of State memorandum on legal aspects of the GATT and OTC, see *Cong. Rec.* of Apr. 23, 1956, p. 6088. See also *The Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation*, Report of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, To Accompany H.R. 5550; H. Rept. 2007, 84th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 18, 1956.

rocal trade agreements and to do it by the GATT process, I am convinced that the creation of the OTC will enable American industry and trade to derive additional and increased benefits from the GATT and the tariff concessions we have received. The agreement for the OTC has been so drafted that United States interests are fully safeguarded.<sup>4</sup> OTC would not be supranational. It could not change a single tariff rate. It could not impose new obligations on the United States without our consent.

This whole proposition is essentially very simple. The OTC would provide machinery to enable the GATT nations to do better those things which the GATT already provides for. It would not extend the GATT provisions to any additional aspects of trade, nor would the OTC take any new kinds of action on aspects already covered by GATT. The new machinery to administer GATT is designed solely to enable the member nations to take more promptly and more effectively those joint actions already provided for in GATT, with respect to those tariff and trade matters already covered by GATT.

GATT and OTC project into the international arena trade-policy objectives with which the United States has long been associated.

We cannot lose by cooperating with our friends in the trade area of our foreign relations, just as we cooperate with them in a variety of other directions. We cannot stand at arm's length from them in this field and hope to meet the unanimity of action which the Soviet Union and its satellites achieve by force and terror.

### **Trade Controls**

When we speak of the Soviet bloc, it brings to mind the other and perhaps darker aspect of our foreign-trade policy—the use of controls by the United States and our friends to avoid a significant free-world contribution to the buildup of the Soviet war potential.

I hope we may some day see the kind of government and the kind of policy in the Soviet Union which would make it possible to bring that nation and its present satellites fully into the family of friendly nations. That day is not yet here, and until it arrives we cannot afford to lower our guard.

<sup>4</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

The destruction of the cult of Stalinism means only, perhaps, that a policy of naked aggression is being replaced by a more subtle and insidious effort to achieve world Communist domination through propaganda, infiltration, and economic penetration. The lures and enticements put out by the Communist leaders are devices to trap the unwary as the spider traps the fly. A true index of Soviet policy may lie in a statement reportedly made by Khrushchev last September as follows:

We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes as a means of promoting relations between our countries.

We do not, of course, want to reject out of hand such opportunities as may arise to reduce world tensions. We must ever be alert to carry forward the principles of peace and peaceful exchanges among nations which President Eisenhower has dedicated himself to achieve.

The problem of East-West trade—how, when, and to what extent it shall be carried on—becomes a complex issue of international relations. Individual transactions or groups of transactions must be viewed from the perspective of our total foreign and national security policy. The results should be of a kind which brings the greatest advantage and the greatest relative strength to the free world.

Perhaps a specific example of Soviet tactics may illustrate the problem. Last month (March 4) the newspapers reported that an American firm had made a licensing agreement to produce in the United States a Soviet-designed turbodrill for drilling oil and gas wells. This device was heralded as being much more efficient than American oil rigs and as a sign of Soviet willingness to exchange their technical advances with those of the United States.

Much less attention was given at first to the quid pro quo desired by the Russians from us, namely, the technological information needed for producing advanced types of boring bits for drilling wells.

From the Soviet point of view this type of "exchange" is designed to create the impression of a fair exchange, in contrast with earlier attempts at one-way acquisition of Western prototypes. But on closer examination—of the type which this Government always gives to such proposals—an appraisal must be made as to whether this exchange might not open the door for the

Soviets to the whole range of developments in American oil production technology. In this type of "exchange" would the Soviets stand to profit more, because of their state control over domestic technical data and because they might latch on to an industry in which they are, on balance, in an inferior position technologically?

Charting the right course in the deadly serious economic contest between East and West requires the greatest wisdom and ingenuity that our policy-makers can muster. From a national security standpoint, this whole business of East-West trade and trade restrictions has caused a great deal of misunderstanding not only here in the United States but among free-world countries as well.

### **Investigation of East-West Trade**

I have recently done some testifying on East-West trade before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The committee was particularly interested in the revisions in East-West international trade controls which took place in 1954.

The hearings were heated. Aside from questioning the policy followed in 1954, the hearings involved issues relating to the constitutional separation of powers as between executive and legislative and to the conduct of affairs within the executive branch. I should like to discuss with you some of the points made in the hearings.<sup>5</sup>

First, I want to say that naturally the committee has every right to make such an investigation. In fact, I think it is completely appropriate that constant surveillance of the executive be maintained by Congress. But even here it has been difficult to prevent gross misunderstanding of the issues involved, of the policies which are maintained, and of the results achieved.

Secondly, I should make it absolutely clear that the inquiry had no relationship whatsoever to U.S. export controls on goods shipped from the United States. We have our own controls, and they were not in question. The committee was concerned solely with the products which our allies ship in East-West trade and with the voluntary multinational controls set up by our allies in agreement with us.

Controls maintained by the United States on shipments to the European Soviet bloc and Com-

munist China are stricter than those of our allies. We have an embargo on all exports to Communist China and North Korea.

No shipments can be made to the European Communist bloc from the United States without first obtaining an export license through the Department of Commerce. Such licenses are automatically denied on items which are in short supply in the United States or which are, generally speaking, of strategic nature. When items in either of these categories are exported to friendly foreign countries, determination is made in advance that transshipment to the Communists is not to be expected.

Shipments of peaceful goods to the European Soviet bloc are authorized through the granting of export licenses. Such trade is relatively small in volume, however.

I have mentioned earlier that other free-world countries working together and with us maintain similar restrictions on trade with the Soviets. Their restrictions are of a more liberal order, however, than are ours. Many items are thus shipped to the Russians from European countries which the United States would not itself ship to them. Some of these items are strategic in nature.

During its investigation the Senate committee has frequently referred to the difference in stringency between U.S. controls and multilateral controls over shipments to the Reds. The inference has been drawn from time to time that we are somehow to blame for the fact that the Communists have been able to obtain materials of strategic significance from others which they cannot buy from us.

When I appeared before the committee I made it clear that if I had my way all free-world countries would exercise the equivalent in restrictions over the sale of strategic goods to the Soviets as those maintained by the United States. I stated further that to the best of my knowledge this same position had been consistently maintained by every interested department in our Government.

I also reported, however, that no power on earth is available beyond the power of persuasion to control the economic activities of other nations. If I remember correctly, I cited to the committee by way of illustration the old adage, "You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink."

Much as I believe that it is in the free-world interest to keep these controls strict, I think, how-

<sup>5</sup> For a statement made before the committee by Under Secretary Hoover, see *ibid.*, Apr. 9, 1956, p. 619.

ever, it must be recognized in all fairness that we cannot compare our situation in the United States to that of European countries without finding tremendous pressures there for different policies in terms of East-West trade.

### **Modification of European Controls**

Thus in August 1954 the multilateral controls maintained by European countries as a limitation upon exports to the Communist bloc were substantially modified. This modification resulted in a shortening of the list of items under multinational control.

What were some of the reasons which led to this modification?

It must be recognized that there are historic patterns and other factors affecting the East-West trade interests of European free-world countries which are far different from those which apply in the United States. For example, Department of Commerce statistics show that, while U.S. exports represent only approximately 3.5 percent of our gross national product, the United Kingdom relies upon exports for 15.6 percent of its G. N. P. The pressure for international trade in the United Kingdom is based on the long-established fact that without adequate trade Britain cannot survive, let alone maintain a decent standard of living or a satisfactory national defense.

Other European countries lean heavily upon foreign trade. Individual export items become vitally significant to the economic welfare of these countries and result in heavy pressures for trade expansion.

As an illustration, the shipment of 2,000 tons of soft unalloyed aluminum by Norway to the Soviet bloc was a required concession as a means of providing a market in the bloc for otherwise unsalable seafood products—a major export item. Denmark is called upon to sell butter abroad or suffer disastrous results in its domestic economy. But in order to sell its butter to the Soviets, Denmark is called upon to supply merchant ships. West Germany finds it difficult to become completely separated in an economic sense from East Germany.

Much of the story of the revisions of the controls in 1954, the reasons for them and the results, has been made available to the public in reports issued by Mr. Stassen, the Battle Act Administrator in 1954, and by myself. Additional information classified for reasons of national security has

been made available on this basis to six committees of the Congress and is being offered to the Investigations Subcommittee on the same basis.

Certain papers of a highly sensitive nature which cover intelligence information, matter relating to international negotiations, and internal working papers of the executive branch could not be furnished. To do so would reveal information classified for the purpose of withholding it from the Soviet bloc.

Now, I am sure that you will all agree with me that, insofar as possible, we should not give the Communists even a scrap of information which would be of significant value to them in the cold war, any more than we should let them have commodities of strategic significance.

If closely guarded information were to be publicized in open hearing, the entire proceedings could be observed by agents of hostile powers and the entire public record could be reported abroad by representatives of the Communist press. We do not want to bare to the Communist nations some of our secret knowledge of their needs and deficiencies and those of our allies and ourselves. We do not want to tell them our own strategic and short-supply reasons for control or decontrol.

In the general area of separation of powers let me cite in conclusion some chapter and verse on the reasons why the executive branch declines certain informational material to the Congress.

At every level of the executive branch of the Government, issues are vigorously debated, and it is only human nature that there will be sharp differences of opinion. The same thing I am sure happens in the executive sessions of congressional committees. It happens in the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court. Does the Congress or the Court offer such discussion to public scrutiny?

Among such operations are preliminary research, undigested data subject to later appraisal, early drafts of memoranda as yet unchecked for errors, incomplete surveys which give only a fractional part of the final report, and other initial thinking and recommendations which must later be revised and perfected or overruled because of new facts or circumstances. Revelation of such embryonic data ripped from context would give an utterly false picture of a situation.

All of us want the unbiased and candid advice of our staffs and subordinates. No organization, no government, no military commander could

operate efficiently if all the scraps of paper and advices and recommendations of staffs and subordinates were to be cast in the public view. If this were done, it would no longer be possible for those charged with action to obtain candid and energetic expressions of opinion at advisory levels in the Government. Rather it might create among subordinates a yes-man complex or a fear of standing by one's own sincere convictions.

It boils down to this: The position of the executive branch is:

1. that we have not withheld facts which could properly be released,
2. that in the national interest we have refused to disclose, except in executive session, certain secrets which potential enemies might use to injure the United States and our allies, and
3. we decline under any conditions to make available internal executive working papers.

So, although we have kept the Congress and the public informed, I have described both practical reasons and security reasons which made it impossible to comply with all of the demands of the Senate subcommittee.

Underlying this whole issue is the historic principle of the separation of powers in our Government, one of the constitutional foundation stones of this Republic.

From George Washington down to Dwight Eisenhower, Presidents have found it necessary, in obedience to their oaths of office, to maintain the proper constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches. In this way only—with vigorous forthright leadership—can our country go forward on the principles which made our Nation great and which today make it the hope and inspiration of the free world.

## **U.S. Farm Goods Sold to Germany in Triangular Transaction**

The International Cooperation Administration announced on April 27 that it had arranged an \$8-million triangular transaction involving sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany will purchase from the United States \$7 million worth of coarse grains—corn, barley, grain sorghums, and oats—paying for them in deutschemarks. An additional \$1 million has been authorized for shipping costs.

The deutschemarks derived from the sale of the products in Germany will be deposited to the account of the U.S. Government. ICA will make these funds available to countries where the United States has defense or economic-assistance programs requiring goods available in Germany. When purchases of such goods in Germany are agreed upon, they will be financed with the U.S.-owned deutschemarks and the triangular transaction will be completed.

The trade with Germany was made under section 402 of the Mutual Security Act. This section requires that at least \$300 million of the funds authorized for the mutual security program during the current fiscal year be used to finance the sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. The local currency proceeds are to be used for mutual security purposes. To date this year, more than \$285 million of these commodities have been authorized by ICA to 20 countries.

## **U.S. Aid to Philippines for 1956 Emphasizes Rural Development**

The International Cooperation Administration announced on April 22 that the \$29.1 million in aid which the United States is providing to the Philippines during the 1956 fiscal year is being used in the following manner:

—\$4.2 million to support an expanded rural development program.

—\$7.6 million to import equipment and commodities needed for projects to expand and diversify the base of the Philippine economy—in particular, rural road construction (principally on the island of Mindanao), port and harbor improvements, rural health units, and water supply and land development projects.

—\$6.7 million, proceeds from the sale of U.S. agricultural commodities, which was loaned to the Philippine Government for relending through commercial banks to help expand small- and medium-size industries.

—\$5.9 million for technical cooperation, including the financing of contractual services of U.S. firms and universities for assistance in advancing public administration, education, agriculture, labor, and industry; training Filipino technicians in the U.S.; technical advisory services of U.S. Government personnel; and supplies and equip-

ment for demonstration and instruction in all major fields of activity.

—\$1.7 million to continue the military construction program begun in fiscal 1955 in connection with the reorganization of the Philippine Army.

Most of the U.S. assistance is in support of President Magsaysay's comprehensive economic development program, for which that country has budgeted \$79.5 million of its own funds this fiscal year to encourage industrialization under private business, to improve government services, and to expand transportation and communications facilities. The main emphasis, however, of joint U.S.-Philippine efforts is to improve the living conditions and earning capacity of the rural population, who make up 70 percent of the Philippines' total population of 22 million.

The United States has conducted an organized aid program in the Philippines since July 1950, following 5 years of cooperation in rehabilitating the war-damaged country. The 6-year nonmilitary aid total of over \$137 million has been more than matched by Philippine funds used in the same program. Each year the Philippine Government has taken over and assumed responsibility for the support and administration of an increasing number of projects initiated with the help of U.S. aid funds.

Here are some of the results since 1950 of this mutual undertaking:

*Public health.* New American drugs, scientific treatment, and hygiene are beginning to wipe out scourges—malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis, and others—which have plagued villagers for generations.

*Agriculture.* Philippine agricultural agents, whose organization has been patterned after the U.S. Agricultural Extension Service, are showing farmers how to increase crop yields through the use of better farming practices, implements, fertilizers, and plant varieties, so that food consumption can be increased.

*Education.* New and better schools, established with help from such American universities as Stanford, Cornell, and the University of Michigan, under Ica sponsorship, are giving young Filipinos an opportunity to obtain a better education.

*Industry.* In 1955, the rate of new industrial development doubled the 1954 rate largely as a result of U.S. technical assistance and U.S. loans.

## THE CONGRESS

### Proposed Revision of Immigration and Nationality Act

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*<sup>1</sup>

First of all, I wish to affirm my belief that revision of the Immigration and Nationality Act is necessary and desirable in the interests of the United States. The present law contains inequities and imperfections. I concur wholly with the President that it is in our national interest to provide for increased immigration to our land and to do so under equitable laws.

Obviously, I do not mean to imply that the present law is all bad. As a matter of fact, the Departmental officers charged with responsibility for the application of this law advise me that, technically, it represents a vast improvement over the numerous statutes which governed prior to its enactment in 1952.

I believe, however, that much improvement is still possible. For that reason, I am here today to support the proposals which the President has made to the Congress and which are embodied in the bills which this subcommittee is considering.

Many of the items in these bills have to do with domestic subjects within the competence of the Attorney General. He has discussed the detailed provisions of the bills with the subcommittee. I desire to support his statement with, however, particular emphasis on the foreign policy aspect of the legislation.

There are three principal items in this category which I should like to discuss. One is the national-origins system of determining quotas. Another is the recommendation to forgive certain mortgaged quotas. The third is the proposal which would permit the waiving of the fingerprinting requirement for those who apply for non-immigrant visas.

The President has recommended, in view of our expanding economy and high standard of living, that we increase our quota immigration by ap-

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Apr. 25 (press release 213). For the President's message on immigration legislation, see BULLETIN of Feb. 20, 1956, p. 275.

proximately 65,000 numbers to a total of approximately 219,000 annually. I fully support the President's recommendations in this respect.

However, my primary concern as Secretary of State is that whatever overall quota is adopted by the Congress be apportioned equitably. Our quota restrictions should not discriminate among persons merely on the basis of their national origin, nor should the restrictions discriminate unfairly against any of the friendly nations which have an interest in common with us in the defense of the free world. The present system of determining quotas is offensive on both counts.

#### **Discrimination Under Present Quota System**

He would, indeed, be bold to the point of recklessness who would identify any national-origins group as unable to contribute to the vigor of our society. Yet in actual operation the national-origins system denies to many of our citizens privileges which are accorded to other citizens and, in fact, to some resident aliens. For example, any American citizen or any resident alien who has a brother born in England, or Germany, or Ireland, or any country having a current quota, may bring his brother to the United States without encountering any delay whatsoever. However, under the present law, an American citizen who has a brother born in Italy, or Spain, or Greece, or the Philippines, or in any of a score of other countries, may not bring his brother to this country as an immigrant except after a waiting period varying from many months to many years. In my opinion, the national-origins system, which draws a distinction between the blood of one person and the blood of another, cannot be reconciled with the fundamental concepts of our Declaration of Independence which, as Abraham Lincoln said, applied not only to this country but to all men and meant "that all should have an equal chance."

It is easy to understand, therefore, the depth of the resentment that is felt by many of our own citizens who are denied the opportunity to reunite their families in the United States. This feeling has its reflection overseas, particularly in those countries where many desire to become United States citizens, where honorable persons, willing and eager to make their home in the United States, know that they cannot do so except after a wait of many years, while other persons similarly situated but living in more favored countries, can

do so without delay. The impact of this situation is felt in our relationships with friendly nations every day. It is particularly awkward and difficult to explain when, year after year, large numbers of authorized quota numbers go unused and yet no relaxation is allowed in the limitations placed on immigration from those countries which most need our assistance in this regard, and which we desire to assist.

The problem which confronts us, therefore, is to find a method of distribution of our quota numbers which is more reasonable than the national-origins system. I realize the inherent difficulty in fairly apportioning quota numbers under an overall ceiling. Traditionally, and as a practical matter, this has been and continues to be a subject for congressional determination. Therefore, I fully support the recommendation that the Congress immediately appropriate sufficient funds to explore thoroughly this entire problem and to devise a system of quotas which is not tied to the discriminatory national-origins concept.

#### **Interim Measures**

However, I believe that the necessity for the alleviation of certain flagrant discriminations contained in the present system is pressing. I support the President's recommendations for interim measures which will alleviate as much as possible the inequities which the Department of State encounters in applying the provisions of the present law.

I believe that the method by which the President has computed, and suggested allocation of, the recommended ceiling of 219,000 is fair and reasonable. Under the President's proposed temporary system, no country will be allocated a smaller quota than it has under the present law and the inequity which results when large numbers of authorized quota numbers go unused will be corrected by the pooling of the unused numbers on an annual regional basis. If this system of pooling unused numbers is adopted, the large waiting lists of preference applicants, who have a priority that is largely theoretical under the present law, can be realistically attacked.

Another feature of the President's proposal on which I would comment is the recommendation for an allotment of 5,000 quota numbers annually to be placed in a special pool, without regard to national origins, to fulfill our needs for persons



having special skills who may be desirable refugees or escapees. The most practical method by which this Government is able presently to grant asylum to escapees is through the Refugee Relief Act. When that act expires, there will be no special method by which this Government can offer asylum to any of the desirable escapees from behind the Iron Curtain. We attach great importance to urgent action on this provision.

#### **Forgiving Certain Mortgaged Quotas**

Another item which the Department strongly supports is that recommendation which would forgive mortgages placed on certain quotas under the terms of previous legislation. It is damaging to our foreign relations, for example, that Greece—a NATO ally—has one-half of its annual quota of 308 mortgaged for the next 61 years.

#### **Fingerprinting Requirement**

Now a few words with respect to the waiver of the fingerprinting requirement. Our recommendation is based primarily on the fact that, in most friendly countries in Europe, citizens may not be fingerprinted until they have been convicted of a criminal offense. The idea, which has recently become acceptable in the United States, of the desirability of having one's fingerprints on file as a means of positive identification in case of a disaster, has not caught on outside of this country. Because the taking of fingerprints connotes suspicion of criminal activity in many countries, we find that in fact we are requiring our friends to provide us with a record which their own governments require only of convicted criminals. I think it is easy to perceive why to many visitors this is a distasteful requirement. It would facilitate not only the travel of these desirable visitors but the fostering of good relations between ourselves and friendly populations if the Congress would be willing to drop the mandatory aspects of this requirement which, as the Attorney General said, is not necessary to the safety or security of this country.

Incidentally, I might mention that our attitude in recommending a provision for waiver is not, by any means, based on the intransigence of the Soviet Union and its satellites with respect to this question.

I wish to say one final word about the Refugee Relief Program. I took great satisfaction last week, Mr. Chairman, in announcing the issuance

of the 100,000th visa under this program. We are now issuing visas at a rate of approximately 2,000 a week, and we can say with conviction that the available allotments of visas for most of the countries involved will be used before the act expires. During the early days of the program many critics made gloomy predictions that it would be a total failure, and indeed the task of accomplishment has not been easy. For this reason, I am particularly pleased by this tangible evidence that the act is being successfully administered to achieve the ends which were intended for it.

Nevertheless, we are still hampered by certain needless difficulties. As you know, the President made 10 proposals for amendment of the Refugee Relief Act during the last session.<sup>2</sup> Other constructive suggestions have since been made. The need for amendment becomes greater as the final date of the act approaches. I therefore urge in the strongest terms that the Congress give immediate attention to this matter.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **84th Congress, 2d Session**

Status of Forces Agreements. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. J. Res. 309 and similar measures providing for the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement and certain other treaties and international agreements, or the withdrawal of the United States from such treaties and agreements, so that foreign countries will not have criminal jurisdiction over American armed forces personnel stationed within their boundaries. Part 2, January 31, February 1 and 2, 1956. 497 pp.

Cotton Imports, Exports, and Minimum Acreage Allotments. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Cotton of the House Committee on Agriculture on H. R. 8658, 8659, 8322, and 8703, a bill to amend the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended. February 6, 7, and 8, 1956. 302 pp.

Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1957. Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations: U.S. Information Agency. February 7-21, 1956. 400 pp.

Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Message from the President transmitting the report of the National Advisory Council on international monetary and financial problems, covering its operations from January 1 to June 30, 1955, pursuant to section 4 (b) (5) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act. H. Doc. 336, February 10, 1956. 69 pp.

Engineering and Scientific Manpower in the United States, Western Europe and Soviet Russia. March 1956. Joint committee print. 85 pp.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, June 13, 1955, p. 951.

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES**

**Calendar of Meetings<sup>1</sup>**

**Adjourned During April 1956**

U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . .	New York . . . . .	Jan. 3-Apr. 3
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 17th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Feb. 7-Apr. 6
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Administrative Unions.	New York . . . . .	Feb. 21-Apr. 4
International Atomic Energy Agency: Working Level Meeting on Draft Statute.	Washington . . . . .	Feb. 27-Apr. 18
8th International Congress of the Vineyard and Wines . . . . .	Santiago . . . . .	Mar. 21-Apr. 1
U.N. ECAFE: 4th Regional Conference of Statisticians . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Mar. 29-Apr. 7
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	London . . . . .	Apr. 3-7
ICAO: 3d Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting . . . . .	Ciudad Trujillo . . . . .	Apr. 3-24
Inter-Parliamentary Union: Executive Council . . . . .	Dubrovnik (Yugoslavia) . . . . .	Apr. 4-8
ILO Petroleum Committee: 5th Session (reconvened) . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 4-13
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 5-21
UNESCO Executive Board: 43d Session . . . . .	Madrid . . . . .	Apr. 9-20
International Instrumentation-Automation Exhibition . . . . .	Oslo . . . . .	Apr. 9-22
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI, Color Television Demonstrations.	The Hague . . . . .	Apr. 10-11
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 3d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee.	San José . . . . .	Apr. 10-14
International Sugar Council: 8th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Apr. 12-13
6th Inter-American Travel Congress . . . . .	San José . . . . .	Apr. 12-22
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: Working Party of Consultative Subcommittee on Rice.	Rome . . . . .	Apr. 16-30
U.N. International Wheat Conference: 2d Session (reconvened) . . . . .	London . . . . .	Apr. 16-25
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (CCIT): Study Group IV, Phototelegraphy and Facsimile.	London . . . . .	Apr. 17-21
WMO Executive Committee: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 17-30
UNESCO Conference on Cultural Integration of Immigrants . . . . .	Habana . . . . .	Apr. 18-27
ITU International Telegraphic Consultative Committee: Study Group V, Joint CCIT/CCIR Committee on Phototelegraphy.	London . . . . .	Apr. 23-25
WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee of Region IV (North and Central America).	Ciudad Trujillo . . . . .	Apr. 25-27
U.N. ECE Steel Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 25-27

**In Session as of May 1, 1956**

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Nov. 28-
GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 18-
U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee of Five (reconvened).	London . . . . .	Mar. 19-
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 9th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 16-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 17-
UNESCO Conference on Asian-U. S. Cultural Relations . . . . .	San Francisco, Minneapolis, Boston, Louisville, Ann Arbor, Washington.	Apr. 19-
ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 21-
9th International Film Festival . . . . .	Cannes . . . . .	Apr. 23-
South Pacific Conference: 3d Session . . . . .	Suva (Fiji) . . . . .	Apr. 23-
U.N. International Law Commission: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-
UNESCO Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America.	Lima . . . . .	Apr. 23-

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 25, 1956. Following is a list of abbreviations: U.N., United Nations; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Africa and the Far East; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international des radiocommunications); ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; CCIT, International Telegraphic Consultative Committee (Comité consultatif international télégraphique); WMO, World Meteorological Organization; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; UPU, Universal Postal Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; CIGRE, Conférence internationale des grands réseaux électriques; PAUGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; IBE, International Bureau of Education.

## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

### In Session as of May 1, 1956—Continued

Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . . . .	San José . . . . .	Apr. 25-
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 7th Session.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 27-
5th International Philatelic Exhibition (FIPEX) . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 28-
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session . . . . .	Istanbul . . . . .	Apr. 30-
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee . . . . .	Bern . . . . .	Apr. 30-

### Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1956

U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 1-
Inter-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	May 3-
2d Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	May 3-
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board . . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	May 3-
U.N. Exploratory Meeting on International Trade in Cocoa . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 3-
NATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 4-
South Pacific Commission: 15th Session . . . . .	Suva (Fiji) . . . . .	May 4-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Meeting on International Principles Governing Archeological Excavations.	Palermo (Italy) . . . . .	May 4-
U.N. <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on the Establishment of SUNFED: 1st Meeting.	New York . . . . .	May 7-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 3d Session.	New York . . . . .	May 7-
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 8-
9th World Health Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 8-
UNESCO Regional Seminar on Curriculum for Latin America . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	May 9-
ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 14-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee and Working Parties: 12th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 14-
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 5th Meeting . . . . .	Santiago . . . . .	May 14-
Inter-American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting . . . . .	Salvador (Brazil) . . . . .	May 20-
4th International Congress of Mediterranean Citrus Growers . . . . .	Israel . . . . .	May 20-
WMO Working Group on International Radiosonde Comparisons . . . . .	Payerne (Switzerland) . . . . .	May 20-
U.N. International Sugar Conference . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 21-
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 23-
Caribbean Commission: 22d Meeting . . . . .	Cayenne (French Guiana). . . . .	May 24-
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Radioisotopes. . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 25-
WHO Executive Board: 18th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
ILO Governing Body: 132d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
UNREF Executive Committee: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
16th International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems (CIGRE).	Paris . . . . .	May 30-
PAIGH Directing Council: 1st Meeting . . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	May
Inter-American Commission of Women: 11th General Assembly . . . . .	Ciudad Trujillo . . . . .	June 1-
International Seed Testing Association: 11th Congress (Executive Committee Meetings June 1 and 10).	Paris . . . . .	June 4-
PASO Executive Committee: 28th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 5-
International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	June 5-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo . . . . .	June 5-
International Labor Conference (ILO): 39th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 6-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 18th Session. . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 7-
International Commission for Criminal Police: 25th General Meeting.	Vienna . . . . .	June 7-
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 6th Annual Meeting.	Halifax . . . . .	June 11-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee. . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 11-
U. N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Mineral Resources Development: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo . . . . .	June 12-
International Rubber Study Group: Management Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 14-
5th World Power Conference . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	June 17-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 27th Session. . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 18-
FAO Council: 24th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 18-
ICAO Assembly: 10th Session . . . . .	Caracas . . . . .	June 19-
5th International Congress on Bridge and Structural Engineering . . . . .	Lisbon . . . . .	June 25-
FAO Meeting of Fish Processing Technologists . . . . .	Rotterdam . . . . .	June 25-
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 25-
U.N. ECE Coal Classification Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 26-
U.N. ECE Coal Utilization Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 29-
International Exposition of the Sea . . . . .	Marseille . . . . .	June
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 22d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 3-

Scheduled May 1–July 31, 1956—Continued

FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 6th Session.	Tehran . . . . .	July 3–
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 3d Session. . . . .	Tehran . . . . .	July 8–
19th International Conference on Public Education (Joint IBE/UNESCO).	Geneva . . . . .	July 9–
UNESCO Executive Board: 44th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 11–
International Whaling Commission: 8th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 16–
International Congress on Housing and Town Planning . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	July 22–
International Association of Theoretical and Applied Limnology: 13th Congress.	Helsinki . . . . .	July 27–
20th International Physiological Congress . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	July 30–
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Housing and Building Materials: 4th Meeting.	Bangkok . . . . .	July 30–
PAIGH Commission on Geography . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	July
South Pacific Commission: Technical Conference on Community Development.	Hollandia (New Guinea) . . . . .	July
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July

## Teacher Development Workshop at the University of Puerto Rico

*by Howard H. Russell*

The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, unique in many ways, serves as a cultural bridge between the United States and the other American Republics. United States foreign policy in this hemisphere, dedicated as it is to the development of a true partnership with the Republics to the south of us, must be based on mutual understanding and respect between our peoples. In carrying out its international educational exchange program, designed to increase such understanding, the Department of State has long been aware of the advantages which Puerto Rico offers as a midway point—a meeting ground for cross-cultural interpretation. Thus ways have constantly been sought to make use of Puerto Rico's excellent educational facilities and other resources of this progressive Commonwealth.

Recently Puerto Rico participated in the introduction of a new and highly successful exchange

project. A Teacher Development Workshop, the first to be conducted by the International Educational Exchange Service outside the continental United States, was held at the University of Puerto Rico from February 11 through 28, 1956. Initiation of the new project resulted, in part, from recommendations made by Vice President Nixon at the close of his visit to the Central American and Caribbean area a year ago.<sup>1</sup>

Fifty-five elementary and secondary school teachers and supervisors from the Central American and Caribbean area attended the Workshop, which was designed to provide:

(a) An understanding of the philosophy, principles, characteristics, and organization of education in the United States.

(b) Opportunity to observe and evaluate modern methods of instruction relevant to the philosophy and principles of education in the United States.

(c) Training in the preparation of inexpensive instructional materials for elementary, secondary, and vocational schools.

<sup>1</sup> For Mr. Nixon's report on his visit, see BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1955, p. 587.

• *Mr. Russell, author of the above article, is Deputy Director of the International Educational Exchange Service and represented the Department at the Teacher Development Workshop.*

(d) Opportunities to visit schools of all types and observe the use of modern methods and techniques.

(e) Opportunities to visit commercial, industrial, and agricultural projects.

In planning the Workshop, the Department had the enthusiastic cooperation of Puerto Rican officials and of the United States Office of Education, which assists the International Educational Exchange Service in administering the teacher development program.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Arturo Morales Carrión, Under Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, gave full support to the project and arranged a program of entertainment and hospitality for the visiting educators. Dr. Oscar E. Porrata, Dean of the College of Education of the university, offered the services of the faculty of his school in planning and conducting the Workshop. The chancellor of the university, Jaime Benítez, made all facilities of the university available. Dr. José M. Gallardo served as coordinator of the Workshop. Throughout the entire program, other members of the staffs of the College of Education and of the Commonwealth's Department of Education gave assistance which contributed significantly to its success.

#### **Selection of Participants**

The Workshop was designed for school administrators and teachers in the fields of elementary, secondary, and vocational education. Selection of participants was conducted in accordance with the procedure used in selecting foreign grantees for the regular 6-month teacher development program. Since the Workshop was conducted in Spanish, however, a command of English—one of the requirements for grantees coming to the continental United States—was not necessary. Candidates were nominated by their respective Ministries of Education and selected by the Department on the basis of recommendations submitted by the various United States Embassies and the United States Office of Education.

Forty-seven grants were awarded to educators from Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salva-

<sup>2</sup> Under the teacher development program, more than 300 foreign teachers and school administrators come to the continental United States each year for 6-month programs of specialized study and observation of educational methods.

dor. In addition, eight grantees from some of these same countries who were completing 6-month projects in the continental United States were awarded supplementary grants to enable them to attend the Workshop. These eight contributed to the success of the Workshop by sharing their recent experiences in the United States with their fellow participants.

At the opening ceremonies, Chancellor Jaime Benítez gave the official message of welcome, expressing the pleasure of the university at the opportunity presented by the Workshop to serve the cause of inter-American solidarity and cultural exchange. He described Puerto Rico as an area of rapid social change and discussed the role of the university and the educational system in meeting the challenge of modern life and their contribution to the evolution of Puerto Rican society. The State Department representative extended greetings to the participants on behalf of the Department and briefly discussed the importance attached to the Workshop by the International Educational Exchange Service.

#### **Education in U. S. Discussed**

During the following days the mornings were occupied by planning sessions devoted to discussion of the philosophy, characteristics, and organization of education in the United States. These discussions were led by educators selected for their specialized interest in, and knowledge of, the subjects treated. Dr. Theodore Brameld, visiting Professor of Education, and Professor Carmen Gómez Tejera conducted the session on the philosophy of education. A discussion of the organization and administration of education in the United States was led by Dean Porrata, who gave a historical summary, tracing the development of our system from its beginnings as a community enterprise, in contrast with other systems which have developed as a result of centralized State control, and by Professor Hermina Vázquez, who spoke on the present structure of the educational system.

One of the most stimulating plenary sessions was that dealing with the psychological basis of education. A team of psychologists under the leadership of Dr. Ramón Ramírez López made a brilliant presentation of the role psychology has played in education in the United States.

Two other sessions were devoted to the academic and vocational aspects of the curriculum. Discus-

sion of the academic curriculum was led by Dr. Aida A. Vergne, assisted by Professor Elroy Cintrón Medina, Principal of the University High School, and Mrs. Cecilia A. Olmeda, Principal of the University Elementary School. A team of specialists headed by Miss María S. Lacot guided the discussion of the vocational curriculum. Dr. Vergne also participated in a discussion of teacher training, which was the topic of the last planning session of the Workshop.

For the afternoon sessions, the participants were divided into three groups according to their interests: elementary, secondary, and vocational. The main objectives of these sessions were to observe and evaluate modern methods and techniques of the educational system of the mainland as adapted to conditions in the island and to train the participants in the preparation of inexpensive materials for instructional purposes at all levels. Elementary school teachers focused their attention in these sessions on language arts, arithmetic, science, social studies, and arts, music, and crafts. Secondary school teachers covered similar topics at their level. Those interested in vocational education directed their attention to industrial, trade, agricultural, and commercial education, industrial arts, and home economics. All of the sessions involved discussion of objectives as well as methods and techniques. Some methods classes at the university had prepared instructional kits which were then presented to the Workshop members by the future teachers of Puerto Rico.

Members of the Workshop also had a chance to see an exhibition of teaching aids, to attend educational films, and to discuss the teaching of English as a second language. English classes were offered for Workshop members interested in learning or improving their mastery of the language.

At one session Dr. Teófila Gamarra and Donald Keiller led a discussion on "The Role of Audio-Visual Aids in Learning." They considered the relation between good teaching and communication, and the effect of the new tools of learning on the curriculum. The discussion developed the idea that communication is the basis of all teaching and that instructors should avail themselves of all media which will strengthen and add meaning to the bonds of communication. The other topic of discussion was the preparation of low-cost materials. The criteria for the selection of material, the principles for effective use, and the

techniques for effective presentation were considered.

One day was given over to visiting eight public schools in the metropolitan area. On another occasion the group visited public schools in the Caguas district, where they saw urban and rural schools in operation. The visitors were favorably impressed with the Puerto Rico Second Unit Rural School, whose curriculum includes vocational agriculture for the boys and home economics for the girls. These rural schools have always emphasized community cooperation and are an important factor in the improvement of rural life. The visits enabled the group to see how teachers in Puerto Rico use modern methods and techniques in their daily tasks. They were especially impressed by the effective way in which the Commonwealth has adapted educational principles and practices of the mainland to the needs of the island. They observed the informality of the student-teacher relation and the active role played by the pupil. Many noted the spirit of teamwork in the schools and expressed their conviction that Puerto Rico had evolved a dynamic school system which offered many possibilities for further adaptation in other Latin American areas.

Many of the participants who were interested in the industrialization program of Puerto Rico utilized free time to visit industrial areas. The feeling was expressed that it is impossible to undertake such a program of industrialization successfully without a solid educational basis. The tours outside the metropolitan area afforded an opportunity to observe the agricultural development of Puerto Rico and to note the modern methods and techniques applied in the sugarcane fields, dairy farms, and pineapple plantations.

There was time, too, for many of the teachers to visit agencies in which they had special interest, such as the Department of Public Instruction, Social Programs Administration, Department of Health, Industrial Development Administration, etc. Some also visited the Puerto Rico Teachers Association, where they received information on the activities of that organization, e. g., its medical services, hospitalization plan, and credit cooperative.

The Workshop was brought to an end with a reception given by the university chapter of the Puerto Rico Teachers Association. After brief remarks by Dr. Thomas E. Cotner of the United

States Office of Education, Dean Porrata presented *certificados* to the teachers.

### **Evaluation of Project**

At the conclusion of the project participants wrote a brief evaluation of the Teacher Development Workshop. The general consensus was that they had achieved a better understanding of the educational system of the United States; that they had learned a great deal about modern methods, techniques, and procedures; that they had discovered many useful teaching aids and materials; and that they had observed the results of a dynamic philosophy of education in Puerto Rico. They agreed that Puerto Rico is an excellent field for training and observation and were enthusiastic about its hospitality.

The most frequently expressed criticism was that 2 weeks is not long enough for a workshop of this nature, which should last a minimum of 4 weeks to allow more time for tours to schools, factories, and other projects. Because of the time element, only 2 days had been allowed for this purpose. It was suggested that observation visits be made in small groups over a longer period. All the participants felt there should be more seminars of this nature and that some system of followup should be set up to keep in touch with the Workshop members and assist them in making the most effective use of what they had learned. Several delegations inquired into the possibility of having teams from the University of Puerto Rico sent to their countries to assist in workshops and other educational activities.

The Workshop is expected to have a far-reaching influence on seminars held in the various countries. The members of the Cuban delegation, for example, gathered materials to prepare for six "Little Workshops," which were held upon their return home. Other delegations requested materials for similar activities. The Cuban delegation is also writing a 50-page pamphlet on *The Educational Experience of Puerto Rico*, in which they show the application of the principles and practices of the educational system of the United States to the Cuban environment. This pamphlet will be distributed in other Latin American countries.

As significant as the professional results of the Workshop is the contribution which it made to the strengthening of inter-American solidarity. The

friendships that grew up, the spontaneous expressions of appreciation for the international educational exchange program, and the informality of all discussions and exchange of views evidenced the feelings of good will and cooperation that prevailed among the visitors and the staff. Again people of different cultures had added to their mutual understanding of each other's countries through working together on problems of common interest and concern. The visitors also took away with them a new conception of the relations existing between Puerto Rico and the United States. Letters received reflect admiration of the progress achieved by Puerto Rico and an interest in pursuing studies at the university there. The Workshop has illustrated once again the significant role Puerto Rico is playing as a meeting ground for the cultures of the Western Hemisphere in furtherance of our common goals.

It is evident that the Workshop not only succeeded in attaining its immediate objectives but also created widespread interest in increased participation in related educational exchange projects. In order to meet this growing interest the International Educational Exchange Service has made tentative plans for holding another workshop next year in Puerto Rico. This second workshop will probably be of longer duration, in accordance with recommendations made by the participants this year. Requests have been received, also, for sending abroad teams of educators from the University of Puerto Rico. These teams would meet with teachers and school administrators and conduct sessions similar to those held at the Workshop. The enthusiasm prompting these requests makes it clear that Puerto Rico will play an increasingly important role in the U. S. international educational exchange program.

### **U.S. Delegations to International Conferences**

#### **UNESCO Conference on Education in Latin America**

The Department of State announced on April 21 (press release 207) that the U.S. Government will be represented at a Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America of the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), scheduled to meet at Lima, Peru, April 23-May 5, 1956, by the following delegation:

Bess Goodykoontz, *Chairman*, Director, International Educational Relations, Division of International Education, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

George Greco, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Operations Mission, Lima, Peru

Thomas A. Hart, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Operations Mission, La Paz, Bolivia

This conference, organized by UNESCO in collaboration with the Organization of American States and the Government of Peru, is being called for the purpose of studying the practical problems arising from the gradual application of free and compulsory education in the states and territories of the Latin American region, and of making recommendations that might serve as the basis for a plan of effective action. The work of the conference will be divided among three committees concerned with questions in the fields of administration and finance, curriculum, and the training and status of teachers.

This meeting of specialists will be immediately followed by a Second Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education. The last named meeting, convened by the Organization of American States, will meet at Lima from May 3 to 8, 1956, and will consider the technical conclusions reached by the participants of the UNESCO conference.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

*Senate advice and consent to ratification given:* April 19, 1956.

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

*Senate advice and consent to ratification given:* April 19, 1956.

##### Aviation

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

*Senate advice and consent to ratification given:* April 19, 1956.

#### Organization of American States

Charter of the Organization of American States. Signed at Bogotá April 30, 1948. Entered into force December 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.

*Ratification deposited:* Argentina, April 10, 1956.

#### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.

*Notification by Belgium of extension to:* Belgian Congo and Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, March 19, 1956.

*Ratifications deposited:* Laos, March 28, 1956; Rumania (with a declaration), March 28, 1956.

#### Trade and Commerce

Protocol on terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3438.

*Notification of intention to apply concessions received:* Finland, April 10, 1956 (effective May 10, 1956).

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Sweden, April 10, 1956.

### BILATERAL

#### Colombia

Agreement for establishment and operation of a rawinsonde observation station on the island of San Andrés. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá February 6 and March 14, 1956. Enters into force on date a memorandum of arrangement is signed by the cooperating agencies of the two governments.

#### Germany

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington February 13, 1956.

*Entered into force:* April 23, 1956 (day each government received from the other a written notification that it had complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements).

#### Japan

Agreement providing for Japanese financial contributions for United States administrative and related expenses during the Japanese fiscal year 1956 under the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 13, 1956. Entered into force April 13, 1956.

Agreement setting forth understandings with respect to the program of aircraft assembly or manufacture in Japan, pursuant to the agreement of June 3, 1955 (TIAS 3383). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 13, 1956. Entered into force April 13, 1956.

#### Union of South Africa

Agreement relating to the reciprocal issuance of passport visas to nonimmigrants. Effected by exchange of notes at Capetown March 28 and April 3, 1956. Entered into force May 1, 1956.



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**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 23-29**

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Press releases issued prior to April 23 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 200 of April 17 and 207 of April 21.

No.	Date	Subject
210	4/23	Dulles: "Developing NATO in Peace" (printed in issue of April 30).
†211	4/23	Delegation to Inter-American Cultural Council.
212	4/24	Dulles: news conference transcript.
213	4/25	Dulles: testimony on immigration policy.
†214	4/25	Robertson: Wilson Centennial Celebration.
*215	4/25	Nominations of Nufer, Lyon, Beaulac.
216	4/25	Dulles: American Society of International Law.
217	4/25	Note concerning Russian seamen.
*218	4/26	Sixth annual awards ceremony.
†219	4/26	Agreement with Germany on film tariffs.
220	4/26	Program for Goulart visit (rewrite).
†221	4/27	Wilcox: "The U.N. in the Mainstream of History."
†222	4/27	Dulles: awards ceremony.
†223	4/27	Nixon: awards ceremony.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS



**Foreign Relations of the United States • • •**

*The basic source* of information on  
U.S. diplomatic history

**1938, Volume V, The American Republics**

The first part of this volume consists of a general section treating multilateral subjects. These include the Eighth International Conference of American States at Lima, the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, conciliation of differences between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, a dispute between the United Kingdom and Guatemala with respect to British Honduras, and boundary disputes between Argentina and Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and Honduras and Nicaragua. The Conference of American States was notable for the adoption of the Declaration of the Principles of the Solidarity of America, generally known as the Declaration of Lima.

The remainder of this volume deals with bilateral relations of the United States with individual American Republics, the topics being arranged under country headings. The subject given most attention is that of trade agreements, negotiations of that nature being recorded with 10 countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Other topics treated include military missions, protection of business interests, exchange restrictions, debts, and claims.

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# The Department of State

Vol. XXXIV, No. 881

May 14, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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# The Mutual Security Program and the National Security

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*<sup>1</sup>

I am here to ask for authority to continue our mutual security program in accordance with the President's message of March 19, 1956.<sup>2</sup> This program is part of a national insurance policy which we take out as against a serious and evident threat from the Soviet Communists. The total cost of this insurance is over \$40 billion a year. Most of this, approximately 90 percent, is spent on our own United States military establishment—our Army, Navy, Air Force, etc. Approximately 10 percent is spent through foreign governments, for the most part to help our allies hold positions which are vital both to us and to them. This 10 percent makes up what we call a mutual security program.

It is particularly tempting to try to save on this mutual security part of our insurance bill, which involves payments to other governments. Of course, \$4 billion is a large sum, and we would all like to save it and use it for tax reductions or for public works here at home. It is hard-earned taxpayers' money and it ought not to be taken and spent unless it is really needed to protect our country.

The President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I, myself, the Secretary of State, are all convinced that this expenditure is necessary for the security of the United States. Congress has in past years shared the same view. Each year, after the most careful scrutiny, it has appropriated the funds to sustain this program

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Apr. 30 (press release 224).

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545. For statements concerning the program in Europe, see *ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1956, p. 674; in the Far East, *ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1956, p. 723.

at approximately the present rate of expenditure, and indeed for several years the rate of expenditure was much higher. Nothing has yet happened to make it prudent to terminate or curtail the present program. Let me make a few illustrations.

## Asia

In Korea there is an armistice, but there is no peace. In Taiwan (Formosa) there are almost daily military engagements between the forces of the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists, who, so far, stubbornly reject our proposal for a renunciation of force in the area. In Vietnam there is an armistice, but no peace. In these three world positions, a total of approximately 50 million free people are confronted by Communists who are using the 600 million people they rule to build a vast military establishment.

Each of these positions is of vital importance from the standpoint of the United States. If any one of them was lost it would involve a dangerous breakthrough into the Western Pacific area.

The importance of Korea is shown by the fact that, when Korea was attacked in 1950, we went to Korea's aid and spent many billions of dollars and incurred over 150,000 United States casualties to assist the Republic of Korea to throw back the aggressors.

The importance of Taiwan (Formosa) is shown by the fact that a little over a year ago the Congress, by almost unanimous vote of both Houses, authorized the President of the United States to send our own forces, if need be, to defend that area from Chinese Communist aggression.

The importance of Southeast Asia is shown by the fact that the Senate, by a nearly unanimous vote, approved our Southeast Asia Treaty, which

commits the United States to action in the event of Communist armed aggression in that area.

These three acts indicate the vital importance which the Executive, the Congress, and the whole Nation attach to the freedom of the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and the three new nations of Indochina.

These positions are primarily held by local forces largely trained and equipped by the United States. But the governments of these impoverished countries cannot maintain their present forces without some economic help also. Therefore, we give not only direct military aid but what is called "defense support," which is the budgetary and economic aid needed to enable a country to have the armed forces which we judge reasonably related to the threat of aggression and our continued plans to prevent it.

The estimate of military-aid and defense-support expenditure next year for Korea, China, Indochina, and other area allies—the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan—is in the neighborhood of \$1.5 billion.

Is it worth while? Well, without this help, these forward positions would have to be held by greatly increased United States forces or else left exposed to a Communist takeover, which either we would have to accept, with grave danger to the United States security position in the Pacific, or else we would have to use our own forces to go over there and drive the Communists out as we did in the case of Korea.

Of course, the armed forces of these allies are not alone sufficient to withstand the full might of Chinese Communist military power backed by the Soviet Union. But we maintain in the general area of the Western Pacific United States mobile striking power to back up the local ground forces. The cost of this United States force is in our defense budget. But the two costs essentially complement each other. Neither would be sufficient without the other.

#### **Middle East**

Then there is the Middle East situation. Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey all have common borders with the Soviet Union, and Iraq is close to it. All four are subject to Soviet threats and the proximity of Soviet power. Pakistan is an ally of ours under the Southeast Asia Treaty; Turkey is an ally of ours under the North Atlantic Treaty; and

all four of these countries have united for collective security under the Baghdad Pact. They hold the gateway to the south, where are found the oil reserves which are vital to the military power and industrial strength of Western Europe. Also, just beyond is the gateway to Africa. It would be reckless not to help these countries to help themselves and at the same time to help us. The estimate of military-aid and defense-support expenditure next year for these countries is in the neighborhood of \$800 million.

#### **Western Europe**

Then we come to Western Europe. There the military forces of NATO stand guard over the greatest industrial and military treasure that there is within the free world, except for the United States itself. So important do we consider this that a substantial part of United States armed force is stationed in Western Europe for its defense. We help maintain the military strength of our European allies by supplying them with certain types of weapons. Also, we now have a base agreement with Spain, and this involves substantial costs. We also think it prudent to help Yugoslavia to maintain its national independence. The expenditure for military aid to NATO (excluding Turkey, of which we already spoke) and military aid and defense support for Spain and Yugoslavia is estimated for next year at about \$1 billion.

These three situations which I have described—the one in the Pacific, the other in the Middle East, and the other in Europe—plus some military help to Latin America, account roughly for 83 percent of the estimated expenditures under the mutual security program for next year. These expenditures not only make it possible to hold vital positions at less cost than any other way which can be contrived, but they provide diversified locations around the globe from which Russia could be struck, with devastating effect, should its rulers launch a war of aggression. This capacity of retaliation is a great deterrent to war and vitally serves the cause of peace and our own security here at home.

The remaining 17 percent of the program is a figure which for next year, as for this year, will involve expending an estimated \$700 million. It is not directly related to military considerations, although much of the money goes to allies. These

expenditures, however, wherever they go, are directly related to our security. They help areas in the world which are threatened by Communist subversion and which contain people, resources, and strategic locations which, in our own interests as well as theirs, should be secure from hostile alien domination. It helps their economic development and also their public health and education, both through our own programs and those of the United Nations.

In these countries the political leaders and the people as a whole want to maintain their independence. They do not want to be subjected to the new Soviet colonialism that grips Eastern Europe. They are themselves carrying the main burden of seeking to preserve their liberty—and this is as it should be. But oftentimes this is a hard task and they need and deserve some outside help.

This portion of the program can easily be justified from the standpoint of our national security, since it offsets efforts by hostile forces to expand their power. But it has a much broader justification.

The United States is far and away the most wealthy nation in the world. Our productivity is not much less than that of all the rest of the world put together. Our annual per capita income is over \$2,000, whereas in the newly developing countries of Asia it is under \$100. The United States cannot live either happily or safely as an oasis of prosperity in a desert of misery.

No wealthy individual can live happily in a community of poverty to which he is indifferent. It is the same with the society of nations. Always the wealthy and economically developed nations have in fact helped less developed countries to develop. We were helped from abroad when we were beginning to develop this continent. That is a law of social life and we cannot violate it except at our peril.

That is more true than ever, since the Soviets are now themselves offering development aid.

I indicated earlier that the Soviet Communist "new look" did not warrant our curtailing our mutual security program. It is true that Soviet policies and doctrine now seem to put less emphasis on violence, and that is encouraging. The danger of general war seems somewhat less, and that is an immense relief. But let us ask ourselves why the danger of violence has receded. It is because the network of mutual security treaties,

sustained by our mutual security program and backed by our mobile striking power, makes it unprofitable for the Soviets to follow their old policies of violence.

Their change is not due to any spiritual conversion. They have not gotten religion. They realistically take account of what the free nations have done to make violence an unprofitable tactic.

But if we want them to continue to desist from violence, we had better continue doing the things which have led them to desist. Our policies are paying off in this respect. But that is not a reason for abandoning the policies, but for continuing them. The Soviets have by no means lost the *capacity* to be violent, and their old policies could quickly reappear if we faltered in the policies which have checked them.

The Soviets' new tactics seek influence with the newly developing countries through posing as an exponent of mutually beneficial relations with these countries. They are seeking to employ trade credits, technical assistance, and sales of military equipment to give credence to this new image of the Soviet-Chinese Communist bloc. They seek to capitalize on the desire of these newly developing countries for economic progress and their need to dispose of raw materials and food-stuffs which are not entirely absorbed by Western markets. Undoubtedly, the Soviet and Chinese Communists hope in this way to expand their influence while at the same time eliminating the risk of war. These tactics also reflect a new stage in the development of the Soviet economy, where industrial development creates needs for agricultural and other raw materials and makes it possible to offer in exchange a wide range of capital goods and technical skills.

#### **Need for Flexibility and Continuity**

These new Communist tactics make it more than ever imperative that the United States should continue the economic phase of our mutual security program and should continue it with greater flexibility and with greater assurance of continuity than ever before. That is why the President has asked for more discretionary funds and why he has asked for the right to commit, out of future nonmilitary appropriations, if granted, up to \$100 million a year for 10 years on long-range development projects. This represents about 2½ percent of the total mutual security program as it is running.

Today we operate in a very cumbersome manner. Already the State Department and the International Cooperation Administration are, at the request of the Bureau of the Budget, preparing programs to be submitted for fiscal year 1958. After those programs have been reviewed by the executive branch and are finally submitted to the Congress, and after the next Congress has authorized and appropriated, then the plans must be adjusted to meet that congressional action and the changing world scene. Then the task of implementing the plans is begun, and there is usually a lag of a year or two between the obligating of the funds in 1958 and the actual getting of the funds into equipment, supplies, and services at the foreign destination. In the case of much of the military equipment, the delay is longer. And when all this process has been completed, it is applicable only to a single year's operation, and there is no assurance that funds will be available to complete the task then begun if it is a long-range project.

All of this points up to the importance of giving the President greater discretion in the use of funds so that to that extent we do not have to try to define their use several years in advance and also so that there should be a modest expectation of continuity.

I should perhaps say at this point that I have spoken in terms of estimated expenditures rather than in terms of authorizations because in that way it is possible to get a better overall picture of what we are trying to do. Actually, the authorization now sought for next year is \$4,672,000,000, which is larger than the estimated expenditures for next year. This is primarily because in both 1955 and 1956 authorizations and appropriations were considerably less than expenditures.

It may be asked whether this mutual security program will have to go on forever. The answer, I think, is that that part of the program which contributes to the security of the United States will have to go on so long as our security is threatened. I hope that that part of the task which relates to the development of the newly developing countries may, more and more, be taken over by private capital. But for that there must be a lessening of the political risks.

The program could, of course, be curtailed if there were an effective plan for supervised limitation of armament. We are trying persistently to get that, and we are negotiating with flexibility.

But it could not honestly be said that there are good prospects of early success.

Of course, this part of the program could be reduced if there should come into being in Russia a nondespotic form of government which was genuinely dedicated to the welfare of the Russian people and which gave up ideas of aggressive expansion.

There are for the first time signs that the yearnings of the Russian people for greater freedom from fear and from want and for greater freedom of thought are assuming such proportions that the Soviet rulers find it expedient to take account of them. On the other hand, Stalin's successors may be seeking to preserve, in a new garb, the essence of his despotism and to substitute for genuine reforms a rewriting of past history. External successes would, of course, help them to postpone a domestic day of reckoning. Therefore, it is now more than ever important to deny such successes to the Soviet rulers and to preserve the means of doing so—our mutual security program.

#### **Proposed Independent Study**

Consideration is being given to an independent study of some of the aspects of our mutual security program. There are a number of aspects of the program which the President feels, and which perhaps you, Mr. Chairman, and this committee feel could usefully be studied by men who are highly qualified but who are not available to serve the Government on a full-time, long-term basis.

I have in mind questions as to the relative role of the State Department and the Defense Department in administering the program; as to whether we should seek to put more of our program on a loan rather than a grant basis; as to whether the program needs to be enlarged and given greater continuity to meet the new Soviet tactics; as to whether, and if so, how, we can speed up our program so that there is not the present long delay between the conception of programs and their execution, and sometimes regrettable gaps between our promises and our performance. There is the question of the degree to which it is feasible to give Congress a dependable itemization of programs which may not come to fruition for several years, by which time the surrounding circumstances may have considerably altered. There is the question of the degree



to which it is useful to provide funds on a bilateral basis as against use of United Nations or regional agencies. There is the question as to whether we should emphasize short-term projects of popular interest or long-range projects which have no obvious popular appeal.

These are all important matters which justify, I believe, a kind of study which it is difficult for Cabinet members or Members of Congress themselves to undertake.

But none of these questions relates to the basic validity of the program itself. It would indeed be ironic if, now that the Soviet has begun giving aid to its allies in terms of billions and offering economic aid to free nations in terms of hundreds of millions, the United States should withdraw from that program which it invented and let the Soviet take over that field.

The President has, under the Constitution, the responsibility to formulate the foreign policy of the United States. And surely it is significant that he judges this mutual security program to be "vitaly important to our people" and "an indispensable part of our national effort." That judgment, expressed in his message to the Congress of March 19, 1956, has not been altered. The President told me that this morning. To have this program appreciably reduced, interfered with, or put in jeopardy would gravely endanger the security of the United States. That is the considered judgment of the President and all his advisers who are charged with safeguarding our national security. I urge, therefore, that the requested authorization be granted.

## **Secretary Dulles' Departure for NATO Council Meeting**

### **White House Announcement**

White House press release dated May 1

The Secretary of State, prior to his departure for Paris this afternoon, conferred with the President in relation to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

They discussed the political development of the Atlantic community, of which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an important manifestation. The President expressed his great interest in the matter, an interest which he has long held

and which was intensified by his experience as Supreme Commander (Europe) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1951-1952.

### **Secretary Dulles' Departure Statement**

Press release 229 dated May 1

I am leaving for Paris to attend the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This will be an important meeting because I think it is generally realized that the North Atlantic community needs to organize itself into something more than a military alliance.

This does not imply that the military aspects of NATO have outlived their usefulness. On the contrary, it remains essential to maintain the military strength and unity of the free nations. It is this strength and unity which have contributed to the present disposition of the Soviet to deemphasize violence as an instrument of their international policy. If we want that happier condition to continue, we must continue the policies which brought it about.

But the North Atlantic community is held together by sentiments far more profound than fear and by objectives far more fundamental than military strength. I hope and expect that at this meeting we will begin to search out new ways to express our common purposes.

In addition to attendance at the NATO meeting I will have the welcome opportunity to exchange views with various of my colleagues with respect to matters of common concern to our countries. Such meetings are a usual byproduct of a NATO Council meeting and are of great value in maintaining harmony and understanding between the United States and other friendly governments.

I plan to leave Paris for Washington next Sunday.

## **Letters of Credence**

### *Rumanian People's Republic*

The newly appointed Minister of the Rumanian People's Republic, Silviu Brucan, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on April 30. For the text of the Minister's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 225.

## Technical Cooperation in the Near East and South Asia

by Stephen P. Dorsey

The countries of the Near East and South Asia—the Arab States and Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Nepal—together comprise not only the subcontinent of the great Asian land mass but also its bridge to the other continents of Europe and Africa. They have known the tramp of armies and the harsh hand of the conqueror from the beginning of our civilization, which was cradled in their midst. Their people vary in many respects from one country to another because of differences in their indigenous circumstances and in the foreign influences to which they have been exposed, but they share a common heritage of economic deficiency and political difficulty.

Of fundamental significance is the dire poverty that characterizes most of this region. Rainfall is erratic—there is either too much or too little. Water supply is a cause of constant concern. Much of the best farmland would be regarded as submarginal in this country. Even in the rich valleys of the great rivers, limited water supply and the acute density of population make life difficult. The farmer—and the average man is a farmer—lives his short life with his family, and often his draft animal, in a one- or two-room

mud hut on a caloric intake at best not more than two-thirds that of the average American, on an annual income of perhaps \$75.

As a result there is everywhere an almost overpowering interest in development—in “catching up” on economic progress. The impact of Western civilization in recent years has jarred the people from the passivism of centuries, and through various channels better ways of life have been revealed. This fact, coupled with the area’s poverty, has produced the social unrest that characterizes the Middle East and South Asia today.

The late Dr. Henry Garland Bennett, who gave so much to the effective launching of the point 4 program, used to say that the peoples of the underdeveloped countries had recently been able to see through a glass window the way people lived in the Western World. It was now up to us to open the window and enlarge it to a door through which they might pass to share some of the techniques and accomplishments of the West. If the door was not provided, he implied, these peoples would blow the roof off to gain access to what they wanted.

In recent visits that I have made to the area I have been deeply impressed by the intense and almost universal drive to telescope evolutionary progress. Governments are under compulsion to bring progress to the masses in tangible, realizable form *now*. It is almost as if the air were charged with an impatience for economic development which will not be denied. In this very impatience, of course, lies the danger that, in the search for a panacea for poverty, some may accept the promises of Moscow as the easiest way out.

•*Mr. Dorsey, author of the above article, is Deputy Regional Director for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, International Cooperation Administration. His article is based on an address made on February 17 before the Institute on International Affairs, Washington State College, Pullman, Wash.*

## Economic and Political Problems

Extraordinary difficulties block the way of economic development and effective assistance by the United States in its accomplishment. This is a region in which the economic, the political, and the emotional are mixed together to an unusual degree. Indeed, one simply cannot speak of economic problems and plans as if they were distinct in nature and reasonably separable from political problems. A few specific current examples are (1) the extended difficulties between Saudi Arabia and Britain over boundaries in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula, (2) the Pushtunistan issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, (3) the Indus River water dispute between Pakistan and India, (4) the problem of dividing the Jordan River waters for the mutual benefit of both Arabs and Israelis.

Problems of this sort create uncertainties as well as serious tensions. These uncertainties affect private business and private investment, foreign and domestic; they affect what the local governments are able to do and the degree to which the United States can help. In dealing with these problems we are confronted not merely with a complex situation but with a perilous one. The extreme nationalism of these new nations is complicated by their fears and memories of colonialism and by the feeling that economic dependency is a primary source of political weakness. In the Middle East, the years since the Palestine partition have brought no healing of the wounds created in the Arab-Israel struggle. These have been 7 years of unabated tensions and bitterness and recurrent bloodshed. They have also been 7 years of a continuing, painstaking search for peace. Yet there is no peace in Palestine. The dispute between the Arab States and Israel underlies all the problems with which that area is beset and remains a lighted fuse that could at any time touch off a potential world war in the atomic age.

To the north the Soviet bloc and Communist China, together controlling one-third of the world's population and a quarter of the earth's surface, border this arc of the Middle East and South Asia which contains resources vital to the welfare of the free world. Here are not only manganese, chrome, mica, and other minerals but also some two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves. I need not remind you that these Communist neighbors maintain 10 million men under arms—the largest force ever assembled in peace-

time during the history of the world; that their resource development and nuclear capabilities are steadily increasing; or that their leaders have vowed that their system will eventually achieve world domination. During the 1940 negotiations with the Nazis, the Soviets made it clear that "the focal point of the aspirations of the Soviet Union . . . [lay] in the general direction of the Persian Gulf."<sup>1</sup> Their courtship of the Near East during the past year is abundant evidence that they still feel the same way.

## Launching of U.S. Aid Program

Thus the security of this area has necessarily come to be a source of deepest concern to the United States and to the rest of the free world. For when any nation falls victim to Communist aggression the Soviets become stronger and U.S. safety is reduced. The mutual security program was established to meet this threat to human liberty through measures both political and economic. Its military provisions were established to provide, to countries which desire such aid, limited military programs which will contribute to their internal security and which will strengthen their ability to resist external aggression.

As for the economic phase of the mutual security program, it undertakes to aid in the preservation of stable free governments and institutions, the development of self-sustaining economies, and the removal of discriminations and restrictions impeding trade with and among the individual states.

In 1953 President Eisenhower said, "We are ready, in short, to dedicate our strength to serving the *needs*, rather than the *fears*, of the world." On returning from his trip to the Near East the same year, Secretary Dulles put it another way:

The peoples of the Near East and Asia demand better standards of living, and the day is past when their aspirations can be ignored. The task is one primarily for the governments and the peoples themselves. In some cases they can use their available resources, such as oil revenues, to better advantage. There are, however, ways in which the United States can usefully help, not with masses of money but by contributing advanced technical knowledge about transport, communication, fertilization, and use of water for irrigation. . . . Money wisely spent for this area under the Mutual Security Program will give the American people a good return in terms of better understanding and cooperation.

American private enterprise has long engaged

<sup>1</sup> *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, Department of State publication 3023, p. 259.

in economic cooperation with the Near East and South Asia. Yankee traders went to this part of the world in the early days of the new Republic. One of the first American technical experts might be said to be Eli Smith from Northford, Conn., who took the printing press to Syria in 1834. Ex-Confederate technicians contributed their skills to the development of the area after the end of the Civil War. These, however, were all private ventures. It was not until World War II that the U.S. Government extended limited lend-lease aid and credits to some of the countries of the area.

In January 1949 technical assistance under government auspices was announced as the fourth point of President Truman's inaugural address. The following year the first technical experts under point 4 reached the Near East and Asia. A program of this sort could not be developed overnight. It took time. But today some hundreds of U.S. technicians are attached to International Cooperation Administration missions in the area, advising cooperating governments in new methods and techniques in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, health, housing, education, natural resources, industry, transportation, communications, and public administration. Near Eastern and South Asian technicians in these fields are brought to the United States for advanced training or are provided basic instruction in regional training courses at the American University of Beirut. Today bilateral programs are operating in Iran, India, Israel, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and all of the independent Arab States except Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen.

Although Moscow tries to represent them as instruments by which underdeveloped countries are forced into imperialist subjugation, the general agreements under which technical cooperation programs are authorized must be based on other governments' requests for technical assistance. They provide for open publication of essential information pertaining to the program. Moreover, the requesting country agrees to integrate the programs and make good use of their results, to cooperate with other countries in carrying out technical programs and maintaining world peace, and to bear a fair share of the costs. Thus technical cooperation is not a one-way transaction. Rather it is a completely voluntary, two-way partnership that grows from mutual respect, trust, and the recognition of common interests.

Together with the broad general agreements,

program and project agreements establish U.S. and local government contributions to, and the administration of, particular technical assistance projects. There are today some 700 such agreements in effect with the countries of the Near East and South Asia.

Our technical assistance programs have been growing in many ways. The number of technicians operating in the Near East and South Asia has increased from 850 in 1953 to 1,100 at the end of 1955; the scope of the programs, at first confined largely to the immediate and basic needs for more food, better health, and more education, has been expanded to cover many other fields. For some countries our technical assistance programs even include training in the peacetime uses of atomic energy.

Our bilateral technical assistance programs in the Near East and South Asia have been supplemented by United Nations technical assistance programs, the U.S. contributions to which have increased steadily each year. Our first contribution for the 18-month period from July 1, 1950, to December 31, 1951, was \$12,007,500. For the sixth period (calendar year 1956) \$15,500,000 was authorized by the Congress. The limiting factor on the U.N. technical programs has not been the amount of money which the United States is willing to put into these multilateral programs; it is rather the inability or failure of other nations to increase their contributions. We are convinced of the value of a U.N. program. We do not want it to become a U.S. program in disguise.

#### **Need for Development Aid**

In the early days of point 4 the hope was that technical assistance would be enough to help the countries of the Near East to help themselves. As time went on, it became apparent that increasing technical competence was not enough unless it could be harnessed. There is no sense in teaching farmers how to double their crops, for example, if the increased harvest cannot be marketed, or in increasing efficiency and thus releasing labor from the farm if it cannot find profitable utilization elsewhere. Conversely, credits for a Helmand Valley project in Afghanistan are useless if technicians have not been trained to carry on the necessary operations and maintenance. In the many countries of the area in which there are serious economic imbalances, technical assistance and devel-

opment or special economic aid clearly cannot be divorced from each other.

The first U.S. Government grant aid to the Arab States and Iran for capital development and other purposes was authorized by the Congress in 1953. Israel had already received such funds for "relief and resettlement projects" for refugees coming into Israel, and there had been grants to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). In South Asia funds for development had been similarly available but were not separately delineated until after 1953. Since the mutual security program first got under way in fiscal year 1951 an average total of \$275 million, including both technical assistance and development aid, has been provided annually to the co-operating countries of the Near East and South Asia. The major beneficiaries have been India, Israel, Pakistan, Iran, and Egypt, with the remaining countries receiving annual assistance averaging several million dollars per year. It is significant that of total mutual security funds available to the area in fiscal year 1956 over one-third are in the form of loans.

In addition development aid has taken the form of direct loans from the Export-Import Bank and of indirect credits through our 32 percent interest in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Export-Import Bank, as of the end of fiscal year 1955, had afforded credits totaling \$300 million in the Near East and South Asia. Of these the largest have been \$135 million to Israel, \$53 million to Iran, and \$39.5 million to Afghanistan. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has extended loans in the following amounts: Iraq, \$12.8 million; India, \$139.7 million; Pakistan, \$77.25 million; and Lebanon, \$27 million (for the Litani River Development Project). Last February Egypt announced that agreement in principle had been reached with the bank on its offer to lend \$200 million to help finance Egypt's \$1.3 billion High Aswan Dam project.

The response to the program, with a few exceptions, has been favorable throughout the area. I have gained this impression from direct contacts not only with officials, who appreciate the soundness of its long-range goals, but also from the man in the street who has had direct contact with U.S. technicians and projects. In personal visits to many of our projects in the field I have found everywhere able, dedicated Americans who work

with their hands, in dirty clothes, far from the comforts of the local capital, next to eager local citizens who are learning at their sides. They are true shirt-sleeve ambassadors. No greater compliment to the effectiveness of their work could be paid to them than the Communists' recent adoption of a program of economic aid to the Near East and South Asia.

### **Programs in India and Pakistan**

It might be of interest to evaluate the program, its goals and accomplishments, in two great countries of South Asia—India and Pakistan.

The Government of India is deeply aware of lessons learned from revolutionary history over the last 10 years. It knows that agrarian discontent in China was used by Mao Tse-tung as an effective weapon to overthrow the National Government. The same agrarian discontent was Ho Chi Minh's weapon in Indochina. In India the 75 percent of the people living in small villages have seen just enough change to whet their appetite for substantial betterment in their lives. Accordingly, India's first Five-Year Plan, which has just ended, emphasized improvement in rural life, not only by increasing the food supply but by returning the benefits of that production to the farmers. In the first years of our program in India more than 90 percent of American assistance went into helping that country meet its goals.

Picture an Indian village in midsummer. The sun burns through clouds of dust choking everyone who walks through the dirt paths in the 112-degree temperature. Clustered closely together so as to use no more of the precious land than is absolutely necessary are the windowless, mud houses in which families of a dozen persons often live in an area the size of an ordinary American living room. Teen-age boys labor to do a man's work plowing the baked ground in anticipation of the monsoon. Girl wives pound chapatis—flat, hard pancakes—amid clouds of flies, their babies lying in the dirt beside them.

But there is no depression or self-pity among these people. The village leaders proudly show a visitor the new school, the first the village has ever had; the covered well, sanitary for the first time; the village handicraft industry. They tell you proudly of the community-development and extension program which in the past 2 years has reached some 60 million of India's poorest people. In the Ganges Plain 3,000 new deep wells will irri-

gate more than 1 million acres. New water-storage dams will provide irrigation for another 4 million acres, increasing food production by over 2 million tons when completed. American technicians have provided catalytic acceleration in these enterprises and in the control of malaria, improvement of sanitation, provision of pure drinking water, village schools, and improved farming methods, including soil conservation and land reclamation.

As for urban life, India's second Five-Year Plan, launched April 15, will emphasize the speeding-up of industrialization. In the cities great numbers of unemployed and underemployed people walk the streets searching for work, eking out a precarious existence by performing odd jobs for little pay. The U.S. program over the last year and in future years will augment India's increasing emphasis on industrial growth. The United States will extend assistance in electric power, transport, and industry. Private industrial development will be assisted by advisory technical and managerial assistance, industrial credit, and the encouragement of foreign private capital investment. The second Five-Year Plan aims to absorb 8 million new people into the labor force.

There has been much discussion in India and here concerning the division of industry by the Government into a public and a private sector, giving rise to misunderstanding of what some characterize as India's "socialization." Where private capital is not available for investment the state has stepped in to enable the economy as a whole to advance rapidly, for rapid advance is essential to success. Prime Minister Nehru, for all his neutralism and his display of friendliness during the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev, is and has been determinedly anti-Communist domestically. In fact India has not hesitated to jail numbers of Communists at any time that she deemed it necessary to protect public security.

Our aid to India, although substantial, has been only a small portion of what India herself has invested in her electrifying development from the stagnation of Indian life under colonial rule. We are vitally concerned in the successful evolution of India, for it is a free and democratic state. Although the United States takes a different stand from that of Nehru with regard to the realities of Soviet designs on Asia, nevertheless we can agree emphatically with his determination to build

a democratic and free society under an independent government.

There are two large show windows in Asia. That of Communist China displays temptingly wares produced by totalitarian methods. India's is based on the principles of freedom, independence, and democracy. If Communist China's experiment proves the more successful, the peoples of Asia may believe that in that direction lies the best means for achieving their desires for a better life. If India does not succeed, the result would be massive tragedy for the United States and the world.

In this context it is important for India to be able to count on our aid year by year until she achieves her goals. The amount of the aid is not as important as the certainty on the part of India's Government that a definite amount can be counted on, so that India can make a long-term calculation of the resources available to her in connection with the achievement of her second Five-Year Plan. It is important also that Indians feel that we appreciate their struggle and do not begrudge them assistance. The people of India are determined to achieve a better life with us or without us. If we are unwilling or begrudging in our assistance, Russia stands ready to take our place as their friend.

Turning to Pakistan, we find a country which has taken a clear stand at our side in unconditional opposition to Communist aggression. Pakistan has joined with other freedom-loving nations to the East to form the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and is united with countries to the West in the Baghdad Pact. Pakistan entered this company of free and independent nations confronted with the economic absurdity of her territory's division into two parts by a thousand miles of Indian territory. Her major economic difficulties arise from the poverty and low productivity of her masses of people, the heart-rending problem of providing for her refugees, and her critical budgetary and foreign exchange situation. These problems reach staggering magnitude because Pakistan entered upon her independence with only a handful of skilled managerial and administrative leaders and technically trained experts. In the old colonial days most Hindus of good families attended British schools, but few Moslems had this advantage. Pakistan's capacity to progress is limited by the very small

number of Pakistanis trained sufficiently to cope with the country's towering problems of economic and social development.

Nevertheless, Pakistan Government leaders are struggling valiantly with the maintenance of political stability, the development of adequate military strength for national defense, and above all the betterment of daily life for the population at large on which depends the achievement of the first two goals. In 1954 a combination of natural disasters and unfavorable market conditions taxed Pakistan's resources to the limit, forcing her to request emergency aid from the United States. The country is just rallying from that year of adversity.

In assisting the Pakistan Government to develop its economy, the United States has emphasized agricultural production, mineral and forest exploitation, stimulation of new industry and investment, and supplying of critical raw materials and consumer goods. Defense support has also been granted to supply Pakistan with equipment to strengthen her armed forces and to assist in developing and expanding industry and transportation. In West Pakistan, which is much too dry, and East Pakistan, which is subjected to recurrent floods, the assistance which we are giving to the water resources program has been crucial. Pakistan's inflationary problems and the consequent pressures on standards of living have been eased by financial assistance for importation of essential consumer goods and raw materials.

But in the villages Pakistan's poorest people will tell you that they want more than enough to eat. "We want a school," they say in village after village in Pakistan. If you ask why, they tell you that they cannot cope with the new issues arising in their lives. "We cannot read," they say. "We don't know how to protect ourselves when we sell our products or make a rental agreement or a contract or try to understand the tax laws." They also say, "We don't know how to protect ourselves against sickness." Pakistan's awakening people not only need but *demand* education. But this demand is particularly difficult for Pakistan to meet because of the shortage of trained people. To assist at this critical point five major United States educational institutions have entered into contracts with provincial educational institutions in Pakistan. Other United States technicians are assisting in the fight against malaria and tuberculosis, village environmental

sanitation programs, and village training centers, which are developing local Pakistan workers to help in a countrywide cooperative program with this staunch protagonist of the free world.

### **U.S. Objectives**

To recapitulate briefly, the United States has tried in recent years to render assistance to the Near East and South Asia in response to the area's needs for rural and industrial development. It has provided technical assistance to most of the countries; its efforts have complemented U.N. programs in the same field. It has made substantial loans both directly and through its membership in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It has provided some special economic aid of a capital nature.

We shall not be stampeded by Russian promises of extensive aid to that part of the world, but we shall carry out the most effective programs of technical cooperation and economic-development assistance programs that we can devise. In our programs we shall continue to emphasize mutuality of interest and flexibility of approach. Apportionment of funds among countries will depend much on need and demonstration of effective absorptive capacity. And, finally, we shall work to encourage conditions under which private investment will show an increasing interest in the area and reduce the need for public assistance. We hope that these measures will be effective in aiding the countries of the area toward a better economic and social climate, toward peace and stability, and toward a strong will to withstand imperialist encroachment against the free nations of the world.

### **German Atomic Energy Minister To Visit United States**

The Department of State announced on May 4 (press release 239) that Franz Josef Strauss, German Federal Minister for Atomic Energy Affairs, will arrive in the United States on May 11 upon the invitation of the U.S. Government. He will visit various AEC installations and call on the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission. He will also discuss with U.S. officials matters of common interest relating to the special area of his responsibility.

Minister Strauss is a member and cofounder of

the Christian Socialist Union (Csu), the Bavarian counterpart of Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union (Cdu). As a member of the Cabinet, he has had a major part in the framing of legislation establishing effective parliamentary controls of the German Armed Forces. He has

also been a staunch advocate of plans promoting European security and integration. His present post as Minister for Atomic Energy is a newly created Cabinet position, with responsibilities encompassing national and international problems of nuclear energy.

## Coordination of British and American Policy in World Affairs

*by Winthrop W. Aldrich  
Ambassador to Great Britain<sup>1</sup>*

I doubt very much whether any of you here are fully aware of the glory which attaches to the name of Coventry in the minds of the American people. The name of this city is a synonym for courage of the highest order. During the anxious years of World War II, the American newspapers and radio told us of the destruction which you were suffering. We marveled at your endurance and morale. We marveled at your ability to sustain a high rate of industrial production on which the very life of this nation depended, when it seemed to us that hardly a brick could have been left standing here or a wheel kept turning. We were proud to think that we had as our allies people who could set us such an example of fighting spirit.

You have virtually built a new Coventry in the past 10 years, and you have done it beautifully. It is modern and efficient; it offers pleasing vistas to the eye; and it bespeaks the progressive, forward-moving spirit of the men and women of Coventry.

No one has to tell me why Warwickshire is one of the great industrial centers of this nation. I have seen the reason for myself.

I said a moment ago that we Americans were proud to have you as our allies. We felt that way in World War I and again in World War II, and we feel the same way today.

What is it that through two hard-fought wars and 10 following years of international crises has

maintained unbroken and completely unimpaired the close and intimate alliance between us? Can it be that this is simply because of the fact that we are an outgrowth of this country, indebted to you for our free institutions, for industrial and other discoveries first made here, indebted for the very blood in the veins of so many of our citizens? This is certainly a great part of the answer.

### Respect for the Dignity of Man

I suggest, however, that the fundamental reason lies in the fact that we have an almost identical attitude toward mankind which makes us natural allies. Expressed in the simplest possible terms, this attitude reflects the fact that we both respect the dignity of man.

This respect for man's dignity is the foundation of our free societies and is the basis of our approach to world affairs. We not only intend to preserve our own freedom and independence, but we stand together in unalterable opposition to tyranny, terrorism, and aggression anywhere on the face of this globe—to any form of oppression which denies the rights of man.

In the joint Anglo-American declaration issued in Washington in February,<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Eden and President Eisenhower gave us a timely reminder that this very question of the dignity of man is the central issue confronting the world in this year of 1956. Our position reflects our common belief that the state exists for the benefit

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Warwickshire Rotary Clubs at Coventry, England, on Apr. 19.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 231.



of man—that people have a basic right to a government of their own choice.

To make clear exactly where we stand, as the Prime Minister and the President did in the Washington Declaration, serves a valuable purpose. By explaining to those with whom you have differences just why you take issue with them, a basis is provided for an approach to a better understanding. An opportunity is created to reconcile your differences. In concrete terms, you tell other nations what you expect from them and what you are ready to give in return.

Our aims and intentions are well known, and they are made clear by our actions. We have joined together with other nations to form voluntary associations for the purpose of establishing a decent and orderly world in which all may have the opportunity to advance their legitimate interests. Our sole object is to deter aggression, prevent unwarranted interference by any nation in the internal affairs of its neighbors, and thereby to preserve peace.

In the past 10 years, Britain and America have by their independent action assisted more than 600 million people in scores of lands to become free nations. Britain's record in this respect is particularly admirable. While you most properly have refused to bow to terrorism or to acquiesce in lawless action, you are continuing to foster and support orderly movements toward self-government among peoples as they show themselves ready for it. At this very moment in Malaya, Africa, and the Caribbean you are assisting British territories in their progress toward entry into the community of independent nations.

Our two countries have also demonstrated their sympathetic concern for the economic difficulties of others; and in order to help peoples to improve their standards of living, we have provided goods, technical aid, and funds on a prodigious scale. Since 1945 the United States alone has provided over \$52 billion in various forms of aid to other nations and has sought a general expansion of trade on a mutually beneficial basis. In no instance of rendering such aid to others has either Britain or America attached any conditions to the giving which would in any way jeopardize the freedom or integrity of the recipients.

As a means of preventing aggression, we have banded together with some 50 nations in collective security arrangements. Simultaneously, we keep

the door open and encourage all nations to seek the solution of their differences and disputes through peaceful negotiation. Many nations are ready to assist in such undertakings, and the United Nations offers an ever-present tribunal for this purpose.

Let others show us a genuine change of heart, and I am confident that they will not find in Britain or America any lack of will to bridge the differences and cleavages that sharply divide the world.

#### **Joint Efforts in Middle East**

While we watch vigilantly and unceasingly for signs of such a true change, we shall continue to exert our not inconsiderable influence to prevent conflicts and maintain peace. An example of the close coordination of British and American policy for this purpose is seen in the efforts we are making in the Middle East. May I emphasize, in this connection, that I deplore the erroneous impression given recently in the press that a major difference of opinion exists between our two Governments on Middle East policies. From time to time rumors have circulated alleging friction or disagreement between London and Washington.

Only last week, in Kansas City, Sir Roger Makins referred to these rumors and said: "Frequently I, who am in continuous contact with the United States administration, am unable to fathom what people are talking about." On the basis of my own continuous contacts with Her Majesty's Government I fully concur with my Washington colleague's statement. It can and should be stated clearly and unequivocally that the American and British Governments are in close contact and constant touch on all problems in which they are jointly concerned throughout the world and specifically concerning the present tension in the Middle East.

The United States is fully aware of the importance of that area, of the fact that its security vitally affects the safety of Western Europe, and of the fact that the problems there are critical and delicate. As President Eisenhower pointed out, we are dealing with a situation that is like a pile of jackstraws; and we must take care not to bring down the entire heap. Yet everything possible must be done to preserve peace in the area and to encourage a settlement which does justice to the interests of all parties concerned.

There is no divergence whatsoever between Britain and America on these objectives, and we are in full accord on the two major lines of policy that are called for. The first is to give our strong support to the United Nations mission which has been sent to the area. President Eisenhower pledged this support, declaring that the United States "will observe its commitments within constitutional means to oppose any aggression" in the Middle East and will support and assist any nation which might be subjected to such aggression.

### **Baghdad Pact**

The second great need for the maintenance of peace and security for the Middle East area is to provide adequate protection against aggression from outside. For this purpose, free nations of the area, together with Britain, have associated themselves in a collective security agreement under the Baghdad Pact. Though the United States is not a member, it gives constant support to the objectives of the Pact and is providing substantial economic and military assistance to the Pact members. The extent of our support is indicated by the strength of the U.S. observer delegation which, under the leadership of Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy Henderson and Admiral [John H.] Cassady, is now in Tehran for consultation with the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council.<sup>3</sup>

The deep personal interest which President Eisenhower takes in the Middle East situation, and his strong desire to see tranquillity restored to the area, was demonstrated in his sending personal messages last week to the Heads of the Egyptian and Israeli Governments.

British good will with respect to that area was also concretely demonstrated by your announcement in Tehran last week of substantial new economic assistance for the member nations of the Baghdad Pact. American good will was demonstrated by the U.S. announcement in Tehran on April 16 of our readiness to discuss a program of broader economic cooperation coordinated through the Baghdad Pact organization, and only yesterday the U.S. became a full member of the Economic Committee of the Pact. The benefits of British and American assistance are bound to extend to all the nations of the area.

This, then, is the pattern of British and Ameri-

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, May 7, 1956, p. 753.

can policy toward their neighbors throughout the world—encouraging the peaceful settlement of differences and disputes, offering our offices to this end, joining in defenses against aggression, and providing full-scale economic assistance for the improvement of standards of living.

This is a pattern of international conduct which must appeal to all men of good will. It is appropriate to discuss these matters with representatives of International Rotary, which is pledged to the advancement of understanding, good will, and world peace through world fellowship.

The approach of our two countries to world affairs is, I believe, the portent of a dawn that the world has long awaited. It reflects the good will and determination of all the world's millions who are dedicated to the ways of freedom. The British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States of America, and the many nations closely associated with us are the true guardians of this good will and determination and will hold aloft the light of freedom until its rays may reach into all the dark places of the earth.

### **Commemoration of First U.S.—Swedish Treaty**

*Following are texts of statements made at Stockholm on April 3 by John Moors Cabot, U.S. Ambassador to Sweden, and Swedish Foreign Minister Östen Undén on the occasion of the presentation to the Swedish Government of the Franklin Commemorative Medal.<sup>1</sup>*

#### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR CABOT**

One hundred and seventy-three years ago your country and ours signed their first Treaty of Amity and Commerce. This year, many organizations in more than 50 countries of the world are celebrating the 250th anniversary of one of the men who helped to negotiate this treaty.

As people in these nations pay their tributes to Benjamin Franklin, I like to remember what he said about formal treaties. Franklin once wrote

<sup>1</sup> For a description of the Franklin Medal and other background on the observance of Franklin's anniversary, see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 249; for an account of Franklin's diplomatic career, see *ibid.*, Jan. 9, 1956, p. 51.

that friendship between peoples created ties stronger than any treaties could make.

We believe sincerely in that philosophy. We have been privileged to enjoy that kind of friendship with Sweden since our new country was born. Today, we pay a double measure of gratitude to those great Swedish and American patriots who built so well on this enduring foundation.

It has been a particularly happy circumstance for us to know that your great scientist, Arne Tiselius, was awarded the coveted Franklin Medal by the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia on January 18, at their meeting to celebrate Franklin's 250th anniversary. No greater ties can be made between peoples than the honors, respect, and friendship we pay to each other.

Benjamin Franklin was a scientist even before he became a statesman. He knew that great scientists—men like Arne Tiselius—were building personally the bonds which would help unite nations in friendship equally as well as the relations between their governments. And so, even when he became an official of government, he continued to pay the highest of tribute to the relations between the individual peoples themselves.

#### **RESPONSE BY FOREIGN MINISTER UNDÉN**

I am very glad, indeed, to accept on behalf of my Government the medal that by authorization of the Congress of the United States has been created in memory of the birth of Benjamin Franklin and of his distinguished service to science, the humanities, the arts, and enterprise.

Benjamin Franklin's great interest in a better understanding amongst nations is symbolized on the medal by the key that opens the ways of understanding in all directions. This seems to have been a guiding principle not only for Benjamin Franklin but also for other founding fathers of the American Revolution.

At an early stage Sweden grasped the significance of the American Revolution and realized that, in spite of all the initial difficulties of the young Nation, the independence of the American States was definitely achieved and that there were justified reasons to recognize this development. As a matter of fact, at the side of France, Sweden was the first country to recognize the United States by entering on April 3, 1783, the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce that we commemorate today.

When this decision had been taken, our Amba-

sador to France, Gustav Philip Creutz, who with Benjamin Franklin signed the agreement, wrote to King Gustaf III that he had received many compliments on the King's behalf because he "had been the first to procure for his country the advantage of entering into fruitful relations with this new republic."

It is evident by the diplomatic correspondence that Creutz shared his King's opinions and regarded this treaty as one of his great diplomatic feats.

Creutz was a very distinguished Swedish poet and a man of great vision. He saw in this treaty the beginning of a fruitful friendship between the United States and Sweden and a flourishing trade unhampered by unnecessary tariffs and regulations. But certainly he could not foresee that Benjamin Franklin and himself initiated an association that a hundred years later would bring millions of Swedish citizens to join in building up this great Nation of yours. I think it would be in the spirit of Benjamin Franklin to commemorate not only the treaty he signed but also all the close personal ties between citizens of our two countries.

#### **Proposed Negotiations With Rumania**

Press release 241 dated May 4

In a note delivered to the American Legation in Bucharest on March 7, 1956,<sup>1</sup> the Rumanian Government proposed that negotiations be opened in Bucharest on problems relating to the claims of some U.S. citizens, Rumanian assets in the United States, and trade relations between the United States and Rumania. In its note the Rumanian Government expressed the hope that such negotiations might lead to improved relations between the two countries.

The U.S. Government has now replied in a note dated April 28, 1956, delivered to the Rumanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs by the American Legation in Bucharest.<sup>1</sup> The note indicated that the U.S. Government is prepared to discuss the economic problems mentioned in the Rumanian note provided the Rumanian Government is prepared to discuss various other points at issue between the two Governments. The U.S. Govern-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

ment has accordingly proposed that an exchange of memoranda be effected in which each Government would set forth in detail matters which each may deem appropriate for consideration, on the ground that such memoranda would serve the useful purpose of indicating whether there is sufficient basis for undertaking arrangements for negotiations.

## **United States Protests to Poland on Repatriation Activities**

Press release 226 dated April 30

### **Department Announcement**

Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy on April 30 handed to the Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic, Romuald Spasowski, a note referring to the Polish Government's attempts to prevail upon Polish nationals in this country to return to their native land. The note reaffirmed the U.S. Government's adherence to the principle of voluntary repatriation and its recognition of the right of a foreign diplomatic mission to normal intercourse with its citizens, but it was made clear that this Government will not tolerate unsolicited personal visits by representatives of the Warsaw regime on behalf of the Polish repatriation campaign.

This campaign has been conducted intensively for several months by the Polish Government throughout the free world by Communist radio and press, by propaganda sent through the mails, by letters signed by relatives and friends in Poland, and by telephone calls and personal visits by regime representatives bringing such letters with them. The campaign has met very little success thus far.

No Polish national in this country is prevented from having contact with Polish Government officials or from returning to Poland, if, of his own free will, he chooses to do so. But an uninvited visit exposes the Polish national in question, without his permission, to the overtures of a personal representative of a state exercising complete control over the lives of relatives and friends in Poland and hence affords the opportunity for pressure, intimidation, and coercion. The U.S. protest arises from this Government's determination not to permit police-state activity in this country and to make clear that the full protection

of American laws extends to all aliens residing in the United States.

### **Text of Note to Polish Ambassador**

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic and has the honor to make reference to the Polish Government's current efforts to induce Poles to return to Poland, which was the subject of the Ambassador's call on Deputy Under Secretary Murphy on November 7, 1955.

It has recently come to the attention of the Department that, in conducting that campaign, representatives of the Polish Government, including members of the Polish Embassy, are seeking out Polish nationals in this country and, in the course of unsolicited personal visits and by various methods, are attempting to prevail upon them to return to Poland. As one means of achieving this purpose these Polish officials take advantage of the fact that close relatives of such Polish nationals still live in Poland, and have presented in person letters bearing the signature of such relatives, although private correspondence would normally proceed by the regular mails.

As the Government of the Polish People's Republic is aware, the United States Government adheres to the concept of voluntary repatriation. This Government interposes no obstacles to the return to Poland of any persons who choose this course.

The United States Government of course recognizes, in principle and in practice, the right of all foreign diplomatic missions in this country to normal intercourse with their citizens.

The above-described activities of representatives of the Polish Government, however, are not compatible with the principle of voluntary repatriation. Moreover, the United States Government does not consider that these activities come within the scope of normal and accepted diplomatic practice. Attempts to exert pressure upon or to influence in this manner private persons living in this country are contrary to the traditions of democracy and individual freedom which prevail in the United States.

It is therefore requested that Polish representatives in this country cease immediately the objectionable practice of unsolicited personal visits in furtherance of the Polish Government's repatriation campaign.

## National Day of Poland

Press release 236 dated May 2

On May 3, the anniversary of Poland's Constitution of 1791, all true Poles and their friends throughout the world have traditionally celebrated Poland's national day. But in recent years May 3 has assumed an added significance. It has become a day on which the United States reaffirms its assurances that it is not reconciled to the bondage of Poland. And at the same time we ask the people of Poland not to despair nor to succumb to the propaganda insinuation that their country has been forgotten.

May 3 is the day on which this country and the people of Poland renew a mutual faith in freedom and in the strong bonds of friendship and common purpose which unite us across all the barriers the Iron Curtain imposes.

## President of Indonesia To Visit United States

The Department of State announced on May 4 (press release 240) that the itinerary has been completed for the State visit of Dr. Sukarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia, who will arrive in Washington on May 16. President Eisenhower's invitation to President Sukarno to visit the United States was extended by Secretary Dulles during his trip to Indonesia in March of this year.

After a 3-day visit in Washington, the President of the Indonesian Republic will begin an extended tour that will include Charlottesville, Va., Camp Pope and Fort Bragg, N. C., Annapolis, New York City, Philadelphia, Springfield, Ill., Detroit, Grand Canyon National Park, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, and Niagara Falls.

## Assistant Secretary Allen To Visit Africa

Press release 233 dated May 3

George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, will leave Washington on May 10 for a 3-week tour of the west and central parts of Africa south of the Sahara. Mr. Allen is making the air trip to inform himself firsthand on recent developments in this area. He will confer with

U.S. Foreign Service officials and officials of the various countries and territories which he will visit during his tour.

Mr. Allen's tentative itinerary is as follows:

May 10 . . . . . Leave Washington  
May 12 . . . . . Arrive Johannesburg, Pretoria  
(South Africa)  
May 14 . . . . . Arrive Capetown (South Africa)  
May 16 . . . . . Arrive Port Elizabeth, Durban  
(South Africa)  
May 17 . . . . . Arrive Lourenço Marques (Portu-  
guese East Africa)  
May 18 . . . . . Arrive Salisbury (Southern Rhode-  
sia)  
May 21 . . . . . Arrive N'dola (Northern Rhodesia)  
May 22 . . . . . Arrive Elisabethville, Léopoldville  
(Belgian Congo)  
May 23 . . . . . Arrive Accra (Gold Coast)  
May 25 . . . . . Arrive Lagos (Nigeria)  
May 27 . . . . . Arrive Monrovia (Liberia)  
May 31 . . . . . Arrive Dakar (French West Africa)  
June 2 . . . . . Arrive New York

## Vice President Goulart of Brazil Visits United States

*Following are the texts of remarks made on the arrival of the Vice President of Brazil, João Goulart, at Washington on April 30, and on his departure on May 3.*

### WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT

Press release 227 dated April 30

#### Remarks by Vice President Nixon

Mr. Vice President, it is a very great privilege for Mrs. Nixon and me and for members of our party to welcome you and Senhora Goulart to the United States. We recall with pleasure our visit to your country, and I remember particularly the great ovation you received on the occasion of your inauguration as Vice President of our great friendly Republic to the south. We know that this will be a very brief visit for you, but we trust that in every place you go in the United States you will receive the same kind of friendly welcome that, I can assure you, you will receive here today.

May I also express another hope. We have put on very special weather here today for you—very much like Rio at its best. We hope the sun al-

ways shines during the few days that you are in the United States for the balance of your visit. And now I know that your friends in this country and also your friends at home would like to hear some words from you.

#### **Response by Vice President Goulart**

Mr. Vice President, still very deeply moved on setting foot for the first time on the soil of the United States, in reply to a very generous invitation extended to me by the distinguished Vice President of the United States, Mr. Richard Nixon, I wish to thank you very deeply, personally and also on behalf of Mrs. Goulart and all the members of my party who are coming with me on this visit, for the very cordial welcome which has been extended to me by Vice President Nixon, on behalf of this great Nation.

At the same time I wish to bring here a most cordial salutation from the people of Brazil and from President Jusecelino Kubitschek and also bring the salutation on behalf of the young generation of Brazilians who are uniting themselves with me in making ever stronger the traditional bonds of friendship that unite our two countries.

#### **DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON**

Press release 237 dated May 3

#### **Remarks by Acting Secretary Hoover**

Mr. Vice President, it has been an honor to have Your Excellency and Senhora Goulart as our guests in Washington. Your presence here has brought us personal pleasure and has strengthened the bonds which so strongly exist between our two countries.

As you travel across this country, you will become acquainted with many of the phases of American life—cattle raising in Texas, an occupation you already know so intimately, to American industrialization in its highest form, as you will see in Detroit. These experiences will, I am sure, point out the similarities between our peoples and our institutions that have served over so many years to unite Brazil and the United States in our common purposes.

On behalf of my Government I extend best wishes for a most pleasant journey to you and Senhora Goulart and all the members of your party. Goodbye and good luck.

#### **Response by Vice President Goulart**

On leaving now this city of Washington I want to express once more how grateful I am, not only personally but on behalf of my wife and members of my party, for the kind and generous hospitality which was shown to us at every moment both by the people and by the Government of the United States. I am leaving now for what is the equivalent of the State of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, that is the State of Texas.

I want to thank all of you for the generous hospitality and to express once more the deep satisfaction that I experienced from the very first moment that I set foot in this generous country. I am very sure that this visit will forge an even stronger link in the solid relationships that have united and will always unite the United States and Brazil.

I am very grateful to Under Secretary Hoover for the very kind words that he has just said, and I also want to extend my thanks to the distinguished labor leaders that I have had the pleasure of meeting here in Washington who surrounded me and the members of my party with so much friendship. I feel that the friendship shown by the labor leaders is also a manifestation of the very strong bonds that do and should unite the workers of Brazil with their fellow workers in the United States.

I would also like to ask Under Secretary Hoover to convey my thanks to the great President of this country, President Eisenhower, and also to transmit a message of friendship to my good friend Vice President Nixon. And once more, I am very grateful for this magnificent welcome that I received in this land that is a staunch friend of my own country.

#### **Surplus Commodity Agreement Signed With Paraguay**

Press release 231 dated May 2

The United States and Paraguay on May 2 signed an agreement authorizing the sale to Paraguay, through private U.S. traders, of wheat, flour, edible oils, lard, and dairy products to a total value of \$2,600,000. The agreement also covers ocean freight in the amount of \$400,000. These sales are being made under authority and provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended. The agree-

ment was signed at Asunción by the Foreign Minister of Paraguay, Hipolito Sanchez Quell, and the American Ambassador, Arthur A. Ageton.

This agreement provides that payment under the sales program will be made in Paraguayan currency. A part of the currency accruing will be earmarked for loans designed to contribute to

Paraguay's economic development and will be payable in dollars or Paraguayan currency under the terms of a supplemental loan agreement which will be concluded at a later date. The balance will be reserved for the use of the United States in Paraguay.

## The Ideals of Woodrow Wilson

*by Walter S. Robertson*

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Had I been told 38 years ago that I was to have the honor to represent President Eisenhower on this occasion, I should have been a frightened, amazed, and awestruck young man—frightened at the role I personally must play today, amazed that an unknown young second lieutenant of infantry by the name of Eisenhower was destined for a mighty role in world affairs which would land him in the White House, and awestruck by the magic name of Wilson.

At that time President Wilson was my Commander in Chief, albeit a remote one. I was a lowly embryo second lieutenant at an air-service flying school. I had a fervent admiration for what Woodrow Wilson stood for and for the man himself, whose ideals, integrity, and eloquence had given the military participation of the United States in the First World War a character it could scarcely otherwise have had.

It has been suggested that my admiration for Woodrow Wilson may not be unrelated to the fact that he was born in Virginia, in this historic and lovely town of Staunton. This allegation I protest, though I must admit to a prejudiced view where Virginians are concerned, and certainly my admiration for Mr. Wilson is in no way lessened by the proud circumstance of his birth.

While Wilson was taken to Georgia at an early age—too early for him to have any say-so in the

matter—and did not return to his native State until he entered the law school of the University of Virginia, he has always appeared to me to stand in a tradition of statesmanship to which Virginia has so richly contributed. He was a man of high ideals, unyielding moral convictions, strong emotions, and great intellect—a man who combined a bearing that tended to the aristocratic with a belief in democratic representative government that had in it an almost religious purpose. In his two terms as President, through the “new freedom” as he called it, he advanced to new goals the cause for which our Nation was founded—the cause of freedom and opportunity for all its citizens. In the principles he proclaimed in taking our Nation into full participation in world affairs—into war—he awakened hopes among the subject peoples of autocracies everywhere, giving the name of our country a force and magic in other lands it had not possessed since the days of the American Revolution and the early years of the Republic. In his address to Congress asking a declaration of war, he proclaimed:

... we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day

<sup>1</sup>Address made at the Woodrow Wilson Centennial Celebration at Staunton, Va., on Apr. 28 (press release 214 dated Apr. 25).

## Woodrow Wilson Centennial Year

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

WHEREAS Woodrow Wilson, the twenty-eighth President of the United States, gave to this Nation and to the world a concept of peace based on justice and freedom and supported by the brotherhood of man; and

WHEREAS this scholar, educator, and statesman led the United States successfully through the ordeal of a devastating war, which was fought to preserve those high principles which this Nation cherishes; and

WHEREAS Woodrow Wilson's outstanding character, his devotion to his country's service, his efforts to strengthen the Government and to promote the public welfare, his dependence upon divine guidance, and his unflinching confidence in our system of free government and the ultimate wisdom of the American people, are a lasting inspiration to the Nation; and

WHEREAS the year 1956 marks the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Woodrow Wilson, and the Congress, by a joint resolution approved August 30, 1954, 68 Stat. 964, established the Woodrow Wilson Centennial Celebration Commission to develop plans for commemorating that event; and by a joint resolution approved April 27, 1956, has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation inviting the people of the United States to observe the anniversary with appropriate ceremonies:

Now, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby call upon the people of the United States to observe the centennial of the birth of Woodrow Wilson; and I urge interested individuals and organizations, both private and governmental, to participate in appropriate ceremonies during 1956 designed to honor and commemorate his life, his ideals, and his concern for the freedom of peoples throughout the world.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-seventh day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-six, and of the [SEAL] Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES  
*Secretary of State*

<sup>1</sup> No. 3134: 21 *Fed. Reg.* 2913.

has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.

In the past 15 years we have come far closer to Wilson than we had been in the 20 years that followed his administration—20 years during which many dedicated Americans earnestly tried to believe that what went on beyond the oceans need not concern or disturb us. In these past 15 years we have lived in a divided world. Also confronted with a divided world, Wilson, in April 1917, made his fateful choice and led the Nation out of its traditional isolation. Most of us can remember back to the 1920's when, in reaction to the idealism of the war years, some spoke with derision of the contention that World War I had been fought "to make the world safe for democracy." Certainly, we have since then paid a fearful price in pursuit of that ideal. We have had to learn once more that when Wilson said "the world must be made safe for democracy" he was expressing a necessary and transcendent objective of our Nation's foreign policy, the end we still must achieve if we mean to survive. Since then we have been confronted with two new mortal challenges to democracy, and one of them faces us today stronger than ever.

### An Invincible Belief in Man

Much has been said and written about the fearful ideological contests of our generation, nazism and communism. Clearly the survival of freedom is the basic issue in these contests. But why do some men believe passionately in freedom while to others freedom is an object of contempt and ridicule? The answer, it seems to me, is powerfully suggested in the character of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's life, his writings, his actions are illuminated by an unmistakable and invincible belief in man himself and in his promise, a conviction that man is worthy of justice and liberty. To a large degree, I think—perhaps more than we sometimes like to admit—our estimate of mankind reflects what we have, all unconsciously, observed of our own selves. In the high estimation of humanity that inspired the battles Wilson fought, it seems to me that we can read the reflection of a nature that was itself generous, imaginative, creative, courageous. Can we conceive of a Hitler or a Stalin respecting his fellow man or



considering him as other than corruptible, devoid of integrity and soul, not to be trusted outside confinement?

There were those in Wilson's lifetime who considered that he had altogether too much confidence in mankind. They accused him of being an idealist. He replied that, if he was an idealist, it was because he was an American.

It was to be Wilson's destiny to give American foreign policy the most important redefinition it had had in three-quarters of a century, since its foundations had been established as the avoidance of involvement in the affairs of the Old World, the Monroe Doctrine, and "manifest destiny."

Wilson's first serious problem of foreign policy arose as a result of the seizure of power in Mexico by General Huerta. It was an instructive problem, for in it two principles, both recognized as valid by Wilson, were at cross-purposes. He felt he could not promote the establishment of order in Mexico by supporting Huerta. "We have no sympathy," Wilson wrote, "with those who seek to seize the power and government to advance their own personal interests." And Huerta had achieved control of the government by assassinating his predecessor. On the other hand, while he felt it necessary after provocations by Huerta to land an American force at Vera Cruz to prevent the unloading of weapons from a German ship, the prospect of a military campaign against Huerta was equally unthinkable to him. In the circumstances he welcomed and quickly accepted an offer of mediation from the so-called ABC powers—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. In doing so, Wilson recognized the desirability of making a conflict between two governments a matter of legitimate interest and concern to the larger community, thus spreading a responsibility which a single nation could scarcely hope to discharge without arousing dangerous and lasting bitterness or being drawn into costly hostilities.

While disorder continued in Mexico and gave Wilson considerably more trouble, the experience of cooperation between the United States and the ABC powers gave rise to a highly significant move toward the establishment of more active security measures in the Western Hemisphere. The essence of an agreement drafted by Wilson to this end and discussed with the ABC powers was: "Mutual guarantees of political independence under republican form of government and mutual guarantees of territorial integrity." The wording of

this article strongly suggests the covenant of the League of Nations. The idea of a Pan American security agreement was itself absorbed in the greater concept of a world organization.

When world war came in Europe, Wilson was primarily concerned to keep our Nation out of it. He had been 8 years old at the end of the War Between the States and had seen at firsthand in Georgia the horror that follows in the wake of war. It made a terrible and lasting impression upon him. His devotion to peace was genuine and compelling. However, he angrily denied that mere safety was the object of the neutrality he urged. Rather he considered it the obligation of the one great Nation that could "play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend." Wilson's counsel to the American people that they be "impartial in thought as well as in action" may sound impractical to some today, but we must reflect that it was the rivalry of two empires in the Balkans—those of the Hapsburgs and Romanoffs—that touched off the war. It is not surprising that Wilson should have seen it in the beginning as an outgrowth of imperialistic conflict and secret diplomacy.

#### **American Peace Efforts**

With both sides infringing America's neutral rights on the seas, Wilson deduced speedily that the main hope of keeping the United States out of the war was to bring it to a negotiated end. His personal representative, Colonel House, explored with the belligerents in 1914, 1915, and 1916 the possibility of finding enough common ground between them to warrant the calling of a peace conference. Wilson's own personal appeals for a compromise peace culminated in his request to both sides in December 1916 for a statement of war aims as a basis for a possible settlement. In the light of what followed, the refusal of the contestants even to be explicit about what they were fighting for, let alone to attempt seriously to compromise their differences, must seem to us as tragic madness. By contrast, Wilson's statesmanship stands out as mature and inspired. He could not have tried harder than he did to bring about "peace without victory," but no man could have held back the tide of events which was to follow—the sacrifice of more hundreds and thousands of lives, the achievement of power by the Communists in Russia, the internal collapse of Ger-

many, and the eventual rise of nazism, bringing upon Europe another and near-fatal war.

The failure of American peace efforts early in 1917 accompanied by the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare by the Germans made the abandonment of American neutrality inevitable. President Wilson explained the historic change in our policy in these words:

We tried to persuade ourselves that the European business was not our business. We tried to convince ourselves that no matter what happened on the other side of the sea, no obligation of duty rested upon us, and finally we found the currents of humanity too strong for us. We found that a great consciousness was welling up in us that this was not a . . . struggle which was to be confined to Europe . . . but that it was something that involved the very fate of civilization; and there was one great nation in the world that could not afford to stay out of it.

Recognizing the hideous destructiveness of modern war and the certainty that the United States would inevitably be drawn into any major war of the future, Wilson was determined that the hostilities in which the United States was then involved had to be concluded by a workable peace settlement and effective measures to prevent the recurrence of war. Even as early as May 1916, at a conference of the League To Enforce Peace, which had been organized the year before under ex-President Taft, he said, "We are participants whether we like it or not in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also, we are partners with the rest. . . . The nations of the world have become each other's neighbors." He declared that the United States should become "a partner in any feasible association of nations formed to realize these objectives and make them secure against violation."

### **The Fourteen Points**

The war took on a new character with our entry into it. In his Flag Day address of June 1917 the President made dramatically clear that it was the "military masters of Germany who denied us the right to be neutral" that we were fighting and not the German people, "themselves in the grip of the same sinister power that has stretched its ugly talons out and drawn blood from us." He went on to declare: "This is the People's war, a war for freedom and justice and self-government amongst all the nations of the world, a war to make the world safe for the people who live upon it . . . the German people themselves included."

In pursuit of his lofty objective he proposed the Fourteen Points as a basis for the cessation of fighting and the making of peace. In these points he dealt concretely with the most urgent problems of the peace and, last of all, with his most precious proposal for "a general association of nations . . . affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."

This historic peace program was a potent weapon of war in the hands of the President. Its psychological effect was overpowering. It was a bombshell in the ranks of the enemy, seriously undermining German morale in the closing years of the war.

On the basis of these principles, the Germans sued for peace in October 1918—instead of making a last stand and fighting on for, as Marshal Foch thought they might have, "maybe three, maybe four or five months. Who knows?"

At that point, with the defeat of Germany, the struggle with the Allies began. The Allies had never taken the Fourteen Points seriously. Clemenceau had never troubled to read them. Speaking to the Chamber of Deputies in late December, Clemenceau said: "There was an old system which seems to be condemned today and to which I do not fear to say that I remain a faithful adherent at this time . . . this system—solid frontiers . . . and balance of power seems to be condemned by certain other high authorities." And he added that "this system of alliances" would be his guiding principle at the peace conference.

Wilson had warned the so-called "realists" of what could be expected from imposing a punitive peace upon the German people. Such a peace, he said, would be "accepted in humiliation under duress . . . and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand." It was a prophetic utterance.

Wilson has been pictured as having failed lamentably at the peace conference. Actually, the final settlement would have been far more shortsighted had it not been for the stand he had taken. He saved the Germans from having to pay the entire cost of the war. He obtained general recognition that colonial peoples were not chattels when he gained acceptance of the system of mandates for the former German colonies. He obtained an undertaking by Japan to restore Shantung Province to China. The primary obstacle to the application of Wilsonian principles was actually not

the unregeneracy of the other members of the Council of Four but the unregeneracy of the complicated facts of Europe's situation. Wilson had to recognize, as his heirs have had to recognize, that the pursuit of high principle can in some situations lead into contradiction. This does not mean that there is no higher morality in international relations—as some whose minds are on the contradictions would have us believe—but only that a higher morality is not simple to apply and that sometimes its application requires great patience.

It was in part because he foresaw the inevitable imperfections of the settlement that Wilson insisted that the Covenant of the League of Nations should be included in the peace treaty and not be left for subsequent consideration after the peace terms had been given to Germany. The League of Nations was, he exclaimed "in a sense the most essential part of the peace settlement itself," for the League, he said, "is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought." On this issue, over bitter opposition from Allied quarters and over opposition even from within his own delegation, the President won a spectacular and most significant victory. On April 28, 1919, 37 years ago today, the Paris Peace Conference adopted the final draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

President Wilson's defeat came not in Paris but at home. It is not my purpose to explore here the causes of that rejection. No one can question the earnest patriotism of the opposition. No one can question that the blame must be shared. It is enough for us to recall that on July 28, 1945, the United States Senate voted in favor of American membership in the League's successor, the United Nations, vindicating Woodrow Wilson's ideals by the startling vote of 89 to 2. We had by then paid in copious measure for our failure to join the League that Wilson had created.

In the 1930's when aggressor nations struck at Manchuria and Ethiopia, the League of Nations proved unequal to the challenge. Thus, when World War II came upon us, we had to learn again that there are "currents of humanity too strong for us" and that we could not remain apart from a "struggle . . . that involved the very fate of civilization."

We were not to make the same mistake again. We helped create the United Nations and joined it wholeheartedly. And when the ominous pat-

tern of the past began to reemerge with the attack in June 1950 upon the Republic of Korea and it was clear that once more the "rights and liberties of small nations" were at stake, we did not hesitate. As the leader of a great coalition of the United Nations we made amends for Manchuria and Ethiopia. By repelling the aggression, we stemmed a tide that could have led only to a third world war.

### **Impress of Wilsonian Ideals**

In recalling a few outstanding examples of Woodrow Wilson's approach to international relations, I have tried to define the meaning that Wilson's policies have for us today; for Wilson's approach to world problems was, in a fundamental sense, to shape the character of our response to such problems for as long as we can see ahead. Wilson had to lead a people naive and inexperienced in international affairs, still speaking in terms of doctrines that were appropriate enough for the weak seaboard Republic of the early 19th century but wholly inadequate for the giant who straddled a continent and would inevitably greatly influence the shape of the future world. After our false start toward imperialism in the Philippine venture—an outgrowth of the war with Spain—Wilson enabled us to find ourselves in terms of what we really are and of the reality of the world at large.

It is the test of great men that they affect substantially the way a people thinks of itself—the image it has of itself. It is also the function of great men to refine and elevate that image.

The picture we have of ourselves as Americans and to which we feel we must live up in our conduct with other peoples bears indelibly the impress of Wilsonian ideals. "The United States," Wilson declared in Mobile in 1913, "will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." This has become axiomatic with us. Some who today are strongly attracted by the notion of "realism" in the conduct of foreign affairs might reject a statement made by Wilson in that same speech that "it is a very perilous thing to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest." Yet in our hearts most of us agree that material interest alone is not a standard high enough for this Nation. There is a cause of humanity, and the obligation has been laid upon us by our favored circumstances and the vision of our great leaders to serve

it. It is not in all cases a clear cause. Sometimes its currents divide and seem to run at cross-purposes. Sometimes it makes irreconcilable demands. And yet it is always there and in a larger perspective has a true and ascertainable course.

We may not always succeed in promoting the cause of cooperation and collective security for all peoples. We may not always succeed in achieving "the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments." We are not allwise or more than human.

Yet when we fall short, we shall know no rest. We are like a people to whom a whisper of infinite possibilities has been vouchsafed, and for us there is no way station where we may tarry in contentment. The voices of the great spokesmen for the American ideal—all who have ever lived—continue to make their demands of us, like an inspiration, like a conscience, impelling us to the sacrifice of 35,000 of our most precious lives in Korea, to the contribution of \$60 billion in 10 years to the war-stricken and the underprivileged of other lands. Among these voices will always be that of Woodrow Wilson, speaking to us of that "universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

I shall close with the last words spoken by Mr. Wilson in public, on the occasion of Armistice Day, 1923, to a small crowd that had formed outside his house:

"I cannot refrain from saying it: I am not one of those who have the least anxiety about the triumph of the principles I have stood for. . . . That we shall prevail is as sure as that God reigns."

## Visa Applications Cut Off for Refugees of Chinese Ethnic Origin

Press release 230 dated May 1

Because of heavy oversubscription of the 2,000 visas allotted by the Refugee Relief Act to refugees of Chinese ethnic origin, whose passports for travel to the United States must be endorsed by the Government of the Republic of China, the Department of State announced on May 1 that it would accept no new applications for visas after midnight, May 7, 1956. The Chinese Government discontinued acceptance of applications for endorsed passports by Chinese refugees wishing to apply under the Refugee Relief Act as of

noon, April 17, 1956. At that time, the Chinese Government had already received 3,500 applications for the allotment of 2,000 visas.

In instructions to the consulates, Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the Refugee Relief Program, emphasized that:

1. The cutoff would not apply to orphan applicants residing in the Far East who are processed under another section of the act.

2. The cutoff would not apply to nonindigenous refugees residing in the Far East. These cases are also processed under another section of the Refugee Relief Act.

3. Although assurances for Chinese ethnic refugees received after the cutoff date will not be processed under the Refugee Relief Act, such assurances will be sent to the appropriate consular authorities to permit the applicant to establish a priority registration date under the normal annual quota of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

As of April 20, 1956, the total worldwide issuance of visas under the Refugee Relief Act was 100,936.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 84th Congress, 1st Session

United States Technical Assistance and Related Activities in Latin America. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations. October 10-28, 1955. 685 pp.

### 84th Congress, 2d Session

Amendment to Refugee Relief Act of 1953. Hearing before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2248, a bill to amend the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, so as to permit the issuance of visas to 20,000 persons of Armenian ethnic origin. January 18, 1956. 35 pp.

The United States and International Health. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. February 8 and 9, 1956. 95 pp.

East-West Trade. Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part 1, February 15-March 6, 1956. 287 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93 and 185, 84th Congress. Part 3, March 7, 1956, 80 pp.; Part 4, March 15, 1956, 33 pp.; Part 5, April 9, 1956, 137 pp.

Niagara Redevelopment Act of 1956. Report together with individual views and minority views to accompany S. 1823. S. Rept. 1408, March 9, 1956. 30 pp.

## Sixth Annual Honor Awards Ceremony

*On April 27 the Department of State held its sixth annual honor awards ceremony at Constitution Hall, Washington, D.C. Following are texts of remarks made by the Vice President and Secretary Dulles at the ceremony.<sup>1</sup>*

### REMARKS BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 222 dated April 27

This occasion is a double honor.

We are honored by the presence of our Vice President, who has made his own record of distinguished service in his work toward gaining the good will and understanding of leaders and peoples of other nations around the world.

We are honored also to be here today to honor those among our number who have been chosen for recognition of outstanding service to our Department and our Nation.

We have come to recognize some who, in hardship or personal injury or even facing the risk of death, have carried on their duties with dedication and courage in far places. Characteristic of these is one who disregarded serious injuries suffered in an airplane crash in Austria to salvage a diplomatic pouch from the burning wreckage and then refused all medical attention until he was able to deliver the pouch into safe hands.

We recognize others who in less dramatic but no less essential ways have carried out their responsibilities with industry and with loyalty and ability of the highest order. In particular do we honor one among these whose recent death came as a shock to us all, who as Deputy Assistant Secretary and Budget Officer displayed patience, skill, and devotion to duty in handling difficult and complex responsibilities.

<sup>1</sup> For a list of individuals and units honored for outstanding performance, see press release 218 dated Apr. 26 (not printed).

When President Eisenhower met with us for the award ceremonies in 1954, he pointed out that in his previous career he had attended many ceremonies rewarding military personnel for unusual ability, devotion, and dedication. But he said to us in the field of diplomacy that "in my conviction your work is now more important than theirs."<sup>2</sup>

The recent shift in the tactics of the Communist dictatorship from warlike to more peaceful means of aggression cannot but shift the main burden of the contest for the world upon the processes—and therefore upon the people—of diplomacy.

The President said further that in selecting one man for an award we must pass over another, or several others, whose service in the face of hardship, danger, or privation should entitle him also to recognition.

In the time that I have served as Secretary of State I have come to realize more and more how much the accomplishment of those of us in the public eye depends upon the devotion and ability of many, many people upon whom the spotlight may never focus.

In no sense does this fact lessen the honor of those of you who are here to receive awards today. But it means that the awards we give to you are symbols of the awards we owe to the many who, like you, have served our country honorably and well.

Many of those receiving awards this year are members of the Foreign Service, now on duty overseas. Their awards will be conferred on them at their posts.

Our ceremony today reaffirms an honorable tradition of service to the Nation. The achievements to which we pay tribute are but a few expressions of the spirit of our Department and Service and of their high standard of performance. Our fu-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 1, 1954, p. 636.

ture success will depend upon this spirit and upon the maintenance of this standard. At future ceremonies like this one I know that others of you here today, and many more besides, will step forward to receive recognition for your part in making this Nation stronger and this world a place of true and lasting peace.

It is now with pride and pleasure that I present to you the Honorable Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the United States.

## REMARKS BY MR. NIXON

Press release 223 dated April 27

The Secretary, in his usually concise manner, has stated virtually everything that I perhaps could have said on this occasion to reflect my own views with regard to those of you who are to receive awards today as well as those others in the Department who are here to witness the award ceremony. But I would like to speak a bit from personal experience, Mr. Secretary, and the rest of you, if you will allow me just a moment for that purpose.

When the State Department came before the Congressional Appropriations Committee last year, I testified on behalf of the representation fund. I spoke from personal experience after having visited countries abroad as a member of the Herter Committee in 1947 and since that time as Vice President, in 1953, 1955, and 1956. To me it is almost an incredible performance when some of the members of the Appropriations Committees of the House and the Senate—they are, I believe, generally in the minority—fail even to understand, first, the great service that is being rendered, and, secondly, the fact that the United States position in the world today requires that we be represented abroad not only by the best in personnel but also by those who have adequate facilities and adequate means to represent this country as it should be represented in the high councils in which we participate.

Now, as I said, I gave testimony to that effect previously and I make that statement again today from personal experience.

It has not been my privilege to meet those to whom I will give awards or any of the others who will receive their awards from the Secretary of State later in the meeting today. But I have had a chance to see members of the Department here

in Washington at briefing sessions which I have attended prior to trips I have taken, and to see those who have traveled with me, and, finally, to see those in the outposts all over the world who have handled this business for Mrs. Nixon and me. Ever since I have been Vice President she has been along on the visits we have made to those countries, and on those occasions these things have impressed me.

Of course, as the President mentioned in his remarks in 1954 and as the Secretary reiterated, there are those who properly should receive awards for exceptionally meritorious performance but there are literally thousands of others who must do the day-by-day work in the Department who should also have recognition.

I recall back in 1947, when I was a very green Congressman traveling in Europe, how impressed I was to be entertained by the then Ambassador to Italy, James Dunn, and his wife, and also how very grateful I was to a man who was then a member of the staff of the Ambassador of Italy, Johnnie Jones, and his wife. I remember that Jones—we were there 2 weeks—on two occasions invited the whole subcommittee to his home and we had dinner with them and had a wonderful time. I think Johnnie will recall we had a piano and it was one of the rare times when I played the piano and the others gathered around and sang. I, of course, don't usually bring that up in political campaigns.

The illustration of this is obvious. When VIP's travel around the world or when any Americans travel, members of the staffs of our embassies abroad, as well as members of the staff here in Washington, have extra work to do. Mimeograph machines have to be run to get out the schedules, based on what country you happen to be visiting, and arrangements have to be made for luncheons and dinners and the like. And may I just say, speaking from my own experience, that for all of those here in Washington and abroad who have done that day-to-day work, work which I assume must be most boring and work which I assume must require mature judgment, may I say that those of us on the Hill, as well as the many other Americans—tourists, businessmen, etc.—are eternally grateful.

I can only add that as we look at the State Department and its personnel today and as the Secretary has already suggested, as we consider the financial remuneration you receive, the work

which you do is truly a labor of love. It isn't even a labor in which recognition is always received, that is, the kind of recognition that will shortly be witnessed by everybody in this room. But as the Secretary has indicated, as the Communist dictatorship around the world seems to be shifting their tactics, the work of those who are skilled in the arts of peace becomes increasingly more important. That means that the future of the United States, of free peoples and people who want to be free all over the world, is in the hands of the diplomats and all of those who work in the Department with the diplomats and in the embassies around the world.

I know that the performance which you have previously given will continue to be at its high level. May I express, on behalf of the Congress, and I think I can speak for both Houses, having been a member of both, and for the administration, and also may I speak for the American people in expressing appreciation to all of the personnel in the Department of State in Washington and abroad for what you have done.

To those of you who have engaged in special activities which deserve special recognition, of course, special appreciation is due. But many times in this life, as we all are aware, the test of a person, of his ability, of his character, is not in doing the things that are dramatic, not in doing the things that are heroic, but in doing the things which are difficult to do. As I put it sometimes more simply, the real test is doing the thing you don't like to do rather than doing the things you like to do, and we all, each day we live, encounter a little of both.

I would not want this opportunity to pass without saying one word also about the man immediately preceding me on the rostrum. I read over the list of those who received awards and his name was not among them. But he, of course, is the Secretary of State, and as such he receives recognition, recognition from many quarters, depending on the point of view of those who want to recognize him.

I should like to say just this word about the Secretary of State. In a political campaign obviously we both, Republicans and Democrats, are partisan and in the general course of events say *our* Secretary of State is a great Secretary of State. I happen to believe that myself personally. I also will agree that it is not possible, when we talk about or discuss great events which are occurring

at this time, to judge the performance of a man until many years later. But this much I am sure of, as far as our present Secretary of State is concerned, there is no member of the President's Cabinet who has more stamina; there is no member of the President's Cabinet who works harder; there is no member of the President's Cabinet who is more devoted to his duty than the present Secretary of State. I would also like to add that as far as those three elements are concerned, elements which generally are decisive in determining whether a performance is good or goes beyond that point and is great, there is no question where our present Secretary of State will stand.

Speaking to that point, as I conclude, I have noted references that I am supposed to have considerable stamina and that is attributed to the fact that I am relatively young. I am supposed to be able to travel many miles in airplanes and still be able to go on traveling and speaking, but, believe me, I could not have possibly done what the Secretary of State has done in the past few years. Not only has he traveled the many miles he has, but here is a man who writes all the speeches he makes, and that, believe me, is a very unusual accomplishment, and one above and beyond the call of duty.

## Advisers Report to President on Tariff Negotiations

White House press release dated May 4

*Following is the text of a statement made to President Eisenhower on May 4 by the non-Governmental advisers to the U.S. delegation negotiating tariff agreements at Geneva.<sup>1</sup>*

Having had an opportunity to observe at first hand the tariff negotiations now drawing to a conclusion at Geneva, we are happy to report to you that the interests of our country have been well served. We have been greatly impressed by the competence of the career men from the nine de-

<sup>1</sup>The advisers were Elliott V. Bell, editor and publisher of *Business Week* and chairman of the Executive Committee, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Inc.; Homer L. Brinkley, executive vice president, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives; Bryant Essick, president of the Essick Manufacturing Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; and Stanley N. Ruffenberg, director of research, AFL-CIO. For the announcement of their appointment, see BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 96.

partments and agencies of the Government who have handled these important negotiations. The members of the Trade Agreements Committee, particularly, have worked long hours for many months with a high degree of concentration and effort.

We were particularly impressed with the unflinching concern of our negotiators to advance the broad interests of the United States. By no stretch of the imagination could the tariff negotiations, as we observed them, be called a giveaway program. The entire program is, of course, based upon reciprocal concessions, and we found our negotiating teams and the Trade Agreements Committee to be bargaining in what seemed to us to be the best Yankee tradition. They insisted on obtaining concessions of full value for each concession made by the United States. There is great need for a better public knowledge of these facts.

The hard work and intelligence that went into the tariff negotiations are the more noteworthy because the present tariff session, following upon earlier negotiations, was restricted to a comparatively narrow range of trading. It required patience and persistence on the part of our representatives to obtain the many important agreements that are being reached.

On the basis of our observations in Geneva, we are strongly of the opinion that there is need for the permanent administrative machinery that is provided for in the proposed Organization for Trade Cooperation. The adoption of this administrative machinery subscribed to by all the interested nations would clearly be in our enlightened self-interest. It would help make all our trade agreements more truly reciprocal. It would also strengthen both the resolve and ability of the member nations to continue their efforts toward an expanding and mutually profitable world trade. It would provide an effective, continuously operating instrument in giving fuller effect to existing commitments to remove such trade barriers as currency restrictions, quotas, discriminatory taxes, and other indirect devices that limit the exchange of our goods with other nations. Failure on the part of the United States, the world's greatest trading nation, to join in setting up this organization would cause great dismay and disappointment throughout the free world at a time when the Soviet Union is stepping up its foreign economic efforts.

Accordingly, we wish to support very strongly

your recommendation for adherence by the United States to the OTC.

We appreciate deeply the opportunity that has been given us to participate as observers in these tariff negotiations. It has been for all of us an interesting and rewarding experience.

## **Agreement With Germany on Motion Picture Films**

Press release 219 dated April 26

Representatives of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany signed on April 26 at Bonn an agreement, negotiated under article XXVIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), making certain changes in the German tariff concession affecting motion picture films.

The new agreement eliminates a clause in the German GATT schedule which provided among other things that if the Germans established a "screen quota" for domestic films—that is, a quota guaranteeing to their own film producers a certain percentage of theater exhibition time—they would not make such quota higher than 27 percent.

In compensation for this withdrawal, Germany agreed: (1) until December 31, 1957 (extendible for another year unless specifically denounced) not to impose any restrictions upon the importation or exhibition of foreign films in Germany that would not be applied in a like manner to domestic films, and (2) should a screen quota be established after the above period and should, in addition, the German foreign-exchange position warrant the imposition of further prohibitions or restrictions, the latter would be imposed only on the transfer of earnings. This second obligation may be denounced in any year.

Article XXVIII of the general agreement permits contracting parties under specified circumstances to withdraw or modify concessions previously granted. These concessions normally take the form of reductions in tariff rates or of agreements not to increase tariff rates, but sometimes embody other specific commitments. When a country invokes article XXVIII, as Germany did in the present case, it holds negotiations with the country with which the concession was originally negotiated and with other countries having a substantial trade interest in the concession. A pur-



pose of this negotiation is to endeavor to maintain the previous level of reciprocal concessions.

The results of the present negotiations provided for the elimination of the following note to tariff item 3708 (other cinematograph film exposed or developed) in the German GATT schedule:

Should the Federal Republic of Germany establish a screen quota for the exhibition of films of German origin, the Federal Republic would then not maintain or establish any prohibitions or restrictions (other than non-discriminatory rates or other charges), whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, on the importation of films which are the product of any other contracting party. Furthermore, should the Federal Republic establish such screen quota, this should not exceed 27 percent.

It is, however, confirmed herewith that, should a screen quota be instituted as indicated above, and in case the German foreign exchange position demands prohibitions or restrictions these can only be effected through the non-transfer of proceeds.

The text of the agreement follows.

#### AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY REGARDING FILMS

##### *Article 1*

The United States of America agrees to the entire elimination of the note to Tariff No. 3708 of Schedule XXXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with respect to a screen time quota for the exhibition of foreign films in the Federal Republic of Germany.

##### *Article 2*

The Federal Republic of Germany agrees not to impose any other or more burdensome conditions or requirements upon the importation of foreign films into or their exhibition in the territory of the Federal Republic until December 31, 1957, unless they are measures which apply in the same manner to domestic and foreign films. The period of the undertaking in this article will be automatically extended for a further period of one year unless specifically denounced by either party before September 30, 1957. The Contracting Parties agree that this obligation does not exclude the application of Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

##### *Article 3*

Should a screen time quota be instituted after the expiration of the period mentioned in Article 2 and, in this case, should the German exchange position demand prohibitions or restrictions, these can only be imposed through the non-transfer of proceeds. This undertaking can be denounced in any year up until the 30th of September, with effect on December 31 of that year.

##### *Article 4*

Both Contracting Parties specifically reserve all rights arising from Article XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

##### *Article 5*

This Agreement also applies to the Land Berlin, which

for the purpose of the Agreement comprises only those areas over which the Berlin Senat exercises jurisdiction, provided that within three months following the effective date of the Agreement, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shall have furnished to the Government of the United States of America a written notification that all legal procedures necessary for the application of the present Agreement in Berlin have been complied with.

##### *Article 6*

The present Agreement shall enter into force one month after the date of receipt by the Government of the United States of America of notification of its constitutional ratification in the Federal Republic of Germany.

## **Peru and United States Sign Educational Exchange Agreement**

The Department of State announced on May 4 (press release 238) that the Governments of Peru and the United States signed an agreement that day putting into operation a program of educational exchanges authorized by the Fulbright Act. The agreement was signed at Lima by Adm. Luis Edgardo Llosa, Foreign Minister of Peru, and U.S. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs.

The agreement provides for the expenditure of Peruvian currency over a 3-year period equivalent to a maximum of \$300,000 received from the sale of surplus agricultural products in Peru to finance exchanges of persons between the two countries to study, do research, teach, or lecture.

Under the terms of the agreement, a Commission for Educational Exchange between the United States and Peru will be established to assist in the administration of the program. The Commission will consist of six members with equal representation as to Peruvian and U.S. citizens in addition to the American Ambassador, who will serve as honorary chairman. All recipients of awards under the program authorized by the Fulbright Act are selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, whose members are appointed by the President of the United States.

With the signing of this agreement, Peru becomes the 30th country and the second of the other American Republics to participate in the educational exchange program initiated almost 10 years ago under authority of the Fulbright Act. Educational exchanges between Peru and the United States have been carried out for a number of years under the Act for Cooperation between the American Republics, the Smith-Mundt Act, and other legislation.

## Atomic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development

### STATEMENT BY JOHN C. BAKER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON ECOSOC<sup>1</sup>

The proposal of the United States to place on the agenda an item on "Studies on Atomic Energy as a Factor in Economic Development"<sup>2</sup> was circulated by the Secretary-General on March 29, 1956. You will find the details of this proposal in document E/2845.

This is not the time to enter into the substance of our proposal. I simply want to commend it to you for inclusion on the agenda on the obvious ground that the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy is bound to have a profound influence upon the economic development of the world at large, and it will be particularly important to the future of the less developed countries. The issue, therefore, is one which does not only fall clearly within the competence of the Economic and Social Council but must be considered one of the most important issues with which the Council is likely to deal during the years to come. It is therefore none too early for the Council to lay some groundwork for its own activities in this area, to discover what studies are already available regarding the uses of the atom for purposes of economic development and what research is either presently undertaken or planned. The action which we shall ask the Council to take in this respect is a modest action but essential to our future activities.

In view of the particular importance of atomic power as a source of new energy needed for industrial development, we propose that the item should be accepted as a subitem to item 5 [Eco-

nomie Development of Underdeveloped Countries].

Mr. President, and members of the Council, I warmly recommend this item to you for your acceptance in the agenda of this 21st session of the Council.

### STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS<sup>3</sup>

Mr. President, I am glad to have this opportunity of meeting with you and the other members of the Economic and Social Council to discuss the role that this Council can play in applying the new and fast-growing body of nuclear knowledge to the old and ever-challenging question of economic development.

For 10 years this Council has coordinated the United Nations efforts to raise the level of living for the people of all countries. It has focused attention on the many United Nations programs for more food, better health, longer life, and improvement in the welfare of many of the world's peoples. It has shown that cooperative effort can speed the attainment of those better conditions of life which men have always sought but seek today with increasing determination and impatience.

Nuclear energy is bound to play an important part in future world economic development. In terms of atomic energy we are all underdeveloped. All countries are, therefore, pioneers. Only 13 years ago the first atomic reactor was made to work. Only 2 years and 4 months ago President Eisenhower presented to the United Nations his program of a world effort to harness this new

<sup>1</sup> Made in the U.N. Economic and Social Council on Apr. 17 (U.S./U.N. press release 2388).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 657.

<sup>3</sup> Made in ECOSOC on Apr. 24 (U.S./U.N. press release 2397). On Apr. 25 the Council referred the item to its Economic Committee.

source of power for man's betterment, gearing it to hope rather than to fear, to construction rather than destruction.

In these few years the speed of development has exceeded all forecasts. We were and still are cautioned not to expect miracles overnight. While keeping this in mind, we still cannot fail to be impressed by the progress made by science and industry in using atomic energy to improve man's life.

A complete catalog of these accomplishments would take far too long.

It would have to include the highly successful use of radioisotopes—for example, in treating diseases which have defied cures by other means; in producing more food and in preserving food from good years to lean years.

It would have to include experiments in the use of atomic energy in ship propulsion and in industrial processing.

Probably the greatest overall contribution of atomic energy to human welfare will be in the generation of electric power—to light homes, to run machines, and to lighten backbreaking labors. In the United States our first full-scale power plant will come into operation next year—at Shippingport, Pennsylvania. It will have an eventual capacity of 100,000 kilowatts. Plans for six other full-scale commercial-type plants have already been concluded. Still other smaller plants are being planned for rural areas with capacities of from 10,000 to 12,000 kilowatts. Entire plants that can be transported by air are also under design for use in remote regions where other types of power are unobtainable.

From the purely economic point of view none of these plants will be producing economically competitive power right away—that is, power which costs as little as that produced by conventional power plants in this country. Atomic power development costs much money; the best guess is that the United States spends about \$200-\$300 million a year for such research and development. But valuable economic as well as technical information will be obtained from the Shippingport plant and the others when they are completed, which will be of help to everyone interested in the potential uses of atomic energy for economic development, and particularly to the less developed countries.

The most recent forecasts made by the Atomic

Energy Commission are that we are now in the research and development stage of economic nuclear power. Some time the economic advantages of nuclear power will become so compelling that a relatively large proportion of new power plants will be nuclear. When this second phase is reached, the proportion of nuclear power plants to the total number being built will increase from around 5 percent to perhaps something like 60 percent in 10 years or less. In the third phase, when this proportion has been reached, it will probably be maintained for some years; in areas where coal, oil, and waterpower are abundant there will continue to be an economic need for them as well.

It is evident that the economic implications of nuclear power development are enormous for this country and for others. The rate of development will necessarily vary from country to country according to conditions in each. It will be related to the level and distribution of incomes, the availability of capital and technical skills, the relative cost of other fuels, and many other factors. But we can clearly see that nuclear fuel is a tremendous potential source of new energy and it will be put to use in the lifetime of most of us.

#### **U.S. Emphasis on Cooperation**

In our development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy the United States has been firmly following the road of international cooperation, the road marked out by President Eisenhower here at the United Nations. The President has repeatedly stressed that the use of the atom for man's welfare can best be achieved by a cooperative spirit. He has stressed the necessity for a "continued partnership of the world's best minds."

This partnership, as far as the United States is concerned, has taken two directions: making facilities available and making information available.

The most recent step toward sharing materials was the announcement last February that we would make available 20,000 kilograms of U-235 for use in nuclear reactors in other countries.<sup>1</sup> This was in addition to 200 kilograms previously announced.

On the information side, it should be set down that 40 complete atomic energy libraries have been

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

sent abroad,<sup>5</sup> each containing more than 200,000 pages of information. In addition, more than 200 students from other countries have come here for training or study in nuclear development.

Evidences of the partnership of the world's best minds, here at the United Nations, have also come in rapid succession. Last summer there was the historic Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Last autumn a United Nations Committee To Study Problems of Radiation was created. And now we have the agreed draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The United States is gratified that plans for this agency are moving ahead in a cooperative atmosphere, and we look forward to the meeting in September when the final action will be taken to set up this newest member of the United Nations family of agencies.

The link between this new agency and the Economic and Social Council will be close—similar though not identical with the tie that exists between the United Nations and other specialized agencies. By the terms of the draft statute the agency will submit reports to this Council on matters within its competence.

Because of the rapid progress that is being made in nuclear technology, together with the rapid progress that is being made internationally for sharing its benefits, the United States, Mr. President, would like to see the Economic and Social Council begin now a program of studies on economic aspects of atomic-energy development. To achieve an orderly progress, to avoid duplication, and to establish a realistic approach, there should be one place where pioneer economic thinking is centered.

#### **Need for Inventory of Studies**

We have in mind, for the present, a report by the Secretary-General of the possible applications of atomic energy to promote economic development. This report would include an evaluation of the studies and publications on the potential economic uses of nuclear energy which are already available. It would include materials from the Geneva conference: out of the 100 sessions, 8 were concerned with this aspect of the question. It would include reports of work being done by the specialized

<sup>5</sup> For description of libraries and list of recipients, see *ibid.*, Apr. 16, 1956, p. 656.

agencies and any discussions of this subject by the regional commissions, as well as studies originating with governments or private research. It is probable that such a report will show up gaps in the research work now under way; if so, this will facilitate further studies, either through the United Nations or through other channels, and their coordination.

The whole field is new: the potentials are unknown. But the advantages of having available in one place an inventory of studies on the possible applications of atomic energy for economic development are self-evident.

#### **Benefits From Nuclear Technology**

Nobody can foresee exactly where the atomic revolution will take us. But we do know that countries in all stages of economic development are bound to benefit from advances in nuclear technology. The highly industrialized countries will benefit because nuclear power will be an essential supplement to available supplies of coal and oil. It will allow for growth and continued rising levels of living. In fact without this new source of energy we might indeed face a decline in living standards. The experts have estimated that the world's energy needs by the year 2,000 will be from 2½ to 5½ times the 1950 level.

For countries which have not yet completed their industrialization, atomic power will create many new opportunities to short-cut the development process. In many cases, where waterpower or coal or oil are now lacking, it may, in time, supply the needed source of energy. In such underpowered areas, in time, as experience is gained and people are trained to operate the new plants, atomic power can multiply muscle power not 2,000 times, as with the high-speed machines known today, but by something more like 25,000 times.

With these possibilities before us, Mr. President, I believe it is more than ever essential that nations work together for the good of the human race. Power is morally neutral. Atomic energy is power, but its potential for good or evil is multiplied beyond anything we have ever thought of in the past. It makes self-seeking attempts by nations to subvert, penetrate, or sabotage other nations all the more reprehensible. By the same token it makes our continued partnership of the world's best minds all the more essential.

In this partnership the Economic and Social Council has a significant role to play and an im-

portant beginning can be made by undertaking the project that is now proposed.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>6</sup>

U.N. doc. E/Res (XXI)/16

*The Economic and Social Council,*

*Considering its responsibilities under Article 62 of the Charter,*

*Recognizing that actual and potential developments in the field of atomic energy may have profound implications in the economic sphere, particularly affecting the economic development of less-developed countries,*

*Taking into account the complexity of the subject, the diversity of studies already made or in process under various auspices, and the need for further information on which to determine its future actions in this important field.*

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General in co-operation with the specialized agencies concerned to prepare for submission to the twenty-fourth session of the Council a report on possible applications of atomic energy, especially in the fields of power, industry and agriculture;

2. *Recommends* that, in preparing the report, the Secretary-General survey the available studies and the research presently being undertaken in this field, and give due consideration to the materials submitted to the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and the views expressed during the twenty-first session;

3. *Invites* Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies to make available to the Secretary-General for the purpose of his report such documentation bearing on the subject as they may be able to provide;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after consultation with the Advisory Committee referred to in General Assembly resolution 912 (X) and the competent specialized agencies, to submit to the Economic and Social Council at its twenty-fourth session a report on the possibility of devoting as much as possible of the programme of the Second International Conference on the Exchange of Technical Information regarding the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to the practical applications of nuclear energy in the interest of promoting the economic development of under-developed countries and/or the desirability of convening a separate conference on this subject;

5. *Transmits* to the Advisory Committee the records of the discussion of the Council on this item;

6. *Decides* to place the subject of atomic energy as a means of economic development on the agenda of the twenty-fourth session of the Economic and Social Council for further consideration.

<sup>6</sup> The original draft (E.L.703) was sponsored by Brazil, Canada, France, U.K., and U.S.; Egypt subsequently became a cosponsor of a revised text (E/L.703/Rev. 2) which the Council adopted unanimously on May 4.

## Question of Opening Date of General Assembly Session

*Following is the text of a note transmitted to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on April 17 by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, together with a note circulated to U.N. members by the Secretary-General on March 27.*

### U.S. Note of April 17

U.S./U.N. press release 2387 dated April 17

The Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary General of the United Nations and has the honor to refer to the Secretary General's note of March 27, 1956, OR-421 (11th), concerning the question of postponing the opening date of the 11th Regular Session of the General Assembly.

The United States shares the hope of the Secretary General that a postponement of the opening date would provide a greater opportunity for preparatory work and thereby expedite the deliberations of the session. The United States therefore supports the proposal submitted by the Governments of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador that the opening of the 11th Regular Session of the General Assembly be convened at Headquarters on Monday, November 12, 1956, or any other day of that week which meets the convenience of the Members.<sup>1</sup>

### Secretary-General's Note Transmitting Proposal of Chile, Cuba, and Ecuador

U.N. press release dated March 29

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of . . . . . to the United Nations and has the honor to transmit a copy of a note dated 26 March 1956 from the Permanent Representatives of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador to the United Nations on the question of the opening date of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly.

As requested in the above-mentioned note and availing himself of the procedures of consultation with Members provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General has the honor to request the Per-

<sup>1</sup> As of Apr. 30, 51 member nations had concurred in the proposal; on May 1 the Secretary-General announced that the Assembly would open at U.N. Headquarters on Nov. 12.

manent Representative to inform him before 30 April 1956 of the position of his Government with regard to the proposal submitted by the Governments of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador that the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly be convened at Headquarters on Monday, 12 November 1956.

It is the hope of the Secretary-General that a postponement of the opening date of the eleventh session of the General Assembly would provide opportunity for delegations, and especially those of the new Members, to engage in more complete preparatory work and thus expedite the deliberations of the session.

27 March 1956

[Enclosure]

TEXT OF NOTE DATED 26 MARCH PROPOSING POSTPONEMENT

The Permanent Representatives of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador to the United Nations present their compliments to the Secretary-General and, in pursuance of instructions received from their Governments, have the honour to refer to the question of the opening date of the eleventh regular session of the General Assembly.

While the opening date of the eleventh session would, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, take place on Tuesday, 18 September 1956, it is the feeling of a number of delegations that a postponement of the opening of the session would be generally welcomed. Therefore, the Permanent Representatives of Chile, Cuba and Ecuador have the honour to propose, on behalf of their Governments, that the eleventh regular session be convened at Headquarters on Monday, 12 November 1956.

The Permanent Representatives would be grateful if the Secretary-General would transmit this proposal to the other Members of the General Assembly for their consideration.

NEW YORK, N. Y., 26 March 1956

RUDECINDO ORTEGA

*Permanent Representative of Chile*

EMILIO NUÑEZ-PORTUONDO

*Permanent Representative of Cuba*

JOSÉ VICENTE TRUJILLO

*Permanent Representative of Ecuador*

## **U.S. Delegations to International Conferences**

### **Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education**

The Department of State announced on April 21 (press release 209) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the Second Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education opening at Lima, Peru, on May 3, 1956:

### *U.S. Commissioner of Education*

Samuel M. Brownell, Commissioner, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

### *Advisers*

Albert A. Giesecke, American Embassy, Lima, Peru

Bess Goodykoontz, Director, International Educational Relations, Division of International Education, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

George Greeo, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Operations Mission, Lima, Peru

Thomas A. Hart, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Operations Mission, La Paz, Bolivia

Paul Packer, Chief, Education Division, U.S. Operations Mission, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Simon N. Wilson, Office of Regional American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Mariano Villaronga, Secretary of Education, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, P.R.

This meeting is an Inter-American Specialized Conference convoked by the Council of the Organization of American States. The agenda as approved by the OAS Council on July 23, 1954, includes two main topics: (1) eradication of illiteracy; (2) extension of elementary education.

A UNESCO Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America will meet at Lima immediately prior to the Second Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education. The Ministers of Education meeting will discuss concrete suggestions and comprehensive plans for the extension and improvement of compulsory education in Latin America on the basis of the technical conclusions reached by the participants of the UNESCO conference.

The First Conference of Ministers and Directors of Education of the American Republics was held at Panamá in 1943.

### **Inter-American Cultural Council**

The Department of State announced on April 23 (press release 211) that Mary P. Holleran, Dean of Faculty of Hampton Institute, Hampton, Va., and U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Cultural Council (IACC) of the Organization of American States, will head the U.S. delegation to the second meeting of the Council at Lima, Peru, May 3-12, 1956. Arturo Morales-Carrión, Under Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, has been designated to serve as the alternate U.S. Representative for this meeting. Dr. Holleran and Dr. Morales will be assisted by the following advisers:

Howard F. Cline, Director, Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress

Albert A. Giesecke, American Embassy, Lima, Peru

Bess Goodykoontz, Director, International Educational Relations, Division of International Education, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Muna Lee, Chief, South American Section, Public Affairs Staff, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

George T. Moody, Chief, Program Planning, International Educational Exchange Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State

Simon N. Wilson, Office of Regional American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Dorothy Woodward, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, N.Mex.

The Inter-American Cultural Council is one of the three technical organs of the Council of the Organization of American States.

Topics on cultural cooperation and organizational matters will be considered at the forthcoming meeting. Of primary interest will be the recommendations of the second meeting to the Council of the OAS regarding the development of a "basic and practical program of cultural action" for the OAS. For this purpose the Cultural Council will consider the activities of the Pan American Union in education, literature, art and music, and science, including social science. The meeting will also discuss a number of studies prepared by the OAS Committee for Cultural Action in Mexico City (permanent committee of IACC) on a variety of subjects including Indian education, validation of academic degrees, exchange of publications and persons, and the teaching of geography and history.

#### **ILO Coal Mines Committee**

The Department of State announced on May 2 (press release 234) that the United States will be represented by the following delegation at the sixth session of the Coal Mines Committee of the International Labor Organization convening at Istanbul, Turkey, May 2-12.

##### *Representing the Government of the United States*

Harry F. Weaver, Chief, Division of Coal Mine Inspection, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C.

George Tobias, Labor Attaché, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

##### *Representing the Employers of the United States*

H. J. Connolly, Chairman of the Board, Pennsylvania Coal Company, Scranton, Pa.

James W. Haley, Vice President, Jewell Ridge Coal Corporation, Washington, D.C.

##### *Representing the Workers of the United States*

Paul K. Reed, International Representative, United Mine Workers of America, Washington, D.C.

Joseph Yablonski, International Executive Board Member, United Mine Workers of America, Clarksville, Pa.

The Coal Mines Committee is one of eight industrial tripartite committees that have been established by the ILO since 1945 to deal with problems of international significance in several industries. The other committees are concerned with inland transport; petroleum; metal trades; iron and steel; building, civil engineering, and public works; textiles; and chemical industries. Two special topics will be considered at this session. They relate to safety in coal mines and to recruitment and vocational training.

## **TREATY INFORMATION**

### **Current Actions**

#### **BILATERAL**

##### **Ceylon**

Agreement providing for a development assistance program in Ceylon. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo April 28, 1956. Entered into force April 28, 1956.

##### **Japan**

Agreement relating to the reduction during Japanese fiscal year 1956 of Japanese contributions, under article XXV of the Administrative Agreement of February 28, 1952 (TIAS 2492), for United States services and supplies in Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 24, 1956. Entered into force April 24, 1956.

Agreement providing for an annual progressive reduction of Japan's contribution for the United States Security Forces in Japan, pursuant to article XXV of the Administrative Agreement of February 28, 1952 (TIAS 2492). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 25, 1956. Entered into force April 25, 1956.

##### **Peru**

Agreement amending the voluntary agency relief agreement of October 21 and 25, 1954 (TIAS 3128). Effected by exchange of notes at Lima June 23 and August 3, 1955. Entered into force August 3, 1955.

##### **Philippines**

Agreement amending and supplementing agreement relating to military assistance of April 27, 1955 (TIAS 3231). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila April 20, 1956. Entered into force April 20, 1956.

# Status Lists

## Convention on International Civil Aviation

Formulated at Chicago December 7, 1944

State	Date of signature	Date of deposit of instrument of ratification	Date of receipt of notification of adherence	Date of entry into force <sup>1</sup>
Afghanistan	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 4, 1947		May 4, 1947.
Argentina			June 4, 1946	Apr. 4, 1947.
Australia	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Austria			Aug. 27, 1948 <sup>2</sup>	Sept. 26, 1948.
Belgium	Apr. 9, 1945	May 5, 1947		June 4, 1947.
Bolivia	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 4, 1947		May 4, 1947.
Brazil	May 29, 1945	July 8, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Burma			July 8, 1948	Aug. 7, 1948.
Cambodia			Jan. 16, 1956	Feb. 15, 1956.
Canada	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 13, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Ceylon			June 1, 1948	July 1, 1948.
Chile	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 11, 1947		Apr. 10, 1947.
China	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 20, 1946 <sup>3</sup> and Dec. 2, 1953 <sup>3</sup>		Apr. 4, 1947. Jan. 1, 1954.
Colombia	Oct. 31, 1947	Oct. 31, 1947		Nov. 30, 1947.
Costa Rica	Mar. 10, 1945			
Cuba	Apr. 20, 1945	May 11, 1949		June 10, 1949.
Czechoslovakia	Apr. 18, 1945	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Denmark	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 28, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Dominican Republic	Dec. 7, 1944	Jan. 25, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Ecuador	Dec. 7, 1944	Aug. 20, 1954		Sept. 19, 1954.
Egypt	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 13, 1947		Apr. 12, 1947.
El Salvador	May 9, 1945	June 11, 1947		July 11, 1947.
Ethiopia	Feb. 10, 1947	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Finland			Mar. 30, 1949 <sup>4</sup>	Apr. 29, 1949.
France	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 25, 1947		Apr. 24, 1947.
Greece	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 13, 1947		Apr. 12, 1947.
Guatemala	Jan. 30, 1945	Apr. 28, 1947 <sup>5</sup>		May 28, 1947.
Haiti	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 25, 1948		Apr. 24, 1948.
Honduras	Dec. 7, 1944	May 7, 1953		June 6, 1953.
Iceland	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 21, 1947		Apr. 20, 1947.
India	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Indonesia			Apr. 27, 1950	May 27, 1950.
Iran	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 19, 1950		May 19, 1950.
Iraq	Dec. 7, 1944	June 2, 1947		July 2, 1947.
Ireland	Dec. 7, 1944	Oct. 31, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Israel			May 24, 1949	June 23, 1949.
Italy			Oct. 31, 1947 <sup>6</sup>	Nov. 30, 1947.
Japan			Sept. 8, 1953 <sup>7</sup>	Oct. 8, 1953.
Jordan			Mar. 18, 1947	Apr. 17, 1947.
Korea			Nov. 11, 1952	Dec. 11, 1952.
Laos			June 13, 1955.	July 13, 1955.
Lebanon	Dec. 7, 1944	Sept. 19, 1949		Oct. 19, 1949.
Liberia	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 11, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Libya			Jan. 29, 1953.	Feb. 28, 1953.
Luxembourg	July 9, 1945	Apr. 28, 1948		May 28, 1948.
Mexico	Dec. 7, 1944	June 25, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Netherlands	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 26, 1947		Apr. 25, 1947.
New Zealand	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 7, 1947		Apr. 6, 1947.
Nicaragua	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 28, 1945		Apr. 4, 1947.
Norway	Jan. 30, 1945	May 5, 1947		June 4, 1947.
Pakistan			Nov. 6, 1947	Dec. 6, 1947.
Paraguay	July 27, 1945	Jan. 21, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Peru	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 8, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Philippines	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Poland	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 6, 1945		Apr. 4, 1947.
Portugal	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 27, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Spain	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 5, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
Sweden	Dec. 7, 1944	Nov. 7, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Switzerland	July 6, 1945	Feb. 6, 1947 <sup>8</sup>		Apr. 4, 1947.
Syria	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 21, 1949		Jan. 20, 1950.
Thailand	Dec. 7, 1944	Apr. 4, 1947		May 4, 1947.
Turkey	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 20, 1945		Apr. 4, 1947.
Union of South Africa	June 4, 1945	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
United Kingdom	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 1, 1947		Apr. 4, 1947.
United States of America	Dec. 7, 1944	Aug. 9, 1946		Apr. 4, 1947.
Uruguay	Dec. 7, 1944	Jan. 11, 1954		Feb. 13, 1954.
Venezuela			Apr. 1, 1947	May 1, 1947.
Viet-Nam			Oct. 19, 1954	Nov. 18, 1954.
Yugoslavia	Jan. 6, 1954			



International Air Services Transit Agreement and International Air Transport Agreement

Formulated at Chicago December 7, 1944

State	Date of signature of		Date of receipt of acceptance of	
	Transit agreement	Transport agreement	Transit agreement	Transport agreement
Afghanistan . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	May 17, 1945 . . . . .	May 17, 1945. <sup>9</sup>
Argentina . . . . .			June 4, 1946 . . . . .	
Australia . . . . .	July 4, 1945 . . . . .		Aug. 28, 1945 . . . . .	
Austria . . . . .				
Belgium . . . . .	Apr. 9, 1945 . . . . .		July 19, 1945 . . . . .	
Bolivia . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Apr. 4, 1947 . . . . .	Apr. 4, 1947 . . . . .
Brazil . . . . .				
Burma . . . . .				
Cambodia . . . . .				
Canada . . . . .	Feb. 10, 1945 . . . . .		Feb. 10, 1945 . . . . .	
Ceylon . . . . .				
Chile . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .			
China . . . . .		Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .		June 6, 1945. <sup>3</sup>
Colombia . . . . .				
Costa Rica . . . . .	Mar. 10, 1945 . . . . .	Mar. 10, 1945 . . . . .		
Cuba . . . . .	Apr. 20, 1945 . . . . .	Apr. 20, 1945 . . . . .	June 20, 1947 . . . . .	
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	Apr. 18, 1945 . . . . .		Apr. 18, 1945 . . . . .	
Denmark . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Dec. 1, 1948 . . . . .	
Dominican Republic . . . . .		Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .		Jan. 25, 1946. <sup>10</sup>
Ecuador . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .		
Egypt . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .		Mar. 13, 1947 . . . . .	
El Salvador . . . . .	May 9, 1945 . . . . .	May 9, 1945 . . . . .	June 1, 1945 . . . . .	June 1, 1945 . . . . .
Ethiopia . . . . .	Mar. 22, 1945 . . . . .	Mar. 22, 1945 . . . . .	Mar. 22, 1945 . . . . .	Mar. 22, 1945 . . . . .
Finland . . . . .				
France . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .		June 24, 1948 . . . . .	
Greece . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .		Sept. 21, 1945 . . . . .	Feb. 28, 1946. <sup>11</sup>
Guatemala . . . . .	Jan. 30, 1945 . . . . .	Jan. 30, 1945 . . . . .	Apr. 28, 1947. <sup>5</sup>	
Haiti . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .		
Honduras . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Nov. 13, 1945 . . . . .	Nov. 13, 1945 . . . . .
Iceland . . . . .	Apr. 4, 1945 . . . . .	Apr. 4, 1945 . . . . .	Mar. 21, 1947 . . . . .	
India . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .		May 2, 1945. <sup>12</sup>	
Indonesia . . . . .				
Iran . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .	Aug. 13, 1946 . . . . .	Apr. 19, 1950 . . . . .	
Iraq . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 . . . . .		June 15, 1945 . . . . .	
Ireland . . . . .				
Israel . . . . .			June 16, 1954 . . . . .	

<sup>1</sup> The convention, in accordance with the provisions of article 91(b) thereof, entered into force initially Apr. 4, 1947.

<sup>2</sup> The participation of Austria effected in accordance with the provisions of article 93 of the convention and resolution of June 9, 1948, by Assembly of ICAO. Effective Sept. 26, 1948.

<sup>3</sup> Reservation accompanying acceptance of China: "The acceptances are given with the understanding that the provisions of Article IV Section 3 of the International Air Transport Agreement shall become operative in so far as the Government of China is concerned at such time as the Convention on International Civil Aviation . . . shall be ratified by the Government of China." (Chinese instrument of ratification of the Convention on International Civil Aviation deposited Feb. 20, 1946. China denounced the International Air Transport Agreement Dec. 11, 1946. Effective Dec. 11, 1947. Notification of denunciation by China of Convention on International Civil Aviation received May 31, 1950. Effective May 31, 1951. China deposited another instrument of ratification of the convention on Dec. 2, 1953.)

<sup>4</sup> The participation of Finland effected in accordance with the provisions of article 93 of the convention and resolution of June 9, 1948, by Assembly of ICAO. Effective Apr. 29, 1949.

<sup>5</sup> Notification of denunciation by Guatemala of Convention on International Civil Aviation and International Air Services Transit Agreement received June 13, 1952. Guatemala canceled its notification of denunciation of

convention and transit agreement on Dec. 8, 1952, and requested that denunciation be considered as withdrawn.

<sup>6</sup> The participation of Italy effected in accordance with the provisions of article 93 of the convention and resolution of May 16, 1947, by Assembly of ICAO. Effective Nov. 30, 1947.

<sup>7</sup> The participation of Japan effected in accordance with the provisions of article 93 of the convention and resolution of July 1, 1953, by Assembly of ICAO. Effective Oct. 8, 1953.

<sup>8</sup> The Minister of Switzerland made the following statement in the note transmitting the Swiss instrument of ratification: "My government has instructed me to notify you that the authorities in Switzerland have agreed with the authorities in the Principality of Liechtenstein that this Convention will be applicable to the territory of the Principality as well as to that of the Swiss Confederation, as long as the Treaty of March 29, 1923, integrating the whole territory of Liechtenstein with the Swiss customs territory will remain in force."

<sup>9</sup> Afghanistan denounced the International Air Transport Agreement Mar. 18, 1948. Effective Mar. 18, 1949.

<sup>10</sup> The Dominican Republic denounced the International Air Transport Agreement Oct. 14, 1946. Effective Oct. 14, 1947.

<sup>11</sup> Reservation accompanying acceptance of Greece: "In accepting this Agreement [transport] in accordance with Article VIII, paragraph two thereof, I am directed to make a reservation with respect to the rights and

(Footnotes continued on following page)

Status Lists—Continued

International Air Services Transit Agreement and International Air Transport Agreement—Continued

Formulated at Chicago December 7, 1944

State	Date of signature of		Date of receipt of acceptance of	
	Transit agreement	Transport agreement	Transit agreement	Transport agreement
Italy . . . . .				
Japan . . . . .			Oct. 20, 1953	
Jordan . . . . .			Mar. 18, 1947	
Korea . . . . .				
Laos . . . . .				
Lebanon . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944 <sup>13</sup>		
Liberia . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 19, 1945	Mar. 19, 1945
Libya . . . . .				
Luxembourg . . . . .	July 9, 1945		Apr. 28, 1948	
Mexico . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	June 25, 1946	
Netherlands . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944 <sup>14</sup>	Jan. 12, 1945	Jan. 12, 1945 <sup>15</sup>
New Zealand . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944		Apr. 19, 1945 <sup>10</sup>	
Nicaragua . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 28, 1945	Dec. 28, 1945 <sup>17</sup>
Norway . . . . .	Jan. 30, 1945		Jan. 30, 1945	
Pakistan . . . . .			Aug. 15, 1947 <sup>18</sup>	
Paraguay . . . . .	July 27, 1945	July 27, 1945	July 27, 1945	July 27, 1945
Peru . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944		
Philippines . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944		Mar. 22, 1946 <sup>19</sup>	
Poland . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944		Apr. 6, 1945	
Portugal . . . . .				
Spain . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944		July 30, 1945	
Sweden . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Nov. 19, 1945	Nov. 19, 1945
Switzerland . . . . .	July 6, 1945		July 6, 1945	
Syria . . . . .	July 6, 1945	July 6, 1945 <sup>20</sup>		
Thailand . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Mar. 6, 1947	Mar. 6, 1947 <sup>21</sup>
Turkey . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944 <sup>22</sup>	June 6, 1945	June 6, 1945 <sup>23</sup>
Union of South Africa . . . . .	June 4, 1945		Nov. 30, 1945	
United Kingdom . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 <sup>24</sup>		May 31, 1945 <sup>25</sup>	
United States of America . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944	Feb. 8, 1945 <sup>26</sup>	Feb. 8, 1945 <sup>26</sup>
Uruguay . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944	Dec. 7, 1944		
Venezuela . . . . .	Dec. 7, 1944 <sup>27</sup>	Dec. 7, 1944 <sup>27</sup>	Mar. 28, 1946	Mar. 28, 1946 <sup>28</sup>
Viet-Nam . . . . .				
Yugoslavia . . . . .				

obligations contained in Article I, Section 1, paragraph (5) of the Agreement, which, under Article IV, Section 1, Greece does not wish, for the time being to grant or receive."

<sup>12</sup> Reservation accompanying acceptance of India: "In signifying their acceptance . . . [transit], the Government of India . . . do not regard Denmark or Thailand as being parties thereto. . . ." (Reservation respecting Thailand withdrawn by India June 6, 1947. Reservation respecting Denmark withdrawn by India Feb. 14, 1950.)

<sup>13</sup> Reservation accompanying signature of Lebanon: "Ad referendum concerning the fifth freedom enumerated in Art. I Section 1 [transport]."

<sup>14</sup> Reservation accompanying signature of the Netherlands: "In accordance with the provisions of Art. IV Section 1 of this agreement [transport] the Netherlands Delegation hereby accept only the first four privileges in Art. I Section 1." (Reservation relinquished by the Netherlands Sept. 21, 1945.)

<sup>15</sup> Reservation accompanying acceptance of the Netherlands: ". . . the signatures . . . affixed to the . . . International Air Transport Agreement (with reservation set forth in Article IV Section 1) constitute an acceptance . . . by the Netherlands Government and an obligation binding upon it." (Reservation relinquished by the Netherlands Sept. 21, 1945.)

<sup>16</sup> Reservation accompanying acceptance of New Zealand: ". . . the New Zealand Government does not regard Denmark or Thailand as being parties to the Agreement [transit]. . . ." (Reservation respecting Thailand is regarded as having been withdrawn by New Zealand Jan. 31, 1947. Reservation respecting Denmark withdrawn by New Zealand Dec. 13, 1949.)

<sup>17</sup> Nicaragua denounced the International Air Transport Agreement Oct. 7, 1946. Effective Oct. 7, 1947.

<sup>18</sup> The Ambassador of Pakistan informed the Secretary of State by note no. F. 96 48 1 of March 24, 1948, that ". . . by virtue of the provisions in Clause 4 of the Schedule of the Indian Independence (International Arrangements) Order, 1947, the International Air Services Transit Agreement signed by United India continues to be binding after the partition on the Dominion of Pakistan." The acceptance by India on May 2, 1945, of the transit agreement applied also to the territory, then a part of India, which later, on Aug. 15, 1947, became Pakistan. The Ambassador of Pakistan informed the Secretary of State by note no. F. 96 50 3 of Nov. 28, 1950, of the withdrawal of the reservation made by India, as it applied to Pakistan after partition from India, with respect to Denmark in connection with the transit agreement, the withdrawal being effective Aug. 15, 1947.

<sup>19</sup> Reservation accompanying acceptance of the Philippines: "The above acceptance is based on the understanding . . . that the provisions of Article II, Section 2 of the International Air Services Transit Agreement shall become operative as to the Commonwealth of the Philippines at such time as the Convention on International Civil Aviation shall be ratified in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the Philippines." (Philippine instrument of ratification of the Convention on International Civil Aviation deposited Mar. 1, 1947.)

<sup>20</sup> Reservation accompanying signature of Syria: "In accordance with Art. IV section 1 of this agreement, Syria accepts only the first four privileges in Art. I section 1 [transport]."

(Footnotes continued on following page)

<sup>21</sup> Thailand denounced the International Air Transport Agreement Mar. 18, 1953. Effective Mar. 18, 1954.

<sup>22</sup> Reservation accompanying signature of Turkey: "In accordance with the provisions of Art. IV section 1 of this agreement [transport] the Turkish delegation hereby accept only the first four privileges in Art. I sect. 1 and leave the acceptance of the fifth privilege to the discretion of their government."

<sup>23</sup> Reservation accompanying acceptance of Turkey: ". . . the reservation made by the Turkish Delegation on the fifth freedom of the air contained in the International Air Transport Agreement is explained in the following article of the law by which the aforementioned instruments have been ratified: 'The Turkish Government, when concluding bilateral agreements, shall have the authority to accept and apply for temporary periods the provision regarding the fifth freedom of the air contained in the International Air Transport Agreement.'"

<sup>24</sup> Reservation accompanying signature of the United Kingdom: "I declare that, failing later notification of inclusion, my signature to this Agreement [transit] does not cover Newfoundland." (Reservation withdrawn by United Kingdom Feb. 7, 1945.)

<sup>25</sup> Reservation accompanying acceptance of the United Kingdom: "In signifying their acceptance of the said Agreement [transit], the Government of the United Kingdom . . . neither regard the Governments of Denmark and Siam [Thailand] as being parties thereto. . . ." (Reservations respecting Denmark and Thailand withdrawn by United Kingdom Mar. 10, 1950.)

<sup>26</sup> Reservation accompanying acceptance of the United States: "These acceptances by the Government of the United States of America are given with the understanding that the provisions of Article II, Section 2, of the International Air Services Transit Agreement and the provisions of Article IV, Section 3, of the International Air Transport Agreement shall become operative as to the United States of America at such time as the Convention on International Civil Aviation . . . shall be ratified by the United States of America." (The United States of America denounced the International Air Transport Agreement July 25, 1946. Effective July 25, 1947. United States instrument of ratification of the Convention on International Civil Aviation deposited Aug. 9, 1946.)

<sup>27</sup> Reservation accompanying signature of Venezuela: "La Delegación de Venezuela firma *ad referendum* y deja constancia de que la aprobación de este documento por su Gobierno está sujeta a las disposiciones constitucionales de los Estados Unidos de Venezuela." (Transit and transport agreements accepted by Venezuela Mar. 28, 1946.)

<sup>28</sup> Venezuela [denounced] the International Air Transport Agreement June 3, 1954. Effective June 3, 1955.

A work paper by Reinhold Niebuhr, Vice President of the Faculty and Professor of Christian Ethics, Union Theological Seminary, with a discussion outline by F. Ernest Johnson, Chief Study Consultant, Department of the Church and Economic Life, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U. S. A. and Professor Emeritus of Education, Columbia University, prepared for Citizen Consultations sponsored by the U. S. National Commission for UNESCO in cooperation with the Adult Education Association of the U. S. A.

**Thailand.** Pub. 6296. Far Eastern Series 71. 51 pp. 10¢.

A background summary on Thailand's current state of affairs and what is being done to solve its social welfare, economic, and political problems.

**SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. First Annual Report of the Council Representatives, March 1956.** Pub. 6305. Far Eastern Series 72. 27 pp. 15¢.

This report explains the purposes and functions of SEATO, records the progress made in the course of the Organization's first year, and examines the outlook for the future.

**The Soviet Challenge and the United Nations.** Pub. 6310. International Organization and Conference Series 111, 114. 23 pp. 15¢.

An address made by Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, before the Annual Convention of the American Association of Junior Colleges at New York City on March 9, 1956.

**International Sugar Agreement.** TIAS 3177. Pub. 5848. 230 pp. \$1.00.

Agreement between the United States and other governments—Dated at London October 1, 1953. Entered into force May 5, 1954.

**Colón Corridor and Certain Other Corridors Through the Canal Zone.** TIAS 3180. Pub. 6213. 19 pp. 4 maps. 50¢.

Convention between the United States and Panama—Signed at Panamá May 24, 1950. Entered into force April 11, 1955.

**Highway Convention.** TIAS 3181. Pub. 6214. 15 pp. 25¢.

Convention between the United States and Panamá—Signed at Panamá September 14, 1950. Entered into force April 11, 1955.

**North Atlantic Ocean Stations.** TIAS 3186. Pub. 5898. 34 pp. 15¢.

Agreement, with annexes, between the United States and other governments—Signed at Paris February 25, 1954. Entered into force February 1, 1955.

**Economic Cooperation—Informational Media Guaranty Program.** TIAS 3187. Pub. 5871. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines—Modifying agreement of February 18 and 19, 1952. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila October 14, 1954, and January 19, 1955. Entered into force January 19, 1955.

**Emergency Relief Assistance—Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3188. Pub. 5872. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Pakistan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Karachi January 18, 1955. Entered into force January 18, 1955.

**Economic Assistance to Israel.** TIAS 3189. Pub. 5876. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Amend-

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Our Moral and Spiritual Resources for International Cooperation.** Pub. 6230. International Organization and Conference Series IV, UNESCO 28. 36 pp. 30¢.

May 14, 1956

ing agreement of November 25, 1953. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem January 31, 1955. Entered into force January 31, 1955.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3190. Pub. 5877. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Signed at Lima February 7, 1955. Entered into force February 7, 1955.

**Mutual Security—Disposition of Balance in Counterpart Special Account.** TIAS 3191. Pub. 5878. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ireland—Signed at Dublin June 17, 1954. Entered into force February 16, 1955.

**Air Force Mission to Bolivia.** TIAS 3192. Pub. 5948. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—Extending Military Aviation Mission Agreement of September 4, 1941, as extended and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz December 3 and 22, 1954. Entered into force December 22, 1954; operative retroactively September 4, 1953. And agreement—Extending and amending the agreement of September 4, 1941, as extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington October 20, 1949, and January 20 and March 30, 1950. Entered into force March 30, 1950; operative retroactively September 4, 1949.

**Economic Aid to Yugoslavia.** TIAS 3193. Pub. 5883. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade February 7 and 9, 1955. Entered into force February 9, 1955.

**Mutual Security—Defense Support Aid.** TIAS 3194. Pub. 5884. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy. Exchange of letters—Signed at Rome February 11, 1955. Entered into force February 11, 1955.

**Mutual Security—Use of Counterpart Funds in Trieste.** TIAS 3195. Pub. 5885. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Italy. Exchange of letters—Signed at Rome February 11, 1955. Entered into force February 11, 1955.

**Technical Cooperation—Amendment of Agricultural Research Program.** TIAS 3196. Pub. 5886. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Costa Rica. Exchange of notes—Signed at San José October 19 and 26, 1954. Entered into force October 26, 1954.

**Constitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.** TIAS 3197. Pub. 5987. 42 pp. 20¢.

Constitution adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration at Venice, October 19, 1953. Acceptance by the United States deposited September 21, 1954. Entered into force November 30, 1954.

**Sale of Feed Grain and Purchase of Building Materials for United States Defense Purposes.** TIAS 3199. Pub. 5900. 2 pp. 5¢.

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change of notes—Signed at Washington May 5, 1955. Entered into force May 5, 1955.

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Administrative agreement, with annex, between the United States and other governments—Implementing Annexes IX and X to agreement of February 27, 1953—Signed at Bonn December 1, 1954. Entered into force December 1, 1954. With exchange of notes between the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and U. S. Acting High Commissioner for Germany—Signed at Bonn and Bad Godesberg December 1, 1954.

**Mexican Agricultural Workers—Recommendations by Joint Migratory Labor Commission.** TIAS 3242. Pub. 6020. 14 pp. 10¢.

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**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3250. Pub. 6071. 7 pp. 10¢.

Interim agreement between the United States and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo May 31, 1955. Entered into force May 31, 1955.

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229	5/1	Dulles: departure for NATO meeting.
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234	5/2	Delegation to ILO Coal Mines Committee (rewrite).
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236	5/2	National day of Poland.
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240	5/4	Visit of Indonesian President (rewrite).
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# The Department of State

Vol. XXXIV, No. 882

May 21, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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## Developing the Atlantic Community

*Secretary Dulles on May 7 returned from a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held at Paris on May 4 and 5. The principal decision taken at the meeting was that the Atlantic Community should be further developed, particularly in political and economic fields. The Secretary reported on the meeting briefly on his arrival at Washington and on May 8 made an address on the subject. On May 9 President Eisenhower requested Senator Walter F. George to serve as his personal representative "in the development of this evolutionary step within the North Atlantic Community."*

*Following are texts of the Secretary's address, his arrival statement, the President's letter to Senator George, and the communique issued at the conclusion of the Paris meeting.*

### ADDRESS BY SECRETARY DULLES<sup>1</sup>

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak before this organization, and I thank you for the warm welcome given me. Your organization stands for human values which are honored wherever men believe in the spiritual nature of man. You believe in the dignity of the human individual and in the brotherhood of man without regard to race or religion. You find in your religion basic truths which are also enunciated by all the world's great religions.

The law of your Prophets was, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," and that was accepted by Jesus when He said, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets." And the Buddha said, "Hurt not

<sup>1</sup> Made before the triennial convention of B'nai B'rith at Washington, D. C., and broadcast to the Nation on May 8 (press release 246).

others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful"; and the Prophet of Islam taught, "No one is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself."

It is these fundamental truths taught by all the great religions that your organization practices. You engage in acts of compassion. In doing so, you are helping to lay the only dependable foundation for the world society of peace and justice for which we strive.

I have just returned yesterday afternoon from a meeting in Paris of the Foreign Ministers of the 15 North Atlantic Treaty countries. That treaty and its organization, called NATO, is one of the means designed to promote peace with justice. So far it has sought to do so primarily by setting up a military shield which would deter armed aggression and behind which moral principles could take root and grow strong and bear good fruit. We primarily dealt with the question of whether or not our countries were, in fact, doing all that they could or should to develop their own unity behind the military shield which was the initial and, so far, the dominant purpose of NATO.

### The Situation in the Near East

I want to talk primarily about this problem of developing the Atlantic Community. But before getting on to that I will mention one other topic of great interest to all Americans at this time which was discussed at the NATO Council meeting—that is the situation in the Near East.

That area is of intimate concern to the Atlantic Community. For many generations, indeed for many centuries, the Western nations have had close ties with the Near East. In recent years there has developed a large measure of economic interdependence affecting the very nature of the daily lives of the people of both areas.

The members of the NATO Council were acutely

conscious of the problem of maintaining peace in the Middle East. When the Palestine mandate came to an end, the United States and other Western nations supported United Nations consideration on the future of Palestine which resulted in the creation of the State of Israel. As members of the United Nations we all intend that the State of Israel shall be maintained in its independence. Also we want friendly political, cultural, and economic relations with all of the nations of the area on a basis of impartiality. We do not believe that these two goals are incompatible.

There was grave concern that the Soviet Union had sought to further its ends by playing fast and loose with peace in the area. There was the feeling that that very fact made it more important for the Western nations to act with firm deliberation and with care.

There was recognition at Paris that wide discrepancies in armed strengths would be likely to create tensions. There was also a conviction that the safety of the countries of the Middle East is not to be found in an arms race, particularly one which tended to pit great world powers against each other.

It seemed particularly important to avoid a situation where great military powers confronted each other, by proxy, under conditions which would engage their respective prestiges in a manner ominous for peace, not only within the area but possibly throughout the world.

There was a belief that reliance should, above all, be placed upon the processes of the United Nations and that we can, perhaps, do so now with somewhat greater confidence since the Soviet Union seems increasingly aware of the dangerous consequences of reckless action and has indicated that it, too, would be prepared to support a solution through the United Nations.

We all welcomed the active part now being taken by the United Nations Security Council to preserve the integrity of the armistice agreements, and we are encouraged by the fact that the Secretary-General's mission to the area seems to have produced some initial positive results.

We believe that solid reliance can be placed upon the principles of the United Nations Charter and that no nation of the area which conforms internationally with those principles will stand alone. President Eisenhower made it clear, in his statement of April 9, 1956,<sup>2</sup> that, so far as the

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1956, p. 668.

United States is concerned, there could not be aggression with impunity.

Past efforts to move toward a settlement of the substantive issues in the Middle East have encountered serious obstacles. The task is immensely complex. I have no illusions that real solutions will be easily come by. But if progress is difficult, it is also necessary. And we continue to make it. There are now grounds for hope that it may be possible to maintain the momentum now established by Mr. Hammarskjold's current efforts. That the United States will seek to do.

### **Progress Toward Atlantic Unity**

Let me turn now to the problem on which we spent most of our time in Paris. That was the development of the Atlantic Community into something more solid than is now the case.

All who know and share Western civilization can take great pride in its accomplishments. It was based upon the Judeo-Christian conception of the spiritual nature of man. Out of this faith came individual resourcefulness and a sense of mission which brought much of good to much of the world.

But when we think with pride of what Western civilization has accomplished, we must also think with regret of the fact that it has never yet found the way to live within itself at peace. If today the West is seriously challenged by believers in an atheistic creed, it is largely because two world wars, coming in quick succession, drained off the lifeblood of our finest and bravest youth and gravely impaired the economic strength of the West. Also the West has lost in moral authority because while professing a religion of peace it has not found a sure way to make peace a permanent reality within its own membership.

Since the end of World War II great strides have been taken to create unity at various levels within the Atlantic Community. All these measures have been taken within the framework of the United Nations Charter, which recognizes the inherent right of collective self-defense and which encourages development along regional lines.

The broadest effort at unity is represented by the North Atlantic Treaty itself, now embracing 15 nations including two from this hemisphere, Canada and the United States. Under this treaty great progress has been made, particularly in military terms. There is an integration of mili-

tary forces on the continent of Europe—including contributions from Great Britain, Canada, and the United States—the like of which has never been seen before. The newly developing forces of the Federal Republic of Germany will share that integration.

The military unity under NATO is supplemented by the new (1954) treaty for Western European Union, which unites France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the three Benelux countries under a system for limitation of armament and of armament supervision and control which is the most thorough and extensive that has ever yet been put into force. Thus on the military front there has developed a unity and combined organization which is of immense value and which has produced a morale which is itself of great unifying value.

In addition to these efforts on the military front there is the Coal and Steel Community, whereby France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries deal with the production of coal and steel. This is the first time that European nations have subordinated national powers in favor of a truly European organization.

There is the Council for Europe, where ministers and parliamentarians of European countries regularly meet for discussion of matters other than defense. There is the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Payments Union, which contribute greatly to easing trade as between the members. These are some of the many steps which have been taken since World War II to establish unity within all or part of the Atlantic Community.

#### **Need for More Adequate Organization**

But at Paris last week we had to ask ourselves whether what has been done is good enough, particularly in terms of consultation about matters which seriously affect each other. There has been a marked development of the consultative process. But it still remains the fact that matters of vital importance to the Atlantic Community are not being given timely consideration on a community basis.

I have already referred to the problem of the Middle East, which had never been seriously discussed by the North Atlantic Treaty Council even though the future of Western Europe is deeply engaged by developments there.

We have seen in North Africa serious dis-

turbances within a part of the North Atlantic Treaty area which have brought about a shifting of forces from continental Europe which alters the capability of defense as against a possible aggression from Eastern Europe.

There is the problem of Cyprus, which deeply concerns three parties to the North Atlantic Treaty—the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey.

I do not suggest that any of these problems should today be made a matter of common consideration around the NATO Council table. At the point to which these particular problems have now developed, there can reasonably be questions as to whether consultation is or is not desirable. Neither do I imply any criticism of the past, for there has never been agreement or understanding that problems of this type should be discussed. And, indeed, the Council is not really equipped to deal seriously with these problems. But surely the Atlantic Community is not adequately organized if matters of this nature, which could shake the community to its foundation, develop over the years without any effort at broad consultation between the members.

Then there is the problem of the reunification of Germany. That subject was discussed by the NATO Foreign Ministers at special meetings which were held just prior to the Geneva summit conference with the Soviet rulers and before the Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference which followed. But, as we know, the Geneva agreement by Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev on "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections" has been ignored by them and they now unashamedly continue the division of Germany as though they had never agreed to the principle of reunification. Most of the Western powers have said, and rightly said, that there cannot be lasting peace and security in Europe unless Germany is reunified. But has the Atlantic Community as a whole sufficiently focused world opinion on the moral aspects of this problem? I wonder.

#### **Relation to Newly Independent Nations**

Then we have the problem of the relation of the Atlantic Community to the newly independent nations of the world. They now represent upwards of 650 million people composing 18 independent nations, and more non-self-governing peoples are at the threshold of independence or

knocking at the door. What has happened is an amazing tribute to the basic beliefs of the West in the rights of man and in government by consent. Nevertheless it would be a great mistake to conclude that, because these newly independent peoples have peacefully won their independence from the Western powers, relations between the former rulers and the newly self-governing peoples are in all respects good. In many cases there remain unresolved problems between the newly independent countries and the colonial powers. Above all, there remain barriers in terms of sensitiveness to racial arrogance which has at times been practiced by some persons of the West.

One-third of the world's population is ruled by Communist despots. Another third are new nations which are today the special target of the predatory tactics of international communism, which seeks to stimulate the prejudices and to appeal to the aspirations of these peoples. The members of the Atlantic Community have so much to offer in the way of genuine brotherhood, they can do so much to strengthen the political and economic institutions of the newly independent peoples, that it is tragic that the outcome is anywhere in doubt.

Certainly, as was often said at our Paris meeting last week, NATO, until now primarily military in its nature, is no proper organ for implementing political and economic policies between the Atlantic Community and the newly independent countries. But the community does contain within its own membership nations which themselves have been through the experience of being colonies and winning their independence. Also it contains colonial powers who have demonstrated and are illustrating today great statesmanship in promoting evolution from colonialism to self-government or independence. Surely the members of such a community could generate greater dynamism to help, in acceptable ways, to sustain political and economic independence elsewhere. Also we should be able to help to find relationships expressive of true brotherhood and recognition of the fact that other civilizations than our own have immense values. We perhaps have material and technical things to give. They too have things to give. And if we are wise enough to perceive and to take what other civilizations have to offer, the balance struck between us will not be one-sided by any true measure of values and will be consistent with the equal dignity of all the parties.

#### **A New Approach to the Community Relationship**

It may be said that the North Atlantic Treaty members already have a permanent Council where problems can be discussed which vitally affect the welfare and integrity of the Atlantic Community. There is a Council composed of Permanent Representatives, who are men of stature and great ability. In theory they could discuss any problems of common concern. The fact is that, as they are now established, their discussions often have been merely reports of actions already taken or decisions already made. That is because the governments concerned have never taken the basic decision to have a council to which problems affecting the Atlantic Community would normally and regularly be brought. If that decision were taken, it would greatly alter the entire character of the community relationship. It would not require different personalities at the Council table, but a different approach and far greater "depth" in terms of political advisers than is now the case. But above all is the basic decision to take seriously the unity of the Atlantic Community and seek to promote it, not by supergovernment but by common counsel.

Such a decision has not yet been taken, except in military terms.

This was the problem which was most actively discussed at Paris during the past week. In that connection we discussed the Soviet threat—the acts of violence which had marked Soviet foreign policy until recently and the latest changes in that policy. We recorded the fact that our joint military efforts had successfully deterred Soviet aggression in Europe and had contributed to the adoption by the Soviet Government of the so-called policy of coexistence. Our joint communique said that, to the extent that this Soviet policy involves a certain easing of tension and the admission by the Government of the Soviet Union that war is not inevitable, it is welcomed by the Atlantic powers. But also we recorded our joint conclusion that the reasons which gave rise to the Atlantic military alliance have not disappeared and that the Western powers cannot relax their vigilance while many outstanding problems have not been solved and when there is no effective disarmament plan. Therefore, we said, "Security remains . . . a basic problem, and the Atlantic Powers must continue to give priority to the maintenance of their unity and strength. However, present

prospects seem to leave scope for further peaceful initiatives on the part of the Atlantic Powers.”

### Three Foreign Ministers To Report

Then we went on to record what may prove to be a historic decision. The communique said that “the Atlantic Council consider it timely and useful for the members of the Atlantic Community to examine actively further measures which might be taken at this time to advance more effectively their common interests.” And the Foreign Ministers went on to designate three of their members to advise “on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.” The three Ministers were asked to submit their report as soon as possible.

It is significant of the importance attached to this matter that the task of exploration was given to, and assumed by, three Foreign Ministers themselves—the Foreign Ministers of Canada,<sup>3</sup> Italy,<sup>4</sup> and Norway.<sup>5</sup> They are each men of wide experience. Each of them personally believes in the development of the Atlantic Community both on a broad base and, within the framework of that broad base, as between groups of members which can in certain respects work together with greater intimacy than can the whole. These three Ministers will be conferring with each of the 15 governments during the coming weeks and, in the light of what they learn, will submit a report, perhaps early next fall, which the governments then can further consider from the standpoint of further action.

It would, I think, be prudent to note that there is as yet no clear definition of the concept of closer Atlantic unity. And we could hardly expect acceptance in advance of close analysis.

The United States perhaps can visualize that concept more readily because of its membership in the Organization of American States. That organization traces its origin back 66 years to the foundation of the Pan American Union. It is not only the oldest but by far the most effective regional organization which has been created. It deals effectively with problems as between its members and has conspicuously done so within the last year or two in relation to the broad threat of international communism, and in relation to

particular situations such as those that arose in Guatemala, in Costa Rica, and as between Ecuador and Peru. It seeks to develop hemispheric international law.

It is obvious that the Organization of American States, which has developed in a particular environment to deal with problems typical of this hemisphere, cannot usefully be duplicated in detail as regards the Atlantic Community. Each community is distinctive. But the experience which the United States has had, in cooperation with the other American Republics, enables us perhaps to see more clearly the possibilities inherent in the Atlantic Community.

Speaking on April 23 prior to this last meeting of the NATO Council I said,

The North Atlantic Treaty already serves as an indispensable and vital instrument of the Atlantic community. But the time has, I believe, come to consider whether its organization does not need to be further developed if it is adequately to serve the needs of this and coming generations. If that be the common desire of the NATO member nations, the United States will join eagerly in exploring the possibilities which now beckon us forward.<sup>6</sup>

It is gratifying to report to you that it is the common desire of the NATO member nations at least to explore seriously these new possibilities. That decision was taken not lightly but after a discussion which prolonged our meeting of Friday and Saturday into the early hours of Sunday morning. The decision was recognized by all as being a decision which could be of historic importance since it could contribute mightily toward erasing what has been the great weakness of the West, namely, its disunity. To erase that disunity, which has given birth to so many tragic consequences, is one of the supreme tasks of postwar statesmanship. Much has already been done. But much remains to be done. You can, I think, feel—as I feel—solid satisfaction that a great new advance is under way.

### ARRIVAL STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY

Press release 244 dated May 7

I return from a meeting of the 15 Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty countries.

This meeting could be, and I believe it will be, a turning point for NATO.

<sup>6</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 706.

<sup>3</sup> Lester B. Pearson.

<sup>4</sup> Gaetano Martino.

<sup>5</sup> Halvard Lange.

It was recognized that the unity of the Atlantic Community must be further developed if it is to surmount the shifting tactics of international communism and if it is to serve the needs of this and coming generations.

NATO was conceived primarily as a military organization. Nothing that has happened has led us to believe that we can safely drop our guard. But it is generally agreed that the time has come to further develop the unity of the Atlantic Community, particularly in the nonmilitary political fields.

No time is to be lost in realizing this enlarged goal for NATO. So three of our Foreign Ministers have undertaken to consider all proposals along this line and to make a report as quickly as possible. The importance of this task is emphasized by the fact that it is being undertaken by Foreign Ministers themselves.

There was general confidence that the Atlantic Community will meet the demands for its own political evolution, and thus meet the challenge of our times.

#### **PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SENATOR GEORGE**

White House press release dated May 9

DEAR WALTER: I know that your present term in the Senate expires this year. In view of that fact, I should like to say two things to you:

It has been my great hope that you would continue on in the Senate where you have been able to make so great a contribution to peace through helping to develop and sustain a non-partisan foreign policy. Your contribution in that respect has been incalculable and I believe it was the overwhelming desire of the American people that you would have found yourself able to continue in the Senate.

I can, however, realize that you may desire to concentrate more exclusively on the great problems of war and peace which confront our nation, free of the other responsibilities which inevitably go with the Senatorship. If that is your preference, I earnestly hope that you will be willing to act for this nation with reference to the development of the North Atlantic Community so that it will in greater unity and greater effectiveness serve the cause of international peace and the preservation of those ideals of human liberty and freedom which are so deeply rooted in the Community.

As you know, at the latest meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, it was decided to explore ways and means by which the North Atlantic Community, through the NATO Council or otherwise, might more fully realize its potential for peace and human welfare. I regard the contribution which the United States can make to this project as of the utmost importance and feel that it may indeed play a decisive role in the achievement of a just and durable peace and the preservation of the great values inherent in our Western civilization.

It would be a great service to the nation and, indeed in a broader sense, to the whole world if you would be willing, for as long as I may hold my present office, to act as my Personal Representative and Special Ambassador in the development of this new evolutionary step within the North Atlantic Community. In case you do feel impelled to lay down the responsibilities of your present office, I can think of no way where you could better serve our nation and more fittingly crown your great career as a statesman.

I may say that Foster Dulles has asked me to express his warm concurrence in what I say and that he greatly hopes that you will favorably consider this important mission.

With warm personal regard,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

#### **NAC COMMUNIQUE OF MAY 5**

The North Atlantic Council met in Paris on May 4 and 5 under the Chairmanship of Dr. Gudmundsson, Foreign Minister of Iceland, and issued the following communique:

1. The Atlantic Powers, seven years ago, entered into the North Atlantic Treaty in face of the Communist threat to their common ideals and civilisation. For they had seen imperilled all the human rights which their peoples regard as essential for their life and freedom, particularly representative government, freedom of the individual, the rule of law and liberty of the press.

With the disappearance of the last free regime in Eastern Europe, that of Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade in 1948, and two years later, the invasion of Korea, the concern of the free world reached its climax. The need for collective military defence was all the more obvious because at the end of the Second World War the free world had disarmed.

These were the circumstances which led to the creation of NATO and its military strength, and this is why the sacrifices necessary for the defence of the Atlantic Community have since then been borne in common.

II. The collective defence efforts of the Atlantic Powers have not been in vain. They have successfully deterred Soviet aggression in Europe and have contributed to the adoption by the Soviet Government of the so-called policy of co-existence.

To the extent that this policy involves a certain easing of tension and the admission by the Government of the U.S.S.R. that war is not inevitable, it is welcomed by the Atlantic Powers, who have always supported this idea. It is now possible to hope that those principles of the United Nations Charter which have regulated the relations between the peoples of the Atlantic Community may eventually also regulate the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers.

III. The reasons which gave rise to the Atlantic Alliance have not, however, disappeared. No progress has been made towards solving certain vital European problems, including the reunification of Germany in freedom, which have to be solved on a basis which would satisfy the legitimate security needs of all. The Western Powers cannot relax their vigilance until these problems have been solved and until a disarmament plan providing the necessary guarantees to all and an effective control system has been put into effect. Soviet military power continues to increase. Security remains therefore a basic problem, and the Atlantic Powers must continue to give priority to the maintenance of their unity and strength. However, present prospects seem to leave scope for further peaceful initiatives on the part of the Atlantic Powers. They are determined to pursue these initiatives with the same energy that they displayed in building up their defence organization and with which this will be maintained.

They solemnly affirm that this policy will be pursued in common, and based on the unity, solidarity and co-operation of peoples sharing common ideals and standing together in the cause of freedom.

IV. The Atlantic Council consider it timely and useful for the members of the Atlantic Community to examine actively further measures which might be taken at this time to advance more effectively their common interests. The Atlantic Powers already possess in the North Atlantic Council an instrument of unity and a forum for consultation regarding policies of general interest. In order to enable the Council better to perform these tasks, the Ministers agreed to appoint a Committee of three Ministers to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community. The Committee of Three was requested to submit its report as soon as possible.

V. In the meantime, the Council agreed:

- (a) to undertake periodical examinations of the political aspects of economic problems;
- (b) to strengthen economic co-operation between member countries, to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and to promote conditions of stability and well-being;
- (c) to instruct the permanent representatives of the Council to examine economic problems in the light of the ideas set out above and of the plan put forward by M. Pineau, Foreign Min-

ister of France, calling upon the services of a committee of technical advisers working under their authority.

VI. The members of NATO are by their Treaty dedicated to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law".

Their first seven years of working together have resulted in marked success and have strengthened the bonds between them.

The members of NATO are determined to remain united and steadfast to their ideals. They face the future with confidence.

## Department's Views on Address by Sir Winston Churchill

*The Department of State on May 11 issued the following statement in response to questions from correspondents concerning the address made by Sir Winston Churchill at Aachen, Germany, on May 10.*

Sir Winston Churchill has stated that, "if" the Russian repudiation of Stalin is sincere, we have a new Russia to deal with and that, if so, there is no reason why the new Russia should not join in the spirit of the solemn agreement of the North Atlantic Treaty to fight the aggressor, whoever he may be. Sir Winston went on to say that "that is for the future" and that in the meanwhile we should go forward toward that future by reinforcing patiently and surely the arrangements which we have so far achieved. He also spoke of the vital need for German reunification.

The first suggestion of Sir Winston is in accord with the proposal which the three Western Foreign Ministers made to the Soviet Union at Geneva on October 27, 1955,<sup>1</sup> during the consideration of the linked problems of European security and the reunification of Germany. In this connection, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States proposed a "Treaty of Assurance" which contemplated reciprocal renunciation of force and withholding of support from aggressors and an agreement that armed attack in Europe would endanger the peace and security and that all parties would then take appropriate action to meet the common danger. This proposal has never been accepted by the Soviet Union, even as a basis for discussion.

Sir Winston's second suggestion for "reinforce-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 7, 1955, p. 730.

ing" the arrangements which we now have is a welcome support for the action taken at last week's meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council, which established a committee of three of the Foreign Ministers to study ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop their unity within the Atlantic Community.

The United States welcomes the spirit and substance of Sir Winston's important address on these points.

## **Four-Power Declaration of Principles Relating to Disarmament**

*Following is the text of a declaration relating to disarmament issued at London on May 4 by the U.S., Canadian, French, and British delegations to the meetings of the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.<sup>1</sup>*

I. In order to promote peace, security and prosperity through disarmament, the delegations of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States reaffirm their determination to seek agreement on a developing programme of disarmament in accordance with their mandate from the United Nations. This programme should begin without delay and should include measures, under effective international control, to end the present competition in armed forces and armaments of all kinds.

(1) The programme should proceed by stages. Progress from one stage to another must depend upon the satisfactory execution of the preceding stage and upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems.

(2) The programme should begin, under effective international control, with significant reductions in armed forces, to such levels as are feasible in present unsettled world conditions. There should be corresponding reductions in conventional armaments and in military expenditures. Further reductions would be carried out as world conditions improved.

(3) The programme should provide that, at an appropriate stage and under proper safeguards,

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from the subcommittee's third report to the Disarmament Commission (U.N. doc. DC/83), which includes working papers and proposals submitted during the London meetings, Mar. 19-May 4, 1956.

the build-up of stockpiles of nuclear weapons would be stopped and all future production of nuclear material devoted to peaceful uses.

(4) The programme should provide for a strong control organization with inspection rights, including aerial reconnaissance, operating from the outset and developing in parallel with the disarmament measures. The control measures should also provide against major surprise attack. This is particularly important so long as it is impossible to account for past production of nuclear material.

(5) Preliminary demonstrations of inspection methods on a limited scale would help to develop an effective control system and could bring nearer agreement on a disarmament programme.

(6) Provision should be made for the suspension of the programme, in whole or in part, if a major State failed to carry out its obligations or if a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should occur.

II. The proposals introduced in the Disarmament Sub-Committee by the delegations of France, the United Kingdom and the United States are inspired by these principles. The Soviet delegation did not accept these proposals. The differences between the position of the Soviet delegation and those of the other four delegations were not reconciled in the meetings of the Sub-Committee.

III. The four delegations recognize that in accordance with the instructions of the Disarmament Commission it is now time to report to the Commission. They express their conviction that a reconciliation of the opposing points of view is possible and necessary and they reaffirm their determination to continue their efforts within the United Nations, and particularly in the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee, to seek agreement on disarmament in accordance with the desire of the peoples of all nations.

## **France To Buy U.S. Farm Products in Triangular Transaction**

The International Cooperation Administration announced on May 3 that it has arranged a "triangular" transaction involving sales of \$30 million worth of U.S. agricultural commodities to France. Under the agreement, France will purchase \$24



million worth of raw cotton and \$6 million of wheat from the United States and will pay for these commodities in francs.

The francs derived from the sales will be deposited to the account of the U.S. Government. ICA will make these funds available to Viet-Nam as part of the mutual security program for that country. The francs will be used by Viet-Nam to finance purchases in the franc area, and, when such purchases are agreed upon, the triangular transaction will be completed.

## Basic Principles in U.S.-Argentine Relations

*by Albert F. Nufer*  
*Ambassador to Argentina*<sup>1</sup>

Within the framework of the Organization of American States, the Americas work together on many problems. Paramount among these is the great political threat of this half of the 20th century—the penetration of alien communism. At the Inter-American Conference held in Caracas in 1954, a foreign policy declaration adopted by the American Governments said in effect that, if the international Communist movement came to dominate or control the political institutions of any American State, that would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of all the American States and would endanger the peace of the Americas. One test of this principle was met successfully by the Guatemalan people at the very time that the American Governments were preparing to meet and to consider a threat to the security of the hemisphere.

As Secretary Dulles has repeatedly pointed out, Communist tactics continually change, but the main objective—the conversion of the world to communism—remains. . . . It is well that we have the Caracas Resolution and a growing appreciation in this hemisphere of the nature of this extracontinental threat to our way of life.

Early this month—on April 5, to be exact—the

The trade with France was made under section 402 of the Mutual Security Act. This section requires that at least \$300 million of the funds authorized for the mutual security program during the current fiscal year be used to finance the sale of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for foreign currencies. The local currency proceeds are to be used for mutual security purposes. To date this year, Ica has approved purchases of about \$330 million worth of these commodities by 21 countries.

Argentine Government by decree announced that it would support fully the Caracas Resolution. As of now, 20 American nations fully approve this important policy declaration.

But inter-American cooperation is more than just a means to attain security. It continues to demonstrate, as it did at the Conference of Ministers of Finance held late in 1954 at Rio de Janeiro, that steady progress through the coordination of government policies and the efforts of private enterprise can accelerate the growth of the economic potential of all the American nations. The horizons of opportunity broaden as the years go by. Early in 1957 a hemisphere economic conference will be held in Buenos Aires. We can be confident that the results will be an added contribution to hemisphere development and the welfare of all our peoples.

The foregoing is a preface to the parting words which I have to offer to you, to the American community in Argentina, and, if I may be so presumptuous, to the Government and people of Argentina.

Since 1952 I have had the honor to serve as United States Ambassador in Argentina—one of the great Republics of this hemisphere and the nation of San Martín and Sarmiento. During that time the basic principles that guided me in the conduct of our relations with Argentina can be summarized as follows: mutual respect for the rights and the obligations of each nation, which means, among other things, strict adherence to the

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from an address made before an American Legion post at Buenos Aires on Apr. 27. Mr. Nufer has since been confirmed as Ambassador to the Philippines.

policy of noninterference in internal affairs; a firm belief in the power of the united brotherhood of the Americas and the inter-American system; and the furtherance of the welfare of the people of Argentina, the people of the United States, and the people of each and every one of the American nations.

In recent weeks and months here in Argentina I have lived through one of the great experiences of my life. You, as well as I, have seen the surge of civic forces which have given a powerful, undeniable impetus to the Argentine nation. A new-found tenacity of purpose, a spirit of decision, and a strong confidence in a great future based on democratic principles have seized the nation.

To be sure, there was, unfortunately, during this time the dread scourge that laid an unseen hand upon scores of children and brought tragedy to many a happy Argentine home. In the task of providing the best of modern care our Government and our National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis did their small part, joining efforts with the Argentine medical and nursing professions and the Argentine people.<sup>2</sup>

May I say that a country like ours, founded on government of the people, by the people, and for the people, must never forget that in the projection of its foreign policy the welfare of other people must necessarily be that policy's ultimate objective and test. A basic principle such as this must never become trite, nor taken for granted, nor should we ever be reluctant to repeat it on occasions such as this or to translate it into action.

In the humanitarian sense it may be a national disaster such as a flood, the blight of crops, an earthquake, or an infantile paralysis epidemic.

In the political and social fields each of our nations may find inspiration in the other for nourishing and strengthening their institutions and enriching each other's culture, thereby forti-

fying the elements of our common unity. We can be inspired in this respect by the great work accomplished, to give an example, by the Argentine-United States Cultural Centers which the citizens of this country have built as monuments to understanding.

In the field of economics, we fully realize that a country must build its future mainly by the industry and enterprise of its own citizens and with the products of its national savings. But capital from abroad, both public and private, can play an important part. Thus, for instance, U.S. investments in Argentina have contributed significantly to the economic expansion of Argentina and thereby to the welfare of the Argentine people. They have brought to this country new enterprises which have not only provided jobs and produced new products but have given Argentina the benefit of their parent companies' industrial research and latest advances in technological skills.

We and the Argentine people, in a hemisphere built on boundless confidence, know that the welfare of all the peoples of the continent constitutes the key to the future and a continuation of that optimism which has been so singularly an American characteristic since the discovery of this continent by Columbus.

And now for the last word. What I have spoken contains my deepest impressions and thoughts and the guideposts of the past 4 years in Argentina. We all realize that life is never smooth, that it has its ups and downs and its difficult moments. All is not "beer and skittles" even for us diplomats, and I too have had my share of problems. But with all, it is for me a heartfelt satisfaction, to which I point with pardonable pride, that as I depart this wonderful country the relations between Argentina and the United States are better than they have ever been in the history of the two nations. May this ever be so. And may I wish to each and to all of you: Farewell, Godspeed, and *hasta la vista*.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1956, p. 527.

## The United Nations in the Mainstream of History

by Francis O. Wilcox

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

As a member of the fraternity of international law, I am honored to appear before you tonight as the Society celebrates its 50th anniversary. We have been colleagues for a long time. It may sometimes seem to you, as it does to me, that we in Government tend to lose touch with the well-springs of scholarship and speculation that are indispensable to intellectual vigor. The scholar, for his part, may sometimes get too far away from the harsh realities of political action. Auguste Comte, I am told, practiced the policy of cerebral hygiene—he didn't read any books except his own. This kind of sterility of thought must be avoided at all costs, and I hope the day never comes when we in the Government read only our own memoranda.

Both the public service and the learned professions can profit from increased contact between our two worlds. Organizations such as the American Society of International Law can and should provide a helpful bridge in this connection.

In wondering how to use this opportunity tonight, I thought it might be beneficial to step back from the immediate and the obvious and look upon the United Nations from a historical point of view.

How can we sum up its first decade? How should we evaluate the trends that have set in? What are the main problems that lie ahead?

First of all, we should abandon the notion, sometimes held, that in 1945 the United Nations sprang into being from nowhere, like Minerva from the brow of Jupiter. The analogy, rather, should be the phoenix arising from its own ashes.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 27 (press release 221).

For, while many felt it wise in 1945 to avoid dwelling on antecedents, those who labored to create the United Nations would have had an extremely difficult time without the precedents of the League of Nations to guide them.

Indeed, the ancestry of the United Nations reaches back to such historic landmarks as the rise of the nation-state, the evolution of constitutional government, the beginnings of modern economic patterns, and the development of international jurisprudence from the time of Grotius and Vitoria.

From these early roots the process which Secretary Dulles has called "the institutionalizing of peace"<sup>2</sup> has slowly taken form, culminating in our age in the creation of the United Nations.

We can criticize history but we can never rewrite it, despite the best efforts of both Stalin and his ungrateful proteges. When the United Nations came into being, men and nations had reached a certain point in their development. It was at this point, and this point only, that the United Nations could be constructed.

By no means all men realized that we had reached that historic watershed. There were those, as there still are, who out of conviction or prejudice denied the possibility of true international cooperation. Much past history was available to support their pessimism.

Others went well beyond that point. Optimistic about man's innate virtue, they sought—and still seek—utopian solutions.

In the main, the United Nations Charter represents a consensus—if not of men, at least of governments. The document itself is a remarkable com-

<sup>2</sup> For the Secretary's address to the Society, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1956, p. 739.

promise in the name of political reality. However, it has provided a satisfactory framework within which the organism has been able to live, to experiment, and to grow. That no nation, however dissatisfied, has withdrawn its membership bespeaks both the intrinsic value of the organization and increasingly articulate world public opinion. One can only conclude that it has been in the interest of member states to participate. This in itself is a major tribute to the architects who, by and large, confined themselves within the bounds of political interests and possibilities. The organization has had to function in a world of fundamental changes, and its responses to those changes show that it has a strong survival factor.

### **The First Decade—Two Overriding Facts**

What are the great changes in the first decade of the organization's life? Two facts of paramount importance stand out.

First of all, after military victory in World War II was assured, the Soviet Union resumed its doctrinal hostility to the non-Communist world and above all to the United States—the symbol of all that stands between it and world domination.

To say this is to describe how the hopeful notion of universal collective security has had to be transformed, at least for this age, into quite a different pattern of coalitions and alliances. It describes the growth and the competition of two great powers—one determined to subvert free societies, the other equally determined to preserve from assault and subversion the values of Western civilization and the practice of freedom under law. This fact has dimmed the United Nations' bright promise of cooperation and peace enforcement. For once the cold war began in earnest, the United Nations had to adapt itself to an intensely competitive, often hostile, and flagrantly "undiplomatic" world of tensions among the great powers. If it had not been able to do so, it would have expired.

A second momentous development has marked the postwar decade. For the first time in modern history the scene of political and social action has significantly shifted from the European West to the great cradle of civilization lying athwart the Equator, stretching from North Africa to the islands of Melanesia. This half of the world, which seemed to slumber through the great revolutions

of the West, is rising from the remains of its mighty past.

In one apocalyptic moment, as history tells time, this ancient world has erupted like some long-forgotten volcano. Today, 11 years after the war, 14 nations containing 600 million people have achieved political independence and become members of the United Nations. Hundreds of millions of their neighbors are moving toward a new political status, either quickly or slowly. They, too, lay claim to the status and the opportunities of the West, demanding an equal share of both.

Those members of the United Nations who share similar backgrounds or similar problems in relation to colonialism and economic development command a parliamentary strength today which few dreamed of in 1945. This balance was strengthened by the admission of 16 more states to membership last fall. What they ask, in short, is freedom from poverty, freedom from control, and freedom from inequality. In the United Nations this takes on concrete shape in the repudiation of a passing age of Western colonialism, in expectations of economic help toward industrialization, and in demands for recognition of their claims for racial, social, and cultural equality. Together these ambitions represent a dynamic emotional force that has swept the subcontinents of the Eastern Hemisphere.

The collision in the United Nations between these two currents, one running between the free world and international communism, the other between Europe and its old imperial holdings, has served to mold the United Nations to the shape of the world it represents. It may have set discouraging limits to the organization. But it has also opened new possibilities for utilizing the United Nations to keep within peaceful bounds these sweeping tides and currents. The foremost task facing both the policymaker and the scholar is to determine how best these forces can be turned to good and constructive use, in pursuance of our goals of peace with justice.

### **The First Decade—Other Problems**

But it is only too easy to forget that if there had been no cold war and if the colonial revolution had not broken out with such energy there would still be a formidable array of international problems. Finding solutions for some of these problems has sorely taxed human ingenuity.

If nationalism is a vital force in Asia, it is no

less so in the rest of the world. Disputes arise between nations over questions of trade, or territory, or simply prestige. Effective machinery is necessary to direct such disputes into peaceful channels. It is likewise necessary for conflicts that arise out of efforts to change the established order. One reason why it is so hard to speak of law as a governing principle of the United Nations is that, like the League, its most pressing problems arise from the desire of nations not to see their legal rights enforced but to change the law itself.

The clash and interplay of conflicting claims and competing systems and cultures has had a transforming effect on the concept of multilateral relations that prevailed in 1945. For one thing, nations have tended to draw together in the United Nations in voting blocs on the basis of their special interests and their estimate of the parliamentary-power situation. Those who placed a high premium on traditions of political and civil liberties have united for defense against world communism. Those who shared a definable corner of the globe tended to find community in regional alliances. Those who administered dependent territories tended to unite on the principle of noninterference in colonial affairs. The non-Communist but anti-colonial nations have banded together to create parliamentary strength out of individual weakness. In this situation, the Communist bloc has worked, as might be expected, to take advantage of these divisions of interest in the free world.

The unreliability of the Security Council, given its unworkable premise of great-power unity, has placed a premium on the Assembly. New voting patterns, involving shifting groups of states, have come to characterize the Assembly. It was there that the Asian, African, and Latin American nations found new ways to exert their influence. It was there that we ourselves turned in 1950 to unfreeze the organization's potential for collective defense against aggression, in the face of the deadlock in the Security Council. And it is there that the great powers have had to present and defend their policies before the rest of the world.

In this setting, the United Nations has tended to become less and less of a tribunal where abstract justice could be meted out and where, when the chips were down, the great powers would together enforce the peace. At the same time, it has also tended to become less of a tight coalition of pro-Western nations. Instead, it has been revealed

for what it really was all along—a sort of log-cabin community house where the entire neighborhood, friends and strangers, rich and poor, law-abiding and law-breaking, are all present.

Their mood indoors is not appreciably different from what it is outdoors, but one great purpose is shared in common by most members: to settle differences peacefully, arguing national policy on a give-and-take basis, negotiating agreements under public pressure, and, if one member gets unruly, trying as best they can to deal with him.

The ground rules are primitive, but those that work are indispensable to world order. The dreams of a future model community under law do not die, nor should they. But just as law is a product of the community, so the community must follow from a consensus, however modest, as to the common goals and purposes of the individual members. The development of this community and the broadening of its underlying consensus is the greatest long-term task facing us today.

#### **How the U.N. Has Developed—Adaptation to Reality**

We have so far depicted the United Nations in broad terms. What has happened to it in the face of changing conditions? The combination of pressures on the organization has led it to adapt in a number of significant ways. None of these has been formally ratified by amendment of the charter. In some cases there was no suitable charter provision to change. But in the main, these were adaptations designed to permit the machinery to function without having to rewrite the charter.

Chief Justice Marshall once said of our Constitution that "it was intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Throughout our history the process of constitutional growth has gone on unceasingly. Specifically, the Constitution has grown in four ways: through formal amendments, through interpretation by the courts, through custom and usage, and through basic legislation passed by Congress. With remarkably little textual change, the Constitution has been kept a living document.

In somewhat the same fashion the charter has proved flexible enough to meet new situations not foreseen 10 years ago. Despite the fears of some, these are not changes in the *powers* of the organization as a whole in relation to its member states. The United Nations' legal powers are no less and

no greater than what was agreed to at San Francisco, although they have been in some respects clarified. The purposes and goals have not changed either. Indeed the changes I refer to have brought these goals closer to fruition by avoiding futility and refusing to accept impotence.

These informal evolutions fall into four categories.

In the first place, some provisions of the charter early became obsolete and unworkable. Much of chapter VII dealing with Security Council enforcement had to be put aside so long as the great-power unanimity it presupposed was impossible to achieve. Similarly, article 106 on interim enforcement measures called for great-power unanimity, and similarly it became unworkable in a setting where one of the powers itself constituted the chief threat to the peace.

In the second place, new interpretations were found for existing charter provisions. The practice of abstention prevented total paralysis of the Security Council on occasions where an outright veto could be sidestepped. The Secretary-General's role has come to be interpreted quite liberally, opening the way to new possibilities in the peaceful settlement of disputes. A new set of activities in the colonial field has grown out of interpretations of article 73 regarding responsibilities with respect to non-self-governing territories, a development which we must help to keep constructive and balanced. And, as I have indicated, the General Assembly has largely replaced the Security Council as the principal forum for consideration of political issues, including many arising from the colonial revolt against the West.

In the third place, international agreements have been developed to fill out gaps in the charter. I have in mind such important treaties as the Atlantic Pact, the SEATO agreement, and other regional and collective defense pacts based on articles 51-54.

These pacts, I am aware, have sometimes been criticized on the ground that they run counter to the spirit, if not the letter, of the charter. Actually they are based on the obvious fact that the enforcement procedures outlined in the charter were denied vitality by the Soviet Union.

Finally, the major organs of the United Nations have used their authority to create subsidiary organs, such as the Interim Committee and the various Ecosoc regional commissions, to assist

the parent organs in performing their proper functions.

It is clear that, if the United Nations is to develop without charter amendments, we must strike a balance between the extreme positions of loose and strict construction. The idea that the charter is so flexible that it can be changed at will merely by interpretation may be dangerous not only for the member states but also for the United Nations. For obviously a member that supports a broad interpretation on one occasion might find the precedent very much against its interests on another occasion. And a General Assembly that might seek to enlarge unduly the area of its power by narrow voting margins would probably find its influence weakened in a relatively short time.

### **The Future of the U.N.—Some Central Issues**

When the member nations come to reexamine the powers, functions, and structure of the United Nations in connection with the proposed charter review conference, these developments all constitute vital background. Nothing could be more futile than to scrutinize the charter in a political vacuum, in the vain hope that improvements in language alone will somehow transform the behavior, the interests, or the motivation of nations. But it would be equally irresponsible, in my judgment, to assume that no real improvements are possible.

This is a uniquely propitious time to be taking a hard look at international organizations and at the role the United States should play in them. For we appear to be living through one of those electric periods when the whole apparatus of history seems to hesitate, shift gears, and move ahead on a new and different track.

Certainly the program of the Soviet Union has shown startling signs of alteration—if not of policy, then of strategy and tactics. We must not be deluded into a false set of assumptions about its continuing purpose. But the tactical shift of the Soviets should not be minimized. It is a major political development, and it has already had an important impact in the United Nations. Indeed, its effects confront us everywhere with new and challenging problems. Their solution will call for the most imaginative balance between the continuing need for military defenses and the growing possibility that economic, social, and cultural weapons may be decisive factors in an era of competitive coexistence.

We still have some distance to go to prepare ourselves to act effectively in the long pull ahead. Indeed, the comments made at the first meeting of this Society in 1907 by its president, Elihu Root, are still discouragingly timely:

The education of public opinion, which should lead the sovereign people in each country to understand the definite limitations upon national rights and the full scope and responsibility of national duties, has only just begun.

What do we see when we look ahead to the next 10 years? Our world has changed drastically over the last 10; have we reason to believe the process will stop?

My own crystal ball is no better than yours. But it is possible to project ahead some of the fundamental issues with confidence that, whatever else happens to these problems, they will not disappear.

*The Problem of Domestic Jurisdiction.*—The most profound issue involving the United Nations has to do with the scope of its authority in relation to member states. Around this central question revolves the whole galaxy of controversial problems involving supranational powers, domestic jurisdiction, the veto, human rights, the development of world law, and many others. We can see the two extreme poles of this argument—world government at one end, relatively complete national freedom of action at the other. But, like all extremes, these are misleading and impractical.

We can equip ourselves to deal intelligently with this problem only if we clarify our own thinking as to the nature and authority of the United Nations.

There is no more persistently recurrent—and unjustified—criticism of the U.N. than that it threatens the sovereignty of the United States. This is a good illustration of how mischievous a little misinformation can be. The misinformation in this case is that the U.N. allegedly has the power to make treaties automatically binding on the member nations. This, of course, is just not so. The United Nations or its specialized agencies can, if its members wish, freely draft and recommend conventions or treaties. However, none of these can ever be binding on any nation until that nation has given consent through its normal constitutional processes. In our case, this means approval by two-thirds of the United States Senate.

The member states of the U.N. are sovereign. They have agreed to collaborate in certain fields

in their common interest. If they wish to use the U.N. as a forum for reaching international agreement on a variety of matters, there is, of course, nothing in the charter to prevent them from doing so. But there is nothing to prevent those same countries from reaching agreement on the same matters *outside* the U.N. The point is that it is the states which make this decision, *not* the organization; and it is, as it always has been, up to the individual state to enter into a treaty or not.

In considering the matter of jurisdiction and the United Nations we would do well to keep emotions from obscuring the facts.

*Collective Security Under the Charter.*—Another central issue is the matter of collective defense against aggression. There has been abundant evidence that the original premises of universal collective security were unattainable in today's world, in the sense that nations would not commit themselves in advance to fight any aggression, anytime, anywhere. If the great powers were the antagonists, this seemed to be particularly true.

When great-power unanimity proved unrealistic, the United States took the lead in devising alternative methods of developing collective defense under the charter. This took two forms. When it was seen that the Security Council was able to act in the Korean aggression only because of the absence of the Soviets, we sponsored the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, strengthening the Assembly's capacity to respond to similar emergencies. Also, we have played a leading part in organizing regional defense pacts and mutual security arrangements, the possible need for which had already been anticipated by the charter.

Some people have complained that our Government has been suffering from a case of "pactitis." We should all recall, however, that soon after the end of World War II the Soviet Union, which alone of the great powers had not disarmed, began to employ military threats and pressure to expand its influence and territories. The urgency of the formation of collective defense pacts was obvious. Behind these bastions nations have been able to put their political and economic houses in order and develop their own defenses. These pacts, along with the "Uniting for Peace" program, have been the answer to the Soviet Union's abuse of the veto. They have provided free-world security inside the charter but outside the veto.

Today, as the world political situation changes,

the United States and other nations are exploring the possibilities of giving greater effect to the potentialities of NATO, for example, in the nonmilitary field, without losing sight of its primary role as a bulwark against aggression. We must now go on to encourage and support other aspects of cooperation inside and outside the U.N. This leads to a third great issue relating to the U.N.: the technical and economic fields.

*U.N. Social and Economic Activity.*—It is important to remember that the charter did not specifically create any of the specialized agencies or the now flourishing technical assistance program. It merely authorized and approved their establishment. In my mind their growth and vitality constitute one of the most remarkable developments in the last 10 years. They reflect a high degree of successful international cooperation.

The United States has from the beginning given the strongest support to this aspect of the U.N. system. It is clearly in our national interest, and it constitutes a powerful force for peace and international understanding. The Soviet Union, after years of indifference or downright hostility, now seems prepared to play a more active role in this work. If this participation is genuine, it is welcome. This is a field in which we do not hesitate to compete with the Soviet Union.

In carrying on its social and economic programs the U.N. and its specialized agencies must be guided by two cardinal principles. In the first place, in their natural enthusiasm to get results, they should be very careful not to alienate public opinion by invading the domestic jurisdiction of their member states. This engenders adverse criticism and loss of valuable support out of which only harm can come to the organizations and their objectives. There is plenty to do within the limits of their present authority, and it can be done most effectively if the agreed metes and bounds are respected.

In the second place, the U.N. should not attempt to do more than it reasonably can. Progress in the social and economic fields is painfully slow, and there is much to do. Yet I believe that modest programs, well conceived and effectively administered, will take the U.N. further toward its goal than more grandiose programs that exceed the organization's present capabilities. We must recognize that the U.N. will lose ground, and may indeed suffer incalculable damage, if it tries to move too far too fast.

## **Other Basic Issues**

I have dealt with only three of the issues that must be thought through in the years to come. Other problems will persist and other vistas of opportunity will open up. There is, for example, the issue of colonialism, and the possibilities inherent in the U.N. for resolving colonial disputes and establishing nonviolent patterns of change. There is also the important field of pacific settlement and international adjudication.

In this connection I might say just a word about Secretary-General Hammarskjöld's mission to the Middle East. It is, of course, too early to predict the final outcome of his efforts. Up to this point he has made a valuable contribution in easing tensions in the area and avoiding the possible outbreak of war. He may well lay the groundwork for a more lasting peace. His role illustrates once more the fact that there are many resources for peace within the charter—including the techniques of direct and quiet diplomacy—which have not yet been fully tapped.

In evaluating the political work of the United Nations let us remember one hard fact. Many important and difficult international problems are solved outside the organization. But the really tough ones, the well-nigh insoluble ones, come to the United Nations. It is, in a way, the court of last appeal.

## **U.S. Relations With the United Nations**

The United Nations is, as I have emphasized, a voluntary partnership of nations which have subscribed to a set of common purposes and principles. In trying to look into the future of this organization we cannot speak for other nations. We can, however, speak for ourselves.

Last fall 16 new members were admitted to the United Nations. Other qualified states are waiting, and the membership list may soon exceed the 80 mark. It is our view that this trend toward approximate universality will add new vitality and strength to the organization.

There are, of course, a few prophets of gloom who have been predicting that the United States will lose its role of leadership in the United Nations. I have no fear of such a development. In the General Assembly the democratic process has worked remarkably well. The small countries, on nearly all important issues, have rallied to the cause of the free world.



Thus far whatever leadership we have exercised has stemmed largely from the logic of our position and our ability to persuade other nations of the rightness of our cause. We intend to continue to rely on these principles. And if the time should ever come when we are consistently outvoted in the General Assembly, then we had better begin to reexamine our basic policies.

As we move into the second decade let us keep firmly in mind the fundamental principles which underlie our participation in the United Nations.

*First:* We intend to live up to the purposes and principles of the charter. We shall refrain from the use of force, and we shall do our utmost to settle our disputes by peaceful means. If other nations will do the same there can be established that mutual confidence which is the indispensable ingredient of permanent peace.

*Second:* We shall continue to foster and encourage the concept of collective security so that those nations which wish to remain free may stand together in protective unity under the charter against the threat of aggression.

*Third:* We shall earnestly pursue our quest, within the framework of the United Nations, to bring about adequately safeguarded disarmament. This is the most complex and the most urgent of all world problems.

*Fourth:* We shall continue to cooperate with other countries in our mutual efforts to attain the social and economic goals of the charter. To this end our Government can be counted on to continue our strong financial support to the United Nations technical assistance program and the work of the specialized agencies.

May I tarry on this point for just a moment. There are suggestions from a few critics to the effect that the United States should limit its participation in, or even withdraw from, certain of the specialized agencies. One argument is that increasing Soviet and Communist satellite activity in these agencies is a threat to free-world interests. This seems to me to be an additional reason, if any were needed, why we should continue in, and even increase our support for, the specialized agencies.

Actually, if we were to withdraw from enterprises of this kind every time we encountered a serious obstacle or an unpleasant situation, we would perforce be compelled to desert almost every international activity of any consequence in which we participate. And it is extremely difficult for

me to understand how we can wage peace successfully by running away from all the battlefields.

*Fifth:* We shall do what we can to encourage through the United Nations the development of international law. Unfortunately this is a period of history in which certain nations ignore moral principles and break rules of law when it suits their convenience. That is precisely the reason we should put renewed effort into the great search for that consensus of world opinion which will make permanent peace the unwritten law of relations among the nations.

It now seems possible that we have an opportunity to wage the sort of diplomacy we ought to excel at—the diplomacy of peace. Such a peace, if it should persist, will not be a static one. It will have to be maintained in a world of conflicts, of passions, and of change. In the background will still lurk the terrible possibility of nuclear war. The hostility of world communism will be long sustained. The working out of far-reaching transformations in the formerly colonial areas and in economically undeveloped regions will be slow and precarious.

But in the sort of world we are working in and toward—a world of peaceful change—the United Nations can continue to grow and flourish as a patron of peace, striving always to create community out of discord and law out of community.

## **Commodity Agreement With Peru**

Press release 245 dated May 8

U.S. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs and the Foreign Minister of Peru, Adm. Luis Edgardo Llosa, signed an agreement at Lima on May 7 authorizing the sale to Peru, through private U.S. traders, of wheat and/or wheat flour to a total value of \$2,470,000. The agreement also covers ocean freight in the amount of \$310,000. These sales are being made under the authority and provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended.

The agreement provides that payment under the sales program will be made in Peruvian currency. A part of the currency accruing will be earmarked for loans designed to contribute to Peru's economic development with eventual repayment to the United States. The balance of the Peruvian currency will be used to meet U.S. Government expenses in Peru.

## Expanding International Trade

*by Ben H. Thibodeaux*

*Director, Office of International Trade and Resources*<sup>1</sup>

As a member of the Department of State, much of my work has to do with our relations with other governments on problems of international trade. If we and other governments can agree on opening the passages of trade and on the observance of fair rules of good behavior in the conduct of trade, the way is made easier for private enterprise to operate. It would then be up to the American businessman to establish and maintain his markets through the sale of quality goods at competitive prices, with the minimum of Government restrictions. And given these conditions, I do not believe that I will arouse any argument in this group if I express the belief that you can sell your product much better yourself than the Government can do it for you.

Unfortunately, foreign trade restrictions have been all too plentiful, a fact that has made normal business operations extremely difficult. It is true that in many cases these trade restrictions arose from necessity, but that does not make them less painful. We have had the distressing experience, for example, of seeing our former large flow of deciduous fruit to Europe get squeezed down to a trickle by an array of import quotas, foreign exchange controls, and other restrictive devices. Some of these restrictions are purely protectionist. But, for the most part, they were imposed because of the shortage of dollars or, what amounts to the same thing, the shortage of any currency that could be converted to dollars. And when dollars were scarce, foreign governments rationed their use for imports of things such as basic foods, raw materials, and industrial items. In these circumstances, American fruit was regarded by other countries as a luxury that could be dispensed with

until more essential needs from the dollar area had been met.

Time and again in postwar Europe I had the frustrating experience of meeting with former importers of American fruit and foreign officials to try to arrange for freer imports from the United States, only to be told, "Yes, the people in this country want your excellent American fruit, but we have no dollars to pay for it."

The period of dollar shortages has been an extended one. Including the war years, it is now nearly 17 years since the days when Europe was our big fruit market. Things happen in that length of time. People deprived of imports of American fruit began to produce their own, and we now have a situation of greatly expanded production of deciduous fruit in Europe. New trade arrangements were made, and imports from non-dollar sources were expanded. And when these things have happened, they are not easily changed.

The net result of these conditions is increased difficulty for American fruit in the European market. Somewhat comparable conditions have also restricted fruit exports to many countries outside of Europe.

### Major Factors in Fruit Exports

But certainly these difficulties are not insurmountable if we have the will and ability to cope with them. At the risk of overgeneralization, I venture to say that fundamentally the outlook for fruit exports will be conditioned largely upon three major factors:

(a) The ability and willingness of the American producer to compete commercially in the foreign market on the basis of quality of product, price, and service;

(b) Continued economic improvement abroad,

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the California Grape and Tree Fruit League at Yosemite, Calif., on Apr. 7.

accompanied by increased demand for commodities such as fruit and by increased earnings of American dollars that may be used to buy American fruit; and

(c) The reduction of trade barriers.

All three of these conditions take a lot of doing if they are to be realized. They do not just happen.

Your ability and willingness to compete in foreign markets is a matter within your own responsibility and capability, assisted by the technical aids and market information available to you. No further comment is needed from me on the point other than to say that I have complete confidence in the competitive ability of the American fruit producer. When I heard the quality of American fruit praised in the European market, I was proud to be associated with it. I do not believe I am overstating the situation when I say that American prestige abroad was furthered by the excellent quality of the fruit you have exported. It is important that this high reputation be maintained.

Moreover, I should like to venture a suggestion from my experience abroad. Your trade representatives need to maintain constant and close relations with foreign dealers and importers, who in turn should not neglect to press their governments for permission to import American products as promptly as conditions make this possible. I do not believe it is necessary for me to labor this point.

I would like to discuss at more length, however, the other two conditions I have outlined. For, regardless of your ability to compete, your commercial export situation is not improved one bit unless other countries can pay for your fruit and unless they permit it to enter their markets. And this boils down largely to the kind of trade program we have and to our cooperation with other countries in international trade.

### **General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade**

Under our trade agreements program, we have joined with a large number of other countries to work for the expansion of international trade on a commercial basis, with full opportunity for private enterprise to conduct that trade. Our major instrument for achieving this objective is through our participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT).

As you know, our participation in the GATT has been severely criticized in some quarters. It has been described as a sinister plot by the Department of State to sell the country down the river. It has been wrapped in a heavy air of mystery and mysticism.

It is true that the Department of State has responsibility for heading the negotiations under the GATT, as it has for any negotiations with foreign governments. But these negotiations are conducted under the guidance of the President and in teamwork with all of the Government departments and agencies concerned with foreign trade, including notably the Department of Agriculture. As a staff member I should like to claim credit for the Department of State for all the benefits that the United States has derived from the GATT, but I cannot honestly do so.

And there is no mystery about the GATT. It is simply a trade agreement. Instead of being a *bilateral* trade agreement between two countries only, it is *multilateral* and includes 35 countries. These 35 countries account for about 85 percent of world trade. The United States has participated in the GATT since 1948 under the authority vested in the President by the Trade Agreements Act. It is nothing new.

As to the mysticism, there is none. True, the GATT is written in legal language, like your insurance policy or like any contractual document that deals with a complicated subject. But the content and objective of the GATT can be simply stated. The GATT has two major substantive parts: (a) schedules of tariff rates for each country and (b) a set of rules of good behavior in international trade. Its objective is to facilitate the expansion of international trade on a sound basis. I regret in one sense that the GATT has nothing mysterious or romantic about it, for if it did perhaps more people would become interested in learning about it.

Our participation in the GATT has paid off. Tariff levels have been lowered on a reciprocal basis. Tariff rates have been kept more stable than at any time since World War I, a factor that has enabled importers and exporters to plan their operations with more assurance. The GATT has also provided a forum where critical trade disputes have been settled on an amicable basis. And a very important development from the point of view of our fruit industry is the fact that the GATT countries have accepted the obligation to remove

their balance-of-payment restrictions against our exports as improvements occur in their reserves of gold and dollars.

On this point the United States is now collecting dividends. The Western European economy generally has now improved to a point well ahead of where it was before the war. Since 1950 there has been a substantial increase in dollar and gold holdings abroad. Regrettably, a number of countries are still having dollar difficulties. But where improvement has occurred, it has enabled us to press for the removal of balance-of-payment restrictions against imports of American products. And on this I am glad to report that real progress is being made.

In 1953, for example, only 2 of the 13 Western European countries in the GATT had relaxed their restrictions on dollar imports to any extent. Today, as a consequence of their improved foreign-exchange position and in keeping with their obligation to us under the GATT, 11 of these 13 countries have taken measures to reduce their dollar-import restrictions. Of these 11 countries, 8 have completely removed their restrictions on more than half their trade with the United States, with the percentage going up to 87 percent for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg and 99 percent for Greece. Moreover, import licenses for dollar goods are much easier to get, even when restrictions still apply.

As regards American fruit and fruit products, as many of you know, import restrictions have been loosened in such important markets as the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Austria. Some American fruit is now moving into Germany, France, and other countries under premium-paying and other arrangements. On March 16, Norway announced an allocation of foreign exchange for the first importation of United States canned peaches and pineapples in 16 years and for the first importation of United States oranges in the postwar period.

For deciduous fruits, the problem continues difficult. I have already referred to the increased production in Europe. This factor, as might be expected, has undoubtedly played a part in the resistance we encounter to liberalizing trade in these fruits. Indeed, restrictions apply to imports among the European countries as well as from the United States. We have made repeated representations that restrictions be reduced for deciduous fruits along with other commodities,

and we propose to continue to press for freer access to these markets.

### **Fruit Exports to United Kingdom**

I should like to comment briefly on the United Kingdom, formerly your biggest market in Europe. I regret to say that the fruit picture there continues cloudy. Our fruit industry understandably has been looking forward to an early resumption of commercial purchases in that important market. But, to put it simply, the British are strapped for dollars. There was a heartening increase in the British official gold and dollar reserves to about \$3 billion in mid-1954 and hopes for freer dollar imports rose accordingly. But by the end of 1955, these reserves had declined to \$2.1 billion. The seriousness of this figure is emphasized when we recall that the prewar British reserves stood at about \$4.4 billion at a time when sterling was fully convertible and world prices were much lower.

We are gratified that the British are taking strong fiscal and monetary measures to put their house in order instead of adding more import restrictions. Let us wish full success to them in overcoming their difficult economic and financial problems.

In view of British reluctance to spend scarce dollars for fruit, we negotiated another special fruit program for the United Kingdom for the 1955-56 season, to be financed by the International Cooperation Administration. The total program amounted to \$22.3 million. Of this total, fresh deciduous fruit comprised \$3.4 million, canned deciduous \$5 million, dried fruit \$9.1 million, and fresh and processed citrus \$4.8 million. There were delays in the negotiations and in the eventual issuance of licenses by the British, but even so there was substantial improvement over the preceding year. This year we are holding early conversations with the British as to the kind of fruit program that may be developed for the 1956-57 season.

### **Exports to Western Hemisphere**

Let us turn now to the Western Hemisphere. Here the picture is brighter. The dollar earnings and dollar availabilities of some of our neighbors to the north and south have been good. Notable among the group are Canada, Cuba, and Venezuela. None of these three countries has any pay-

ment restrictions on imports from the United States. They are good customers for our fruit, and there is no frustrating waiting around by the fruit importer for a governmental official to decide whether to give him an import permit. And, I am sure you will agree, that is how it should be. It is our hope to make these favorable conditions widespread. We are working toward that end.

Following this brief sketch of conditions abroad, I believe that I am justified in repeating that our participation in the GATT has paid off. Through the GATT, and because of its rules of good trade behavior, we have been able to exert effective pressure on other countries to relax their payment restrictions against American exports as fully as their gold and dollar reserves allowed.

The results have been good, and they are getting better as economic conditions and dollar earnings abroad continue to improve. The progress that is being made is reflected in our exports. For the last quarter of 1955, the value of our exports exclusive of military grant-aid was at an alltime record high. We want to make it possible for American fruit to join fully in this march of trade.

#### **Need for OTC**

The GATT has served us well, but it must be made more effective through better administration. As I have said, the GATT is an agreement. It is not an organization. The important business of the GATT is handled principally at the annual meetings of the member countries. This method of operation may have sufficed in the early postwar period, before world trade had recovered. But with an increasing volume of trade and the concurrent efforts to remove restrictions came the imperative need to deal quickly with urgent trade problems. It became increasingly difficult to defer the settling of these problems until the annual meeting of the GATT countries. It became obvious that a full-time, responsible organization was sorely needed. At the initiative of the United States, therefore, the GATT countries last year negotiated an agreement to establish the Organization for Trade Cooperation (the OTC).<sup>2</sup>

The primary function of the OTC would be to administer the GATT on a good housekeeping basis.

<sup>2</sup>For text of OTC agreement, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 579.

The purpose is to make the operation of the GATT more systematic, more efficient, and hence better able to cope with the problems associated with the tremendous expansion in world trade now taking place. The OTC would also serve as a continuing forum for trade negotiations and consultation and would publish information on trade matters.

If the Congress approves United States membership, it is probable that the OTC will be approved by the other GATT countries and be established. If the Congress disapproves, the OTC cannot come into effect. It must be approved by countries accounting for 85 percent of the foreign trade of the GATT members. The United States, the largest importer and exporter in the world, accounts for more than 20 percent of the trade of the GATT countries. The decision as to United States membership is crucial, therefore, in determining whether there will be an OTC.

The decision by the Congress on the OTC is important to the fruit industry, to all of us in the United States, and to our trading partners abroad. For, as President Eisenhower said in his state of the Union message this year,

“Our membership in the OTC will provide the most effective and expeditious means for removing discriminations and restrictions against American exports and in making our trade agreements truly reciprocal. United States membership in the Organization will evidence our continuing desire to cooperate in promoting an expanded trade among the free nations.”

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **84th Congress, 2d Session**

- Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the Republic of Nicaragua, and a Protocol Relating Thereto. S. Exec. G, March 9, 1956. 17 pp.
- Interim Report on Abandonment of Panama Railroad. Interim report pursuant to H. Res. 118, 84th Cong. II. Rept. 1878, March 13, 1956. 2 pp.
- Continuing the Policy of the United States Concerning Certain International Injustices in the World. Report to accompany H. Res. 370. H. Rept. 1877, March 13, 1956. 4 pp.
- Providing Additional Authorization for the Continued Construction of the Distant Early Warning System (DEW Line). Report to accompany S. 3152. S. Rept. 1660, March 14, 1956. 3 pp.
- International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956. Report to accompany S. 3116. S. Rept. 1664, March 16, 1956. 8 pp.

## Draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO SECRETARY-GENERAL

U.S./U.N. press release 2396 dated April 24

*Following is the text of a letter transmitted on April 24 to the U.N. Secretary-General by James J. Wadsworth, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations.*

I have the honor to transmit four copies of the Draft Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This Draft Statute was unanimously approved at Washington, D. C. on April 18, 1956 by the Delegations comprising the Twelve Nation Negotiating Group.<sup>1</sup> The Negotiating Group considered a previous draft statute circulated on August 22, 1955,<sup>2</sup> in the light of comments received from other countries during the discussion at the Tenth General Assembly of the United Nations and subsequently.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Group at its April 18th session, distribution of the Draft Statute is being made to the Delegations in New York and the diplomatic missions in Washington, D. C. of the Governments Members of the United Nations and of the Specialized Agencies. Copies of the Draft Statute are to be distributed to the press for release at noon on Wednesday, April 25.

You will recall that negotiations on an International Atomic Energy Agency grew out of a proposal made by President Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953.

### TEXT OF DRAFT STATUTE

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<sup>1</sup> For text of communique, see BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 729.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 666.

ARTICLES IV	-Membership
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#### ARTICLE I

##### *Establishment of the Agency*

The Parties hereto establish an International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") upon the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth.

#### ARTICLE II

##### *Objectives*

The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to the peace, health, and prosperity of the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

#### ARTICLE III

##### *Functions*

A. The Agency shall be authorized:

1. to encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; and, if requested to do so, to act as an intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying of materials, equipment, or facilities by one Member of the Agency for another; and to perform any operation or service useful in the practical application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes;

2. to make provision, in accordance with this Statute, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes, in-

cluding the production of electric power, with due consideration for the needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world;

3. to foster the exchange of scientific and technical information on peaceful uses of atomic energy;

4. to encourage the exchange of scientists and experts in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy;

5. to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and, at the request of the parties to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement not otherwise under the Agency's supervision or control, to apply these safeguards to such arrangement;

6. to establish or adopt standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to life and property (including standards for labor conditions), and to provide for the application of these standards to its own operations as well as to the operations making use of materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its control or supervision; and, at the request of parties to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement not otherwise under the Agency's supervision or control, to provide for the application of these standards to operations under the arrangement;

7. to acquire or establish any facilities, plant, and equipment useful in carrying out its authorized functions, whenever such facilities, plant, and equipment otherwise available to it in the area concerned are inadequate or available on terms it deems unsatisfactory.

B. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall:

1. conduct its activities in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded world-wide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies;

2. establish control over the use of special fissionable materials received by the Agency, in order to ensure that these materials are used only for peaceful purposes;

3. allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure efficient utilization and the greatest possible general benefit in all areas of the world, bearing in mind the special needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world;

4. submit reports on its activities to the General Assembly of the United Nations and, when appropriate, to the Security Council: if, in connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and may also take the measures open to it under this Statute, including those provided in paragraph C of Article XII;

5. submit reports to the Economic and Social Council and other organs of the United Nations on matters within the competence of these organs.

C. In carrying out its functions, the Agency shall not make assistance to members subject to any political, eco-

nomie, military, or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of this Statute.

D. Subject to the provisions of this Statute and to the terms of agreements concluded between a State or group of States and the Agency, the activities of the Agency shall be carried out with due observance of the sovereign rights of States.

#### ARTICLE IV

##### *Membership*

A. The initial Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency shall be those States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies which shall have signed this Statute within ninety days after it is opened for signature and shall have deposited an instrument of ratification.

B. Other members of the Agency shall be those States, whether or not Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, which deposit an instrument of acceptance of this Statute after their membership has been approved by the General Conference upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors. In recommending and approving a State for membership, the Board of Governors and the General Conference shall determine that the State is able and willing to carry out the obligations of membership in the Agency, giving due consideration to its ability and willingness to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

C. The Agency is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members, and all Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this Statute.

#### ARTICLE V

##### *General Conference*

A. A General Conference consisting of representatives of all Members shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as may be convened by the Director General at the request of the Board of Governors or of a majority of Members.

B. At such sessions, each Member shall be represented by one delegate who may be accompanied by alternates and by advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegation shall be borne by the Member concerned.

C. The General Conference shall elect a President and such other officers as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office for the duration of the session. The General Conference, subject to the provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each Member shall have one vote and, except as otherwise provided in this Statute, decisions shall be adopted by a majority of those present and voting. A majority of Members shall constitute a quorum.

D. The functions of the General Conference shall be:

1. to elect Members of the Board of Governors in accordance with Article VI;

2. to admit new Members in accordance with Article IV;

3. to suspend a Member from the privileges and rights of membership in accordance with Article XIX;

4. to consider the annual report of the Board;

5. in accordance with Article XIV, to approve the budget of the Agency recommended by the Board or return it with recommendations as to its entirety or parts to the Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;

6. to approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required by the relationship agreement between the Agency and the United Nations, except with respect to the reports referred to in paragraph C of Article XII, or return them to the Board with its recommendations;

7. to approve any agreement or agreements between the Agency and the United Nations and other organizations as provided in Article XVI or return such agreements with its recommendations to the Board, for resubmission to the General Conference;

8. to approve rules and limitations regarding the exercise of borrowing powers by the Board, in accordance with paragraph G of Article XIV;

9. to approve amendments to this Statute in accordance with paragraph B of Article XVIII.

E. The General Conference shall have the authority:

1. to make recommendations to the Board of Governors on any matter relating to the functions of the Agency;

2. to make recommendations to the Board on any matter brought to the attention of the General Conference by the Board;

3. to propose matters for consideration by the Board and request from the Board reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Agency.

#### ARTICLE VI

##### *Board of Governors*

A. The Board of Governors shall be composed as follows:

1. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the First Board, the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for membership on the Board the five Members most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials and the Member most advanced in the technology of atomic energy including the production of source materials in each of the following areas not represented by the aforesaid five:

- (1) North America
- (2) Latin America
- (3) Western Europe
- (4) Eastern Europe
- (5) Africa and the Middle East
- (6) South Asia
- (7) Southeast Asia and the Pacific
- (8) Far East.

2. The outgoing Board of Governors (or in the case of the First Board, the Preparatory Commission referred to in Annex I) shall designate for membership on the Board two Members from among the following other producers of source materials: Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Portugal; and shall also designate for membership on the Board one other Member as a supplier of

technical assistance. No Member in this category in any one year will be eligible for redesignation in the same category for the following year.

3. The General Conference shall elect ten Members to membership on the Board of Governors, with due regard to equitable representation on the Board as a whole of the Members in the areas listed in subparagraph A-1 of this Article, so that the Board shall at all times include in this category a representative of each of those areas except North America. Except for the five Members chosen for a term of one year in accordance with paragraph D of this Article, no Member in this category in any one term of office will be eligible for re-election in the same category for the following term of office.

B. The designations provided for in subparagraphs A-1 and A-2 of this Article shall take place not less than sixty days before each regular annual session of the General Conference. The elections provided for in subparagraph A-3 of this Article shall take place at regular annual sessions of the General Conference.

C. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance with subparagraphs A-1 and A-2 of this Article shall hold office from the end of the next regular annual session of the General Conference after their designation until the end of the following regular annual session of the General Conference.

D. Members represented on the Board of Governors in accordance with subparagraph A-3 of this Article shall hold office from the end of the regular annual session of the General Conference at which they are elected until the end of the second regular annual session of the General Conference thereafter. In the first election following that of the First Board, however, five shall be chosen for a term of one year.

E. Each Member of the Board of Governors shall have one vote and decisions shall be made by a majority of those present and voting, except as otherwise provided in this Statute. Two-thirds of all Members of the Board shall constitute a quorum.

F. The Board of Governors shall have authority to carry out the functions of the Agency in accordance with this Statute, subject to its responsibilities to the General Conference as provided in this Statute.

G. The Board of Governors shall meet at such times as it may determine. The meetings shall take place at the headquarters of the Agency unless otherwise determined by the Board.

H. The Board of Governors shall elect a Chairman and other officers from among its Members and, subject to the provisions of this Statute, shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

I. The Board of Governors may establish such committees as it deems advisable. The Board may appoint persons to represent it in its relations with other organizations.

J. The Board of Governors shall prepare an annual report to the General Conference concerning the affairs of the Agency and any projects approved by the Agency. The Board shall also prepare for submission to the General Conference such reports as the Agency is or may be required to make to the United Nations or to any other organization the work of which is related to that of the



Agency. These reports, along with the annual report, shall be submitted to Members of the Agency at least one month before the regular annual session of the General Conference.

#### ARTICLE VII

##### *Staff*

A. The staff of the Agency shall be headed by a Director General, who shall be appointed by the Board of Governors for a term of four years. The Director General shall be the chief administrative officer of the Agency.

B. The Director General shall be responsible for the appointment, organization, and functioning of the staff and shall be under the authority of and subject to the control of the Board of Governors. He shall perform his duties in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board.

C. The staff shall include such qualified scientific and technical and other personnel as may be required to fulfill the objectives and functions of the Agency. The Agency shall be guided by the principle that its permanent staff shall be kept to a minimum.

D. The paramount consideration in the recruitment and employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be to secure employees of the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence, and integrity. Subject to this consideration, due regard shall be paid to the contributions of Members to the Agency and to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

E. The terms and conditions on which the staff shall be appointed, remunerated, and dismissed shall be in accordance with regulations made by the Board of Governors, subject to the provisions of this Statute and to general rules approved by the General Conference on the recommendation of the Board.

F. In the performance of their duties, the Director General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any source external to the Agency. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as officials of the Agency. Each Member undertakes to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Director General and the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.

G. In this Article the term "staff" includes guards.

#### ARTICLE VIII

##### *Exchange of Information*

A. Each Member should make available such information as would, in the judgment of the Member, be helpful to the Agency.

B. Each Member shall make available to the Agency all scientific information developed as a result of assistance extended by the Agency pursuant to Article XI.

C. The Agency shall assemble and make available in an accessible form the information made available to it under paragraphs A and B of this Article. It shall take positive steps to encourage the exchange among its Members of information relating to the nature and peaceful uses of atomic energy and shall serve as an intermediary among its Members for this purpose.

#### ARTICLE IX

##### *Supplying of Materials*

A. Members may make available to the Agency such quantities of special fissionable materials as they deem advisable and on such terms as shall be agreed with the Agency. The materials made available to the Agency may, at the discretion of the Member making them available, be stored either by the Member concerned or, with the agreement of the Agency, in the Agency's depots.

B. Members may also make available to the Agency source materials as defined in Article XX and other materials. The Board of Governors shall determine the quantities of such materials which the Agency will accept under agreements provided for in Article XIII.

C. Each Member shall notify the Agency of the quantities, form, and composition of special fissionable materials, source materials, and other materials which that Member is prepared, in conformity with its laws, to make available immediately or during a period specified by the Board of Governors.

D. On request of the Agency a Member shall, from the materials which it has made available, without delay deliver to another Member or group of Members such quantities of such materials as the Agency may specify, and shall without delay deliver to the Agency itself such quantities of such materials as are really necessary for operations and scientific research in the facilities of the Agency.

E. The quantities, form and composition of materials made available by any Member may be changed at any time by the Member with the approval of the Board of Governors.

F. An initial notification in accordance with paragraph C of this Article shall be made within three months of the entry into force of this Statute with respect to the Member concerned. In the absence of a contrary decision of the Board of Governors, the materials initially made available shall be for the period of the calendar year succeeding the year when this Statute takes effect with respect to the Member concerned. Subsequent notifications shall likewise, in the absence of a contrary action by the Board, relate to the period of the calendar year following the notification and shall be made no later than the first day of November of each year.

G. The Agency shall specify the place and method of delivery and, where appropriate, the form and composition, of materials which it has requested a Member to deliver from the amounts which that Member has notified the Agency it is prepared to make available. The Agency shall also verify the quantities of materials delivered and shall report those quantities periodically to the Members.

H. The Agency shall be responsible for storing and protecting materials in its possession. The Agency shall ensure that these materials shall be safeguarded against (1) hazards of the weather, (2) unauthorized removal or diversion, (3) damage or destruction, including sabotage, and (4) forcible seizure. In storing special fissionable materials in its possession, the Agency shall ensure the geographical distribution of these materials in such a way as not to allow concentration of large amounts of such materials in any one country or region of the world.

I. The Agency shall as soon as practicable establish or acquire such of the following as may be necessary:

1. plant, equipment, and facilities for the receipt, storage, and issue of materials;
2. physical safeguards;
3. adequate health and safety measures;
4. control laboratories for the analysis and verification of materials received;
5. housing and administrative facilities for any staff required for the foregoing.

J. The materials made available pursuant to this Article shall be used as determined by the Board of Governors in accordance with the provisions of this Statute. No Member shall have the right to require that the materials it makes available to the Agency be kept separately by the Agency or to designate the specific project in which they must be used.

#### ARTICLE X

##### *Services, Equipment, and Facilities*

Members may make available to the Agency services, equipment, and facilities which may be of assistance in fulfilling the Agency's objectives and functions.

#### ARTICLE XI

##### *Agency Projects*

A. Any Member or group of Members of the Agency desiring to set up any project for research on, or development or practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes may request the assistance of the Agency in securing special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, and facilities necessary for this purpose.

B. Any such request shall be accompanied by an explanation of the purpose and extent of the project and shall be considered by the Board of Governors.

C. The Agency may arrange for the supplying of any materials, services, equipment, and facilities necessary for the project by one or more Members or may itself undertake to provide any or all of these directly.

D. For the purpose of considering the request, the Agency may send into the territory of the Member or group of Members making the request a person or persons qualified to examine the project. For this purpose the Agency may, with the approval of the Member or group of Members making the request, use members of its own staff or employ suitably qualified nationals of any Member.

E. Before approving a project under this Article, the Board of Governors shall give due consideration to:

1. the usefulness of the project, including its scientific and technical feasibility;
2. the adequacy of plans, funds, and technical personnel to assure the effective execution of the project;
3. the adequacy of proposed health and safety standards for handling and storing materials and for operating facilities;
4. the inability of the Member or group of Members making the request to secure the necessary finances, materials, facilities, equipment, and services;
5. the equitable distribution of materials and other resources available to the Agency; and

6. such other matters as may be relevant.

F. Upon approving a project, the Agency shall enter into an agreement with the Member or group of Members submitting the project, which agreement shall:

1. provide for allocation to the project of any required special fissionable or other materials;
2. provide for transfer of special fissionable materials from their then place of custody, whether the materials be in the custody of the Agency or of the Member making them available for use in Agency projects, to the Member or group of Members submitting the project, under conditions which ensure the safety of any shipment required and meet applicable health and safety standards;
3. set forth the terms and conditions, including charges, on which any materials, services, equipment, and facilities are to be provided by the Agency itself, and, if any such materials, services, equipment, and facilities are to be provided by a Member, the terms and conditions as arranged for by the Member or group of Members submitting the project and the supplying Member;
4. include undertakings by the Member or group of Members submitting the project (a) that the assistance provided shall not be used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and (b) that the project shall be subject to the safeguards provided for in Article XII, the relevant safeguards being specified in the agreement;
5. make appropriate provision regarding the rights and interests of the Agency and the Member or Members concerned in any inventions or discoveries, or any patents therein, arising from the project;
6. include such other provisions as may be appropriate.

G. The provisions of this Article shall also apply where appropriate to a request for materials, services, facilities, or equipment in connection with an existing project.

#### ARTICLE XII

##### *Agency Safeguards*

A. With respect to any Agency project or other arrangement where the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the Agency shall have the following rights and responsibilities to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement:

1. to approve the design of any specialized equipment and facilities, including nuclear reactors;
2. to require the observance of any health and safety measures prescribed by the Agency;
3. to require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials;
4. to call for and receive progress reports;
5. to approve the means to be used for chemical processing of irradiated materials and to specify disposition of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product, and to require that such special fissionable materials be deposited with the Agency except for quantities authorized by the Agency to be retained for specified non-military use under continuing Agency safeguards;
6. to send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, designated by the Agency after

consultation with the State or States concerned, who shall have access at all times to all places, persons, and data necessary to account for source and special fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose referred to in subparagraph F-4 of Article XI, with the health and safety measures referred to in subparagraph A-2 of this Article, and with any other conditions prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned;

7. in the event of non-compliance and failure by the recipient State or States to take requested corrective steps within a reasonable time, to suspend or terminate assistance and withdraw any materials and equipment made available by the Agency or a Member in furtherance of the project.

B. The Agency shall, as necessary, establish a staff of inspectors. The staff of inspectors shall have the responsibility of examining all operations conducted by the Agency itself to determine whether the Agency is complying with the health and safety measures prescribed by it for application to projects subject to its approval, supervision or control, and whether the Agency is taking adequate measures to prevent the source and special fissionable materials in its custody or used or produced in its own operations from being used in furtherance of any military purpose. The Agency shall take remedial action forthwith to correct any non-compliance or failure to take adequate measures.

C. The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in subparagraph A-6 of this Article and of determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in subparagraph F-4 of Article XI, with the measures referred to in subparagraph A-2 of this Article, and with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the State or States concerned. The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all Members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the event of failure of the recipient State or States to take fully corrective action within a reasonable time, the Board may take one or both of the following measures: direct curtailment or suspension of assistance being provided by the Agency or by a Member, and call for the return of materials and equipment made available to the recipient Member or group of Members. The Agency may also, in accordance with Article XIX, suspend any non-complying Member from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership.

#### ARTICLE XIII

##### *Reimbursement of Members*

Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of Governors and the Member furnishing to the Agency materials, services, equipment, or facilities, the Board shall

enter into an agreement with such Member providing for reimbursement for the items furnished.

#### ARTICLE XIV

##### *Finance*

A. The Board of Governors shall submit to the General Conference the annual budget estimates for the expenses of the Agency. To facilitate the work of the Board in this regard, the Director General shall initially prepare the budget estimates. If the General Conference does not approve the estimates, it shall return them together with its recommendations to the Board. The Board shall then submit further estimates to the General Conference for its approval.

B. Expenditures of the Agency shall be classified under the following categories:

1. administrative expenses: these shall include

(a) costs of the staff of the Agency other than the staff employed in connection with materials, services, equipment, and facilities referred to in subparagraph B-2 below; costs of meetings; and expenditures required for the preparation of Agency projects and for the distribution of information;

(b) costs of implementing the safeguards referred to in Article XII in relation to Agency projects or, under subparagraph A-5 of Article III, in relation to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, together with the costs of handling and storage of special fissionable material by the Agency other than the storage and handling charges referred to in paragraph E below;

2. expenses, other than those included in subparagraph 1 of this paragraph, in connection with any materials, facilities, plant, and equipment acquired or established by the Agency in carrying out its authorized functions, and the costs of materials, services, equipment, and facilities provided by it under agreements with one or more Members.

C. In fixing the expenditures under subparagraph B-1 (b) above, the Board of Governors shall deduct such amounts as are recoverable under agreements regarding the application of safeguards between the Agency and parties to bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

D. The Board of Governors shall apportion the expenses referred to in subparagraph B-1 above, among Members in accordance with a scale to be fixed by the General Conference.

E. The Board of Governors shall establish periodically a scale of charges, including reasonable uniform storage and handling charges, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities furnished to Members by the Agency. The scale shall be designed to produce revenues for the Agency adequate to meet the expenses and costs referred to in subparagraph B-2 above. The proceeds of such charges shall be placed in a separate fund which shall be used to pay Members for any materials, services, equipment, or facilities furnished by them and to meet other expenses referred to in subparagraph B-2 above which may be incurred by the Agency itself.

F. Any excess of revenues referred to in paragraph E over the expenses and costs there referred to, and any voluntary contributions to the Agency, shall be placed

in a general fund which may be used as the Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, may determine.

G. Subject to rules and limitations approved by the General Conference, the Board of Governors shall have the authority to exercise borrowing powers on behalf of the Agency.

H. Decisions of the General Conference on financial questions and of the Board of Governors on the amount of the Agency's budget shall require a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

#### ARTICLE XV

##### *Privileges and Immunities*

A. The Agency shall enjoy in the territory of each Member such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.

B. Delegates of Members together with their alternates and advisers, Governors appointed to the Board together with their alternates and advisers, and the Director General and the staff of the Agency, shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Agency.

C. The legal capacity, privileges, and immunities referred to in this Article shall be defined in a separate agreement between the Agency, represented for this purpose by the Director General acting under instructions of the Board of Governors, and the Members.

#### ARTICLE XVI

##### *Relationship with other Organizations*

A. The Board of Governors, with the approval of the General Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements establishing an appropriate relationship between the Agency and the United Nations and any other organizations the work of which is related to that of the Agency.

B. The agreement or agreements establishing the relationship of the Agency and the United Nations shall provide for:

1. submission by the Agency of reports as provided for in subparagraphs B-4 and B-5 of Article III;

2. consideration by the Agency of resolutions relating to it adopted by the General Assembly or any of the Councils of the United Nations and the submission of reports, when requested, to the appropriate organ of the United Nations on the action taken by the Agency or by its Members in accordance with this Statute as a result of such consideration.

#### ARTICLE XVII

##### *Settlement of Disputes*

A. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this Statute which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.

B. The Board of Governors is empowered, subject to

authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the Agency's activities.

#### ARTICLE XVIII

##### *Amendments and Withdrawals*

A. Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any Member. Certified copies of the text of any amendment proposed shall be prepared by the Director General and communicated by him to all Members.

B. Amendments shall come into force for all Members when (i) approved by the Board of Governors, (ii) approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting, and (iii) accepted by two-thirds of all the Members in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. Acceptance by a Member shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of acceptance with the depositary Government.

C. At any time after five years from the date when this Statute shall initially take effect in accordance with paragraph B of Article XXI or whenever a Member is unwilling to accept an amendment to this Statute, it may withdraw from the Agency by notice in writing to that effect given to the depositary Government, which shall promptly inform the Board of Governors and all Members.

D. Withdrawal by a Member from the Agency shall not affect its contractual obligations entered into pursuant to Article XI or its budgetary obligations for the year in which it withdraws.

#### ARTICLE XIX

##### *Suspension of Privileges*

A. A Member of the Agency which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Agency shall have no vote in the Agency if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two years. The General Conference may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

B. A Member which has persistently violated the provisions of this Statute or of any agreement entered into by it may be suspended from the exercise of the privileges and rights of membership by the General Conference acting by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors.

#### ARTICLE XX

##### *Definitions*

As used in this Statute:

1. The term "special fissionable material" means plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing; and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; but the term "special fissionable material" does not include source material.

2. The term "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235

or 233" means uranium containing the isotopes 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to the isotope 238 is greater than the ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature.

3. The term "source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine; and such other material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine.

## ARTICLE XXI

*Signature, Acceptance, and Entry into Force*

A. This Statute shall be open for signature on \_\_\_\_\_, 1956, by all States Members of the United Nations or any of the specialized agencies and shall remain open for signature by those States for a period of ninety days.

B. The signatory States shall become parties to this Statute by deposit of an instrument of ratification.

C. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and instruments of acceptance by States whose membership has been approved under paragraph B of Article IV of this Statute shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as depositary Government.

D. Ratification or acceptance of this Statute shall be effected by States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

E. This Statute shall come into force when eighteen States have deposited instruments of ratification in accordance with paragraph B of this Article, provided that such eighteen States shall include at least three of the following States: Canada, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America. Instruments of ratification and instruments of acceptance deposited thereafter shall take effect on the date of their receipt.

F. The depositary Government shall promptly inform all States signatory to this Statute of the date of each deposit of ratification and the date of entry into force of the Statute. The depositary Government shall promptly inform all signatories and Members of the dates on which States subsequently become parties thereto.

## ARTICLE XXII

*Registration with the United Nations*

A. This Statute shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

B. Agreements between the Agency and any Member or Members, and agreements between Members subject to approval of the Agency, shall be registered with the Agency. Such agreements shall be registered with the United Nations if registration is required under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

*Authentic Texts and Certified Copies*

This Statute, done in the \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ languages, each being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary Government. Duly certified copies of this Statute shall be transmitted by the depositary Government to the Governments of the other signatory States and to the Governments of States admitted to membership under paragraph B of Article IV.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Statute.

Done at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, one thousand nine hundred fifty-six.

## ANNEX I

*Preparatory Commission*

A. A Preparatory Commission shall come into existence on the first day this Statute is open for signature. It shall be composed of one representative each of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America, and one representative each of six other States to be chosen by the International Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Preparatory Commission shall remain in existence until this Statute comes into force and thereafter until the General Conference has convened and a Board of Governors has been selected in accordance with Article VI.

B. The Preparatory Commission shall

1. make arrangements for the first session of the General Conference; and

2. make designations for membership on the First Board of Governors in accordance with subparagraphs A-1 and A-2 and paragraph B of Article VI.

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## Launching the U.N. Study of Effects of Atomic Radiation

### FIRST MEETING OF SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION, MARCH 14-23

*by Shields Warren*

The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation held its first meeting at United Nations Headquarters from March 14 to March 23, 1956. The nations represented were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The following United Nations organizations were also represented: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labor Organization (ILO), U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

The work of the committee was scientific in nature. It conducted most of its work in closed sessions, organized as working parties. In detailed, technical discussions, the committee surveyed the scientific problems involved in carrying out the mandate of the General Assembly to examine the effects of radiation on man and his environment.<sup>1</sup> It asked the U.N. Secretariat to collect from members of the United Nations and specialized agencies by August 1, 1956, preliminary measurements of natural radiation back-

ground and of environmental contamination caused by manmade radioactivity. Information will also be assembled in other scientific fields for evaluation by the committee at its next meeting in October 1956.

Working groups of the committee discussed seven topics: genetics, the effects of irradiation by internally absorbed isotopes, the effects of external radiation, natural radiation background, exposure during medical procedures, occupational exposure, and environmental contamination. The committee requested information more rapidly on natural radiation and environmental contamination for two reasons:

*First*, these physical measurements are fundamental to scientific evaluation in other fields. For example, the genetic effects of radiation cannot be evaluated without a knowledge of the amount of natural radiation to which humans, animals, and plants throughout the world are exposed day after day throughout their lives. Occupational exposure and exposure during medical procedures also must be evaluated in terms of how much they increase this "normal" amount of radiation exposure.

*Second*, the committee felt that more immediately usable information was available on the results of these physical measurements than exists in certain other areas of knowledge under consideration.

In the field of genetic effects, for example, the committee members pointed out during discus-

<sup>1</sup> For text of the resolution adopted by the 10th General Assembly on Dec. 3, 1955, see BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 855.

• *Dr. Warren, scientific director of the Cancer Research Institute of the New England Deaconess Hospital, Boston, represents the United States on the U.N. Scientific Committee.*

sions that sufficient knowledge or information on which to base definite conclusions is not available. Before making specific recommendations for research projects, the committee will collect information on natural mutation rates, changes in mutation rates after different radiation dosages, and spontaneous (natural) detrimental mutations and their effects. (A mutation is a change produced in succeeding generations by a change in the structure of the genes, the hereditary factor in reproduction; a spontaneous mutation is a gene change that occurs without any definitely known cause.) Specific information on local geographic, geophysical, or demographic conditions will also be requested by the committee from member nations. These data will be studied to see if any correlation in biological changes can be obtained from areas with different levels of natural radiation background.

Information which the committee plans to collect on the effects of irradiation of the human body from internally absorbed isotopes and the effects of external radiation may come from different sources. Among these are patients who have been treated with radiation or have undergone repeated radiological examinations; workers who have been exposed to these hazards in their occupation; and cases of possible exposure to radiation from tests of nuclear weapons. Physiological and pathological changes resulted from overexposure to radiation in the initial work with radiation. Such effects as leukemia, malignancies, changes in the blood and bone marrow, and biochemical changes have been found. It should be pointed out, however, that cases of extreme exposure and extreme effects are quite rare today, and one of the aims of the committee is to collect data on relatively low exposures. These exposures usually result in physiological changes which the body can repair, as opposed to pathological changes such as cancer.

The committee considered that fundamental biological research should be encouraged, including methods of detecting biological effects of low-intensity irradiation and the study of chemical methods capable of altering the biological action of irradiation.

This need for indicators of the biological effects of small doses of radiation has also been pointed out by the committee in its recommendations for research in the field of natural radiation. In addition to obtaining data on measurements of

natural radioactivity and its distribution over the world, the committee is seeking uniform methods for estimating the amount of radiation received by certain parts of the human body from natural radioactive materials in it. Methods of estimating the biological effect of small doses are considered so essential that the committee has requested its members to submit preliminary reports on them by August 1, 1956.

The committee decided to establish a means of prompt collection and examination of information on any accidental overexposure of human beings, and it is seeking information on the amount of radiation exposure that occurs during medical procedures such as diagnostic radiological examinations.

For all individuals whose occupation exposes them to ionizing radiations, the committee has recommended the maintenance of continuing personal files that would include information from periodic medical examinations.

In addition to measurements of radioactive fallout over the surface of the globe, the committee has asked for information on the amount, distribution, and composition of radioactivity that still remains in the upper atmosphere. Part of this activity falls on the earth each year and is thus a continuing source of possible increases in radiation levels. However, data available to the committee at this time from India, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States indicate that fallout to date is only a fraction of the natural background.

While calling for information almost immediately in several of these scientific areas, the committee recognized that standard procedures of measurement have not been formulated and accepted internationally. It has therefore decided to distribute information on known procedures of measurement as quickly as possible. At the same time, the committee will study and compare these procedures prior to its next meeting with the hope that internationally acceptable standards can be achieved as quickly as possible.

At its first session, the committee also took note of statements by representatives of the World Health Organization, the U. N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization on ways in which these specialized agencies might cooperate with the committee in its work.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Inter-American Indian Institute

The Department of State announced on May 2 (press release 235) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the meeting of the Governing Board of the Inter-American Indian Institute, which convenes at Mexico City on May 3, 1956, by Isabel T. Kelly, who was designated alternate U.S. representative on the Governing Board of the Institute on April 26, 1956. Alexander G. Jacome, the U.S. representative on the Governing Board of the Inter-American Indian Institute, will be unable to attend the forthcoming meeting.

The Inter-American Indian Institute, which has its headquarters at Mexico City, is a specialized organization of the Organization of American States. Formally established in 1941, the Institute has 15 member governments. They are Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, and the United States. Functions of the Institute are to conduct scientific investigations on all phases of Indian life in the Americas and to develop information of use to the member governments in connection with policies related to their Indian populations. In addition to its other functions, the Institute acts as the permanent committee of the Inter-American Indian Conference.

### World Health Assembly

The Department of State announced on May 4 (press release 242) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the 9th World Health Assembly convening at Geneva, Switzerland, on May 8:

#### *Delegates*

- Dr. Leonard A. Scheele, *Chairman*, Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare  
Dr. Charles Mayo, Professor of Surgery, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minn.  
Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

#### *Alternate Delegates*

- Howard B. Calderwood, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Dr. Lowell T. Coggeshall, Special Assistant for Health and Medical Affairs, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Dr. H. van Zile Hyde, Chief, Division of International Health, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

#### *Advisors*

Col. Theodore C. Bedwell, Jr., USAF, Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Air Force

Dr. Daniel Bergsma, State Commissioner of Health, Trenton, N.J.

Wendell B. Coote, Office of International Administration, Department of State

Dr. John J. Hanlon, Chief, Public Health Division, International Cooperation Administration

Lucille P. Leone, Chief Nurse, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Dr. James R. Reuling, American Medical Association, Bay Side, N.Y.

Kenneth S. Watson, Sanitary Engineer, General Electric Company, Schenectady, N.Y.

#### *Secretary of Delegation*

Henry F. Nichol, U.S. Resident Delegation for International Organizations, Geneva, Switzerland

#### *Staff*

William F. Marshall, *Documents Officer*, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

G. Lucille Batchelder, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Velma Heine, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Josephine Hirschinger, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Beatrice Kinn, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

The World Health Assembly is the supreme authority of the World Health Organization (WHO), a specialized agency of the United Nations. At the present time, the governments of 81 countries are members of the WHO, while the governments of 4 countries are associate members. The Assembly meets in regular annual session and determines the policies of the Organization.

Besides reviewing the work of the WHO during 1955, the participants in the 9th World Health Assembly will review the program and budget of WHO for 1957; review reports on the business conducted by the Executive Board at its 16th and 17th sessions; and determine the scale of assessments for 1957. Other items to be considered include WHO's participation in the expanded program of technical assistance; peaceful uses of atomic energy; international quarantine; malaria eradication; WHO's relations with the United Na-



tions Children's Fund (UNICEF); and a review of decisions of the United Nations and of other specialized agencies on matters affecting the activities of WHO.

The work of the Organization embraces international programs on a wide variety of public health questions: the control and eradication of communicable diseases; measures for the improvement of maternal and child health; dental health and occupational health; the provision of advice and assistance to national governments in developing and encouraging the application of higher standards in respect to such activities as nursing, public health administration, and professional education and training. In addition, the WHO undertakes or participates in technical health work of international significance through establishing biological standards, determining the addiction-producing properties of drugs, exchanging scientific information, preparing international sanitary regulations, revising the international list of diseases and causes of death, and collecting and disseminating epidemiological information. Through its field programs, the WHO also assists governments in the control of various diseases.

The 8th World Health Assembly was held at México, D. F., May 10-27, 1955.

#### **International Cotton Advisory Committee**

The Department of State announced on May 7 (press release 243) that 79 countries and 10 international organizations have been invited to send delegates or observers to the 15th plenary meeting of the International Cotton Advisory Committee, which is to be held at Washington, beginning on May 8, 1956, under the auspices of the U.S. Government.

The U.S. Government will be represented at the meeting by the following delegation:

##### *Delegates*

Marvin L. McLain, *Chairman*, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

F. Marion Rhodes, *Vice Chairman*, Director, Cotton Division, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Edwin Dean White, *Chairman of Standing Committee*, I.C.A.C., Associate Director, Office of Food and Agriculture, International Cooperation Administration

##### *Alternate Delegate*

Stanley Nehmer, Office of International Trade and Resources, Department of State

##### *Government Advisers*

George A. Sallee, *Secretary of Delegation*, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce

Robert C. Sherman, Director, Cotton Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

A. Henry Thurston, Director, Textiles and Clothing Division, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce

##### *Industry Advisers*

William Rhea Blake, Executive Vice President, National Cotton Council of America, Memphis, Tenn.

Read P. Dunn, Jr., Director, Foreign Trade Division, National Cotton Council of America, Washington, D. C.

Robert C. Jackson, Executive Vice President, American Cotton Manufacturers' Institute, Washington, D. C.

Walter L. Randolph, Vice President, American Farm Bureau Federation, Montgomery, Ala.

Jack Stoneham, American Cotton Shippers Association, Dallas, Tex.

The purpose of the meeting will be to make a thorough review of the factors currently affecting the consumption, production, and international trade in cotton and to study any measures that may be suggested for the purpose of encouraging international collaboration in the improvement of the world cotton situation.

Of the 79 invited countries, 32 and the United States are members of the International Cotton Advisory Committee. That Committee was established in 1939 to provide a mechanism for observing and keeping in close touch with developments in the world cotton situation and for suggesting, as and when advisable, measures for international action in respect of cotton.

Membership in the Committee is open to any member of the United Nations or of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations having a substantial interest in cotton. The present members, each of whom is entitled to be represented at the forthcoming meeting by delegates, are:

Argentina	Greece	Spain
Australia	Guatemala	Sudan
Austria	India	Sweden
Belgium	Italy	Switzerland
Brazil	Japan	Syria
Canada	Republic of Korea	Turkey
Columbia	Mexico	United Kingdom
Denmark	Netherlands	United States
Egypt	Nicaragua	
Finland	Norway	
France	Pakistan	
Federal Republic of Germany	Peru	
	Portugal	

The countries and international organizations which are not members of the Committee but which have been invited to send observers to the forthcoming meeting are:

Afghanistan	Laos
Bolivia	Lebanon
Burma	Liberia
Cambodia	Libya
Ceylon	Luxembourg
Chile	Nepal
China	New Zealand
Costa Rica	Panama
Cuba	Paraguay
Czechoslovakia	Philippine Republic
Dominican Republic	Poland
Ecuador	Rumania
El Salvador	Saudi Arabia
Ethiopia	Thailand
Haiti	Tunisia
Honduras	Union of South Africa
Hungary	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Iceland	Uruguay
Indonesia	Venezuela
Iran	Viet-Nam
Iraq	Yemen
Ireland	Yugoslavia
Israel	
Jordan	

U.N. Commission on International Commodity Trade  
 Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States  
 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  
 Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements  
 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
 International Monetary Fund  
 Organization for European Economic Cooperation  
 Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
 International Federation of Agricultural Producers  
 International Federation of Cotton and Allied Textile Industries

### **ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee**

The Department of State announced on May 10 (press release 250) that the United States will be represented by the following delegation at the fifth session of the Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee of the International Labor Organization at Geneva, Switzerland, May 14-26:

*Representing the Government of the United States*  
 Arnold E. Chase, Chief, Construction Statistics Division,  
 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor

Frank J. Meistrell, Deputy Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency  
 George Tobias, *Adviser*, Attaché, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

#### *Representing the Employers of the United States*

Robert T. Morrill, President, National Association of Plumbing Contractors  
 Lester C. Rogers, President, Bates and Rogers Construction Corporation, Chicago, Ill.

#### *Representing the Workers of the United States*

O. William Blaier, Vice President, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America  
 Howard McSpedon, President, New York City Building and Construction Trades Council

The Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee is one of eight industrial committees that have been established by the ILO since 1945 to deal with problems of international significance in several industries. The other committees are concerned with coal mines, inland transport, iron and steel, metal trades, textiles, petroleum, and chemical industries. In addition to making a review of recent events and developments in the construction industry, the committee will consider two special topics: safety in the construction industry, and national housing programs and full employment.

## **TREATY INFORMATION**

### **Current Actions**

#### **MULTILATERAL**

##### **Automotive Traffic**

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratified by the President:* May 4, 1956.  
 Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratified by the President:* May 4, 1956.

##### **Aviation**

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.  
*Adherence deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, May 9, 1956.  
 International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

*Acceptance deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, May 9, 1956.

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratified by the President:* May 4, 1956.

### Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Ratification deposited:* Liberia, April 27, 1956.

Protocol 1 concerning application of the convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Ratification deposited:* Liberia, April 27, 1956.

Protocol 2 concerning application of the convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

*Ratification deposited:* Liberia, April 27, 1956.

### Germany

Agreement relating to external debts of the City of Berlin and of public utility enterprises owned or controlled by Berlin. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn February 29 and March 2, 1956.<sup>2</sup> Entered into force March 2, 1956. TIAS 3545.

Agreement relating to the return of captured files and archives of the former German Foreign Office at present in the territory of the United Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn March 14 and April 18, 1956.<sup>2</sup> Entered into force April 18, 1956.

### Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Done at New York June 23, 1953.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Monaco, April 12, 1956.

### Whaling

Amendments to paragraphs 4 (2), 5, 7 (a), and 8 (a) and (c) of the Schedule of the International Whaling Convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at the Seventh Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, Moscow July 18-23, 1955. Entered into force November 8, 1955, with the exception of amendments to paragraph 8 (a) and (c). Amendments to paragraph 8 (a) and (c) entered into force March 7, 1956, except for the United States and certain other countries. TIAS 3548.

### Women—Political Rights

Inter-American convention on granting of political rights to women. Done at Bogotá May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.<sup>3</sup>

*Signature:* Nicaragua, April 24, 1956.

<sup>1</sup>Not in force.

<sup>2</sup>Similar notes were exchanged *mutatis mutandis* between the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, and between France and the Federal Republic.

<sup>3</sup>Not in force for the United States.

### Canada

Agreement relating to the construction of family housing units at Pepperrell Air Force Base, St. John's, Newfoundland, with contract attached. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa April 18 and 19, 1956. Entered into force April 19, 1956.

### Chile

Agreement for a cooperative program of geological and mineralogical investigations of the uranium resources of Chile. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago April 10 and 20, 1956. Enters into force upon receipt by the United States of notification by Chile of its ratification.

### Colombia

Agreement for technical cooperation activities in civil aviation pursuant to general agreement of March 5 and 9, 1951 (TIAS 2231), and superseding agreement of October 23 and December 3 and 22, 1947 (TIAS 1738). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá January 17 and March 27, 1956. Entered into force March 27, 1956.

### Finland

Agreement further supplementing the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of May 6, 1955 (TIAS 3248), by providing for the purchase of additional commodities and amending the supplemental agreement of March 26, 1956 (TIAS 3533). Signed at Helsinki April 26, 1956. Entered into force April 26, 1956.

### Italy

Agreement relating to the grant of food for an emergency feeding program in areas of Italy still suffering from devastation brought about by the winter storms. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome April 27, 1956. Entered into force April 27, 1956.

### Peru

Agreement for a program of educational exchanges authorized by the Fulbright Act (60 Stat. 754). Signed at Lima May 4, 1956. Entered into force May 4, 1956.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on May 7 confirmed Livingston T. Merchant to be Ambassador to Canada.

The Senate on May 10 confirmed Willard L. Beaulac to be Ambassador to Argentina.

The Senate on May 10 confirmed Cecil B. Lyon to be Ambassador to Chile.

The Senate on May 10 confirmed Albert F. Nufer to be Ambassador to the Philippines.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3284. Pub. 6003. 44 pp. 20¢.

Agreement, with official minutes and exchange of notes, between the United States and Japan—Signed at Tokyo May 31, 1955. Entered into force June 25, 1955.

**Protection of War Victims—Civilian Persons.** TIAS 3265. Pub. 6142. 181 pp. 60¢.

Convention, with annexes, between the United States and other governments—Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Date of entry into force with respect to the United States, February 2, 1956.

**Trade—Withdrawal of Concession and Grant of Compensatory Concessions Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.** TIAS 3473. Pub. 6295. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Governments of the Netherlands and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union—Signed at Geneva June 8, 1955. Entered into force July 24, 1955.

**Trade—Withdrawal of Concession and Grant of Compensatory Concessions Under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.** TIAS 3474. Pub. 6294. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada—Signed at Geneva June 8, 1955. Entered into force July 24, 1955.

**Parcel Post.** TIAS 3475. 32 pp. 15¢.

Agreement and detailed regulations between the United States and Pakistan—Signed at Karachi July 20, 1955, and at Washington October 7, 1955. Entered into force January 1, 1956.

**Mutual Defense Assistance—Loan of United States Naval Vessels to the Republic of Korea.** TIAS 3481. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul December 28, 1955. Entered into force December 28, 1955.

**Passport Visas.** TIAS 3484. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic. Exchange of notes—Dated at Ciudad Trujillo December 14 and 16, 1955. Entered into force February 1, 1956.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3485. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Spain—Amending agreement of April 20, 1955, as amended—Signed at Madrid January 21, 1956. Entered into force January 21, 1956.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3486. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia—

Amending agreement of January 5, 1955, as amended—Signed at Belgrade January 19, 1956. Entered into force January 19, 1956. And related note.

**Economic Assistance to Yugoslavia.** TIAS 3487. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Yugoslavia. Exchange of notes—Dated at Belgrade January 19, 1956. Entered into force January 19, 1956.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3488. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Finland—Amending agreement of May 6, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 12, 1956. Entered into force January 12, 1956.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3489. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Modifying agreement of November 10, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 31, 1956. Entered into force February 1, 1956.

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses.** TIAS 3490. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea—Signed at Washington February 3, 1956. Entered into force February 3, 1956.

**Emergency Wheat Aid to Libya.** TIAS 3491. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Libya. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 30 and July 18, 1955. Entered into force July 18, 1955.

**Mutual Defense Assistance.** TIAS 3492. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Norway—Amending Annex C of agreement of January 27, 1950, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Oslo December 10 and 16, 1954. Entered into force December 16, 1954.

**Status of Canadian Forces Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany.** TIAS 3495. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bonn and Bonn/Bad Godesberg April 19, 1955, and January 26, 1956. Entered into force January 26, 1956.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3496. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt—Modifying agreement of December 14, 1955. Exchange of notes signed at Washington February 8, 1956. Entered into force February 8, 1956.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3497. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Israel—Amending agreement of November 10, 1955, as modified—Signed at Washington February 10, 1956. Entered into force February 10, 1956.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3498. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Union of Burma—Signed at Rangoon February 8, 1956. Entered into force February 8, 1956.

**Air Transport Services.** TIAS 3504. 38 pp. 15¢.

Agreement and exchange of notes between the United States and India—Signed at New Delhi February 3, 1956. Entered into force February 3, 1956.

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**Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 7-13**

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.  
 Press releases issued prior to May 7 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 221 of April 27, 235 of May 2, and 242 of May 4.

No.	Date	Subject
243	5/7	Cotton Advisory Committee Meeting (rewrite).
244	5/7	Dulles: arrival statement.
245	5/8	Surplus commodity agreement with Peru.
246	5/8	Dulles: report from NATO.
*247	5/9	Merchant sworn in as Ambassador to Canada.
†248	5/10	Dulles: testimony on mutual security.
†249	5/10	Austrian social security benefits.
250	5/10	Delegation to Building Committee, ILO.
*251	5/11	Program for Sukarno visit.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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## Educational Exchange Grants

Publication 6301

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The International Educational Exchange Program is a program which enables citizens of the United States to visit other countries and foreign nationals to come to this country for purposes of study, teaching, lecturing, conducting research, observation, consultation, training, or to gain practical experience.

As authorized by the Congress of the United States, the program has for its chief objective the development of greater mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States and those of other countries. This objective is based on the recognition of the need for such person-to-person understanding in the furtherance of our foreign relations.

This 25-page pamphlet, which supersedes Department of State publication 5484, describes the operation of the program, tells how grantees are selected, and lists the opportunities being offered. It outlines the procedure to be used by a citizen of the United States or another country in applying for a grant under the Fulbright Act.

Copies of *Educational Exchange Grants* are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

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# The Department of State

Vol. XXXIV, No. 883

May 28, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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## Basic Elements of the Mutual Security Program

*Statement by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

I know that this committee has held extensive hearings on the mutual security program for next year, as proposed in the President's message of March 19, 1956.<sup>2</sup> I am glad to try now to sum up the administration's position. I shall confine myself to the broad philosophy of the measure, knowing that others have dealt with details.

The President has requested the Congress to authorize appropriations of \$4,672,475,000 for fiscal year 1957 and to appropriate \$4,859,975,000. As you know, these figures are larger than our estimated expenditures for next year, which will probably be in the neighborhood of \$4.2 billion. This is approximately the same rate of expenditure as we had last year and will have this year.

I wish that I could recommend a lesser amount. I cannot do so, consistently with my view of the essential needs of the United States for security. Some slight adjustments may be appropriate in view of new information which has developed since the program was submitted. But I cannot see how we can safely change the order of magnitude now proposed.

It is, I think, important to see this mutual security program in proper perspective. It is an essential part of our overall security program, a program which includes the military establishment of the United States itself. The total figure for all forms of national security, domestic and

foreign, is about \$40 billion. Of this about 90 percent is spent on our own United States military establishment. Approximately 10 percent is spent through foreign governments, for the most part to help our allies hold positions which are vital both to us and to them. This 10 percent makes up what we call a mutual security program.

This entire program has been carefully considered by the administration. The President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I, myself, the Secretary of State, are all convinced that this expenditure is necessary for the security of the United States. This mutual security part of this program is a contribution to our security just as is our own defense establishment. Congress has in past years shared that view. Each year, after the most careful scrutiny, it has appropriated the funds to sustain this program at approximately the present rate of expenditure, and indeed for several years the rate of expenditure was much higher.

Nothing has yet happened which in my opinion would make it prudent to terminate or curtail the present program. Last week I was in Paris attending one of the NATO ministerial meetings. There were present the 15 Foreign Ministers of the member countries. We considered at length the Soviet change of tactics and the recent developments within the Soviet Union. We agreed that these changes were on the whole encouraging. They seemed to increase the chance of peace and to suggest the possibility that Soviet Russia might ultimately have a government responsive to an educated public opinion and reflecting a code of conduct such as is accepted by other civilized nations and as is embodied in the principles of the United Nations Charter. However, we unani-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on May 10 (press release 248).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545. For texts of statements on area programs made before the committee by Department officers, see BULLETIN of Apr. 23, 1956, p. 674 (Europe), and Apr. 30, 1956, p. 723 (Far East); for a statement made by Assistant Secretary Allen before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, see p. 875.

mously agreed that "the Western Powers cannot relax their vigilance" and that "security remains a basic problem, and the Atlantic Powers must continue to give priority to the maintenance of their unity and strength."<sup>3</sup>

This, I remind you, was the view shared by the North Atlantic Community, particularly in relation to Europe, where the Soviet Union seems to be on its best behavior. But their behavior is not so good in the Middle East, where they have played fast and loose with peace in the area by a reckless policy of dispensing arms. This is an area which is of great importance to the United States, both because it includes the State of Israel, with which the United States has close ties, and also because the area produces the oil required for industry and the military establishment of Western Europe.

The situation is even less stable when we look to the Far East, where the Chinese Communists maintain a threatening posture and refuse to agree to any meaningful renunciation of the use of force.

As General Lemnitzer has already told you, we have an armistice in Korea but no formal peace. In Taiwan there are almost daily military engagements between the forces of the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists. In Viet-Nam, there is an armistice, but no formal peace. In these three world positions, a total of approximately 50 million free people are confronted by Communists who are using the 600 million people they rule to build a vast military establishment.

The importance of these areas to the United States is already demonstrated by the fact that the United States has concluded treaties covering them which provide that an armed attack by the Communists upon them would be dangerous for the peace and safety of the United States. You will also recall the congressional action, led by this committee, which authorized the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States, if need be, to resist attacks which might be directed against Taiwan (Formosa).<sup>4</sup>

We do not, of course, want to have to use United States troops to hold these areas, although we do maintain some forces in Korea. In the main, these areas are protected primarily by local forces, largely trained and equipped by the United States. But the governments of these impoverished coun-

tries cannot maintain their present forces without some economic help also. Therefore, we give not only direct military aid but also budgetary and economic aid necessary to enable these countries to have the armed forces which we judge reasonably related to the threat of aggression and our continued plans to prevent it.

The estimate of military aid and defense support assistance next year for Korea, China, Indochina, and other area allies—the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan—is in the neighborhood of \$1.5 billion.

#### **U.S. Mobile Power in Pacific**

Of course, the armed forces of these allies are not alone sufficient to withstand the full might of Chinese Communist military power backed by the Soviet Union. But we also maintain in the general area of the western Pacific United States mobile striking power to back up the local ground forces. The cost of this force is in our defense budget. As Admiral Radford has already testified to this committee, the two costs essentially complement each other. Neither would be sufficient without the other.

I have already referred to our security interests along the Soviet perimeter in the Middle East. Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey all have common borders with the Soviet Union, and Iraq is close to it. All four are subject to Soviet threats and the proximity of Soviet power. Pakistan is an ally of ours under the Southeast Asia Treaty. Turkey is an ally of ours under the North Atlantic Treaty, and all four of these countries have united for collective security under the Baghdad Pact.

These countries hold the gateway to the south, where the oil reserves so vital to the military power and industrial strength of Western Europe are located. Just beyond is the gateway to Africa. It would be reckless not to help these countries to help themselves and at the same time to help us. The estimate of expenditures for military and defense-support assistance next year for these countries is in the neighborhood of \$800 million.

In Western Europe the military forces of NATO stand guard over the greatest industrial and military treasure that there is within the free world, except for the United States itself. So important do we consider this area that substantial United

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, May 21, 1956, p. 836.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1955, p. 213.

States armed forces are stationed in Western Europe for its defense.

We help maintain the military strength of our European allies by supplying them with certain types of weapons. We also have a base agreement with Spain, and this involves substantial costs. We also think it prudent to help Yugoslavia to maintain its national independence. The expenditure for military aid to NATO (excluding Turkey, of which we have already spoken) and military aid and defense support for Spain and Yugoslavia is estimated for next year at roughly \$1 billion.

Our military assistance and supporting economic aid to the countries in these three critical areas, plus some military help to Latin America, account for roughly 83 percent of the estimated expenditures under the mutual security program for next year. These expenditures make it possible to hold vital positions at less cost than in any other way which can be contrived. These expenditures provide diversified locations around the globe from which Russia could be struck, with devastating effect, should its rulers launch a war of aggression. These expenditures are fundamental to our own peace and security.

#### **Nonmilitary Aid**

The balance of the mutual security program—the other 17 percent—will involve spending next year, as this year, a little over \$700 million. This money is not directly related to military considerations, although much of the money goes to allies. Wherever they go, these expenditures are directly related to our security. They help areas in the world which are threatened by Communist subversion and which contain people, resources, and strategic locations which, in our own interests as well as theirs, should be secure from hostile domination.

In these countries the political leaders and the people as a whole want to maintain their independence. They do not want to be subjected to the new Soviet colonialism that grips Eastern Europe. They are themselves carrying the main burden of seeking to preserve their liberty, but this is a hard task and they need and deserve some outside help. Our help supports their economic development and, through both our programs and those of the United Nations, such activities as public health, education, and technical assistance. Such help is essential to supplement their efforts to

develop freely and independently in the world today.

The importance of this aspect of the matter is emphasized by the fact that the Soviet Union, having transformed itself into an industrial state, now sees the advantage of having a "mutual security program" of its own with its allies and with other countries.

It is said that imitation is the sincerest flattery. We would indeed be flattered if we could feel that the Soviet Union was sincerely seeking to strengthen the political and economic independence of other nations. Unhappily, it is demonstrable that the Soviet bloc, already impoverished in terms of consumer's goods, diverts economic strength to other peoples only for the purpose of bringing about what Lenin called the "amalgamation" of these peoples into the Soviet Communist bloc. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that the Soviet Union today measures its assistance to its satellite allies in terms of billions of dollars and its assistance to other countries in terms of hundreds of millions of dollars. It would indeed be ironical if the United States should sharply curtail its mutual security program just at the time when the Soviet Union is moving with predatory intent into the field which we would thus vacate.

The new Communist tactics make it more than ever imperative that the United States should continue the economic phase of our mutual security program. It is also important that it should be continued with assurance of continuity. Of course, I realize that one Congress cannot bind a future Congress to appropriate money. We can, however, and do, have continuing policies. It is the continuing policy of the United States to maintain its own military establishment. The funds for that are appropriated annually. But no one doubts that this program is a continuing one, and so it needs to be, at least for the foreseeable future, as regards our mutual security program. It is, as I said, a vital component in our total program for national security.

The world needs to know that this program will continue so long as there is a threat to our security. Other countries with whom we share our security effort cannot do their own planning intelligently, or appropriate their own funds dependably, or obtain supplementary funds from other quarters unless they believe that there will be a reasonable measure of continuity in our pro-

gram. Also, to a limited extent, we need a measure of project continuity. That is why, Mr. Chairman, we have contemplated the committal of a modest amount of funds on a long-term basis subject, of course, to congressional appropriations on a yearly basis.

We also believe that there is need for greater flexibility in the executive.

This committee has had many explanations of the long-time cycle involved in the planning and executing of this program. We are already engaged, in May of 1956, in preparing, at the request of the Bureau of the Budget, programs to be submitted for fiscal year 1958. After those programs have been reviewed by the executive branch and are finally submitted to the Congress, and after the next Congress has authorized and appropriated the funds, then the plans must be adjusted to meet that congressional action and the changing world scene. Only then can the task of implementing the plans be commenced, and there is usually a lag of a year or two between obligating the funds and actually getting the funds into equipment, supplies, and services at the foreign destination. In the case of some of the military equipment, the delay is greater.

All of this points up to the importance of giving the President greater discretion, particularly with respect to the use of the distinctively economic portion of the fund.

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that consideration is being given to an independent study of some of the aspects of our mutual security program. There are a number of matters relating to the administration of this program which the President feels, and which perhaps members of this committee feel, could usefully be studied by men who are highly qualified but who are not available to serve the Government on a long-term basis.

I have in mind certain questions which have arisen in the course of these hearings, such as the relative role of the State and Defense Departments in administering the program; whether we should seek to put more of our program on a loan rather than a grant basis; whether the program needs to be enlarged and given greater continuity to meet the new Soviet tactics; whether, and if so, how, we can speed up our program so that there is not long delay between the conception of programs and their execution and sometimes regrettable gaps between our promises and our performance. There is the question of the degree to which it is feasible

to give Congress a dependable itemization of programs which may not come to fruition for several years, by which time the surrounding circumstances may have considerably altered. There is the question of the degree to which it is useful to provide funds on a bilateral basis as against use of United Nations or regional agencies. There is the question as to whether we should emphasize short-term projects of popular interest or long-range projects which have no obvious popular appeal.

These questions, as I indicated, are questions of method and technique. None questions the basic validity of the program, which is essential to our own security and is fully integrated with all other national programs. As the President said the other day,<sup>5</sup> "The program as it is now outlined represents to us a minimum that is necessary for the welfare of the United States in the years to come."

I urge that the committee approve the authorizing legislation which is now before it.

## Armed Forces Day

Press release 268 dated May 18

*Secretary Dulles issued the following statement for the observance of Armed Forces Day on May 19, 1956.*

The ties that bind the members of the Armed Forces and the members of the Foreign Service and of the Department of State grow increasingly close with each passing year. One reason is, of course, the accumulation of tradition since the founding of the Republic. But there is a current and compelling reason: We are today inseparably joined with the Army and the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines in the search for a secure peace. This search takes many forms, but its goal is a common goal—the just and lasting peace that the collective strength of the free nations of the world can bring into being.

You of the Armed Forces have made a great contribution to that strength. I know the deep pride that your contribution has brought to you and the sense of service and dedication that goes with it.

I salute you on the day that is yours, and I look forward to the day when strength and partnership and assistance to those in need will have at last assured peace in full measure to the world.

<sup>5</sup> At his May 4 news conference.

## The Mutual Security Program for the Near East, South Asia, and Africa

*Statement by George V. Allen*

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I would like to discuss with you some of the political and economic problems of the Near East and Africa and the relationship to them of the mutual security program. Specifically, this area includes Greece, Turkey, Iran, the Arab States and Israel, and the continent of Africa.

The importance of this area to the United States economically, strategically, politically, morally, and culturally is too well known to this committee to warrant detailing. It is clearly in the interest of the United States to promote peace and stability throughout the area, to achieve and maintain friendly relations, and to assist these countries in their economic development as a means of removing the root causes of discontent and political instability.

Throughout the area there is a tremendous, stirring drive for change and improvement. Standards of living are frequently as low as can be found anywhere in the world, yet there is an awareness that improvement can be had and that the material benefits of 20th-century civilization are not unattainable. But just how these changes can come about peacefully and without chaotic disruption of existing situations is not always clear either to the peoples or their governments. Many of these states achieved their full independence only within the last 10 years, others are in the process of becoming independent, and still others have barely started on the road. Yet the political ferment and economic aspirations are fundamentally the same among all these peoples and states.

They require assistance if the changes and improvements in economic status which must come are to be achieved peacefully and with stability. The programs in which we have been engaged have been designed and administered so as to assist in accomplishing these objectives. Much has been accomplished, but much still remains.

Assistance, to be effective, must recognize and respect the drive for the maintenance of independence inherent in the area. The important element in improving living standards and in achieving economic stability is recognition of the problems and consciously directed action toward their solution by the governments of these countries. It is only then that outside assistance can be effective. Favorable developments in this direction have taken place in nearly all the countries.

### **Need for Collective Security**

Coupled with the need for economic development is the necessity for providing for collective security against aggressive forces. The past year has seen the formation of the Baghdad Pact—a collective security arrangement among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. This arrangement provides an important link between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the West and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in the East. It is encouraging that the pact nations not only joined in their collective defense but have emphasized the importance of the pact organization in considering mutual problems of economic development. The United States supports and encourages the pact, though we believe that our

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 8.

own interests and those of the area are such that we should not join it at the present time. However, the United States has joined the Economic Committee of the pact, which concentrates on problems of economic development common to countries of the area.<sup>2</sup>

As this committee is well aware, recent events in the area have made doubly difficult the accomplishment of U.S. objectives. Internal pressures are so acute that frequently disruptive forces overtake desires for peaceful evolution and development.

It is this factor which had made recent Soviet-bloc moves so important. Soviet offers of economic assistance in any of several forms are not inherently bad. Directed solely and honestly toward economic development of the area, such offers would be welcome. But viewed in the light of Soviet historical aspirations and examined in terms of the obvious objectives of each offer, these moves pose a very real threat to the peace of the area.

In the past year the Soviet-bloc objective, first, of eliminating all Western influence from the area and, second, of dominating it themselves has remained unchanged. Soviet tactics, however, have changed markedly. The Communist posture in the area used to be one of threat and thinly veiled attempts to subvert Near Eastern governments. The Soviet bloc is currently stressing the line that they stand in the van of the strugglers against "imperialism" and have shown a willingness to support the foreign policies and claims of the governments of those Near East states which are immediate Soviet targets in the area. This "new look" has been accompanied by offers of the use of the Soviet veto in the U.N., declarations of solidarity, offers and deliveries of Soviet-bloc arms, attractive-looking offers of trade agreements, technical assistance, loans and grants for economic development, invitations to visit the U.S.S.R., and cultural missions. It goes without saying that with Soviet aid come Soviet "technicians." In its penetration of the area the Soviet Government makes the effective pretense that no strings are tied, no affiliations or commitments implied, and in fact it encourages "neutralism."

<sup>2</sup> For the final communique issued at the close of the second meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council at Tehran, Apr. 10-20, 1956, together with statements made by U.S. observers before the Council and the Economic Committee, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1956, p. 753.

## Israel and the Arab States

The primary vector of the Soviet virus has been the unresolved quarrel remaining from the Arab-Israel hostilities of 1948. Egypt's fear of Israel's military superiority motivated the Egyptian-Czech arms deal of September 1955. The large-scale deliveries of Soviet-bloc arms to Egypt understandably arouse considerable apprehension in Israel, and pressure mounts to strengthen the Israel military forces to counter deliveries to the Arabs. The frightening prospects of a devastating arms race or even a resurgence of hostilities are thus enhanced. U.S. policy is aimed at the achievement of a peaceful and equitable settlement of Arab-Israel differences. Our goal in the area is the permanent security of the states there. Their future peace and prosperity will not rest primarily upon arms but upon the international rule of law and the establishment of friendly relations among neighbors.

We are proud of our record of accomplishment in the Arab States and Israel in the fields of technical assistance and economic development. Progress has been fostered and the sovereign independence of the nations of the area has been strengthened as a result of our efforts. Plans have gone forward for the harnessing of the rivers of the area, the Nile, the Jordan, the Litani, and the Tigris. New methods of attacking disease and problems of inadequate production have been devised. Roads have been built. We need to continue and intensify our efforts along these lines in order to show the Near Eastern peoples that the peaceful economic and social development to which they aspire may best be obtained through cooperation with the free world, not the Communist bloc.

## The Northern Tier

The northern part of the Near East, consisting of Greece, Turkey, and Iran, is a strategic area along the Iron Curtain, and all three countries are growing in economic strength. Greece and Turkey are members of NATO and are also allied with Yugoslavia in the Balkan alliance. Iran and Turkey are members of the Baghdad Pact along with Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. Geographically the members of NATO and the Baghdad Pact form an uninterrupted arc running from above the Arctic Circle in Norway through Pakistan. Greece, Turkey, and Iran are

at the center of this collective-defense are, and each of them belongs to one or both of these defensive associations.

Turkey, as a comparatively new republic, has pressed forward rapidly with a program designed to convert it from an underdeveloped country into a modern state. It has taken tremendous strides in accomplishing this transition. A key element has been an economic development program which has stretched Turkey's own means to the limit and which has led to serious internal and external financial difficulties. To meet this problem the Government has now pledged itself to undertake a rigorous economic stabilization program. If Turkey's efforts to develop a sound economy are to be successful, and if Turkey is to maintain its strong position on the strategic eastern flank of NATO and its key place in the collective security arrangements of the area, it must have continued assistance.

Greece's traditional friendship for America, its strategic location, and its important place in the NATO defense structure are key factors in the U.S. interest in Greek welfare and stability. The greater part of the large amounts of U.S. aid received in the past was used up immediately in defending the country against armed Communist attack. While Greece is still one of the poorest of the NATO countries, it has made remarkable economic progress since the end of the Communist guerrilla war. But its strategic location requires the maintenance of defense forces in the NATO structure beyond the capacity of its own resources if its economic development is to continue.

Iran has abandoned its traditional neutrality by adhering to the Baghdad Pact. This direct participation in the free-world collective security system has called forth unfriendly and even threatening reaction from the U.S.S.R., with which it has a 1,200-mile common frontier.

Iran's large economic development program is proceeding. We have long been interested in helping Iran to carry out its plans for economic and social improvement. Partly due to demands placed on it by this program and partly because the Iranian economy has not yet fully recovered from the disruption caused by loss of oil revenues following nationalization, Iran has not been able to balance its ordinary budget despite its reviving oil revenues. Various internal reforms now under way are directed at this problem. The importance to U.S. objectives of supporting Iranian ef-

forts toward economic development and its continued alinement with the free world in the face of Soviet threats cannot be overemphasized.

### **Tempo of Change in Africa**

Africa is a tremendous continent, four times the size of the United States, rich in mineral resources, and in most of its area far behind in achieving 20th-century development. It is all too clear that the Communist bloc is well aware of the potential of Africa and is making a concerted effort to penetrate the continent.

The tempo of social, economic, and political change has increased tremendously during the past year. The problem of developing policies which further our national interests in Africa is complex indeed; for this is a continent of as great diversity in social, economic, and political features as in climate and topography. Here we must deal with both independent countries and territories in varying stages of political evolution. All of them also are in varying stages of social and economic underdevelopment and are faced with all the usual impediments to progress. With those areas in a dependent status our relationships must fall into a triangular pattern with the colonial powers. This requires that our policies relating to the dependent territories must be reconciled to our national interests in both the metropolises and the territories and to their respective interests, which are at times conflicting.

The United States desires that the peoples of Africa progress and share in the social, economic, and political freedoms and advantages of the West. Beyond this the continent's human and natural resources contribute very significantly to the strength of the Western World. Our interest includes continued access to Africa's important and, in some cases, vital supplies of a number of essential materials including uranium, industrial diamonds, copper, manganese, cobalt, beryl, asbestos, chrome, rubber, zinc, lead, corn, cocoa, and sisal. It includes also strategic air bases and communications facilities, particularly those spotted across the northern part of the continent.

Africa, probably more than anywhere in the world, is a crucial testing ground of the good judgment and leadership of the Western powers. It is essential that the United States, through the mutual security program, strengthen its ties with, and support, the development aspirations of the independent nations of Africa. It is equally

important we work with our allies in recognizing the aspirations for independence and development of dependent peoples. We and our Western European allies are directly involved, and the eyes of the underdeveloped peoples everywhere are upon us. Here we must collaborate in demonstrating conclusively the superior values of free-world ideals.

The bilateral country aid which is proposed in the mutual security program is essential to assist in meeting the problems of the area. But the Soviet economic offensive, the emergence of major economic crises, and the growing awareness within the area of the multilateral nature of some economic problems dictate a new approach in achieving our objectives through the mutual security program. It is for this reason that we are requesting a new, flexible Middle East and Africa authorization of \$100 million.

### **National Goals in South Asia**

I should like now to turn to South Asia. The five South Asian countries, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ceylon, and Nepal, however different in some respects, are profoundly alike in their basic national goals. These goals are the maintenance of political independence and the achievement of economic strength. Our national situation in the early years of our independence was essentially that of the South Asian nations today. But the pace of political and economic developments is more rapid in the world of today, and the ideology of communism offers less developed countries a pattern for economic growth which neglects the cost to individual and, in the end, national liberties. Awareness of the rapidity of economic change adds urgency to the awakened demands of the newly independent peoples of South Asia for improvement of their living standards. Soviet-bloc offers of economic assistance in various forms, while holding dangers known to the governments and peoples, are tempting because they coincide in time with these exigent national aspirations.

As we said last year, economic improvement in the less developed countries is extremely important to us. Vast differences in standards of living constitute a constant source of irritation in international relations at a time when strength and cooperation are essential. The determination that the extension of assistance to the countries

of South Asia is in our national interest is equally valid today. What has become even clearer in the last year is the nature, the extent, and the drive of the Communist-bloc economic wooing of the free nations of Asia. That this activity is in one sense a compliment to the effectiveness of our own assistance programs in the area makes it no less a danger to the independence of these nations and, hence, to our interests.

The importance to us of the freedom and independence of the South Asian countries can, perhaps, be more keenly appreciated if we think of the consequences if they were to become committed to communism or disaffected with the free world. These five countries contain almost one-fifth of the world's population. They have some 3,000 miles of common border with the Asian lands now dominated by the Communists. South Asia is a key area linking the Near East and the Far East and dominates the communication lines between Europe and the Far East. The countries have important amounts of scarce materials. In one year, India alone supplied the United States with 41 percent of our manganese imports, 68 percent of our cyanite imports, 57 percent of our mica imports, and over 95 percent of our jute-product imports. Thus, geographical, commercial, and strategic interests reinforce our desire to see these Asian peoples remain free and advance economically.

India's 375 million people have made remarkable, if modest, advances under India's first Five-Year Plan of economic development. However, India will have to make even greater efforts if it is to reach the development goals of its second Five-Year Plan. This plan, which commences this April, aims at an increase of national income of 25 percent by 1961, achieved through expenditures more than double that of the earlier plan. Even with new taxes, new borrowings, and large deficit financing, the plan requires external assistance of \$1.7 billion if it is to succeed. Before the visit last winter of Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev, the Soviet bloc had made offers of economic assistance to India. These offers have now been substantially increased. The basis for continuing our aid to India has, however, not been changed by these events. India wants and intends to preserve the values of freedom and democracy. Its economic system may become less like our own; we may continue to have different views on the best way to preserve peace; but, with our basic



identity of values, we can with good will compose our differences. Our aid is an important evidence of our belief that India will continue to demonstrate that a free Asian nation can meet the desires of its people for progress under a democratic system.

Pakistan has continued its adherence to the free world's system of collective security. In addition to its membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, it has joined three of its neighbors and the United Kingdom in the Baghdad Pact organization. Pakistan also in the last year established a new constitution and has become a republic. Although the financial demands of its defense establishment and commitments are substantial and both East and West have had severe floods this year, Pakistan has continued its valiant efforts in the field of economic advancement. Pakistan has also been evolving a new, comprehensive Five-Year Plan of development. Pakistan looks to its partners in the free world for the assistance necessary to supplement its own defense and development efforts.

The impact of the Soviet-bloc offers of assistance on the less developed countries of Asia has perhaps been greatest in Afghanistan. The seeds were dropped on ground fertilized last spring by the flareup of Afghanistan's dispute with neighboring Pakistan over Pushtunistan. This dispute with Pakistan and Afghanistan's intense desire for hastened economic improvement created a situation of receptivity to massive Soviet aid offers. Following earlier loans for various projects, the Soviet Union offered Afghanistan a \$100-million line of credit during the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit. The terms of the loan, 30 years at 2 percent interest, were appealing, and Afghanistan signed an agreement. Although Afghanistan has assumed a heavy mortgage on its freedom, the interest of the United States in Afghanistan's continued independence has not been changed by these events. To this end, we are also concerned in strengthening Afghanistan's ties with its free neighbors and the United States. We have demonstrated the genuine nature of our interest in Afghanistan in many ways, including the extension of loans and grants totaling almost \$50 million since 1951.

Nepal has taken further steps to strengthen its political system and undertake a more comprehensive attack on its economic problems. The King has announced that Nepal's first elections

will be held in October 1957 and has meanwhile appointed a new Prime Minister and Cabinet. Nepal has introduced a new Five-Year Plan of economic development which includes the much needed expansion of its internal and external transportation and communications system. The Prime Minister has expressed particular hopes for aid from traditionally friendly countries.

Ceylon, with whom we have had the friendliest of relations, is an island republic whose continued independence and economic development is extremely important to U.S. objectives. With its great dependence on exports for a substantial part of its national income, Ceylon faces difficult problems of development. Recently national elections resulted in replacement of the former government—one whose officials were most outspoken in the support of free-world objectives. Its electoral defeat was based on internal, domestic considerations rather than on matters of international relations, though some changes in foreign policy are to be expected. Ceylon is an important member of the free world, one whose government and people are dedicated to economic improvement. And from the point of view of U.S. interests, one of the most significant factors is that the governmental change was accomplished through democratic processes.

Our programs of assistance are an essential arm of our foreign policy. They give substance to our support of the aspirations of free people to remain free and to become economically strong. They are of vital importance both to the countries of South Asia and to the objectives of U.S. policy.

## Senator George's NATO Mission

White House press release dated May 14

President Eisenhower and Senator George on May 14 discussed the President's letter of May 9 in which the President expressed his desire to appoint Senator George as his personal representative and special ambassador to deal in the first instance with the pending proposal of the NATO Ministers that ways and means should be found to improve and extend NATO cooperation in nonmilitary fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.<sup>1</sup>

Senator George stated that he would be glad to accept this responsibility and contribute his own

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 21, 1956, p. 836.

thinking and the benefit of his experience to the development of this project so vital to future peace.

Senator George stated that he plans to retain his present post in the Senate for the time being but would be available after the adjournment of the present session to perform any duty, consistent with his Senatorial responsibilities, that might be requested by the President. In the meantime, the Senator, in cooperation with the Secretary of State, will study the problem of developing the Naxo concept and consult with the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway, who were designated by the Naxo Council to study the problem with the governments involved.

Following his retirement from the Senate, Senator George would plan to devote himself actively to advising the President and the Secretary of State with reference to this matter, as well as regards the general development and implementation of bipartisan foreign policy.

## **President Eisenhower**

### **To Attend Panama Meeting**

The White House announced on May 11 that President Eisenhower had accepted an invitation extended by President Ricardo M. Arias Espinosa of Panama to attend a meeting at Panamá on June 25-26. Similar invitations have been extended to Presidents of the other American Republics.

### **Muenster Peace Medal Presented to President Eisenhower**

Press release 261 dated May 16

The Peace Medal of the city of Muenster, Germany, was presented on May 16 to White House Presidential Secretary James Hagerty, who accepted for President Eisenhower. The presentation was made by Helmut Mueller, chief reporter of the *Westfaelische Nachrichten*, on behalf of Lord Mayor Busso Pens and the City Council of Muenster.

The medal was established by the city of Muenster to commemorate the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War and which was signed at Muenster in 1648. It has been given only rarely and is being presented to President Eisenhower in recognition of his contributions to

world peace and as an expression of thanks for Marshall plan aid, which was partially responsible for rebuilding the city of Muenster. The medal bears the inscription *Pax Optima Rerum* (Peace is the best of all things).

Mr. Mueller has just arrived in the United States for a 45-day tour of this country under the International Educational Exchange Program of the Department of State.

## **Reduction of Soviet Armed Forces**

*News Conference Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 254 dated May 15

The United States welcomes the Soviet announcement of its intention to reduce its armed forces by 1,200,000 men within the next year, if this proves to be evidence of an intent to forgo the use of force in international affairs. However, the obvious explanation is a need for greater manpower in industry and agriculture. I pointed this out last week before the House Foreign Affairs Committee<sup>1</sup> and forecast that the Soviet Union would probably shift a considerable body of manpower from the armed forces to the farms and factories.

The United States since World War II has reduced its own forces by more than 9 million, from a level of 12,300,000 to under 3 million. We have already proposed at the disarmament discussions in London that an inspection system be established to provide for immediate reduction of Soviet and United States armaments to a basis of 2,500,000 men each, as part of a disarmament program that would include reductions of armaments and major restrictions in the nuclear field as well.

It should be noted that there will be no verification of actual reduction in the Soviet Union from the now estimated level of more than 4 million men, since there will be no inspection of the proposed reductions. The large forces of Communist China remain. Moreover, the Soviet reductions deal largely with men rather than armaments, and there is nothing to prevent the speedy recall and equipping of large units of thoroughly trained reserves. In addition, the U. S. S. R. and its allies are free to move their forces throughout their central land territory and bring the threat of armed force to bear at any

<sup>1</sup> For the Secretary's prepared statement on the mutual security program, see p. 871.

point around the rim of Communist-held territory. The free world, however, must be prepared to defend the outer edge of this area and depend on shifts of forces along long lines of communication, the maintenance of which requires large forces.

Despite these factors, the United States has proposed the kind of reductions in manpower and armaments, and restrictions in nuclear capabilities, which can be taken now under the present circumstances, and which go beyond what the Soviet Union has proposed.

A real disarmament program should include a system for guarding against great surprise attack. It should provide reductions in weapons, which can be more effectively controlled than manpower, as trained men can be rapidly shifted back to arms, if arms exist. It should also include an effective system for verifying these reductions. We continue to believe that it should comprehend effective measures to halt the nuclear armaments race as proposed by President Eisenhower on March 1 to Premier Bulganin.<sup>2</sup>

The United States is always ready to join with the Soviet Union and other nations in a program which allows the world to reduce further the burden of armaments in safety and security, bring under control the nuclear threat, minimize the danger of surprise attack by the President's "open sky" plan as well as by other checks, and release more economic resources for peaceful purposes.

## Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 255 dated May 15

*Secretary Dulles:* I want first of all to express my great gratification that Senator George has accepted the request of the President that he act as a special representative of the President to deal in the first instance with this problem of trying to create greater unity within the Atlantic Community and in upbuilding of the nonmilitary functions of NATO.<sup>3</sup> The fact that Senator George is undertaking this task is, I think, evidence to all the world of the great importance which we attach to it and the great hopes we have of accomplishing something substantial along these lines.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.

<sup>3</sup> See p. 879.

I have a statement to make on the Soviet announcement with respect to its armed forces.<sup>4</sup> . . . Do you have any questions?

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do I understand the burden of what you are saying is that, if the Soviets are serious about reducing weapons, they should reduce nuclear weapons as well as manpower?*

A. What I had in mind in that connection was what is illustrated by the Brussels Treaty for Western European Union, which sets up what is today the most effective and embracing system of control of armaments that the world has yet known. Under that treaty the emphasis is placed upon the control of weapons rather than upon the control of men. There is a premise that there shall be in each country a certain number of divisions. Then from that premise it is assumed that would require a certain number of weapons, and then the control and verification relate primarily to the weapons rather than to the men.

Military manpower is the most illusive thing in the world to control. The effectiveness of your manpower depends upon the length of training, which in the Soviet Union is 36 months, so that they have a very thorough training system, and their system of reserves, and the training that is given in schools, and the like. Experience, particularly under the Treaty of Versailles, shows how illusive it is to have an effective control if you think primarily in terms of the numbers of men. Therefore, modern thinking is in terms more of reduction of the weapons which the men could use.

To take a great simplification—if you are thinking only in terms of riflemen, if you only have one million rifles it doesn't do you much good to have two million men who are trained to shoot. But if you have two million men that are trained to shoot and you have two million rifles, and then you say, "I will take one million of these men out of the army and send them into the factories," they can come back on a few days' notice as long as they have two million rifles. But if you cut down on the number of rifles, that is a far more effective control than cutting down ostensibly what is the number of men in the armed forces. I think perhaps that makes clear the point I was trying to make.

<sup>4</sup> This statement was also issued separately as press release 254 (see p. 880).

*Q. Is the President's "open sky" proposal a precondition to the negotiations on the disarmament question?*

A. It certainly is not a precondition to negotiations because we have been having very intensive negotiations. We have continued to urge that the "open sky" proposal should be accepted because we believe that it is the most effective proposal yet made to dissipate the fear that there could be a massive surprise attack. And we believe that if that fear can be dissipated then there will come about almost automatically a reduction of armaments.

As I said at the United Nations, I think at the opening last fall,<sup>9</sup> it is very difficult to bring about reductions of armaments when people are afraid and think that armaments may be needed for their self-preservation. As the need for armaments seems to diminish, then the possibility for reduction of armaments greatly increases. So we believe that the effect of the President's "open sky" proposal would be to create conditions of greater confidence which would then make it easier to bring about reductions. Indeed, that was the expressed purpose of the proposal when it was made, and we do not believe any good substitute for that has been found.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, where do we stand on that proposal now? Does it apply to our overseas bases?*

A. We have not in any way sought to limit the scope of our proposal to our own territorial areas. The Soviets have indicated that they might like to have it extended, and we said: We are quite prepared to have it extended in any way.

*Q. Does the executive branch of the Government have authority to do that or does it require legislation?*

A. It would require negotiation with other countries, but we have no doubt that, as part of a general scheme, their consent would be obtained.

*Q. I mean within our own country.*

A. I believe that it would probably require a treaty which would be consented to by the Senate. I doubt whether the President would do this entirely by executive action.

<sup>9</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523.

*Q. Have the Brussels Treaty allies succeeded as yet in setting up machinery for carrying out their agreed limitations?*

A. They have machinery which is, I think, adequate to the present state of affairs. Of course, that machinery in considerable part is designed to relate to the new forces which would be brought into being as a result of the Federal Republic of Germany joining, and those forces have actually not as yet been brought into being in any appreciable degree; so there is not required the full measure of control machinery which would be required later on.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you clarify how Senator George can serve in both legislative and executive branches?*

A. Well, in much the same way, I suppose, that Senator Vandenberg and Senator Connally did.

*Q. They did not have an appointment, however.*

A. Senator Austin, as I recall, acted for several months for the President as adviser to our representative on the United Nations Security Council. It is not permissible to take pay from two sources, but there is nothing which inhibits a member of the Senate from cooperating with the Executive. The statement that was made last night contained the words "consistent with his Senatorial responsibilities." Now there may be limitations which would flow from a possible inconsistency. In that case, of course, his duties as Senator would prevail.

*Q. Do you contemplate an actual appointment as ambassador?*

A. I would think we would not contemplate any formal appointment as long as he is in the Senate.

### **Challenge to West**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [Adm. Arthur W. Radford] yesterday told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that militarily the West is doing all right in relation to the Soviet Union but that there was reason to worry about our political and diplomatic position. Do you care to comment on that?*

A. I have not seen his testimony, and I prefer not to comment on it until I have seen actually what he said.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there was comment on Capitol Hill after this announcement by the Russians on the arms reduction and the challenge to the West that the United States was in danger of losing initiative. Do you believe this is true, and do you plan positive countermeasures to combat that?*

A. Well, we are not going to advocate any reduction of armed forces that we think are essential to the security of the United States merely as a counterpropaganda move. The United States carefully studies all the time what we regard as a minimum safe level of armaments. Our conclusions are arrived at not on the basis of what the Soviets say they are going to do but on the basis of our best estimate of what, in fact, their capabilities are. We have recently had to increase, as you know, our military expenditures and ask for a substantial supplement from Congress—I think nearly a billion dollars this year—to meet what we regard as the increasing threat from Soviet Russia. They are developing intensively new weapons, guided missiles, submarines, and the like; and a shift of men from their standing forces to their factories, where they will be perhaps producing military power in a degree which is more threatening than if they were standing around in the army, does not necessarily create a condition to which we think we should respond by reducing our own forces. Certainly we do not intend to reduce that as a counterpropaganda move.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you implying that this is primarily a propaganda move—the announced reduction?*

A. I would say this, that the move is, I think, based upon economic factors. I pointed out in my own testimony that I referred to before the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Soviet Union was in my opinion overextended in a good many respects. It is developing intensively these new weapons which are very, very expensive. It is trying to enlarge its industrial base, which is a heavy drain on the country. It has encountered grave setbacks in its agricultural program and is not getting enough food for its people. It is also trying at the same time to develop the counterpart of our mutual security program. Now it cannot do in all these respects all that it would like to do, and I indicated that in my opinion it would have to cut at some point and I thought the point where it could cut to the greatest advantage to itself would be by taking out of its armed forces a cer-

tain number of men and putting them back into factories and on the farms. That is what they have done. They have done it for very solid and compelling economic reasons, in my opinion. Having done it, they are trying to use it as a propaganda weapon and make it appear that they are doing this because of their love of peace. They are hoping undoubtedly that that will lead to a reduction on the part of other nations. If this occurred, it would really weaken these countries militarily, whereas what the Soviet Union is here doing I do not think is calculated appreciably to alter their military power.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday in Moscow Japan and Russia signed a fisheries pact, one agreement of that being that the Japanese resume peace talks with the Russians in July. Would you care to comment on that?*

A. The United States hopes that there will be established peace on decent and acceptable terms between the Soviet Union and Japan. I think it is very regrettable that the Soviet Union refused to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty, which nearly 50 of the allied nations signed at San Francisco 5 years ago. It has prolonged a technical state of war now for over 10 years since the surrender terms were signed. So anything which will restore a juridical state of peace between those countries is to be desired as long as it is done on terms that are consistent with the sovereignty and dignity of Japan.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you made a series of criticisms of the Soviet proposal, pointing out the various reasons why we have to be careful. Do you see any merit in the Soviet proposal at all? Do you see that it in any way contributes to a lessening of tensions?*

A. Well, the Soviet "proposal," as you put it, is a statement of the Soviets' own intentions, which are no doubt based upon its own estimate of its own interests. I said in my prepared statement that, if this is evidence of a further intention to abstain from the use of violence in the conduct of international affairs, it will be welcomed. And it may contain some ingredients of the disavowal of the use of violence which was the Stalin doctrine that one had to depend upon violence to make the Soviet foreign policy succeed. Now, there has been a disavowal of that, certainly in terms of words. They have disavowed that. And if this

reflects in deeds a further intention along that line, it will be welcomed. I think, however, that what is happening can be explained primarily by economic factors rather than by a shift in foreign-policy intentions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does this mean you regard this particular move as perhaps a departure from the succession of steps that constituted the new look rather than a continuation of it?*

A. No, I certainly do not treat it as a departure from that. In form it purports to be an accentuation of that. I'm merely warning that I believe what has happened can be explained by economic factors and the desire of the Soviet rulers to strengthen their economy in terms of agriculture and industry—perhaps to have more people in the factories which produce modern weapons rather than to have them standing around doing guard duty or training duty in the army. Therefore, we must not jump to the conclusion that this is any conclusive proof of the reality of the new look. On the other hand, it is entirely consistent with that and it is certainly not a backward step.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, last week, as you know, Mr. Churchill made a suggestion that under certain conditions Russia ought to be included in a kind of expanded NATO. And I believe that was the same day that you testified something to the effect that in 10 years or so we might hope to look on the Russians as more respectable citizens. Could you comment first on Winston Churchill's proposal and, second, spell out a little bit more what you meant by your remark?*

A. I read quite carefully the full text of what Sir Winston Churchill said, and it seemed to me that he was saying in effect much the same thing which the three Western powers had said last November at the Geneva conference where we met with the Soviet Foreign Minister. At that time we proposed, as part of the European settlement which would bring about the reunification of Germany, that there should be some kind of overall security treaty which would engage the members of NATO, or certain of them, and certain powers on the other side to a comprehensive agreement which would assure that, in the event of armed aggression of any one against the other, we would all stand against the aggressor. That proposal was made by us with the British and the French at the Geneva conference last November. And, as I say,

I interpreted Sir Winston Churchill's remarks as being in essence a repetition of the thought and spirit of those remarks.

#### **Chances for Basic Change in Soviet Union**

Now, you had a second half to your question. You asked for an elucidation of what I had said before the Foreign Affairs Committee, I think last week, to the effect that there was evidence within the Soviet Union of forces toward greater liberalism which, if they persisted, could bring about a basic change within the Soviet Union and the kind of government which we could welcome as a respected and respectable member of the society of nations. Now, what I meant by that was that what has been done already is, I think, a barometer which records strong underlying basic forces within the Soviet Union which demand for themselves greater personal security, greater freedom of thought and expression, greater participation in the products of their labor than they are getting at the present time. They are also demanding a government which is more broadly based and which is more responsive to the basic wishes of the people.

Now, the present government is going through certain motions which we cannot fully appraise at the present time. They may be merely an attempt to delude the Russian people with the thought that they are getting something different and without there being the reality of much difference. They are certainly going through a lot of motions in terms of demoting Stalin. But the demoting of Stalin and the rehabilitation of people who are dead does not of itself promise much that is new for the future. Nevertheless, what the Soviet is doing is, I think, a measure of the forces within Russia. By that test those forces must be very considerable indeed because the steps which the Soviet rulers are taking are steps which involve for them considerable hazards. You do not destroy the reputation of a man who has been a demigod for 25 years without taking some risks. You do not impair what has been the sacred creed of communism for 25 years and change it in essential respects without taking certain risks. You do not offer hope to people who have aspirations for greater spiritual and material freedoms than they now have without increasing the volume of the pressure. It is not easy to reverse what is now under way. I said, following the Geneva "summit" conference of last July, that the success or

failure of that conference would largely be judged by whether there is set up within the Soviet Union forces that might become irreversible.

Now, we don't know yet whether these forces are irreversible or not. We probably can't judge that for quite a little while. And I said it would be very foolish for us to drop our guard on the assumption that what is now demonstrated assures that danger is removed. But if these forces go on and continue to gather momentum within the Soviet Union, then we can, I think, reasonably hope, I said within a decade or perhaps a generation, that we would have what is the great goal of our policy, that is, a Russia which is governed by people who are responsive to the wishes of the Russian people, who had given up their predatory worldwide ambitions to rule, and who conform to the principles of civilized nations and such principles as are embodied in the charter of the United Nations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on Wednesday President Sukarno will arrive in the United States. What do you expect will be the result of his visit in Washington?*

A. Well, I think that the result of his visit here will be—certainly I hope that it will be—a clearer realization of the basic bonds of sympathy and understanding that can exist between a nation like the United States and a nation like Indonesia, which has recently won its independence and which is struggling with many of the problems which are inherent in the coming of independence when it is not or has not been practiced and when many new things have to be learned and many new policies have to be hammered out. I do believe there is a basic bond of sympathy between our two countries, and I think that will be developed and better understood as a result of his visit here.

#### **German Reunification**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, last Sunday German Atomic Energy Minister Strauss said he believes the problem of German reunification is now tied in with the whole problem of Eastern Europe and he felt that it should now be the time that the Russians should allow elections for the whole area and give freedom to the whole area. In other words, he tied German unification into the whole problem of Eastern Europe. Do you agree with this position?*

A. Well, I agree with it, if I understand right. I said, following the Geneva conference of last October-November, that I felt that the hardening of the Soviet position as regards Eastern Germany was because they felt that, if they allowed free elections in Eastern Germany, that would start a chain reaction within the other countries of Eastern Europe, the satellite countries, and that it would be extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to continue its hold upon those countries if it once permitted free elections and free choice within one of the satellite countries, which East Germany has now become. Certainly, in my opinion, the thinking of the Soviet Union is that these two problems are connected, and, in my opinion, they are connected. And, of course, one of the goals of our policy, and one of the tests which should be applied as to the acceptability of any Soviet Government as a respectable member of the community of nations, is that it will allow genuinely independent governments to exist in these European countries which have, many of them, a very long record of independent existence and many fine historic traditions.

*Q. Will the United States discuss with its NATO allies the Soviet manpower reduction announcement and its implications for the West?*

A. Well, I have no doubt that this will be discussed very fully at the NATO Council, where the permanent representatives sit. I may say that we already discussed it at the ministerial meeting 2 weeks ago because we anticipated at that time that it was coming.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of that anticipation, was there any thought given in this Government to ways of countering the propaganda advantages such as moves by Moscow might gain?*

A. There was set up a group within the Government which has been functioning for the last few weeks to study the implications of this thing and the point of view with which we should respond to it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it a fair conclusion from what you said this morning that you would prefer to have the Soviet Union keep these men in their armed forces?*

A. Well, it's a fair conclusion that I would rather have them standing around doing guard duty than making atomic bombs.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it correct to interpret the sense of your comments on Mr. Churchill's remarks as being that at Geneva we proposed to the Soviet Union that she participate in a European collective security or European nonaggression pact, that Churchill was at Aachen repeating that proposition or the sense of it, and that the United States is still backing such an invitation of the Soviet Union, that is, to enter a collective nonaggression pact and to come into NATO?*

A. I do not want to say whether or not what Churchill said was consciously based upon what had been said at Geneva. It may have been, quite likely was, his own spontaneous thinking. What I pointed out was that it was quite parallel with what we had done at that time. We had proposed what was called then a Treaty of Assurance to cover all of the essential parts of Europe and containing mutual guaranties, consultations, and the like. The United States is still adhering to that position.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, let me clarify that. I want to understand it completely. Churchill, I understood, at Aachen—that is the impression I had—urged that Russia be included in the NATO alliance. Is that the American position? Is that what we are saying?*

A. I do not think that Churchill proposed the inclusion of Russia in the NATO alliance. I think that what he proposed was that the Soviet Union should support the principles of the NATO alliance.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, coming back to what you said—if there is a beginning of a revolution in Russia, do you think there are, in your opinion, any new ways or possibilities for the world to accelerate this revolution?*

A. I believe that there are. And I believe that some of the things we have done have already had an accelerating effect. It is almost impossible to prove that. Also it's impossible to disprove it. But I do believe that, while in the main what has happened has been due to internal forces that are almost inherent in the nature of man and in part also due to the increased education that has gone on within Russia, there have also been contributions from the outside. How you apportion those is anybody's guess. But I do believe there are ways of accelerating those, and I can assure you those are being very intensively studied.

## **Mr. Sonnabend Named Director of Benjamin Franklin Foundation**

The Department of State announced on May 18 (press release 265) that Abraham M. Sonnabend of Boston, Mass., has been named a director of the Benjamin Franklin Foundation. This Foundation, created at the suggestion of the Secretary of State in connection with the U. S. policy to support the security and welfare of Berlin, is a corporate entity in Berlin established under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The State Department announced the composition of the Board and the purpose of the Foundation on December 12, 1955.<sup>1</sup> The Benjamin Franklin Foundation was created in 1955 to develop a program and construct a building in Berlin to make manifest the American tradition of free speech and free communication. In order to meet the needs of the city of Berlin for a suitable place of assemblage, a Conference Hall designed by an outstanding American architect will be erected and will constitute the participation of the U. S. Government in the Building Exposition of September 1957. The building is being financed jointly by the U. S. Government, the city of Berlin, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Foundation is charged not only with carrying through the construction of the Conference Hall but also with developing the program of use during an initial period prior to the turning over of the building to the Germans. Because this program coincides with the celebration of the 250th anniversary of the birth of Benjamin Franklin, the building will be called the Benjamin Franklin Foundation.

## **Austrian Social Security Benefits To Cover Certain U.S. Residents**

Press release 249 dated May 10

A new Austrian social security law recently went into effect which provides that individuals residing in the United States who are entitled to old-age or survivors benefits in accordance with the Austrian social security laws and who were subject to political, religious, or racial persecution during the period from March 4, 1933, to May 9, 1945, are entitled to receive generally such benefits retroactive to May 1, 1945.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 1, 1956, p. 15.



Individuals who are entitled to such retroactive benefits should file their claim as soon as possible directly with one of the following offices, depending upon the nature of their former employment in Austria:

1. Pensionsversicherungsanstalt der Angestellten (Employees Retirement Fund), Wien V, Blechturm-gasse 11, Austria.

2. Pensionsversicherungsanstalt fuer Arbeiter (Workers Retirement Fund), Wien V, Blechturm-gasse 11, Austria.

3. Versicherungsanstalt oesterr. Eisenbahnen (Insurance Association of the Austrian Railroads), Wien VI, Linke Wienzeile 48, Austria.

Persons who were insured with one of the Austrian agricultural and mining associations (Versicherungen der Landerwirtschaft und des Bergbaus) should write for information concerning retroactive benefits directly to the association by which they were insured.

## **U.S. Sending Foodstuffs to Peru To Meet Emergency**

The International Cooperation Administration announced on May 8 that the United States will provide 45,000 tons of wheat, barley, and corn and 2,000 tons of dry milk to Peru as a gift of the American people to help meet an emergency in the South American nation. These foodstuffs, which will be made available under title II of the Agricultural Trade and Development Act, have a U.S. market value of approximately \$3.6 million. Title II authorizes the use of American farm commodities for relief purposes.

An unprecedentedly severe drought and unusually early frosts in the Lake Titicaca Plateau region of southern Peru have created a serious food shortage for the 1.5 million people—most of them farmers—who live in the area. School attendance in this region has already dropped 30 percent, an indication that some families have abandoned the area to search for food.

It is estimated that harvests will drop far below normal yields. The potato yield is expected to decline 80 percent, the barley yield 40 percent, and the yield of quinoa (a high-protein, cereal-like food) by 30 percent. In addition, a forage loss of close to 2 million dry tons is expected.

Under the supervision of the Government of Peru, the U.S. foodstuffs will be distributed free

to needy persons, or sold with the proceeds to be used to help support relief projects set up by Peru to aid destitute people to remain in established communities.

Peru and the United States have worked together in technical cooperation programs since 1942. For fiscal 1956, \$2.35 million has been programmed for U.S. technical aid there.

The technical cooperation program in Peru emphasizes development of agriculture and natural resources, health and sanitation facilities, industry and mining, and education. Irrigation and community road-building projects are being increasingly stressed in order to get the greatest benefit of these programs to the rural people of Peru.

## **First Shipment of Streetcars Leaves for Korea**

Streetcars that formerly carried Los Angeles residents soon will be ringing their trolley bells thousands of miles away along the streets of Seoul and Pusan.

The International Cooperation Administration announced on May 10 that the first shipment of 15 California streetcars was expected to leave Los Angeles harbor that day for Korea. As many as 75 may be shipped eventually to rehabilitate the public transportation systems of Korea's two largest cities. Most of them will come from a Los Angeles streetcar system that has now converted to buses.

The cars are part of a Korean street-railway rehabilitation project for which the United States is providing \$1,080,000 in assistance. Included in this program are motors, generators, car-shop equipment, spare parts, and other supplies needed to bring the Seoul and Pusan traction systems back to their 1950 condition. The lines and equipment were severely damaged in the fighting against the Communist invaders.

Seoul has 30 miles of streetcar track and 135 serviceable streetcars, most of them 30 or 40 years old. This is half the number of cars operated before the Communist invasion of 1950. The number of passengers carried daily averages some 600,000 and is increasing. The street-railway system is the principal means of transportation for Seoul's 2,000,000 population, and block-long queues of men, women, and children stand for long

periods at trolley stops waiting to crowd onto the small and antiquated cars.

Similar conditions exist at Pusan, a city of 1,000,000 people, where 110,000 persons daily ride over 10 miles of track. Only 29 of Pusan's 79 cars are operable on an average day. Seventy percent of Pusan's cars are at least 20 years old.

In both cities, the deteriorated and poorly equipped car shops have not been adequate to the job of rehabilitating the obsolete and war-damaged cars without the additional equipment and supplies which are being provided under the U.S. aid program. At least 50 cars, now unusable, are to be rebuilt and put into use in the two cities. Maintenance will be improved for the newly procured cars.

About two-thirds of the American streetcars are to be sent to Seoul and one-third to Pusan. The Los Angeles cars operate on a track that is narrower than that required by the usual American car. They have a 42-inch gage, the same as the Korean gage. Most American trolleys have a 56½-inch gage.

### **Export-Import Bank Credit To Japanese Electric Company**

An \$11 million credit to the Kansai Electric Company for thermal-power development in Japan, where a severe shortage of electrical energy now prevails, was signed at the Export-Import Bank of Washington on May 10.

Samuel C. Waugh, president of Export-Import, signed the loan agreement on behalf of the bank; Shin Hory, chairman of the board of Kansai, signed for the Japanese company; and William E. Knox, president of Westinghouse Electric International Company, signed as the U. S. supplier of materials and equipment to be sold, exported, and installed with technical assistance at the new Kansai plant in Osaka.

The shortage of electrical energy now prevailing in Japan is expected to continue for about 5 years. The Kansai expansion, financed through the Eximbank loan, is part of an extensive effort by all the largest Japanese power companies to overcome the shortage with thermal-power development programs.

Japanese industry has been seriously affected by a seasonal scarcity of electrical energy, Japanese power companies being predominantly hydroelec-

tric. Moreover, land characteristics in Japan have restricted development of large reservoirs, and as a result the country has suffered serious annual curtailment of electrical energy during the dry season, December to March.

### **World Bank Loans to Norway, Burma, and Haiti**

#### **POWER PROJECT IN NORWAY**

The World Bank announced on May 3 a loan of \$25 million to Norway for hydroelectric power development. The loan will help to finance the Tokke power project, which will add 400,000 kilowatts of generating capacity to the electricity network serving southeastern Norway, including the city of Oslo. This area now consumes 55 percent of all the power produced in Norway.

Despite the rapid expansion of electric-power capacity in Norway, the supply has not kept pace with the demand; power from the Tokke project will help bring the situation into balance. The first 100,000-kilowatt unit will come into operation in 1961, and the other three before the middle of 1963. Projections of the power market in the area show that the additional power can be absorbed quickly; all of it will be sold in bulk to distributing authorities and to industry. Industries to which power from the project will be available include plants manufacturing metals, chemicals, pulp, paper, and mechanical and electrical equipment.

The total cost of the project is estimated at the equivalent of \$70 million. The bank's loan will provide \$25 million of this amount, and the remainder will be provided by the Norwegian Government partly from appropriations from general revenue and partly by the sale of bonds to counties, municipalities, power companies, and industrial users of power in southern Norway.

One of Norway's most important natural resources is its lakes and rivers which, because of the conformation of the land, can be harnessed for hydroelectric power at low cost. Only one-fifth of the power potential has thus far been developed. Norway's ability to supply power at lower costs than most other areas of the world has attracted investment, both domestic and foreign, in industries where power is a substantial cost factor,

such as the electrochemical and electrometallurgical industries. Prospects for the expansion of these industries are good; further increases in aluminum production, for example, are now under consideration. Such developments would be important to the Norwegian economy since these industries produce largely for export; metals and chemical fertilizers already account for about one-quarter of Norway's exports.

### **FIRST BANK LOANS TO BURMA**

On May 4 the World Bank announced two loans totaling \$19,350,000 for the improvement of Burma's transport system. These are the bank's first loans in Burma, and the funds will be used mainly for the reconstruction of installations and properties destroyed during World War II.

One loan of \$14 million was made to the Commissioners for the Port of Rangoon and is guaranteed by the Burmese Government. This loan will help to finance the reconstruction of cargo berths and storage facilities at the port of Rangoon and the purchase of floating equipment, such as dredges and tugs, for harbor operations. The second loan of \$5,350,000 was made to the Union of Burma. It will pay for freight cars, diesel railcars, and bridge construction materials for a rehabilitation and development program being carried out by the Burma Railways.

Improvement of transport is of high priority in the development plans of the Burmese Government. The port of Rangoon is Burma's chief seaport and handles four-fifths of the country's foreign trade. The project being financed will increase the capacity of the port, facilitate the movement of freight, shorten the turn-around time of vessels, and provide better and safer service to ships calling in port. The railways carry the bulk of Burma's passenger and freight traffic. The program being undertaken will improve the services and efficiency of the railways, especially the movement of rice, timber, and minerals destined for export.

### **3-YEAR HIGHWAY PROGRAM IN HAITI**

A loan of \$2.6 million to Haiti to help finance a 3-year highway improvement program was announced by the World Bank on May 7. Under the program a highway maintenance section will

be organized, equipped, and staffed to rehabilitate and repair 725 miles of primary and secondary roads and to provide continuing maintenance on all public highways and roads in Haiti. Improved roads will expedite the delivery of agricultural goods from farms to markets and will better serve Haiti's growing tourist industry.

The total cost of the program is estimated at the equivalent of \$3,980,000. The bank's loan will pay for the necessary imported equipment, materials, and services; the local currency costs, equivalent to \$1,380,000, will be met by the Haitian Government. The Royal Bank of Canada is participating in the loan, without the World Bank's guaranty, to the extent of \$413,000, representing the first three maturities which fall due from July 1, 1959, through July 1, 1960. This is the first time that a Canadian bank has participated in a World Bank loan.

Haiti has 1,875 miles of roads, of which all but about 325 miles are dirt roads. Most of the roads were built in the 1920's and because of inadequate maintenance have so deteriorated in places that motor travel is difficult and sometimes unsafe. The most pressing need is to put existing roads in good condition and provide for their routine maintenance; the program being undertaken with the help of the bank loan is directed toward this end.

Roads are the chief means of transport in Haiti. Because the country is predominantly agricultural, an adequate road network is essential if agricultural produce is to be marketed efficiently. At present, difficulties of road transportation greatly handicap Haitian agriculture. For the most part crops are grown by primitive methods on small farms and are carried long distances to market on women's heads and donkeys' backs. Goods are passed from smaller to larger markets in this same way. Even export crops pass through many successive and costly steps before they finally arrive at one of the two major commercial centers, Port-au-Prince or Cap-Haitien.

Remedying the difficulties of highway transport can be expected to give an incentive to increased agricultural production. It should have a beneficial effect on the Haitian economy as a whole by reducing food imports and increasing foreign exchange earnings through larger exports of Haiti's commercial crops.

## Implementing the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention With Canada

*Statement by Warren F. Looney*<sup>1</sup>

The Department of State recommends favorable consideration by your committee of H.R. 9951, H.R. 9958, and H.R. 10001, identic bills to implement the Great Lakes Fisheries Convention between the United States and Canada, which was signed at Washington September 10, 1954.<sup>2</sup> The convention has now been in effect since October 11, 1955. The United States and Canadian commissioners are already appointed<sup>3</sup> and, indeed, held their first meeting at Ottawa last week. Statutory authority such as is provided in these bills is now required in order that the United States may carry out fully the obligations incurred by it under the convention.

### **The Convention**

As the provisions of these bills can best be discussed in terms of the convention and the obligations it places upon the United States, it may be well to describe briefly the purposes and provisions of the convention.

The convention was negotiated to meet two outstanding problems of the Great Lakes fisheries which the United States or Canada acting separately cannot effectively solve. The waters of the Great Lakes are, of course, boundary waters. In the case of stocks of fish freely swimming across the international boundary between the United States and Canada, any rational conservation program requires joint action by the two countries.

<sup>1</sup>Made on May 3 before a subcommittee of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives. Mr. Looney is Deputy Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Under Secretary.

<sup>2</sup>Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3326.

<sup>3</sup>For list of U.S. commissioners, see BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 374.

The two problems of the Great Lakes fisheries are:

1. The immediate and pressing problem of the predatory sea lamprey, and
2. The need for coordinated fishery research in the lakes.

Your committee, Mr. Chairman, is well acquainted, I am sure, with the sea lamprey and its disastrous effects upon the fisheries in the upper three lakes. The lamprey, a creature about 18 inches long and looking like an eel, lives by affixing its snout to a fish and subsisting on the blood and body juices of its host. Originally a salt-water species, it acclimated itself eons ago in Lake Ontario. For centuries Niagara Falls blocked its passage westward. It appeared, however, in the upper lakes in the 1930's, presumably having made its way through the Welland Canal, which bypasses Niagara Falls. Lake Erie, itself not congenial for lamprey populations, did, however, provide the lamprey with a means of transit to Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior.

Unfortunately this predator attacks most readily the lake trout and whitefish. The history of its westward movement and the proof of its destructive power can be read in a few figures. A lamprey spawning run was first found in Lake Huron in 1934. In 1936 the first lamprey was taken in Lake Michigan. Here is what happened. In 1935 United States fishermen took in Lake Huron 1,743,000 pounds of lake trout; in 1941 they took only half as much—842,000 pounds; in 1951 they caught less than 50 pounds. In Lake Michigan the United States catch of lake trout in 1943 was 6,800,000 pounds; in 1946, 3,974,000 pounds; in 1952, 3,000 pounds. The lake trout fisheries in Huron and Michigan have vanished.

The loss in lake trout to American commercial fishermen alone is \$3,500,000 per year in these two lakes. A similar depressing story could be told of the whitefish fisheries in those two lakes.

Lake Superior, being to the westward, is now feeling the brunt of the lamprey attack. The average annual United States and Canadian catch of Superior trout in modern times was 4,400,000 pounds. By 1954 this had fallen to 3,472,000 pounds, and the 1955 catch is estimated at less than 3,000,000 pounds. If the Superior trout fishery is also destroyed, the States of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin will lose a further \$1.3 million in catch.

Eleven political entities share research work on the lakes fisheries: the eight Great Lakes States and our Federal Government on one side of the border; the Canadian Federal Government and the Province of Ontario on the other. That this research should be coordinated in order to multiply its benefits without a corresponding increase in costs seems a wise move. Problems in the lakes fisheries, which expanded and coordinated research can attack and probably solve, are numerous. For example, trash fish have, year after year, been supplanting the more desirable species. Again, although year-to-year poundage overall remains fairly constant, radical changes in catch by species occur. Until such trends are accounted for and anticipated, the commercial fisherman must operate on a hit-or-miss basis in planning his year's operations.

#### **Mechanics of the Convention**

The convention provides for a bilateral Great Lakes Fishery Commission to be composed of a United States and a Canadian Section, each of not more than three members appointed by the respective parties. Each Section has one vote, and all actions of the Commission require unanimous vote.

The Commission has the following duties:

- (a) to formulate research programs designed to determine what, if any, conservation measures are needed;
- (b) to coordinate research under such programs;
- (c) to recommend measures to the parties; and
- (d) to formulate and implement a comprehensive program for the purpose of abating the lamprey population.

The Commission is authorized to conduct investigations and to take measures and install devices in the Great Lakes and the tributaries thereof for lamprey control. In carrying out its duties, the Commission is required, insofar as feasible, to make use of the official agencies of the parties and of their Provinces and States.

#### **No Regulatory Power Granted by Convention**

It is to be noted that no regulatory power over fishing operations is vested by the convention in the Commission. While research may well point the way to possible conservation measures, such measures can only be recommended by the Commission to the party Governments.

#### **Provisions of H.R. 9951, H.R. 9958, and H.R. 10001**

Section 2 provides definitions which, it is believed, are self-explanatory.

Section 3 provides for the appointment of three United States Commissioners by the President. These are to serve without compensation and at the pleasure of the President. It is required that, of the three Commissioners, one shall be an official of the United States Government and two shall be persons residing in Great Lakes States (but not in the same State), duly qualified by reason of knowledge of the lakes fisheries.

Section 4 provides for the appointment of an advisory committee for each of the Great Lakes, on which each State bordering on the lake shall be represented by not more than four members, and places the power of appointment in the United States Section. Section 4 also provides for certain privileges of the advisory committee members.

In connection with sections 3 and 4, it is to be noted that the procedures of appointment and other provisions follow generally the precedents of our other international fisheries commissions, of which there are six: Halibut, Sockeye Salmon, Whaling, Northwest Atlantic, Inter-American Tropical Tuna, and North Pacific Fisheries Commissions.

Section 5 is a conflict-of-interests provision.

Sections 6 and 7 vest authority in the three United States Commissioners on the one hand, and in the Secretary of the Interior on the other, to carry out the lamprey control program. With reference to the operations of this program, the techniques thus far developed to control the lamprey aim toward preventing their ingress into

spawning streams. This is accomplished by erecting electric or mechanical barriers across the potential spawning streams. The lamprey in the fifth year of life returns from the lake to a stream—not necessarily its natal stream—to spawn and die. Since the lamprey cannot, so far as we know, successfully spawn in the lakes, it is only necessary to deny them access to the streams to prevent future generations.

The control devices are installed in a stream quite near to the mouth. Normally each device (except a barrier dam) will require about 50 linear feet of stream bed, plus a strip 10 feet wide on either bank, plus an acquisition road. Land acquisition powers are required, therefore, and these are vested in the United States Section by section 6(a), whereby the United States Section is authorized to acquire interests in land on behalf of the United States. Sections 6(b) and (c) authorize the United States Section to construct, operate, and maintain any lamprey control project and to contract with any State or other public agency or private agency or individual for such type of work.

As this committee knows, the Fish and Wildlife Service for the past several years has had the sea lamprey under investigation and for this purpose has erected 70-odd devices in streams in the upper lakes. Section 7(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to transfer to the United States Section all such devices. Section 7(b) is a very important provision whereby the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to act for and on behalf of the Section in carrying out the Section's powers. It is intended by this provision to establish the procedure whereby land acquisition, construction, operation, and maintenance of the devices and, where necessary, the contracting out of such work will be performed by the Secretary of the Interior on behalf of the United States Section. This procedure makes use of existing staff and methods and obviates the necessity of establishing an international staff to carry out functions in this country for the accomplishment of which Federal agencies are already well equipped. For any duties so carried out by the Department of the Interior, it will be reimbursed by the International Commission.

Section 8. The electrical devices used to bar entry of lampreys to the streams could, in some circumstances, it is believed, kill or seriously injure a human being. Animals as large as deer have been killed by the present devices. Section 8,

which makes the United States Section an agency of the United States within the meaning of those provisions of title 28, U.S. Code, relating to tort claims and procedures, is designed to utilize present Federal procedures should a claim arise out of the operation of a device. It should be added that all devices will be adequately fenced and otherwise protected and that no claims have thus far been made against the Fish and Wildlife Service under its present program. It should also be added that, while the International Commission itself has the power under the convention to erect and install barriers in the territories of the United States and Canada, it is the Department's intention to arrange for such operations to be carried out in the United States only through the United States Section.

Section 9 requires appropriate notice to be given by the United States Section to the States concerned before approving a proposal to utilize any lamprey control measure or device in a stream. Thirty days' notice is specified. It is felt that this is sufficient time in which to indicate objection if any exists.

Section 10. As stated above, the convention confers no authority to regulate fishing operations. The Commission is, however, by article IV(c) given the duty of recommending to the contracting parties conservation measures on the basis of its research findings. Section 10 places upon the Secretary of State the duty of transmitting such recommendations to the Governor of each Great Lakes State.

Section 11 authorizes Federal agencies to cooperate with the United States Section. In lamprey control activities they may do this on a reimbursable or other basis.

Sections 13 and 14 are standard provisions relating respectively to appropriations and to the applicability of the remaining provisions of the act in the event any provision is invalid.

#### **Consultation With States and Public**

In the summer and fall of 1955 the Department consulted with conservation officials of the eight Great Lakes States, as well as representatives of the fishing industry of the area, concerning implementing legislation. The proposed legislation sent by Acting Secretary Hoover to the Speaker on March 12, 1956, substantially expressed the provisions of legislation on which there was general

agreement with the affected interests in the area. As stated in Mr. Hoover's letter to the Speaker, however:

The proposed legislation is, to the best of the Department's knowledge, non-controversial. With regard to Sections 3 and 4, however, it is the Department's understanding that the fishing industry and conservation interests in the Great Lakes States prefer language that would require (a) that one of the two Commissioners residing in the Great Lakes States be a conservation official of one of the Great Lakes States, and (b) that appointments from any State to the advisory committees be made by the Governor of that State. The intent of Sections 3 and 4 as worded in the proposed legislation is to retain in the President and the United States Section flexibility in making appointments which experience has proved to be necessary in the administration of Federal programs.

### **Need for Early Action on H.R. 9951**

The Great Lakes Fishery Commission is already in existence, the United States Commissioners having been appointed by the President last February and the Canadian Commissioners by the Canadian Government some weeks previously. The Commission held its first meeting in Ottawa April 23 through 25, 1956. It is now ready to launch its program for the rehabilitation of the whitefish and lake-trout fisheries and to build up a coordinated and expanded system of research. The necessary Canadian legislation has been passed and Canadian appropriations made available. There only remains the passage of United States implementing legislation and United States appropriations for the fiscal year 1957.

The Department believes the passage of H.R. 9951 will serve the interests of the United States and requests the committee's favorable consideration of the bill.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **84th Congress, 2d Session**

Financing of Aswan High Dam in Egypt. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. January 26, 1956. 26 pp.

Scope of Soviet Activity in the United States. Hearing Before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part 6, March 6, 1956. 82 pp.

Address of the Honorable John A. Costello, Prime Minister of Ireland, delivered before the Senate of the United States and distinguished guests March 15, 1956, together

with the Fitzpatrick Letters of 1777-1778. S. Doc. 104. 17 pp.

Transportation on Canadian Vessels to and Within Alaska. Report to accompany S. 3269. S. Rept. 1666, March 19, 1956. 3 pp.

Mutual Security Program. Message from the President relative to the mutual security program. H. Doc. 358, March 19, 1956. 8 pp.

Proposed Appropriations for Mutual Security. Communication from the President transmitting proposed appropriations for the fiscal year 1957, in the amount of \$4,859,975,000, for mutual security. H. Doc. 360, March 20, 1956. 6 pp.

Extending Greetings to Pakistan. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 223. H. Rept. 1927, March 20, 1956. 2 pp.

Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1956. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3481, a bill to amend the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, and for other purposes. March 21, 1956. 42 pp.

Authorizing the Loan of Two Submarines to the Government of Brazil. Report to accompany H. R. S100. S. Rept. 1708, March 22, 1956. 4 pp.

Inventory Report on Real Property Owned by the United States in United States Territories and Possessions and in Foreign Countries as of June 30, 1955, prepared by General Services Administration at the request of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. S. Doc. 109, March 27, 1956. 99 pp.

Constitutional Amendment Relative to Treaties and Executive Agreements. Report together with individual views to accompany S. J. Res. 1. S. Rept. 1716, March 27, 1956. 31 pp.

Protocol Relating to Certain Amendments to the Convention on International Aviation. Report to accompany Executive F, 84th Congress, 2d Session. S. Exec. Rept. 4, March 28, 1956. 3 pp.

Report on the Tenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by Hon. Brooks Hays, Arkansas, and Hon. Chester E. Merrow, New Hampshire, of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to H. Res. 91. H. Rept. 1980, March 29, 1956. 111 pp.

United States Technical Assistance in Latin America. Fourteenth Intermediate Report of the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 1985, March 29, 1956. 36 pp.

Convention Concerning Customs Facilities for Touring and Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles. Report to accompany Executives A and B, 84th Cong., 2d sess. Exec. Rept. 5, April 11, 1956. 9 pp.

Constitutional Amendment Relative to Treaties and Executive Agreements. Individual views of Mr. Hennings to accompany S. J. Res. 1. S. Rept. 1716, Part 2, April 11, 1956. 5 pp.

Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1956. Report to accompany S. 3481. S. Rept. 1726, April 11, 1956. 22 pp.

Eleventh Semiannual Report of United States Advisory Commission on Information. H. Doc. 376, April 11, 1956. 31 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Report to accompany H. R. 9952. H. Rept. 1998, April 12, 1956. 5 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93 and S. Res. 185. Part 6, April 12, 1956. 37 pp.

The Agreement on the Organization for Trade Cooperation. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H. R. 5550, a bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 with respect to the administration of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. H. Rept. 2007, April 18, 1956. 211 pp.

Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Fiscal Year 1957. Report to accompany H. R. 10721. H. Rept. 2021, April 20, 1956. 23 pp.

## Problems Relating to the Economic and Legal Regime of the High Seas

### INTER-AMERICAN SPECIALIZED CONFERENCE ON CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES: CONTINENTAL SHELF AND MARINE WATERS, CIUDAD TRUJILLO, MARCH 15-28

The Inter-American Specialized Conference on Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Marine Waters was held at Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic, March 15-28, 1956, in accordance with decisions made by the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas in 1954 and the Council of the Organization of American States earlier this year. At this conference the American Republics for the first time had an opportunity to consider as a whole the problems relating to the economic and legal regime of the high seas in the light of scientific knowledge.

Delegations from 20 American Republics participated, Bolivia being absent. The U.S. delegation was headed by Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Other delegates were: John C. Dreier, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, vice chairman of the delegation; William C. Herrington, Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Under Secretary of State; Ralph L. Miller, U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior; and William Sanders, Counselor of Embassy, Santiago, Chile. Advisers from the Departments of State, Navy, and Interior were likewise included on the U.S. delegation. Delegations from other countries also included diplomats, jurists, and scientists.

The composition of the U.S. delegation represented one measure of the importance which this Government attributed to the Ciudad Trujillo conference. A growing movement among some Latin American countries to extend their territorial waters far out into the high seas had been for some time a major concern of the United States. Disputes with some other American Re-

publics over fishing rights on the high seas further contributed to the significance of the deliberations at Ciudad Trujillo. Finally, the action taken by the Inter-American Council of Jurists regarding territorial waters and related matters at its third meeting at Mexico City, January 17-February 4, 1956, had created problems of both a political and a legal character for the United States.<sup>1</sup>

#### Organization of the Conference

Meeting in the attractive new building of the Dominican Congress, now in the midst of the International Fair, the conference was opened by Hector B. Trujillo, President of the Dominican Republic. The Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic, Porfirio Herrera Báez, was unanimously selected chairman of the conference.

Three working committees were established: Committee I on the continental shelf, Committee II on marine waters, and Committee III to take up other subjects. It was understood that Committees I and II would discuss the technical and economic problems associated with their respective subjects. In the meantime, the heads of all delegations met informally under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister to consider ways and means of dealing with the complex and controversial juridical questions associated with both the continental shelf and marine waters.

In approaching the juridical problems the delegates had before them the several drafts of the

<sup>1</sup> For background on this conference, see BULLETIN OF Feb. 20, 1956, p. 296. For an article on the Santiago Negotiations on Fishery Conservation Problems Among Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and the United States, see *ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1025.



International Law Commission of the United Nations on the Regime of the High Seas and the Regime of the Territorial Sea. The Inter-American Council of Jurists at Mexico City had adopted a resolution<sup>2</sup> which that Council had termed a "preparatory study" for the Ciudad Trujillo conference. Finally, the conference had before it specific draft resolutions submitted by the delegations of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, dealing primarily with the continental shelf, while the United States had advanced through its embassies in the Latin American capitals certain suggestions regarding the type of resolution which might be adopted.

In view of the controversial nature of many of these juridical questions, the heads of delegations, adopting the practice often encountered in inter-American meetings, determined to continue informal, private meetings where these problems and the method of treating them could be discussed frankly and fully without the handicaps that would accompany a dramatic public debate. A common understanding was early reached in these conversations to adopt a policy of seeking agreement on all questions which lent themselves to agreement at that time and to define and state important issues on which agreement could not be reached. This decision implied a desire to abstain from forcing through decisions by majority votes on issues of vital importance to all countries, and an intention on the contrary to call for further study and consideration of the issues in disagreement, with a view to seeking an ultimate accommodation of different viewpoints in the traditional spirit of inter-American cooperation.

#### **Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo**

After certain preliminary discussion the heads of delegations agreed to take as a working paper the draft of a resolution which had been submitted by the United States to the various Foreign Offices, because this draft was the most comprehensive and was the only one that had been available for study in all the Foreign Offices prior to the conference. Working in daily sessions the heads of delegations developed a resolution which subsequently was introduced in Committee III and adopted by unanimous agreement, under the title of "Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo," as the principal declaration of the conference in the ju-

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 298.

ridical and political field.<sup>3</sup> The resolution deals with three main substantive areas: continental shelf, marine resources, and territorial waters.

The continental shelf represented the least controversial subject dealt with in the resolution. There was no opposition to the principle that the sea bottom and subsoil of the continental shelf belong to the coastal state. In determining the areas which should be recognized as being under the jurisdiction and control of the coastal state, however, the conference adopted as one alternative the principle of exploitability, thus suggesting that states might extend their jurisdiction and control over the shelf even beyond the 200-meter-depth line—the line proposed in the 1953 report of the International Law Commission—if the resources could be practically exploited.

The conference concluded that it was not possible to reach agreement on the juridical regime governing the waters over the submarine areas recognized as being under the jurisdiction of the coastal state. Nor was the issue resolved as to which of the benthonic species go with the sea bottom and which with the superjacent waters.

With respect to the conservation of marine resources, the conference recognized the great desirability of promoting cooperation among states for the achievement of the optimum sustainable yield of living resources of the high seas and stated that this cooperation could best be achieved through agreements among the states directly interested. While the conference agreed on recognizing a "special interest" of the coastal state in the continued productivity of the resources of the seas off its coast and beyond its territorial waters, it was not possible to agree on any definition of this interest or of the rights that might flow therefrom.

The U.S. delegation offered to include in the resolution a statement that the adjacent coastal state should have the right—

to participate in any programs for the conservation of fishery resources off its coast, and the right, in clearly defined circumstances of urgent necessity, where a conservation agreement with other interested states cannot be reached, to adopt reasonable emergency conservation measures, subject to adequate safeguards for other states against arbitrary or discriminatory action, including procedures for the settlement of differences.

It was urged by some other delegations that the coastal state should be given virtual jurisdic-

<sup>3</sup> For text, see annex 1.

tion over fisheries to an indeterminate extent off its coast, subject only to certain broad principles of action which would, however, be interpreted unilaterally by each government exercising such control. However, neither of these formulas proved to be generally acceptable.

In attempting to clarify the concept of conservation, the U.S. delegation took a position in support of the definition of the objectives of conservation approved by the U.N. International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, held at Rome in 1955.<sup>4</sup> While all other governments represented at Ciudad Trujillo had likewise supported that definition, an effort was made at Ciudad Trujillo to introduce into this essentially scientific concept some inadequately defined social and economic objectives. The impossibility of reaching an agreement on this modification of the Rome conference concept was noted in the resolution.

It was clear that little advantage was to be gained from a debate on the subject of the breadth of the territorial sea. The strongly held differences of view among the various countries were well known. Consequently, the conference merely stated that there existed a diversity of positions among the states on this subject and left it for future consideration. The final paragraph of the resolution calls for continued diligence by the governments in considering the problems on which agreement had not been reached with a view to finding adequate solutions.

### Technical Discussions

A large number of technical papers were presented and discussed in the meetings of Committees I and II. In the former, special attention was given to the need for further information regarding the continental shelf and its resources. The relationship of the shelf to the land mass, technical problems involved with the exploitation of its resources, and problems associated with cables and pipelines were among the subjects receiving special consideration. A strong tendency was manifest to adopt the term "terrace" (*zócalo*) for the submarine land areas under discussion, since it included not only the surface of the continental shelf but also the slope and the land mass underneath as well. Great interest was shown in the

<sup>4</sup>For the report of the Rome conference, see U.N. doc. A/Conf. 10/5/Rev. 2.

technical possibilities of exploiting resources of the slope even beyond the depth of 200 meters.

In Committee II papers on oceanography, marine biology, and specific fishery problems were of special importance. The committee rapporteur, in his report, noted particularly the discussion over the "biome" concept, during which differing viewpoints were expressed by the delegations of Chile and the United States. While the Chilean representative supported the concept of the biome as a valid basis for studying the living resources of the sea, the U.S. delegation presented the view that because of the unsuitability of the biome concept to the ocean (unless the ocean as a whole is considered as one biome) and because specific fishery problems are associated with stocks of fish that frequently move through wide areas of the ocean, the biome concept does not serve as a suitable basis for fishery conservation studies.

Committee III, in addition to approving the Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo, also adopted a resolution concerning the establishment of an Inter-American Oceanographic Institute. Based largely on a proposal submitted by the delegation of Mexico, the resolution calls upon the Council of the Organization of American States to continue and accelerate its studies on the possibility of establishing such an institute in accordance with resolution LXXXIV of the Caracas conference. The resolution, moreover, makes various suggestions concerning the scope and nature of the institute, recommending that it consist not only of a central headquarters but also of a number of subregional branches responsible for carrying on extensive programs of research in problems of the living resources of the sea. The conference in this resolution also urged the Pan American Institute of Geography and History to carry forward its work of coordinating oceanographic studies. The practical possibility of actually setting up in the near future an institute of the scope indicated in the resolution, and involving the expense which such an organization would entail, was recognized by many delegations as being extremely limited.

In the final meeting of the conference, various delegations took the opportunity to state the views of their governments on subjects which had been discussed in connection with the Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo and particularly those on which agreement had not been reached. Some delegations advanced the view, directly or indirectly,

that the work of the Ciudad Trujillo conference left untouched the Resolution of Mexico City on territorial waters and related matters. In view of these and other expressions of opinion the U.S. delegation included in the Final Act a brief statement on these questions, which pointed out, among other things, that the Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo constitutes the latest and most authoritative expression of the Organization of American States on the subjects referred to therein.<sup>5</sup>

## ANNEX 1

### RESOLUTION OF CIUDAD TRUJILLO

The Inter-American Specialized Conference on "Conservation of Natural Resources: Continental Shelf and Marine Waters",

#### CONSIDERING:

That the Council of the Organization of American States, in fulfillment of Resolution LXXXIV of the Tenth Inter-American Conference held in Caracas in March 1954, convoked this Inter-American Specialized Conference "for the purpose of studying as a whole the different aspects of the juridical and economic system governing the submarine shelf, oceanic waters, and their natural resources in the light of present-day scientific knowledge"; and

That the Conference has carried out the comprehensive study that was assigned to it,

#### I

#### RESOLVES:

To submit for consideration by the American States the following conclusions:

1. The sea-bed and subsoil of the continental shelf, continental and insular terrace, or other submarine areas, adjacent to the coastal state, outside the area of the territorial sea, and to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the sea-bed and subsoil, appertain exclusively to that state and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.

2. Agreement does not exist among the states here represented with respect to the juridical regime of the waters which cover said submarine areas nor with respect to the problem of whether certain living resources belong to the sea-bed or to the superjacent waters.

3. Cooperation among states is of the utmost desirability to achieve the optimum sustainable yield of the living resources of the high seas, bearing in mind the continued productivity of all species.

4. Cooperation in the conservation of the living resources of the high seas may be achieved most effectively through agreements among the states directly interested in such resources.

<sup>5</sup> For text of the U.S. statement, see annex 2. Copies of the Final Act of the conference may be obtained from the Pan American Union, Washington 6, D.C.

5. In any event, the coastal state has a special interest in the continued productivity of the living resources of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea.

6. Agreement does not exist among the states represented at this Conference either with respect to the nature and scope of the special interest of the coastal state or as to how the economic and social factors which such state or other interested states may invoke should be taken into account in evaluating the purposes of conservation programs.

7. There exists a diversity of positions among the states represented at this Conference with respect to the breadth of the territorial sea.

#### II

Therefore, this Conference does not express an opinion concerning the positions of the various participating states on the matters on which agreement has not been reached and

#### RECOMMENDS:

That the American States continue diligently with the consideration of the matters referred to in paragraphs 2, 6, and 7 of this Resolution with a view to reaching adequate solutions.

## ANNEX 2

### STATEMENT FOR FINAL ACT OF THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

In view of certain statements made by other Delegations at the final Plenary Session of this Conference on March 27, or inserted in this Final Act, the Delegation of the United States of America wishes to record the following statements:

(a) The Government of the United States does not recognize a right on the part of a coastal state, as claimed by certain Delegations, to exclusive control over the resources of the high seas. The United States maintains that, in accordance with international law, fishery regulations adopted by one state cannot be imposed on nationals of other states on the high seas except by agreement of the governments concerned. Moreover, the United States Delegation also wishes to record the fact that it made a specific proposal for the Conference which would, if adopted, effectively meet the conservation problem that would be posed in the event of failure of the interested states, including the coastal state, to reach agreement on the need for and application of conservation measures.

(b) The Government of the United States does not recognize that a state has competence to determine the breadth of its territorial sea apart from international law.

(c) The Delegation of the United States also wishes to call attention to the fact that broader consideration having been given at this Conference than at any previous inter-American meeting to the various aspects of the subjects on its agenda, the present Resolution of Ciudad Trujillo constitutes the latest and most authoritative expression of the Organization of American States on the subjects discussed therein.

## The Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency

by James J. Wadsworth

Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

We are now at an auspicious point in the long road of International Atomic Energy Agency negotiations. For the first time we can see clearly a path ahead that leads to the actual establishment of an agency and the beginning of its useful work. The steps which are before us are clear-cut—there will be a world conference opening in late September at United Nations Headquarters in New York, which we hope will conclude by approving a statute and opening it for signature. Then a preparatory commission, composed of the 12-nation negotiating group with 6 other states to be elected by the world conference, will begin advance planning for the agency, at the same time that the statute is being ratified by the signatory nations. By the middle of next year the necessary 18 states may have ratified the statute and a first general conference of the agency can be called to complete election of the first board of governors. Then the agency's work can start in earnest.

The goal is thus to have the agency begin its work a little over a year from now. Each of the steps which I have outlined could, of course, run into difficulties and lead to delays, but the schedule is a feasible one and we intend to bend every effort to seeing that it is met. We could hardly have been so confident last fall, despite the unanimous vote in the United Nations General Assembly in favor of the "atoms-for-peace" resolution.<sup>2</sup> There

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<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Nuclear Energy Writers Association at New York, N. Y., on May 9 (U.S./U.N. press release 2411 dated May 8). Ambassador Wadsworth represented the United States in the 12-nation group which negotiated the draft statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1030. For text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Nov. 14, 1955, p. 801.

was then no real agreement as to what the agency statute should be, and there had been much frank criticism and open expression of suspicion of the motives of the original negotiating group of eight, as well as a number of general objections voiced by the Soviet Union, the significance of which was uncertain.

Now we have a draft statute unanimously approved by the expanded 12-nation negotiating group.<sup>3</sup> We have also passed successfully a crucial test of the sincerity of the desire to reach agreement which was voiced in the General Assembly last fall.

### Genuine Desire for Agreement

I believe that the most promising factor of the negotiations just concluded was the spirit of cooperation which prevailed among the 12 delegations representing the major areas and political viewpoints of the world. There was a general desire for agreement which was not the synthetic cooperation which pretends that difficulties don't exist and shoves problems to one side. It was the more realistic spirit which frankly recognizes all kinds of opposition and works to reconcile them in a mutually acceptable solution. If we can continue this same effort to reconcile disagreements in the world conference and during the labor of planning and establishing the agency, the hopeful schedule which I have outlined can become a reality.

I think that some people lost hope and became

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<sup>3</sup> For text of draft statute, see *ibid.*, May 14, 1956, p. 819; for final communique at conclusion of 12-nation talks, see *ibid.*, Apr. 30, 1956, p. 729.

cynical about the proposed agency in the 2½ years since President Eisenhower's speech of December 8, 1953, before the United Nations General Assembly. Those whose hope is weakened are, I believe, those who expected too much. The time that has been taken in these negotiations has not been unreasonable. We are dealing with a new and complex science which is only now moving from the laboratory of the scientists to the drawing boards of the engineers. The first practical application of this new science has been to military purposes, and the new emphasis on peaceful uses has had to proceed cautiously. Furthermore, we have tried to make the establishment of this agency the occasion for a new understanding between the East and the West in our divided world. We have thus undertaken an extremely complex and arduous task with many political and technical aspects. Much careful work, much exploration of the problems and of the varying views of many nations has had to go into laying the foundation for a solid and practicable agency.

#### **What the Agency Will Do**

Now that we can foresee an agency coming into existence at a fairly definite time, the natural question is: What will this agency do?

One answer to this question can be found by looking at the functions authorized in the new draft statute published on April 25. The work of the agency will be devoted to accelerating and enlarging "the contribution of atomic energy to the peace, health, and prosperity of the world." Specifically, the agency will have authority to do the following things:

1. To encourage and assist research and development and peaceful application of atomic energy;
2. To perform any operation or service useful in achieving its general purposes;
3. To make provision for atomic materials for atomic research and application;
4. To foster the exchange of scientific and technical information;
5. To encourage the exchange of scientists and experts;
6. To establish and administer safeguards;
7. To establish and apply health and safety standards; and
8. To acquire or establish plants and facilities necessary to carry out these functions.

The potential scope of work of the agency is thus extremely broad—it can do almost anything found useful by its members in the peaceful application of atomic energy. The actual extent of what it does will depend, of course, on the decisions of the members, expressed through the governing organs of the agency, as to just which of these authorized functions should be performed. These decisions will be made on the basis of such practical considerations as the costs the members are willing to bear and the adequacy of available facilities or channels of supply. I will not try to predict in detail the extent to which the agency initially will make use of all its powers. It is particularly difficult to assume that it will be found advantageous to set up agency research facilities and to have the agency perform certain potentially valuable services such as the processing of materials.

It is clear that there are some things which an agency with broad membership can do better than any more informal or bilateral arrangement. These include the systematic exchange of information on a worldwide basis, the establishment of uniform health and safety standards, the exchange of information about research underway to enable nations to avoid costly duplication, the inventorying of available resources, and the authoritative evaluation of the economic aspects of nuclear power.

The field of useful activity is thus very large, and, as I look at the work to be done, I have no doubt that the agency will make an important contribution from the beginning of its work. Indeed the difficulty will be to decide how the resources which the members agree to make available can be apportioned to meet the needs.

#### **Why We Need an Agency To Do This Work**

I have said that the agency will find much useful work to do. Some people have asked, however, why we should turn to an international agency to do this work.

I think this is an important question. The establishment of an international agency is a difficult task and the conduct of the work of any large international body is fraught with difficulties. But we can achieve things through an agency which we could not hope to attain in other ways.

The most important of these is indicated by the President's original speech before the United Nations. That speech dealt with the peaceful uses

of atomic energy, but, even more important, it dealt with the reviving of hopes for broad cooperation and relaxation of tension in the world. At that time the President spoke of his proposal as possibly a "new channel for peaceful discussion" which might lead the way out of the frustrations and inertia of other negotiations. If our concern were solely with spreading the benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to other countries, we could perhaps achieve this equally well through expansion of our system of bilateral agreements. By bilateral or regional arrangements, we could make materials or technology available to any friendly country in a position to benefit. Our vision, however, is of cooperation in atomic energy as a bridge and an avenue to peace. To achieve this broader vision, we must build an organization in which we can enlist nations of diverse political views and stages of development.

A second major reason for promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy through an international agency is the crucial task of safeguarding expanding peaceful atomic energy activities throughout the world. From the first consideration of this problem of control and safeguards, in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946 and 1947, the seriousness and difficulty of the task has been recognized. Put simply, the difficulty is that, at the same time that atomic power is produced, fissionable material usable in weapons is produced by the same reaction. Every atomic power plant is thus a weapons-material producing plant. This duality in the use of atomic energy has led to the conclusion that there must be effective safeguards if the growing peaceful use of atomic energy is not to lead to mutual suspicion and tensions and the development of military stockpiles in many nations. The safeguards must also include careful regulation of health and safety conditions.

If safeguards and controls are to be reliable and thus give reassurance to nations who rely on them, these safeguards must be effective and uniform. Ultimately, there must be a comprehensive system uniformly applied. This has been our objective in the framing of the statute of the Atomic Energy Agency, and this is one of the basic reasons why such an agency is essential as part of our efforts to maintain world peace.

Another important aspect of the control problem is the practical importance of linking control activities with creative work in the promotion of the

peaceful uses of atomic energy. An agency which was simply an inspecting organization, an atomic police force, would have a negative role and from the start would be doomed to failure. Nations would understandably resent such supervision. Control and inspection in themselves would be unlikely to be successful if they were applied by men without the technical knowledge and the interest in peaceful programs that will enable them to understand and supervise the dangerous processes. Competent men could never be obtained and kept interested in an organization with only policing functions. They must have the satisfaction of working in an organization where the necessary safeguarding activity is intimately linked up with the achievement of the beneficial goals of a peaceful atomic energy program.

Furthermore, the safeguarding and control measures which are necessary must, to be effective, have the full assent and support of each nation whose atomic energy project is subject to inspection. I believe that this can only be achieved if the safeguards are administered by an international body in which each inspected nation has a voice. The burdens and intrusions of inspection and control will be palatable and can be accepted if a nation has participated in establishing these controls and has voluntarily accepted the intrusions.

#### **Sense of Common Interest**

In speaking thus about the importance of a voluntary acceptance of the responsibilities of safeguarding the peaceful development of atomic energy, I have touched on the final reason why an international agency is important. There are other burdens which must be accepted. The peaceful application of atomic energy at present is in good part a burden rather than an economic benefit. Great tasks lie ahead of the world's scientists and engineers before the full benefits of atomic energy are made available to underdeveloped and advanced nations alike. Participation in the agency should do much to create more awareness and appreciation of these difficulties among nations. By a common approach to the solution of the difficult technical and organizing problems, we can hope to draw on the resources of all countries.

In the discussion in the last United Nations General Assembly, there was an undercurrent of enthusiasm which grew out of the general aware-

ness of the importance of this agency for all countries. In this common enthusiasm the differences between the stages of technical development of the various countries lost their importance. The underdeveloped and the industrialized countries alike saw a richer and more prosperous future as a result of atomic energy and saw the agency as an organization in which each could contribute to realize that future.

The word which the spokesmen of the various nations used to describe this sense of common interest was "equality." I can illustrate this by quoting from the remarks of the Indonesian spokesman [Abu Hanifah]. He said—and you will note the unanimity of view with the Netherlands—

Of at least equal importance for us is that the International Atomic Energy Agency be based on the principle of equality. . . . In this new atomic revolution international cooperation must stand for the narrowing of the ever-widening gap between the industrialized and the under-industrialized countries. It must manifest itself in the full realization and acknowledgment that all nations have something to contribute and to receive in return. Indeed, in warning against placing any undue emphasis upon existing differences between countries which are contributors of technological means and fissionable materials and those which are not, I can do no better than to quote from the excellent statement made on this subject by the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Schurmann. He said: "Application of the first principle of real and effective international cooperation demands that the cooperation should take place, so far as possible, on a basis of equality. The Agency should, therefore, be set up in such a way that instead of emphasizing the difference between the countries that have at their disposal the material and technological means for the practical use of atomic science and those which are still deficient in either of these two respects, it should embody the common and equal interest of all countries in this venture."

To us in the United States it may appear paradoxical to say that an atomic energy agency should be established on the basis of equality. We are keenly aware of the tremendous gap in resources and in technical capability among the countries of the world and of how much the success of the agency must initially depend on the support of a relatively few nations. We have, I think rightly, argued that the management of the agency must take advantage of the experience and technical ability of the advanced countries and give them a special voice in decisions.

Yet, I believe that this principle of equality, rightly understood, is fundamentally sound. Our objective is to bring home to every country the

importance of atomic energy as a resource for the peace and well-being of humanity; this we can only do if those countries play a positive role, making in each case such contribution as is possible. I believe that all countries can make some contribution to help others in this new program and can join enthusiastically in this work without having to swallow their pride as beneficiaries and dependents solely. I think that national pride is a good and useful trait, and the fact that many countries through such pride insist on assuming the responsibilities of members in this agency rather than simply receiving assistance augurs well for the health of the agency.

### **Responsibility for Controls**

This principle of equality means also that each member must assume responsibility to see that the agency works and, in particular, to see that the agency's safeguards are operated effectively. The problem of controlling atomic energy concerns every nation which hopes to enjoy the benefits, and each member should share responsibility for the administration of adequate IAEA controls. I was interested to see in the last General Assembly how many spokesmen referred to the gravity of the problem of control out of an awareness that the military and the peaceful applications of atomic energy can never be far apart. By administering the necessary safeguards and controls through an agency in which all members have some voice, the charge is avoided that these controls are imposed by the "have" countries on the "have not" countries. Instead, they will be voluntarily undertaken by all countries who benefit from the agency's work. Thus, these safeguards will, as they should, be administered in the mutual interest of all peaceful states.

This spreading realization that the problem of control of atomic energy concerns the security of every nation is a good thing. It is a conviction which the United States has long expressed. It is reflected in our Atomic Energy Act, which forbids export of fissionable materials except under guaranties that such materials will not be used for any military purpose. The act also provides for tight restrictions on the exchange of sensitive atomic energy data until "effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established by an international arrangement."

These restrictions are not because we wish to withhold atomic materials and technology from other nations. On the contrary, we believe our atomic energy achievements should benefit other countries as well. But we also believe that necessary safeguards must accompany the peaceful development of atomic energy. We have taken just this position in the negotiations for the agency.

You will recall that President Eisenhower in his 1953 address spoke of allocations "to the extent permitted by elementary prudence." More recently, the same policy was restated in the President's announcement that 20,000 kilograms of uranium 235 have been made available for distribution outside the United States.<sup>4</sup> The President's statement emphasized that the United States welcomes progress toward creation of the international agency and will cooperate with it when it comes into existence. He emphasized also that "distribution of special nuclear material will be subject to prudent safeguards against diversion of the materials to nonpeaceful purposes." In this spirit we have urged that adequate safeguards be incorporated in the draft statute for the agency. If the present safeguarding provisions are retained in the final text, and if these provisions are applied effectively by the agency's board of governors, then conditions will be created in which it will be possible for the United States to be as generous in supplying materials for the agency as we would like to be.

The technical and political role of the agency which I have outlined for you in a speculative way is a large and important one. There is one other possibility which we must always bear in mind. This is the President's "atomic pool" proposal whereby the principal atomic powers would make joint contributions to the agency and thus begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles. The agency statute permits the carrying out of this proposal if agreement among the atomic powers can be reached. The United States continues to seek such agreement. In the President's letter of March 1 to Premier Bulganin,<sup>5</sup> he repeated his proposal of December 8, 1953. Agreement on this pool would do much, as the President said, to "reverse the present trend toward a constant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the world." It is

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.

such stakes as these that make us seek so earnestly and persistently the early establishment of the agency.

### U.S. Position

In closing, let me quote from a statement which I made to the 12-nation conference on March 5 last—a statement in which I set forth the guiding principles which governed the United States position in regard to the creation of an agency. I said that what we wanted was—

to create an agency with authority and capability equal to the great purpose we have agreed upon; an agency with clearly defined functions, with flexible powers to possess and make useful disposition of fissionable materials; an agency, uninhibited by an arbitrary budget ceiling, able to tap the financial resources of countries willing to lend it money; an agency responsive to the opinions of the world as a whole, responsibly arrived at, but with enough independence in its day-to-day decisions to permit effective discharge of its executive duties; an agency which can win the support of the nations most able to provide it.

It is my belief that the statute as now written provides for such an agency; it is my fervent hope that the conference next fall will approve the statute as it stands in substance. Any material weakening of the structure, as we see it, would seriously jeopardize the support which this agency needs.

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## The Problem of Forced Labor

*Statement by John C. Baker*

*U.S. Representative on the U.N. Economic and Social Council*<sup>1</sup>

One of the most important functions of the United Nations is the preservation and advancement of human dignity and human rights. It is a field in which the United Nations, to be effective, must exercise ceaseless vigilance and untiring activity.

The charter itself reflects the concern which the founders of the United Nations felt for this important work, since the only commission it mentions is the Commission on Human Rights.

One of the most discouraging of the various aspects of violations of human rights is the existence of forced labor—so much so, in fact, that many people wish we could close our eyes and ignore its existence. There are other abuses of human rights which we do not discuss. That fact could furnish an excuse for the Council to avoid this subject. But unfortunately, the violations of human freedom and dignity in this area have been so extensive that the conscience of the world will not let us ignore them. In fact, it was through the medium of a nongovernmental organization that the problem was first brought to our attention.

New incontrovertible facts on this unhappy subject are set forth in the report before us prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of the International Labor Office (E/2815). The material in this report has already been investigated by an ILO Forced Labor Committee, composed of three eminent men of unquestioned integrity—Mr. Paul Ruegger of Switzerland, a former president of the International Committee of the Red Cross; Mr. César Charlone, a former minister of foreign affairs of

Uruguay; and Mr. T. P. Goonetilleke, former district judge in Ceylon.<sup>2</sup>

After thorough examination of the facts the Committee reached the “firm conviction that there exists in the world today definite systems of forced labour, (a) as a means of political coercion or education, (b) as a regular and normal means of carrying out state plans and projects for economic development.” These general conclusions confirmed decisions made by the previous U.N.-ILO *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labor about the existence of forced labor in the Soviet Union and in the countries under its direct influence. This new report is of special importance because it conclusively establishes that the same system also exists under the Communist regime on mainland China and in Albania, two areas which were not covered in the previous report.

It is not our function to go into great detail on the information contained in the bulky document before us. The details are there for all to read. It is our responsibility, however, to appraise and evaluate. Much of the information, it should be noted, came directly from official organs of the two areas concerned. Other information came from victims of the system who have since escaped and have had an opportunity to tell the world about what they experienced.

### “Corrective” Labor in Albania

First a few words about Albania. The Albanian Penal Code makes elaborate provisions for “corrective labor” and banishment of citizens to concentration and labor camps. Over the past 10

<sup>1</sup> Made in the Council on Apr. 30 (U.S./U.N. press release 2398 dated Apr. 27).

<sup>2</sup> The text of the ILO Committee's report, dated Mar. 17, 1956, is contained in ILO doc. G.B. 132/4/1.

years some 40 political prisons and concentration camps have been in operation in Albania, at one time or another, in which approximately 16,000 people have perished. Among these are included distinguished persons whose only crime was that of being born into a social group considered hostile by the Communist government. Innocent Albanian women and children have been forced to labor under conditions already well known to this Council.

After examining the material which reflected these conditions, the ILO Forced Labor Committee concluded:

In view of the declared purpose of the [Albanian] Penal Code and the wide and flexible manner in which the definitions which it contains concerning acts considered contrary to the interests of the State can be interpreted, the legislation in force in Albania could constitute a basis for a system of forced labour for political purposes, aiming at the correction of those who are opposed to the ideology of the Government.

Forced labour for economic purposes appears to have been established in the form of extensive projects based on legislative and administrative provisions which authorise the recruiting, mobilisation and direction of workers for carrying out the economic plans of the State.

The penalties imposed for failure to fulfil the standards set for individual output and the system of labour discipline permit, among other sanctions, the imposition of forced labour as a corrective measure.

Thus the world has once again been brought face to face with oppression of human beings on a systematic and widespread basis. The fact that Albania has but a small population does not diminish the moral reaction we instinctively feel toward such a situation.

#### **"Reform Through Labor" in Red China**

It is even more shocking to know that this form of modern slavery has also been introduced to the mainland of China by the Chinese Communist regime. Although information has long been available that the Chinese Communists were employing forced-labor systems and other severe forms of punishment which are contrary to provisions of the United Nations Charter, it was only in 1951 that the Chinese Communists themselves revealed the vast extent and systematic nature of this program by adopting laws and regulations putting forced labor on a permanent basis.

The institution which has been imposed upon the Chinese people is closely patterned after the experience and practice of the U.S.S.R. This is

no accident. Lo Jui-ching, Minister of Public Security and head of the Communist Chinese MVD, himself made this clear when he submitted the new forced-labor law to the Government Administration Council in 1954 by stating:

During the process of preparation, assistance was received from Soviet legal experts, and many discussions were held and revisions made.

The report before us contains laws, regulations, and policy statements from Communist China which discuss the administration and purposes of their forced-labor system. It includes the full forced-labor code of Communist China—*Regulations Governing Reform Through Labor*. It also contains material from eyewitness sources. The information shows that wide segments of the population are considered as class enemies and treated like criminal elements, that a major purpose of the system is to compel allegiance to the political views of the ruling regime, and that the system is used for economic purposes.

The system is directed, first and foremost, to eliminating any shades of opinion and thought which differ from those of the regime. This was made clear as early as 1949 by Mao Tse-tung in his essay "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship":

The reactionaries must be deprived of the right to voice their opinions; only the people [and Mao explicitly meant that in Communist China only certain types of persons are "people"] have that right. Those belonging to reactionary classes or groups would be given a chance to reform themselves through labor into new persons, but only on condition that they do not rebel, sabotage, or create disturbances.

Mao stated that this could be referred to as a "benevolent policy" but that it would be "compulsorily imposed upon those originally from enemy classes. . . . If they do not want to work the People's State will force them to do so."

What this means in forced-labor camps was revealed in a broadcast from Peiping on October 18, 1951, concerning the Ching-ho Forced Labor Camp:

When Chairman Mao Tse-tung's treatise "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" and the policy of reform through labor were explained to the criminals, they showed signs of violent mental revolt. Some of them burst into tears, some lost their appetite for food, some wrote death notes, and some attempted suicide or escape. To meet the situation, responsible officials of the farm made the criminals fully understand that reform through labor was a liberal measure taken by the people and the State for the sake of giving the counterrevolutionaries a

new life and was therefore their only means of having a new future.

Mr. Chairman, this process is praised in the Chinese Communist press as a significant contribution to the national economy and was adopted with that end in view. Production figures have been given by the Chinese Communist press which show that they consider forced labor to be of considerable economic importance. These figures can be found in the documents before us. On September 7, 1954, furthermore, the Peiping *People's Daily* revealed that 83 percent of the persons in confinement in Communist China had been assigned to forced labor and indicated that they were doing such jobs as cutting timber, constructing buildings, and building water conservation installations, railways, and highways. Shortly over a month later it stated, "Production from corrective labor . . . has now reached impressive proportions, and is playing a real role in national economic reconstruction," a comment similar to that of Lo Jui-ching that "Production under the reformatory labor program has contributed significantly to the supply of commodities to meet the requirements of basic national development."

It is thus clear that forced labor is used in Communist China for both political and economic purposes. The vast extent of the system is revealed by the production figures cited by their own sources and by the fact that the *Regulations* make elaborate provisions for various types of forced labor institutions, including provisions for camps of 3,000 or more prisoners.

The ILO Committee, after examining this extensive material, concluded:

The guiding principle . . . is that persons hostile to the régime (described usually as "counter-revolutionary elements, feudal landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists") must be deprived of political rights and compelled to reform through labour.

. . . in application of this principle, the legislation has set up a very highly organised system of forced labour, in prisons and labour camps, for the purpose of political coercion and education. . . .

. . . [This] system of forced labour . . . is being used on a vast scale for carrying out State programmes of economic development [and] . . . the Government is thus conscripting labour on a large scale to further its economic plans.

. . . [This] legislation . . . does not appear to be of a temporary or emergency character or resulting from the need for reconstruction but is inspired by a definite policy laid down by the legislators of the People's Republic.

. . . the elaborateness of the machinery set up by the legislation and the figures mentioned in . . . newspaper

articles . . . convince [the Committee] that forced labour exists on a very large scale, and that the number of persons involved represents a considerable proportion of the total population.

[While] . . . the legislation contains certain provisions which should secure reasonably good treatment for prisoners and persons in forced labour camps, . . . from the other information before it . . . the Committee must have serious doubts as to the extent to which these legislative provisions are actually applied in practice. The many concordant reports of abuses in the procedure for sentence, in the conditions and treatment of prisoners, and in the "disciplinary measures" taken cannot be ignored.

### Reported Improvements in U.S.S.R.

It is tragic that such serious revelations should be made at a time when there have been reports of improved conditions in some forced-labor camps in the ideological center of the system—the U.S.S.R. Many reported improvements, for example, apparently followed the dramatic strikes at Vorkuta and elsewhere. In addition, many people were apparently released as a result of the 1953 amnesty, although persons sentenced to forced labor for political reasons were not among them. The September 1955 amnesty may have released many more, although it is impossible to verify this. There have also been reports that the aspects of the Penal Code which were most strongly criticized by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Forced Labor may be under revision, and there have even been objections recently by Soviet officials against the system of labor direction.

The ILO Forced Labor Committee, perhaps with these reports in mind, recognized that there has been some improvement in the situation in certain countries since 1953 but concluded, "while this in itself is satisfactory, it cannot be considered as a major advance, since the Committee is firmly of the opinion that the systems mentioned above should in any case be completely abolished."

There is as yet absolutely no evidence that the U.S.S.R. has taken steps to abolish its forced-labor system or significantly alter its political and economic role in Soviet society, and we cannot even accurately assess the causes for these changes which have taken place. Nevertheless, it is possible that world opinion, as expressed through this Council, has played its role.

The United Nations can take pride in the fact that our investigations of the forced-labor issue have undoubtedly materially helped to improve the lot of a great number of fellow human beings.

There is no evidence, I repeat, that any steps

are being taken to abolish the system itself. And I am sure that this is the result for which the Economic and Social Council has always striven. The purposes and principles of the United Nations demand that United Nations efforts continue until that end is reached.

### **Text of Resolution on Forced Labor<sup>1</sup>**

U.N. doc. E/Res (XXI)/10

*The Economic and Social Council,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General and the Director-General of the International Labour Office on Forced Labour, prepared in response to Council resolution 524 (XVII) and General Assembly resolution 740 (VIII),

*Noting* with satisfaction that the question of forced labour is to be considered at the forthcoming session of the International Labour Conference in June,

*Having received* the communication of the Director-General of the ILO transmitting the decision of the Governing Body to establish an *ad hoc* committee of the ILO on forced labour and to seek the collaboration of the United Nations,

*Recognizing* that the ILO has special responsibilities in this field and is giving particular attention to measures designed to assist in the elimination of forced labour,

1. *Condemns* all forms of forced labour, wherever they exist, which are contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, in particular, all systems of forced labour which are employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views, and which are on such a scale as to constitute an important element in the economy of a given country;
2. *Urges* that action be taken towards the elimination of forced labour wherever it may exist;
3. *Commends* the ILO for the action it has taken thus far, and expresses its interest in further action to be taken by the organization;
4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in response to the communication from the Director-General of the ILO referred to above, to transmit to the Director-General any information which he may receive relating to forced labour, and notwithstanding the provisions of Council resolution 75 (V) as amended;
5. *Invites* the ILO to include henceforth in its annual report to the Council an account of action taken in this field.

<sup>1</sup> Sponsored by Ecuador, France, Netherlands, U.K., U.S.; adopted by the Economic and Social Council on May 1 by a vote of 13-2 (Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R.), with 3 abstentions (Egypt, Indonesia, Yugoslavia).

### **Purpose of Resolution**

Mr. Chairman, I now turn to the specific action which we can take at this session. It relates in large measure to the ILO. The International Labor Organization has quietly and without fanfare during the past quarter of a century been working toward elimination of various aspects of forced labor.

Now it is carrying forward work preparatory to consideration by the International Labor Conference of the broad problems of forced labor as set forth in the U.N.-ILO *Ad Hoc* Committee report of 1953.

The United Nations should be in wholehearted agreement with this work of the ILO. It carries forward on a practical, workaday plane much of the same effort we have made in the Economic and Social Council. The ILO, as the international organization with special competence in labor problems, can confidently be relied upon by us to press forward vigorously to eliminate systems of forced labor wherever they are found.

Together with the delegations of Ecuador, the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom, the United States has cosponsored a resolution designed to facilitate this. As in the past, it condemns the existence of forced labor for political and economic purposes. It requests the ILO to continue its work in the field and to report on forced labor to the Council in its annual report. It also includes a request to the Secretary-General to transmit any information he may receive to the ILO for its information and use, including information of a nature which ordinarily would be circulated only under the provisions of resolution 75 (V).<sup>3</sup>

The total effect of this resolution would be to place the subject in the hands of a competent group of men in a responsible and experienced organization who will press forward to seek to eliminate forced labor as rapidly as possible. It will be possible for us to review the subject periodically on the basis of the ILO reports, or if the situation warrants to take it up as a special agenda item in the future. It is our hope that the trends in world thinking and relations have come to the place where all delegations can support this resolution.

<sup>3</sup> ECOSOC resolution 75 (V) established the principle of not divulging the identity of authors of communications on human rights.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### United States and Costa Rica Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement

On May 18 the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 266) announced that representatives of Costa Rica and the United States had signed on that day a proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The agreement was negotiated within the framework of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program. The agreement was signed for Costa Rica by Ambassador Fernando Fournier. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F. Holland, and Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, signed for the United States.

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952.<sup>1</sup>  
*Adherence deposited:* Norway, April 23, 1956.

##### Trade and Commerce

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.<sup>2</sup>  
*Signatures:* Denmark and Greece, April 19, 1956.

##### War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;  
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;  
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;  
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, 3365, respectively.

*Ratifications deposited:* Venezuela, February 13, 1956; Peru, February 15, 1956.

*Adherences deposited:* Panama, February 10, 1956; Iraq, February 14, 1956.

##### Wheat

International wheat agreement. Open for signature

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

at Washington until and including May 18, 1956.  
*Signatures:* May 14, 1956, Ireland, Israel; May 15, 1956, Belgium,<sup>3</sup> Ecuador,<sup>4</sup> France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway; May 16, 1956, Canada, Denmark, El Salvador, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Sweden,<sup>5</sup> Vatican City State; May 17, 1956, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Lebanon, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua; May 18, 1956, Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, India, Korea, Liberia, Philippines, Switzerland, Union of South Africa,<sup>6</sup> United States, Yugoslavia.

#### BILATERAL

##### Costa Rica

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington May 18, 1956. Enters into force on day on which each government shall receive from the other written notification of compliance with its statutory and constitutional requirements.

##### Germany

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, with protocol and exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington October 29, 1954.

*Ratified by the President:* April 30, 1956.

##### Paraguay

Surplus agricultural commodities agreement pursuant to title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Asunción May 2, 1956. Enters into force on date of receipt by the United States of notification by Paraguay that it has been approved in accordance with its constitutional procedures.

##### Turkey

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of March 12, 1956 (TIAS 3517). Signed at Ankara May 11, 1956. Entered into force May 11, 1956.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### State Department Budget for 1957

*Statement by Secretary Dulles<sup>7</sup>*

The pattern of international relations is being rapidly and drastically transformed. Not many years ago a few Western European countries exerted a dominant influence throughout the world and only a few of our foreign missions had major

<sup>3</sup> Signed for the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.

<sup>4</sup> Signed *ad referendum*.

<sup>5</sup> Signed subject to ratification.

<sup>6</sup> With reservation.

<sup>7</sup> Made before the Subcommittee for State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 15 (press release 253).

responsibilities. Now the number of sovereign countries is rapidly increasing. Since the end of World War II, 18 new nations have come into being and several other peoples are at the threshold of independence. Furthermore, all countries, large or small, which are not in the grip of international communism have become important in their own right. They are truly independent, and coordination of free-world policies depends not on dictation but on a vast network of negotiation and voluntary adjustment. Also, the struggle with international communism is more and more being intensified in terms of nonmilitary activities which are comprehended within the scope of diplomacy. The United States, too, has ever-increasing responsibilities as materially the strongest of the free nations.

The United States is now associated with 44 other nations under security pacts. Most of these are based on a finding that attack on the treaty area would endanger the peace and safety of the United States. But that peace and safety are not assured merely by treaty words. It is necessary to give these treaties continuing vitality by developing a genuine partnership relationship based upon sympathetic understanding by each of the problems of the other. This is a new and major task of our diplomacy. Not one of these treaties existed 10 years ago, and four of them, relating to 11 Asian countries, were made within the last 2 years.

If the Department of State and the Foreign Service of the United States do not themselves develop in ways which correspond to these worldwide developments, then the foreign policies of the United States will fail and the foreign policies of our enemies will prevail. That is why the State Department has asked this year, as it did last year, for an increased appropriation.

Since being Secretary of State, I have been to 39 foreign posts. Most of these have never before been visited by any Secretary of State, and, indeed, until recently there has been no particular reason why those countries should have been visited by a United States Secretary of State, except as a matter of tourism. But now all these countries are important, and they hold the key to positions of vital importance to peace and security, including that of the United States. They are entitled to be dealt with as equals. Yet 15 of these nations I have visited to confer with the Heads of the Government were not even in existence as sovereign states 11 years ago.

If, at any one of the 78 places where we maintain foreign missions, there were a collapse, that could set up a chain reaction which could gravely jeopardize the goal of our foreign policy, which, as I have expressed it briefly, is to enable our people to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty.

### **Tribute to Personnel**

I want, in this connection, to pay tribute to the personnel of the Department of State and our Foreign Service. They are a dedicated body of men and women who are rendering a splendid service to our Nation. They are fully aware of the responsibility that they carry, and they are carrying it well. There is a patience, a determination, and a skill of which we can all be proud.

The fruits of diplomacy often require much care and ripen slowly. It took 8 years and almost 400 four-power meetings before the Austrian Treaty finally came into being last year. When it did come, Austria was liberated and the withdrawal of Soviet troops marked the first backward step taken by the Red Army in Europe since the end of World War II.

It took a year of patient and delicate negotiation to settle the Iranian oil controversy, with the United States assisting Iran and the United Kingdom. That started the vital oil flowing again toward the free world and saved Iran from the imminent grip of communism.

It took a year of intensive, new-type negotiation to bring about a Trieste settlement, ending a dangerous dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia that had persisted for many years.

Only a remarkable contribution by our foreign missions over the past 2 years helped to prevent the French military defeat at Dien-Bien-Phu in 1954 from involving the loss of all Indochina to militant communism.

I could multiply these illustrations of major results which were achieved by the patience, dedication, and skill of our Foreign Service, backed by the same qualities found in our personnel here in Washington in the Department of State.

I have, as I say, been in close personal touch with much of this and know whereof I speak. But I have to add that I am shocked at the number whose health has been undermined by working too hard and often under very difficult physical conditions. It is almost normal that our people, both in the State Department and abroad, work

12 or more hours a day, often without respite on Saturdays or Sundays.

I have been associated in my life with a good many business enterprises, but I have never known one where there was the sustained intensity of work which I have found in the Department of State and in the Foreign Service. But we are operating without an adequate margin of safety.

There is imperative need for more qualified personnel and for more facilities for them.

In the past we have not had enough people to bring our Foreign Service officers back home as often as should be, so that they can be refreshed in their home environment and keep in more intimate touch with our policies.

We feel so cramped with respect to funds for cable and code charges that we sometimes have to make close and perhaps now and then even wrong decisions on whether or not the importance of a prospective message justifies the cost of sending it.

There is need to bring our heads of mission together more frequently on a regional basis so that missions in neighboring countries will understand problems which often make neighbors antagonistic.

In many places the working and living conditions of our personnel abroad are subnormal, both in terms of what should be the dignity of a United States embassy and chancellery and also in terms of the health and efficiency of the workers.

Africa is an opening area where today we have few adequate buildings whatsoever or persons trained in the languages and cultures of that continent.

We need to be able to organize quickly for unexpected international gatherings and to be able to provide more adequately for the high officials from other countries who increasingly come to our lands and whose impressions may decisively influence future relations.

It should be noted that, with modern means of rapid transportation, personal diplomacy has more and more become the order of the day and events unfold rapidly. The United States has had within the last 3 years visits from the Heads of Government or Foreign Ministers of over 40 states. It is interesting to note that Bulganin and Khrushchev, during the past year, spent about one-quarter of their time on visits of negotiation or propaganda to foreign countries.

This practice of personal diplomacy, so-called,

does not replace the more conventional forms of diplomacy or make our ambassadors and their staffs less important. On the contrary, it merely intensifies the whole process.

These are the kinds of considerations, Mr. Chairman, which led me to ask for the opportunity to appear personally before this subcommittee. I want to go on record in the most positive way possible as regards the need of the funds which we have requested.

It can perhaps be said that some small part of the money that we have had has been spent inefficiently. That is so in every enterprise I know of. It is never possible to get a theoretically perfect result. There are human inadequacies within the State Department and the Foreign Service, as there are everywhere. But I can assure you that there is nowhere any mood of extravagance or wastefulness. The spirit is one of austerity. We are constantly striving, and I believe successfully striving, for the efficient expenditure of each dollar that Congress gives us.

The House of Representatives recognized on the whole the validity of the case for the Department's budget. They have, however, made certain cuts to which I would direct myself because I do not believe that they can be imposed without serious detriment to the best interests of the United States.

#### **Salaries and Expenses**

For this, in our budget for fiscal year 1957, we requested \$92.2 million in this appropriation. The House of Representatives allowed \$90 million, a reduction of \$2.2 million from the amount requested. I am convinced that the full amount requested for fiscal year 1957 is required if the Department is to discharge properly its duties in the field of foreign affairs.

#### **Representation Allowances**

For this we asked for \$1 million, and the House appropriated only \$700,000. I am greatly concerned over this \$300,000—30 percent—reduction. One of our prime objectives is to strengthen friendly relations through increased personal contact between personnel of our missions and consular offices and foreign officials and other foreign leaders. Never have informal personal relationships counted as much as they do today. We have never had sufficient money appropriated for representation allowances, with the result that those

who can afford to do so have to use personal funds and others who should spend more on this account do not do so.

In the case of junior officers we have been unable to grant more than token representation allowances. This situation should be corrected because many associations with foreign officials established in the early years of an officer's career have effective results on future leaders of foreign countries.

Part of the additional increase requested in this appropriation for fiscal year 1957 is needed to provide for additional posts and additional personnel which have been approved by the House.

#### **Acquisition of Buildings Abroad**

The House of Representatives allowed \$19 million in this appropriation, a reduction of \$2.9 million from the amount requested. We do not appeal the \$2.9 million reduction made by the House because, I am advised, a recent ruling of the Comptroller General makes it possible for the Department to use foreign currency proceeds from the sale of properties overseas for purposes authorized under the Foreign Buildings Program. While the full effect of this ruling is impossible to assess at this time, the Department is confident that this assistance will materially offset the reduction in our 1957 estimates as set forth by the House of Representatives.

#### **Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service**

We are requesting an increase of \$1.9 million in this appropriation for fiscal year 1957. This increase was requested to provide the Department with a contingency fund with which to meet international developments which cannot be anticipated and for which we could not otherwise provide in our budget estimates.

#### **Contributions to International Organizations**

The House reduced our request for this appropriation by \$328,410. \$300,000 of this amount is of particular interest to me and to our efforts in redesigning the objectives of NATO, with emphasis on political and cultural aspects as well as military.

#### **International Fisheries Commission**

The reduction of \$102,725 made by the House in this appropriation will, I understand, make it

necessary to reduce the operation of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission below the level established by the international convention.

#### **International Educational Exchange Activities**

The House reduced our request for this key appropriation by \$1.8 million. This reduction will eliminate needed increases in educational exchange activities planned for the Far East, Near East, and Latin America. Even if we should receive the full amount requested in this appropriation, we would not have sufficient funds to meet many fresh needs for activities of this kind which have developed during recent months.

Greater understanding between ourselves and other nations is a continuing objective of our foreign policy. In this area of endeavor the exchange program performs a vital service. The program, operating under the provisions of the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt Acts, is now going into its second decade. I trust it will be allowed to move strongly forward.

Other representatives of the State Department—Mr. Henderson, the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration; Mr. Carpenter, the Assistant Secretary-Controller; and Mr. Crouch, the Director of the Office of Budget—will justify our budget request in detail. My own particular responsibility to you is:

1. To appraise whether the overall international situation calls for expanded diplomatic activity on the part of the United States. That it does so is demonstrable beyond the possibility of doubt.

2. To judge whether or not our existing staff, equipment, and funds are adequate or inadequate to meet the expanding needs. I am satisfied that they are not adequate, and my judgment in this respect is based not upon conjecture but upon a very broad personal familiarity with our foreign posts and their tasks.

3. To make sure that our budget is made up by persons who are competent, hardheaded, and who do not condone extravagance. That fact I can vouch for, and it will be demonstrated to you as you inquire further into this matter.

Therefore, in discharging my responsibility as Secretary of State I ask the Congress to grant the funds which we have requested and which are needed to enable our foreign policies to prevail against the formidable challenge they encounter.



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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Press releases issued prior to May 14 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 248 and 249 of May 10.

No.	Date	Subject
†252	5/14	Rubottom appointment (rewrite).
253	5/15	Dulles: State Department budget.
254	5/15	Dulles: reduction of Soviet armed forces.
255	5/15	Dulles: news conference transcript.
*256	5/15	Parsons nominated Ambassador to Laos.
*257	5/15	Dowling nominated Ambassador to Korea.
*258	5/15	Program for Sukarno visit.
*259	5/17	Achilles nominated Ambassador to Peru.
†260	5/16	Revised list of Sukarno party.
261	5/16	Muenster peace medal presented to Eisenhower.
†262	5/16	Nixon and Sukarno arrival statements.
*263	5/17	Briggs nominated Ambassador to Brazil.
*264	5/18	Cecil Lyon sworn in as Ambassador to Chile.
265	5/18	Sonnabend named director of Franklin Foundation (rewrite).
266	5/18	Atomic agreement with Costa Rica (rewrite).
†267	5/18	Technology agreement with Turkey.
268	5/18	Dulles: Armed Forces Day.

\*Not printed.  
†Filed for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



## Educational Exchange Grants

Publication 6301

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The International Educational Exchange Program is a program which enables citizens of the United States to visit other countries and foreign nationals to come to this country for purposes of study, teaching, lecturing, conducting research, observation, consultation, training, or to gain practical experience.

As authorized by the Congress of the United States, the program has for its chief objective the development of greater mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States and those of other countries. This objective is based on the recognition of the need for such person-to-person understanding in the furtherance of our foreign relations.

This 25-page pamphlet, which supersedes Department of State publication 5484, describes the operation of the program, tells how grantees are selected, and lists the opportunities being offered. It outlines the procedure to be used by a citizen of the United States or another country in applying for a grant under the Fulbright Act.

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## Working Together for International Understanding

*Address by President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>*

Members of the graduating class and fellow Texans:

The honor you have conferred on me joins me with a great school, of great traditions, of great achievements, of great goals. Baylor's 10 schools and colleges are the fruition of seeds planted in 1845 at Old Independence. Baylor's graduates in positions of leadership testify to the wisdom and foresight of Baylor's founders. Your magnificent Armstrong Browning Library exemplifies the growth of Baylor as a principal cultural center of the Southwest.

This university is dedicated to true education; it strives to develop wisdom. This implies, over and beyond mere knowledge, an understanding of men's relationship to their fellow men in a world created for their stewardship by a God in whose image they are all made. You have been taught here to do justice and to love mercy and to walk humbly before your Maker even as you use every opportunity to better yourselves through the profession in which you have been here grounded.

Now you enter a new phase of your life experience—in a world where the principles by which you live are frequently flouted and ignored. What is your place in this world? What can you do to improve it? Pointedly, what can each one of you as an individual do to promote a world society that respects the values in which you, and this school, believe so deeply? The thoughts I bring to you this morning deal primarily—and

that sketchily—with the international phases of a suggested answer.

I speak of international affairs for a very simple reason. In the fundamental struggle in which the world is now engaged, world issues create, or at least color, almost every domestic question and problem.

Clear comprehension of the basic factors involved is vitally important to leaders and officials and to every citizen of this country and of the free world. Such understanding, I submit, is especially important to you young people who, perforce, must look at these critical current problems against a horizon of 10, 20, 40 years hence.

Today a militant, aggressive communistic doctrine is dominant over much of the world's surface and over hundreds of millions of the world's people. In the postwar period we have seen it indulge in a particularly cynical type of colonialism, expressed in the Communist subjugation of once free and proud nations in Europe and in Asia. Simultaneously, in the free areas of the world, 600 million people in more than a score of new countries have achieved independence.

Communism denies the spiritual premises on which your education has been based. According to that doctrine, there is no God; there is no soul in man; there is no reward beyond the satisfaction of daily needs. Consequently, toward the human being, communism is cruel, intolerant, atheistic. This doctrine, committed to conquest by lure, intimidation, and force, seeks to destroy the political concepts and institutions that we hold to be dearer than life itself. Thus communism poses a threat from which even this mighty Nation is not wholly immune.

<sup>1</sup> Made at the commencement ceremonies at Baylor University, Waco, Tex. on May 25 (White House press release).

Yet communism is, in deepest sense, a gigantic failure.

Even in the countries it dominates, hundreds of millions who dwell there still cling to their religious faith; still are moved by aspirations for justice and freedom that cannot be answered merely by more steel and bigger bombers; still seek a reward that is beyond money or place or power; still dream of the day that they may walk fearlessly in the fullness of human freedom.

The destiny of man is freedom and justice under his Creator. Any ideology that denies this universal faith will ultimately perish or be recast. This is the first great truth that must underlie all our thinking, all our striving in this struggling world.

### **Fundamental Principles of Human Liberty**

A second truth is that the fundamental principles of human liberty and free government are powerful sources of human energy, loyalty, dedication—and guides to enduring success. They are mightier than armaments and armies.

Americans have recognized those two truths in the historical documents of the Republic. They are repeated in the preamble to the fundamental policy statement in our current series of national security directives. In part that preamble reads:

The spiritual, moral and material posture of the United States of America rests upon established principles which have been asserted and defended throughout the history of the Republic. The genius, strength and promise of America are founded in the dedication of its people and government to the dignity, equality and freedom of the human being under God.

These concepts and our institutions which nourish and maintain them with justice are the bulwark of our free society and are the basis of the respect and leadership which have been accorded our nation by the peoples of the world.

Much as we are dedicated to this expression of lofty sentiment, it will count for little unless every American, to the extent of his influence and capacity, daily breathes into it the life of his own practice. The test is the readiness of individuals to cleave to principle even at the cost of narrower, more immediate gains.

For you graduates, and for all citizens, opportunities to strengthen our assault on injustice and bigotry will be as numerous as the tasks you undertake and the people you meet each day. Nothing I might add could either quicken your recognition of such opportunities or strengthen your response

to them. But certain it is that in this recognition and this response will be found the measure of America's future safety, progress, and greatness.

The third great truth that must underlie our thinking on international questions is this: People are what count. A sympathetic understanding of the aspirations, the hopes and fears, the traditions and prides of other peoples and nations is essential to the promotion of mutual prosperity and peace. Such understanding is a compulsory requirement on each of us if, as a people, we are to discharge our inescapable national responsibility to lead the world in the growth of freedom and human dignity.

Communism seeks to dominate or to destroy; freedom seeks to cooperate and to help others to build. But these basic differences are not self-evident. Therefore, the people of the world are not necessarily thinking in terms of opposing concepts of communistic dictatorship and of human rights and freedom.

Rather, today, the most unyielding expression of peoples' aspirations seems to be an intense nationalism. There is nothing to be feared in this—of itself. The right of a people, capable of self-government, to their own political institutions is deeply imbedded in American thinking. Among peoples as among our own citizens we believe the rights of the weak are identical with those of the strong. And in the past we have helped many small nations to independence. We will continue to hail with satisfaction the birth of each new nation whose people, achieving independence and freedom, become peaceful members of the world community.

In this day, however, one acute economic problem grows more acute as each new nation steps forward to an independent place in the international family. New nations, springing up, create new political boundaries. Far too often these political boundaries become serious barriers to the flow of trade.

Such barriers are daily of more importance as increasing industrialization and specialization critically increase the economic interdependence of peoples. Specialization in any area—which implies an unbalanced local economy—is not necessarily a weakness, provided always that there is free opportunity for exchanging a portion of the products of such specialization for the other things needed to satisfy the requirements of people.

This means that, where any nation does not possess, within its own boundaries, the major elements of a broadly balanced economy, it is normally handicapped in assuring maximum satisfaction of human wants and a stable prosperity for its own people. So we find that the emotional urge for a completely independent existence may conflict with an equal desire for higher living standards.

This conflict, so obvious, is often ignored. But even the productivity and prosperity of this great country would vanish if our States were 48 separate nations, with economic and political barriers at each boundary preventing or impeding the interflow of goods, people, and information.

We must put to ourselves this question: How can we help answer both the great desire of peoples for a separate, independent existence and the need for economic union or, at least, effective cooperation among them?

This question is of vital importance to every nation. Unhappiness, unrest, and disaffection caused by depressed living standards can be as acute as when caused by political injustice. Disaffection, long continued, in any portion of the earth, can bring about political convulsions and grave global crises. In Communist areas the answer is achieved by compulsion.

But effective cooperation is not easily accomplished among free nations. Permit me in one illustration to point up the difficulty, among free peoples, of progress toward this type of union.

### **Progress Toward European Unity**

The statesmen of Western Europe have long been aware that only in broad and effective cooperation among the nations of that region can true security for all be found. They know that real unification of the separate countries there would make their combined 250 million highly civilized people a mighty pillar of free strength in the modern world. A free United States of Europe would be strong in the skills of its people, adequately endowed with material resources, and rich in their common cultural and artistic heritage. It would be a highly prosperous community.

Without such unification the history of the past half century in Europe could go on in dreary repetition, possibly to the ultimate destruction of all the values those people hold most dear. With unification, a new sun of hope, security, and confidence would shine for Europe and for the free world.

Why, then, has this great objective not been attained by intelligent peoples? The basic reasons are simply stated. First: it is the great pride of each nation in separate existence. Second: it is the intense fear of losing, in such a union, cherished local traditions and cultural and political institutions and of suffering temporary economic dislocations. We, of course, appreciate the weight of such considerations—and are therefore patient—even though the history of this largest of our States refutes the fears that seem to loom so large in Europe.

Another stumbling block to European unity is the failure of populations as a whole to grasp the long-term political, economic, and security advantage of union. These are matters that do not make for a soul-stirring address on a national holiday. They can be approached only in thought, in wisdom—almost, we might say, in prayer.

Nevertheless—and happily—much progress has been made.

Years ago, our European partners began both to study and to act. Our country's help was given wherever possible because our own future security and prosperity are inescapably linked to those of our European friends. There was established the Brussels Compact, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the European Payments Union, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the Council of Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, although an organization comprehending much more than Western Europe, nevertheless provides the cooperative mechanism for greater security in the area. All these were set up to attack immediate problems in cooperation.

Despite setbacks and difficulties, these have been operating with increasing efficiency. So, European Union, one of the greatest dreams of Western man, seems nearer today than at any time in centuries, providing bright promise for the future of our European friends and for the growth and strength of liberty.

### **Developing Nonmilitary Aspects of NATO**

On a broader geographical scale, members of the Atlantic Community are working together in many different ways and through many different agencies. But such cooperation can usefully be further developed. At the NATO meeting several weeks ago it was decided that the members of the Atlantic Community should "examine actively

further measures which might be taken at this time to advance more effectively their common interests."<sup>2</sup> They designated a committee of three Foreign Ministers to advise on "ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."

This effort recognizes the truth that all peoples of the free world must learn to work together more effectively in the solution of our common problems or the battle for human liberty cannot be won. Among equals, attempting to perform a difficult task, there is no substitute for cooperation.

It is gratifying to all of us to know that Senator Walter George has agreed to act as my personal representative and special ambassador in working for this new evolution of the Atlantic Community. Nothing could testify more forcefully to the critical importance of this project than the willingness of Senator George to undertake it.

Patiently but persistently we must work on. We must take into account man's hunger for freedom and for food; all men's dignity as well as some men's power; the eventual triumph of right and justice over expediency and force.

The responsibility for carrying forward America's part in helping improve international cooperation cannot be met through paper work in a governmental bureau. But it can be met through a combined effort by all of us, in and out of government, all trying to develop the necessary understanding that every international problem is in reality a human one. You, the fortunate graduates of this great institution, are in a particularly advantageous position to lead in the development of this kind of thinking and understanding.

You owe it to yourselves and to your country to continue your study and critical analysis of the great international questions of our day. You can join with like-minded men and women in the many voluntary associations that promote people-to-people contact around the world. By means of them, the thorny problems of the time are scrutinized from many viewpoints. Solutions are approached by many avenues. Creative thinking is sparked. Mutual understanding is furthered.

Thus, every thinking person will come to understand that his country's future will be brighter as the lot of mankind improves; that no nation can

in the long run prosper except as the world enjoys a growing prosperity. We must indeed be partners for peace and freedom and prosperity if those words are to record achievement as well as to express a dream.

The foreign policy of this Republic, if it serves the enduring purposes and good of the United States, must always be founded on these truths, thus expressing the enlightened interests of the whole American people. Certainly the basic foreign relations measures taken by the United States in this century have been so developed. They do not belong to any political party—they are American. These measures range from our support of the Organization of American States to our membership in the United Nations and our present programs of partnership and assistance.

The United Nations by its very comprehensiveness is a unique association within which nations of every political complexion and philosophy have their place. The smaller groupings in which we hold membership are bound together by a respect for common values and principles. They conform, of course, to the U.N. Charter. But in each organization the likeness in background or interest or purpose that characterizes the membership and the restricted geographical limits within which it operates assures more effective discharge of their functions than is possible in a group as large as the U.N.

We shall continue in our loyalty to the United Nations. But we should, at the same time, further expand and strengthen our other international associations.

Some of them, although only a few years old, are already household words, recognized as immense contributions to the prosperity and the security of particular areas in the free world—and to our own prosperity and security. Yet none provides a complete answer to any of our international problems. Again, consider NATO.

A united Western Europe may still be on the far-off horizon. NATO is nevertheless a great alliance, rich in human and natural resources. But this great array is neither self-sustaining nor self-sufficient. Its freedom and prosperity and security are intertwined with the freedom and prosperity and security of many other nations—old and new and still to be born—that people an even greater portion of the earth. Within this community of freedom, all are more sure of their

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of May 21, 1956, p. 836.



independence and prosperity and security when all join so that :

- Mutual trade is fostered.
- Legitimate political and economic aspirations are advanced.
- Cultural traditions are respected.
- The difficulties and misfortunes of the weaker are met by help from the stronger. To be backward or pennywise in our practice of this truth can lead only to greater risk and greater cost—far greater cost to ourselves.

### **Helping To Build Educational Facilities**

The ways in which progress along these four roads can be achieved are legion in number. The first, of which I've spoken at some length, is the need for the growth and spread of understanding among our own people. The next is that the peoples of other nations must, through similar study and thought, recognize with us the need for this kind of cooperation.

This, in itself, is not easy. Many nations, though their cultures are ancient and rich in human values, do not possess the resources to spread the needed education throughout their populations. But they can wisely use help that respects their traditions and ways. For example, the whole free world would be stronger if there existed adequate institutions of modern techniques and sciences in areas of the world where the hunger for knowledge and the ability to use knowledge are unsatisfied because educational facilities are often not equal to the existing need.

Do we not find here a worthy challenge to America's universities and to their graduates? I firmly believe that, if some or all of our great universities, strongly supported by private foundations that exist in number throughout our land, sparked by the zeal and fire of educated Americans, would devote themselves to this task, the prospects for a peaceful and prosperous world would be mightily enhanced.

In no respect should the purpose of these institutions be to transplant into a new area the attitudes, the forms, the procedures of America. The staffing, the conduct, the curriculum of each school would be the responsibility of the people where the school might be built.

Each school would help each nation develop its human and natural resources and also provide a

great two-way avenue of communication. We would gain new knowledge and wisdom out of the priceless values of another people's traditions and proud heritage. They would gain knowledge in the technical and scientific fields where we have had an earlier start.

Such a voluntary effort in people-to-people partnership would be a dynamic, a fruitful corollary to three elements already effectively at work in our governmental foreign policy :

- To our atoms-for-peace program.
- To our efforts to establish a climate in which universal disarmament can go forward.
- To our long-sustained campaign for the exchange of knowledge and factual information between peoples.

Purposes and projects such as these, formulated by Republicans and Democrats, are parts of a comprehensive effort to meet present and future needs, to solve problems in the enlightened self-interest of the United States. It takes into account our global concerns on all the continents, on all the oceans.

It is not a haphazard, makeshift arrangement to meet day-to-day crises—big or little or imaginary. Instead, it is a platform for the development of a stable, prosperous, peaceful world. Immediately concerned with this year and next year, our foreign policy is a realistic approach to a better world for all in 1966, 1976, and 1996.

### **Community of Interest**

The basic policy objectives I have described are in furtherance of the aspirations of those who founded the Republic. These objectives are plainly advanced if we foster and secure conditions at home and abroad with which this system of freedom can live and under which it can find fertile ground for acceptance and growth. Thus our security and our aspirations are linked with the security and aspirations of liberty-loving people in many other lands. It is idle to talk of community of interest with them in measures for defense without recognizing community of interest with them in that which is to be defended.

Security cannot be achieved by arms alone, no matter how destructive the weapons or how large their accumulation.

So today it is vitally important that we and others detect and pursue the ways in which cultural and economic assistance will mean more to

free-world strength, stability, and solidarity than will purely military measures.

You of this class, like all Americans, must act in terms of today. At the same time, you in particular should think in terms of those years that now seem so distant.

Increasingly, from this day onward, the influence of men and women now of your age will mold our course at home and abroad. It is logical that you should start immediately thinking about the Republic and the world that stretches out ahead. Then you can start working now for the sort of country and world you want as a home for your children and grandchildren.

You have in your heritage the dynamic principles that arouse visions in mankind. You have in your hearts and minds the means to lift the eyes of men and women above the drab and desolate horizon of hate and fear and hopelessness.

For, my friends of Baylor, as Texans, as Americans, believing as you do in the brotherhood of man and in his right to freedom—joined with all the millions of dedicated men and women at home, linked in partnership with hundreds of millions of like-minded people around the globe—you constitute the mightiest temporal force on earth.

## Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 272 dated May 22

*Secretary Dulles:* I have no initial statement of my own to make, so I will be glad to receive your questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us your reaction to Egypt's recognition of Red China?*

A. It was an action that we regret. That is the only comment I care to make.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that will improve Red China's chances of getting into the United Nations at the next meeting?*

A. Not appreciably.

*Q. What is the status, Mr. Secretary, of the Aswan Dam?*

A. Well, the status is about as previously reported here, except that the Egyptian Government has, I think, sought to work out some arrangement

with the Sudan with reference to the division of the Nile waters before planning to proceed actually with work or expenditures of its own; and that is the present status of that.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will the United States be willing to put any money into that project if the Egyptians accept aid from the Soviets?*

A. You say "if"?

*Q. There have been a lot of stories out of Egypt saying Colonel Nasser possibly will accept Russian Communist help in building the dam. Would that automatically exclude or end our offers to participate, or would we be willing to join in something which the Communists might be interested in?*

A. That is rather a hypothetical question, but I would say it would be unlikely, I think, that we would find it practical or desirable to engage at this time in a cooperative effort of this type with the Soviet Union.

### Soviet Armed Forces

*Q. Mr. Secretary, at your last press conference you gave us as reasons for the Russians cutting down their military manpower as based on internal and economic grounds.<sup>1</sup> A few hours later Secretary Wilson said they were just readjusting their forces to nuclear warfare, the same way we were, and on Friday, I think, the Presidential assistant, Mr. Stassen, said that it was a response to our policy. None of these factors exclude the other. I was wondering if you could put this in perspective for us.*

A. I think it should first perhaps be made clear that there was no disclosure at London by the Soviets of their intention to reduce their armed forces. The conclusion was drawn in London, as well as here, that because of the various factors, particularly their economic situation and the general trend toward emphasizing modern weapons more than men, there would likely be a reduction of Soviet army manpower. That was a matter of deduction and not of disclosure.

Now, since the action was taken unilaterally, without any prior disclosure to the Disarmament Subcommittee, it is necessarily speculative as to why they did it. And when you get into people's motivations it is always a difficult thing to be clear about it, particularly when it is the motivation of

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 28, 1956, p. 880.

people like the Soviet rulers, whose motivations are not influenced by public-opinion considerations or parliamentary considerations. Now, it is, broadly speaking, the view, I think, of the administration that the action taken was primarily responsive to the two factors alluded to: namely, first, the economic pressures that the Soviet Union is under, particularly the need of greater manpower in agriculture and in industry, and, secondly, the fact that the modern trend, as evidenced by our own action, is to put more emphasis upon modern weapons and less emphasis upon the number of men under arms.

The United States, as I think I pointed out last week, has itself made a considerable aggregate reduction in the numbers of men under arms. We have not claimed that that was done as a contribution toward disarmament or because we wanted to weaken ourselves; indeed, we have felt that we were stronger as a result of our shifts. They did not involve any diminution in our military power, and we have no reason to believe that the action announced by the Soviet Union will result in a diminution of its military power. Furthermore, there is no system of supervision or verification. We don't really know what will go on and whether in fact there will be even the shift of manpower away from armies that has been forecast.

Now it may be that they also intended, and probably hoped, to set in motion a movement toward reduction of armaments in the Western countries. Perhaps they hoped for a reduction in armaments which in other cases would actually mean a diminution of military strength. Perhaps they also had in mind the possible impact of what they did on the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany, where legislation is before the Parliament dealing with the question of the establishment of the military forces of the Federal Republic and the length of their service.

As I say, one can speculate almost indefinitely as to the motivations that may have been back of the announcement. It is impossible to be certain about that. I think, however, that it is the safest thing to assume that the motivations were primarily of two sources: namely, the trend in all modern countries which make these new weapons to put more emphasis upon that than upon actual manpower and, secondly, the economic needs of their agriculture and industry at the present time; and perhaps in the third place the desire to make gains on the propaganda front and in terms of bringing

about actual disarmament on the part of the Western countries, which they naturally would like to see.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify a point, if I may, on that same subject, it has been published—and I think not until now denied—that Mr. Stassen was told by Khrushchev at his meeting in London that they were indeed going to reduce their armed forces, but it isn't clear whether there was any figure involved, and Mr. Stassen reported this to be true. Now, what you're saying, is that contradicting that? Is that not true?*

A. I checked back with Mr. Stassen yesterday. He was in St. Paul. He said to me that their conclusions were from deductions and not disclosure.

### **Japanese Textiles**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the American textile industry has been pushing to obtain some sort of limitation of Japanese imports for some time. Recently, instead of a negotiated agreement, they asked for and received an exchange of notes between the United States Government and the Japanese Embassy on Japanese exports, with a promise that they would get some sort of an export subsidy program, and another promise that they would try to persuade other countries to buy more textiles from Japan to ease the pressure in Japan for export of textiles here.<sup>2</sup> Can this be interpreted as being a limit to the action which the administration will take in regard to Japanese textiles?*

A. No, I would not say so. The administration has its normal duties under the law to give domestic industries protection against imports which seriously endanger or jeopardize an industry. It is always preferable to see that necessary protec-

<sup>2</sup> In an exchange of notes with the United States on May 16 (not printed), the Japanese Embassy at Washington described the nature of Japanese voluntary textile-export controls and set forth the Japanese intention to continue into 1957 the controls in effect in 1956 and to give 3 months' advance notice of any future increase in export quantities.

On May 21 the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced that, as of Aug. 1, 1956, it would extend the price benefits of its raw-cotton export program, announced on Feb. 28, to cover exports of cotton textiles, cotton yarns, and spinnable cotton waste. Under the export program, Commodity Credit Corporation stocks of upland cotton are made available for sale for export on a competitive bid basis.

tion of American industries brought about by a voluntary action on the part of the nations which are exporting to the United States; that is, it is preferable to do it that way than by unilateral protective action by the United States. But certainly the United States has not forgone its intention, indeed its duty, to take any action that may be called for by the facts. I do not myself know whether the facts are such that that action has been invoked. I don't think it has been invoked as yet by the textile industry. But they are always free to do so.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you aware of any developments which will indicate whether the Soviets meant business when they spoke about cooperation and relaxing tensions in the Middle East? What would be the price of their cooperation in such an effort?*

A. Well, there has been no effort that I am aware of to test that in terms of any specific action. There probably will be a resolution of some sort proposed in the Security Council which would be a followup of the first resolution,<sup>3</sup> which was the United States proposal, pursuant to which Mr. Hammarskjold went out to the Near East. I think that is being informally discussed at the present time. And it may be that that followup resolution will afford testing or an opportunity to know more clearly what it is that the Soviets had in mind by their statement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would the United States Government like to see Mr. Hammarskjold return to the Middle East to carry on—I believe the words you used in your speech at one point—the momentum which he has already achieved?*

A. Well, we think it's very important that the momentum should be maintained. We are not clear whether that requires or would be well served by Mr. Hammarskjold himself going back at this particular time. I believe that Mr. Hammarskjold has some doubts as to whether that is the best action to take at the moment. I think he is following up a number of aspects of his work there by communication from time to time with the Heads of the Governments or with the Foreign Ministers concerned. You see, there is a good bit still to be done to implement the agreements that were actually made, particularly in terms of giv-

ing mobility, freedom of movement, to the armistice teams, and things of that sort. Those things are still being worked out and, I understand, are being actively followed up by Mr. Hammarskjold from this country, and we are not yet clear that the stage has been reached where Mr. Hammarskjold ought to turn and go right back again. Perhaps not.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your conference Saturday with Japanese Minister Kono,<sup>4</sup> were you able to determine that the Soviet Union has established any new policy or made any new offers toward Japan leading to peaceful relations, and also will the United States help Japan make up this fishing deficit?*

A. I don't think that the United States will have to do anything affirmative to help, as you put it, to make up the deficit. I think that there are fishing areas which are available to the Japanese, and it would not be necessary to alter, I would think, the terms of our fishing treaty with Japan, the trilateral treaty to which Canada, the United States, and Japan are parties.<sup>5</sup> That treaty, you may recall, was negotiated at the same time that I was negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty, and I had some part in the negotiations of that fishing agreement also. Now, as far as the Soviet attitude toward Japan is concerned, I think that they still want to reestablish more normal relations with Japan, but the terms and conditions under which that might take place I couldn't report on here. That is a matter primarily for consideration between the Japanese Government and the Soviet Government.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in voting on the foreign aid bill, has*

<sup>4</sup> In a statement to correspondents on May 19, Lincoln White, Acting Chief of the News Division, said: "The Japanese Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Mr. Ichiro Kono, visited Washington on May 19 on his way home to Tokyo from the Soviet Union. He described to senior officers of the Department of State the fisheries agreements he has just concluded with the Soviet Union in Moscow. State Department officials expressed their appreciation to Mr. Kono for his courtesy in coming to Washington to convey this information. . . . Mr. Kono was received informally by the Secretary of State . . . [and] discussed with the Secretary matters concerning the strengthening of friendly relations between the United States and Japan."

<sup>5</sup> BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1952, p. 340, and May 26, 1952, p. 830.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 628.

rejected a specific long-term aid commitment and voted a general statement of policy to continue aid as long as the Communist threat persists. Would you tell us whether this meets your and the administration's hopes or falls short of it?

A. I would say that, on net balance, this provisional action fell short of our hopes. Of course, the bill has not yet been finally reported out of the committee, and I think it is premature for me to make assumptions regarding the bill until it is finally reported out, because, as we all know, changes are often made at the last minute and positions are sometimes reversed. But we welcome very much the statement of policy in the so-called Richards amendment, which seems to us to be a very straightforward and sane statement that, as long as there is danger from the Soviet-bloc countries, we will take reasonable measures to meet that danger, including measures to strengthen the position of the free world abroad as well as at home. Now, it does not meet our hope for an indication of congressional approval of specific projects which we had asked for, and we intend to continue to seek that authority when the matter comes up for further consideration perhaps by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did President Sukarno, when he was in Washington, seek from you any statement by this Government on behalf of their position on West New Guinea, and if so what was your reply?*

A. As far as I am aware, President Sukarno did not personally bring that matter up. It was raised in a talk which I had with the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia. The Foreign Minister repeated his well-known hope that the United States would support the Indonesian position with reference to West Irian. I indicated the reasons why we did not feel in a position to support affirmatively their position, and the situation. I would say, was left much as it was before the visit in that respect.

#### **U.S.—Egyptian Relations**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you received any information that would tend to either confirm or discredit the rumor out of Cairo that Communist China might supply arms to Egypt?*

A. No, we had no information about that, other than what is in the newspaper accounts.

*Q. Still on the subject of Egypt, Mr. Secretary, it has been widely reported that the State Department originally was quite enthusiastic about Mr. Nasser but has taken a much more bearish view of him recently. Your indications in answer to questions this morning—were you wanting to infer that that bearishness is intensified? Is that true? Can you clarify it a little more?*

A. Well, I expressed a regret of his action extending recognition to Communist China. I have also indicated that we are sympathetic with whatever action he reasonably takes to emphasize the genuine independence of Egypt, and, to the extent that he is a spokesman for Egyptian independence, we have sympathy with his point of view. But to the extent that he takes action which seems to promote the interests of the Soviet Union and Communist China, we do not look with favor upon such action.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when you spoke about the unlikelihood of the United States making a cooperative effort with the Soviet Union in building the Aswan Dam, is that an implication there that the United States also might take another look at economic and technical aid to countries in Asia which are accepting similar aid and offers from Russia?*

A. No, the question, as I understood it at least, posed the question whether we are willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union on a specific project. That is something quite different from our assisting on one project, while the country in question is obtaining assistance from the Soviet Union with respect to some other project.

#### **Presidents' Meeting in Panama**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us about the administration's viewpoint toward this meeting in Panama of the Presidents,<sup>6</sup> and whether you propose to go?*

A. The meeting is one which was initiated, as you know, by the Government of Panama to celebrate the first Pan American meeting [in 1826], which was called on the initiative of Bolívar. We believe that the developments of unity within the American States which have occurred since that time are tremendously important. They constitute in some respects an example to other areas of the

<sup>6</sup> BULLETIN of May 28, 1956, p. 880.

world, and it is deserving that an occasion like this should be given importance. It does indicate the ability of the Republics of this hemisphere to work together through the Organization of American States in a way which is, I think, of great benefit to them; it enables them to settle disputes between themselves and to create a solidarity as against external threats. It is undoubtedly not only the oldest but the best organized regional association that there is in the whole world, and the opportunity to bring that more to the attention of the world is an opportunity which the President thought was so important that he was willing to accept the invitation from the Republic of Panama and to go to the area.

I think it is likely that I will accompany the President, although there has been no firm decision on that. I normally do go with the President when he makes foreign visits of this character.

*Q. Within the week it has been said that the cuts that the Russians propose to make in their armed forces reflected an initiative in the direction in which we want the Russians to go. Would you care to discuss that? Some of your statements seem to be a little at variance with that.*

A. No, I prefer not to discuss that particular statement. I think I have already adequately stated my views on the announced reduction of men in arms by the Soviet Union. Perhaps that statement of mine had better stand on its own footing.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past few days there have been a few developments that have come out on the Near East. I wonder if you could comment on them. One is the trip by the Egyptian correspondent to the Israeli Government and the subsequent permission by the Egyptian Government to publish his dispatches, and secondly, last night a commentator on the Cairo radio stated that he believed that peace was possible between Israel and Egypt. I wonder if you can comment on those two developments.*

A. Well, I think both of the developments to which you refer are encouraging, and the United States is very happy that those events can occur—the trip and the announcement that was made. We are not in a very good position ourselves to evaluate these developments, particularly the last one to which you refer. But if there is any kind of rapprochement there between the Israelis and

the Arabs in terms of making the settlement more durable and secure, that of course is in line with the United States policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would the followup resolution in the Security Council about which you spoke have to do with the armistice itself or going the next step, to the problem of peace?*

A. I do not feel at liberty to discuss that, because it is being actively discussed at the present time between the various members of the Security Council in New York and on an informal basis. There has been no crystallization of thinking of just what should be in the resolution, nor, so far as I am aware, have Mr. Hammarskjöld's definitive views been yet obtained. So I think it would be premature to conjecture about what the resolution would contain, because all the elements that would contribute to our thinking on that subject are not known.

#### **Trade With Communist China**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Anthony Nutting said in Parliament about a week ago that the British Government intended to make use of the exception clause of the restricted list in trade with Red China under the embargo agreement.<sup>7</sup> Can you say whether the British Government's attitude on this point is a result of consultations with the United States, and what your feeling about this is?*

A. Well, that topic was discussed somewhat by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and myself when we were in Paris in connection with the NATO ministerial meeting.<sup>8</sup> The British Government through him did indicate an intention to use perhaps somewhat more freely the so-called "exception" procedure which has always been in the CHINCOM<sup>9</sup> multi-

<sup>7</sup> As spokesman for the British Government, Mr. Nutting on May 14 replied to a question in the House of Commons concerning Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd's talks with Secretary Dulles by stating that the discussions were not yet concluded; "in the meantime, however, more use will be made of the exceptions procedure to permit reasonable exports in appropriate cases to China of goods which are not on the Soviet list."

<sup>8</sup> See also the joint statement issued on Feb. 1 following Sir Anthony Eden's talks with President Eisenhower (BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 232).

<sup>9</sup> The China Committee, which coordinates international security controls over trade with Communist China. For background on strategic trade controls, including a chart of the international organization, see BULLETIN of Dec. 5, 1955, p. 918.

lateral understandings. We do not know what the practical impact of that will be because, until we know what may be the items or the quantities to which this "exception" procedure would be so extended, we can't judge what it means. We do not now have to conclude that it will lead to a general breakdown of the multilateral structure for controlling and checking trade.

You see, in any event, this applies only to items which are not on the so-called CoCOM [Coordinating Committee] list—that is, the limitations on the trade with the Soviet Union—but only upon items which are not deemed strategic as far as the Soviet Union is concerned but are still nevertheless on the China list. So it will relate presumably to some of those items which are on the China list but not on the Soviet list. This implies at least that the items are not regarded as high in strategic value, or else they would be on the Soviet list, and they are items which are always procurable through the Soviet Union. It could buy them and ship them to Communist China. That involves certain delay, certain additional expense. It involves questions of the availability of space on the roads and the railroads. There is a moral factor. So, the COMCOM list is regarded by us as highly significant. But the items themselves are not considered of prime importance as regards strategic value or else they would be on the CoCOM list.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask—I understand that at a reception in Moscow last night Khrushchev told Ambassador Bohlen that he, Khrushchev, told Mr. Stassen in London that the Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces. Is that a lie?*

A. Well, I have already said enough on that subject to indicate my view of what Khrushchev reportedly said. I repeat that there was no disclosure and that the conclusions drawn were deductions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, weren't the deductions strong enough so that you established an interdepartmental subcommittee in the Government to study what the reaction of this Government ought to be?*

A. Yes, we thought it highly probable that there would be a reduction coming along. We felt that, however, not by any means exclusively as a result of anything that was learned in the talks

in London. There were a number of indications from a good many quarters. I repeat again that there was no disclosure by the Soviets at London of what they intended to do. They were deductions drawn.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when you spoke about the import restrictions from Japan, you mentioned the normal duties under the law. I presume by that you meant the escape-clause procedures?*

A. Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are we going to Panama purely for symbolic reasons, or do you think the President will have some concrete offer to make, some proposal to make to the meeting?*

A. No, we do not anticipate that the meeting at Panama will deal with any of what I call items of business. It is more than symbolic, because the importance attached to a meeting of the American States at that place, on that particular date, and with the attendance that will be there, will certainly give an important lift to the whole concept of the Organization of the American Republics.

#### **NATO and the Atlantic Community**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been discussion for many months now that perhaps in the expanded role of NATO and its new position that you are now evaluating, that perhaps in cases like Cyprus that NATO might assume jurisdiction there. Would you say such a move there as this is envisaged in the expanded NATO?*

A. Well, that is undoubtedly one of the problems that will be considered by this ministerial committee that is studying this question, that is, whether or not the Atlantic Community should develop more in terms of a regional association and should attempt to settle differences as between its members through some regional process or not. You see, at the present time NATO is not set up as a regional association under the United Nations Charter. It is set up as a collective defense association under article 51.

Now, the charter does encourage the development of regional associations, and it also encourages the settlement of disputes "in the first instance," as it puts it, by various means of the parties' own choosing, including, among other things, by the settlement through regional processes. Now so far, as I say, NATO has not been

organized as a regional association, nor has it any policy or jurisdiction to deal with disputes as between the members. One of the matters which will doubtless be considered in evaluating the desirable evolutionary steps to be taken at this time would be that question of whether or not to make it more of a regional association with a responsibility to settle differences between its members.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, insofar as the Cyprus question is a matter between governments, has the United States ever offered to mediate or play a role; I mean as between Turkey and Greece and Britain?*

A. No, we have never offered to, nor have we been invited to.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe the United States has always been opposed to the maintenance of political standing groups in NATO as opposed to military groups. Is there any change in that position?*

A. Well, the question of whether we make the Atlantic Community, through NATO or otherwise, into a body of greater political importance is one of the matters that is being considered. So far there has been no decision by any of the governments concerned to do that. So far, it has been operated primarily as a military alliance, and, while there have been reports from time to time on political matters, those have been primarily for the purpose of keeping the other Ministers informed on matters of interest rather than on the basis of the common duty, you might say, to seek to arrive at a common position on these matters. We are quite prepared to consider, with an open mind and with the other countries, an evolutionary step which would place greater political responsibility upon representatives of the NATO or the Atlantic Community countries.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you draw a distinction between NATO and the Atlantic Community when you or the President use those terms? And, if so, what is it, in your mind?*

A. There is a difference, I think, in this respect, that NATO is technically a creature of a treaty and that treaty is primarily a military alliance. As far as the treaty itself goes, the provisions of, let's say, article 2 and article 4, which are the two articles which deal with nonmilitary topics, those provisions are rather narrow and rather sketchy.

And it may very well be that, if these broader aspects are to be developed, they could be developed through steps which were additional to, or you might say superimposed upon, the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. I do not think we need to be limited by the terms of the treaty, because there is within the President an authority to conduct foreign relations, and to negotiate, through persons and by means that he chooses. If he chooses to conduct foreign relations through persons who at the same time are members of the NATO Council, he can do so. In other words, they would in a sense be wearing two hats.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us your reaction to Russia's reported offer to let Pan American Airways fly into Moscow?*

A. Well, the United States has for many years sought for our air companies an opportunity to fly into Russia, and if that facility is to be accorded we would welcome it.

*Q. Wouldn't that necessitate our giving them some privileges, such as flying the Atlantic, which might have some military value in training their people?*

A. Well, so far there has been no suggestion that this would have to be on a reciprocity basis.

*Q. Thank you very much.*

## **Anniversary of the Founding of Buddhism**

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*

Press release 279 dated May 24

The 2,500th anniversary of the founding of Buddhism is being celebrated this year throughout the world. The Sixth Buddhist Synod has reached its culmination in Rangoon, Burma. I should like to take this opportunity to express the importance which our Nation attaches to the recognition of the moral and spiritual values which alone can give significance to our lives and which must be the basis on which will be built the world of peace and justice which we all seek. We feel a sense of brotherhood with all peoples who adhere to such principles and welcome all occasions on which their essential importance is reaffirmed.



## Visit of President Sukarno of Indonesia

*Following are texts of remarks made on the arrival at Washington on May 16 of President Sukarno of the Republic of Indonesia, together with the two major addresses made by President Sukarno during his 3-day State visit in Washington.*

### WELCOME AT NATIONAL AIRPORT, MAY 16

Press release 262 dated May 16

#### Statement by Vice President Nixon

Mr. President, it is a very great privilege to welcome you to the United States on behalf of President Eisenhower, the Government of the United States, and all of the people of our country. I recall the very warm welcome that I received on the occasion of my visit to your country 2½ years ago. I can assure you that every place you go in the United States you will receive the same kind of welcome here because you, like our own George Washington, led your people to independence from colonialism and now in peace lead the Government of your country and the people to even greater achievements.

We trust that your visit every place will be one that will be of interest to you. We know that your conversations with President Eisenhower, the Secretary of State, and other Government officials will serve to strengthen the bonds of friendship between our two peoples.

#### Response by President Sukarno

Mr. Vice President, I am very happy to be in Washington today. I am very grateful for the invitation President Eisenhower and the American Government rendered to me. I am also very grateful for the kind reception.

I have come to America to see your country with my own eyes. I have come here to observe the great achievements of the great American Nation. I have come here to confirm or to modify the im-

pressions of your country which I have collected for so many years. Above all, I have come here to America to learn something from America—not in the first place from America merely as a country, merely as a nation, merely as a people, but from America as a state of mind, from America as the center of an idea.

I carry with me the greetings of the Indonesian people to you. I carry with me the thanks of the Indonesian people to you for all the assistance you gave us in our national reconstruction. I hope this visit will lead to a real understanding and to a real friendship between the American Nation and the Indonesian nation.

Thank you.

### REMARKS AT WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON, MAY 16

White House press release dated May 16

#### President Eisenhower

We are gathered here, of course, to do our part in extending to the President of Indonesia and his party a welcome to this land.

Mr. President, gathered here are many members of the executive branch of our Government, the Chief Justice of the United States, distinguished members of the United States Senate and of the United States House of Representatives, as well as representatives of our industrial and educational life. This representative body, I assure you, expresses the thought of America in saying to you: You are truly welcome and we hope you have a wonderful time in this country.

There are, of course, some parallels between your country and ours. Both of us were colonies. And both of us in our early years of freedom had some difficult problems to solve.

It happens that when we were in our 11th year of independence, as you are now, the man whose portrait is on the far wall over there—John

Adams—was President. One of the stories told about John Adams in this house—he was the first man to live in this house—was that his wife, Abigail, hung her laundry, done by her own hands, in the East Room, where we shall have coffee.

I tell this little story merely to show that in our time, in our 11th year, we were going through a period where it was indeed difficult going. But we had friends on the earth, as you have. And I think it is to the credit of the human race that when they see an individual or a nation working or struggling to go higher in life so that men may realize more of their material and spiritual ambitions, there is always somebody ready to help them. Of course, there's always someone ready to step in our faces, too, but I think friendship is stronger than the jealousies and the hatreds.

At least this is my hope: during your visit here in America you find much of interest that you can carry back and possibly even apply—or find some adaptation—to your own country. Above all, we hope—all of us here—that you will carry back with you a sense that the American people are truly interested in Indonesia and you and your efforts to raise the standards of all your people, to make for them a better life.

Gentlemen, would you rise with me and drink a toast to President Sukarno, the President of Indonesia.

#### **President Sukarno**

Mr. President, gentlemen, twice today I have expressed my admiration for the great American Nation, and I hope to have still more opportunities not only during this visit of mine but in my whole life to express again and again my admiration for the great American people.

This lunch, which I feel as an honor rendered to me, gives me an opportunity to express my admiration—my great admiration—for your great President, President Eisenhower.

May I ask you to rise and to join me in drinking a toast to the health of President Eisenhower.

#### **ADDRESS TO THE CONGRESS, MAY 17<sup>1</sup>**

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, I deem it a great honor and privilege to be able to address

<sup>1</sup>Made before a joint meeting of the Senate and the House of Representatives; reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of May 17, 1956, p. 7524.

this honorable Congress, and I express my gratitude to you for this opportunity.

Standing here before you, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, and before all the other honorable Members of this Congress, my thoughts, the thoughts of a man born in a cottage and grown up among poor people, go to the homes and hearts of the multitudes of the American people from all strata of your society, for whom you act as elected representatives. May I, therefore, convey to you, and through you to the people of America, the most sincere greetings of the Indonesian people and their thanks for your past generous assistance, with the hope that this visit to the United States of America will foster closer relations between our two nations.

In our contemporary world, the impact of America is felt more and more. The influence of the American with his outlook, his ideas, his technical and scientific advances, reaches to almost every corner of Asia and Africa, whilst in America itself, Asia, the Asian and his personality, his ideals, the fruits of his labor, are gradually becoming a living reality. Americans and Indonesians are no longer strangers to each other. We know each other from the films; the beams of the radio reach into our very homes; and the magazines and daily press provoke us to think of each other. These cultural exchanges, coupled with the products of your industries and the fruits of our soil, have kept us always much closer together than the thousands of sea miles which separate our two countries.

I have come to the United States, as I said yesterday, to see your country with my own eyes and to observe the achievements of the great American Nation. I have come here to confirm or to modify the impressions of your country which I have collected from a distance over many years. But, above all, I have come here to learn something from America—from America not merely as a place, not merely as a nation, but America as a state of mind, America as the center of an idea.

It was this very America which was in fact the first product of nationalism, of anticolonialism, and of the principle of independence. It is this America which, as the hothouse of American technology, surpassed the development of older sister nations and became a great power—nay, one of the most powerful nations in the world today. Present-day America as a world phenomenon, with all its impact on the peoples of the earth, was the

child of a marriage between the revolutionary America of Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln and the technological America imbued with the prodigious technical spirit of Edison and Ford.

The shot that was fired at Lexington on the 19th of April 1775 was heard around the world. It echoes still in the hearts of all who have recently won their independence, and it echoes still in the hearts of peoples who still struggle against their colonial bonds.

Over half the world the burning words which fired the American War of Independence have been closely studied as a source of inspiration and a plan of action. Yes, this period is the period of Asian and African resurgence.

If we could see the passage of history as yesterday I saw your country from the windows of an aeroplane, we could have no doubt that the world is passing through the period of Asian and African nationalism.

### **“Nationalism”**

I hesitate at using that word “nationalism,” for I know that in many countries and in many nations nationalism is an out-of-date political doctrine. Please remember, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, that for us of Asia and Africa nationalism is a young and progressive creed. We do not equate nationalism with chauvinism, and we do not interpret nationalism as meaning the superiority of our peoples over others. No. For us, nationalism means the rebuilding of our nations; it means the effort to provide equal esteem for our peoples; it means the determination to take the future into our own hands. For us, nationalism is the love of country and the determination to improve it which, not so very long ago, illumined the actions of the founders of your Nation. Nationalism may be an out-of-date doctrine for many in this world; for us of Asia and Africa, it is the mainspring of our efforts. Understand that, and you have the key to much of postwar history. Fail to understand it, and no amount of thinking, no torrent of words, and no Niagara of dollars will produce anything but bitterness and disillusionment.

We who are living in Asia and Africa during this period of Asian and African nationalism, and particularly those of us who have been called upon to guide the destiny of nations—we ask that the rest of the world should show understanding and sympathy. After all, for what do we strug-

gle? Not for fame; not for conquests; not for territorial aggrandizement; not for domination over other peoples. Our efforts and the sacrifices we have made have been for the release of our people from a colonial tyranny lasting for generations and centuries. It has been a struggle—it is still a struggle—for the simple human demands which the rest of the world has long taken for granted.

We ask you to understand our national struggle, and we ask you to sympathize with it. We ask you to understand and sympathize with the fact that our national struggle is still incomplete. How can it be complete when millions of our people in Asia and Africa are still under colonial domination, are still not free? How can the national struggle in Indonesia be complete when part of our own country and part of our own nation are still unfree?

I recall with the very greatest pleasure that shortly after the first Asian-African Conference last year, this Congress unanimously approved a resolution reaffirming America's traditional anti-colonial attitude. That conference in Bandung, in which the leaders of 29 states took part, and which represented far more than half the population of the world, was a clear indication of history's direction. Practically all shades of the political spectrum were represented there, and almost all were but recently emancipated from colonialism. They were united by many things but chiefly by their abhorrence of colonialism. They produced a declaration which explicitly stated their continuing opposition to colonialism in all its forms. This Congress, noting that conference and its declaration, then unanimously restated, for all the world to know, its own longstanding opposition to colonialism. By that action, this Congress demonstrated its sympathy with our efforts. In the scales of history, your weight was placed resoundingly onto the side of the future.

### **Indonesian Independence**

It is now almost 11 years since, on the 17th of August 1945, the Indonesian people proclaimed themselves independent. Note: I said the Indonesian people. Not those of Java alone, nor Sumatra alone, nor Celebes alone, but all of them, from the north of Sumatra to the southernmost corner of West New Guinea, which we call Irian Barat.

That Declaration of Independence covered every

part of what was once called the Netherlands East Indies, which constituted the vast colonial empire in Asia of a small European country. We had no quarrel with the Dutch as a people; we had no quarrel with the Government of the Netherlands as a government. Our quarrel, and the quarrel of our forefathers, was with colonialism: we had a quarrel with the colonial attitudes of some Dutch people; we had a quarrel with the colonial attitudes and actions of the Netherlands Government.

Four and a half years of fighting and negotiation followed. Four and a half years in which our colonially impoverished country, suffering already from the torments of Japanese occupation, suffered more from the attempts forcibly to reimpose the colonialism we had rejected. Finally, due in no small part to the efforts of the United Nations and its bodies in which America was prominent, the Netherlands made formal recognition of complete and unconditional sovereignty to Indonesia.

But our struggle was not yet at an end. One part of our country, one section of our brothers, were not free—and even today are not free. The territory of Irian Barat, West New Guinea, is still a colonial outpost on Indonesian soil. Our Declaration of Independence had covered all of the Netherlands East Indies. The agreements by which Holland recognized that independence and that sovereignty had made reference to the whole territory of the Netherlands East Indies. But part of our land, a part of the territories covered by those agreements, is still a colonial cancer in the body politic of our motherland.

We are told that the people of West Irian are not our brothers and that they come from a different racial stock and therefore West Irian is not Indonesian. Where—again, where—is the country whose citizens are ethnically pure? In fact, for many hundreds of years past, West Irian has been recognized as being part of the Indonesian archipelago. Before colonial days, West Irian was part of the Indonesian national state of Modjopahit, one of the glories of the Hindu-Javanese civilization. West Irian was part of the Dutch Empire in Asia and was administered and recognized without question as being a unit of the Netherlands East Indies. In all ways, and by ties of common colonial experience, West Irian has been, and still is, an essential part of Indonesia.

We are told that the people of West Irian are not ready for a change from their colonial status,

and that they need the continued guidance of the West to train them for the transition to liberty.

We know this “guidance.” We have had experience of this “training.” It left us, after 350 years, with an illiteracy rate of 94 percent. It left us without sufficient doctors to treat even those who are sick unto death. It left us with a typically colonial economic and social structure.

#### **Progress Since Independence**

I tell you this in all solemnity. In the 11 years of our independence, the Indonesian nation has made more human progress, and has been the scene of greater human happiness, than in all the tens of generations of colonialism that went before. Our people are free, and in freedom they have found their soul—just as the people of West Irian will do when they too are free. They can do what we have done. The figures are available: the lists of schools built, of recurrent epidemics abated, of diets improved, of infant mortality decreased. Forgive me if I seem to boast. I do not intend to boast. I wish to give you a factual account. Let me cite just one item in the field of education. Illiteracy before the war was 94 percent; today it is 40 percent. That is what the ending of colonialism will mean in West Irian.

The return of West Irian is for us the remaining part of our national political aspiration. It is the final installment on the colonial debt. We see our brothers still in chains, who joined with us in proclaiming our common independence, and so our own freedom is not yet complete. The salt of liberty cannot have its full savor for us until all of Indonesia is again united under the freedom which is the birthright of all men.

Permit me to remind you, sir, of one of America's greatest sons, who said that this Nation could not exist half slave and half free. That father of the American tradition was not speaking then of colonial slavery, but his words apply in all their moving strength to this case.

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, although somewhat belatedly, we of Indonesia are now in the stage of national turmoil through which you passed before us some 150 years ago. We are anti-colonialists, for the sweat of our labor has been extorted by other nations, leaving us poverty-stricken with the sorrow of our hearts. We are nationalists, for it is our right to win back the worthy place in the family of nations torn from our forefathers three and a half centuries ago. In all of this, we

do not claim to have discovered novel principles. No, but like your forefathers, we regard our findings as universal values, as the common property of all mankind.

Present-day Indonesia has so much in common with the growth of the United States of America in the past. You are now reaping the fruits of your pioneering struggle, while we are still busy sowing the seeds from which our future national life will spring. You achieved your material and cultural prosperity based upon the principles of the democracy which is one of your proudest boasts today. Democracy is part of our principles too, part of our Pantja Sila, an instrument to build national prosperity and stability. But we Indonesians are well aware that, however noble the aim, practical democracy is not always easily attainable.

### **First Steps Toward Democracy**

Last year we twice faced the test of the free and secret ballot, one of the fundamentals of political democracy. The conduct of these elections, one for the House of Representatives and the other for the Constituent Assembly, showed that Indonesia is capable, as the international press reported, of taking the first steps along the road to democracy. Although the elections are not compulsory, about 80 percent of the electors, numbering some 35 million souls and scattered over thousands of miles in thousands of islands in our great archipelago, came to the polls and fulfilled their duties as responsible citizens. As a result of these elections, it has been possible to form a coalition government between the largest political parties. The PNI (Nationalist Party), the Masjumi and the Nahdatul Ulama (both Moslem parties) with the support of some of the smaller parties, have formed a coalition cabinet. I trust that this coalition, with more than ample support from Parliament, will be stable enough to maintain itself throughout the entire 4 years of its mandate, so that the national process of growth will not be interrupted by intermittent changes of government.

Although these first elections have been successfully accomplished, I shall be modest, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, in my claims for the establishment of democracy. For who has absolute democracy? We have our feet on the road to democracy, and we have made a good start. But we will not deceive ourselves with the false illusion that we have traversed the full extent of the road

to democracy, if indeed any end there be. The secret ballot, the free press, the freedom of belief, the voting in parliaments—these are all merely expressions of democracy. Freedom of expression has a guardian in a certain measure of prosperity, the achievement of freedom from want. For us, then, democratic principles are not simply an aim, the expression of desires inherent in human nature; they are also a means of providing our people with a reasonable standard of living. The freedom of expression and the freedom from want are indivisible, two interdependent souls in one body. As with all other freedoms, freedom of expression is no absolute; its indiscriminate and unrestrained exercise could hamper the harmonious growth of other freedoms, could hamper the harmonious growth from want, and thus sow the seed for the destruction of the fundamentals of human freedom itself.

Your Nation began your struggle for liberty, equality, fraternity, and prosperity at a period in history when there was no great gap between the standards of nations. There was no great gap between haves and have-nots, there were no nations of abject poverty and extreme wealth, there were no nations of super technical development and utter technical backwardness, there was not so great a gap between the fortunates possessing full-fledged democracy and the sufferers living under complete tyranny. The contrasts today are great. The contrast between the joy of life cherished by some nations and the burden of suffering imposed upon more than one half of the human race has outstripped all proportions. Such conditions do not stimulate normal growth toward emancipation, especially when the less-privileged are subjected to the competition of the privileged and the powerful in their daily human activities. But if the development of the newly independent countries in the direction of their prosperity be regarded as indispensable for the preservation of civilized man, there certainly will be no need for regrets over the world's wealth and the almost unlimited resources for the further development of man's technological civilization.

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, the impact of your revolution has not always been of the same kind upon all countries of the globe. We in Indonesia attach great importance to the freedom of expression, to be preserved even in the Herculean task of firmly founding our national economy. Other revolutions have aimed immediately upon building heavy industry as the basis for freedom

from want in the future, if necessary even at the sacrifice of some aspects of freedom of expression for the time being. These are rival conceptions, and they constitute a challenge to Indonesia which she must answer in translating ideals into practice.

The development of Indonesia in particular and of certain other countries of Asia in general will be the test case of the success or failure of the modern world's application of democratic principles. The solvency of less technically developed countries, the solution of the social and economic problems of newly independent peoples at a pace which can keep up with their consciousness of their own worth as equal members of the human family—these are all questions to measure the success of our democracy. In Indonesia, apart from the wealth of nature, our main capital is the sweat and tears of our population, the sacrifices even to the death of those who have gone before. It has been, and it still is, an investment of voluntary human cooperation and sacrifice which is needed for the development of our country. There is no imposition upon the people to save part of their meager income as a means of accumulating badly needed national capital, neither would we introduce forced labor for national undertakings, nor the expropriation of existing big companies which are run mainly on the basis of profit motives.

Moreover, the present situation in the world is, as I have already mentioned, such that even we the economically weak nations have to compete in order to grow—compete with the forces of powerful and experienced nations in order to survive the drives and thrusts of the current of elimination. Democracy, when all is said and done, is the introduction of equal opportunity in human activities amongst the indigenous people themselves, and, next to that, some degree of opportunity for foreign competitors to insure the best performance. This sometimes leads toward the presence of an anachronism in which colonial vestiges become strengthened at the expense of national growth. Taking all this into consideration, the question arises: Will democracy succeed in Indonesia? Will democracy really bring prosperity and happiness in Indonesia? What is the reason for Indonesia's firm belief in the democratic process and progress? These are questions, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, which have long occupied the minds of many Indonesian leaders. These problems, I think, also raise doubts—or hopes—among the statesmen and politicians of a number

of Western countries about the ability of the Indonesian people to outlive the shock of national responsibility in this turbulent world.

My answer, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker is: Have no doubt about that.

### **Five Principles**

Immediately we had proclaimed our independence in August 1945, we attached as preamble to our Constitution the Pantja Sila, the five guiding principles of our national life. Perhaps you know already what our Pantja Sila is. It gives us the five principles of our State. These are:

First, belief in God.

Second, nationalism.

Third, humanity.

Fourth, democracy.

Fifth, social justice.

These five principles are the combined reflection of Indonesia's natural climate and the personality of its inhabitants. They were also partly formulated by President Eisenhower in his speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on the 21st of April last, when he spoke of certain principles:<sup>2</sup>

First, "They believe deeply in the right of self-government";

Second, "They believe deeply in the dignity of man";

Third, "They aspire to improve the welfare of the individual, as a basic aim of organized society."

So again, have no doubts about democracy in Indonesia. Even in the most difficult years immediately after the recognition of sovereignty, we were able to guard the unity of our country through another democratic concept, expressed in the motto of the State, "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika"—Unity in Diversity. Voluntary loyalty to the Indonesian motherland as a whole has been settled in our country without compulsion, without the process of civil war, despite subversive actions by people who do not want to see us free, despite provocation at home and abroad.

Having survived the early, most critical years of our national existence, more attention can be paid to upbuilding and rehabilitation, and especially to the investment of human skill. Just before I left Indonesia, we inaugurated a campaign for village community development, and Parlia-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 699.

ment is soon to discuss the first national 5-year plan, with a total allocation of 11 billion rupiahs, or \$1 billion.

However important they may be, our own national efforts on their own will not suffice to achieve steady progress toward viability for our country against the impact of economic or political competition from overseas. It is in this field that we ask your understanding and your cooperation for our mutual benefit. America is known the world over for generosity; if I am not mistaken the American taxpayer has already spent more than \$50 billion in foreign aid. But that aid has brought variable results. An example of good results is the recovery of Western Europe after World War II; other results are still prospective in other parts of the world, whereas elsewhere American aid is regarded as of doubtful benefit for national progress.

#### Technical Assistance

Indonesia is indeed grateful for the technical assistance she has received to date from America, and in acknowledging my gratitude I want to express myself with the frankness of a friend. Am I allowed to be frank, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker? For the furtherance of their function as defenders of freedom, America and Indonesia need to realize how to obtain lasting results, and these depend upon the specific conditions of Asian countries and the development of the national aspirations of the Asian people, which, indeed, America cannot be expected immediately to know or to understand. The approach to the question of foreign aid should be based upon different principles in different countries. Without adequate knowledge of those countries, and even if your motives in granting aid were solely the stability of this region, the results could be adverse, and the flow of even billions of dollars could lead only to strained relations. Certainly military aid is no substitute for Asian stability. It will only serve to make countries accepting it more dependent upon America, and their worth as genuine partners in the universal struggle for liberty, peace, and prosperity will consequently decline. The main aim should be for the people of Asia, like the Western nations, to become economically stable but also politically stable and thus be able to defend their freedom against all assaults. Political stability comes only with the stability of

the political heart. And this heart of ours is now still an unsatisfied heart. The Asian people must soon be brought to the stage of development where they are capable of cherishing their hard-won freedom.

This two-sided struggle is a longer and a harder struggle, but until it is won, the process of emancipation of our people will not be complete. The Republic of Indonesia is a democracy which has leaned heavily upon the experience of the West, and particularly of your great Union, for its national ideals. We know that is not enough. To the famished man, democracy can never be more than a slogan. What can a vote mean to a woman worn out by toil, whose children fret and ail with the fever of malaria? Democracy is not merely government by the people; democracy is also government for the people.

The fight for the emancipation of our people is our fight, and, believe me, we shall not shirk it. We ask for your understanding of it and your sympathy with it. We will accept with the greatest appreciation any assistance that may come to us, from whatever quarter it may come, for that assistance will lighten our burdens and shorten our struggle. Such assistance is not one-sided but is of mutual benefit. Out of it comes a greater measure of good will, and—perhaps more important—out of it comes a greater volume of production in the world. But, from whatever quarter of this divided globe that assistance comes, we are determined that no material advantage will buy from us any part of our hard-won freedom, for that freedom is more dear to us than the products which any country can give or sell. We welcome assistance on terms of mutual benefit. We reject the idea of exchanging intellectual and spiritual independence or physical liberty for momentary advantage.

And now, Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, finally, may I say this:

We live in a troubled world, in which man cannot rest and cannot give his whole thought and effort to the welfare of mankind. A shadow, pregnant with horror, hangs over the future. It is a man-made shadow, and its mushroom shape colors all our thoughts and all our dreams. In their technical and scientific skill, men have created something whose potentiality for good or evil is so great that the imagination of the same men is overpowered.

So far, the full horror of this latest of mankind's achievements has not burst on the world. So far

only small samples of this victory over nature have been used for their designed purpose. And what is that purpose? May God forbid that man should ever take upon himself the responsibility for the use of this weapon. The destruction of this world is not the prerogative of man.

There is irony in the fact that, for the first time ever, man has it within his power to make the desert bloom like a garden, to banish poverty and want from the world, to open up a new era of brotherhood, and yet, at the same time, no man can look with confidence into the future. The rivers and the tides obey our command; we bstride the skies and pluck wealth from under the earth and the sea; we conquer the age-old plagues of humanity and even fight a winning battle against death. At the same time, we dig ourselves shelters in the rocks and prepare to sit and die in them, as man did during the dawn of the world. Have we then made so little progress? Have we learned nothing?

It may be that war is a natural function of man and that his combative feelings prevent his living in peace with his neighbors. It may be so, but I do not believe it.

In any case, should the new weapons begin to fall, the question would be academic, for then we would have not war but universal death and the end of mankind's brief civilization. It is true that repeatedly throughout history man has crucified himself, only to rise again. Let there be no mistake about it. After an atomic war there would be no resurrection. Certainly we cannot let things slide and trust to luck that no megalomaniac will press the fateful trigger.

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker, in saying these things to you, I am well aware that I am saying nothing you do not already know, for this Congress of the United States of America has given anxious thought to this matter. We who have not got the atom bomb, we will watch every move you take in this matter. With hope in our hearts but fear in our breasts, we will applaud everything which helps to make the future safe for our children. We will support every action taken by you, or the responsible leaders of any country, to remove the shadow of the atom bomb from this world.

May God give men the will to avert calamity.

And may He give us, America and Indonesia, the best friendship which has ever existed between two nations.

It is a rather overpowering experience to meet at one time so many men and women of the press. It is overpowering and in some ways rather frightening, for indeed the press of the world is a mighty implement for good or evil. I recall the words of Mark Twain who was also impressed by the power of this tool. Mark Twain once wrote, "There are only two forces that can carry light into all the corners of the world—only two: the sun in the heavens, and the Associated Press down here." With all of Mark Twain's experiences, he never faced 600 journalists, not only of the Associated Press but of all parts of the world. Moreover, I was always glad to note that he put the sun first. This at least must impress upon all journalists—and all of us—a proper and due sense of humility.

I am expected to talk to you, presumably to talk about Indonesia, but talking to experts is a difficult matter. Nevertheless, this is an opportunity for which I am profoundly grateful because it not only allows me to renew many old acquaintanceships but to make many new ones.

One of the most far-reaching effects of technical progress has surely been in the sphere of communications between the nations of the world. What is done in one country today is known to all the world tomorrow. It is known, and it is praised or criticized. This has the great advantage that the actions of all governments are bathed in the light of day—and presumably in the light of the press. It means that public opinion is in truth a factor of international affairs, and one which can be ignored by no government, whatever its political color. It means, too, that what happens in one country has its effects the world over. If one man suffers under tyranny, the stature of all men is lessened; if one man reaches a little further toward justice, then the chains of all men are weakened. The historical task of the press is to seek out the facts, to publish the facts, and to analyze the facts. The degree of success in that task influences in large measure the opinions, and thus the actions, of all states. It is a heavy responsibility to bear, but I think the Fourth Estate is not afraid of responsibility.

As a matter of fact, that willingness to accept responsibility is a characteristic of men in this 20th century. The world would be in a sorry state if it were not so. And yet those responsibilities have in many cases been heavier than anything previously



imposed upon man. Which of us would exchange our position in life for that of the President of the United States who had to decide whether or not the atomic bomb should be dropped? Who amongst us would take the burden of deciding between guns and butter for our people?

The irony is that we could all have both guns *and* butter. Furthermore, if we all had butter, perhaps we would not want guns. We have indeed produced a strange world, one in which the highest ideals of human brotherhood are pronounced, while at the same time we prepare to destroy those same human brothers. We know how to overcome the problems of nature; we have not learned how to overcome the problems in our own minds and hearts.

And yet we have made progress. What was once a silver thread in the works of a visionary is now a reality in the world. The ideal of human fellowship has advanced and the ideal of each man being his brother's keeper is generally accepted, even if not yet generally implemented. We of Asia and now of Africa know this well.

### **Struggle Toward National Fulfillment**

Our struggle toward national fulfillment has been eased by the assistance given by people of other countries and continents. The wheels of history have been oiled for us by understanding and sympathy. We have taken courage from the example and the burning words of others, and the night has been made radiant by the truth and high ideals so often expressed and so sincerely struggled for.

In truth this is one world, and the actions of all have an effect upon all. A little time ago I picked up, quite casually, a history book used in schools of my country. It was a book for children of 10 or 12 years old and is also used widely by adults who have, in their maturity, learned the art of reading.

That history book contained stories from all over the world of national heroes who had fought for the freedom of their country. It told of Washington and of Jefferson, of Garibaldi and of Mazzini, of Cromwell and of Ireton. Furthermore, it told of others in other countries. It spoke of names familiar to us, and beloved by us, but perhaps strange to you—of those in Egypt, in Turkey, in Morocco, in India, in Burma, in Japan, and in China. All of those great men struggled that

their nations might be free. Many died before that ideal could be realized, but the lamp they lit has never been, and will never be, extinguished. And all of those men were related one to the other by bonds of common action and common faith.

For what did they struggle? Yes, for their nations. But what is a nation? Many great thinkers have applied their minds to this. Many answers have been given, often conflicting, and usually confusing. One of the truest and most moving descriptions I know was contained in a short essay by a little-known professor of Ohio University. About 40 years ago, Professor Taylor wrote:

Where and what is the nation? Is there such a thing? You would answer that the nation exists only in the minds and hearts of men. It is an idea. It is therefore more real than its courts and armies; more real than its cities, its railroads, its mines, its cattle; more real than you and I are, for it existed in our fathers and will exist in our children. It is an idea, it is an imagination, it is a spirit, it is human art. Who will deny that the nation lives?

Yes, who will deny, who can deny, that the nation lives, even if all the political scientists fail to define it?

### **Effects of Colonialism**

We of Asia are told that the troubles of our continent are due to nationalism. That is as wrong as saying that the world's troubles are due to atomic energy. It is true that there is turbulence in Asia, but that turbulence is the result and aftermath of colonialism and is not due to the liberating effects of nationalism. I say "the liberating effects of nationalism." I do not mean only that nations are again free of colonial bonds, but I mean that men feel themselves free. You who have never known colonialism can never appreciate what it does to man. The agrarian effects, the economic effects, the political effects can be measured. The effect on man's mind and spirit cannot. Regard it only in this simple light. For generations the political leaders of colonies work and aim for the destruction of the colonial governments. Perhaps the leaders understand the dangers inherent in cultivating a destructive mentality, but the mass of people know only their misery under colonialism and seek only the destruction of colonialism. Then, by one means or another, there comes independence. Immediately

that already weakened nation—weakened by colonialism and by the struggle against colonialism—immediately that nation must begin to seek a reorientation. Not destruction, but construction; not opposition, but support; not conflict, but cooperation. Is it surprising that sometimes independence proves to be a heady wine?

In any case, whether all the world approves or not, the fact is that nationalism and the liberation of nations are realities. They are the reality of international life. What we must do is learn to adjust international relations to this reality. We cannot afford the attempt to distort the reality to make it fit old patterns. In that way would lie disruption, and particularly disruption of the few precious world organizations we already have. The new nations of Asia and Africa are recent additions to an adult family. The older members of that family must not be jealous of the new arrivals.

The chief factor that these nations have in common is their nationalism and the concomitant release from colonialism. *To understand Asia and Africa, we must understand nationalism.* For us, it is the mainspring of action. This cannot be surprising to Western peoples, for the love of country, the spirit of patriotism, is a great element in life here also. There would have been no American War of Independence if nationalism had not burned with a hard and fierce flame in the breasts of the men of '76. Nearer home, it was nationalism which supported the Allied nations during their battles against the horrors of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, or Imperial Japan.

I know that nationalism is today in many circles a suspect word and that it conveys ideas of chauvinism, of racial supremacy, and a dozen other ideologies that we reject. Those evil things are not nationalism, but distortions of nationalism. Do not confuse the distortions with the sound fruit. How foolish it would be to reject democracy because in some places and at some times democracy has been bent into shapes which are a perversion of the democratic ideal. Equally, how foolish it is to reject nationalism because it has sometimes been perverted.

This I know: We of Indonesia and the citizens of many countries of Asia and Africa have seen our dearest and best suffer and die, struggle and fail, and rise again to struggle and fail again—and again be resurrected from the very earth and finally achieve their goal. Something burned in

them; something inspired them. They called it nationalism. We who have followed and have seen what they built, but what they destroyed themselves in building—we, too, call their inspiration, and our inspiration, nationalism. For us, there is nothing ignoble in that word. On the contrary, it contains for us all that is best in mankind and all that is noblest.

### **Nationalism and Internationalism**

Perhaps the future belongs to greater organizations than mere nations. Certainly the increasing trend toward internationalism is an encouraging sign of man's growing maturity. Perhaps the future will see the growth of international, supernational, and supranational bodies. That may be so. In any case, those bodies cannot be built until nations are built first. You cannot establish international bodies until nations have established their national identities. You cannot build supernational and supranational bodies without using nations as the foundations and the brick and the keystones.

Therefore I say: Do not denigrate our nationalism. Try to understand and sympathize with it. It is at least a positive creed, an active belief, and has none of the cynicism and lassitude of other less virile outlooks.

Whatever can be said of my nation, no one can accuse it of being static. It is on the move, and the revolutionary impetus of 11 years ago is still strong. In fact, that impetus received new strength as we moved, after our first nationwide general election, into a new phase of activity. Today we have a Parliament elected by the people and closely reflecting the political views of the people. We have a Government supported by that Parliament and responsible to it. We have, in fact, all the trappings of political democracy. That is progress. In 11 years we have passed through stages of political development that older nations encompassed in generations. We have even gone beyond the stage of political democracy reached by some states established for centuries. I say that in no spirit of boasting, but as a record of fact. With us, voting is universal and secret, and some democratic states have not yet accepted such methods.

Of course, we make mistakes; of course, we are sometimes too eager for the immediate result. Of course, we sometimes seem to carry things beyond

their logical conclusion. But please remember this. Ours is still a revolutionary nation and a nation which, only 11 years ago, was 350 years out of date. We are in a hurry because the world has no intention of standing still while we catch up. We must cram the experience of centuries into a generation, and it is important for us that the revolutionary spirit of self-sacrifice and solidarity should be maintained. That is our driving force.

### Rejection of Colonialism

One misunderstanding should be eliminated immediately. *We are not anti-West.* We may, in fact we do, sometimes oppose what is called the West. But that is not dictated by a feeling of being anti-West. In our relations with the world, we seek always what we believe to be the best road for humanity as a whole. Sometimes, no doubt, we are wrong. At other times, I have equally no doubt, we are right. It is true that there is one manifestation of the West which we—and all of Asia—completely reject and will continue to reject. That manifestation is colonialism. We are told that we see only one sort of colonialism, and that sort is dead. Well, we have experienced only one sort of colonialism, and that came to us from the West. However, I would like to recall to your minds that the Bandung conference last year unanimously expressed its opposition to colonialism in all its forms—yes, in all its forms, whether it is economic colonialism, physical colonialism, classical colonialism, or the colonialism of a small, alien body within a nation.

As I said, we are told that colonialism is dead and that we are whipping a dead horse. My reply to that is a simple one. Come to Asia and see for yourselves. Travel to Africa and see for yourselves. Colonialism, even in its classical form, is *not dead* so long as one nation is unfree, so long as the vision of the United Nations Charter is not applied to one territory, so long as brother is divided from brother by a colonial barrier. Colonialism will not be dead until the domination of one people by another is ended. Colonialism will not be dead until nations—including my nation—are reunited in that freedom which is the birthright of all men. Rationalization of these facts is dangerous. There is no such thing as a beneficent colonialism, just as there is no such thing as a beneficent disease. Colonialism, the

history of the postwar years shows, does not train for self-government; it trains only for hatred, and that hatred can be directed against the quarter from which colonialism comes, as well as against colonialism itself.

In America, I know it is not necessary for anyone to defend or apologize for a policy of anticolonialism. It is often necessary, however, to defend the fruits and results of such a policy, particularly if, on occasion, that policy appears to run counter to the policy of this country and its associated countries. Let us try to look at the very basic facts of the policy followed by this country. What is the real object of it? The object is not the defeat of communism in the world. In your view that is a most desirable thing. But it is not the object of your policy. No. I think you would agree, and the leaders of your Nation would agree, that you are seeking a larger freedom for mankind. Communism appears to you to stand in the way of that object; therefore you oppose communism. To see the defeat of communism as the end of policy is to confuse military victory with the aims of war.

Now, what is the object of our policy? What is the object of Indonesia's policy? It is to seek a larger freedom for mankind. In doing so, we seek to shake off the final bonds and effects of colonialism. Thus the object of our policy is the same as the object of your policy. We differ in tactics because our immediate problems are different, but we have the same basic aim.

Accepting this, I think it can be agreed that there may well be more than one road to final consummation of a policy. We are not concerned with a problem in geometry, where the shortest distance between what we have and what we want is a straight line. In international affairs, a straight line can lead directly into the ruinous heart of a megaton explosion. We are dealing, not with mathematical postulates, we are dealing with men.

None of us, I feel sure, have the whole truth in our understanding. Perfect understanding is an attribute of God, not of man. It is, however, certain that we must continue searching for understanding. I know that the United States is the country where sociological research is taken most seriously. Much of that research is into the factors that divide humanity. I would like to see similar research into the factors that unite humanity. And there are many. I would like to see research, not into the cultural differentiation of man, but

into the cultural unity of man, into the factors which make men brothers and not just points on a statistician's graph. From Iceland to New Zealand, from Japan to New York, man is the same in his humanity. When we come to realize that and realize that the man is not the same as his personal iron curtain of prejudices, we are more than halfway to the fulfillment of our ideals.

### Technological Indigestion

This is a very strange world we have inherited. In moments of frustration, I sometimes feel that man has reached for the stars and smeared his hands with primeval mud. We have penicillin and—the wonders of bacteriological warfare. We have rocket-powered bombing aircraft and—ox-drawn ploughs. We have atom bombs and—half the world lit by flickering oil lamps. We have television and—soap opera. Is it possible that our technical skill is surpassing our mental stature? I do not believe so, for I have a profound faith in the potentiality of man. What seems obvious is that we have a bad dose of technological indigestion and should really take greater care with our diet. It needs, I think, a better balance. It lacks a spiritual and moral content. In international affairs, we move—or stagger—from expedient to expedient and never quite catch up with the reality. In national affairs, we find it difficult to follow the basic principle of doing the greatest good for the greatest number of people because we do not know what is the greatest good. Yes, it is a puzzling world, a disturbing world, but a supremely challenging world.

Sometimes people have sympathized with me because long years of my life were spent in jail and in exile. Well, these years of jail and exile were a mixed experience. I hated them because they separated me from the dearest thing in the world, the struggle of my people for rebirth. At the same time, they were a blessing, because I had what is so rare in this world, the opportunity of thinking about basic issues, the opportunity of examining afresh the beliefs I held.

Since 1942, since the Japanese who occupied my country released me from exile, I have again been engaged in those things which surely provide the fullest and most beneficial use of the powers God has granted to any person. If I may say so without seeming to boast: I know my people; I know them up and down, inside and out. And now I will tell you this about them.

To all Indonesians, their country and their nation come first. They have fought for their land: it is theirs. They have fought for independence: it is theirs. They have fought for their national identity: it is theirs. They have fought for these things before and will fight again if anything openly threatens them or undermines them.

We are called "neutralist." We are not neutral and will never be neutral until man the world over is free. It is said we are sitting on the fence, but we have no intention of being trampled to death in the corral. It is said we have bitten the hand that fed us. I don't know about that, but we certainly had to bite the hand that starved us before we got rid of the colonial harness.

### Plea for Understanding

In all seriousness, let me ask this of you: Seek to understand us. Give us, if you can, your sympathy, as I am sure you give your sympathy to what we are trying to do. Give us, if you can, your *active* sympathy and understanding. This will help us. It will also help the people of this great Nation and the whole world!

We have won our national independence, and we are trying to give that independence a genuine and worthwhile content for every hungry man, every weary woman, every unlettered child in our vast archipelago. A hungry man cannot eat a voting paper. We believe in methods and ideals of democracy, but it must be an economic and social democracy as well as a political democracy. In the midst of want, social inequality, and poverty, democracy cannot exist for long.

We seek the unity of our nation and are working, and will work, for the reinclusion of West Irian into the fold of that nation. We do this because it is a sore tribulation to us that any part of our country should still suffer colonialism, and no outpouring of words can disguise the fact that colonialism still rules there. We feel incomplete and unprotected without Irian, and we feel that the battle for even the most elementary stages of liberty is not yet won.

Understand that we are in the era of Asian and African nationalism. That, for Asia and Africa, is primary. No torrent of dollars, no cascade of rubles will change that. Equally, dollars and rubles will mean nothing unless they respect the national aspirations of the people of those continents.

Finally, let me assure you of this: Our inde-

pendence is not complete yet, but we value what we have, above all things. That independence is not for sale, and no currency will buy one scrap of it. Certainly, we will take assistance wherever it comes from because that assistance may stop a child crying from hunger or a man from being driven early to his grave, wornout by toil. But we will labor at our land and jungles with bare hands rather than exchange any part of our freedom for any sort of aid.

You have been very patient with me. Thank you all very much for that and for the opportunity of meeting you today.

“Merdeka”—that is Indonesia’s greetings to you!

### **MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY <sup>3</sup>**

Press release 260 dated May 16

#### **Indonesian Members**

Dr. Sukarno,  
President of the Republic of Indonesia

Roeslan Abdulgani,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Moekarto Notowidigdo,  
Ambassador to the United States

Zainul Arifin,  
First Deputy Chairman of the Parliament

Dr. Wirjono Prodjodikoro,  
Chief Justice

Dr. Abdul Karim Pringgodigdo,  
Director of the Cabinet

Sanusi Hardjadinata,  
Governor of West Java

Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo,  
Member of Parliament

Vice Air Marshal Suryadarma,  
Chief of Staff, Air Force

Mr. Suwirjo,  
President Director of the Indonesian Industrial Bank

Dr. Johannes Leimena,  
Member of Parliament

Sutarto Hadisudibjo,  
Member of Parliament

Colonel Nazir,  
Commander of Naval Bases in Java

Colonel J. F. Warrouw,  
Commander, Seventh Army Division

Dr. Ouw Eng Liang,  
Physician to the President

Lientenant Colonel Sugandhy,  
Aide-de-Camp to the President

<sup>3</sup> Revised list; original list and program were announced in press releases 251 of May 11 and 258 of May 15 (not printed).

#### **U.S. Members**

Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.,  
Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia

John F. Simmons,  
Chief of Protocol, Department of State

Maj. Gen. Gordon R. Rogers, U. S. A.,  
American Aide to President Sukarno

Clement E. Conger,  
Assistant Chief of Protocol, Department of State

Jameson Parker,  
Press Officer, Department of State

### **U.S. Policy on Right of Asylum**

White House press release dated May 24

The Soviet Government and its satellites in Eastern Europe have shown unusual interest in inducing the return of refugees from these countries, particularly those resident in Western Europe and more recently those in the United States. The formation of repatriation committees, proclamations by the various governments of amnesties for citizens who have escaped, and personal contact on the part of official Soviet-bloc representatives abroad are manifestations of this concern.

The objects of this activity are to induce the return of those who have fled from Communist oppression and to sow fear and dissension among those who choose to remain in the West. Any means at hand—such as alleged appeals from relatives—are employed in the campaign.

Refugees from Communist countries have displayed great steadfastness in the face of the strong pressures exerted upon them to return to their homelands. The number of those who have gone back is insignificant in comparison with those who seek freedom and security in the West. And the continued flow of refugees to the free world, despite all the efforts of the Communist authorities to prevent it, is the best answer to the propaganda offering illusory prospects to those who are prepared to give up their freedom for life under a dictatorship.

The West as a whole has shown a deep sense of responsibility for those who have sought haven in its territories from Communist tyranny and regimentation. The receiving countries have already taken in more than one million refugees since 1945 and, despite the many problems connected with resettlement, have done their best to provide homes and jobs and the opportunity to become productive and respected citizens in a free

society. Those who have not yet been provided for continue to be objects of concern and sympathy. The United States has been happy to contribute its share to this mass resettlement operation, which is continuing because it is in accord with American traditions to protect and assist those fleeing from persecution.

It is likewise U.S. policy that any person in this country, including those who have sought asylum here, shall have a free choice to leave the United States. It is also the right of this Government to satisfy itself through its responsible agencies that the individual is leaving this country only of his own free will.

The United States is taking action against instances of improper and irregular pressure by officials of foreign governments seeking to influence persons who have sought asylum in this country. The United States has already taken steps which make clear its determination to extend the full protection of American laws to all aliens residing here.

The right of asylum is one of the treasured traditions of free peoples. The United States intends to continue firmly to adhere to and uphold this principle.

## **U.S. and Canada To Examine Subject of Boundary Waters**

Press release 275 dated May 23

The Canadian and United States Governments have decided to examine together the subject of waters which flow across the international boundary between the two countries.

The last time both Governments examined this matter thoroughly together was before the conclusion of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. During the 46 years which have elapsed since its ratification, the International Joint Commission, which was established by the treaty, has worked with outstanding success in solving water problems within the framework of this treaty.

It has recently appeared, however, that the development of the resources of such basins as the St. John, the Columbia, and the Yukon requires, among other things, the solution of various complicated legal, economic, and engineering questions. In agreeing to examine the matter of waters which cross the boundary, the two Governments

realize that there may be no easy or quick answer to the problems which are arising today in such areas and that the studies may reveal that the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 is sufficiently broad to meet present problems. The two Governments believe, however, that a full and confidential exchange of views may contribute to the resolution of these problems, and it is in this spirit that the discussions have been agreed to. At the same time, the two Governments desire that the International Joint Commission shall press forward its studies under the Columbia River Basin Reference of 1944 and the other similar References which it has under consideration.

## **Visa Applications Cut Off for Certain Polish Refugees**

Press release 278 dated May 24

Because of heavy oversubscription of the 2,000 visas allotted by the Refugee Relief Act to refugees who were members of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland during World War II, were honorably discharged, and resided in the British Isles when the Refugee Act was enacted, the Department of State announced on May 24 that it would accept no new applications for such visas after midnight, June 4, 1956. As of May 18, 1,448 visas have been issued to such Polish refugees. For the remaining 552 visas, there were pending 1,722 applications.

In instructions to the consulates, Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the Refugee Relief Program, emphasized that:

(1) The cutoff would not apply to orphan applicants residing in Great Britain who are processed under another section of the act.

(2) Although assurances received after the cutoff date will not be processed under the Refugee Relief Act, such assurances will be sent to the appropriate consular authorities to permit the applicant to establish a priority registration date under the normal annual quota of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

(3) The cutoff does not apply to Poles who may be eligible under the refugee program to come to the United States from other countries than Great Britain.

As of May 18, the total worldwide issuance of visas under the Refugee Relief Act was 108,819.

## World Bank Reports \$21.2 Million Net Income for 9-Month Period

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on May 7 reported a net income of \$21.2 million for the 9-month period ending March 31, 1956, compared with \$18.6 million for the corresponding period in 1955. This income was placed in the supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guaranties, and raised the reserve to \$142.7 million. Loan commissions amounted to \$10.9 million and were credited to the bank's special reserve, increasing that reserve to \$73.2 million. Total reserves on March 31, 1956, were \$215.9 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loans commissions, was \$47.3 million, compared with \$43.8 million in 1955. Expenses, which included \$20.6 million for interest on bank bonds and other financial expenses, totaled \$26.1 million for the period.

During the third quarter of this fiscal year, the bank made two loans totaling \$13.1 million in Japan and Ecuador. This brought the total number of loans to 141 in 41 countries and raised the gross total of commitments to \$2,483.5 million. Disbursements on loans for the 9-month period were \$215.6 million, bringing total disbursements to \$1,895.3 million.

## U.S. Signs GATT Protocol of Supplementary Concessions

Press release 274 dated May 23

On May 23 Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, signed at Geneva on behalf of the United States the Protocol of Supplementary Concessions embodying the results of the tariff negotiations begun on January 18 under the auspices of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The opening of this protocol for signature formally marks the end of the 1956 tariff conference.

The United States successfully concluded negotiations with all the 21 other countries participating in the conference. An analysis of the results of the negotiations completed by the United States will be issued on June 7, and a Presidential proclamation giving effect on June 30 to the concessions granted by the United States will be issued about the same time.

The conference included not only 22 countries which are Contracting Parties to the GATT but also the High Authority acting on behalf of the member states of the European Coal and Steel Community.

The parties engaged in some 60 intergovernmental negotiations for the stabilization or reduction of tariff barriers. The results will be incorporated in the tariff schedules of the GATT. The import trade of the negotiating countries in the items affected by concessions granted in the negotiations is estimated at about \$2.5 billion a year.

The 1956 tariff conference is the latest in a series of multilateral negotiations carried out by the Contracting Parties to the GATT. The first negotiating conference was held at Geneva in 1947, and subsequent conferences were held at Annecy, France, in 1949 and at Torquay, England, in 1950-51. Further negotiations were conducted at Geneva in 1955 in connection with the accession of Japan to the GATT.

The following Contracting Parties completed negotiations:

Australia	France
Austria	Federal Republic of Germany
Benelux Customs Union	Haiti
(a) Belgium	Italy
(b) Luxembourg	Japan
(c) Kingdom of the Netherlands	Norway
Canada	Peru
Chile	Sweden
Cuba	Turkey
Denmark	United Kingdom
Dominican Republic	United States
Finland	

The United States participated in the negotiations under the authority of the Trade Agreements Act, which authorizes the President, within limits and under prescribed procedures, to make concessions in U.S. tariff treatment in exchange for reciprocal concessions from other countries which will promote U.S. foreign trade.

The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 authorizes the President to reduce tariffs to rates 15 percent below rates existing on January 1, 1955. The act also authorizes the President to reduce rates that are above 50 percent ad valorem to 50 percent. The reductions are to be put into effect by stages pursuant to the law, the first stage in most cases to be put into effect by June 30, 1956.

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES**

**Calendar of Meetings <sup>1</sup>**

**Adjourned During May 1956**

GATT Contracting Parties: 1956 Tariff Negotiations . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 18-May 23
U.N. Disarmament Commission: Subcommittee of Five (reconvened).	London . . . . .	Mar. 19-May 4
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 9th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 16-May 4
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 21st Session. . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 17-May 4
UNESCO Conference on Asian-U.S. Cultural Relations. . . . .	San Francisco, Minneapolis, Boston, Louisville, Ann Arbor, Washington.	Apr. 19-May 19
ITU Administrative Council: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 21-May 19
UNESCO Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in Latin America.	Lima . . . . .	Apr. 23-May 5
South Pacific Conference: 3d Session . . . . .	Suva (Fiji) . . . . .	Apr. 23-May 6
9th International Film Festival . . . . .	Cannes . . . . .	Apr. 23-May 10
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 11th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-May 19
Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . . . .	San José . . . . .	Apr. 25-May 3
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 7th Session.	New York . . . . .	Apr. 27-May 18
5th International Philatelic Exhibition (FIPEX). . . . .	New York . . . . .	Apr. 28-May 6
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 6th Session . . . . .	Istanbul . . . . .	Apr. 30-May 12
UPU Executive and Liaison Committee . . . . .	Bern . . . . .	Apr. 30-May 12
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board . . . . .	México, D. F. . . . .	May 3 (1 day)
U.N. Exploratory Meeting on International Trade in Cocoa . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 3-4
2d Inter-American Meeting of Ministers of Education . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	May 3-9
Inter-American Cultural Council: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Lima . . . . .	May 3-12
NATO: Ministerial Meeting of the Council . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 4-6
South Pacific Commission: 15th Session . . . . .	Suva (Fiji) . . . . .	May 4-9
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on International Commodity Trade: 3d Session.	New York . . . . .	May 7-18
U.N. <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on the Establishment of SUNFED: 1st Meeting.	New York . . . . .	May 7-23
International Tin Study Group: Management Committee. . . . .	London . . . . .	May 8 (1 day)
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 15th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	May 8-17
9th World Health Assembly . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 8-25
UNESCO Regional Seminar on Primary School Curriculum for Latin America.	Lima . . . . .	May 9-22
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 5th Meeting . . . . .	Santiago . . . . .	May 14-15
U.N. ECE Housing Committee and Working Parties: 12th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 14-16
ILO Building, Civil Engineering, and Public Works Committee: 5th Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 14-26
Inter-American Technical Cacao Committee: 6th Meeting . . . . .	Salvador (Brazil) . . . . .	May 20-27
U.N. ECE Working Group on Indicators of Short-Term Economic Changes: 1st Session.	Geneva . . . . .	May 22-26
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 23-25
UNESCO Meeting of Experts on Radioisotopes. . . . .	Paris . . . . .	May 25-28

**In Session as of May 31, 1956**

North Pacific Fur Seal Conference . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Nov. 28 (1955)-
U.N. International Law Commission: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Apr. 23-
U.N. Committee of Experts To Review the Salaries, Allowances, and Benefits System.	New York . . . . .	May 10-
U.N. International Sugar Conference . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 21-
WMO: 2d World Comparison of Radiosondes . . . . .	Payerne (Switzerland) . . . . .	May 23-
Caribbean Commission: 22d Meeting . . . . .	Cayenne (French Guiana) . . . . .	May 24-
FAO Joint Subcommittee on Mediterranean Forestry Problems . . . . .	Nice . . . . .	May 27-
PAIGH Directing Council: 1st Meeting . . . . .	México, D.F. . . . .	May 28-
ILO Governing Body: 132d Session. . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
UNREF Executive Committee: 3d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
WHO Executive Board: 18th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	May 28-
U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Maintenance Obligations . . . . .	New York . . . . .	May 29-
16th International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems (CIGRE).	Paris . . . . .	May 30-



# Calendar of Meetings—Continued

## Scheduled June 1–August 31, 1956

Inter-American Commission of Women: 11th General Assembly . . .	Ciudad Trujillo . . . . .	June 1–
International Seed Testing Association: 11th Congress (Executive Committee Meetings June 1 and 10).	Paris . . . . .	June 4–
PASO Executive Committee: 28th Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	June 5–
International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	June 5–
U.N. ECAFE Working Party of Senior Geologists on the Preparation of a Regional Geological Map for Asia and the Far East: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo . . . . .	June 5–
International Labor Conference (ILO): 39th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 6–
International Commission for Criminal Police: 25th General Meeting.	Vienna . . . . .	June 7–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 18th Session . . . . .	New York . . . . .	June 7–
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 6th Annual Meeting.	Halifax . . . . .	June 11–
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 11–
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Minerals Resources Development: 2d Meeting.	Tokyo . . . . .	June 12–
International Rubber Study Group: Management Committee . . .	Paris . . . . .	June 14–
5th World Power Conference . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	June 17–
FAO Council: 24th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 18–
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 27th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	June 18–
ICAO Assembly: 10th Session . . . . .	Caracas . . . . .	June 19–
FAO Committee on Relations with International Organizations . .	Rome . . . . .	June 21–
Commemorative Meeting of Presidents of American Republics . .	Panama . . . . .	June 24–
5th International Congress on Bridge and Structural Engineering .	Lisbon . . . . .	June 25–
FAO Meeting of Fish Processing Technologists . . . . .	Rotterdam . . . . .	June 25–
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 25–
U.N. ECE Coal Classification Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 26–
U.N. ECE Coal Utilization Working Party . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	June 29–
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 6th Session.	Tehran . . . . .	July 3–
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 22d Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July 3–
FAO International Union of Forest Research Organizations: 12th Congress.	Oxford (England) . . . . .	July 7–
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 3d Session . . . . .	Tehran . . . . .	July 8
19th International Conference on Public Education (Joint IBE/UNESCO).	Geneva . . . . .	July 9–
UNESCO Executive Board: 44th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	July 11–
FAO Technical Panel on Forestry Education: 1st <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting .	Oxford (England) . . . . .	July 13–
International Whaling Commission: 8th Meeting . . . . .	London . . . . .	July 16–
International Congress on Housing and Town Planning . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	July 22–
FAO Meeting on Control of Tick-Borne Diseases of Livestock . . .	Rome . . . . .	July 23–
International Association of Theoretical and Applied Limnology: 13th Congress.	Helsinki . . . . .	July 27–
20th International Physiological Congress . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	July 30–
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Housing and Building Materials: 4th Meeting.	Bangkok . . . . .	July 30–
South Pacific Commission: Technical Conference on Community Development.	Hollandia (New Guinea) . . . .	July or August
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	July
8th International Conference of Social Work . . . . .	Munich . . . . .	Aug. 5–
U.N. European Regional Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders: 3d Session.	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 6–
18th International Geographical Congress . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	Aug. 9–
International Geographical Union: 9th General Assembly . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	Aug. 9–
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): 8th Plenary Session.	Warsaw . . . . .	Aug. 9–
International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art . . . . .	Venice . . . . .	Aug. 16–
10th International Congress of Entomology . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Aug. 17–
Edinburgh Film Festival . . . . .	Edinburgh . . . . .	Aug. 19–
American International Institute for the Protection of Childhood: Directing Council.	Montevideo . . . . .	Aug. 27–
International Congress of Soil Science: 6th Congress . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Aug. 29–

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, May 23, 1956. Following is a list of abbreviations: GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; U.N., United Nations; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; ILO, International Labor Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; SUNFED, Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organization; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; WHO, World Health Organization; CIGRE, Conférence internationale des grands réseaux électriques; PASO, Pan American Sanitary Organization; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; IBE, International Bureau of Education; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radiocommunications.

## Financing the Continuing Movement of Migrants From Europe

### THIRD AND FOURTH SESSIONS OF COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION

by George L. Warren

The Council and Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) met at Geneva, Switzerland, in their third session from October 6 through October 22, 1955, and in their fourth session from February 14 through February 24, 1956.<sup>1</sup> The chief subject under discussion at both sessions was the problem of financing the operational activities of the Committee during 1956.

At the third session the Council adopted a budget for 1956 based on an estimated movement of 125,900 migrants and refugees out of Europe and calling for a total of \$43,759,342: \$2,690,366 for administrative expenditure and \$41,068,976 for operational expenditure. However, the total of contributions which government members were prepared to offer at the third session fell short of the amount called for in the budget by \$2,700,000. As the cash resources of the Committee had been exhausted by the movement of 120,422 persons out of Europe during 1955, the Council was under the necessity of convening the fourth session early in 1956 in order that the Director of the Committee might have precise knowledge of the income available for operations before such

operations were too far advanced in 1956. The problem was satisfactorily resolved at the fourth session.

The Migration Committee was organized on United States initiative at Brussels in 1951. It now includes 26 member governments. The Committee is engaged in securing increased movement of migrants and refugees who would not otherwise emigrate out of the overcrowded countries of Europe to overseas countries of immigration. Under a constitution which came into force in October 1954 and has been accepted by 24 member governments, the Council is composed of all member governments and the Executive Committee of nine.

The following 23 governments were represented at the third and fourth sessions:

Argentina	Greece
Australia <sup>2</sup>	Israel
Austria	Italy <sup>2</sup>
Belgium	Netherlands <sup>2</sup>
Brazil <sup>2</sup>	New Zealand
Canada <sup>2</sup>	Norway
Chile <sup>2</sup>	Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Colombia	Sweden
Costa Rica	Switzerland
Denmark	United States <sup>2</sup>
France <sup>2</sup>	Venezuela
Federal Republic of Germany <sup>2</sup>	

• *Mr. Warren is Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State. He served as principal adviser to the U.S. delegation at the third session of the ICEM Council and Executive Committee, and alternate U.S. representative at the fourth session.*

<sup>1</sup> For an article on the second session of the Council and the Executive Committee, see BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1955, p. 308. For announcements of the U.S. delegations to the third and fourth sessions, see *ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1955, p. 631, and Feb. 27, 1956, p. 355.

<sup>2</sup> Member of the Executive Committee.

The Government of Paraguay was not represented at either session. Uruguay was not represented at the third session and accepted observer status at the fourth session, pending formal acceptance of the constitution. Luxembourg was represented at the third but not at the fourth session.

The Holy See, the Governments of the Dominican Republic, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Union of South Africa were represented at both sessions as observers. The representatives of Spain and the Union of South Africa indicated that negotiations concerning membership in the Committee were about to be concluded. The United Nations, the International Labor Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and nongovernmental organizations interested in migration were also represented as observers.

The Executive Committee met in advance of each session of the Council under the chairmanship of Eric O. van Boetzelaer (Netherlands) and prepared recommendations for action by the Council. At the third session, the Council adopted staff regulations for employees that had been drafted by the Executive Committee and thus completed the final step in the organization of the Migration Committee and the determination of its regulations and procedures.

### **Migration Services**

The Council also gave considerable attention to the question of migration services supplied by the Committee. These services consist of information to migrants concerning opportunities in the countries of immigration, language training, orientation instructions, vocational training, the preselection of migrants and processing for emigration, embarkation services, reception in the immigration country, and the placement of migrants in employment after arrival in the receiving country. All services are supplied at the direct request of the governments concerned. The costs of the services are shared with the governments under arrangements which envisage the eventual assumption by the governments of the full costs of the services supplied.

Assistance in the preselection of migrants, in

processing them for emigration, in embarkation, and in reception is an integral part of the process of movement. The other services are aimed at improving the qualifications of migrants and assisting their successful adjustment in the country of immigration. Vocational training is provided only for those who have already been selected for emigration by the recruiting missions of the receiving countries.

While expressions of support for the provision of migration services by the Migration Committee reflected the direct benefits received from the services by individual government members, all agreed that those services directly connected with movement were essential and should be continued. Some governments expressed concern that more might be attempted in the field of vocational training than the resources of the Migration Committee could support. The Director, Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., assured the Council, however, that most of the expenditures for vocational training were borne by the interested governments and that the role of the Migration Committee was restricted to the planning of training and the provision of experts when required. He also explained that the Committee tried only to supply the minimum of basic training to assist the migrant in securing employment after emigration. No final decisions were taken with respect to migration services, and the Director was requested to report further on developing experience at a later session.

Differences of views, which were not resolved at the session, were expressed with respect to the Migrant Contribution Plan presented by the Director. Most governments, including Italy and the United States, expressed strong support for encouraging the migrant to contribute as much as he could to the cost of his transportation. Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands expressed equally strong convictions that, although the migrant might be required to make prepayment in advance of his movement, he should not be burdened with the necessity of making installment payments after arrival in the country of immigration because such a burden would hinder his readjustment in the new country.

The Council learned during the discussion that approximately 93 percent of the migrants presently moved contribute in some manner to the costs of their transportation and that complete application of the Migrant Contribution Plan

might increase the Committee's resources by as much as one million dollars annually in later years. Under the revolving funds administered by the voluntary agencies, to which both the Migration Committee and the voluntary agencies have contributed, over 50,000 migrants were assisted by loans in 1952, 1953, and 1954 to meet a substantial part of their transportation costs. The extent of repayment on these loans has been most creditable. Of the loans made in 1952, more than 64 percent was repaid by 1955, and of those made in 1953, more than 41 percent.

### **Problem of Financing 1956 Operations**

The main preoccupation of the Council at the third session was with the problem of financing operations for 1956. The budget of movement adopted called for \$2,700,000 more in income than current contributions of governments would produce. This situation resulted from the fact that the contributions of individual member governments are based in the main on per capita rates applied to persons actually moved to or from their particular countries. The totals of the contributions thus related to specific movements do not in most instances cover the actual costs of these movements, and the Migration Committee must in consequence subsidize the deficit movements from its own resources. Movements to certain destinations like Australia call for larger subsidies than others, while some movements earn sufficient income to cover the costs involved. During 1954 and 1955 the Migration Committee had been able to provide the subsidies required from the funds carried over from the operations of previous years and from increased contributions of member governments. It was not anticipated, however, that there would be any substantial funds carried over into 1956.

As the government members were not prepared in October to pledge the additional income of \$2,700,000 required, the Council decided to establish a Working Party of five member governments, Argentina, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States, to explore the problem further and to make recommendations well in advance of the fourth session to be convened in February 1956.

During the course of the third session, Viscount Malvern, Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, J. G. Smurhoff, Minister of Social Affairs and Public Health of the Nether-

lands, Dino Del Bo, Under Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, and Pierre Schneiter, Chairman of the French National Assembly and Special Representative of the Council of Europe, made important statements to the Council concerning their governments' views on the problems of migration. Pierre Micheli (Switzerland) presided as chairman at the third session. Victor Montoya (Venezuela) served as vice chairman, Tyge Haarlov (Denmark) as second vice chairman, and Ralph Harry (Australia) as rapporteur.

The Working Party met at Washington in December 1955. After a thorough study of the financial problem which had been created in part by the fact that a larger proportion of the total annual movement—over 40 percent—was to go to Australia in 1956, the Working Party recommended that a Special Fund of \$3,000,000 be created. All additional contributions of government members resulting from increased rates of per capita payments or otherwise which constitute new income for the Committee for operations in 1956 would be credited to the Special Fund.

The Council on convening the fourth session in February elected Scott McLeod (United States) as chairman, Alzate Avendano (Colombia) as vice chairman, Tyge Haarlov (Denmark) as second vice chairman, and Kurt Seidler (Austria) as rapporteur. Before relinquishing the chair to Mr. McLeod, the retiring chairman, Pierre Micheli (Switzerland) paid a tribute to the late Congressman Chauncey W. Reed, who played a major role as a member of a number of U.S. delegations to ICEM in the creation and development of the Migration Committee, particularly in the drafting of the constitution. At M. Micheli's suggestion the Council passed a resolution requesting the U.S. representative to transmit to the United States Congress the expression of the Council's deep regret and sympathy at the death of Mr. Reed.

### **Recommendation of Working Party**

The recommendation of the Working Party with respect to the creation of a Special Fund of \$3,000,000 was accepted by the Director, approved by the Executive Committee, and adopted by the Council. Thereupon, the chairman called for additional pledges to the Special Fund and succeeded in securing firm promises of contributions totaling over \$2,600,000, which, with a carryover of

\$385,000 from 1955, approximately met the additional income requirements of the 1956 budget. Included in the additional contributions pledged were \$546,000 by Australia, \$164,500 by Austria, \$120,000 by the Federal Republic of Germany, \$281,850 by Italy, \$236,500 by the Netherlands, \$116,822 by Switzerland, and \$939,600, subject to certain conditions, by the United States. Thirteen governments made definite pledges of additional contributions, and three reported that such contributions were still under consideration.

The Director, in reporting on progress since the third session and problems facing the Committee in 1956, made reference to the improved economic situation in many of the emigration countries in Europe and to the fact that many of the emigrants available for movement would require at least a minimum of vocational training if they were to qualify for the opportunities open to immigrants in the receiving countries. The U.S. representative pointed out that the Committee had failed to date to interpret its migration services sufficiently to insure the receipt of income adequate to cover the expenditures and that the Committee's assistance in the movement of refugees should win wider support, particularly from the member governments not directly concerned with emigration.

Of the total number of migrants moved by the Committee during 1955, 29,323 were refugees; 19,919 of these came under the terms of reference of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The corresponding figures for the 4-year period ending on December 31, 1955, were 139,189 and 83,188. The total number of all migrants moved in this 4-year period was 406,867.

#### **Discussion of Director's Report**

In the discussion of the Director's report many representatives pointed out that the need for migration from Europe will persist irrespective of the current high level of economic activity in Europe. In appraising the need for migration, they felt that consideration should be given to such factors as the density of population, the lack of living space, the increasing encroachment of European cities on agricultural land, the need for a more rational distribution of manpower, and the requirements of developing countries overseas for a continuing flow of migrants. The Australian representative pointed out that, if the more favor-

able opportunities for migrants in receiving countries are not exploited during periods of high business activity, it will prove difficult, if not impossible, to reestablish the flow of migration during periods of lower economic activity; in other words, that the continuity of migration is of importance to both emigration and immigration countries and contributes to the strength of the free world. In this discussion several representatives drew attention to the achievements of ICEM to date in providing shipping on many migrant routes where commercial shipping is unavailable or inadequate, in establishing cooperative services between emigration and immigration countries, and in building up, in the selection, processing, and reception of migrants, standards of performance that have reduced waste, confusion, and costs in this field.

Kurt Seidler, the Austrian representative, made a special plea during the course of the session for the assistance of other governments and ICEM in facilitating the emigration of increasing numbers of refugees arriving in Austria from Eastern European countries. Some 3,000 such refugees had arrived during 1955, and more were expected in 1956 because of easier access to Austria since the withdrawal of the Soviet forces under the provisions of the Austrian State Treaty. Dr. Seidler expressed the hope that other governments of the free world would assist Austria in providing asylum for the refugees whom Austria, because of her geographical position, receives in the first instance.

The Council adjourned the fourth session on February 24, 1956, confident that the activities of the Migration Committee for 1956 had gotten off to an auspicious start and resolved to convene the fifth session about October 1, 1956.

## **U.S. Delegations to International Conferences**

### **U.N. Sugar Conference**

The Department of State announced on May 21 (press release 269) that the U.S. Government will be represented at the U.N. Sugar Conference, to be convened at U.N. Headquarters at New York on that day, by the following delegation:

*United States Representative*

Marvin L. McLain, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture

#### *Alternate United States Representatives*

Earl M. Hughes, Administrator, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Lawrence Myers, Director, Sugar Division, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

#### *Advisers*

Thomas H. Allen, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Malcolm Baldrige, General Counsel, U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners Association, Washington, D. C.

Richard M. Blake, Secretary, National Beet Growers Federation, Greeley, Colo.

William M. Case, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Paul E. Callanan, International Resources Division, Department of State

John J. Cyzak, Assistant to the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Eric Englund, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, London

Josiah Ferris, Vice President, American Sugar Cane League, Washington, D.C.

Ernest Greene, Washington Representative, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, Washington, D.C.

Hans G. Hirsch, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

Wallace Kemper, President, Southdown Sugars, Inc., New Orleans, La.

Nat B. King, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, New York

Gordon Lyons, Executive Manager, California Beet Growers Association, Stockton, Calif.

Stanley D. Metzger, Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State

Slater Miller, Washington Representative, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, Washington, D.C.

Thomas O. Murphy, Commodity Stabilization Service, Department of Agriculture

P. K. Norris, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture

Robert H. Shields, President and General Counsel, U.S. Beet Sugar Association, Washington, D.C.

Luis Rivera-Santos, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan

Dudley Smith, President, Association of Sugar Producers of Puerto Rico, Washington, D.C.

Harry R. Turkel, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

The present International Sugar Agreement, which was negotiated at a U.N. Sugar Conference at London in 1953, came into force at the beginning of 1954.<sup>1</sup> Article 42 provides that the duration of this agreement shall be for 5 years from January 1, 1954, and that in the third year of this agreement the International Sugar Council (the

administrative body of the agreement) shall examine the entire working of the agreement, especially in regard to quotas and prices. The Council, at its meeting at London, November 28-December 1, 1955, requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations in order to make possible an examination on a wider basis than is possible within the Council. Accordingly, the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced in March 1956 that a U.N. Sugar Conference would be convened on May 21, 1956.

The agenda of the conference, prepared by the Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements (a body of the United Nations), will provide an opportunity to review the operation of the present agreement and to consider whether any changes should be made in the light of this review and the current situation in international trade in sugar.

#### **U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee**

The Department of State announced on May 24 (press release 277) that Christopher H. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs and U.S. representative on the United Nations Refugee Fund Executive Committee, will attend the 3d session of the Committee convening at Geneva, Switzerland, on May 28. He will be assisted by Henry F. Nichol, conference officer, U.S. Resident Delegation for International Organizations at Geneva.

In a resolution of October 21, 1954, the General Assembly of the United Nations authorized the establishment of a United Nations Refugee Fund to enable the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to undertake a program designed to achieve permanent solutions of certain refugee problems by December 31, 1958. Under the program it was planned to take action to stimulate the integration of refugees into agriculture; to provide for their establishment in trades, small businesses, and professions; to plan the construction of housing for refugees; to provide vocational and other training for refugees to facilitate their integration or resettlement; to aid university students; to create community centers; to promote resettlement programs overseas; and to establish resettlement counseling services for refugees.

The Executive Committee was established by

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 26, 1953, p. 542; Dec. 14, 1953, p. 823; and Mar. 29, 1954, p. 493.

the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to provide necessary guidance to the High Commissioner in carrying out the program of permanent solutions. The Executive Committee determines the general policies under which the operation of the fund shall be planned, developed, and administered; determines the annual financial plan for the fund; adopts administrative regulations for the fund; reviews expenses incurred under the fund; and insures the taking of all necessary steps to provide for continuing supervision of approved projects.

The members of the Executive Committee are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iran, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and the Vatican.

### **132d Session, ILO Governing Body**

The Department of State announced on May 25 (press release 282) that J. Ernest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor and U.S. Government representative on the Governing Body of the International Labor Office, will attend the 132d session of the Governing Body at Geneva, Switzerland, on June 1 and 2, prior to the opening of the 39th session of the International Labor Conference, which convenes on June 6. Meetings of various committees of the Governing Body will begin on May 28.

Mr. Wilkins will be assisted by the substitute U.S. representative, Arnold L. Zempel, Executive Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor, and four advisers: Otis E. Mulliken, Officer in Charge, Social Affairs, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State; Stuart Rothman, Solicitor, Department of Labor; B. Allen Rowland, Special Assistant to the Secretary, Department of Commerce; and George Tobias, Labor Attaché, American Consulate General, Geneva.

The Governing Body usually meets three times a year to receive reports on activities of the International Labor Office, outline future work of the Office, examine and recommend the annual budget, and prepare agendas for the annual sessions of the International Labor Conference. It is responsible for establishing all ILO committees, setting their meetings, reviewing their work, and determining the action to be taken on their recommendations.

## **International Cooperation To Develop Water Resources**

### **STATEMENT BY JOHN C. BAKER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ON ECOSOC<sup>1</sup>**

The problem of managing national water resources for the greatest benefit of their citizens is common to all governments. Those nations whose territories are subject to floods from great rivers or whose lands lie in arid zones face the more urgent problems. But, as increasing population and economic development result in rising demands for water, all countries will have to take steps to assure the best possible use of their water resources. Where two or more countries share those resources, as in the case of many river systems, their beneficial use for the good of all is of international concern.

Because effective use of water resources is of great importance to economic development, my delegation attaches great significance to this area of the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. We have, therefore, been glad to join with the delegation of France in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document E/L.721. I should like to make a brief statement concerning this resolution and the report of the Secretary-General (E/2827).

Past resolutions of the Council have stressed the importance of the multiple-purpose approach to the development of water resources. They have also emphasized the necessity for interagency coordination, if international organizations are to make their most effective contribution to the solution of national and international water problems. The resolution before us would reaffirm our support of these policies.

The development of sound policies for the use of water resources is, of course, largely a matter of national responsibility. It is true that in the case of those important water resources which are shared by two or more countries, some form of bilateral or multilateral cooperation is desirable. Even in these cases, however, each national government concerned has the final responsibility for planning and carrying out any development of those resources within its territories.

As to water resources located entirely within

<sup>1</sup> Made in the U.N. Economic and Social Council on May 2 (U.S./U.N. press release 2403).

one country, the most that any international agency can do is to help make the world's knowledge and experience more readily available to governments, to help stimulate the development of new knowledge, and to demonstrate new or improved techniques.

Some of the specialized agencies of the United Nations have, from the very beginning, developed active programs in certain phases of water resources development. For example, WHO [World Health Organization] has for some time been especially concerned with environmental sanitation and the problem of providing safe water for human consumption; FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] with the conservation and use of water for agriculture and fisheries; UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] with scientific research on many aspects of water, especially for the improvement of arid zones; and WMO [World Meteorological Organization] with meteorology.

But beginning in 1952, and more particularly since 1954, there has been an important change in their activities as a result of the Council's recommendations. Since then, these agencies, together with the Secretary-General and the executive secretaries of the several regional economic commissions, have consulted with each other on a regular and systematic basis, with a view to preventing duplication. These consultations have served to highlight the interrelationships between all phases of the development of water resources and particularly the advantages of multipurpose development. We commend all the agencies involved in these cooperative arrangements.

Since this question was last on our agenda, considerable progress has been made in such specific fields as the assembly of data and the exchange of views and technical information among the interested agencies. We are pleased to note that, as a result of these interagency consultations, FAO is assuming responsibility for the study of watershed management in all its aspects and expects to complete a handbook on this subject by 1957.

We hope that, as these interagency consultations continue on a regular basis, all the agencies—and through them, governments—will acquire a better understanding of the interrelationships of all aspects of water-resource development. Each agency should constantly keep in mind that what it does in its own field may well have an impact on the activities of other agencies. It cannot ade-

quately plan its own program without taking into account the relationship of such program to the programs of other agencies. For example, a watershed project by FAO may have a direct bearing on a health project of WHO, or on an industrial or power project being undertaken in the same area.

The Secretary-General reports that the interagency group with which he has consulted with respect to work in this field has recommended that two types of activity be given especial attention by the appropriate agencies. We assume that this would be in addition to the approved work programs already underway. These are, first, remedying deficiencies in hydrologic data, and, second, examining the implications of integrated river-basin development. We agree that these projects should be given high priority.

So far as the first of these two projects is concerned, it is our understanding that WMO will not collect, compile, and publish hydrologic data but will help in establishing standards for their collection and compilation. Also, we assume that the hydrologic activities of WMO will be coordinated with those of such regional activities as the ECAFE [Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East] Bureau of Flood Control and Water Resources. The need for coordination in this field emphasizes strongly the desirability of filling the position of Water Resources Adviser to the United Nations.

As far as integrated river-basin development is concerned, it is clear that a single form of river-valley authority is not necessarily the answer for dealing with the problems of all river valleys. The important objective is to develop the waters of a river valley for the benefit of the people concerned. Different forms of political and administrative organization may be suitable for achieving this objective in different places.

There is another point that nontechnical administrators sometimes do not fully take into account. That is the long period required for the collection of basic data and for the economic and engineering analysis essential to successful river-basin programs. While the Council may feel that the water program has not proceeded at the rate or on the scale it had hoped for, a program of this character will never move very rapidly. The capacity of countries to assemble, analyze, and use the basic data for planning an integrated river-basin development is often limited. Moreover, the ability to



finance, construct, administer, and operate even relatively small and simple projects is frequently lacking. More than money, machinery, and expert advice is required. A long period of education and patient training at all levels is needed, from the man on the land who applies the irrigation water, to top officials who must administer policies and funds with integrity and foresight.

International agencies can usefully explore techniques for the exchange of information concerning developments on selected problems of common interest among administrators, engineers, and scientists. We note that the Secretary-General and other agencies have suggested the possibility of convening a world conference of water resources for this purpose. While such a conference may eventually prove to be desirable, we question whether such a conference would be of value at the present time. The world's water problems are of great diversity and complexity, and there are great differences in the interests of various regions of the world in those water problems.

We would suggest, instead, that the Secretary-General seek the assistance of a standing panel of recognized experts which he could constitute for this purpose. The flexible use of such a panel should enable the United Nations, its regional economic commissions, the specialized agencies, and governments to take action in the light of a thorough consideration of the technical, administrative, policy, and educational phases of water-resource development.

We suggest that the Secretary-General include in his next report information on progress in these various fields, together with his recommendations for further action.

Mr. President, this whole field of water-resource development is of utmost importance to the general economic progress of all member countries. Here, the leadership and coordination provided by the United Nations can be of great assistance to all. We hope that the Secretary-General, in planning his budget for submission to the General Assembly, will accord this activity a sufficiently high priority so that the important post of Water Resources Adviser can soon be filled with an expert of stature and experience. My Government will cooperate with the Secretary-General in every possible way to make this important program a success.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>2</sup>

U.N. doc. E/Res. (XXI)/15

*The Economic and Social Council,*

*Having noted* the Secretary-General's report on "International Co-operation with respect to Water Resource Development",

*Recognizing with appreciation* the progress already achieved in strengthening international co-operation as a result of periodic inter-agency meetings on water resources,

*Endorsing* the recommendation of the Secretary-General that high priority be given to remedying deficiencies in hydrology data and to assisting in integrated river basin development,

*Considering* that the general subject of international co-operation with respect to water resource development and the study of arid regions has been of increasing concern to the United Nations,

*Considering* the growing importance of the utilization of brackish and saline water, either unprocessed or demineralized, for the economic development of areas where fresh water supplies are becoming insufficient,

*Believing* that there is a growing economic and social need for the most effective utilization and development of these water resources in view of the progressive increase in the world's population, the need for raising the standard of living of the peoples of the world, and rapidly increasing industrialization,

1. *Reaffirms* its support of Council resolutions 417 (XIV) and 533 (XVIII);

2. *Commends* the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies for the co-operation evidenced in the series of consultations on water resources already held;

3. *Urges* the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to continue such consultations to the end that in so far as possible the activities of the United Nations organizations be carried on with full regard to the inter-relationships involved;

4. *Calls to the attention* of Governments the importance of demineralization of saline water and utilization of sub-soil water and urges them to exchange information on the findings of research concerned with a solution of these problems;

5. *Draws to the attention* of Governments the desirability of an increased use of the available technical assistance facilities, especially in the training of personnel in this field;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To make appropriate arrangements for ensuring the collection, analysis and dissemination of information on current development of water projects, research programmes and related activities;

(b) To initiate, in co-operation with competent specialized agencies and with the Governments concerned, a preliminary inquiry on existing hydrologic services, plans for their extension and conditions for the execution of these plans;

(c) To constitute a panel of world known experts for

<sup>2</sup> Adopted unanimously on May 3.

reviewing, with the assistance of the United Nations Secretariat, the administrative, economic and social implications of integrated river basin development, and for advising on the proper action (including, if they deem it advisable, the convening of an international conference) to be taken in order to ensure world-wide exchange of experience and data in related domains:

(d) To report to the Council, not later than its twenty-fifth session, on progress in these fields and to formulate recommendations on further action that might be taken by the United Nations organizations.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### U.S. Signs Agreement With Turkey on Defense Use of Technology

The Department of State announced on May 18 (press release 267) the signing of an agreement with Turkey to facilitate the exchange of patent rights and technical information for defense purposes. The agreement was signed at Ankara, May 18, 1956, by Muharrem Nuri Birgi, Secretary General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Foy David Kohler, American Chargé d'Affaires.

The agreement is expected to foster the exchange of technology for defense purposes between the two Governments and between the private industries of the two countries. Thus it should be of reciprocal benefit in providing for national defense and in contributing to the mutual defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

The agreement with Turkey is the latest to be signed of a series being negotiated with the NATO countries and with Japan. Other agreements of this nature have been signed with Italy, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan.

The agreements recognize that, wherever practicable, privately owned technology should generally be exchanged through commercial agreements between owners and users. They also note that rights of private owners of patents and technical information should be fully recognized and protected in accordance with laws applicable to such rights. The agreements are also intended to assure fair treatment of private owners when they deal directly with a foreign government. In addition,

the agreements provide for the protection of technical information communicated through government channels and for the establishment of arrangements by which owners of patentable inventions placed under secrecy by one government may obtain comparable protection in the other country. The agreements further provide as a general rule that, when government-owned inventions are interchanged for defense purposes, this interchange will take place on a royalty-free basis.

Each of the agreements provides for the establishment of a Technical Property Committee to be composed of a representative of each government. These committees are charged with general responsibility for considering and making recommendations on any matters relating to the agreements brought before them by either government, on their own behalf or on behalf of their nationals. One of the specific functions of the committee is to make recommendations to the governments, either in particular cases or in general, concerning disparities in their laws affecting the compensation of owners of patents and technical information.

The United States representative to the Technical Property Committees in Europe is assigned to the staff of the Defense Adviser, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations (Usro), 2 Rue St. Florentin, Paris.

Policy guidance for the U. S. representatives on the Technical Property Committees is provided by the Interagency Technical Property Committee for Defense, chaired by the Department of Defense. Representatives of the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Government Patents Board are included. This committee is assisted by an industry advisory group representing major sectors of American industry concerned with defense production.

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Cultural Property

Convention for protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Mexico, May 7, 1956.

##### Extradition

Convention on extradition. Signed at Montevideo Decem-

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

ber 26, 1933. Entered into force January 25, 1935. 49 Stat. 3111.

*Ratification deposited:* Argentina, April 19, 1956.

### Trade and Commerce

Procès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol<sup>1</sup> amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the protocol<sup>2</sup> amending the preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement, and the protocol<sup>3</sup> of organizational amendments to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.

*Signatures:* Haiti and New Zealand, December 3, 1955; Canada, February 9, 1956; Netherlands, February 13, 1956; Belgium, February 16, 1956; Australia, March 2, 1956; India, April 16, 1956; Greece, April 19, 1956; United States, May 11, 1956.

## BILATERAL

### Turkey

Agreement to facilitate interchange of patent rights and technical information for purposes of defense. Signed at Ankara May 18, 1956. Enters into force on the date of receipt by the United States of notification of constitutional approval by Turkey.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Franklin Medal Presented to Department of State

Press release 271 dated May 22

The Franklin Medal, commemorating the 250th anniversary of the birth of Benjamin Franklin, was presented to the Department of State on May 22 by Clarence L. Jordan, chairman of the 250th Anniversary Committee, and accepted for the Department by Deputy Under Secretary for Administration Loy W. Henderson.

Mr. Jordan made the presentation on behalf of the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Congress. Public Law 259, 84th Congress, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to have struck 71 bronze medals commemorating the 250th anniversary of Benjamin Franklin's birth and, in cooperation with the Franklin Institute of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, "to provide for the presentation of" these medals. Twenty-one recipients are named in the act as institutions, enterprises, and societies of which Franklin was a member, founder, or sponsor. Fifty other recipients have been chosen as representative of Franklin's ideals in the broad fields of knowledge

and the service of man. The Department of State and the United States Information Agency have been acting for the Department of the Treasury in the presentation of the Franklin Medal to recipients outside the borders of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

The face of the bronze medal shows Franklin's profile in relief with the inscription "Benjamin Franklin—1706—1956—Medal of the Congress—United States of America." The reverse of the medal bears the inscription: "Wise and Good Men Are the Strength of a Nation." Laura Gardin Fraser, sculptor of the Franklin Medal, also designed the medal commemorating the 200th anniversary of the United States Military Academy and the medals presented by the Congress to Gen. George C. Marshall and Col. Charles A. Lindbergh. Her husband, the late James Earle Fraser, created the memorial statue at the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia.

### First Meeting of Foreign Service Advisory Committee

Press release 270 dated May 21

The Advisory Committee for the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State held its first meeting at Washington on May 21. Nine members from private and academic life were invited by Secretary Dulles to form this group. They are:

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Editor, *Foreign Affairs*  
Mrs. Frances P. Bolton, U.S. House of Representatives  
Ellsworth Bunker, President, The American National Red Cross  
Robert D. Calkins, President, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.  
Robert Cutler, Chairman, Board of Directors, Old Colony Trust Co., Boston, Mass.  
Clyde K. Kluckhohn, Director, Laboratory of Social Sciences, Harvard University  
William L. Lauer, Chairman, Committee on Regional Studies, Harvard University  
Charles E. Saltzman, Henry Sears & Co., New York, N.Y.  
Henry M. Wriston, Director, The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University

The Institute, under the direction of Harold B. Hoskins, conducts a continuous training program for the U.S. Foreign Service, the Department, and other agencies of government engaged in foreign affairs. Courses include orientation, language in-

<sup>1</sup>For texts of statements made at previous presentations, see BULLETIN of Feb. 13, 1956, p. 249, and May 14, 1956, p. 800.

struction, modern management training, and international studies.

During its 1-day session the new committee met briefly with the Secretary, was greeted by Under Secretary Loy W. Henderson, and reviewed with Director Hoskins the Institute's progress and future plans. Their agenda also included a tour of the Institute's present quarters, 2115 C St. NW., and a luncheon at Blair-Lee House.

### Designations

E. Allan Lightner, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, effective May 14.

Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, effective May 16 (press release 252 dated May 14).

Jack D. Neal, as Director of the Office of Middle American Affairs, effective May 16.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3503. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt—Modifying agreement of December 14, 1955, as supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 17, 1956. Entered into force February 17, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3505. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Austria—Signed at Vienna February 7, 1956. Entered into force February 7, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3506. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iran—Signed at Tehran February 20, 1956. Entered into force February 20, 1956.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Japanese Financial Contributions. TIAS 3507. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan—Modi-

fying agreement of July 12, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo February 3, 1956. Entered into force February 3, 1956.

## German Foreign Policy Documents

The Department of State announced on May 24 (press release 276) the release of another volume of the series entitled *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*. This is series D, volume IX, *The War Years, March 18, 1940-June 22, 1940*. The volumes are published cooperatively by the United States, Great Britain, and France from archives of the German Foreign Office captured by Allied forces at the close of World War II.

The volume opens with the minutes of the meeting at the Brenner Pass on March 18, 1940, between Hitler and Mussolini. The documents go through the period to June 1940.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 21-27

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to May 21 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 252 of May 14, 260 and 262 of May 16, and 267 of May 18.

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272	5/22	Dulles: news conference.
*273	5/23	Nebraska editor to tour Germany under NATO.
274	5/23	Signing of GATT protocol.
275	5/23	U.S. and Canada to study boundary waters.
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277	5/24	U.N. Refugee Fund Executive Committee delegation (rewrite).
278	5/24	Cutoff on Polish visa applications.
279	5/24	Dulles: anniversary of founding of Buddhism.
*280	5/25	Snow retirement.
†281	5/25	Holmes appointment.
282	5/25	ILO delegation (rewrite).
†283	5/25	Pan American Institute of Geography and History delegation (rewrite).

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# the Department of State

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# The Department of State

Vol. XXXIV, No. 885

June 11, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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# Petroleum Imports

*by Under Secretary Hoover*<sup>1</sup>

We, as members of the various State and Federal agencies, in our regulatory or advisory capacities must share many problems and responsibilities in common. For the policies and actions adopted in one field may well have far-reaching effects in many others. One of these problems is petroleum imports.

The entire petroleum situation, and imports in particular, have been a matter of serious and continuing consideration in both the Department of State and in the President's Advisory Committee on Energy Supplies and Resources Policy. I am grateful for the opportunity to review this situation with you and also to examine in a broad way the effectiveness of the existing import program and to explore some of the longer-run problems.

As we review the problems that are before us at this time and endeavor to look beyond them into the future, many questions come to mind. We may ask, for example:

- (1) Whether oil imports are a temporary phenomenon, or are they a permanent one? Are they likely to increase with time?
- (2) What is their actual impact upon the domestic fuels industries and upon the broad problem of our national security?
- (3) Should such imports be controlled? And if the answer is yes, how can they be controlled?
- (4) What is the proper function of the Federal Government in relation to the oil import problem?

In the serious discussion of the oil import problem during the past few years, everyone has agreed on one basic fact: the necessity of maintaining within our borders vigorous and progressive fuels

industries which have the capacity of rising to the required output levels should a national emergency arise. President Eisenhower, in establishing the Committee on Energy Supplies and Resources Policy in July 1954,<sup>2</sup> directed the committee to study and evaluate all factors pertaining to the continued development of energy supplies and resources in the United States "with the aim of strengthening the national defense, providing orderly industrial growth, and assuring supplies for our expanding national economy and for any future emergency."

From the standpoint of the national welfare, this requires the maximum practical reserves, coupled with the ability to produce, transport, refine, and distribute the required quantities of petroleum products wherever needed both for the civilian economy and for military use. It also requires that, if such supplies are not available within our own continental limits, they should be readily obtainable from other friendly nations. Obviously, only a small part of this can be done by government. Hard work, know-how, and the initiative of all members of the industry must be relied upon to do the job. It involves a very large and continuing investment of capital, together with a venturesome willingness to assume correspondingly large risks. It is here that our competitive free-enterprise system excels all others. The industry, on a voluntary basis, has met every emergency in the past, and we trust that it will continue to do so in the future.

Stated briefly, the U.S. petroleum situation today involves the balancing of rapidly increasing consumption against available production and reserves. And yet domestic reserves are increasing

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Interstate Oil Compact Commission at Dallas, Tex., on June 1 (press release 290 dated May 31).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 9, 1954, p. 199.

at a relatively slow rate. Therefore, it is vital that our import policy must be one that will actively encourage the maximum practicable effort toward oil exploration here at home through the use of constantly improving techniques in discovery and production. At the same time we must not forget that in the years to come we will probably require appreciable quantities of petroleum from friendly countries elsewhere.

In many respects 1955 represented a peak year for the crude-oil producing industry. Domestic production was at the alltime high of 6.8 million barrels per day. Domestic demand was more than 7.5 million barrels per day. The balance of somewhat less than 800 thousand barrels per day was made up by imports.

The total number of wells drilled in 1955 was 56,682, an increase of 5.1 percent over the previous alltime high of 1954. Wildcats drilled were 12,605, or almost 9 percent above the previous alltime high of 1954. The number of active drilling rigs on December 31, 1955, was 4,987, or almost 7 percent above the number active at the end of 1954. United States proved crude-oil reserves at the end of 1955, according to the A.P.I., were also at their alltime high of over 30 billion barrels.

On the other hand, we must face the fact that costs of discovery and development in the United States are rising. New fields are more difficult to find, wells must be drilled deeper, and costs of materials, equipment, and labor are higher than ever before. Net additions to proved crude-oil reserves in 1955, according to the A.P.I., amounted to only 451 million barrels. The average gross increase in proved oil reserves in 1955 per well drilled was only 60,500 barrels, or only two-thirds of the amount during 1951-53.

Military authorities tell us that, if a war emergency should be thrust upon us, we would need oil wherever we can obtain it, in both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. In times of peace our oil imports help to maintain vigorous petroleum industries and strong economies abroad, which in turn increase the strength of the free world and strongly resist the efforts of those who would destroy the institutions we believe in.

We must at the same time face the fact that today flush, low-cost oil from some areas of the world can be laid down in the United States more cheaply than it can be found and produced domestically.

## **Need for Oil Imports**

The need to draw on foreign sources of supply to meet our expanding demand is recognized as inevitable by many authorities. Many other industrial countries are required to do likewise although few of them, like ourselves, are in the fortunate position of having at the same time a strong domestic oil industry to supply the bulk of their requirements. It is difficult for a country to achieve and maintain a sound industrial economy, with increased productivity to meet the needs of its population, unless it has a fully dependable source of relatively low-cost energy. Our chief problem in the United States in this connection is that of maintaining a proper balance between imports and domestic oil production.

Turning briefly to residual fuel oil, imports have gradually increased over the years and have compensated for the decreased yield in our own refinery operations. The domestic production of residuals, plus imports, has remained practically unchanged. In 1955 some reduction of stocks occurred because of the tight supply situation, which should be corrected by a moderate increase of imports prior to the next winter season.

Imports of crude and residual fuel oil do not affect the domestic petroleum industry alone. They have an impact on other fuels, such as coal.

The coal industry is making an excellent recovery from the low level of 1954. Production increased from 419 million tons in 1954 to almost 500 million tons in 1955. Production of bituminous coal thus far in 1956 is almost 20 percent higher than in 1955. Coal exports are much larger than in 1955 and seem to be taking on a permanent character not anticipated even a few years ago.

The facts indicate, therefore, that the domestic coal industry is progressing rapidly, and it appears to be affected little, if at all, by the increased volume of residual fuel oil imports. Such imports at present appear not to constitute a threat to the national security.

## **Maintaining Appropriate Balance**

Considerations such as the ones I have outlined have been the focus of attention of the President's Advisory Committee since it first met. The problem of whether or not action should be taken to maintain an appropriate balance between imports and domestic crude-oil production was answered in the affirmative when the committee is-

sued its report on February 26, 1955.<sup>3</sup> This appeared to be a sound conclusion in the light of the conditions in our fuels industries at that time.

The problem of what measures should be taken was perhaps an even more difficult and significant one to solve. There were several methods from which to choose. All had been used at one time or another in our country's past dealings with international trade questions and were urged upon the committee by the various parties at interest.

The first of these methods was to increase our duties or taxes on oil imports. This method was not acceptable for several reasons. To raise such duties sufficiently to restrain imports would have resulted in barring imports from certain relatively high-cost producing areas which are particularly important to our national defense and with which we have long enjoyed excellent trade relationships. It would have imposed especial hardship on several of our close neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. Even if we had wanted to, this situation could not be corrected by imposing tariffs of varying levels to different countries, depending upon their geographical location or upon their relative costs of production. To do so would have violated our policy of nondiscrimination, which is almost as old as the Republic itself and which is embodied as an obligation in virtually all of our commercial treaties with countries around the world.

The second of these proposed methods was to impose quota limitations on oil imports. This method was also not acceptable for a number of reasons, some of which were equally applicable to the imposition of higher import duties. From the practical standpoint, quotas are extraordinarily difficult to administer. They can—and usually do—become a source of continuing international frictions, misunderstandings, and pressures. It would have been necessary to set up some administrative agency to determine how much oil should be imported and from what countries it might come. Each of these countries would then have to determine what amounts might be imported by each company. Country and company quotas, in turn, would have to be based on historical averages. This would have the effect of denying access to countries and importers who might not already have been included in the historical base

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 21, 1955, p. 487.

period. Such a method would have placed shackles on an industry whose dynamic qualities should be fostered rather than hampered. Sources of production would tend to be frozen, and progress and flexibility to meet changing circumstances would be defeated.

Within the United States, quotas would inevitably lead to governmental price fixing and ultimately to further controls and regimentation. It would be an open invitation to controversies between the producing countries as to quotas to be assigned, conflicts between domestic producing and consuming interests, and a rigidity covering the entire industry at a time when flexibility is required to meet rapidly changing conditions. I do not believe that any of you in the petroleum industry wants to be placed in this sort of strait-jacket.

#### **Voluntary Restraints**

The only alternative method, and the one which was adopted by the President's Advisory Committee, is that of individual, voluntary restraint by the oil-importing companies. The committee believed that every effort should be made to avoid the necessity of governmental intervention. It has been the purpose of the present administration to provide leadership along this course, believing as it does in the fundamental soundness of our competitive free-enterprise system and in the need of flexibility of action to enable industry to meet new or changing circumstances. This policy provides the flexibility that is essential to technical and economic progress and to the overall interests of the consuming public and of our national defense.

Examples of this flexibility are evident in the letters which the chairman of the committee [Arthur S. Flemming] sent to the importing companies on October 29, 1955, and May 11, 1956.

In his letter of October 29, 1955, Dr. Flemming indicated that the committee had reached certain conclusions regarding the application of its formula. Specifically, the committee recognized the desirability of placing in a separate category crude-oil imports from Canada and Venezuela. Among other considerations, national defense was one of the basic factors affecting this decision. In the event of a national emergency, oil from Western Hemisphere countries will always be recognized as our safest supplemental source of petro-

leum. Moreover, in the case of Canada, the United States had encouraged the building of the Trans-Mountain Pipeline from Alberta to the Pacific Coast in order to provide that rapidly growing and strategically important area with an assured source of crude. Also in the case of Canada an additional factor underlying the committee's conclusion was the fact that most of Canada's crude-oil exports to the United States come to areas where they are needed to supplement domestic sources and where the detrimental effects on the domestic industry are at a minimum. The light Canadian crudes are especially needed on the west coast.

In his letter of May 11, 1956, Dr. Flemming indicated that the committee had made further modifications in the application of its formula. It recognized the special character of the demand-supply situation on the west coast, which from the oil standpoint is a separate geographic area. A larger proportion of imports, particularly from Canada, will be required in order to meet increasing demands for petroleum products. The west coast and the area east of the Rockies are distinct and separate problems and therefore will be treated separately. At the present time, in order to keep supply and demand in balance, the west coast needs a larger supplemental supply of petroleum, proportionately, than does the rest of the country. To lump together figures for the United States as a whole, as has been done on some occasions, tends to create a distortion of the true facts.

As indicated by the letter, the committee will continue to follow closely all aspects of the situation, in both regions, to avoid threats to the national security which might arise from excessive imports. The subject is under constant and intensive review, and action will be taken whenever circumstances indicate that it may be desirable.

The committee also believed, as stated in the letter of May 11, that industrial expansion and changing economic and national-defense requirements might make it advisable to take another look at the import formula which the committee set forth in its February 1955 recommendations.

By providing flexibility in the application of the import formula and by relying on the individual, voluntary cooperation of the importing companies, rather than on rigid formulas, I believe that we have thus far experienced a large measure of success in handling the problems which

were so urgent at the time the President appointed the committee in July 1954. There was initially grave doubt in many quarters that a program of voluntary restraint could be successful. While not all elements of the situation are satisfactory, particularly the relative slowness with which United States crude-oil reserves are increasing in spite of the high level of exploration and drilling, the feeling on the part of many persons was justified that the industry as a whole would cooperate if effective guidance could be provided. The committee has endeavored to provide that leadership to the best of its ability, and I believe that so far it has been successful.

Dr. Flemming, as Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, has the responsibility, however, under the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, to advise the President if he has reason to believe that any article is being imported into the United States in such quantities as to threaten to impair the national security. In such event, the President would determine what steps would be taken.

While the industry as a whole appears to have cooperated wholeheartedly in the attempt to reach a solution of the oil import problem, there have been some exceptions. They may, in fact, be jeopardizing the very foundations of a free oil industry. A careful analysis shows that in most instances these organizations are the ones that would be hurt the most by governmental controls. It is hoped that their actions may not make necessary the very type of controls and regimentation which I feel sure that the overwhelming majority of the industry deeply desires to avoid.

#### **Formula To Be Reexamined**

The many developments that have occurred since the date of the committee's original report have led the committee to recommend, as stated in Dr. Flemming's letter of May 11, 1956, that a reexamination of the import formula be undertaken and completed by September 1, 1956. This recommendation relates to the imports of both crude and residual oils. It is in conformity with the committee's recommendation in February 1955 that "the desirable proportionate relationships between imports and domestic production be reviewed from time to time in the light of industrial expansion and changing economic and national defense requirements."

Following this reexamination the committee will

again review the oil import situation. If it finds that import programs are threatening to impair the national security, the committee has stated that it will recommend the scheduling of a public hearing not later than October 1, 1956, under the provisions of section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955.

It is probable that the rapid increase of demand will require that the United States import appreciable quantities of oil in the years to come. I believe that this can be done without endangering the basic prosperity of our domestic fuels industries.

This does not mean, however, that there will not be many complex and difficult problems ahead. By maintaining flexibility to meet changing circumstances, and a willingness to work through the voluntary, individual methods of free enterprise, I believe that they can be surmounted. This will require statesmanship on the part of the industry

and the full cooperation of all of the State and Federal agencies, of which the State regulatory commissions and the Interstate Oil Compact Commission can play a major part.

Our country has been built upon the foundation of a competitive and voluntary system of free enterprise. Controls often seem like an easy panacea for our problems, but once started they are hard to stop. Freedom from unnecessary regimentation is the American way, and the fact that the problems ahead are complex and difficult is no reason why we should be unwilling to tackle them in the American way. Rather, it becomes a challenge to our best efforts in Washington, in the several States, and in the industry. This approach has proved to be so far superior to regimentation in the past that I am encouraged, and I hope you are, about our ability to make it work in the future.

## Maintaining the Strength of the Free World Through Mutual Security

*Statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy<sup>1</sup>*

Nearly a decade ago the United States embarked upon a program which is quite unique in the history of the world. We then decided that in order to protect and maintain our way of life we would devote a part of our resources to helping other nations build the economic health and military strength necessary for the preservation of their freedom. This program, with its various related parts, has become known as the mutual security program. An authorizing bill to continue this program for fiscal year 1957 has recently been reported out by the Foreign Affairs Committee.

The origin of this program lay in the situation which we faced in Western Europe immediately following the last World War. The countries in that area had been devastated by the war. Their industries and transportation systems were destroyed. Their trade had been dis-

rupted and their foreign exchange liquidated. Following the withdrawal and demobilization of the Allied forces, Western Europe was left without the resources to rebuild their economies and maintain an adequate standard of living and without the strength to resist the vast forces still poised in Eastern Europe to take advantage, directly or through internal subversion, of the chaos and devastation to the west.

In the face of this situation the then Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, announced in the spring of 1947 that the United States stood ready to assist those countries which joined together in a cooperative effort to rebuild their economies. Subsequent to the original formulation of the Marshall plan, in the face of overt Communist hostilities in North Korea, we decided to supplement our original economic aid with direct military assistance to some of our friends and allies who felt with us that it was essential to build a defensive shield against the threat of the Communist powers. A substantial part of our mutual security program has been furnished to

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Subcommittee on International Relations of the House Committee on Government Operations on May 31 (press release 287).

the nations of free Europe in the subsequent years. The best measure of the success of this program has been the remarkable growth of economic vitality, political stability, and military strength among these nations. Nato is a going concern; European unity has progressed; production, trade, and living standards have risen.

Europe still faces many difficult problems, and our interest in finding a successful solution of these problems remains. But through our mutual security program we have substantially helped in raising the level of European economic activity from the distressing low of the postwar years to a point higher than it was before the war. This year we are giving no economic assistance to our European Nato allies, and none is envisaged for next year. We have, as General Marshall foresaw, assisted them in getting their own house in order and maintaining their own economies. In addition, these countries have raised large forces which stand with ours in Western Europe as a shield to maintain and protect our way of life. We continue, through the mutual security program, to assist these nations to maintain these forces by supplying certain items of military equipment.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that that illustration of the use of the mutual security program perhaps will clarify as much as anything the way in which it supports our foreign policy. The goal of our foreign policy is an enduring peace with justice. So long as there remain forces hostile to freedom, we must maintain adequate and coordinated military power. So long as there are peoples who aspire to sustain their freedom but face economic obstacles which may endanger this freedom, it is in our own interest to render them assistance.

### Three Guidelines

In addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors last April,<sup>2</sup> the President outlined three main guidelines which we should follow to sustain and advance the great cause of freedom in the world today.

First, he said, "We must maintain a collective shield against aggression to allow the free peoples to seek their valued goals in safety."

Second, "Within the free community, we must be a helpful and considerate partner in creating conditions where freedom will flourish."

Third, "We must seek, by every peaceful means, to induce the Soviet bloc to correct existing injustices and genuinely to pursue peaceful purposes in its relations with other nations."

To carry out this program we must use all of the instruments and techniques available to us. We must maintain our military and economic strength at home. We must seek the expansion of trade and investment in the free world. We must work with other nations to assist in developing a society marked by human welfare, individual liberty, and a rising standard of living. We must continue to provide technical knowledge and assistance and to work with our friends to develop the peaceful uses of the atom. We should continue our information programs and our educational and cultural exchange programs in order to expand mutual knowledge and understanding.

The mutual security program remains one of our most essential instruments for carrying out the three guidelines laid down by the President. Through it we give military assistance to those countries willing to stand with us in maintaining a defensive shield against aggression. Through it we give assistance to those who are facing such serious economic problems that, without some assistance, they might lose the liberty and independence they cherish. Through it we have developed a strength and firmness which has forced the Communists to change their tactics and which, if maintained with equal firmness today, gives promise of a brighter future for us all in years to come.

### World Situation Today

Mr. Chairman, let me review briefly the situation we find in the world today as the Secretary of State outlined it in presenting the mutual security program to the Foreign Affairs Committee.<sup>3</sup>

In Korea we have an armistice but no formal peace. In Taiwan there are almost daily military engagements between the forces of the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists. In Viet-Nam there is an armistice but no formal peace. Each of these countries is covered by a security treaty with the United States. In this area where the danger of aggression is still real, a total of approximately 50 million free people are confronted by Communists who are using the 600 million people they rule on the Chinese mainland to build a vast military establishment.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 699.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, May 28, 1956, p. 871.

In the Middle East we find Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey with long common borders with the Soviet Union, and Iraq close to it. All four of these countries are subject to Soviet threats and to the proximity of Soviet power. Pakistan is an ally of ours under the Southeast Asia Treaty. Turkey is an ally of ours under the North Atlantic Treaty, and all four of these countries have united for collective security under the Baghdad Pact.

In Western Europe the military forces of NATO stand guard over the greatest industrial and military power there is in the free world except for the United States itself. We also support the military position and independence of Spain and Yugoslavia.

To all of these countries the United States is currently giving military assistance in the form of equipment and matériel and, in some instances, military training. This assistance, as the Secretary stated in his testimony, "is an essential part of our overall security program." It is not a gratuity but is an investment in our own self-interest. Admiral Radford has testified that this military assistance is fully integrated with our own defense plans and that, without the mutual security program, it would cost us four to five times as much money in our defense budget to achieve the same degree of security for the United States.

Many of the countries which I have mentioned do not have the economic strength to maintain the forces which they are willing to put into the field and which our military advisers consider necessary to an adequate defense. To these countries we also render a form of economic assistance which is called defense support, in order to assist them to carry the burden of these military forces.

In addition to the military part of the program which I have just mentioned, we also render through the mutual security program some economic aid to countries which do not have military assistance agreements with us. In his statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 10, Secretary Dulles said this part of our program is to "help areas in the world which are threatened by Communist subversion and which contain people, resources, and strategic locations which, in our own interests as well as theirs, should be secure from hostile domination."

Speaking in Philadelphia last February, Secretary Dulles also pointed out that "by these programs we too hope to advance our legitimate national interests. We have never pretended other-

wise. . . . Our interests will be fully served if other nations maintain their independence and strengthen their free institutions. We have no further aims than these. We want a world environment of freedom. We have shown this, time after time, by electing to give freedom where we could have had conquest."

#### **Economic Aid to Less Developed Areas**

Our economic assistance is given to those less developed countries, many of which have only recently won their independence, in cases where they do not have the resources or independent ability to develop their standards of living. In many of these countries the average annual income is only about \$100 a year, compared with over \$2,000 in the United States. The leaders of these countries are desirous of maintaining their independence, but they may be unable to do so in the face of the strong competitive forces at work today.

We must recognize, as the Secretary said in his Philadelphia talk, that the Soviet Communist experiment has won for itself a considerable popular prestige in the less developed countries. Industrialization is a magic word. It is a slogan the people have come to believe will solve all domestic economic and political problems. These people do not like to be dependent upon the industrialized West for their manufactured goods. They have, for the most part, their political independence, but they have not yet achieved what they would consider adequate economic independence.

The economic assistance which we give under the mutual security program is designed to meet this situation. We give this assistance in many different forms: in surplus agricultural commodities, in modern farm and industrial equipment, in loans to assist in the industrial development of the country, in assistance for transportation and irrigation projects, and in some instances for straight budgetary support where the finances of the country concerned are in such bad shape that disaster might rapidly follow if there were not immediate assistance.

This is a task which, under our system, we would normally expect private capital to do. Indeed, much private capital today does flow into the less developed countries, but only in cases where the economic and political risks make it attractive. In many parts of the world the risks

are such that private capital is not ready to take them, but we as a nation still have a strong security interest in those areas. If capital is to be provided, therefore, a substantial part must be provided on a public basis, which spreads the risk so that it is not appreciable in terms of any single individual.

### Importance of Flexibility

Mr. Chairman, before closing I would like to say a word about what is commonly referred to as flexibility under this program. We are already engaged today, at the request of the Bureau of the Budget, in preparing a program to be submitted for fiscal year 1958. This program will be refined during the summer months, included in the President's budget message next January, and later submitted to the Congress. After the Congress has acted, perhaps 14 months from now, this program will have to be readjusted to reflect the congressional action. Only at that time can the task of implementing the plans be commenced, approximately 18 months after their first formulation, and this process will continue in some cases for another 6 to 12 months.

Now there is not one of us in the Department of State, the International Cooperation Administration, or the Department of Defense who will come before you and claim that we are able to predict precisely what will happen 2 years from now or what special problems we will then face. In fact, I think all of us will agree that some things are certain to happen then that we cannot predict now.

In this type of a program, unlike the normal budget for an executive department, we must face sudden problems in the external world which we cannot fully predict in advance. At such times we can hardly come back to Congress and develop new legislation to meet the special case which has arisen. There must be a degree of flexibility in this program. We request funds to carry out certain types of activity in certain countries, some of it for military and some of it for economic purposes, but we cannot assure the Congress that illustrative projects which we submit in justification of the program will necessarily be carried out

2 years later in exactly the form in which they are submitted.

The mutual security program is our ammunition in the cold war. No committee of Congress votes ammunition in a hot war to be used on a particular hill at a particular time. That would be as much as to tell the commanding officer that, in case that enemy had moved to his flank by the time he reached the hill, he could only fire toward the hill and not to his right or to his left. Similarly with our mutual security ammunition in the cold war. We can tell you in advance the purposes for which we will use it, but we cannot identify the exact hill on which it may be expended.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I say that I am not myself an expert on all the details of our mutual security program. But I do have a judgment as to the value to the United States of these programs as a whole. In my opinion, the mutual security programs have achieved, and are achieving, measurable success in bringing about the conditions which in my opinion are the best guaranty of peace and freedom in the world. As President Eisenhower stated in submitting the 1957 program to the Congress: "The mutual security program is an indispensable part of our national effort to meet affirmatively the challenge of all the forces which threaten the independence of the free world and to overcome the conditions which make peace insecure and progress difficult." This program remains today, he said, "as indispensable to the security of every American citizen and to the building of an enduring peace as on the day it began 9 years ago."

In conclusion, and as Secretary Dulles has stated in testifying before Congress,<sup>4</sup> our essential task is to continue "the policies which have produced this strength and, with it, added safety and new opportunities. . . . Whatever successes or failures we encounter in our immediate relations with the international Communist bloc, we can be sure that our chances for peace and freedom will continue to depend, for many years to come, upon the total strength which free peoples are able to create and maintain."

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, May 23, 1955, p. 854.



## Withdrawal of NNSC Teams From South Korea

### U.N. COMMAND STATEMENT

Press release 288 dated May 31

*The United Nations Command representative made the following statement at the 70th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, Korea, on May 31.*

I must return to an important matter frequently discussed here in the past and discussed also in the 10th session of the United Nations General Assembly with no satisfactory result.<sup>1</sup>

The Korean Armistice Agreement has been in effect for almost 3 years, and its primary objective, to stop the hostilities in Korea and prevent them from being renewed, continues to be met. The danger of general war in the Far East has been greatly diminished as a result.

At the same time, there has been a notable and persistent failure of certain arrangements set up by the armistice agreement which were intended to contribute to the stability of the cease-fire. Among these are those arrangements concerning the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the reporting and inspection of introduction of military personnel and equipment into Korea. These arrangements were intended to assure that both sides would comply with the agreed limitations, which are set forth in paragraphs 13 (c) and (d) of the armistice agreement, on such introductions.<sup>2</sup> In short, the primary object in establishing the NNSC was to prevent violations of the armistice agreement by providing a supervisory mechanism which would be enabled to make full and adequate inspections and which would thus be able to insure accurate reporting and compliance.

At previous meetings of the Military Armistice

<sup>1</sup> For statements in Committee I by Jacob Blanstien, U. S. Representative to the General Assembly, see BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1074.

<sup>2</sup> For text of armistice agreement, see *ibid.*, Aug. 3, 1953, p. 132.

Commission, the Senior Member of the United Nations Command delegation has protested at length actions and delinquencies of your side which have prevented these inspection arrangements from operating successfully.<sup>3</sup> I shall therefore only summarize the situation today.

### Failure To Report Introductions of Personnel and Equipment

From the time the armistice agreement was concluded, your side has continuously made illegal introductions without reporting them to the NNSC. When the United Nations Command has called for an inspection of these illegal introductions, the Czech and Polish members on the NNSC have either vetoed such inspections or have cooperated with your side in obstructing the efforts of the Swiss and Swedish members of the Commission so as to render effective inspections, and thus disclosure, of these illegal introductions impossible. You have used the continued existence of the NNSC as a blind behind which to hide these illegal introductions, since you have effectively prevented it from performing in North Korea the task which under the armistice agreement it was created to do. The United Nations Command, on the other hand, has faithfully observed the provisions of the armistice agreement and has fully cooperated in the inspections made by the NNSC teams in the territory under United Nations Command control.

As a specific example, note the contrast between your performance in reporting to the NNSC and that of the United Nations Command. The armistice agreement requires both sides to make detailed and prompt reports of all introductions of military personnel and equipment. During approximately the first 6 months following the beginning of the armistice, the period during which your side made most of its illegal introductions, your side

<sup>3</sup> For a statement made on July 5, 1955, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 191.

made only 11 combat matériel reports to the Nxsc, reporting the implausibly low number of 40 rounds of replacement ammunition and no aircraft. During the same period, the United Nations Command submitted 598 reports, covering introduction of approximately 13,000,000 rounds of replacement ammunition, and 2,431 replacement aircraft. In the entire period since the armistice agreement went into effect until June 1955, you submitted a somewhat larger number of combat matériel reports, totaling 162. However, these still notably omit all reference to aircraft and compare unfavorably with the 1,969 reports submitted by the United Nations Command during the same period. The failure of your side to report introductions of combat aircraft is particularly conspicuous since your side now maintains in North Korea between 400 and 500 such aircraft, more than half of which are jet fighters or bombers, whereas you had none in that area at the time the armistice agreement was signed.

At the same time, Poland and Czechoslovakia, nominated by your side to participate in the Nxsc, have refused to agree to inspections in North Korea which your side opposed or have delayed inspection until evidence of the violations could be removed. By virtue of constituting one-half of the membership of the Commission, the Czech and Polish officers on the Commission have enjoyed an unqualified veto power over any proposal laid before it. The members of the Nxsc nominated by the United Nations Command, Sweden and Switzerland, have been truly neutrals in the accepted sense of the word. Their officers on the Nxsc have examined and decided each proposal or charge on its merits.

#### **Other Obstructing Tactics**

Besides this fundamental perversion of the Nxsc through actions of the Czech and Polish officers which allow significant inspections only in the territory under the control of the United Nations Command, your side has employed additional tactics designed to frustrate the operations of the Nxsc in the territory under your control.

Your side has made introductions through other than approved ports of entry; in at least one place you constructed a railway bypass around a port of entry and introduced material and personnel over it. Your side has also restricted the activities of Nxsc teams stationed in the ports of entry under

your control so as to prevent them from carrying out their duties, as when you scheduled inspections of trains at unreasonable hours in the middle of the night and when you failed to give the teams sufficient notice to permit them to appear to inspect a train passing through a port of entry.

Mobile team inspections in the north have also been frustrated. As the Swiss and Swedish members of Team #7 concluded after attempting to carry out an inspection of airfields there, ". . . the team was not in a position to conduct the investigation in a sufficiently thorough manner which would have allowed [it] to reach a convincing judgment. . . ." They explained this conclusion in detail by pointing out *inter alia* that your side had refused to make your records of aircraft movements available and that their repeated requests to inspect even the nearest surroundings of airfields whose alleged boundaries they doubted were denied.

#### **Cooperation of U.N. Command With Inspection Teams**

The United Nations Command, in contrast to the obstruction of your side, cooperated fully with the inspection teams sent to investigate your allegations of armistice violations. Teams #9 and #10 were shown records of aircraft movements pertinent to their investigation and were allowed to inspect aircraft on the field. As the Swiss and Swedish members of Team #10 concluded on April 26, 1955:

No justified complaint can be made against the United Nations Command side that it did not render the Team such assistance as could be deemed necessary for the fulfillment of the investigation. Further there is no ground for suspicions that the side did intentionally withhold information relevant to the investigation. The investigations and the inspections were carried out in all the places especially indicated by the KPA (CPV [Korean People's Army Chinese People's Volunteers] side. However, not one single piece could be found of the many different items of combat material . . . enumerated in the charge. . . .

The cooperation of the United Nations Command in the investigations of Teams #9 and #10 in the south and the difficulties expressed by Team #7 in the north reflect a continuation of the situation described in a memorandum submitted to this Commission on May 7, 1954, by the Swiss and Swedish representatives on the Nxsc. At that time, after nearly a year's experience, they said:

The United Nations Command side, . . . took from the beginning a broad view of its obligations and threw itself open to full control by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams stationed at the ports of entry in the territory under its military control. Partly on its own initiative and partly on request, it put at the disposal of the inspection teams all documents . . . relating to incoming and outgoing matériel. . . . The inspection teams were therefore in a position to inspect and to report on any matériel they felt to be interested in. . . .

The Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers' side, on the other hand . . . never submitted any other documents for inspection than prior notification reports . . . the inspection teams were unable to check efficiently on other movements and this because of the stand taken by their Czechoslovak and Polish members . . . in the territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the inspection teams, thanks to their "veto" power, have kept those spot check controls to a bare minimum . . . they have merely become a face saving device devoid of any real significance. The inspection teams in the north have therefore never gained the insight in movements of matériel as have the inspection teams in the south.<sup>4</sup>

#### **Frequent Protests by U.N. Command**

The United Nations Command has made frequent formal requests in the Military Armistice Commission during these almost 3 years, most recently on February 25, 1956, that your side amend its behavior and comply with those provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement regulating the introduction of combat matériel and equipment. Your side has failed to meet these demands and has given no indication of any intention to do so. It must therefore be concluded that your side intends to continue in default on its reporting obligations. It must be further concluded that your side intends to continue its practice of exploiting the unneutral conduct of the Czech and Polish members of vetoing embarrassing inspections, and that the Nxsc will continue to be unable to detect and disclose the illegal introductions by your side.

The Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have proposed repeatedly during recent months to appropriate Czech, Polish, and Chinese Communist authorities the withdrawal of the inspection teams to the Demilitarized Zone, where both sides would continue to report to the Commission. This reasonable proposal has been rejected repeatedly by your side. Most recently, in its note

<sup>4</sup> For excerpts from another memorandum by the Swiss and Swedish representatives, dated May 4, 1954, see BULLETIN of June 21, 1954, p. 944.

of April 9, 1956, to the nations represented in the United Nations Command, the Chinese Communist regime took the position that this problem could not be solved until the problems of unification of Korea and withdrawal of troops are solved. Consequently, it has become necessary to invoke the remedies available to the United Nations side to meet the situation created by the defaults to which I have referred. Your side, and also the Czech and Polish members of the Nxsc, have failed to carry out faithfully important provisions of the armistice agreement. Therefore, the United Nations side, as a party to that agreement, is entitled to take steps necessary to protect itself from the consequences of such unwarranted conduct. Accordingly, you are no longer privileged to take advantage of those provisions of the armistice agreement which have been violated and frustrated by your conduct and that of the Czech and Polish members of the Nxsc. The United Nations side has exhibited the greatest caution and forbearance in this matter. We have pursued every other practicable alternative course to redress the situation. The course we must now adopt is carefully adjusted to the violations and frustrations and to the burdens and injury involved and is the least we must do to protect our legitimate interests under the armistice agreement by lawful, peaceful, and reasonable steps.

Because of these obstructions and violations of your side and the conduct of the Czech and Polish members of the Nxsc and Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the United Nations Command is now notifying your side and the Nxsc and its subordinate teams at Incheon, Pusan, and Kunsan that the United Nations Command will provisionally suspend, during the time that your side continues in default, performance on its part of those provisions of the armistice agreement governing the operations in the area under the control of the United Nations Command of the Nxsc and Nxrt's. You are informed that this suspension will be put into effect in about one week and the United Nations Command will expect withdrawal of the teams from the area to be effected at that time. The United Nations Command is taking only such steps as are indispensable to protection of its rights under the armistice agreement. The United Nations Command continues to regard the armistice agreement as in force and limits its action to the particular suspensions described above. Finally,

since for the reasons above stated the NNSC teams in the north have not been able to accomplish their purpose, we see no purpose in their remaining there.

## **EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH CHINESE COMMUNISTS**

### **Chinese Communist Note of April 9**

*Following is the text of a note received by the British Chargé d'Affaires at Peiping from the Chinese Communists on April 9, 1956.*

1. The Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have, on many occasions, stated to the Chinese Government the practical difficulties which they have encountered in their work in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea and have expressed the hope that a settlement could be reached. The Chinese Government sympathizes strongly with the position of the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland and have endeavoured unceasingly to try to mitigate their difficulties. Recently the Swedish Government proposed that the whole of the six neutral observation teams, which are at present stationed in designated ports in South and North Korea, should be withdrawn for the time being and that observation teams should be despatched temporarily only when the need arose, while the Swiss Government proposed that the existing neutral observation teams in the six designated ports should be eliminated and that mobile observation teams only should be retained. The Chinese Government hold that a fundamental solution to the practical difficulties which the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland have repeatedly raised, can only be reached when a solution has been reached on the question of peaceful unification of Korea and first of all on the question of withdrawing all foreign forces from Korea.

2. Since the Geneva Conference on Korea in 1954, Korean and Chinese sides have consistently advocated that a conference of the Nations concerned should be called to discuss the question of withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and the peaceful unification of Korea. The Chinese Government are, moreover, convinced that if all parties concerned are genuinely desirous of seeking a settlement a reasonable solution to those questions could be reached.

3. In the light of the above considerations, the

Chinese Government, both in their own name and by authorization of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, propose to the Government of the United Kingdom and through the Government of the United Kingdom to all other Governments of the United Nations Command, to call a conference of the nations concerned to discuss the question of the withdrawal from Korea of all foreign forces and of the peaceful unification of Korea. The Governments of Korea and China request the Government of the United Kingdom to transmit this proposal to all other Governments of the United Nations Command. The Governments of Korea and China hope that the Government of the United Kingdom and all the other Governments of the United Nations Command will give active consideration to this proposal and that they will reply as soon as possible.

### **Reply of May 28**

*Following is the text of a note delivered by the British Chargé d'Affaires to the Chinese Communists at Peiping on May 28, 1956.*

1. On instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have to refer to Your Excellency's Note of the 9th of April concerning the difficulties of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea and proposing a conference on withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea and the unification of Korea.

2. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in accordance with the request in Your Excellency's Note of the 9th of April, has transmitted that Note to the other Governments of the United Nations Command, who, after consultation, have requested Her Majesty's Government to reply on their behalf.

3. The Governments of the United Nations Command have long regarded the frustration of the hopes of the Korean people for unification of their country as the basic problem in Korea. At Geneva they set forth in detail their position with regard to a just settlement of this problem in conformity with the objectives of the United Nations. This position was reiterated at the past two sessions of the General Assembly, where it was endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations.

4. With regard to the proposal of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime

for a conference on the withdrawal of foreign troops and the unification of Korea, the Governments of the United Nations Command are not aware of any change in the position of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime which would render such a conference fruitful. The Governments of the United Nations Command remain ready to discuss unification on the basis of the United Nations objectives. If the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime have concrete proposals for a settlement of the Korean question in conformity with the objectives of the United Nations, they are prepared to give such proposals every consideration.

5. In the absence of willingness of the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime to negotiate on the basis of the United Nations objectives, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission problem can and should be separated from the problem of unification. Pending agreement on unification, the Armistice Agreement remains in force in Korea, and all parties concerned should endeavour to maintain the effectiveness of the Armistice and to correct problems that arise regarding it. The Governments of the United Nations Command wish to reaffirm their support of the Armistice Agreement and their intention to contribute to peace in the area.

6. The Governments of the United Nations Command cannot accept the statement in the Note of April 9, 1956, that the People's Republic of China and the North Korean regime have "endeavored unceasingly to try to mitigate" the difficulties encountered by the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland in their work in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, since these difficulties have in fact been created by the conduct of the Chinese-North Korean side itself. The proposals of the Swiss and Swedish Governments referred to in the Note of April 9 (which the Governments of the United Nations Command regard as reasonable and which have their full support)

were made necessary by the policy of systematic frustration of the functions of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which the Chinese-North Korean side has followed ever since the Armistice Agreement was first signed. The Chinese-North Korean side has persisted in introducing military personnel and supplies into Korea through other points of entry than those provided for in the Armistice Agreement, and has failed to report these introductions to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Through the obstruction of the Czech and Polish members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, the United Nations Command has been effectively prevented from having its charges of such introductions investigated. In short, the Chinese-North Korean side has completely frustrated any effective supervision by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the area north of the Demilitarized Zone. Under these circumstances, the activities of the Czech and Polish components of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission south of the Demilitarized Zone are an inequitable burden on the United Nations side. The United Nations Command will announce its position on this matter fully in the Military Armistice Commission.

7. In the light of the foregoing and having regard to the attitude of the Chinese-North Korean side with respect to its obligations toward the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, as shown by its conduct in practice, the Governments of the United Nations Command believe that no evidence has been shown of the good faith which alone could enable any new conference to serve a useful purpose. Until the Chinese-North Korean side is prepared to negotiate sincerely on the basis of United Nations objectives, the Governments of the United Nations Command believe that another conference would only bring about a repetition of the deadlock which resulted at Geneva in 1954.

## Progress in Free Viet-Nam

*by Walter S. Robertson*

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

This past March, I had the pleasure of accompanying the Secretary of State on his visit to Saigon, where we conversed with President Diem on the present and future problems of Viet-Nam. I was struck, as so many other recent observers have been, at the progress Free Viet-Nam has made in a few short months toward stability, security, and strength. President Diem seemed to reflect this progress in his own person. On the occasion of our earlier visit some 15 months ago, he seemed tense and gravely concerned about the problems facing Viet-Nam. This time he was relaxed, poised, and appeared confident of the future of his country.

Among the factors that explain the remarkable rise of Free Viet-Nam from the shambles created by 8 years of murderous civil and international war, the division of the country at Geneva, and the continuing menace of predatory communism, there is in the first place the dedication, courage, and resourcefulness of President Diem himself. In him, his country has found a truly worthy leader whose integrity and devotion to his country's welfare have become generally recognized among his people. Asia has given us in President Diem another great figure, and the entire free world has become the richer for his example of determination and moral fortitude. There is no more dramatic example of this fortitude than President Diem's decisions during the tense and vital days of the battle against the parasitic politico-religious sects in the city of Saigon in the spring of 1955. These decisions were to resist the multiple pressures to compromise that were build-

ing up around him and to struggle to the victorious end for the sake of a just cause. The free world owes him a debt of gratitude for his determined stand at that fateful hour.

Consider Viet-Nam at three stages in its recent history:

First, in mid-1954, partitioned by fiat of the great powers against the will of the Vietnamese people, devoid of governmental machinery or military strength, drifting without leadership and without hope in the backwash of the defeat administered by the combined weight of Communist-impressed infantry and of Chinese and Russian arms;

Secondly, in early 1955, faced with the military and subversive threat of the Communists north of the 17th parallel, confronted with internal strife, its Government challenged by the armed, self-seeking politico-religious sects, its army barely reformed and of uncertain loyalty, assailed from within by the most difficult problems, including that of having to absorb the sudden influx of three-quarters of a million refugees who would rather leave their ancestral lands and homes than suffer life under Communist tyranny;

And finally Viet-Nam today, in mid-1956, progressing rapidly to the establishment of democratic institutions by elective processes, its people resuming peaceful pursuits, its army growing in effectiveness, sense of mission, and morale, the puppet Vietnamese politicians discredited, the refugees well on the way to permanent resettlement, the countryside generally orderly and calm, the predatory sects eliminated and their venal leaders exiled or destroyed.

Perhaps no more eloquent testimony to the new state of affairs in Viet-Nam could be cited

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the American Friends of Viet-Nam at Washington, D.C., on June 1 (press release 289 dated May 31).

than the voice of the people themselves as expressed in their free election of last March. At that time the last possible question as to the feeling of the people was erased by an overwhelming majority for President Diem's leadership. The fact that the Viet Minh was unable to carry out its open threats to sabotage these elections is impressive evidence of the stability and prestige of the Government.

The United States is proud to be on the side of the effort of the Vietnamese people under President Diem to establish freedom, peace, and the good life. The United States wishes to continue to assist and to be a loyal and trusted friend of Viet-Nam.

### **U.S. Policies in Viet-Nam**

Our policies in Viet-Nam may be simply stated as follows:

To support a friendly non-Communist government in Viet-Nam and to help it diminish and eventually eradicate Communist subversion and influence.

To help the Government of Viet-Nam establish the forces necessary for internal security.

To encourage support for Free Viet-Nam by the non-Communist world.

To aid in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of a country and people ravaged by 8 ruinous years of civil and international war.

Our efforts are directed first of all toward helping to sustain the internal security forces consisting of a regular army of about 150,000 men, a mobile civil guard of some 45,000, and local defense units which are being formed to give protection against subversion on the village level. We are providing budgetary support and equipment for these forces and have a mission assisting the training of the army. We are also helping to organize, train, and equip the Vietnamese police force. The refugees who have fled to South Viet-Nam to escape the Viet Minh are being resettled on productive lands with the assistance of funds made available by our aid program. In various ways our aid program also provides assistance to the Vietnamese Government designed to strengthen the economy and provide a better future for the common people of the country. The Vietnamese are increasingly giving attention to the basic development of the Vietnamese economy and to projects that may contribute directly to

that goal. We give our aid and counsel to this program only as freely invited.

I do not wish to minimize the magnitude of the task that still remains and of the problems that still confront this staunch and valiant member of the free world fighting for its independence on the threshold of the Communist heartland of Asia.

### **Communist Conspiracy**

The Communist conspiracy continues to threaten Free Viet-Nam. With monstrous effrontery the Communist conspirators at Hanoi accuse Free Viet-Nam and its friends of violating the armistice provisions which the Vietnamese and their friends, including ourselves, have scrupulously respected despite the fact that neither the Vietnamese nor ourselves signed the Geneva Accords while they, the Communists, who have solemnly undertaken to be bound by these provisions, have violated them in the most blatant fashion.

The facts are that, while, on the one hand, the military potential of Free Viet-Nam has been drastically reduced by the withdrawal of nearly 200,000 members of the French Expeditionary Corps and by the reduction of the Vietnamese Army by more than 50,000 from the time of the armistice to the present as well as by the out-shipment from Viet-Nam since the cessation of hostilities of over \$200 million worth of war equipment, we have, on the other hand, reports of steady, constant growth of the war-making potential of the Communists north of the 17th parallel.

Our reports reveal that, in complete disregard of its obligations, the Viet Minh have imported voluminous quantities of arms across the Sino-Viet Minh border and have imported a constant stream of Chinese Communist military personnel to work on railroads, to rebuild roads, to establish airports, and to work on other projects contributing to the growth of the military potential of the zone under Communist occupation.

As so eloquently stated by the British Government in a diplomatic note released to the press and sent to Moscow in April of this year,

The Viet Minh army has been so greatly strengthened by the embodiment and re-equipment of irregular forces that instead of the 7 Viet Minh divisions in existence in July 1954 there are now no less than 20. This striking contrast between massive military expansion in the North and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in the South speaks for itself.

By lies, propaganda, force, and deceit the Communists in Hanoi would undermine Free Viet-Nam, whose fall they have been unable to secure by their maneuverings on the diplomatic front. These people, whose crimes against suffering humanity are so vividly described in the book by Lieutenant Dooley,<sup>2</sup> who addressed you this morning, have sold their country to Peiping. They have shamelessly followed all the devious zigzags of the Communist-bloc line so that their alliance with Communist China and the Soviet Union is firmly consolidated. These are the people who are now inviting President Diem to join them in a coalition government to be set up through so-called "free elections."

### **U. S. Support for Reunification**

President Diem and the Government of Free Viet-Nam reaffirmed on April 6 of this year and on other occasions their desire to seek the reunification of Viet-Nam by peaceful means. In this goal we support them fully. We hope and pray that the partition of Viet-Nam, imposed against the will of the Vietnamese people, will speedily come to an end. For our part we believe in free elections, and we support President Diem fully in his position that, if elections are to be held, there first must be conditions which preclude intimidation or coercion of the electorate. Unless such conditions exist there can be no free choice.

May those leaders of the north in whom the spirit of true patriotism still survives realize the futility of the Communist effort to subvert Free Viet-Nam by force or guile. May they force the abandonment of these efforts and bring about the peaceful demobilization of the large standing armies of the Viet Minh. May they, above all, return to the just cause of all those who want to reunify their country in peace and independence and for the good of all the people of Viet-Nam.

Ladies and gentlemen, I wish the greatest success in the efforts of the American Friends of Viet-Nam to seek ways and means further to strengthen the relations between our two peoples. The United States will be helped by your efforts, and I can assure you of the determination of this Government that there shall be no weakening in our support for Free Viet-Nam.

<sup>2</sup> *Deliver Us From Evil*, by Thomas A. Dooley (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1956).

## **U.S. Trade Mission to Japan, March 10–April 22, 1956<sup>1</sup>**

The 1956 U.S. Trade Mission to Japan learned soon after its arrival in Tokyo that one basic problem overshadows all other questions now affecting trade relations between the United States and Japan.

Japan must import approximately 20 percent of its food supply and most of the raw materials which go into the finished products needed by its almost 90 million people. Considerable imports of machinery and other manufactured goods also are necessary.

To get the money to buy these things Japan must export and it has been rapidly increasing its sales to all parts of the world.

Much of the food, raw materials, and manufactured products which Japan buys comes from the United States. In each of the past 3 years Japan has been among our four top customers. Japan is our best customer for raw cotton, and imports large quantities of U.S. wheat, soybeans, coal, and other commodities. The postwar modernization of Japan's industries has also provided a good market for all types of American machinery and tools.

According to official Japanese statistics, Japanese imports in 1955 amounted to \$772 million worth of business for American producers. In the same year, American buyers took \$449 million worth of Japanese products. While Japanese exports to the United States were substantially above the 1954 total, they still left Japan with an import excess of well over \$300 million. Japan must therefore continue to strive to sell more goods to the United States.

Many of the products we buy from Japan, however—such as cotton textiles and clothing, plywood, and tuna fish—are also produced in the United States, and large-scale imports have an undeniable effect on American producers' sales.

### **Members of Mission Specially Selected**

Japan therefore faces this problem: How to continue and to increase its sales to the United States—and its imports from the United States as well—and at the same time minimize the ad-

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from the *Foreign Commerce Weekly* of May 21, 1956.



verse effects of those sales on American producers, since it is feared that such adverse effects might ultimately induce the United States to limit imports from Japan.

Members of the trade mission to Japan were specially chosen for the task of exploring this problem. The chief of the mission, Eugene M. Braderman, Director of the Far Eastern Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, has dealt with problems concerning Japan for a number of years. Charles A. Keough, president of the Ballthral Trading Co., Philadelphia, lived in Japan from 1927 to 1931, and has been actively engaged in foreign trade during his whole business career. Egil E. Krogh, president and general manager of Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., Rochester, N. Y., has devoted many years to retail merchandising, and has also served as president of the Washington State Third International Trade Fair. Vergil D. Reed, vice president and associate director of research of the J. Walter Thompson Co., is an expert on marketing, market research, and advertising, and is the author of several books on those subjects which are widely read in Japan. In Japan the mission was joined by J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr., Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Tokyo, who has spent the past 8 years in Japan at several U.S. Foreign Service posts.

Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks sent the trade mission to Japan in connection with U.S. participation in the Third Japan International Trade Fair, held at Osaka, April 8-22. Before and during the fair, however, the trade mission visited 15 other major industrial and commercial cities in Japan. In each city, the mission met in round-table discussions with manufacturers, business leaders, Japanese Government officials, and others concerned with foreign trade. Time was set aside also for individual consultations with businessmen who had specific problems concerning their own companies, and who wanted the private advice of mission members.

These programs, arranged through the American consulates and American cultural centers serving the areas visited, received enthusiastic cooperation from Japanese prefectural and municipal government officials and local chambers of commerce and industry. A total of 1,300 businessmen met with the mission in these prefair discussions and individual consultations.

### **Arrangements Made for Individual Meetings**

The trade mission arrived in Osaka several days before the fair opened and set up its offices in the Trade Information Center, located within the American pavilion at the fair. While on tour the trade mission had invited businessmen to call at the Trade Information Center at the fair, and the American consulates had sent letters of invitation to thousands of business firms, advising them of the center's facilities. By the time the fair opened, therefore, many businessmen had already requested appointments for individual consultations with mission members.

Since the Trade Information Center occupied an excellent location near the entrance to the American pavilion, many other visitors to the pavilion introduced themselves and took advantage of the center's facilities. In all, 482 persons called at the Trade Information Center. During the trade fair, members of the mission made additional visits to other cities, where they met with about 300 Japanese officials and businessmen in group discussions.

The group discussions and individual consultations held by the trade mission throughout Japan and at the International Trade Fair in Osaka gave mission members a broad basis on which to form a judgment concerning Japan's major trade problems. One point immediately became apparent. Whenever an item begins to sell well in the United States, Japanese producers and exporters tend to "jump on the bandwagon" and concentrate their efforts on that one item. The result is frequently a phenomenal increase in shipments of that item to the United States, and a consequent reaction by American firms producing similar items.

### **Export Diversification Explained to Japanese**

This has been true of the so-called "dollar" blouses, which increased more than twentyfold between 1954 and 1955. In advising Japanese businessmen on this point, the mission pointed out that while imports of Japanese cotton textiles and clothing amounted in the aggregate to 2 percent of American consumption, particular items, such as blouses, corduroy, gingham, and velveteen, so far exceeded this average figure as to constitute a serious threat to the existence of the American industries concerned. It was explained to the Japanese that if exports, not only of cotton goods but of all types of products, could be diversified,

so that the impact would be distributed throughout the numerous items and price levels which find acceptance in the United States, then it should be possible for Japanese exports to grow steadily with the natural increase of the American market and at the same time avoid undue pressure on American-made products.

The value of knowledge of the American market, and of market research, was stressed by the trade mission. Many medium- and small-sized Japanese manufacturers sell their products through export and import agents without knowing the ultimate disposition and use of the products by the American consumer. Designs, quality standards, and other factors are frequently set by the American firm placing the order, and the Japanese manufacturer follows them without gaining a real appreciation of the reasons involved.

While these practices sometimes appear to make it possible for large amounts of acceptable merchandise to be produced and shipped to the United States in a short time, the trade mission suggested that it was in the long-range interests of both partners in trade for the Japanese to learn more about American consumer needs, the types of designs which appeal to our taste, and, above all, to strive for business in higher quality and higher priced lines, where competition is more dependent on style and quality and less on price and where equivalent dollar returns can be had with less physical volume. Distribution outlets, the mission stressed, should be chosen carefully, in keeping with the type of product and the class of customers to be reached.

#### **Advice Sought on Wide Range of Subjects**

In their search for wider markets, Japanese businessmen asked the trade mission for information and advice on a wide range of subjects. Among these was the question of the exemption of lightweight silk scarves from the provisions of the Flammable Fabrics Act on the grounds that scarves are not a potentially dangerous apparel item. While some segments of the Japanese scarf industry have successfully converted to heavier weight scarves, a number of producers apparently have not been able to develop other business and have been in dire circumstances since their exports of scarves were stopped.

A large number of questions were raised on other subjects, including the market for Japanese silk, hardwood, plywood, and tunafish; eradica-

tion of the citrus canker disease, which prevents U. S. import of Japanese mandarin oranges; adaption of Japanese designs and handicraft items for the American market; the role which American investment could play in the further development of Japan; reciprocal tariff reductions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); and coal versus atomic energy as a source of electricity generation. These questions proved to the mission that Japanese businessmen have a wide-awake interest in all aspects of foreign trade.

#### **Japan Prepared To Cooperate With U.S.**

The invariable friendliness and warmth with which the mission was received throughout Japan convinced the members that the United States has a firm and dependable friend in Japan. The frankness and goodwill with which mutual problems were discussed was further evidence that the Japanese were prepared to cooperate with the United States in reasonable measures to permit the healthy growth of Japan-United States commercial relations and to minimize adverse effects on either side.

Japan is more than a market for U.S. products and a source of U.S. imports. It is also a bulwark of democracy and free enterprise in Asia. In the 10½ years since the end of World War II, Japan has rebuilt its cities and its industries, and is now giving its citizens a per capita real income higher than the prewar average.

This accomplishment is a tribute to both the American and the Japanese people. The forward-looking policies of the United States toward Japan, including the extension of considerable amounts of aid during the immediate postwar years, stand out among our most important accomplishments in Asia. But the degree and rapidity of the progress made is due largely to the skill and hard work of the Japanese people.

The maintenance and continued development of Japan as a prosperous and dependable member of the democratic free world is important to the security of the United States and therefore merits the close attention of the American people. The necessity for direct economic aid has given place to the necessity for the Japanese people to carry on their own development with their own energy and intelligence, albeit with friendly cooperation from the United States.

As one Japanese businessman put it in a discussion with the trade mission, "We Japanese do not

now pray to the United States, 'Give us this day our daily bread,' but 'Give us this day an opportunity to earn our livelihood.'” This spirit is one which should be welcome to the American people, and one which we should encourage.

The trade mission feels that there is still ample room both in Japan and in the United States for increased understanding and appreciation of the situation and point of view of the other country. The problems which our two nations face in ex-

panding their trade on a mutually satisfactory and mutually profitable basis may be difficult, but they are not insoluble.

What is needed on both sides is goodwill and commonsense, and continued devotion to the principles of fair play and free enterprise which have made the American economy the greatest in the world. The members of the 1956 U.S. Trade Mission to Japan feel that their work in Japan has contributed significantly to this purpose.

## World Trade—Opportunity and Challenge

*by Walter Williams*

*Under Secretary of Commerce*<sup>1</sup>

Surely there is no more appropriate place in this country to talk about opportunities and challenges than here in California. Your dramatic growth in population and industry during the past 15 years seems only the dynamic beginning of a development which may in the next quarter-century place your State in the very forefront of economic activity in this country. Many experts confidently predict that by 1975 California's population will be more than 25 million, with almost half of that number living in the Los Angeles area.

The industrial expansion which will accompany this growth must aggressively seek markets for its production, and, fast as is our national population growth, our rate of productivity is growing even faster. Where will the goods be sold which your 25 million and the 200-odd million other Americans who will then be living produce?

Certainly our biggest market will always be within our own boundaries. But there are compelling reasons why our factories must find increasing markets abroad for a part of their production. Not to do so would mean incomplete use of our plant capacity, weakening of our employment structure, and softening of our domestic market.

There is also a factor in our economy about

which we have thought very little for the past 30 or 40 years. As our industrial productivity increases, our need for raw materials grows also. For reasons of strategy—both military and economic—it is in our interest to import a greater amount of these goods than we have up to now. In the long run our ability to obtain such raw materials abroad is determined by our volume of exports. Steadily increasing sales volume in foreign markets is therefore a “must” if we are to maintain a strong economy at home. But exports are equally important in their own right. For one of the outstanding lessons of industrial development in this country is the constantly proven fact that mass markets make possible low unit cost of production with consequently lower prices to the consumer and a broad-based rich standard of living for all of our 167 million fellow citizens. Foreign markets frequently offer just the additional outlets for American production which make possible such savings in costs and reductions in price in the market at home.

This “multiplier” function of foreign trade is also evident in imports. The effect of our importing manganese, for example, is far greater in terms of our steel production for domestic use, as well as for export, than the dollar value of such imports would of itself indicate. In the consumer field, imports of French perfume or Italian-designed dresses, since they create interest and demand for these types of goods, are often used by

<sup>1</sup>Address made before the World Trade Luncheon of the Foreign Trade Association of Southern California at Los Angeles on May 24 (Commerce Department press release).

alert merchandisers of domestically produced women's dresses and perfume as a means of selling their American goods to customers whose only contact with the foreign-produced article is through the advertising pages of magazines and newspapers.

Since our foreign trade, both export and import, is so closely woven together with our domestic commerce, our foreign economic policy must be closely related to our policies with respect to industry and distribution at home. In fact, it becomes increasingly apparent that our commerce with other nations and the whole sum of business activity within the United States are two parts of one whole.

What is our economic policy? It is and must be the continuous expansion of business, the increase of production, and the continuous development of additional markets for our products. This is the economic creed under which we have prospered for 180 years. It is the philosophy whose value is vividly shown in our present enjoyment of unprecedented national prosperity with record highs in employment and business activity.

The foreign-trade aspect of this philosophy is simply stated. Our policy is to encourage the continuous expansion of multilateral trade, which means the increased exportation of American products accompanied by substantial imports of those foreign-made goods which merge with and strengthen our own economy. It means the encouragement of travel by residents of this country going abroad and the welcoming of visitors from foreign lands to our shores. It means fostering sound investment abroad of our capital and of our know-how in industries and enterprises which not only strengthen the economy of friendly nations but also do much to create and maintain a demand for American-made parts and accessories and other products whose use follows in the wake of the economic development abroad which our investment has made possible.

In this respect, our foreign economic policy not only encourages increased business for the United States; it also strengthens our friends and allies throughout the world, making them economically more vigorous and militarily more secure against the inroads of antagonistic economic and political beliefs.

But a policy is only as good as the operations which are carried on under it. What have we done

to make our economic policy effective in the field of foreign trade? I think the record of our achievements is clear evidence of the sincerity of our will toward international commercial expansion and the ever-increasing interchange of goods and services among the peoples of the earth.

### **Implementing Foreign Economic Policy**

First, we are steadily active, in cooperation with our trading partners, to reduce unreasonable barriers to trade. Continuing to work under the reciprocal trade agreements program, and in recent years making this work more effective through our participation in the international agreement created for this purpose, GATT—the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—we have reduced the average level of our own tariffs well under that of 1930. This reduction, I am happy to say, has not been one-sided. As a result of our negotiations with individual nations and of our cooperation with the 34 other nations taking part in GATT, we have secured some 60,000 reductions in foreign tariffs on a wide range of commodities. Yesterday, May 23, witnessed the signing in Geneva of new protocols embodying the results of the recent negotiations for tariff reductions.

Second, recognizing that tariffs are not the only barriers to trade, indeed in many respects are among the least important of such barriers, we have urged our friends in other areas of the world to abandon, or at least to diminish, such hindrances to the flow of commerce as quotas and unduly rigorous exchange controls. We have also not hesitated to reduce barriers of our own making, such as the unduly complicated procedures formerly demanded by our laws for customs administration. Although much remains to be done in this field in order to effectuate our belief that the Government's job is to remove every possible hurdle from the path of business, we have made substantial progress in that direction.

A third encouragement to international trade development is our program to encourage greater participation by American business in international trade fairs throughout the world. In directing that this activity be undertaken, the President said:<sup>2</sup>

International trade fairs have been of major importance to foreign countries for many years, and most of the trading nations have strengthened the promotional as-

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 122.

pects of their industrial displays in many fairs with a central exhibit designed to emphasize the industrial progress and achievement of the nation.

Soviet and satellite exhibits, for example, have been costly, well-planned, and housed in expensive structures designed to convey the impression that the U.S.S.R. is producing on a large scale for peace and is creating a paradise for workers.

The United States, which has a larger volume of international trade than any other nation, until recently has been conspicuous by its absence at these trade fairs. American visitors and participants have pointed out the failure of their Government to tell adequately the story of our free-enterprise system and to provide effective international trade promotion cooperation. . . .

Since the inception of this program in 1954, the Department of Commerce, with the enthusiastic and highly valued cooperation of the American manufacturer, has organized central exhibits in 33 fairs in Europe and the Far East. These exhibits have accomplished several things. Perhaps the most far-reaching effect they have had is that they have presented to peoples of other nations a true picture of the American economy and its achievements in the service of man, denying the Communist libel of us as the exploiter of the people. Certainly also, however, they have served as a demonstration and advertisement of American production. In many instances, they have strengthened the privately organized displays of American manufacturers at the fairs in which the central exhibits were presented and have increased the audience attraction of these private exhibits, with consequent increase in the volume of business done by American exhibitors as a result of their exhibition.

We are vigorously continuing this program because of its success in presenting the American story abroad and also because we have evidence that it is effective in encouraging American private enterprise to undertake this responsibility on its own, both as institutional advertising of the American industrial system and as a fruitful means of developing sales volume.

#### **Trade Missions**

A fourth activity for the encouragement of international trade which is closely allied with our trade fair activities is our program of sending trade missions to countries throughout the world to assist businessmen both at home and abroad to generate increased export and import trade. These missions, which usually maintain a trade information office as part of the officially organ-

ized central exhibit at a trade fair, differ from the trade missions sent abroad by many other countries in at least one important respect. Whereas the trade missions of other countries usually have as their chief objective the conclusion of government-to-government trade agreements, which in most cases are mainly arrangements for large-scale barter, our missions have as their sole objective assisting private enterprisers in the United States and in foreign countries to do increased business with each other on a straight sale-for-profit basis without any encumbering barter requirements.

The membership of these missions is recruited from the ranks of businessmen in the United States, who serve for periods of 6 weeks to 3 months without compensation. They operate while abroad under the chairmanship of an official of the Department of Commerce, but it is the business representatives who carry the load of consultation and advice as to methods of concluding business arrangements, channels for trading, sources of information on pricing, and other matters pertinent to the development of business connections between a business concern in the United States and its customer or supplier abroad. An important part of the activities of the missions is the visits they make to the chief industrial centers of the country in which a fair is being held. In this way, and by their attendance at a fair, they are enabled to make contact with hundreds of active businessmen in each country that a mission visits. Since January 1955, 26 trade missions have visited 18 countries and have made contact with at least 60,000 businessmen.

These are some of the things which your Government is doing to promote sound increases in international trade volume. The major achievements, of course, belong to business itself. The energetic activities of American exporters and importers have pushed our foreign-trade total volume to the highest level in history. Our exports, exclusive of military shipments, are now running at a rate of \$15 billion per year, exceeded only by the immediate postwar rehabilitation shipments of 1947. Our imports have reached a \$12 billion annual rate.

Surely these notable achievements should be sources of satisfaction not only to the businessmen who have made the sales but also to each of us who enjoys our present level of prosperity, to which this volume of foreign trade has signifi-

cantly contributed. Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of this bright picture is that there are strong indications that in the coming years these totals will continue to rise.

In many of the countries with whom we do substantial business, gold and dollar balances are increasing. This is a good omen for the American exporter for two reasons. It increases his opportunities for sales since it means that the dollar shortage in many areas of the world will no longer be as serious a deterrent to the sale of American products as it formerly was. Second—and I think all of us who understand the United States will agree that this is good—more availability of gold and dollar exchange abroad makes many markets more competitive. Gold and dollars may be spent anywhere, whereas their former substitute, United States Government grants, gave United States producers a virtual monopoly on the market. Therefore, producers in many other countries are now free to compete with United States exporters in foreign markets. It has been our consistent experience that increased competition means increased trade for us. It brings out the mettle of our traders and usually increases the efficiency of their operation while stimulating them to more aggressive selling and greater responsiveness to the needs of customers.

### **Benefits of Increased Imports**

On the import side, the prospects for long-term increases are also good. The national income is rising and the demand for consumer and industrial goods may therefore be expected to rise also. Such a rise in import volume will be healthy for the United States for many reasons. Let me cite three.

The first is that by increasing our purchases from free nations abroad we increase their ability to earn the dollars to pay for our exports and therefore we widen the market for our industries.

Secondly, we strengthen the manufacturing and raw-materials producing industries of our friends in other lands and thereby make employment of their citizens surer and prosperity for them more abundant, which makes them, as nations and as individuals, less susceptible to the blandishments of antagonistic ideologies which are counsels of despair and attractive only to people in fear of hunger and of misery.

The third benefit of increased imports is that we obtain for our industries greater supplies of

necessary raw materials to permit production within this country, with consequent rise, even above our present high levels, in employment in the producing industries, to say nothing of the increased employment and business volume which increased imports will make possible in our distributive trades.

I am talking about steady, sound increases in trade volume. I am not talking about booms with their inevitable busts. Continual expansion of business, which means steadily increasing production and increasing needs for it to satisfy, is the heartbeat of our economy. It is the reason why we may look to the future with hope; it is the reason why our high birthrate is a blessing rather than a dilemma.

Our international trade is just one factor contributing to our national income. Large as it is in billions of dollars, it is a relatively small component of our total business activity. But because of its effect on our ability to produce in high volume and to maintain prices within the reach of our consumers, it is vital that our international trade must continue in a direction compatible with our national interests. Its success or failure, and the shape that it takes, intimately concerns each of us. Private business has, of course, the main responsibility for the development of our trade. The role of the Government is to foster and encourage the development of commerce by providing a favorable climate for its expansion and by assuring to private traders freedom of opportunity to develop profitable business.

The items on the immediate agenda for Government action to achieve these results are of several kinds. They include:

Encouraging increased investment of American capital and know-how in sound enterprises abroad. There is a proposal now before Congress to provide a tax incentive for foreign investment by granting a 14-point reduction in the tax on incomes derived from such sources. The administration supports this proposal and we, in the Commerce Department, join in that support.

We also look forward to the activation of the new International Finance Corporation, which the United States has already joined. This organization will be equipped to provide relatively small amounts of ownership capital to international business ventures and will thus, we believe, act as a catalyst to spark private investment in such ventures.

The achievements attained through our work in GATT in the field of tariff and other trade-restriction removal are substantial. The procedure under GATT, however, is somewhat cumbersome, since its business can usually be transacted only in annual general meetings. The proposed Organization for Trade Cooperation, which would be an administrative body organized for year-round activity in furtherance of GATT's objectives, would, we believe, be a forward step. It would be of particular benefit to the United States, by the way, since we are the country which would benefit most from an improvement in GATT's administrative procedure. It would greatly expedite work for the elimination of barriers and we strongly support its creation and the membership of the United States in it.

The simplification of customs administration and procedure has been the subject of many legislative proposals. Legislation has been passed which did much to eliminate or simplify outworn administrative requirements and thereby to ease the burden of the American importer in entering his goods for consumption in the United States. The method of determining value for duty purposes, however, was not covered in this legislation and it continues to be a source of great uncertainty and costly delays in assessing proper duty. A proposal now awaits action by the Senate, having passed the House, which would provide a simple and easily understood method of determining such value. We, in the Department of Commerce, are hopeful such legislation may be passed by this Congress.

Stimulation of travel abroad by residents of the United States is an important part of our program for the encouragement of increased foreign trade. Expenditures by such travelers in 1955 approximated \$1.5 billion. The consequent increase in the dollar resources of our customers abroad expanded the market for American exports. In addition, U.S. tourism also fosters better understanding among peoples and warmer ties of international friendship. It is, therefore, a staunch rock in our fortress against the encroachment of militant communism.

This is the unfinished business with respect to foreign trade upon which we are presently working. We believe that these actions by Government will encourage and make easier the work of the American foreign trader and investor abroad. The major responsibility for the creation of inter-

national business is theirs. With the energetic cooperation of the businessman directly concerned, and of the Government, which is all of the people, we shall continue to press forward for the high levels of international commerce which so closely merge with and support our business activities at home.

## **St. Lawrence Seaway Discussions With Canada**

Press release 285 dated May 28

Intergovernmental discussions between the United States and Canada will be held on May 29 in Ottawa regarding a question which has arisen on the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Projects. The question relates to the responsibility for dredging north and south of Cornwall Island, which is one of the principal matters concerning the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Projects still to be resolved.

The Canadian representative will be George C. Marler, Minister of Transport, to be assisted by Lionel Chevrier, President of the Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, and officials of related Canadian Government departments. The U.S. representative will be Wilber M. Brucker, Secretary of the Army, whose advisers will include Lewis G. Castle, Administrator of the U.S. Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, and other U.S. officials.

## **U.S.-U.K. Discussions on Telegraph Services**

Press release 286 dated May 29

During the period May 16 through May 25, 1956, informal discussions were held in Washington between officials of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments concerned with telecommunications. Representatives of the interested private companies of both countries and of the interested committee of the United States Senate attended the later stages of the discussions.

The purpose of these meetings was to exchange views on questions relating to U.S.-U.K. telegraph services and not to arrive at any treaty or formal agreement. During the course of these discussions a wide variety of views were exchanged which covered the aspects of modernization of existing plant, the utilization of new fa-

ilities and techniques, and ways and means of utilizing communications facilities to serve the close mutual interests of the United Kingdom and the United States.

Mr. R. J. P. Harvey, Deputy Director General of the British General Post Office, was Chairman of the United Kingdom Delegation. Mr. J. Paul Barringer, Director of the Office of Transport and Communications of the Department of State, and Commissioner E. M. Webster of the Federal Communications Commission, and Commissioner Richard Mack, Alternate to Commissioner Webster, acted as co-spokesmen for the United States.

It was felt that much useful work had been done and that the discussions had served to bring into focus and proper perspective many of the problems which had been facing both countries. It was also felt that it would be desirable to maintain a continued close liaison between the United Kingdom and the United States in this field.

The meeting concluded with a feeling of mutual satisfaction that the exchange of views pointed the way toward common objectives and aims.

## President Approves Farm Bill

*Statement by President Eisenhower*

White House press release dated May 28

I have today approved the farm bill, H. R. 10875.

The heart of the bill is the soil bank. Its acreage reserve will help bring production of certain crops into balance with their markets. It will check current additions to our price-depressing, market-destroying surplus stocks of farm products. It is a concept rich with promise for improving our agricultural situation.

The conservation reserve feature of the soil bank can be the most significant advance in the conservation field in many years. It will result in improved use of our soil and water resources for the benefit of this and future generations. Together with the forestry provisions of the bill, it will increase our supply of much-needed forest products. It will help hold rain and snow where they fall and will heal with grass and trees the scars of erosion which now mar our countryside. It will make for better land use in those areas of the Great Plains which have experienced dust storms. It will reduce the stimulus to livestock production induced by feed-grain output on acres diverted from wheat and cotton.

The delay in the bill's enactment, however, makes it virtually impossible to put the soil bank properly into effect in 1956, and I am disappointed that advance payments to farmers are not provided for.

Most of the harmful provisions of the previous farm bill have been deleted or have been substantially modified. Some of them still remain, however, and some new ones have been added.

Sections 202 and 203, which apply to cotton, are particularly unfortunate.<sup>1</sup> This administration is committed to a policy of orderly disposal of agricultural surpluses abroad and a healthy expansion of international trade. This policy is in our national interest and serves to promote the strength of the free world. These two sections call for measures which could result in a serious setback to this policy.

Section 203 requires the Government to follow an inflexible program of cotton export sales with little regard to costs and without adequate regard to the far-reaching economic consequences at home and abroad. In order to avoid seriously disruptive effects, this section of the bill will have to be administered with extreme caution.

Section 202 intensifies further the restrictions already applied on imports of long-staple cotton at a time when domestic cotton of this type is fully competitive with foreign growths and domestic consumption is rising. The same section of the legislation requires the Government to export Commodity Credit Corporation stocks of extra

<sup>1</sup> Following is the text of sections 202, 203, and 204:

### EXTRA-LONG STAPLE COTTON

Sec. 202. (a) Hereafter the quota for cotton having a staple length of one and one-eighth inches or more, established September 20, 1939, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, as amended, shall apply to the same grades and staple lengths included in the quota when such quota was initially established. Such quota shall provide for cotton having a staple length of one and eleven-sixteenths inches and longer, and shall establish dates for the quota year which will recognize and permit entry to conform to normal marketing practices and requirements for such cotton.

(b) Beginning not later than August 1, 1956, the Commodity Credit Corporation is directed to sell for export at competitive world prices its stocks of domestically produced extra long staple cotton on hand on the date of enactment of this Act. The amount offered and the price accepted by the Commodity Credit Corporation shall be such as to dispose of such quantity in an orderly manner and within a reasonable period of time.

*Footnote continued on next page*



long-staple cotton, a type which we normally do not sell abroad in significant quantities.

Section 204 authorizes the President to negotiate agreements to limit certain imports outside the procedures established by our trade-agreements legislation. This section represents an undesirable complication in the field of foreign trade.

The effective operation of a two-price plan for rice is faced with several serious problems, which must be carefully evaluated before a decision is made as to whether to institute such a plan.

In freezing acreage allotments for rice and cotton for the next 2 years at the 1956 level the bill runs counter to the adjustment principle which underlies our basic agricultural legislation.

Despite the shortcomings of the bill, its advantages outweigh its harmful provisions. I am gratified with the constructive features it contains, and I am hopeful that the Congress will review and repair its shortcomings.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 84th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions

Newsprint Study. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. March 15, 1955, January 10 and 25, 1956. 217 pp.

### EXPORT SALES PROGRAM FOR COTTON

SEC. 203. In furtherance of the current policy of the Commodity Credit Corporation of offering surplus agricultural commodities for sale for export at competitive world prices, the Commodity Credit Corporation is directed to use its existing powers and authorities immediately upon the enactment of this Act to encourage the export of cotton by offering to make cotton available at prices not in excess of the level of prices at which cottons of comparable qualities are being offered in substantial quantity by other exporting countries and, in any event, for the cotton marketing year beginning August 1, 1956, at prices not in excess of the minimum prices (plus carrying charges, beginning October 1, 1956, as established pursuant to Section 407 of the Agricultural Act of 1949) at which cottons of comparable qualities were sold under the export program announced by the United States Department of Agriculture on August 12, 1955. The Commodity Credit Corporation may accept bids in excess of the maximum prices specified herein but shall not reject bids at such maximum prices unless a higher bid is received for the same cotton. Cottons of qualities not comparable

United States Information and Educational Exchange Act Amendments of 1956. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 631, S. 2410, and S. 3638. July 20, 1955, and April 17, 1956. 113 pp.

### 84th Congress, 2d Session

East-West Trade. Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part 2, March 7, 8, 9, 26, and 29, 1956. 263 pp.

Reorganization of the Passport Office. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Government Operations on S. 3340, a bill to transfer the functions of the Passport Office to a new agency of the Department of State to be known as the "United States Passport Service," to establish a Passport Service fund to finance the operations of the United States Passport Service, and for other purposes. April 13, 1956. 50 pp.

Disarmament, a Selected Chronology, January 1, 1918-March 19, 1956. Staff Study No. 2 of the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 20, 1956. 33 pp. Committee print.

Review of the United Nations Charter. Final Report of the Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to the provisions of S. Res. 126, 83d Cong., as amended by S. Res. 193, 83d Cong., and S. Res. 36 and S. Res. 83, 84th Cong. S. Rept. 1797, April 23, 1956. 37 pp.

Great Lakes Fishery Act of 1956. Report to accompany S. 3524. S. Rept. 1858, April 25, 1956. 3 pp.

Extending Greetings to the Sudan. Report to accompany H. Cou. Res. 210. H. Rept. 2053, April 25, 1956. 1 p.

Crude and Calcined Bauxite. Report to accompany H. R. 8228. H. Rept. 2064, April 25, 1956. 3 pp.

International Air Agreements. Report of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. S. Rept. 1875, April 30, 1956. 30 pp.

Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended December 31, 1955. H. Doc. 369, May 3, 1956. 37 pp.

Personnel Programs and Policies of the Federal Government in Overseas Operations. Report of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. H. Rept. 2109, May 3, 1956. 59 pp.

to those of cottons sold under the program announced on August 12, 1955, shall be offered at prices not in excess of the maximum prices prescribed hereunder for cottons of qualities comparable to those of cottons sold under such program, with appropriate adjustment for differences in quality. Such quantities of cotton shall be sold as will reestablish and maintain the fair historical share of the world market for United States cotton, said volume to be determined by the Secretary of Agriculture.

### AGREEMENTS LIMITING IMPORTS

SEC. 204. The President may, whenever he determines such action appropriate, negotiate with representatives of foreign governments in an effort to obtain agreements limiting the export from such countries and the importation into the United States of any agricultural commodity or product manufactured therefrom or textiles or textile products, and the President is authorized to issue regulations governing the entry or withdrawal from warehouse of any such commodity, product, textiles, or textile products to carry out any such agreement. Nothing herein shall affect the authority provided under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (of 1933) as amended.

## The Human Rights Commission Moves Ahead

**TWELFTH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, MARCH 5-29**

*by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord*

Programs for annual reports on human rights and for studies of specific rights were inaugurated by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights at its 12th session, held at New York from March 5 to 29, 1956. The first program provides that the Commission each year shall consider general developments, progress achieved, and difficulties encountered in the field of human rights. Its work will be based upon annual reports by member governments and on information furnished by them for the *Yearbook on Human Rights*. Under the second program the Commission established a committee of four of its members to study "the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile." This study will be based on information from member governments, the Secretary-General, the specialized agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the writings of recognized scholars and scientists. With the adoption of these two programs the Commission completed action on the three-point action program introduced by our delegation at the 1953 session. The third part, advisory services in the field of human rights, was adopted by the Commission last year and later approved by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup>

The Commission on Human Rights consists of the representatives of 18 member states, elected

by the Economic and Social Council: Australia, Chile, China, France, Greece, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States. Only one new state was represented this year, Iraq having replaced Egypt.

The Commission unanimously elected the following officers: René Cassin (France), chairman; Felixberto M. Serrano (Philippines), first vice chairman; Rudecindo Ortega (Chile), second vice chairman; and Abdul Waheed (Pakistan), rapporteur. These were the same officers as last year, except that Mr. Serrano replaced Salvador P. López (Philippines).

The U.S. delegation was composed of the following: representative, Mrs. Oswald B. Lord; principal adviser, Philip Halpern, associate justice of the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, Third Department; advisers, James Frederick Green, deputy director, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State, and Richard F. Pedersen, Economic and Social Affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

### Annual Reports

The first of the three proposals introduced by the U.S. delegation in 1953 provided for the submission of annual reports by governments on cur-

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of June 15, 1953, p. 842; Aug. 17, 1953, p. 215; and Aug. 15, 1955, p. 277.

• *Mrs. Lord is U.S. Representative on the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.*

rent developments and progress achieved in the field of human rights and for consideration of these reports by the Commission each year. The Commission at its 1953 and 1954 sessions, being preoccupied with the draft covenants, took no action on this proposal but at its 1955 session accepted it in principle as part of the work program for future sessions.

The delegations of China, Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Philippines jointly proposed that the preamble of our draft resolution include a new paragraph stating that positive steps to promote respect for human rights "can be taken without prejudice to the adoption and ratification of the covenants on human rights, including the measures of implementation provided herein, it being understood that this resolution shall be subject to review upon the coming into force of the covenants together with measures of implementation." This amendment was adopted by 17-0-1 (United States).

The Soviet delegation, in an obvious effort to embarrass the United States by references to the draft covenants, racial discrimination, and self-determination, introduced an amendment to the first operative paragraph to provide that states would also report on measures "taken to implement the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the draft international covenants on human rights, including the legislative and other measures adopted by States to combat discrimination based on race, national origin, sex or language, and also the steps taken by States responsible for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories to implement the right of self-determination." This amendment was rejected by 4 in favor (Soviet bloc-India), 11 against, with 3 abstentions (Greece, Iraq, Lebanon).

The Lebanese delegation, desiring to include a reference to self-determination without any reference to the draft covenants, proposed an amendment to include references in the first and second operative paragraphs to "rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the right of self-determination." The two references to the Universal Declaration were adopted by 15-0-3 (Australia, United Kingdom, United States), and the two references to the right of self-determination were accepted by 11 in favor to 6 against (Australia, China, France, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom), with 1 abstention (United States).

The resolution as amended was adopted by 13 to 4 (Australia, France, Turkey, United Kingdom), with 1 abstention (Norway). (For text, see annex I.) This impressive vote was most gratifying to our delegation. It resulted in part from the fact that we had made every possible effort, during the course of four sessions of the Commission and between sessions, to accommodate the views of other governments, the specialized agencies, the nongovernmental organizations, and the Secretariat. We had earnestly endeavored to have the final text—the seventh version submitted by our delegation—reflect the views of all concerned. Thanks to these extensive consultations and debates, all the Latin American and Arab-Asian delegations were able to vote for the resolution. In fact, we succeeded in meeting the technical objections of the Soviet-bloc delegations so that even they could apparently find no plausible reason for voting against the resolution. We regretted that four of the Western delegations felt obliged to vote negatively, primarily because of their strong opposition to the reference to the right of self-determination, which they felt was inappropriate and, indeed, unacceptable for the purpose of this new reporting system.

#### **Studies of Specific Rights**

At the 1953 session the U.S. delegation introduced, as the second part of its three-point action program, a draft resolution on studies of specific rights or groups of rights, to be undertaken by an expert adviser appointed by the Secretary-General. As in the case of the draft resolution on annual reports, the Commission at its 1953 and 1954 sessions did not take action on this draft resolution, but at the 1955 session it included the principle of studies in the work program for future sessions.

At this session our delegation introduced a fourth version of its draft resolution, which was considerably shortened and condensed. In particular, this draft omitted the previous detailed list of sources of information to be drawn upon by the expert adviser. This draft, like the version introduced in 1955, proposed as the first subject for study the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile. This right, taken from article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, seemed to our delegation to be particularly important and suitable for study at this time.

The streamlined draft resolution submitted at this session provided merely that the expert adviser should utilize "published material and written statements necessary for the study." Representatives of Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Philippines questioned this general provision and urged us to return to the more specific listing of sources that had appeared in the earlier drafts. To accommodate their views our delegation revised the text to provide that material should be drawn from the following sources: (i) governments of states members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, (ii) the Secretary-General, (iii) specialized agencies, (iv) nongovernmental organizations, and (v) writings of recognized scholars and scientists. The specific reference to governments of states members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies was designed to avoid any future controversy over the question whether communications should be sent to the Communist regimes controlling areas outside the United Nations system.

With regard to the method for conducting the study, our delegation argued continually, as it had in previous sessions, in favor of an independent expert adviser appointed by the Secretary-General. It became obvious, however, that even some who supported the proposal had misgivings over this procedure. They feared that an independent person, serving in his personal capacity and utilizing unofficial materials, might be unduly critical of governments. Lebanon, India, and others suggested that the study be undertaken by a committee of four members of the Commission.

Our delegation offered a compromise formula (in the form of a corrigendum to the resolution) by which the study would be undertaken by an expert adviser in consultation with the four officers of the Commission. This compromise did not satisfy other delegations, and an amendment submitted by Greece, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines, providing for a Committee of Four to be elected by the Commission, was adopted by 9 in favor, 2 against (United Kingdom, United States), with 7 abstentions.

The Commission also adopted an amendment—proposed by Chile, China, Lebanon, Pakistan, and the Philippines—to add to the preamble a paragraph stating that certain positive steps to promote human rights can be taken without prejudice to the adoption and ratification of the Covenants

on Human Rights, including the measures of implementation provided therein. This paragraph was adopted by 14-0-4 (United States, Soviet bloc). To make this draft resolution conform to the one on annual reports in another respect, our delegation revised the text to state that any comments resulting from studies should be "of an objective and general character."

During the course of this debate our delegation submitted four revisions (including the corrigendum mentioned earlier) of its draft resolution, which was the fourth version of the text originally introduced in 1953. Thus, the final text as adopted was the eighth in this series, incorporating a wide variety of amendments, comments, and suggestions over the past 3 years. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 11 in favor, 3 against, (Soviet bloc), with 4 abstentions (Australia, France, Mexico, United Kingdom). (For text, see annex II.)

Toward the end of the session the Commission elected the representatives of the following four states to form the Committee of Four: Chile, Norway, Pakistan, and the Philippines. Although this first study still requires the approval of the Economic and Social Council at its session in July-August, the Committee held an organizational meeting and elected Mr. Serrano (Philippines) as chairman-rapporteur.

#### **Advisory Services**

Last year the Commission adopted a resolution on advisory services, which constituted one part of the U.S. action program. This resolution was subsequently approved by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly, which consolidated all of the previous resolutions on advisory services with regard to freedom of information, status of women, and discrimination and minorities. The resolution provided that the Secretary-General should report regularly to the Commission, and his first report was before the Commission at this session. Meanwhile the sub-commission had transmitted to the Commission a draft resolution requesting the Secretary-General to consult with governments about the possibility of arranging for seminars in the field of discrimination and minorities.

Mr. Serrano, with my support, suggested that the Commission could save time by dealing with both aspects of the question of advisory services. A draft resolution was circulated by Mexico, Pak-

istan, the Philippines, and the United States, which noted that the General Assembly had authorized three kinds of assistance—advisory services, fellowships and scholarships, and seminars—and noted the emphasis given to seminars by reports of both the Secretary-General and the subcommission. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to explore, in consultation with governments and specialized agencies and in accordance with the General Assembly resolution, with a reference to a paragraph dealing with nongovernmental organizations, the desirability of holding seminars in the field of human rights, especially with regard to the prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities. This draft resolution, which incorporated a number of subjects made during the debate, provoked little controversy. In introducing the resolution I read a telegram received from our delegation to the Commission on the Status of Women, meeting at Geneva, which quoted a resolution on advisory services just adopted by that Commission on the use of seminars in the field of political rights; and our joint draft resolution made reference to that resolution.

The joint draft resolution was adopted by 14-0-4 (Australia, Chile, China, United Kingdom).<sup>2</sup> Australia and the United Kingdom abstained because of their continuing skepticism about this subject; Chile, because it considered that the Commission had not yet given adequate attention to the report of the subcommission; and China, because it felt that special emphasis on the use of seminars was premature at this time.

#### **“Other Questions”**

When the Commission rearranged the provisional agenda, P. D. Morosov (U.S.S.R.) suggested that under item 3, “Development of the Work of the United Nations,” there be added a subitem, “(d) Other questions.” Mr. Morosov subsequently introduced two draft resolutions, one proposing that the Commission add the Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Child to the agenda for the next session and the other inviting the subcommission to prepare at its 1957 session “a draft international convention prohibiting discrimination in education on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other

beliefs, nationality or social origin, property or other status.”

Mr. Morosov stressed the importance of preventing discrimination in education, the need for a separate convention on this subject, and the desirability of speeding up the preparation of such a convention. Our delegation and others argued that the report on this subject was still before the subcommission, which had yet to submit recommendations to the Commission. In the light of these objections Mr. Morosov withdrew his draft resolutions.

The Soviet draft resolution proposing that the Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Child be added to the agenda for next year was adopted by 18-0-0. A French resolution proposing that the right of asylum be added to the agenda was adopted by 15-0-2 (Australia, United Kingdom), with Lebanon absent. The Australian and United Kingdom delegations abstained because they doubted whether it would be useful to debate this subject in view of the widely differing positions taken by member governments.

Our delegation and the Mexican delegation joined in sponsoring a draft resolution concerning the 10th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Our two delegations pointed out that this anniversary would fall on December 10, 1958, and that early preparation would be required if the date were to be properly celebrated. Our joint draft resolution proposed that the Commission appoint a committee consisting of its four officers to prepare the necessary plans, in consultation with the Secretary-General, the appropriate authorities of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and other specialized agencies, and interested nongovernmental organizations.

The resolution was adopted by 16-0-1 (Iraq).<sup>3</sup> The Iraqi representative explained that he had abstained because of the fact that human rights were being flagrantly violated in the Near East.

#### **Membership of the Subcommission**

The Commission was required to take a decision on the membership of the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, as the 3-year terms of the present 12 members would expire at the end of 1956. There

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN. 4/728.

<sup>3</sup> U. N. doc. E/CN. 4/729.

appeared to be a consensus that the present membership would be reelected for another 3-year term. I pointed out, however, the importance of eventually including in the subcommission nationals from some of the 16 new member states. In view of the fact that Max Sorensen (Denmark) had stated that he could no longer serve in the subcommission, the Commission extended the term of office of the other 11 members to December 31, 1959, and later elected Vieno Voitto Saario (Finland) to fill the vacancy.

Mr. Ortega (Chile) introduced a draft resolution proposing that the membership of the subcommission be increased from 12 to 15 to provide for experts from some of the 16 new member states. Our delegation and others, while agreeing that such experts should at some time be included in the subcommission, urged that no action be taken until a decision had been reached about the future size of the Economic and Social Council and of its functional commissions. An Australian motion to adjourn the debate on the Chilean resolution was adopted by 13 to 3 (Chile, Greece, India), with 1 abstention (Pakistan).

#### **Report of the Subcommission**

Many aspects of the report of the eighth session of the subcommission were discussed, but action was taken on only two specific points—the geographic scope of the studies being undertaken by the subcommission and the calling of another conference of nongovernmental organizations.

Serious controversy had developed in the subcommission in January 1956 over the geographic scope of the projected studies in discrimination. The terms of reference, approved by the Commission, provided that these studies should be "on a global basis." The special rapporteur on discrimination in education had requested the Secretary-General to send a communication to the Chinese Communists requesting information. The Secretary-General initially declined to send such a communication, but later in the session of the subcommission he indicated that he would transmit a communication on request from the special rapporteur. Similar questions had already arisen with regard to communications to East Germany and might arise in connection with North Korea, North Viet-Nam, and Outer Mongolia.

In order to solve this problem our delegation, together with China and the Philippines, submitted a draft resolution specifying that the studies of

the subcommission should relate to states members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies. The resolution also dealt with other aspects of the subcommission's report and provided that the Commission would take note of it "with appreciation." The resolution was adopted by 11 in favor, 3 against (Soviet bloc), with 4 abstentions (Australia, India, Iraq, Lebanon).

In the spring of 1955 a Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations Interested in the Eradication of Prejudice and Discrimination was held at Geneva under United Nations auspices. The conference was attended by representatives of 97 nongovernmental organizations and chaired by a former President of France, Vincent Auriol. The conference was widely regarded as a useful undertaking, and its recommendations were considered by the subcommission last January. A proposal that a second conference be held was submitted to the Commission by 18 of the nongovernmental organizations.

The French delegation introduced a draft resolution calling the attention of the Economic and Social Council to the recommendation of the conference that a second conference on discrimination be convened, if possible, within 2 years. The draft resolution was subsequently revised to request that the nongovernmental organizations state their views on the date, duration, program, objectives, and methods of this second conference, so that the subcommission and the Commission might consider these views at their 1957 sessions. The recommendations of these two organs would then be considered by the Council. This revised text was adopted by 15-0-1 (Pakistan), with Iraq and Lebanon absent.<sup>4</sup>

#### **Significance of Session**

This session was in many ways the most successful of the four I have attended as United States representative. There seemed to be a general desire for cooperation and for reconciliation of differing views. In contrast to their cold-war tactics in the past, the three Soviet-bloc delegations refrained from making propaganda attacks against the West. Most important, the Commission agreed to move ahead along lines of practical action—to consider each year the progress achieved in the field of human rights, based upon reports from governments, to make a thorough study of

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN.4/730.

one right or group of rights at a time, and to provide for advisory services upon request of governments. The Commission agreed, in effect, that these activities were supplementary to the draft covenants, on which it had devoted so much time in the past, and should go forward while the draft covenants are still before the General Assembly.

As I stated during one of the debates at this session:<sup>5</sup> "The United States views with concern the violations of human rights in many parts of the world—violations that are accepted by some countries as part of their political and social systems. We feel, as many other delegations do, that this Commission has a responsibility to do all it can to further human rights throughout the world, to use every means possible—education, exchange of information, public opinion—to further human rights. We also realize that many countries are struggling under difficulties and would benefit by an exchange of ideas and discussions with other countries. It is in this spirit of sincerely wishing to see progress in the field of human rights that the United States has put forward its action program. This is a practical program designed simply to establish a wider observance of and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world. . . .

"There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that no matter how modestly we start in this program of advisory services, objective reporting, and special studies, it will be a program welcomed throughout the world, a program that can grow with time and be progressively helpful to all of our countries."

## ANNEX I—RESOLUTION ON ANNUAL REPORTS

U.N. doc. E/CN. 4/726

### *The Commission on Human Rights,*

*Considering* that by Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter the Members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to take joint and separate action to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

*Considering* that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets forth the goals toward which all Member States of the United Nations should strive, both by their own efforts and through international co-operation, in the promotion of human rights,

*Desiring* to advance as rapidly as possible respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms and to stimulate Governments of Member States

to press forward toward attaining the goals set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

*Convinced* that certain positive steps to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms can be taken without prejudice to the adoption and ratification of the covenants on human rights, including the measures of implementation provided therein, it being understood that this resolution shall be subject to review upon the coming into force of the covenants together with measures of implementation,

*Desiring* to obtain from each Member State of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies information on developments and progress achieved in the field of human rights and measures taken to safeguard human liberty in its metropolitan area and trust and non-self-governing territories, with a view to learning the results obtained and difficulties encountered in their work for the wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world,

*Having adopted* as part of its programme of future work the consideration of general developments and progress achieved in the field of human rights and measures taken to safeguard human liberty, taking into account information furnished for publication in the Yearbook on Human Rights, and additional reports from Member States and from specialized agencies pursuant to the terms of any further specific resolution with respect to reports adopted by the Commission,

*Bearing in mind* the special responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies in the promotion of human rights and the facilities the latter may have for obtaining necessary information from their Member States,

1. *Decides* to consider general developments and progress achieved in the field of human rights and measures taken to safeguard human liberty in States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies relating to the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to the right of peoples to self-determination, taking into account information furnished for publication in the Yearbook on Human Rights and the additional reports from Member States and from specialized agencies referred to hereinafter; and to transmit to the Economic and Social Council such comments, conclusions and recommendations of an objective and general character, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the information and reports, as it deems appropriate;

2. *Recommends* that the Economic and Social Council request that each Member State of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies transmit annually to the Secretary-General a report describing developments and progress achieved in the field of human rights and measures taken to safeguard human liberty in its metropolitan area and trust and non-self-governing territories, such report to deal with the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the right of peoples to self-determination and to supplement the information furnished for publication in the Yearbook on Human Rights and to make reference to any relevant portions of reports already submitted to another organ of the United Nations or to a specialized agency;

<sup>5</sup> U.S./U.N. press release 2367 dated Mar. 8, 1956.

3. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to call the attention of each Member State to the advisability of setting up an advisory body, composed of experienced and competent persons, to assist their Government in the preparation of its report;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare a brief summary of the reports upon a topical basis;

5. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to invite the specialized agencies, in respect of rights coming within their purview, to transmit annually to the Secretary-General a report on a topical basis summarizing the information which they receive from their Member States, and to co-operate in the full realization of the aim set forth in this resolution.

## **ANNEX II—RESOLUTION ON STUDIES OF SPECIFIC RIGHTS**

U.N. doc. E/CN. 4/727

### *The Commission on Human Rights,*

*Considering* that by Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter the Members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to take joint and separate action to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

*Considering* that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets forth goals toward which all States Members of the United Nations should strive, both by their own efforts and through international co-operation, in the promotion of human rights,

*Desiring* to strengthen the work of the United Nations for wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms,

*Convinced* that certain positive steps to promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms can be taken without prejudice to the adoption and ratification of the covenants on human rights, including the measures of implementation provided therein,

*Having adopted* as a part of its programme of future work, the undertaking of studies of specific rights or groups of rights, stressing general developments, progress achieved, and measures taken to safeguard human liberty, with such recommendations as may be necessary,

*Recognizing* that such studies are necessary for the purpose of ascertaining the existing conditions, the results obtained, and the difficulties encountered in the work of States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies for the wider observance of, and respect for, human rights and fundamental freedoms,

*Bearing in mind* the special responsibilities of the specialized agencies as regards certain human rights,

#### *1. Decides*

(a) To undertake studies of specific rights or groups of rights in States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies and to stress in these studies general developments, progress achieved and measures taken to safeguard human liberty, with such recommendations of an objective and general character as may be necessary; and

(b) To select, subject to the approval of the Economic and Social Council, specific subjects for study, provided that no subject shall be selected which can more appropriately be studied by another organ of the United Nations or by a specialized agency;

2. *Decides* to appoint a committee of the Commission consisting of four members to be elected by the Commission, which shall,

(a) Prepare the study, bearing in mind the terms of sub-paragraph (a) of operative paragraph 1 hereof, with such assistance from the Secretariat as it may require, utilizing published material and written statements necessary for the study, such material to be drawn from the following sources: (i) governments of States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, (ii) the Secretary-General, (iii) specialized agencies, (iv) non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship with the Economic and Social Council, and (v) writings of recognized scholars and scientists;

(b) Proceed with the work of the study with a view to submitting a preliminary report at the session of the Commission following its appointment and, if possible, a complete report at the succeeding session;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to assist the committee in the study;

4. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to invite the States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies, in transmitting the reports requested under the resolution on annual reports, to deal in particular with the right or groups of rights currently selected for study under the terms of this resolution;

5. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to invite the specialized agencies and the non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship with the Economic and Social Council to co-operate in carrying out this resolution; and

6. *Decides* to select, subject to the approval of the Economic and Social Council, as its first subject for study the right of everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile.

## **Teaching About the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies**

*Statement by Richard F. Pedersen*<sup>1</sup>

The importance of an informed world opinion about the United Nations cannot be underestimated. The distinguished delegate from Indonesia [Aris Munandar] brought out in his opening remarks the significance which was attached to this informed world opinion by the founding fathers of this organization. We can be pleased that such a large number of countries have replied to the

<sup>1</sup> Made in the U.N. Economic and Social Council on Apr. 26 (U.S./U.N. press release 2407 dated May 3). Mr. Pedersen was adviser on the U.S. delegation to the Council.



inquiry from the Secretary-General and the Director-General of UNESCO on the work being done in their own countries in spreading information about the United Nations. Over 40 countries have replied. If our significant role as a world forum is to be understood by the peoples of the world, and if we are to have their support, they must have the greatest amount of knowledge possible.

The reports, of course, do not reveal as great an amount of information as we would have desired, and we hope that by the time the next report is made there will be further significant progress in the knowledge of United Nations documents and in the discussion of the United Nations among people around the world.

Like the United Kingdom, the United States has a decentralized school system. Responsibility for curricula, for direction of the schools, and for financing school operations is in the hands of State and local authorities. There is also a great deal of private education in the United States and a great deal of voluntary effort, both at the adult level and in extracurricular activities in schools, through which knowledge about the United Nations is made available. This has been one of the strengths of our own school system, inasmuch as it relies upon local initiative and educated interest of great importance among the people themselves. The significant amount of interest in the school systems of the United States about the United Nations does not stem from Government direction or from pressure by the Government but stems out of the desires of the people of the United States to learn and understand the United Nations.

This decentralization, of course, does cause some difficulties when we attempt to obtain information to report to the United Nations on what is being done in our schools. Accordingly, when we were requested to prepare the report reflected in the document before us,<sup>2</sup> the Office of Education in Washington had to make a special effort to collect the information. The time available for the preparation of the material was very short, but inquiries were addressed to the chief school officers

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<sup>2</sup> *Teaching of the Purposes and Principles, the Structure and Activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in Schools and Educational Institutions of Member States: Report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director-General of UNESCO*, U.N. doc. E/2837 dated Mar. 16, 1956.

in all of our States and territories, asking their cooperation in gathering information from schools at all levels of instruction. Similar letters were sent to private institutions, and approximately a thousand additional inquiries were issued from Washington, while some States, county and district superintendents distributed inquiries to schools under their authority. Furthermore, contact was made by letter or personal interview with the United States National Commission for UNESCO, officers of national organizations such as the Foreign Policy Association, 56 local Councils on World Affairs, the American Association for the United Nations, the National Education Association, and the United States Committee for the United Nations. We received a very large response, which was enormously gratifying, both in substance and as evidence that people in every part of the United States feel responsibility for their children learning the facts about the United Nations system.

#### **Evidence of Growing Interest**

One of the most significant results of the compilation of material was evidence of the growing understanding and interest in the United Nations. A few examples may suffice to demonstrate this. In 1955, 49 Governors appointed a State or territorial chairman for commemoration of United Nations Day. In 1952, there were 12. In 1955, there were 1,500 local committees appointed for United Nations Day, whereas in 1952 there were only 297. In 1955, there were United Nations Day observances of some kind in 10,000 communities, whereas in 1952 there were observances in slightly over 5,000. Even in requests for literature which have been addressed to the United States Committee for the United Nations there has been a similar increase, reaching, in 1955, 41,000 requests from a total in 1952 of 18,000. This indicates the growing awareness of the activities of the United Nations and interest in learning about them throughout the country.

Another interesting result which came out of the inquiries was that a great deal of the interest in teaching and learning about the United Nations centers around special days. United Nations Day and Week, Human Rights Day, and the "tricks or treats" program of UNICEF are particularly mentioned as events around which educational and voluntary organization authorities direct their efforts in learning about the United Nations.

A great number of techniques are utilized in educational efforts about the United Nations, and they have been developed at all levels of the educational process—in the elementary schools, in the secondary schools, in the universities, in adult education, and even in preschool education. I would like to give just one example of the types of programs available, based on the report from the State of New York: While interdependence of peoples and nations is stressed in each year of the elementary school program, special attention to the United Nations as an organization for world peace is accorded it in the programs of the fifth and sixth grades in New York State. A number of techniques are employed to make the study effective: (1) Panel discussions are held in classes on "The United Nations—Success or Failure"; (2) pupils make reports on such subjects as the control of nuclear weapons; (3) schematic charts are made; (4) pupils write "who's who" accounts of personalities in the United Nations (perhaps about someone sitting at this table); (5) charts are drawn showing the similarities and differences of the League of Nations and the United Nations; (6) films telling of the work of the United Nations in resolving disputes are shown to help drive home points in the study; (7) classes consider conflicting statements made about the United Nations and the role of the organization.

A great many other techniques have been used. One of the most significant of these is the system of model General Assemblies, which has been very widely used in the United States. The United Nations Public Information Department assists approximately 40 such Assemblies every year in the United States by providing materials and information about United Nations activities. Many other special events are also held. Frequently classes study other countries to learn about their systems of government, their habits, their mores, and their position in the world. The approach often used is an historical approach or a problem approach on questions with which the United Nations is dealing. One of the most significant programs, which has been carried forward over a period of years, has been the essay contest on the United Nations. In 1955, over 3,280 schools participated in this program, the winners of which received free trips to the United Nations to see it in operation. I should not close this part of our comments without mentioning the fact that as part of the 1954 conference of the National Education

Association, which brings together outstanding teachers from all over the United States, over 4,000 teachers spent several days at the United Nations Headquarters learning about the United Nations program.

#### Availability of Materials

One of the matters which is covered by the joint resolution presented by Ecuador, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States,<sup>3</sup> and which has been an important aspect of the Council's discussions, is the question of availability of materials for use in schools and in nongovernmental organizations and otherwise. American educational authorities, as reflected in their reports to the Federal Government, have revealed that a number of useful information materials are already available.

Various publications in the United States are used in schools, among which were mentioned *My Weekly Reader*, *Our Times*, and *Junior and Senior Scholastic* as being magazines which carry materials on the United Nations and in October frequently carry full issues specifically dealing with United Nations activities. Other materials of interest were the *United Nations Review*, the *Handbook on the United Nations*, and the *UNESCO Courier*.

At the same time, it was demonstrated that there is a need for further materials graded to various age levels for appropriate use by local authorities. Anecdotal material, folklore, films, and other matters were mentioned. There were a number of specific suggestions about the types of material that would be welcome. Not only teachers, but Scout leaders, Sunday School teachers, librarians, and other youth leaders are constantly in search of inexpensive and attractive pamphlets written specifically for children in the elementary grades. At the elementary and intermediate levels, there is a need for graphically illustrated, informative, simply worded books and booklets. They should be of a size convenient to handle and colorful in design. Concise, accurate, and lively presentations of the basic facts about the United Nations and the specialized agencies, written with the average teen-ager in mind, also would be useful. This was the type of comment which was received on the availability of materials.

Now, if I may turn to the role which the United

<sup>3</sup> U.N. doc. E/L.708 dated Apr. 25.

Nations might play. It has already been brought out by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom [R. D. J. Scott Fox] that, inasmuch as responsibility for education rests with local authorities in many countries and not with the central government, it is obvious that we should not and could not seek to pass any responsibility to deal with educational problems to international organizations. This, indeed, has already been made clear in paragraph 315 of the Secretary-General's report, i. e., that the writing, publication, and distribution of teaching materials in the final form in which they are to be used in schools is a domestic responsibility and that neither the United Nations nor UNESCO has the authority nor the desire to interfere in any way with the educational systems of member states.

On the other hand, there is a need for material directed to various age levels that can be used by nongovernmental organizations, educational authorities, teachers, or other youth leaders, insofar as they may find it possible and desirable. Therefore, this resolution, as has been brought out by the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, suggests that this type of material on United Nations work might be prepared by the United Nations.

#### **Emphasis on Study**

I would also like to comment briefly, if I may, on the paragraph of the resolution which invites governments of member states to encourage in their educational institutions, through appropriate means, the study of the United Nations and specialized agencies and the participation of their country therein. I would like to stress two things: First, the *study* of the United Nations. In spite of the fact that it is desirable to have as much information on the United Nations system available as possible, it is not our purpose here, and should not be our purpose, to indoctrinate or to propagandize children, adults, or anyone for the United Nations. It is the feeling of the United States that the greater the amount of information that can be made available, good or bad, about successes or failures, the greater will be the possibility of further developing an educated public opinion which will adequately support United Nations activities. The resolution, therefore, asks for *study* of the United Nations.

Second, the resolution also brings out that the encouragement which governments should give to

this education should be *as appropriate* according to the constitutional arrangements of each government. This is done to accommodate to the various systems of government and particularly those of countries which have a decentralized system. There are definite limitations on the action which a federal government such as that of the United States can take in connection with educational activities.

The role of nongovernmental organizations is also mentioned in the resolution because they are so significant in the United Nations. Here again we would agree with the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom that perhaps the main role of the nongovernmental organizations, particularly those in consultative status, is to establish contact between the United Nations and the public and to spread information about the activities of our organization. We look in particular to the role which the World Federation of United Nations Associations can play in disseminating information about United Nations activities around the world.

Finally, one brief comment about the new report which the resolution suggests for consideration in 1960, and this is a technical comment. The United States Government would appreciate, in such a report, if the cutoff date on the period to be covered could be established somewhat earlier than was the case in connection with the present report. If we are to consider this report in 1960, for instance, it might be possible to have a final date of coverage of the report set in the middle of 1959, so that governments could have the request to prepare material earlier and would have a fuller opportunity to consult appropriate educational authorities to obtain material.

The report before us is an important advance, but it is only a step on the way. Four years from now we hope that every member of the United Nations can be represented in the report and that the scope of activity will expand as more and more people learn about the United Nations and share their information with others.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> On Apr. 26 the Council unanimously adopted L.708 as amended (E/Res(XXI)/9 dated May 3) noting the increased interest reported from all areas in learning about the United Nations; commending the nongovernmental organizations for their valuable contribution to disseminating such information; inviting member governments to encourage the study of the U.N. and the specialized agencies; and requesting the Secretary-General, in collaboration with UNESCO, to compile a similar report on the subject for consideration by the Council in 1960.

## U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Directing Council, Pan American Institute of Geography and History

The Department of State announced on May 25 (press release 283) that Robert H. Randall, Assistant on Cartography, Resources and Civil Works Division, Bureau of the Budget, who is also U.S. representative on the Commission of Cartography of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History, will represent the U.S. Government at the first meeting of the Directing Council of the Institute at Mexico City, May 28-June 4, 1956.

The Directing Council, which has been established pursuant to a decision of the 6th General Assembly of the PAIGH (Mexico City, June 25-August 6, 1955), is responsible for the administrative aspects of the work of the Institute during the periods between the quadrennial sessions of the General Assembly and for formulation of the annual program and approval of the budget. It is composed of representatives of all the American Republics.

### TREATY INFORMATION

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Aviation

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* United States, May 22, 1956.

#### North Atlantic Treaty

Agreement on status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national representatives and international staff. Done at Ottawa September 20, 1951. Entered into force May 18, 1954. TIAS 2992.

*Signature:* Federal Republic of Germany, May 29, 1956.

#### Postal Services

Universal postal convention, with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air-

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

mail and final protocol thereto. Signed at Brussels July 11, 1952. Entered into force July 1, 1953. TIAS 2800.

*Ratification deposited:* Syria, May 4, 1956.

### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.

*Ratifications deposited:* Czechoslovakia (with reservation), April 17, 1956; Austria, April 20, 1956.

## BILATERAL

### China

Agreement for disposition of equipment and materials furnished by the United States and no longer required by the Republic of China. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei April 3, 1956. Entered into force April 3, 1956.

### Honduras

Agreement for performance by members of Army and Air Force Missions of duties specified in article V of the military assistance agreement of May 20, 1954 (TIAS 2975). Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa April 17 and 25, 1956. Entered into force April 26, 1956.

### Peru

Surplus agricultural commodities agreement pursuant to title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Lima May 7, 1956. Entered into force May 7, 1956.

### Uruguay

Agreement for disposition of equipment and materials furnished by the United States under the military assistance agreement of June 30, 1952 (TIAS 2778), and no longer required by Uruguay. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo June 1 and September 16, 1955. Entered into force September 16, 1955.

### Yugoslavia

Agreement providing for reciprocal customs privileges for consular officers. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 21, 1956. Enters into force 2 weeks following date of a written notification from the Government of Yugoslavia that it has been ratified.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on May 29 confirmed Theodore C. Achilles to be Ambassador to Peru.

The Senate on May 29 confirmed Ellis O. Briggs to be Ambassador to Brazil.

The Senate on May 29 confirmed Walter C. Dowling to be Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

The Senate on May 29 confirmed J. Graham Parsons to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Laos.

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**American Republics.** Directing Council, Pan American Institute of Geography and History . . . . . 994

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.  
 Press release issued prior to May 28 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 283 of May 25.

No.	Date	Subject
†284	5/28	Delegation to Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems (rewrite).
285	5/28	U.S.-Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway discussions.
286	5/29	Discussions on U.S.-U.K. telegraph services.
287	5/31	Murphy: testimony on mutual security.
288	5/31	U.N. Command statement in Korean Military Armistice Commission.
289	5/31	Robertson: Progress in Free Viet-Nam.
290	5/31	Hoover: Petroleum Imports.
*291	5/31	Educational exchange.
*292	6/1	Educational exchange.

\*Not printed.  
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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**U.S. Policy in the Near East,  
South Asia, and Africa—1955**

The year 1955 witnessed no lessening of American interest in the countries and peoples of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, and it brought no end to the difficult and complicated problems which have come to the United States from this vital part of the world. On the contrary, the old, basic issues, involving the resurgent and often strident nationalism of the peoples of the area, the problem of self-determination or "colonialism," and questions of the economic development of underdeveloped countries still persisted 10 years after the end of the Second World War. In addition, important individual problems such as the Arab-Israel controversy, Cyprus, and French North Africa have also remained as matters of American concern, whether directly or otherwise, because of the position of the United States as one of the leaders of the free world.

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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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# The Cost of Peace

*Address by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>*

Each one of you is going out into a world where you hope to enjoy in peace the blessings of liberty.

That is the kind of a world which United States foreign policy tries to provide.

Today we have peace; no nation is at war with the United States.

Also, we have many blessings. We have good relations with most of the nations of the world. We do not fear them nor do they fear us. We trade with each other and our peoples visit back and forth, all to our mutual profit and enjoyment.

For that peace, and for those blessings that we enjoy, we can be profoundly grateful.

But all of this is not to be had for nothing. Others before you have gone out into the world with eager hopes. But those hopes ended on the field of battle. And those at home were heavy of heart. And the means for economic well-being were dissipated in the wastages of war.

That kind of a price, paid in the coin of war, will always be paid unless men are willing, in time of peace, to pay to preserve peace.

That lesson seems never to be learned. The illusion constantly persists that peace is to be had merely by wanting it. If that were true, war would have been abolished many centuries ago. The fact is that to keep peace is as hard, indeed harder, than to win a war. Wars have been won. But lasting peace has never yet been won. To win a final victory over war will take planning and action that is farsighted, well calculated, courageous, and at times sacrificial. Such sacrifice will be required under conditions less dramatic and apparently less urgent than those of war. But peace will never be enduring as long as men reserve for war their finest qualities of mind and spirit. Peace, too, has its price.

<sup>1</sup>Made at commencement exercises at Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa June 9 (press release 307 dated June 8).

I want to illustrate that in terms of one phase of the peace effort our Nation is now making. It could be described as a peace insurance policy, and it costs about \$40 billion a year.

## **Our Peace Insurance Policy**

The basic elements of this peace insurance policy are drawn from early and successful American foreign policy. We go back to the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1823 President Monroe proclaimed to the despotic alliance then headed by Czarist Russia that "we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety" and that we would not "behold such interposition in any form with indifference."

It was indeed farsighted and bold for our young Nation thus to identify its own self-interest with the fate of freedom thousands of miles away. Yet the pronouncement of that principle, Webster recorded, was greeted with "one general glow of exultation."

That principle has now been extended. Its broadest application is found in the United Nations Charter. But because veto power makes United Nations action undependable, many nations have made with each other treaties which embody the principle of the Monroe Doctrine. Within the last 10 years the United States, always acting in a bipartisan manner, has made such treaties with 42 countries of America, Europe, and Asia.

These treaties abolish, as between the parties, the principle of neutrality, which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it

is an immoral and shortsighted conception. The free world today is stronger, and peace is more secure, because so many free nations courageously recognize the now demonstrated fact that their own peace and safety would be endangered by assault on freedom elsewhere.

However, it is not enough under present conditions for the free nations merely to proclaim their purpose to stand together. There is need for forces-in-being to give authority to those words.

At the outset of World War I and World War II, the United States had little military strength in being. In the case of the Korean War, our initial strength was inadequate. But on these past occasions the conditions of warfare gave us time within which to build up our strength.

But since then, man's capacity to destroy has suddenly expanded to a degree that passes comprehension. Today, a single bomb can release destructive power equal to that used in the 5 years of World War II. Potential enemies could destroy so much, so quickly, if initially unopposed, that we dare not gamble on developing military power after an attack has occurred. To deter aggression, to prevent miscalculation, we need not only to warn but to back that warning by forces-in-being which include retaliatory striking power. That is why our peace insurance policy is so expensive.

The cost of our United States military establishment, at home and abroad, is about \$36 billion a year. That is about 90 percent of the total of a little over \$40 billion a year which our peace insurance policy costs.

The other 10 percent, roughly \$4 billion, goes to promote strength in other lands under our mutual security program. I want to discuss that program and explain why it is part of our total peace insurance policy.

I shall be speaking in terms of expected expenditures. But to keep going at this rate we shall for next year need an appropriation larger than expected expenditures, because the appropriation for this year is less than current expenditures by about \$1 billion.

#### **The Far East**

The largest expenditures under our mutual security program are in the Pacific and Far East. They help strengthen countries with which we have collective defense treaties. This area is today under obvious hostile pressure.

In Korea there is an armistice. But the Chinese Communists have never been willing to make a peace which would unify Korea through free elections held under the auspices of the United Nations. So hostile armed forces face each other across an armistice line.

In Taiwan (Formosa), where the Republic of China now has its home, there is the constant menace of war. The Chinese Communist regime persistently refuses to make a meaningful renunciation of force covering this area.

Then there is Viet-Nam, where again there is an armistice but no formal peace.

I have already pointed out that we have, by treaties, solemnly recognized that an armed attack in these areas would be dangerous to our own peace and security. And Congress, with only four dissenting votes, has authorized the President to use United States forces to defend Taiwan (Formosa) if he deems it necessary. But we do not want it to be necessary to fight to save freedom in these areas. Our purpose is to deter war. So we give military and financial aid to enable the free governments there to maintain their own armed forces to an extent which we and they judge reasonably related to the threat of aggression and our coordinated plans to prevent it.

We expect next year to spend about \$1.5 billion for military aid and defense-support assistance in this area. It goes mostly to the Republics of Korea and China and to the three nations of Indochina. There are lesser amounts for other area allies—the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan.

#### **The Middle East**

Let me turn now to the Middle East. This area produces the oil required for the industry of Western Europe and for the military establishment of NATO. If this were unavailable, it would involve tragedy for the producing countries, which are largely dependent upon the oil royalties. Also, it would require us to share with Europe the oil resources of this hemisphere, and there would be scarcity instead of plenty.

So we assist those four Middle East countries which hold the gateway to the south where the oil reserves are located; and just beyond is the gateway to Africa.

The estimate of expenditure for military aid and defense support for these countries in the next year is in the neighborhood of \$800 million.

## NATO

I turn next to Western Europe. There the military forces of NATO stand guard over the greatest industrial and military treasure that there is within the free world except for the United States itself. So important do we consider this area that nearly six divisions of the United States Armed Forces are stationed in Western Europe for its defense. The European members of NATO themselves make a large contribution to the defense of the area. However, we help by supplying them with certain types of weapons, the cost of which is in our mutual security budget.

We help to support West Berlin as a symbol of freedom behind the Iron Curtain. We are developing bases in Spain, and this involves substantial costs. We also think it prudent to help Yugoslavia, so long as it remains determined to maintain genuine independence. It does not have the form of society that we like. But Marshal Tito defied Moscow and won out. And even though that struggle is today calmed, Yugoslavia provides a notable example of national independence in Eastern Europe.

This European aspect of the mutual security program involves an estimated cost for next year of approximately \$1 billion.

The expenditures I have described are designed to make secure, at minimum cost to us, countries whose safety is part of our own safety. The resultant widespread, interlocking system of security provides, as a valuable byproduct, diversified locations around the globe from which we and our allies could strike back at an aggressor if he struck any of us. Diversification, in this respect, is immensely valuable; for launching facilities limited to a single area could be wiped out by an initial assault. Also, the present system enables less expensive planes with shorter range to carry out missions which otherwise would require far more costly planes.

Thus, these expenditures serve our peace and our safety.

### Economic Aid

There remains about \$700 million to be accounted for, or about 2 percent of our total peace insurance cost. This is so-called economic aid. The primary purpose is to help newly independent nations and less developed countries to maintain their independence, as against the plotting of international communism.

As the Caracas Resolution pointed out in relation to this hemisphere, if international communism obtains control of the political institutions of any nation, that endangers peace and security elsewhere. This portion of the mutual security program offsets efforts by hostile forces to expand their power by gaining new human and material resources and new strategic locations. But it has a broader justification.

The United States has far and away the most highly developed economy of any nation in the world. Our productivity almost equals that of all the rest of the world put together.

Always the economically developed nations have helped less developed countries to develop. We were helped from Europe when we were beginning to develop this continent. That is a law of social life and we cannot violate it except at our peril.

The burden on us is lessened by the fact that a considerable part of our economic assistance goes in the form of surplus agricultural products. Also, upwards of \$200 million takes the form of repayable loans, not gifts.

The importance of this economic part of our peace insurance policy is emphasized by the fact that the Soviet Union is now pushing its own interests by means of credits extended to other countries.

The new Communist tactics make it more than ever imperative that we should continue, and perhaps enlarge, the economic phase of our mutual security program. It would indeed be ironical if we should drop out of that field just at the time when the Soviet Union is moving into it.

These programs which I have described—\$36 billion, plus \$3.3 billion, plus \$700 million—make up the grand total of about \$40 billion, which is the annual cost of our peace insurance policy. As to the \$36 billion spent on our own military establishment, there are differences of opinion as to *how* it shall be spent. But few deny that this much money should be spent. There is more controversy about the \$4 billion which is used, in ways I have described, under our mutual security program.

I should like now to answer some questions about that.

### No "Give Away"

First of all, is this a "give away" program, whereby Americans are taxed merely to aid foreigners?

Emphatically no. I hope what I have said al-

ready makes that clear. It is quite true that the mutual security money does help others. But no program can properly be labeled "give away" merely because it helps others. Often by helping others we help ourselves more effectively than we could do in any other way. That is the case with our mutual security program. It makes our freedom safer by creating an environment of freedom. The decisive reason for each item of expense is our own enlightened self-interest.

Let me be specific and emphatic on this point of motivation: not a single dollar is sought for this program for any reason other than an American reason. Our Nation has recognized, since its infancy, that liberty elsewhere was vital to our own peace and safety. When that liberty has been jeopardized by war, we have gone into war to save it. That is the most costly way to protect ourselves. We hope now to protect ourselves in less costly ways. That is the reason for our mutual security program.

#### **Not Buying Gratitude**

Is our foreign aid wasted because the recipients are not grateful enough or not subservient to our views? No, because we do not seek either gratitude or subservience. We know that gratitude can never be bought, and we do not spend taxpayers' money on the folly of such an effort. Neither do we seek or want subservience. Our policies command wide respect abroad because of their intrinsic merit. But the success of our foreign aid program is to be tested not by gratitude, not by subservience, but by whether it makes more vigorous the freedoms elsewhere that buttress the freedom of ourselves. By that test, our program works.

#### **Amounts Closely Calculated**

Another question is whether, assuming the need for a mutual security program, the amounts requested are reasonable. We believe they are reasonable. Of course no one can prove in advance that any given expenditure spells decisively the difference between increased peril and increased security, or between war and peace. If we gain security and peace, it can always be alleged that we could have got them more cheaply. And no one can prove the contrary. Only if there is failure can it be seen that we did not spend enough. But then it is too late.

I can assure you that all of us who work on the

program are patriotically striving to serve this country and to keep the expenditures down to the lowest level consistent with our national interest. Our judgments are based on farflung worldwide sources of information, which help us to judge the capability and intentions of hostile elements throughout the world and the resistant quality of friendly elements. There may be mistakes in judgment, and there is room for honest differences of opinion. But the operation is carefully conducted and reviewed by many agencies of government, and the final result, as submitted to the Congress, reflects the best judgment of the President and the National Security Council. When dealing with the peace and security of this Nation, it is risky to seek bargain-counter prices. Cut prices may not save money—except by increasing the risk of war.

#### **Is Administration Efficient?**

Again it may be asked, is this money being spent efficiently? Does our outlay for peace and safety always make the target? The answer must be that there is a certain amount of wastage. How much, I wonder, of the ammunition used in World War II hit its appointed target? Only a small percentage. But we did not on that account refuse to supply our fighting men with ammunition. A part of every program goes for naught. That is the price we pay for human frailties. We constantly strive for increased efficiency. But lack of perfect marksmanship is no reason for denying the dollar ammunition needed to win the peace.

#### **Are Local Forces Needed?**

Another question sometimes asked is, Does not the deterrent striking power of the United States make local forces unnecessary, so that their cost could be saved? Certainly our strategic power reduces the need for local forces. It would indeed be impractical to have local forces all around the orbit of the Soviet world sufficient to stop a large-scale attack wherever it might be mounted. But we cannot rely wholly on centrally located strategic power. Nations that are menaced feel an impelling need to be able to fight in their own defense. Indeed, if they did not feel that way, support from us might not be merited or effective. Also, there needs to be loyal local strength to prevent subversion backed by international communism.

The deterrent to aggression is found not only in our strategic power but in the knowledge that subversion cannot be easily achieved and that an open armed attack would be met at once by brave and competent resistance. This, when reinforced by treaty pledges of collective action, will assure consequences which no aggressor could control or limit. That knowledge is the great deterrent.

This problem of balance between the strategic power of the U.S.A. and local power is admittedly difficult. Equally difficult is the problem of balance between military and economic effort. These problems are constantly receiving the closest attention of the National Security Council. In each case, the balance is subject to adjustment in the light of changing conditions.

### Is There an End?

Finally, it will be asked, Will this cost go on forever? Can we see no end to this gigantic expenditure, totaling about \$40 billion a year, as the cost of our peace insurance policy?

The answer is that, so long as the danger persists, for so long must we pay to combat that danger.

The Soviet rulers are engaged in a gigantic effort to build up their military establishment and to extend the area of their dominance. They maintain a military establishment approximately comparable to our own and spare no cost in striving to excel us. They give military aid to Communist China and to their Eastern European satellite allies. This is measured in terms of billions of dollars. They now woo free nations by offers of credit for economic and military goods. Credits totaling nearly \$500 million have already been concluded, and several hundred more million have been offered. They devote about \$500 million a year to foreign propaganda.

The Soviet Union is spending, for military and foreign-policy purposes hostile to us, about 20 percent of the gross product of the Soviet nation. So long as this is going on, we may have to expend about 10 percent of our gross national product, as we are now doing, for peace insurance purposes.

We can do so while at the same time raising our living standards. The demonstration of that fact has had a potent influence on the international scene.

Never will a responsible administration put its faith in protestations of peace and good will that have no dependable foundation, or expose the Na-

## President Urges Congress To Restore Funds Cut From Mutual Security Program

*Following is the text of a letter from President Eisenhower to Representative Joseph W. Martin, Jr., which the latter read to the House of Representatives on June 7.*

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
Washington, June 7, 1956.

DEAR JOE: No doubt you and other House leaders on both sides of the aisle realize full well, from our discussions in the White House and from my remarks yesterday to the press, the importance I attach to the pending mutual-security legislation. Nevertheless, to remove any possible doubt as to my feelings, I am sending you this letter. You may, if you wish, bring it to the attention of the entire House membership, so strongly do I believe that the pending issue concerns the security of our country.

Great consequences are involved in this legislation. In the present international situation, the free world can ill afford to move hesitatingly and uncertainly. The United States—the most powerful of the free nations—can afford least of all to take a backward step in this constant battle all of us are waging for a just and enduring peace.

I am deeply convinced that our Nation's security and our partnership with like-minded nations in the world will be seriously impaired by the extent of the proposed cut in the funds requested this year for the mutual-security program. I, therefore, hope most earnestly that the large majority of these funds can be restored. If we fail to do so, we must either eliminate essential programs or so reduce them as to cripple our entire effort.

I know that many conscientious people are of the opinion that there will be no serious results if a severe reduction in mutual-security funds is made at this time. Yet I personally, the Secretary of State, the Director of the International Cooperation Administration, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are united in the conviction that the proposed cut will be hurtful to the best interests of our own people and to the well-being of our friends throughout the world. I do, therefore, urge that you and your colleagues in the Congress vigorously carry forward your efforts to restore to this legislation the funds needed to maintain the pace of our battle to win a lasting peace throughout the world.

With warm regard,  
Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

The Honorable JOSEPH W. MARTIN, JR.,  
*House of Representatives,*  
Washington, D.C.

<sup>1</sup> Reprinted from *Cong. Rec.* of June 7, 1956, p. 8836.

tion to being isolated in the world, or deny it the retaliatory facilities needed to deter surprise attack.

But there are signs that a new day may be dawning. The Soviet rulers now profess to renounce the doctrine that violence is a necessary part of their foreign policy. They are debasing Stalin, who for 25 years was treated as a demigod. Writings of his, which for 25 years formed the Communist creed, are now withdrawn from circulation. This year, for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution, the Christian Bible is being printed and sold in Russia. The Russian people are getting more personal security, and labor is getting increased freedom of choice.

Obviously, there is a rising demand on the part of the captive nations to have more independence and on the part of the subject people, within and without Russia, to have more freedom from fear and to enjoy more of the fruits of their labor instead of having those fruits diverted to serve policies of aggrandizement. This popular demand must be broad in scope and intense in degree. Only that can explain the extraordinary exertions being made by the Soviet rulers to make it seem that they are offering a change. Out of all of this there may come—not this year, or next year, but some year—a government which is responsive to the just aspirations of the people and which renounces expansionist goals.

Enough is happening to make us confident that if we remain strong, if we support freedom and make evident the blessings of liberty, that policy will prevail.

The time will never come when we can safely stop planning and working for peace and making sacrifices for peace. But we can see that, if we remain steadfast, the time may come when the danger will be much less and when the cost can be correspondingly reduced. Until that time is here, the clear course of patriotic duty is to hold fast that which has proved good.

## Letters of Credence

### *China*

The newly appointed Chinese Ambassador, Hollington K. Tong, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on June 6. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 296.

## President Eisenhower's Views on Neutrality

White House press release dated June 7

*The President has authorized the following statement supplementing his informal press conference remarks of yesterday with reference to neutrality.*

Questions have been presented to the White House concerning the exact meaning of expressions in the President's press conference yesterday defending the rights of certain nations to a neutral position. He particularly referred to neutrality as a refusal to take sides in any military lineup of world powers.

It is obvious that in some countries of the world there are certain ideological, geographical, or other reasons making military alliances impractical. Such nations may declare themselves to be neutral, hoping thus to secure the support of world opinion against attack from any quarter. Neutrality does not mean either disarmament or immunity from attack. We have had historical examples of this kind of neutrality for many decades.

The President believes in the principle of collective security whereby the nations associate themselves together for each other's protection. This is the modern and enlightened way of obtaining security. The United Nations was designed to provide collective security for all. In view, however, of the veto power in the Security Council it has proved necessary to organize for collective defense under the provisions of article 51 of the charter. The United States has such collective defense arrangements with 42 other nations, and it believes that, under present conditions, these treaties represent the best and most effective means of preserving world order within the framework of the United Nations Charter. Our mutual security program is primarily designed to reinforce that world order. The President does believe that there are special conditions which justify political neutrality but that no nation has the right to be indifferent to the fate of another or, as he put it, to be "neutral as between right and wrong or decency or indecency."

The President does not believe that association for mutual security with the United States will involve any country in added danger but, on the contrary, will provide added security on the basis of mutuality and scrupulous respect for the independence of each. As the President pointed out,

the United States is not going to attack anybody; but some great powers have shown an aggressive disposition, and military association with such a power could lead to difficulties.

## Departure of President Sukarno

*The White House on June 5 made public the following exchange between President Eisenhower and Dr. Sukarno, President of the Republic of Indonesia.*

### President Eisenhower to President Sukarno

JUNE 5, 1956

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Your gracious and heart-warming message written on the eve of your departure from the United States reached me this morning. I am deeply gratified that you and the members of your party have enjoyed your brief visit to our shores, and I bid you farewell and God-speed with the hope that you found what you sought in America as a state of mind and as the center of an idea. The mastery of time and distance which modern science has given us makes it relatively easy for a visitor to travel among us. To find what is in men's hearts is a much more difficult task. Your message leads me to believe that you have succeeded.

You have taken something of America with you. At the same time you have left with us a feeling of friendship, warmth and sympathy, and a deeper understanding of the common hopes and aspirations shared by all mankind. By your frankness and eloquence you have given us a greater insight into the aims and aspirations of your new nation and have strengthened the ties of sympathy, respect, and understanding between our peoples.

*Assalamu 'alaikum, selamat djalan,*

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

His Excellency

DR. SUKARNO

*President of the Republic of Indonesia  
c/o Indonesian Embassy  
Ottawa, Canada*

### President Sukarno to President Eisenhower

MR. PRESIDENT: When I accepted with such pleasure your invitation to visit America I sought advice on what I should bring with me and on what I might expect to find there. I discovered

that one visitor to these hospitable shores was advised in these words: "He may bring with him a feather bed, bolster, pillow, blankets, a rug and three pairs of sheets. Many households in Virginia are so well provided as to entertain a stranger with all things necessary for the inner man, yet few or none are provided for the back". That, Mr. President, was advice given to an immigrant in 1634.

I didn't follow that advice.

You have provided me with all things necessary for the inner man, the back and the mind. Your other guests and I are taking back with us much more than we brought. We are taking back a widened knowledge of your country and people; a deeper appreciation of what America means in the world. Shortly after we arrived you did me the honour of referring to me as a frontier man, a compliment which I value highly.

I have read of your frontier and the hard men who pushed it westwards until the American Nation faced the Pacific and became in fact the neighbour of Indonesia. Pioneers, explorers, men of intrepid mind and stout body, are needed the world over to push forward the frontiers of knowledge, the frontiers of liberty.

Mr. President, by your hospitality, I have seen a little of how this great nation under your guidance is attacking those problems—how man's knowledge is being increased and how the burden of hard physical labor is being reduced. We have learned much from our visit. We have gathered many impressions and those impressions will take some time to fall into a pattern.

This is certain however: We have benefited greatly from your kindness and hospitality. Apart from whatever your guest has learned, the strong ties of friendship between our peoples have been drawn closer.

President Eisenhower, the Indonesian Nation has long owed a debt of gratitude to the American Nation during our struggle for the recognition of our independence and sovereignty. The United Nations played a great and conciliatory role and the United States was foremost in the activities of the United Nations, which eventually brought peace and relief to the weary people of the Indonesian Archipelago.

Since those days you have given us technical assistance. You have sent us experts in various fields. You have helped us to defeat some of the old and evil things which hampered the develop-

ment and progress of that reborn nation. Those things have provided a bond between us just as the fact that you are a great market for our natural wealth provides a bond between us. Those bonds are not enshrined in formal words or treaties; they exist most strongly in the friendship, the understanding, the sympathy between the two nations.

I recall from my reading of American history that William Penn once made an agreement with the Indians in a place called Shackamaxon which means "The Place of The King". In Shackamaxon under the elm trees, there William Penn and the Indians made an agreement which was not signed. They formulated perhaps the only treaty without signature and which has been forever respected. Perhaps such agreements as that

are more binding, are more real, than formal documents. I would like to think, Mr. President, that the relations between our two peoples will remain always strong, always friendly, always relations of sympathy and understanding, always relations of equal esteem.

President Eisenhower, in taking leave of you, I wish to express my personal thanks and of all your other guests for the warmth of your reception and kindness extended bountifully during our visit to your country.

Thank you, sir. Goodbye and may God keep you.

SUKARNO

THE PRESIDENT  
THE WHITE HOUSE.

## Evaluation of U.S. Economic Relations With Latin America

*by Henry F. Holland*

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

In my talk tonight I should like to analyze our economic relations with Latin America and make these points: first, a realistic evaluation of the present state of our economic relations with Latin America; second, an analysis of the present trend of those relations, with particular emphasis on the 3½ years of President Eisenhower's administration; lastly, a consideration of what we, as well as the governments and peoples of Latin America, can do to strengthen and improve our economic relations.

First, a word as to the importance to you of the area to which my remarks will relate. I do not have to be very extensive on the subject. We speak of the Republics of this hemisphere as a family, the American family of states. We feel a kinship which unites us strongly. We believe that our futures will follow a common path.

If we need to speak of economic reasons for the importance of Latin America, we can remember that the largest trade that the United States conducts with any area of the world is that which we

conduct with Latin America—larger than trade with Europe, larger than our trade with Asia, larger than our trade with any other area. Thirty percent of all imports into the United States come from Latin America. Twenty-five percent of all exports from the United States go there. Thirty-seven percent of all United States investments outside the territorial limits of our country reside in Latin America. Surely, insofar as economic factors determine the importance of an area of the world, this is to you and to me today the most important of the world. And yet its importance today in no wise represents that which surely and inevitably it will have for us in the near future. Do our peoples and our governments throughout the hemisphere understand this? I believe we are coming to do so. Such unprecedented meetings of Chiefs of State as that recently held in White Sulphur and that which will be held later this month in Panama are a measure of today's feeling. Are you aware that during the 3½ years of President Eisenhower's administration six Latin American Presidents have visited us—as many as during the 6 years preceding?

<sup>1</sup> Address made at the University of the South, Sewanee, Tenn., on June 9 (press release 304 dated June 8).



## **Objective of U.S. Economic Policy in Latin America**

What is the objective of our economic policy in Latin America? It is a very simple one, one dictated by what we conceive to be the legitimate best interest of the people of the United States. It is to make the most constructive, effective contribution that we can to the efforts of the governments and peoples of our sister republics to create in their territories for their people the strongest possible national economies. It is to the interest of each of you that there be to the north of us and to the south of us strong, progressive, prosperous peoples—peoples whose national economies are self-reliant and sturdy, able to withstand the shocks and strains of normal life. We think, too, that economic progress, here or abroad, means little unless it is the kind that raises the standards of life of the men, women, and children who comprise our peoples. We believe that an enterprise is not an asset to its owner or to its community or to its nation unless it pays its employees salaries that enable them to live with dignity, responsibility, and hope. Throughout this hemisphere men must look forward to better lives for their families, better homes and educations for their children. If that is the objective we have in common with the Latin American countries, how are we going about helping them achieve it?

I conceive that all contributions by the United States to economic progress in our sister republics can be divided into two categories. First, everything that puts dollars into the economy of another country. That is the essential common benefit that any foreign country derives from the United States, whether through trade, investments, loans, tourism, or grant aid. It is the common denominator by which other countries can compare the success of their economic relations with the United States. Those relations provide dollars which can be translated into capital equipment, goods for consumption, expert services—all the things that contribute to economic development and progress.

Our second contribution to economic progress abroad is to help spread through the hemisphere the technical knowledge and experience that we have all accumulated. There is little that our private enterprise and Government can do in the economic field whose significance to our sister republics cannot be measured by one of these two standards.

Let me talk first about dollars. How successful are we in supplying them to Latin America?

Again, we can measure that success in two ways. First, how many dollars does Latin America receive each year from the United States? Second, how sound and dependable are the sources from which those dollars come? We want our economic relations in this hemisphere to be the kind that will produce for our sister republics a volume of dollars that will make a real contribution to their development. We and they are very much interested in seeing that these dollars reach their destination by wholesome channels, the kind that contribute most to real progress.

Let us apply the first measure. How many dollars does Latin America derive from the United States? The figures that I shall give you are interesting. They represent dollar income from the United States alone and through all channels except military expenditures.

In 1940, fifteen years ago, Latin America received from transactions with the United States a billion dollars. This was the total received through trade, investments, tourism, loans—all nonmilitary sources of dollars. Last year Latin America received from these same sources—and from the United States—\$4,959,000,000, an increase of almost five times since 1940. That is encouraging, but how does it compare with other areas of the world? Until 1953 Western Europe received more dollars from the United States through nonmilitary channels than any other area in the world; but in that year Latin America moved into first place with the largest nonmilitary dollar income of any area of the world, \$4,441,000,000. Western Europe dropped to second place, with \$4,168,000,000. In 1954 Latin America was again first, and with a bigger dollar income of \$4,884,000,000. Once more Western Europe was in second place. In 1955 Latin America's dollar income rose again, this time \$4,959,000,000, approaching the \$5 billion mark. This time Western Europe achieved an even greater increase and closed the year with a total nonmilitary dollar income of \$5,200,000,000. For the 3 years of President Eisenhower's administration the totals are: Latin America, \$14,284,000,000; Western Europe, \$13,993,000,000. Other major areas of the world fall considerably short of these figures.

Let us consider the quality of the sources from which that income was derived. There again the facts are interesting. We believe that the soundness of a country's economic relations with the United States can be judged by the degree to which

it increases its independence of governmental sources of dollars. Every country would prefer that the sources of its dollar income be free from government control. We understand and support this desire. Therefore, we try to help other countries channel their dollar incomes more and more into private trade and investment and other sources not identified with governments.

We attribute more importance to trade than any other source of dollars. Why? I think the answer is obvious. Trade is the source of income which can be expanded more than any other. Trade is a source of dollars that renews itself year after year. Trade provides dollars on which neither interest nor dividends are paid. Trade is a self-generating source of income.

### **Increasing Private Investment**

Next, we try to increase the income of our friendly allies from private investment. Why? First, a loan draws interest whether the investment earns a profit or not. Not so with private investment. To withdraw a dividend the investor must first earn it. Second, investments, like trade, can be increased regardless of the dollar-borrowing capacity of the other country. A country, like an individual, can reach the limit of its dollar-borrowing capacity. Even then it can often receive and sustain more sound private dollar investment. Dividends on those new dollars invested are usually not a drain on the dollar reserves of the host country. They represent only a small part of the new dollars which those investments bring into the economy of the host country, dollars that would not have otherwise been there. A sound investment produces and pays a dollar dividend to the economy of the host country before it sends a dividend to its owners. Finally, private investment is important because it brings with it technical knowledge and skills, which are perhaps its most important contribution.

How does Latin America compare with other areas of the world as regards the soundness, the independence of its sources of dollars? Our most sound economic relations, judged by this standard, are those with Canada. Why? Canada receives almost as many dollars annually from the United States as all of Western Europe or as all of Latin America. Yet it receives every dollar of that income from trade and private investment. It receives no money from grant aid or government loans.

Who comes second as regards the quality of its sources of dollars? Latin America. Latin America is less dependent on United States Government aid than any other area of the world, with the single exception of Canada. Less than 8 percent of Latin America's huge dollar income is derived either from United States governmental loans or grant assistance.

Therefore we have this encouraging spectacle. As regards volume of nonmilitary dollar income, our sister republics occupy first place in the world. As regards the quality of that income, the independence of its sources, they occupy second place, with Canada in first. This means that the most stable, mature economic relations that we have anywhere in the world are those with the countries of this hemisphere.

Now let us look a bit, if you will, at today's trends. Again I would like to consider particularly the 3 years of President Eisenhower's administration.

Let us take trade first. Our trade with Latin America, as you probably know, is a \$7 billion business. Each year we buy about \$3½ billion of their goods and services. They use those dollars to buy about the same amount from us. I have already told you that this is the largest trade that we conduct with any area of the world. However, in my judgment, it can be expanded considerably.

What is the current trend? In the past 20 years the value of our imports from Latin America has increased almost seven times. They were \$500 million 20 years ago. Today the average is almost \$3½ billion, and they are still growing. 1955 was larger than 1954, and it exceeded 1953. An important feature of this import business is that 70 percent of the increase in Latin America's dollar earnings from exports to the United States comes from increases in the prices that we pay for their products. Only 30 percent comes from increased volume of exports. That is particularly significant if you consider another factor. In the past 15 years the prices of Latin America's exports to the United States have increased twice as much as the prices of her imports from us. This is a fact that is not generally known.

Now let us take a look at the trends in private investment. Our latest information indicates that United States direct private investment in Latin America is increasing at an average rate of about \$400 million a year. Its total is about \$61½ billion today, larger, as I've told you, than in any

other area of the world, 37 percent of our entire private investment abroad. I am confident that the present flow of private capital can be substantially increased.

On the whole, United States investors in Latin America have taken their places among those who are working sincerely for progress. They are currently reinvesting about half of all their profits in the local economies. On income taxes alone they pay about \$250 million a year to local governments. They account for 10 percent of all goods produced in Latin America and 30 percent of its exports to this country. Those exports produce over a billion dollars a year. Exports to other areas earn additional income in dollars and other currencies. Goods produced for local consumption save hundreds of millions of dollars which would have been spent abroad had it been necessary to import those goods. Yet their average remittance of profits to the United States is only about \$380 million.

### **Tourism**

Let us take a look at tourism, another very important source of dollars, a source far more important than most of us realize. Did you know that last year United States tourists spent \$387 million in Latin America? That is a large figure, but here is another that will startle you. Of those \$387 million, \$260 million were spent in Mexico. Tourism is the biggest single source of dollars in the economy of that great country. An estimated \$107 million were spent in the West Indies and Central America, and \$20 million in South America. The estimate for Western Europe was \$427 million; that for Canada was \$308 million. Now those figures give you an indication of what the tourist business can mean in this hemisphere. If Mexico can earn \$260 million a year from United States tourists, and Canada \$308 million, what are the potentialities for the rest of the hemisphere?

Let us pass to another source of dollars for Latin America—government loans. We realize that, as important as private investors are, they are not going to furnish all the development capital our sister republics need. There are essential projects that are not attractive to private capital—roads, port works, irrigation systems, projects of that character. We have attempted generously to meet the need for the kind of development capital that is not forthcoming from private investors.

As regards local currencies our sales of agricultural reserves offer an important source of financing for both governments and private enterprise. As you know, a large part of the proceeds of sales of agricultural reserves are lent to the local governments for use in economic development. During the current fiscal year, sales for the equivalent in local currencies of \$125 million will be negotiated in Latin America.

### **Export-Import Bank**

During the past 2 years we have undertaken to expand very substantially the activities of the Export-Import Bank as a source of dollar loans, particularly in the field of economic development. What has been the result of that policy?

During the 12 months before the policy was announced, the Export-Import Bank authorized new credits in Latin America of \$52 million. During the 12 months following the announcement of that policy, the Export-Import Bank authorized new credits in Latin America of \$284 million—more than five times as much as before, 58 percent of all new loans authorized. During that same year, 30 percent of all new loans authorized by the World Bank were authorized in Latin America—\$123 million.

Here is the trend in Export-Import Bank operations. During the 3-year period of President Eisenhower's administration, new credits authorized by the Export-Import Bank in Latin America have averaged \$210 million a year. In the entire previous history of the bank there has been only one year when this record was even equaled.

These are encouraging figures. But we feel that the Export-Import Bank can be playing an even more positive role in the development of Latin America. Through the bank we hope to insure that no economically sound developmental project fails for lack of access to capital from other sources to cover dollar needs. The only limit on the sound loans that the bank is willing to make in Latin America is the limit of the bank's capacity and the borrower's ability to repay in dollars. Today the bank's capacity very considerably exceeds the aggregate of all applications pending. It is prepared to receive and consider more applications than it is currently receiving for sound development projects in Latin America. That causes us concern. During the past year representatives of the bank have visited 19 Latin American countries to explain the availability of

its service. Yet during the first 5 months of the present calendar year fewer than a dozen applications for economic development projects were received. An institution which could be one of the greatest factors for economic development in the area is not being fully utilized.

Why are there so few applications for development loans? It is because sound projects are not being planned in which capital can be used. The industrialists and businessmen who comprise the private enterprise of Latin America are the best source of such projects there, just as our own are here.

I have heard of two approaches to the need for development capital. One begins with an estimate of an amount of capital which, if usefully invested, would produce a desired rate of economic growth. Usually no attempt is made to identify the project or even countries into which that amount of capital would go if it were available. The other approach begins with a search for sound developmental projects in which capital can be usefully employed. The total needs of those sound projects become the total to be invested. We feel that the second is the only sound approach.

Regardless of how much capital is available, it will contribute nothing to economic progress until it is invested in sound projects. Capital by itself cannot employ people and pay them salaries. The first move is to seek out sound developmental projects into which capital can go profitably and constructively; the second is to approach investors or lending institutions for that capital. One thing is certain: The funds of the Export-Import Bank will not produce progress anywhere so long as they remain in the bank. Even after they leave the bank, they cannot become a force for good in our hemisphere until they are converted into sound new enterprises and developmental projects that supply employment and improve standards of living. The computation in round figures of total needs of capital for the development of Latin America is a sterile exercise. The only constructive approach is to identify sound projects which, if completed, will produce economic development and then seek the capital needed to carry them out.

#### **Technical Aid**

Let us pass to technical aid, another important component of our economic relations. At the Rio economic conference our Government promised to strengthen and diversify United States participa-

tion in technical aid projects throughout the hemisphere. During the 3 years of President Eisenhower's administration, the average contribution of the United States to technical aid programs in Latin America has been \$27.7 million each year. Since these programs were begun in 1941, there has been only one year in which this record has been equaled. That was accounted for by our contribution in 1948 to the control of hoof-and-mouth disease in Mexico.

The last source of dollar income which we should consider is nonmilitary grant aid. Our sister republics prefer not to receive grant aid from the United States. They would rather stand on their own feet. That is consistent with the proud tradition of proud people. They would rather receive their dollars through trade, investments, and sound loans. Therefore, United States policy is to extend grant aid only where it is needed to meet temporary emergencies. During the past 3 years our average contribution in the form of grant aid within this policy has been \$36.4 million. In the preceding 20 years there has been only one year when United States grant aid in Latin America reached the level of this average figure. Again, it was in 1948 and represents our contribution to the eradication of the hoof-and-mouth disease in Mexico.

Here is a contribution which you might call grant aid and which, I think, should cause us all happiness. That is United States participation in the completion of the Inter-American Highway, which will run from the northern frontier of Mexico through Central America to the Panama Canal. Mexico completed alone the portion in her territory. Last year Congress granted the President's request for an appropriation of \$62,800,000 to complete the remainder of the highway in 3 years. This represents two-thirds of the cost of completion. The other third will be contributed by the countries involved. It will be a wonderful thing for all of us when it becomes possible to get in a car anywhere in the United States and drive to the Panama Canal.

I have tried to give you a picture of what is going on in the fields of trade, investments, loans, technical assistance, and aid. You will want to know whether from it we can draw any conclusions regarding overall economic progress in Latin America. I think we can, and they are good. Perhaps the best measure of a country's economic progress is the increase in its gross national pro-

duction—the total of all goods and services produced. The average annual increase in gross national production since the last war in Latin America has been 5½ percent a year. That in Western Europe has been 5 percent, in the United States 4 percent. So this great area is developing more rapidly than any other area of the world today. That should be a source of satisfaction to each of you.

Can we be complacent about this encouraging picture that we see to the south of us? Can we fold our arms and say that we and they are doing everything we should to insure the progress of our hemisphere? My answer is no. There is much for resourceful and energetic men still to do. Why do I say that? There are many answers. So long as substantial sectors in every one of our countries live in poverty and illiteracy, our job in this hemisphere is not done. Stated in these terms our task is great. But we can face it with confidence. Look at Canada. There is a country that has less than one-third of the area of Latin America and less than one-twelfth of its population. Its natural resources, large as they are, are considerably smaller than those of Latin America. Yet our trade with Canada and her total dollar income from the United States are almost as great as those of Latin America. What does that mean? It means to me that economic relations between the United States and Latin America are at the threshold of their development. When they have been developed to a degree even approaching the level of Canada, then the position of Latin America will be even more important than it is today.

### **Increasing Trade**

How are we going to achieve this? There are several things that must be done. First, we must increase trade. How can we make this \$7 billion annual inter-American trade into a \$10 billion business? By buying more from Latin America. They cannot buy more from us unless they have the dollars with which to do it. They will not have those dollars unless we buy more from them. The U.S. has to increase its imports from the rest of the hemisphere. Yet, if we propose to increase our imports, we must first protect their existing level. Do you think that is easy? Let me assure you, after 2½ years in Washington, that it is a very hard thing to do.

Our special-interest groups are understandably anxious to reduce the access of competitive Latin

American products to U.S. markets. We must find within ourselves the courage and intelligence to resist the understandable attempts of our own special-interest groups to eliminate their Latin American competitors. The greater national interest requires that we defend the existing access of Latin American products to our markets. We know that this policy will occasionally cause some domestic business to lose new sales it would make if its foreign competitor's product were eliminated from our market. But remember that the dollars that a foreign competitor earns here are spent with other U.S. producers. There is an overall gain for our producers. It is not in the national interest to cut down our imports from Latin America when to do so hurts our own exporters as well as our sister republics.

What has been the record of our Government in defending this policy? Until the past month it was perfect. Until that time not one piece of legislation was passed during President Eisenhower's administration, not one governmental regulation was adopted, that reduced the access of one Latin American product to the market of the United States. We have fought to maintain that record. I have said that, sooner or later, we would lose some round in that fight. We have just lost one. When he signed the farm bill last week, the President pointed out how two of its provisions conflict with his policy of protecting our two-way international trade.<sup>2</sup> He expressed the hope that Congress will review and repair the shortcomings of the law. The Congress has tightened restrictions already applied on imports of long-staple cotton. This comes at a time when our domestic long-staple cotton is fully competitive with foreign growths and when our domestic consumption is rising.

The Congress has also required the Government to follow an inflexible program of cotton export sales. It would require us to sell with little regard to costs and without adequate regard for the far-reaching economic consequences which our sales may have, both at home and abroad. President Eisenhower has stated that this provision will be administered with extreme caution. Otherwise, damage could be caused to the economies of our friends and to our own export trade as a whole.

We have lost one round in the fight to protect inter-American trade. We have won a good many. The fight will go on. We are confident that, more

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of June 11, 1956, p. 982.

and more, our people understand that, if the United States is to be strong itself and if it is to lead a strong free world, our international trade must grow. When we limit our commerce to give an advantage to one small domestic group, we hurt the economy of the Nation as a whole. We undermine confidence abroad in our leadership.

As hard as it sometimes is to protect the existing levels of our inter-American trade, we cannot stop there. We have to increase that trade. We must not let it remain a \$7 billion business. It must grow. The way to make it grow is to increase our imports from the other Republics. Each new dollar of imports means a new dollar of exports. Three ways to increase our imports from Latin America are apparent.

First, their exporters and our importers can cooperate to increase our consumption of products which they can supply in greater volume.

Second, we can find products which we have not traditionally imported from Latin America but for which a demand exists in the United States. A recent contract to import natural gas from Mexico is an example of how our imports can be increased in this way. We have never imported gas from Mexico. There is a demand for it here, and our next-door neighbor has a surplus supply. The contract can substantially increase the dollar earnings that Mexico uses to buy our exports.

Finally, there are a number of Latin American products which our U. S. markets could absorb in greater quantity. Copper and iron ore are examples. Our governments and businessmen here and abroad are cooperating to increase production in Latin America. Increased U. S. imports will mean more dollars available in Latin America to buy our exports.

I have discussed trends in the field of private investment and have expressed the opinion that it could be increased. The most important source of new investment capital in Latin America is, as should be, their own investors. They command very substantial resources, both in dollars and in local currencies. In the United States alone these amount today to more than \$1½ billion.

Clearly, it is in the interest of every country of the hemisphere for its government to establish those local conditions that will inspire confidence in its own private investors. Unless those conditions exist, there is little hope for a strong economy. Unless local investors have confidence, foreign investors will not enter. No government

of the hemisphere, including our own, can provide more than a fraction of the development capital needed. There is little need to consider special measures to attract foreign investors if foreign investors will come. The only additional assurances they seek are nondiscriminatory treatment and a reasonable opportunity to repatriate profits.

### **Conditions To Encourage Investors**

What are the conditions that encourage foreign and domestic investors alike? They are rather well known. They lie largely within the power of the local government, and they are usually achievable. Happily, they benefit the whole economy, not just investors.

First I would put the adoption of vigorous measures to combat inflation. No investor, domestic or foreign, is going to risk his capital if he fears that the value of his investment will be eroded by inflation. Over the years we have watched with admiration the courage and determination with which many of the Latin American governments have checked inflationary tendencies in their economies. Peru is a notable example. The most recent, perhaps, is that of Chile. By the application of tried and tested remedies the Government of Chile has arrested a 25-year inflationary trend. In a matter of weeks the value of the Chilean peso was brought from a low of 840 to the dollar to its present level of about 490 to the dollar.

Another great incentive to investors of every nationality is reasonable taxation. We have all seen how reasonable taxes have been an important factor in bringing over \$2 billion of investment into petroleum, mining, and other industries in Venezuela. There is no better way to measure what this has meant than to point out that the average annual income of a Venezuelan citizen is almost twice that in any of the other Republics.

The adoption of sound and reasonable tax measures is producing impressive results elsewhere in the hemisphere. About a year ago the Government of Chile revised its taxes on the production of copper. The industry immediately embarked on a \$100-million expansion program. In the same way modernization of the nitrate tax laws is producing almost \$50 million of new investment. Similar examples can be pointed out in Peru, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and other parts of the hemisphere.

Fair government regulation of utilities is another important factor in encouraging new in-

vestment. In many parts of Latin America industrial development is retarded by the inadequacy of electric power. In many states private utilities are able and willing to invest the millions of dollars needed to satisfy the increasing demand for electricity. In almost every case the first step is for the government to adopt rate regulations which will bring stability and progress to the industry. On the one hand the consumer must be assured an adequate supply of power and at reasonable prices. The company on the other hand must be sure of a fair rate on its investment; otherwise it cannot raise the capital for plant expansion. Governments have it within their power to give consumer and producer alike the assurance that he needs. Where it does so, the results are immediately apparent.

In 1949 the Government of Mexico modernized its regulations of the electrical industry to permit reasonable rate adjustments. The result has been an investment of about \$100 million throughout the country. Definitely projected investment for the years 1956-58 amounts to an additional \$81 million. Mexico City is today the only major Latin American city where there is no curtailment of electric-power consumption. It is generally anticipated that, if the present plans of the Government of Chile to revise its regulations governing the electrical industry prove successful, over \$100 million will immediately start into plant expansion.

I have said that, so far as the foreign investor is concerned, he asks for no favored treatment as an incentive to come into a country. He is, as a rule, entirely satisfied to take his place beside the local businessman in all respects. He is, however, hesitant to risk his capital in any country where foreign investors are subjected to discriminatory treatment. No one questions for a moment the sovereign right of every government to determine whether it wants foreign investors and, if so, under what conditions. At the same time we must recognize that every measure discriminating against one foreign investor is a cause for concern to every other. Each fears that, though he is not affected today, once the principle of discrimination is established it may eventually be extended to prejudice his investment.

### **Government Competition**

I cannot leave this summary of factors influencing investors without mentioning the one which, more than any other perhaps, determines the climate for private investment, both domestic and foreign. That is the question of government competition. No investor wants to risk his capital if there is basis for fearing that tomorrow he may find himself in competition with a government. The best possible encouragement that government can give to private enterprise is assurance that private businessmen will be given the opportunity to build strong economies without government competition. And where that assurance is given, it is only fair that the government should require private enterprise to discharge fully and fairly its social obligation to establish working conditions and terms of employment that are generous and healthful.

In these remarks I have undertaken to outline briefly the rapidly ascending curves of our economic relations with Latin America. They indicate that Latin America's position in comparison with other areas of the world is favorable. They indicate steady improvement in each of the principal sectors of our relationships—trade, investment, and loans. The conclusion seems justified that our governments and peoples have it within their power to achieve very considerable expansion of activity in each of these fields. There are dangers which could prevent this. From the side of the United States they lie in nationalistic trade restrictions to benefit special groups at the expense of the national economy. On the side of Latin America they relate to policies and programs which will determine whether the unlimited energies and resources of private enterprise, particularly their own, will flow into the innumerable opportunities for economic progress which exist there.

The one conclusion that I would leave with you is this. If our governments follow reasonably enlightened policies, if the men and women who make up our private enterprise work with a full consciousness of their responsibilities to society, then, without a shadow of doubt, we shall enter into a period of development and prosperity that will profoundly affect the lives of all of us.

## The Aircraft Industry and Foreign Trade Policy

*by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi*  
*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The Department of State is extremely interested in particular industries—their needs, desires, and problems—for it would not be realistic for government to try to deal with policy problems apart from problems in private life. At the same time, as you of course know, we must always be governed by the best interests of the Nation as a whole as we understand them. Therefore, in reaching decisions on foreign economic policy we have to fit individual interests, claims, and points of view of specific American industries, including your own, into the broader pattern of United States foreign relations.

It has been suggested that you would like to hear about the work of the Economic Bureau of the Department of State. The "E" area, as we call it, is that part of the Department which is concerned on a continuing basis with the economic aspects of United States foreign policy. Among other things it deals with such matters as the negotiation of air transport agreements, protection of American investments abroad, the negotiation of trade agreements, the removal of foreign barriers to American exports, and the protection of copyrights and patents, to mention only a few of the many responsibilities with which we are charged.

Neither time nor normal human patience would permit even a summary of our work and operation at this time. Instead, with your permission, I should like to explore briefly some phases of foreign trade with which we are mutually concerned. I know that this will have an immediate and practical appeal to you because yours is an export industry. About one-third of your civil transport

production is sold abroad. Inevitably each of you has a special interest in the Government's foreign trade policy.

An important element in that policy is the future of the Organization for Trade Cooperation (the Orc). As a part of his program of encouraging a higher level of trade, the President has strongly recommended to the Congress the enactment of H. R. 5550, the bill which would authorize United States membership in that body.

The Organization for Trade Cooperation would be an essentially administrative body for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the trade agreement to which the United States and 34 other countries adhere. The principles of international fair trade included in the general agreement are of direct interest to the members of your industry because they provide protection against arbitrary and unnecessary restrictions on imports by other countries from the United States. Through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, we have been able to obtain the substantial relaxation and elimination of numerous foreign import restrictions adversely affecting our commerce.

If the Organization for Trade Cooperation were established, we believe that it would improve the facilities which now exist in the general agreement for obtaining a review and examination of trade restrictions imposed for financial reasons. It would permit the United States to maintain and continue the substantial progress it has made in reopening world markets to American products as the world financial situation has improved. Both the Organization for Trade Cooperation and new tariff concessions, of which I shall speak in a moment, are very important in an individual as well as in an institutional sense.

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Wings Club at New York, N.Y., on June 7 (press release 299 dated June 6).



But for you there is no more important element in foreign trade than the future the American aircraft industry faces abroad. During the past few years many of you have experienced a sharp increase in competition from the foreign producers of aircraft equipment.

That competition promises to grow. Today the United States still retains its advantageous position with regard to production capacities, methods, costs, and volume of output of aircraft of all types. There is every reason to believe that with effort the industry can continue to hold this position and to meet effectively foreign competition in foreign export markets. But, if it is to do so, it will be necessary for the industry to keep three basic rules in mind and to follow them with care and vigor.

### **Developing the Market**

The first rule is that sales simply do not "just happen." They must be vigorously developed.

The market for aircraft, like that for many of our other products, is changing. It is not the same as it was shortly after the war. It is becoming more and more competitive as some of the European manufacturers develop transport as well as other types of aircraft and equipment that can be used by foreign airlines and foreign companies, flying schools, and the like. I am sure you agree that our manufacturers cannot afford to wait for orders but must expend vigorous efforts in securing them. The days of the order taker are numbered, and the salesman is called for. It will be necessary to station representatives abroad who are experienced not only with specifications and performance of products but who also know how to sell in foreign markets. The mere sending of printed material, specifications, and performance data is no longer enough. You have good products, and I am sure you will continue to maintain high standards. But continued sales in a highly competitive market require more of you than possession of good products.

Our principal foreign competitors have stationed representatives permanently abroad in order to promote sales. They are willing to work tactfully, slowly, and patiently with prospective purchasers, to study the prospect's needs, to explain how the equipment will work out in operation, to answer many questions, and to show a sincere interest in the prospect's equipment problems. That, in many instances, is how your competitors have managed to introduce their new aircraft in

competition with your own. Unless you put forth increased efforts, it may be expected that your competitors will succeed in placing additional aircraft in preference to yours.

It goes without saying that we in the Departments of State and Commerce will do our best to help you develop your markets. I understand our Aviation Division has close liaison with your association. We want that to continue. Reporting on matters of interest to your industry by our missions abroad is steadily improving, and special efforts will be made to continue the improvement. However, it is only fair to point out that under our system of government the identification and exploitation of potential markets abroad is basically an industry responsibility and there is a limit beyond which government should not go.

It has been said that some of the European governments give their aircraft manufacturers more favorable assistance than does the United States by providing or by guaranteeing export credits on sales of equipment. Since practices differ so widely from country to country, I am not prepared to say whether this assertion is true or not. However, I do wish to say that the assistance available through the Export-Import Bank has not been fully utilized or appreciated. I urge you to look into this matter more carefully with a view to making greater use of the Export-Import Bank. We shall be glad to help back you up as far as we can.

### **Maintaining a Two-Way Street**

The second rule for winning foreign markets is that international trade is a two-way street. Many governments still husband their precious foreign-exchange earnings with great care. In spite of their limited amount of American dollars, these same governments are anxious that their people buy American products. This is especially true of American aircraft equipment because of its well-deserved reputation.

It is, of course, axiomatic that foreign governments cannot permit their people to buy from us unless they are also able to sell to us. It is sales here that earn dollars the American exporters seek for their products. One way in which foreign countries can earn dollars is through their own airline operations to the United States. It seems self-evident that undue restrictions on foreign airline operations in the United States can adversely affect the sale of American transport aircraft and

other American products to foreign countries.

To harmonize the interests of the air transport and aircraft industries, the United States must maintain a transport policy free of unnecessary and arbitrary restrictions.

I do not have to tell you there is much at stake. As you know, a comparison of United States exports and imports of aircraft and aircraft equipment shows a tremendous balance in our favor. In 1955 this country exported goods valued at a grand total of more than \$15.3 billion. Of these exports, shipments abroad of all aeronautical products, including military, totaled about \$728 million. Within this category of \$728 million about one-third to one-quarter consisted of civil aircraft. In 1954, 86.6 percent of the aircraft equipment used by all airlines throughout the world was of American manufacture.

This large stake of the aviation equipment industry in foreign trade is convincing proof of the need for the United States to maintain a foreign trade policy that will permit other countries to continue to buy our products. We cannot erect over-high walls around the vast American market and at the same time expect to win foreign markets.

#### **Cooperation Between Governments**

The third rule for winning foreign markets is that a high level of international trade requires international cooperation between governments. The principal means used by the United States for more than 8 years to obtain that cooperation has been its active participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

That is why the administration now seeks the establishment of the Organization for Trade Cooperation and congressional action on H. R. 5550. The success of the policy just enunciated is indicated by the increasing liberalization of foreign trade controls by the partners in the general agreement.

One of the most important steps in this trade liberalization program has been in the making over the past few months. Today we are announcing in Washington the detailed results of the tariff negotiations recently completed at Geneva. You will undoubtedly see stories about this in the evening papers.

These tariff negotiations led to a mutually satisfactory balance of concessions with the 21 other countries participating in the conference. In terms of the amount of trade covered, which is not

the only significant factor in judging the value of tariff concessions, the United States obtained concessions directly on \$400 million worth of our export trade. In addition, United States exports will enjoy more favorable customs treatment on a substantial volume of trade in products on which the other countries exchange concessions among themselves.

Of special interest to you will be the tariff concessions which foreign countries granted on United States exports of aviation equipment. The exports of items on which these concessions were made amounted to more than \$19 million in 1954. The United States also granted some concessions to other countries on aviation equipment. Our concessions were on items which in 1954 were imported into this country in the amount of about \$5 million.

These negotiations were carried out under the authority given to the President in the 1955 extension of the Trade Agreements Act. The successful conclusion of the negotiations is another important step toward the administration's goal of promoting a higher two-way trade between the American people and their friends abroad.

In conclusion, permit me to remark that the foreign economic policies of the United States have an immediate and personal consequence for you. The wisdom with which they are developed and pursued may determine your well-being and success. On the other side, let me also remind you that every businessman who engages in an economic enterprise abroad is in a sense an informal ambassador of the United States. On your activities in substantial measure depends the good will of other peoples toward the United States.

### **Bill Amending and Extending Sugar Act Signed**

*Statement by President Eisenhower*

White House press release dated May 29

I have today approved H.R. 7030 to amend and extend the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, and for other purposes.

In addition to extending the Sugar Act for 4 years, the bill restores to the domestic areas the right to supply 55 percent of this country's increased requirements of sugar. The amendments also permit foreign countries to supply as much as they have been, plus 45 percent of the increases

in our requirements. These increases will be most important relatively for the countries that heretofore have been minor suppliers.

It was not considered feasible to recommend an increase in the Philippine quota at this time. I believe, therefore, that when new amendments are being prepared at the conclusion of the present act, consideration should be given to allowing the Philippines to share in increased consumption, as is now provided for other foreign countries by this bill.<sup>1</sup>

## Adjusting World Sugar Production and Consumption

*Statement by Marvin L. McLain  
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture*<sup>2</sup>

It is a privilege and a pleasure to welcome this distinguished group to the United States, and I bring you a warm welcome and the best wishes of the Secretary of Agriculture and all of his staff. You have a big job cut out for you at this conference.

I do not know how much time I can spend with you at this conference, but Mr. Earl Hughes, Administrator of the Commodity Stabilization Service of the Department of Agriculture, also plans to spend some time here; and, of course, Larry Myers, Director of our Sugar Division, whom many of you know, and members of his staff will be here continuously. Mr. Hughes and myself will be within reach should an occasion arise when we may be needed.

The United States is very much interested in the purposes and objectives of this conference. Sugar is an important commodity. We are, I guess, the largest sugar-consuming nation in the world, with an annual consumption of about 8½ million tons. However, we are also a large sugar-producing nation, producing about 2½ million tons on the United States mainland and well over 2 million tons in our other domestic areas—Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Altogether the domestic areas produce about 4½ million tons.

<sup>1</sup>For a statement by Assistant Secretary Holland before the Senate Finance Committee regarding H.R. 7030, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 172.

<sup>2</sup>Made before the U.N. International Sugar Conference at New York, N.Y., on May 22. Mr. McLain is U.S. representative to the conference.

The remainder of our needs, about 4 million tons, comes from foreign areas, of which Cuba and the Philippines supply by far the greater part. Our present consumption is about 103 pounds per capita, which, in light of our other sweeteners, appears to be about the saturation point, but we anticipate an increase in consumption of about 135,000 tons a year based upon our very rapidly expanding population.

We have just completed rather lengthy negotiations in amending our own Sugar Act, which was passed by the Congress just last week.<sup>3</sup>

When I think about the problem we had in trying to arrive at a fair and equitable distribution of our sugar market, I think that problem was quite parallel with the one confronting this conference in trying to adjust sugar production and sugar consumption for the world as a whole. Both of us are interested, I think, not alone in our own individual welfare but in the welfare of others and in the hope of stimulating greater commerce between nations. You might be interested in the program we have worked out, to see what kind of answers we found in our own little sphere.

### Objectives of U.S. Sugar Legislation

The United States has had special sugar legislation since the 1930's. Mr. True D. Morse, Under Secretary of Agriculture, when he appeared before the Senate Finance Committee in support of the Sugar Act amendments, stated that the fourfold objective of our specialized sugar legislation was:

1. to maintain and protect the domestic sugar-production industry,
2. to avoid undue burden on domestic consumers,
3. to increase our imports of sugar and thereby to benefit our general export trade, and
4. to insure that the benefits of the system would be passed on to farmers and laborers. . . .

These were the objectives we were trying to obtain in our deliberations. They are a great deal like the objectives of the International Sugar Agreement as stated in article 1. Certainly all of us wish to assure ample supplies of sugar at reasonable prices to consumers. Certainly all of us wish to have reasonable prices to producers. Like any other industry, all of us should be interested in expanding consumption and certainly all of us should be interested in stimulating greater commerce between nations, which should result in

<sup>3</sup>See p. 1016.

a greater degree of prosperity for everyone. In our own plan to reach these objectives we have attempted to divide, equitably, our sugar market. This was no easy job since everyone, domestic producers and foreign nations, wanted a larger share. Anyone who has ever tried to divide four pieces of candy among six children can appreciate the problem. No one got everything he wanted. It had to be a give-and-take proposition that would result in the greatest good for the greatest number.

In our program we have deliberately restricted the production in our own domestic areas in order to provide part of our market for foreign areas. This was done deliberately to stimulate export trade and to show some responsibility toward the welfare of our neighbors. We have divided the increase in consumption from here on on a basis of 55 percent to the domestic areas and 45 percent to the foreign areas. We have recognized, as you do, that some countries are quite restricted in the variety of crops that they can produce and therefore production and sale of sugar are of paramount importance to them if they are going to acquire the necessary foreign exchange to make them good customers for the commodities they need and to improve their standard of living.

I hope you will not think that we here in the United States feel that we have all the answers. We would be the first to admit that we do not. I am merely citing to you the answers we came up with in our own deliberations. You are welcome to them for whatever they are worth.

#### **Increasing World Consumption of Sugar**

I do hope, however, that in the deliberations of this conference you will not devote all of your attention to seeking a magic formula through which to manipulate quotas and prices, as the only means of adjusting production and consumption. Every successful business in the world that has reached the saturation point starts bending its efforts for a greater outlet for its product. One of your stated objectives is to increase the world consumption of sugar, which I am informed now averages about 30 pounds per capita. I fully appreciate the many factors that are involved in trying to do this job. Nevertheless, it is a challenge to the producers of sugar everywhere. Certainly, I am not competent to tell you how to do it, but I am sure that, if there is an answer, that answer will come from a gathering of world sugar experts such as are here present. This prob-

lem is probably one of education and promotion and of serious study of the various factors that are holding consumption down.

You are fortunate in that you have a commodity with a universal appetite appeal. The people in all of the low sugar-consuming nations of the world would like to have more sugar. How to get it to them, at prices they can afford to pay, is one of the problems which should receive very serious consideration here.

In conclusion, might I say I have only tried to reemphasize the importance of the objectives that you already have incorporated in your agreement, and I do hope that I have stimulated a little thinking along lines other than control measures. I think you should take advantage of this opportunity, when you have a great number of the sugar experts of the world together, to consider some of the broader objectives of what an international organization might hope to accomplish.<sup>4</sup>

#### **Eximbank Loan to Brazil**

The Export-Import Bank announced on June 5 that a \$35 million loan agreement with the Brazilian National Steel Company was signed at Washington on that day by Samuel C. Waugh, president of the Export-Import Bank, and Gen. Edmundo de Macedo Soares e Silva, president of the company. The signing puts into effect the Export-Import Bank loan authorized in February and announced by Vice President Richard M. Nixon while he was attending the inauguration of President Juscelino Kubitschek.<sup>1</sup>

The Brazilian company was founded in 1940-41 with the assistance of an Eximbank credit of \$25 million. Further credits of \$20 million and \$25 million were approved by the bank in 1943 and 1950. The new loan, which brings the total amount authorized to \$105 million, will enable the Brazilian industry to expand its operations and to continue to contribute substantially to Brazil's steady progress toward a higher standard of living.

The \$35 million will be used for the purchase in the United States of materials, equipment, and engineering services for export to Brazil.

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<sup>4</sup>After consideration of possible amendments to the International Sugar Agreement and preliminary discussion of quotas, the conference on June 12 agreed to recess June 20. It is expected to reconvene in October.

<sup>1</sup>BULLETIN of Feb. 27, 1956, p. 336.

## Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Domestic Agricultural Surpluses

*The following is an excerpt from a staff study, dated October 1955, which was circulated to interested Government agencies by the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal on May 22, 1956.<sup>1</sup> The study group which prepared it was headed by Ernest T. Baughman, Assistant Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. In an introduction, the Interagency Committee states that the study is "a staff document, not one representing the position of the ICASD. Its conclusions correspond to the views of the Chairman of the ICASD [Clarence Francis]. It has not been approved by any agency and its conclusions and analysis do not necessarily reflect the views of the Administration."*

### CONCLUSIONS

"Special" export programs initiated or expanded in 1954-55 apparently have achieved some increase in United States exports and a further moderate increase is indicated for 1955-56. However, only in the event of widespread and repeated crop failures in important producing countries would a large enough increase in exports be achieved to make substantial reductions in current troublesome surpluses, particularly wheat, cotton, and rice in the next few years.

The best opportunities for increasing exports without risking substantial displacement of United States exports for dollars or of "usual" exports of friendly countries exist in the low-income, low-consumption areas. Agricultural surplus commodities can make an important contribution to programs designed specifically to accelerate capital development and increase consumption in such areas. Special attention should

<sup>1</sup> For background on the Interagency Committee, established to coordinate activities under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P. L. 480, 83d Cong.), see BULLETIN of Oct. 4, 1954, p. 498.

be given, therefore, to using United States surpluses in support of investment programs, especially in the less developed countries. However, the financial return to the United States of such use of the surpluses would be small. Over the long term, an increase in productivity in the low-income areas could result in the development of expanded export markets for United States commodities. Since capital development programs require several years for completion, it would be necessary to commit supplies of surplus commodities in support of such programs for periods up to possibly 3 to 5 years.

### SUMMARY

#### The Size and Nature of Agricultural Surpluses

1. The amount of agricultural surplus commodities as reflected by Ccc [Commodity Credit Corporation] loans and inventories has increased about \$6 billion in the three years ending June 30, 1955 and may show some further increase in 1955-56. The rapid increase in surplus stocks in recent years has resulted from a volume of exports somewhat below the high level reached in earlier post-war years, high levels of price support relative to market prices, and rising output of farm commodities. Total agricultural output has tended to rise although output of certain crops has been curtailed by acreage and marketing controls.

2. Aggregate surpluses of a number of commodities available for export or other disposition outside usual domestic uses in 1955-56 are very large. Even with additional exports equivalent to 50 percent of the 1954-55 volume, it would require five years or more to liquidate the surpluses of wheat, cotton and feed grains and about four years to liquidate the surpluses of rice and tobacco. Exports normally provide outlets for only relatively small amounts of the dairy products and feed grains.

3. Large amounts of the less desired qualities of some commodities make the disposal of the surpluses more difficult. This applies especially to stocks of cotton, wheat and rice.

### Trends in International Trade in Agricultural Commodities

1. The proportion of the world's agricultural output moving in international trade is now on the order of 15 percent, whereas it was about 20 percent prewar. Despite substantial increases over prewar in population and world output of agricultural commodities, and in international trade as a whole, world trade in agricultural commodities regained its prewar 1934-38 level only in 1950 and in succeeding years has shown little change. A strong move toward a greater degree of national self-sufficiency in agricultural products is evident throughout most of the world.

2. United States exports of agricultural commodities have been well above the low prewar volume throughout the postwar years and in 1954 exceeded prewar by about 50 percent. The United States in 1934-38 provided 11.5 percent of world exports of commodities. At its postwar peak in 1949, it accounted for 24 percent. In 1953-54 the percentage was 16.5. Compared with prewar, United States exports now account for larger proportions of total world exports of wheat, feed grains, rice, dairy products and edible fats and oil and oilseeds; for tobacco the proportion holds about the same as prewar; cotton is the only major surplus commodity in which the United States now supplies a smaller proportion of world exports than in prewar years.

3. United States exports of agricultural commodities have tended to decline as the amount of exports financed by aid programs has tapered off.

### The Authorities

1. The Congress has provided a comprehensive framework of authorities to facilitate the export of agricultural surplus commodities. Export subsidies, barter, sale for foreign currencies, donations to avoid waste, and grants for famine relief and other purposes are authorized.

2. Since disposal of agricultural surpluses is not the major purpose of all of the authorities, it perhaps is inevitable that there should be some overlapping and duplication. To the extent that the authorities attempt to achieve several objectives simultaneously, and where a program may

qualify under two or more of the authorities, some confusion results. Nevertheless, the authorities do fall into somewhat of a pattern, and it does not appear that a major modification or consolidation of the authorities would help materially at this time.

### Accomplishments Under Existing Authorities

1. Over two-fifths of United States exports of agricultural commodities in 1954-55 were aided by one or another government program. The distribution of total agricultural exports by type of program was as follows:

	<i>Million dollars</i>		
Exports for dollars, not aided by government sales at reduced prices <sup>1</sup> -----			1,800
"Special" export programs:			
Barter-----	125		
Sale for foreign currency, P.L. 480, Title I-----	63		
Sale for foreign currency, MSP Aid, Sec. 550, 402-----	281		
U.S. Government grants:			
MSP economic aid-----	175		
Donations, P.L. 439, Sec. 416--	130		
Relief, P.L. 480, Title II, etc.--	83	388	<sup>2</sup> 857
Subsidized exports sold for dollars, Sec. 32-----			36
Other subsidized exports for dollars-----			450
Total "special" and subsidized exports-----			1,343
Total agricultural exports-----			3,143

<sup>1</sup> Includes \$70 million of loans, largely to finance sale of cotton to Japan.

<sup>2</sup> Export subsidies incurred on about \$340 million of this total.

2. The amount of commodities included in P.L. 480, Title I agreements signed in 1954-55 and the amount of authorizations issued under Mutual Security aid programs both were substantially in excess of the amount of commodities shipped under these programs. Shipments in 1955-56 should be appreciably larger due to the completion of shipments under the previous year's agreements and the anticipated shipments of a larger proportion of current year agreements which are expected to be signed somewhat earlier than was the experience last year. Wheat, cotton and feed grains accounted for most of the exports for foreign currency under P.L. 480, Title I. Wheat and cotton accounted for the major part of sales for foreign currencies under aid programs. Tobacco, feed grains and fats and oils were also included in significant amounts.

3. Barter transactions showed a large gain as compared with only \$34 million in the previous

year. Grants pursuant to Foa economic aid programs have shown a decline each year since 1948-49. Donations "to avoid waste," under Section 416, in 1954-55 were approximately double the 1953-54 amount. Shipments for emergency relief under P.L. 480, Title II, and similar programs were materially smaller than in 1953-54 but somewhat larger than in the preceding two years.

4. Shipments pursuant to "special" export programs in 1954-55 showed a gain of about \$275 million over the 1953-54 amount. Increases were shown for all the major surplus commodities except tobacco and resulted in gains in total exports of wheat, cottonseed oil and the major dairy products—butter, cheese and dry milk. However, total exports of cotton, feed grains and rice declined despite increases in exports under special programs.

#### **Obstacles to Greater Accomplishments**

1. The United States exports surplus agricultural commodities under a number of programs but even if prices were made fully competitive, each is subject to certain limitations:

a. Sale for dollars is limited by the amount of dollars available to foreign purchasers, their willingness to spend dollars for agricultural commodities relative to other commodities and discrimination against commodities supplied from the dollar area:

b. Barter shipments are limited by the kinds and amounts of materials we are willing to import in exchange for surplus agricultural commodities and the willingness of foreign owners of such materials to exchange them for surplus commodities:

c. Sales for foreign currencies pursuant to Mutual Security programs are limited by the amounts of agricultural commodities which can be used effectively within the purposes of that Act:

d. Sales for foreign currencies pursuant to P.L. 480, Title I are limited somewhat by the provisions of the Act, that such sales should not displace "usual marketings of the United States" or "unduly disrupt world prices" of agricultural commodities, by the amounts of commodities countries are willing to purchase, and by the extent to which foreign currencies can be made to serve purposes acceptable to the United States;

e. Grants and gifts of agricultural commodities are limited in the first instance to the require-

ments of famine situations and relief programs, and secondly by the willingness of the United States to provide commodities on these terms.

#### **Export Potential for Surplus Agricultural Commodities**

1. The principal commercial foreign markets for United States agricultural commodities have been Canada, Cuba and the densely populated industrialized countries of Western Europe and Japan. Commercial exports of cotton, citrus fruits and winter vegetables to Canada should continue to show a gradual increase as population growth continues and industrial development proceeds in that country. Exports to Europe will be limited by a relatively slow rate of population growth, low income elasticity of demand for food, and strong tendencies toward a high degree of agricultural self-sufficiency. European markets and possibly the Japanese market for our surplus products will be strengthened if international programs to secure freer and less discriminatory trade are successful.

2. It will be difficult to achieve any substantial increase in exports above the rates indicated for 1955-56 to countries in which consumers already enjoy relatively high levels of consumption without incurring serious adverse reactions from other friendly countries. Possible exceptions include programs designed specifically to: maintain consumption following crop failures, achieve increased consumption by certain groups, provide more adequate inventories, support expanded livestock production in such areas.

3. Exports to low-income, low-consumption areas can be expanded above present levels, possibly by several hundred million dollars annually if the United States is willing to make the commodities available to these areas on very favorable terms, i. e., terms which will net very little financial return to the United States. Major objectives of such exports would be to increase consumption and accelerate the rate of capital investment in such areas.

4. It is possible that some amounts of wheat, cotton, tobacco and butter and other fats and oils might be disposed of to the European Soviet Bloc nations in the next year or two if such sales are determined at some future time to be consistent with U.S. foreign policy.

5. Special export programs initiated or expanded in 1954-55 are achieving some increase in

United States exports of agricultural commodities. A further moderate increase is indicated for 1955-56. Dollar exports undoubtedly are being displaced to some extent as are exports of other suppliers. It is doubtful that these programs can make any more than a gradual inroad on current surpluses unless there should be widespread crop failures in important producing countries. Programs for accelerating capital development and increasing consumption in low-income, low-consumption areas provide the best prospects for increased exports without risking displacement of United States exports for dollars or "usual" exports of friendly countries.

6. Export prospects for major surplus commodities:

*Wheat:* We probably will be able to maintain something approximating the level of exports achieved in 1954-55; we are unlikely to increase exports materially except in the event of crop failures in important producing areas and, possibly, through programs to increase stocks in some importing countries.

*Cotton:* Export prospects are uncertain. Some increase in exports can be achieved if our cotton could be priced competitively with other sources of supply. Due in part to the "umbrella effects" of the domestic support price the United States share of world exports has declined despite economic aid and surplus disposal programs.

*Rice:* A major question is whether or not Asia will again supply its own rice needs, and, if not, whether international political conditions and domestic price policy will permit the United States to supply rice to that region. In prewar years Asia was a substantial exporter of rice but in recent years has been a net importer. If Asia's production increases materially, United States exports to that area will probably decline and offset any possible increases in exports to other parts of the world. United States prices will have to be competitive with prices in other surplus-producing areas if the current level of exports is to be maintained.

*Tobacco:* Exports are expected to show a substantial increase in 1955-56 as shipments under special export programs rise. Commercial exports may decline if prices are maintained at current levels, production in other areas continues to expand, and import restrictions continue to severely limit trade.

*Fats, oils and oilseeds:* The long-term outlook

for world demand and United States exports of cottonseed and soybean oil and of soybeans is considered good. It will be very difficult and perhaps impossible to develop a substantial export market for butter in the next few years. Exports of lard probably can be increased but the commodity is expected to be available domestically in large supply.

*Cheese and dry milk:* The United States has been an important exporter of dairy products only in periods of abnormal supply or demand. Exports in recent years have been largely as a result of donations for distribution to low-income consumers and for special uses outside commercial channels. It will be very difficult if not impossible to develop a substantial commercial export market for cheese and the prospects for dry milk are uncertain.

## POLICY ISSUES

1. Should the United States attempt to make a maximum use of agricultural surpluses to raise consumption and accelerate capital development in low-income areas? It would be possible to increase exports under such a program without incurring serious displacement of commercial exports for the United States and other friendly countries. If such a policy is adopted, careful consideration should be given to (1) the desirability of authorizing commitments of agricultural surpluses under such programs up to periods of three to five years and (2) to specifying in the legislative authority that the use of surpluses for this purpose is one of the major objectives of agricultural surplus disposal programs especially as it pertains to resource development in low-income countries. The programs should be handled primarily on the basis of sale for local currencies with most of the currency made available to the recipient country as grants or loans for use in specified capital development projects which clearly would accelerate investment and increase income and consumption. Little would be gained unless investment was in fact accelerated. It should be recognized at the outset that the immediate financial return to the United States would be small. Over a period of years the increased production capacity could result in the development of some additional commercial export markets for United States goods.

2. Should exports to Soviet Bloc countries be



expanded? A potential market for some additional amount of agricultural surplus commodities apparently exists in the European Soviet Bloc countries, if the commodities are offered at world prices. Present legislation permits exports of government stocks through barter to friendly nations only. As a result, sales for dollars have also been withheld as not being in line with the declared policy of Congress. Opportunities clearly in the interests of the U.S. may develop in the future to sell or barter to countries excluded by this legislation. Therefore, consideration might be given to modifications in legislative authority to permit the President to exploit at his discretion such opportunities as may be deemed appropriate.

3. Should export subsidies be used to increase exports of additional amounts of surplus agricultural commodities? Subsidies have proved effective in bridging the gap between supported domestic prices and world prices of wheat, which is exported in large volume and for which there is an international agreement, and a number of other commodities exported in relatively small amounts. Subsidies for commodities exported in large volume incur high costs to the Treasury. If used to obtain more than the "customary" share of markets normally served or to export substantial amounts to other than usual markets, subsidies are likely to incur retaliation by other countries. Subsidies have been used also to offset the effects of discriminatory trade restrictions imposed against United States exports.

4. Should barter programs be expanded? If procurement of strategic materials for the stockpile or Ccc inventory were to be expanded or if procurement of other materials and services were confined to barter to the maximum extent possible, barter programs could be expanded and probably would result in some moderate additional export of agricultural surplus commodities. However, barter transactions in which the government provides the commodities to be exported and provides the market for the commodities imported are almost certain to tend toward bilateralism if long continued. This represents a trading practice which the United States generally has opposed in principle and which may work to our disadvantage if used more generally by other countries. An important policy question, therefore, is whether we should encourage a more widespread use of this practice for purposes of agricultural surplus disposal.

5. What policy *re* use of foreign currency? Making effective use of the foreign currency generated under P.L. 480, Title 1 will become an increasingly important consideration as shipments under that program are continued. Sales for foreign currencies necessarily have the effect of grants or loans until such time that the currencies can be substituted for dollar expenditures or converted into dollars. Only then is it possible to make financial recovery for the United States. Usually sales are quite limited if we insist on use of the currency in lieu of dollar expenditures and much less limited if the currency is loaned or granted to the agreement country. Thus, planned uses of foreign currencies offset the volume and terms of sales. Those currencies allocated for use by the United States in lieu of dollar expenditures must be used to the maximum extent practicable by Departments which can use them effectively if a maximum financial return is to be realized.

6. Aid to shipping or maximum export of surpluses? The legislative requirement that at least 50 percent of surplus commodities disposed of pursuant to P.L. 480 be shipped in United States bottoms has, in certain instances, inhibited the disposal of surplus commodities under this Act.

7. Cooperation vs. competition? Considering the large amount of our surpluses and the tremendous financial strength of the United States, it is not surprising that friendly countries have expressed concern about our intentions to boost exports of agricultural surplus commodities and about the possible effects of "special" export programs on world markets and on their country's exports. Since it is a policy of the United States to give due consideration to usual exports of friendly countries in developing agreements with importing countries and to avoid undue disruption of world prices, it would appear advisable for the United States and interested friendly countries to keep each other mutually informed on general trade policies and objectives. Joint discussion of international trade developments and prospects among representatives of countries vitally interested in particular commodities important to the United States may prove helpful in promoting mutual understanding of trade problems and minimizing friction between friendly but competing exporters.

8. What alternatives? Since foreign disposal does not appear to offer outlets adequate for the

disposition of current surpluses of agricultural commodities in the next few years, the situation strongly suggests that domestic production, price support and sales policies be carefully reviewed. It would appear that current output of supported commodities should be brought within the bounds of prospective dispositions; that all opportunities for decreasing production and marketing costs as well as for increasing domestic utilization be thoroughly explored; that legislative provisions that prohibit domestic sales except at levels materially above current prices should be reexamined; and that rigid domestic support prices for some commodities that cause the United States to be a residual supplier to world markets should be adjusted. The United States need not make the adjustments alone. Policies which result in competitive prices and permit substantial supplies to move readily into export markets will bring pressures on other countries, both importers and exporters, to share in the needed adjustments. Further success in efforts to achieve currency convertibility, reduce trade barriers and eliminate discriminatory trading practices will have a similar effect.<sup>2</sup>

## Visa Applications Cut Off for Certain Escapees

Press release 298 dated June 6

In view of the large number of applications for visas under section 4(a) (3) of the Refugee Relief Act which have been received from escapees residing within the European continental limits of the NATO countries and in Turkey, Sweden, and Iran, the Department of State announced on June 6 that it would not accept new applications for such visas after June 11, 1956. The Refugee Relief Act allotted 10,000 visas for such escapees. As of June 1, 6,288 visas had been issued and more than 10,000 applications covered by assurances were on file

<sup>2</sup> The remaining sections of the staff study are entitled: "The Size and Nature of Agricultural Surpluses," "Trends in International Trade in Agricultural Commodities," "Nature and Purpose of Existing Authorities and Programs for Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses Abroad," "Accomplishments Under Existing Authorities," "Barriers or Limitations on Greater Accomplishments," and "Export Potential for Surplus Agricultural Commodities." Also included are three supplements dealing with wheat, cotton, and rice.

in the Department for the remaining 3,712 visas.

In making this announcement, Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs for Refugee Programs, emphasized that:

(1) The cutoff of applications does not apply to escapees residing in Germany and Austria, for whom section 4(a) (2) of the Refugee Relief Act allots 35,000 visas. Of this allotment only 10,210 visas had been issued by June 1 but, because of the limitations contained in the act, these visas cannot be used for escapees residing in other countries.

(2) Many of the escapees potentially eligible under 4(a) (3) are also registered with the United States Escapee Program. The United States Escapee Program, which is also under the supervision of Mr. Gerety, will continue its efforts to effect the successful resettlement of escapees in countries throughout the free world or to work out a local solution for those who prove unable to emigrate.

(3) Although applications for visas under section 4(a) (3) of the Refugee Relief Act will no longer be available, a limited number of visas will continue to be available for escapees under the regular quotas of the Immigration and Naturalization Act.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 84th Congress, 2d Session

Departments of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1957. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H.R. 10721. January 12-May 16, 1956. 713 pp.

Organization for Trade Cooperation. Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 5550, a bill to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 with respect to the administration of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. March 1-16, 1956. 1444 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1956. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 10082, a bill to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. March 20-May 10, 1956. 1094 pp.

Report on the Operations of the Department of State under Public Law 584. H. Doc. 374, March 30, 1956. 105 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3238, a bill to provide for continuation of authority for regulation of exports, and for other purposes. April 19 and 30, 1956. 148 pp.

Suspension of Duties and Import Taxes on Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H. R. 8636. H. Rept. 2107, May 3, 1956. 4 pp.

Amending the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. Report to accompany H. R. 9606. H. Rept. 2110, May 3, 1956. 5 pp.

## U.N. Security Council Continues Secretary-General's Role in Palestine Question

*Following are texts of statements made in the Security Council by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and by James J. Wadsworth, Deputy U.S. Representative, together with the Security Council's resolution of June 4 requesting Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to continue his good offices in connection with the Palestine question.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE, MAY 29

U.S./U.N. press release 2414

The United States supports the resolution now before the Council sponsored by the United Kingdom,<sup>1</sup> and we do so because we think it is the logical outgrowth of the Security Council's resolution of April 4<sup>2</sup> and of the mission undertaken by the Secretary-General pursuant to that resolution—a mission which we think has done much good.

The resolution of April 4 was adopted unanimously. There was at that time an ominous drift toward hostilities in Palestine. Prompt action was required. To halt this drift and to restore tranquillity in the area the Secretary-General was requested as a matter of urgency to undertake his mission to the Near East. In this the Secretary-General has, we think, met with significant success. Conditions in the area are measurably different from what they were on April 4. Dangerous tensions have been reduced, and the prospect for full and effective operation of the armistice machinery is good.

As the sponsor of the resolution of April 4, which requested the Secretary-General to undertake his mission, the United States continually

emphasized the importance of full compliance with the armistice agreements as the essential first step in restoring peaceful conditions in the Near East. We stated on March 26 that:<sup>3</sup>

in the first instance United Nations efforts should be concentrated on full compliance with the armistice agreements by Israel and the Arab States and on the carrying out in detail of the Security Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955, and 19 January 1956.

I went on to say that:

we therefore propose in the draft resolution before the Council that the Secretary-General undertake as a matter of urgency discussions with the parties and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, General Burns, to find ways and means to put these resolutions and the proposals which they embody into immediate effect.

Then on Wednesday, March 28, I summarized the United States position this way:<sup>4</sup>

We wanted two things: To act promptly in the face of a gravely worsening situation, and, in acting promptly, to indicate, with the Security Council's endorsement, certain steps which the Secretary-General and the parties might take to carry out the provisions of the armistice agreements. These are not new purposes; the unanimous resolutions of the Security Council, to which our draft resolution refers, likewise had as their purpose the effective functioning of the armistice. That is our sole purpose. Surely no one would deny that, unless the armistice agreements can be effectively carried out, a grave threat to the peace may result.

I mention those two quotations, Mr. President, because I think it will help us to see clearly where we are going if we have clearly in mind what it was that we thought when we undertook this present program.

Now, this remains the United States position. The Secretary-General's mission pursuant to the

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/3600/Rev. 1.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1956, p. 628.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 628.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 629.

resolution of April 4 has contributed greatly to the effective functioning of the armistice agreements and has thus diminished appreciably the likelihood of a threat to the peace in the area.

The report of the Secretary-General<sup>5</sup> shows that progress can be made toward the full functioning of the armistice agreements. Much has been accomplished of a practical nature along the lines of the measures previously proposed by the Chief of Staff and endorsed by the Security Council. The speedy carrying out of the proposal so far agreed upon will provide the basis for extending agreement on remaining practical measures proposed to the parties, thus solidifying the gains already made.

Now, Mr. President, the resolution sponsored by the representative of the United Kingdom has a basic purpose, which is to emphasize the Security Council's wish that (1) the agreements already arrived at are speedily put into effect and (2) that remaining measures called for in the Security Council's resolutions not yet fully agreed upon are adopted without delay. I think that is an accurate summation.

And it remains true today, as it did in April, that the practical measures which the Council has endorsed are the key to the full functioning of the armistice agreements and to peaceful conditions in the area. Where they have been agreed upon, therefore, there should be no delay in putting them fully into effect. Where they are still to be agreed upon, we hope to see the continuation of the Secretary-General's efforts to reach such agreement.

A prime feature in all these arrangements is that of freedom of movement for the United Nations Truce Supervision Observers. If they are to perform their task effectively, they must be given ready access to the area along the armistice demarcation lines, to the demilitarized zones, and the defensive areas as defined in the armistice agreements. The United Nations observers will thus be in a position to be the very eyes and ears of the United Nations Security Council and should be a strong deterrent to any possible aggressive action from any source.

Another important aspect of the draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom is the provision in operative paragraph 5 that, in carrying out his observation of the cease-fire, pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 11 August 1949,

the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization should report to the Security Council whenever any action undertaken by one party to the armistice agreement constitutes a serious violation of that agreement or of the cease-fire which in his opinion requires immediate consideration by the Security Council. And this, too, should be a strong deterrent to any possible aggressive action from any quarter, and this too has the full support of the United States.

Thus the task before the Security Council today is to consolidate the gains made by the Secretary-General in the agreement he has reached with the parties to prevent a recurrence of a situation such as prevailed earlier in the year. It seems fitting—in fact, it seems wise—to call upon the Secretary-General to make further efforts with the parties to that end.

If the Security Council agrees, as I am confident that it will, that the Secretary-General should continue to act in its behalf in accordance with the resolutions previously adopted, we will all be able to feel renewed confidence in the prospect of a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem in full accord with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

#### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WADSWORTH, JUNE 1**

U.S./U.N. press release 2415

In the statements we have heard from representatives of the parties to the various armistice agreements and from some members of this Council, certain misgivings have been expressed, with varying degrees of concern, relating to four paragraphs of the United Kingdom draft resolution: the sixth paragraph of the preamble, the third operative paragraph, the fourth operative paragraph, and the seventh operative paragraph.

With respect to the sixth paragraph of the preamble,<sup>6</sup> concern has been expressed that the reference to conditions for a peaceful settlement "on a mutually acceptable basis" derogates from past resolutions of the United Nations on the Palestine question and thus is meant to encourage a settlement which disregards the expressed views of the majority of the United Nations.

<sup>6</sup> "Conscious of the need to create conditions in which a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis of the dispute between the parties can be made."

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. S/3596 dated May 9.

With respect to the third operative paragraph,<sup>7</sup> the question has been raised as to the reason for the inclusion of certain words not appearing in the comparable paragraph in the resolution of April 4, these words in question being "in all areas."

With respect to the fourth operative paragraph,<sup>8</sup> concern has been expressed similar to that concerning the sixth preambular paragraph.

With respect to the seventh operative paragraph,<sup>9</sup> it has been suggested that the request of the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties should be made more precise to make it clear that it is intended that the Secretary-General's efforts should be within the framework of the resolution of April 4.

Mr. President, it was a matter of great satisfaction to the United States delegation that its initiative embodied in the resolution of April 4 met with such general approval and resulted in the successful mission of the Secretary-General to the Near East. It is a matter of continuing gratification to us that in the present debate general approval of the resolution of April 4 and of the results achieved by the Secretary-General has again been expressed.

It seems pertinent, therefore, Mr. President, in connection with the questions raised in this debate, for me to recall the statement of the United States representative here last Tuesday [May 29]. Mr. Lodge said at that time that the United Kingdom draft resolution was the logical outgrowth of the resolution of April 4 and of the Secretary-General's mission pursuant to that resolution. In that connection he recalled what it was the United States, as sponsor of the resolution of April 4, had hoped to accomplish and referred to his earlier statements before the Council. He pointed out on Tuesday, in quoting from his earlier statements,

<sup>7</sup>"3. Declares that full freedom of movement of United Nations observers must be respected in all areas along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas as defined in the Armistice Agreements, to enable them to fulfil their functions;"

<sup>8</sup>"4. Endorses the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represents a stage which has to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties;"

<sup>9</sup>"7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties, and to report to the Security Council as appropriate."

that he did so because he felt that this would help to see clearly where we were going if we had clearly in mind what it was we thought when we undertook the present program. He reiterated that the position of the United States remains unchanged.

I should like to state again today, Mr. President, that the United States position remains unchanged and that we regret that some concern has arisen over what may have been a misconception of the purpose of some of the language contained in the present draft resolution. I feel sure that our view of the present draft resolution, namely that it is fully in accord with and consistent with the resolution of April 4, is also the view of the sponsor of the resolution, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom [Sir Pierson Dixon]. It seems to me that he has made this quite clear today. The reference in the draft resolution to the need for conditions in which a peaceful settlement on a mutually acceptable basis can be made seems to us to state the obvious. Any agreed solution, that is, agreed between the parties, in contrast to an imposed solution, is bound to be one which is "mutually acceptable." This certainly does not mean in our view that the Security Council is by its actions derogating from the authority and validity of resolutions of the General Assembly. The emphasis in this sixth preambular paragraph is on the necessity for conditions which would be propitious for a settlement of outstanding problems. The conditions with which this Council is concerned are the same conditions with which we were concerned when we adopted the resolution of April 4. Those conditions are the absence of incidents, the reduction of tensions, and the full operation of the armistice machinery. These are the things which we around this table have been seeking to establish.

Now the reference to all areas along the armistice demarcation lines in the third operative paragraph is, in the opinion of the U.S. delegation, merely for purposes of emphasis. By referring to all areas along the armistice demarcation lines we would be taking note of the fact that so far freedom of movement in these areas is not fully unrestricted. The representative of the United Kingdom has, however, amended his draft resolution by taking out those words in order to dispel any further concern on this point.

The reference to the continuation of the Secretary-General's good offices with the parties in

the seventh and last operative paragraph means, in our opinion, simply the continuation of those efforts which the Secretary-General has already undertaken on behalf of the Security Council pursuant to the resolution of April 4. Again, however, the representative of the United Kingdom has amended his draft resolution to make this crystal clear.

Mr. President, I hope that this explanation of the understanding of the United States concerning the draft resolution will reinforce the statements already made here by the representative of the United Kingdom and that the concern which some of the parties have expressed on the matters I have mentioned will be dispelled. It is in the light of this understanding of the draft resolution that we have welcomed the initiative of the United Kingdom and that we fully support the draft resolution as amended.

#### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WADSWORTH, JUNE 4**

U.S./U.N. press release 2416

The United States delegation will vote in favor of the United Kingdom resolution as further amended by the deletion of the sixth preambular paragraph and the consequential change in the seventh preambular paragraph.

As I explained last Friday, my delegation feels that the paragraph in question does not derogate from the resolutions of the General Assembly, that it merely states the obvious, and that the fears expressed concerning it are not justified. For that reason we have a certain amount of regret that it has been found necessary to delete the paragraph. However, Mr. President, the amended resolution remains an important step toward solidifying the gains made as a result of the Secretary-General's mission in spite of the differences of opinion that have arisen here.

We sincerely trust that the unanimity which we hope will now be achieved by the Security Council on this matter will be translated into further cooperative action in the area and will continue to develop the conditions for which we have been working from the beginning.

If the Security Council agrees, as I am now sure that it will, that the Secretary-General should continue to act in its behalf in accordance with the resolutions previously adopted, we will all be able to feel renewed confidence in the prospect of a

peaceful solution of the Palestine problem in full accord with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

#### **TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>10</sup>**

U.N. doc. S/3605

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions of 4 April 1956 (S/3575) and 11 August 1949 (S/1376-II);

*Having* received the report of the Secretary-General on his recent mission on behalf of the Security Council (S/3596);

*Noting* those passages of the report (Section III and Annexes I-IV) which refer to the assurances given to the Secretary-General by all the parties to the Armistice Agreements unconditionally to observe the cease-fire;

*Noting* also that progress has been made towards the adoption of the specific measures set out in the third operative paragraph of the Security Council's resolution of 4 April 1956;

*Noting*, however, that full compliance with the General Armistice Agreements and with the Council's resolutions of 30 March 1955, 8 September 1955 and 19 January 1956, is not yet effected, and that the measures called for in the third operative paragraph of its resolution of 4 April 1956 have been neither completely agreed upon nor put fully into effect;

*Believing* that further progress should now be made in consolidating the gains resulting from the Secretary-General's mission and towards full implementation by the parties of the Armistice Agreements;

1. *Commends* the Secretary-General and the parties on the progress already achieved;

2. *Declares* that the parties to the Armistice Agreements should speedily carry out the measures already agreed upon with the Secretary-General, and should cooperate with the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to put into effect their further practical proposals, pursuant to the resolution of 4 April, with a view to full implementation of that resolution and full compliance with the Armistice Agreements;

3. *Declares* that full freedom of movement of United Nations observers must be respected along the Armistice Demarcation Lines, in the Demilitarized Zones and in the Defensive Areas, as defined in the Armistice Agreements, to enable them to fulfil their functions;

4. *Endorses* the Secretary-General's view that the re-establishment of full compliance with the Armistice Agreements represents a stage which has to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues between the parties;

5. *Requests* the Chief of Staff to continue to carry out his observation of the cease-fire pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of 11 August 1949 and to report to the Security Council whenever any action undertaken by one party to an Armistice Agreement constitutes a serious violation of that Agreement or of the cease-fire,

<sup>10</sup> Adopted unanimously on June 4.

which in his opinion requires immediate consideration by the Security Council;

6. *Calls* upon the parties to the Armistice Agreements to take the steps necessary to carry out this resolution, thereby increasing confidence and demonstrating their wish for peaceful conditions;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue his good offices with the parties, with a view to full implementation of the Council's resolution of 4 April 1956 and full compliance with the Armistice Agreements, and to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

## Cooperating To Solve Western Hemisphere Travel Problems

### SIXTH INTER-AMERICAN TRAVEL CONGRESS SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA, APRIL 14-21, 1956

*by H. H. Kelly*

Since 1939, a series of Inter-American Travel Congresses has been held under the auspices of the Organization of American States. These official conferences were useful in focusing attention upon the many problems involved in the development of international travel in the Western Hemisphere, but observers noted a lack of continuity between the periodic meetings and therefore a lesser accomplishment of effective results than had been hoped for.

In 1954, at the Fifth Congress at Panamá, agreement was reached upon a new and improved form of organization, with a Permanent Executive Committee and four technical committees designed to insure careful study of travel problems in the intervals between the periodic congresses and the preparation of detailed reports and recommendations.

This effective forward planning came to fruition at the Sixth Inter-American Travel Congress held at San José, Costa Rica, April 14-21, 1956. All of the optimistic expectations for a new and aggressive attack upon travel problems in the Western Hemisphere, with close cooperation be-

tween government and private industry, were fully justified at San José. The present report summarizes the principal accomplishments of the meeting and indicates the future lines of work which are now definitely mapped.

#### Agenda

The agenda for the San José meeting was built largely upon the recent energetic work of the Permanent Executive Committee and the four technical committees. These committees were concerned respectively with research and organization, facilitation, travel plant (physical facilities for tourists), and promotion. In addition, there was a chapter in the agenda on policy and planning. The San José Congress was organized with working sessions on each of these five main topics, and the various delegations participated in discussions of many detailed items under each of them.

The Executive Committee and all of the technical committees had held meetings in preparation for the San José Congress,<sup>1</sup> and their reports supplied the basis for practical discussions. In fact, the entire body of documentation for the Congress, prepared by the Permanent Secretariat in the Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., was the most comprehensive ever available at a meet-

• *Mr. Kelly, who is Director of the International Travel Division, U.S. Department of Commerce, was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Sixth Inter-American Travel Congress.*

<sup>1</sup> For an account of the meeting of the Technical Committee on Travel Plant at Washington in December 1955, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 223.

ing of this kind and contributed in essential measure to the success of the Congress.

### Participation

Nineteen of the 21 American Republics were represented by official delegations at San José. The total number of government delegates registered was approximately 90. Special observers were also in attendance from the United Nations, Inter-American Hotel Association, Inter-American Radio Association, Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production, Inter-American Federation of Automobile Clubs, International Air Transport Association, and International Road Federation. In addition, observers were registered from more than 40 industrial and commercial associations and companies.

The 19 countries represented by official delegations (only Paraguay and Venezuela being absent) were: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United States, and Uruguay.

### U.S. Delegation

The U.S. delegation, which in itself typified the close cooperation existing between government and private industry in this field, was composed of the following persons:

Henry H. Kelly, *Chairman*, Special Assistant on International Travel, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce

Charles P. Nolan, *Vice Chairman*, Officer in Charge, Transportation and Communications, Office of Regional American Affairs, Department of State

Malcolm C. Hope, Chief, General Engineering Program, Division of Sanitary Engineering Services, U.S. Public Health Service

William F. McGrath, Executive Vice President, American Society of Travel Agents, New York, N. Y.

Godfrey Macdonald, Vice President, Grace Lines, Inc., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, New York, N. Y.

Parks B. Pedrick, Vice President, Mississippi Shipping Co., for the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N. Y.

Norman J. Phillion, Air Transport Association of America, Washington, D.C.

Dr. Knud Stowman, Special Consultant, Division of Sanitation, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service

Each member of the U.S. delegation was assigned to one or more of the working committees,

and in this manner the U.S. position for the Congress, prepared in advance at Washington with clearances by the Interdepartmental Committee on Foreign Travel, was ably presented and the delegation's instructions were fully carried out.

### Organization of Conference

All preparations for the meeting were handled by an organizing committee of Costa Rican Government officials and consultants. The chairman of the Congress was Mario A. Esquivel, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica, and the secretary general was Mario Hernandez, member of the Board of Directors, Costa Rican Institute of Tourism. The Permanent Secretary of the Inter-American Travel Congresses, Francisco J. Hernandez of the Pan American Union, also played an important part in the conduct of the meeting.

At the inaugural session on April 14, a notable address on the broad economic and social aspects of travel development was made by the President of Costa Rica, José Figueres. Speaking only from notes, the President of the Republic gave his address alternately in Spanish and faultless English. The content of his remarks, in the opinion of many of those present, will be of permanent value in this field.

Sessions of the working committees began on April 14 and continued through the following week. Plenary sessions were held to consolidate and approve the work of the committees. The closing session was held on April 21, with the ceremony of signature of the Final Act containing all of the resolutions adopted.

### Conclusions

The Final Act of the San José Congress contains 57 resolutions, all adopted unanimously. They cover the entire field of travel development in the Western Hemisphere and establish a pattern of constructive operation which will be of value not only in that area but throughout the world.

The following is a summary of the principal resolutions which were adopted by the Congress and which will be transmitted to the Governments of the American Republics for action.

*Chapter I—Policy and Planning:* The Council of the Organization of American States was requested to approve an increase in the membership of the Permanent Executive Committee from five to seven, in order to insure fuller representation in this important steering body. The new member-



ship would include the present five members—Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and the United States—with the addition of Panama and Uruguay. A similar request was made regarding recognition of regional congresses of tourism, a new chapter on which is to be inserted in the organization plan of the congress.

Negotiations were authorized with the International Union of Official Travel Organizations, whose headquarters is at Geneva, Switzerland, to ascertain if an official relationship could be established on the basis of a single collective membership for the official travel offices of the American Republics. This question will probably be discussed with IUTO at its next annual assembly at Vienna in October 1956.

Montevideo, Uruguay, was designated as the site of the Seventh Inter-American Travel Congress in 1958. Cuba also made a strong bid for the 1958 meeting, but, when preference was shown by a large majority for Uruguay, the decision was made to have the Permanent Executive Committee hold one of its early sessions in Habana. The membership of the four technical committees was continued as at present, with all of the 21 American Republics holding representation on one or more. Chairmanship of these committees is as follows: Research and Organization, Peru; Elimination of Travel Barriers, Argentina; Travel Plant, United States; Promotion, Mexico.

*Chapter II—Research and Organization:* The Permanent Executive Committee was charged with studying present governmental methods of compiling statistics on tourism, with the objective of preparing recommendations for clarification and greater uniformity. Cooperation with the Inter-American Statistical Institute and the Statistical Commission of the United Nations was indicated as desirable. The importance of accurate definitions was emphasized.

The Permanent Executive Committee was charged with studying the structure and functions of the national tourist offices in America, and also those of nonprofit organizations, with special reference to methods of obtaining full cooperation. Recommendation was made that the governments establish national tourist offices, where these do not already exist, and that these offices consult with private industry in order to obtain needed coordination in travel development.

The Permanent Executive Committee was charged with making an investigation of means of exchanging technical personnel in the travel field.

The Congress defined the objectives of "tourist education" in America and recommended inclusion of appropriate instruction in primary, secondary, college, and professional courses.

The Permanent Secretariat was requested to assemble a bibliography of scientific and technical studies on tourism and to ask the Columbus Commemorative Library of the Pan American Union to study the classification and cataloging of published works in cooperation with other institutions.

*Chapter III—Facilitation:* The Congress approved recommendations which had been made by the Permanent Executive Committee at its first meeting, in June 1955, on the basic problems of personal documentation for international travelers. The important items covered included the complete elimination of police certificates, special entry and exit permits, and transit visas and the unilateral elimination of visas, tourist cards, and similar documents wherever possible. It also established the objective of limiting documentary requirements as soon as possible to a minimum of three—proof of identity and nationality, a simple embarkation/debarkation form for statistical and other record purposes, and the international certificate of vaccination.

Ratification by all governments of the two 1954 United Nations conventions on customs facilities for tourists and for private automobiles was also recommended. (The U.S. Senate on April 19, 1956, while the San José conference was in session, gave its consent to ratification of both of these conventions by the U.S. Government.)<sup>2</sup> A special study was authorized on the problem of availability of foreign exchange for international travelers.

Governments were urged to simplify to the maximum extent possible the documentary requirements applicable to civil aviation, in conformity with annex 9 of the International Civil Aviation Convention (Chicago, 1944).

Proposed excursion fares for air travel to South America on routes originating or terminating in the United States or Canada were pronounced an effective means of promoting tourism, and their extension to all countries of the Americas was favored.

The Congress recommended to all governments that their documentary requirements for passengers on ships should be the same as for those on

<sup>2</sup> For texts, see S. Execs. A and B, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

aircraft, together with elimination of consular visas on documents required for the entry or departure of passenger ships.

Support was given to the ratification by all governments of the Convention on Road Traffic of 1949<sup>3</sup> and the Convention on Inter-American Automotive Traffic of 1943.<sup>4</sup> Both of these agreements provide, among other things, for reciprocal recognition of drivers' licenses and registration plates in international travel by private automobiles.

Study was authorized of international railway transport of passengers as it relates to the development of tourism.

*Chapter IV—Travel Plant:* In a resolution of special interest to private industry, the Congress pointed out the urgent need for construction and expansion of hotels and similar establishments in Latin America. It established a series of provisions for a model law for use by any country which sincerely desires to establish favorable conditions for attracting private capital. These provisions include designation of the hotel industry as an essential industry from the standpoint of national interest, providing of national hotel credit, government guaranties on principal and interest payments, customs exemptions on importation of materials and equipment, and admission of expert personnel from other countries for reasonable periods.

The providing of accommodations for motorists on the route of the Inter-American Highway, which is expected to be opened for through traffic from the Mexico-Guatemala border to the Panama Canal by 1959, was found to be an especially urgent problem. A special resolution envisaged a chain of 16 modern motels at approximately 100-mile intervals, basic cost of which was estimated at \$2,500,000; joint action of the governments of the six Republics directly affected, in cooperation with private industry, was recommended.

A new attack was launched upon a problem of fundamental importance to all travelers—that of improved sanitation. The Congress requested the Pan American Sanitary Bureau to appoint a committee of experts to cooperate with the Inter-American Travel Congresses in establishing minimum standards of sanitation for tourist accommodations, including hotels and restaurants. The

Secretariat was instructed to make wide distribution of a report prepared for the Congress by the U.S. Public Health Service on "Sanitation Aspects of Travel." It was recognized that agreement upon minimum standards on an intergovernmental level—with special reference to water supply, food, plumbing, kitchen facilities, and the like—would mark a long step forward in this important phase of travelers' safety and would be of value throughout the world.

Attention was given to the improvement of relations between hotels and travel agencies, using the experience of the United States industry as a guide.

The Secretariat was requested to compile information on hotel schools now functioning in the Americas, for the purpose of promoting creation of more schools of this type and greater uniformity in their programs and administration. The Congress recommended that national hotel associations be organized in countries which do not have them at present and that these affiliate themselves with the Inter-American Hotel Association.

*Chapter V—Promotion:* On the direct promotion of tourist volume, the Congress agreed upon a series of fundamental principles for advertising and publicity. It also instructed the Secretariat to give wide distribution to a report showing how Latin American countries could obtain a larger share of the U.S. travel market, which was prepared for the Congress by the Air Transport Association of America with the assistance of the J. Walter Thompson Company of New York. Presentation of this report, illustrated with slides, at a combined session of the technical commissions of the Congress proved to be one of the outstanding events of the meeting.

A set of principles relating to cooperation between official agencies and private enterprise was also adopted. Study was authorized of cooperative publicity campaigns, continental or regional in scope.

Authorization was given for the conducting of prize essay contests on tourism topics. In this connection, the U.S. delegation announced that the initial contest of this nature would be offered for the next Congress with three prizes of \$1,000, \$500, and \$250, respectively, the funds to be contributed by leading U.S. transportation associations and the administration of the contest to be handled by the Pan American Union.

Appreciative recognition was given to the Gov-

<sup>3</sup> Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2487.

<sup>4</sup> TIAS 1567.

ernment of the United States for its offer of technical assistance projects in the field of tourism. Publication of a technical manual by the Pan American Union, on the basis of the wealth of

material submitted to the Sixth Congress and with a complete index, was authorized. An editing committee will be appointed by the Permanent Executive Committee for this purpose.

## Economic Opportunities for Women

### TENTH SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

*by Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn*

The U.N. Commission on the Status of Women at its 10th session, which met at Geneva from March 12 to 29, 1956, stressed the economic items on its agenda, particularly economic opportunities for women. In addition, it reviewed the political rights of women, the access of women to education, and discrimination practices in the field of family and property law. The Commission praised the resolution on advisory services in the field of human rights adopted by the U.N. General Assembly last year<sup>1</sup> and urged that the facilities being provided by this new program be utilized in the promotion of the status of women.

Mrs. Agda Rossel of Sweden was elected chairman of the Commission; Begum Anwar Ahmed of Pakistan, first vice chairman; Mrs. Mitra Mitrovic of Yugoslavia, second vice chairman; and Miss Uldarica Manas of Cuba, rapporteur.

Two countries, Belgium and Israel, served on the Commission on the Status of Women for the first time at its 1956 session. The other 16 countries represented on the Commission were Argentina, Australia, Byelorussia, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Indonesia, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Four of these countries sent new representatives, so that six of the delegates were attending a session of the Commission for the first time.

The Soviet Union had a new representative on the Commission this year, Mrs. Nina S. Spiridonova. In the first few days of the session she

vigorously attacked the Western countries, and the United Kingdom representative and I replied sharply to these attacks. Thereafter, the U.S.S.R. representative shifted to an attitude of cooperation and carefully avoided attacking the Western countries. During the second week of the session the U.S.S.R. representative invited the members of the Commission to attend a 2-week seminar in Moscow during July or August 1956. The Soviet Union offered to pay the expenses of members of the Commission from their countries to the Soviet Union and within the Soviet Union during the seminar. The chairman acknowledged the invitation, but no other response was made to it by the members of the Commission.

#### Resolutions Relating to Employment

The Commission adopted five resolutions in the economic field and called upon the U.N. Secretary-General and the International Labor Office to prepare background material for the further consideration of these subjects at the 1957 session of the Commission. The five resolutions concerned equal pay, the occupational outlook for women, cottage industries and handicrafts, working women with family responsibilities, and the removal of economic discrimination against women.

In the resolution on occupational outlook for

• *Mrs. Hahn is U.S. Representative on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women.*

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1034.

women the Commission asked the United Nations to prepare lists and descriptions on principal professional and technical fields of training and opportunities which are already available to women or which may in the future become available to them. The Commission decided that it would undertake a long-term study of this subject.

The United States joined with Pakistan in submitting a resolution on cottage industries and handicrafts which was adopted by the Commission. This resolution directed special attention to methods for placing handicraft production and sale on a sound basis, including adequate safeguards for workers against the abuses of industrial homework.

The Commission decided to undertake a study of working women with family responsibilities. The Soviet-bloc members on the Commission sought to focus attention on the protection of "mother and child." The United States and a number of other delegations, however, urged that it would be preferable for the Commission to emphasize the employment situation of women with family responsibilities, and this emphasis was approved by the Commission. The United Nations and the I.L.O. will accordingly prepare reports for the 1957 session of the Commission on activities in various countries for improving employment conditions for working women with family responsibilities.

The U.S.S.R. and several other delegations urged further implementation of a resolution adopted in 1955 by the Economic and Social Council which called for the removal of economic discrimination against women. They proposed a comprehensive report for the 1957 session of the Commission. The United States and several other delegations pointed out that it would be impractical to ask for such a report next year, and unanimous agreement was finally reached on a resolution which asked the United Nations and the I.L.O. to prepare for 1957 and for later sessions of the Commission a series of reports concerning steps being taken by member states to remove economic discrimination against women.

The Commission had a general discussion on problems relating to part-time work for women and older women workers and decided to consider this subject further at its next session. One aspect of the situation of older women workers which was of universal interest to the Commission was the

age for voluntary retirement under social insurance systems.

In the discussion of the subject of equal pay for equal work, and in the resolution finally adopted, the Commission stressed the importance of collective-bargaining procedures as one of the most effective ways to insure equal rates of pay to women workers. On further information to be obtained on this subject the Commission asked that particular attention be given to procedures found useful for achieving equal pay through collective bargaining, such as by encouraging greater participation by women in unions. The Commission was also interested in taxation policies in relation to employed married women.

There was considerable interest on the part of nongovernmental organizations in the agenda items in the economic field, and a number of them participated in the discussions. These organizations were the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Alliance of Women, the International Council of Women, the International Federation of Business and Professional Women, the International Federation of University Women, the International Federation of Women Lawyers, the Pan-Pacific South-East Asia Women's Association, the World Movement of Mothers, the World Union of Catholic Women's Organizations, the Open Door International, and the St. Joan's International Social and Political Alliance.

#### **Equal Suffrage and Equality in Education**

On the political rights of women I joined other members of the Commission in congratulating four countries where women have recently won full suffrage rights—Colombia, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru. There are now only 15 countries which deny women the right to vote. In 1945, at the time the U.N. Charter was signed, only 36 countries provided women with full political rights; the number has now increased to 65.

Members of the Commission stressed the importance of increasing citizenship training for women who have recently received the right to vote in order that there will be greater participation by these women in the political life of their countries.

On access of women to education, the Commis-

sion requested an analytical summary of information on discrimination against women in education for review by the Commission at its 1957 session. The Commission discussed that section of the draft report of the special rapporteur appointed by the U.N. Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities concerning discrimination on the basis of sex. The Commission was of the opinion that the discussion of discriminatory practices against women in this draft report was inadequate and that the Commission itself should undertake the preparation of a comprehensive statement on this subject.

As a followup of resolutions adopted by the Commission at earlier sessions concerning family law and the property rights of women, the Commission at this session decided to undertake a more detailed study of laws, practices, and customs relating to polygamy, child marriage, bride-price, and the right of the mother to exercise parental authority and to have custody and guardianship of the children during marriage and after its dissolution. Considerable concern was expressed in the Commission concerning laws, practices, and customs which adversely affect the dignity of women and are inconsistent with the principles of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

#### **Technical Assistance**

To implement the resolution on advisory services in the field of human rights adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1955 the Commission expressed the hope that the three forms of assistance provided in this resolution would be utilized in the promotion of the status of women. The three forms of assistance provided are (a) advisory services of experts, (b) fellowships and scholarships, and (c) seminars.

The Commission expressed the view that the organization of seminars should be a particularly fruitful method for the promotion of the rights of women and the improvement of their status through the exchange of information and experience in this field. The Commission asked the U.N. Secretary-General to consult particularly with governments and specialized agencies concerning the possibility of holding regional seminars to assist women who have recently acquired political rights, or do not yet fully exercise them, in devel-

oping their understanding of civic responsibilities and increasing their participation in the public life of their countries.

Recommendations for action adopted by the 10th session of the Commission on the Status of Women will be considered by the Economic and Social Council at its 22d session in July 1956.

#### **Special Studies and Future Plans**

The documentation prepared for the Commission this year included special studies in both the political and economic fields. A report on "Opportunities for Girls in Vocational and Technical Education," developed jointly by UNESCO and the ILO, will be considered at next year's session of the Commission. Another document described briefly over a hundred different technical-assistance projects which affected the status of women directly or indirectly and listed U.N. materials which might be useful to technical experts in countries where changes are taking place in the status of women. Two of the other documents considered by the Commission were based principally on information from women's nongovernmental organizations, one being an analysis of methods for the promotion of equal pay and the other of activities directed toward the recognition and exercise of women's political rights.

The increasing interest of the Commission in equal pay and equal employment opportunities for women reflects the increasing responsibilities women in almost all countries are undertaking in the economic field. That this is true in our own country is evidenced by the growing proportion of women in the labor force, with married women and older women accounting for much of this expansion. The ILO and UNESCO have regularly made their resources available to the Commission, and plans for next year will continue to draw on these agencies in cooperation with the United Nations. Since interchange with nongovernmental organizations is basic to the Commission's understanding of problems and the development of recommendations in this field, I hope their members will continue to make use of the records of the Commission and give thought to its program.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Information on the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women is contained in various sales documents published by the United Nations. A list of these may be obtained from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y.

## U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

### Intergovernmental Copyright Committee

The Department of State announced on June 7 (press release 301) that Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office, Library of Congress, and U.S. representative on the Intergovernmental Copyright Committee, will represent the U.S. Government at the first session of the Committee, which will meet at Paris June 11-16.

The Unesco-sponsored Universal Copyright Convention, which became effective on September 16, 1955,<sup>1</sup> provides for the Intergovernmental Copyright Committee to study the problems concerning the application and operation of the convention, prepare for its periodic revision, and study other problems of international copyright protection in consultation with interested intergovernmental organizations. The United States adheres to the convention and is a member of the Committee.

The first session of the Committee will have the task of adopting rules of procedure and of establishing precedents for its future activities. The Committee will also discuss questions pertaining to (1) international protection of performing artists, record manufacturers, and broadcasting organizations and (2) protection granted to news and other press information on current events by national copyright laws and international treaties and conventions.

There are now 18 parties to the Universal Copyright Convention: Andorra, Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Haiti, Holy See, Israel, Japan, Laos, Liberia, Luxembourg, Monaco, Pakistan, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States.

### International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on June 5 (press release 294) that the United States will be represented at the 39th session of the International Labor Conference at Geneva, June 6-28, by the following delegation:

#### REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

##### *Delegates*

J. Ernest Wilkins, Assistant Secretary of Labor, *Chairman*

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1955, p. 326. For text of convention and protocols, see S. EXEC. M, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

David W. Wainhouse, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

##### *Alternate Delegate*

B. Allen Rowland, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce

##### *Congressional Advisers*

Augustine B. Kelley, House of Representatives

Samuel K. McConnell, Jr., House of Representatives

##### *Advisers*

John T. Fishburn, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Selene Gifford, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior

Paul Gurske, Director, Bureau of Labor Standards, Department of Labor

Alice K. Leopold, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Labor for Women's Affairs

Otis E. Mullen, Office of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

James H. Pearson, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Stuart Rothman, Solicitor, Department of Labor

George Tobias, Labor Attaché, U.S. Resident Delegation and Consulate General, Geneva

Arnold Zempel, Executive Director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

#### REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

##### *Delegate*

Charles H. Smith, Jr., President, Steel Improvement and Forge Co., Cleveland, Ohio

##### *Advisers*

Virgil B. Day, Manager, Union Relations Service, Public and Employee Relations Services, General Electric Co., New York, N.Y.

G. Gordon Mitchell, Manager, Industrial Relations Division, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Wilmington, Del.

Carl E. Schneider, Vice President, Industrial Relations, Burroughs Corporation, Detroit, Mich.

Frank H. Terrell, 500 Fairfax Building, Kansas City, Mo.

William G. Van Meter, Attorney, Labor Relations and Legal Department, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, D.C.

#### REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

##### *Delegate*

George P. Delaney, International Representative, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D.C.

##### *Advisers*

James B. Carey, President, International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, Washington, D.C.

C. J. Haggerty, Secretary-Treasurer, California State Federation of Labor, San Francisco, Calif.

Thomas Murphy, Treasurer, Bricklayers, Masons, and Plasterers International Union of America, Washington, D.C.

Harry Pollak, Department of International Affairs, Amer-

ican Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D.C.

George J. Richardson, Secretary-Treasurer, International Association of Fire Fighters, Washington, D.C.

Harry Sayre, President, United Paperworkers of America, Washington, D.C.

The International Labor Conference, which meets yearly, is a forum in which representatives of employers and workers as well as governments for the 73 member countries formulate, through consultation and debate, suggested standards looking to the improvement of working and living conditions around the world. The other principal organs of the International Labor Organization (ILO) are the Governing Body, which is the executive council, and the International Labor Office, which is the secretariat of the organization.

The report of the Director General of the International Labor Office, which will be discussed at the Conference, will include a factual review and analysis of developments in the social field of particular concern to the ILO, the problems of rural and urban employment and their interrelationship in the social field, and an account of ILO activities during the year under review with specific reference to the main emphases in its work and to new developments in its program. Other items on the agenda include vocational training in agriculture; welfare facilities for workers; weekly rest in commerce and offices; and forced labor.

#### **International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems**

The Department of State announced on May 28 (press release 284) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegates at the 16th session of the International Conference on Large Electric High-Tension Systems (CIGRE) at Paris May 30-June 9, 1956:

Donald S. Campbell, Chief, Division of Power, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior

George A. Grimm, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Properties and Installations, Department of Defense

Ellsworth J. Hand, Deputy Director, Power Equipment Division, Business and Defense Services, Department of Commerce

Leslie N. McClellan, Assistant Commissioner and Chief Engineer, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior

Founded at Paris in 1921 under the auspices of the International Electrotechnical Commission, CIGRE serves as a focal point for the acquisition and dissemination of technical knowledge on an

international scale in the fields of power generation and transmission. At the forthcoming conference, consideration will be given to technical questions on alternators, cables, transformers, towers, circuit breakers, and overhead lines. It is expected that there will also be reports on the advances made in Europe in recent years in the design and construction of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines and in particular on an extensive 380-kv transmission system which is now in operation in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy.

CIGRE membership is composed of 1,800 individuals and collective members (industrial and scientific societies, organizations dealing with high-tension electrical systems) in Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

## **Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography**

### **Security Council**

Letter dated 8 March 1956 from the Representative of Syria addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3555, March 8, 1956. 2 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 13 March 1956 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3559, March 14, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 6 April 1956 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3577, April 6, 1956. 3 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 9 April 1956 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3579/Rev. 1, April 13, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo.

Letter dated 12 April 1956 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3585, April 12, 1956. 2 pp. mimeo.

Communications circulated by the President of the Security Council at the request of the Secretary-General.

1. Text of message from the Secretary-General to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated 11 April 1956 from Cairo, Egypt. 2. Letter dated 12 April 1956 from the Prime Minister of Israel to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at Cairo, Egypt. 3. Text of message from the Secretary-General to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated 13 April 1956 from Cairo, Egypt. S/3586, April 13, 1956. 7 pp. mimeo.

Communications circulated by the President of the Security Council at the request of the Secretary-General.

1. Message from the Prime Minister of Israel to the Secretary-General dated 13 April 1956. 2. Message from the Secretary-General to the Prime Minister of Israel dated 13 April 1956. 3. Message from the Foreign Minister of Israel to the Secretary-General delivered personally at Lydda airport on 14 April. S/3587, April 16, 1956. 4 pp. mimeo.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### United States and Austria Sign Atoms-for-Peace Agreement

On June 8 the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 306) announced that representatives of Austria and the United States had signed on that day a proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The agreement was negotiated within the framework of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.

The agreement was signed for Austria by Ambassador Karl Gruber and for the United States by Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48 (a), 49 (e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1581) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratifications deposited:* Mexico, May 13, 1955; Netherlands, May 31, 1955; Honduras, June 1, 1955; Denmark, June 4, 1955; Spain, June 6, 1955; Iceland, July 5, 1955; Sweden, July 8, 1955; Philippines, July 27, 1955; Portugal, September 20, 1955; Indonesia, October 18, 1955; Pakistan, October 21, 1955; Turkey, December 23, 1955; China, February 16, 1956; Syria, March 8, 1956; Afghanistan, March 15, 1956; Austria, April 13, 1956; Switzerland, April 17, 1956; Norway, April 18, 1956; Bolivia, May 23, 1956; Union of South Africa, May 24, 1956.

##### Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London

<sup>1</sup>Not in force.

February 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 1953. TIAS 2792.

*Ratification deposited:* Greece, April 21, 1956.

##### Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.

*Acceptances deposited:* Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia, May 14, 1956.

##### Safety at Sea

Regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force January 1, 1951. TIAS 2899.

*Acceptances deposited:* Thailand, December 8, 1955; Viet-Nam, March 15, 1956.

##### Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, April 30, 1956.

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##### Netherlands

Agreement relating to certificates of airworthiness for imported aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague September 19 and November 4, 1955.

*Entered into force:* May 22, 1956 (date of receipt by the United States of a notification from the Netherlands that the agreement has been constitutionally approved).

##### Pakistan

Construction agreement pursuant to article I, paragraph 1, of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of May 19, 1954 (TIAS 2976). Signed at Karachi May 28, 1956. Entered into force May 28, 1956.

##### Panama

Reciprocal agreement for gratis nonimmigrant visas. Effected by exchange of notes at Panamá March 27, May 22 and 25, 1956. Entered into force June 1, 1956.

##### Portugal

Surplus agricultural commodities agreement pursuant to title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Lisbon May 24, 1956. Entered into force May 24, 1956.

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##### Resignations

R. Douglas Stuart as Ambassador to Canada, effective May 6.

<sup>2</sup>Not in force for the United States.



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*293	6/5	Program for Adenauer visit.
294	6/5	Delegation to International Labor Conference (rewrite).
*295	6/5	Nufer sworn in as Ambassador to Philippines.
296	6/6	China credentials (rewrite).
†297	6/6	Results of 1956 tariff negotiations.
298	6/6	Cutoff date on visas for escapees.
299	6/6	Kalijarvi: "The Aircraft Industry and Foreign Trade Policy."
*300	6/7	Educational exchange.
301	6/7	Intergovernmental Copyright Committee.
*302	6/7	Conant: American Chemical Society.
†303	6/8	Delegation to World Power Conference (rewrite).
304	6/8	Holland: "Evaluation of U.S. Economic Relations With Latin America."
*305	6/8	Educational exchange.
306	6/8	Atoms-for-peace agreement with Austria (rewrite).
307	6/8	Dulles: "The Cost of Peace."

\*Not printed.  
 †Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# The Department of State

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June 25, 1956



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# *The Department of State* bulletin

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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# A Peaceful Crusade for Freedom

by Vice President Nixon<sup>1</sup>

I was tempted in preparing my remarks for this occasion to discuss at length the economic prospects for the years ahead. We are fortunate to be living in a period when for the first time in a quarter of a century we have had 3 consecutive years of unparalleled prosperity. The college graduates of 1956 will find available to them the most jobs at the highest wages in the Nation's history. And it would be fascinating indeed to explore the almost limitless possibilities for expansion of the American economy during the years ahead as we begin to harness the new sources of energy which our scientists have tapped.

Tonight, however, I believe there is a subject of greater importance to this graduating class and to the Nation. I refer to the titanic struggle between two opposing concepts of life in which we are engaged. The next few years will determine whether we can live in peace and at the same time avoid surrender. And that question will be answered by how well we are able to meet and defeat the changing tactics of the dictatorial forces which threaten the free world.

From the end of World War II to the death of Stalin in 1953, our problem was a relatively simple one. Communist leaders all over the world used open threats of force coupled with thinly veiled support of revolutionary and subversive movements in countries designed for conquest. These actions of bluster and abuse inevitably drove the free world together in self-defense.

Then came the death of Stalin and the "new look" in Communist foreign relations. The leaders of the Soviet Union invited the rest of the world to a period of peaceful coexistence. In doing so they seemed to abandon their previous

tough line, and they have even repudiated some of the excesses of past regimes.

This change of tactics has understandably created considerable confusion in the non-Communist world.

I think there will be little dissent from the conclusion that, in view of the record of the men in the Kremlin, the lines of military and diplomatic policy that we have hammered out over the past 10 years must continue to govern our conduct at this time.

But is this the whole answer? Do we stand pat and leave all the initiative to the other camp? Do we act as if nothing has happened in the 3 years since Stalin died?

I answer these questions by saying that we could make no greater mistake than to rest on our oars and to ignore the "new look" in Soviet diplomacy.

If it is made to appear that our primary concern is military hardware, we may find ourselves isolated in a world that has been convinced by the traveling salesmen of the Soviet Union selling other products.

What we face today is a new line which could be far more dangerous in the long run than the Stalin line of bluster and brute force. It is basically a war for men's minds, a struggle for their allegiance, an effort to win them peacefully to the Soviet camp.

In this struggle, ideas—not guns or aircraft—are the weapons. In this war, our armies wear the university cap and gown—not the uniform of the soldier. Books and pamphlets, rather than tanks and battleships, will be decisive in this contest.

One of the major reasons for the change in Soviet policy now becomes apparent. It was obvious to the successors of Stalin that they could not sell their new line so long as people remem-

<sup>1</sup> Address made at commencement exercises at Lafayette College, Easton, Pa., on June 7.

bered slave-labor camps, mass purges, and the ever-present terror of the secret police. Yet, to the outside world, there would appear to be a break with the past and a writing off of the handicaps derived from more than 30 years of terror. And the "new look" was sufficiently appealing in contrast to the old that there was every chance of selling this policy to uncommitted nations and of breaking off one by one those who had allied together in a common policy of defense.

In the cold light of history it seems fantastic that a nation with the Soviet record of terror and aggression could hope to make widespread gains by announcing a simple change of policy. At the least, one would expect that all non-Communist countries would adopt a policy of watchful waiting and not make any shift of program until the "new look" had been tried for 5 to 10 years. Unfortunately, this is not the case.

We must recognize that there are powerful assets which work to the benefit of the Soviet in this contest. Unless we examine them and face them realistically, we may well lose out in the battle for men's minds.

### **The Uncommitted Nations**

First, let us see what is at stake. Approximately 600 million people live in the so-called uncommitted or neutral nations. It is easy to see that the world struggle will be determined by what happens to these people.

On the basis of my travels through most of this part of the world, may I tell you what I believe the people in the uncommitted nations want and contrast the Communist appeal with our own?

*First*, there is the desire for peace throughout the world, a desire which is particularly strong in the nations newly freed from colonial ties. This is not merely negative in the sense of war weariness or fear. It is often something much more positive. They wish the time and freedom to build their countries economically, politically, and culturally. To such nations the Communist world talks and promises peace. It appears to respect their desire for neutrality.

By contrast we often seem to be talking war and military alliances. I do not say that these impressions are correct, but they are more widespread and sincerely held than we often realize.

*Second*, there is the understandable desire for economic progress in nations less developed than

those in the West. To these nations, the Soviet Union holds up the example of its own dramatic industrial progress under communism.

On the other hand, the almost unbelievable prosperity of the United States appears to many of these nations as a goal impossible of attainment.

*Third*, there is the desire for recognition, prestige, and independence. In much of Asia and Africa, strong resentments have been built up against Western nations because of past or present colonial and imperialistic policies. Often there is the deep hurt that springs from real or imagined racial discrimination.

Here we find that there is a fear of what they term cultural imperialism, an effort by the West to dominate the thinking of other nations rather than to respect their cultures and religions on an equal basis with ours.

And here again the Soviet has been adroit in recognizing this desire. Compare, for example, the tactics of Bulganin and Khrushchev in dealing with the peoples of the Far East and their tactics in Great Britain.

A *fourth* point to note is the attitude of many peoples toward material things in contrast to the intellectual and the spiritual. This is difficult to express accurately. In one sense, all peoples are concerned with economic and material problems. They must produce to live. Yet, at the same time, there are often profound differences in the relative place assigned to these activities.

In many areas of the world a place of honor is given to leaders in the arts and intellectual fields and in religious activities. The intellectual is not dismissed as an egghead. The artist is not called a long-hair. The minister of religion is not considered an impractical idealist.

Here again we find that many peoples think that we in America are too materialistic to have such ideals. We are considered anti-intellectual, deficient in culture, superficial in religion.

Again, I am not passing judgment on the truth or falsity of these charges. The important point is that they are widely believed.

And what is truly amazing is this—that the apostles of communism can parade as exponents of the very ideals that they accuse us of neglecting when their own philosophy is the ultimate in materialism and the antithesis of religion.

But we find again how cleverly they present their case. They point out that the scientist and the intellectual are held in high esteem in the

Soviet Union. Artists and writers are among the highest paid and most honored citizens in their regime. Even the persecution of religion is played down by the claim that worship is free and that only political activities of the churches are suppressed.

### **Implications for U.S. Policy**

We now come to the basic question: What should our policy be in the light of the new Soviet tactics?

We must, of course, continue to maintain adequate military strength at home, and we must try to keep alive our vital alliances abroad.

We must continue our programs of economic assistance and avoid if we can the possibility that less developed nations will be forced to become economic satellites of the Soviet Union.

But our military and economic programs, essential as they are, may not prove to be the most important elements in this battle. Of this we can be sure. The uncommitted nations are not going to be frightened into alliances with the West by military power, nor can their allegiance be purchased by dollars. What will probably be decisive in this struggle is not how much each side does but how it is done. That is why we must, at whatever cost, place additional emphasis on developing the kind of ideological program which is designed to win the minds and hearts of men.

### **Need for Tact, Humility, Friendliness**

Before I discuss details of such a program, may I suggest one fundamental condition that can make the difference between success and failure. Whatever we do, we must deal with other people as our moral and spiritual equals.

Nothing is more infuriating or more likely to make our program fail than a boastful or condescending attitude on our part. It is dangerous to parade our material wealth or economic achievement. This may merely create envy, rather than admiration, on the part of other peoples.

In a sense, we must deal with other nations with the tact, humility, and friendliness of missionaries. Indeed, we could learn a great deal in our foreign relations by studying the attitudes and methods of the Christian missionaries who have won friends throughout the world. They came to help the nations to which they were sent.

They learned their languages and customs. By taking literally the truth that all men are brothers under God, they were accepted into families and homes of distant peoples.

Once we have this attitude, our task is to convince others that democracy and freedom and all the rights and privileges we hold sacred are better for them than is the Soviet way of life. It is not enough to denounce or expose communism. We must show that we have a better alternative. We do not do this by parading our superior material standard of living. It is the total pattern of life that must prevail—not merely one phase of it.

May I make one point clear at this time: There is no question but that we have the better case to sell. Because basically we are on the right side—the side of freedom and justice, of belief in God, against the forces of slavery, injustice, and atheistic materialism. Ours is the truly revolutionary, dynamic idea. It is the Communist idea which is repressive and reactionary.

### **Getting Our Message Across**

How do we get our message across?

I believe that often too much reliance is placed upon the effectiveness of bombarding the uncommitted countries with radio broadcasts, motion pictures, and press releases which present the American viewpoint. These programs are important and necessary, but, in the long run, I believe there are others which are more effective.

May I emphasize first the overwhelming importance of expanding our program for exchange of persons. This includes high school youngsters who spend a year living with American families and going to our schools, college and university students who get their degrees in American schools, and the leader program under which each week 50 or more foreign visitors—leaders in business, government, labor, and education—come to the United States as guests of our Government to talk with Americans who are in the same field as theirs. In this way our guests learn about us firsthand, correcting false impressions they may have had about us.

It is particularly important that we expand this program in countries newly released from colonial status. Here the need for trained leaders is often the greatest. Many times students will graduate from a university and almost immediately take a high political position in their native lands.

From a long-range point of view, we can gain immensely by programs of this nature. For the cost of one large bomber we can make friendships that will benefit the free world for generations to come. President Eisenhower's brilliant proposal that American educational institutions and foundations aid in expanding educational opportunities throughout the world is in line with this approach.<sup>2</sup>

If the free world can teach the leaders of tomorrow in areas that may well dominate tomorrow's world, we need not fear the contest between communism and freedom.

There are those, of course, who may point out the fact that many of those who today oppose Western policies were trained in Western universities. But they oppose us because we taught them ideals of freedom while we were keeping their lands in colonial bondage. Now that great areas of the world are free from colonialism, we have a good chance to win back the friendship and loyalty of leaders of these lands.

#### **Responsibility of Individual American**

In addition to government-sponsored activities, it is important that every American who goes abroad or who deals with foreign guests in our own land realize that he is an ambassador representing our Nation. All of us must try to be sensitive, understanding, and helpful. Arrogance and boastfulness make enemies—not friends.

And particularly we must appreciate the high place given to intellectual and spiritual values in many areas of the world. This places a tremendous responsibility upon our tourists and business visitors, upon the exporters of motion pictures and books—indeed, upon anyone who is likely to be taken as a representative of our way of life.

I was reading an article the other day that showed the importance of these attitudes. It concerned the great atomic scientist, Bruno Pontecorvo, who left Great Britain to devote his genius to Soviet atomic research. One of the important reasons for his defection, according to his colleagues, was the fact that he thought he would have more honor, prestige, and even greater freedom of research in the Soviet Union. Likewise, many of the scientists who got caught in the Soviet

espionage network in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain were partially influenced at least by the feeling that they were not sufficiently appreciated in the free world. The world of tomorrow belongs to the nations that lead in scientific research and technical skill. We shall pay a great price if we fall behind in this contest.

#### **Possibility of East-West Contacts**

In discussing our need to win the war for men's minds, I have said little about direct contacts with the people behind the Iron Curtain. Today we can have such contacts almost for the asking. If the present trend continues in the Soviet Union and in many satellite countries, it will be possible to meet broadly with these peoples, to exchange ideas, to compare our respective ways of life.

Many of my fellow Americans are rather skeptical about this new move. They suspect, with some justification, a hidden trick—possibly a device to make communism respectable and to discourage the peoples held in submission by Red armies.

I do not fully share this point of view. I think that the explosive power of freedom is greater than the combined effect of all the atomic and hydrogen weapons in the world today. Whatever be the motives behind these new moves, I think that in the long run the cause of freedom will be served by breaking through the Iron Curtain wherever an opportunity is presented.

#### **A Task for All Americans**

The task ahead of us is a task for all the American people and not government alone.

In time of war we are prepared to risk our lives serving with the armed forces of our country. But the war for men's minds is a real war and just as important as the struggle of armies, navies, and air forces.

You in the academic world are particularly fitted to serve in this contest. May I suggest that you graduates and you of the faculty give thought to the part that you can play.

On an even broader sphere, I hope that the learned societies of the United States with their counterparts in other free nations will devote time and energy to extend their study to this great struggle for allegiance.

Jointly, you should embark upon a peaceful crusade for freedom. Some should volunteer for

<sup>2</sup>For text of the President's address of May 25, see BULLETIN of June 4, 1956, p. 915.



service abroad, just as soldiers volunteer for special missions. The best thought of our best minds should be given to this burning problem.

It was once said that "you shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." This challenge has echoed through the ages. It is as valid today as it was when it was uttered more than 19 centuries ago.

We believe in truth and in the power of truth. We believe in such basic truths as man's equality under God, the dignity of man, the rights of each individual to live his life in peace, the sacredness of law, the benefits of political freedom, including the freedoms guaranteed in our Bill of Rights.

These truths are the great heritage of mankind. We are confident that they will prevail. And it is the task of this generation to make sure that our confidence is not misplaced and that all Americans will rise to the challenge that faces us.

## **Talks With Chancellor Adenauer of Germany**

*Following is the text of a joint communique issued on June 13 at the conclusion of the 2-day meeting between Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany and Secretary Dulles.*

Press release 322 dated June 13

The visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Washington has afforded an opportunity for a full exchange of views between him and Secretary of State Dulles. This has permitted the Chancellor and the Secretary of State to undertake a broad review of the world situation and of problems confronting their governments in the international field. The Chancellor was accompanied by State Secretary Hallstein.

Foremost among the matters discussed were the question of German reunification, the most recent events in the Soviet Union, and the further development and strengthening of the Atlantic community.

Secretary of State Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer emphasized German reunification as a major objective of the West and the conviction that the attitude of the West toward the Soviet Union should be determined by the endeavor to promote the reunification of Germany in freedom.

In connection with developments within the Soviet Union, they exchanged views regarding the letters recently addressed to their respective Governments by Chairman Bulganin transmitting the Soviet Government's statement of May 14 regarding its armed forces. They noted that other North Atlantic Governments had received similar communications and they agreed on the desirability of consultation with their NATO partners regarding this development.

They noted that the Soviet Government has professed a desire to find a basis for peaceful co-existence with the nations of the free world. They agreed that one test of the sincerity of this profession will be the willingness of the Soviet Government to respect its international obligations and to refrain from endeavoring to impose its system upon other peoples. They recalled that at Geneva nearly a year ago the heads of government of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the United States recognized their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany, and agreed that the reunification of Germany should take place by means of free elections and should be carried out in conformity with the national interest of the German people and the interest of European security. The Chancellor and the Secretary of State considered that, until the Soviet Government had taken action to discharge that responsibility and to put an end to the brutal and unnatural division which it has imposed on Germany, it will be difficult to place credence in promises and pledges of the Soviet Government.

The Chancellor and the Secretary of State reaffirmed the desire of their governments to work out with the Soviet Union and with nations of the North Atlantic area arrangements which would ensure European security in conjunction with the reunification of Germany in freedom.

The Chancellor and the Secretary of State agreed on the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which constitutes an essential contribution to the security of the free world. They agreed on the need for strengthening and developing further the relationships among the members of the North Atlantic Treaty and for harmonizing their policies and actions with respect to major problems affecting the treaty objectives. They pledged the support of their governments to the work being carried on in this regard under

the decision taken at the recent meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Paris.

The Secretary of State informed the Chancellor of the satisfaction with which the United States Government has learned of the recent Franco-German agreement on the Saar. He expressed also the interest of the United States in the results of the Venice meeting regarding new steps toward European integration and especially in the prospects for the early negotiation and establishment of a European organization with common authority and responsibility in the field of nuclear energy. He indicated that the establishment of such a common organization would make possible a particularly close relationship with the United States in this field. The Secretary also expressed the interest of the United States in the creation of a European common market and the promise which such a market would hold for the future economic development of Europe.

The Chancellor and the Secretary of State noted with satisfaction the continued development of close relations between Germany and the United States. The Chancellor raised the question of war-vested German assets in the United States. The Secretary of State expressed the hope that there would be early United States legislative action on this subject.

The Secretary expressed the satisfaction of the United States Government with the action just taken by the Federal Republic of Germany to remove the quota restrictions on imports from the dollar area, in accordance with the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Chancellor and the Secretary agreed on the importance of the free world continuing to cooperate in measures to expand the flow of trade on a mutually advantageous basis.

## **Germany Frees Many Imports From United States**

Press release 316 dated June 13

The freeing of over 90 percent of Germany's private imports from the dollar area, referred to in the communique issued in connection with the talks between Chancellor Adenauer and Secre-

tary Dulles, is regarded as a further major step toward eliminating quota restrictions on imports of goods from the dollar area.

The German action means that almost 93 percent of Germany's private imports from the United States and Canada will be free of import quotas. Almost 600 individual items are affected by the action. These items include raw materials and agricultural and manufactured products. American exporters can now sell U.S. goods on the dollar-liberalization list without German Government restriction and solely on the basis of commercial considerations, such as price and quality.

The Department of State believes that this action will be welcomed by the American business community as further evidence of the desire of the Federal Republic to remove its restrictions on imports in accordance with its commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In 1954 the United States exported \$483 million worth of goods to the Federal Republic and imported from that country \$278 million. In 1955 exports were \$587 million and imports were \$362 million.

The U.S. Government views the dollar-liberalization measure taken by the Federal Republic as a significant move to place international trade on a freer basis in accordance with the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It is believed that there will be advantages to the German economy as well as to U.S. trade from this action. The U.S. Government looks forward to the elimination by the German Government of the remaining quota restrictions on imports from the dollar area.

The list of items will be issued by the German Government in about 10 days. When it becomes available, it will be published by the Department of Commerce in the *Foreign Commerce Weekly*.

The extent to which other Western European countries have significantly freed imports from the dollar area from quantitative restrictions are as follows: Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg—87 percent; Denmark—55 percent; Greece—99 percent; Italy—40 percent; Portugal—53 percent; Sweden—58 percent; Switzerland—98 percent; and the United Kingdom—56 percent.

## American Business Abroad and the National Interest

*by Under Secretary Hoover*<sup>1</sup>

It is indeed a great honor to be asked to address the closing session of the 26th National Business Conference this evening, and I am delighted to have the opportunity to be with you.

Since I left these same buildings, almost 30 years ago, there have been extraordinary changes in the world situation. A great war has taken place, and the entire structure of relationships abroad has altered radically. In the midst of this changing scene, it seems most fitting that the theme of this year's conference should be devoted to the future of American business abroad.

One of the major factors affecting the future is the unpredictable character of Soviet economic policy, controlling as it does the lives of hundreds of millions of people. We have heard a great deal in the past year, for instance, about the new Soviet economic offensive. What is it, and where is it going?

Is it a genuine movement toward peaceful economic expansion? Or are its objectives to spread Communist political domination over new areas in the free world?

Is the American system capable of coping with this development? What are the opportunities and responsibilities of American business as we look ahead into the future?

These and many other questions arise as we watch the pattern unfold in the far corners of the world. I would like to explore with you the answers to some of these questions this evening, because our conclusions may have much to do with the shaping of our governmental and commercial policies for many years to come.

As we look back in history, we find that in the 25 years prior to Stalin's death in 1953, through outright military power and aggression, and aided by subversion from within, the Communists expanded their domination over many parts of the world. Repeated threats to the independence of many countries culminated in open warfare in a number of instances. Our persistent attempts to arrive at peaceful solutions were rebuffed on countless occasions.

During Stalin's regime it was repeatedly announced that the Communist objective was the ultimate domination of the world. Khrushchev has subsequently reiterated this aim on several occasions.

The effect on the free world was to draw together many nations for purposes of self-defense. As a reaction to this military aggression and threats to the peace of the world, 43 countries joined together in the Rio Pact, NATO, ANZUS, SEATO, the Balkan Alliance, and the Baghdad Pact. The result was that the free world became stronger and more resolved than ever to resist Communist threats of violence and subversion.

Although it had been obvious for some years that the old policies were no longer succeeding, it was not until after Stalin's death that new tactics and a new approach could be adopted. Peace and competitive coexistence became the order of the day. While the ultimate Communist objectives remained the same, the problems for the free world have taken on new aspects.

### **Our Economic Traditions**

I have outlined here, in only the broadest terms, the problems that we face today. Let us turn for a moment to the American economic system and

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the 26th National Business Conference of the Harvard Business School Association at Boston, Mass., on June 16 (press release 329).

evaluate our own ability to cope with this change of tactics.

We know that the Soviets regard our own American system of free competitive enterprise as a vastly greater impediment to their own designs of world domination than that of any other country. It is upon us, therefore, that they concentrate their efforts and their strategy.

It is strange how unfamiliar our system is to many people abroad. As a matter of fact, one of the major efforts of the Communists is to spread an image of the American system as one which embodies the most extreme form of exploitation.

The American system has evolved over the past 50 years in directions which were totally unforeseen when Marx and Engels were belaboring capitalism a century ago. Not only does the American system bear little resemblance to the classical Marxist concept of capitalism; it also differs significantly from the systems which prevail in other countries conventionally regarded as capitalistic.

When we talk about individual liberty in the United States, we have in mind something which goes beyond the freedom expressed in political institutions. A representative form of government, the right to vote, the secret ballot—these are all part of our heritage. But in this country individual freedom has assumed new and significant dimensions, many of which can be found in few other places in the world.

One such attribute is what has aptly been called the freedom of opportunity—the opportunity to choose one's job or profession and the opportunity to rise to one's fullest capabilities. Furthermore, there is no other country in the world where educational opportunities are as accessible as they are in the United States, or where there are equal opportunities available for economic success.

It is no accident that the American system, with its freedom and incentive for the individual and with its stress on individual worth, has attained the highest standard of living for its people. Moral and spiritual values have provided the driving force for this achievement. And it is all our people who are the beneficiaries of this progress—not a chosen few. In fact, the difference in income between our factory workers, on the one hand, and management personnel, on the other, is smaller in the United States than in any other major industrial nation in the world, even including the Soviet Union.

I should like to cite a few figures which illustrate as well as anything I know the difference between the American system of today and the outmoded Marxist image of capitalism as a ruthless exploiter of the individual.

In recent years the average American family income has increased over 50 percent in real terms. But the lowest fifth of income recipients have experienced an even larger increase than the average. Their incomes rose 125 percent. Of all the great industrial nations, the one that relies most heavily on individual initiative and private enterprise has come closest to providing abundance for all.

There are other dimensions of individual freedom in the United States which have grown in importance as this country has matured.

The American worker's freedom of organization is traditional in our system, and responsible trade unions have an accepted place in our national life.

Property ownership in America is widely diffused. About 8 million people are stockholders in American corporations. Almost 4 million farmers own the farms which they work. About 3 million small business enterprises belong to individual owners. No small clique owns America. The responsibilities and the profits are widely shared.

There are many essential ingredients in our environment. But one above all is relevant to our discussion tonight. That is the tradition of independence and free competition that has existed in America. It is a tradition that goes far back in our history. It is the very foundation upon which our system has been built.

How has this tradition of independence and individual responsibility affected our approach to foreign economic relations?

I think the answer is that we instinctively conduct our relations with other countries in a way which will strengthen their integrity, sovereignty, and independence. This is the natural reaction of Americans to their own history of independence and freedom. We want other countries to be strong, independent, and free; and the more they are so, the better we like to do business with them.

Under our system, international trade and investment are commercial operations carried on by widely dispersed interests, competing against each other as well as against those from other countries. With us, political control is irrelevant to normal commercial relationships.

There are no political strings attached to American business operating abroad.

### **The World Trade Picture**

What are the economic facts of life that face American business in the world today?

World trade, as measured by exports, was at an alltime high in 1955—\$92 billion. Trade between the free-world countries in 1955 was \$80 billion, or 86 percent of the total. Trade between the Soviet bloc and the free world was \$4.4 billion, or less than 5 percent of the total. In addition there was trade among countries inside the bloc of \$7.8 billion, or 9 percent of the total.

The significant point of these figures is the great preponderance of world trade which took place among the non-Communist countries. The United States alone generates almost 20 percent of all international trade. A substantial portion of this trade, amounting to \$11 billion of imports and exports, was with Latin America, Asia, and Africa. These are the newly developing areas which are among the prime targets of the Soviet economic drive.

By contrast, the trade of the Communist countries with these areas amounted to about \$1 billion.

The low level of Communist trade with the rest of the world is mainly due to a deliberate policy of self-sufficiency. The leaders in the Kremlin want to build a self-contained economic unit. Their recent trade offers to the newly developing countries are politically inspired. Khrushchev himself said: "We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes."

The United States does not direct its trade for political ends. It is important that other countries should understand this fundamental difference between the American and the Soviet reasons for international trade.

Our approach carries substantial advantages in dealing with other nations. For under our system companies and industries are constantly vying with one another to create new products, new processes, and new services. Another advantage inherent in our system is that it offers relative stability of markets. Demand cannot be turned on and off for political purposes. This is particularly important for the newly developing countries which depend largely on a few export products

to earn the foreign exchange to finance their external requirements.

The Soviet trade offensive to date consists mainly of offers to buy or sell raw materials or to deliver specified types and quantities of capital goods, often on a direct barter basis. This is necessarily a cumbersome and limited method of trading. Furthermore, it does not give any assurance of large or continuous markets. Soviet trade practices are unpredictable. They may be a large buyer or seller one year and disappear from the market the next. Such in-and-out behavior may be related to their domestic difficulties, to needs of satellite countries, or to political objectives elsewhere. Moreover, the history of Soviet trade suggests that the renewal of a transaction may well be attended by political demands, even though the first deal did not appear to be based upon such a consideration.

Sustained economic progress must come from stable trade conditions, from expanding and diversified markets, and from trade activated by commercial and not political considerations. This is the kind of trade the American system offers.

### **Government Programs**

While American business must shoulder the largest part of the responsibility for our own economic activity abroad, it cannot be expected to do so without adequate support and encouragement from our own Government.

Physical security is indispensable to economic progress. Hence the need for our collective security arrangements and military assistance programs.

Certain types of investment, such as roads and port facilities, cannot be financed on a wholly private basis. Hence the role of the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank in helping to finance basic development projects abroad.

Many types of technical assistance, such as education and public health, require government organization to recruit and channel skilled personnel. Hence the various technical assistance programs.

Nations that have recently achieved their independence and newly developing countries need assistance to strengthen their economies and to maintain their liberty. Hence our programs of economic aid.

Such programs are vital and indispensable if the challenge of communism is to be met and if we are to preserve freedom in many areas of the world.

These governmental programs are complementary to the potentially far larger role of normal commercial activity. American industry, with its many centers of initiative and ingenuity, with its ability to combine capital, technical know-how, and managerial skill, is eminently qualified to play a major role in accelerating economic development overseas.

It is true, of course, that, although much attention has been given to the problem of private investment abroad, especially in newly developing countries, the need for foreign capital remains great.

There are a variety of reasons why private capital has not moved abroad in even larger volume than at present. Indeed, a good part of the discussion at your meeting today has been concerned with this problem. The reasons are partly political conditions overseas; partly inadequate knowledge of opportunities; and partly a reflection of the fact that the major interests of the American business community have traditionally been at home.

The Government has taken a variety of steps to encourage a larger flow of capital abroad.

The commercial and tax treaty programs have long been an integral part of the effort of our Government to develop on a reciprocal basis standards of fair treatment. Since World War II, 15 commercial treaties, with modernized provisions relating to investments, have been negotiated. Similar treaty proposals are under negotiation or consideration with more than half a dozen other governments. At home and abroad, our Department of Commerce and our foreign missions perform a variety of services, largely of an information and trade-promotion nature, for American business interested in foreign trade and investment.

American investors can insure themselves against the inability to transfer their profits and capital, and against expropriation, in countries with which we have negotiated agreements to that effect. The problem of more favorable tax treatment for income earned from foreign investment has also been the subject of much attention. In fact, measures in this field are now before the Congress.

In cooperation with other free-world countries we are continuing our efforts to encourage the expansion of private investment. If we succeed, the American system can play its full role in making the world a better place to live in—both here and abroad.

### **Opportunities and Responsibilities of American Businessman**

Let us take a closer look at the opportunities that exist abroad and the responsibilities of the American businessman in the present world situation.

American business today may easily be affected by what happens in far corners of the globe. A measure of our own foreign interests is the fact that direct private American investment abroad now exceeds \$18 billion and the value of American merchandise exports and imports in 1955 alone was over \$25 billion.

Today, science and technology promise ever new attainments in human satisfactions and welfare for our people. At the same time, however, the greater part of mankind is still living in areas where industrial production and living standards are both extremely low. Most of these people are now making great efforts to speed up their industrial development and raise their standards of living. In fact, this effort constitutes one of the most far-reaching economic and social changes in history. In this setting, American business abroad faces great opportunities and heavy responsibilities.

The opportunities exist both in a strictly business sense and in terms of the general interests of our country. With production and incomes increasing in many areas and with a steady reduction of restrictions hampering international trade, new opportunities constantly present themselves for developing foreign markets. With American industry becoming more dependent upon basic materials from abroad, we are constantly developing new sources of supply. As newly developing countries move rapidly into the mainstream of the world economy, foreign investment opportunities of all kinds will increase on an expanding scale.

I know from many years of personal experience that one area of American business activity abroad of great potential importance is in providing engineering, construction, and other services. These

services are required on a large scale by countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East which are just beginning to develop modern industries. Their impact often goes far beyond the immediate projects that may be involved.

In purely individual terms, too, there will be many challenging occasions for Americans to participate in the worldwide process of constructive change and to foster healthy economic growth abroad complementary to our own.

Through increased trade and expanded investment abroad, American business can support not only the continued growth of our own economy but the accelerated development of other free-world countries. By helping to impart to the peoples of the other areas of the world a sense of progress, of achievement, and of purpose in life, the American businessman will be helping to assure that their aspirations and their strivings are channeled along sound and constructive lines.

As I have already indicated, while American business is faced with challenging opportunities abroad, it must also be prepared to shoulder corresponding responsibilities. After all, the American businessman abroad is the representative of the American system to many people who have no other basis upon which to judge it. To carry with him the spirit of responsibility that is the hallmark of American industry at home should be his constant aim.

Our effective businessman abroad respects the attitudes of other nations. He takes an interest in training his foreign personnel with a view to raising them to positions of responsibility. He makes them feel an integral part of the enterprise. He is alert to present the true image of the American system.

In short, he strives to develop a mutuality of interest with the country in which his enterprise is located. In the largest sense of the word, the American businessman is an ambassador of his country.

I have discussed some of the elements which account for the strength of the American system, the challenge it faces in the Communist economic offensive, and the way it is responding to this challenge. I have also touched upon the great opportunities that exist for American business to make increasing contributions toward strengthening the free world.

Great as is our faith in the American system,

we do not content ourselves merely with a passive belief in it. The initiative and resourcefulness which have been concentrated on solving our own problems are now serving the broader interests of the free world. Thus we are taking a long step toward solving the overriding question of this century—whether in vast areas men will continue to enjoy the opportunities of freedom.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **84th Congress, 2d Session**

- Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures. Report of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures pursuant to Section 601 of the Revenue Act of 1941 on Unexpended Balances: Foreign Aid. S. Rept. 1958, May 7, 1956. 9 pp.
- Technical Assistance and Related Programs. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. S. Rept. 1956, May 7, 1956. 30 pp.
- Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Message from the President transmitting a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between the United States of America and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, together with a protocol and an exchange of notes relating thereto, signed at The Hague on March 27, 1956. S. Exec. II, May 7, 1956. 22 pp.
- 1956 Amendments to the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. Report to accompany S. 3638. S. Rept. 1959, May 9, 1956. 22 pp.
- Considering Residence in American Samoa or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands by Certain Employees of the Governments Thereof, and Their Dependents, as Residence in the United States for Naturalization Purposes. Report to accompany H. R. 4031. H. Rept. 2131, May 9, 1956. 11 pp.
- Report of the Special Study Mission to the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and the Western Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 91, a resolution authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct a full and complete investigation of matters relating to the laws, regulations, directives, and policies including personnel pertaining to the Department of State and such other departments and agencies engaged primarily in the implementation of United States foreign policy and the overseas operations, personnel, and facilities of departments and agencies of the United States which participate in the development and execution of such policy. H. Rept. 2147, May 10, 1956. 213 pp.
- Disposal of World War I Assets. Report to accompany S. 2226. S. Rept. 1971, May 14, 1956. 10 pp.
- Foreign Agents Registration Act. Report to accompany S. 1273. S. Rept. 1996, May 14, 1956. 4 pp.
- Narcotic Control Act of 1956. Report to accompany S. 3760. S. Rept. 1997, May 14, 1956. 36 pp.
- Giving Effect to the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries Signed at Washington September 10, 1954. Report to accompany S. 3524. H. Rept. 2154, May 14, 1956. 10 pp.
- Extension of Sugar Act of 1948. Conference report to accompany H. R. 7030. H. Rept. 2174, May 16, 1956. 9 pp.
- Administrative Management of the Department of State. Sixteenth Intermediate Report of the House Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 2172, May 16, 1956. 35 pp.

## Results of 1956 Tariff Negotiations

### DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 297 dated June 6

The tariff concessions which the United States has obtained and granted in 4 months of tariff bargaining with 21 other countries at Geneva, Switzerland, were announced on June 7.<sup>1</sup> The first stage of the concessions granted by the United States will become effective June 30.

Twenty-two of the 35 governments that are parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) completed negotiations at this conference. The negotiations began January 18, and the results were signed on May 23 by representatives of all 22 governments.

Herbert V. Prochnow, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, signed on behalf of President Eisenhower, who has the authority under the Trade Agreements Act to enter into trade agreements.

A "concession" is usually either a reduction of a tariff rate or a commitment not to raise an existing rate.

The United States and each of the other 21 governments struck a mutually satisfactory balance of concessions on products which figure importantly in their two-way trade. In the bargaining, weight was given to many factors, including the amount of the existing trade in the commodities affected; the amount of trade expansion which the concessions are likely to stimulate; the depth of each country's tariff cuts, which for some foreign countries ranges from a few percentage points to com-

plete elimination of the tariff (100 percent); and the question of how soon the concessions will go into effect.

The 21 countries granted concessions to the United States applying to \$400 million of our exports to them in 1954 (the latest year for which complete figures are available). Under GATT rules U.S. exporters will benefit not only from these concessions but also from concessions which the other countries granted to one another. No dollar estimate of the existing trade coverage of these added benefits is available.

In the direct tariff negotiations, concessions were obtained for a wide range of U.S. export commodities, including, for example, citrus fruit and other citrus products exported to eight countries including Canada, Benelux, and the Federal Republic of Germany; animal tallow and lard to Germany, Austria, and Chile; beer, shrimp, and oysters to Canada. Sixteen countries gave concessions on one or more of a wide variety of chemical products including plastic resins, antibiotics, insecticides, photographic film, and synthetic textile fibers. Canada, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom gave concessions on some or all machine tools and attachments; concessions on various iron and steel products were obtained from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Peru, and the United Kingdom. Concessions were also obtained from Benelux, Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Germany on tobacco or tobacco products. Other important groups of concessions obtained for export to various destinations are heavy machinery, refrigerating and air-conditioning equipment, office machinery, motor vehicles, airplanes, electrical equipment, other canned fruits and vegetables, and petroleum products.

Substantial additional benefits for U.S. exports will result from the other countries' negotiations with each other. For example, in a multilateral negotiation the United Kingdom, Germany, and

<sup>1</sup> The complete lists of commodities, the changes in tariff rates, and a detailed analysis are given in a 311-page report which may be purchased for \$1 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. The report is Department of State publication 6348, Commercial Policy Series 158, entitled *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Analysis of United States Negotiations—Sixth Protocol (Including Schedules) of Supplementary Concessions, Negotiated at Geneva, Switzerland, January–May 1956*.



Benelux agreed to substantial reductions in their duties on paper and paper products in return for concessions on textiles and other manufactured products from Norway, Sweden, and Finland. These reduced duties will also be available to U.S. exporters. Canada gave Cuba a concession on cigar leaf tobacco which should bring substantial benefits to U.S. exporters of that commodity to Canada.

The United States granted concessions, in terms of tariff rates actually effective at the present time, which would apply to \$519 million worth of our 1954 imports from the country with which each concession was initially negotiated. Imports of these same items from other participating countries amounted to an additional \$134 million, so that the total trade of all participating countries covered by the concessions comes to \$653 million.

The United States also granted a potential concession on one item—copper—which could affect \$158 million of imports on the basis of 1954 statistics, if it were to become effective. However, the import tax of 2 cents a pound is now suspended by U.S. domestic law, and, even if the tax were reimposed, the reduction would not operate if the price of copper fell below 24 cents a pound.

Nearly all of the U.S. concessions, which were made under the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 (known before passage as H.R. 1), were made under the provision which authorizes the President to reduce tariffs by no more than 15 percent below the rates existing January 1, 1955, normally in three annual stages.

Although other countries' concessions vary widely in depth, many are deeper than the 15 percent which was the maximum limit governing almost all U.S. concessions. For example, almost 80 percent of the trade coverage of Germany's concessions to us are tariff reductions of 25 percent or more. Half of the trade coverage of Canada's concessions to us are cuts of more than 21 percent, and the Canadians are also benefiting U.S. exporters by removing on certain commodities the preferential treatment which they have been giving to British Commonwealth members.

Also, with few exceptions, other countries will put their concessions into effect all at once, within the next few months.

Among the concessions granted by the United States there are several which have but little likelihood of affecting trade volume, even though they

may help the other countries concerned earn more dollars. For example, the United States made a concession to the United Kingdom on Scotch whisky. Our imports of Scotch whisky in 1954 were valued at more than \$60 million, and it is doubtful whether the tariff, even now, is a significant restrictive factor. Thus, while our tariff reduction may make trade in Scotch whisky more profitable, it is doubtful whether the concession has much trade-expansion potential.

What the United States gave in these negotiations included not only a *quid pro quo* for new concessions but also compensation for various past U.S. tariff increases, including our escape-clause action on bicycles.

The total trade coverage of concessions granted by the United States in all of the GATT negotiations up to now about equals the total trade coverage of concessions which have been obtained by the United States in GATT to improve the tariff treatment of American exports; and the figure remains at about \$7 billion a year each way.

Neither these figures nor the estimate of 60,000 items covered by GATT is much changed by this year's negotiations, since most of the commodities had already been the subject of past concessions at Geneva in 1947; at Annecy, France, in 1947; at Torquay, England, in 1950-51; or at the 1955 conference in Geneva at which Japan was brought into full GATT participation. The contribution of the new negotiations is to have brought about further tariff reductions and preference eliminations on a portion of the trade already covered.

The tariff concessions granted by the United States involve a variety of tariff categories and include Scotch whisky, vermouth, certain chemicals, aluminum, steel bars and tubes, automobiles and parts, airplanes and parts, unsweetened chocolate, oriental-type cigarette leaf tobacco, smoked sardines, sheet and plate glass, calculating machines, wrapping paper, carpets and rugs, fish oils, woven silk fabrics, piano accordions, synthetic rubber.

### **The Participating Countries**

In terms of trade coverage, the largest negotiation which the United States carried on at Geneva was with the United Kingdom. Next largest were those with Canada, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Benelux.

Following are the 22 countries that completed

negotiations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

In addition, the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community participated for the first time in a GATT tariff conference. Acting as agent for the six member states, the High Authority negotiated reductions in the tariff rates of France, Germany, and Italy on certain iron and steel products. It did not negotiate reductions in the rates of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (Benelux), because their rates are generally lower than those of the other three.

The total trade coverage of all the concessions made by the whole group in these negotiations is estimated at about \$2.5 billion in 1954.

#### **Application of U.S. Tariff Concessions to Other Countries of the Free World**

The tariff reductions granted by the United States will apply to imports into the United States from all free-world countries. This is in accordance with the policy established by Congress in the trade-agreements legislation. The reductions will not, however, apply to imports from the Soviet-dominated bloc. Tariff reductions granted by the United States under the trade-agreements program are required to be withheld from the Soviet-dominated countries by section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended.

Total imports into the United States from all foreign countries of products to which the tariff concessions granted by the United States will apply amounted to \$911 million in 1954. Of this amount the countries which negotiated at Geneva supplied 89 percent, or \$811 million.

Most of the other governments which took part in the Geneva conference will also extend widely the concessions they have granted in the negotiations. Thus, even though the greatest advantages resulting from the Geneva negotiations will accrue to the negotiating countries, free-world trade in general will be better off for their having taken place.

#### **Comparison of U.S. Concessions With "Public List"**

U.S. participation in the conference was carried out on behalf of the President in accordance with

regular procedures. Recommendations as to items to be listed, offers to be made, and concessions to be sought were made to him by the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements, consisting of representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury; the International Cooperation Administration; and a member of the United States Tariff Commission. The President approved these recommendations and the results of the negotiations.

On September 21, 1955, the executive branch published a list of items on which U.S. concessions would be considered.<sup>2</sup> This "public list" was supplemented on December 9, 1955.<sup>3</sup> Public hearings were held on all these items.

All of the products on which concessions were granted by the United States were selected from that list. The United States, however, did not make concessions on the whole list.

No duty was reduced below a "peril point" rate found by the Tariff Commission.

The entire public list covered trade from all countries of about \$1,630,000,000. The concessions actually granted were on products with a trade coverage of about \$911 million from all countries.

#### **Tariff Increases**

The United States negotiated two increases in its tariff rates—on liquid sugar and certain fur-felt hats and hat bodies. The object of the liquid-sugar renegotiation was to bring the tariff rates on liquid sugar up to the existing level of the tariff on dry crystalline sugar.

In the case of the hats and hat bodies, the principal object was to achieve the approximate level of protection which had been intended in the escape-clause action taken by the United States in 1950. A 1955 judicial determination held that the escape-clause rates did not apply to most of the hat bodies to which the escape-clause action had been directed, so that without some new action the domestic industry stood to lose the intended protection.

In its "peril point" report in connection with the 1956 Geneva negotiations, the Tariff Commission found that tariff increases were necessary to prevent serious injury to the domestic industries

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1955, p. 507.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1020.

producing tungsten alloys and violins and violas. In both of these cases, however, it developed that the advantages of negotiating the increases would have been outweighed by attendant disadvantages which made it undesirable to accomplish the increases by this means. Also, in the case of tungsten alloys, since some but not all alloys were specified in the public list, negotiating the increase on some but not others would have unduly complicated our tariff structure without adequate economic justification.

As required by law, the President on June 7 sent a message to Congress concerning his reasons for not negotiating these increases. The considerations entering into this decision would not be a bar to applications by domestic producers of these products for escape-clause action.

#### **Use of the "50 Percent" Authority**

The Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, besides authorizing reductions of 15 percent, also authorizes the President, in cases where rates now are more than 50 percent of the value of the imported goods, to reduce such rates to 50 percent, normally in three stages. This "50 percent" authority was used in relatively few of the U.S. concessions. The trade coverage of these concessions was quite small, possibly because the very high rates have held down imports.

Of the total trade coverage of the U.S. concessions, only \$3.5 million involved use of the "50 percent" provision. About half of this \$3.5 million is a single item, silk handkerchiefs and mufflers, on which a concession to Japan will reduce the rate from 60 percent to 50. On several minor sundries items, mostly ornamented wearing apparel and fabrics, the rates were reduced from 90 percent to 50.

#### **Example of Tariff Cut in Three Stages**

Here is an illustration of how the U.S. three-stage reductions will be put into effect: The present U.S. tariff on candied orange peel is 4 cents a pound. The United States granted a 15 percent reduction in this rate. This is a reduction of .6 cents per pound. Thus the ultimate new rate will be 3.4 cents. But the cut will be made in three steps—to 3.8 cents on June 30, 1956, to 3.6 cents a year later, and to 3.4 cents 2 years later.

**June 25, 1956**

389277-56—3

#### **Simplification of Rates**

When U.S. duties are reduced, either under the 15-percent authority or the authority to reduce duties to 50 percent, the law permits minor additional reductions on items which are reduced in order to simplify tariff rates. This applies to intermediate stages as well as to the ultimate new rates. Thus the reductions in the three stages are not always identical in amount.

The rules for applying these additional reductions—or "roundings"—are complex, but such reductions may never exceed one-half of one percent ad valorem (or its equivalent if the tariff is in such terms as cents per pound).

#### **PROCLAMATION GIVING EFFECT TO 1956 TARIFF CONCESSIONS**

Press release 320 dated June 13

The President on June 13, 1956, signed a proclamation giving effect to the concessions negotiated by the United States at the 1956 tariff negotiations held at Geneva, Switzerland, by contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Pursuant to the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act, most of these U.S. concessions will be made effective in three annual stages, and the proclamation provides that the first of these stages will enter into force on June 30, 1956. The proclamation also makes effective on the same date an increase in duty on certain hat bodies negotiated by the United States and, to the extent possible under the trade agreements authority, an increase on liquid sugar. It contains a number of adjustments regarding prior proclamations resulting from the recent negotiations, principally relating to the preferential treatment of certain Cuban products.

#### **Text of Proclamation<sup>4</sup>**

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (48 Stat. (pt. 1) 943, ch. 474, 57 Stat. (pt. 1) 125, ch. 118, 59 Stat. (pt. 1) 410, ch. 269), on October 30, 1947, he entered into a trade agreement with certain foreign countries, which trade agreement consists of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter referred to as "the General Agreement"), including a schedule of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule XX

<sup>4</sup>No. 3140; 21 *Fed. Reg.* 4237.

(Geneva—1947”), and the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, together with a Final Act (61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6) A7, A11, and A2050) :

2. WHEREAS the trade agreement specified in the first recital of this proclamation has been supplemented by several subsequent agreements, including :

(a) The Protocol Modifying Part I and Article XXIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of September 14, 1948, (3 UST (pt. 4) 5355).

(b) The Annex Protocol of Terms of Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of October 10, 1949, (64 Stat. (pt. 3) B139), including a supplemental schedule of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as “Schedule XX (Annex—1949)”).

(c) The Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of April 21, 1951, (3 UST (pts. 1 and 2) 615 and 1841), including a supplemental schedule of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as “Schedule XX (Torquay—1951)”).

(d) The Declaration on the Continued Application of Schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of March 10, 1955, (TIAS 3437), and

(e) The Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of June 7, 1955, (TIAS 3438), including a supplemental schedule of United States concessions :

3. WHEREAS by the following proclamations the President has proclaimed such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States, or such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as were found to be required or appropriate to carry out the trade agreement specified in the first recital of this proclamation or agreements supplemental thereto, or has terminated in whole or in part proclamations specified in this recital :

Proclamation 2761A, of December 16, 1947, (61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1163), Proclamation 2769, of January 30, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1479), Proclamation 2782, of April 22, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1500), Proclamation 2784, of May 4, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1505), Proclamation 2790, of June 11, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1515), Proclamation 2791, of June 12, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1519), Proclamation 2792, of June 25, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1520), Proclamation 2798, of July 15, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1528), Proclamation 2809, of September 7, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1553), Proclamation 2829, of March 8, 1949, (63 Stat. (pt. 1) 1261), Proclamation 2865, of November 30, 1949, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A376), Proclamation 2867, of December 22, 1949, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A380), Proclamation 2874, of March 1, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A390), Proclamation 2884, of April 27, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A399), Proclamation 2888, of May 13, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A405), Proclamation 2895, of June 17, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A116), Proclamation 2901, of September 6, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A427), Proclamation 2908, of October 12, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A443), Proclamation 2912, of October 30, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A450), Proclamation 2916, of December 29, 1950, (64 Stat. (pt. 2) A456), Proclamation 2929, of June 2, 1951, (65 Stat. C12), Proclamation 2935, of August 1, 1951,

(65 Stat. C25), Proclamation 2949, of October 19, 1951, (65 Stat. C11), Proclamation 2951, of November 26, 1951, (66 Stat. C6), Proclamation 2959, of January 5, 1952, (66 Stat. C15), Proclamation 2960, of January 5, 1952, (66 Stat. C16), Proclamation 2986, of August 16, 1952, (67 Stat. C7), Proclamation 3007, of March 2, 1953, (67 Stat. C35), Proclamation 3040, of December 24, 1953, (68 Stat. (pt. 2) C26), Proclamation 3059, of June 30, 1954, (68 Stat. (pt. 2) C44), Proclamation 3100, of June 29, 1955, (69 Stat. C38), Proclamation 3105, of July 22, 1955, (69 Stat. C41), Proclamation 3108, of August 18, 1955, (3CFR, 1955 SUPP., p. 42), and Proclamation 3128, of March 16, 1956 (21 F. R. 1793) :

4. WHEREAS I have found as a fact that certain existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America and of Australia, the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of Cuba, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Dominican Republic, the Republic of Finland, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Haiti, the Republic of Italy, Japan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, Peru, the Kingdom of Sweden, the Republic of Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, all being contracting parties to the General Agreement, are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the United States of America and that the purposes declared in section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, will be promoted by a trade agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of some or all of the other countries referred to in this recital :

5. WHEREAS, pursuant to section 3 (a) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 (65 Stat. 72, ch. 141), I transmitted to the United States Tariff Commission for investigation and report lists of all articles imported into the United States of America to be considered for possible modification of duties and other import restrictions, imposition of additional import restrictions, or continuance of existing customs or excise treatment in the trade agreement negotiations with the governments of the foreign countries referred to in the fourth recital of this proclamation, and the Tariff Commission made an investigation in accordance with section 3 of the said Trade Agreements Extension Act and thereafter reported to me its determinations made pursuant to the said section within the time period specified in the said section 3 :

6. WHEREAS reasonable public notice of the intention to conduct trade agreement negotiations was given, the views presented by persons interested in such negotiations were received and considered, and information and advice with respect to such negotiations were sought and obtained from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, and Defense, and from other sources :

7. WHEREAS, the period for the exercise of the authority of the President to enter into foreign trade agreements under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, having been extended by section 2 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955 (69 Stat. 162, ch. 169) from June 12, 1955, until the close of June 30, 1958, on May

23, 1956, as a result of the finding specified in the fourth recital of this proclamation, I entered, through my duly empowered plenipotentiary, into a trade agreement providing for the application of the relevant provisions of the General Agreement to additional schedules of tariff concessions relating to the countries named in the said fourth recital of this proclamation, which trade agreement consists of the Sixth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated May 23, 1956, including the Annex thereto containing a supplemental schedule of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as "Schedule XX (Geneva—1956)"), and which trade agreement is authentic in the English and French languages as indicated therein, and a copy of which in the English language is annexed to this proclamation;<sup>5</sup>

8. WHEREAS, the protocol of Supplementary Concessions specified in the seventh recital of this proclamation having been signed on behalf of the Government of the United States of America on May 23, 1956, and the notification of the intention to apply the concessions provided for in Schedule XX (Geneva—1956) having been given on May 31, 1956, to the Executive Secretary to the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement pursuant to paragraph 2 of the said Protocol of Supplementary Concessions, the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956) will become a schedule to the said General Agreement relating to the United States of America on June 30, 1956, and the concessions provided for in the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956) shall then enter into force as specified therein;

9. WHEREAS, under the authority of subsection (a) (3) (D) of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and of subsection (b) (2) thereof by reference to that subsection, I have determined, in the case of those modifications of existing duties proclaimed in Parts I (a) and II (a) of this proclamation which reflect decreases in duties exceeding the limitations specified in subsection (a) (2) (D) or (a) (3) (B) of the said section 350, or in subsection (b) (2) thereof by reference to those subsections, that such decreases will simplify the computation of the amount of duty imposed with respect to the articles concerned;

10. WHEREAS I have made the determinations regarding the ad valorem equivalent of specific rates of duty (and combinations of rates including a specific rate) and

<sup>5</sup> Not printed in the FEDERAL REGISTER. The text of the protocol is being published at Geneva, Switzerland, by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in separate volumes in English and French. The title of the English volume is "General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Sixth Protocol of Supplementary Concessions". The English text of Schedule XX (United States of America) is being reproduced in Treasury Decisions (Customs). The text in languages in which authentic, together with an English translation of those portions authentic in French only, will be published in Treaties and Other International Acts Series and in the bound volumes of United States Treaties and Other International Agreements. [Footnote in the FEDERAL REGISTER]

regarding representative periods, under the authority of subsection (a) (2) (D) (ii) of section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and of subsections (a) (3) (D) and (b) (2) thereof by reference, directly or indirectly, to the said subsection (a) (2) (D) (ii), in the case of each modification of existing duties proclaimed in this proclamation for which such a determination was relevant, using, to the maximum extent practicable, the standards of valuation contained in section 402 of the said Tariff Act of 1930;

11. WHEREAS I find that each modification of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America and each continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States of America which is proclaimed in Part I (a) of this proclamation will be required or appropriate, on and after the date specified in the said Part, to carry out the trade agreement specified in the seventh recital of this proclamation;

12. WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in the manner referred to in the first recital of this proclamation, on October 30, 1947, he entered into an exclusive trade agreement with the Government of the Republic of Cuba (61 Stat. (pt. 4) 3699), which exclusive trade agreement includes certain portions of other documents made a part thereof and provides for the treatment in respect of ordinary customs duties of products of the Republic of Cuba imported into the United States of America;

13. WHEREAS by the following proclamations the President has proclaimed, in respect of products of the Republic of Cuba, such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States, or such additional import restrictions of the United States, or such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as were found to be required or appropriate to carry out the exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation, or has terminated in whole or in part proclamations specified in this recital: Proclamation 2764, of January 1, 1948, (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1465), Proclamation 2946, of October 4, 1951, (65 Stat. C39), Proclamation 3099, of June 25, 1955, (69 Stat. C36), and the proclamations of January 30, 1948, April 22, 1948, May 4, 1948, June 11, 1948, June 25, 1948, July 15, 1948, March 8, 1949, November 30, 1949, December 22, 1949, March 1, 1950, April 27, 1950, May 13, 1950, September 6, 1950, October 12, 1950, June 2, 1951, December 24, 1953, and July 22, 1955, specified in the third recital of this proclamation;

14. WHEREAS Part II of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947), which was made a part of the exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation, is supplemented by Part II of the Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), and I determine that it is required or appropriate, on and after the date specified in Part II (a) of this proclamation, to carry out the said exclusive trade agreement that Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1947) be applied as supplemented by the said Part II of Schedule XX (Geneva—1956);

15. WHEREAS I determine that, in view of the finding set

forth in the eleventh recital of this proclamation, it will not be required or appropriate to carry out the exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation on and after June 30, 1956, to include the items identified below in this recital in the list set forth in the sixteenth recital of the proclamation of July 22, 1955, specified in the third recital of this proclamation:

*Items in the 16th recital of the Proclamation of July 22, 1955 to be deleted effective June 30, 1956*

411	802
717 (c)	1530 (e)
772	1541 (a) ;
778	

16. WHEREAS, in view of the amendment of Article I of the General Agreement by section A (iii) of paragraph 1 of the Protocol Modifying Part I and Article XXIX of the said General Agreement specified in the second recital of this proclamation, of the inclusion of certain products in Part I of Schedule XX (Torquay—1951) and in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), and of the inclusion of item 774 in Part II of Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), it is required or appropriate that, effective June 30, 1956, the references to Article I of the said General Agreement in the sixth and seventh recitals of the proclamation of January 30, 1948, specified in the third recital of this proclamation be amended to refer to the fourth instead of the third paragraph of the said Article I, and that the list set forth in the seventh recital of the said proclamation of January 30, 1948, as amended, be further amended to read as follows:

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
408	Boxes, barrels, and other articles containing oranges, lemons, limes, grapefruit, shaddock or pomelos.	12½% ad val.
743	Grapefruit: When entered during the period from August 1 to September 30, inclusive in any year.	1½¢ per lb.
	When entered during the month of October in any year.	9½¢ per lb.
743	Limes, in their natural state, or in brine.	1¢ per lb.
747	Pineapples, not in crates and not in bulk.	27¢ per crate of 2.45 cu. ft.
752	Watermelons, in their natural state, not specially provided for.	20% ad val.
765	Beans, not specially provided for: Green or unripe: Lima beans: When entered during the period from December 1 in any year to the following May 31, inclusive.	2½¢ per lb.
	When entered during the month of November in any year.	2½¢ per lb.
772	Tomatoes in their natural state: When entered during the period from March 1 to July 14, inclusive, or during the period from September 1 to November 14, inclusive, in any year.	2.1¢ per lb.
	When entered during the period from November 15, in any year, to the last day of the following February, inclusive.	1½¢ per lb.
774	Vegetables in their natural state: Cucumbers, when entered during the period from December 1, in any year, to the last day of the following February, inclusive.	2½¢ per lb.
	Squash	1½¢ per lb.
774	Eggplant in their natural state, when entered during the period from December 1 in any year to the following March 31, inclusive:	

	When the rate applied to the product of Cuba is 0.57 cent per pound.	1.17¢ per lb.
	When the rate applied to the product of Cuba is 0.54 cent per pound.	1.14¢ per lb.
	When the rate applied to the product of Cuba is 0.5 cent per pound.	1.1¢ per lb.
775	Pimentos, packed in brine or in oil, or prepared or preserved in any manner.	4½¢ per lb.
802	Ethyl alcohol for beverage purposes.	\$2.25 per proof gal.
1005 (a) (1)	Cordage, including cables, tarred or untarred, composed of three or more strands, each strand composed of two or more yarns: Wholly or in chief value of benequen: Smaller than ¼ inch in diameter . . . . .	1¢ per lb. and 7½% ad val. 1¢ per lb.
	Other . . . . .	
1406	Labels, flaps, and cigar bands, composed wholly or in chief value of paper lithographically printed in whole or in part from stone, gelatin, metal, or other material, but not printed in whole or in part in metal leaf and not specially provided for (except labels and flaps not exceeding 10 square inches cutting size in dimensions, if embossed or die-cut): Printed in less than eight colors (bronze printing to be counted as two colors): Labels and flaps . . . . . Cigar bands . . . . .	2½¢ per lb. 3½¢ per lb.
	Printed in eight or more colors (bronze printing to be counted as two colors): Labels and flaps . . . . . Cigar bands . . . . .	28¢ per lb. 35¢ per lb.
1558	Banana flour and plantain flour . . . . .	14% ad val.

17. WHEREAS, agreement for such withdrawal and modifications having been reached pursuant to Article XXVIII of the General Agreement, and pursuant to the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 (b) of the Declaration on the Continued Application of the Schedules to the said General Agreement specified in the second recital of this proclamation, I determine that it is required or appropriate to carry out the trade agreement specified in the first recital of this proclamation that Part I of Schedule XX (Annecy—1949) be applied as though item 502 [first] were withdrawn therefrom, and that the value-bracket subclassifications preceding the subclassification for articles valued at more than \$30 per dozen in item 1526 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947), item 502 [first] in Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1947), and item 502 in Part I of Schedule XX (Torquay—1951) be applied as though the said subclassifications and items read as follows:

PART I OF SCHEDULE XX (GENEVA—1947)

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
1526(a)	Valued at not more than \$9 per dozen . . . . .	55% ad val., but not less than \$1.25 per doz.
	Valued at more than \$9 and not more than \$12 per dozen: If for men or boys . . . . . Other . . . . .	55% ad val. 65% ad val.
	Valued at more than \$12 and not more than \$18 per dozen: If for men or boys . . . . . Other . . . . .	47½% ad val. 65% ad val.
	Valued at more than \$18 and not more than \$24 per dozen: If for men or boys . . . . . Other . . . . .	40% ad val. 65% ad val.
	Valued at more than \$24 and not more than \$30 per dozen.	40% ad val.

## PART II OF SCHEDULE XX (GENEVA—1947)

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
502	Molasses and sugar sirups, not specially provided for and not containing soluble non-sugar solids (excluding any foreign substance that may have been added or developed in the products) equal to more than 6% of the total soluble solids.	0.53 cents per pound of total sugars.

## PART I OF SCHEDULE XX (TORQUAY—1951)

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
502	Molasses and sugar sirups, not specially provided for and not containing soluble non-sugar solids (excluding any foreign substance that may have been added or developed in the product) equal to more than 6% of the total soluble solids. NOTE: This item shall be effective only during such time as Title II of the Sugar Act of 1948 or substantially equivalent legislation is in effect in the United States, whether or not the quotas, or any of them, authorized by such legislation, are being applied or are suspended.	0.6625 cents per pound of total sugars.

18. WHEREAS I determine that, upon the effectiveness of the modification of the concession provided for in item 1526 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947) set forth in the seventeenth recital of this proclamation, the termination of the proclamation of December 16, 1947 specified in the third recital of this proclamation insofar as it related to a part of the said item 1526 (a), by the proclamation of October 30, 1950, specified in the said third recital of this proclamation, will no longer be in the public interest;

19. AND WHEREAS the following item was inadvertently omitted from the list set forth in the sixteenth recital of the proclamation of July 22, 1955, specified in the third recital of this proclamation, and I determine that the addition of the said item to the said list in its correct numerical order is required or appropriate to carry out the exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation on and after September 10, 1955:

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of Products	Rate of Duty
397	Articles or wares not specially provided for, if composed wholly or in chief value of gold, or if plated with gold, or colored with gold lacquer, whether partly or wholly manufactured.	52½% ad val

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, do proclaim as follows:

## Part I

To the end that the trade agreement specified in the seventh recital of this proclamation may be carried out:

(a) Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) of this Part, such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as are specified or provided for in paragraphs 1 to 6, inclusive, of the Protocol of Supplementary Concessions specified in the said seventh recital of this proclamation and in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1956) contained in the Annex thereto shall be effective as follows:

(1) The rates of duty and import tax specified in column A at the right of the respective descriptions of products in Part I of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), on and after June 30, 1956:

(2) The rates of duty and import tax specified in columns B and C, respectively, at the right of the respective descriptions of products in Part I of said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), on and after the appropriate dates determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the "General Notes" at the end of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956):

*Provided*, That in the case of a product which is described in both Part I and Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), the rate in Part I, when lower, shall be applied to the product of the Republic of Cuba.

(b) The application of the provisions of subdivision (a) of this Part and of subdivision (a) of Part II of this proclamation shall be subject to the right of withdrawal of concessions and to the other applicable terms, conditions, and qualifications set forth in paragraphs 1 to 6, inclusive, of the said Protocol of Supplementary Concessions, in Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), including the General Notes, contained in the Annex thereto, in Parts I, II, and III of the General Agreement, including any applicable amendments and rectifications thereof, and in the Protocol of Provisional Application specified in the first recital of this proclamation, and the application of the provisions of subdivision (a) of this Part and of subdivision (a) of Part II of this proclamation shall also be subject to the exception that no rate of duty or import tax shall be applied to a particular article by virtue of this proclamation if, when the article is entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption more favorable customs treatment is prescribed for the article by any of the following then in effect:

(1) A proclamation pursuant to section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, but the application of such more favorable treatment shall be subject to the qualifications set forth in the third paragraph of the general notes in Schedule XX (Geneva—1956):

(2) Any other proclamation, a statute, or an executive order, which proclamation, statute, or order either provides for an exemption from duty or import tax or became effective subsequent to May 23, 1956.

## Part II

To the end that the exclusive trade agreement specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation may be carried out:

(a) Subject to the qualifications and exceptions provided for in subdivision (b) of Part I of this proclamation and to the qualifications set forth in the exclusive trade agreement with the Republic of Cuba specified in the twelfth recital of this proclamation, such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States of America in respect of products of the Republic of Cuba and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of products of the Republic of Cuba imported into the United States as are specified or provided for in paragraphs 1 to 6, inclusive, of the Protocol of Supplementary Concessions specified in the seventh recital of this proclamation and in Part II of Schedule XX (Geneva—1956) contained in the Annex thereto shall be effective as follows:

(1) The rates of duty and import tax specified in column A at the right of the respective descriptions of products in Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), on and after June 30, 1956;

(2) The rates of duty and import tax specified in columns B and C, respectively, at the right of the respective descriptions of products in Part II of said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), on and after the appropriate dates determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the "General Notes" at the end of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956):

*Provided*, That in the case of a product which is described in both Part I and Part II of the said Schedule XX (Geneva—1956), the rate in Part I, when lower, shall be applied to the product of the Republic of Cuba.

(b) The list set forth in the sixteenth recital of the proclamation of July 22, 1955, specified in the third recital of this proclamation shall be amended (i) as provided in the fifteenth recital of this proclamation, effective June 30, 1956, and (ii) as provided in the nineteenth recital of this proclamation, effective September 10, 1955.

## Part III

To the end that the trade agreement specified in the first recital of this proclamation may be carried out, effective June 30, 1956:

(a) The reference to Article I of the General Agreement in the sixth and seventh recitals of the proclamation of January 30, 1948, specified in the third recital of this proclamation, and the list set forth in the seventh recital of the said proclamation of January 30, 1948, shall be amended as provided in the sixteenth recital of this proclamation.

(b) The value-bracket subclassifications preceding the subclassification for articles valued at more than \$30 per dozen in item 1526 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX (Geneva—1947) shall be applied as though the said subclassifications read as set forth in the said seventeenth recital of this proclamation.

(c) Item 502 [first] in Part II of Schedule XX

(Geneva—1947) shall be applied as though the said item read as set forth in the seventeenth recital of this proclamation:

*Provided*, That pending further proclamation by the President, the rate of duty for products described in this item testing less than 74.6 per centum total sugars shall be 0.15 cents per gallon plus 0.165 cents additional for each 1 per centum of total sugars over 48 per centum and fractions of 1 per centum in proportion.

(d) Item 502 in Part I of Schedule XX (Torquay—1951) shall be applied as though the said item read as set forth in the seventeenth recital of this proclamation: *Provided*, That pending further proclamation by the President, the rate of duty for products described in this item testing less than 56.8 per centum total sugars shall be 0.375 cents per gallon plus 0.4125 cents additional for each 1 per centum of total sugars over 48 per centum and fractions of 1 per centum in proportion.

## Part IV

So much of the proclamations of December 22, 1949, and May 13, 1950, specified in the third recital of this proclamation, and of any other proclamations specified therein, which give effect to the concession provided for in item 502 [first] in Part I of Schedule XX (Annecy—1949) specified in the seventeenth recital of this proclamation, and the proclamation of October 30, 1950, specified in the third and eighteenth recitals of this proclamation are terminated, effective at the close of business June 29, 1956.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirteenth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eightieth.



By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,  
*Secretary of State*

## President Reports to Congress on Certain Tariff Increases

*The White House announced on June 7 that the President had sent the following message to the Congress, as required by section 4 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.*

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

This message is submitted pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended.

Under the authority of the trade agreements



legislation, the United States entered into a trade agreement at Geneva, Switzerland on May 23, 1956 with other contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. A copy of that agreement is submitted herewith. The United States received tariff concessions from other countries on various products exported by the United States in return for tariff concessions by the United States.

On two products the United States by separate action negotiated increases in the existing rates of duty. In one case, involving certain fur-felt hat bodies, a court decision had in effect nullified tariff increases which were proclaimed a few years ago as the result of an escape clause investigation. In its peril point investigation on these hat bodies, the Tariff Commission found that the lower rates resulting from the court decision should be increased. The negotiated increases raise the rates of duty to the peril points found by the Tariff Commission, and in general restore the rates which had been applicable under the escape clause proclamation prior to the court decision. In the other case, involving liquid sugar, there had been no peril point finding that an increase was necessary; the objective was to equalize the rates applicable to dry and liquid sugar.

In the other two cases—certain tungsten alloys and violins and violas—in which the Tariff Commission reported that increases in existing rates of duty were required, it was found that the advantages of negotiating the increases would have been outweighed by attendant disadvantages which made it undesirable to accomplish the increases by this means. Also, in the case of tungsten alloys, only one group was listed for negotiation while others, including ferro-tungsten, the most important in terms of imports, was not listed. Increasing the duty on the listed alloys would thus have unduly complicated our tariff structure without adequate economic justification. For these reasons, increased rates on tungsten alloys and violins and violas were not included in the trade agreement. These considerations would not be a bar to applications by domestic producers of these products for escape clause action under the provisions of Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
June 7, 1956.

## Transcript of Secretary Dulles' News Conference

Press release 314 dated June 12

*Secretary Dulles:* Since I met with you the last time, several important things have occurred. There has been the release by the State Department of what we believe to be an authentic version of Khrushchev's speech. There has been the adoption of an important resolution on Palestine by the United Nations Security Council.<sup>1</sup> There has been the visit here this week of Foreign Minister Pearson to discuss the possible evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and we have here Chancellor Adenauer, who arrived yesterday.

I have two prepared statements to make, copies of which will be available at the close of this conference. The first relates to the Refugee Relief Program.<sup>2</sup>

### Visa Allotments in Refugee Relief Act

I wish to call to your attention an action which the Refugee Relief Program was required to take last week,<sup>3</sup> and which points up in a forceful but unfortunate way the merit of the President's repeated requests that there be a reallocation of visa allotments contained in the Refugee Relief Act.

We were compelled to announce that, effective midnight last night, no more applications for visas could be accepted for Iron Curtain escapees residing in the NATO countries of continental Europe, plus Sweden, Turkey, and Iran—but not including Germany and Austria. Ten thousand visas were authorized for this group of escapees. About 6,000 have been issued. We now have in process over 10,000 escapee applicants for the remaining 4,000 visas. At the same time, we have thousands more visas authorized for Iron Curtain escapees residing in Germany and Austria than we have escapee applicants in those two countries.

One of the President's proposals was to reallocate visas from places where they are not needed to places where they are needed.<sup>4</sup> Over a month ago, I also testified before a Senate subcommittee urging congressional action to amend the Refugee

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of June 18, 1956, p. 1025.

<sup>2</sup> The following three paragraphs were also released separately as press release 313 dated June 12.

<sup>3</sup> BULLETIN of June 18, 1956, p. 1024.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, June 13, 1955, p. 951.

Relief Act.<sup>5</sup> The present situation confirms that need.

The second statement which I have relates to the version of the Khrushchev speech on Stalin as issued here last week.<sup>6</sup>

### **Khrushchev Speech**

It reveals a period of horror, but nothing unexpected. I recall that over 6 years ago, in *War or Peace*, I said about the Soviet Communist police state:

Dictatorships usually present a formidable exterior. They seem, on the outside, to be hard, glittering, and irresistible. Within, they are full of rotteness. They "are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness."

That appraisal was challenged by many at the time, particularly by the Soviet regime itself. Now Khrushchev confirms, in detail, the abuses to which the Soviet-type dictatorship leads.

But the evils which Khrushchev exposes and condemns are not merely due to the personality of Stalin but due to a system which implements a philosophy which considers human beings as tools of the state, to be exploited for the glorification of the state.

We can hope that Khrushchev's revelations will mark the beginning of a change away from that system of dictatorship. But that, I fear, may not be his purpose. The purpose may be merely to persuade the subject peoples that the present dictatorship is good because it condemns the past dictatorship.

There is only one cure for the evils of the imposed Soviet dictatorship—that is, government which derives its powers from the consent of the governed. This is a lesson that history teaches, that Khrushchev confirms, and which needs to be applied if we are to have a world society of peace and justice.

Now if you have any questions.

### **Neutrality**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be a great deal of confusion as concerns the statement you made in your speech the other day about neutrality being "immoral"<sup>7</sup> and the President's statement almost simultaneously that he wouldn't be at all surprised that some nations preferred to, in view of the risks*

*involved in becoming members of an alliance—how do you reconcile those two points of view?*

A. In the first place, I point out that the quoted language you attribute to me is not complete or accurate. In the second place, I would point out that there is no difference whatever between the President and myself on this subject. I had a long discussion with him in the course of other matters on Thursday afternoon [June 7], and I can assure you that there is no difference whatever in our points of view. As far as language differences are concerned, I think you can probably find I have expressed my own view on this subject a good many times over the last decade, perhaps 50 times, and I doubt if on any two of those 50 occasions I used precisely the same language. You can find a difference in my expression on every one of those 50 occasions. But I do not think that my views have changed. As the President said, it is a complicated subject and it is not possible to find a precise formula of identical words to deal with the subject as it comes up in different contexts.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you explain the circumstances under which the clarifying statement on neutrality<sup>8</sup> was issued by the White House on Thursday?*

A. No, the White House would issue its own statement if it thought fit to do so.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech in which you said that the concept of neutrality was increasingly obsolete except under very exceptional circumstances, would you tell us what kind of circumstances you consider would not render it obsolete?*

A. Well, the outstanding example of neutrality is, of course, Switzerland. Switzerland has declined to join the United Nations because it recognizes that the United Nations Charter is incompatible with strict neutrality.

*Q. Well, would you apply that exceptional term to states like India and Indonesia, for example?*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, May 7, 1956, p. 773.

<sup>6</sup> The following six paragraphs were also released separately as press release 312 dated June 12. For text of Khrushchev speech, see *Cong. Rec.* of June 4, 1956, p. 8465.

<sup>7</sup> BULLETIN of June 18, 1956, p. 999.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1001.

A. I don't care at this time to get into naming states and passing judgment upon the course of action of other governments.

*Q. Could we put the question this way then, sir? Is it your feeling that those states which have joined alliances with the United States and other Western countries as of today should remain in them but you have no objection to those which do not at the moment have such alliances remaining outside them? Is it the status quo on that problem that you were approving?*

A. I am afraid that, if I tried to answer that question, you would find in the answer a fifth version, which you would then compare with the preceding fourth or third or second or first. I believe enough has been said on that subject to make quite clear the views of the administration with reference to neutrality.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it fair then for us to infer from what you said this morning that there is no difference within this administration, and all the reporting on this subject is misleading the people as to the position of this Government?*

A. Well, I don't want to pass judgment upon the reporting. I can say, and repeat what I said, which is that I had a discussion on this subject with the President on Thursday afternoon, and I am satisfied that there is no difference of opinion between the President and myself on that subject.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you talk to the President before his Wednesday press conference on the subject? He gave his remarks on neutrality as a volunteered statement, not in answer to a question.*

A. I prefer not to answer that. I think that the details of the personal relations between the President and myself don't lend themselves to public exposition.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you agree with what the President said on this subject?*

A. I have said that there is no difference that I can detect between the views of the President and myself on this subject.

*Q. In that same speech you made a reference to our treaty with Formosa, and in it I believe you said that the President had the authority to use United States forces to defend Formosa if he*

*deemed it necessary. May I ask, isn't he "required" to use American forces to defend Formosa and only has the authority to use them to defend the offshore islands if that is necessary in his judgment?*

A. I do not believe that the act of Congress, as I recall it, did purport to or, indeed, that it constitutionally could "require" the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States in any particular respect. The act said "authorized." I do not, of course, want to leave any question or doubt but what the President has the full intention of using the forces of the United States, if need be, to defend Taiwan. I am merely addressing myself to the constitutional question of whether or not the Congress could impose any particular obligation on the President in that respect.

#### **Talks With Chancellor Adenauer**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you hopeful that your talks with Chancellor Adenauer this afternoon will produce a new Western approach to German reunification, especially in view of what Mr. Khrushchev said recently about his preferring the status quo in Germany to a unified Germany?*

A. I have no doubt that we shall discuss that question of German unification, particularly as against the background of the statement which Bulganin and Khrushchev made at the summit conference in Geneva. Then they said that the Four Powers had a responsibility for the reunification of Germany and agreed that Germany should be reunified by means of free elections. There is an apparent disparity between that assurance and the more recent statements attributed to the Soviet leaders. That would certainly be a subject that we will discuss. I would not want now to forecast a result of that discussion because that would be to anticipate the views of Chancellor Adenauer, which I have not yet obtained.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Turkish Government has within the last 10 days, I believe, put through its parliament a very strict new press-control law. Do you feel that this is in the interest of progress among our allies?*

A. Well, the views of the United States about freedom of the press are well known. What the impact of that law will be, I suppose, is to be determined not necessarily by speculation as to what could be done under the law but in the terms of

what actually is done. We hope and trust it will not impair the basic rights of the press to free exchange of information.

*Q. It has been widely reported that the Soviet Union suggested a proposal to cosponsor the British resolution on Mr. Hammarskjöld's visit and that the United States opposed the Soviet cosponsorship. Is this report correct, and, if so, what was the reason for the American opposition?*

A. That particular matter took place, as I recall, when I was away, and I am not aware myself that there was any definite proposal of Soviet cosponsorship. There was a question, I recall, as to whether the resolution should be put in by the United States, which had introduced the prior resolution, or by the United Kingdom, which thought it would be useful for it to do it, and we acquiesced in the view of the United Kingdom. I do not recall the other matter.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I have two questions with regard to the atoms-for-peace agreement which we signed with the Austrian Government last week.<sup>9</sup> Was there any period or term included for the duration of that agreement; and, secondly, is it the first agreement of its kind that we have signed, or are there others under consideration?*

A. Excuse me, which agreement?

*Q. The atoms-for-peace agreement that we signed with Austria last week.*

A. Well, we have signed agreements for nuclear research plants with a good many countries. I am not aware there is anything different in what we did with Austria than with other countries. If there is a difference, it has not been brought to my attention.

#### **Developing NATO**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the outcome of your conversations with Mr. Pearson on the NATO problem? Did you make any progress?*

A. I can only say that the talks, in my opinion, were extremely useful. They were, of course, quite preliminary. Mr. Pearson has not yet met with his colleagues; so they have not had an opportunity to exchange views. But they are independently checking on some of the points of view of the NATO countries. They plan to come to-

gether in Paris—I think early next month or perhaps the latter part of this month—and begin mapping out formally their plan of work.

We had a good talk of a preliminary nature which was, I hope, constructive. Of course, the views of the United States are only the views of one country, and our own views are still at a formative and tentative stage. But I would think it was a useful and important talk.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it would be useful for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make a visit to the Soviet Union?*

A. That is primarily a matter for military judgment, and I have no independent views of my own as to what the military value of that would be. I would assume the thinking in the military area was reflected pretty well by the decision of the President which was reported by Mr. Hagerty yesterday.<sup>10</sup>

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could just review for us how far you have gone in your own writings in expressing how you think NATO could be developed?*

A. The views that I have in that respect were pretty well set forth, I think, in the speech which I made in New York before the Associated Press prior to going to the last NATO ministerial meeting.<sup>11</sup> But I would not care at this time to develop my thinking more fully than is indicated by that speech. The studies have gone forward. We have a very able group of officers within the Department of State who are studying the problem from a technical standpoint.

You may recall that in that speech I indicated objectives to be served in harmonizing the policies of the member states, particularly in relation to the treaty area. I also pointed to certain problems involved and that we did not want to get into a procedural bind which would enmesh us so as to deprive the member countries of all capacity for quick and decisive action. And I pointed out that the United States was not only an Atlantic country but also a country of the Americas, also a Pacific country, and that all those things had to be weighed.

<sup>10</sup> At a press briefing on June 11, James C. Hagerty, White House press secretary, announced the President's decision not to entertain a Soviet invitation for all members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit the Soviet Union.

<sup>11</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 30, 1956, p. 706.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1038.

Now the study group which we have which is working within the Department, and with which Senator George is in close contact, is taking those propositions which I enunciated in that New York speech and attempting to develop them in terms of seeing where they would come out in terms of actual new procedures that might be adopted. It would be premature to indicate the thinking going on there, but I would say it is closely along the lines I outlined in my New York speech.

### **The SEATO Alliance**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, while you have been discussing NATO at some length, there has been increased criticism, especially from the Philippines, of what they describe as the continued weakness of the SEATO alliance. Does the United States have plans to strengthen that alliance militarily or bringing in other countries? What will be the situation of SEATO in view of this criticism in Asia?*

**A.** I am not aware that there is any general rising criticism in Asia. We had, for example, earlier this year the joint operation which was given, I think, the name of "Firm Link," and which made a very strong impression upon the Asian members. It showed the capacity of carrying out quickly and effectively an operation which would bring a great power to bear in those areas. The particular area then selected was the area of Bangkok in Thailand. The same could have been done elsewhere.

I think you know what certainly all the treaty members know—that we agreed and that it was understood from the very beginning that we would not attempt to establish a force-in-being in SEATO comparable to the force-in-being which is assigned to NATO. We have to depend primarily upon an appropriate cooperation of local forces-in-being with the mobile striking power of the United States which is available in the Western Pacific and which is available to be used wherever it needs to be used. It may have to be used in Korea; it may have to be used in Taiwan; or it may have to be used in Viet-Nam or other places which cannot now be known.

Pinning down particular forces to particular areas would not be to increase the strength generally of the position in the Far East but actually would be to weaken it. The Philippines is as de-

pendent upon the maintenance of the integrity of the armistice in Korea and the independence of Taiwan (Formosa) and of Japan as it is in Southeast Asia. And to take forces and tie them down in Southeast Asia would not be to strengthen in fact the position of any one of the SEATO treaty powers.

Now, what we are working on is the exercises and planning which will indicate how the forces available, which are ample, can be brought to bear on the areas of possible danger. I do not believe there is any weakening of SEATO. I think it is developing very effectively along the lines that were forecast, and I am not officially aware of the particular criticisms which you refer to. I have seen some reference to them in the press, but I think there is a good understanding and good working relationship as far as SEATO is concerned.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the British have decided to permit the shipment of rubber to Communist China. Can you tell us if that is done with American concurrence and, if not, what the United States view about it is?*

**A.** The action wasn't taken with any agreement on the part of the United States. As you probably are aware, the so-called Chinese list—the COMCOM [China Committee] list—differs from the COCOM [Coordinating Committee] list, which applies to the Soviet-bloc countries, and is considerably enlarged beyond the COCOM list. At the time that list was established it was agreed that there could be exceptional action taken with respect to items which were not on the COCOM list, in other words, items which could be bought by the Soviet-bloc countries but which were on the enlarged list as against the Chinese Communists. That provision for exceptional procedures has always been in that list and has from time to time been availed of. We do not know to what extent the rubber-producing countries intend to avail of that exception. They said they do intend to avail of it to some extent. The extent is unknown to us. The procedure is agreed and has been ever since the beginning, and we don't form any judgment about it until we know in fact what is likely to happen.

### **Foreign Aid Program**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you just came from a meeting of Democratic and Republican Senators on the*

*foreign aid program. Can you tell us what happened?*

A. We expressed to them the administration's viewpoint with reference to the cut which the House made in authorizing the funds for the mutual security program and the conditions attached to the use of those funds in certain respects, and we had an exchange of views. A good many questions were asked. No commitments were sought or given.

*Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, in part, have you had any direct contact with the President since his illness—either in person or by telephone—and in view of his enormous personal prestige in this matter of foreign policy and, in particular, the subject of foreign aid, how much, if any, do you think it may impair your foreign aid program by his being limited in action for some time because of this illness?*

A. I do not think it will impair the situation. The President's views are fully known. No Member of the Congress this morning in conference had any doubts about what the President's views are, or his reasons for them. You may recall that he expressed them quite directly and forcefully in a letter which he wrote to Minority Leader Martin<sup>12</sup> before the matter was debated by the House. And I do not look toward any impairment of the administration's case because of the present indisposition of the President.

*Q. Does one infer from that, sir, that you not only hope but expect that the Senate will restore the House cut?*

A. Well, you can say that I hope it. I don't indulge at the moment in the realm of speculation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the head of the Greek Orthodox Church in London was deported today to Greece. I wonder if you have any comment on that?*

A. I don't know about that. I'm sorry. I haven't heard of it and have no comment to make.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us your thinking on the implications of the visit of Mr. Shepilov, the new Foreign Minister, to Cairo?*

A. Well, it emphasizes the fact which I have called attention to a good many times: that nowadays, with the present means of communication,

foreign ministers travel a good bit instead of depending upon written communications. He seems to be following that example.

*Q. Tit-for-tat policy, sir?*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you any comment to make about the last Bulganin message on disarmament?<sup>13</sup> Are we now in a complete deadlock on this matter?*

A. Well, I would not say that we were at a complete deadlock by any means. Of course, the message from Bulganin was, in essence, the transmittal of the statement which had previously been issued by the Soviet Government, on May 14. And the main body of the communication was merely a transmittal of what we had already read in the newspapers. Now there was some accompanying comment which will receive attention in due course. It is being studied by the State Department, being studied by the Defense Department. It is being studied by Mr. Stassen, the President's Special Adviser, and, no doubt, we will have some talks with friendly governments that are concerned. Particularly, I suppose that would be one of the subjects which Chancellor Adenauer and I would talk about because it alludes, as you will recall, to the possible withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany. We have not yet come to any conclusions as to what kind of answer to make.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect to have any discussions with Mr. Adenauer pertaining to the return of vested alien property, such as aniline film, to the German nationals?*

A. I don't know whether Chancellor Adenauer will bring up that subject or not. If he does, I will, of course, tell him the state of the legislation on that topic.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you made any change in your plan to go to the meeting in Panama on June 25?*

A. Well, I don't know that the meeting will actually be held on June 25. There seems to be some uncertainty about that in view of the probable inability of the President to attend at that time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you tell the foreign-aid meeting this morning your view on the House*

<sup>12</sup> For text of Bulganin message of June 6, see White House press release dated June 8.

*language on aid to Yugoslavia—as to whether that is acceptable to the administration?*

A. No. I did not go into that particular question of the language of that bill. We did discuss the general question of Yugoslavia.

*Q. Another point on the same subject, Mr. Secretary. Have you received the slightest indication at all from Senator Russell that he will not go ahead with his announced intention over the weekend of seeking an additional billion out in the bill?*

A. No. I've had no communication with Senator Russell that covered that point. He was at the meeting this morning, but that did not come up.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the NATO business, could you say whether you have reached any opinion on whether the NATO treaty, as it now stands, has jurisdiction over political questions, if member countries are willing to commit such questions to NATO for consideration?*

A. Well, the NATO Council which exists is not only in the form of occasional meetings by the Foreign Ministers but, also, in the form of a Permanent Council and does now discuss from time to time political matters. The question is whether or not it is important and desirable and agreeable to all concerned to develop that function. It is a function which to some extent is now used. You may recall that prior to the summit meeting, for example, there was a meeting of the Ministers that was especially called for that purpose. And then, prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers that was held at Geneva in October–November, there was a meeting. There have been other meetings which have discussed political problems. So that, if we develop this, it would not be really breaking new ground. It would be developing further the ground that has already been broken.

*Q. Is it clear, sir, that the whole idea, as now considered in developing NATO, is entirely in the political field and not in the economic field? Your remarks would indicate that.*

A. Well, I cannot speak except for the United States in that respect. Certainly consideration is being given to development in the economic field, and there are certain respects in which it is hard to draw a clear line between what is political and

what is economic. Economic policies are often part of your political machinery; and, to that extent, if there was to be a more full discussion of political policies, that would also embrace, I would assume, the economic policies of the member countries insofar as they concern the treaty area.

Now, as far as being an operating mechanism in the economic field is concerned, it is the view of the United States that there are enough operating mechanisms there. We have the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation], the EPU [European Payments Union], the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the International Monetary Fund—all of which are operating agencies in the economic or related financial fields. And there would not seem to be much room or occasion to create a new operating agency. As I say, insofar as economic policies are involved as a part of the policies of the member states, those would be embraced within political exchanges of views.

I want to emphasize that those are just the views of the United States that I am expressing. I don't know what the views of the other members will be.

*Q. Have you had any indication from Prime Minister Nehru about his forthcoming trip, in view of the President's illness?*

A. I believe that there has been an inquiry with reference to the trip. I have not actually seen it, nor has any reply been made.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do I understand the implication of your statement on the Khrushchev speech to be that Stalinism was the result of a system which continues to exist in the Soviet Union?*

A. We have not yet seen any evidence of a change from a system which, historically, has always produced the kind of evils which are portrayed in the Khrushchev speech. What is going on behind the scenes, I don't know. I expressed the hope that there was a movement toward government which would, to a greater degree, derive its powers from the consent of the governed. I expressed the fear that it might be that the Soviet rulers were trying to hold on to their dictatorial power by claiming virtue from having attacked the past fruits of their system. But those evil fruits of the past are implicit in the system; and, if the system is continued, we are fearful that the same evil fruits will again develop from it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do the increasing reports of the liquidation of labor camps, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners, and so forth—how do you interpret that, or do you regard these reports as reliable?*

A. I think that the reports are reliable. I discussed them last month with President Meany, for example. He was inclined to think that the report was reliable—that they were offering labor a greater freedom of choice as to the work and jobs that the laborers would undertake. However, he pointed out that the effectiveness of that freedom was considerably impaired by the housing restrictions, which meant that, if you moved away, maybe you wouldn't get any house in which to live. Nevertheless, there are encouraging developments which indicate that there is a growing demand within the Soviet Union for greater freedom and for a government which will be more responsive to the wishes of the governed and which will be primarily concerned with advancing their legitimate aspirations. It is hard to judge yet, I say, which way it is going to go; but, as I said in my speech at Ames, it is quite obvious that there are very strong pressures in that direction. We hope very much that there will be more than lip service given to those pressures and that the trend may be toward a government which is really responsive to, and which derives its power from, the consent of the governed.

*Q. Thank you.*

## **Ambassadorial Talks at Geneva With Chinese Communists**

Press release 315 dated June 12

The Chinese Communists on June 12 issued another public statement regarding the Geneva discussions which calls for a reply.<sup>1</sup>

### **I**

In their statement they quote a draft of an announcement proposed by the United States on April 19, 1956, reading as follows:

1. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, and Amba-

<sup>1</sup> For an account of the earlier course of the Geneva negotiations, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 164; also available as Department of State publication 6280, entitled *Renunciation of Force*.

sador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, agree, without prejudice to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peaceful means or its inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, to announce:

2. The United States of America and the People's Republic of China are determined that they should settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force in the Taiwan area or elsewhere.

3. The two ambassadors should continue their talks to seek practical and feasible means for the realization of this common desire.

This draft, the Communists state, was rejected by them on the ground that it represents a demand by the United States that the Communists "accept the present state of the U.S. interference in China's internal affairs and its occupation of Taiwan," and that the United States "has refused to take a positive stand on the question of holding a Sino-American conference of the Foreign Ministers."

What the Communists fail to point out is that the above-quoted U.S. proposal is identical with the Communist proposal of December 1, 1955,<sup>2</sup> except for the addition of the words which are underlined above, viz.:

1. The addition to paragraph 1 of the Communist proposal of the words "without prejudice to the pursuit by each side of its policies by peaceful means or its inherent right of individual or collective self-defense."

2. The addition to paragraph 2 of the Communist proposal of the words "in the Taiwan area or elsewhere."

The United States believed that there could be no further excuse for the Communists' refusing to join in a meaningful renunciation of force if the United States accepted the Communist proposal of December 1, 1955, with the addition of words to make clear that by the announcement:

(1) neither party was agreeing to abandon the pursuit of its policies by peaceful means;

(2) each party reserved the right of self-defense if the other by breach of the renunciation of force did engage in armed attack; and

(3) the renunciation of force applied both generally and specifically to the Taiwan area.

But these reasonable hopes of the United States were met by a Communist rejection of what

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 167.



amounted to its own proposal. In addition, the Communists advanced the requirement that only 2 months were to be allowed the Ambassadors to reach an agreement satisfactory to the Communists or the renunciation of force would no longer be effective.

How there can be any possible objection to the words which the United States proposed to add to the Chinese draft is not understandable unless the Communists are determined either not to join in a meaningful renunciation of force or intend to reserve to themselves the use of armed force if they are not assured in advance that they will gain their goals.

The principle of the renunciation of the use of force is neither the abandonment of the right to pursue the attainment of objectives by peaceful means, or the right of self-defense. Nor does the principle of renunciation of force expire when one believes that he can better attain his objectives by the use of force.

## II

The Communists make no mention of the fact that, although on September 10, 1955, they undertook that they would adopt measures to permit Americans in China to return to the United States.<sup>3</sup> 13 Americans are still held in Communist prisons. We continue to seek the fulfillment by the Chinese Communists of their undertaking, not only for humanitarian reasons but because respect for international undertakings lies at the foundation of a stable international order.

We shall continue to seek a meaningful renunciation of force.

### **U.S. and U.K. Agree To Extend Cooperation in Atomic Energy**

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 326) announced on June 14 that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom on June 13 had concluded an agreement further extending their

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

cooperation in the field of atomic energy. British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins, representing Great Britain, and Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis L. Strauss and Acting Assistant Secretary of State C. Burke Elbrick, on behalf of the United States, signed an agreement amending the U.S.-U.K. agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy which has been in effect since July 21, 1955.<sup>1</sup>

The effect of this amendment is to broaden the scope within which exchanges may take place in two respects: (a) as regards materials utilized in the atomic energy programs of the two countries, and (b) information regarding military package power reactors and other military reactors for the propulsion of naval vessels, aircraft, and land vehicles.

Under the provisions of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, there must be a 30-day period during which the agreement lies before the Congress before the amendment becomes effective.

### **Atoms-for-Peace Agreements With New Zealand, Dominican Republic**

The Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State (press release 318) announced on June 13 that representatives of New Zealand and the United States had signed on that day a proposed agreement for cooperation in research in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Signing of a similar agreement with the Dominican Republic took place on June 15 (press release 328). Both agreements were negotiated within the framework of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace program.

The agreement with New Zealand was signed by Ambassador Sir Leslie Munro and, for the United States, by Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, and Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The agreement with the Dominican Republic was signed by Ambassador Joaquin E. Salazar, Mr. Strauss, and Henry F. Holland, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.

<sup>1</sup> For background, see BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 58.

## The Impact of the United States on Europe

*by Eleanor Dulles*

*Special Assistant to the Director, Office of German Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

Two centuries ago there was transplanted to this land a society and a culture which continued to be nourished and enriched from abroad. We, the heirs of this society, have always been ready to acknowledge our debt. We are grateful for our heritage. We have received so much in value over the years that we have been preoccupied with our youth as a nation. We have not recognized the full significance of the changes that have taken place in recent times. The fact is that for more than a decade of war and reconstruction this country has been giving substantial and critically important support to those lands from which we came.

Thus, the passage of time and the change in our destinies have brought to you and to me new opportunities and new tasks. We are so accustomed to thinking of ourselves as the junior partners in efforts to maintain the values of civilization that we hesitate to acknowledge the new role we have assumed.

It is important now, at this stage of international recovery, and also in this phase of your personal lives, to turn our attention to some of these facts. Consideration is worth while since, in a very deep sense, this new situation will affect the world you live in and will determine the claims which will be made upon you. It is important, therefore, that you now take stock of where you stand and what your country has done in relation to Europe. Such an appraisal as you may make will almost certainly give you a sense of the scope of the problem and a new excitement over the part you will be asked to play.

The best way in which I can acknowledge the privilege of being here is to give you a summary of what I have seen and what I believe. When I look at the past and the future, I am impressed

with the cause for pride in what we have accomplished in war and peace.

In the period of armed conflict and years of reconstruction, we have as a Nation gained new stature. Thus, during a brief span of 15 or 20 years, this country has made good a considerable portion of its obligation to the civilizations to which it has been so deeply in debt. It has assumed a large share of the burden of leadership in renewing and expanding our human heritage.

Of course, this giving back of resources, material and spiritual, has not been without a strong motive of self-interest. In the past few years it has become widely realized that the success of efforts to preserve those influences and values which can make possible a richer and more secure life requires a broader partnership between nations. Thus the contributions we have been able to make to restore the economic and spiritual life have been with a clear purpose. They have been designed to save the cultures and peoples of those countries so important to all of us.

The new element in our relations with Europe over the past 15 years has been the energy with which they have been conducted, the scope of the imagination, and the extent of material support. Moreover, without the elements of common origin in our political and economic institutions, in tradition and custom, the success achieved would have been less impressive. These common origins have made possible a working together in relief and reconstruction, a shared effort to win financial stability by using familiar techniques, well-tried and well-known methods. Because of our common understanding of law and of literature, of

<sup>1</sup> Address made at commencement exercises at Hunter College, New York, N. Y., on June 14 (press release 317 dated June 13).

education and industry, we have been able to work together.

Thus, the Atlantic Community is a real community. In contributing to it in this time of need, we have indeed been supporting those institutions and those cultures which we so long have prized.

One of the difficulties which surrounds any attempt to appraise the influence of this country on Europe is that such an appraisal raises in many peoples' minds questions of modesty on our part and pride on their part. If one looks at the facts objectively, there is no serious doubt that this country has made an enormous contribution. Because the United States has been able to offer aid of various sorts to European nations, there is a better chance for the survival of the world as we know it.

Whether in fact this world can continue to grow in strength and in richness of expression is not a matter which can be demonstrated now. The main point which I wish to make as I review the question is that Europe and the world have been given a new chance. The importance of this new chance for peace and security can scarcely be exaggerated. We have gained years in which our principles can be further applied, in which young men and women can be educated to new horizons and broader concepts.

#### **Four Main Aspects**

My analysis of the impact of the United States on Europe leads me to emphasize four main aspects. These are all closely related and have complemented each other.

The first to command attention is the material support through relief and reconstruction which this country was able to render Europe.

The second was the new organizations, the structures of working cooperation whose development we have done so much to assist—organizations designed to serve new communities of nations not only in Europe but also in the Middle East and Asia.

The third aspect is the series of alliances and commitments which bind us together with the future of Europe.

The fourth, our role in developing new aspects of personal liberty and individual freedom to enrich the heritage of the past.

I have seen the workings of all these four categories of influence in France, England, Austria,

Germany, and elsewhere; and it is from these personal observations that I want to speak today. For instance, I went into Austria in the early summer of 1945 and shared the difficult struggles for recovery in Austria and in Germany. I had a small part in the efforts of the Western allies to maintain the security and welfare of the city of Berlin, hard pressed by the Communist tyranny. I have been close to the formulation of early plans for a number of European organizations. In the course of this work, I have talked with hundreds of students and exchangees and have sat in many meetings where the values of a good society have been discussed and where the efforts for true international understanding have been frankly and fully debated.

Perhaps this intimate experience which has been my privilege leads to a special point of view, but, in any case, it forms the basis for strong convictions. As the result of participating in the struggles and seeing the results, I am convinced that our influence has been to make possible, and even probable, a close and enduring cooperation for freedom.

#### **Relief and Reconstruction**

The time which has been won was first at the cost of human lives during the war, then by virtue of a great financial expenditure in the postwar period.

This phase of history and the revival in Western Europe has been one in which we as Americans can be proud, since it justifies our early traditions and our inheritance from the great men of Europe.

There is a tendency now to underestimate and even to forget the material importance of the early aid to Europe and the later more integrated accomplishments of the European recovery plan. Americans at times feel almost apologetic about grants and loans; but, if they had not been extended, the chaos of much of Europe might have prevented the recovery of the world from the Second World War.

When I went into Austria in 1945, I lived in a hotel which had been torn wide open by bombs. There was virtually no light in the city at night. Frequently we saw persons drop from hunger in the streets. We saw professors and bankers, as well as workers and the unemployed, picking up cigarette butts from the gutters. We saw misery

and fear, weakness and disease, confusion and despair.

Conditions in France and England were slightly better. In Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, perhaps they were worse.

The first task facing the United States, consistent with our aims to bring a real recovery, was obviously to bring in food, clothes, medicines, and fuel. This alone, however, would have been of little worth. The basic job was to put the people to work, to give them tools, to restore light, fuel, machinery, transport, and the financial systems. It is easy now to forget the complexity of the task. Many do not even remember how great the need, how long the road to recovery was.

In the case of Austria there was, in 1945 and 1946, virtually no coal. Fuel had to be shipped in from outside. There was need for passenger transport, trucks, and rolling stock. These were loaned from the Army, later bought, and finally rebuilt.

The electric-power systems had great potential, and in the short space of 5 years a large part of the plant had been put back into operation. In 10 years the capacity has been expanded way beyond prewar levels.

One of the most vital of the economic contributions to Austria was, however, the measures taken jointly with the other Western occupying powers to accomplish the stabilization of the currency. This was done not on the basis of financial reserves, which were nonexistent, but on the basis of techniques and confidence. Austria after the war was a poor country. The capital position destroyed by the *Anschluss* with Germany was at the lowest possible level. There was little basis for stabilization except the firmness of the Austrian political and financial leaders and the help of the American Government. In spite of obstacles raised by the Communists, who also occupied Austria, the monetary reform was carried through: and, since 1947, the cigarette money characteristic of the postwar years ceased to function. National bank money became the general standard and the accepted means of payment. Sooner than anyone expected, the exports climbed to a point where they virtually balanced imports.

The United States influence in Austria, as in other Western European countries, was also notable in the restoration of the democratic machinery and the strengthening of the institutions of free-

dom. The Americans, first in Austria, and working often closely with their English and French allies, helped plan the first informal meeting of political leaders. They stood back of the Austrian elections which were held a few weeks after the shooting stopped. They safeguarded the principles and assisted in the process of free, secret, and orderly choosing of the first government since the *Anschluss* in 1938.

I have taken Austria as a typical example of the economic impact of the United States on Europe. The cases of Belgium and France, of Germany and Italy, and the other countries receiving U.S. aid could, perhaps, have been used with equal validity.

### **Organizations for Cooperation**

The methods used and the institutions created in recent years were more than short-run accomplishments. They transcend in time and scope the initial purpose for which they were formed. They succeeded in bringing together 16 nations in a continuing association for mutual support. The cooperating agencies in Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union, have not only been vehicles for increasing the effectiveness of U.S. aid but also for bringing together the economists and statesmen of Europe in a long-range endeavor. In particular the OEEC and the EPU were trailblazers in the world of ever closer contacts and cooperation and may well constitute a turning point in moving from European conflict to sound and lasting community of interests. They may be counted among the major contributions of the United States to growing world prosperity.

Both institutions, centered on Paris, were simple in structure and relatively free of redtape. Both tended to act to smooth the relations and increase the commerce between European nations. The participation of the United States has been close and intimate through its continuing advice and efforts to bring about cooperative understanding on trade liberalization, financial adjustments, and effective use of material resources. Thus, in a noncontroversial manner, these 16 countries, some of them recently engaged in mortal combat, worked in a joint endeavor to raise the standard of living of their people and to remove causes of economic friction.

In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization followed soon on the first phase of recovery to provide urgently needed security measures. The Coal and Steel Community was developed to make possible a rational production and marketing of coal and steel as a basis for coordinating the heavy industries.

It is not possible to describe the various organizations that have been set up at the instigation and under the inspiration of United States leadership and with the cooperation of this country's allies in the Western World. They all, whatever their character, have merit in that they develop the skills required for working together and develop the habit of cooperation. They break down the barriers of unfamiliarity and cross over the gaps which have formerly been raised by national differences of language and custom.

Europe, thus, has had not only a time span in which to develop economic and political strength but also new tools and a new knowledge that the United States is working alongside with shared aims, trying to make these tools effective.

If one were to select an institution which, though still in the making, may have the most critical importance on the fate of Europe, and of mankind, that institution would be EURATOM. This organization is designed to bring within the cooperative framework of joint control the uses and further exploration of the development of atomic power for peace. It is designed to bring under joint control, for mutual benefit, almost unimaginable developments in that area.

All must recognize how important it is that no nation go its way completely alone. If, for instance, in the field of atomic power nations were to act separately, the whole world could be the victim of the least responsible and the least disciplined of such nations. It is perhaps in this area that our deepest concern and our greatest hope for essential integration will lie. This agency could be the major instrument for fulfilling the hopes and plans sketched out by President Eisenhower in his speech on the atom for peace.

#### **Alliances To Safeguard Security**

Of major importance as a cornerstone of the contribution of the United States to the hope of peace for the future of Europe has been the series of alliances designed to safeguard the security of Europe and the peace of the world. The organiza-

tions already mentioned have been the outward expression of these alliances, but they are not as yet fully representative of the intentions and the meaning of strength which come with the joining together for security and against aggression.

The full meaning of this new form of America's participation in the fate of Europe and its readiness to stand with other free nations against aggression is best understood when one considers the pleas for a similar kind of security effort after the First World War. It was not possible for the United States to make a commitment in Europe in the 1920's. Apparently, with a few notable exceptions such as Woodrow Wilson, neither the people of the country nor the leadership were convinced of the necessity. Now almost everyone knows isolation is not possible. A significant share of this country's effort is devoted to making mutual security a reality.

These facts are known and appreciated in Europe. Those who talk about whether we are liked or disliked abroad are looking at superficial aspects of the situation and ignoring the basic facts. The United States shouldered many responsibilities and made serious commitments. There is no European leader who does not know that in this situation there is great strength. There is no leader in the Kremlin who does not recognize that these facts are of major importance.

Because of this notable extension of our influence and of our activities, policy in every European country has changed in significant ways in recent years. The policy in Russia has changed. One of the aspects of the present situation which is being watched most carefully in Moscow is undoubtedly the new, unpredicted, and, to a large extent, unexpected willingness of the Germans and the French to work together. Such a situation could not have been anticipated 50 years ago. These are major developments not only for Europe but for the world in general. These are results of patient, continuous, and imaginative efforts on the part of the United States.

The Berlin story is the prime illustration of the execution of a joint effort to protect an area to which we are committed. It was a practical realization of our will to support those who stand for democratic principles.

The action of this country together with its Western allies in mounting the airlift, and thus standing with Berlin in time of trial to frustrate

the Communist blockade, is evidence of our new participation in the affairs and destinies of Europe and our new ability to assist our friends. The United States was and is committed to Berlin along with the other occupying powers. Immediately upon the imposition of the blockade, it acted to supply the city. It showed by word and deed that it would stand with the free Berlin population.

The Berliners, for their part, made their memorable decision to reject the lures of the East, to refuse the bribes of dictatorships, and to assume the risks of maintaining their freedoms. They did not know, when they made their choice, whether or not the trickle of food and fuel coming into the city would ever increase to sufficient volume to maintain their life. They knew the risks which they were taking, but they also knew that they had support from outside. If the United States and the allies had not mounted an airlift in Berlin, the Communist dictatorship would probably have reached the Rhine. There would be now no shining light, no freedom bell in this city in the center of Europe, far behind the Iron Curtain. Perhaps the newly won sovereignty of Germany would have been impossible. The strategic potential of NATO might not exist. Who knows whether France and Italy could have held firm?

The dramatic circle and descent of planes over the apartment houses of Berlin, the thousands of tons of fuel and food unloaded at Tempelhof made possible the strength to refuse the lures of the Communists. They made possible the choice of Berliners to stand with the West and to make their stand unmistakably clear to the East. Now, as a result of this choice, a short distance from Warsaw, 150 miles east of the Rhine, the Berliners maintain an island of democracy. Thus, the United States reached out with aid, with planes, with courage and foresight to hold this outpost of freedom. All Europe must acknowledge the deep significance of these policies and the foundations they laid for dependable alliance.

#### **New Concepts of Personal Liberty**

The concepts of freedom and the urge to let thought and speech range over wider and wider spaces, the attempts to reconcile the stability that comes with tradition with the sense of opportunity which nourishes our society date back beyond

to the beginning of recorded time. The United States in this generation, in our relation to Europe, has added more than a footnote to this long history, however. We have written the beginning of a new chapter.

The form which our influence has taken is in line with our early philosophy and our more recent technical development. It is the almost limitless mobility of the individual between places, between classes, between professions. He can choose his way of life. If necessary he can change it. This new extension of the choice of the individual is typical of this country. In our relations with Europe it has been revealed in our breaking down of cartels and professional monopolies. It has been of revolutionary importance in introducing a new type of partnership between management and labor. Europe has recently been turning its attention to our education and culture in relation to the opportunity of the individual.

Like all new liberties and all modifications in the established order, these changes have not been fully understood and have been overlooked completely by some observers. There is little doubt that they are altering the nature of European society.

Since the aim of this country, in its efforts to reconstruct the best in the old system and build new structures on the foundations of the past, was to make other countries strong, its influence in this field is in fact self-limiting. Those elements in Europe to which we gave the most aid are now most independent. Thus, the success of the program to increase democracy, to widen the areas of free choice and cooperation was, by its very nature, a transitional phase in world progress.

Some wonder at the meaning of the expressions of initiative or even of disagreement that now occur more frequently as sovereign nations express their increasing independence and their national will. This development is in the truest sense a sign of success and not of failure. Healthy nations do not want to be led. They wish to exert leadership. As long as they are acting for the peace and security of the group, they are, by showing initiative, carrying forward the new concepts and increasing the strength of the mutual enterprise.

In every foreign post and in the work at home for these ends, the work of this country has been accomplished by people like you. From our great

colleges they and you have gained a clear view of the importance of these tasks. They and you have gained pride in a willingness to accept responsibility, a respect for the high standards of workmanship. In sharing in the education of our great institutions, the lessons have been clear. You have learned to fear the disaster which might overtake us all if you fail. You have known the hope for a world of peace. Above all, you have become aware of the great opportunities which you have in science, education, art, and business.

The impact of the United States on Europe has been crucial to the future of mankind. The reconstruction of these countries has saved some of the world's most precious values. Such reconstruction would not have been possible if there had not been a resurgence of the political vitality of the countries which created most of the democratic institutions governing mankind. The new institutions for working together have opened up possibilities for a widening and ever more significant cooperation. The alliance in compacts and treaties has given substance to the will for peace. And finally, the expanding of the borders of personal freedom and opportunity has added to our heritage of freedom and dignity.

This work has been carried on in large measure by the men and women who graduated from college in the last 30 years. A not inconsiderable part has been the work of those who graduated in the last 10 years. As the task increases in variety and urgency, the need for you is greater.

You can take pride in the accomplishments of your country, its work and its ideals. You can resolve to seize the present opportunity and continue the work already begun.

As Carl Schurz said, in April 1859:

"Ideals are like stars; you will not succeed in touching them with your hands. But like the seafaring man on the desert of waters, you choose them as your guides, and following them you will reach your destiny."

## **U.S. Concern for Refugees**

*Statement by Christopher H. Phillips<sup>1</sup>*

All of us here share in common a deep aversion to systems of political and religious persecution, which are the cause of most of the tragic human problems for which we are trying to find solu-

tions through the work of this Committee and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

No matter what other difficulties may exist between them, free peoples are united in their determination to preserve and foster conditions of religious and political freedom and respect for the worth and dignity of the individual human being.

The people of the United States share deeply these sentiments. Their concern for the plight of the victims of political and religious oppression is reflected in the large amount of refugee work carried on under private auspices as well as varied governmental efforts made through national and international programs.

We support and participate in programs for the overseas resettlement of as many refugees as resettlement opportunities permit. We also support and participate in programs for the local integration of those refugees for whom overseas resettlement is impracticable or impossible. We consider both approaches as important ways to achieve solutions for the problems of refugees.

The United States recognizes the valuable contribution which the present UNREF program can make to solve the difficult problems of residual refugees in Europe. Given adequate support by governments, we have confidence in the High Commissioner's ability to achieve these solutions.

In these days, Communist governments under the guise of "voluntary repatriation" are seeking through intimidation and threat the forceable return of refugees to their former homelands, where they are certain to face even greater perils than those from which they fled. We therefore look especially to the High Commissioner to exercise that alertness and vigilance necessary to protect the refugees against these efforts. We are confident that he will do so.

As an indication of the importance the United States attaches to this program and especially to its efforts on behalf of the foreign-speaking refugees, I am pleased to announce that my Government is prepared to make a supplementary contribution of \$194,000 to be used as a special effort on

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<sup>1</sup>Made before the United Nations Refugee Fund Executive Committee at Geneva, Switzerland, on May 28. Mr. Phillips, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, is U.S. representative on the UNREF Executive Committee.

behalf of non-German-speaking refugees in Austria. We propose that this contribution be used primarily for handicapped refugees and difficult cases amongst the foreign refugee population of Austria. It is to be considered a one-time contribution which bears no implication, direct or indirect, that a further U.S. contribution for this purpose will be made in future years. Furthermore, it is expected that the High Commissioner will negotiate an agreement with the Austrian Government whereby Austria will make appropriate contributions for the same purposes for which the special United States grant is made.

Mr. Chairman, this additional effort through UNREF is being undertaken simultaneously with a special effort on behalf of refugees in Austria through the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. My Government has announced its intention to make an extra contribution of \$250,000 to ICEM for a special resettlement program on behalf of foreign-speaking refugees in Austria.

These acts constitute a further indication of the deep concern which the United States has for refugees and more specifically for the particularly urgent refugee situation in Austria. I am confident that, through the joint efforts of the Austrian Government and the High Commissioner, this special grant to UNREF will make a significant contribution to a most pressing human problem.

## **Report on Atomic Radiation Transmitted to U.N.**

*Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on June 12 transmitted to Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld copies of a study made by the National Academy of Sciences on "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation." Following is the text of the letter of transmittal.*

U.S./U.N. press release 2420 dated June 12

I have the honor to transmit herewith the first report submitted by the United States pursuant to the request of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation for national reports on subjects relevant to its work. Enclosed are 16 copies of the publication "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation, Summary Reports, from a Study by the National Academy

of Sciences," and 10 copies of the accompanying forty-page "layman's" summary of the Reports entitled "The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation, A Report to the Public."

It is requested that one copy of each document be transmitted to the other members of the Radiation Committee. The remaining two copies are for the use of the Secretariat. Additional copies of the report will be transmitted as soon as they become available from the printer.

The National Academy of Sciences, an independent non-governmental body of scientists, conducted this comprehensive study through the work of six committees, concentrating in the following fields: (1) genetics; (2) pathology; (3) agriculture and food supplies; (4) meteorology; (5) oceanography and fisheries; and (6) disposal of radioactive wastes. The findings and recommendations contained in the Report are those of the Committees themselves.

As additional studies relevant to the Committee's work are completed, they will be transmitted to the United Nations.

## **U.S. Delegations to International Conferences**

### **World Power Conference**

The Department of State announced on June 8 (press release 303) that Gail A. Hathaway, Special Assistant to the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, will be the U.S. delegate to the fifth meeting of the World Power Conference, which will meet at Vienna, Austria, June 17-23. Mr. Hathaway is also chairman of the U.S. National Committee of the World Power Conference and a vice chairman of the International Executive Council of the World Power Conference.

Mr. Hathaway will be assisted at the meeting by the following members of the delegation:

R. L. Brown, Staff Adviser, Bituminous Coal Division, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior  
Donald S. Campbell, Chief, Division of Power, Department of the Interior  
W. Kenneth Davis, Director, Division of Reactor Development, Atomic Energy Commission  
W. A. Dexheimer, Commissioner of Reclamation, Department of the Interior  
John E. Flaherty, Manager, Chicago Operations Office, Atomic Energy Commission  
Arthur E. Gorman, Division of Reactor Development, Atomic Energy Commission



George A. Grimm, Chief, Utilization Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Properties and Installations, Department of Defense

Roland A. Kampmeier, Assistant Manager of Power Supply, Tennessee Valley Authority

Charles W. Kinney, Office of the Assistant Chief of Engineers and Civil Works, Department of the Army

L. N. McClellan, Assistant Commissioner and Chief Engineer, Department of the Interior

Col. Carroll T. Newton, Chief, Engineer Research and Development Division, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army

George P. Palo, Head Structural Engineer, Tennessee Valley Authority

William A. Pearl, Administrator, Bonneville Power Administration, Department of the Interior

Frank H. Speding, Director, Ames Laboratory, Iowa State College

I. I. Rabi, Department of Physics, Columbia University, and Chairman, General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission

Ulysses Staebler, Chief, Civilian Power Reactors Branch, Division of Reactor Development, Atomic Energy Commission

Frank L. Weaver, Chief, Division of River Basins, Bureau of Power, Federal Power Commission

Roy Zook, Assistant Administrator, Rural Electrification Administration, Department of Agriculture

The World Power Conference is a private international organization founded at London in 1924 to bring together scientists, engineers, economists, and administrators who are primarily concerned with the development and utilization of the world's power resources. It is the principal international agency engaged in collecting world power statistics, including data on the world's hydraulic power and coal resources. The plenary meetings of the World Power Conference are normally held every 6 years, the fourth meeting having been held at London in 1950.

The theme selected for the fifth meeting is "World Energy Resources in the Light of Recent Technical Economic Developments." In this connection, approximately 300 papers will be dealt with under the following divisions: (1) the present status and development of power production and utilization in individual countries; (2) the preparation and conversion of fuels; (3) the utilization of primary sources of energy; (4) the purification of waste water and exhaust gas in the production and use of energy; and (5) international cooperation in the production and use of energy. This will be the first in the series of plenary meetings of the World Power Conference to give extensive consideration to questions relating to atomic energy.

The World Power Conference has national com-

mittees or representatives in the following countries and areas: Algeria, Argentine Republic, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Saar, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

#### **ECE Coal Committee**

The Department of State announced on June 14 (press release 323) that Albert L. Lynn, vice president of the Island Creek Coal Company, Huntington, W. Va., has been designated the U.S. delegate to the series of meetings to be held at Geneva, Switzerland, under the auspices of the Coal Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe, during the week of June 25, 1956. This Committee is one of the principal subsidiary organs established by the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, which is concerned with the demand, supply, and consumption of coal in the European market. The Coal Trade Subcommittee, which convenes on June 25, will be followed by meetings of the Classification Working Party, June 26-28, and the Utilization Working Party, June 29-30.

Mr. Lynn will be assisted at these meetings by T. Reed Scollon, Chief, Division of Bituminous Coal, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, and by a member of the U.S. resident delegation at Geneva.

#### **International Civil Aviation Organization**

The Department of State announced on June 14 (press release 325) that the U.S. Government will be represented by the following delegation at the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which will convene its 10th session at Caracas, Venezuela, on June 19, 1956:

##### *Delegates*

Thomas B. Wilson, *chairman*, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation

Joseph H. FitzGerald, Director, Bureau of Air Operations,  
Civil Aeronautics Board

Harold A. Jones, U.S. Representative on the Council of the  
International Civil Aviation Organization

Claude H. Smith, Chief ICAO Officer, Civil Aeronautics  
Administration, Department of Commerce

Henry T. Snowdon, Assistant Chief, Aviation Division,  
Department of State

#### *Alternate Delegates*

H. Alberta Colclaser, Chief, Air Transport Relations,  
Aviation Division, Department of State

Godfrey H. Summ, Office of International Administration,  
Department of State

#### *Members of Delegation*

William B. Becker, Director of Operations, Air Transport  
Association of America, Inc.

Robert L. Froman, Associate Director, Bureau of Safety  
Regulations, Civil Aeronautics Board

Jean Stacy Gravatte, Aviation Division, Department of  
State

Alfred Hand, Chief, ICAO Division, International Region,  
Civil Aeronautics Administration, Department of  
Commerce

Mary C. Hillyer, Assistant Chief, Foreign Air Division,  
Civil Aeronautics Board

Paul Reiber, Assistant to the General Counsel, Air Trans-  
port Association of America, Inc.

Frederick L. Smith, Colonel, USAF, Assistant Chief,  
Civil Air Branch, Department of the Air Force

John H. Wanner, Associate General Counsel, Civil Aero-  
nautics Board

#### *Secretary of Delegation*

Hampton Davis, Office of International Conferences, De-  
partment of State

The forthcoming session, which will be the first meeting of the Assembly to be held in Latin America, will undertake a comprehensive review of all matters (technical, economic, legal, administrative, budgetary) pertaining to the past and future work of the organization. It is anticipated that special attention will be given to the problem of providing air-navigation facilities and services to meet the needs of international civil air transport, which is developing rapidly both in volume and type of planes used.

The Assembly is the supreme body of ICAO, in which all member states (69 at present) are entitled to be represented. As provided in article 48 (a) of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the Assembly has met annually since ICAO came into existence in 1947. In accordance with the established policy of holding major sessions of the Assembly every 3 years and confining

intervening sessions mainly to consideration of administrative, budgetary, and financial matters, this will be a major session for the examination of all phases of the organization's work.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952.<sup>1</sup>  
*Adherence deposited:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 24, 1956.

##### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.  
*Ratification deposited (with a declaration):* Albania, May 16, 1956.

##### Trade and Commerce

Fourth protocol of rectifications and modifications to annexes and to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 7, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

*Signatures:* Czechoslovakia, March 1, 1956; France, May 23, 1956.

*Declaration deposited (recognizing signature as binding):* Federal Republic of Germany, June 5, 1956.

Declaration on continued application of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force March 10, 1955. TIAS 3437.

*Signature:* Greece, February 23, 1956.

*Declaration deposited (recognizing signature as binding):* Federal Republic of Germany, May 30, 1956.

Protocol amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

*Signatures:* Luxembourg, February 22, 1956<sup>3</sup>; Czechoslovakia, March 1, 1956; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.

Protocol amending preamble and parts II and III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

*Signatures:* Luxembourg, February 22, 1956<sup>3</sup>; Czechoslovakia, March 1, 1956; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.

Protocol of organizational amendments to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

*Signatures:* Luxembourg, February 22, 1956<sup>3</sup>; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.

Agreement on Organization for Trade Cooperation. Done at Geneva March 10, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

*Signatures:* Luxembourg, February 22, 1956<sup>3</sup>; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

<sup>3</sup> Subject to ratification.

Protocol of rectification to French text of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 15, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

*Signatures:* Luxembourg, February 22, 1956<sup>3</sup>; Czechoslovakia, March 1, 1956.

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.<sup>2</sup>

*Signatures:* France, May 23, 1956; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.

Procès verbal of rectification concerning the protocol<sup>2</sup> amending part I and articles XXIX and XXX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the protocol<sup>2</sup> amending the preamble and parts II and III of the general agreement, and the protocol<sup>2</sup> of organizational amendments to the general agreement. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.

*Signatures:* Luxembourg and Union of South Africa, February 22, 1956; United Kingdom, March 1, 1956; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, May 23, 1956; Pakistan, May 24, 1956.

Sixth protocol of supplementary concessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and annexed schedules. Done at Geneva May 23, 1956.<sup>2</sup> Schedule of each contracting party enters into force on the thirtieth day following day of notification of intention to apply concessions, or on such earlier date as the contracting party may specify in notification.

*Signatures:* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

## BILATERAL

### Austria

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 8, 1956. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall receive from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

### Chile

Surplus commodity agreement pursuant to title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Signed at Santiago March 13, 1956.

*Entered into force:* June 2, 1956 (date of Chilean notification of approval in accordance with its constitutional procedures).

### Iceland

Agreement providing for reciprocal extension of the validity period of visas for certain nonimmigrants. Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik June 4, 1956. Entered into force: June 4, 1956.

### Iraq

Agreement providing for the reciprocal issuance of non-immigrant passport visas. Effected by exchange of notes at Baghdad June 6, 1956. Entered into force June 6, 1956.

### New Zealand

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 13, 1956. Enters into force on the day on which each Government shall receive from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

### Paraguay

Agreement for reciprocal import privileges for nondiplomatic personnel. Effected by exchange of notes at Asunción May 9 and 11, 1956. Entered into force May 11, 1956.

### United Kingdom

Agreement for the sale of tobacco to the United Kingdom and the construction of military dependents' housing and community facilities for use of the United States Air Force in the United Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at London June 5, 1956. Entered into force June 5, 1956.

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 15, 1955 (TIAS 3321). Signed at Washington June 13, 1956. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall receive from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements.

## PUBLICATIONS

### Recent Releases

*For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.*

**Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1955.** Pub. 6243. International Organization and Conference Series III, 111. 202 pp. 70¢.

This report, covering fiscal year 1955, is the eighth annual report by the United States to the United Nations, pursuant to article 88 of the United Nations Charter, on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Previous reports in the series were published by the Department of the Navy, 1948-1951 and the Department of the Interior, 1952 and 1953. Material for the 1954 report and the present report was furnished by the Department of the Interior and the Department of the Navy.

**New Opportunities in the U.S. Foreign Service.** Pub. 6284. Department and Foreign Service Series 51. 20 pp. 15¢.

A revised pamphlet describing the increasing opportunities in a wide variety of assignments both at home and abroad.

**The International Educational Exchange Program—Fifteenth Semiannual Report to Congress, January 1-June 30, 1955.** Pub. 6293. International Information and Cultural Series 44. 57 pp. 20¢.

The report reviews the activities carried out by the International Educational Exchange Service of the Department of State during the period January 1-June 30, 1955, together with an appraisal of their effectiveness.

**Educational Exchange Grants.** Pub. 6301. International Organization and Cultural Series 45. 25 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet which gives the full story of the International Educational Exchange Program, opportunities offered, selection of grantees, etc.

**You and the United Nations, 1956.** Pub. 6302. International Organization and Conference Series III, 113. 27 pp. 15¢.

An illustrated revised pamphlet in which Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Representative to the U.N., answers typical citizens' questions about the United Nations.

**Human Values in Social Change—in South and Southeast Asia and in the United States.** Pub. 6328. International Organization and Conference Series IV, UNESCO 31. 33 pp. Limited distribution.

A work paper, prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, for the Conference on Asian-American Cultural Relations held April 19–May 19, 1956, in Ann Arbor, Boston, Louisville, Minneapolis, San Francisco and Washington.

**Whaling.** TIAS 3198. Pub. 5899. 10 pp. 10¢.

Amendments to the schedule to the international whaling convention—Signed at Washington on December 2, 1946. Adopted at the Sixth Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, Tokyo, July 19–23, 1954. Entered into force November 8, 1954, and February 17 and 24, 1955.

**Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft.** TIAS 3200. Pub. 5901. 7 pp. 10¢.

Arrangement between the United States and the Union of South Africa. Exchange of notes—Signed at Pretoria October 29, 1954, and February 22, 1955. Entered into force February 22, 1955.

**Guaranty of Private Investments.** TIAS 3202. Pub. 5944. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 23, 1955. Entered into force March 23, 1955.

**Guaranty of Private Investments.** TIAS 3203. Pub. 5945. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima March 14 and 16, 1955. Entered into force March 16, 1955.

**Economic Cooperation—Informational Media Guaranty Program.** TIAS 3206. Pub. 5905. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 3 and 7, 1955. Entered into force March 7, 1955.

**United States Military Mission With the Imperial Iranian Gendarmerie.** TIAS 3207. Pub. 5906. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iran—Extending agreement of November 27, 1943, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tehran March 15 and 19, 1955. Entered into force March 19, 1955.

**Cooperative Agricultural Program in Peru.** TIAS 3208. Pub. 5919. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Peru—Extending agreement of September 15 and 21, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima February 23 and March 9, 1955. Entered into force March 10, 1955.

**Technical Cooperation—Community Welfare Program.** TIAS 3209. Pub. 5920. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Iraq—Signed at Baghdad March 2, 1955. Entered into force March 2, 1955.

**Relief Supplies and Equipment—Duty-Free Entry and Exemption from Internal Taxation.** TIAS 3210. Pub. 5921. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Chile. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago April 5, 1955. Entered into force April 5, 1955.

**Agriculture—Cooperative Program in Bolivia.** TIAS 3212. Pub. 5924. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Bolivia—Extending agreement of June 13 and 18, 1952. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz February 25 and March 3, 1955. Entered into force March 18, 1955.

**Defense—Loan of Vessels and Small Craft to China.** TIAS 3215. Pub. 6143. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and China—Amending agreement of May 14, 1954. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei March 22 and 31, 1955. Entered into force March 31, 1955.

**Naval Mission to Ecuador.** TIAS 3220. Pub. 5934. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Ecuador—Extending agreement of December 12, 1940, as modified and extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington August 30 and December 6, 1954. Entered into force December 6, 1954.

**Establishment and Operation of SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center.** TIAS 3236. Pub. 6011. 39 pp. 20¢.

Agreement between the United States and the Netherlands. Exchange of notes—Signed at The Hague December 14, 1954. Entered into force December 14, 1954. And Netherlands note—Dated January 15, 1955.

**Military Assistance.** TIAS 3240. Pub. 6263. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Cambodia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Phnom Penh May 16, 1955. Entered into force May 16, 1955.

**Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 3248. Pub. 6063. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Finland—Signed at Helsinki May 6, 1955. Entered into force May 6, 1955. With related exchange of notes—Dated at Helsinki May 6, 1955.

**Mutual Defense Assistance—Japanese Financial Contributions.** TIAS 3314. Pub. 6154. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo July 12, 1955. Entered into force July 12, 1955.

**Mutual Defense.** TIAS 3283. Pub. 5935. 12 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Guatemala—Signed at Guatemala City June 18, 1955. Entered into force June 18, 1955.

**Establishment of Mexican-United States Commission for Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease.** TIAS 3300. Pub. 5996. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States and Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington August 26, 1952. Entered into force August 26, 1952.

**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.** TIAS 3470. Pub. 6282. 6 pp. 5¢.

Procès-Verbal extending the validity of the Declaration Regulating Commercial Relations between certain contracting parties and Japan, pursuant to paragraph 1 (c) of that Declaration—Done at Geneva February 1, 1955. Entered into force with respect to the United States March 21, 1955.

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.  
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*308	6/11	Hill: "The Importance of Patriotism."
*309	6/11	Educational exchange.
*310	6/11	Educational exchange.
*311	6/11	Dowling sworn in as Ambassador to Korea.
312	6/12	Dulles: Khrushchev speech (combined with No. 314).
313	6/12	Dulles: visa allotments in Refugee Relief Act (combined with No. 314).
314	6/12	Dulles: news conference transcript.
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316	6/13	Germany frees imports from U.S.
317	6/13	Eleanor Dulles: "The Impact of the U.S. on Europe."
318	6/13	Atomic agreement with New Zealand (rewrite).
†319	6/14	Strong: Norway in the Postwar Era."
320	6/13	Proclamation on 1956 tariff negotiations.
*321	6/13	Educational exchange.
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323	6/14	ECE delegation (rewrite).
*324	6/14	Educational exchange.
325	6/14	ICAO delegation (rewrite).
326	6/14	Atomic agreement with U.K.
*327	6/14	Program for Pineau visit.
328	6/15	Atomic agreement with Dominican Republic (rewrite).
329	6/16	Hoover: "American Business Abroad and the National Interest."
†330	6/16	Murphy: statement on arrival of Pineau.

\*Not printed.  
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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