


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EIGN POLICY

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled April 1–June 30, 1958—Continued

ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI (Television)	U.S.S.R	June
GATT Balance-of-Payments Consultations	Geneva	June
International Tonnage Measurements Experts: 6th Meeting	Hamburg	June
UNREF Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	June*
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 7th Session	Geneva	June*
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	Geneva	June
UNESCO Meeting on Standardization of Educational Statistics	Paris	June

The Law of the Sea

Statement by Arthur H. Dean

Chairman, U.S. Delegation, U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea¹

As the representative of the United States of America, it is my pleasure on behalf of my delegation, to extend my Government's congratulations to the chairman,² vice chairman,³ and rapporteur⁴ on their election to their posts on this important committee and to express our pleasure at working with such distinguished colleagues.

My delegation wishes also to express its feeling of appreciation to the able members of the International Law Commission and its special rapporteur,⁵ who have labored so well and intelligently over the years on the articles on the law of the sea which are now before us.⁶

In addition, my delegation wishes to thank the

¹ Made in Committee I on Mar. 11. For an announcement of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 404; for text of U.N. resolution convoking the conference, see *ibid.*, Jan. 13, 1957, p. 61.

² K. H. Bailey (Australia).

³ Sergio Gutierrez Olivos (Chile).

⁴ Vladimir Koretsky (Ukrainian S.S.R.).

⁵ J. P. A. François.

⁶ For text of "articles concerning the law of the sea" as adopted by the International Law Commission at its eighth session at Geneva, Switzerland, April 23–July 4, 1956, see U.N. doc. A/3159. The three articles to which Mr. Dean specifically refers in this statement read as follows:

Article 3

1. The Commission recognizes that international practice is not uniform as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea.

2. The Commission considers that international law does not permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles.

3. The Commission, without taking any decision as to the breadth of the territorial sea up to that limit, notes, on the one hand, that many States have fixed a breadth greater than three miles and, on the other hand, that

many States do not recognize such a breadth when that of their own territorial sea is less.

4. The Commission considers that the breadth of the territorial sea should be fixed by an international conference.

Article 27

The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas comprises, *inter alia*:

- (1) Freedom of navigation;
- (2) Freedom of fishing;
- (3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
- (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.

Article 66

1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to

(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;

(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.

2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

members of the secretariat and other experts who have placed in our hands procedural and substantive material necessary to a proper consideration of the problems posed by this Conference on the Law of the Sea.

The world regrets the failure of the Hague conference of 1930. The United States of America considers that this conference affords the nations of the world, large and small, a new opportunity to bring order out of some of the chaotic conditions which exist with respect to the law of the sea, as well as to advance the development of international law.

In view of the many complex and sometimes controversial subjects before us, these objectives can only be achieved by the greatest of good will and cooperation among all concerned. Indeed, the law of the sea is of vital concern to all states, large and small, maritime and nonmaritime, coastal and landlocked.

It is the purpose of the United States delegation to do everything it can to assist in our task, and it welcomes consultation and discussion with other delegations on all matters of mutual interest.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation considers that two matters before Committee I are of such importance as to be the key to the general success of this conference. They are, *first*, the breadth of the territorial sea and, *second*, the contiguous zone.

Solutions of the problems implicit in these articles 3 and 66 would make the work of this committee a milestone in the development of international law. My delegation believes that with patience, understanding, and good nature such agreement can be reached.

It is related that Queen Elizabeth of England said in 1580: "The use of the sea is common to all; neither can a title to the ocean belong to any people or private persons, forasmuch as neither nature nor public use permit any possession thereof." So we who "go down to the sea in ships" and do business in great waters and see the wonders of the Lord in the deep are greatly concerned about these matters.

For, and I state it merely as a fact, the coastlines of the continental United States stretch for some 12,000 miles, and the coastlines of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico add many more miles to this figure. Our merchant fleets traverse the seven seas, and our mer-

chant-fleet tonnage of approximately 23,500,000 tons is about 22 percent of the world figures set forth in Lloyd's Register as of July 1, 1957. Consequently, our interest in the law of the sea and in this conference is not a casual one.

Our views are based on historic practice and experience with rules that have been tested by time. They have been reached, I hope, in good spirit, with the voice of reason and with due regard to the sometimes conflicting requirements of stability and change. They truly represent our best efforts to reach just and equitable solutions to common problems.

But we are dealing in some respects with a mathematical equation. For whatever you add to an individual state's territorial waters you subtract inevitably from the high seas, the common property of all, large or small. The law of mathematics is, I am afraid, as binding on new nations as on old.

Let us examine together a few of our common problems.

Now, for example, if you lump islands into an archipelago and utilize a straight baseline system connecting the outermost points of such islands and then draw a 12-mile area around the entire archipelago, you unilaterally attempt to convert into territorial waters or possibly even internal waters vast areas of the high seas formerly freely used for centuries by the ships of all countries. And, unhappily, you lend encouragement to others to go and do likewise.

Thus the threat to the free and continued use of the high seas becomes enormous. And you can't disguise it by labeling what is essentially restrictive, and detrimental to the general welfare, as being progressive; or disguise the shackling of liberty for all by calling it "new thought" or "realistic development" or "progress" or the "new concepts of new states."

By asking us to be generous and to accept such restrictions in the freedom of the seas, you ask us to be generous with other persons' property, held in common for the benefit of all peoples.

But, just as my delegation is prepared to listen with understanding and sympathy to the expression of views of the smallest countries, be they landlocked or nonmaritime, and to their problems, so too my delegation expresses the hope that its views and those of other maritime powers with experience will be received fully and fairly in the light of their intrinsic merits.

The position of the United States of America concerning the breadth of the territorial sea is determined by its attitude toward the doctrine of the freedom of the seas. There is no doctrine of international law more universally recognized than the principle that the high seas are the common property of all and that no part of them can be unilaterally appropriated by any state to its own use without the concurrence of other states.

In this day of improved methods of transportation and communication, which have served to bring countries ever closer together, it is vitally important that the international highways of the sea and of the superjacent air should not be brought under the restrictive domination or control of individual states, however worthy their motives. I repeat, any such proposals which would result in restricting the freedom of the seas would not be progress but rather retrogression.

We sincerely believe that this doctrine, in its widest implication, is the principle fairest to all, large and small. The doctrine of the freedom of the seas is not a mere historical relic of the so-called time when maritime law was developed by the great powers.

There have been suggestions here that the interests of small and large states in these matters are different.

The history of the United States and of the 3-mile limit is a living refutation of such suggestions.

Almost from the day of its emergence from colonial status into independent statehood, the United States of America has stood for freedom of the seas. In notes drafted by Thomas Jefferson in 1793 in his capacity as Secretary of State in the course of "friendly conferences and explanations with other powers," and basing his decisions in part on treaties already entered into, he announced that the United States was for a 3-mile limit of territorial sea.

It was important to the United States as a newly emerged country of approximately 3,900,000 people to be assured of freedom for its ships and its nationals on the high seas. And it has fought to maintain that freedom. Freedom is important to all, perhaps of even greater importance to the small state than to the large. This is no less true of freedom of the seas than of any other freedom.

We are grateful to the distinguished delegate of Peru for noting my country's consistent advocacy of this principle through all stages of our historical development.

Of the many states which presently adhere to the 3-mile rule and have done so in the past, there are many small states. Indeed, the doctrine was born of the desire of a small state for equal rights on the high seas.

Let us examine briefly some of the benefits which are our common heritage in the high seas, since our decisions here may affect these priceless benefits. For purposes of illustration only, this preliminary discussion is limited to but three of the freedoms of the high seas declared in article 27 of the ILC draft.

Navigation

The freedom of navigation on the high seas means the essential liberty of maritime transportation and communication unfettered by the requirement of consent by any foreign state. And the bridge of understanding which this creates between us was eloquently noted here by the distinguished delegate of Sweden.

To this freedom, sturdy fishing communities owe their livelihood. To this freedom many of us owe our economic strength and our opportunity in other fields.

The merchant fleets of the world represent not only profit to commercial interests but the only means by which the essentials of life can be transported readily to countries where there is a market. For the most precious commodity is of little value if there is no market for it where it is found. It must be transported as cheaply as possible to its buyer. Thus, freedom of the high seas is as important to the seller or producer as to the buyer.

Ship bottoms have carried food, clothes, medicine, and indeed the very means of national survival to virtually every country here represented.

Now the question before us is, which breadth gives the maximum freedom of navigation of the high seas in keeping with the ever-increasing sea communications of the modern-day world—a 3-mile-limit territorial sea or a wider breadth?

It is idle to assert that because of the existence of the right of innocent passage freedom of navigation does not suffer by an extension of the territorial sea.

The United States of America attaches the utmost importance to this historic right and believes that an unequivocal declaration should be made in our articles thereon. The right of innocent passage in territorial waters, however, is itself a recognition of the fact that freedom of navigation is restricted by the existence of a territorial sea under state sovereignty. And the doctrine of innocent passage is an effort to alleviate that situation.

If, as some say, the peaceful passage of foreign vessels through their territorial waters is guaranteed as long and insofar as it is not contrary to the sovereignty or harmful to the security of the coastal state, isn't there only a restricted right of innocent passage?

I submit that this extension of territorial waters to greater limits with this qualification as to the right of innocent passage is not equivalent to the right previously existing on the high seas.

Does this movement to wider breadth for the territorial sea, with consequent encroachment upon the high seas, represent progress? Isn't keeping the high seas as large an area as possible in the interests of all people—*res communis*, as Grotius termed it—just as desirable a goal as it was when Grotius first advocated it in 1609?

For those vessels which seek to avoid contact with the territorial sea for reasons of their own or because such contact may be forbidden by the coastal state, the difficulties and uncertainties of navigation and piloting increase geometrically with extensions of the territorial sea beyond 3 miles.

Let us pause to examine a few hard facts common to us all that must be encountered if the territorial seas were extended to, say, 12 miles.

Many landmarks, for instance, employed in visual piloting still necessary for small craft of all states are just not visible at a range of 12 miles. Indeed, it is estimated that only 20 percent of the world's lighthouses have a range of 12 miles or more.

We are greatly concerned that this conference should not impose this pall of darkness and its frightening possibilities on small craft.

Moreover, radar navigation at 12 miles and beyond is of only marginal utility in most instances. This is so because many objects normally used for radar navigation are unidentifiable at such dis-

tance. Further, it would be impossible for many small boats such as fishing boats to anchor at depths normally found outside a 12-mile limit, as they could not carry sufficient cable or appropriate anchors.

Thus, safety of navigation is greatest with a 3-mile limit.

Efforts by merchant ships to avoid violating the coastal states' regulations in extended territorial waters will inevitably lead to longer, less economical runs and to increased shipping costs, less revenues to the producers of the products carried, and higher prices to the consumer. Economic dislocations and substitution of products are inevitable.

These considerations are not to be lightly dismissed. As such difficulties materialize, the increased shippers' costs will inevitably be borne by the countries dependent upon seaborne commerce for their economic existence.

In addition, any extension of the breadth of the territorial sea would impose a burden on the coastal state to patrol effectively the larger area. This burden would carry with it an increase in the fiscal expenditures of the coastal state stemming from an increased workload, in both merchant-marine safety and law enforcement.

For example, the United States estimates an approximate initial capital outlay of \$8,000,000 and an increase in annual operating cost of \$1,500,000 per each hundred miles of coast, in the case of an extension of the territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles, or an increase of annual expenditure of some \$180,000,000 for our continental coastlines alone. These figures to me are somewhat appalling.

While on the matter of costs, I wonder how many other nations have made estimates of their own as to what it would cost to extend navigational aids such as buoys, gongs, whistles, fog signals, groaners, channel markers, and the like to 12 miles and to change the necessary charts and piloting manuals which mariners must have on board when at sea. The figures would be very interesting. We would like to see them.

I submit, any failure by a state to exercise effective control over an area to which it has laid claim would risk the incurrence of international embarrassment to the state asserting the claim. Sporadic attempts at enforcement would have only the undesirable result of increasing international tension and perhaps in decisions unfavorable to the coastal state.

Now I realize there are certain facile attractions for a state neutral in time of war in having the right to extend the territorial seas to a 12-mile limit. However, in the unhappy event of a future conflict, which God forbid, neutrality and the international law pertinent thereto will be matters which may have to be taken into account.

Now, of course, if it could safely be assumed that all contending belligerents would respect the territorial sea of a neutral, the possibility of hostile incursions into neutral coastal areas would be materially lessened. But I think, rather, the possibility, at least, cannot be excluded that certain belligerents in any future war would be even less inclined to accord complete respect to a 12-mile coastal belt of neutral waters than to a 3-mile zone—particularly in view of the probable inability of the neutral to control the broader belt.

The problem of the neutral with a 12-mile territorial sea in maintaining its neutrality is further demonstrated by the greatly increased ocean areas which would have to be patrolled to insure the inviolability of its sovereignty.

The possible attractiveness of neutral waters to a belligerent may be easily demonstrated. For reasons of its own safety a submarine will seldom attempt to operate within 3 miles of shore. The hazards to a submerged submarine are usually lessened materially as the distance from shore increases.

Thus, a belligerent submarine would look upon a neutral with a broad territorial sea as offering a particularly attractive haven if she were hard pressed by antisubmarine aircraft or surface vessels of the enemy operating on the high seas which could not legally enter such territorial sea. Further, other combatant types might be enticed to enter the territorial waters of a neutral hoping to find a safe refuge from pursuit by enemy forces.

There is another factor which would serve to lure belligerent vessels within 12 miles of a neutral coast. For reasons already discussed, navigation at a distance of 12 miles from shore is less exact and almost impossible in case of fog. Captains and masters are accordingly strongly disposed to navigate at a distance less than 12 miles from charted navigational objects on shore.

In view of all of these considerations, violation of the neutrality of a state with a 12-mile territorial sea in time of international conflict would appear to be increased rather than otherwise.

Fishing

I turn now to the second of the freedoms I shall discuss.

Coastal states almost universally deny to nationals of other states the right to fish in their territorial sea. If that territorial sea is extended and the high seas thereby diminished, a great and inexpensive source of food in that area is thereby denied to other people in the world. And this would occur at a time when population figures are mounting at an ever-increasing rate.

It is estimated that a general extension of the territorial sea by 1 mile reduces the area of the high seas, where freedom of fishing and other freedoms exist, by an estimated 280,000 square miles. Likewise, it is estimated that a general extension of the territorial sea by an additional 9 miles would reduce the area of the high seas by 2,500,000 square miles, an area roughly equal to the size of the United States of America.

I would suggest that expressing this reduction in terms of percentage is most misleading, as a mile near the coast both from a navigational and fishing standpoint is far more important relatively than a greater number of miles on the high seas. Further, a large percentage of the world's catch of fish is taken off or near coasts, reefs, shelves, shoals, or banks. For example, approximately 56.7 percent of the fish caught off the United States coast are caught within a breadth of 3 miles.

Now, unilateral extensions of the territorial sea in general or in specific areas violate the existing rights of all other states. Of this there can be no doubt.

Only recently, an example of this was provided in the Far East, where by the drawing of an arbitrary line 115 miles long enclosing thousands of square miles of sea and the assertion of a 12-mile territorial sea beyond that line, an area traditionally open to all states, large and small, was suddenly claimed by unilateral act of the coastal state to be *mare clausum* and off limits to all other peoples, some of whom had traditionally sought their means of living in the area.

So far as I am informed no other country in the world asserts exclusive right to a so-called bay with a mouth of this size.

My Government has filed formal protests to this declaration.⁷

⁷ BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 461.

I have already adverted to the situation created by the Indonesian declaration of December 1957.

Obviously if in the name of progress we were to consider that the 3-mile limit is obsolete, just where would the matter stop if each state were free to suit its own economic or alleged security interests? The free seas would soon look like a patchwork quilt with "no trespassing" signs posted in all directions to bewilder the poor mariner.

Air Navigation

I now want to discuss the third freedom of the seas.

The freedom to fly over the high seas of the world, which belongs to all peoples and states alike, is denied entirely in the airspace over the territorial sea unless the coastal state gives its consent. The vital importance of the right of overflight is spotlighted in the airspace over international straits in accordance with the Convention on International Civil Aviation of December 7, 1944, which became effective as to 73 states on April 4, 1947.

Let me point out—there is no right of innocent passage for aircraft over territorial seas as distinct from the right of innocent passage for vessels through such seas. Thus any extension of the territorial sea beyond 3 miles will result *pro tanto* in diminishing freedom of flight.

The effect of this in straits and other narrow seas might well be pondered closely by looking at an atlas of the world. I suggest that you take a pair of dividers and measure the distance across the Straits of Gibraltar north and south. If you extend territorial waters to 6 miles each way, there is no area of high seas remaining. Or I suggest you try extending various coastlines all over the world in each direction by 6 or 12 miles and draw comparable lines accordingly around islands or, if you choose, archipelagos, and see what you have done to the freedom of the high seas, the right to overfly and the right to fish.

As the distinguished delegate from Greece so clearly pointed out, an extension of his country's territorial sea to 12 miles would be equivalent to closing the Aegean Sea.

These are hard, cold facts which must be examined by new states as well as the so-called great powers.

Now, sir, and distinguished delegates of nations new and old, we are still governed by the physical facts of the universe. The number of feet in a nautical mile and the parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude are fixed. And as for the breadth of 3 miles for territorial sea being obsolete because of the doctrine of hot pursuit, that doctrine, I submit, is just as relevant to a 12-mile as to a 3-mile zone. It all depends on where the pursuit starts.

I have mentioned but a few of the benefits which the freedom of the high seas bestows on all states. Let us consider carefully chart by chart, strait by strait, and island by island any proposal to set in motion or accelerate the erosion of these freedoms for some supposed temporary or local benefit.

Let us also not lose sight of the fact that rights create obligations and an increase in territorial limitations is no exception. For there can be only loss of national prestige for a state which provides inadequately for the needs and safety of international navigation in its territorial waters or is unable to assert full sovereign control over a wide territorial sea.

Finally, a word to those states advocating the permissibility of a state setting the breadth of its territorial sea from 3 to 12 miles according to its own opinion as to its own needs.

This position in the opinion of my delegation is exactly equivalent to a vote for 12 miles. Indeed, it is, I think, a myth to say that the adoption of article 3, subdivision 2, of the ILC draft gives nations flexibility up to 12 miles, because it is readily apparent, I believe, that the maximum inevitably would tend to become the minimum.

Because navigators must not only know where they are but where they have a right to go and what they can do, I submit it is not plausible to expect that states which respect the equal rights of others to the high seas up to 3 miles from their shores will long suffer being barred from a sea area adjacent to the shores of others four times that wide. Increase may breed increase and restriction restriction, and the chain reaction thus set in motion will result in the maximum claim by all.

Moreover, as there is neither logic nor tradition in a 12-mile limit, what reason is there to expect termination there? Carried to its logical conclusion such course of action will run its due

course, and the freedom of the high seas, so valuable to us all and especially to the small countries, will vanish—and be gone with the wind.

In such a situation, isn't it at least possible to speculate that those with large economic resources may be able to fend for themselves better than the small?

Legal Case for the Three-Mile Limit

The legal case for the 3-mile or 1-marine-league limit has been cogently set forth here by the distinguished delegates of a number of other states, including the distinguished delegates of France, Great Britain, Greece, the Netherlands, and Japan, a number of whom have made reference to the decision of the International Court of Justice in the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case*,⁸ to the effect that the validity of the delimitation of the territorial sea with respect to other states is determined by international law although international law must, of course, be implemented by municipal legislation. It is the view of my Government, without elaboration or citation of authorities or making an extended legal argument at this time, that the 3-mile rule is established international law; that it is the only breadth of territorial waters on which there has ever been anything like common agreement; and that unilateral acts of states claiming greater territorial seas are not only not sanctioned by any principle of international law but are indeed in conflict with the universally accepted principle of the freedom of the seas.

There is universal agreement that each state is entitled to a territorial sea of a breadth of 3 miles, or 1 marine league. But this cannot be said of any claim to a greater breadth, each of which claims has been protested by many states. This fact was recognized in the report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its seventh session when it stated that "international law does not require states to recognize a breadth [of territorial sea] beyond three miles."⁹

The United States regards this to be the true legal situation. Further, it considers that there is no obligation on the part of states adhering to the

3-mile rule to recognize claims on the part of other states to a greater breadth of territorial sea.

Since the right of states to a 3-mile territorial sea is universally recognized, and since in its view the greatest freedom of the seas is in the interest of all states, large and small, the delegation of the United States of America proposes that article 3 of the ILC draft be changed to an unequivocal declaration of restraint that the breadth of the territorial sea shall not exceed 3 miles or 1 marine league.

Other Articles Concerning the Limitation of the Territorial Sea and Innocent Passage

The delegation of the United States of America is in substantial agreement with most of the other articles of the ILC draft relating to the delimitation of the territorial sea and the right of innocent passage.

We will have certain modifications, drafting changes, and amendments to suggest at the proper time in the interests of clarity and in consonance with achieving the greatest freedom of the seas for all of us. But we will submit them in the hope of being helpful and cooperative in our efforts here.

We shall make a further statement in Committee II with respect to the articles of the ILC draft referred to that committee.

Contiguous Zone

I said at the start of this statement that the United States of America attached the utmost importance to article 66 relating to the contiguous zone.

My Government is not unmindful of and, indeed, is highly sympathetic with the problems which concern a large number of the coastal states and which have led them in the past to certain unilateral actions in high-seas areas for the primary purpose of conservation of the fish stocks off their coasts.

We submit that these needs, which have been so eloquently expressed by some of our friends from Latin America, may be fully and adequately met by means other than through extensions of the territorial sea, which extensions violate the rights and freedoms of all countries. We are prepared to be helpful in working out a constructive solution.

⁸ I.C.J. Report, Dec. 18, 1951, pp. 116, 132.

⁹ U.N. doc. A/2934, p. 16.

It is to take care of the legitimate needs of many countries that the United States attaches deep significance to article 66 and also to the articles on fishery conservation which are under the jurisdiction of the Third Committee.

We also attach significance to the problem of the continental shelf, which is under the jurisdiction of the Fourth Committee, and to the problems of landlocked countries, under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Committee, and shall make appropriate statements in each of these several committees.

It is the belief of the United States that these rules set down by the International Law Commission may be molded to give full and sufficient remedy to the genuine needs and to make possible a more fruitful exploitation of the resources of the sea for the benefit of all mankind.

We sincerely trust that this conference will not prove what Victor Hugo said about the sea in his famous novel *Ninety-three*, book II, chapter 7:

The sea never tells what it means to do. There is everything in this abyss, even chicanery. One might almost say that the sea had designs; it advances and retreats, it proposes and retracts, it prepares a squall and then gives up its plan, it promises destruction and does not keep its word. It threatens the North, and strikes the South.

No, indeed.

Testing of Nuclear Weapons on High Seas

Now let me turn for just a moment to another problem. Since the problem of the testing of nuclear weapons on the high seas has been raised in the debate in this committee, as well as in other committees, I should like very briefly to clarify the United States position on this matter at this conference.

Now the real danger to the world lies in the possible use of nuclear weapons and not in some light addition to the natural forces of radioactivity. While the United States of America conducts its tests in a manner recognized as being consonant with international law, it should also be abundantly clear to this conference that we have repeatedly offered to enter into arrangements embodying meaningful and effective measures for the control of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately no agreement has yet been reached which would make this possible.

Because of its paramount importance to all mankind, this subject should continue to be dealt with in the established United Nations organs created specifically to deal with the problems of weapons control.

We must all hope that further negotiations on disarmament, of which the nuclear testing problem is but one element, will produce satisfactory results in the interests of humanity. But in line, I trust, with the position the distinguished representative of India tentatively indicated here the other day, I question whether we are a proper body to intervene in this negotiating process.

We are experts assembled here to undertake a task which is great enough in its scope to tax all our resources. We should not, I submit, complicate the delicate work of other agencies in the field of disarmament by the intrusion of our pronouncements and in effect prejudice our work of attempting to codify the law of the sea by embarking on an undertaking with such enormous implications.

So, in conclusion, permit me to say that we look forward to working with you, sir, and with you, the distinguished delegates of the conference, in a spirit of helpful and cooperative enterprise so that we may make a real and fruitful contribution to the development of international law.

Thank you.

U.S. Questions Continuing Prosecution of Hungarian Patriots

Following is an exchange of correspondence between the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and the Hungarian Mission to the United Nations, together with a U.S. statement of March 15, concerning the continuing prosecution of persons who participated in the Hungarian uprising of October and November 1956.

U.S. Letter of February 11

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: It has no doubt been evident to your Mission from the debates and discussions which have taken place during the Second Emergency Special Session and the Eleventh and Twelfth Sessions of the General Assembly that current developments in Hungary are being followed with deep concern throughout the world. Information which has been made known through

official Hungarian news media concerning the continuing prosecution of persons who participated in the popular uprising of October and November 1956 has occasioned widespread anxiety. It had been hoped that the Hungarian authorities would heed the repeated calls by the United Nations for a cessation of repressive measures against the Hungarian people and implement an amnesty which would make normal life possible for those who are being held or who are threatened with possible arrest for having supported what was clearly a national manifestation. Such a hope now appears illusory in the light of the unequivocal statement of Mr. [Premier Janos] Kadar before the Hungarian Parliament on January 27, 1958, rejecting any thought of such an amnesty. Under these circumstances persistent reports of further unannounced trials, imprisonments, and executions inevitably gain credence.

On December 17, 1957, your Mission issued a press release in which it stated that if the United States Representative were "really interested in ascertaining what was happening in Hungary", he had "the opportunity to ask for authentic information through the proper channels". In view of the worldwide concern over the situation in Hungary—a concern which is shared by the American people—I have decided to take advantage of this suggestion and ask you the following questions.

1. What are the present circumstances of Major General Pal Maleter, Major General Istvan Kovacs and Colonel Miklos Szucs, all of whom were members of the Hungarian Delegation appointed by the Hungarian Government in November 1956 to negotiate with a Soviet Delegation on the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary?

2. What are the present circumstances of the following individuals and their families who, upon relinquishing asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, were apprehended by Soviet military authorities: Imre Nagy, Geza Losonczy, Zoltan Szanto, Ferenc Donath, I. [Gabor] Tanczos, Sandor Haraszti, Ferenc Janosi, Gyorgy Fazekas, Jozsef Szilagyi, Peter Erdos, Zoltan Vas, Julia Rajk, Ferenc Nador, Szilard Ujhelyi and Miklos Vasarhelyi?

3. What are the present circumstances of Sandor Kopacsi, formerly chief of the Budapest Police?

4. What are the present circumstances of Dominik Kosary, a former professor of history at Budapest University who is well known in the United States through his history of Hungary which was published here?

5. What are the present circumstances of Istvan Bibo, Minister of State in the Hungarian Government announced November 3, 1956?

These questions pertain only to a small number of individuals whose fate is being followed with particular interest because of their prominence or the circumstances connected with their disappearance from public life. It is my sincere belief, however, that a forthright and full reply to these questions would help not only to clarify the current situation in Hungary but also to afford millions of interested people throughout the world a clearer understanding of the present intentions of the Hungarian authorities.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES J. WADSWORTH

*Acting United States Representative
to the United Nations*

Hungarian Letter of February 17

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 11, 1958. Please let me assure you that I will, at the earliest possible date, forward it to the Hungarian authorities having competence in the matter.

Sincerely yours,

PETER MOD
Permanent Representative

U.S. Letter of March 6

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: You will recall that on February 11, 1958, the Acting United States Representative to the United Nations addressed a letter to you as Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations in which a number of questions were raised concerning the present circumstances of certain prominent Hungarians, and that you acknowledged receipt of this letter on February 17, 1958. The United States Mission has as yet received no reply to this inquiry. I would like therefore to take this occasion to express again my earnest hope that a reply will be forthcoming in the near future.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE
*United States Representative
to the United Nations*

Department of State Bulletin

Hungarian Letter of March 13

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: With reference to the letters of February 11 and March 6, 1958 of the United States Mission I should like to express to you the willingness of the Permanent Mission of the Hungarian People's Republic to co-operate with your Mission in every question that might improve the relations between our countries and advance the great cause of mankind. In your letter of February 11 I have recognized your endeavour to correct the mistake made in the statement of your delegation at the XII session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to which alludes the quotation in your letter from our press release of December 17, 1957. It is to be regretted, however, that this intention cannot reassert itself in your letter.

Firstly, the letter contains such prejudiced statements, in presence of which no constructive exchange of views can be conducted with anyone.

Secondly, you fail to take note of the fact that by making use in a distorted way of the questions involved, your Mission already tried to incite hostile public sentiment against Hungary on the basis of rumours which it had not previously controlled. This mistake naturally cannot be considered as cancelled in view of subsequent inquiry.

Thirdly, the wording of your questions makes the appearance as if you and your Mission wanted to interfere in the domestic affairs of Hungary. My Mission cannot co-operate in confirming such an appearance.

Let me assure you again that the Hungarian Mission will always be prepared to co-operate with the United States, with your Mission, in every question that leads us nearer to an easing of tension and strengthening of peace.

Sincerely yours,

PETER MOD
Permanent Representative

U.S. Statement of March 15

U.S./U.N. press release 2888

This latest letter from the Hungarian representative is an obvious attempt to evade an answer to our specific questions. In our letter of February 11 we asked about the present circumstances of prominent Hungarians who were named in our letter. We asked about them because they had disappeared from public view and this has caused widespread concern.

Our inquiry was invited by the Hungarian Mission itself. Yet the Hungarian authorities have refused to answer it.

This refusal recalls earlier actions by the same regime: their refusal to permit the United Nations Special Committee to enter Hungary to carry out the mandate given to it by the General Assembly; their refusal to cooperate with the As-

sembly's Special Representative, Prince Wan of Thailand; and their refusal to accept the letter which the Special Committee addressed to their United Nations Mission last December. In every case their refusal has demonstrated that they have something to hide about the situation in Hungary.

World opinion has recognized as just the aspirations of the Hungarian people to regain their independence. This new reply by the Hungarian Mission to our letters will only increase the anxiety of world opinion about what is going on in Hungary.

U.S.-Euratom Discussions

Press release 135 dated March 19

A joint U.S.-European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) working party will convene at Luxembourg on March 20 with instructions to pay special attention to the possibility of initiating at an early date a joint program for the development of full-scale prototype power reactors. The U.S. delegation includes Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission officials. This meeting, which will continue to April 3, is a prelude to the visit of Louis Armand, President of EURATOM, to the United States this spring¹ to discuss the possibilities of close cooperation between the U.S. Government and the European Atomic Energy Community in the fields in which EURATOM will be engaged in order to develop the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Ambassador W. Walton Butterworth, U.S. Representative to the European Atomic Energy Community, will head the U.S. group, while Max Kohnstamm, Special Assistant to the EURATOM President, will head the European group.

The Atomic Energy Commission representatives will include R. W. Cook, Deputy General Manager; A. J. Vander Weyden, Deputy Director, Division of International Affairs; Paul C. Fine, Director, Office of Operations Analysis and Planning; Frank K. Pittman, Director, Office of Industrial Development; Louis Roddis, Deputy Director, Reactor Development; Nelson F. Sievering, Jr., Assistant to Director, Division of Reactor Development; Edwin E. Ferguson, Deputy General Counsel; Harold D. Bengelsdorf, European Branch, Division of International Affairs;

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1958, p. 425.

and Amasa Bishop, AEC Scientific Representative in Paris.

Representatives from the Department of State will be J. Robert Schaetzel, Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy; Stanley D. Metzger, Deputy Legal Adviser; Stanley Cleveland, Office of European Regional Affairs; Mortimer J. Goldstein, Assistant Chief, International Finance Division; and Louis Boochever, U.S. Mission to the European Communities.

U.S. Proposes Broadening UNICEF Aid to Child Welfare

Statement by Katherine Oettinger¹

UNICEF aid is at the present time directed almost exclusively toward improving the health of mothers and children. This is so because of the enormous toll which disease and malnutrition take in lives of mothers and children in many parts of the world. There are, however, many social and environmental factors that adversely affect children and which contribute directly or indirectly to their physical and mental ill health. In its aid to community development UNICEF has shown its understanding of the broad meaning of the term "child welfare." Might it not, however, be appropriate to consider ways in which UNICEF programs could be extended more directly in the area of social services for children?

One area for which aid is urgently needed and which seems highly appropriate for UNICEF assistance is that of children living wholly or in part away from their own homes. I refer to children in residential institutions or who spend their days in day-care centers while their mothers work.

Throughout the world at least several million children are deprived of normal home life and are living in institutions. Some are homeless children whose parents are dead, have deserted, or are unable to provide care. The most universal method of care for children outside their own home is in congregate or specialized residential institutions. Such institutions exist to some extent in most countries.

¹ Made before the Executive Board of the U.N. Children's Fund on Mar. 6 (U.S./U.N. press release 2879). Mrs. Oettinger is the U.S. Representative on the Executive Board.

Rapid urbanization is a worldwide phenomenon, and experience in many parts of the world, even the least advanced, indicates this usually results in significant increases in the numbers of children for whom some form of care outside their own family circles has to be provided.

In the UNICEF-aided countries, in the immediate future, it can be anticipated that the need for such care will be increasing, and this type of care will be the only practical method of meeting such need.

In addition, many infants and preschool children of working mothers are being cared for in day-nursery and crèche programs in countries experiencing industrialization or otherwise needing the labor of women.

In crowded cities the growing employment of women increases the need for such services. The long-standing problem of care of children while mothers work in the fields remains. In some established maternal and child-welfare centers there is a beginning use of day-care centers as an opportunity to train mothers and at the same time improve the environment by providing better nutrition and other care for children.

The kind of care these children get varies tremendously in both types of services. In some institutions children receive excellent physical and emotional care, family ties are preserved for them, and they have opportunity to share in community life. Others are housed and fed for many years without regard for their social and emotional needs, especially in preparing them to resume life in the community. And still others are confined in unhygienic quarters where they are subject to exposure to contagious diseases which take a heavy toll of life, or they are inadequately fed and cared for so that their growth and development are impeded.

The dangers to physical and mental health are known to be very great for children living in institutions, particularly for long periods of time. In some countries an effort is made to develop adoption and foster-family care for younger children, but in many countries institutional care will be the only means of providing for dependent and neglected children for many years. To quote from the U.N. document *The Institutional Care of Children*:²

² U.N. doc. ST/SOA/31 dated August 1956.

... in many countries where poverty is still a major problem, and where rapid industrialization and urbanization are altering the family structure, growing numbers of children in need of care may come to the attention of the community. In these instances, where social services on the whole are at an early stage of development, the establishment of institutional care programmes for children is likely to increase in the near future as the most practical immediate method of action.

There are many ways institutional care can be modified and improved so that it provides more adequately for children's physical, mental, and emotional needs, so that some of the benefits of home life can be preserved, and so that the child can be better prepared to enter into community life as an adult.

The report referred to above, prepared at the request of the Social Commission, provides ample evidence of the interest of a number of countries in improving the quality of care children receive in institutions. It points out the major and common need for better trained staff and cites a number of trends in programs, such as the attempt to care for children in small, family-like groups.

Would it not now be possible to consider implementing some international action to give some assistance to countries wishing and needing help in pushing forward in this area? UNICEF might, in some cases, be in a position to assist with equipment, supplies, and training, but the technical skill for developing a program lies primarily in the Bureau of Social Affairs. The World Health Organization, through its maternal and child-health staffs, would also have technical advice to contribute.

My suggestion is, therefore, that the Board authorize the administration to seek the help of the Bureau of Social Affairs and WHO in developing a possible program of UNICEF aid for children in institutions and in day-care centers. Such a program should be started on an experimental basis, using pilot projects to demonstrate the value of such aid and to try out ways of providing it effectively. By the March meeting of 1959, I would hope the Board could have before it a plan for consideration on a policy level.

A program of aid in institutional and day care of children should be looked on as only a beginning phase in a broader program of child welfare or social services for children. Ultimately, I

hope, UNICEF can develop a comprehensive policy of appropriate aid in this area. This broader goal should be kept in mind during the study of ways for developing this segment for improving the conditions under which children live and grow.

Mrs. Oettinger and Mrs. Taubman To Represent U.S. on UNICEF Board

The White House announced on February 28 that the President had on that day appointed Katherine Brownell Oettinger, Chief of the Children's Bureau, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to be representative of the United States on the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund.

On the same day the President appointed Elizabeth Clare Taubman to be alternate representative of the United States on the Executive Board of the U.N. Children's Fund.

Current U.N. Documents A Selected Bibliography¹

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Letter Dated 13 February 1958 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the President of the Security Council. S/3952, February 13, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.

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Letter Dated 17 February 1958 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia Addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the Attention of the President of the Security Council. S/3957, February 17, 1958. 2 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

Examination of the Annual Report on the Administration of the Trust Territory of Tanganyika. Supplementary information submitted by the Administering Authority. T/1349, January 21, 1958. 10 pp. mimeo.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Administration

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2900 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

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TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Slavery

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force for the United States March 7, 1956 (TIAS 3532).

Acceptance deposited: Hungary, February 26, 1958.

BILATERAL

British Guiana

Agreement for the exchange of international money orders. Signed at Georgetown October 8 and at Washington November 4, 1957.

Entered into force: January 1, 1958.

Ireland

Agreement amending annex to air transport services agreement of February 3, 1945 (EAS 400). Effected by exchange of notes at Dublin March 4, 1958. Entered into force March 4, 1958.

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of November 7, 1957 (TIAS 3945). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 29 and February 4, 1958. Entered into force February 4, 1958.

Philippines

Agreement concerning claims arising in connection with SEATO maneuvers during February and March 1958. Effected by exchange of aide memoire at Manila February 20, 1958. Entered into force February 20, 1958.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on March 10 confirmed Raymond A. Har to be Ambassador to the United Arab Republic.

The Senate on March 10 confirmed Homer M. Byington, Jr., Ambassador to the Federation of Malaya, to serve as the representative of the United States to the 14th session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Designations

James Byrd Pilcher as Consul General at Hong Kong (For biographic details, see Department press release 13 dated March 18.)

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Releases issued prior to March 17 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 123 of March 13 and 126 and 127 of March 14.

No.	Date	Subject
*130	3/17	Horace H. Smith nominated Ambassador to Laos (biographic details).
131	3/18	Pilcher designated Consul General at Hong Kong (rewrite).
132	3/19	Dillon: International Development Association.
*133	3/19	Educational exchange.
†134	3/19	Eleanor Dulles: "Labor Rejects Communism—East Germany."
135	3/19	U.S.—EURATOM discussions.
136	3/20	ICA scientific training program.
†137	3/20	Rubottom: U.S. relations with Latin America.
138	3/20	Deadline for filing claims against Germany.
*139	3/20	Barnes sworn in as Special Assistant for Mutual Security Coordination (biographic details).
140	3/21	U.S.—Soviet negotiations for film exchange.
*141	3/21	Visit of President-elect of Costa Rica.

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS



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The recent release of Volume II completes the publication of this two-volume compilation, which presents in convenient reference form the basic published documents regarding American foreign relations for the 6-year period of 1950 to 1955.

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- VII - Middle Eastern regional arrangements
- VIII - Western Hemisphere developments
- IX - Western Europe
- X - Germany, Austria, and European security
- XI - The Soviet Union
- XII - Eastern European Communist regimes and the Baltic states
- XIII - Near and Middle East, South Asia, and Africa
- XIV - The Far East and Southeast Asia
- XV - Korea
- XVI - Disarmament and the control of atomic energy
- XVII - Foreign economic policies—trade and tariffs
- XVIII - Foreign aid—economic, military, technological
- XIX - International information and educational exchange programs
- XX - Organization and special responsibilities of the Department of State and the Foreign Service

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Bulletin

Vol. XXXVIII, No. 981

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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April 14, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Trade Agreements Program: Its Relation to National Well-Being and Security

Following is the text of an address made by President Eisenhower at the National Conference of Organizations on International Trade Policy at Washington, D. C., on Mar. 27, together with remarks made by Secretary Dulles and Deputy Under Secretary Douglas Dillon at the same meeting.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

White House press release dated March 27

I am indeed honored to join tonight with this great gathering of citizens from all parts of the Nation. You have come here to demonstrate the strength of your support for an enlightened trade policy that promotes jobs at home and peace in the world. My grateful thanks go to you for this magnificent bipartisan citizen effort to rouse Americans to the great stake all of us have in widening and deepening the channels of world trade.

This cause that draws us together tonight does not readily command the headlines. Like so many other good things, the benefits of trade are somehow taken for granted and are assumed to be a normal part of life. On the other hand, the special domestic problems to which world trade sometimes gives rise, in terms of impact on particular industries, are real and identifiable and demanding of action. But I think it is quite necessary for all of us to remember this one fact: No single, separate part or area of America can ever prosper, no matter what tariffs we might erect, unless the United States of America as a whole prospers.

Now, you and I believe firmly that our reciprocal trade program is good for America, and so we have an obligation to our fellow citizens to set forth our

views fairly and so convincingly as we may. If we do so, I am confident that the countrywide support of this program will be reflected in the Congress. And that is where fateful decisions about its whole future will shortly be taken.

We know that the American people will always do what they think is important and necessary to do. Our task is to make sure the importance of expanding trade is understood by all of us.

Now, in searching for what is best for 173 million Americans, we must recognize that questions concerning reciprocal trade have been raised by conscientious Members of Congress and others deeply concerned with the economic welfare of their particular communities. On Capitol Hill the most potent arguments against trade legislation are likely to be its effect on the industries of specific States and districts.

So, in the effort to dispel honest doubts about the reciprocal trade legislation's great value to the entire nation, we should first hammer home the fact that safeguards in the law are being strengthened to cope with the uneven impact of import competition.

Next we should point out that the authority to make trade concessions to others in our national interest is permissive, not mandatory. It applies to individual products and will be used only on a case-by-case basis, after full review of all factors involved.

Likewise, we should present this commonsense arithmetic: The defeat of the trade agreements program would destroy far more jobs and more job opportunities in agriculture, in manufacturing, and in transportation than it could possibly ever preserve.

We should make everyone aware of the deadly peril impending if, through blindness, America and the free world are robbed of adequate economic

defense against Communist penetration. I doubt that anyone would favor tearing down our trade program were he to have on his conscience full knowledge of such grave hazards.

We can be heartened because in districts, States, and Nation a growing majority is finding that far stronger reasons can be advanced for an effective extension of the trade agreements legislation than the excuses made for rejecting or crippling it.

Both job security and national security demand an enlightened trade policy. So compelling and justifiable are these individual and collective reasons that even those who previously opposed reciprocal trade should see the need of changing from their former position and so measure up to this inescapable duty of our day.

An informed and observant public would disapprove of anyone who insisted on clinging to old, outmoded ideas which cannot solve crucial new problems. But that same public would welcome and praise everyone in public or private life for changing his mind in the best interests of 173 million Americans.

Importance of U.S. Export Trade

Now let me be specific.

Our reciprocal trade program is good for America. It strengthens our own economy, and it strengthens the economy of the free world and thus reinforces our security against external danger.

The United States is the greatest trading nation. Last year the world's export trade amounted to about \$100 billion. We exported a fifth of that enormous total. This vast flow of commerce to and from our shores is vital to our economy.

Consider these facts.

World trade makes jobs for at least 4½ million American workers. At a time of slack in the economy like the present these jobs should not be placed in jeopardy by crippling our trade program. The presence here tonight of representatives of the great labor organizations of America underscores this point.

Export trade, in the most recent year for which we have data, is big, important business. It was greater than all consumer purchases of furniture and household equipment. It was greater than all residential nonfarm building or as great as the sale of all steel-mill products in this country. Such sample facts as these indicate why the great

business organizations of America are represented here tonight.

We shipped abroad last year, for example, over a tenth of our machine-tool production, almost a fifth of our motor trucks and coaches, over a quarter of our construction and mining equipment. And that is why so many manufacturers, small and large, are represented here tonight.

Foreign markets provide an indispensable outlet for our farm output. In the most recent marketing year, with the aid of special programs, over half of our wheat, cotton, and rice went abroad. So did over a third of our soybean production, a quarter of our tobacco, and a fifth of our lard output. Those and other farm exports benefited not only farmers. The movement required financing, inland transportation, storage, and ocean transportation for 36 million tons of cargo. That was enough farm produce to fill 800,000 freight cars and 3,600 cargo ships. Now, those activities mean jobs—lots of jobs.

And for those who may wonder what the connection is between these farm exports and our reciprocal trade program let me cite this fact: Nearly four-fifths of these record farm exports went to countries with which we have agreements under that program. Loss of income from overseas markets would deal a hard blow to farm families. And such facts as these indicate why the great farm organizations of our country are represented here tonight.

Now this brief review of our huge export business evidences an inescapable truth: Trade is good for all America—for its workers, its businessmen, and its farmers.

Role of Imports

Now, what of the other side of the trade—imports?

In discussion of trade problems some people seem to be for exports and against imports. They apparently assume that we can continue to sell even though we refuse to buy. But let me remind you, our farmers, our workers, and businessmen cannot use drachmas, rupees, lire, francs, or other foreign currencies for their purchases in this country. Consequently they cannot accept those currencies for the goods they ship abroad. They can accept only dollars. In the same way, if other nations are to buy our exports to them, they must get

dollars earned by their exports to us. This means giving them an opportunity to sell in the American market on a reasonable basis.

Our import needs are great—\$13 billion last year. We obtained from abroad most of our supplies of tin, mica, asbestos, platinum, nickel, and newsprint. Part of our requirements for iron ore, petroleum, copper, raw wool, bauxite, burlap, and other materials must be obtained outside this country. Such imports keep our factory wheels turning and assembly lines moving.

We also import some foods and manufactured goods. They are not as essential to us as are industrial materials. Nevertheless America wants them. Americans are entitled to a reasonable chance to buy them. Selling customers what they want is the way American stores keep in business. And that is why representatives of consumer groups are here tonight.

Since imports of manufactured goods are the center of much of the trade controversy, we should keep one fact clearly in mind: Last year we imported \$2¾ billion of manufactured goods; we exported \$10½ billion—nearly four times as much. Now, of course, we want, under the law, to accord manufacturing industries relief from demonstrated injury or the threat of injury due to imports. But, if we seek to do this by ill-advised measures such as broad and rigid systems of quotas or unconscionable tariffs, we should consider the consequences upon our 4-to-1 interest in exports of these goods. Now, other countries have their trade problems too. As we and they have learned to our mutual regret, everybody can play the costly game of trade restrictions.

The choice is plain: It is reciprocity or retaliation.

Strengthening the Economy of the Free World

Important as our trade program is to building a stronger nation here at home, it is equally important in building a strong neighborhood of nations where we can be secure.

Our first line of defense against potential attack is an effective deterrent power widely based in the free world. The dispersal of this power is a key aspect of our defense. But dispersal requires cooperation among the free nations—not merely military cooperation but in all the ways which make our allies strong.

It may be trite to say that trade is a two-way street, but is it trite to say that cooperative security is a two-way street? By no means. Allies are needed, and we need them to be sturdy—reliable. Sturdy allies need progressive economies, not merely to bear the burden of defensive armament but also to satisfy the needs and aspirations of their people.

This fact requires a clear understanding on our part that, for most of these nations, foreign trade is vital to their economies and therefore to our security. Some of these nations are limited in natural resources; their markets at home are small. In many instances their economies are much less developed than is ours. Trade is truly their economic lifeblood. The United States must continue to make it possible for them to trade with others and with us on a reasonable basis.

The American people have long been keenly aware of the Communist military threat. Our people are determined to maintain ample retaliatory power to deter armed aggression. But we must make certain that our people clearly recognize the danger of the Communist economic drive among developing countries—offering the carrot and hiding the stick.

That danger is real, and it is growing. The Communists are deterred from military adventure by the defensive forces we and our partners have built. They now seek, through economic penetration and subversion, their purposes of ceaseless expansion.

The character of the Soviet economic offensive is clear: To the leaders of Communist imperialism economic relations are merely another way of gaining political control over nations that have become economically dependent upon the Communist bloc.

It is the Communist system—the Communist system, rather than things—that the Kremlin is determined to export.

It is the system of economic freedom that the Kremlin is determined to destroy.

If, through utilizing trade and aid, the Communists can tempt free nations one by one into their spider web, they will have paved the way for political victory, for world domination. And they will have made progress toward their great goal of economic encirclement of the United States.

Now, though Soviet resources do not by any means match our own, yet they are enabled by despotic rule to concentrate those resources effectively for special purposes. By forced investment, heavy industrialization, and the repression of consumer needs the Soviet bloc is producing on a growing scale the goods and capital equipment which many of the newer nations must have if they are to be increasingly effective allies of the United States.

Now, the Soviet capacity to export is coupled by a willingness to import. The Soviets are offering to receive raw materials and other products which free nations have to sell. Thus the Communist bloc is becoming an important supplier of capital and equipment, especially to the newer nations, but its principal export is still Communist imperialism.

Now, communism, like all other forms of dictatorship, is a reactionary movement. This we know. Yet reaction has more than once in the past enjoyed periods of marked success. Can we be sure that reactionary communism will not succeed in tempting many nations to exchange freedom for glittering—and sometimes realistic—opportunities for material betterment?

We cannot at all be sure of this unless we see to it that economic freedom is allowed to operate effectively, that the benefits of economic advance in the free world are diffused and spread to others.

And this means trade.

If free and needy nations cannot find room and opportunity to trade within the free world, they will surely, inexorably turn to trade with the Communist world.

For to live they must trade. It's as simple as that.

Proposals for Extending Program

This brings us directly to the proposals for the extension of the reciprocal trade program. This program was inaugurated by a great American, Cordell Hull, almost a quarter of a century ago. It has been extended and strengthened no less than 10 times. It has become a prime impetus to economic cooperation and to flourishing world trade. It strengthens freedom as against despotism.

To move forward along the road on which we have thus far advanced, I have recommended to the Congress a 5-year extension of the Trade

Agreements Act.¹ I have requested authority to negotiate reductions in tariffs, on the basis of the "peril point" procedure, by 5 percent of existing rates a year, during this 5-year interval. I have further recommended strengthening the "escape clause" and "peril point" procedures to recognize more fully and promptly the need for relief in cases where injury to a domestic industry due to trade concessions is established under the law.

Now, this program has been attacked as both too little and too much, depending on the side of the argument any individual has taken. But this fact may suggest that it is about right.

In my opinion the authority requested in the bills introduced by Representatives Mills and Kean,² embodying these proposals, is necessary to the continued success of the program. So, too, is the 5-year extension period essential to the continuity and stability of our trade relations.

There is a mistaken belief spread among some people that the 5-year proposal was merely introduced as a bargaining position. I should like to set the record straight. It is a proposal dictated by the facts.

Among these facts the greatest is a special one: A great Common Market is now being formed by six nations of Western Europe. These countries will in due course eliminate all barriers to trade among themselves and act toward all the rest of the world as a single economy. That means a common tariff applying to imports from the rest of the world, including the United States. It is expected that important steps toward this common tariff will become effective during 1962—up to 4½ years from the renewal date of our reciprocal trade legislation this summer. If we are to serve the interests of American buyers and sellers, the President must have from the Congress adequate authority and given a sufficient time to prepare and conduct negotiations with the Common Market authorities. I can conceive of no other single fact so important as this as a reason for extending the act for 5 years. In the national interest this timetable dictates a minimum extension of the law for this period.

The good of America will not be served by just any kind of extension bill. It must be a good bill.

¹ For text of the President's message recommending extension of the Trade Agreements Act, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 263.

² H. R. 10368 and 10369.

It must be an effective bill. Such a bill is before the Congress.

Now, the issue before the Congress and the American people in this spring of 1958 is a momentous one: Will we through apathy or ignorance see our trade program killed outright or gutted by amendments? Will we weaken ourselves by returning to the law of the jungle in trade relations between nations?

Or will the program be extended and strengthened?

The choice is clear.

I repeat: This program is good for America.

It is good for America on straight pocketbook grounds. It is good today because it will help protect millions of jobs. It is good tomorrow because more trade means more jobs.

It is good for America, too, because it helps build the road to peace.

Finally, this program is vital to our national security. Retreat on this program would make dangerously difficult the holding together of our alliances and our collective-security arrangements.

Less trade means more trouble.

We cannot find safety in economic isolationism at a time when the world is shrinking. For us to cover behind new trade walls of our own building would be to abandon a great destiny to those less blind to the events and tides now surging in the affairs of men.

America will not choose that road, for it is a downward-leading road to a diminishing America—isolated, encircled, and at bay in a world made over in the image of an alien philosophy.

Rather, America will move forward strongly along the clear road to greater strength at home, expanding trade with other free nations, greater security and opportunity in a friendlier world for this and for succeeding generations.

This is a great and continuing mission in which you and I and every American can have a part. I am proud that we can do so, because I believe in doing so we will be, in some partial way, worthy of the great traditions that have been given to us by our Founding Fathers and those who have followed them. We can serve this great nation today by keeping our country firmly on its chosen course of fostering lifegiving trade among the nations. And on that same course we shall move ever nearer to permanent security and to an enduring peace with right and with justice for all.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 156 dated March 27

I am glad to discuss with you the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Its extension is, I believe, essential to our national security. For the act symbolizes throughout the world the principle that it is better for peoples to work together than for each to try to be self-sufficient. That principle of interdependence is the cornerstone of free-world policy.

Cooperation To Deter Aggression

The United States is today confronted with a possibility of physical assault heretofore unknown. Hydrogen bombs, with an explosive power sufficient to destroy whole populations, can be delivered across ocean-spanning distances within a matter of hours, if not minutes. American communities are now subject to major devastation from weapons launched from foreign soil.

How is this danger to be held in check and peace maintained? It is by having such power to retaliate against armed aggression that such aggression obviously would not pay. But today power to retaliate is not adequate unless it is dispersed. If our retaliatory power were located only in the United States, it would not be a dependable deterrent for it might be largely obliterated by a sudden blow. It takes cooperation all around the world to assure that Soviet armed aggression will be deterred.

We have that kind of cooperation today. But military cooperation cannot be isolated from economic cooperation. The United States is at once the largest consumer and the largest producer of the goods that enter into the markets of the free world. The flow of trade across our borders is not only important to us; it is the very lifeblood of the economies of our partners and allies. Without it they cannot live or prosper.

If we seem to ignore that fact or to be indifferent to its implications, we cannot expect the consequences to be purely economic. The consequences would be political and military and would disrupt the relationships upon which our national security depends.

Political-Economic Threat

To the physical danger of armed attack there has now been added another, and probably more

imminent, danger. That is the danger created by the new political-economic offensives of international communism. They seek to subvert one country after another until finally the United States is isolated and its economy so depressed that, to use Mr. Stalin's words of 1924, the United States "will consider it expedient 'voluntarily' to make substantial concessions to the proletariat."

The Soviet rulers have been rapidly industrializing their country by forced draft methods which impose severe austerity on most of the Russian people. Today the Soviet Union and such an industrialized satellite as Czechoslovakia can supply the rest of the world with manufactured goods in increasing quantity and variety, importing in return the agricultural and mineral products which many of the free nations have to sell. The glowing Soviet prospectus of assured markets and low interest rate credits attracts many nations toward a relationship which would give the Soviet Union at first economic and then political dominance. This attraction to the Soviet system will become irresistible if the United States does not afford a reasonable trade alternative.

"A Noble Strategy of Victory"

Some elements of United States industry seek to improve their competitive position by implying that any competition from abroad, merely because it is "foreign," should on that account be debarred. We cannot accept that viewpoint without endangering our whole nation. There are, of course, cases where foreign competition should be restrained, and is restrained, by protective action. But a general disposition to exclude foreign goods whenever they are competitive would gravely disrupt economic, political, and spiritual relationships which are required for our own welfare and for the defense of our peace and freedom.

It is neither un-American nor unpatriotic to have national policies designed to assure a congenial and friendly world environment. Since our earliest days it has been, and now is, accepted United States doctrine that our own peace and security interlock with conditions elsewhere. We have, when needed, paid a great price in blood and treasure to prevent other lands from falling under the control of hostile despotisms.

The United States has, by treaties or joint congressional resolutions, proclaimed, as regards nearly 50 nations, that the peace and security of

the United States would be endangered if these other nations were to fall into the clutches of Communist imperialism. But the Communists are not going to keep "hands off" merely because of bold treaty words or resounding congressional proclamations. The Russian and Chinese Communists are tough. Our words will command respect only if we are seen to be ready to back them up.

If we are to avoid the grim alternatives of war or surrender, we must have the national policies and actions represented by our mutual security program and by the Trade Agreements Act. With these measures, the United States and its allies *can* peacefully win the cold war. President Eisenhower said last December in Paris: "There is a noble strategy of victory—not victory over any peoples but victory for all peoples."³

However, this result will not be achieved unless the free-world nations stand firm on the policies that create a unity which nullifies both the military and the political-economic threats which now stem from Communist imperialism.

The imperialist leaders have, or believe they have, one asset on their side—that is the tendency of the democracies to get tired and not to be willing to persist in the efforts that are required to sustain free-world unity and strength. If that unity ever collapses, then the Communists could feel that victory was within their grasp. The essential is that we hold fast to policies which have demonstrated their worth and which, if persisted in, will assure that the ultimate victory will not be that of the despots but of the people.

Four Illustrations

To illustrate my point, let us consider our trade relations with four key countries within the free world—to the north, south, east, and west.

To the north lies Canada, with which we are inescapably interdependent for the defense of the continent. Two-thirds of Canada's foreign trade is with the United States. Last year Canada bought almost \$4 billion of American goods and sold to us almost \$3 billion of goods. If the people and Government of Canada were to come to believe that it is our policy to make this trade balance still more adverse to them, that would inevitably and adversely affect our joint defense of North America.

³ BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

To the south there is Venezuela, with its supplies of petroleum. Venezuelan oil helped to win World War II. It sustained our efforts in the Korean war. Venezuela imported from the United States about a billion dollars' worth of goods in 1957. We imported from Venezuela some \$900 million worth. Surely the national security would not be served if we were to give Venezuelans the impression that we intend drastically to reduce our purchases from them.

In Europe I take the United Kingdom as an example. The British are our partners in NATO and in SEATO. We are joined with them in vital and varied cooperation throughout much of the world. The United Kingdom cannot live without large participation in international trade. If the United States were to set off a chain reaction, in terms of trade restrictions, the effect would be little short of disastrous—on them and on us.

In the Far East there is Japan, an industrial nation of 90 million people compressed into a naturally poor area the size of California. Japan, too, must live by exchanging manufactured products for raw materials and foodstuffs. The Communists strive to bring Japan's industrial power, the only such power in the Far East, within their own orbit of control. The Japanese have steadfastly refused to be drawn into this subservience. But we must help Japan meet its great need for a broad market, primarily within the free world, which will allow her to satisfy the economic wants of her people. In 1957 we sold Japan about \$1.25 billion of goods and bought from her some \$600 million. Surely it is clear that excessive restrictions against the trade of Japan could create in Japan conditions dangerous to our own security.

Trade and National Security

In the modern world it is not possible to consider trade apart from the whole complex of our international relations and our national security in a world that is fraught with danger. When we speak of the future of our trade agreements legislation, we are speaking of an instrument which is vital to the whole of our foreign relations. It is an instrument needed to prevent a "hot" war and to win the "cold" war.

Surely a system that contributes so much to our political and military security, which, through "peril point" and "escape" procedures, realistically

takes account of the needs of our domestic industry, and which provides our farmers and industrial workers with vast markets, should be effectively continued. The Trade Agreements Act stands as a worldwide symbol of enlightened statesmanship. Failure to renew and strengthen that act as the President has requested would set back the clock and endanger our Republic and each and every person in it.

I ask you to recall the period of the early thirties. It was a time of economic depression here at home, and we sought relief by raising our tariffs and devaluing our currency without regard to the serious impact of our acts upon others who were largely dependent on international trade.

What was the outcome? We did not get the domestic relief we expected. And our conduct and example seemed to others to justify, if not require, the practice of "each for himself; the devil take the hindmost."

Nations like Germany and Japan fell under extreme nationalistic leadership that professed to believe that only by expanding their national domains at the expense of weaker neighbors could they assure their people a well-being no longer available by normal methods of peaceful trade.

Finally, the devil caught up with us all in terms of world war. Humanity paid, in rivers of blood and mountains of gold, for its follies.

May we be spared the folly that would repeat that tragic past.

REMARKS BY MR. DILLON

Press release 153 dated March 27

I have been asked to discuss two closely related subjects, *first*, the Soviet economic offensive and, *second*, the European Common Market. I think it will simplify matters if I discuss these topics separately, relating each to the reciprocal trade agreements program as I go along.

Soviet Economic Offensive

Let's begin with the economic offensive which the Soviet Union has launched. Today the main threat to the peace, security, and welfare of the American people is the threat of international communism. The threat has two barrels—both loaded.

The first barrel is the military threat. We are all pretty well aware of Soviet military strength.

We know that the Soviet bloc has at its disposal the largest peacetime army in history. We know that the Soviet Union is maintaining a submarine fleet three times larger than ours. We know that the submarine fleet and the army are backed up by tactical and intermediate missiles with nuclear warheads. We know that the Soviet Union is racing to perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile.

But, in spite of all of this, I believe that the other barrel of this loaded gun is a greater threat to the security of the United States and the free world. I am talking about the Soviet economic offensive. This offensive is a new technique to gain domination of the world.

Back in 1924 Lenin said: "First we will take Eastern Europe, next the masses of Asia, and finally we will encircle the last bastion of capitalism—the United States. We shall not have to attack it; it will fall like overripe fruit into our hands."

The Soviet Union has never changed its admitted goal of world rule.

The Soviet economic offensive coincided with the death of Stalin. The bluster, bullying, and bullets of the Stalin era have been put in a skeleton closet. "Sweetness and light" is the new policy. The Soviet Union is now speaking softly and professing friendship. They want to be brothers with the less developed nations, particularly those which are strategically located.

Let no one take lightly this new technique of trying to win countries by subversion and economic penetration instead of armed aggression. The Soviets are entering this economic cold war with the same drive and determination that they showed in forcing the countries of Eastern Europe behind the Iron Curtain.

Starting from zero in 1954, Soviet-bloc economic assistance to the less developed nations had risen to \$1.6 billion by the end of 1957. The package deal which the Soviet offers contains long-term loans at low interest rates. Almost without exception the development projects require Soviet-bloc industrial equipment and many Soviet-bloc technicians to help move the country in the general direction of the Soviet orbit. The loan provisions usually permit repayment in goods or raw materials which the debtor country has available, as an alternative to payment in convertible currencies.

This economic offensive has increased Soviet-bloc trade with the less developed nations, both imports and exports, from \$840 million in 1954 to probably double that figure—about \$1.7 billion in 1957; and the number of trade agreements signed has leaped from 49 to 147. Soviet-bloc trade with the whole of the free world has increased from \$3.6 billion in 1954 to about \$6.1 billion in 1957.

Let me make it clear that this Soviet economic offensive is no sudden spurt which we have a right to expect will fall off. The industrial growth of the Soviet Union is moving along at a pace more than twice that of the United States. Their rate of industrial growth is 9 or 10 percent a year compared to America's 4 percent. Five years from now Russia's industrial production may well reach a figure well over \$100 billion.

There is no secret about how the Soviet Union has become a world economic threat. They have accomplished it by the simple process of denying their own citizens everything but the basic necessities of life. Automobiles, washing machines, refrigerators, and television sets are things the average Russian scarcely dreams of possessing. His per capita income of \$308 a year compared to our own of nearly \$2,500 a year keeps the Russian's nose to the grindstone. The Soviet leaders are ruthlessly sacrificing the immediate welfare of their people to increase rapidly the physical assets of communism.

Now we in the United States would not be justified in viewing with alarm the Soviet economic offensive if its real purpose and intention was to help the less developed nations. But Khrushchev himself has assured us that the Soviet Union is not guided by lofty motives or a desire for sound economic relations. In 1955 he told a group of Congressmen, "We [meaning Soviet Russia] value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes."

The goals of the Soviet trade offensive are not hidden behind the Iron Curtain. They are crystal clear. They are:

To create economic dependence on the Soviet bloc;

To spread Communist economic ideology;

To weaken and disrupt economic relations among free-world countries;

And, finally, to pave the way for ultimate Communist political domination.

Challenge to Free Enterprise

The basic question to be answered is: How should the United States meet this Soviet economic offensive? What steps are in our national interests?

Should we match barter deal with barter deal? Should we alter our concept of the interdependence of nations? Is free-enterprise buying and selling obsolete in international trade?

The answer is clearly "No." The economic cold war that we are engaged in is not a battle for any given market or for the products of a particular country. We are in a war that pits the competitive free-enterprise system against Soviet statism. The fundamental concept of the role of government in society is at stake.

The reciprocal trade program is much more than just a symbol of international cooperation among the nations of the free world. It is the cutting edge of the sword in this world economic struggle.

Under the reciprocal trade program America's exports in 1957 rose to another all-time high. The figure was \$19 billion. Face to face with that figure can anyone deny the importance of foreign trade to the United States?

But, in spite of that figure and in spite of the fact that we are the world's largest trading nation, trade is more important to many other nations than to us. Exports account for 16 percent of the total economic output of the United Kingdom, for instance. For Belgium and some other free-world countries exports are even more important. In the less developed nations the ability to export raw materials and foodstuffs to the markets of the free world is the chief means by which they can get machinery and equipment. These newly developing nations need these tools to beat back poverty, disease, and ignorance.

The stakes were never higher. If the leaders of these young nations cannot satisfy the aspirations of their peoples through trade with the free world, they will be forced to trade with the Soviet bloc. If we fail to extend our reciprocal trade agreements program, we will serve notice on the world that we lack confidence in ourselves and in our future. There is no lack of confidence in the Soviet camp. If we surrender the offensive to the Soviet bloc, it is not likely that they will give us an opportunity again to grab the ball and run with it.

Yesterday morning Secretary Dulles received a letter signed by 11 of our ambassadors stationed in the Far East. I would like to read to you some excerpts from this letter:

We wish to express unanimous agreement that a serious threat to the position of the free world in the Far East lies in the subsversive capabilities of the Communist movement. These capabilities feed upon poverty and despair, and we are witnessing in Asia the intensive and increasing efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc at economic penetration and subversion through loans at liberal terms, alluring promises of trade, and the ready willingness to supply Communist technicians to assist the less developed countries with their economic problems. . . . We believe the extension of the Trade Agreements Act is . . . of the utmost importance. . . . all of the countries in the region need to trade for their livelihood and for their further economic development. Most of them are heavily dependent upon trade with the United States, directly or indirectly. The United States is the largest exporter as well as the largest importer in the world. It follows that the kind of trade policy followed by the United States will be a major determinant as to whether the free countries of the Far East will be able to achieve the level of economic development and human welfare prerequisite to durable political stability under free government in the region. . . . Without the instruments of foreign aid and trade, we shall be to a great extent defenseless in the economic warfare that has been declared against the people of the United States and the free world.

We are confronted, then, with a dangerous and powerful economic offensive by the Soviet Union aimed at breaking up trading relationships among the free nations as a means of furthering the objective of world domination by international communism. The issue is whether the nations of the free world will meet the Soviet trade threat in the only way it can be met. Will they, in other words, now move to strengthen the free-world trading community by further action to reduce the barriers which still impede the flow of goods among themselves?

Formation of European Common Market

The answer to this question hangs in the balance on both sides of the Atlantic—in the European Economic Community, where a great new Common Market is being formed, and in the United States, where our Congress is debating the future of the trade agreements program. The decisions which we will make, and those which our European friends will make, are directly related to each other.

Let me explain.

A year ago last Tuesday six nations of Western Europe—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—signed at Rome a treaty to merge their separate economic systems into one. That treaty has now been ratified by all of the legislatures of the six governments, so that it is a binding commitment on their peoples.

The Rome Treaty is not a mere statement of good intentions. It is an explicit document which sets forth precisely and in detail the steps that will be taken to create a fully integrated European Economic Community. We may be sure, therefore, that this is no paper plan but a genuine undertaking to achieve the economic unity of the six member nations.

In the field of tariffs and trade the European Economic Community will constitute a Common Market. There will be complete free trade within the Common Market, and a single uniform tariff will be applied to imports into the Common Market from the United States and other countries. In short, six nations will become as one nation so far as tariffs and trade are concerned.

This truly revolutionary movement will not be completed all at once. Some 12 or 15 years will be required to transform the six countries into a single trading entity. But the process will begin soon. The next 4 or 5 years will be the formative years of the European Economic Community. It will be during these formative years that key decisions will be made affecting the future tariff and trade policy of a new trading nation on the world economic scene.

The importance of the Common Market to the trade of the free world can hardly be exaggerated. The European Economic Community will combine nations now having a total population of some 160 million people—among the most skilled, intelligent, and hard-working people the world possesses. These nations have a gross national product of over \$140 billion. They are, moreover, great world trading nations, much more so in relation to their economic activity than is the United States. In 1957 the six countries together imported \$14 billions of goods from the rest of the world, excluding their imports from each other. This was more than \$1 billion larger than the total import trade of the United States in that year.

We have been used to thinking of the United States as the most important of the world trad-

ing nations. And so we are, as of today. We must now begin to realize, however, that with the formation of the European Economic Community there will be a second great market whose influence on the currents of trade within the free world will compare with, and perhaps even exceed, our own.

Importance of U.S.—Common Market Cooperation

What is the meaning of these facts and statistics? Their meaning, surely, is this: If free-world trade is to be nourished and made to flow more freely, the United States and the European Economic Community must join hands to bring about that result.

Now, the European Common Market holds great promise for the long-term development of world trade. Internal free trade within the six countries, and the stimulus to productivity which intensified competition will bring, will create a strong upsurge in the production and income of the members of the European Economic Community. And out of this will grow a greater capacity to import and to export. That is one of the reasons why the United States, since the early days of the Marshall plan, has consistently supported the goal of European economic integration.

Yet there are two important conditions which must be met if these beneficial results are to be achieved.

One is that the tariff and trade policy of the Common Market should not be restrictive but should be directed to the lowering of world trade barriers in general. The other is that during the formative period of the Common Market the Common Market tariff should be made as low as possible in order to ease the trade adjustments for other countries, including the United States, that will inevitably take place as industries located within the Common Market gain an increasing tariff advantage over imports from the outside.

The members of the European Economic Community have declared themselves willing to do their part.

First, they have agreed to adhere to the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which require that the Common Market tariff may not be higher or more restrictive, on the whole, than the separate national tariffs previously in effect.

This is a valuable safeguard which prevents the Common Market tariff from moving upward. It does nothing, however, to bring the Common Market tariff down, and that is what is now needed in the interests of the trade of the free world as a whole. Reductions in the Common Market tariff can be accomplished only through further reciprocal tariff negotiations between the members of the European Economic Community, the United States, and the other members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

On this point the members of the European Economic Community have also given evidence of their willingness to cooperate. In article 18 of the Rome Treaty they have stated that:

Member States hereby declare their willingness to contribute to the development of international commerce and the reduction of barriers to trade by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the reduction of customs duties below the general level which they could claim as a result of the establishment of a customs union between themselves.

And so we come back across the Atlantic to the reciprocal trade agreements legislation now before the Congress of the United States. For, if Congress approves the proposal of President Eisenhower for a 5-year extension of the Trade Agreements Act, we will have the authority we need to negotiate with the Common Market during its formative years, thereby advancing the economic interests of the United States and of the rest of the world. I would like to emphasize that the usual 3-year extension of the trade agreements legislation will not be enough for this purpose. The timetable for formulating and implementing the Common Market tariff is such that, if the Trade Agreements Act were extended for only 3 years, it would expire before our negotiations with the Common Market countries could be completed.

If the Trade Agreements Act is not extended for the necessary period, or with adequate authority to offer meaningful tariff concessions, we shall be

condemned to a policy of standstill and drift. We shall have missed our main chance to move forward confidently and surely in strengthening the trading system of the free nations in the face of the economic challenge hurled at us by international communism.

The importance of the trade agreements program to our vital national interests is very great. Failure to extend the Trade Agreements Act as the President has proposed could be one of the most costly failures in our history.

U.S. Nuclear Tests To Demonstrate Reduction in Radioactive Fallout

Statement by President Eisenhower

White House press release dated March 26

In line with what I said to the press on July 3, 1957, the United States will demonstrate the progress our scientists are achieving in reducing radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions.

To this end, for the first time at any test, we are planning to invite the United Nations to select a group of qualified scientific observers to witness at the Pacific Proving Ground this summer a large nuclear explosion in which radioactive fallout will be drastically reduced.

We will also invite, as we have on occasions in the past, a representative group of United States and foreign news-media correspondents.

The United States scientists have been making progress in reducing radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions in the hope and belief that basic advances in both the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy will thus be achieved. The advantages to mankind of continued progress in this field are obvious.

The United States has always publicly announced in advance its nuclear testing programs. We trust that the forthcoming tests will provide valuable information to the world.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of March 25

Press release 150 dated March 25

Secretary Dulles: Questions, please!

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you read the exchange of notes on the subject of a summit conference over the last week or so, it's difficult to find anything particularly new in this whole situation. How do you estimate where we now stand on the problem of a summit conference?

A. It has not yet been possible for me to study thoroughly and in detail the Soviet note, which I only received last night. But it does seem as though the Soviets were seeking to exact a terribly high political price as a condition to having a summit meeting. Now, as you know, President Eisenhower has made perfectly clear that he wants to have a summit meeting if there is any reasonable chance of reaching substantial agreements which will ease the international situation and make peace more likely. But it's more and more apparent, and has been revealed, I think, by this exchange of correspondence, that the Soviets are demanding a very high political price as a condition to having such a meeting, and the question is whether there is enough hope out of such a meeting to justify paying the political price which the Soviets seem to be exacting.

I have jotted down here, quite hurriedly, some of the price tags that they seem to be putting on it, and I would like to read those to you, if I may, to illustrate my points:¹

1. The equating of certain Eastern European governments, such as Czechoslovakia and Rumania, with such Western governments as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy;

2. Acceptance of the legitimacy of the East German puppet regime and acquiescence in the continued division of Germany;

3. Ending the agreed joint responsibility of the four former occupying powers of Germany for the reunification of Germany, a responsibility that was reaffirmed at Geneva in 1955;

4. Acceptance of the Soviet claim for numerical "parity" in bodies dealing with matters, such as disarmament, within the competence of the United Nations General Assembly—a "parity" which, if conceded, would give the Soviets a veto power in many functions of the General Assembly, enabling them to evade the will of the great majority and thus further to weaken the United Nations by, in important respects, importing into the General Assembly the same weaknesses that have crippled the Security Council;

5. The acceptance of an agenda so formulated that virtually every item—9 out of 11—implies acceptance of a basic Soviet thesis that the Western powers reject.

Now in making clear this price tag, I do not want to imply that I think that there will not be a summit conference.

Q. Could we explore that a little further, Mr. Secretary? You and the President, as you have already indicated, have taken a firm and consistent line that there should not be a summit conference without, as you put it, meaningful preparation. Regardless of the height of these prices—the price tags that you have just enumerated—the Soviets, if we can believe what we read, seem to have been making a good deal of progress in enlisting support in the neutrals and even among our allies for a summit meeting more or less on their terms. Is the administration prepared to go on with its position indefinitely, or is there a danger that you might have to cave in and accept some kind of a compromise arrangement for a summit conference that you do not now want?

¹The following five paragraphs were also released separately as press release 149 dated Mar. 25.

A. I do not think there is any prospect of what you refer to as a "cave-in." On the other hand, in these matters there is always a field for legitimate give-and-take. Nobody should just lay down an ultimatum. And if the Soviets have laid down an ultimatum, then I think that the situation looks very dark indeed. I think it's fair still to assume that they are negotiating and that many of these things they talk about are negotiable. To explore that is the function of this preparatory work. We don't intend to take this last note as necessarily the last word. If it is the last word, then—I was going to say, "It is the last word." (Laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, have there been through private diplomatic channels, such as the respective ambassadors, any indications of any willingness to negotiate? You say you think they are negotiable, but the terms you list do not appear to indicate that.

A. There have been no informal talks with the ambassadors on this matter. But in answering that question I don't want to set a precedent to indicate that I would always answer it. The greatest hope in situations like this lies occasionally in having some talks which are not publicized and which may indicate a ground for hope that would disappear if it were exposed at an early and infantile condition to the harsh rays of the sun. (Laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, sir, whether the Soviet conditions for a summit conference, as they now stand, do constitute turning a summit meeting into a "spectacle"?

A. I would say that, if those terms were accepted, it would turn the summit meeting into something much worse than a "spectacle." It would mean that on the way to the summit we would have lost our shirt. Perhaps that would result in a "spectacle." (Laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, Lester Pearson of Canada has suggested that the NATO countries should decide among themselves on a firm pattern for bargaining with the Soviet Union and let the United States do the talking for them if there should be a summit conference. How do you feel about that idea?

A. That would be primarily up to the allied countries to decide. It would be putting a very

heavy responsibility on the United States and one that we, I think, would be reluctant to assume, although in advance of the event I would not want to slam the door to such a possibility.

Agenda for Summit Meeting

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the note from the Soviet Government of yesterday, they referred to the possibility of discussing a German peace treaty and also a pact between the Warsaw powers and the NATO powers. Now, as agenda items, do those two points not open the whole question of the reunification of Germany and, also, the position of Eastern Europe, which you want to discuss?

A. I would feel rather that they tend pretty much to close the door to the kind of thing that we want to discuss. The Soviet, at least, would interpret such an agenda item as limiting the discussion to the particular matters; namely, a peace treaty involving both Germanies and equating of the Warsaw Pact with the NATO group. I would be extremely concerned to see the agenda accepted in that form without at least making clear that we interpret the agenda as opening up the possibility of discussing these other items. You will recall that at the last summit conference at Geneva there was a very prolonged and rather sharp exchange of views at the restricted meeting with respect to the label and title to be given to these topics. And finally we compromised upon a title that was called "European Security and Germany," and that, we felt, was broad enough to open up the kind of subjects that you refer to.²

If we now accepted a narrowing of that agenda item, as the Soviets propose, certainly they would argue that we had agreed to forgo at this time any discussion of the reunification of Germany. Indeed, they are quite categorical, and have been in the whole series of notes that they have put out, that they do not consider that the reunification of Germany is discussable. If we accept such an agenda item with their interpretation on it, I would think that—while, of course, nobody is there physically to prevent the heads of Western governments from uttering words, and we could probably use those words "reunification of Ger-

² For text of the Directive to Foreign Ministers, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

many"—I am quite sure it would be contended on the other side that the terms of the conference have implicitly, or, indeed, explicitly, excluded that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, your Manila press conference remarks gave the impression that you felt that one possibility for negotiation was in the disarmament field and that you might be prepared to discuss that as a single agenda item, assuming the deadlock on the other items continues. Is that a correct impression?

And, secondly, on the question of outer space, which was initially advanced here—the control of outer space—are we prepared to have a U.N. agency control this, and are we prepared to put exploration of outer space under such a U.N. agency, with or without Soviet participation?

A. Your first question calls for this answer: that it is not a correct interpretation of what I said at Manila that we would accept a summit conference with only one item on the agenda, that is, disarmament. We would feel that it would be quite important to resume the discussion of some of the—or, indeed, all of the items that constituted the last agenda at the summit meeting, and that, as I put it, to bury those items of the first summit meeting in a second summit meeting would be a very undesirable procedure.

Now on the second question, about the control of outer space by the United Nations, you may recall that at my talk, and in answer to questions, at the Press Club here in Washington, I advocated the control of outer space by an organization under, and created by, and responsible to, the United Nations.³

Q. Mr. Secretary, a few questions back you said that you felt that the Soviet position on the agenda was negotiable. Is it your position that the agenda as you have now described it is also negotiable?

A. I indicated that all of these matters are, I think, subject to negotiation and that I was not in the position on behalf of the United States of laying down any ultimatum.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us if our view will continue to be that lower-level discussions which make progress in easing some of the existing disputes are indispensable in order to deter-

mine whether a summit conference will be worth while?

A. We believe that preparatory talks through ambassadors and/or foreign ministers are an indispensable prerequisite to a summit meeting. I do not see how otherwise it is possible to meet the test which the Soviets themselves laid down, namely, that any new summit meeting should deal with matters which seemed to be susceptible of solution. In our aide memoire⁴ we asked the Soviet Government to indicate the matters which they thought were susceptible of solution in the light of the known position of the United States and other allied powers. There was no particular response to that. They say—I think there is a statement there—that they regret that the United States has not made clear its position on some of these matters. One would think that they had not read the letters which President Eisenhower wrote to President Bulganin, which do make clear our position on these matters.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would the United States accept an agenda item using the same language as the previous summit meeting on European security and Germany, and is it correct that it is "Germany" or "German reunification"?

A. The label on the item was "European Security and Germany." Under that label there appeared a rather full discussion of German reunification. So it is quite apparent that that label carries with it the concept of German reunification. Also, that is made clear in the preceding sentence, the prelude which leads up to that, where the powers, it is said, recognize the close link between European security and the reunification of Germany.

Q. Would we accept such an item for the agenda, then?

A. I don't want to be absolutely categorical about any of these matters. I think that, when I have said that we thought that a second summit meeting should begin where the last one left off, it is fairly clear what our view is. But these matters are all subject to discussion with our allies. There is another meeting of the NATO Council on this general subject, I believe, tomorrow. I don't like to take unilaterally positions which ought in the first instance to be discussed with our allies.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1958, p. 159.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 457.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you list one or two items which you think are the most negotiable? (Laughter)

A. I would find it difficult to do that, I am afraid.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you cut through all this talk about agenda and explain to us whether you would accept the proposition that at the meeting in the preliminary phase anybody there could talk about anything he wanted to?

A. At the summit meeting?

Q. No, the preliminary meeting.

A. I think that, if the preliminary meetings are exchanges of views through diplomatic channels or through meeting of foreign ministers, this whole area should be discussed without any prior limitations.

Q. Would you accept that at the summit itself?

A. I think that that could not be answered in advance. I think much would depend upon what came out of those preliminary talks. I think we have made quite clear on a number of occasions that, if it is apparent that a summit meeting could only lead to a sharpening of differences, then it is better not to have one. And if, indeed, at a summit meeting the talk is going to be in the same tone and language of the last Soviet note, then it would seem to me to be a great mistake to have a summit meeting, because that would not allay tensions but only increase them. The tone of the Soviet notes has been increasingly harsh, and, if that is to be a preview of the summit, you better not have any summit. I think it must be made clear through preliminary talks that a summit meeting would serve a constructive purpose and not a destructive purpose; and, if the preliminary talks indicate that it would serve a destructive purpose, then it is better not to have it.

Liaison Between NATO and OAS

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the NATO meeting in December you suggested a closer liaison among the free-world organizations,⁵ and since then there has been some correspondence between NATO and the Organization of American States—between the Secretaries General—which some Latin Americans have termed as rather insipid because they merely propose an exchange of information which was already available through the libraries of the

two organizations, and there has been some comment that you seemed to have launched the idea and then let it wither away. Are you prepared to see it through and develop into something constructive, or are you just going to let it just stand on the books? What are your plans?

A. I think all things start in a modest way and that that does not necessarily presage their withering away. It depends upon how the idea develops. I have always thought and believed that this thing would have to start in a rather modest way. We have never wanted to try to bring about an organic unity of these different organizations. Informal contacts between the Secretaries General, for example, where they talk together, would indicate whether or not it would be useful to go forward and, if so, along what lines. I may say I am entirely satisfied with the progress that has been made to date and with the likelihood that there will be a beginning of contacts.

You say that information has been in the libraries. That is quite true. But it has been in the libraries outside of a context of some kind of association between the different organizations. The fact that this proposal even in its present modest form is evoking a great deal of attention and even discussion within the different organizations shows that there is in it a significance far different from the fact that you can go into libraries and read about some of these things.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if we may climb back to the summit for a moment, do you believe that the price tag put up by the Soviets as it now stands is too high?

A. I do.

Q. Do you think that the latest note in effect has advanced or reversed prospects of the summit meeting?

A. I think it has not advanced them any, and it seems to me to have made it apparent that a continuation of this public note-writing is not going to advance matters.

Indonesia

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what is going on out in Indonesia? Our Ambassador seems to have a riot on his hands, a sort of student demonstration.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1958, p. 8.

A. I understood there were some demonstrations there.

Q. *They grabbed a Danish ship, and the Government there seems to be intensifying its anti-American attitude. These demonstrations and riots are certainly not accidental.*

A. I don't think that such demonstrations necessarily reflect or in fact do reflect any governmental impetus. Rioting goes on in quite a lot of places. There were even riots, you remember, in Taipei not so long ago, which I am sure did not reflect any anti-American feeling on the part of the Government. It was due to a local incident. I was out in Taipei just 2 weeks ago, and certainly there was no vestige anywhere whatever of any anti-American feeling, I would say, among the people, as far as I could judge—certainly not among the Government. I wouldn't attach too much importance to these student riots. I remember when I was a student at the Sorbonne in Paris I used to go out and riot occasionally. (Laughter)

Q. *On whose side, sir?*

A. I can't remember now which side it was on. That shows how students just like to riot for the fun of it. (Laughter)

Q. *Can you tell us something about the substance and the purpose of your talks with the Minister of Economy of Germany, Mr. Erhard?**

A. We welcomed here the visit of the Deputy Chancellor, and we talked very largely about economic problems, which is an area in which he is particularly familiar and where he is at least partly responsible, perhaps largely responsible, for policies which have brought about a very remarkable economic recovery in postwar Germany. There are quite a number of problems relating to the Common Market and the Free Trade Area which can have potential repercussions upon the United States and American business. Those were the things which we primarily discussed.

Middle East

Q. *Mr. Secretary, there have been reports of some changes in administrative policy within Saudi Arabia—transfer of certain functions to*

Prince Faisal. Would you give us your appraisal of this situation as regards our relationship, or the relationship of the Western countries, to Saudi Arabia? Do you think this indicates any change or any imminent change in relationships between our country and Saudi Arabia?

A. No. We do not consider that this involves any change in relations. It is not easy to evaluate what has happened, and there are a number of interpretations that are put upon it, all of them of a speculative character. I think it is to be borne in mind that Prince Faisal has in the past been Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He gave up those functions because of illness. He came to the United States, as you will recall, to have medical attention. While here, he met with the President and with me. We have no reason whatever to believe that he is animated by anti-American sentiments. He goes back there to resume functions which he had exercised before his illness required him to lay them down. So that, as far as that is concerned, what has happened is quite a normal development.

Now, I would add this, that the whole situation in the Arab world is in a state of evolution and it is not easy to evaluate any event that occurs there because the situation is considerably in flux. The creation of the United Arab Republic and the Federation and matters of that sort all inject new elements, new forces, into the situation. And it requires close observation and attention. But we have no reason at the moment to put any unusual evaluation upon what has happened in Saudi Arabia.

Q. *Would you relate this in any way to the announcement by the Saud Government at the international maritime law meeting that it considers its waters around Aqaba national rather than international?*

A. That has been the position of the Government of Saudi Arabia for a long time. And that proposition will be involved, not in terms of specifics but in terms of the general propositions that are being discussed. As you know, the position of the United States historically has been, and is, that full territorial rights do not extend more than 3 miles. There is a strong movement to bring about acceptance of a change in that rule of international law. The United States believes

* Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics of the Federal Republic of Germany, conferred with officials in Washington Mar. 24-26.

that the 3-mile limit should be sustained and that is the position of our delegation at Geneva.⁷

Q. Mr. Secretary, this month it has been a year since the public expression of certain hopes and expectations that led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Sharm-el-Sheikh. I want to say, can you tell us, in your view, if these hopes and expectations with regard to the specific issue involved at the time, you are satisfied with what has happened since then?

A. As far as the issues that were involved at the time of the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the deployment of United Nations Emergency Forces there, the results have fully fulfilled our maximum expectations. There has been peace and order in the area, and the United Nations forces there have played a very useful, indeed indispensable, role. I think it is now recognized that, while both sides—both Israel and Egypt—had great concern about that solution in the beginning and about the principles which we advocated very strongly, there is now a realization on both sides that our position at that time was sound and that events have justified the position that we then took.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us something at this time about Mr. Murphy's mission to Paris and Tunis; and, second, what is your position regarding the project of the Mediterranean pact which has been suggested by Gaillard?

A. Mr. Murphy and Mr. Beeley of the United Kingdom, after having spent some days in Tunis in talking with the Tunisian Government and with President Bourguiba, have returned to Paris with a formulation which has been agreed to by President Bourguiba and which we think takes considerable account of the preoccupations of both sides on this situation. It has been presented to the French Cabinet and is being discussed and considered. We do not know yet what the final

official reaction of the French Government will be. Perhaps that will be forthcoming within a matter of hours or days. We hope that it will lead to a solution there of the immediate problem, although of course the major problems will take some time to resolve.

I want to take this occasion to say that I think Deputy Under Secretary Murphy and his British colleague have done a very fine job to date. I don't know whether their mission will be crowned with success or not. But whether or not it is crowned with success, they have already dealt with many problems that looked as though they were totally insoluble and have brought them into a compass which at least offers some reasonable hope. They have done a superb diplomatic job.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up that question, in your Manila conference you said that the Western Mediterranean defense and economic pact would be constructive if the development of that concept were in a manner which is compatible with the complete independence of all of the countries involved. Did you mean to include Algeria within that phrase of "independence of all of the countries involved"?

A. No. I was speaking of the then independent countries and that the Mediterranean pact should not in any way impinge upon the existing independence of the countries of the area. I think I also made reference to the fact that there has to be acceptance, within the concept of independence, of the concept also of interdependence. As I emphasized yesterday in my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,⁸ the concept of interdependence today is vital and anyone who pushes the doctrine of independence to such a point as to deny the practice of interdependence is in fact jeopardizing his own independence. But I did not intend by that statement to carry any implication, one way or another, about the future of Algeria.

Q. Thank you, sir.

⁷ For a statement made by U.S. Representative Arthur H. Dean on Mar. 11 at the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea at Geneva, Switzerland, see *ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1958, p. 574.

⁸ See p. 622.

Basic Principles Governing United States Relations With Latin America

by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹

Today I would like to state as simply as possible the policy which guides United States relations with Latin America. Our Government has consistently placed the highest priority on maintaining and further extending our excellent relations with this vast neighboring area. This is a bipartisan policy and one which has broad public support throughout the United States. It is a policy which we strongly adhere to and which we keep under continuing study in order that we may be prepared to meet whatever exigency arises. It is one which has already stood the test of time. Yes, and also the vicissitudes of war and economic depression.

Those of us who are charged with the responsibility for the conduct of this policy strive to be as alert as possible to the political, social, and economic developments to which United States policy must respond. Recently there has been more than the usual amount of public attention paid to our relations with Latin America. This is heartening. Early in March the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, which is conducting a review of United States foreign policy, held open hearings to discuss our relations with Latin America. Governor Muñoz Marín of Puerto Rico appeared before the committee, and I was also called to testify.² Now let me state the policy.

The United States not only desires, but feels the need, to establish the closest and most friendly relations with the Latin American peoples and their governments. This need arises out of more

than self-interest. It is a need that springs from one and the same root and has been a long time growing. It is, in fact, as old as the earliest colonization of the Western Hemisphere. Sometimes we think so much about differences—in language, national origin, aspects of religion and customs—that we forget the identities. However, one of the most striking things about the Americas is how much they have in common. There is no other group of peoples so numerous, no other area of the globe so extensive, of which this could be truthfully said. Here in a world which really was a New World for our forefathers, a tremendous experiment was undertaken with results decisive for human history. We began as groups of explorers and settlers. We had a period of colonization. We felt the need of independence and won it. Because we believed in the dignity and freedom of man, we established constitutional democracies. And “we” means all of the American Republics—the United States and the 20 sister nations.

In view of this parallel experience, our machinery of inter-American cooperation developed naturally—indeed, almost inevitably. When we speak of the American family of nations, we are voicing a fundamental truth. Since it is truth, it follows that our own cooperation with the other American Republics is based on genuine affection for our friends, which we hope is reciprocated. This affection applies to each of the 20 countries whose considerable differences and distinctive characters we fully recognize while, at the same time, we greatly treasure, as each of them does, our common membership in the Organization of American States, which President Eisenhower has

¹ Address made at Tyler Junior College, Tyler, Tex., on Mar. 21 (press release 137 dated Mar. 20).

² For text of Mr. Rubottom's statement, see BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1958, p. 518.

called "the most successfully sustained adventure in international community living that the world has ever seen."

We hold deeply to the belief that the people of the various countries in the hemisphere have the right to choose their own political destiny: The policy of nonintervention, which we strongly uphold, is one of the cornerstones of the inter-American system. Our commitment to this policy, however, does not lessen our own dedication to democracy in its real and, I might add, American sense, and "we are in a position to feel—and we do feel—satisfaction and pleasure when the people of any country determinedly choose the road of democracy and freedom."³ Here we should remind ourselves of the obligation we have to overcome our own shortcomings and improve upon the example which we are expected to set. We should also recognize that no two governments, any more than two individuals, can be exactly alike. Thus we should not be surprised when the emerging patterns of government differ from country to country.

We acknowledge the high stakes for our neighbors as well as ourselves in maintaining the security of this hemisphere. We hope no aggressor will ever dare attack the nations of the free world, but we cannot rule out this possibility. In addition to recognizing the right of each country to take the measures necessary for self-defense, all 21 of the American Republics are joined together under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Treaty, which is the first of the regional collective-security pacts of the free world. Under this treaty each of the American Republics recognizes that an attack on any one constitutes an attack on all and accepts the obligation to assist in meeting the attack.

Economic Interdependence

In the realm of economic relationships we recognize our interdependence with Latin America. Our own economic well-being, certainly if it is to be lasting, is inextricably intertwined with that of Latin America. This mutual well-being is, I am glad to say, based primarily on trade. This is a proud relationship. More than one-fifth of our exports now go to Latin America, a business worth approximately \$4 billion to the United States in

1957 and almost as much in 1956. On the other hand, almost 50 percent of all of Latin America's exports were to the United States last year, the total amount being nearly in balance with the above \$4 billion figure. This is big business, and we want to keep it that way; you can rest assured that Latin America feels the same way about it, and would like to see those figures increased. Right now Latin America is observing closely economic trends in the United States, and with ample justification, just as you are. Every Latin American ambassador in Washington is anxiously watching our own efforts to overcome the present problem and is praying that we will be successful in turning business upward again.

There has been a severe decline in prices in some of the goods sold us by Latin America, notably in nonferrous metals, although other products have been affected. Coffee is Latin America's main concern, if one considers that 15 countries produce coffee and that 6 of these are dependent on that product for most of their foreign exchange. However, it makes no difference whether the affected product is coffee, copper, lead, zinc, tin, or something else. When prices drop sharply, people in every walk of life in the producing countries are adversely affected. We can and should be sympathetic to these serious problems in Latin America, just as we know they are to our own problems in the United States. It is in our common interest to find solutions to these common problems.

One of our most important tools in finding mutually beneficial solutions is the Trade Agreements Act. With the authority of this act, first enacted in 1934, behind us, we can negotiate agreements to reduce government-imposed barriers to trade. Without this authority we would find ourselves in an economic jungle in which the only remedy for each injury or fancied injury in the field of trade would be not negotiation but retaliation. Latin America is watching with tremendous interest the debate which is now going on. The effects of the decision ultimately taken by Congress will have far-reaching repercussions in our foreign relations, both psychological and real.

Private Economic Cooperation

But obviously our entire economic relationship is not based on trade alone. United States firms have been investing their capital in Latin America

³ *Ibid.*, p. 520.

on a constantly increasing scale. This kind of private economic cooperation is helping to speed the development of Latin America, just as foreign investment, mostly European, participated in the growth of our own country. During the last few years United States investors have been pouring approximately one-half billion dollars per year into Latin America, and the total is now more than \$8½ billion. Not only have these investments been increasing rapidly, but they are going into diversified manufacturing and service industries as well as the production of vitally needed raw materials. A recent study by the Department of Commerce,⁴ using data compiled through 1955, revealed that in that year United States companies operating in Latin America paid salaries totaling \$1 billion to 625,000 employees, of whom only 9,000 came from the United States. These companies in the same year paid slightly more than \$1 billion in taxes to the host governments in Latin America. Their sales abroad *for dollars* went over the \$2-billion mark during that year.

The United States, of course, believes in private enterprise because of its proven success. We also know that private investors are willing to commit large amounts of capital in almost any area where conditions promise mutually beneficial results; it is also self-evident that there is a limited amount of public money available. Therefore, we have recognized, most recently at the Buenos Aires Economic Conference, that the additional great sums required for the development of Latin America can only be supplied through a combination of private and public funds. Thus we say that, if private capital is available in adequate amounts and on reasonable terms for a given project, it is our policy now, as it has been for years, not to have our public lending agencies compete with such capital. This policy is not pointed at any given industry but applies across the board. Notwithstanding our deeply held feeling regarding private enterprise, we recognize the absolute right of any other country to pursue whatever means it deems best for developing its resources.

⁴ *U.S. Investments in the Latin American Economy*, published by the Office of Business Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce, and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.; price \$1.75.

Other Sources of Capital

In addition to the roles of trade and investment in Latin America, the United States acknowledges the importance of providing loans to our neighbors. During the past decade United States direct loans to Latin America, under the auspices of the Export-Import Bank, have amounted to more than \$2 billion. At the same time additional United States public funds have been going to Latin America through our participation in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the technical assistance programs of the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and through other organizations relying heavily upon the United States for financial support. But to speak expressly about the direct United States cooperation through the Export-Import Bank, it is the operating principle of that institution that no economically sound development project in Latin America shall fail for lack of access to capital from other sources to cover its dollar needs. Between 1953 and 1957 the bank authorized credits to governments and private companies in the amount of \$1,354,000,000. Recent loans have been as little as \$50,000 and as large as one to Brazil of \$100 million for the modernization of its railroad system. Every one of our sister Republics shared in these credits during this period, and, I might add, their record of repayment is on the whole excellent.

Another newer source of capital is now provided through the sale for local currency of our surplus agricultural products. Under Public Law 480, adopted by Congress in 1954, the value of loan agreements with Latin American countries signed through 1957 totaled \$222 million and the emergency grants of surplus agricultural products aggregated \$31 million. An important feature of these loans is the provision that enables the purchasing country to borrow back for its economic development a large part of the money paid to the United States for the products received. Thus the recipient country receives a three-way advantage: (1) the surplus products themselves; (2) the dollar savings, since payments can be made in their own currency; and (3) the loan of a large portion of the sales proceeds over a long period of time and at a low interest rate.

Stabilization credits provide another example of how public funds are used in our economic cooperation with Latin America. These credits, or standbys, as they are called, are made available to

countries to help them ease the strain on their reserves and maintain the value of their currencies while they are attempting to achieve financial stability. The standby credits are usually "package" arrangements, with participation by the United States Government, the International Monetary Fund, and, frequently, private United States banks. During 1953-1957 direct participation by the United States Government alone in standby credits aggregated \$115½ million.

Another means of extending United States cooperation to Latin American countries has been that of providing emergency grant aid when they were unable to meet their needs with their own resources. These emergencies have arisen from natural disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes or from unforeseen economic or political situations. Since 1954 this aid, provided under our mutual security program, has totaled \$75 million. In addition, easy-term loans were made under Senator Smathers' amendment totaling \$12.8 million to seven Latin American countries for certain development projects in the fields of health, sanitation, and education.

Still another type of direct United States Government cooperation is that offered by congressional appropriations for the United States share—which is two-thirds—in the cost of the Inter-American Highway, extending from the Guatemalan border with Mexico down to the Panama Canal. Since 1953 appropriations have amounted to more than \$81 million, and Congress is being asked this year to approve another \$10 million.

This year for the first time the United States has funds available under the Development Loan Fund. Several applications from Latin American countries are now being considered by the administrators of this fund, and approval of some of those projects is expected shortly. The fund is designed primarily to extend loans for financing projects in the free world which contribute to economic development and which cannot otherwise be financed by existing international or private institutions. These loans may be repaid in either local currency or dollars and are relatively long-term and at reasonable interest rates.

Technical Cooperation

In speaking of our economic policy toward Latin America I have purposely left until last the mention of our long record of technical cooperation in Latin America. This program, started in

1942, probably yields more human-interest episodes than any of the others, not to mention the long-term practical contribution it is making in our relations with Latin America. In it, scientists, technicians, and other experts from the United States team up with their counterparts in Latin American countries to carry out cooperative programs in agriculture, public health, education, transportation, housing, community development, public administration, and in other areas vital to a country's welfare. A remote tropical jungle can be the setting for one program and a high, arid plateau the location of another. In practically every instance the host government for these projects contributes considerably more to their financing than the United States Government; so you can visualize the constructive work going on when I tell you that in the past 5 years our share alone amounted to \$125 million. However, even if we had before us complete figures from all countries, the total, though imposing, would be no index to the accomplishments of this program. The exchange of ideas and technical know-how cannot be reckoned in terms of dollars, and no one can foresee the value of the changes which will follow the improved health conditions, new agricultural techniques, increased productivity, and other positive results growing out of this type of partnership.

Now, having stated the policy and the instruments at our disposal for executing it, I would like to describe briefly some typical problems. Underlying our approach to these, of course, is the most fundamental ingredient of all for constructive foreign relations—the desire to cooperate with our friends. This bears repeating again and again.

The Importance of Coffee

I have already referred to coffee. Let us examine it in more detail.

As important as coffee is to those of us who love both the taste and the aroma of a cup in the morning—or any other time—coffee is even more important to our friends to the south. As I mentioned earlier, 6 of the 15 coffee-producing countries depend on coffee for most of their foreign exchange to buy what they need in the United States. The United States is the principal consumer of coffee.

Except for a period of 6 years, beginning in April 1941, when quotas on imports were first im-

posed, and continuing through the removal of price controls in 1947, coffee has been subject to the normal laws of supply and demand. There was a time in 1954 when coffee prices in the United States to the consumer rose to such a point as to encounter rather severe resistance. Nobody, certainly not the countries which depend on coffee for their foreign exchange and the livelihood of their people, wants to see coffee priced out of the market. On the other hand, I do not think that the American housewife, any more than the Government of the United States, wants to see a disastrous price decline which would have even more disastrous effects on the countries where coffee is produced and, ultimately, on the quality and quantity of the product that we have come to depend upon to help us get started on our day's work.

Given the importance of coffee, what is going on in this industry? The price of mild coffee fell almost 20 cents a pound between January and October last year, when the new crop came in. Sales were being made at less than 50 cents a pound, which was below the support prices guaranteed producers by their governments and lower than the average prices for any year since 1949. With a large crop coming to market this year and a still larger one forecast for next year, they were understandably worried, and the principal Latin American producing countries met in Mexico City in October of last year to consider what they should do. The chief result of that meeting was a coordinated effort on their part to stabilize coffee prices. This they did by establishing export quotas and agreeing to place on the market only as much as could be sold at what producers regarded as a reasonable price. The plan has been in operation now for about 5 months, and prices are currently about 53 to 54 cents a pound—about what they averaged in 1951 and 1952.

Later, at Rio de Janeiro in January of this year, the American coffee-producing countries met with the African coffee producers to discuss the problem on a worldwide basis. The principal consuming countries of Europe were represented, and the United States sent an official observer. The leading buyers of coffee in the United States, members of the National Coffee Association, were also represented by an observer. The result of that meeting was the establishment of a world coffee organization, the main purposes of which are to promote the increased consumption of coffee, as one method of attacking the problem

of overproduction, and to provide a place where the supply-and-demand situation can be kept constantly under review.

Now the United States is searching for the most useful means of cooperating with its Latin American friends on the problem of coffee. In some respects our approach to the problem is different from theirs; in fact, we have quite frankly disagreed with some of their efforts to maintain prices at levels which might operate to reduce consumption. But these disagreements have been in the context of a deep and abiding friendship, and we are searching for means of agreement rather than concentrating on the disagreements. The problem is under urgent and continuing study in the Department of State, and I am confident that we will find a means to work with Latin America on this problem of transcendental importance.

The Problem of Oil

While in Texas, I should not overlook the problem of oil. This, my home State, along with other oil-producing regions of the world, is faced with the problem of reestablishing the petroleum production and marketing relationships which were seriously disrupted when we in the Western Hemisphere expanded to meet the supply deficit created by the Suez crisis. The problem was further complicated by the decline experienced in the United States domestic demand following the Suez crisis and which still continues. We certainly hope that the problem will not be one of long duration.

Meanwhile our Government, with the cooperation of an overwhelming majority of crude-oil importers, instituted a new program of voluntary import limitations last July which has worked very well indeed, even acknowledging the two or three exceptions where cooperation has not been forthcoming. This program, of course, magnifies the fact that the oil problem is not confined to the United States. It is of great significance to two of our Western Hemisphere partners and friends, Venezuela and Canada, on whom we rely for part of our needs for oil and other vital products, both in normal and emergency periods.

Now what do good friends do when they find a common problem? They sit down together to seek a mutually satisfactory solution.

I visited Venezuela about 3 weeks ago and explored this problem with the Provisional Gov-

ernment, certain political and business leaders in the country, and others. I found a disposition on the part of our Venezuelan friends to engage in the kind of frank discussion which should help us find a solution to the problem. The same attitude has been shown by our Canadian friends. I am happy to report that consultations on the technical level have recently been held in Caracas and in Washington in which my outstanding friend and fellow-Texan, General Ernest O. Thompson, took part. This is the essence of the approach that we people of the Americas take to find solutions to problems, and I am sure that this effort will not fail.

Now let us take up another type of problem. Let us assume there is a Latin American country whose exports consist of 50 percent in coffee and 50 percent in nonferrous metals. It finds that because of the decline in prices of one or both of these commodities, and also because of lessening demand abroad, there is a sharp reduction in its income from exports. Its foreign-exchange deficit for the coming year is estimated at about \$50 million. Let us also assume that this country has drawn down its reserves in the previous year and that it has only \$20 million left with which to meet the anticipated deficit.

In all likelihood a senior official would be sent to Washington to lay this problem before the International Monetary Fund and the United States financial authorities. He would describe his country's situation and work out a program jointly with the IMF staff for dealing with it, subject to the concurrence of his Government and the Board of Directors of the IMF. In general this country would strive for austerity in its imports and would seek to maintain a balanced budget and a tight rein on credit. In some instances where the applicant country's currency has been kept at an artificially low rate of exchange, it may offer to let the rate fluctuate and find its own level, thus reducing some of the drain on foreign exchange.

The measures I just mentioned may show, on examination, that policies to reduce imports and promote exports will only reduce the deficit \$25 million instead of \$50 million. The International Monetary Fund, having concluded that the program adopted by the country is adequate and that the deficit is temporary in nature, is willing to put up \$15 million to help cover that gap. Another \$10 million might be obtained from private bank-

ing sources in the United States. If so, that makes a package which covers a \$25 million deficit.

In some cases, however, the country may not be able to raise an additional \$10 million in New York and it may be necessary to turn to other sources to make up this package. The country, for example, because of a local shortage may need wheat and other farm products and be eligible under United States Public Law 480 to obtain \$10 million worth of these from our surplus stocks on very long credit terms. In some cases it might even be necessary to ask the Export-Import Bank to make available the last component of the total deficit in order to finance the flow of essential United States imports into that country.

Generally the agencies contributing toward the \$25-million gap desire that the IMF contribution come first, since the fund was set up precisely for the purpose of helping countries which have temporary balance-of-payments problems. At times these agencies work out arrangements whereby drawings on them are made in some agreed-upon relationship to the drawings on the IMF and the private banks.

The foregoing represents how the United States Government, in cooperation with international and private financial institutions, assists a country which might otherwise have to reduce imports to such an extent that the economic development of the country would suffer.

I wish to stress that there is deep concern and good will inherent in the United States approach to economic cooperation with Latin America.

Soviet-Bloc Efforts in Latin America

Now to refer briefly to a subject which has received some public notice:

There is evidence that the Soviet Union is intensifying its economic and political offensive in many parts of the world, including Latin America. The Kremlin's propaganda professes sincere interest in trade expansion. Yet, in actual fact, Soviet-bloc trade with Latin America has been declining in recent years, primarily because of the failure of the Soviets to deliver acceptable, competitively priced goods as a counterpart to those raw materials received by them from Latin America.

Although there have been numerous reports of Soviet-bloc "offers" of trade, capital, and technical

assistance, it remains to be seen whether these will meet with general acceptance or whether they will actually materialize as serious propositions. This is said because of the vague and illusive character of the offers, as well as because of Latin American governmental prudence based on past experience with Soviet promises.

Nevertheless, I do not wish to minimize the gravity of the challenge for the United States posed by the Soviet-bloc efforts in Latin America or its capacity to choose selected targets for an economic offensive. This will require sustained vigilance and care on the part of the countries approached, and I am confident that our hemisphere partners will not be found lacking.

I have tried today to convey to you a concise idea of the basic principles governing our relations with Latin America. I have endeavored to make clear the needs and situations—the types of problems—to which United States policy must respond. I have spoken of the friendly spirit in which all the American Republics work together to solve our mutual problems. We in Washington are resolved to dedicate our best efforts to insuring that this spirit of inter-American solidarity is further strengthened, and we humbly ask the guidance of Almighty God in our task.

President-Elect of Costa Rica Visits United States

The Department of State announced on March 24 (press release 146) the following members of the party accompanying Mario Echandi Jimenez, President-elect of the Republic of Costa Rica, during his visit to Washington, D. C., March 26-29:

Señora de Echandi

Gonzalo J. Facio, Ambassador of Costa Rica, and Señora de Facio

Alfredo Hernandez Vollo and Señora de Hernandez

Jorge Borbon Castro and Señora de Castro

Joaquin Vargas Gene and Señora de Vargas

Tomas Federico Guardia Herrero and Señora de Guardia

Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., Chief of Protocol of the United States

U.S. Economic Aid to Spain Increased by \$15 Million

Press release 148 dated March 25

The American Ambassador at Madrid, John Davis Lodge, informed the Spanish Government on March 25 that the United States has made available to Spain an additional \$15 million in economic assistance. Ambassador Lodge told Foreign Minister Fernando Maria Castiella that the Embassy had received official announcement of the increase approved by President Eisenhower.

The new funds, made available under the terms of the Mutual Security Act, bring the total of the defense support program for Spain to \$56 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1958. The \$15 million increase for this year brings the total economic aid to Spain under the mutual security program to \$356 million since the signing of the 1953 Spanish-American defense agreements.¹

The entire program is designed to bolster the Spanish economy in the interests of mutual defense. The economic program has emphasized railroad rehabilitation, electric power development, agriculture, and technical assistance.

More recently, in order to help maintain a high level of industrial production and to insure the adequacy of domestic supply, this program has supported Spain's economy by providing industrial raw materials and essential agricultural commodities. In accordance with the desire of the Government of Spain, the additional \$15 million granted to Spain will be used primarily to finance the imports of industrial raw materials.

Ambassador Lodge also informed Foreign Minister Castiella that he was authorized to negotiate an amendment to the January 17 agreement for the sale of U.S. surplus products which will permit Spain to buy for pesetas 23,800 additional bales of short-staple cotton valued at approximately \$4 million.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1953, p. 436.

Labor Rejects Communism—East Germany

by Eleanor Lansing Dulles

Special Assistant to the Director, Office of German Affairs¹

Labor Knows the Price of Communism

Labor does not like communism. There was a time when it would not have been easy to prove this statement. Those were the days when it seemed possible that the organized economic system which raised the peasant and serf of Eastern Europe and put them in a factory or workshop would substantially improve their lot.

There has been, at least in statistics and to some extent in real values, an improvement in the living standards of many thousands in Russia. Because conditions before the revolution were primitive, the economic changes were defended by some as worth the price of dictatorship.

Later, in 1947 and 1948, when the Communists tried to apply their methods to more highly industrialized countries, such as Czechoslovakia and Germany, the real meaning of the system of controls became evident to the workers in the occupied countries and they came to fear both for their welfare and, more important, for the freedoms won over the centuries.

This basic attitude of labor has been evident in many places but nowhere more clearly than in the part of Germany occupied by the Communist troops. Here, more than elsewhere, the flaws in the Communist system can be analyzed. Because conditions are in so many respects comparable, the glaring differences between the two parts of Germany in productivity, in consumption, in worker-management relations, and in civil rights are of striking significance.

Here, in 1958, one finds on two sides of the artificial and temporary frontier workers of the same tradition, skills, and habits of life. Here are millions of Germans differing in no essential respect from each other except the political regimes and the economic consequences created by these regimes.

The facts of economic repression under communism become evident in the statistics of consumption and production, in rationing, and now have been brought into the open in the recent debates between the rulers. The workers speak for themselves, whenever possible, at times in active revolt or when they escape as refugees.

The Russians learned to fear the free choice of the people, either voting as individuals or acting through union groups, shop committees, or other forms of voluntary cooperation. In 1945 they tried the experiment of permitting elections in Hungary and in Austria. These votes were an overwhelming repudiation of communism, and the experiment has not been tried again by the Communists. Now they even try to prevent the travel or communication of East Germans with the outside world, and they visit penalties on the friends and families of those who flee from their tyranny.

Today, after decisions last August to press toward complete socialization of industry and agriculture, there is a split in the Communist leadership on policy. There are some in the ruling group who argue that the Germans will not submit to tyrannical restrictions and slavish conditions in mine and factory. Others, in spite of warnings of danger of revolt, insist upon more discipline and more severe penalties.

¹ Address made before the International Relations Council at St. Mary's College, South Bend, Ind., on Mar. 21 (press release 134 dated Mar. 19).

One worker in East Germany, endeavoring to sum up the present situation, said recently, "The Soviets can warp an economy, but they cannot win the support of the people or make their part of the world a decent place to live in without basically altering their system." The question now, of vital importance to all of us, is whether they can or will modify their system in Germany or elsewhere.

Why the Germans Reject Communism

The workers in Germany reject the restrictions and oppression of communism, as does labor in all the industrialized countries who have experienced the benefits of an advanced economic and political society. Whatever accomplishments labor may have expected several decades ago from a government which promised the worker-state, experience has now demonstrated the losses in position and in opportunity which they have already suffered, and they are fearful for the future.

The reasons why communism has not been able to win popular support can be grouped under three main headings. While these are more applicable to the Western democracies, at the present time, they become increasingly significant for all countries as the world potential for production and consumption continues to rise. The problems which the Soviets are now facing in their zone of occupation in Germany cast a shadow which will fall on many Communist lands in the coming decade.

Because of their broad significance, it is worth analyzing the areas of main grievance of labor in Germany today: the failure to have responsible and democratic relations with management, the deterioration of working conditions, and the deplorable living standards. These three concerns, if considered as a framework for more specific issues, may be said to be the major causes of unrest, defiance, and continuing hatred of the Russians and their agents in Germany. These represent the flaws inherent in the Communist system which will now, and in the future, prevent its forward progress. Only recently have they begun to disturb the Kremlin in Russia, itself, in a manner apparent to the outside world. Before the improvement in wages and the extension of education to large groups, considerations of this sort were unimportant. Now they can be left out of account nowhere.

It is not only occupied Germany and the outer fringes of the bloc that are in a state of suppressed revolt. Throughout the satellite countries there are stirrings and questionings as to the incentives to produce, the right to share the fruits of modern industry and science, and the desire to participate in decisions. These are ideas that cannot be kept within national borders.

In the denial of these rights and responsibilities to those who have known good living conditions and in the contrast between the East and West portions of Germany, a nation with unified traditions and purposes, there can be no permanence. In this ferment are found the ingredients of ultimate Communist destruction. Here, in Germany, one can see the difference between the two systems. Here, incontrovertibly, the cost of the Communist system in terms of human values is evident.

The Lack of Worker Representation

The original Soviet concept of worker relation to industry and to the state location of authority was so different from that of the Western World that it was largely misunderstood outside of Russia. The Soviet constitution of 1936 indicates that the workers are the state and the workers' state governs all. There are no dependable provisions for dealing with questions of wages, hours, or methods of work. One of the rare constructive welfare functions they perform in Russia—and this applies to the East Zone of Germany also—is to administer worker vacations.

In general, plans affecting the lives of individuals and occupational groups, and conditions in factories or mines or workshops, are settled in the authoritarian hierarchy of the Council of National Economy. Such workers' unions as are permitted to exist are more a formal recognition of the existence of the working force than instruments for improving conditions.

In their occupied zone the Russians began to realize in 1946 and 1947 that the tradition of real bargaining was strong. They were dealing with dedicated and experienced labor leaders, particularly in Berlin. At that time they considered permitting unions to function on a limited basis. They developed and actually put into effect in a few cases a special system of Works Councils, and then, in a matter of months, they recognized the danger of establishing organs of potential resistance and decided to allow the plan to lapse. The

workers' groups for the past 10 years have had to maintain their existence in an inconspicuous and unrecognized manner.

Now, in 1958, after 12 years of Soviet occupation, it is not possible for workers to meet in free assembly. Plans to improve the lot of the man and woman in industry, discussed from time to time, have been as often abandoned by the Soviets.

The Soviets have never dared to permit open elections in trade unions or in other groups. Those who continue to advise and lead the workers, in defiance of the totalitarian state, do what they can unobserved—without scheduled meetings, without visible financial support, and without any means to speak for the rights and needs of the craftsmen and laborers who are their fellows. At present there is much evidence of unrest in the zone.

The controlled labor organization, the so-called Free German Federation of Trade Unions, in the East Zone is not able to influence elections or working conditions or develop an active leadership. It is a Communist showpiece with no substance; it has little meaning to workers brought up in the German tradition. Its spokesmen merely parrot the words of the sinister and powerful leader of the party, Ulbricht.

The unwillingness of the Berliners to accept Communist domination was evident even in 1946 and 1947. Observers of postwar Berlin testify that the lessons of 1933 had been well learned. The struggle of the union leader against Kremlin representatives in 1946 was brought to a climax in March with the openly expressed opposition to the single voting list. This list would have merged Socialist and Communist Parties, but, supported by the Western Allies, the city rejected the proposal. This expression of independence and opposition to the new dictatorship was possible in Berlin because of the position there of the three Western powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. They were in a position to protect free speech and prevent a reign of terror with the threat of arrest and kidnaping.

The decision of the Soviets not to risk genuine elections after 1945 is a basic element of their policy and relates to their stand on reunification.

It is reasonable to assume that only an awareness that the tide of opinion is running strongly against them can lead the Soviets to a change in method and policy. This they are beginning to discover in the East Zone. Thus the superficial short-run advantages they think they gained in repressing

free expression and representation may lead to unmanageable conditions. Those same workers who helped stem the further advance of communism in 1946 and 1947 may help to demonstrate the need for freedom by their unwillingness to yield in spirit in the decade that lies ahead.

Working Conditions Unacceptable

The conditions in the workshops themselves are a genuine cause of frustration and bitterness to the German workman. This is a major cause for his lack of tolerance of the Soviets and their system. Even Sputnik has been regarded with cynicism in view of the Soviets' inability to provide the households with the simpler necessities or to set up high-grade machinery.

There are, of course, a number of exceptions. The favored industries are well equipped. Work of high quality is being carried on in a number of places. In general, however, there are signs of breakdowns in agriculture and in many industries. Construction and transportation are of poor quality. The manpower shortage, accentuated by the flow of refugees, compounds the difficulties.

The Communist rulers of East Germany have recently shown some awareness of the unsatisfactory working conditions. In fact, the purges and upheavals of 1958 are directly related to controversy over working conditions and labor requirements. The workers were promised shorter hours. Within the party and outside there has been heated discussion of norms, which are the standards set for output per worker. The regime has made minor upward adjustments in money wages, but any real gain in purchasing power has been, for the most part, illusory because of the shortage of consumer goods.

The net improvement for the worker in industry has been negligible. The theoretical normal hours of 45 per week are stretched by additional hours and production requirements to meet the norms.

Meanwhile, the productivity standards, subject to continuing resistance on the part of the workers, have been increased while the actual productivity fails to gain. Tools and machinery in many industries, and generally in agriculture, have deteriorated rather than improved in the past 5 years. The worker under these pressures is forced to increase his exertion to keep wages up

and keep hours down and still is 30 or 40 percent less well off than his fellow worker in West Germany.

The Communists are now facing this problem. For almost the first time they are giving thought to the question of incentives in their handling of German problems. It would be unwise to assume that the present low level of production will continue. As the result of present conflicts of views and criticisms of conditions, concessions will probably be made of necessity. The main point to observe, which will be watched by the world at large, is whether there will be a loosening of restrictions and a significant reduction of oppressive measures.

Recent reports of the economic administrators and politicians conferring on these economic questions show a recognition of the continuing dilemma. There are complaints of failure to improve economic conditions leading in January and February to purges of some half dozen leading officials. Meanwhile, labor shortages are serious and are likely to keep productivity well below standards. Indifference or flight are continuing factors.

Genuine improvement of wages and hours has been postponed from year to year. Even according to Communist claims output per worker is increasing slowly in most industries and overall production remains low, except in certain segments, and equipment and raw materials inadequate. Some of the Communist central officials say that there may be a complete breakdown because of the lack of balance between equipment, raw materials, and labor.

The Communist rulers of East Germany, by any standards, have a real problem on their hands in attempting to check the flight of able-bodied workers, as thousands a month take refuge in the Federal Republic and Berlin. The first flood of migration reached a peak when an average of 5,000 a week left the zone in 1953. At that time it was considered that the refugees were motivated mainly by the fact that their political independence had been drastically curtailed and that their lives as upstanding and freethinking Germans would bring reprisals and perhaps political captivity. Now, in 1958, the continuing steady stream of refugees from Soviet-occupied territory appears to be more largely caused by the intolerable economic and labor conditions which prevail. Thus, workers in factories and in mines, on rail-

roads and construction jobs find themselves unable to hold their own as craftsmen, as heads of families, and as free men in a difficult struggle with inadequate equipment, low-grade materials, and unfavorable working and living conditions. They have compared prewar, wartime, and postwar factory standards both in the East Zone and, through their friends and associates, with those in the Federal Republic.

Above all, they are impressed by the striking difference between the two parts of Germany. Those who become hopeless with regard to maintaining their individual position as groups are likely to go West. For this reason, in the large numbers of the refugees probably more than 30 percent are able-bodied young men, at the peak of their working potential, who are seeking not only a more favorable political climate but also decent trade-union activities and reasonable working conditions. As the numbers continue to add to the labor supply of the Federal Republic, the authorities in the Soviet-occupied territory find themselves short of both skilled and unskilled labor and are becoming more restive.

It is largely this drain of manpower and lack of incentive which disturbs the balance and limits economic capacity. There are combined with these a political and prestige factor in the large refugee stream, making it a source of humiliation to the regime. In the past 6 months the Communists have endeavored to limit travel within the zone and between the zones. This has lessened incidental travel but has not changed the numbers leaving the zone permanently. The Soviets are aware of the fact that the mere permission to leave home is a privilege; denying it increases the feeling of bitterness—granting it might increase the ease with which the workers can slip from their grasp. No matter what action they take, many visit Berlin or cross the zonal boundaries to make their homes in the West. The fact that the restrictions have not greatly diminished the flow of refugees but have led to serious resentment on the part of the entire population increases the need for police controls.

In agriculture the situation is even worse than in industry. Equipment is at the point of breakdown. Seed is poor, fertilizer scarce. Yields in most crops are far below prewar. Thousands of acres are abandoned each year, and, by 1958, the stream of refugees to the West has seriously handicapped agriculture.

Conditions such as these in industry and agriculture led to the widespread revolt of June-July 1953. At that time scores of towns and cities were involved. Thousands of workers attempted to express their demands for decent working conditions. The first spark of revolt was struck among the masons on the scaffolds of Stalinallee in East Berlin. The regime had announced a few days previously an increase in the norms, the output required per worker. This arbitrary act led to the spontaneous formation of a committee which went from their place of work in Stalinallee to the Ministry to request an adjustment to meet reasonable requirements of the workers.

The chosen representatives of the masons and allied building workers marched to the headquarters of the German Democratic Republic with their grievance. They were summarily denied a hearing. Refused admittance to the labor offices, they were then joined by thousands, demonstrated in the streets, burned the posters with pictures of Communists and misleading posters and slogans. The thousands of Germans had their hour of protest and their days of rebellion in Berlin and elsewhere throughout the zone in more than 250 towns and villages.

Throughout the zone, in Berlin and in the smaller cities, they were run down by tanks, shot by machine guns, dispersed by force, and in many cases imprisoned. From that time, with no respite, labor relations in the zone then and now have been at gunpoint and in the shadow of the political prison.

Living Conditions

The miserable living conditions of the majority of the workers in the Soviet-occupied zone constitute the third source of resentment against communism.

In a country where family ties are still of prime importance and where tradition has set high standards of home life, the privations of today in East Germany are particularly painful. The pride in house and garden, in church and school, is gone. In many respects the worker is in a strait-jacket. He cannot choose freely where to live, where to work, his occupation, or his recreation. If he, in a rare case, has a motorcycle and takes his girl out on a Sunday ride, he must watch carefully that he follows a permissible route and does not cross the zonal border. His athletics and recreation are under supervision; his education

and his religious activities are restricted and closely watched.

Rationing, of course, continues in the Soviet Zone. Meat, fats, cheese, and sugar are in short supply. Clothing is expensive and of poor quality. Many East Germans come to Berlin to buy shoes and suits, overcoats and other key articles of wearing apparel.

The difference in material standards for the average man in the East Zone has been estimated as approximately 30 percent below that in the Federal Republic and perhaps 60 percent below that of average workers in the United States. If luxuries like butter, coffee, woolens, high-grade meat are taken into account, prices converted on the basis of hours of work are approximately four times as high. For example, woolen material costs approximately 9 hours of work per meter in the Federal Republic and 40 hours in the Soviet Zone. Many other examples could be given. For instance, coffee in the Federal Republic costs the equivalent of 4 hours of work a pound and 15 to 30 hours in the East Zone.

The nonmaterial standards are even more distressing than lack of goods and services. The church and school are perhaps the most seriously blighted by the Communist rule. Efforts are made to keep the young people out of the Sunday schools and to force them to take an atheist oath. The selection of teachers is said to be more and more on the basis of party membership, with teaching warped to the party line.

These are the repressions of communism which have made the worker look on the system with bitterness. These are the human deprivations which will, in the long run, be the undoing of the tyranny wherever men see any hope of freedom.

The Meaning of Labor's Attitude Toward Communism

The comparison of the regime's slavery and freedom, in the East and in the West of Germany, which reveals the basic differences in the working and living of the people under two systems, does not lead to any easy optimism. Unfortunately, the outlook for an improvement in conditions in the East Zone to bring them up to levels in the West is extremely remote. There is no immediate prospect of a relief for those under Communist control from the oppressive conditions they must endure.

The fact of their continued resistance to both form and substance of the tyrannical regime under which they are living is, however, a bright and shining sign of human faith that their resistance has meaning for the future. The kind of strength which is required to face the risks and hardships of the present with only a distant prospect of better days is impressive not only to their relatives and friends in West Germany but also to all of us who can help shape our own destinies. The workers in East Germany have not weakened in any substantial degree even though the organizations which are permitted to them are meaningless and even though their voices cannot now be heard in the planning of their economy or in the decisions which determine their welfare.

The testimony of those who visit the East Zone and of the refugees who have fled in search of the opportunities which are the heritage of free men and the very complaints of the Communist press all demonstrate the continued vitality of the spirit of the anti-Communist majority. The resistance of these men and women will always be considered as one more chapter in the history of men's struggle for civil and human rights. While some individuals may not live to realize the hopes for which they are now fighting, human beings everywhere should be strengthened in their fight for a better world by the firm purpose and the amazing courage of those who have stood out against the Communist regime in East Germany. The workers, who had most to gain, some thought, from changes in an economic system of the 19th century, now know that the foundation on which their future welfare must be built is a genuine system of representation with the opportunity for each individual to act according to his conscience and speak according to his belief.

Requirements Eased on Exports of Technical Data

Simplification of regulations covering unclassified technical data exportable under general license, including scientific and educational information and published material, was announced on March 7 by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce. The amended regulations now permit this type of material to be exported by mail or otherwise without indicating on the letter or parcel the general license authorization under which the export is made.

In announcing removal of this requirement, the Bureau indicated that the amendment was one aspect of the Department's broader program to promote the collection and dissemination of scientific and educational information within the United States and between the United States and foreign countries.

Letters of Credence

Australia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Australia, Howard Beale, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on March 27. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 154.

Norway

The newly appointed Ambassador of Norway, Paul Gruda Koht, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on March 27. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 155.

Venezuela

The newly appointed Ambassador of Venezuela, Hector Santaella, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on March 26. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 151.

President Postpones Tariff Action on Stainless-Steel Flatware

White House press release dated March 7

White House Announcement

The President on March 7 announced that in the escape-clause case involving stainless-steel table flatware he had decided that a full evaluation of Japan's voluntary limitation of shipments to the United States was necessary since this voluntary limitation signifies an important reduction of the volume of imports and thus holds considerable promise of relieving the situation of domestic producers. The President, therefore, requested the Tariff Commission to keep this matter under review and to report to him as soon as practicable after December 31 with particular reference to the experience of the domestic industry in 1958, during which the Japanese limita-

tion on exports to the United States will have been in effect.

The President set forth his action and the reasons for it in identical letters to the chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee.

Letter to Chairmen of Congressional Committees¹

MARCH 7, 1958

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Under Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, the United States Tariff Commission reported to me on January 10, 1958 its finding that the domestic producers of stainless steel table flatware were experiencing serious injury as a result of increased imports.

I have carefully studied the facts of this case, and I have had the benefit of the advice of the Trade Policy Committee and various departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.

Although entirely satisfactory information is not available, especially for the year 1957, the Tariff Commission's report demonstrates a striking upward trend in imports with important consequences for domestic producers. Bearing on this situation, however, are two significant developments that the Commission has not had an opportunity to appraise fully. Japan, which accounted for more than ninety per cent of our imports in 1956, has limited its flatware exports to the United States. The first action in this regard set a limit of 5.9 million dozen for the year beginning last October first. The Government of Japan has now informed this Government that it has decided to limit Japanese shipments to the United States to 5.5 million dozen for the current calendar year.

These developments signify a important reduction in the volume of imports and thus hold considerable promise of relieving the situation of domestic producers. Because of this, I have con-

¹ Addressed to Sen. Harry Flood Byrd, chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, and Rep. Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.

cluded, after a thorough examination of the facts of this case, that a full evaluation of these developments is required and that action at this time on the Commission's recommendations is inadvisable.

In order that the necessary evaluation might be as precise as possible, I have asked the Secretary of Commerce to see that appropriate information on flatware imports is officially collected and tabulated.

I am, moreover, requesting the Tariff Commission to keep this matter under review and to report to me as soon as practicable after December thirty-first with particular reference to the experience of the domestic industry in 1958 during which the Japanese limitation on exports to the United States will have been in effect. In the event that unusual circumstances require, I shall call upon the Commission for a report at an earlier date.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Letter to Edgar B. Brossard, Chairman, U.S. Tariff Commission

MARCH 7, 1958

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: For the reasons set forth in the enclosed copy of my letter of today to the Chairman of the Senate Finance and the House Ways and Means Committees, I have concluded that action at this time is inadvisable on the Tariff Commission's recommendation of January 10, 1958 concerning stainless steel table flatware.

I request the Commission, however, to keep this matter under review and to report to me as soon as practicable after December thirty-first with particular reference to the experience of the domestic industry in 1958 during which the Japanese limitations on exports to the United States will have been in effect.

In the event that unusual circumstances require, I shall call upon the Commission for a report on an earlier date.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Interdependence, Basic Concept of the Mutual Security Program

*Statement by Secretary Dulles*¹

I appear on behalf of the mutual security program as recommended by the President for the fiscal year 1959.²

I. General Considerations

This program is a continuation of tested security measures that have had their birth and growth during the postwar years. It has provided peace and the opportunity which flows from a world environment of healthy societies of free men. Without this program our peace would be gravely endangered and opportunity would disappear as hostile communism more and more closely encircled us until we became a beleaguered garrison state.

The basic concept of our mutual security program is the concept of *interdependence*. The free nations, assaulted by Communist imperialism, must help each other if they are not to succumb, one by one.

We automatically accept that concept of interdependence in the case of *open* war. During the First World War there were 27 Allied and Associated Powers. We helped each other, militarily and economically, to win victory. During the Second World War 47 nations united their full resources, military and economic, in the cause of victory.

Now we are engaged in a *cold* war. We shall

not emerge victorious unless, in this type of war also, we apply the concept of interdependence.

The soundness of mutual security is no longer a theory. It is a proven fact. Until its principles began to be applied, international communism took over nation after nation. Since the postwar collective-defense system began to be forged, international communism has neither taken over, nor subjected to armed attack, any nation which participated in that system. All members have contributed to security, and all have received security.

II. The Soviet Economic-Political Offensive

Until a few years ago Communist imperialism relied primarily on a policy of threats, bluster, or armed action. Now the Communist leaders follow a new technique. Where they formerly treated all free nations as enemies, they now profess the greatest friendship toward them—particularly toward those which seek economic development.

In pursuing this course, backed with capital and skilled manpower, they have made offers of economic help to nations in all parts of the globe.³ They and other bloc nations have already entered into agreements with 16 nonbloc nations for lines of credit or grants totaling nearly \$1.6 billion in economic assistance and an additional \$400 million for military assistance. They are also engaged in vigorous efforts to increase their trade with nations in all parts of the free world.

³ For a statement on economic activities of the Soviet bloc in less developed countries made before the committee on Mar. 3 by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon, see *ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Mar. 24 (press release 144).

² For President Eisenhower's message to Congress, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 367. For statements made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by Secretary Dulles and ICA Director James H. Smith, Jr., see *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1958, p. 427, and Mar. 31, 1958, p. 527.

Mr. Khrushchev has recently said:

We declare war upon you—excuse me for using such an expression—in the peaceful field of trade. We declare a war we will win over the United States. The threat to the United States is not the ICBM, but in the field of peaceful production. We are relentless in this, and it will prove the superiority of our system.

That is a warning to be heeded. It means that, while we must, of course, deter war—whether general nuclear war or limited war—we must also prevent Communist absorption or envelopment of free nations by the more subtle means of economic penetration and political subversion.

III. Detering War

First let us consider the problem of deterring war. We have treaties with over 40 nations which pledge aid to be given and received if armed attack occurs. These promises are important. But there is need also of military strength-in-being. Our program of mutual security has that as one of its principal purposes.

By this program our allies have vastly increased the effectiveness and numbers of their forces. We have contributed primarily weapons and material up to about \$20 billion, while nations associated with us in the collective-defense effort have made defense expenditures totaling \$122 billion.

We have gained great reinforcement of the most powerful deterrent to aggression, that is, our strategic air force and our naval might. This great power is heavily dependent on dispersed bases around the world. These are supplied by many of our allies and friends as part of their contribution to our mutual security effort.

Great as this mobile strategic power is, we cannot be sure that it alone will deter all aggression. The free world must also have local forces to resist local aggression and give mobile power the opportunity for deployment. Our associates in mutual security are willing to provide the great bulk of the needed conventional forces if we will provide some of the necessary arms and, in certain countries, some of the economic strength needed to support their military establishments.

The peace of our country and the peace of every free nation in the world today rests in the most literal sense on the combining of the forces of the United States with the forces of the rest of the

free world. Together they create an arch on which rests the safety of our homes and loved ones. The military-assistance and defense-support aspects of the mutual security program are the keystones in this security arch.

IV. The Development Need

It is not sufficient, as I indicated earlier, for us to rely solely on military defensive power. To achieve peace and security we must also counter the Communist efforts to manipulate for their own ends the intense economic aspirations of peoples in newly independent and less developed nations.

I have heard it said that we must not enter into a competition with the Soviet bloc in this field. My reply is that we are not entering into a competition with them. They are entering into competition with us. They are attempting to take over and pervert for their own uses the normal processes whereby, historically, nations that are not yet developed borrow abroad to get their own capital development under way. For example, in our own country's early history we borrowed great sums from foreign private investors with which we started our own transportation and industrial development.

We favor today the greatest possible participation by *private* capital in the development of the less developed areas of the world. However, the political risks in many of these countries are greater than private persons will assume. Unless there is to be a lapse in what have been the normal and historic means of developing less developed countries, our governmental funds must play a part. Failure to provide these funds would place great victories within the Communist grasp.

V. The Mutual Security Program in Fiscal Year 1959

If these are the challenges which confront us, what then must we do to surmount them and go forward?

An essential part of the answer is in the President's proposals now before you.

First, to maintain the peace we must maintain the military strength of the free world as a deterrent to Communist armed aggression.

The President has asked \$1.8 billion for military assistance. Of this amount the great bulk will go to our NATO allies, essentially for modernization and missiles, and to Asian countries,

such as Korea, Pakistan, Taiwan, and Iran, which are separated from the full power of the Soviet bloc only by a border gate or a narrow strait.

The details of this military assistance program and its essential role in support of our own defense effort were presented to this committee last week by representatives of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Closely related to our military assistance is our defense support program, for which the President has requested \$835 million.

Defense support is proposed for 12 nations, 70 percent intended for 4 countries: Korea, Taiwan, Viet-Nam, and Turkey.

These 12 nations are collectively providing 3 million armed men in ground, air, and naval units located at strategic points around the perimeter of the Communist bloc. None of the 12 has the economic strength to support forces of the size we believe important to our common defense without the proposed economic assistance from us.

The *second* great purpose of our mutual security program is to deal realistically with the need of the peoples of the newly developing nations to make economic progress. We have the instruments for this in our well-established technical cooperation program and our newly created Development Loan Fund.

This year we propose a moderate expansion in our technical cooperation, primarily to increase activity in a few countries where we now have programs and to undertake new programs in nations which have recently gained independence. The total requested for this program for 1959 is \$142 million.

In addition we are requesting an increased authorization for the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, to include participation in the important new special projects fund approved by the last General Assembly¹ and a continuation of our regular program through the Organization of American States.

Our other vital instrument for promoting economic development is the Development Loan Fund. It was recommended to the Congress last year, upon the basis of numerous public and private studies—particularly the excellent study and report by the Senate Special Committee on Foreign Aid—that a loan agency be established

which would make it possible for the United States to help friendly nations develop their economies on a basis of self-help and mutual cooperation.

The Congress appropriated \$300 million for the fund last year and authorized the appropriation of \$625 million for the coming fiscal year. Since the appropriation of the funds for fiscal year 1959 is already authorized, your committee will not be called upon to act on the authorization. Nevertheless, I would like to take advantage of this occasion to make clear my belief that it is immensely important that the full amount of these funds be made available as part of the capital of the Development Loan Fund. They are as important for the future safety of our country as any dollars appropriated for weapons.

The committee of conference on the authorizing bill last year recommended that the fund should in the future be established as a corporation. This is in accord with the views of the executive branch, and we recommend to the Congress that this be done, in a form that will assure that lending by the fund will be fully coordinated with the foreign-policy interests of the Department of State, the mutual security activities of the ICA [International Cooperation Administration], and the lending of the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank.

For the special assistance program we are requesting \$212 million. This aid is designed to meet certain important needs which cannot be met out of the other categories of aid. These needs include help to maintain political and economic stability in certain nations where we do not support substantial military forces and which are not therefore eligible for assistance under defense support. Special assistance is also designed to support such activities as assistance to West Berlin, to continue the worldwide malaria-eradication program, and for other important uses.

Perhaps one of our most important needs is the ability to respond to new situations and new requirements which may arise in the course of the coming fiscal year. The President has asked a \$200-million contingency fund for needs of this nature. It would be reckless, in the light of conditions existing in the world today and the virtual certainty of Communist cold-war initiatives that we cannot now foresee, to leave the President without an emergency fund of at least this size.

¹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 13, 1958, p. 57.

Other programs, for which the President requests in the aggregate \$106.6 million, will be dealt with in detail by subsequent witnesses.

VI. The U. S. Economic Recession

I know that many people—Members of this Congress and their constituents—are concerned about the cost of our mutual security program and about what is often referred to as a “foreign giveaway.” This is even more true when there is an employment and business recession here in the United States and when there is much that needs to be done here at home.

I think we might all bear in mind three things:

First, this is no “giveaway” program but an absolutely essential part of our great national effort to maintain peace and opportunity for our country. *Not* to have this program would be a “giveaway.” We would then indeed “give away” to communism the control of a dozen or so nations with their hundreds of millions of people. We would indeed “give away” bases essential to our national peace and security. We would indeed “give away” the access which we and other nations have to essential resources and to trade upon which our own well-being depends.

Second, unquestionably we all wish for additional roads, schools, reclamation projects, and other facilities here at home. But we will gain little and lose much if, in our drive for them, we recklessly tear down the very structure of the free world which makes it possible for us to enjoy in peace and freedom the material blessings we now have.

Third, although the fundamental purpose of this program is to provide for the security of our nation, our families, and ourselves, it has added value of special significance now: Its effect is to counter economic recession. The great bulk of our mutual security funds—over three-fourths—are spent in the United States in the first instance. As one of the studies made for you last year showed, in 1955 some 600,000 jobs were provided by the program for American farmers and workers. The remainder, after aiding the economy of one of our allies, returns sooner or later, and mostly sooner, to be spent in the United States for the products of United States industries and agriculture. To cut these funds would be to cut employment here at home, as well as to endanger our security.

VII. Duration of Program

In conclusion let us consider a question often asked: “Will this program have to go on forever?” The answer, I suggest, is this:

I hope and believe that the concept of collective security is here to stay. Every civilized community applies that concept domestically. No longer does each family stand as the sole protector of their own home. There is a common contribution to a collective police force, fire department, sanitary department, and the like. Only the society of nations has been so backward and primitive as to go on practicing the obsolete security conception of each nation standing alone. And the result has been a harvest of recurring wars.

We had hoped that the United Nations would provide the needed collective security on a universal basis. In time it may do so. But the Soviets with their veto power now block that. And Chairman Bulganin recently told President Eisenhower that the Soviet Union would not yield an inch on the matter of veto power.⁵

But the practice of collective security must and will go on. Otherwise wars are inevitable and freedom is in constant jeopardy.

But even though the concept of collective security is permanent, that does not mean that the sums spent on security, be it national or collective, have to be permanently at the present level. We are striving to achieve a limitation of armaments and to find solutions for the basic political problems that give rise to tensions. If the Communists will negotiate in good faith toward these ends, we believe that progress can be made which will make it safe to spend far less on armaments than is now the case.

As far as economic cooperation is concerned, we can expect that, as political stability increases, private capital will play a steadily increasing role. Private capital from the more industrialized countries has in the past flowed in substantial quantities to the less developed areas and can be expected to do so again.

VIII. Conclusion

We are living today in an historic era of great change.

⁵ For texts of the Soviet letter of Feb. 1, 1958, and the President's reply of Feb. 15, see *ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 373.

(1) There is the march toward independence of colonial peoples. Since World War II, 20 nations with a population of about 750 million people have achieved their independence. These people, as well as the people of other less developed nations, are determined that they must and *will* have economic progress.

(2) There has been the revolutionary, and reactionary, threat of international communism. It has within little more than a generation subjected all or major parts of 17 nations and nearly 1 billion people to a new type of dictatorship, the dictatorship of a harsh, materialistic creed. The outward thrust of that movement has been somewhat stayed. But the Communist dictators, exploiting the vast human and material resources they control, still seek to extend their conquests around the globe.

(3) Within the Sino-Soviet world there are growing and, in the long run, irresistible demands which are incompatible with the creed and practice of orthodox communism. The subject nations increasingly demand more national independence; and a steadily increasing number of individuals seek greater personal security, increased freedom of choice, and more independence of thought. This mounting tide has already altered somewhat the complexion of Communist rule in Soviet Russia, and it has openly challenged that rule in such

captive countries as Hungary, Poland, and East Germany.

(4) To these three forces must be added a fourth—the force of the enlightened conduct and example of the United States.

We must cooperate with the healthy evolution toward independence of colonial peoples and assist in the achievement of economic progress and of freedom that will be sustained;

We must continue to hold in check the still aggressive and predatory ambitions of international communism; and

We must encourage by peaceful means the adaptation of Sino-Soviet government to the aspirations of the people. The rate of such adaptation will largely depend on whether the present type of rule gains, or is denied, enhanced prestige through external conquests.

Without the policies represented by the mutual security program and without adequate funds to carry out these policies, we cannot do these things. World trends hostile or unfavorable to us would gain the supremacy. There could be a new and prolonged "dark age."

This mutual security program is our response to a challenge which threatens our survival as a nation and the survival in the world of the ideals for which our nation was founded. It is, therefore, a program which cannot be allowed to fail.

Extending the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Legislation

Statement by Douglas Dillon.

Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

I welcome this opportunity to appear before the Committee on Ways and Means. I am here to present, on behalf of the Department of State, additional information in support of the President's proposals for the extension of the reciprocal

trade agreements legislation.² I intend to deal with certain questions which have arisen in the

¹ For text of the President's message to Congress on continuation of the trade agreements program, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 263; for statements made before the committee by Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks on Feb. 17 and by Secretary Dulles on Feb. 24, see *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1958, p. 432.

² Made before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Mar. 24 (press release 143).

course of the committee's hearings and which are of vital importance to our international economic relations.

First, it has been asked: Of what use is the trade agreements legislation in countering the threat of international communism?

Second, it has been asked: What relationship is there between the creation of the new Economic Community in Western Europe and the trade agreements legislation that makes it necessary for us to extend the legislation for a period of as long as 5 years, thus departing from past practice?

The answers to these questions lie at the heart of the legislative proposals you are now considering. I would like to take them up in order.

I. RECIPROCAL TRADE AND THE SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE

It is evident that the safety, freedom, and welfare of the American people will depend upon their ability to meet and overcome the threat presented by international communism. This threat exists not merely because the Soviet leaders have stated over and over again their determination to install the Soviet Communist system throughout the world. Such a declaration of purpose could be ignored or treated lightly if there were no visible means to carry it into effect. But the threat is real because the Soviet leaders now possess a large reservoir of physical power with which to implement their objectives.

International communism now has nearly a billion people under its domination. The gross national product of the Soviet bloc, including Communist China, is of the order of \$280 billion a year. About \$175 billion of this annual amount is produced in the Soviet Union. The rate of economic growth of the Soviet Union is now about 7 percent a year, which compares with a growth rate of about 4 percent a year for the United States.

The industrial growth of the Soviet Union is especially noteworthy. It is growing at a rate of about 10 percent a year, which compares with a rate of about 4 percent a year for the United States. Industrial output in the Soviet Union is now about \$68 billion a year, which makes the Soviet Union the second greatest industrial power in the world. By 1963—that is to say, 5 years from now—its industrial production may reach a

figure of over \$100 billion. The Soviet Union achieves these growth rates by depriving the Russian people of the consumers goods and the better living standards that would otherwise be theirs. The Soviet leaders are ruthlessly sacrificing the immediate welfare of their people so as to increase the physical assets under their control.

Since World War II the United States and its allies have been chiefly concerned over the Soviet military threat, which arises from the existence of large Communist military forces and the willingness to use them wherever the defenses of the free world are weak or uncertain. This threat continues, but it has now been broadened to include an economic threat as well. Within the last 4 years the Soviet bloc has launched a large-scale offensive directed at the countries of the free world.

Communist Trade-and-Aid Drive

Soviet-bloc economic assistance to less developed countries outside the bloc has risen from zero in 1954 to a total of \$1.6 billion by the end of 1957. This assistance is being extended in the form of long-term loans, bearing low rates of interest, which are tied to the use of Soviet-bloc industrial equipment and technical personnel in development projects within the less developed countries. The repayment provisions of these loan agreements usually permit the debtor countries to make repayment in the goods which they have available for export as an alternative to payment in convertible currencies.

Soviet-bloc trade with countries outside the bloc has also risen rapidly in this period. The exports of the bloc to the free world as a whole increased from \$1.8 billion in 1954 to about \$3.2 billion in 1957, a gain of 80 percent, and bloc imports from the free world increased in about the same degree.

The pattern of the Soviet trade offensive in the less developed countries stands out even more clearly. The total trade of the Soviet bloc with the less developed countries of the free world amounted to \$840 million in 1954. In 1957 it was probably double that figure—an estimated \$1.7 billion. There were 49 trade and payment agreements between the bloc and these countries at the end of 1953. By the end of 1957 there were 147 such agreements, an increase of 98 over the 4-year period.

The economic-assistance activities of the Soviet bloc clearly contribute to an expanding bloc trade program. As Soviet loans and credits are drawn down by the recipient countries, imports into these countries from the bloc will tend to increase further. And as these countries begin to pay off their financial obligations to the bloc, which they are usually allowed to do in goods, their exports to the bloc will also tend to increase.

The economic basis of the Communist trade-and-aid drive lies in the fact that the bloc's industrial growth is enabling it to supply in increasing quantities the capital equipment and manufactured goods which many free-world countries must import, and in the fact that the bloc is able and willing to accept in return many kinds of raw materials and foodstuffs which free-world countries have for sale and for which they sometimes have difficulty in finding markets.

Now there is nothing wrong with trade or aid as such. The question is rather the purpose to which the Soviet trade-and-aid programs are likely to be put. The Soviet leaders have made it abundantly clear that the purpose is political. What they are aiming for is to create economic dependence upon the Soviet bloc, to spread Communist economic ideology, to weaken and disrupt economic relations among free-world countries, and to pave the way for ultimate Communist political domination. In 1955 Mr. Khrushchev told a group of visiting United States Congressmen, "We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes."

A few weeks ago I made a detailed statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Soviet economic offensive in the less developed countries.³ This statement was based on a detailed study of this subject which is now in preparation in the Department of State and which should be available shortly. If the committee so desires, my statement can be made available for the record of these hearings.

Meeting the Economic Challenge

How should the United States defend its national interests in the face of this Soviet economic offensive? Should it attempt to match Soviet trade deals by itself engaging in selective barter arrangements, state trading, and other forms of

economic warfare aimed specifically at frustrating Soviet economic moves?

The answer to that question is clearly "no." The economic challenge presented by the Soviet bloc is not one of this deal or that deal. Fundamentally it is not a question of whether the Soviets or ourselves gain in one market or another. On the contrary, the Soviet economic challenge runs to the whole of the basic economic philosophy of the United States on which our foreign economic policy rests. It is, in short, a challenge which asserts that the economic system based on free, competitive enterprise which we espouse will not succeed in commanding the continuing support of the people of the free world and that the Communist economic system will prove its superiority.

There is only one way to meet the Soviet economic challenge which is compatible with the preservation of our political institutions and our national ideals. That way is to make sure that our system, based on concepts of economic freedom and competitive enterprise, is given the chance to work. If we will do this, there can be no doubt as to which system will win out in the long run. It will be ours.

Now it is often said that the trade agreements program is a symbol of international trade cooperation among the free-world countries. It is much more than that. It is a working instrument through which a large number of the most important trading countries outside the Communist bloc have achieved great progress in reducing barriers to trade within the free world. When the free world is menaced as never before by an overall economic, political, and military threat from international communism, it is essential that this process of opening up the channels of trade which link the economies of the free world should not grind to a halt.

Trade is economically important to the United States. It is vital to most of the other countries of the free world. Exports account for 16 percent of the total economic output of the United Kingdom. For Belgium and some other countries of Western Europe the percentage is even higher. For the people of Japan trade makes the difference between well-being and starvation. For the less developed countries, exports of raw materials and foodstuffs to the markets of the free world are the primary means by which they can obtain the machinery and equipment which

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.

they must have for their economic development. If the governments of the free countries cannot satisfy the basic economic needs and aspirations of their people through growing trade within the free world, they will be compelled to turn more and more to trade with the Soviet bloc.

It may be asked whether we have not already done enough. But the Soviet challenge is a dynamic one. It will not be met by a standstill policy on our part. Our great strength lies in the productivity and vitality of the competitive enterprise system which today prevails throughout most of the free world. Unless we permit our free-enterprise system to work fully and freely, we will be shackling ourselves in the face of the dangerous and powerful economic offensive of the Soviet Union. This explains why the President's proposals are so vital to our foreign policy in the continuing contest with Soviet imperialism.

This brings me to my second question, namely, the European Common Market and its relationship to the legislation before you.

II. TRADE AGREEMENTS LEGISLATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

The United States, Western Europe, and Japan are the three great industrial centers of the free world. A complex network of trade relationships connects these areas with one another and each of them with the less industrially advanced countries of Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Following 1929 this trading system broke down under the combined impact of the depression and the emergence of extreme economic nationalism. Since those days the system has been gradually rebuilt. Once again we have a significant degree of integration among the free-world economies so that developments within one of the three industrial centers can seriously affect the rest of the structure.

The creation in Western Europe of a European Economic Community, which will merge the economies of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, is therefore of great significance to international trade as a whole and to the economies of the many countries which depend upon such trade. The European Economic Community, which was established by the Rome Treaty of March 1957, embraces a population of 160 million people. The total gross national product of the six member countries

amounted to \$140 billion in 1956. The imports of the six countries from the rest of the world, excluding trade among themselves, amounted to \$14 billion in 1957, which was over \$1 billion larger than the total import trade of the United States. The 1957 imports of the six from the United States alone amounted to \$3.1 billion during 1957. Taken together the Common Market countries are a close second to Canada as a market for our exports, and they account for approximately one dollar in every six of our total export trade.


The European Economic Community, when fully established, will have completely free trade within the Community and a single uniform tariff on imports into the Community from other countries.

It is the height of this tariff that is of concern to other countries, including the United States. I believe that other witnesses have already testified that we have assurances through our participation in GATT that the Common Market tariff will not be higher on the whole than the average of the separate national tariffs previously in effect and that increases in national tariffs necessary to arrive at a Community tariff will be matched by decreases. These are valuable safeguards which will help to assure satisfactory trade relationships between the European Economic Community and other GATT countries.

Yet what is often lost sight of is the impact of the elimination of all tariff barriers within the Community. By creating a single market roughly comparable in size to the American market, European manufacturers will be able to expand production and so to cut their costs. This will inevitably lead to trade adjustments which will affect, with more or less severity, the exports of other countries to the Common Market area, depending on the height of the common tariff. The only way to ease these adjustments is to reduce the level of the external tariff of the Common Market below the average of present rates provided for by GATT. To take a single illustration: It will be a great deal easier for an American exporter of sewing machines to France to face the new competition created by duty-free entry into France of Italian sewing machines if the tariff which the American exporter has to pay is only 6 percent instead of 12 percent.

The United States and other exporting countries therefore have a direct and important eco-

HOW A TRADE AGREEMENT IS MADE



* ALL RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY TAC ARE TRANSMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT THROUGH TIC WHICH SUBMITS SUCH ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT AS IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE

conomic interest in obtaining reductions in the rates of the proposed Common Market tariff which are of particular concern to their export trade. Such reductions can, of course, be obtained only through reciprocal tariff negotiations.

There is a further important consideration. Whatever the level of the Common Market tariff is to be, its general nature will be settled within the next 4 to 5 years. Any reductions which the United States and other countries may see, even on a reciprocal basis, will be much harder to obtain if the Common Market area has already become accustomed to the operation of a higher tariff. The best chance we will have to achieve the reductions that are important to our export trade will be to negotiate them before the new tariff has become solidly established.

It is primarily for this reason that the President has requested a 5-year extension of the Trade Agreements Act. In order that there should be no doubt as to the relationship between these negotiations and the request for a 5-year extension, I should like to explain it in some detail.

Common Market Timetable

First let me describe the procedure and timetable for the establishment of the Common Market. Then I will explain how United States negotiations would fit into these procedures and this timetable during each of the 5 years for which the trade agreements authority is being requested.

The procedure to be followed in forming the European Common Market may be envisaged as two separate but substantially simultaneous series of tariff adjustments, one internal and the other external.

With respect to the internal tariffs, that is, the duties which the six countries now apply on their imports from each other, these are to be gradually reduced until they are entirely eliminated and complete free trade exists within the Common Market. The first step in reducing these internal tariffs will be taken next January 1, when internal duties are to be reduced by 10 percent from their present height. On July 1, 1960, there will be a second 10 percent reduction, and by the end of 1961 the reduction of internal tariffs will reach 30 percent. By the end of 1965 it will reach 60 percent, and reductions will continue in stages with the complete elimination of

internal tariffs being scheduled for the end of 1972 at the latest.

After the first of next year, therefore, goods produced within any Common Market country will have a steadily increasing advantage within the rest of the Common Market over American and other free-world goods.

With respect to external tariffs, that is to say, the second of the two series of tariff adjustments, the plan is as follows:

Step one will be to establish a proposed—and I underline the word proposed—external tariff for the Common Market as a whole. This would be a single uniform set of tariff rates applying to imports into any of the six countries just as the United States tariff applies to imports into all customs districts of the continental United States. For purposes of simplicity I will call this the target common tariff.

The rates of duty to be provided for in the target common tariff are to be determined partly by a formula established in the Rome Treaty, partly by schedules specifically provided for in the Rome Treaty itself, and partly by negotiations among the six countries.

For those rates to be established by formula, the method used is that of a simple arithmetic average. To take an example: There are now separate tariffs for ball bearings in the Common Market—a rate of 6 percent in Benelux, one of 28 percent in France, one of 15 percent in Germany, and one of 25 percent in Italy. These four rates are added together, and the sum total is divided by four, yielding a Common Market rate of 18 percent.

The negotiations for the target common tariff will take some time to complete. The European Economic Community has informed us that they expect to have the entire target tariff available for examination sometime during the latter part of 1959.

The second step in the procedure for establishing the external tariff of the Common Market will be to test the target tariff which I have just described against the rules and criteria provided for in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, taking into consideration the views of other countries, including the United States, toward whom the Common Market countries have assumed GATT obligations.

FIVE YEAR EXTENSION OF TRADE AGREEMENTS AUTHORITY

NEW
AUTHORITY

first year second year third year fourth year fifth year

JAN. 1, 1958 JAN. 1, 1959 JULY 1, 1959 JAN. 1, 1960 JULY 1, 1960 JAN. 1, 1961 JULY 1, 1961 JAN. 1, 1962 JULY 1, 1962 JAN. 1, 1963 JULY 1, 1963 JAN. 1, 1964 JULY 1, 1964

DATE FOR COMPLETION OF PROPOSED RATES

FIRST STEP TOWARD COMMON TARIFF

THIS TABLE FOR REDUCING DUTIES WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET

COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES

NEGOTIATING SCHEDULE

UNITED STATES

PREPARATION OF PROPOSED COMMON TARIFF RATES

PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

ACTUAL TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS UNDER GATT

SECOND (50% DUTY FREE ZONE)

THIRD (25% DUTY FREE ZONE)

In examining the target tariff proposed by the Common Market countries, the other GATT countries will want to be satisfied on the two main points:

They will want to assure themselves that the target tariff is not on the whole higher or more restrictive than the separate tariff schedules previously in effect.

They will also want to be sure that, wherever a Common Market country, in order to arrive at the new single tariff, intends to increase the duty on a product on which it has granted a tariff concession, there is adequate compensation in the form of a duty reduction elsewhere in the tariffs of the countries forming the Common Market, either on the same product or on a product of equivalent interest to them.

I wish to reemphasize at this point that neither the United States nor any other GATT country has the right to insist that the Common Market countries reduce the general level of the Common Market tariff. They can only insist that the general level not be higher or more restrictive than the present average level and that increases on concession items be matched by equivalent decreases.

We come now to the third step, during which the external tariff of the Common Market begins to be applied and begins to have an effect on the actual flow of trade.

This third step is to be taken on January 1, 1962, when the Rome Treaty requires that the first concrete measures to put the Common Market tariff into effect must take place. On that date member countries will be required to eliminate 30 percent of the difference between their national tariff rate and the new Common Market rate. Thereafter, over succeeding years, similar adjustments will be periodically made, some upwards and some downwards in the different countries, so that by June 1, 1973, at the latest, a single uniform tariff around the whole of the Common Market will be achieved.

The timetable which I have described means that the customary 3-year extension of the Trade Agreements Act would not enable the United States to participate in reciprocal tariff negotiations with the Common Market during its formative period. If the act were to be extended for only 3 years, it would expire before negotiations could be completed. Under such circumstances it would be unwise to enter into them at all.

Steps in U.S. Negotiations

It may be useful to an understanding of this point to outline the negotiating steps that would be followed by the United States during each of the 5 years for which the authority is being requested. I have here a chart on which the members of the committee can observe the various negotiating steps for each of the 5 years 1958-1963. If the committee so desires, we will be glad to have this chart reproduced in a form suitable for inclusion in the printed record of the hearings.

During the first year, from June 1958 to June 1959, we would seek the agreement of the Common Market countries and of other GATT countries to hold a general round of tariff negotiations which would include reciprocal tariff concessions by the Common Market countries below the level of the common tariff which would otherwise prevail. It would not be possible to reach international agreement to hold such negotiations unless the other governments concerned were sure that the United States possessed adequate bargaining power for the full period required for negotiation.

During the second year, we would receive the completed proposed common tariff, that is to say, the target tariff to which I have already referred, and undertake our analysis of it so as to be sure that it met the requirements of the GATT and so as to determine what concessions we would want to request in order to best preserve our export markets. During the latter part of this period, that is to say, during the first half of 1960, we would begin our final preparations for negotiations, including the issuance of a public notice of intention to negotiate and the holding of public hearings on the items on which we might be prepared to grant concessions.

During the first part of the third year, that is, between June 1960 and January 1961, we would complete our own preparations, and lists of requests for concessions would be exchanged among all participating countries with a view toward starting active negotiations by January 1961, if at all possible. This would be a very tight schedule to meet, but every effort must be made to complete negotiations prior to the entry into force of the first tariff adjustments toward the new Common Market tariff on January 1, 1962. Previous general tariff negotiations at Geneva in 1947 and at Torquay in 1951 took 7 months to complete. In view of the complexity of the negotiations with

the Common Market, in which every concession granted by the Common Market will require prior agreement among the six governments concerned, we must count on at least 1 full year of negotiations.

Thus, allowing no time whatsoever for slippage, the earliest possible date for completion of these negotiations will be January 1, 1962, a full 3½ years from the expiration of the present act. A far more realistic date would be June 30, 1962. We are asking for a fifth year to June 30, 1963, in order to provide a safe margin for the delays that will inevitably arise during the course of the negotiations.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, it is the firm conviction of the Department of State that an extension of this legislation for a full 5 years is necessary if tariff negotiations are to be conducted with the European Economic Community, thereby advancing American economic interests and those of the free world as a whole.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands (for Realm in Europe, Surinam, Netherlands Antilles, and Netherlands New Guinea), March 7, 1958.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands (for Realm in Europe, Surinam, Netherlands Antilles, and Netherlands New Guinea), March 7, 1958.

Trade and Commerce

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Dated at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

Accession deposited: Italy, February 20, 1958.

BILATERAL

Philippines

Interim arrangement permitting the exploitation of mineral resources within the Fort Stotsenberg Military Reservation. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila April 8, 1957. Entered into force April 8, 1957.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on March 26 confirmed the following:

James S. Moose, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Sudan.

Robert Newbegin to be Ambassador to Honduras.

Horace H. Smith to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Laos.

Robert F. Woodward to be Ambassador to Uruguay.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Participation of the United States Government in International Conferences—July 1, 1955–June 30, 1956. Pub 6548. International Organization and Conference Series 1, 34. xi, 205 pp. 55¢.

A record of the official participation of the U.S. Government in multilateral international conferences and meetings of international organizations during the period July 1, 1955–June 30, 1956.

Employment Information—United States Department of State. Pub. 6564. Department and Foreign Service Series 71. 31 pp. Limited distribution.

A pamphlet outlining the requirements for employment in the Department of State, both at home and abroad and the manner in which appointments are made to the Departmental Service and to the Foreign Service.

Career Opportunities in the U.S. Foreign Service. Pub 6566. Department and Foreign Service Series 72. 22 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet outlining the opportunities that exist for young men and women to become career officers in the Foreign Service of the United States.

American Republics. Basic Principles Governing United States Relations With Latin America (Rubottom) 608

Atomic Energy. U.S. Nuclear Tests to Demonstrate Reduction in Radioactive Fallout (Eisenhower) 601

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Releases issued prior to March 24 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 334 of March 19 and 137 of March 20.

No.	Date	Subject
*142	3/24	Educational exchange.
143	3/24	Dillon: House Ways and Means Committee.
144	3/24	Dulles: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
†145	3/24	Wilcox: "The United Nations: Challenges of a New Age."
146	3/24	Visit of President-elect of Costa Rica (rewrite).
†147	3/25	Rubottom: "The American Discovery of America."
148	3/25	U.S. grants \$15 million to Spain.
149	3/25	Dulles: Soviet conditions for summit meeting (combined with No. 150).
150	3/25	Dulles: news conference.
151	3/26	Venezuela credentials (rewrite).
*152	3/26	Nominations to rank of career minister.
153	3/27	Dillon: national conference on international trade policy.
154	3/27	Australia credentials (rewrite).
155	3/27	Norway credentials (rewrite).
156	3/27	Dulles: national conference on international trade policy.
†157	3/29	Plan for payment of U.S. claims against Germany.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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the
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Meeting of Heads of Government

Paris, December 1957

TEXTS OF STATEMENTS

The Heads of Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Paris from December 16 to 19, 1957, for the first top-level meeting of the North Atlantic Council since the founding of the Alliance more than 8 years before. They came together because they desired to increase the effectiveness of NATO in relation to current international political, military, and economic problems arising out of the policies of the Soviet Union.

This new Department of State publication contains statements made by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles before and after the meeting; the addresses delivered by Prime Minister Bech, Premier Gaillard, and President Eisenhower at the opening public session; the statements made by Secretary General Spaak and the Heads of Government at the first business session; and the Declaration and Communiqué issued on the final day.

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Publication 6606

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Bulletin

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Vol. XXXVIII, No. 982

April 21, 1958

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XXXVIII, No. 982 • PUBLICATION 6630

April 21, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 1

Press release 164 dated April 1

Secretary Dulles: I am ready for questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday was the Soviet announcement about suspending nuclear tests.¹ A lot of the practical aspects of this seem to be missing. For example, do you have any information through diplomatic channels as to when the suspension would become effective and how long it would last, under what circumstances it might be terminated? If you don't have such information, which would bear up details of it, are we correct in reading into yesterday's statement the implication that in your view this whole announcement is just phony?

A. The last part is easier to answer than the first. We do not think that there is anything new of substance in the statement made yesterday by Mr. [Andrei A.] Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister].

To go to the earlier part of your question, we have no information through diplomatic channels or any other channels as to the details of the proposed suspension. The Soviets have just concluded their most intensive series of tests, and it would be normal, almost inevitable, that there would be a considerable lapse between that series of tests and the inauguration of a new series of tests. We have always found that that was inevitable in our own practice. We have not had any tests for some little time. We are resuming some the latter part of this month, I believe. So that some periodic suspensions of testing are, from a technical standpoint, a necessity.

Now the Soviets say that they will suspend testing but that, if we resume testing, they reserve the right to resume it. Now, of course, they know

that we have this series of tests which has been planned and announced for many months and which will start in the very near future. Therefore, as far as the language of the pronouncement is concerned, they would be free to resume tests at any time in the light of the fact that we expect to begin testing within the next few weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the United States policy on the nuclear testing? For example, have any of the studies been concluded within the administration on the possibility of our halting such tests?

A. We have always been willing to halt tests as part of a program which would lead to the effective elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the nations. Now, the problem has been whether or not to suspend testing without any such elimination. That raises some very serious problems which have been known and discussed for some time.

The actual situation today is that the Soviet Union has, as we have, enough large thermonuclear weapons to destroy the other and perhaps a large part of humanity. The Soviet Union is willing apparently to let it go at that. We are not willing to let it go at that. We want to do either of two things: either to cut down on this and to eliminate nuclear weapons effectively from the international arsenals, or, if that is not going to be done, to develop the weapons so that they can be effectively used as a defensive weapon without a mass destruction of humanity. Either course seems to us to be one which we could choose. We prefer the first choice—have always preferred the first choice.

The Baruch plan, offered some 10 years ago, would have prevented any thermonuclear atomic weapons. The Eisenhower proposals for atoms-for-peace, followed by the more detailed proposals

¹For a Department statement on the Soviet announcement, see p. 646.

Development of Smaller, Cleaner Weapons

made in the Disarmament Subcommittee,² would have led to the gradual elimination under effective controls of nuclear weapons through the transfer from war stocks to peace stocks of the existing stockpiles. That is what we want; that is what we are going to try to get; but that, so far, the Soviet Union has rejected.

Now if that rejection is final and we have to go along with this situation, then, as a country which is governed by humane considerations, which do not always apply to some other countries and governments, we want to get away, if we can, from having these weapons inevitably involve a vast destruction of humanity and turn them into smaller, tactical, cleaner weapons which can be used effectively for defensive purposes without this great possible danger to humanity. Also, I may say, develop their uses for peaceful purposes.

Our first preference, of course, is the original preference indicated by the Baruch plan and by our more recent plans to have an effective way of getting rid of them. If you can't do that, then the question is, do you keep them only in such shape that they then threaten the existence of humanity or do you refine them, develop them into distinctive, discriminating weapons which can be used defensively for military purposes?

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported on the Moscow proposal in an Italian newspaper that Mr. Khrushchev stated, "United States atomic bases undermine Italy's security because they might become a means for attacking other countries without Italian knowledge." I wonder, Mr. Secretary, whether you care to say anything about such statements?

A. The reference, I suppose, is to the possible establishment of intermediate-missiles bases in Italy?

Q. Yes.

A. I may say, if that is the case, first, there is no such agreement at the present time. And the pattern for any such agreements has been set by our arrangement with the United Kingdom,³ where it is expressly stipulated that there cannot be any use of those bases except with the consent and participation of the Government of the United Kingdom, and the same would presumably apply to Italy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your understanding from the scientific advice you have as to how long it would take, in terms of testing, for the United States to develop a weapon, a smaller, cleaner, tactical weapon, if that is the choice that has to be made?

A. I don't recall that any date has been put on this by our advisers. I think we will know a great deal more about it after the conclusion of the now projected series of tests. It is never possible in advance of testing to know just what the tests will show. But we would hope, at least, that much of the information that we want will be obtained from the present series of tests.

Now there is another aspect of the matter, which probably will not be resolved by the present series of tests, and that is the possible use of nuclear power to create a defense against intercontinental or intermediate missiles. That is a phase of the matter which has not yet developed to a point where we would, I think, expect to get any definitive results out of the present series. But, as far as it relates to the making of smaller, cleaner weapons, it could very well be that that area would be pretty well exhausted by the present series of tests or perhaps supplementary tests that might be conducted entirely in a sealed compartment underground so that there would be no danger at all of any fallout or effect on human life.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have any evidence of the nature of this recent series of Soviet tests, specifically whether or not they may have tested the smaller, cleaner, defensive type of weapons you are talking about?

A. Well, our knowledge, of course, depends upon what we pick up. And, for instance, we know what we know, but we don't know what we don't know. Now we cannot know whether or not there have been tests of which we have not gained any knowledge by the instruments that we have outside for detection purposes. The information that we have indicates that the tests have covered a considerable range from the smaller type measured in kilotons to the larger type measured in megatons. But it is entirely possible that there have been tests of still smaller weapons—that we haven't, perhaps, picked up yet. That we don't know.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1958, p. 418.

Q. Have any of these tests been announced within the Soviet Union—I mean, since February 22?

A. I think, in fact I am quite certain, that there has been no announcement made within the Soviet Union. There was one announcement made some months ago in the Soviet Union of a single test. But in the main these tests have been conducted in an atmosphere of complete secrecy, insofar as the Soviet Union could impose complete secrecy, and that has been total insofar as its own people have been concerned, with the one exception which, I think, occurred last fall.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you say there was no substance—I think that was the phrase you used—in this announcement of yesterday, what do you mean by that?

A. What I mean by that is that it has added nothing to what has been known for quite a long time—that is, that the Soviet Union would like to bring about a cessation of testing on the part of the United States and itself and the United Kingdom and any third countries. They want to do that, however, quite apart from and unrelated to any program for doing away with the weapons themselves. Now they talk about banning the bomb and so forth, but they have neither proposed nor have they been willing to accept any program which would effectively bring about any diminution in the accumulation of weapons stockpiles.

Q. Mr. Secretary, didn't they make such a proposal last August 29?

A. No, not that I am aware of. We proposed a cutoff in the use of fissionable material. We also proposed that weapons stocks be diminished in some proportion to be agreed upon. We didn't say on a basis of equality. We pointed out that probably we have larger stocks of fissionable material than the Soviets had and therefore that we would assume that their contribution from war stocks to peace stocks should be proportionately less than our own. But they have never accepted either of those proposals.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in one of your previous comments I believe you said—you referred to the now projected series of tests. Is any thought being given to calling off these tests?

A. No, no thought has been given to calling them off.

The Three-Power Declaration

Q. Mr. Secretary, on another point: The wording of the three-power declaration, which was sent to Moscow yesterday,⁴ has given rise to some puzzlement as to whether the difference in language used indicates that the United States Government has agreed to soften its position somewhat on the kind of lower level talks that we envision. Could I ask, sir, whether it is still our position that lower level diplomatic discussions, either on an ambassadorial or a foreign-ministers level, which succeed in narrowing the differences on substantive foreign-policy questions, are necessary before we decide to go to a summit meeting?

A. Yes, that is still our position, and I thought that that was made reasonably clear by the announcement yesterday. It said, in effect, as I recall, that there was a need to try to reduce international tensions and to settle some of the great problems of the world, and that, if a summit meeting would promote that result, it would be desirable. But before we could tell whether or not a summit meeting would produce that result, it would be necessary to have these exploratory talks at the level, first and primarily, of the ambassadors—the diplomatic level—and then a meeting of foreign ministers shortly preceding a summit conference, if there was to be one.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the meeting of foreign ministers, that statement seemed to indicate that the foreign ministers would, if they met, merely set a place and a time and determine the composition of the conference. Do you contemplate that the foreign ministers would meet to examine the issues, as it also states, in addition to doing these things which seem to be the same conditions as the Soviets have set down for a foreign ministers' meeting?

A. We would expect that the exploration of the issues would be primarily conducted at diplomatic levels. That position of ours was made clear, I think, in our aide memoire of March 6th.⁵ At that time we referred to the Soviet suggestion that the meeting of foreign ministers would be limited to this, and we said we did not object to that as long as this work was done through diplomatic channels. And as a matter of fact I think I have

⁴ For text, see p. 648.

⁵ BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 457.

made clear a good many times that a prolonged meeting of foreign ministers, which would have to discuss the pros and cons of all these issues, is the last thing in the world that I personally would want to get into.

Propaganda Advantages Weighed

Q. Mr. Secretary, regardless of the validity, or lack of it, of Mr. Gromyko's announcement yesterday, do you not agree that it is a fact that it has put us sharply—"us" meaning the West—sharply on the defensive, from a propaganda point of view? And is it not necessary for us to respond in a way beyond the initial apparent impact of calling it little more than an April Fool's joke?

A. I think that it has given them a certain propaganda victory, or at least a success, and I may say that in that respect we are not surprised.

We had a meeting recently of the principal top officials involved in this situation with President Eisenhower. And we discussed very seriously this prospect and the question of whether it would be wise and prudent and in the best interests of the United States to try to steal a march on the Soviets by ourselves announcing a suspension of testing, at least for a time. We weighed very carefully all the pros and cons, and particularly some of these things that I have alluded to—the fact that unless there can be a program which goes to the heart of this problem, namely, the existence of nuclear weapons, we really ought to try to make these weapons into something that could be usable without vast human destruction and which could make progress toward their utility as more of a tactical weapon.

Now I don't say that they ever will be a very nice thing to be hit by. But it wasn't very nice to be hit by all the bombing that hit Berlin or by the fire bombs that were dropped on Tokyo. But there is a difference between a weapon which will destroy on impact a very considerable area and a weapon which through fallout will destroy or impair human life through areas of a thousand miles or more of diameter. We considered this problem, and we decided that we could not, in fairness to our responsibilities and our duties to the American people, perhaps to humanity, desist in a program which we believe to be sound, merely for propaganda advantages. We deliberately accepted this propaganda thrust, knowing we were

going to have to take it, rather than do something which we felt was basically unsound.

Now we operate, I think, under some disadvantages from a propaganda standpoint. We operate under conditions that are totally different from those which surround the Soviet Union.

We operate, as is visible right here, in terms of a free and independent and highly intelligent press. If I came before you with something that was a phony, you would recognize it in a minute and tear it apart publicly.

We operate in terms of an opposition political party, which is alert and prepared to expose, here at home and for reporting abroad, anything which does not seem to be thoroughly sound.

We operate in terms of an American public opinion which is highly intelligent and properly critical of its Government—when I say "critical," I don't mean necessarily antagonistic but which holds government up to high standards.

And we operate with allies who have to be consulted; they are not just dummies that we can lay down the law to, like the Soviet satellites are.

Now all of those conditions make it very difficult for us to carry on a type of propaganda such as the Soviets carry on. I don't say that we are doing the best job that we can do—I know we are not; we ought to do it better. But I do say that we face conditions which are totally different from those of the Soviet Union, and I thank God that we do. I wouldn't for a minute give up, in order to get a propaganda advantage in the world, any of these things I have talked about. I wouldn't give up our free press; I wouldn't give up our intelligent political opposition; I wouldn't give up the dedication of the American people to high principles; and I wouldn't give up our allies' being free people that we have to work with, persuade, consult with, and we just can't shoot from the hip without regard to their views.

Now I think these things which we cherish so much, which are an inherent part of our free world, have to be retained and not sacrificed in an effort to get propaganda advantage. And, indeed, I don't think we could get a pure propaganda advantage in the face of those conditions of our free society, which we honor and cherish and which we would never forgo merely to get conditions for a more effective propaganda.

I recall back in the United Nations in '49, I think it was, when Mr. Vyshinsky made a great speech. He said, "We are not using atomic energy for war purposes; we are only using atomic energy to move mountains, to shift rivers, for irrigation purposes," and so forth and so on. Why, it was just a wonderful speech. There wasn't a single word of truth in it, and it was never printed, of course, in the Soviet Union.

Well, do we want to have conditions where we can pull off propaganda stunts of that sort? Surely we do not.

Here you had yesterday the Head of the Government of the Soviet Union quietly removed—not a word of praise, not a word of blame, not a word of explanation. He just goes back to being a teller in a bank. (Laughter) Well, we don't want conditions like that in this country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether this meeting of which you spoke was last week?

A. Well now, when you fix me on the date, I can't say. It was within 10 days or 2 weeks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, returning to those alternatives that you outlined at the beginning, are we to understand you to mean that, when we have achieved a smaller, cleaner, tactical bomb, we will then be prepared to eliminate from our atomic arsenal the megaton bombs and the kiloton bombs?

A. Well, this operation that I refer to involves a considerable making over of existing weapons into smaller or cleaner weapons. In other words, it is a process of transformation. You don't throw them away; the material is too valuable.

Q. But will we not retain any of the megaton bombs and kiloton bombs in the arsenal?

A. I just don't know what the program is in that respect, and it is quite a long ways off before we could get to that, and I think that is a rather academic question at the moment. I assume we might retain some, but that will be a military decision, probably to be made maybe 5 or 10 years from now.

Question of Sharing Nuclear Information

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is considerable doubt on the Hill about the administration's proposal to share nuclear military information with allied governments.⁵ The chief point of opposition ap-

pears to be a fear that this will encourage the development of fourth-country nuclear powers. Can you give any assurance that it is not this Government's intention to do anything that would help fourth nuclear powers, beginning with France?

A. The program which we have, which permits of sharing some of our nuclear knowledge with our allies, is not designed to, nor would it be used primarily to, expand the number of countries which have nuclear weapons. However, the idea that we can stop that expansion by trying to keep our information secret is illusory. Today, with atomic material increasingly being used for power purposes around the world, with increasing knowledge about the art, it is no great trick. It takes some money, but almost anybody who has enough money and some reasonably educated scientists can make at least a crude atomic or nuclear weapon, and the crude ones are the worst from the standpoint of their damaging effect on vast masses of people.

I believe myself that a program which enables the United States with discrimination to share its knowledge is more apt to keep the development of nuclear weapons under control than a very futile effort, thinking that we can stop this movement by not sharing our knowledge. And, of course, not sharing our knowledge with some countries—like the United Kingdom, which has already got a program of this sort—strikes me as a complete folly. All that it does is it calls for a vast duplication of expense. It is very silly for the United Kingdom, which is cooperating with us in this type of program, to have to spend hundreds of millions of pounds to learn something which we can give it for nothing, and then we may have to help them out economically in order to make up for the unnecessary financial burden that we imposed upon them for nuclear weapons.

Inter-American Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the subject of inter-American relations, the current opinion of Presidents of Latin America is that they want more vigorous aid as well as private investment from the United States, and also there is a great preoccupa-

⁵ For a statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, see *ibid.*, Feb. 24, 1958, p. 312.

tion with the present slump in raw-materials prices and with the threats of duties on some of their exports in the United States. Would you care to comment on this and to tell us perhaps what you're thinking in terms of meeting these problems?

A. We are quite aware of this concern, and indeed we share it. This decline in the prices for raw materials hits not only them but it also hits us in many respects. And the problem of how to deal with it is a difficult one which is being studied actively by Mr. Dillon, our Deputy for Economic Affairs, by the Secretary of the Treasury, by the Export-Import Bank, and by other agencies of the Government. Whenever a recession occurs which carries with it a decline in the price of raw materials, that is particularly injurious to countries which do not have a diversified economy and which depend primarily upon a one- or two-crop export. We are very sympathetic with the problems that arise there. The situation has happened before. But I think that we will be alert to do what we can to take care of the need by trying to minimize restrictions on their exports to the United States and by trying to take care of their needs to import from the United States, perhaps through the Export-Import Bank, which is designed partly for that purpose.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I go back to a previous question that you answered, referring to the meeting with the President, at which you discussed the possibility of suspending tests. Was that occasion the first time that the administration seriously discussed the matter, or was the administration, as it was reported, discussing it at the time during the campaign in '56 when Adlai Stevenson made his proposal to suspend tests?

A. I would say that this possibility of suspending tests has been almost under constant review for the last 2 or 3 years and that this particular meeting was nothing unique or unusual. This particular meeting was a review of the situation occasioned by our foreknowledge that probably the Soviets, as soon as they completed their tests, would make some kind of a gesture which would have propaganda effect but would not, in fact, have any practical effect, as far as we can judge, upon what they would be doing.

As I said, they would naturally suspend tests upon the completion of one series until they were ready for another. And to say that they will re-

sume, if we go on with our tests, is virtually to say that they are going to resume. Therefore there was nothing in it but propaganda. But we recognized that it was a propaganda move which could have, probably would have, considerable effect. The question was whether we should try to meet it. For the reason that I have given, we couldn't meet it the way they meet it. They met it by saying things that don't have any substance. We can't and wouldn't want to meet it by saying things that don't have any real substance. Under our form of society we can't do it, I may say.

I referred to some of the elements which are permanent in our society, I hope, which prevent that kind of thing. I want to say also that never have I known a man who was so dedicated to truth and sincerity and faith in the goodness of man as President Eisenhower. When he deals with these things, you get a standard of judgment which is just so remote from any consideration of pure propaganda or phoniness that it just can't exist in the same room with him.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a widespread feeling that the United States is more than just a little favorable toward the rebels on Sumatra. Would you say, please, what our feeling is toward the rebel movement on Sumatra and if there is any further thought being given to the blockade which exists on both sides of Sumatra?

A. The United States views this trouble in Sumatra as an internal matter. We try to be absolutely correct in our international proceedings and attitude toward it. And I would not want to say anything which might be looked upon as a departure from that high standard.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we have any information that the Indonesian Central Government has received aid from the Soviets?

A. Yes, we do have.

Israel-United Arab Republic Border Dispute

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the recent flareups along the border between Israel and the Syrian part of the United Arab Republic, are you considering the advisability of proposing to station the United Nations Emergency Forces along that border too?

A. I don't know of any consideration being given to that proposal at the present time. I would

hope, and we have considerable reason to hope, that this matter can be settled through the United Nations machinery that is already there. You see, the problem arises primarily from the fact that there is this work being done. An irrigation project is under way. The question is, does it or does it not impinge upon the demilitarized zone?

Now, the precise limits of the demilitarized zone are not altogether clear. And what you're talking about is a question of, as I understand it, a few hundred yards. There is a plan to have a survey made which would permit of delimiting with greater accuracy just exactly what are the boundaries of the neutralized zone, and there is an indication of the willingness of the Israeli Government to comply with whatever is the result of that survey. So I would hope that the matter could be worked out in an amicable way and without such a rather major operation that would be required to establish new units of the UNEF in that area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could we follow up an earlier question? You replied "yes" when the question was asked if you had any information as to Soviet shipments of arms to the Central Government of Indonesia.

A. Wait a minute, I don't think it was a question of shipments of arms.

Q. Shipment of aid.

A. Aid, yes.

Q. Well, sir, could you then answer the question, will you explain what information you have about this aid, what type it is, and the extent of it?

A. Well, there was a credit of \$100 million which was opened in favor of the Government of Indonesia by the Soviet Union some months ago. That credit is now being drawn upon in terms of various supplies, first of which, as far as I am aware, are certain ships which have recently arrived in Djakarta.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was announced yesterday, I believe, that large areas of the Soviet Union, including the Ukraine and the Caucasus and Southwest Asian area, have been banned to travel by foreigners. Have we any information as to why or what's going on? That is apparently a large area.

A. No, I have not heard from our intelligence people any analysis of that.

Effect of Canadian Elections

Q. Mr. Secretary, what effect do you see the Canadian election results having upon United States-Canadian relations?

A. I think that, whatever the outcome of the elections might have been, there would have been a continuance of the good relations which we have been having with the Government of Canada and which we expect to have. In saying that, I don't deny the fact that there are between us problems; there always have been problems between us. I mentioned them here before in some detail. The working out of those problems is something to which we must dedicate ourselves, and will. But we know from recent experiences with the Conservative Government since it has been in power that their Government is composed of men of good will—we know that ours is too. And we are confident that any problems there are will be worked out because we are all, both sides, dedicated to the proposition that we must get along together.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the event of a shift of megaton bombs to smaller bombs, what then happens to the policy of massive retaliation when the United States moves on the offensive and deals out widespread destruction?

A. Well, I don't know what you mean by the United States moving to the offensive. We never intend to initiate any attack, and the question is, if we are attacked, what do we do? When I say "we are attacked," that includes our allies, to whose defense we are committed. Now, obviously, I would say that, if there is an attack upon us which involves a massive use of nuclear weapons, we would respond in kind. If the attack is of a kind which could be dealt with by smaller weapons and if we have them—and that is one of the things that we are exploring through these tests—then it could be dealt with in that way and would not involve this interchange of nuclear weapons so dangerous to such vast segments of humanity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev, in an interview with the Italian newspaper Il Tempo on Friday, made this comment about a summit. He said "The Government of the Soviet Union has been blamed for not having lived up to its promises, but it must be noted that the Soviet Union at no time promised reunification of Germany through free

elections as Secretary Dulles and others imagine." Could you comment on that, sir?

A. Well, I can only comment by reciting, I think with substantial accuracy, the exact words which Mr. Khrushchev agreed on, and those were: they agreed—that means the participants at the summit conference—that Germany should be reunified by free elections in conformity with the national interests of the German people and of European security.⁷ Now, there was certainly some agreement there because the very word "agreed" is used in that particular statement. And it is also demonstrable that nothing has happened as a result of that agreement. Therefore, it seems to me that the conclusion from those two facts is that somebody has welshed on an agreement.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Ninth Anniversary of NATO

Message of Secretary Dulles

Press release 170 dated April 4

Following is the text of a message from Secretary Dulles to the Secretary General of NATO, Paul-Henri Spaak, on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty.

I send you and your colleagues on the North Atlantic Council warmest good wishes on the ninth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

At this time it is, I believe, particularly important to recall the great progress made by NATO during the past nine years. It is doubtful that human history records any instance in which a group of independent states, through collective action, have accomplished so much in so brief a period.

While recalling the achievements of the past we look to the promises and the challenges of the future. We must constantly seek to strengthen the bonds of understanding and cooperation that hold

⁷ For text of the directive issued to the Big Four Foreign Ministers at the conclusion of the Heads of Government Meeting at Geneva, July 18-23, 1955, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

us together. We must maintain our defensive strength. We must continue, with patience and determination, our search for a just and lasting peace.

There can be no doubt that the strength and unity achieved through NATO has already greatly lessened the danger of war. But the peace we seek means more than the mere absence of war. It should be a positive condition of justice and well-being.

As we have shown we are willing to seize every reasonable opportunity of advancing the cause of a just peace through genuine negotiations. While we continue our search for the reality of peace, I am confident that we will steadfastly refuse to be satisfied with the mere mirage.

NATO's past record gives us every reason for confidence that our Alliance will prove successful in meeting the challenges of the future. As we enter this tenth year, I reaffirm the dedication of the United States to the principles and purposes of NATO. I would also like to send our special thanks to you and to the entire International Staff for the devoted work done in the past year.

U.S. Views on Soviet Announcement of Cessation of Bomb Tests

Following is a Department statement of March 31 regarding an announcement by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that it would terminate tests in the Soviet Union of all types of atomic and nuclear weapons.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Press release 158 dated March 31

The Soviet statement about nuclear testing will, of course, be studied in detail. But some general observations can be made at once.

The Soviet statement comes on the heels of an intensive series of secret Soviet tests. They should arouse world opinion to the need to deal in an orderly and dependable way with the testing and related aspects of the disarmament problem.

Soviet official propaganda incessantly seeks to create abroad the image of a peace-loving Soviet

Government. But that same Government openly defies the United Nations with respect to both the substance and the procedure of disarmament.

The charter of the United Nations gives that organization broad authority with reference to principles of disarmament and the regulation of armaments. In the exercise of that authority the United Nations General Assembly has, by an overwhelming vote, approved a comprehensive first-stage disarmament proposal and called on the nations concerned to begin at once technical studies as to how these proposals might be carried out.¹ These studies included the studies needed for a supervised suspension of nuclear testing. The United States stands ready instantly to respond to that resolution. But the Soviet Union refuses to comply.

The same General Assembly reconstituted and enlarged its Disarmament Commission. The United States wants that Commission to carry out its mandate. But the Soviet Union boycotts the Commission.

The charter makes the Security Council responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. The United States has recently proposed to the Soviet Union that this responsibility be discharged.² But the Soviet Union refuses to cooperate.

The Soviet Government declines to deal with the subject of armament in any of the several ways prescribed by the United Nations Charter. It prefers elusive formulations of its own.

It is elemental that free nations which want to remain free will not, and should not, forgo their indispensable collective capacity to deter and defend against aggression merely in reliance on a Soviet statement of intentions for which there is no system of verification, which can be evaded in secrecy and altered at will.

The United States again calls on the Soviet Union to deal with the vital problem of disarmament in an orderly way, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to which the signature of the Soviet Union is affixed. That charter constitutes a solemn agreement. If it is nullified by the Soviet Union, why should the world place confidence in new Soviet engagements?

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1958, p. 518.

TEXT OF SOVIET DECREE³

The question of the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests gains a greater significance for the cause of peace and the welfare of the people with every year and with every month. At the present moment the cessation of tests is demanded by the overwhelming majority of the world's population.

Despite the fact that for many years now people have persisted in their demands for the termination of these tests, the tests continue to be held, a circumstance which leads to the creation of new types of lethal nuclear weapons, increases the concentration of radioactive elements in air and soil, poisons human organisms, and threatens the normal development of further generations.

The Soviet Union has made persistent and consistent efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the powers in possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons, on the subject of immediate and unconditional termination of nuclear tests. For this purpose the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government reiterated over the past few years concrete proposals for terminating the tests, on the basis of which an accord on this matter could have been achieved a long time ago.

In the appeal to the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament of May 10, 1957,⁴ the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet called upon the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament to cooperate in concluding an agreement between the governments of the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Great Britain on an immediate termination of the experimental explosion of atomic and hydrogen bombs. At its last session, in December 1957, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, expressing the striving of the Soviet people toward peace, proposed that the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States take upon themselves the obligation to terminate, from Jan. 1, 1958, all tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

However, the United States and Great Britain did not respond to these proposals of the U.S.S.R. Consequently, experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs are continuing in various parts of the globe as before, a fact which bears witness to the further intensification in the field of production of ever more dangerous types of mass destruction weapons.

Guided by the endeavor to make a practical beginning to a universal termination of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests, and thus to make the first step in the direction of the final salvation of mankind from the threat of destructive atomic war, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet decides:

1. To terminate tests in the Soviet Union of all types of atomic and nuclear weapons. The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet expects that the parliaments of other states in possession of atomic and hydrogen weapons will, on their

³ Passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on Mar. 31 following an address by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko.

⁴ Not printed.

part, do everything in their power in order that experimental explosions of these types of weapons will be terminated also in those countries.

2. To charge the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers with undertaking the necessary measures aimed at the implementation of the first point of this decision and with making an approach to the governments of other states possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons with an appeal for the adoption of analogous measures so as to secure the termination of atomic and hydrogen tests everywhere and forever.

Should the other powers that possess atomic and hydrogen weapons continue to test these weapons, then the Government of the Soviet Union will, understandably, act freely in the question of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons in the Soviet Union, in conformity with the above mentioned circumstances, and bearing the interests of the security of the Soviet Union in mind.

The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet sincerely hopes that the initiative of the Soviet Union for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests will receive due support from the parliaments of other states and is profoundly convinced that if, in response to the decision of the Soviet Union, other states possessing nuclear weapons should in their turn cease testing these weapons, then by this very act an important practical stride will have been taken on the road to the consolidation of peace and the strengthening of the security of all peoples.

Such a step would undoubtedly have great significance as regards the restoring of the whole of the international situation to health and would be conducive to the liberation of mankind from oppressive alarm for the fate of the world, for the fate of future generations.

The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Moscow, the Kremlin, Mar. 31, 1958.

Western Powers Issue Declaration on Summit Meeting

Following is a Department announcement with the text of a three-power declaration regarding a summit meeting (press release 159), together with a letter of March 3 from Soviet Premier Bulganin to President Eisenhower and a Soviet aide memoir of March 24.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT, MARCH 31

The following is the text of an identical declaration presented to the Soviet Government at noon today, e.s.t., by the British, French, and United States Ambassadors in Moscow.

The declaration has received the unanimous approval of the Council of the North Atlantic Alliance. It expresses the common position of the

member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

TEXT OF THREE-POWER DECLARATION

The present international situation requires that a serious attempt be made to reach agreement on the main problems affecting attainment of peace and stability in the world. In the circumstances a summit meeting is desirable if it would provide opportunity for conducting serious discussions of major problems and would be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects.

It is clear that, before a summit meeting can meet in these conditions, preparatory work is required.

This preparatory work could best be performed by exchanges through diplomatic channels leading to a meeting between foreign ministers.

The main purpose of this preparatory work should be to examine the position of the various governments on the major questions at issue between them and to establish what subjects should be submitted for examination by heads of government. It would not be the purpose of these preparatory talks to reach decisions but to bring out, by general discussion, the possibilities of agreement.

The foreign ministers, assuming they have concluded the preparatory work to their satisfaction, would reach agreement on the date and place of the summit meeting and decide on its composition.

If this procedure is acceptable to the Soviet Government, it is suggested that diplomatic exchanges should start in Moscow in the second half of April.

LETTER OF PREMIER BULGANIN TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MARCH 3

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of February 15,¹ and I deem it necessary to express some views regarding the questions touched upon in your message.

It has been almost three months since the Soviet Government, concerned about the development of the international situation, which development is dangerous to the cause of peace, made a proposal to convene a conference of top government officials to solve a number of problems of immediate urgency and to determine through joint

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 373.

efforts effective methods of easing international tension and of ending the "cold war" situation.

It is obvious even now that the idea of conducting negotiations at the highest level has met with approval and support on the part of governments and wide public circles in many countries. This is all the more understandable because the supreme interests of all peoples—the interests of the preservation and strengthening of peace—invariably demand that an end be put to a further drift toward war, that the atmosphere of suspicion, threats, and military preparations be dispelled, and that a path of peaceful coexistence and businesslike cooperation of all states be embarked upon.

In our letters to each other during recent months we have exchanged views in regard to the holding of a summit conference, and I consider that this exchange of views has had a positive significance and has played a definite role in the preparation of such a meeting. Above all, our correspondence has shown that the governments of our two countries hold the general opinion that a conference of top government officials is desirable and that its successful outcome can exert a favorable influence on the entire international situation. Furthermore, we have had an opportunity to present in a preliminary way our views with regard to a number of specific problems, which is useful in itself, since it facilitates the search for a mutually acceptable basis of negotiations.

In your message of February 15 you state, Mr. President, that the Soviet Government insists that only its own proposals be discussed by the participants in the conference and that it refuses to consider the questions proposed for discussion by the Government of the United States. This is, however, an altogether erroneous interpretation of the position of the Soviet Government. Actually, the presentation of problems which we propose for discussion at a summit meeting has by no means been dictated by any special interests of the Soviet Union. They are international problems which have not arisen just today, problems the solution of which has been long awaited and demanded by the peoples.

Are the American people less interested than the people of the Soviet Union or of other countries, for example, in a renunciation by states of the use of atomic and hydrogen bombs, in having nuclear weapons tests terminated at long last or in having the states take coordinated measures toward preventing a surprise attack? Are the British and French, the inhabitants of West Germany, or the Belgians less interested than the Russians, Poles, Czechs, or the inhabitants of East Germany in the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between NATO member states and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty, or in the initiation by both sides, by mutual agreement, of a reduction in the number of foreign troops in Germany, or in creating in the center of Europe a wide zone which would be free of nuclear weapons and excluded from the sphere of the use of atomic, hydrogen, and rocket weapons? Can one believe that only the Soviet Union of all the states is interested in the creation of a healthier international political atmosphere, to which end it is necessary to stop the war propaganda which is poisoning the minds of the people in a number of countries? It is also quite obvious

that it would be in the interest of all states to have a free development of international trade based on the principle of mutual advantage without any artificial barriers, and to stabilize the situation in the Near and Middle East through a renunciation by the great powers of any interference in the internal affairs of the countries in that area, which more than once has already been a hotbed of dangerous conflicts.

We believe it is the duty of all statesmen who are really concerned over the fate of the world to contribute in every possible way toward achieving an agreement on these pressing problems. There are no insurmountable obstacles to the solution of all these problems. Only one thing is required—a willingness of the participants in the negotiations to display realism and a desire actually to achieve a relaxation of international tension, which things are so necessary under present conditions.

The only factor that motivates the Soviet Government in its proposal for consideration of these problems is the conviction that under present conditions it would be best to begin a general lessening of international tension by solving the most immediate problems, which could be completely solved even now without harm to the interests of any individual state. We see a confirmation of the correctness of this viewpoint in the fact that the Soviet Union's proposals have found a sympathetic response and support on the part of governments and wide public circles in many countries, both in the East and in the West.

Furthermore, we by no means believe, nor have we ever stated, that only the topics proposed for discussion by the Soviet Union can be considered at a summit meeting. I should like to remind you that in our proposals of January 8² there was a direct statement concerning the willingness of the Soviet Government also to discuss, by mutual agreement, such additional constructive proposals contributing to a termination of the "cold war" as might be presented by the other participants in the meeting.

However, this does not mean that we can agree to discuss matters that are in the sphere of internal affairs of other states, the consideration of which could have no results other than a still further aggravation of the relations between states. Precisely in this category belong such matters as the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe and the unification into a single state of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. You, Mr. President, are familiar with the viewpoint of the Soviet Government in this respect, and it is hardly necessary to speak of this again in detail. A discussion of such questions would mean inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, to which the Soviet Union will never in any case agree. The legitimate question arises as to why proposals are directed to the Soviet Government to discuss the internal affairs of third countries that are sovereign states and with which both the United States of America and the Soviet Union have normal diplomatic relations. In fact, if the Government of the U.S.A. has any uncertainties with regard to the internal structure of this or that country of Eastern Europe, there exists, as you are aware, a

²Not printed.

practice, developed through the centuries, of clarifying such questions not by interfering in the internal affairs of other countries but by making use of ordinary diplomatic channels. We do not consider it possible to assume the role of judges and decide questions pertaining to the internal structure of other countries. We are likewise unable to recognize such a right for any other state, and we consider inadmissible not only the discussion but even the mere presentation of such questions.

We have no doubt that if someone were to propose an international conference for the discussion of the internal political situation in France, Italy, Turkey, Canada, or in the United States itself, for example, such a proposal would meet with the most emphatic objection on your part. To include questions of this kind in the agenda of a summit conference would certainly mean foredooming this conference to failure, and this we do not desire at all.

I should like to add that, if we, for our part, put forward a number of questions which in the opinion of the Soviet Government should be considered at the conference, we do not at all consider the list of these questions definitive. As I have already communicated to you, Mr. President, the Soviet Government has always been prepared to discuss also at a summit conference, by common consent, any other constructive proposals for ending the "cold war" that might be submitted by other participants at the conference.

My colleagues and I have closely studied the considerations contained in your messages. The Soviet Government agrees to discuss the following questions as well at a summit conference:

We are prepared to discuss the questions of prohibiting the use of outer space for military purposes and the liquidation of alien military bases on foreign territories. I think you will agree that the reaching of an agreement on this important question would greatly reduce the danger of a sudden outbreak of war and would be an important step toward ensuring conditions for a tranquil and peaceful life among nations.

The Soviet Government also considers it possible to discuss the matter of concluding a German peace treaty. We propose that the governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany be invited to participate in the discussion of this problem. Of course, the problem of uniting the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. in a single state, which falls completely within the competence of these two German states, cannot, as the Soviet Government has already stated repeatedly, be the subject of discussion at the forthcoming summit conference.

We agree that at a summit conference there should also be a discussion of the questions of developing ties and contacts among countries. The Soviet Government has invariably been in favor of every possible development of such contacts. It shares the views expressed in your message of February 15 concerning the importance of such contacts. I should like to emphasize that for its part the Soviet Government attaches great significance to the maintenance of systematic personal contacts between top government officials for the exchange of views concerning current international problems in the interests of improving relations between states and of strengthening mutual trust and consolidating universal peace.

Likewise, we are not opposed to having an exchange of views regarding ways of strengthening the U.N.; we have merely expressed certain considerations of principle which we have in this respect.

I have already had occasion to explain why we consider unacceptable the proposal that our two governments renounce the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in deciding certain questions in that body. We cannot agree at all with the claim that the only thing in question is the procedural aspect of the matter, although, as is well known, this aspect also has important significance in settling great political problems. We are firmly convinced that the implementation of measures proposed by you would in practice lead to the use of the Security Council in the interests of one or several powers to the detriment of the interests of other states, to undermining the various principles of unanimity of the great powers which have the basic responsibility for maintaining international peace, that principle on which the U.N. is founded and which represents the basic guarantee for the normal activity and the very existence of the U.N. It is a well-known fact that in the development of this principle the Government of the U.S.A. itself played an active role. One cannot fail to see that at the present time the preservation of this principle is still more necessary than it was thirteen years ago, when the U.N. was created.

The Soviet Government has set forth its viewpoint, not only concerning problems subject to discussion but also regarding the participants, the time of convening, and certain other problems. Unfortunately, we do not yet know the viewpoint of the Government of the U.S.A. concerning these matters; there is no mention of this even in your message of February 15.

As to the method of preparation for the conference, the necessity for which has now been expressed by the heads of the governments of all the largest states, the Soviet government feels that all ways and means should be used that might expedite such preparations. It seems to us that an agreement can be reached through diplomatic channels on certain questions relating thereto, and these opportunities should, of course, be utilized. At the same time we take into account the fact that the Government of the United States and certain other governments have declared themselves in favor of calling a Foreign Ministers' conference as one of the preparatory measures for a summit conference. If you consider that a Foreign Ministers' conference would serve and would help to expedite the convening of a conference of top government officials with the participation of the heads of government, then we are prepared to comply with such a desire. We are proceeding on the premise that the convening of a summit conference as soon as possible fulfills the hopes of all peoples.

Since the parties agree on the desirability of expediting the preparation of a summit conference, we propose to call a Foreign Ministers' meeting in April, and we consider that it should prepare the agenda for a summit conference, determine who should participate in it, and decide when and where it should be held. It would be advisable to decide all these questions as soon as possible.

I must say, Mr. President, that the present state of preparation of the summit conference causes us definite concern. The lack of a reply from the Government of the United States to a number of concrete proposals from the Soviet Government concerning preparations for the conference, and also the fact that the Government of the United States continues knowingly to submit unacceptable questions, all of this obviously delays the convening of the conference.

We are all the more alarmed since, in addition to delaying a decision on the question of convening the conference, the governments of the United States and of certain other NATO member states are stepping up the tempo of practical measures in the sphere of military preparations, which cannot but aggravate international tension. I have in mind particularly a recently signed agreement between the United States and Great Britain on the establishment of bases in the territory of the latter for launching American medium-range rockets,³ and also the announcement of the convening in Paris, in April of this year, of a conference of Defense Ministers of the NATO nations for the purpose of studying such questions as setting up rocket bases in the territories of NATO member countries, stockpiling atomic weapons in those countries, and the transfer of atomic weapons to NATO members.

We note that the press of certain Western powers has recently stated openly that the United States will not consent to a summit conference until agreements have been reached concerning the establishment of American rocket bases in the territory of the West European NATO member countries.

All of this results in a very strange situation: on the one hand, assertions are being made regarding readiness to make efforts toward relaxing international tension and lessening the danger of war; on the other hand, military preparations are being made with feverish haste, which can only increase international tension and the danger of war.

How should we, Mr. President, under these conditions, evaluate the situation which has been created? Should we judge the true intentions of the Government of the United States and of certain other NATO nations by their words or by their deeds? It seems to us that if we are all agreed that it is necessary to hold a summit conference to study urgent international questions, then at least measures should not be taken that might only impede the convening of such a conference and render more complicated the solution of the problems facing it.

I cannot, Mr. President, overlook certain statements, chiefly concerning questions of Soviet-American relations, contained in your communication of February 15. I do not wish to dwell on the tone in which certain passages of that communication were written, since a contest in sharp words cannot be useful in finding ways to relax international tension.

First of all, I must say that the statements concerning the Socialist order of society, the domestic and foreign policy of the Socialist states, and the mutual relations

between them as contained in your communication are not in conformity with actual reality.

We are, of course, aware that you are opposed to the ideas of communism and the principles underlying the social system in the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. We do not expect our views on questions of social development to coincide. However, while you maintain that the proponents of the ideology which you also support have the right to criticize the Socialist system in every way, you construe the criticism of capitalist social orders made by Communists in the Soviet Union as proof that the Soviet Government is not endeavoring to improve relations with the United States of America.

This question deserves special consideration. We have more than once emphasized how dangerous it would be to the cause of peace to bring ideological disagreements into the sphere of relations between states. We cannot come into agreement in the ideological sphere. You prefer the capitalistic system while we have never concealed our negative attitude toward capitalism, and we are firmly convinced that only socialism can ensure true freedom and equality for all men and the most complete development of society, both materially and morally. The polemics between the adherents of the two ideologies is perfectly natural. But does that mean that between the Soviet Union and the United States of America there cannot exist normal or even good and friendly relations? Of course it does not. Otherwise, the prospects of preserving peace would be dark indeed. The experience of the Soviet Union, which maintains good relations with many states, based on mutual respect and trust, which states have a different social order from that of the Soviet Union, is sufficient proof that a difference in social systems is not an obstacle in such matters.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we not only consider an improvement in our relations with the U.S.A. possible and desirable, despite the difference in the social systems of our two countries, but on more than one occasion we have put forward concrete proposals to that end. We fully share your opinion on the desirability of taking steps to enable our peoples to become better acquainted.

We can only welcome your proposal that influential citizens of the Soviet Union visit the United States of America for the purpose of becoming familiar with the life of the American people. For our part, we shall be glad if prominent Americans come to the Soviet Union to see how the Soviet people live. This can only be regarded as useful. It is well known, for example, that many Americans, including prominent public figures of the U.S.A., after a visit to the Soviet Union, have admitted publicly how erroneous was their previous opinion concerning the life of the Soviet people.

I shall recall in this connection that the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. proposed to the Congress of the U.S.A. two years ago an exchange of their parliamentary delegations. It can hardly be denied that such an exchange would contribute to a mutual understanding of life in our two countries. Unfortunately, Mr. President, this proposal has not yet received any reply. The question arises as to how this can be reconciled with the desires expressed in your message regarding a development of mutual con-

³ BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1958, p. 418.

tacts. If the position of the American side in regard to this question has now changed, such a change can only be welcomed.

We also welcome your statement that the recently concluded Soviet-American agreement on exchanges in the fields of culture, technology, and education⁴ should be fully utilized to improve the relations between our countries. As you know, we on our part are ready to go even further in this respect; it is precisely this desire that dictated our proposal to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

There is no doubt that the development of Soviet-American contacts and ties will facilitate a strengthening of mutual understanding between our two countries, in the interests of peace and international cooperation. On the other hand, it is obvious that any attempts deliberately to sow distrust and kindle animosity between the peoples of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., as well as any endeavor to consign to oblivion the historical traditions of friendship between our peoples, may lead to consequences that would be dangerous, and not only for our two countries alone. It is precisely for that reason that we cannot fail to react when voices are heard in the United States preaching the idea of a "preventive war," an armed attack on the Soviet Union. You write that you know of no one in the United States that comes forth with such appeals. Unfortunately, there are such people, and such appeals are heard in the U.S.A.

For example, the idea of a "preventive war" against the U.S.S.R. has been discussed in the American press for several weeks, an idea which, as attested by such well-known American commentators as Hanson Baldwin, Arthur Krock, and Drew Pearson, is contained in a secret report presented to the National Security Council of the U.S.A. by the so-called "Gaither Committee." Commenting on this report, Baldwin, military commentator of the "New York Times," writes that "since the launching of the Soviet spatniks one hears again in Washington, though in muted tones, the old talk about a preventive war, made easier to swallow by the new term of 'preventive retaliation,'—that is to say, attacking the Soviet Union first."

How can all this be evaluated, Mr. President? We do not know what precise recommendations are contained in the report of the "Gaither Committee," but one thing is clear: this report provoked a public discussion in the U.S.A. of the idea of a "preventive war." Such persons as Lawrence, editor of the widely circulated magazine "United States News and World Report," and Puleston, former Director of American Naval Intelligence of the U.S.A., and others came forth with open propaganda for aggression against the Soviet Union.

Of course, we do not confuse the statements of such persons with the official policy of the U.S.A. But the security of the Soviet Union does not allow us to ignore completely statements of this kind, especially since the Government of the U.S.A. did not condemn the statements in question. In our opinion there is danger and harm in the very fact that such ideas are suggested to the American people on the printed page, read by millions of Americans. It is hardly necessary to emphasize the fact that

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

propaganda of this kind runs counter to any improvement in the relations between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

Lastly, I cannot fail to reject the unfounded assertions contained in your message of February 15 to the effect that responsibility for the fact that nuclear energy is being used at present primarily for military rather than for peaceful purposes rests with the Soviet Union. In reality it was not the Soviet Union that was the first to begin the production of atomic weapons and it was not the Soviet Union that used this weapon of mass destruction. From the very beginning the Soviet Union has demanded that the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons be prohibited and that existing stocks be destroyed. As early as June 19, 1946 the Soviet Government presented to the U.N. for consideration a draft international convention which provided for these measures. We have insisted on this for 12 years. However, the Government of the United States refuses even to this very day to agree to the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

I solemnly declare, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union is prepared to sign even tomorrow an agreement on the total prohibition of all types of nuclear weapons, on the cessation of their manufacture, their elimination from armaments, and the destruction of all available stocks of such weapons under appropriate international control.

The peoples expect of their leaders, who are responsible for the destiny of their countries, concrete action to avert the threat of atomic war and to strengthen peace. Millions of people ardently hope that our two countries will make a definite contribution to the establishment of a healthier international situation, and that they will decisively turn from the "cold war" and the armaments race toward peaceful cooperation on the part of all states. We consider that a conference of top government officials, with participation of heads of government, can and must be an important step in that very direction. Now, when there is agreement in principle between states on such a meeting, it is especially necessary to concentrate our joint efforts on the practical preparations for it, with a view to making such a meeting possible in the very near future.

We hope, Mr. President, that the considerations of the Soviet Government concerning the preparation and the holding of a summit meeting will meet with a favorable attitude on the part of the Government of the U.S.A.

Respectfully,

N. BULGANIN

MARCH 3, 1958

SOVIET AIDE MEMOIRE, MARCH 24⁵

The Soviet Government has attentively examined the considerations set forth by the U.S. Government in its aide memoire of March 6, 1958,⁶ which is a reply to the aide memoire of the Soviet Government of February 28⁷ on the question of preparing a meeting at the highest level.

⁵ Handed to U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson at Moscow on Mar. 24 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

⁶ BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 457.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 459.

As is known, the Soviet Government, concerned as it is over international developments which have taken a turn dangerous to the cause of peace, proposed at the close of 1957 to call a meeting of leading statesmen to solve a number of urgent problems and to define through joint efforts effective ways to reduce international tension and to end the state of "cold war."

The Soviet Government notes that the U.S. Government, referring in its aide memoire to the purpose of a summit meeting, also proclaims that it desires this meeting to take meaningful decisions which would initiate the settlement of at least some important political problems and lead to the establishment of international climate of cooperation and good will.

However, one must admit that while the Soviet Government, after proposing to call a meeting of leading statesmen, has taken several concrete steps to meet the wishes of the U.S. Government and of other Western powers, both with regard to the questions which should be examined at a summit meeting and with regard to the procedure of preparing this meeting, the U.S. Government, as evident from its aide memoire, is trying in fact to bring the entire question of a summit meeting back to the initial position.

The Soviet Government has proposed that the summit meeting should discuss such pressing international problems, agreement on which seems feasible at this meeting and the settlement of which could lay the foundations for better mutual understanding among states and for the settlement of other international problems.

It is the deep conviction of the Soviet Government that the following are the questions of great international significance which must be given priority: immediate ending of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons; renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.S.R., the United States and Great Britain; establishment of a zone free from nuclear and rocket weapons in Central Europe; signing of a nonaggression agreement between states belonging to the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw treaty member states; reduction of the numerical strength of foreign troops stationed on the territory of Germany and in other European states; drafting of an agreement on questions involved in the prevention of surprise attack; measures for extending international trade; ending of war propaganda; ways to reduce tension in the area of the Near and Middle East.

Are there any grounds to claim that only the Soviet Union is interested in a positive solution of the above questions and that for the peoples of other countries, including the United States, these questions are of a lesser importance? The questions listed above have been posed by life itself, by the entire trend of development of international relations in the past few years. If we are to be guided by the interests of consolidating peace, there can be no other opinion but that it would be equally to the benefit of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great Britain, France, and other countries if agreed measures were adopted to lessen the danger of rocket-nuclear war, to end the armament race, to abolish tension in international relations caused by the "cold war," and to diminish the danger of conflicts in those areas of the world where, in view of the

tension existing there, such conflicts are especially liable to break out.

The Soviet Government gave full consideration to the wishes of the U.S. Government and the governments of other Western powers regarding the questions they would like to propose for discussion at a summit meeting.

Guided by the desire to pave the way for a meeting at the highest level and taking note of the considerations of the Western powers, the Soviet Government announced its consent to discuss at a summit meeting the problem of forbidding the use of outer space for warlike purposes and of scrapping foreign military bases on the territories of other countries. Moreover, the Soviet Government declared that it was prepared to discuss the problem of concluding a German peace treaty and of the development of ties and contacts among countries.

Thus, the problems which the Soviet Government proposes for discussion at the summit meeting also take into account those proposals of the U.S. Government on which useful negotiations could be conducted for the purpose of reducing the tension in the international climate. Therefore, one cannot agree with the contention made in the aide memoire of the U.S. Government that the Soviet Government claims a veto power in determining the range of problems to be examined at the summit meeting or special privilege and powers at the conference itself. Such an arbitrary interpretation of the Soviet Union's position with regard to the preparation of the international meeting has nothing to do with the actual state of affairs.

In its aide memoire the U.S. Government declares that it is guided by serious intentions in considering questions pertaining to preparations for a summit meeting. It goes without saying that such an intention is only commendable.

It is surprising, however, that the U.S. Government admits the possibility of the summit meeting being turned into a kind of theatrical show, a spectacle. It should be noted that such pronouncements about a summit conference, on which the peoples pin so much hope, are strange, to say the least. Even if some Western circles do have an intention to smear the idea of a meeting at the highest level, it is to be hoped that this does not reflect the position of the U.S. Government.

As to the Soviet Government, it has stated more than once that it attaches exceptionally great importance to the salutary effect on the entire international climate and to the important contribution to the cause of peace which a meeting with the participation of the heads of government would have.

Further, what constructive approach to a summit meeting on the part of the U.S. Government can we talk about if it continues insisting on the discussion of the so-called problem of the situation in East European countries. It is difficult to believe that the U.S. Government does not realize that such a proposal cannot but be resolutely condemned by the Soviet Union and those countries, the situation in which it would like to make the subject of discussion at an international conference. The very fact that this question is being posed is insulting to these states and impermissible in international relations.

No one has given the United States or any other country the power to appear in the role of judges who decide whether a given country should or should not

have its social and state system chosen by its people. He who today, guided by his hostility to socialism, poses the question of changing the social system in East European countries, pushes the world into the road of kindling enmity among peoples, the road of war. But then it is pertinent to ask: What do international negotiations and a summit meeting for reducing international tension have to do with that?

The Soviet Government has already more than once pointed out how dangerous to the cause of peace it would be to carry ideological differences into the sphere of international relations. This viewpoint finds ever wider international recognition and was reflected in particular in the unanimous decision of the 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly on the problem of peaceful coexistence of states. Nevertheless, the aide memoire of the U.S. Government lays stress on differences of an ideological nature and at the same time alleges that "international communism" is the main cause of tension.

Were we to discuss the irreconcilable, fundamental differences existing between social systems, the differences between capitalism and socialism, where would this lead us and what would be the chances of rapprochement between states? Unquestionably, in that case, the gap between the states of East and West would become even deeper, and the winners would be those who are sowing enmity and discord in international relations.

As to the real cause of tension in present-day international relations, it is an open secret that this cause is the policy of "cold war" conducted by the Western powers, the forming of aggressive military alignments and the continually increasing armament race which daily leads to an ever greater build-up in the armament of states and which has already created an enormous machinery of extermination. Who would deny today that were this machinery brought into action, it would spell untold disasters for mankind.

Neither can the problem of unifying the G.D.R. and the Federal German Republic into a single state be the subject of a summit discussion, because this matter is entirely within the competence of the two German states themselves. If an aggravation of relations between states were the aim, the proposal to discuss the question of an international conference would be understandable. However, the Soviet Government believes that the participants of the conference should proceed from the interests of its success and refrain from suggesting questions which would jeopardize the convocation of such a conference.

The Soviet Government considers it of great importance that an agreement on practical questions of preparing for a summit conference be reached in the nearest future. In his message of January 12, 1958,⁹ President Eisenhower said that he was also prepared to meet Soviet leaders to discuss proposals which were introduced by the Soviet Government for summit discussion. As has been noted above, the Soviet Government has also expressed its readiness to discuss at a top-level conference a number of questions advanced by the American Government.

Unfortunately, the American aide memoire does not

reply to the Soviet Government's proposal of February 28 concerning the summit agenda. The American Government confines itself to the statement that any new conference of the heads of government should not ignore the previous conference, that a new summit conference should begin where the Geneva Conference of the heads of government left off.

But it becomes obvious that such an approach completely ignores the fact that considerable time has elapsed since the Geneva Conference and the international situation has changed substantially. That is why the Soviet Government has proposed that, in line with the current world situation, a new approach should be made to the solution of pressing international problems.

The Soviet Government takes into account that under the present circumstances a summit conference would find it difficult to reach agreement on all pressing international problems. We have proposed that the conference focus its attention first and foremost on the most urgent problems whose solution would initiate an improvement of the international situation as a whole. The examination of other problems could be postponed until a subsequent stage of talks between the states. Thus, taking into account the lessons of the past and desirous of preventing the thwarting of the important cause of relaxing international tensions, we proposed that a new approach be made to the solution of unsettled international problems and that the method of gradual solution of these problems be adopted as the most realistic and justified.

The Soviet Government believes that the settlement of the question it has proposed for summit discussion would be in complete accord with the desires of the peoples and would be an important start in radically changing the international situation and terminating the cold war.

Inasmuch as the aide memoire of the U.S. Government fails to give an impartial account of the state of affairs in connection with the discussion of the disarmament problem in the United Nations,⁹ it must be recalled that it was the Western powers which, at the 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly, rejected the proposal for such a composition of the U.N. Disarmament Commission as would allow due consideration for the views of U.N. member countries.

Instead of patiently searching for mutually acceptable decisions, the session, under manifest pressure, adopted a resolution envisaging a composition of the Disarmament Commission in which the absolute majority belongs to proponents of the military alignments of the Western powers.

Thus, the Western powers made use of their majority for obviously unreasonable purposes and have actually vetoed disarmament talks and made the achievement of fruitful results impossible.

Is it possible in fact to make progress in the disarmament problem by imposing decisions which are advan-

⁹For statements by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge at the 12th session of the U.N. General Assembly, together with texts of three U.N. resolutions on disarmament, see *ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.

tageous to one of the sides, to one alignment of powers, and infringe on the lawful interests of the other side? It is clear that no state can allow the infringement of its national interests, regardless of the number of unacceptable decisions the participants of the Western military alignment could wish to impose on it by using their majority.

Today, with the existence of two social systems, there can be no other policy but a reasonable policy of searching for mutually acceptable decisions which neither place anyone at an advantage nor infringe on the security interests of the others. There is no need in this case to dwell in detail on the disarmament problem, because the Soviet Government has already set forth its position with sufficient clarity in its messages to the U.S. Government.

The aide memoire of the U.S. Government cannot but disappoint anyone who regards summit talks as a dependable means of relaxing international tensions and terminating the cold war which the peoples have come to hate. The Soviet Government, proceeding from the need for the earliest completion of preparations for a summit conference, would like to have the U.S. Government set forth its views on the questions which the Soviet Union has proposed for discussion at the forthcoming summit conference, as the Soviet Government has done with respect to the American proposals.

The Soviet Government believes it equally necessary that the question of the composition of the summit conference, its date and place be agreed upon in the nearest future.

Guided by its desire to speed up the preparations for a summit conference and proceeding from the fact that all means and ways to bring about the earliest agreement should be used for this purpose, the Soviet Government has consented to a foreign ministers conference to prepare a top-level meeting of the heads of government and has suggested that the ministers conference be held in April 1958.

At the same time, it has proceeded from the fact that the range of issues subject to discussion by the ministers should be limited to problems relating to the organizational side of preparations for a summit meeting—agenda, composition of the summit meeting, time, and place.

A discussion of the substance of the questions advanced, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, should be left to the summit meeting with the participation of the heads of government. It can hardly be doubted that a meeting of the heads of government invested with the broadest powers and much less hindered by the instructions usual in such cases, has better chances of success, particularly when its aim is to change the general trend in international relations and to turn them toward liquidation of existing tensions.

On the other hand, if the foreign ministers conference is entrusted with examination of the substance of the issues there is every reason to fear that this, far from facilitating, may on the contrary retard the convocation of a summit meeting and complicate the achievement of an agreement on the questions discussed. It is contrary to logic to recognize the need and usefulness of a summit conference and at the same time do everything to retard

such a conference further and further or to make its very convocation doubtful on the pretext that at the preliminary stage the conference of foreign ministers came up against contradictions which can hardly be overcome.

The Soviet Government hopes that the U.S. Government will study with due attention the considerations set forth above concerning the need to start without further procrastination a concrete discussion of questions of preparing and convening both a ministers conference and a summit conference.

White House Lists Some Proposals Rejected or Ignored by U.S.S.R.

White House press release dated April 2

A Partial Listing of Some of the United States Proposals Which Have Been Rejected or Ignored by the Soviet Union

1. *Baruch Plan for International Control of the Atom*

Presented to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission June 14, 1946.¹

2. *Preparation of Realistic Measures for Inspection and Control*

Proposal for the inauguration of technical studies on inspection related to nuclear weapons tests, cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and peaceful use of outer space. All were included in August 29, 1957, proposals made in London during the meeting of the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee.²

3. *Open-Skies Proposal*

Open-skies proposal, presented at Geneva Summit Conference, July 21, 1955.³ Three variants of aerial and ground inspection zones related to the open-skies proposal were included in proposals on August 29, 1957.

4. *Peaceful Use of Outer Space*

Proposal for peaceful use of outer space, presented in speech by Ambassador Lodge to General Assembly on January 14, 1957,⁴ and by the President in his letter of January 12, 1958, to Premier Bulganin.⁵

¹ BULLETIN of June 23, 1946, p. 1057.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1957, p. 225.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.

5. *Transfer of Nuclear Weapon Stocks to Peaceful Uses*

Proposal for cutting off production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and for the transfer of fissionable materials from weapons to nonweapons purposes, included in August 29, 1957, proposals.

6. *Freedom of Travel*

Proposal for the abolition of closed zones for

foreigners, made in note to the Soviet Union on November 11, 1957.⁶

7. *Limitation of U.N. Veto*

Proposal to refrain from using the veto power to prevent the Security Council from proposing methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes pursuant to chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, made in the President's letter to Premier Bulganin, January 12, 1958.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1957, p. 934.

The American Discovery of America

by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹

If the place for our inter-American discussion this evening is appropriate, the time is even more so. We are already within a new age—the atomic era—undertaking explorations of scientific frontiers even more vast than the geographical frontiers of 1492. America then was the gateway to a new knowledge of the earth. Our present gateway opens on the sheer abyss of space.

The American discovery of America, with all that it connotes of solidarity and stability and cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, is a steady element for the rest of the world, as well as for ourselves, in this greatest adventure of the human mind and body.

The subject we have posed naturally brings up the questions: When did America begin? When Columbus glimpsed San Salvador on an October dawn in 1492? With the aborigines who had lived and roamed these lands for centuries before his coming? With the first settlements, the first explorations?

In the cultural sense—and I am not using the word as a technical term of anthropology but with the concept that culture is “acquainting ourselves with the best that has been known and said in the world”—America certainly did not begin with the

Indians. The splendid Indian civilizations were not yet “American” culture, although, even when fragmented, they were eventually to become a part of it. Until that time, they were still aboriginal. Nor did America begin with the discovery and those first small, insecure settlements clinging to the coast and looking back to the homelands in Spain or England or France. Those settlers were still European.

Someone has suggested that the first real American was the Inca, Garcilasso de la Vega in Peru, whose parents were an Inca princess and a Spanish conquistador, and who wrote in Spanish of his mother's people. He was perhaps the first American writer; but there were Americans before him. It seems to me that America became a reality in the second generation of those settlers—whatever their ancestry and wherever they were—who, instead of gazing back toward Europe with the idea of someday returning there, faced the New World wilderness and realized that in it lay their own future and the home of their children's children's children.

The first Americans were frontiersmen; they had to be. That was true on both sides of the Río Grande, whether the ancestor had come over in the *Santa María*, the *Niña*, the *Hercules*, the *Mayflower*, or a later vessel. It is an important factor, because the frontier attitude—enterprising, inde-

¹ Address made at Baylor University, Waco, Tex., on Mar. 28 (press release 147 dated Mar. 25).

pendent, and persistent—and the frontier characteristics—energy, fortitude, cooperation—have become hemisphere determinants. We should add to the list faith in one's self, faith in one's neighbors, and faith in God. Without that triple strength the dream of America could never have been transformed into the American reality.

These are all fundamental qualities. However they may have varied proportionally from time to time and from area to area, they have been instrumental in shaping the destiny of the American peoples. They motivated the conquest of the wilderness: the deep forests, the immense prairies, the agonizing heights of those mountain ranges that must have seemed invincible. Throughout the hemisphere those qualities were basic in our declarations of independence, our wars for freedom, our development into constitutional democracies. They underlie our hemispherewide objective of peace with liberty. They are the explanation, because they have given us a fundamental unity, of our successful inter-American system, which is the method of the international conference table, where free nations meet freely, as equals, to resolve their mutual problems.

Inter-American Solidarity

It is a remarkable thing that one immensely important national policy is traditional and constant in all the American Republics. This is the policy of inter-American solidarity as a guaranty of mutual security. A concomitant is the belief in inter-American cultural relations as a means of bringing about that understanding among our peoples which is essential to their continuing solidarity.

There is no other comparable group of peoples with such a mutual policy upheld through generations, although, fortunately, other nations are taking heed and striving to follow the inter-American example. The inter-American system, one of the major consequences of the American discovery of America, has afforded the rest of the world not only a working model for the United Nations but a long series of established, well-tested precedents. In this hemisphere all our Republics uphold the dual policies of inter-American solidarity and the cultural cooperation that is our instrumentality for mutual discovery. In none of our countries have these policies ever been merely partisan or even merely national. Together they

form one traditional hemisphere policy, tenaciously adhered to by all our governments because it embodies a deeply held conviction of all our peoples.

The proofs of this are written into our 21 national histories. They are so many that it is impossible to advance them all here today, even on the part of just one country—our own. But we could call the roll of our Presidents, beginning with George Washington, and hear them speak to this thesis one by one. Washington's admonition in his Farewell Address against entangling alliances is frequently cited. Let us remember also that in that same address he assured his fellow citizens that "harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest." Thomas Jefferson pointed to "the advantages of a cordial fraternization among all the American nations." John Quincy Adams said of United States participation in the Congress of Panamá convoked by Bolívar: "It may be that, with the lapse of centuries, no other opportunity so favorable will be presented to the Government of the United States to subserve the benevolent purposes of Divine Providence, to dispense the promised blessings of the Redeemer of mankind, to promote the prevalence in future ages of peace on earth and good will to man, as will now be placed in their power by participating in the deliberations of this Congress." Abraham Lincoln advocated "strengthening our ties of good will and good neighborliness with Latin America." Herbert Hoover said that "cultural currents not only contribute to better understanding but also emphasize the essential unity of interest of the American Republics." Franklin D. Roosevelt declared in his First Inaugural Address that he "would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor." President Eisenhower has energetically and consistently furthered the concept that in the Western Hemisphere the bonds which unite us as sovereign equals who are working side by side for the betterment of all of us—nations and citizens—have elevated this neighborly relationship to one of genuine partnership.

It would be easy to cite parallel statements in support of inter-American cultural as well as political cooperation made by our Secretaries of State in illustrious succession from Thomas Jefferson to John Foster Dulles. Instead of quoting exhortations, however, no matter how apt and inspir-

ing, let us take a quick look at the record. What have we done and what are we doing to bring about and extend the mutual discovery of America which gives rise to this productive partnership of good neighbors?

From our own standpoint, that of the United States, I would say that we have done a great deal, though still not nearly enough, to increase understanding and good will through cultural relationships—which is to say, to make and follow road-maps of mutual discovery. There are three angles of approach in estimating the accomplishment. First, there is our official United States program of cultural relations with the other American Republics. Second, there is our participation in the cultural programs of the Organization of American States, our multilateral inter-American system. Third is the important cumulative contribution toward discovery, toward understanding, made on a people-to-people basis through private institutions—such as Baylor University—and private citizens—such as yourselves.

Precedent for U.S. Technical Cooperation Programs

It is an interesting, but not surprising, fact that our Government's present large worldwide programs of educational exchange and information began, like so many others, within our American family of nations. The first such official United States program was established in 1938, a year dark with global threats of war. In order to strengthen the hemisphere solidarity which was the safeguard of the American peoples, the United States Government at that time set up an Inter-departmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation with the other American Republics and created in the Department of State a Division of Cultural Relations, likewise focused at first on Latin America. Both agencies, from the beginning, invited and encouraged the cooperation of private citizens and institutions.

At first the State Department's cultural program concentrated largely on what, in official language, we term the "exchange of persons." This interchange included visits to and from Latin America of students and teachers, leaders of thought and opinion, specialists in fields ranging from medicine to music, from journalism to anthropology. It was all part of the discovery on our part of how Latin Americans think and feel

and act, and of their similar discovery of us. And it all added up in the same column: solidarity—with, let us be frank, an occasional minor erasure or correction here and there.

The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was created in 1941 to coordinate, further stimulate, and activate inter-American activities. Two of its early accomplishments were establishment of the Inter-American Educational Foundation and the Inter-American Trade Scholarship Program. The Coordinator's office, and later the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, served among other things as precedent and seedbed for our Government's present worldwide technical cooperation programs.

It is beside the point of our brief presentation to go into details of post-World War II reorganizations which brought the Coordinator's office into the State Department framework, later developed the global International Cooperation Administration, and established the United States Information Agency as a massive independent entity, also worldwide in scope. However, I think it is important to note that all these programs, whether short-range in scope because of pressing wartime urgencies, or long-range, looking toward the eventual years of peace, employed the informational media constantly—press, radio, motion pictures, and, lately, television. At the present time worldwide programs in these media, as well as supervision of United States libraries and binational centers abroad, and related activities, are under the direction of USIA, the United States Information Agency, which works in close cooperation with the Department of State. The Department continues to further bilateral programs of exchange of persons in educational, scientific, and cultural fields under the Fulbright and Smith-Mundt Acts and related legislation, while technical-training exchanges are an important part of the International Cooperation Administration.

The binational centers to which I refer are highly important groups. They afford a meeting place for citizens of the host country who wish to learn more about the United States and for resident United States citizens who wish to learn more about the host country. In this enterprise of mutual American discovery, English classes are an amazingly important factor. It would surprise you to see the thousands—and I mean thousands, literally—of all ages and from every

walk of life, who line up to pay a fee and enroll for courses in the English language. Last year—1957—a grand total of 75,204 students were enrolled in the other American Republics at these binational centers for the study of English. Everybody in Latin America seems to want to learn it. I wish we had as many persons in our country clamoring to learn Spanish or Portuguese. Here in Texas we make a pretty good showing in that respect. But it is still not enough.

Other important factors are the United States schools in Latin America—organized and operated by private citizens, usually not for profit—which are helping a large number of young people and their parents really to discover America. Future leaders in political and many other fields will come from those schools. Just one such privately operated United States school, at La Paz, Bolivia, has graduated the present President of that country, his Foreign Minister, another Cabinet member, and the Bolivian Ambassador to the United States.

Our cultural relations programs, in addition to the interchanges which I have noted, have many other aspects. They encourage two-way art and scientific exhibits, for example, and the translation and publication of books. In several Latin American countries enlargement of the programs has been facilitated by the extension to this hemisphere of the Fulbright Act. As you probably know, this measure provides for educational exchange on funds made available in foreign currencies obtained from the sale abroad of surplus agricultural commodities under terms of Public Law 480.

Furthermore, and very especially and very emphatically, our Government is furthering an entirely new phase of the American discovery of America: the mutual investigation and utilization of every means by which nuclear energy may be employed for the peace and benefit of this hemisphere and all the rest of the world.

If this governmental program of cultural relations seems somewhat stark and dry in a quick rundown like this, let me assure you that, if we had the time, I could give you a dozen vivid human-interest stories to illustrate every phase. A good many of them would be from my own firsthand observations in Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, and elsewhere.

OAS Cultural Activities

So far we have been looking at our official bilateral cultural relations with the other American Republics. Those are the programs which the United States carries on with each of the other American Republics separately, through government-to-government agreement. At the same time, of course, we are also engaged in the multi-lateral undertakings of the Organization of American States, agreed upon and carried out by the American Republics working together. Our own bilateral programs are correlated with, but do not duplicate, them.

The Organization of American States is, as you know, a voluntary association of the 21 American Republics. Its seat is the Pan American Union, which is the name both of the permanent secretariat and of the beautiful building that houses it at Washington. The purposes of the OAS, as set forth in its charter, are:

To strengthen the peace and security of the continent;

To prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States;

To provide for common action on the part of those States in the event of aggression;

To seek the solution of political, juridical and economic problems that may arise among them; and

To promote, by cooperative action, their economic, social and cultural development.

The OAS cultural relationships are worked out through the Cultural Affairs Department of the Pan American Union and through the Inter-American Cultural Council. This Council has 21 members, one for each of the American Republics, appointed by the respective governments. The first United States representative on this Inter-American Cultural Council, which was created by the Ninth Inter-American Conference at Bogotá in 1948, was the eminent historian, Dr. Lewis Hanke, now director of the Institute of Latin American Affairs at the University of Texas. Our present representative is a distinguished educator, Dr. Mary P. Holleran. The Cultural Council meets every 3 years, and its subsidiary five-member Committee for Cultural Action functions during the interim.

Just as the Presidents of the United States and their Secretaries of State have successively attested their faith in inter-American understanding and friendship as measures of foreign policy, so have successive inter-American conferences voiced the same conviction. This is no fair-weather attitude, pleasant words when the skies are clear. The impressive fact is that, when international clouds are darkest, the American Republics show themselves to be more than ever convinced of the immense, immediate—I should like to use a good emphatic Spanish term here—*imprescindible* importance of their cultural relationships. Here again, although we have not time for a complete rollcall, let me cite some significant instances:

The first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at Panamá in 1939 prefaced its General Declaration of Neutrality in the European conflict by reaffirming “the spiritual unity” of the peoples of America. The Declaration of Mexico adopted by the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at Mexico City in 1945 declared that “education and material well-being are indispensable to the development of democracy” and that “the inter-American community is dedicated to the ideals of universal cooperation.” The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (model for the NATO and SEATO agreements), adopted in 1947 by the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, is predicated on the desire of the American peoples and their governments for “consolidating and strengthening their relations of friendship and good neighborliness.”

As regards specific OAS cultural relations activities, I think we may say that the multilateral cultural program began effectively 22 years ago with the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations adopted by the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace at Buenos Aires. It provided for interchange of students and teachers, since hemisphere peace would be fortified by greater mutual knowledge of the people and institutions of the countries represented, and a more consistent educational solidarity on the American continent. The United States delegation presented to that conference a declaration of principles which stressed the fact that the American Republics

“have a common likeness in their democratic form of government and . . . common ideals of peace and justice” and that they share the objective of “harmonious development of their commerce and their cultural aspirations in the various fields of political, economic, social, scientific and artistic activities.”

This emphasis on education underlies the whole of the OAS cultural program. Fundamental education and libraries were the main themes of the first meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council, and educational problems likewise dominated its second meeting in 1956.

The Committee of Presidential Representatives, which was created at President Eisenhower's suggestion to explore ways of extending the influence and effectiveness of the Organization of American States, related most of its recommendations to education. Two major items were proposals for a sizable system of OAS scholarships and for exploration of the peacetime uses of atomic energy.

With regard to both proposals, much recent progress has been made. In our own country the United States Atomic Energy Commission, while expanding and augmenting its training programs to increase the supply of United States scientists and engineers, is also providing training assistance to friendly nations. Latin American students are among those who have received such training at the International School of Nuclear Science and Engineering at Argonne, near Chicago, and the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies in Tennessee. Furthermore, the United States Atomic Energy Commission has inaugurated with the University of Puerto Rico a special program of assistance and collaboration. This is expected to become a nuclear research and training center helpful to many countries of the hemisphere. The American peoples are united in their great purpose of advancing by every means within their power the development of atomic energy for the purposes of peace.

The recommendation of the Presidential Representatives for a multilateral scholarship program has already been agreed upon by the Organization of American States. It is expected to be in operation by September of this year. Beginning with 170 fellowships, the number will be increased as rapidly as possible to 500 a year. Their purpose is to contribute to the economic, social, scientific, and cultural development of our 21 Republics.

Fellowships will be granted for study only in educational and training centers outside the applicant's country of permanent residence. It is all part of our great adventure of mutual discovery.

In the areas of natural resources, agricultural and industrial development, and improved living standards the Organization of American States carries on economic, social, and cultural projects through its several subordinate councils and specialized organizations. They deal with problems of housing and city planning, cooperatives, social work, labor, social security, and migration. They are all means toward our mutual hemispherewide American discovery of America.

People-to-People Program

When we look into nongovernmental programs—the contributions of private individuals, groups, institutions—we find that the American discovery of America began as a people-to-people enterprise long before it was officially sanctioned as government-to-government policy.

We have noted that in the Organization of American States the cultural relations program was inaugurated by the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations in 1936 and that the United States own official cultural relations program was launched 2 years later. But as a people-to-people activity our inter-American cultural program is as old as the United States.

In the first period of our national life Benjamin Franklin, to take one example, was an inter-American person-to-person program in himself. He not only studied Spanish assiduously but encouraged the teaching of the Spanish language and the translation and publication of books about other areas of this hemisphere. He also favored building up library collections dealing with Spain and Latin America. At his instance the American Philosophical Society, of which he was the guiding spirit, invited Alejandro Ramirez, a Hispanic botanist who had done considerable work in the Caribbean area, to become a corresponding member. Reciprocally, the Spanish Academy of History in 1784 elected Franklin as its first member in the young United States. Years later a member of the Spanish Cortes was a guest in Franklin's home in Philadelphia, where he had an exceptional opportunity to meet leaders in national life and to see for himself how

our new Republic was functioning. When he returned to Madrid in May 1816, he described his visit eloquently and paid admiring tribute to our way of life in a long speech before his fellow parliamentarians.

And in this connection I should like to speculate on some exchanges of persons which never occurred but which, if they had taken place, might have altered the attitude of thousands of Latin Americans toward the United States during the initial years of the present century. During that period we were often criticized as being crass money-grubbers whose motivations were materialism and utilitarianism. And which of our representative great men was often mentioned as the uninspired and uninspiring prophet of that unenlightened code? Well, the name that came up most frequently as the typical materialist was none other than that of Benjamin Franklin! I hope such delusions have long since been cleared up. I am sure that any of our Latin American neighbors who might still have any misconceptions of the kind would be helped toward a real discovery of our America if they came to visit us. They could find here for themselves the living heritage bequeathed us by that wise, witty, and genial founding father, Benjamin Franklin, who had the newspaperman's inquiring mind, the inventor's imaginative dexterity, the statesman's patient sagacity, and the patriot's indomitable faith. We conceive Franklin to have been dedicated, upright—hardheaded, yes—but also a great-hearted idealist, who, against all odds, in a hostile England and a reluctant France, proclaimed the doctrine of American freedom because "Our cause is the cause of mankind!"

We citizens of the United States, especially those of us who have not had the good fortune to visit our southern neighbors, also hold certain misconceptions sometimes about them. Many of these can be overcome by study and reading as well as personal contact with Latin Americans who visit us. If I may cite a personal experience, I recall that despite several years of study of Spanish in high school and university I had only a vague notion of what was Latin America until 1937 when, as Assistant Dean of Student Life at the University of Texas, I began to have direct dealings with Latin American students at the University of Texas. Some of them were visitors in our land, as in the case of the Farmer Fellows,

who were studying there while a group of Texas students were studying at the University of Mexico in exchange. Others were my fellow Texans, born in this country but of direct Latin American descent. Regardless of their land of birth, they were uniformly attractive and quick to make friends. I am happy to recite this personal testimonial of the results in one instance of a people-to-people program carried out right in this State.

Our fellow citizens are rapidly overcoming their lack of knowledge about Latin America. They are traveling to Mexico especially and to many other countries in ever-increasing numbers. The coin which they leave behind, to the tune of about \$375 million per year, certainly has two sides. There is the economic side, which, we hope, helps to overcome the chronic dollar scarcity in the area—dollars which are usually resented in the United States. There is also the cultural and spiritual side growing out of the thousands of daily human contacts which are involved in this travel. Over the long run this may be even more important than the financial side of the coin.

There is one particular kind of travel, by a necessarily limited group of people, which I would like to cite as having unusual value. It is that being carried out by our respective parliamentarians. We in the State Department derive constructive ideas from the travels undertaken by our own Senators and Congressmen to Latin America. Conversely, in the last few years we have had an increasing number of their colleagues visit us from Latin America, most of them as our State Department's special guests under the official exchange program. For example, I can recall several profitable discussions in the past 2 years with visiting parliamentarians from Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay.

What we have begun to call the people-to-people program—as we have seen, it had been going on spontaneously without a name since colonial times—is a channeling and coordination, insofar as possible, of unofficial and often informal international relations. In September 1956 President Eisenhower called for "the active support of thousands of independent private groups and institutions, and millions of individual Americans acting through person-to-person communications." In this program every citizen can take part and, in fact, must take part at some time

and in some way, whether or not he realizes that he is doing so. It is a very important aspect of America. The impression left in Guadalajara by a visitor from Waco; the hospitality shown to or withheld from a Peruvian student; inter-American exhibitions of paintings or of livestock; the Garden Clubs of Texas cooperating with the Garden Club of Chile; the picture albums sent to and received from Latin America by Camp Fire Girls; the meeting of the Inter-American Bar Association at Dallas; the working out together of recipes for a regional dish or of blueprints for an atomic reactor—all such things are fragments, large and small, of a whole which, when put together entire, is the hemisphere itself.

A Real-Life Story

Perhaps a little story from real life will sum this up better than statistics would. It is a true story. It happened a year or so ago, and it happened to Texans. To my mind this incident which really occurred symbolizes the friendship that cements inter-American solidarity. It demonstrates the generosity and good will of people in another neighboring Republic—in this case, Colombia—not by interchanges on a high official level but by what is often far more revealing: an instantaneous response from the heart.

The scene was the Colombian Andes, the month, January. An SA-16 unit of our Air Reserve Group at Albrook Field, Panama, crashed during a search for a privately owned United States plane from Texas which had been reported missing in the area. Two members of the SA-16 crew were killed outright, and a third was mortally injured. The nearest town, a small agricultural community called Jardín, had fewer than a thousand inhabitants.

The authorities at Jardín immediately telephoned the news of the disaster to the nearest city, which communicated with Albrook so that a second air rescue plane could be sent at once. However, Jardín itself is not accessible by air except by helicopters. Ambulances had to be sent in from 5 hours away by a difficult mountain road, and other help was dispatched by automobile from the United States consulate at Medellín. Before any of our own people could arrive, however, practically the whole town of Jardín had dropped every other employment for the time being in order to assist in the rescue. The two

physicians at the small local hospital, which had been built by the townspeople themselves, worked unceasingly for 48 hours or more. The women of the town, in a noble spirit of compassion and Christian tenderness, collected red and white and blue cloth and sewed together American flags to cover our dead. When the limited hospital supply of drugs, bandages, and the like was exhausted, volunteer workers slipped out quietly and bought supplies with their own scanty funds and without any idea of compensation. In fact, from first to last, all efforts on the part of a United States citizen, whether in official or private capacity, to reimburse these good Samaritans for the services so generously given were unavailing. Instead, the Mayor of Jardín, the two doctors, and the people in general spoke proudly of the high estimate which they placed on spiritual values. "It is our sincere pleasure to be able to do something for the great North American nation," they said. The Mayor added that the citizens of Jardín would like, however, to make one request, and one only, of the United States. The one thing which they wanted from us, in symbol of the undying friendship between our countries, to fly over their little hospital alongside the flags of their own country, Colombia, and the Red Cross, was a United States flag!

Dr. Milton Eisenhower To Visit Central America

White House press release dated March 29

The President announced on March 29 that Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower is planning to make a goodwill visit in June, as personal representative of the President, to Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama.

Exact dates and details for the arrangements will be announced later. This will be the third goodwill visit to our neighbor nations to the south by Dr. Eisenhower. In 1953 he toured the 10 countries of South America, and in 1957 he visited Mexico.

U.S. Operations Mission To Be Opened in Sudan

The Department of State announced on April 3 (press release 167) that under a new agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Sudan a U.S. economic assistance mission, headed by Robert W. Kitchen, Jr., is scheduled to arrive at Khartoum April 13 or 14 to open an International Cooperation Administration operations office there.

The bilateral agreement, signed March 31 at Khartoum by representatives of the two Governments, provides a framework for U.S. economic and technical assistance to the Sudan in the fields of agriculture, vocational education, road development, and communication.

Ghana Requests Establishment of U.S. Operations Mission

Press release 175 dated April 4

Agreement has been reached with the Government of Ghana for the establishment of a United States Operations Mission in that country, the Department of State announced on April 4.

The mission will conduct a technical cooperation program in the year-old African republic, with primary emphasis in the field of agriculture. Projects are being initiated to help expand Ghana's cattle industry, to develop an agricultural extension service, to establish a veterinarian school and farmers' training institutes, and to conduct further surveys of the country's agricultural and livestock potential. The program also includes training in the United States for officials from the agriculture, labor, and geological departments of the Government.

Details of the program were worked out following a study undertaken at the request of the Government of Ghana by a survey team from the International Cooperation Administration. In a meeting on April 1 the Ghana Cabinet gave formal approval of the projects and requested the establishment of a mission.

The United Nations: Challenges of a New Age

by Francis O. Wilcox

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs¹

I am particularly pleased to meet with you tonight. It is encouraging to me that groups of responsible citizens such as the New Hampshire Council on World Affairs are taking a keen and active interest in international relations and their grave implications for both the present and the future.

The New Age

Today we live in a world which is in every sense on the threshold of a new age—the space age. It is an era which holds implications and challenges for man far greater than those of the 15th and 16th century age of discovery and exploration. We all recognize today what a significant age that was although very few people at the time were aware of it. It was an era of tremendous scientific achievement and expansion of horizons of man's knowledge. Whole continents were settled. New states and empires came into being. The results of all this—and some of the problems which arose in that period—are still with us today.

There is, however, a fundamental difference between the new age which we are entering and the age of exploration and discovery. The significance of improved navigation and commerce in that period was apparent only to a privileged few. In sharp contrast, millions of people throughout the world today are keenly aware of the fact that we are on the eve of a new age in history.

This was particularly evident to me during a trip abroad from which I have just returned. Everywhere I traveled—to the Near East, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the Far East—people

¹ Address made before the New Hampshire Council on World Affairs at Manchester, N. H., on Mar. 24 (press release 145).

appeared to recognize that recent scientific and technological advancements of the new age demand, to use the words of President Eisenhower, that a way be found “by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.”²

I would like to discuss with you some of the major challenges which confront both the United States and the United Nations in this new era. There is no doubt that the United Nations today is man's best hope for meeting many of these challenges. The United States regards the United Nations as a cornerstone in its development of a sound and imaginative foreign policy to cope with the impact of these challenges.

Technological Challenges

In the technological field man is on the verge of conquering outer space. At this moment, as you know, three artificial satellites—Sputnik, Explorer, and Vanguard—are circling the earth. Men put them there. These, together with the ICBM and other missiles, are only the beginning of a new era of scientific and technological advances which until recently have been relegated to the realm of the Sunday supplements and comic books. Developments in the field of outer space will inevitably shrink the universe of which we here on earth are but an infinitesimal part. The mysteries of other planets will gradually be unfolded.

In addition, man soon will become the master of matter and energy. Research on the atom already has opened up new limitless vistas in many areas of human endeavor. Progress in atomic

² BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 851.

energy will affect almost every facet of our daily lives—the power which runs our factories, the wares which they produce, the homes we live in, even the food we eat. A promising start is under way in the international development and control of this fabulous resource through the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

These technological and scientific developments serve to reemphasize the increasing interdependence of man, his institutions, and his international organizations. They bring into sharper relief than ever before the absolute necessity for a common international approach to meet common problems.

Political Challenges

This new age, along with its technological and scientific developments, has produced equally far-reaching political challenges. They are not as apparent nor as spectacular, but they are certainly as real and as urgent.

Unfortunately we are accustomed to thinking of the world as being divided into power blocs. As a result we have tended to overlook a fact of vital importance. While it is true that the world is divided into power blocs, militarily, it is at the same time developing politically into a multinational society with new challenges and new problems which demand the same common approach by the nations of the world as do those in the scientific and technological field.

These challenges stem from the steadily increasing number of newly independent countries; they consist of the many new issues which arise from conflicting aspirations of these nations. We have only to look around us to see daily evidence of the disputes associated with the crumbling of ancient empires and the vigorous nationalism and intense anticolonialism of newly emerging states. Nor is the new nationalism the only seedbed for new issues in the political field.

In many new nations the population in one generation has been undergoing almost overnight a social and economic transformation which required centuries in Western Europe. Africa is a case in point. In this vast territory peoples are eagerly seeking recognition of their national identities. You can be certain that what happens in Africa in the next decade will influence profoundly the future course of events of this world in which we live.

The Soviet Challenge

Finally, there is an even more formidable challenge of constant and increasing concern to all free men. I refer, of course, to the increased power of the Soviet Union as it crosses the threshold of the new age.

This new Soviet power confronts us with many far-reaching problems. Sputniks I and II have provided a striking demonstration of the Soviet Union's capabilities in the scientific and technological fields. But these capabilities, according to our best scientific information, have been accompanied by the development of certain types of missiles, notably the ICBM. The Soviets have given top priority to training more scientists and more engineers in their schools and universities. Their efforts in this respect, when compared with our own, are a source of serious concern. Certainly our own free democratic society is far better equipped to explore scientific truth and thus provide the necessary capabilities for the advancement of mankind. Yet the Soviet Union—dictatorship that it is—has demonstrated to the world that it can mobilize both its manpower and resources for the education of highly qualified scientists and engineers and encourage their scientific and technological achievements, although it may be at the expense of a broad education for all the people.

The Soviets are posing a serious challenge on still another front through the misuse for imperialistic purposes of their rapidly growing economy. In four decades, and at great sacrifice to the material well-being of its people, the Soviet Union has developed an industrial base that is second only to that of the United States. And today it is still expanding. The Soviet gross national product, for example, is increasing approximately 6 to 7 percent annually. During the past decade its output of electric power rose from 56.5 billion to 210 billion kilowatt hours and oil production from 26 million to 98 million metric tons.

Now, of course, the Soviet Union is fully aware of the aspirations of newly developing nations for economic and social progress. With this in mind it has utilized its economic strength and has embarked on a campaign of economic penetration and political subversion of these countries, particularly in the Near East and Asia. In the past 2½ years, according to Department of State estimates, the Sino-Soviet bloc has committed the

equivalent of \$1,900,000,000 in economic and military assistance to these new states. Energetic efforts by the Communist bloc to negotiate trade and payments agreements have more than doubled its trade with these countries since 1954. With a great deal of fanfare the Soviets have bought agricultural products from countries which have had temporary difficulties in disposing of their surpluses in free-world markets.

This Communist economic offensive has made American trade and assistance programs more important than ever before. The Mutual Security and Trade Agreements Acts, which President Eisenhower called "the iron imperatives of peace" and which are now under study by Congress, provide potent weapons in meeting this new economic threat.

I know that some of our people vigorously attack our foreign aid program. They have condemned it as a "giveaway" program, and they have deplored the fact that we continue, over a period of years, to send our aid abroad.

This is to seriously miscalculate the nature of the challenge we face. We must never underestimate the determination of the Soviet Union to convert the uncommitted nations to the Communist system. Without an adequate foreign aid program we would be faced with an impossible task in our attempt to help keep the free world free.

My point is that the Soviet Union is moving into the new age aggressively on all fronts. Backed with enhanced power, it has injected into its foreign policy on the one hand a new demanding and threatening tone and, on the other hand, blandishments of good will and peaceful intent. This requires bold initiative on our part as well as swift countermeasures. Otherwise the free world will be faced with the grim prospect of a very serious reversal in the balance of power.

The U. N. and Technological Challenges

The implications of man's ultimate mastery of the atom and conquest of outer space are awesome in magnitude. There is no doubt the United Nations provides the most effective instrument to insure that these conquests will be devoted to peaceful purposes. The peaceful uses of outer space must be assured, and its use for military purposes must be prevented. Immediate exploratory work is necessary to establish the competence of the United Nations in this field.

Secretary of State Dulles, in advocating that outer space should be dedicated to peace,³ has said that

... there is an opportunity here which is almost staggering in its possible implications—its implications if we do it, and its tragic implications if we do not do it.

In this connection you will recall our efforts which began over a decade ago to insure the peaceful uses of atomic energy when we had a monopoly on atomic weapons. As early as 1946, when the atomic age was in its infancy, the United States took the unprecedented step of offering to relinquish that monopoly and vest it in an international authority with complete control over the manufacture and use of dangerous atomic energy materials. As you know, the Soviets turned that offer down. Consequently it is now impossible, owing to the passage of time and the refinement of scientific techniques, to account for past production of fissionable materials. Thus a great humanitarian opportunity slipped by. The world cannot afford to let a mistake like that happen again.

Once again we have made a new proposal, this time relating to cooperation in the use of outer space. President Eisenhower in his letter of January 12 to Soviet Premier Bulganin⁴ stated the United States position when he declared:

Should not outer space be dedicated to the peaceful uses of mankind and denied to the purposes of war? That is my proposal.

Once again the choice lies with the Soviets.

It is my firm conviction that, given assurance of peaceful uses of outer-space development, the possibilities for the advancement of mankind are enormous. It is, of course, impossible at present to assess the full impact on our lives of the exploration and exploitation of outer space. But there are a number of significant possibilities which already are becoming apparent and, in fact, in certain instances are predicted as certainties by our scientists.

We are told, for example, that artificial satellites, reporting back to earth, will enable us to study the mysteries of the universe for the first time unimpeded by the distortions of the earth's atmosphere. New knowledge of the behavior of the sun and of radiations which interfere with

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1958, p. 166.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.

radio communications will be acquired. This will mean eventual improvements in means of communication, with satellites being used as radio relay points. For the first time reliable radio communication, unhampered by disturbances in the atmosphere and ionosphere, may be possible between the most distant points on earth. A worldwide system of television will be feasible. Navigational and air-safety aids beyond anything now conceived will become realities. Weather forecasting will be immeasurably improved through the study of cloud patterns on a planetary scale. Even weather control through the use of space platforms may be a possibility.

We are also told that the impact of new knowledge gained from studies conducted from such vantage points may have a revolutionary effect on medicine, nutrition, agriculture, food preservation, and other fields intimately connected with man's welfare.

These are but a few of the breathtaking prospects which this age may open up. Do they not represent a prize worth attaining—for all mankind? This prize is within the reach of man, provided international agreement can be achieved on the peaceful exploitation of outer space as proposed by the President and Secretary Dulles. The question now is how best to achieve such agreement. Naturally a prime requisite is Soviet willingness to cooperate.

We hope that the announcement made by the Soviet Union last week presages a somewhat more positive attitude toward the repeated efforts of the United States over the past 14 months to move toward agreement on the peaceful uses of outer space. The fact that the Soviets have tied in unrelated conditions with their proposals on outer space, however, is not encouraging. Nevertheless, their proposals on space will require and will receive the most careful study by the United States.

Unfortunately sovereign states cannot always be counted upon to do the logical thing. It would seem logical, however, to try to agree upon certain fundamentals now while our activities in outer space are just beginning. Once the great powers have moved further into outer space, their positions may become hardened and it may be far more difficult to secure agreement. We can see the danger ahead; now is the time to avert it.

One thing we will need to do is to develop some simple rules of conduct for the use of outer space.

We have such rules for the use of the high seas and for the air space above us. But the creation of rules for the use of outer space is a far more complex matter. One has only to consider the terrific speed by which a satellite circles about the earth, passing over many countries in its flight. What rights do the states launching such missiles have to use outer space? And what rights, if any, do the states have over which the satellites pass? Is it feasible to claim jurisdiction over space that never stands still over any nation? One has only to raise these questions to realize their complexity.

It would be tragic indeed if outer space were used in such a way as to intensify the arms race and magnify even further the danger that could come to mankind from the uncontrolled use of missiles and nuclear weapons in outer space. Achievement of the possibilities inherent in the conquering of outer space would have a tremendous effect on the relations between nations. The scientific and material advantages would benefit all mankind. The demonstration of good faith and good will provided by cooperation on both sides of the Iron Curtain would materially assist in the relaxation of tensions which now grip the world.

The Challenge of Disarmament

In this connection one logically thinks of the problem of disarmament. The quest for agreement on this most complex of man's problems becomes increasingly a race between time and catastrophe—and time may be running out. The United States record in this quest is one of earnest endeavor. The record spreads over more than a decade and has been punctuated by such United States initiatives as the offer we made in 1946 to internationalize atomic energy and President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal made at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. This same record consists of months, in fact years, of patient negotiation in the United Nations to arrive at some reasonable accommodation which will provide an effective system of limitation and control of all types of armaments, conventional as well as nuclear.

The subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission met last year in London 71 times over a period of 5½ months, the longest session in its history. During these months of difficult negotiations apparent progress was being

made in narrowing the areas of disagreement between the Soviet Union and the West. There appeared to be some reason for hope that a limited first-stage agreement could be arrived at which would eliminate the danger of surprise attack and lessen the threat of nuclear war. New and practical proposals to this end were advanced by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada.

Then came an abrupt hardening of the Soviet attitude. When the Western proposals were introduced, the Soviets refused to discuss them in the subcommittee. Nevertheless, the proposals were overwhelmingly endorsed by the General Assembly last November.⁵ As a conciliatory gesture and as an expression of its earnest desires to have disarmament talks resumed, the Assembly agreed to expand the Disarmament Commission from 12 to 25 members. The Soviet response was to serve notice that it would boycott any future meetings of the Disarmament Commission and its subcommittee.

The Soviet Union has sought to make considerable propaganda of its easy slogan of "ban the bomb." We, however, are not interested in slogans. We seek an effective disarmament program. To us, this means control and control means inspection. To us, the manufacture of nuclear weapons—not merely the cessation of nuclear tests—is the heart of the problem.

However, in spite of Soviet intransigence, we shall persist in concert with our NATO allies and other members of the United Nations in our efforts to arrive at a reasonable solution which will give to man everywhere freedom from anxiety and an opportunity to pursue the arts of peace. We hope to persuade even the Soviets that this would be in their own interests as well. For that, in the last analysis, is what we seek—security for all.

The immediate problem is to get serious disarmament talks under way once again. This is our objective. With this in mind the United States earlier this month, and after consultations with other United Nations members, suggested informally to the Soviet representatives at the United Nations steps which could lead to an early resumption of the discussions and also insure the continuing responsibility of the United Nations

in this field. We suggested to the U.S.S.R. that the enlarged Disarmament Commission hold discussions in line with the resolution adopted by an overwhelming majority of the Assembly in 1957. We believe that the Disarmament Commission should meet in spite of the Soviet Government's announced intention to boycott such a meeting.

In addition, the United States also proposed to the U.S.S.R. that, if the Disarmament Commission discussions were unproductive, a procedural meeting of the Security Council should be convened in order to insure a proper link between the United Nations and any disarmament negotiations which might be held later. As you may recall, the Security Council, under the terms of the charter, is charged with the responsibility of achieving a regulation of armaments. Consideration of the problem by the Council would enable it to adopt appropriate procedural steps which could lead to an early resumption of the talks in other channels. These steps, rather than blocking the way to resuming the discussions, actually would pave the way and increase the possibility for serious negotiations.

The opposition of the Soviet Union to the resumption of discussions in the Disarmament Commission constitutes a continued defiance of the General Assembly's resolution. The U.S.S.R. in refusing to consider disarmament, even on a procedural basis, appears to no longer regard the United Nations as the responsible channel for dealing with the problem. We, for our part, are not willing to abandon the United Nations in its quest to find means to resume the disarmament talks.⁶

The Summit Meeting

The Soviet Government ostensibly desires a heads-of-government meeting for a discussion of a number of pressing international issues, including the disarmament question. I can assure you that the United States is ready to take part in such a meeting if advance preparations provide evidence that high-level talks would lead to agreement. The agreements we seek are those which would actually resolve issues, lessen international tensions, and respond to the hopes of men everywhere.

⁶ For text of a U.S. statement on resumption of disarmament talks, see *ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1958, p. 516.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.

I do not need to point out that recent Soviet declarations relating to the disarmament problem are hardly calculated to attain these goals. However, I can assure you that the United States will continue its efforts by every reasonable means to bring about a resumption of serious disarmament discussions.

One can, of course, understand the basic reasons Soviet leaders are so attached to the idea of a summit meeting. Mr. Khrushchev, in particular, has persistently sought to identify himself with the world's quest for peace. A summit meeting would provide him with the most solemn and influential forum for him to repeat his pronouncements about world peace. Even if no agreement were reached, this exercise would be of considerable value to the Soviet cause.

We and our allies, on our part, recognize the dangers as well as the possible advantages that might flow from holding a summit conference. We do not want such a meeting to increase tensions rather than reduce them. We do not want it to spread disillusionment and misunderstanding. We have made it unmistakably clear, therefore, that we would be willing to participate in a summit conference provided there is good evidence that fruitful results can be obtained.

It would seem to me that there are at least two prerequisites for such a meeting: First of all, there must, of course, be some agreement upon the items to be discussed. Secondly, there should be sufficient exploration of these items in advance of the conference to indicate that positive results can be achieved.

The U.N. and Political Challenges

If it is true that the United Nations is essential in meeting the technological challenges of the new age, it is more vital than ever as a forum in which political challenges can be placed in their proper perspective and adjusted on the basis of reasonable compromise.

The society of nations, as I said earlier, is still characterized by the existence of sovereign, independent states, the principal new factor being that there are more of them. More than 20 new nations have achieved their sovereignty since the end of World War II. The United Nations, as you know, was established in 1945 with 51 member states. Its roster had risen to 60 by 1955 and by last year to a total of 82 members. The recent

merger of Egypt and Syria has, of course, reduced this number by one, that is, to 81 members at present. Accordingly, the political problems arising from the conflicts of national interests of these new sovereign states have increased proportionately. The United Nations has played a fundamental role in dealing with these new issues.

Consider, for example, how the United Nations has been dealing with the Tunisian crisis. Here is a really serious situation containing all the political characteristics of the new era in which we live—nationalism, anticolonialism, and Soviet imperialism seeking fertile ground to extend its harmful influence. Tensions were running extremely high. The incident which touched off the crisis occurred on February 8th. The Security Council met on February 18th.⁷ The conflict was channeled into the United Nations, and quiet and effective diplomacy persuaded Tunisia and France to accept the good offices of the United States and the United Kingdom to assist the parties to resume peaceful negotiations.

The significance of the United Nations role in the crisis was aptly described by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, who declared that

It is . . . a good augury for the future that the parties to the proceedings now before this Council are endeavoring, as suggested by article 33, to settle peacefully the differences noted in their cross-submissions to the Council and the other outstanding problems between them by means of their own choice.

I agree; it is indeed a "good augury," not only in the Tunisian crisis but in a larger sense for the future. The Security Council and article 33 of the charter have proved invaluable instruments in dealing with situations which are likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security.

The vital role of the Security Council also was clearly demonstrated in the case of the Egyptian-Sudanese border dispute. While the elements of this issue were quite obscure and were different from those in the Tunisian crisis, the fact is that the Security Council dealt effectively with a dangerous situation threatening the peace in the area.

Here was a complicated border dispute which suddenly erupted between a newly sovereign nation and an old one. On January 29 Egypt requested that the Sudan Government hand over certain border territories. The Arab Union

⁷ *Ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 372.

plebiscite was to take place on February 20, and the Sudan parliamentary elections were to take place on February 28. Acrimonious charges involving alleged troop movements and seizures were leveled from both sides. Tension rose. On February 20 the Sudanese Representative at the United Nations lodged a complaint with the Secretary-General. The Security Council met on February 21, only 24 hours later.⁸

In the meantime the Egyptian Government had indicated that it did not intend to conduct the plebiscite in the disputed area. Moreover, after a short debate in the Council, the Egyptian Representative announced Egypt's willingness to negotiate with the Sudan in the spirit of article 33 after the Sudanese elections. Council action, therefore, had a moderating influence, and peaceful conditions prevail at the moment.

These two recent issues demonstrate the versatility of the United Nations machinery in dealing quickly and effectively with the political stresses and strains inherent in the new age. In both instances passion gave way to moderation and potential violence to peaceful discussion. Opportunity for reasonable accommodation was afforded in the one case through use of "good offices" and in the other through negotiation between the parties themselves. The existence of the United Nations and its machinery had a significant influence on the situation. What is even more important is the fact that in both cases the Security Council still remains seized of the question and can bring further useful influence to bear, if need be, for peaceful settlement.

I am convinced that the versatility of the United Nations demonstrated in these two crises can be exploited further and the utility of the United Nations proportionately increased provided there is a willingness among its members to resort to its machinery instead of to the trust of force.

The Changing Role of the United Nations

If the machinery of the United Nations is to be fully utilized, we first must recognize that it has changed in responding to new political conditions. In this way we can better assess how it may be adapted to fulfill its purpose, namely "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

⁸ *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 491.

As you may recall, the role of the United Nations, as originally envisaged, was enforcement of the peace. The Security Council was designed as the action arm of the United Nations for this purpose. However, the cleavages between the Soviet orbit and the free world over a 10-year period and an endless use of the veto by the U.S.S.R. seriously crippled the effectiveness of the Security Council. The Assembly gradually assumed greater importance in this field, particularly in view of its increased membership.

For example, it was the General Assembly which created the United Nations Emergency Force, which has been so effective as an influence for peace in the Gaza Strip and Sharm-el-Sheikh area. The charter wisely provided that the General Assembly could "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter. . . ." This has enabled the Assembly, backed up by its increased membership, to assume a role far more potent than that originally foreseen. This development is an example of the vitality and adaptability of the United Nations in responding to the changing political facts of life.

But the increased importance of the Assembly need not detract from the continued need to revitalize the Security Council. This prompted President Eisenhower in his letter of January 12 to Premier Bulganin to propose that ". . . we should make it the policy of our two governments at least not to use veto power to prevent the Security Council from proposing methods for the pacific settlement of disputes pursuant to Chapter VI." By such action the United Nations would be strengthened and would become, as the President suggested, "the effective instrument of peace and justice that was the original design."

In this connection I might recall that the United States as early as 1948 submitted to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly concrete and detailed proposals designed to improve the functioning of the Security Council. Unfortunately, however, the Soviets were unwilling to consider any categories of questions on which they would agree not to use the veto. We hope that in the months ahead the Soviets will see the wisdom of strengthening the United Nations by agreeing to a restriction of the veto with respect to the peaceful

settlement of disputes. The cause of world peace would profit immensely if the Soviet Union would permit the Security Council to play the effective role which the framers of the charter intended.

Concluding Comments

It is clear to me that the United Nations has served the interests of the United States and world peace. As an instrument of collective security it repelled Communist aggression successfully in Korea. In the field of pacific settlement it has alleviated many disputes containing the seeds of war. It has provided us with a powerful forum to present our viewpoint and refute Soviet propaganda. It has channeled national aspirations toward independence or self-government through evolutionary processes. It has made modest but constructive attacks on the root causes of war—economic, social, and cultural—through the Economic and Social Council, the Human Rights Commission, and the specialized agencies and the technical assistance program.

It is equally clear that the United Nations has shown a remarkable capacity to adjust to rapidly changing political and economic conditions. It has demonstrated that it is a flexible organization that can be adapted to the new age that is upon us. It is not too much to say that it can, with intelligent leadership, do a great deal to help give shape and order to the political landscape of this new era upon which we are entering.

But the United Nations is, after all, an organization of sovereign states. It can do no more than its member states are willing to have it do. We must, therefore, look ahead with the wisdom and the imagination which the times require. We must give to the United Nations the vitality it needs to nurture and encourage peace in a world in which change is both frequent and profound.

In this respect we would do well to recall the words of Abraham Lincoln in another era of great challenge:

We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope of earth.

The United Nations, with all its imperfections, remains the best hope of earth for the achievement of world peace. It is up to us, and the other members of the United Nations, to bring that hope to its full fruition.

April 21, 1958

Germany Extends Deadline for Restitution Claims

Press release 171 dated April 4

The American Embassy at Bonn has reported that the deadline for filing claims under the Federal Law for the Settlement of Monetary Restitution Claims against the German Reich has been extended to December 31, 1958.¹

The law which has now been extended modified the German Federal Restitution Law and opened the way for the filing of certain categories of monetary restitution claims by former Nazi persecutees who have been unable to obtain compensation under previous legislation. The modifications relate to claims arising from unlawful taking by certain German entities of tangible or intangible property which at the time of the taking was "identifiable" within the meaning of restitution legislation but which cannot be restituted because of loss, damage, or deterioration. The modifications are believed to be of particular interest to individuals who sustained losses due to confiscation of identifiable property outside West Germany which property was subsequently sent into West Germany or Berlin. The development is considered of significance in cases where special levies or discriminatory taxes were collected through seizure of such property. Knowledge of the final location of the property is not required.²

President Determines Tariff Quota on Wool-Fabric Imports for 1958

White House Announcement

White House press release dated March 7

The President has determined the application for 1958 of the tariff quota on imports of most woolen and worsted fabrics established by his proclamation of September 28, 1956,³ which invoked the so-called Geneva wool-fabric reservation. At the same time, the President noted the many problems involved in the wool-fabric tariff

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1957, p. 581.

² The Department of State has available an information sheet giving further details of the German legislation which will be furnished upon request.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1956, p. 556.

quota for the domestic woolen industry, for American clothing manufacturers, and for importers, and requested the Trade Policy Committee, through its chairman, the Secretary of Commerce, to undertake a special review of the alternatives to the present arrangements under which wool-fabric tariffs are applied.

Pursuant to his 1956 proclamation the President notified the Secretary of the Treasury of his decision that the "breakpoint" of the tariff quota is to be 14.2 million pounds for 1958.

Until 1958 imports reach the breakpoint, the rates of duty remain at 30¢ or 37½¢ per pound (depending upon the nature of the fabric) plus 20 percent or 25 percent ad valorem (again depending upon the nature of the fabric). Imports during 1958 in excess of the breakpoint will be subject to an ad valorem duty of the full 45 percent allowed by the Geneva reservation. The specific duty (cents per pound) is not affected. The President amended the 1956 proclamation to provide that the overquota rate shall be 30 percent for imports of handwoven fabrics less than 30 inches wide and for imports of "religious" fabrics.

If imports during 1958 exceed 14.2 million pounds, the higher rates of duty will go into effect for the remainder of 1958, terminating at the end of 1958.

The Geneva wool-fabric reservation is a right that was reserved by the United States in a 1947 multilateral trade agreement at Geneva. Under that reservation the ad valorem rates of duty applicable to most woolen and worsted fabrics entering the country may be increased when such imports, in any year, exceed an amount determined by the President to be not less than 5 percent of the average annual United States production of similar fabrics for the three preceding calendar years. The 1947 tariff concession and the reservation apply to woolen and worsted fabrics dutiable under paragraphs 1108 and 1109 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified. Most woolen and worsted fabrics entering the United States are dutiable under these paragraphs. The President's action applies only to imports of such fabrics.

In considering this matter the President had the advice of the Trade Policy Committee and other departments and agencies of the executive branch.

Letter to the Secretary of Commerce

MARCH 7, 1958

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Under the so-called Geneva Wool Fabric Reservation, I have determined the 1958 breakpoint for the tariff quota established by Proclamation 3160 of September 28, 1956. I have also modified that Proclamation with respect to certain special fabrics.

In considering this matter, I am impressed once more with the many problems involved in the application of the wool fabric tariff quota. I am also mindful of the various proposals for meeting these problems that have been advanced by the domestic woolen industry, American clothing manufacturers, and importers. As you know, these proposals have included suggestions for varying the duty, applying the tariff quota, or computing separate breakpoints on a fabric category or periodic basis.

I am aware of the difficulties that have confronted the Trade Policy Committee in considering these proposals, such as the fact that the application of the tariff quota on a fabric basis would be contrary to the Reservation. Clearly, more work is needed on these questions. Accordingly, I approve the recommendation of the Trade Policy Committee in this respect and request a special review and early report to me of the alternatives to the present arrangements under which wool fabric tariffs are applied.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Honorable SINCLAIR WEEKS
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D. C.

Letter to the Secretary of the Treasury

MARCH 7, 1958

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Proclamation No. 3160 of September 28, 1956, as amended by the proclamation of March 7, 1958, provides for the increase of the ad valorem part of the duty in the case of any of the fabrics described in item 1108 or item 1109 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Geneva—1947) or in item 1109 (a) in Part I of that Schedule (Torquay—1951) entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in any calendar year

following December 31, 1957, in excess of a quantity to be notified by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Pursuant to paragraph 1 of that proclamation, as amended, I hereby notify you that for the calendar year 1958 the quantity of such fabrics on imports in excess of which the ad valorem part of the rate will be increased as provided for in the seventh recital of that proclamation, as amended, shall be 14,200,000 pounds.

On the basis of presently available information, I find this quantity to be not less than 5 per centum of the average annual production in the United States during the three immediately preceding calendar years of fabrics similar to such fabrics. Although it is believed that the final statistics will not alter this finding, in the event that they do, I shall notify you as to the revised quantity figure.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

The Honorable ROBERT B. ANDERSON

Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.

Proclamation 3225¹

AMENDMENT OF PROCLAMATION No. 3160 RELATING TO CERTAIN WOOLEN TEXTILES

1. WHEREAS, by Proclamation No. 3160 of September 28, 1956 (3 CFR, 1956 Supp., p. 44), the President announced the invocation by the Government of the United States of America of the reservation contained in the note to item 1108 in Part I of Schedule XX annexed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A 11, A 1274), and proclaimed that the ad valorem part of the rate applicable to fabrics described in item 1108 or item 1109 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A 1274), or in item 1109 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX to the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (3 UST (pt. 1) 615, 1186), entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in excess of certain quantities would be 45 per centum; and

2. WHEREAS I find that, effective January 1, 1958, it will be appropriate to carry out the said General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that the ad valorem part of the rate be 30 per centum ad valorem in the case of any of the fabrics described in the said item 1108 or 1109 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX to the said General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which are described in paragraph

(a) of the seventh recital of the said proclamation of September 28, 1956, as amended by paragraph 2 of this proclamation:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the Statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (ch. 474, 49 Stat. 943; ch. 269, 59 Stat. 410; ch. 169, 69 Stat. 162; 19 U. S. C. 1351) do proclaim that the said proclamation of September 28, 1956, is hereby amended as follows:

1. The sixth recital is deleted.
2. The seventh recital is amended to read as follows:

"7. WHEREAS I find that following December 31, 1957, until otherwise proclaimed by the President, it will be appropriate to carry out the trade agreements specified in the first and third recitals of this proclamation that

"(a) the ad valorem part of the rate be 30 per centum ad valorem in the case of any of the fabrics described in the said item 1108 or item 1109 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade set forth in the second recital of this proclamation which are

"(i) hand-woven fabrics with a loom width of less than 30 inches, or

"(ii) serges, weighing not over 6 ounces per square yard, and nuns' veilings and other woven fabrics, weighing not over 4 ounces per square yard; all of the foregoing described in this clause (ii) wholly or in chief value of wool of the sheep, valued at over \$4 per pound, in solid colors, imported to be used in the manufacture of apparel for members of religious orders, and

"(b) that the ad valorem part of the rate be 45 per centum ad valorem in the case of any other of the fabrics described in the said item 1108 or item 1109 (a), or in the case of any of the fabrics described in the said item 1109 (a) in Part I of Schedule XX to the Torquay Protocol set forth in the fourth recital of this proclamation,

excepting in each case articles dutiable at rates applicable to such fabrics by virtue of any provision of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, other than paragraph 1108 or 1109 (a) if any of the foregoing fabrics described in this recital are entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in any calendar year after that total aggregate quantity by weight of such fabrics which shall have been notified by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury, and published in the *Federal Register*, has been so entered or withdrawn during such calendar year; which quantity the President shall have found to be not less than 5 per centum of the average annual production in the United States during the three immediately preceding calendar years of fabrics similar to such fabrics; and"

3. Paragraph 1 is amended to read as follows:

"1. In order to carry out the said trade agreements specified in the first and third recitals of this proclamation, until otherwise proclaimed by the President, the ad valorem part of the rate which shall be applied to the

¹ 23 Fed. Reg. 1687.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

said fabrics described in the seventh recital of this proclamation entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in excess of a quantity notified to the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to that recital shall be the percentage ad valorem specified for such fabrics in the recital;"

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this seventh day of March in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.



By the President:

CHRISTIAN A. HEETER

Acting Secretary of State

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

Signature and acceptance: Federation of Malaya, March 20, 1958.

BILATERAL

Colombia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U. S. C. 1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding and exchange of notes. Signed at Bogota March 14, 1958. Entered into force March 14, 1958.

Jordan

Agreement amending the agreement of July 10 and September 24, 1956 (TIAS 3663) relating to an investment guaranty program, and providing war risk guaranties under section 413 (b) (4) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 832, 847; 22 U. S. C. 1933). Effected by exchange of notes at Amman November 20, 1957, and February 22, 1958. Entered into force February 22, 1958.

Philippines

Agreement concerning claims arising in connection with SEATO maneuvers during March and April 1957. Effected by exchange of aide memoire at Manila February 6, 1957. Entered into force February 6, 1957.

Designations

Aaron S. Brown as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel, effective April 3.

Leon L. Cowles as Deputy Director of Personnel, effective April 3.

Donald Edgar as Deputy Director of the International Educational Exchange Service, effective April 7.

Henry S. Villard as U.S. Representative to International Organizations and U.S. Consul General at Geneva, Switzerland. (For biographic details, see press release 173 dated April 4.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. TIAS 3930. 95 pp. 30¢.

Protocol amending the preamble and parts II and III of the agreement of October 30, 1947, between the United States of America and Other Governments—Done at Geneva March 10, 1955. Entered into force in part October 7, 1957.

International Sugar Protocol. TIAS 3937. 79 pp. 30¢.

Between the United States of America and Other Governments, amending agreement of October 1, 1953—Dated at London December 1, 1956. Entered into force with respect to the United States of America September 25, 1957.

Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Private Road Vehicles. TIAS 3943. 106 pp. 35¢.

Between the United States of America and Other Governments—Opened for signature at the Headquarters of the United Nations, New York, June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957.

Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. TIAS 3947. 65 pp. 25¢.

Treaty and protocol between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea—Signed at Seoul November 28, 1956. Entered into force November 7, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3959. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with memorandum of understanding and note, between the United States of America and Greece—Signed at Athens December 18, 1957. Entered into force December 18, 1957.

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158	3/31	Department statement on nuclear testing.
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*160	3/31	Educational exchange.
*161	3/31	Educational exchange.
*162	3/31	Howe nominated Ambassador to Chile (biographic details).
†163	4/1	Mann: "The Trade Agreements Program and American Prosperity."
164	4/1	Dulles: news conference.
†165	4/2	Manley appointment (rewrite).
*166	4/2	7th annual awards ceremony.
167	4/3	Economic assistance agreement with Sudan (rewrite).
*168	4/3	ICA insures investment of U.S. firm in U.K.
†169	4/3	Joint U.S.-EURATOM statement.
170	4/4	Dulles: 9th anniversary of NATO.
171	4/4	Germans extend date for filing restitution claims.
†172	4/4	Delegation to ECE (rewrite).
173	4/4	Villard designation (rewrite).
*174	4/4	Evans named Civil Servant of the Year.
175	4/4	U.S. technical cooperation mission to Ghana.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meeting of Heads of Government

Paris, December 1957

TEXTS OF STATEMENTS

The Heads of Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Paris from December 16 to 19, 1957, for the first top-level meeting of the North Atlantic Council since the founding of the Alliance more than 8 years before. They came together because they desired to increase the effectiveness of NATO in relation to current international political, military, and economic problems arising out of the policies of the Soviet Union.

This new Department of State publication contains statements made by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles before and after the meeting; the addresses delivered by Prime Minister Bech, Premier Gaillard, and President Eisenhower at the opening public session; the statements made by Secretary General Spaak and the Heads of Government at the first business session; and the Declaration and Communiqué issued on the final day.

Copies of the publication may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for 50 cents each.

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State

Bulletin



Vol. XXXVIII, No. 983

April 28, 1958

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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April 28, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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President Asks U.S.S.R. To Agree To Begin Study of Specific Disarmament Control Measures

Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

White House press release dated April 8

APRIL 8, 1958

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your communication of April 4 repeating, in substance, the already widely publicized statement of the Soviet Government with reference to the suspension of nuclear testing.¹

It seems peculiar that the Soviet Union, having just concluded a series of tests of unprecedented intensity, should now, in bold headlines, say that it will not test again, but add, in small type, that it may test again if the United States carries out its already long announced and now imminent series of tests.

The timing, wording, and manner of the Soviet declaration cannot but raise questions as to its real significance.

The position of the United States on this matter of testing is well-known. For several years we have been seeking a dependable ending to the accumulation of nuclear weapons and a dependable beginning of the steady reduction of existing weapons stockpiles. This was my "Atoms for Peace" proposal, made in 1953 before the United Nations. Surely, the heart of the nuclear problem is not the mere testing of weapons, but the weap-

ons themselves. If weapons are dependably dealt with, then it is natural to suspend their testing. However, the Soviet Union continues to reject the concept of an internationally supervised program to end weapons production and to reduce weapons stocks. Under those circumstances of the Soviets' making, the United States seeks to develop the defensive rather than the offensive capabilities of nuclear power and to learn how to minimize the fissionable fallout.

It goes without saying that these experiments, so far as the United States is concerned, are so conducted that they cannot appreciably affect human health.

Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you recall the Joint Declaration made by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States at Bermuda on March 24, 1957.² We then declared that we would conduct nuclear tests only in such a manner as would keep world radiation from rising to more than a small fraction of the levels that might be hazardous. We went on to say that we would continue publicly announcing our test series well in advance of their occurrence with information as to their location and general timing.

We further said that we would be willing to register with the United Nations advance notice of our intention to conduct future nuclear tests and to permit limited international observation of such tests if the Soviet Union would do the same.

The Soviet Union has never responded to that invitation. Its latest series of tests was conducted behind a cloak of secrecy, so far as the Soviet Union could make it so. Nevertheless, as I re-

¹ For text of a decree passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on Mar. 31, see BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1958, p. 647.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 8, 1957, p. 561.

cently stated,³ it is the intention of the United States to invite observation by the United Nations of certain of our forthcoming tests.

Not only did the Soviet Union ignore our Bermuda proposal on testing, but it has persistently rejected the substance of my "Atoms for Peace" proposal. It refuses to agree to an internationally supervised cut-off of the use of new fissionable material for weapons purposes and the reduction of existing weapons stocks by transfers to peaceful purposes. During the five years since I first proposed "Atoms for Peace", the destructive power in our nuclear arsenals has steadily mounted, and a dependably controlled reduction of that power becomes ever more difficult.

Mr. Chairman, now that you have become head of the Soviet Government, will you not reconsider your Government's position and accept my proposal that fissionable materials henceforth be manufactured only for peaceful purposes?

If the Soviet Union is as peace-loving as it professes, surely it would want to bring about an internationally supervised diversion of fissionable material from weapons purposes to peace purposes.

If the Soviet Union is unwilling to accept "Atoms for Peace", there are other outstanding proposals by which the Soviet Union can advance the cause of peace. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, my "Open Skies" proposal made to you and Chairman Bulganin in Geneva in 1955.⁴ You will also recall my proposals for the international use of outer space for peaceful purposes emphasized in my recent correspondence with Chairman Bulganin.⁵ These proposals await Soviet acceptance.

The United States is also prepared, in advance of agreement upon any one or more of the outstanding "disarmament" propositions, to work with the Soviet Union, and others as appropriate, on the technical problems involved in international controls. We both recognize that international control would be necessary. Indeed, your present letter to me speaks of "the establishment of the necessary international control for the discontinuance of tests".

What is "necessary"? The question raises problems of considerable complexity, given the

present possibility of conducting some types of tests under conditions of secrecy.

If there is ever to be an agreed limitation or suspension of testing, and the United States hopes and believes that this will in due course come about as part of a broad disarmament agreement, plans for international control should be in instant readiness. Why should we not at once put our technicians to work to study together and advise as to what specific control measures are necessary if there is to be a dependable and agreed disarmament program?

The United Nations General Assembly has called for technical disarmament studies, in relation both to nuclear and conventional armaments. The United States says "yes". I urge, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviet Union should also say "yes". Then we can at once begin the preliminaries necessary to larger things.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: One of the most urgent problems in present international relations which very deeply agitates millions of people in all countries of the world is that of the necessity of the immediate discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons of various kinds. It is easy to understand the deep alarm which the continuing experimental explosions of nuclear weapons arouse among all strata of society, from political personages, scientists, and specialists to ordinary people, the rank and-file workers of city and village, to mothers of families. These tests stimulate the armaments race and promote the development of new and ever more destructive and deadly kinds of nuclear weapons, and thereby still further intensify the threat of atomic war which hangs over mankind.

Moreover, systematic explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons for experimental purposes even now, in peacetime, are causing damage to the health of peaceful unsuspecting, and entirely innocent inhabitants of various countries. In the petition signed by 9235 scientists of 4 countries, including many prominent scientists of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union, and delivered in January of this year to the Secretary General of the United Nations, it is stated that each test of a nuclear bomb increases the quantity of radioactive fallout thereby causing harm to the health of people throughout the entire world and threatening the normal development of coming generations.

Taking all this into account, the Soviet government has come to the conclusion that it is impossible to postpone

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1958, p. 601.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 373.

any longer the solution of the question concerning the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests because it is impossible to allow the health of the people to be irreparably harmed.

Today only three powers so far—the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and Great Britain—possess nuclear weapons, and therefore an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is comparatively easy to reach. However, if the tests are not now discontinued, then after some time other countries may become possessors of nuclear weapons and under such conditions it will of course be a more complicated matter to reach an agreement on the discontinuance of the tests.

During the last three years the Soviet government has repeatedly approached the governments of the United States of America and of Great Britain with proposals to discontinue tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. In as much as both the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain have not wished to agree to discontinue nuclear tests without specifying a time limit, the Soviet Union advanced a proposal of its own, that is, to discontinue these tests, at first even for a limited time, for two or three years, for example. The proposals of the U.S.S.R. on this question provide for the establishment of the necessary international control for the discontinuance of tests.

Despite all this, it has unfortunately been impossible up to now to come to an agreement for settling the question concerning an unconditional and immediate discontinuance of nuclear tests, or even concerning a temporary suspension.

Guided by the desire to make a practical beginning to the discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons everywhere and thereby take the first step in the direction of a final liberation of mankind from the threat of a destructive atomic war, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has decreed the discontinuance in the Soviet Union of tests of all kinds of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

The Soviet Government, implementing this decree of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., *decided to discontinue unilaterally, as of March 31, 1958, tests of any kind of atomic and hydrogen weapons.*

The Soviet Government addresses to the Government of the United States of America, and also to the Government of Great Britain, a proposal to join in these measures.

If the governments of the countries which now have nuclear weapons at their disposal support this proposal of the U.S.S.R. and in their turn adopt a decision to re-

nounce further tests, then the question which so deeply agitates the peoples of the whole world will finally be resolved and a great step will thereby be taken toward the establishment of genuine trust among states and toward the strengthening of peace.

However, if the governments of the countries with the nuclear weapons at their disposal do not wish to respond to this decision of the Soviet Government and prefer to leave things as they were before and continue experiments with atomic and hydrogen weapons, then in such case the Soviet Union, in the interests of ensuring its own safety, will of course have no alternative other than that of considering itself freed from any obligation undertaken by it in regard to the discontinuance of nuclear tests. The Soviet Government would not like to see matters take such a course.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. expresses the sincere hope that the Government of the United States of America will join in the initiative of the Soviet Union and will thereby make possible the discontinuance forever of nuclear weapon tests everywhere.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government it would be appropriate if our two countries—the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., which were the first to create atomic and hydrogen weapons and to possess considerable stocks of these weapons—would come forth as leaders in the noble cause of the immediate cessation of nuclear tests.

This first practical step on the path toward the protection of mankind against the calamities with which it is threatened by modern nuclear weapons would enormously facilitate the advance toward a solution of the problem, that is, the complete liberation of peoples from the threat of an atomic war. Hardly anyone will deny that the discontinuance of experiments with atomic and hydrogen weapons would greatly improve the international political atmosphere as a whole and would create more favorable conditions for the settlement of other unsolved international problems.

Permit me, Mr. President, to express the hope that the proposals of the Soviet Government stated above will meet with a favorable attitude on the part of the Government of the United States of America.

With sincere esteem,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

April 4, 1958

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 8

Press release 179 dated April 8

Secretary Dulles: You will, I think, have in your hands by now the text of President Eisenhower's reply to his first communication from Chairman Khrushchev in the place of Chairman Bulganin.¹

The heart of that lies in the last paragraph which again presses the Soviet Union at least to begin some of the technical studies about supervision and control which we both agree are the necessary prelude to any agreement on control or limitation of armaments or inspection against surprise attack. We see no reason at all why, if there is really good faith on the part of the Soviet Union—and we trust there is—at least the technical studies should not now be gotten under way.

We will await a reply on that, as we also await a reply to the three-power note or memorandum communicated to the Soviet Government now about 10 days ago² inviting the beginning of diplomatic talks to see whether or not a summit conference can usefully be held.

Now for your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any idea what is meant by Premier Khrushchev's public references to the possibility of international supervision over the suspension of atomic-energy tests?

A. No, we don't know, and that is one of the reasons why it would be useful to have these technical studies to find out whether we are thinking at all in the same terms. We have conducted here in our own Government intensive technical studies to ascertain what would be necessary to have a dependable agreement on, let's say, the suspension of testing, and we have that work now pretty well completed.

A recent report was made by a group which had

¹ See p. 679.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1958, p. 648.

³ James R. Killian, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

been set up by Dr. Killian³ to study that very subject. We don't know whether we are thinking along the same lines at all as the Soviet Union. When we talk about international supervision, I notice, for example, the press reported yesterday the intention of the Soviet Union to use nuclear power for explosion in tunnels and various underground areas ostensibly for civil purposes.

You cannot tell from a distance of several thousand miles whether an explosion of that character is actually for civil purposes or whether it is for military purposes. So that there would have to be, we think, a considerable degree of inspection. The teams would have to have some mobility to establish a supervision of a cessation of testing that was effective. But whether or not the Soviet Union is thinking along those lines we don't know. That is the reason why we think it would be useful to get started at least on some of the technical studies while the other problems are being debated—the questions of principle.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the President's letter he asked Chairman Khrushchev to reconsider his Government's position and accept a proposal that fissionable material can be manufactured only for peaceful purposes. Do you anticipate the Russians might unilaterally announce a reduction or cutoff of this fissionable material, and would that satisfy his request?

A. No, it would not satisfy. You asked whether the Soviets might announce it. I would not attempt myself to put any limits on what they might announce. The question of what they might allow to be supervised, controlled, and checked is a totally different matter. An announcement which assures no element of supervision or control must, I think, be judged, in the absence of further evidence, as primarily propaganda material rather than a move which is designed actually to allay concern or to assure others that a new situation has been created.

Probability of Detection

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the Killian study. Is it the conclusion of that study, and therefore the administration's, that inspection and control is possible to eliminate the degree of risk to a point which this Government would accept?

A. Very definitely they come to the conclusion that a fairly complex system is required to eliminate totally the risk—I don't think they believe that any system of supervision would be proof against all possible evasions. But I think there is one factor that we can properly take into account; namely, that if there is an agreement to suspend, an international agreement coupled with sufficient supervision so that there would be a high degree of probability that evasion would be detected, then that of itself creates a considerable likelihood that evasion will not be attempted. That is because the consequences of an evasion that gets caught might be so serious as to more than balance out the advantages of the surreptitious testing.

Q. In fact you are rejecting the contention that the Russians could cheat on any inspection system. Is that correct?

A. No, I think I said that the report indicates that there cannot be absolutely 100 percent assurance of detection of everything. But I also suggested, I think, that that is perhaps not necessary if you create a high probability that an evasion would be detected. We doubt whether the advantage to be gained from such an attempted secret test would more than balance out the risk that would be involved if you get caught.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would such a system require an exemption for civil purposes or the development of atomic explosions for use in petroleum exploitation and digging up harbors and canals, et cetera?

A. I think there would have to be a sufficient supervision to determine whether a nuclear explosion was in fact for civil purposes or whether it was an explosion of weapons under the guise of being for civil purposes.

Q. What I mean, there would have to be an exemption to allow continuance of this benign—or do we propose to forgo those?

A. No, I don't think they should be forgone. I think the advantages would be so great there

should remain the possibility of the use of nuclear power for civilian purposes of that sort. But, if there is to be an agreement that they will not explode for weapons purposes, then there must be some way of deciding which the particular explosion is.

Detection Stations

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk of the high degree of probability that such tests could be detected, are you talking in terms of having inspection within the territory of the Soviet Union and the United States and not a ring of stations around the border states?

A. That is correct. There would have to be a number of stations within the areas of possible explosion with a degree of mobility to permit them to go to an area where there was a suspicious development to ascertain whether or not it was an earthquake or an explosion and, if it was an explosion, whether it is for civil purposes or for military purposes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us if this report indicates that no hydrogen megaton-range explosion can be detected from outside countries without inspection or whether this is referring to atomic tests?

A. I do not think we yet know the degree of detectability from a distance of explosions at a very high altitude. I don't think there is enough knowledge about that so that I can give a positive answer to the question.

Q. What about supervision against the cutoff? What about inspection to make sure the fissionable material is cut off from production? Do we have any knowledge yet there is a feasible inspection to get cutoff of fissionable material?

A. Yes, we have made studies on that subject and are of the opinion there can be a reasonably effective protection there. I would say that, as the use of nuclear power grows for civilian purposes—for nonmilitary purposes—the degree of risk that must be taken is even greater than in the case of supervising against the test explosions. To get anything approaching complete protection, it would require a degree of inspection into factories, plants, and power plants, and the like, which probably would not be very practical. But we do believe again that it is possible to have a

degree of inspection which gives a sufficient degree of exposure so that cutoff would be acceptable.

I think, in this whole area, we have to recognize that certain risks must be taken. There are risks if you do, and there are risks if you don't. Certainly to allow this whole atomic-nuclear development to go ahead without any control, without any supervision at all, that involves very great risks too. So one has to balance the risks on one side and the other and strike something that would be acceptable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to pursue that question of nonmilitary explosion—in a speech last week Senator Humphrey said that testimony before his disarmament subcommittee had disclosed the same technology which might make nuclear explosives usable in peaceful pursuits might also be applied to making weapons with vast dimensions of radioactive fallout. Therefore it would not be necessary to allow nations to continue tests of so-called clean weapons but only to allow an international agency or an agency under international control to develop nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. Could you comment on that?

A. I am afraid that I might make some mistake if I commented on that. This whole field is so highly technical that really I think questions of that sort should probably be addressed to the Atomic Energy Commission. I don't have the technical knowledge which would enable me to judge the accuracy of that statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the Killian report be made public and, if not, why not?

A. I just don't know whether it is going to be made public or not. If not, I am sure there will be good reasons for it. (Laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, what order or number of stations within the area inside the Soviet Union would be required to give a sufficient degree of protection on testing?

A. You are wanting to prejudice the answer to the last question. That is in the Killian report. If I understand correctly, you ask the estimate of the number, the character of the stations that would be required in various countries. Is that your question?

Q. Well, specifically in the case of the Soviet Union, Mr. Stassen, while he was, I believe, still

in an official position in the Government, used a figure of the order of 20 or 24 or something like that. It is a question which comes up so much that any specific information which we could rely on would be useful.

A. I would say this, that the estimates have gone up since the time that the study was made that was reflected in Mr. Stassen's report that you refer to.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to U.S. policy in the Middle East the view has been expressed rather widely of late that the United States had a choice of two courses toward Nasser, either to try to block the further spread of his influence in that part of the world or to try to get along with him, and that we aren't doing one or the other. Could you comment on that, sir?

A. I think we are getting along with him, as far as I am aware.

Policy on Arms Shipments to Indonesia

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia this morning called in your Ambassador Howard Jones, to take exception to a statement that Mr. [Lincoln] White [Chief of the News Division] made yesterday in the course of which he said that the U.S. regretted Indonesia's buying Communist arms for possible use in killing Indonesians who openly opposed the growing influence of communism in Indonesia. The Foreign Minister asked Mr. Jones for clarification of that which he interprets as United States Government siding with the rebels to some extent. I realize you haven't had Mr. Jones' relay from the Foreign Minister yet, probably, but I wonder if you could clarify the U.S. attitude on this arm deal particularly. Is that accurate, as stated yesterday?

A. The United States has a broad policy with respect to arms, which, I am sorry to say, seems not to be shared by the Soviet-bloc countries. We believe that arms should be supplied to a country from without only in accordance with certain fairly well-defined principles. One of these is the need of a country to have defense against possible aggression from without. The other is to have small arms which would be required for a normal police force and the forces required to maintain internal order against subversive activities.

ties and the like which would not be of great proportions and not stimulated from abroad. But we do not believe that the promiscuous spreading of large amounts of major armaments around the world is a sound or a healthy practice. We try not to indulge in that ourselves. And we would be glad if others followed the same practice. That is the principle that has guided us in general in different parts of the world. I would not say that there is any principle that I can define here with sufficient elaboration to cover every possible contingency, and perhaps every rule has its exception. But, broadly speaking, those are our principles. A spreading of arms, which may be primarily designed for offensive operations, is not something that we approve of.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does this mean that the United States would turn down a new request from the Indonesian Government for arms?

A. Turn down a new request?

Q. Yes.

A. There is, I think, [a report of a new request, but that has not yet been actually received]. We got a request back last July, as I recall, for a very large amount of arms indeed. We asked the Indonesian Government for certain clarifications about that request. It turned out that what they were requesting was an amount of arms of the value between \$600 million and \$700 million. Shortly after that there were statements made about the West New Guinea or West Irian situation, whichever you call it, which came with the failure of Indonesia to get a two-thirds vote for a United Nations resolution which they wanted. These statements indicated that they might want to use force to produce the result which they had failed to get through the peaceful processes of the United Nations. In the light of those indications which came from Indonesia it did not seem that it would fit in with the United States policy to allow the export of any such vast quantity of arms as the Indonesian Government has referred to, nor did it seem to be any likelihood at all that there was in any quarter a threat of aggression against Indonesia which would require any such quantity of arms. That was the situation which continued until later on when the revolt broke out, and it did not seem wise to the United States to be in the position of supplying arms to either side of

that civil revolution. That conforms, generally speaking, to our policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last week you told us that the Indonesian crisis was an internal matter and that the United States attitude had to be absolutely correct. Does yesterday's statement indicate a change in this attitude?

A. No; I am sure it is still our view that the situation there is primarily an internal one, and we intend to conform scrupulously to the principles of international law that apply to such a situation. It is quite true that the Soviet bloc is now supplying large amounts of arms under conditions which we hardly think is good international practice. But I use "good" in the sense of standards of judgment which are beyond those of accepted international law at the present time. We do not question that what is going on is within the compass of accepted principles of international law. They do not conform to what would be and has been United States policy with respect to the disposal of arms around the world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we received a request for arms from the Indonesian rebels in Sumatra?

A. No, we have not.

Psychological Warfare

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower suggested at his last press conference we might have a psychological warfare expert in the Department. Are there any plans along that line?

A. No, there are no plans along that line. The problem is a very difficult one because I don't think that you can separate psychological warfare from the substantive work that we are doing. That can be done perhaps in the Soviet Union, where they can conduct psychological warfare as a separate compartment and isolate it from what they are doing in terms of their own policy, foreign or domestic. They conduct psychological warfare on that basis. As I pointed out before, they say one thing in France about their attitude toward Algeria; they say another thing in Algeria and North Africa as to their attitude toward Algeria. They put their psychological warfare in compartments, and they conduct it purely from a propaganda standpoint as to what they think will win favor in different parts of the world. They do that almost irrespective of what, in fact, they are

doing as a matter of policy, both international and domestic. Now we can't operate on that basis. We can't have propaganda which is any better than, or any different from, what we actually are doing as a matter of policy and a matter of practice. So that, while I think we can present our case more effectively than we have been doing, I don't think we can do it by trying to put propaganda in a totally separate compartment from policymaking and operations.

Q. On that point, propaganda and policy are so closely connected, is there any plan to revitalize your own policy-planning board?

A. We are thinking of what we can do to try to operate more effectively in this field. I think that we are registering some improvement. Now you take the President's reply in this letter to Khrushchev. We got the Soviet note in a Russian text late Friday afternoon. We got it translated by Saturday morning. We got a reply completed by Monday noon and on its way to Moscow, the intervening days being the Saturday before Easter and Easter Sunday itself. And in the course of that time we consulted with the United Kingdom, which had received a similar note, and we also informed our NATO allies. Now I think that is a fairly good record, at least as far as making a quick reply is concerned. We are trying to do things like that, to speed up.

Now I would add this, when you speed up, particularly when you do it over an Easter weekend, you don't have as good an opportunity to consult with everybody as you like. You might have to sacrifice a little bit of perfection in getting out a quick reply. But I think, on the whole, that it is important to deal with these things quickly, and I think that what we did over this Easter weekend is a demonstration that at least in one respect we are trying to speed up our operations so as not to give the Soviet propaganda line a free run for as long a time as has often been the case in the past.

We had a statement ready,⁴ in anticipation of Mr. Gromyko's speech, which was released instantly, as soon as we got the substance of what he was saying, and we emphasized the fact that the Soviets, although they talk a lot about wanting to have disarmament and so forth, are in effect defying at almost every level the United Nations,

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1958, p. 646.

which is the agreed forum for dealing with these things.

I do believe that as a result of experience we are improving our techniques somewhat, not in terms of trying to match them in kind, because we can't and don't want to match them in kind, but in terms of trying to get our viewpoint out more quickly and more effectively. We are studying the whole area with a view to trying to improve our techniques.

Free-World Propaganda Initiative

Q. Mr. Secretary, these are replies. Is it possible in a free world or in a democracy to take the initiative?

A. Well, it is in a sense a reply, but it is also an initiative. The series of exchanges that have been taking place here go back now to such a remote date that it is almost impossible to know which is the chicken and which is the egg from that standpoint. (Laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the problem that you outline, why would it not be wise to appoint one or two or several people full time to the job of psychological warfare? I think most of us realize that a good propaganda, so-called, is based mainly on a good policy. But do you think enough attention has been paid to articulating this policy? Do you think enough attention has been paid, for example, to making sure that the sentences in the various Government announcements and letters that we put out are clearly written so that people can understand them? I was just wondering what view you have on that. (Laughter)

A. Well, I don't know whether a professor of English would be a great addition to our propaganda effort. I think, you know, when you try to get linguistic perfection, you lose something of the thrust that comes when people express themselves more or less spontaneously, even though the English isn't always perfect. Perhaps that is not exactly what you meant. Perhaps you think that some expert in writing could enable us to express ourselves more effectively than we do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as a case in point, what Mr. [John] Scali [of the Associated Press] said, do we understand by the statement of the President this morning that we would consider, on these

technical group studies, meeting with them on just the technical group concerned with suspension of tests, or do we want several study groups set up?

A. I think that almost any testing or supervising system requires, at least at the beginning, a number of studies which would be applicable to all. You have got questions as to who conducts them, the nationals of what country, the means of communication, et cetera. There are a number of problems of that sort which are common to all. So that I think we could make a useful start without seeming to give a priority or exclusiveness to one as against another.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the President, in the reply before this last note or the note before that,⁵ said to Mr. Bulganin that perhaps we should stop this dialogue, this letter-writing debate, and that since they have not stopped it, we are changing our policy and are going to out-write them; we are going to say, okay, if you want it that way, we will do better? Is that what you're saying, in effect, has happened within the last few weeks?

A. I don't think that there is any change in our view that, if there is a sincere desire to get into agreement on some of these matters and get started on something, the way to do it is not by writing public letters which purport to be signed by the head of the Soviet Government and directed to the head of another. We believe that that is an effort to put the thing on a propaganda plane rather than upon a plane of sincere effort. Nevertheless, if they persist in doing this, I think we have to reply somewhat in kind, although we would very much prefer to have these matters dealt with on a level where we could really expect to make some progress rather than on a level which is primarily a propaganda level.

I would point out that there is a slight gain, perhaps, in that, I think, the last letter from Mr. Khrushchev is approximately one-third of the length of the last letter from Bulganin. (Laughter)

Disarmament

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this letter today, is it a fair reading that the United States is now prepared to accept or to limit its disarmament package to

⁵ *Ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 273.

the matters discussed here—that is, test suspension, production offset, and stockpile reduction, all with inspection? That is also unclear in the semantics as to whether we would be prepared to accept those things separate from all the other issues that were in the London package.

A. No, I think you will find a reference made in one place to being as part of "a broad disarmament agreement" and in another place a reference to "nuclear and conventional armaments." We are not prepared to abandon the position that the program upon which we are embarked ought to cover as many aspects of disarmament as is possible, including the conventional, which are, as I pointed out here before, of very great importance to some of our European allies, and they would be very reluctant to see the nuclear problem dealt with apart from the conventional.

Now that doesn't mean that we are not prepared to take up technical studies which would deal just with the nuclear problem. Also, I have already indicated we would be prepared to deal with technical studies dealing with the problem of outer space quite apart from anything else.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what information do you have on the arrest of seven American newsmen in Cuba, and what is your reaction to this report?

A. Well, the only information I have is that I heard it over a radio this morning just before I left my house to come to the office.

Q. Are any steps being taken, do you know, on the behalf of these people?

A. I couldn't tell you that. It's too recent.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with this business of speeding up in the American Government's responses and initiatives in the propaganda, psychological-warfare field, is there any thought being given to not only responding quickly but anticipating possible Soviet moves, and putting out some sort of statement which might take all the sting out of the possible effect of what the Soviets might do?

A. Yes. I pointed out at my last press conference⁶ that we gave quite a lot of study to the possibility of giving out a statement designed to anticipate Mr. Gromyko's statement. In view of the uncertainty as to just what his statement

⁶ *Ibid.*, Apr. 21, 1958, p. 639.

would be and the difficulty of establishing a position which would effectively counteract that, particularly in view of our allied relationships, we had decided not to do that particular thing. But that doesn't mean that we would not do it wherever we have a clear field in which to do it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you indicate, there has been no change in the American disarmament position so far as breaking up the package and so on; would not these talks be a continuation of the London talks which broke down in deadlock?

A. No, because the London talks that broke down in deadlock broke down because of disagreement on the basic principles that were involved. Now we have always felt it would be useful, and might perhaps be helpful in reaching an agreement on principles, if we started at it from the other end, that is, see what we would actually do to carry out any agreement. I think, if we could find an area of agreement there and a climate of good will, that that would help us very much perhaps to reach an agreement on principles.

U.S. Position on Suspension of Tests

Q. Mr. Secretary, it isn't yet clear, at least to me, whether the Russians will maintain their unilateral suspension of nuclear tests after our forthcoming tests. But I take it, from the discussion of the package and discussion of the continuing necessity for inspection, that that would make no difference as far as we are concerned, that we would still not be ready to join in any unilateral suspension of tests without inspection. Is my impression correct?

A. Well, as far as your doubt about the meaning of the Soviet statement, I think that is a doubt which all reasonable men can share. They have certainly left that open, by what President Eisenhower refers to as the "small type," to go on testing after what would be a normal interval of suspension. We all of us, who are doing these things, have a period of preparation and then a period of activation. There has to be an interval of about 6 months in between. They have had roughly a period of 6 months or so of very intensive testing which is now drawing to an end. In the normal course of events they would not have any more testing until next fall. We have had a period of suspension of about 6 months. We will now have a period of testing which will

end in the late summer. So that, if they want to, they can pick up again quite in the normal course, without breaking their stride at all, on the ground that we have not responded to their suggestion that we should stop the present tests. Now that answers the first question that you put. I have forgotten by now what the second half was.

Q. The second was, should they maintain their suspension of tests even after we complete our series, would we then be ready to join them in that, or, as I conclude from what has been said today, we would still not be ready to join them?

A. We would not suspend testing merely on the basis of their declaration, without supervision and control, unless and until we came to the conclusion that we had gained from the testing substantially all of the information that we needed in order to make cleaner weapons and smaller weapons and the like. Now whether or not that may be the case, following the next series of tests, I just can't tell. Nobody can tell, because we don't know what the tests are going to disclose.

Q. Is it a hope that, if these tests are completed successfully, they may provide enough information so that without any great risk we could go ahead and suspend testing for some time to come.

A. I think that we all hope that. I would say that, on the basis of what I learned, there is a likelihood that there will be a need for some further testing in some of the areas which probably will not be fully explored by the next series of tests. So you have to make a difference between hope and expectation. I think that we would be happily surprised if we got all the information we needed out of this series of tests, but we may get most of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the shipment of arms, the Department, I think, suspended a shipment of arms to Cuba recently which the Cuban Government wanted somewhat for the purposes you outlined a moment ago. Can you tell me whether the Department has completed its study of the need for those arms by the Government of Cuba and what its decision is?

A. No. I don't know that the study has been completed. As you point out, the action was taken in accord with the broad policy I have indicated, that we allow arms to go to other countries primarily to meet international defense re-

quirements—in this case, the needs of hemispheric defense, where Cuba has a very definite role assigned to it. But we don't like to have large shipments of arms, particularly of a large caliber, as distinguished from just small arms that might be required by normal police force—we don't like to have those go where the purpose is to conduct a civil war.

Q. Thank you, sir.

International Cooperation Through Aviation

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

The central theme of your conference is "The Humanities of Aviation." That is a most appropriate subject for exploration at this time. Too frequently the humanitarian role of aviation is lost sight of because of emphasis on the destructive potentiality of aircraft. Your discussions here can help to counteract the misconception that aviation developments are primarily of military significance. Such groups as yours prove that modern aviation has given the peoples of the world an unparalleled opportunity to learn to cooperate instead of to fight.

The United States attaches the greatest importance to international cooperation through aviation. But it should be clear to all of us that that cooperation can only be effective if firmly based on sound principles. Cooperation cannot long last in a climate of arbitrary government decisions. The way to real cooperation lies in acceptance of the proposition that civil aviation should be designed to permit maximum contact and understanding among the peoples of the world.

The United States seeks to respond to this fundamental concept. President Eisenhower has frequently expressed his strong conviction that all the world benefits from international travel by people in all walks of life. No better formula for arousing mutual interest and creating mutual understanding has been found than physical and spiritual contact among the peoples of the world.

¹Made before the Aero Club of Washington and the delegates to the 51st annual conference of the *Fédération Aéronautique Internationale* at Washington, D. C., on Apr. 9 (press release 184).

It makes little difference whether international travel is motivated by business, cultural, scientific, or purely recreational interests. The fact is that the international contact resulting from such travel, in each instance, dispels prejudices and narrows the gulf between people of different nationalities. The speed, convenience, and economy of aviation have now brought international travel within the reach of many people to whom it was previously denied. Thus we progress toward a truly international world.

As the complexities of world politics multiply, the importance of air communications in intergovernmental relations increases proportionately. My own experience as an air passenger offers evidence on this point. Those who have kept track of my whereabouts estimate that since my appointment as Secretary of State in 1953 I have traveled nearly 500,000 miles by air, almost 90 percent of that internationally. And despite some impressions to the contrary I am not the only high government official who travels.

Aviation interests have recognized their broad responsibilities to facilitate and encourage the international interchange of passengers, mail, and cargo in every way at their command. They have thereby made a great contribution to the development of broader perspectives in the people of the world.

It is significant to note that the *Fédération Aéronautique Internationale* charter, written over half a century ago, foresaw that aeronautics should be developed

By making evident the essentially international spirit of aeronautics as a powerful instrument for uniting the peoples of the world;

and

By encouraging and developing solidarity and mutual assistance in the field of aeronautics among the nations of the world.

The farsighted drafters of your charter merit praise for the goals they set for us.

Today aviation is able to defy natural barriers between nations. But it cannot ignore modern-day principles of airspace sovereignty. International aviation, despite its ability to surmount the physical limitations of earlier days, cannot exist without international cooperation. Such cooperation is not limited purely to the interchange of air privileges and the reduction of entry formalities but must also include mutual exchanges

of knowledge and techniques in the field of aviation. Aviation cannot survive in a world where skills are the exclusive asset of a few. Skills and equipment to meet the ancillary requirements of telecommunications, navigational facilities and services, and operational practices must be available all about the globe on a relatively uniform basis.

Technical Cooperation in Aviation

Nations less advanced in the art of modern aviation desire to meet accepted standards and practices. Also the more advanced nations desire to see those standards established everywhere. There results a broad use of technical assistance projects which seek to achieve mutual benefit by equalizing proficiency at the most highly developed level.

The United States seeks to contribute in this respect. As of today we are maintaining civil-aviation assistance groups assigned to 26 countries and offering cooperative services to a total of 46 countries. In addition it has been made possible for aviation specialists from 44 foreign lands to come to the United States to observe and learn our way of doing things in all phases of aviation activities. At the same time we have also learned from them.

Technical cooperation in the aviation world has not been limited to bilateral arrangements. The remarkable postwar development of civil aviation can, in substantial part, be attributed to multilateral enterprise and foresight. The efforts of the International Civil Aviation Organization in setting standards to meet international aviation requirements have proven indispensable. Furthermore, its contribution to the accomplishment of those standards is glowing evidence of what can be achieved through united effort toward mutually advantageous objectives. The International Air Transport Association, too, has proven that even the highly competitive international airline industry has much to gain through cooperation. Only through pooling of the world's skills have we achieved the aeronautical knowledge we have today.

The modern turbojet engine is a good example of what international cooperation can produce. The aeronautical scientists and engineers of many countries have contributed to the international development of the original invention. Although

born in wartime and originally limited in use to military aircraft, this type of propulsion was perfected through mutual exchanges of technical data and cooperation of objectives. It is destined in the near future to revolutionize civil aviation as we know it today.

In many other respects do we see the interrelation of military and civil aviation. The military provision of supplementary air-navigation facilities and services, of communications and meteorological services, and of other aids to civil air operations materially benefits the orderly expansion of these operations. And where do we look for search-and-rescue support? Military aviation offers unstinting assistance in the protection of life. Too little note is given to the wide range of military mercy missions in the international fields of disaster relief, agricultural crises, regional emergencies, and the like, except by the immediate beneficiaries. These activities certainly come under the heading of international cooperation of the highest degree. They demonstrate the basic unity of spirit in the field of aviation.

Military aviation's contributions to the civilian population, however, do not stop at the purely tangible acts of cooperation and assistance. Aviation is a dynamic field in which each experience, each bit of knowledge or information, each development has an overall significance. Advances in the aeronautical sciences mean improvement in the reliability and performance of aircraft operation whether they be designed for military or civil uses.

Guidelines of U.S. Policy

What the future holds in this vast and challenging area of human endeavor is as yet unknown. But the guidelines of United States policy have been clearly laid down. In a very deep sense they stem from President Eisenhower's statement at the time he made his proposals at the United Nations General Assembly concerning the peaceful uses of atomic power:²

... the United States pledges before you—and therefore before the world . . . to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

The spirit of American policy in matters that more especially concern this gathering is the

² BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

same: President Eisenhower's open-skies proposals at Geneva in 1955 opened up a new role for aviation in the maintenance of world peace. Aerial photography by unarmed, peaceful planes was urged, in this Geneva statement, as the start of a broader system of inspection which could well be the foundation of effective disarmament. The Soviet Union has, for nearly 3 years, evaded a clear response. But we have not given up hope or determination that aviation shall make its distinctive contribution to peace. Indeed we see no other way by which so much security against surprise attack can be achieved and a solid basis thus provided for reduction of armaments. President Eisenhower again yesterday urged Chairman Khrushchev to accept the open-skies proposal.³ We earnestly hope that in this way aviation will be permitted to make the immense contribution to peace of which it is capable.

The governments of the free world are inspired by concepts that are markedly similar to those which underlie the charter of the *Fédération Aéronautique Internationale*: the desire to be of service and a sense of comradeship in such service; belief in the inherent goodness of man and his deep wish for true peace; belief in the unity and partnership of the free nations as defenders of the peace; and belief that aviation can indispensably serve all of the world in the search for the peace and security and community that all men want.

Anniversary of Fall of Bataan

Following is the text of a message sent on April 8 by President Eisenhower to President Carlos P. García of the Philippines on the occasion of Bataan Day, April 9.

White House press release dated April 8

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On this 16th Anniversary of the Fall of Bataan, an event which we commemorate with sadness, but with pride, I extend best wishes to you and to the people of the Philippines on behalf of the people of the United States.

The symbol of Bataan, the offering of the ultimate sacrifice by friends for one another, is an ideal so rarely witnessed that it will inspire free-

³ See p. 679.

dom-loving men always. That together we have carried on our struggle for the preservation of liberty with justice does honor to the memory of our fallen sons and comrades.

Our mutual friendship has been nourished by the spirit of Bataan. May it continue to grow.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

U.S. Grants Wheat to Tunisia

Press release 186 dated April 10

A grant of up to 20,000 tons of U.S. wheat to help relieve the critical unemployment situation in Tunisia was announced on April 10 by the Department of State. About one-third of the work force in Tunisia is presently unemployed.

The grain will be made available to the North African country by the International Cooperation Administration under provisions of title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480). This provision, which ICA administers, authorizes the use of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for emergency purposes.

The wheat will be used by the Government of Tunisia as payment in kind to persons given employment on the governmental development projects now being launched to relieve unemployment in the country. The Government of Tunisia itself has earmarked the equivalent of \$2.4 million of its own resources to support the employment program in which the grain will be used.

It is estimated that the proposed joint Tunisian-U.S. employment program will give jobs to an average of 40,000 Tunisians, or approximately 10 percent of those now out of work, for a period of 5 months. Since the average Tunisian worker has four to five dependents, this will mean that more than 200,000 people will benefit directly.

The ICA document formally making the wheat available to the Tunisian Government was signed on April 9 by the Tunisian Ambassador to the United States, Mongi Slim.

The wheat will be shipped in two vessels, each carrying 10,000 tons. Arrangements are now being made to start moving the grain from the United States to Tunisia as soon as possible, probably within 2 or 3 weeks.

The Trade Agreements Program and American Prosperity

by Thomas C. Mann

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

The subject I want to talk about with you, the trade agreements program, is as important to Texas as to any other State in the Nation.² In October 1957 the value of the commercial exports and imports, excluding military shipments, handled by the seaports of Texas totaled, just in that one month, \$165 million. The magnificent Houston ship channel has made that city the Nation's second largest port in tonnage of cargo handled. Texas farms and industries are dependent on foreign trade both for markets and for sources of supply.

And as it is with Texas, so it is with the Nation. It was in recognition of the importance of foreign trade to our national prosperity that Congress first passed the Trade Agreements Act in 1934. Then the executive branch and Congress were seeking ways to end the disastrous decline in our foreign trade which had resulted from the high, rigid tariffs of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and from the restrictive measures which other nations had taken in retaliation. Foreign trade was rightly regarded as a means of hastening the end of the great depression.

Today, 24 years later, we are in another economic decline. Surely we must not repeat the errors of the past. If we do, we can expect to see again a decline not only in the foreign trade of the United States but in world trade, and this will

seriously deepen the recession at home and extend its effects over the entire free world.

As a result of our liberal trade policy, our exports climbed from \$2.1 billion in 1934 to a record \$19.5 billion in 1957. This means that exports now form a larger share of our national product than the building of nonfarm homes, the production of automobiles, the production of furniture and other household equipment, or the production for sale of all farm crops. Exports in 1956 equaled in value our output of crude or prepared minerals and approached the value of consumer purchases of clothing and shoes. We are familiar with what a small decline in automobile production can mean to our economy; we need to be more familiar with the equally serious effects of a drop in U.S. exports.

Imports have also increased since 1934—from \$1.7 billion then to \$13.0 billion in 1957. Their contribution to American prosperity lies in the fact that we are dependent on imports for many materials essential to American industry, from tin to industrial diamonds, and many commodities highly desired by the American palate, from coffee to bananas. And, of course, imports are the primary means by which other countries earn the dollars with which to buy our exports. Without a high level of imports, a high level of exports would be impossible.

How Foreign Trade Affects Individual Interests

But my experience has been that many people who are willing to concede the importance of foreign trade to that vast abstraction, the American economy, still fail to see the importance of trade to their own lives, as businessmen, farmers, workers, or consumers. The contribution of for-

¹ Address made before the Owens Foundation Conference on International Trade and Economic Development at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex., on Apr. 2 (press release 163 dated Apr. 1).

² For an address made by President Eisenhower at the National Conference of Organizations on International Trade Policy, together with remarks made by Secretary Dulles and Deputy Under Secretary Dillon at the same meeting, see BULLETIN of Apr. 14, 1958, p. 591.

ign trade to American industry, for example, is far greater than the business it provides to those engaged directly in the handling of exports and imports. Almost every important industry exports part of its production. Eleven percent of our output of machine tools, 14 percent of our coal, 19 percent of our trucks, 26 percent of our construction and mining equipment, 29 percent of our sulphur—much of that, of course, from Texas—and 33 percent of our civilian aircraft are sold abroad.

These industries, and others with a lesser stake in export markets, could not continue to operate without imports. We now obtain from abroad one-quarter of our iron ore, one-third of our copper and rubber, and most of our newsprint and aluminum. Still other materials, most of them unfamiliar to the general public but no less essential to the industries which require them, are entirely or almost entirely imported. In this category are such minerals as tin, nickel, manganese, chrome, antimony, cobalt, tungsten, cadmium, mica, and asbestos.

And, of course, for every business and industry that is dependent on exports and imports there are the employees of that business, whose jobs depend wholly or partly on a high level of foreign trade. Government statisticians have estimated that in 1952 some 976,000 farmers and other agricultural workers and about 2,150,000 nonagricultural employees were engaged in production for export. Another 450,000 people were engaged in the transportation and distribution of imports, and about 800,000 were employed in the first processing of imported materials, that is, in working up imports which came into this country either as raw materials or as semifinished goods. A total of 4,376,000 were thus estimated to be directly or indirectly dependent on foreign trade for their livelihood. This figure is estimated to stand today at about 4½ million persons, or about 7 percent of the labor force. Deprive these people of their jobs and you would double the number of unemployed, even in this recession period.

The number of workers dependent upon exports in specific industries can, of course, range far above the national average. A 1947 study indicated that 13 percent of the employees of the chemical industry, 13 percent of those employed in the coal and petroleum-products industry, 15 percent of the textile-mill workers, 17 percent of

those in the iron and steel industry, and 20 percent of those employed in manufacturing agricultural, mining, and construction machinery owed their jobs to exports.

I have mentioned the farmer in passing, but his interest in world trade deserves particular mention, if for no other reason than that his stake in foreign trade has been one of long standing. Unfortunately, the American farmer has been threatened in recent years by the loss of many of his traditional foreign markets, due to a combination of domestic prices which were above the world market level and increased agricultural production in other countries. Special programs have been found necessary to enable the farmer to hold his place in world trade. In the 1956-57 crop year these programs were particularly successful, and more than 85 percent of our rice production, almost 54 percent of our wheat, 26 percent of our tobacco, and 61 percent of our cotton were exported. But no amount of special programs to assist agricultural exports will avail if the produce of other countries is excluded from our markets. Japan, for instance, cannot remain the biggest single purchaser of American cotton if every Japanese product which begins to sell well in this country is suddenly barred. With farm exports, as with industrial products, we must buy if we want to sell.

Businessmen, workers, farmers—all have an interest in foreign trade. But one major group, the biggest and most important group of all, has not been mentioned: the American consumer. He benefits from the lower prices and greater variety of goods which imports make available to him. Anything made out of sugar would be much more expensive if imports of sugar were cut off. The price of an American automobile would be sharply increased if imported iron ore were unavailable, and both price and quality would be affected if some of the rarer metals and minerals could not be obtained.

The Case for Renewal of the Trade Agreements Act

A high and rising level of foreign trade is therefore important not only to the American economy as a whole but to our individual interests as businessmen, employees, farmers, consumers. The President's authority to promote an expanding foreign trade by means of agreements with other nations for the reciprocal reduction of tar-

iffs and other barriers to trade expires, as you know, on June 30 of this year. Even if no case for renewal of the Trade Agreements Act could be made except on the basis of its direct contribution to the American economy and American prosperity, renewal would be clearly justified.

But, in the circumstances in which the United States finds itself today, there are few pieces of legislation which we can afford to consider purely from the domestic point of view, without regard for their effect on the rest of the free world. For the prosperity of the United States depends, in the long run, on the prosperity of the rest of the world. We cannot be an island of wealth in a sea of poverty; we cannot be an oasis of peace and stability in a desert of chaos and conflict. This is no longer a matter of serious public debate in the United States. But what does need wider recognition in this country is the degree to which sound trade policies contribute to the economic well-being of the free world and therefore to the strength and unity of the Western alliances. For we may be sure that in the long term cohesion between allies and friends rests on mutuality of interests and that it cannot survive on sentiment and words alone.

Most other countries are smaller and less diversified economically than the United States. They must import a much larger share of what they need. They can do this only if their exports are correspondingly large in relation to their output.

For the major industrial countries, such as the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France, the ratio of exports to gross national production is two to four times as great as for the United States. For smaller advanced nations, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland, it is five to nine times as great. For many of the less developed countries exports are the largest single component of the market part of their economy. Ceylon must sell its natural rubber, Iceland must sell its fish, Burma must sell its rice, and Uruguay its wool.

The United States is the world's largest market and principal trading nation. To any nation, therefore, for which trade is important, trade with the United States is almost automatically important as well. Trade with the United States means the difference between prosperity or depression to many countries. Over two-thirds of the total exports of Colombia, Mexico, and Cuba

go to the United States. For Canada the ratio amounts to 60 percent, while for Brazil and the Philippines it is at least 50 percent.

For many particular commodities the United States is the dominant market. For example, Chile sends two-thirds of her total copper production to the United States; Cuba sells us half of her sugar; Indonesia sells one-quarter of her rubber; Bolivia, one-third of her tin; Brazil, over one-half of her coffee production.

This is why the Trade Agreements Act is the cornerstone of American foreign economic policy and is looked upon all over the world as the symbol of American determination to maintain its leadership. In the eyes of foreign countries passage or hamstringing of this act is our choice between cooperation and isolationism.

European Economic Integration

There is still another reason why a continuation of two-way trade is vital to us. Six of our Western European allies—France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg—have recently made their choice in favor of greater cooperation. On January 1 they joined together in a customs union, or Common Market. Over a period of 12 to 15 years the six countries will eliminate all barriers to internal trade and establish a common tariff against outside countries. Clearly this will give some advantage to producers inside the Common Market over their competitors outside; but the extent of this advantage depends in large part upon the height of the common tariff. And the height of the common tariff will depend on our authority to negotiate reductions on a reciprocal basis. This is one of the reasons why the President has asked Congress to extend the Trade Agreements Act for 5 years and to permit him to reduce tariffs, in return for equivalent concessions from other nations, by a maximum of 5 percent each year.³

Tariff negotiations on a scale in keeping with our exports to the six, which reached \$2.9 billion in 1956, require time to prepare and time to carry

³ For text of the President's message to Congress, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 263; for statements made before the House Committee on Ways and Means by Secretary Dulles and Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, see *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1958, p. 432; for a statement by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon before the same committee, see *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1958, p. 626.

out. Therefore, not only the authority to negotiate but also sufficient time for effective negotiation is essential. A 5-year extension of the Trade Agreements Act will provide that necessary time and will enable the United States to exercise a liberal influence throughout the first and most formative stage of the Common Market's development.

The movement toward European economic integration is continuing. The 17 nations which belong to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, including the six Common Market countries, are now negotiating a free-trade area. The creation of so large an area in which goods could be freely traded will surely have significant repercussions upon United States interests. As in the case of the Common Market, we want to make sure that the free-trade area will increase rather than decrease its members' trade with the outside world. And as with the Common Market, the strength of our position in dealing with the free-trade area will depend on how strong a Trade Agreements Act we are given by Congress.

It would be an act of sheer folly, with unalterable consequences, if we, at a time when vast new trading areas are being created, were to shut ourselves off from the rest of the world by a protectionist policy. No responsible and informed person that I know proposes that we do so. But a danger exists that we shall drift into a practice of "isolationism by exceptions"—liberal trade in theory and word but protectionist in practice. Exceptions are, of course, necessary, and I can assure you that the administration is not only conscious of its responsibilities to American industry but, in the 6 months that I have had an opportunity to observe the problem at close hand, it has taken prompt action to protect American business from injury in numerous ways that seldom are known to the general public. But we must take care to prevent a situation where the exceptions cease to *prove* the rule and instead *become* the rule.

Striking a Balance

I would be less than candid if I spoke to a Texas audience on foreign trade and did not mention oil. Our national interest requires that we maintain adequate domestic petroleum reserves and a healthy domestic industry which has the resources to exploit those reserves and the incentive to continue the constant process of exploration and development. Our national defense also requires

that our friends and allies not be deprived of the essential income which they derive from their oil exports to the United States and that we not deprive ourselves of access to their oil. In spite of the great reserves in this State and others, the Nation will in the future be increasingly dependent on foreign supplies. The President has therefore had to consider not only the need of the Nation in this temporary period of oversupply but the long-term needs of the Nation as well. I know you will join with me in hoping that the experience of the next few months will prove that the formula which has been announced is fair and effective, just as I know you will share my conviction that, if new remedies are needed, they will be found. We must seek to strike some rational balance between complete dependence on domestic production and what might be an overdependence on foreign sources of supply. I think the President's Cabinet Committee on Oil Imports, headed by Secretary of Commerce Weeks, has struck such a balance for the present period.

To sum up, two-way trade:

- (a) combats economic recession and promotes the economic process of the American economy;
- (b) strengthens and unites the free world and thereby promotes our security; and
- (c) can, if we allow it to do so, guarantee our access to the markets of the new trading communities being formed in Western Europe.

May we have the vision and the courage to serve our country by doing our part to defend the trade agreements program against the attacks which are being made on it from every side

World Trade Week, 1958

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS world trade is vital to the economic growth and national security of the United States; and

WHEREAS the export trade of the United States provides employment for millions of Americans and is an indispensable outlet for the products of our farms and factories; and

WHEREAS imports into the United States help to keep factory wheels turning and assembly lines moving for our national defense, and are essential to the domestic economy of our Nation; and

¹ No. 3230; 23 Fed. Reg. 2319.

WHEREAS world trade contributes to the economic strength and development of the free nations of the world, and is therefore a powerful force for the advancement of peace;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 18, 1958, as World Trade Week; and I request the appropriate officials of the Federal Government and of the several States, Territories, possessions, and municipalities of the United States to cooperate in the observance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, and civic groups, as well as the people of the United States generally, to observe World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities designed to promote continuing awareness of the importance of world trade to our economy and our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 7th day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and [SEAL] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.

By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State

United States World Trade Fair

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the Second Annual United States World Trade Fair is to be held at New York, New York, from May 7 to May 17, 1958, inclusive, for the purposes of exhibiting and promoting the sale of foreign and domestic products to the American trade and to the public; and

WHEREAS the Congress, by a joint resolution approved March 28, 1958 (72 Stat. 70), has authorized the President, by proclamation or in such other manner as he may deem proper, to invite the States of the Union and foreign countries to participate in the Second Annual United States World Trade Fair; and

WHEREAS this exhibition and trade gathering will tend to encourage further development of international trade and to foster friendly relations among participating nations:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby invite the States of the Union and foreign countries to participate in the Second Annual United States World Trade Fair to be held in the Coliseum in New York, New York, from May 7 to May 17, 1958, inclusive.

¹ No. 3232; 23 Fed. Reg. 2397.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 9th day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and [SEAL] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.

By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State

President Asks Further Report on Umbrella-Frame Tariff

White House press release dated March 12

White House Announcement

The President on March 12 requested the Tariff Commission to submit a supplemental report in the escape-clause case involving umbrella frames.

The Tariff Commission had reported to the President on January 14, 1958, that three members of the Commission found that escape-clause relief was warranted, that two members reached a contrary conclusion, and that one commissioner did not participate.

In identical letters to the chairmen of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, the President noted some of the salient facts of the case and said that, although some clear interpretations could be drawn from the present record, the domestic producers and other parties should be given the opportunity to present further information before he made his final decision in this case.

Letter to Chairmen of Congressional Committees¹

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Under Section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, the United States Tariff Commission submitted to me on January 14, 1958 its report on umbrella frames. Three members of the Commission found that the domestic producers were

¹ Identical letters were sent to Senator Harry F. Byrd, chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance, and Representative Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means.

experiencing serious injury; two Commission members reached a contrary conclusion; and one Commissioner did not participate in this case.

I have carefully considered the Tariff Commission report and have had the advice of the Trade Policy Committee and other departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.

The tariff concession on umbrella frames and their components came into effect in 1951. In late 1955, domestic producers announced prices for 1956 that ranged up to 30 percent above 1955 prices. In late 1955, imports began to increase and continued sharply upward in 1956, totaling 344 thousand dozen for 1956. In May of that year, the domestic industry adjusted its prices downward from the higher levels that it had recently set. The level of imports dropped markedly during the last two months of 1956, and total imports in 1957 were less than half as much as those of 1956.

The industry's profits reflect this pattern. The Commission's report shows that the industry's net profits for 1955 amounted to 7.6 percent of net sales. With the substantial rise in both domestic prices and imports in 1956, losses were experienced by two of the four domestic firms that reported. During the most recent financial period covered by the Commission's report, the first five months of 1957 when imports were at a much lower level than in the preceding year, the industry as a whole showed a moderate profit. Two of the Commissioners suggested that the reported profits for early 1957 understate the position of the industry on two grounds: First, one of the companies included in the industry average was undergoing operational reorganization and its financial experience was quite out-of-line with the other companies; second, the industry usually does better in the latter part of the year, and this, of course, is not taken into account by early figures.

Although some clear interpretations can be drawn from the present record, I have concluded that before my final decision is made the domestic producers and other parties should be given the opportunity to present further information on the industry's experience in recent months. Additional data on the industry's financial experience and the import pattern through the first quarter of 1958 should clarify the situation and enable a better resolution of the points of difference set forth in the minority and majority opinions of the Tariff Commission report.

I am, therefore, requesting the Commission to submit a supplemental report including data on the period ending March thirty-first and also including such other material as the Commissioners deem appropriate in view of the above.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Letter to Edgar B. Brossard, Chairman, U.S. Tariff Commission

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have carefully studied the Tariff Commission's report of January 14, 1958 concerning umbrella frames.

As set forth in the enclosed copy of my letter of today to the Chairmen of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees, I have concluded that it would be useful to have additional data on the industry's financial experience and the import pattern during recent months.

I request the Commission, therefore, to submit a supplemental report including data on the period ending March thirty-first and also including such other material as the Commissioners deem appropriate.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Great Lakes Fishery Commission Meets at Washington

The Department of State announced on April 9 (press release 181) that the Great Lakes Fishery Commission, established by treaty between the United States and Canada, will meet at Washington April 9 and 10. The principal function of the Commission is the eradication of the sea lamprey predator which has so effectively destroyed most of the valuable food fishes of the upper Great Lakes.

Chairman of the Commission is L. P. Voigt, Conservation Director of the State of Wisconsin. Other U.S. members are Claude Ver Duin, Mayor of Grand Haven, Mich., and Donald L. McKernan, Director of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries of the Department of the Interior.

The Canadian Commissioners are A. L. Pritchard, Director of the Conservation and Development Service of the Department of Fisheries, Ot-

tawa; A. O. Blackhurst, Manager of the Ontario Council of Commercial Fisheries, Port Dover, Ontario; and W. J. K. Harkness, Chief of the Division of Fish and Wildlife of the Ontario Department of Lands and Forests, Toronto.

On hand to report progress and plans on behalf of the two government agencies which are conducting the Commission's program will be W. A. Kennedy of Canada and J. W. Moffett of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. They will be accompanied by top members of their scientific staffs. State conservation agencies will be represented by Albert Hazzard of Pennsylvania, Mason Lawrence of New York, and Lee Roach of Ohio.

The principal method used to control the lamprey is the blocking of streams tributary to the lakes. The lampreys are killed by electrical weirs on their upstream migration to spawning grounds. Another method has been the subject of experimentation, and very hopeful results are being obtained. This is the introduction into the streams of selective toxicants which kill the lampreys and their larvae but do not harm fish or leave a poisonous residue dangerous to human or animal life. Perfecting of this system will speed the work of lamprey control and bring nearer the time of rehabilitation of the lake trout and other commercial and sports fisheries.

THE CONGRESS

The Mutual Security Program in the Far East

*Statement by Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

I am glad of the opportunity to appear before you in support of the mutual security program on a scale which will not cripple its objectives. This committee is acutely aware of the importance to the security of the United States and the free world of the continued freedom and independence of the non-Communist countries of the Far East. In our judgment the mutual security program is a bulwark of their freedom and is vital to our own safety.

I shall address my remarks to the foreign-policy considerations which govern our activities in the Far East under the Mutual Security Act. As program operations are conducted by the Department of Defense and the International Cooperation Administration, the specific programs will be covered by the statements of Capt. Bertton A. Robbins, Jr., United States Navy, Far East

Regional Director for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, and by Dr. Raymond T. Moyer, ICA Regional Director for the Far East.

The Secretary of State recently said that we live in an historic era of change. He drew attention to two great forces at work: Communist imperialism and the "drive for progress" on the part of the ex-colonial peoples and those of the less developed countries.² These forces are conspicuously present in the Far East.

Communism rose to immense power in the area when mainland China fell in 1949. Today Communist China with its 600 million people, large army, and modern air force regards its neighbors as potential satellites or provinces. It plans to make them so. The 12 million relatively unassimilated overseas Chinese in the countries of South-

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 28.

² For a statement made by Secretary Dulles before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, see BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1958, p. 427.

east Asia offer a potential fifth column which Communist China is vigorously attempting to exploit.

Eight of the 11 Asian countries of the Far Eastern area have achieved their independence since the Second World War. They are determined to remain free. They are sensitive to any conceivable impingement upon their sovereignty. Their peoples demand of their governments economic progress, and their conservative leaders are under great pressure to show evidence of it quickly. Despite the ever-present military threat, a new emphasis has been placed upon economic development. Leaders of these countries must be able to answer the Communist assertion that only communism can provide them economic progress quickly.

More than a third of the earth's population—900 million people—dwell in the land and ocean area stretching from Japan, China, and Korea southward through Southeast Asia to Australia and New Zealand. Here there are great contrasts in development—Japan, Australia, and New Zealand on the one hand and some of the least economically developed countries in the world on the other. Here exists the greatest variety of cultures, creeds, and backgrounds of any of the major world areas. Here are areas of the greatest and of the least population pressure. Here are countries with abundant natural resources and others where human resources constitute the only significant production factor. In free Asia are some of the most steadfast friends of the United States. In Communist Asia are some of its most unyielding foes.

Japan is the only great industrial complex among the Asian countries and one of the four greatest industrial areas of the world. Its people are energetic and resourceful. They are pursuing a democratic way of life. Japan is a bastion of the free world. Upon its alinement with the free world depends much of the security position of the free world in Asia. Southeast Asia is rich in agricultural products and the raw materials of industry. Taiwan and the Philippines are indispensable to the island defense chain upon which we rely. The Republic of China is a major obstacle to the consolidation of Communist power in mainland China and to the extension of Communist domination over the important communities of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.

The position of the Republic of China in the United Nations has remained firm. It would be well to remember, when people speak of our isolated position with regard to Red China, that 43 nations of the world recognize the Republic of China as the lawful government of China. Only 17 non-Communist nations so recognize the Peiping regime. During the year the Republic of China established diplomatic relations with five additional countries. There were about 6,000 overseas Chinese students studying in Taiwan, while the numbers going to Communist China declined, and hundreds of disillusioned students have made their way out of mainland China.

The Republic of Korea stands as a symbol of determined military resistance to Communist aggression. I need not add that the prestige, honor, and safety of the free world are heavily engaged in Korea.

The free nations of the Far East have more than one and three-fourths million men under arms, who, together with our own forces, constitute the free-world defense against Communist overt aggression in that area. These countries cannot support these forces unaided. Hence, the mutual security program provides substantial military aid and economic assistance within the defense-support category. Seventy-one percent of the fiscal year 1959 global defense-support request is proposed for Far Eastern countries. Three countries, Korea, Taiwan, Viet-Nam, account for 60 percent.

The Communist Tactical Shift

In considering what I might report to the committee as the outstanding developments in the Far East during this last year, I concluded that there had been no real changes in the basic situation. There are, of course, important events which tend to reveal and emphasize the nature of the basic situation. This is another way of saying that our grave problems in the Far East are still with us. Perhaps the most significant trend was the increasing emphasis placed upon economic development by countries of this area, accompanied by the stepped-up activity of the U.S.S.R. and other Communist countries in the field of foreign economic assistance and trade. In their Manila communique of March 13³ the SEATO powers drew attention to this Com-

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 31, 1958, p. 504.

unist tactical shift away from direct military measures to enlarged economic, political, and cultural activities.

I wish I could say that the Communist threat had receded in the Far East and that the position of the free countries with our help had correspondingly improved. I am obliged to say, however, that the situation will permit of no complacency. It requires and will require tireless effort and constant vigilance. Communist imperialism has no timetable. It has time. It conceives of its expansion in terms of decades and generations. It believes it can wear us out—that we will tire of the struggle and the cost and let down our guard until too late to raise it again.

I am sure that you will agree that, however difficult the road may be, the United States must be prepared to persist indefinitely in whatever measures are necessary to meet the challenge we face today. I am confident that the American people will make whatever sacrifices are necessary once the issues are clarified and made known to them. To make sure that they are informed imposes a grave responsibility upon those in whom they have placed their trust.

Highlights of the Existing Situation

Permit me to highlight the existing situation in the Far East:

1. There is still no evidence of any weakening of Moscow-Peiping solidarity. On the contrary, Mao Tse-tung ringingly reaffirmed the close bonds between the two countries at the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, where he publicly acclaimed Moscow's undisputed leadership of the Communist world.

2. No country's boundary has been changed in this year by Communist aggression. No country has fallen prey to Communist subversion.

3. The Communists remain strong in north Korea with approximately 650,000 troops and some 600 to 700 modern airplanes. Even if the Chinese Communists do withdraw from north Korea following their recent propaganda announcement of intention to do so, their withdrawal would be only to a point behind the Yalu from which their return could be made with great speed. The Communists remain strong in Viet-Nam, with a puppet army in north Viet-Nam of from 350,000 to 400,000 men. On the Chinese mainland the Chinese Communists have an army

of some 3 million men and hundreds of modern airplanes. They are steadily building up their military capabilities across the strait from Taiwan, where they have prepared jet airfields, railroads, and troop dispositions. In all our discussions with the Communist Chinese authorities in Geneva in an effort to arrange the repatriation of imprisoned Americans, including an accounting for some 450 missing military personnel, those authorities have for more than 2 years refused to renounce their intention to take Taiwan by force of arms if need be.

4. Subversive efforts are continuous in all free Asian countries. A softening process is being applied on the political, economic, and social front in anticipation of the day when large, sudden gains may be possible by military, revolutionary, or other means. In south Korea, in south Viet-Nam, in Laos, in Cambodia, in Thailand, in Burma, in Malaya, in Indonesia, the machinery of subversion is employed conspicuously by the Communists for whatever gain it may bring. The increased strength of the Communists in Indonesia highlights the serious position there just at a time when lack of unity in the Government has led to potentially widespread civil strife, with communism and Communist participation in government among the main issues.

5. On the economic front international communism bids for the favor of the aspiring, underdeveloped countries with offers of aid and promises of economic progress.⁴

The Soviet Union has now begun to back up its propaganda line with genuine economic development assistance in some areas. It has made offers of assistance to many individual countries. At the recent Communist-dominated Afro-Asian meeting in Cairo the Soviet Union offered unlimited "aid without strings" to all countries in Asia and Africa.

At the meeting in Kuala Lumpur this month of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, the Soviet Union stressed Soviet readiness to expand trade-and-aid relations with the countries of the region. It urged the more extensive use of Soviet technicians in the development of these countries. And it offered

⁴For a statement made by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon before the committee regarding the economic activities of the Soviet bloc in less developed countries, see *ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.

technical training in the Soviet Union to a substantial number of students from the region. The Soviet Union also indicated its readiness to consider long-term purchase contracts for primary commodities. This latter suggestion probes a sensitive economic wound of the moment, as the Asian countries that are exporters of primary commodities are increasingly concerned over the recently declining value of such exports.

The objective of the Communist economic offensive is to gain prestige and influence in the underdeveloped countries, to identify nationalism and economic progress with adherence to communism, and to open the door to subversive agents operating under the guise of technicians. Respect for Soviet science and technology was greatly augmented in the Far East by the recent Soviet demonstrations of competence in space technology.

Only three countries, Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia, have so far accepted aid offers from Communist-bloc countries. Since 1955 Burma has accepted \$38 million in proffered credit aid from the Soviet Union and \$4 million from Communist China. Indonesia, after protracted deliberation and in view of its deteriorating economic position, finally in February 1958 accepted with parliamentary approval a loan of \$100 million from the Soviet Union negotiated in September 1956, of which about one-half will finance the purchase of ships from the U.S.S.R. Indonesia has also received a total of \$9.4 million in credits from East Germany and Czechoslovakia and a recent offer approximating \$35 million from Communist China. Cambodia has received a grant of \$22 million from Communist China.

Communist China is playing an increasing role in the trade-and-aid offensive of the Communist bloc. It is expected to furnish 15 percent of the aid promised by the bloc to Far East countries, and it accounts for a high proportion of bloc trade with free Asian countries.

6. A delicate situation exists in Laos. The 1954 Geneva accords⁵ provided for unification of the country under the central government. The Communist-dominated Pathet Lao, however, refused to turn over to the Royal Government the two provinces under their armed control, using their defiance of this international agreement to negotiate successfully in November 1957 a coalition

government which netted them two cabinet positions, other administrative participation, and legal status as a political party. This may extend Communist influence dangerously in Laos.

7. Cambodia's foreign policy continues to be based on neutrality, and that country continues to show a determination to remain free and independent. In a speech to Cambodian students in Paris last October, Prince Sihanouk made this significant statement:

Without American aid . . . innumerable consequences would be in store for us. . . . At least for the present no replacement is possible except to become a satellite. Have we the means to be free once communized? . . . It is a question of the existence of our very race.

8. In our defense-support and technical-cooperation programs throughout the Far East we have made necessary, if unspectacular, contributions to economic and political stability, to the defense posture, or to the economic development of the countries according to the nature of their problems and the specific applications of assistance. Our technical-cooperation programs in the several countries of the Far East are generating benefits which will be realized gradually and will remain indefinitely.

There are many factors affecting political stability in the underdeveloped countries besides the economic. However, over a period of years—a decade or more—the popular test of the success of national leadership may well be the adequacy of the rate of economic progress. If conservative or middle-of-the-road leadership does not produce the popularly desired result, the peoples of these countries may be expected to listen attentively to the glowing, if illusory, promises of the extreme left. International communism takes full advantage of any opportunity to lend credibility to the loud claims of leftist contestants for popular political support.

Meeting the Threats of Communist Imperialism

In the current struggle the shifting of emphasis to the economic front does not exclude the possibility of a return to direct military action where lassitude on the part of the free world invites such an action. We cannot afford fatigue, and, if we understand our problem, we will never let fatigue influence our judgment.

To meet the array of threats which Communist imperialism presents to the United States and to

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 164.

the free world in the Far East, it remains our policy:

1. to deter, and where necessary to repel, Communist military expansion and infiltration by maintaining an adequately strong free-world military posture. It is in furtherance of this policy that we have negotiated security treaties with Japan and the Republics of the Philippines, Korea, and China, that we joined with seven other nations in the SEATO treaty of alliance against aggression in Southeast Asia and with Australia and New Zealand in the ANZUS defensive alliance.

2. to assist the free nations of the Far East to achieve internal security and political stability and to promote improved conditions of life for their people.

Without the mutual security program our present free-world posture in the Far East could not be maintained. This program is in three principal phases. These are military aid, defense support, and economic aid. Economic aid in this sense includes both technical cooperation and economic development assistance from the Development Loan Fund.

In order that the peaceful life of a country may flourish and economic progress be realized, there must be political stability, freedom from the threat of military attack or insurrection, and sufficient resources available to finance economic development. If domestic resources—financial, human, and material—are drained away by defense expenditures, little or nothing may remain for long-term growth and development. And yet, in the presence of the Communist threat, the defense posture is a prerequisite of an independent national life.

The defense posture of any country is a complex of political, military, economic, and human factors. Weakness of one aspect may be fatal to the whole. United States military aid provides equipment and training for the armed forces of the recipient countries which comprise the first line of defense of their national security and independence. Defense support adds current strength to bolster and maintain the continuity of their economic life so that they can support these necessary defense establishments without economic deterioration.

Without the security provided by such assistance, neither political stability nor economic prog-

ress would be possible. In some countries, even with this assistance, private capital, both domestic and foreign, is impeded by the danger of aggression from making its essential contribution to economic development. In such cases the lending authority of the Development Loan Fund provides necessary long-term financing otherwise unobtainable from free-world sources. I cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of this fund having ample resources to assist in so helping underdeveloped countries.

The mutual security program is a direct response to the Communist challenge. The only alternative to American aid in the Far East today is Communist aid. And we can be certain that, wherever or whenever we step out, the Communists stand eager and ready to step in. If we should eliminate ourselves, we should be removing for the Communists the last obstacle blocking their road to the complete domination of Asia. The mutual security program in the Far East remains one of the great imperatives of our foreign policy.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

85th Congress, 1st Session

Message from the President of the United States transmitting the 38th Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the year ending December 31, 1956. H. Doc. 199, March 10, 1958. 39 pp.

85th Congress, 2d Session

Review of Foreign Policy, 1958. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Part I, February 3-March 10, 1958. 417 pp.

Increase Lending Authority of Export-Import Bank. Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 10459. February 25 and 26, 1958. 71 pp.

Extension of Export Control Act of 1949. Hearing before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on H.R. 10127. March 4, 1958. 39 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. Part V, March 7 and 11, 1958. 103 pp.

Export Control Act Extension. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3093, a bill to extend for an additional period of 2 years the authority to regulate exports contained in the Export Control Act of 1949. March 13, 1958. 38 pp.

Export Control Act Extension. Report to accompany S. 3093. S. Rept. 1427, March 26, 1958. 3 pp.

Plan Submitted to Congress for Payment of U. S. Claims Against Germany and Return of Vested German Assets

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 157 dated March 29

The Department of State has delivered to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and to the chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee a letter dated March 28, 1958, submitting on behalf of the executive branch an outline of a proposal designed to provide the basis for a solution to the problems of vested German assets and the unsatisfied war-damage claims of American nationals against Germany arising out of World War II. The plan is designed to provide for the payment of all legitimate American war-damage claims against Germany and an equitable monetary return to the former owners of vested German assets.

The program, as outlined in the letter to the Congress, would authorize:

1. The earmarking of \$100 million for the payment of such legitimate American claims;
2. A return of up to \$10,000, as a matter of grace, to natural persons who were former owners of vested German property;
3. The use of any remaining funds from vested German assets to complete the payment of American damage claims, and thereafter for *pro rata* return to the former owners of vested German properties, including those owners ineligible for the \$10,000 return, such as corporations.

This program would be financed from the proceeds of vested assets supplemented by an appropriation of \$100 million. This appropriation would restore in the assets account a substantial part of the proceeds from former German assets used to pay American claims vs. Japan. American claims against Germany which prove to be in excess would also be made available for the *pro rata*

return to the former owners of vested German properties.

LETTER TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

MARCH 28, 1958

DEAR SENATOR EASTLAND:¹ There is submitted herewith an Administration proposal designed to provide the basis for a solution to the long unresolved problems of vested German assets and of the war damage claims of American nationals against Germany arising out of World War II.

Proposals offering a solution to these problems were submitted on behalf of the Executive Branch to the 84th Congress and to the First Session of the 85th Congress. These have received consideration in your committee and in the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, but no legislation regarding them has as yet been enacted.

Although provision has been made for dealing with war claims of American nationals against other former enemy states, no provision has been made by the United States Government for war claims of American nationals against Germany except those of prisoners of war, and merchant seamen. In addition, the vesting program has imposed hardships on numerous German nationals who had small properties in this country prior to World War II and it appears desirable, in the interests of our relations with Germany, to take action to alleviate these hardships.

The German Federal Government has on a number of occasions indicated to this Government its hope that legislation could be enacted on the sub-

¹ A similar letter was sent to Representative Oren Harris, chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.

ject of the return of vested assets. It has welcomed the \$10,000 return program heretofore proposed by the Executive Branch. At the same time, it has expressed the hope that it would prove possible to go beyond the limited return contemplated in the Administration's previous proposals. The subject was last raised with the President by Chancellor Adenauer on the occasion of his visit to Washington in May of last year, as a result of which a new study of the problem was undertaken by the Administration. An announcement was made by the White House in July of 1957² that supplementary proposals regarding these matters would be submitted at the next session of Congress. The objective to be sought was the payment of all legitimate American war claims against Germany and an equitable monetary return to former owners of vested German assets.

It would obviously be desirable to arrange a final settlement of the unsatisfied claims of American nationals against Germany for World War II losses. It would also be in the interest of our relations with the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve a final and mutually satisfactory solution to the problem of vested German assets. What can be done in both instances depends essentially on the determination of what funds can be made available.

Pursuant to various agreements which the United States has entered into over a period of time (the Paris Reparation Agreement of 1946,³ the London Debt Settlement of 1953,⁴ and the Paris Agreements of 1954⁵), the proceeds of vested German assets constitute the only presently existing funds available for payment of American war claims against Germany. Under the terms of the agreements to which I have referred, the United States Government has agreed not to seek compensation for such claims from the German Federal Government. These latter two agreements followed the policy expressed in the War Claims Act of 1948 under which the proceeds of vested assets were to be devoted to the settlement of American war claims.

While it is difficult to give any firm figure either of the amount of claims which might be filed or the amount which after due examination would be

actually allowed, the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission has recently estimated that a reasonably adequate program for the payment of the war damage claims of American nationals against Germany could be carried out within the limits of \$100 million. The cost of a return of up to \$10,000 to natural persons who were former owners of vested German properties would be approximately \$50 million. Thus at least \$150 million would be necessary to implement a program for the payment of legitimate American war damage claims and for a \$10,000 return. Sums beyond this total would be required to complete an American claims program, should \$100 million prove inadequate for this purpose, and to provide an equitable monetary return to all former owners of vested German assets not receiving a full return under the \$10,000 program, including corporations.

Proceeds from vested assets are presently available in the amount of approximately \$83 million according to the Office of Alien Property. This is manifestly not enough to cover an American claims program and the \$10,000 return program. Ultimately some further funds might become available from reserves totalling \$179 million now maintained by the Office of Alien Property for litigation and claims payable out of vested assets under existing legislation. The most substantial reserve is that of \$100 million for the General Aniline and Film litigation.

As a result of the pooling of vested German and Japanese assets for the purpose of paying those claims provided for in the War Claims Act of 1948, a sum of approximately \$125 million deriving from German assets was in effect used to pay claims against Japan. In order to secure a final and equitable settlement of the claims and assets problems the Administration is prepared to seek from the Congress an appropriation of \$100 million for a claims and assets program, as a restoration of a substantial part of the former German assets used to pay American claims against Japan. The Administration would not be prepared to seek an appropriation beyond this amount for this purpose.

The presently available proceeds from vested assets (\$83 million) together with the restoration of a substantial part (\$100 million) of the former German assets used to pay claims against Japan would make \$183 million immediately available for a program for the payment of the claims of

² BULLETIN of Aug. 19, 1957, p. 306.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1946, p. 114.

⁴ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2792.

⁵ For text, see S. Doc. 11, 84th Cong., 1st sess.

American nationals against Germany and for an equitable monetary return of vested German assets to their former owners. The total estimated cost of an initial American claims program and a \$10,000 return to former individual owners would be approximately \$150 million leaving about \$33 million for the settlement of any unpaid awards to American claimants, and to the extent not required for those awards, for *pro rata* distribution among the former owners of German properties, with the prospects that some further funds might eventually become available from vested assets as reserves are liquidated. If the payment of legitimate American claims in full required less than \$100 million, a further sum would then become available for distribution among the former owners of German properties. It is believed that if funds are made available in this order of magnitude a final settlement can be reached which will take into account, and provide a fair and equitable treatment of the interests of, both the American claimants and the former owners of German properties.

It is not intended that this recommendation include vested Japanese assets with respect to which the existing circumstances are substantially different. It appears that the value of vested German assets exceeds the amount of American war claims against Germany which have already been paid or which should appropriately be paid out of the proceeds from such assets. On the other hand, the amount of American war claims against Japan which have already been paid by the United States Government exceeds by far the value of the vested Japanese assets.

In accordance with the above, it is recommended on behalf of the Administration that the Congress give favorable consideration to a solution of the problem of vested German assets and the World War II damage claims of American nationals against Germany which would: (1) authorize the setting aside of \$100 million for the payment of such legitimate American claims; (2) authorize a return of up to \$10,000, as a matter of grace, to natural persons who were former owners of vested German properties; (3) provide that the remaining funds from vested German assets, and any sums realized in the future from vested German assets, which are available after the requirements of the \$10,000 program are met, be used first to complete the compensation of American war

damage claimants in full in the event the initial fund of \$100 million proves insufficient and, second, to effect a *pro rata* return, as a matter of grace, to the former owners of vested German properties not receiving a full return under the \$10,000 program; (4) provide that if the \$100 million fund is more than sufficient for the satisfaction of American war damage claimants in full, the remaining balance be included with the funds from vested German assets devoted to the *pro rata* return. It is further proposed that this program be financed from the proceeds of vested German assets, including presently reserved assets which may in the future become free of claims, litigation, or other present obligations, supplemented by an appropriation of \$100 million, representing a substantial part of the proceeds from German assets used for the payment of American claims against Japan. This program contemplates the expeditious liquidation of vested properties.

In connection with the proposed return, it may be noted that the Federal Republic of Germany has been informed of the United States view that such a return should not be regarded as a precedent with respect to other allied countries.

The legislation should give the Administration discretionary authority to work out with the German Government arrangements with regard to the return of vested assets which would, to the maximum extent possible, relieve the United States Government of the burden of administration. The returns of up to \$10,000 would be made by the United States Government, with maximum German assistance. The *pro rata* returns in excess of \$10,000 might be dealt with on a lump sum basis, depending upon what arrangements could be made with the German Government. Returns to former owners who are now American nationals in all instances should be made directly by the United States Government. In other respects, such as the provisions relating to copyrights, trademarks, property subject to agreement with other countries, war criminals, and the coverage of the claims program, the legislation should follow the lines of previous Administration proposals. In addition, provision should be made for the divesting of unliquidated interests which the United States still holds in estates and trusts so that there can be terminated the continuing participation of the United States for an indefinite period in the administration of these estates and trusts.

Almost thirteen years have passed since the end of the war. It is essential that action be taken promptly if many of the original American claimants, and the original owners of German vested properties, are to derive during their lifetimes any of the benefits which a solution of these problems would afford. The program outlined above would provide, at long last, compensation to American citizens for losses and damages suffered during World War II and attributable to Germany. In addition it would resolve a troublesome problem in the field of our foreign relations and would strengthen our ties of friendship with the Federal Republic of Germany.

I respectfully request that early consideration be given to the enactment of legislation embodying the program outlined above. A similar letter is being sent to the Chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee.

There is enclosed a statement of the events and legislative background leading to the recommendation of this program.

The Bureau of the Budget advises that the above proposals are in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, JR.
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable

JAMES O. EASTLAND,

Chairman,

Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate.

Background Statement

March 17, 1958

VESTED GERMAN ASSETS AND PAYMENT OF AMERICAN WAR DAMAGE CLAIMS AGAINST GERMANY

By the first War Powers Act of December 18, 1941, Congress amended the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 to grant the President extensive powers to vest assets in the United States owned by foreign countries or their nationals. The 1917 Act already contained provisions for the return of such of the property to be vested as might ultimately prove to be owned by non-enemies. However, neither the 1917 Act nor the 1941 Act provided for the disposition of World War II vested assets finally determined to be owned by enemy governments or their nationals. That matter was left open.

Early in 1942 the President created the Office of Alien Property Custodian as an independent agency and delegated to the Alien Property Custodian the power to vest

property other than securities, cash and credits. In June 1945, the Custodian's vesting power was expanded to include German and Japanese-owned securities, cash and credits. As a result, substantially all the German and Japanese assets known to be in the United States as of December 7, 1941, were vested by the Custodian or by his successor, the Attorney General.

In January 1946 the United States and 17 allied nations other than the Soviet Union and Poland executed the Paris Reparation Agreement whereby they agreed upon the division of the limited German assets in kind available to them as reparation from Germany, including German external assets located within the respective signatory countries. The 18 Allies agreed to hold or dispose of these external assets in such a way as to preclude their return to German ownership or control. This program was formulated in light of the allied experience after World War I when the attempt in effect to exact reparation from Germany's current production failed and led to Germany's default on its obligations. Moreover, it was clear after the end of World War II that the United States would have to provide major assistance to Germany to prevent disease and unrest. This country, therefore, favored measures which would limit Germany's World War II reparation to its external assets and other assets in kind, thus relieving Germany of reparation payments from current production and avoiding the indirect financing of reparation by the United States. The Paris Reparation Agreement met this objective.

In 1946 Congress enacted section 32 of the Trading With the Enemy Act authorizing returns of vested property to persons having merely technical enemy status and to enemy nationals who were persecuted by their own governments. In the same year, Congress added section 34 to the Act, providing for the payment of pre-vesting debt claims of Americans against enemy nationals whose property was vested.

By the War Claims Act of 1948 Congress added section 39 to the Trading With the Enemy Act, providing that German and Japanese assets not returnable under section 32 should, after the payment of debt claims therefrom, be retained by the United States without compensation to the former owners. In addition, the War Claims Act of 1948 gave priority to the use of the net proceeds of liquidation of this retained property for the payment of compensation to American civilian internees of the Japanese, to American servicemen captured by the forces of Germany, Japan and other governments which failed to provide adequate subsistence as required by the Geneva Convention and to certain Philippine religious organizations which had rendered aid to American personnel. This Act did not provide for the payment of war claims of Americans arising out of war-caused property damage but authorized a study of the problem. The Attorney General has advanced a total of \$225,000,000 from the proceeds of vested assets for purposes of the War Claims Act of 1948. Thus that Act constituted a Congressional disposition of the German and Japanese assets vested under the Trading With the Enemy Act during World War II. Furthermore, that Act, in effect, gave confirmation to the reparation program set forth in the Paris Reparation

Agreement by devoting German external assets to the satisfaction of certain American war claims.

The Bonn Convention of 1952 for the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation, between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, Britain and France also affirmed the policy of the Paris Reparation Agreement. In that Convention the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to compensate its own nationals for their loss of external assets by the vesting and other action of the Allied Powers. For their part, these countries gave the Federal Republic a commitment that they would not assert any claims for reparation against its current production. These provisions of the Bonn Convention were carried forward and approved in the Paris Protocol of 1954 which was approved by the Senate April 1, 1955, and came into force on May 5, 1955.

On July 17, 1954, Chancellor Adenauer wrote to the President to enlist his support for legislation which had been introduced in Congress for the general return of vested German assets.⁶ The Chancellor referred to the hardships suffered by many of the German individuals whose property had been vested. He mentioned old people, pensioners and beneficiaries of insurance policies and inheritances in particular and urged that alleviation of these hardship cases would make a considerable contribution to furthering the friendship between the peoples of the United States and Germany. The President's reply of August 7, 1954, referred to the fact that the Allied Governments decided to look to German assets in their territories as a principal source for the payment of their claims against Germany. The President expressed sympathy with individuals in straitened circumstances in Germany for whom the operation of the vesting program in the United States had created particular hardship. He pointed out that American nationals who had suffered losses arising out of the war had received no compensation, also with resultant hardship in many cases. Finally, the President stated that although none of the bills then pending in Congress with regard to the return of vested assets had the approval of his Administration, the problem was receiving earnest consideration and he hoped that a fair, equitable and satisfactory solution could be achieved. The matter was also raised by Chancellor Adenauer with the President during the former's visit to Washington in October, 1954,⁷ and conversations between representatives of the two Governments were agreed on.

As a result, the Executive Branch formulated a plan which was subsequently incorporated in a draft bill submitted to the 84th Congress.⁸ Prior to the submission of that bill, representatives of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany discussed the matter of vested German assets and the related problem of American war claims against Germany.⁹ During these discussions

representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany were informed that the Executive Branch would recommend a limited return of vested assets to natural persons up to a maximum of \$10,000 as a matter of grace for the purpose of alleviating the cases of hardship caused by vesting. The United States representatives pointed out that this action would result in a full return to approximately 90 per cent of the former owners whose property had been vested and would achieve the equitable solution sought by the President. The United States representatives expressed the hope that in addition to relieving hardships of an appreciable number of German people, this action would serve to make even more secure the ties between the United States and Germany. The representatives of the German Federal Government expressed the hope that the proposed return would subsequently be followed by a wider program. They were informed, however, that the Administration did not envisage a broader return than was contained in the proposed recommendation.

At the time of the submission of the Administration proposal in 1955, it appeared that between \$50 and \$60 million might be realized from the liquidation of German and Japanese assets, over and above the amounts which had already been paid into the War Claims Fund pursuant to the War Claims Act of 1948, as amended, and the amounts required to pay claims which might be asserted under the Trading With the Enemy Act. It was then calculated that a return of up to \$10,000 to former individual owners of vested German and Japanese assets would require approximately \$60 million. There was therefore need for finding some arrangement for financing the payment of claims of American nationals against Germany if any measures of partial return of vested assets were to be contemplated.

As a result of the pooling of vested German and Japanese assets for the purpose of paying those claims provided for in the War Claims Act of 1948, it was then estimated that the sum of approximately \$100 million deriving from German assets had in effect been used to pay claims against Japan. This use of German assets to pay claims against Japan thus drastically reduced the funds which would otherwise have been available at the discretion of Congress to pay American property damage claims against Germany. It was therefore proposed that the sum of \$100 million be restored from governmental funds to pay war claims against Germany.

The subject of the disposition to be made of the vested assets and of American claims against Germany was again considered by the Administration in the early part of 1957. At that time it appeared that larger sums would be available from the liquidation of assets than had previously been estimated. It was calculated that the sum of \$108 million was immediately available and that a substantial additional amount might become available out of funds held in reserve against unresolved claims, litigation and other obligations. It was therefore recommended by the Administration, in letters sent to the Vice President and the Speaker of the House from the Chairman of the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under date of April 3, 1957, that returns be made up to \$10,000 to the former individual owners of German and Japanese properties, as previously recommended, and that the remainder

⁶ For texts of Mr. Adenauer's letter and the President's reply, see BULLETIN of Aug. 23, 1954, p. 269.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Nov. 8, 1954, p. 680.

⁸ For a statement made on Nov. 29, 1955, before the Senate Judiciary Committee by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, see *ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 971.

⁹ For text of a joint statement issued following the U.S.-German discussions, see *ibid.*, Mar. 14, 1955, p. 437.

of the proceeds of vested assets be used to meet the war damage claims of American nationals against Germany.

Thereafter, a new study of the problem was made by the Administration. On July 31, 1957, the White House announced the intention of the Administration to submit to

the next session of Congress a supplementary plan which would provide for the payment in full of all legitimate war claims of Americans against Germany and would permit, as an act of grace, an equitable monetary return to former owners of vested assets.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. and Canada Advocate Principle of Abstention in Fishing

Press release 159 dated April 11

The following statement was released at Geneva on April 11 by the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.¹

The United States and Canada have introduced a proposal for a new article in the proposed codified law of the sea, as well as certain changes in one section of the draft proposal drawn up by the International Law Commission. The proposal is aimed specifically at filling a gap in the ILC draft and through it increasing the world's supply of a major food—fish.

The joint U.S.-Canadian proposal would make the principle of abstention an essential conservation procedure in certain fishing situations. It would provide an incentive for all states to restore, maintain, and further develop fishery production. It would give meaning to a concept that is necessary if the world is to obtain full utilization of the resources of the sea.

In advancing the procedure, the sponsors have emphasized three basic considerations:

1. The states fishing the resource must have added to the productivity of the resource by constructive conservation measures.
2. The states fishing the resource must utilize the resource fully, so that the introduction of more fishing effort will not produce more fish.
3. Any question as to the fulfillment of these prerequisite conditions would be subject to test-

ing by any interested state, and disputes regarding their existence would be settled in an objective, expeditious manner.

The concept and practice of abstention in fishing has grown out of the experience, sometimes individually, often jointly, of the United States and Canada. Since 1923 both these nations have through major expenditures and severe restraints on their own fishermen saved from disastrous depletion and, in fact, made major advances in the quantitative catch of several major fish crops. By research, scientific management, construction of costly fishways, and forgoing of water-power projects, the United States and Canada have jointly built up the salmon, halibut, and fur-seal resources of the Northeast Pacific.

Of equal importance is the fact that abstention would apply only to specific stocks of fish, not to areas of the sea. It would not touch upon general fishing activities in an area but would affect only the harvesting of the particular stock of fish which qualifies for abstention procedures. Nor would it limit a coastal state adjacent to a high-seas area where the abstention procedure is being carried out, even though nationals of that coastal state had not previously participated in the fishery. The doctrine could not prevent but rather would promote the full utilization of a fishery resource.

Abstention is a highly beneficial conservation concept which encourages countries to make the investment in talent, time, money, and self-denial necessary to develop the productivity of the resources of the sea. Lacking this or some equivalent procedure, nations will have little or no protection and resultingly little or no incentive to

¹ For a statement by Arthur H. Dean, chairman of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1958, p. 574.

undertake expensive programs for developing, restoring, and maintaining such resources.

The world as a whole has a great deal to gain by accepting abstention as a general rule. The United States Government considers the concept essential to any complete set of articles on high-seas fisheries conservation.

Ambassador Burgess Concludes Consultations in Washington

Press release 185 dated April 11

Ambassador W. Randolph Burgess, U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations, left on April 11 to return to his post in Paris after extensive consultations in Washington.

In the interest of improvement in political consultation in NATO, the communique issued by the Heads of Government of the NATO countries at their meeting in Paris last December¹ expressed their intention to keep their permanent representatives in Paris fully informed of all government policies which materially affect the alliance and its members.

Ambassador Burgess during his stay in Washington attended meetings of the Cabinet and of the National Security Council. He also met on several occasions with Secretary Dulles, Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy, and numerous other officials of the State Department, the Defense Department, and other Government agencies. His discussions with Government officials covered major subjects of current interest to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including preparations for the conference of NATO defense ministers which will be held at Paris April 15-17, preparations for the NATO foreign ministers' meeting to be held at Copenhagen May 5-7, and consultations now in progress in NATO regarding possible discussions with the Soviets.

Ambassador Burgess also discussed with Government officials and representatives of business and finance current economic problems relating to the work of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), with which the United States is closely associated.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 12.

U.S.-Euratom Working Party Concludes Discussions

Following is the text of a joint statement released at Washington and Luxembourg on April 3 at the conclusion of meetings of a joint U.S.-European Atomic Energy Commission working party, which convened at Luxembourg on March 20.

Press release 169 dated April 3

A joint working party composed of representatives of the Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the Government of the United States has today concluded a series of meetings in Luxembourg.¹

This group has been studying the means whereby a joint EURATOM-United States nuclear power program might be developed. The objective would be to initiate promptly a program aimed at bringing into operation by 1963 a number of large-scale nuclear power plants to be built within the community, primarily of the pressurized and boiling water types, and having a total installed capacity of approximately one million kilowatts of electricity.

The group also has been examining the principal aspects of a supporting joint research and development program which would be centered on these reactors.

The program would be designed to encourage maximum participation by the industries of the Community and of the United States.

Substantial progress has been made toward these objectives and it is planned that there will be further discussion of the proposed joint program in Washington later in April.

Dr. Manley Named Senior Adviser to U.S. Representative to IAEA

The Department of State announced on April 2 (press release 165) the appointment of John Henry Manley, formerly research adviser at the University of California's Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, to be senior technical adviser to Rob-

¹ For a Department announcement and names of members of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1958, p. 583.

ert M. McKinney, U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and U.S. member of the Agency's 23-nation Board of Governors.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) came into being in 1957 as an outgrowth of President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace proposal. United States participation in the IAEA is coordinated by a permanent mission located at Vienna, Austria, headquarters of the Agency.

Dr. Manley will join the mission in time to attend the meeting of the Board of Governors of the IAEA scheduled to convene at Vienna, April 24, 1958.

U. S. Delegations to International Conferences

13th Session, Economic Commission for Europe

The Department of State announced on April 4 (press release 172) that Henry J. Heinz II, president of H. J. Heinz Company, was sworn in as the U.S. Representative to the 13th session of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), scheduled to be held at Geneva, Switzerland, April 9-25, 1958.¹ Mr. Heinz served as a public member of the U.S. delegation to the 12th session of the Contracting Parties of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which met at Geneva in October 1957. In 1954 he headed the U.S. Special Economic Mission to Pakistan.

The Department also announced that Mr. Heinz' principal advisers will be John W. Evans of the American Embassy, London, and George Tesoro, Senior Economic Officer, U.S. Resident Delegation to International Organizations, Geneva.

The ECE is one of the three regional commissions established by the United Nations to deal with the special economic problems of its area and to contribute to better living standards in the world as a whole.

At its 13th session the Commission will review the activities of its committees, which cover the fields of agriculture, coal, electric power, housing, industry and materials, inland transport, manpower, steel, timber, and trade. The Annual Survey of Europe, as prepared by the secretariat on its own responsibility, will also be reviewed.

¹ Mr. Heinz was confirmed by the Senate on Apr. 2.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.

Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, March 3, 1958; Mexico, April 7, 1958.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Federation of Malaya, April 7, 1958.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

Signature and acceptance: Ghana, April 3, 1958.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.¹

Accession deposited: Austria, March 19, 1958.

Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

Adherence effective: Haiti, July 1, 1958.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.²

Acceptance deposited: Japan, March 17, 1958.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926 (46 Stat. 2183), as amended by the protocol of December 7, 1953 (TIAS 3552).

Accession deposited: Ceylon, March 21, 1958.

BILATERAL

Sudan

Agreement providing for economic, technical, and related assistance to the Sudan. Effected by exchange of notes at Khartoum March 31, 1958. Entered into force March 31, 1958.

Union of South Africa

Agreement supplementing the passport visa agreement of March 28 and April 3, 1956 (TIAS 3544). Effected by exchange of notes at Pretoria March 31, 1958. Entered into force April 1, 1958.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

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189	4/11	Explanation of abstinence in fishing.
*190	4/12	Secretary Dulles to speak at Minnesota Statehood Day.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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May 5, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The Interdependence of Independence

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

It is for me a high privilege to greet you in this House of the Americas. Here we are each among friends and at home. Words can scarcely express how fortunate we are in this hemisphere, how greatly blessed, to have this kind of association, which has no counterpart in all the world and indeed in all history.

It was 50 years ago when the cornerstone of this our home building was laid on May 11, 1908. The late Ambassador Joaquim Nabuco of Brazil said that day that the United States, by virtue of being made the host of the permanent seat of the Pan American Union, had received the highest tribute ever paid to this Republic. We are still deeply conscious of that high honor and shall strive constantly to merit it.

This day, April 14, is being observed in our American Republics as Pan American Day. It is an annual festival of freedom, friendship, and good will which has acquired unique significance for the American peoples.

The United States gives striking proof of this. President Hoover first proclaimed Pan American Day in 1931, and since then its observance has grown year by year. It has become a people's festival, not merely a celebration by the government. One day has proved to be not enough for all of the ceremonies prepared in the name of this hemisphere friendship throughout our land. Consequently, 3 years ago President Eisenhower made the now traditional proclamation of Pan American Day a proclamation of Pan American Week as

well.² And let me call your attention to the geographic range of our United States commemoration. In addition to the President's proclamation, we now have governors' proclamations as well from Alaska to Florida and from Guam to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Our present commemoration of Pan American Day takes on a special significance. For this year is the 10th anniversary of the Charter of the Organization of American States. Through that organization the inter-American system finds the framework for its constructive international deliberation and cooperation. It thus becomes a great contemporary force for the extension and maintenance of peace, not in this hemisphere alone but throughout the world. And it is not for our present troubled era only but for the future of the human race as well.

The Organization of American States is unique because of the degree to which it combines the independence of our countries with recognition of their interdependence. We have learned that interdependence must be practiced if worthwhile independence is to be preserved.

At the beginning of our history as separate national entities, our wills and our energies were directed primarily toward securing our independence. The right of men in the New World to live in freedom, subject only to the dictates of moral law and not the whims of overseas rulers, inspired our forefathers to epic struggles. This burning desire for freedom enabled the troops of Bolívar

¹ Made at Pan American Day ceremonies at the Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., on Apr. 14 (press release 191).

² For President Eisenhower's proclamation of Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1958, see BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1958, p. 217.

and San Martín to endure incredible hardships in scaling the windswept passes of the Andes. The same determination held together the small band of devoted soldiers under the leadership of George Washington through the bitter winter at Valley Forge. The forces of tyranny could not match the valor, resourcefulness, and steadfastness of the patriots. Through their struggles throughout this hemisphere the independence of the New World was achieved.

Monroe Doctrine

But just as the individual, however independent, cannot live wholly alone but shares the life of a society, so the newly created nations of the Western Hemisphere found that they could not maintain their independence in isolation from each other. The Holy Alliance, under the leadership of the Russian Czar, threatened to reconquer the liberated colonies in Latin America and to encroach upon the northwest of the North American Continent. It was that situation which led President James Monroe, the 200th anniversary of whose birth is celebrated this month, to enunciate the first major statement of United States foreign policy. He declared that the peace and safety of the United States would be endangered if the European despots attempted to extend their systems to any part of this hemisphere.

That was the first great proclamation of interdependence. It was, at its inception, a unilateral proclamation. But it stated a concept of broad applicability. Thus it became, by a logical historical evolution, multilateral and mutual in acceptance throughout the American Republics. That evolution has been speeded by the recurrence of external dangers. During the First World War we drew together in substantial unity. Then, in the 1930's and 1940's, when human freedom was again menaced by an aggressive totalitarian power, the American states rapidly closed ranks to present a unified front. At Buenos Aires in 1936, at Lima in 1938, at Panamá in 1939, at Habana in 1940, and at Chapultepec in 1945 the principles of American solidarity against foreign aggression were laid down. The natural culmination was the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance—the Rio Treaty of 1947—providing that an attack against any American state would be considered as an attack against all.

Collective-Defense Structure

Despite victory in World War II the need for maintaining our collective-defense structure is as great as ever. A new menace grew as international communism pursued its goal of world conquest. It manifestly has predatory designs against this hemisphere, and it views the existence of inter-American solidarity as an insuperable barrier to its aggressive plans. Through agents, overt and secret, communism strives incessantly to open a breach in our bastion.

In the face of this serious threat the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, in 1954, made its memorable Declaration of Solidarity of the American States.³ It declared that the domination or control by the international Communist movement of the political institutions of any American state would threaten us all and endanger the peace of America. Thus again the American Republics marshaled the political and moral force of America against the efforts of an alien despotism to extend its system to this hemisphere and to intervene in our affairs.

Nowhere in the world has a group of nations so proudly won and preserved its independence. Also, nowhere in the world have nations so fully developed the concepts of interdependence. Interdependence is not only made explicit, as by the declarations mentioned, but it is implicit in those portions of our charter which call for consultation and cooperation in the solution of political, juridical, and economic problems and for the peaceful settlement of international controversies.

The Organization of American States does, moreover, aid in the achievement of the basic principles of the American states even when it does not have direct responsibility as an organization for putting them into effect. In the basic documents of the Organization of American States and in the deliberations of its conferences, the fundamental ideals and common objectives have been set forth and clarified. Progress toward their realization depends not only on collective action but on the individual action of the member countries in the exercise of their responsibility for national development.

Take, for example, the ideal of representative government based upon respect for human rights

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 638.

That concept has commanded the allegiance of the peoples of all our countries. It has been proclaimed on numerous occasions and is inscribed in the charter.

Yet the statesmen of the American community have learned that democracy because of its very nature cannot be imposed from without but must be nourished from within each country. The principle of nonintervention is, therefore, entirely consistent with the principle of encouraging representative government and respect for human rights.

Interdependence has cultural and economic as well as political and security aspects. The Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives, resulting from the 1956 Panamá meeting of the Presidents, has worked fruitfully in this field. The Committee concluded its sessions with a meeting in this very hall about one year ago.⁴ Since that time the task of converting the Committee's recommendations into realities has been going forward. The Governments of the American Republics have expressed agreement in principle with the recommendations, and provision has been made for a substantial start. I understand that the Council has laid the foundations for a greatly expanded program of fellowships under OAS auspices. It is also setting up an Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission,⁵ which should play a significant role in assisting the American Governments to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

These and the other worthwhile projects currently being worked out have excellent prospects of succeeding in "making our Organization of American States a more effective instrument in those fields of cooperative effort that affect the welfare of our peoples."⁶ The United States rejoices that so promising a start has been made, and we take this occasion to express to the members of the Council, as well as to the Secretary General and his able assistants, our appreciation of their conscientious and fruitful labors.

Now I should like also to refer to the economic aspects of our interdependence. This, too, is very much of a reality—a reality not yet adequately organized. Today conditions vary considerably among the 21 Republics of the Western Hemisphere. America as a whole continues to move forward—irresistibly. In some countries the pace of growth has hardly diminished in spite of less hospitable world conditions, so powerful have been the vital internal forces of progress. In others, including the United States, the rate of growth has perceptibly slowed down. A few countries are experiencing serious financial difficulties.

A major cause of these difficulties is the severe contraction of demand for certain basic commodities which has led, in turn, to lower prices. This has cut sharply into the foreign-exchange earnings of some countries. They have had to reduce imports or accumulate commercial arrearages—or both. Nearly all have had to utilize reserves heavily.

Certain of the factors bearing on the economic difficulties are beyond the power of governments to change. Consumer habits cannot be coerced—at least in our Republics—and artificial stimulants often make the patient sicker. However, the United States Government realizes the potential consequences of violent fluctuations in the prices of Latin America's exports, and we are daily searching for ways and means to contribute toward a solution of economic problems.

One problem involves petroleum, a commodity of greatest importance in the economies of all our countries, whether as producers or as consumers. The world is faced with a readjustment of marketing relationships, distorted at the time of the Suez crisis and complicated by a decline in demand. In view of this situation the United States Government, with the cooperation of the importing companies, has inaugurated a program of voluntary limitations on the amount of crude petroleum to be imported into the United States. I would like to make two points in this connection: We have consulted regarding this program with our friends in Venezuela, who are our principal foreign suppliers, and we have also kept the Canadian Government informed of these developments. My second point is this: Despite drastic cutbacks

⁴For a statement by President Eisenhower and a Committee announcement made at the conclusion of the meeting, see *ibid.*, June 24, 1957, p. 1014.

⁵*Ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1957, p. 976.

⁶For an address by President Eisenhower at Panamá, July 22, 1956, see *ibid.*, Aug. 6, 1956, p. 219.

in our domestic production we endeavor to insure to foreign petroleum the same percentage of our domestic market it normally occupies.

This is the spirit in which we try to meet the difficult problems of the present economic situation. When consumption declines, we strive not to shift all of the burden onto weaker nations. We seek to share it fairly, believing that this is in our enlightened self-interest.

I can assure you that we are truly anxious to help within the limits of what is sound and within our governmental capabilities. And we are always ready to discuss with our neighbors these mutual problems in an effort to find practical and acceptable solutions. Our great stimulus in this quest is our desire to promote a better way of life for all our peoples, on whom the future of America depends.

Rio Treaty, the Model for NATO

Our inter-American system has a significance which surpasses the bounds of this hemisphere. It is well known, for example, that the Rio Treaty served as the model for the North Atlantic Treaty, which created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Quite understandably, NATO was at first compelled to concentrate largely on combating the threat of military aggression. But recently, despite the persistence of this danger, increased attention has been given to developing the scope of that organization. President Eisenhower, speaking in Paris last December at the NATO meeting,⁷ said this:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in response to a military threat. Yet NATO should not for all time be primarily a collective-defense organization. We hope and believe that the time will come when its defense aspect will be minor and perhaps even unnecessary. . . . We should so shape this association, and our respective parts in it, that it permanently serves to promote harmony not only between us but also between ourselves and other people and areas of the world.

It requires no great gift of detection to determine the origin of that concept. Its origin is right here, in the Organization of American States.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1958, p. 6.

Our organization, too, has its collective-defense aspects. But they are minor. We have developed our association along many other lines. Indeed, never before in history has a group of nations of comparable number enjoyed, in organized form, so high a measure of fellowship and harmony. Thus we set an example from which others can profitably learn. I believe that the inter-American system for the peaceful solution of disputes has in it elements which could be adapted to solve some of the thorny problems which too often emerge elsewhere, with consequences that might even affect this hemisphere.

I am glad, therefore, that Dr. [José] Mora, the Secretary General of our organization, has replied in an affirmative vein to NATO's suggestion for an interchange of information. As we help others, we may help ourselves.

If there be any who believe that inter-American solidarity is something at which we toss bouquets of words every April 14 and forget for the rest of the year, it would be well for them to look at the record. It is a continuous advancing record of positive accomplishment resulting from day-by-day efforts. It shows our united determination to make America a happier, better home for Americans.

In our endeavors may we never lose sight of the basic truth that cannot be too often stated: The independence of the American Republics is safeguarded by their recognition of their interdependence. Solidarity could not exist if our peoples had not consciously determined to achieve it. In our time solidarity is built on many interdependent factors—political, cultural, economic. In the beginning, however, there was but one powerful factor: the stubborn will for self-determination. That was a positive element at our very roots as free peoples. It was inherent in our nature as pioneers, peoples of the ever-advancing frontiers toward ever-enlarging horizons. It was a moral force in each American nation. It was also a unifying bond of kinship. The founders of our Republics renewed their faith in their own purpose of freedom by witnessing the dedication of others to that purpose. May the American Republics never forget that dedication, nor ever waver in that faith.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of April 15

Press release 193 dated April 15

Secretary Dulles: I recall that 2 or 3 weeks ago I spoke of the able diplomacy with which Mr. Murphy and Mr. Beeley were carrying on their good-offices mission as between France and Tunisia.¹ I want to repeat that expression of high approval today when happily there is a greater prospect than when I spoke of the success of their mission. The outcome, of course, is still uncertain; but as far as the good-offices mission can function at the governmental level, they have succeeded in reaching an agreement which is in the great interest, we believe, of the governments concerned and, indeed, of all the world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some criticism in France that the arrangements which they are proposing are hostile to the interests of France—that the United States is taking a hostile line.

A. I am aware of the fact that there are rumors that circulate in France and have various origins which suggest that the United States has some devious purpose of trying to take over the French position in North Africa. When the President and I were in Paris at the NATO meeting last December, we were aware of those rumors and the President rejected them with indignation, I may say, and I am prepared to reject them with the same degree of indignation.

The fact is that there are economic and cultural ties of a long historic background between France and North Africa which we believe to be a basis for fruitful cooperation between Western Europe and North Africa, and the last thing in the world we would want to do is disrupt those relationships.

I recall that the NATO meeting I referred to took cognizance of those relationships and referred to them as a useful basis for friendly cooperation between Western Europe and North

Africa.² The United States fully subscribes to that view, and never for one instant do any other influences operate to make our policy as regards that area. The idea that we are operating there in some devious way to take over North Africa in the interests of American corporations is just about as far from the truth as any statement could be.

Prospects for Meeting With U.S.S.R.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the reports from the Paris NATO meeting seem to indicate that the Western countries have agreed to meet the Russians on the diplomatic level provided the Russians will not have any prior conditions and in fact that we are not asking prior conditions with that level. Is that correct?

A. Well, it is partially correct but only partially correct. You say we are willing to meet the Russians at the diplomatic level. You may recall it is we who have been urging the Russians to meet at the diplomatic level. I recall that at my meeting before the Press Club last January³ I urged that this preparatory work should be gotten away from the business of public exchanges between heads of government—gotten down to a lower level—and I said preferably the diplomatic level. It was our proposal, made some 2 weeks ago to the Soviet Union,⁴ that we should carry on these talks at the diplomatic level.

The Soviet Union indicated they were prepared to accept that, but they attached conditions which are unacceptable to the Western powers. Now I think it is likely—I hope it is likely—that talks will now be conducted at the diplomatic level, and

¹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1958, p. 13.

² *Ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1958, p. 159.

³ For text of three-power declaration of Mar. 31, see *ibid.*, Apr. 21, 1958, p. 648.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 14, 1958, p. 607.

I suppose the first thing they may talk about is what they are going to talk about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does that mean the issue of whether or not you will talk about substantive matters is not now resolved and that you will go to this meeting to see if you can resolve them?

A. The latest Soviet memorandum,⁵ while agreeing to our proposal to talk at the diplomatic level, indicated they were not willing to talk at the diplomatic level, or indeed at any other meeting short of the summit meeting itself, about matters of substance. So that issue is not resolved.

Q. What is our position as of today on that point as to the talks at the diplomatic level?

A. Our position is precisely what was set out in the three-power declaration handed in in Moscow 2 weeks ago.

Q. In other words, we are still saying that at this diplomatic level there must be talks as to substance or we will not meet at this level?

A. Well, I wouldn't put it quite that way. We are proposing to conduct the preparatory talks now at the diplomatic level. The Soviets agree they will talk at the diplomatic level, and we are not yet in agreement as to what we will talk about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Soviets refuse to enter into substantive talks at a lower level or at the ambassador level or foreign-minister level, will we decline to attend a summit meeting?

A. Well, I am not prepared to give a categorical answer to that question at this time. U.S. views have been fully set forth by the President. After all, it is a "summit" meeting. That means it is his meeting. He would be going to it, and I cannot say on his behalf just what he will do. He has spoken for himself on that subject, and that is for all the world to know.

Q. Will the diplomatic talks start in Moscow on Thursday of this week?

A. I do not know, and that has not been decided yet. The terms of our next communication to the Soviet Union have not yet been fully concerted. We are working on them at the present time. I do not know whether they will be ready in time to permit of the diplomats to start talking this week or not.

Q. Is it clear, Mr. Secretary, the diplomatic talks at the diplomatic level, when, as, and if they occur, will be four-power talks?

A. That is what we proposed, and, as far as that aspect of the matter is concerned, it is apparently what the Soviets accept.

Question of Agenda

Q. Mr. Secretary, in practical terms what has been your experience about the ability to stick to any agenda set in the first place with the Russians? Is this a realistic procedure to believe that it can be kept to an agenda?

A. Well, I don't think that we would ourselves want to have an agenda so rigid that we were precluded from talking about some of the matters which we believe are of vital importance for the peace of the world. Even though these were not accepted as a topic for agreed discussion in the sense there was preliminary agreement that they could be fruitfully discussed with a good prospect of agreement, we might still want to be able to talk about them.

You will recall at the last summit meeting there were opening statements of a general character which were made. In his opening statement President Eisenhower, among other things, spoke of the problem created by the situation in Eastern Europe and the inability of those nations there to have governments of their own choosing.⁶ Now, Mr. Bulganin came back and said they were not willing to discuss it. But the President had made his point in his opening address. I would suppose that, following that pattern, if there were a summit meeting there would be an opportunity for the Heads of Governments there to open up, at least, by saying the things that were on their minds. But then the question is, are you going to get on to anything at all where there is a prospect of agreement?

You will recall that Mr. Bulganin, when head of the Soviet state, said that the conference should concentrate on matters as to which the known positions of the states indicated a likelihood of agreement. There isn't yet a sufficient exploration to indicate what, if any, matters might lend themselves to agreement, given the "known position" of the states. I think there needs to be a further

⁵ See p. 728.

⁶ BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 171.

exploration of that matter before agreeing on those items of the agenda where we would presumably try to reach at least a framework of an agreement.

I doubt whether it is possible at a summit meeting to reach a detailed agreement about many of these matters. They are tremendously complicated, particularly the subjects of armaments and the like. But the outline of agreement—the basic positions—could perhaps be agreed to in some areas. I think that is a possibility which we need to explore because, as President Eisenhower said, if all that is going to happen at the summit meeting is that they sit around the table and glare at each other, that would not be a profitable operation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't what you are describing the same kind of summit meeting we had the last time with the icebreaking meeting at the summit followed by, I presume, the foreign ministers' meeting to fill in this outline you describe?

A. Well, that would involve a considerable change in what now seems to be the agreed concept of such a meeting. The last summit meeting started out with an invitation from the three Western powers to meet, and they said it would not be expected that at that meeting any agreements would be reached but that they might agree upon topics as to which they would instruct their foreign ministers to try to reach an agreement.

Now, the Soviet proposal for a summit meeting is that the meeting should concentrate on matters as to which the known positions of the states indicate a likelihood of agreement at the summit meeting. In other words, whereas the first summit meeting did not purport to be a meeting to reach any agreement at all, but only to agree on areas which might be usefully explored, now the matter has been reversed making necessary some preparatory work. And, indeed, you have been having a measure of preparatory work in the exchanges of diplomatic notes that have been taking place and the exchange of letters between the Heads of Governments. But in further preparatory work we should try to discover whether or not there are important matters as to which the known positions of the states indicate a likelihood of agreement at the summit meeting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you had to make book on this summit meeting now, with the baseball season

and the racing season on us, what would you say are the chances of its taking place?

A. Well, I wouldn't want to publicly admit that I am a gambler. (Laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, in very real terms don't your remarks add up more or less to the following as being our position: that we do not want and don't think that we should have a summit meeting without proper preparation, but that we don't see any real way to stop having it on terms that we don't like?

A. No, I don't think that what I have said adds up to that. I hope not.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with this question of the summit conference and other aspects of foreign policy—are you satisfied with the degree of understanding and support you are getting from the Senate today?

A. It seems to me that there is a very understanding attitude on the part of Congress with respect to this summit meeting. We have tried to keep in touch with each other. I am having a meeting this afternoon with the chairman and a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee to discuss this matter further. But I think that there is a very considerable degree of understanding of, agreement with, and support for the position that we have been taking on this matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier you were asked, if the Soviets refused to enter into substantive discussions at a lower level, would the United States decline to go into a summit meeting, and you said you couldn't answer categorically. Now, sir, do you think it is possible to have lower-level meetings which do not go into substance and yet make an adequate preparation for a summit meeting?

A. Well, I think that it is possible to have exploratory talks which would throw light at least upon whether or not it is likely that an agreement could be reached on some aspects of the so-called question. That could be done without necessarily getting into the details of such an agreement. A good deal in these matters depends upon the attitude, the approach, the temper of the Soviet Union. Clues can be obtained as to its probable attitude without necessarily probing into all aspects and having the i's dotted and the t's crossed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would it be necessary to obtain a reply from Russia to the note which will go

forward later this week before the Western diplomats sit down to any talks in Moscow?

A. Not as far as we are concerned. We have been ready, are ready, and will remain ready to talk at the diplomatic level. That is what we have been trying to do. You might say we have been trying as far as this preparatory work is concerned to get down from the summit and get down to rock bottom where perhaps we can do something more effective. This preparatory work for the summit meeting started in exchanges of letters between the Heads of Government. Then it was carried on by the exchanges of notes between the foreign ministries. Now it may be getting down to the diplomatic level, which is what I have always argued for. And as we get down from the summit, as far as the preparatory work is concerned, I think that there is more chance of doing some useful preparatory work. So we stand ready at all times to talk about this business at the diplomatic level.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are not the Russians likely to point to the bogging down of this preparatory work and say that this proves the futility of talking on a lower level and that these matters can therefore be solved only at the summit?

A. Well, we haven't started talking on this level yet; so it is a little premature to say that it is futile.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on what topic is Ambassador Thompson and his two colleagues in Moscow—on what topics are they prepared to discuss in a preparatory nature? Are you thinking of disarmament, Germany, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, or what?

A. The President in his January letter to Chairman Bulganin⁷ indicated a number of topics which the President put forward as possible topics for discussion. That letter had been submitted to and approved by NATO before it was sent. So that that probably constitutes at least a preliminary indication of the position we would take so far as the preparation of an agenda is concerned.

Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you view the growing unrest in the Middle East? I am referring par-

ticularly to the reports of threat of civil war in Lebanon, demonstrations in Gaza against King Hussein, and what I consider intensified name-calling from Cairo against those nations not joining in the United Arab Republic?

A. Well, it is difficult to evaluate those particular instances you refer to, and indeed I have no evaluation of them. They only happened within the last 24 hours. But when you speak about growing unrest, I am afraid that is a little of an exaggeration, because there has been quite a considerable amount of unrest in that area for some little time now.

Q. I said "intensified."

A. I am not sure it is intensified over what it has been.

Latin America

Q. Mr. Secretary, a number of Latin American diplomats have expressed disappointment that you did not take advantage of your speech at the Pan American Union yesterday⁸ to make a major pronouncement of our intentions toward that area. In fact, they believe that it would have given us a decided psychological advantage in the mounting contest to win Latin America's friendship by the Soviet Union. I wonder if you would care to comment on that?

A. I think that in my speech yesterday I broke a considerable amount of new ground in relation to the handling of economic problems which concern this hemisphere—the United States and the other American Republics. I think that that speech deserves to be rather carefully evaluated in that respect, because it does mark a considerable advance over what has been our position in many of these respects heretofore. Now you cannot come out unilaterally with some detailed program which involves other countries. Undoubtedly there has got to be quite a lot of work to be done if it is to be possible to implement the general concepts that I referred to. I talked about consultation, which is something that we have been rather hesitant to do in the past. I am not just referring to the recent past, indeed, to the long past. I referred to a desire to share the burdens of any recession fairly and not try to impose them just upon weaker countries. The

⁷ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.

⁸ For text, see p. 175.

general principles that I enunciated there are of extreme importance and I think will bear fruit. All the fruit isn't borne when the tree is planted.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any information bearing on Soviet efforts, if any, to launch a third earth satellite and why no such satellite has been launched up to now?

A. No. I have no firm information about that, only speculation. I think it is fair to conclude that they have had some difficulties, perhaps, or else they would have launched another satellite before now. But that is largely in the area of speculation—perhaps you might say, an educated guess. But it is not supported by any firm evidence that we have.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your remarks on Latin American economy, are they to be interpreted as meaning that the United States has changed its long-time position of allowing world prices on primary products to seek their own level in a free market and that we are going to agree to some form of world support not only for coffee but for tin, rubber, and all the other products that are depressed at this period?

A. I think that the action that we have taken with respect to petroleum, which I spoke concretely about yesterday, indicates a willingness to have this problem handled in some kind of a cooperative way, mutually acceptable to the producers in this country, I hope, and also to producers abroad.

Now each one of these situations has to be dealt with on its own merits. You can deal with petroleum in one way because there are a relatively small number of importing companies to be brought into a so-called "voluntary" program—a voluntary program with a certain amount of teeth in it. But each situation stands on its own footing. We have, of course, an arrangement about sugar. Well, that is possible because of certain conditions which prevail in the sugar industry. I wouldn't say that there is any one pattern which is applicable to all industries. Each has to be studied by itself. But the general approach of trying to find a program which is fair to all and which mitigates the grievous consequences of a decline, that is something which we are prepared to do. That perhaps is an advance somewhat over our past policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say a review of the United States policy toward the acquisition of land on Okinawa is under way and, if so, how far that may go? It has been a subject of great concern to the Okinawans.

A. The High Commissioner announced, I think, in his address of a few days ago that a review was under way, and I confirm that such a review is under way. It would be premature to indicate what the result of that review will be, but the fact that it is under review does indicate that we have taken note of the fact that the present policy did not seem to win complete favor among the Okinawans.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on another point, there have been reports that one of the reasons that the Russians announced their nuclear ban was because of a nuclear accident or miscalculation. Do we have any reason or any evidence whatever which might suggest that this is true?

A. I would doubt if that is the explanation.

U.S. Relations With Egypt

Q. Mr. Secretary, back in the Middle East, sir, there is a feeling in some diplomatic quarters that we are seeing a few faint signs that perhaps our relations toward Egypt are back on the road toward improvement. Do you detect any signs of that, sir, and, if so, what are they?

A. I am told that there has been some moderation of the tone of the press and radio of the U. A. R. as regards the United States. That would be a favorable sign, I would think.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, it has been reported that this Government is seriously considering unfreezing the funds of the Egyptian Government. Is that true?

A. No, it is not correct. On that particular item, as you will recall, the reason for the freezing was to have a fund which would protect American shipping companies from double jeopardy if it should be held in the courts of this country that they had improperly paid the Egyptian Canal Authority whereas they should have paid the Universal Suez Canal Company. There are lawsuits, I think, pending or in prospect, which raise that issue. Therefore we took the position that to protect our people against double jeopardy we

Ambassador Thompson's Instructions

would want to keep a fund here available to protect them, unless and until it seemed that there would be a direct settlement between the Universal Canal Company and the Egyptian Government.

Now, a first meeting was held to try to bring about such a settlement. The parties found themselves quite apart. A second meeting is to be held, I think, in the quite near future. We hope, and indeed have some reason to believe, that the position of the parties will have by that time come somewhat closer together. If it should seem that an agreement is likely, we would then reconsider our policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you do not believe that we are going to be pushed into a summit conference against your will, could you not be more specific in explaining what our minimum terms are? This phrase "proper preparation" covers an awful lot of things.

A. I understand that. But I also ask you to understand that in this matter we are not just operating on our own. If we were operating on our own, we would be able to make our position quite clear, I think. But I believe and think that almost everybody believes that it is worth while to maintain our alliances, particularly, in this matter, our NATO alliance. You cannot have an alliance as between free nations if one nation is just attempting to go on its own and dictate to the others. Therefore, in this matter, which is of deep concern to the governments of our allies in Europe, we take some account of their views. We do not attempt just to impose our views upon them. And if I were to attempt here unilaterally, just for the United States, to lay down a firm line which we were going to take without regard to what their views were, I think I would not be faithful to the alliance and to the principles which we agreed upon last December.

Last December we had this summit meeting in NATO and we agreed there among ourselves we would seek to avoid making statements or taking public positions which were of concern to others without prior consultation. We are trying faithfully to live up to that, and I think we have lived up to it faithfully. But, if I were here to make the statement that you call for, that would be a repudiation of what we agreed to last December.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the possibility of an ambassadorial meeting looking toward the "summit" in Moscow, is it desirable or necessary to have Ambassador Thompson come home for consultations with you before starting out?

A. I don't think it's necessary for him to come back before starting out. I would think it would probably be desirable, if the meetings get under way and do get down to a discussion of some of these matters which may come up for an agenda proposal. At some stage it might be useful for him to come back. But we don't think it would be necessary for him to come back at least before we take the initial step.

Q. I wonder, Mr. Secretary, if you could indicate when the Western reply may go forward to Moscow?

A. No, I can't indicate that with any definiteness. It's being worked on today. I can't foresee whether there will be agreement today, or maybe tomorrow. I don't think that the obstacles, the differences, between us are of any major character at all. We are all agreed as to the substance of it. Indeed, the position is essentially a restatement of what we said in the three-power declaration made at Moscow previously. Each of the governments has suggested a text. There are naturally slight variations between those texts. They are not matters of substance. They are being ironed out. We may reach an agreement today, maybe tomorrow, maybe the day after. I don't anticipate any long delay.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I hope you will forgive me if I say I'm still not clear in my mind as to what's likely to happen in Moscow this week or next when the Ambassadors sit down with Foreign Minister Gromyko; and without wishing to go into matters which have not yet been agreed upon with our allies, I just wish to ask about something which we have presumably agreed in substance with our allies. I put this specific question: When the Ambassadors meet in Moscow with the Soviet Foreign Minister, if, as could be assumed, Gromyko first raises the question of date and preparations for a foreign ministers' conference and then for a summit conference, would our Ambassador be authorized to discuss the preparations for the summit meeting before and unless

there has been some discussion of the matters of substance which we wish to raise regarding an agenda?

A. He has no present authority to do that and would probably seek further instructions if the matter should develop in that way.

Soviet Misuse of Diplomatic Machinery

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a great deal of talk, and especially in the newspapers, that we are not anywhere near keeping up with the power and influence of Russian propaganda. The inference of so-called nuclear testing, with people trembling on the edge—do you think that would presumably indicate that we should seek to improve our own propaganda?

A. I think that we are becoming more effective in this respect. I think it's important to bear in mind that up until recent days the United States has never thought, nor indeed have any of the so-called civilized nations of the world thought, that diplomatic communications were designed, or should be designed, primarily for propaganda purposes. We have always considered that these exchanges, and indeed most conspicuously exchanges between heads of government, were designed, generally on a highly confidential basis, sincerely to achieve some practical result. So you have a long tradition, not only of this country but of all of the countries which have shared in the development of diplomacy and international law, of carrying on diplomatic discussions not for purposes of propaganda but for the purposes of really achieving agreements.

For the first time that I know of in all history that process has been debauched and prostituted into purely an organ of propaganda. There seems to be no desire whatever to use this machinery really to get to an agreement but merely to use it for propaganda purposes. Now it takes a little while to adjust our processes to meet that. Whether we should meet it fully or not, I am not entirely convinced. For I do believe that there should be honesty and integrity in terms of these diplomatic notes and exchanges if the nations of the world are ever going to get along together. I think that what has been going on here is most dangerous from the standpoint of peace. It's done, I know, in the name of peace. But when,

for the sake of a temporary propaganda advantage, a nation uses the only way which nations have of really exchanging views and getting together—uses that not for the purpose of really getting together but only for propaganda purposes, you're destroying one of the frail reeds upon which the peace of the world often rests.

How far should we pursue that course? I'm not entirely clear. I am clear on the fact that in some way and in some manner we should find a more effective way to meet this propaganda. And I believe that we are going to be able to do it. And I believe that in the long run the nations of the world, including the neutrals, will listen more, and pay more heed, to what we do and a little less attention to just what is said.

I was talking here yesterday in this room to this meeting of an international group of editors [International Press Institute], and I recalled the fact that Hitler in the thirties used to make the most impassioned speeches about "peace." And he persuaded many people in the world of his dedication to peace. Now there are a good many people, particularly in the newly developing countries, the newly independent countries, who are just for the first time getting into the stream of international affairs, who haven't had the opportunity to become mature in these matters, and Soviet propaganda initially is having a kind of a field day in those areas.

I don't think that this is anything permanent. I think we can deal with it. But I don't know whether we should deal with it by matching them in terms of debanching, debasing, the means whereby nations which have differences of a critical nature may perhaps resolve those differences. If we destroy that process, we will have destroyed something which is very vital to the world. And I say that nations which profess to want peace, and which in the process of making these professions destroy the mechanics by which peace is historically preserved, may have to pay a heavy price for what they are doing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you read Mr. Khrushchev's 9,000-word letter to Lord Russell?

A. Yes, I read it.

Q. Did you read in it the fact that it's filled with more falsity and more nonsense and aimed at influencing less developed nations than anything that has come out in a long time?

A. Well, I would have been glad to say that except I thought the publication probably would not have published it if I had said it. But let me say this: As I read that letter, the heart of it was this: that there is no difference between nations which have no moral standards and those who have moral standards, because sometimes those nations don't completely live up to their moral standards. I say there is the biggest gulf that you could think of between people who have standards, even though they deviate from them, and those who do not even profess to have them.

Question of Spending for Propaganda Purposes

Q. Mr. Secretary, in testimony before Congress recently—recent testimony before Congress—you said that it was doubtful whether it was worth while to investigate or put too much money and time in getting to the moon second. Does that include that you imply the Russians would get to the moon soon, first?

A. I believe that again there is a question of how much you spend on what essentially has a propaganda value or is done for propaganda purposes. The money that it takes to do these things comes out of the sweat and labor of people, and broadly speaking we think people who sweat and labor are entitled to get something back for it in terms of a little better economic livelihood. To have them do this merely for propaganda purposes is a matter of some question.

I have referred here several times to the monuments that were built in the past by the great despots, the Pyramids of Egypt, the Colosseum of Rome, the palaces of the French kings in France. Those all had an impressive propaganda value. But all of them were made of the sweat and labor of people who were compelled to do this in order to glorify their rulers. Now we don't want to get into that kind of business. If and as it develops that there may be scientific value in doing this thing, I suppose we will do it—although this is not primarily in my area, I may say. But I do not think that, just because the Russians may be doing it, we necessarily ought to do it. We must not allow ourselves to be made over into the pattern of the thing that we hate. There is always a tendency to do that. There is always a danger that you make yourselves over into the image of the thing that you are fighting in order to fight it

better. We have to fight it some other way. But that does not mean I'm against going to the moon. (Laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your earlier statement on propaganda and peacemaking, you use the words "debauched and prostituted" with respect to the meaning of peaceful processes. And at a later point you referred to Soviet propaganda. Are you saying in this statement that it is the Soviet propaganda techniques which have debauched and prostituted the peacemaking processes?

A. I meant to say that, when you use what historically had been the established means whereby people communicate with each other for vital purposes of trying to reach agreement and maintaining a condition of peace, when you turn those processes into instruments of propaganda, I think you're doing a great harm to the real machinery whereby the world has historically endeavored, inadequately, to keep the peace. Time after time those processes have served a very important, indeed a vital, purpose. And I hate to see them converted just into instruments of propaganda. Does that answer your question?

Q. Well, I'm trying to get at what agency is so converting them.

A. The Soviet Union is.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you explain the fact that we give aid to so many countries and in these countries—I'm thinking now in terms of Lebanon, which has always indicated friendship for the West—that even there it appears that we are criticized for actions that we take. Isn't there something in us and the way that we give aid that brings forth these criticisms, or does the fault lie elsewhere?

A. I think that the fault is found probably in many causes. The fact that assistance is received does not provide any immunity against criticism. Indeed, sometimes perhaps it promotes criticism. We don't give aid, as I have often said, merely as a means of buying gratitude. Gratitude is not obtained in that way. Nor is that our purpose. We give assistance and provide aid to enable countries to maintain their independence. If they maintain their independence, that is what we want. If they use their independence to criticize us, that is their right.

Q. Thank you, sir.

U.S., U.K., and France Ready To Begin Talks at Moscow

THREE-POWER STATEMENT OF APRIL 16

Press release 195 dated April 16

Following is the text of an identical statement presented to the Soviet Government on April 16 by the British, French, and United States Ambassadors at Moscow, in reply to the Soviet aide memoire of April 11, 1958.

The United States, British and French Governments have studied the Aide Memoire communicated to their Ambassadors in Moscow on April 11. They note that the Soviet Government has accepted their proposal that the preparatory work for a Summit meeting could best be performed by exchanges through diplomatic channels leading to a meeting between Foreign Ministers. They also note that the Soviet Government agrees that these exchanges should begin in Moscow as soon as possible. The Western Powers for their part will be ready to begin on April 17.

It is clear from the Soviet Government's Aide Memoire that there are still substantial differences of opinion between the Soviet Government and the Western Governments as to the precise character and scope of the preparatory work.

In the first place, our Foreign Ministers cannot absent themselves from their countries for a prolonged period. Thus, it is essential that the diplomatic talks in Moscow should be concerned not only with plans for a meeting of Foreign Ministers but with examining the positions of the various governments on the major questions at issue between them and with carrying on discussions designed to bring out the possibilities of agreement on them. Even if such diplomatic talks do not result in complete agreement they would greatly facilitate the task of the Foreign Ministers.

As regards a Summit meeting the Western Governments hold the view that such a meeting will not be fruitful unless the ground has been thoroughly prepared in advance and it is clear from this preparatory work that there is broad agreement on the nature and order of the agenda, and a real desire among all who participate in the meeting to make practical progress towards a settlement of the differences between us. There

must be reasonable prospect of achieving concrete results on specific issues. Satisfactory completion of the preparatory work must therefore precede arrangements for such a meeting.

This approach is in consonance with the statement made by the Head of the Soviet Government on February 1, 1958¹ that a Summit meeting should be "concentrated on the most urgent problems, with regard to which the known positions of states provide a certain degree of assurance as to their positive solution at this time." Up to the present, the exchange of views on this matter has been conducted solely through published correspondence and has not yet established any degree of assurance that agreement on urgent problems could be reached. Thus, there is plainly need for preparatory work beyond mere matters of organization.

It is the view of the Western Governments that the differences of opinion mentioned above should be the first subject of discussion between the Soviet Government and the Western Ambassadors in Moscow. Such discussion may be more likely to lead to agreement than a further exchange of public communications. That is our hope.

The Western Ambassadors will, for this purpose, make themselves available to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 17.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT OF APRIL 11

White House press release dated April 11

The United States has received at Moscow a reply to the declaration which the United States made on March 31st² in conjunction with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom with reference to preparatory work through diplomatic channels to determine whether a summit meeting would serve a useful purpose.

The Soviet reply is manifestly not an acceptance to this Western proposal. It proposes that the diplomatic preparatory work shall not deal at all with a summit meeting but only with the time, place, and composition of a subsequent meeting of foreign ministers.

The implications of the note will of course be carefully studied.

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 376.

² *Ibid.*, Apr. 21, 1958, p. 648.

The Government of the Soviet Union has examined with all attention the joint statement of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France of Mar. 31, made in connection with the Soviet Government's proposal regarding the speeding up of preparations for a summit conference, contained in the Soviet Government's aide memoire of Mar. 24, 1958.³

The Soviet Government notes that although the governments of the three powers also state that the present day international situation demands the making of serious efforts with a view to reaching agreement on the fundamental international problems and the consolidation of general peace, and that it renders desirable the convocation of a high level conference, they, in essence, avoid replying to the Soviet Union's concrete proposals about the convocation of such a conference made as far back as December 1957.⁴

As was pointed out in the Soviet Government's aide memoires of Feb. 28⁵ and Mar. 24, 1958, the main task at present is the speediest completion of preparatory work for a summit conference. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to organize a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in April in order to carry out this work.

It is with regret that one is forced to admit that the governments of the three powers are causing delays over the talks to prepare a high level conference.

With a view to the speediest completion of preparatory work regarding the convocation of the summit conference the Soviet Government deems it necessary at present to reach agreement on, first of all, the question of holding the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs not later than the end of April or the middle of May 1958. In this connection it is borne in mind that all preparatory work through diplomatic channels must be completed by that time. For this reason, the Soviet Government deems it expedient to restrict the exchange of views through diplomatic channels to a minimum of questions relating directly to the organization of a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, that is, questions of the date and place of the ministers meeting and the composition of its participants.

Striving for a most rapid completion of preparatory work for the summit conference, the Soviet Union, as is known, long ago submitted for consideration by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, its proposals on the question of a summit conference agenda, the composition of its participants, and the place and date of holding it. The Soviet Government expects that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France will give in the near future a definite reply to these concrete proposals.

As regards the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs, these ministers—in the opinion of the Soviet Government—must reach agreement on the question of date, venue, and composition of a high level conference, and

determining the range of questions which will be considered at the conference.

In this connection it is not excluded that while attending to preparations for the high level conference, the ministers may if necessary and if generally agreed, exchange opinions on certain of the problems proposed by the parties for inclusion in the agenda of the summit conference, for the purpose of determining whether it is expedient to include a given question in the summit conference agenda.

It is self-evident that the question of the convocation of a high level conference cannot be linked with the results of the meeting of ministers of foreign affairs. The Soviet Government bases itself on the argument that all parties to the meeting will strive to achieve positive results. The Soviet Government, on its part, will do everything possible for this aim to be achieved. However, if the ministers are unable to reach the necessary agreement on questions of preparations for a summit conference, this would not signify in any way that the necessity of having such a conference has become less pressing.

The present tense international situation demands the speedy settlement of ripe international problems; in these conditions it would be incorrect to make the convocation of a high level conference depend on the results of a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs. It is perfectly obvious that difficulties which may appear during the ministers conference can and must be overcome at a conference of statesmen invested with wider powers.

Guided by the aforesaid, the Soviet Government expresses readiness to begin in Moscow on Apr. 17 the exchange of views about preparations for a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs.

U.S. Denies Soviet Charge of Provocative Flights in Polar Region

On April 18 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko charged in a news conference that U.S. nuclear-armed bombers had made "provocative" flights across the Arctic toward the Soviet Union. Following is the text of a Department statement read to news correspondents on the same day by Joseph W. Reap, acting chief of the News Division.

It is categorically denied that the U.S. Air Force is conducting provocative flights over the Polar regions or in the vicinity of the U.S.S.R. Mr. Gromyko's charges appear to be an attempt to raise fears of mankind in the nuclear age. What we do is public knowledge; what happens behind the Iron Curtain menacing to the free world is carefully hidden by the Soviets. We will be glad to discuss this question in the United Nations, as we are always willing to discuss these

³ *Ibid.*, p. 652.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 127.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 459.

any charge made against us. The United States is ready and willing to work with all nations of the world to reduce tensions and particularly the fear of sudden surprise attack. The U.S. proposals for increasing protection against surprise attack have had as their aim not merely protection of one side against the other, but also have been designed to give each side knowledge of the activity of the other so as to reduce fears and misjudgments. Until these fears are banished, the United States must take all steps necessary to protect the free world from being overwhelmed by a surprise attack.

The Strategic Air Command is the mainstay of the free world's deterrent position. It has been successful in accomplishing this mission for the past decade. It can only accomplish its mission of deterrence in the future if it is well known that it is so trained, so equipped, and so situated that it cannot be surprised and destroyed on the ground by an enemy. Therefore, it has in the past, and will continue in the future, to maintain its high state of efficiency through constant practice. All these training exercises, however, are designed to maintain the force within areas which by no stretch of the imagination could be considered provocative to the U.S.S.R. So far the SAC force has never been launched except in carefully planned and controlled exercises and practices. Should there be a real alert, based on a warning of a possible attack, the force would be launched under a procedure which makes certain that no SAC airplane can pass beyond proper bounds far from the Soviet Union or its satellites without additional unequivocal orders which can come only from the President of the United States. The procedures are in no sense provocative and could not possibly be the accidental cause of war.

U.S. Policy Regarding Algeria Remains Unchanged

Following is a Department statement read to news correspondents on April 18 by Stuart Lillico, press officer.

In view of the fact that the status of the good-offices mission¹ is now in suspense, it would be

inappropriate for the United States to make any comments with regard to the French-Tunisian dispute at this time.

The Acting Secretary [Mr. Herter] informed the French Ambassador [Hervé Alphand] this morning that press speculation to the effect that there has been a basic change of United States policy with respect to Algeria is without foundation. As the United States Government has long made it known, the United States is greatly concerned by the Algerian conflict and attaches the highest importance to the need for a peaceful, democratic, and just solution. It has always been the hope of the United States Government, and still is, that France itself will be able to work out such a solution, which is of great interest to all of the countries of the free world.

NATO Defense Ministers Conclude Discussions

Following is the text of a final communique released at Paris on April 17 at the conclusion of the NATO Defense Ministers' conference

In accordance with the decision taken at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at the level of Heads of Government on 19th December last,¹ the Defense Ministers of the NATO member countries met at the Palais de Chaillot, under the Chairmanship of the Secretary General, Monsieur P. H. Spaak, on 15th, 16th and 17th April, 1958.

2. The Ministers heard full and valuable reports by the Military Committee, the Standing Group and the Supreme Allied Commanders on the present state of the forces of the Alliance, on the progressive introduction of the most modern weapons and equipment and on the forces needed for NATO defense in the years ahead. They also heard progress reports on projects initiated by the Heads of Government in December. On the basis of these reports a most useful discussion took place between the Ministers and the NATO military authorities.

3. In order to meet the continuing efforts made by the Soviet leaders to equip their large forces with

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 372.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

the most modern weapons the Ministers discussed ways and means of making the best of the resources of the Alliance and of achieving greater effectiveness for its forces. They confirmed their support of the basic NATO strategy for the preservation of peace and for the defense of member countries. This defensive strategy continues to be founded on the concept of a strong deterrent, comprising the shield, with its conventional and nuclear elements, and the nuclear retaliatory forces.

4. The Ministers also were in agreement on certain measures to achieve greater co-ordination and to widen co-operation among member countries, both with respect to defense research, development and production and to the organization of forces.

5. The Ministers are confident after these discussions, which confirmed their unity and common purpose, that the progressive modernization of NATO forces, on the basis of the agreed strategic plans, will enable the Alliance to maintain its defensive strength while efforts continue to be made to re-establish international confidence through effective, controlled disarmament.

Secretary Dulles To Visit Berlin After NATO Ministerial Meeting

Press release 197 dated April 16

The Department of State announced on April 16 that the Secretary of State will visit Berlin briefly at the conclusion of the NATO Ministerial Meeting at Copenhagen.

The Secretary expects to arrive at Berlin in the late morning of May 8. He will be the guest of honor at a lunch given by the Governing Mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt. Late in the afternoon of May 8 he expects to leave Berlin for Paris, where he will attend a meeting of the U.S. ambassadors in Europe.

Senator Case To Represent U.S. at Berlin Congress Hall Ceremonies

The Department of State announced on April 19 (press release 203 dated April 18) that Senator Clifford Case will represent the United States at Berlin on April 26 at the ceremonies passing title

to the Berlin Senat of the Benjamin Franklin Congress Hall, built for the 1957 International Building Exposition.

At the ceremonies President Heuss will deliver the principal speech for the Federal Republic of Germany. Presiding over the ceremonies will be Ralph Walker, chairman of the Benjamin Franklin Foundation and former president of the American Institute of Architects, who was named in 1957 by the AIA as "Architect of the Century." Mr. Walker will present the key to the Congress Hall to Mayor Willy Brandt to conclude the ceremonies.

The Benjamin Franklin Foundation was created in 1955 in Berlin to act as the agent for the U.S. Government, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Berlin Senat to design and construct a Congress Hall dedicated to the freedom of speech. The building was opened in September 1957 during the International Building Exposition and was especially dedicated to Benjamin Franklin with his quotation:

... God grant that not only the love of liberty, but a thorough knowledge of the rights of men, may pervade all the nations of the earth, so that a philosopher may set his foot anywhere on its surface, and say, This is my country.

The building itself, designed by American architect Hugh Stubbins, has already become one of the landmarks of Berlin. Characterized by its soaring roof, it includes an auditorium seating 1,200 people, a modern theater, indoor and outdoor restaurants, and multilingual facilities for simultaneous translation.

Letters of Credence

Austria

The newly appointed Ambassador of Austria, Wilfried Platzer, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on April 18. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 201.

Cuba

The newly appointed Ambassador of Cuba, Nicolás Arroyo y Marquez, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on April 16. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 194.

International Trade and Our National Security

by Under Secretary Herter¹

President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles asked me to tell you of their keen interest in this great civic enterprise. The benefits of a fair such as this extend throughout the United States. In the most practical way possible, you are demonstrating the interdependence of nations. Our foreign policy is based on the belief that no nation is an island unto itself and, in bringing nations and peoples and goods closer together, you are furthering the aims of this Government.

Trade fairs hark back to ancient days. There is a Biblical reference in the Book of Esther to a fair lasting 180 days conducted by Xerxes, King of the Persians, for the purpose of displaying "the riches of his kingdom." This was 500 B.C. Through the ages, trade fairs played an important role in establishing many of the important trading centers of Europe—Frankfort, Leipzig, Lyon, Brussels. They became crossroads of traffic in the very same sense that this great city of Seattle is a "gateway to the Orient."

We can trace the history of fairs from medieval times through the Middle Ages down to the present—from stalls and booths and bazaars and shows to the great industrial exhibitions of today. But there is an essential difference between fairs today and in olden times.

This is a geographical difference. In Europe distances between countries like Belgium or Holland or, for that matter, almost any country in western or central Europe are comparatively short. Because of the difficulties of transportation and the small area and population of each country, the producers of goods a few hundred

years ago had to rely on outlets in neighboring countries.

The mid-20th century has changed all this. The world is the market for the man with the better mousetrap. You can fly that mousetrap from Bangkok to Seattle in 44 hours.

This is a mixed blessing. In less than 44 hours a military plane carrying an atomic or hydrogen bomb can also deliver its cargo to any city in the world. This, together with the threat of ballistic missiles, makes it all too evident that the United States is no longer protected by its Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From a space-age viewpoint, Moscow is just about as close as your nearest shopping center.

Now, the foreign policy of the United States reflects this fundamental fact—and that is that the security and prosperity of this Nation cannot be separated from that of other nations.

Communist Strategy

We live in a troubled world, but we have no trouble in locating the threat to our peace and security. The threat is international communism. The threat is not new. It is as old as communism itself. Thirty-five years ago, Lenin said:

First we will take Eastern Europe, next the masses of Asia, and finally we will encircle the last bastion of capitalism—the United States. We shall not have to attack it; it will fall like overripe fruit into our hands.

Now that is very specific and very direct; and I don't think I need to point out to this audience that communism has accomplished the first step. What the mapmakers called Eastern Europe 20 years ago is behind the Iron Curtain.

This Lenin statement is Communist doctrine. It charts the strategy, and it has been like a polar

¹ Address made before the Seventh Annual Washington State International Trade Fair at Seattle, Wash., on Apr. 11 (press release 183 dated Apr. 9).

star to the succession of rulers in the Kremlin. World domination was and *is* the goal.

While attempting to lull the free world into a sense of false security, the Sino-Soviet bloc has developed the largest standing army in the history of the world. They have built a submarine fleet more than three times larger than our own. And they back up this army and navy with an array of tactical and intermediate missiles. While protesting their peaceful intentions, they work night and day to develop the so-called ultimate weapon—the intercontinental ballistic missile.

This is the *military* threat of communism. It is *not* dreamed up by any alarmist. It exists today—now—and it is very, very formidable.

In view of the record of international communism, a record filled with treachery and broken promises, simple prudence would dictate that the United States and the rest of the free world counter this threat. This we have done and will continue to do. Briefly, I would like to tell you *how*.

First, we have strengthened, modernized, and streamlined our own military establishment. The more than 2,600,000 men and women in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force are equipped with the latest nuclear weapons, atomic submarines, guided-missile ships, fighters, bombers, and ballistic missiles. This combined force, dispersed, ready for action, and capable of instant retaliation, is a mighty deterrent to any would-be aggressor.

The Mutual Security Program, a Shield of Additional Strength

But we have not stopped here. Under the mutual security program we have built a shield of additional strength to protect the free nations of the world.

Using our basic theory of the interdependence of nations, we have established military alliances with 42 nations of the free world. We have bilateral treaties with Korea, free China, Japan, and the Philippines and multilateral agreements through the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Australia-New Zealand-United States treaty called ANZUS.

During the past 7 years we have contributed \$20 billion in mutual defense assistance to our

free-world allies. But during this same period of time our partners in these defensive alliances have contributed \$122 billion to develop the strength of the free world. In addition to helping us with manpower problems that would greatly weaken our economy if we had to go it alone, our allies have provided more than 250 major overseas bases.

This massive defensive strength has brought to a halt outright armed aggression by the forces of international communism. The weapons of bullying and bullets have been put in the skeleton closet—probably the largest skeleton closet in all history.

Soviet Economic Offensive

Communism is now probing in another direction with new weapons. I am talking about the new Soviet economic offensive.² Instead of bombast and bluster, the Communists now talk softly. They coax and use blandishments. Listen to this statement by a Russian delegate at the recent Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Cairo:

We do not seek to get any advantages. . . . We are ready to help you as brother helps brother, without any interest whatever, for we know from our own experience how difficult it is to get rid of need.

I think the martyrs of Hungary and Poland and Czechoslovakia and Rumania and Latvia and Estonia and Lithuania and Bulgaria bear silent witness to the tragedy of believing that "brother act." Getting rid of the Communists is harder than getting rid of need.

The sometimes voluble Khrushchev let slip the real intention of the economic offensive of the Soviet Union when he told a group of Congressmen who interviewed him: "We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes."

But, unbelievable as it may seem, nations which have waited centuries for independence are edging perilously close to the spider's web. With long-term loans at low interest rates, the Soviet bloc has doubled its trade with the less developed nations in 3 years from \$840 million in 1954 to about \$1.7 billion in 1957; and the number of trade agreements in this 3-year period has leaped

²For a statement by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon on Soviet-bloc economic activities in less developed countries, see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.

from 49 to 147. The ink is scarcely dry on these agreements before the first planeload of Soviet technicians arrives to begin the job of veering the country toward communism.

President Eisenhower, in a message to Congress,³ made it clear how we as Americans must regard this new threat. This is what the President said:

If the purpose of Soviet aid to any country were simply to help it overcome economic difficulties without infringing its freedom, such aid could be welcomed as forwarding the free world purpose of economic growth. But there is nothing in the history of international communism to indicate this can be the case. Until such evidence is forthcoming, we and other free nations must assume that Soviet bloc aid is a new, subtle, and long-range instrument directed toward the same old purpose of drawing its recipient away from the community of free nations and ultimately into the Communist orbit.

Now, the greatest mistake we could make would be to assume that this Soviet economic offensive is something that will pass in the night, that it is a "flash in the pan," that it will peter out. It is being pursued with the same determination, the same ruthlessness, the same disregard for the truth, and with the same tenacity that the Soviet Union has demonstrated in its military buildup.

The mutual security program is a counter to this threat, too. We are working with the less developed nations to help them find their "place in the sun." Most of these nations need higher levels of health, education, and sanitation. They need to learn new methods of agriculture, of irrigation, of conservation. They need nurses, doctors, teachers, engineers, administrators. Through our technical cooperation program we are helping in all of these areas.

Development Loan Fund

We are not trying to prime the pump of these underdeveloped countries. We are helping them to get the basic industry—the pump itself—for them to prime. Most of these developing countries do not yet have the basic facilities to attract private risk capital. They lack good harbors, port facilities, roads, communications, power, railways. To help fill the vacuum we established late last year the Development Loan Fund as a part of the mutual security program.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 367.

The Development Loan Fund lends money for specific, economically sound, and technically feasible projects. It does not extend credit when other financing is available on reasonable terms. It concentrates on long-range, economic-growth projects. Applications for nearly \$2 billion in such projects are now being carefully screened. Only \$300 million was appropriated last year, and \$625 million has been requested for this year.

There are strong moral and humanitarian reasons for this effort to help hundreds of millions of people rid themselves of dirt, disease, and despair, but there are strong reasons from an economic, self-interest standpoint too. This one-third of the world's population constitutes a tremendous potential market for the goods of America, the world's largest trading nation.

Let me say a few words about world trade and America's relation to it. I am a Yankee from Massachusetts. From my State about a century ago, clipper ships set sail on voyages round the world. Those beautiful clipper ships helped to build not only Massachusetts but the entire United States of America. Today America is the world's largest exporter and the world's largest importer. Our two-way trade in 1957 reached the staggering total of \$32 billion, an all-time high in any nation's history.

Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program

This world record was accomplished within the framework of the reciprocal trade agreements program. Twenty-five years ago, Cordell Hull, a great American, established this program. It has become known as a symbol of international trade cooperation. The reciprocal trade agreements program has been renewed by Congress 10 times, and it is before Congress for renewal now. The President of the United States has requested that it be renewed again, this time for 5 years.⁴

Strong voices are being raised against the program by those who think, rightly or wrongly, that the trade agreements program is injurious to their particular industry. Less than a month ago about 1,300 leaders from all walks of life and from all sections of the country gathered in Washington

⁴ *Ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 263; for statements by Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks, Secretary Dulles, and Deputy Under Secretary Dillon, see *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1958, p. 432, and Apr. 14, 1958, p. 626.

to voice their support of the reciprocal trade agreements program.⁵ Theirs was the "grass roots" voice of America, but whether it will continue to be heard over the daily cries of the self-interest groups remains to be seen.

Here is an example of the situation we face. In the month of February 114 textile concerns in Japan went bankrupt. Now, my own State of Massachusetts is one of the leading textile States in the Nation. We have unemployment in the textile industry in Massachusetts at the present time, and all of us naturally have a greater concern for the problems of our own citizens than for those of our friends overseas.

But let's just consider this fact: Japan is America's second best customer for the products of our farms and factories. Last year it was better than a billion-dollar customer, but its trade deficit with the United States was \$624 million. The effect of Japan's purchases is felt in every corner of the U.S.A. And when you have a billion-dollar-a-year customer who shows signs of ailing, it's time to call the doctor and get a good diagnosis.

What's wrong is obvious. Japan needs desperately greater access to the American market. Japan is the most industrialized nation in Asia. They are a dependable ally. Faced with 90 million people to support in an area smaller than California, and with few natural resources of her own, Japan must trade to live. If the West closes the trade door in Japan's face, Japan must turn to the Communist bloc.

This situation illustrates vividly the interrelationship between international trade and security. We cannot have strong partners in our free-world alliance unless we give them a chance to build strong economies through trade.

This is the problem—how to safeguard the Nation's defense through effective alliances while adequately protecting American business interests. There is no perfect way to accomplish both objectives. However, I believe that the reciprocal trade agreements program, with its built-in protections, is the most practical way.

If we do not make it possible for the nations of the free world to trade with us, they have no

⁵ For an address made at the conference by President Eisenhower and remarks by Secretary Dulles and Mr. Dillon, see *ibid.*, Apr. 14, 1958, p. 591.

alternative but to trade with the Soviet Union. As a supporter of this program has so aptly said, "This is the cold algebra of sense and reason." Khrushchev is confident that our democratic system will force the nations of the free world into his hands. Last November he said:

The threat to the United States is not the ICBM, but in the field of peaceful production. We are relentless in this, and it will prove the superiority of our system.

This is a warning to be heeded. What could be greater folly than to push the nations of the free world into the crushing embrace of the Russian bear?

This economic cold war will be won in the field of trade. It will be won by dedicated men and women like yourselves, working toward the common goal of national freedom and trade freedom. I have unbounded faith in the outcome of this struggle.

Reply of "Sixteen" to Chinese Communist Statement on Korea

Following is a Department announcement regarding a note transmitted to Chinese Communist authorities on April 9 by the United Kingdom Government on behalf of the Governments of the countries which have contributed forces to the U.N. Command in Korea, together with a letter of transmittal of April 10 from U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the text of the note.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 182 dated April 9

The United States Government, in consultation with other governments which contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea, has given careful consideration to the Chinese Communist statement of February 7¹ transmitted through the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peiping. This statement reiterated a north Korean statement of February 5,¹ concerning Korean unification, and made reference to the holding of elections for that purpose.

¹ Not printed.

Upon concluding their consultations, the governments concerned requested the British Government to inform the Chinese Communist authorities of their views, and of their interest in having clarification of certain points in the Communists' proposals.

In their consultations the governments concerned reaffirmed that their aim in Korea is to see the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea, in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions.² To this end, as they have often stated, they wish to see free elections held under United Nations supervision for the constitution of a National Assembly. They were glad to note that the Communist authorities have stated that they also favor free elections, and they welcomed the announcement that Chinese Communist forces are to be withdrawn from north Korea.

There appears to the governments concerned, however, to be some doubt as to the precise interpretations to be placed on the Communist proposals. A variety of statements is reported to have been made, for example, by north Korean representatives in Peiping and Moscow, to the effect that the "purpose of supervision by a neutral nations organization was to see that all political parties and public figures in both north and south Korea would have freedom of action, speech, publication, assembly, and association," but that "such supervision should not intervene in the elections." Since these interpretations appear to call for some clarification, the governments concerned believe that it would be useful to know whether, when the north Koreans speak of a "neutral nations organization" to supervise the elections, they accept that these should be held under United Nations auspices and that there should be adequate supervision not only of the preliminaries but also of the elections themselves. They would also be glad to know whether it is accepted that representation in the new National Assembly shall be in proportion to the indigenous population.

The governments concerned have asked the British Government, in informing the Chinese Communist authorities of their views, to state that

² For statements made in the 12th session of the General Assembly by Representative Walter H. Judd and the text of a U.N. resolution of Nov. 29, 1957, see BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 966.

if the Communists will provide clarification of the points mentioned with such other details of the proposals as may be relevant, they will be given careful consideration.

A copy of the British Government's communication is being transmitted to the United Nations.

TRANSMITTAL TO UNITED NATIONS

U.S./U.N. press release 2894 dated April 10

Ambassador Lodge's Letter

The Representative of the United States to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary General of the United Nations and has the honor to transmit on behalf of the United States Government, in its capacity as the Unified Command, a copy of the note which the United Kingdom Government transmitted to the Chinese Communist authorities, on April 9, 1958, on behalf of the governments of the countries which have contributed forces to the United Nations Command in Korea. The note of the United Kingdom Government was in reply to the Chinese Communist statement issued in Peiping on February 7, 1958, which had been communicated to these governments.

It is requested that this communication and the attached copy of the note be circulated to all members of the United Nations as a General Assembly document.

Text of Note

Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to state that, as requested by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 7, the statement on Korea made on that date by the Government of the People's Republic of China has been communicated to the Governments of the countries which have contributed forces for the United Nations force in Korea, who, after consultation, have requested Her Majesty's Government to reply on their behalf.

The Governments of the countries which have contributed forces for the United Nations force in Korea have noted the statement made by the North Korean authorities on February 5 and that made by the People's Republic of China and communicated to Her Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking on February 7. They have given careful study to these statements and to the proposals made therein.

The Governments concerned reaffirm that their aim in Korea is to see the establishment of a unified, independent

and democratic Korea, in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions. To this end, as they have often stated, they wish to see free elections held under United Nations supervision for the constitution of a National Assembly. They are glad to note that the North Korean authorities and the People's Republic of China also favour free elections and they welcome the announcement that Chinese forces are to be withdrawn from North Korea.

There appears, however, to be some doubt as to the precise interpretation to be placed on the North Korean proposals. A variety of statements is reported to have been made, for example, by North Korean representatives in Peking and Moscow, to the effect that the "purpose of supervision by a neutral nations organization was to see that all political parties and public figures in both North and South Korea would have freedom of action, speech, publication, assembly and association" but that "such supervision should not intervene in the elections". These interpretations appear to call for some clarification and the Governments of the countries concerned would be glad to know whether, when the North Korean authorities speak of a "neutral nations organization" to supervise the elections, they accept that these should be held under United Nations auspices and that there should be adequate supervision not only of the preliminaries but also of the elections themselves. They would also be glad to know whether it is accepted that representation in the new National Assembly shall be in proportion to the indigenous population.

If the People's Republic of China will seek from the North Korean authorities clarification of the points mentioned above with such other details of the Korean proposals as may be relevant, they will be given careful consideration.

A copy of this reply is being transmitted to the United Nations.

Sentences of Japanese Parolees Reduced to Time Served

Press release 176 dated April 7

The U.S. Government and other governments concerned, having considered recommendations of the Japanese Government on a case-by-case basis and in consultation with each other, have informed the Japanese Government of their decision to reduce to the time served as of April 7, 1958, the life sentences imposed by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East upon Sadao Araki, Shunroku Hata, Naoki Hoshino, Okinori Kaya, Koichi Kido, Takasumi Oka, Hiroshi Oshima, Kenryo Sato, Shigetaro Shimada, and Teiichi Suzuki. All of them had previously been released from prison on parole.

The Japanese Government had made recommendations, in accordance with the provisions of

article 11 of the treaty of peace with Japan signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951,¹ based on the good behavior of the parolees during their confinement and while on parole, and based also on the fact that all of them are now of advanced age.

Impact of Mutual Security Program on the United States Economy

by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon²

It was suggested that I speak on the mutual security program, a subject as timely as it is important. In the time at my disposal I doubt if I could cover the many aspects of this program and do justice to any of them. I would prefer to discuss certain of our objectives and give you some idea of the impact of the mutual security program on the economy of the United States.

This is a subject that falls rather directly into my bailiwick. Under a recent reorganization at the Department of State I was assigned responsibility for coordinating the mutual security program with other related foreign policies and programs. This coordinating responsibility includes the activities of the International Cooperation Administration and the military assistance program of the Department of Defense.

The objective of this newly assigned responsibility is to insure that our foreign economic policy travels in the same direction as our foreign policy. As I am sure you gentlemen know, both policies have the same goal and that goal is to advance the security and well-being of the United States and its people.

In my travels and talks in various parts of the country—and in Washington, too—I frequently get the impression that people think there is nothing "mutual" in the mutual security program. They seem to feel that we take our national budget, decide somewhat arbitrarily that 5 percent of it should be allotted to this thing called "foreign aid," and that we then hand over this sum of

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of AUG. 27, 1951, p. 349.

² Address made before the National Security Industrial Association at Washington, D. C., on Apr. 10 (press release 180 dated Apr. 9).

money for the nations of the free world to spend as they see fit—with perhaps a modest amount of supervision.

The exact opposite is the truth of the matter. This year we are asking the Congress for \$3.942 billion.³ Of this amount, \$2.635 billion is for military assistance and defense support.

The estimates of the needs of the free-world nations in building up their defensive strength are not supplied by the recipient countries. The military estimates are drawn up by the Department of Defense acting through military assistance advisory groups assigned to the country or area. The United States makes the final decision of who gets how much in every instance. And we control the purse strings and continue to control them every step of the way.

The estimates for technical cooperation and the other forms of grant assistance are made by specialists within the International Cooperation Administration, with the help of area and country specialists from the Department of State. And again let me say—we control the spending.

The purpose of the mutual security program can be simply stated. We seek peaceful progress among the entire community of nations. There is nothing altruistic about this. Peace is in our national self-interest.

Two Challenges to Peaceful Progress

We face two challenges to peaceful progress in the world we live in. The first of these is the military challenge of the Soviet bloc. To meet this challenge we have entered into a system of defensive alliances with 42 nations of the free world. And, as the strongest link in this defensive chain, we are playing the dominant role in building total strength to deter further Communist expansion. We do not play the dominant role from a money or manpower standpoint—only in materiel. Since 1950 we have spent approximately \$20 billion to build the military strength of our free-world allies. During this same time these allies have spent more than \$122 billion, or better than \$6 for every dollar we have

spent. Their contribution in manpower comes to more than 3½ million men under arms, a total considerably larger than the entire armed forces of the United States.

The second challenge we face in striving for peaceful progress is an economic one. Since World War II, 20 new nations have come into being. These 20 nations have about 750 million people. They total nearly one-third of the world's population. Each of these nations has emerged from years, sometimes centuries, of colonial status. Each has had a close, intimate, personal relationship with disease, ignorance, and poverty.

The United States has been trying to help the peoples of the less developed nations since the end of World War II. During Joseph Stalin's lifetime Russia showed not the slightest interest in the hopes and aspirations of these peoples. But since Stalin's death in 1953 the Soviet Union has "discovered" the existence of the 750 million people in these 20 nations. Instead of bluster, bullying, and bullets the Communists have turned to blandishments in an effort to win the newly independent countries. In some places they have made considerable headway.

The Communists are mounting this offensive with the same zeal, the same determination, and the same disregard for truth that seem to characterize their actions. They tell the less developed nations that our democracy is a "freak," a "phony." They don't tell them that 6 percent of the world's peoples living under this democracy produce 40 percent of the world's goods. As Winston Churchill might say, "Some freak, some phony!"

This economic cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States is waxing warm. They have wooed the less developed nations with \$1.6 billion in loans and grants during the past 3 years with the obvious purpose of leading them away from the free world and into the Soviet camp.⁴ We cannot lose this cold war without gravely endangering our national security. The challenge is fully as important as the military challenge. If these new nations slip one by one into the Soviet orbit, we will become beleaguered, encircled, and finally strangled. It is certain that our standard of living will change radically if the immense raw-

³ For President Eisenhower's message to Congress requesting continuation of the mutual security program, see BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 367; for statements by Secretary Dulles and ICA Director James H. Smith, Jr., before congressional committees, see *ibid.*, Mar. 17, 1958, p. 427; Mar. 31, 1958, p. 527; and Apr. 14, 1958, p. 622.

⁴ For a statement by Mr. Dillon on Soviet-bloc economic activities, see *ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469.

material resources of the Middle East and Far East are denied us. It is certain, too, that the Soviet Union does not intend to fight this economic war according to any Marquis of Queensberry rules.

Our chief reliance in this economic competition is on the Development Loan Fund, through which we can lend mutual security funds to the newly developing countries for projects that will help them along on the road toward industrial development. These loans can be made on an attractive basis, often repayable in local currency, and they fill a need which cannot be met by other loaning agencies such as the Export-Import Bank and the World Bank. We are asking \$625 million for this project. Without these funds we would be entering the ring against the Soviets with one hand tied behind our backs.

Most people in America today appear to have given up on the 19th-century concept that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans constitute a heaven-sent protection from attack. In the world we live in, Chicago is 6½ hours from Moscow by bomber, and Washington, D. C., may well be 6½ minutes from a missile fired by submarine.

Today we understand that there *is* an interdependence of nations. Space weapons make distant peoples our neighbors. The theory of dispersal of men and bases and the need for strong allies seem readily apparent. And these are the goals of the mutual security program.

Now some of you may feel that the mutual security program is well worth while but hardly the kind of activity we should be indulging in when 5.2 million Americans are reported to be looking for work.

This program involves the security of the United States, directly and indirectly, now and for the future. We are not *now* and must never be in the position of being unable to afford our own security. The entire mutual security program costs each of us the equivalent of an airmail stamp a day; and I might point out that the \$3.9 billion for this year's program is about one-fourth of what we spend each year for liquor and tobacco.

If anybody thinks the mutual security program is a "do good" charitable proposition, they might be interested in what General Nathan Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has to say about it:

The cold facts of the matter are that the security of the United States depends upon our collective security system, which, in turn, depends upon our military assistance program. There may be some alternative to collective security and military assistance. Maybe those who make the broad charge that all money spent in this area goes down the rathole know what the alternative is, but so far no responsible military man has been able to think of it.

A Plank in the Antirecession Drive

But, aside from the security aspects of the matter, the mutual security program can be considered a very strong plank in the antirecession drive. According to Mr. [Mansfield D.] Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense, approximately 85 cents of every dollar spent under the military assistance program will be spent right here in the United States. We estimate that between 75 and 80 cents of every dollar of mutual security funds will be used to buy the products of American farms and factories. And practically all the rest of the money will sooner or later return to bolster our economy.

I would like to use a few dollars-and-cents figures to give you an idea of just what this program means to the industry of the United States and to our entire economy. Here are some of our purchases in 1 year in the United States.

Machinery and equipment	\$70 million
Iron and steel	\$35 million
Bread grains	\$94 million
Cotton	\$84 million
Chemicals	\$25 million
Petroleum	\$35 million
Motor vehicles	\$20 million
Coal	\$20 million

—and listen to this one—

Military equipment	\$1.443 billion
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Now, I don't need to point out to this group that this \$1.443 billion for military equipment fans out to hundreds of subcontractors and suppliers in every walk of American life. A recent non-Government witness before Congress stated that, in his opinion, 1 million jobs were directly or indirectly due to the mutual security program. Those of us directly connected with this program have never used a figure higher than 600,000 jobs. But whichever figure you prefer is very sizable; and this hardly seems to be the time to put any of these workers into the job pool.

In addition to the direct purchases which I have mentioned is the tidy sum of \$58 million which was paid last year to U.S. flag exporters to

carry the goods of the mutual security program to the nations of the free world.

Let me make it clear that we are *not* trying to buy friends under the mutual security program. We are *not* trying to give everyone our *American* standard of living. We are trying to build strong allies, allies whose strength combined with ours will deter aggression in any part of the world. We are trying to help the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to achieve a decent standard of living.

It is in our own national self-interest to get these hundreds of millions of people into the market place of the world, where they can buy the goods of the world's largest trader—*America*. This program to improve the buying power of one-third of the world's population should appeal to every businessman.

A Tough Foe and a Tough Battle

This economic war with Russia is a challenge to you as businessmen. We are the world's largest exporter and the world's largest importer. We have the highest standard of living in the history of the world, and we are unquestionably the world's most privileged people.

We are being challenged in a field where we are the defending champion. We are being challenged by a nation whose own standard of living is lower than that of some of the countries she rules. We are being challenged by a nation whose per capita income is \$308 as compared to our per capita income of nearly \$2,500.

But we are also being challenged by the nation with the second highest gross national product in the world. And Soviet industrial strength is growing at a rate of 10 percent a year versus our own growth of 4 percent. We are being challenged by the nation with the largest standing peacetime army and the largest fleet of submarines in the history of the world. We are being challenged by a godless nation that has never disavowed its objective of world domination.

In 1924 Lenin said: "First we will take Eastern Europe, next the masses of Asia, and finally we will encircle the last bastion of capitalism—the United States. We shall not have to attack it; it will fall like overripe fruit into our hands."

There is the blueprint, and the Soviets have accomplished the first objective—the seizure of

Eastern Europe. We face a tough foe and a tough battle.

We cannot afford to be complacent about our own security. And we cannot afford to be indifferent to the needs of our allies. We must wage this economic war with all our resources, both human and material. We must fight with all the ingenuity that our inventors and scientists and businessmen can command. As President Eisenhower has said, we must "wage total peace" to beat the Soviets at their game of "total cold war."

I urge you to join and support this Nation's effort to achieve peaceful progress through the mutual security program.

President Approves Duty-Free Entry of Automobiles for Show Purposes

Statement by President Eisenhower

White House press release dated April 16

I have today [April 16] approved H.R. 776, "To permit temporary free importation of automobiles and parts of automobiles when intended solely for show purposes," in the interest of making the privileges it grants available at the earliest date and because I believe that increasing the opportunities for the display of foreign products would be of benefit to the United States.

I wish, however, to call attention to the fact that the measure makes the allowance of reciprocal privileges by a foreign nation a condition to the granting of the benefits of the bill to that nation by the United States. In this respect it is inconsistent with our obligation to accord unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with respect to customs duties to a great many countries of the world. This obligation is contained in most of our treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation and trade agreements. If we grant the privilege of temporary duty-free importation to automobiles from any country, we are, therefore, obligated to grant identical treatment to many other countries, whether or not they permit temporary duty-free importation of automobiles from the United States.

I therefore urge that the Congress give consideration to the early enactment of legislation amending H.R. 776 to eliminate the reciprocal privilege requirement.

Sharing Nuclear Knowledge With Our NATO Allies

Statement by Secretary Dulles¹

I welcome the opportunity to testify here to the importance of the proposed amendments of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. These amendments are indispensable, both to our collective security policies and to our disarmament policies.

I shall direct myself primarily to these two aspects of the matter.

I.

United States defensive policy is one of *collective* defense. This is authorized by the United Nations Charter, and it is, indeed, necessary to our national safety. We have collective defense arrangements with many nations. The most highly developed military organization is under the North Atlantic Treaty. Its protection of the vital European area depends upon two components. One is the deterrent of our strategic striking power. The other is the "shield" of NATO forces in the area.

During recent years primary stress has been placed upon the deterrent of retaliatory striking power, with less emphasis accorded the shield. There were two reasons for this. The decisive superiority of the United States in the field of nuclear weapons made our strategic deterrent highly effective. Also a "shield" of conventional forces could not indefinitely match the much greater conventional forces that could be amassed by the Sino-Soviet bloc.

However, that situation is now changing. The Soviet Union itself possesses a large nuclear strik-

ing power. Also, new ways are being found by our scientists whereby nuclear power can increasingly be used in smaller tactical weapons. Through such weapons we and our allies can obtain an additional direct deterrent to Soviet attack upon European territory. This latter development was expounded by the President and myself at the NATO meeting of last December² as opening up new possibilities of strengthening the "shield" component of our military efforts.

However, as nuclear weapons acquire more and more tactical significance and can enhance the capabilities of the "shield," there is increasing need for a broader sharing of nuclear knowledge with our allies. Only thus will it be possible for them to participate, to a significant degree, in the development of defensive planning and their own defense should they be attacked.

In our opinion it is *not* necessary for the United States, in peacetime, to deliver to the national control of our NATO allies complete nuclear weapons or the nuclear components of these weapons, and we are not proposing that course. We *do* believe that it is necessary for the United States to maintain in Europe nuclear warheads deployed under United States custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and subject to release, under Presidential authority, and use by the appropriate NATO Supreme Allied Commander in the event of hostilities. This assumes the existence of nuclear-capable NATO forces. NATO has been doing its part toward building up such forces. Our part is to give them knowledge so that these forces could, in war, be operational.

As the President and I pointed out in Paris, there cannot be these nuclear-capable NATO forces or the necessary military planning without supplying our NATO allies with more nuclear

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Agreements for Cooperation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Apr. 17 (press release 199) in connection with S. 3474 and H. R. 11426 (amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954). For a statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy before the subcommittee on Jan. 31, see BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1958, p. 312.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

know-how than is possible under the present law. So we said in Paris:

Another ingredient of an effective NATO nuclear force should be a common body of knowledge about nuclear weapons and military doctrine for their employment to permit their confident and responsible use.

We believe that our NATO allies should share more information as to military nuclear matters. Broader understanding is needed as to the weapons themselves, their effects, and the present and prospective state of this still new military science. The legislative changes we are proposing to the United States Congress would permit the exchanges of information needed to accomplish this.

The NATO Heads of Government unanimously agreed with our "stockpile" proposal and decided to proceed with NATO defense planning and training on this basis.

Let me point out that, unless our Government is able to share its nuclear knowledge more fully with our allies, grave consequences may result. Our NATO allies may either intensively seek to develop nuclear weapons capacity for themselves or move toward neutrality, or at least nonparticipation, in what should be a common military effort. The first alternative would divert the efforts of our allies into a needless and costly duplication of what we have already achieved. The second alternative of neutrality or nonparticipation would place a far greater burden on the United States and radically alter the power balance with serious damage to our vital security interests.

Let me repeat. United States policy does not seek to spread nuclear weapons around the world beyond United States control.

What United States policy seeks, and what these amendments would permit, are:

Common defense planning in NATO, which can take place only if the Allied Commanders know the effective use of nuclear weapons and the capabilities of the Soviet Union which may have to be met;

Adequate training of NATO allied forces so that in the event of hostilities those forces could effectively use nuclear weapons;

The making available to our allies of nuclear reactors which can be used for the propulsion of naval craft; and

In the case of an ally which already has a nuclear weapons capability, the exchange of nuclear-weapons information and the provision of materials for the making of nuclear weapons.

II.

A special element of our collective security policy is our relationship with the United Kingdom. Great Britain now has a considerable nuclear weapons capability, and it is just common sense for us to be able to exchange weapons information and provide materials where it is to the mutual advantage. We can thus avoid wasteful duplication and make the most efficient use of the common resources of the alliance. This cooperation with the United Kingdom in military technology would not be a one-way street. The scientists and engineers of the United Kingdom have made outstanding contributions to the weapons used by the forces of the United States and the free world in such fields as jet engines, radar, and aircraft-carrier design. Even though their nuclear weapons program is of smaller dimensions than our own, we can be confident that their scientists will make important contributions to a cooperative effort.

The Soviet Union now knows the secrets of nuclear weapons design. Nevertheless, for years the United Kingdom has been forced to follow the sterile course of reworking ground already covered by the United States and known to the Soviet Union. It is time to reinstate a more fruitful United States-United Kingdom nuclear weapons collaboration within the framework of expanding nuclear cooperation with other NATO allies which can create nuclear-capable forces and can helpfully participate in planning a modern defense of their territories.

III.

I now turn to the bearing of the proposed amendments upon our disarmament or, to be more accurate, "limitations of armaments" policies.

I understand that concern has been expressed lest these amendments would promote the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world, thus making it more difficult to set up international controls and perhaps bringing nuclear weapons into the hands of those who might perhaps use them irresponsibly.

I have in the past expressed emphatically our deep concern that there should *not* be a promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons. We do not want such weapons to get into the hands of irresponsible dictators and become possible instruments of international blackmail. An ever-present threat of

that character would make the world a grim place in which to live.

We would delude ourselves, however, if we concluded that this somber development could be prevented, or even retarded, by rejecting these amendments of the Atomic Energy Act. Materials needed to make nuclear weapons are becoming increasingly available as nuclear power plants are built. The knowledge needed to turn these materials into weapons has been independently attained by three countries, and the scientists of many other countries have the skills to enable them to do the same. The only effective preventive is that the development of nuclear weapons should be brought under international control.

There is today understandable resistance on the part of other free-world countries to an international agreement which would have the effect, if not the purpose, of perpetuating for all time their present nuclear-weapons inferiority without the mitigation which would be made possible by these amendments. Other free nations would understandably find it difficult to accept that result, and the United States does not want to seem to be seeking to impose it.

The situation is altered if the United States can and will deploy nuclear weapons for common defensive use in case of armed aggression and share knowledge which will make our allies partners in this endeavor. Failure to do this will create resistance, perhaps insuperable resistance, to the international control needed to prevent, over coming years, the promiscuous spreading and possible irresponsible use of nuclear weapons.

There is another thought which I would like to express in this connection. The Soviet Union is making extreme efforts to bring it about that the free-world nations of the Eurasian continent will be limited to *conventional* weapons as against the nuclear weapons capability of the Soviet Union. If it can succeed in this effort, it will have already achieved a one-sided disarmament which involves no controls or limitations whatever on the Soviet Union but only limitation upon the neighboring nations of the Eurasian continent. Under these circumstances there will be much less incentive for the Soviet Union to seek a balanced limitation of armament.

On this point the NATO communique of last December³ had this to say:

³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the U.S.S.R. should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age.

As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defenses. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need.

To realize this concept requires the amendments now proposed to this act. Not thus to amend the act would in effect make the United States a partner with the Soviet Union in imposing on our NATO allies such an incapacity to use nuclear tactical weapons that Soviet dominance over Western Europe would be largely achieved and little incentive would be left for the Soviet Union to limit its own armament. And our NATO allies will not feel the strength and confidence needed to pursue vigorous anti-Communist policies if they feel that they are dominated by a Soviet nuclear weapons capability and that we will not share our nuclear capability with them, even to the modest extent required to enable them to share in the planning of a nuclear defense and make them capable of using nuclear weapons received from us if hostilities should occur.

On the other hand, if these amendments are enacted, we will not have disarmed our allies and the Soviet Union will have an incentive, otherwise lacking, to achieve balanced and multilateral limitation of armament.

IV.

In conclusion, I urge most strongly that this committee should recommend to the Congress the adoption of the proposed amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

It will enable us to build up what otherwise may become a disintegrating collective-defense effort.

It will make our allies more willing to accept and the Soviet Union more willing to grant a balanced program of disarmament with control of nuclear-weapons testing and nuclear-weapons making.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During April 1958

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights: 14th Session	New York	Mar. 10-Apr. 4
U.N. Preparatory Committee on the Special Fund	New York	Mar. 11-Apr. 4
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on the Status of Women: 12th Session	Geneva	Mar. 17-Apr. 4
U.N. ECAFE/FAO Working Party on Food and Agricultural Price Policies	New Delhi	Mar. 21-Apr. 3
UNESCO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee for the Major Project on the Extension of Primary Education in Latin America: 2d Meeting	Panamá	Mar. 29-Apr. 2
U.N. ECLA Committee of the Whole: 6th Session	Santiago	Apr. 7-9
WMO Regional Association V (Southwest Pacific): 2d Session	Manila	Apr. 7-19
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe: 13th Session	Geneva	Apr. 9-25
2d Conference on Home Economics in the Countries Served by the Caribbean Commission	Trinidad, B. W. I.	Apr. 10-18
2d FAO Technical Meeting on Control of Sunn Pest	Tehran	Apr. 14-23
ILO Textiles Committee: 6th Session	Geneva	Apr. 14-25
GATT Intersectoral Committee	Geneva	Apr. 14-28
FAO European Commission on Foot and Mouth Disease	Rome	Apr. 17-18
International Sugar Council: Executive Committee	London	Apr. 17 (1 day)
FAO Joint Subcommittee on Mediterranean Forestry Problems	Madrid	Apr. 17-21
International Sugar Council: Statistical Committee	London	Apr. 21 (1 day)
International Sugar Council: 15th Session	London	Apr. 22-25

In Session as of April 30, 1958

GATT Tariff Negotiations With Brazil	Geneva	Feb. 14-
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea	Geneva	Apr. 24-
U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 9th Session	New York	Apr. 14-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 25th Session	New York	Apr. 15-
Brussels Universal and International Exhibition of 1958	Brussels	Apr. 17-
ITU Administrative Council: 13th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21-
UNESCO Executive Board: 50th Session	Paris	Apr. 21-
4th FAO Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology	Madrid	Apr. 22-
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Apr. 24-
Pan American Highway Congresses: 3d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee	Washington	Apr. 25-
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 10th Session	New York	Apr. 28-
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 13th Session	Geneva	Apr. 28-
ILO International Labor Conference: 41st (Maritime) Session	Geneva	Apr. 29-
WMO Executive Committee: 10th Session	Geneva	Apr. 29-

Scheduled May 1-July 31, 1958

11th International Cannes Film Festival	Cannes	May 2-
NATO: Ministerial Session of the Council	Copenhagen	May 5-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions	New York	May 6-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Apr. 16, 1958. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCEP, Commission consultative des études postales; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radiocommunications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international téléphonique et téléphonique; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; U. N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled May 1–July 31, 1958—Continued

U.N. Advisory Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy	Geneva	May 7–
ICEM Council: 8th Session	Geneva	May 7–
FAO Cocoa Group: 3d Session	Hamburg	May 16–
ITU International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee (CITT): Study Group VIII Working Party	Warsaw	May 19–
UPU Consultative Commission on Postal Matters (CCEP): 1st Meeting of Administrative Council	Brussels	May 19–
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee	Geneva	May 19–
ICAO Assembly: 11th (Limited) Session	Montreal	May 20–
U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration	New York	May 20–
11th World Health Assembly	Minneapolis	May 26–
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Gas Problems: 4th Session	Geneva	May 28–
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI (Television)	Moscow	May 28–
UNESCO Special Intergovernmental Committee on the Preparation of a New Convention for the International Exchange of Publications	Brussels	May 28–
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 17th Plenary Meeting	London	June 2–
FAO Group on Grains: 3d Session	Rome	June 2–
Inter-American Judicial Committee	Rio de Janeiro	June 2–
International Labor Conference: 42d Session	Geneva	June 4–
12th International Ornithological Congress	Helsinki	June 5–
U.N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties	Geneva	June 9–
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 8th Meeting	Halifax, Nova Scotia	June 9–
International Rubber Study Group: 14th Meeting	Hamburg	June 9–
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 22d Session	New York	June 9–
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 5th Session	New York	June 9–
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 5th Session	Rome	June 10–
IABEA Board of Governors	Vienna	June 16–
5th International Electronic Nuclear Energy Exhibition and Conference	Rome	June 16–
FAO Desert Locust Control Technical Advisory Committee: 8th Session	Rome	June 16–
WHO Executive Board: 22d Session	Minneapolis	June 16–
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 16th Session	Geneva	June 16–
6th Inter-American Seminar on Overall Planning for Education	Washington	June 23–
U.N. ECE Coal Trade Subcommittee	Geneva	June 23–
International Whaling Commission: 10th Meeting	The Hague	June 23–
International Wheat Council: 24th Session	London	June 25–
ILO Governing Body: 139th Session	Geneva	June 26–
8th Berlin Film Festival	Berlin	June 27–
GATT Balance-of-Payments Consultations	Geneva	June
U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee	Geneva	June
UNREF Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	June*
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 7th Session	Geneva	June
International Tonnage Measurements Experts: 6th Meeting	Hamburg	June*
U.N. Committee on South-West Africa: 6th Session	New York	July 1–
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 26th Session	Geneva	July 1–
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 2d Meeting	Montreal	July 3–
Joint UNESCO/IBE International Conference on Public Education: 21st Session	Geneva	July 7–
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Coordination of Transport	Bangkok	July 8–
Inter-American Technical Committee on Cacao: 7th Meeting	Palmyra, Colombia	July 13–
15th International Congress of Zoology	London	July 16–
International Union of Architects: 5th Congress	Moscow	July 20–
South Pacific Commission: Technical Conference on Cooperatives	Port Moresby, New Guinea	July 21–
4th FAO Inter-American Meeting on Livestock Production	Jamaica	July 22–
Interparliamentary Union: 47th Conference	Rio de Janeiro	July 24–
Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council: 5th Meeting	London	July 28–
U.N. ECAFE Seminar on Regional Planning in Relationship to Urbanization and Industrialization	Tokyo	July 28–
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee for the Revision of the Agreement for Establishment of the Caribbean Commission	Trinidad, B. W. I.	July
Inter-American Child Institute: Directing Council	Montevideo	July
International Union of Biological Sciences: 13th General Assembly	London	July*

U.S. Supports Special Fund for Economic Development

Statement by Christopher H. Phillips¹

I should like to take this occasion briefly to emphasize one or two points which are basic to my delegation's approach to the task before this committee. Let me make it clear that this is not intended to be an exposition of our detailed views on the organization and operation of the Special Fund. I shall discuss our thinking in these respects during our reading of the views and suggestions presented by the Secretary-General.²

At the General Assembly my Government was convinced that the United Nations had before it a realistic opportunity to embark on new important action to assist the less developed countries by making available technical aid of a kind not possible under the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance. To this end the United States delegation proposed, and the General Assembly voted unanimously for, the establishment of a Special Fund.³ My Government continues to be firmly convinced that, with the full support of all members of the United Nations, the Special Fund can and will make a significant contribution to the economic development of the less developed countries.

In order to do so, however, it must be able to devote its resources to projects of considerable scope or depth, perhaps involving financial commitments by the fund over rather long periods of time and perhaps involving relatively large amounts of supplies and equipment. One of the important results of such concentrated effort by the Special Fund would be, we are convinced, to facilitate new capital investment of all types—private and public, national and international—by creating conditions in the underdeveloped countries which would make such investment either feasible or more effective, thereby helping to increase the flow of capital resources to the underdeveloped countries, the basic need for which we all recognize.

¹ Made in the U.N. Committee for the Special Fund on Mar. 12 (U.S./U.N. press release 2884). Mr. Phillips is U.S. Representative on the committee.

² According to a committee decision, remarks other than the opening statements will not be made public.

³ BULLETIN of Jan. 13, 1958, p. 71.

If we are to avoid scattering the Special Fund's resources over a multitude of small projects, it will be necessary to avoid such procedures, which have become integral aspects of the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, as country programing and allocations to participating agencies. This is why the United States agreed at the General Assembly that the Special Fund, though an extension of present United Nations activities, should be separate and distinct from the Expanded Technical Assistance Program. This continues to be the position of my delegation, and, as I have indicated, I shall discuss how we feel this might be accomplished when the committee gets into detailed discussion of the organization and operations of the Special Fund.

General Assembly Resolution 1219 spoke of the possibility of having available for total United Nations technical assistance activities the sum of \$100 million. This is the target which my Government has utilized in taking steps to assure that the United States will be in a position to contribute its share of this intensified effort to spur economic development. My Government sincerely hopes that the figure of \$100 million will quickly be converted from a target figure into resources actually available to assist the underdeveloped countries. It has, therefore, requested the Congress for an authorization of \$38 million as a United States contribution toward a combined 1959 program of \$100 million. Such a contribution is, of course, subject to congressional approval, and any United States contribution will be subject to the percentage limitation provided for by law.

Speaking to the press on December 16 on the accomplishment of the last General Assembly, the Secretary-General stated:

I would highlight, first of all, the Special Projects Fund decision which opens new possibilities for the development of economic assistance. . . . I, of course, regard this as a major achievement. I may remind you of the fact that the United States representative, in commenting upon it, used the word "milestone," which is a very strong word, and I for one would agree with him.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation will do its best in cooperation with other members of this committee to help translate the General Assembly resolution into the kind of concrete action which we believe will pay great dividends in terms of the economic development of underdeveloped countries.

Developments in Trust Territory of Tanganyika

*Statement by Mason Sears
U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council¹*

Because of Great Britain's outstanding success in transforming its former empire into a commonwealth of free and independent nations, it is hard to understand how there could be any doubt in Tanganyika about its own political future. But apparently there is.

The Visiting Mission reports that among politically conscious Africans there is still an expression of fear about the future. Obviously they do not like the present multiracial system in the Legislative Council because it gives the small immigrant minorities, representing less than 2 percent of the population, 66 percent of the elected members. According to the Visiting Mission there are some Africans who fear this may become a permanent feature of the constitution. Under the Trusteeship Agreement, however, it would be absolutely impossible. No final constitution can be proposed for Tanganyika by Great Britain without consulting the freely expressed wishes of the people, and this must be done in a manner which can be approved by the United Nations itself.

The United States delegation appreciates that the Administering Authority has made many helpful declarations on this subject. Nevertheless it is to be hoped that the Government will make further and continuous efforts to correct this unnecessary misunderstanding and promote political stability.

Can anyone doubt that Tanganyika is and always will be overwhelmingly African and under international agreement must be developed along democratic lines—which means primarily as an African state?

It is true that the forthcoming elections for the Legislative Council will be held on the present multiracial basis. But this is only a transitional stage in progress toward the kind of one-man, one-vote system which is found in Great Britain and in many other independent nations.

In any case, the Administering Authority has announced that a committee to recommend revi-

sions of the constitution will be appointed in 1959 and will review the parity system. It is hoped that this committee will propose such adjustments in the voting procedure as will provide the African population with a more proportionate representation.

In addition, the United States delegation hopes that it will recommend steps which will lead toward the goal of universal suffrage with the least possible delay.

We have also been much interested in the work which has been done to promote the organization of town and district councils. It was encouraging to learn that the administration desires to see these local councils established as rapidly as possible in all districts of Tanganyika. Now that the process has begun, it may well have a snowballing effect upon the way it spreads throughout the Territory.

Considering the Territory as a whole the United States delegation does not wish to emphasize the speed or direction of the political growth of Tanganyika so much as the smoothness of its progress. The direction, of course, is toward self-government, as is mandatory under the charter. The speed of progress, however, will, in the last analysis, be increasingly subjected to continental as well as territorial influences. But the smoothness of the operation will depend on racial good will and upon the ability of all sides to foresee and prepare for the human adjustments which must be made if the trusteeship is to end in harmony.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary for Great Britain, put his finger on this problem last June in the House of Commons. He stated that

... just as the Africans are faced with tremendous problems of mental and spiritual adjustment when plunged into western education and the modern world simultaneously, so the members of the more advanced races in Africa are also faced with tremendous problems of adjustment as more and more educated Africans begin to emerge. There is very real danger that not enough members of the advanced races will make this adjustment quickly enough, and that the resentments that this will cause will encourage a growing tendency toward racialism from the other side. This is a very real danger which we should be imprudent to ignore.

If the necessary adjustments cannot be effectively made, all communities in Tanganyika will be the losers. The advancement of living standards and the place of Tanganyika in a free so-

¹Made before the Trusteeship Council on Mar. 11 (U.S./U.N. press release 2882).

ciety would be seriously endangered without financial and technical support from the outside world. On the other hand, the contribution of the outside world to the development of Tanganyika would be rapidly destroyed without African support.

Obviously the progress of economic development in the Territory is essential to its ultimate political freedom. It is therefore encouraging to learn of the many satisfactory developments during the past year.

More and more Africans appear to be participating in the marketing of primary produce and in retail trade. African cooperatives have shown a remarkable increase and continue to be successfully managed. Expenditures for economic services have been increasing for a number of years. The Administering Authority and the African population should be commended for all of these things. They are laying the basis for an ever stronger and more educated Tanganyika.

Mr. President, tremendous developments are in store for Africa during the period immediately ahead. In this period perhaps 60 million Africans are likely to become citizens of free and independent countries. These developments will have their inevitable impact on Tanganyika.

But, considering the skill which the British Government has shown in helping so many nations to become independent, there should not be the slightest doubt about the ability and the desire of the Administering Authority to meet every new situation in a realistic way and to put it to the best advantage of Tanganyika.

Mr. President, before closing I would like to refer to the outgoing and incoming governors of Tanganyika.

When the present governor, Sir Edward Twinning, retires from the governorship next spring, he should have the satisfaction of knowing that he has made a lasting contribution to the building of a Tanganyikan nation. He will be followed in office by another distinguished British administrator, Sir Richard Turnbull, who has spent much of his active life in promoting the interests of the African people. He has made intensive studies of African affairs and has come to be recognized as an outstanding authority on some of their customs and ambitions. The United States delegation wishes him success in the work of helping Tanganyika prepare for independence.

We also hope that he will have the continued advice and assistance of Mr. Fletcher-Cooke, who, together with Sir Andrew Cohen, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, has discharged his duties before this Council with marked ability.

Seattle Selected as Site for Colombo Plan Meeting

Press release 178 dated April 7

The Department of State announced on April 7 that Seattle, Wash., has been selected as the site for the tenth meeting of the Colombo Plan in the fall of 1958. The ninth meeting of the 18-nation Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan), held at Saigon, Viet-Nam, in October 1957, unanimously accepted the United States proposal that the Committee next meet in the United States.¹

The purpose of the meeting at Seattle will be to review the progress, consider the problem of development, and survey the economic position of the member countries of South and Southeast Asia. The annual meeting of the Consultative Committee provides an opportunity for exchanging views on development problems of mutual interest and provides a framework within which an international cooperative effort can be promoted to assist the countries of the area to accelerate their development.

The highlight of the Seattle conference will be the Ministerial Meeting. This meeting, of about 5 days' duration, will be preceded by a 2-week meeting of officials to prepare material for ministerial consideration.

The United States became a member of the Consultative Committee in 1951 and has since that time participated in the annual meetings. The other member governments of the Colombo Plan are Australia, Burma, Canada, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaya, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom (together with Singapore and British Borneo), and Viet-Nam.

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1957, p. 755, and Dec. 2, 1957, p. 899.

SEATO Announces New Series of Research Fellowships

Press release 177 dated April 7

The Department of State on April 7 released information received from the SEATO headquarters at Bangkok, Thailand, concerning the new series of research fellowships to be awarded under the cultural program of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization for 1958-59. The object of the fellowship program is to sponsor research into social, economic, political, cultural, scientific, and educational problems as a means of giving an insight into the present needs and future development of the area. Ten to fifteen fellowships will be awarded to nationals of the SEATO member states.

The fellowships will include a monthly allowance of \$400 and tourist-class air travel to and from the countries in which the research is conducted. Candidates must possess high academic qualifications, preferably of the doctoral level or equivalent, and must have had several years of professional experience. Published material will also be taken into consideration in making the awards. Applications must be submitted not later than August 1, 1958, to the SEATO national office in the candidates' country of citizenship. The Department of State has designated the Committee on International Exchange of Persons, Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, 2101 Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, D.C., to receive and screen the applications of United States citizens. This committee will recommend candidates to the Department and the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships. The Board will then nominate a panel to be forwarded to the SEATO headquarters in Bangkok, where final selections will be made. The awards will be announced in November 1958.

Eleven fellowships were awarded by SEATO in January of this year as part of its 1957-58 program of cultural relations. A number of the fellows have already started work on their research projects.

The Council of Ministers of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization at its fourth annual meeting held at Manila in March agreed to continue and

expand the program of cultural activities.¹ Among the new projects to be initiated is the appointment of professors at universities of the Asian member states and of traveling lecturers.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography²

Economic and Social Council

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- Statistical Commission. Draft Revised International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities. E/CN.3/243, January 22, 1958. 73 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Information Concerning the Status of Women in Non-Self-Governing Territories. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/318, January 22, 1958. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value. E/CN.6/322, January 22, 1958. 38 pp. mimeo.
- Statistical Commission. Basic Industrial Statistics—A Progress Report. A memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/CN.3/242, January 23, 1958. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Age of Retirement and Right to Pension. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/321, January 23, 1958. 12 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Technical Assistance Programmes in Relation to the Status of Women. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/326, January 23, 1958. 14 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on Human Rights. Periodic Reports on Human Rights. Reports by the Specialized Agencies. E/CN.4/758, January 24, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Access of Women to Education. UNESCO activities in 1957 of special interest to women. Report prepared by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. E/CN.6/320, January 24, 1958. 19 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Information Concerning the Status of Women in Trust Territories. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/319, January 28, 1958. 38 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Working Women, Including Working Mothers With Family Responsibilities. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/324, January 28, 1958. 41 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on the Status of Women. Access of Women to Higher Education. Report prepared by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in collaboration with the International Federation of University Women. E/CN.6/327, January 28, 1958. 66 pp. mimeo.
- Statistical Commission. Draft Revisions to the International Standards in Basic Industrial Statistics. E/CN.3/242/Add. 1, January 29, 1958. 43 pp. mimeo.

¹ For text of final communique, see BULLETIN of Mar. 31, 1958, p. 504.

² Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48 (a), 49 (e), and 61 of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratifications deposited: Viet-Nam, December 30, 1957; Italy, March 24, 1958.

Duties and Rights of States

Protocol to the convention on duties and rights of states in event of civil strife, signed at Habana February 20, 1928 (46 Stat. 2749). Opened for signature at the Pan American Union May 1, 1957.¹

Signature: El Salvador, March 27, 1958.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signature and acceptance: Tunisia, April 14, 1958.

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

Signature and acceptance: Tunisia, April 14, 1958.

Maritime

Protocol terminating the convention of May 31, 1865 (14 Stat. 679) concerning the Cape Spartel lighthouse, and transferring the control, operation, and administration of the lighthouse to the Government of Morocco. Signed at Tangier March 31, 1958. Entered into force March 31, 1958.

Signatures: Belgium, France, Italy, Morocco, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York June 23, 1953.²

Accession deposited: Argentina, March 24, 1958.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948.

Entered into force March 17, 1958, for: Argentina, Australia, Belgium (metropolitan territories only), Burma, Canada, Dominican Republic, Ecuador (with

declaration), France, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico (with reservation), Netherlands (including Surinam, Netherlands Antilles, and Netherlands New Guinea), Switzerland (with reservation), United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, and United States (with reservation).

Whaling

Protocol amending the international whaling convention of 1946 (TIAS 1849). Done at Washington November 19, 1956.²

Ratification deposited: France, April 14, 1958.

Technical Cooperation Agreements Signed for West Indies Islands

The Department of State on April 18 (press release 202) announced the signing of two technical cooperation agreements relating to the British West Indies, one with Trinidad and Tobago, and another with the other eastern West Indian territory islands including the Leewards, Windwards, and Barbados. The ceremony took place at the International Cooperation Administration with Rollin S. Atwood, President of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, acting for the U.S. Government and R. W. Jackling, Counselor, Head of Chancery of the British Embassy, signing on behalf of the West Indian Governments concerned.

The technical cooperation programs in Trinidad and the eastern Caribbean are expected to include such activities as housing, agriculture, health, natural resources, communications, public administration, and technical education. Donald R. Laidig has been designated as ICA field representative, for the purpose of implementing these new programs, with headquarters in Trinidad, which is also the seat of the new Federal Government.

In connection with signature of the agreements, it was noted that these are the first technical cooperation assistance agreements concluded respecting member territories of the new Federation of The West Indies since the Federation came into being on January 3, 1958, and held its first parliamentary election on March 25. The agreements represent another concrete example of United States readiness to assist the Federation. With the technical assistance program already in effect with Jamaica, these agreements now extend technical assistance to all of the Federation.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Consulate at Nicosia Elevated to Consulate General

The Department of State announced on April 11 (press release 187) the elevation of the American Consulate at Nicosia, Cyprus, to the rank of Consulate General, effective April 13, 1958. Taylor G. Belcher will continue as principal officer.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Meeting of Heads of Government, Paris, December 1957. Pub. 6906. International Organization and Conference Series I, 35. xx, 117 pp. 50¢.

A volume containing the texts of statements, addresses, etc., made by Heads of Government at the meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization held in Paris from December 16 to 19, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3961. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with memorandum of understanding and exchanges of notes, between the United States of America and Pakistan—Signed at Karachi November 15, 1957. Entered into force November 15, 1957.

Financial Agreement. TIAS 3962. 2 pp. 5¢.

Between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, amending agreement of December 6, 1945—Signed at Washington March 6, 1957. Entered into force April 25, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3963. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Italy, amending agreement of May 23, 1955. Exchange of notes—Dated at Rome December 2 and 11, 1957. Entered into force December 11, 1957.

Uranium Reconnaissance. TIAS 3964. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Brazil, replacing agreement of August 3, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington December 26, 1957. Entered into force December 26, 1957.

Claims—Damages Arising From SEATO Maneuvers and Ground Field Training Exercises. TIAS 3965. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of aide memoire—Dated at Manila November 1, 1957. Entered into force November 1, 1957.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Disposition of Equipment and Materials. TIAS 3966. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Guatemala December 16, 1957. Entered into force December 16, 1957.

Foreign Service Personnel—Free Entry Privileges. TIAS 3967. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador. Exchange of notes—Signed at Quito October 22 and November 6, 1957, with related note—Signed November 11, 1957. Entered into force November 6, 1957.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 14-20

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Washington 25, D. C.

Releases issued prior to April 14 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 176, 177, and 178 of April 7, 180, 182, and 183 of April 9, and 187 of April 11.

No.	Date	Subject
191	4/14	Dulles: Pan American Day.
*192	4/14	President of Chile to visit U.S.
193	4/15	Dulles: news conference.
194	4/16	Cuba credentials (rewrite).
195	4/16	U.S.—U.K.—French reply to Soviet aide memoire.
†196	4/16	McKinney: "Atoms for Power: International Status."
197	4/16	Dulles to visit Berlin.
†198	4/17	Holmes: "The United States and Middle Africa."
199	4/17	Dulles: statement on revising Atomic Energy Act.
†200	4/17	Dulles: message to Prime Minister Nkrumah.
201	4/18	Austria credentials (rewrite).
202	4/18	Technical cooperation agreements with West Indies islands.
203	4/18	Senator Case to represent U.S. at Berlin ceremony (rewrite).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Correction

BULLETIN of March 24, 1958, p. 470: The reference to Ethiopia as a recipient of Sino-Soviet bloc economic assistance should be deleted from Table I. The totals in that table should be adjusted accordingly.

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The 20-page pamphlet, in question-and-answer format, discusses the development, functions, organization, and achievements of the OAS. The booklet is illustrated with photographs and an organizational chart.

Copies of *Organization of American States* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, for 15 cents each.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XXXVIII, No. 985 • PUBLICATION 6641

May 12, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Our Experiment in Human Liberty

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

I am here first of all to express my deep respect for the military chaplains of the United States. You sustain the faith of those upon whom patriotism and duty place the heaviest demands. They must, in time of war, sacrifice their lives. And in time of peace they accept discipline and danger in order to maintain the forces needed to deter aggression and to preserve the peace.

You yourselves, the chaplains, sacrifice much and often risk much to perform your high mission. Your dedication is a noble one. You serve the spiritual life of the individual. Also you cultivate the spiritual values which collectively are the distinctive characteristic of our Nation and of the civilization of which we form part.

Material Things Not a Primary Goal

Jesus pointed out that, in his time, the nations of the world were giving priority to material things. He called upon men to seek first the Kingdom of God. Material things would then be added unto them. But such things would be a byproduct, not a primary goal.

It is of the greatest importance to bear that distinction in mind as we face the challenge of an atheistic society which avowedly puts first the search for material things.

The American people are naturally competitive, and that is a good thing. During recent decades we have scored so many "firsts" in so many fields of endeavor that we feel chagrined if in any field we are outdone. We react even more strongly when we are outdone by those who are hostile to us, who challenge us and who gloat when they

outdo us. There is little doubt, for example, that Sputnik I made it apparent that we had become too complacent. We need at times to be jolted into realization of the fact that our leadership in any field is not automatic. It requires effort and sacrifice. We have need today for greater endeavor and greater sacrifice. But also there is need to be careful lest, in a purely competitive spirit, we be swept away from our basic spiritual moorings. We must not put first such material successes as are avowedly the goals of Soviet communism.

"Communism" in the Soviet Union

I should like to interpolate here a comment about the word "Communist." In relation to the Soviet rulers and their practices we are using the title that the ruling party within the Soviet Union applies itself. However, "communism" is not actually practiced within the Soviet Union, and the challenge we face does not come from those who follow the lofty maxim "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." When the Soviet constitution was last amended, there was a discussion on whether to introduce that maxim into the constitution. That proposal was rejected on the ground that Soviet society was not yet ready for that high standard, and I fear indeed that it is not.

The humanitarian concepts of "mercy" and of "need" and of "justice" have little place in the Soviet system. Material productivity—"work"—is the official goal. There is, of course, a small privileged class. But the people generally are provided for only to the extent needed to make them competent physical workers for the state. They are bound under severe penalties to labor, as directed

¹ Made before the Military Chaplains' Association of the U.S.A. at New York, N. Y., on Apr. 22 (press release 210 dated Apr. 23).

by their rulers, in order to achieve the material levels set for them not by their needs but by the state.

One of the goals of Soviet communism, probably its primary goal, is to achieve the world's greatest military establishment and then be able to frighten others into a mood of subservience. The Soviet Union devotes more than 15 percent of its gross national product to military purposes. Soviet propaganda seeks, for the most part, to divert attention from the magnitude of that military effort. It talks about "peace" and about "disarmament." But it also makes crude military threats whenever that seems likely to serve its ambitions.

The Soviet Government has not made one single serious proposal to limit modern armament. It has rejected or evaded many such proposals made to it. The Soviet Government now boasts that it has the world's greatest capacity for long-range massive destruction. We question the accuracy of that boast. But we do not question that the Soviet Union has in its power to create and indeed has already created a very great military potential.

A second Soviet goal is to excel in the field of science and scientific applications. Here again they boast that they are already supreme in terms of numbers of their scientists and in terms of spectacular scientific accomplishments, such as the first manmade earth satellite. Some aspects of their claims are questionable. But we cannot question that, when a despotism makes mass education a matter of science and directs its most qualified youth into that channel, it can obtain very great scientific results indeed.

Throughout the ages despots have achieved the spectacular. The Pharaohs had their pyramids, the Roman emperors had their colosseums for their gladiator battles, the kings of France had their palaces. No doubt the rulers of Russia can produce the equivalent, in modern terms.

I turn now to a third Soviet goal. Their rulers say that the Soviet Union will become the world's greatest producer of consumers goods. Stalin said that the Soviet Union should be a country "fully saturated with consumers goods." Khrushchev repeats the same theme and boasts that the Soviet Union in this field too will outdo the United States. He admits that to achieve that goal will take time. But who can say that a purely materialistic society may not, perhaps, produce

greatly, perhaps most greatly, in purely material things?

U.S. Rejects Goal of Military Supremacy

Faced by such materialistic challenges, the essential is that our society should not accept the premises of these challenges. We should not compete under the rules that that challenger lays down. We should not make ourselves over into the image of the very thing we hate. We find the atheistic, militaristic, and materialistic creed of Soviet communism to be repugnant to us. Let us be sure that we do not copy it.

We must *not* accept an armaments race, as if to be the greatest military power were a worthy or even acceptable goal.

We must *not* seek that scientific education and scientific applications monopolize the minds of our youth, as though other values did not matter.

We must *not* accept the quantity of consumers goods—automobiles, washing machines, refrigerators, radios, and the like—to be the decisive measure of our society, as though its spiritual content were unimportant.

Sometimes it is indispensable for a nation, as for an individual, to say "no." And those are some of the "no's" which our Nation should emphatically and, indeed, proudly utter.

We say "no" to making it our goal to be the world's greatest military power and to be able militarily to dominate the world. Twice within this century war effort has made us incomparably the greatest military power. And each time, when peace came, we quickly abandoned that role. We do not seek it now. Today our military establishment, in terms of deterrents, is probably supreme. We hope so. But our military goal is, as put by George Washington and repeatedly reaffirmed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, to have a "respectable military posture"—that is, a military establishment that others will treat with respect.

Too often we have not had that—with tragic results. Militaristic despots have treated us with contempt, as a military cipher that they did not need to take into account in their calculations. As a result there have been wars that might perhaps have been avoided.

Today we have, and I trust will continue to have, a military posture that others do respect. It safeguards the peace not merely for ourselves

but for others who join with us to establish collective security against aggression. In this sense our strength is a sacred trust for the benefit of free men who band together to create a shield behind which they can carry on their peaceful pursuits.

If today we wanted to dominate the world militarily, we have it within our power. We need only take, for military purposes, the same percentage of our national production that is taken by the Soviet Union of its national production. We need only impose on our people some small fraction of the austerity that is imposed on the Soviet peoples. I do not doubt that the American people would readily accept greater sacrifice if future developments made that needed to enable our nation to maintain a respectable military posture. But God forbid that the day should ever come when the American people became a militaristic people, seeking military might as an end in itself.

We can rejoice that we reject, for ourselves, the military goals that the Soviet rulers set for themselves.

Educational Goals

Let us turn to the matter of education.

We say "no" to education being nationalized with a view to producing the greatest possible number of scientists. We do not look upon education as a process whereby the minds of our youth are manipulated by government so that they can better serve to glorify the state. Our primary goal in the field of education is to train minds so that the individual can more surely and more fully achieve his God-given potentialities.

No doubt our educational system has deficiencies. These ought to be remedied. Also, no doubt, we need more scientists, and we shall have them. This is an era of scientific breakthroughs. It challenges the imagination and effort of men. We would be far gone in decadence if our youth were not stimulated by what today opens up for exploration. But we do not forget that our educational system should also produce those who are well versed in the humanities. I certainly do not need to remind this gathering that our Nation needs more and better theological seminaries and more and better students in them. For religion is the foundation of our society.

The Soviet Union, obsessed by its materialistic dogma and seeking exhibits to glorify its despotisms, is creating a society of educational unbalance. Probably in that way it will achieve some spectacular results, designed to promote its expansionist ambitions. But such unbalance is unnatural and fraught with unpredictable consequences.

For our part it can, I think, be said with confidence that our educational system will continue to be a balanced one, that it will *not* concentrate wholly on the sciences, and that it will *not* be operated by the Federal Government in order to enable that Government to produce mere servants to aid it in scientific and military exploits.

We can rejoice that we reject, for ourselves, the goal that the Soviet rulers have set themselves, that is, to make all education primarily a matter of scientific specialization in the interest of state glorification and militarization.

Productivity of Free Labor

Let us turn now to the matter of producing consumers goods. It is tempting for us to accept the Soviet challenge to make the material productivity of our respective systems the test by which we shall be judged. Today we produce many times as much consumers goods as does the Soviet Union, and we expect that it will continue to be that way. But I know of no inherent reason why a materialistic despotism might not produce as much as does a spiritual society of freedom.

Our own rate of production could perhaps be increased if it were not that labor is free and authorized, and indeed encouraged, to organize and bargain for hours and conditions of labor. We have long since abolished slave labor and have ceased to treat labor as a commodity.

We believe that free labor, using the constantly perfected machinery that free enterprise supplies, will always achieve unrivaled productivity. But that, if it happens, is a byproduct. We do not want labor to be free merely because thereby it is more productive. We want labor to be free because freedom is its right.

We can rejoice that we do not give material productivity the priority given it by Soviet despotism. We have demonstrated that free men, working at tasks of their choice under conditions

largely of their making, have achieved the greatest measure of productivity yet known. All the world can see that adequate, indeed ample, productivity can be achieved without enslavement and without the surrender of freedom. It is possible to have both productivity and freedom.

The Positive Challenge

It is, of course, not enough to be negative and to refuse to accept the militaristic and materialistic goals of Communist imperialism. We also have a positive challenge of our own.

The American people have always had qualities of the spirit that could be, and were, projected far and wide. Our Nation was founded as an experiment in human liberty. Its institutions reflected the belief of our founders that men had their origin and destiny in God; that they were endowed by Him with certain inalienable rights and had duties prescribed by moral law; and that human institutions ought primarily to help men develop their God-given possibilities. We believed that, if we built on that spiritual foundation, we would be showing men everywhere the way to a better and more abundant life.

We realized that vision. There developed here an area of spiritual, intellectual, and economic vigor the like of which the world had never seen. It was no exclusive preserve; indeed, world mission was a central theme. Millions were welcomed from other lands, to share equally the opportunities of the founders and their heirs. Through missionary activities, the establishment of schools and colleges, and through travel, American ideals were carried throughout the world. We gave aid and comfort to those elsewhere who sought to follow in our way and to develop societies of greater freedom.

Material things were added unto us. Our political institutions worked. That was because they rested upon what George Washington said were the "indispensable supports" of representative government, that is, morality and religion. And, he added, it could not be assumed that morality would long prevail without religion.

Our people enjoyed an extraordinary degree of personal liberty. That was because the individuals making up our society generally accepted voluntarily the moral law and the self-discipline, self-restraint, and duty to fellow man that the moral law enjoins.

I recall a debate that I had with Mr. Vyshinsky in the United Nations in 1946. He said, "It is indispensable to bring a limitation to the will and to the action of men." Therefore, he argued, some men must have power to rule others. If one denies the existence of moral law, as do the Communists, then dictatorship is the only logical form of society. But a society that accepts moral law need not be ruled by men. It can make government its servant, not its master; it can make government the means of doing collectively what needs to be done, and what cannot will be done individually. That is what the American people have done, and that is their great challenge to the world of despots.

I hear it asserted today that the qualities that made America honored and judged great throughout the world no longer have an adequate appeal and that we must invent something new in order to compete with Soviet dictatorship and its materialism.

My first reaction is that faith is not something put on, taken off, or changed merely to please others.

My second reaction is to challenge the correctness of the assertion. It may be that, partly through our own faults and partly through Communist publicizing of our faults, the image of America has become distorted in much of the world. Our individual freedom is made to appear as individual license and a casting aside of those restraints that moral law enjoins and that every society needs.

Sales talk based on the number of automobiles, radios, and telephones owned by our people fails to win converts, for that is the language of the materialists. Our capitalistic form of society is made to appear as one devoid of social responsibility.

I do not believe that human nature throughout the world has greatly changed from what it was when "the great American experiment" in freedom caught the imagination of men everywhere. I am afraid that the fault, if any, may be here at home in that we ourselves have lost track of the close connection between our faith and our works and that we attempt to justify our society and to make it appealing without regard to the spiritual concepts which underlie it and make it work. So many material things have been added unto us that what originally were secondary byprod-

ucts now seem to rank as primary. And if material things are to be made primary, then it is logical to have a materialistic creed that justifies this primacy.

Woodrow Wilson, shortly before he died, wrote of the challenge of the doctrines and practices of communism. He concluded:

The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed spiritually. . . . Here is the final challenge to our churches, to our political organizations, and to our capitalists—to everyone who fears God or loves his country.

Making Freedom Dynamic

The response of our free and spiritual society to this challenge of a materialistic despotism must above all come from individuals rather than from government. That must be so because what is being tested is the merit of a free, spiritual society as against a materialistic despotism. There is, of course, a role for government. But the present test can never be won by freedom if, to win it, freedom has more and more to abdicate and to speak and act only through government. Only individuals, by their conduct and example, can make freedom a dynamic, persuasive, and wanted thing. And individuals will do that only if they are under the influence of moral principles and great religious concepts such as those represented by the faith of you, the military chaplains of the United States, and to you we pay all honor.

U.S., U.K., and France Suggest Joint Meetings at Moscow

Press release 216 dated April 24

Following is the text of an identical statement presented to the Soviet Government on April 24 by the British, French, and United States Ambassadors at Moscow.

In their joint communication of March 31¹ the United States, French and United Kingdom Governments proposed to the Soviet Government, in connection with arrangements for a summit meeting, that the preparatory work could best be performed by exchanges through diplomatic channels, leading to a meeting between **Foreign Ministers**.

The Soviet Government's reply, dated April 11,² refers to the joint communication of the three powers and expresses readiness to begin an exchange of views in Moscow on the preparations for the Foreign Ministers' meeting. There is nothing in this reply which suggests that the Soviet Government had any other plan in view than dealing with the three powers jointly in making the necessary arrangements for the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The three Governments were therefore surprised when, in his interviews with their respective Ambassadors, the Soviet Foreign Minister made it clear that he was not prepared to hold joint discussions with the three Ambassadors.

As the three powers have already stated, their view is that the main purpose of the preparatory work should be to examine the position of the various Governments on the major questions at issue between them and to establish what subjects should be submitted for examination by Heads of Government. It would not be the purpose of these preparatory talks to reach decisions, but to bring out by general discussion the possibilities of agreement.

The three powers consider that, as a matter of practical procedure, the necessary preparations can be advanced more rapidly by joint meetings rather than by a series of separate interviews. In this way unnecessary complications and delay would be avoided. They wish therefore to suggest to the Soviet Government that joint meetings between the three Ambassadors and the Soviet Foreign Minister should begin immediately in order to make the necessary preparations for the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The three Governments think that such joint meetings should first discuss the agenda for a summit meeting for the purposes described in the fourth paragraph of this message, and then, at the appropriate time, discuss the date and place of a Foreign Ministers' meeting and what countries should be invited to be represented at this meeting.

In conclusion, the three Governments wish to express their hope that the Soviet Government will feel able to give favorable consideration to the above proposal as offering a prospect of early progress by means of a simple and straightforward procedure.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1958, p. 648

² *Ibid.*, May 5, 1958, p. 728.

Security Council Hears Soviet Complaint on U.S. Military Flights; U.S.S.R. Withdraws Draft Resolution

The U.N. Security Council met on April 21 at the request of the U.S.S.R. to consider a question submitted by the Soviet Union concerning "Urgent measures to put an end to flights by United States military aircraft armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the frontiers of the Soviet Union." The representative of the U.S.S.R. introduced a draft resolution (U.N. doc. S/3993) calling upon the United States "to refrain from sending its military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs towards the frontiers of other States for the purpose of creating a threat to their security or staging military demonstrations." At the close of the debate the Soviet representative withdrew his draft resolution. Following is the text of the statement made at the meeting by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge (U.S./U.N. press release 2905).

Gentlemen of the Council, it scarcely needs to be said that the pending Soviet charge is untrue. We have done nothing which is in any way dangerous to peace. The Soviet Representative has not adduced one single fact. We have done nothing that is not wholly consistent with the so-called "peaceful coexistence resolution."¹ We trust that the Soviet resolution will not be adopted.

Indeed, nothing that the United States has done can be regarded by men who are honest with themselves and with others as anything except the inescapable requirements of legitimate self-defense. This self-defense was undertaken in the face of continued resistance to countless efforts on our part over a period of more than 10 years to negotiate and through negotiation to settle the differences which divide us. We have tried again and again and have failed each time to discover any willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to take positive steps toward easing tension, eliminating fear, and freeing all of our resources for constructive, peaceful purposes. Our concern is that we see once more, although we will never lose

hope, the somber pattern of the last decade in the events of the last weeks.

In recent months the Soviet Union, turning its back on the United Nations, on the Disarmament Commission, on the Security Council, on the decision of the General Assembly, on the normal uses of diplomacy, on all the machinery available for consultation and negotiation, has demanded that there be a meeting of heads of government for the professed purpose of easing tension and solving the problems that divide us. We are engaged at the highest levels in diplomatic exchanges with the Soviet Government to find possibilities of agreement by which the cause of peace can be achieved. As President Eisenhower's published statements on this make clear, the United States in all these exchanges has had a single end in view: to make possible significant discussions in the interest of world peace. The fact that charges of an alleged United States threat to the peace should be made at the moment when our representatives are once more trying to resume serious discussions with the Soviet Union is deeply perplexing.

The United States Government wholeheartedly regrets that the Soviet Union at a moment when

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 20, 1955, p. 104.

its leaders are proclaiming their desire for a meeting of heads of government should have taken this action.

It is against this background that I would ask the members of this Council to view the issue presented by the Soviet complaint.

Guarding Against Surprise Attack

A cardinal aspect of our defense is to guard against the possibility of a surprise attack. The immense destructive power of modern weapons makes it at least theoretically possible to wipe out the military capacity of a country in a single coordinated strike against all its defense installations. The United States has only one conceivable course in such circumstances. Until all fears of surprise attack are banished by effective international arrangements, we are compelled to take all steps necessary to protect ourselves from being overwhelmed. In order to deter aggression all nations which wish to retain their freedom must maintain strong and alert forces incapable of being destroyed by a surprise attack however skillfully delivered.

Now, the Strategic Air Command is the mainstay of all nations who wish to maintain their independent existence. It has successfully carried out its mission for the past 10 years. It can only accomplish its mission of deterrence if it is known that the Command is so trained, so equipped, and so situated that it cannot be surprised and destroyed on the ground. The awesome power of modern weapons makes a surprise attack absolutely unthinkable. Yet today we are confronted by a totalitarian state which has the capacity to strike without warning, without the knowledge of its people, by the decision of a few men who are unaccountable to the Soviet people.

It is precisely these circumstances which make it mandatory for us to maintain our Strategic Air Command in its high state of efficiency through constant practice. All of these training exercises, however, are designed to maintain the force within areas which by no stretch of the imagination could be considered provocative to the Soviet Union. Aircraft of the Strategic Air Command have never been launched except in a carefully planned and controlled way. A procedure is followed which insures that no Strategic Air Command airplane can pass beyond its proper bounds, far from the Soviet Union or its satel-

ites, without additional unequivocal orders, and these orders, gentlemen, can only come personally from the President of the United States. The routes which are flown and the procedures which are followed are not only in no sense provocative; they could not possibly be the accidental causes of war.

Aggressive Policies of Soviet Union

Now why has it been necessary for the United States, which has the greatest possible interest in peace, to erect at tremendous expense this system of defense by means of military aircraft? The American people are reluctant to spend money for military purposes. After each war in the past we have relapsed into virtually total unpreparedness. What caused us, reluctantly, to build our present defense system was the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union. This defense system is maintained because the policies of the Soviet Union are still aggressive.

Recent examples of this are: that the Soviet Union proclaims its intention to communize the world; that in 1957 it threatened atomic devastation against 22 nations; and that it has brutally suppressed freedom in Hungary and continues to enslave most of Eastern Europe. In the face of this conduct and of the continued refusal of the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on disarmament, of course we cannot be defenseless.

The United States has no aggressive intention against any country. Our open system of government and our collective-security arrangements make it impossible. President Eisenhower has repeatedly emphasized that the United States will never attack another country. The United States fully accepts the obligations set forth in the charter of the United Nations. Our words and our deeds speak for themselves. Time and again we have demonstrated our good faith and our steadfast desire to build and to maintain peace. We have kept trying—even though the Soviet Union has repeatedly rejected our efforts, often out of hand. We have never hesitated to expose any aspect of our foreign policy to public discussion in the United Nations or elsewhere. Frankly, gentlemen, I wish as much could be said of the Soviet Union.

Now as long as it is necessary for our safety that we maintain a Strategic Air Command, we

intend to keep it at all times in a state of efficiency. We shall also keep it under the strict control which I have described. Numerous individuals and groups, including representatives of foreign governments, have had an opportunity to visit and to see at first hand the operation of the Strategic Air Command. They have seen and recognize the effective controls under which this force operates. These things are matters of public knowledge. What we do is known throughout the world. What the Soviet Union does is carefully veiled in secrecy.

U.S. Proposal for Aerial Inspection

The American people, and the Government which they have freely chosen, have been seeking for the last 12 years a way to be rid of these elaborate and burdensome defense preparations and to do so in safety. That is why President Eisenhower at Geneva in 1955 proposed that the Soviet Union agree with us to mutual inspection of each other's territory by aerial sentinels in an open sky. This proposal was designed to guard against surprise attack.

Now note this: that if such a mutual inspection system could be put into effect, no massive air attack could be launched in secret. The fear of war would decrease, and a great step forward would be taken toward the reduction of expensive and deadly armaments. But the Soviet Union has refused to join hands with us in setting up a true inspection system.

Since President Eisenhower made this proposal, we have suggested to the Soviet Union a wide range of choices on how and where to begin. During the meetings of the Disarmament Subcommittee in London a year ago, we proposed an inspection system covering all the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, and the Soviet Union. We also proposed an alternative in case the Soviet Union wished to start on a smaller basis—namely, that we start the open-sky system in the Arctic region.

Now one might have thought that the Soviet Union would have welcomed the proposal concerning the Arctic. But far from welcoming it, they treated it with scorn. In June 1957 in Helsinki Mr. Khrushchev said, "Much has been made of photographing the Arctic from the air as a beginning, but this sounds totally comical." In

August of that same year Mr. Mikoyan was even more derisive when he said, "What can one control from the air beyond the Arctic Circle other than the number of polar bears who, as is known, for the time being do not intend to attack anyone?" That was the Soviet attitude toward an inspection system which would have made it virtually impossible to launch a surprise attack over the polar regions.

Other Proposals to Which Soviets Could Respond

Now I stress the open-sky plan because it is so directly relevant to the pending charge. But this is not the only proposal to which the Soviet Union has failed to give a constructive response. Thus if the Soviets are seeking a means to contribute to peace and particularly to disarmament, there is much that they can do.

They can say "yes" to President Eisenhower's proposal made as recently as April 8th of this month,² which, incidentally, has been withheld from the Soviet people, to join in technical disarmament studies by which, as the President said, "we can at once begin the preliminaries necessary to larger things."

The Soviet statement of April 18³ says that the Soviet people are indignant at the activities of the United States Air Force. If this indeed is true, this indignation can only be based on the partial and often distorted information which the Soviet Government permits them to have because, as I have just said, the Soviet Government denied publication to the Russian people of the President's proposal of April 8. The Soviet Union could, in fact, change their negative attitude toward the five-point disarmament plan which was overwhelmingly endorsed by the 12th General Assembly last December⁴—and which the Soviet Union and its satellites were the only nations here to oppose.

The Soviet Union could agree to a meeting of the Disarmament Commission, which was enlarged by the last General Assembly for the expressed purpose of meeting their views, and in the reasonable belief that it would do so, and which they have nonetheless spurned.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 28, 1958, p. 679.

³ For text of a statement of Apr. 18 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, see U.N. doc. S/3991.

⁴ BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.

And they can carry on true diplomatic discussion in Moscow in the serious vein which the world situation requires.

This Soviet move reminds one of the trumped-up charges of the past. It continues the policy of constantly singling out the United States for vilification. It leads to the conclusion that what the Soviet Union is after is to weaken and to tear down the United States and, with it, all countries, large and small, which value their freedom.

How often in all these speeches which we have heard here has the United States been condemned for adhering to so-called "positions of strength"! And how clear this makes it to the whole world that what the Soviet Union actually wants is to put the United States in a position of weakness!

Against all these assaults we have done much more than simply to remain militarily strong. Year after year we have made new proposals and started fresh approaches to the profound issues which have plagued our relations with the Soviet Union. The Baruch plan, the atoms-for-peace plan, the open-sky plan, the proposals on the unification of Germany and of Korea, the proposals for free exchange of information and ideas, the proposals which led to the liberation of Austria—these are a few of our initiatives. And, let me say, we will never stop trying for peace.

I suggest that the representatives of the Soviet Union ask themselves what they gain by tactics such as they are employing here. Think for a moment of the billions of rubles which they have spent on propaganda, money which could have gone to constructive purposes for the Russian people.

What have they got to show as a result of this great propaganda effort? At no time has the Soviet Union ever been able to get the support of the United Nations for any of its major propaganda themes. Future historians will record that the Soviet Union has not gained by the course which they have pursued. Their interest in a peaceful world is just as great as ours. Some day, I am sure, they will give up their dream of world revolution and help man's natural evolution to take place. Some day they will see that it would be better for them, as well as for the rest of the world, if they were to cease these tactics and if they were to come around the table and try to help solve the world's problems.

Over this weekend I have come to sense some of the heartache that exists among representatives of governments here at the United Nations—many of them being governments which are not allies of ours—because of the effect of this latest move on the outlook for peaceful, significant negotiations. But we will never get discouraged and we will never stop trying. And we say to you that to calumniate the United States, as you are doing today, is not the action of someone who wants a summit conference to succeed—not the action of someone who wants peace.⁵

News-Media Representatives Invited To Observe Detonation

Press release 220 dated April 25

The Department of State announced on April 25 that each of the other 14 countries¹ represented on the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation which accepts the invitation to send a scientific observer to one of the detonations of the Hardtack series is being invited to designate one news-media representative to observe the same detonation.

On March 26, 1958, President Eisenhower announced this Government's intention to invite a group of scientific and news-media representatives to observe a detonation demonstrating the progress U.S. scientists are achieving in reducing radioactive fallout from nuclear explosions.² The

⁵ After the Soviet representative withdrew his draft resolution, Ambassador Lodge made the following statement (U.S./U.N. press release 2907) in his capacity as President of the Security Council for the month of April:

"Let the record show that the present occupant of the Chair did not engage in any unheard-of procedure; that the rules which he followed are not contrary to usage; that what he did was not unprecedented and did not suppress free speech; that what he did was to carry out the regular order in the democratic way, which is that, when a member makes a proposal, it is put to the vote. That is the way things have always been done in the Security Council.

"The fact of the matter is that the Soviet representative did not have the votes—and all of us can give our reasons why he did not have the votes."

¹ Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 14, 1958, p. 601.

detonation which the scientific observers and U.S. and foreign news-media representatives are being invited to observe will take place in July or early August 1958.

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission is simultaneously releasing information concerning the extension of invitations to U.S. news media to observe the detonation.

The United States and Middle Africa

by Julius C. Holmes

Special Assistant to the Secretary¹

In view of the vastness of Africa, the great extent of its problems, and the limited time available, I shall confine my discussion of "The United States and Middle Africa" to a single topic—that of the movement of African nationalism, which is strong and swift.

For our purposes this morning I shall define "Middle Africa" arbitrarily as all of the continent except the Mediterranean states and Algeria in the north and the Union of South Africa at the southern extremity. This area—considerably larger than the whole of the United States—has a population estimated at 140 million and consists entirely of dependent or United Nations trust territories, with the exception of the independent states of the Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Ghana.

Political, social, and economic developments in Middle Africa are uneven. Some areas are very advanced; others are just awakening to the urge for self-assertion. Metropolitan powers responsible for most of the area pursue diverse policies based on different philosophies. As a result nationalism throughout the region is neither uniform nor simple.

Complicating the development of nationalism in Middle Africa are tribal conflicts on the one hand and tribal loyalties on the other; strains between different races living side by side in the same territory; and threats from extraneous forces inimical to orderly, evolutionary advancement. Where electorates have developed, the African often tends to vote for and follow personalities rather than

programs, and leaders crying "Africa for the Africans" and "an end to colonialism" are the ones most likely to have a popular following.

Yet, despite these negative aspects and complications, nationalism and the trend to self-government are strongly manifest in contemporary Middle Africa. Resurgent nationalism, of course, is a worldwide, postwar development which began in Asia, swept through the Middle East and across North Africa, and is now a powerful force throughout the rest of the African continent. This movement resulted in the creation—or recreation, to be more precise in some cases—of 20 new nations with a population of about 750 million people. Of these 20 new countries, 5 are in Africa.

Indicative perhaps of the growing consciousness of their common interests, representatives from eight of the nine independent states of Africa² are now meeting in a Pan-African conference at Accra, discussing mutual problems and means of increasing cultural, economic, political, and social cooperation throughout the continent. The outcome of this conference, which was called by Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana, will be closely studied by all those interested in African political evolution.

Before we turn to an examination of the trend toward self-government among the dependent Middle African territories, it is important to recall that Africa's first republic, Liberia, will this year celebrate its 111th anniversary and that Ethiopia's history as an independent African entity dates back to Biblical times.

Trust Territories Ready for Release From Tutelage

As examples of slightly differing stages of nationalist development, let us first consider four of the six U.N. trust territories, all but one of which were German colonies until World War I and mandates of the League of Nations until World War II. Under terms of the United Nations Charter, each administering power is charged with promoting the advancement of its trust territories toward self-government or independence. As a consequence, some are now about ready to be released from tutelage.

Among those in this category is Somalia, a former Italian colony, which after a brief period under British administration after World War II

¹Address made before the Pittsburgh Foreign Policy Association, Pittsburgh, Pa., on Apr. 18 (press release 195 dated Apr. 17).

²The Union of South Africa declined an invitation to attend the conference.

Secretary Dulles' Message on the Pan-African Conference

Press release 200 dated April 17

Following is the text of Secretary Dulles' message to Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana delivered on the eve of the Pan-African Conference, which opened at Accra April 15.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: As representatives of eight independent African states assemble in Accra on your invitation to discuss mutual problems and develop new modes of cooperation, I take this opportunity to extend my heartiest good wishes and hopes for the success of the Conference.

Through you, I wish to assure the African nations that they can count on the sympathetic interest of the people and government of the United States. The United States will continue to stand ready to support the constructive efforts of the states of Africa to achieve a stable, prosperous community, conscious of its interdependence within the family of nations and dedicated to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

became an Italian trust territory in 1950 and is scheduled by General Assembly resolution to become independent in 1960. This country, on the horn of Africa, populated by 1 million people, largely Muslim, elected its first legislative assembly of 70 members in February 1956 and has been governed by a ministerial government headed by Prime Minister Abdullahi Issa of the majority Somali Youth League Party since May of that year. Elections will be held soon for a new legislative assembly, which will be charged with preparing the constitution for the new state. Relations between the Somalis and the Italian Trusteeship Administration are excellent, and there is no reason to question that the orderly transition of this country to full independence will be achieved as anticipated.

A U.N. supervisory staff will be present when citizens of the French west African Republic of Togo vote on April 27 for an enlarged chamber of deputies, instituted as a result of recent liberal amendments to the constitutional statute. The new chamber, which will meet after this month's elections, will probably express its views regarding the future status of Togo and determine whether to request the U.N. General Assembly to: (1) terminate the trusteeship agreement or (2) continue under the trusteeship.

The French Trust Territory of Cameroun, to which the French have, as in the case of Togo, liberally awarded autonomy in many matters but not including foreign affairs, defense, and currency, has its own flag and national anthem, an indigenous civil service, and a developing judicial system. The political evolution of the Cameroun, however, has been complicated by the uprising of a small group of Communist-led rebels—the UPC (*Union des populations camerounaises*)—who demand that the French negotiate with them on the questions of immediate independence. This element is confined to a small jungle coastal area, however, and is not considered sufficiently strong either to threaten or to overthrow the present Camerounian Government.

The much smaller British Cameroons are divided into two administrative areas: northern Cameroons, which is expected to join the northern region of Nigeria with which it is now associated, and southern Cameroons, larger and more populous, which, on the one hand, has a history of political association with Nigeria that began with the First World War and, on the other, has tribal kinship with neighboring peoples in the French Cameroun. These two British areas will also be called upon in the near future to determine: (1) whether they will join the new Nigerian nation, expected to become independent within the British Commonwealth in 1960; (2) continue under U.N. trusteeship; or (3) join with a fully self-governing French Cameroun.

Progress toward complete self-government in Middle Africa is not limited to U.N. trust territories, however. Great strides are being taken toward full local autonomy in other French and British territories.

France's Imaginative Policy in Tropical Africa

France is to be commended for its imaginative policy in tropical Africa since World War II. The constitution for the Fourth French Republic confers citizenship on the African inhabitants of French territories. Through the new *loi cadre*, or "framework law," put into effect early in 1957—and not to be confused with the special *loi cadre* approved for Algeria last winter—Africans are now brought into political activity at all levels from the municipal, territorial, and federal legislatures in Africa to French Union and national legislative bodies in Paris.

In French West and Equatorial Africa, French Somaliland, and Madagascar, representatives, mainly African, were elected to legislative assemblies in March 1957 on the basis of universal adult suffrage and a single electoral roll. African cabinet ministers and French associates are now working side by side in harmony and cooperation in each of these territories.

A unique development of perhaps major importance in African political evolution has recently unfolded in the federation of the eight huge territories of French West Africa, which has a population of about 19 million and is about eight times the size of France.

Two of the leading African parties of this federation—the African Socialist Movement and the African Convention—and five smaller regional groups, at meetings held recently in Paris and Dakar, decided to merge into a single political movement and to present the following three-point program to the French Government:

1. Creation of two "democratic federations of territories": French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa; and complete internal autonomy for all French African territories, whether federated or not;
2. The "right to independence" for the two federations; and
3. Amendment of the French Constitution to transform the French Union into a confederal republic in which metropolitan France, the two federations, and the remaining nonfederated African territories would be equal partners.

Although the outcome of this ambitious proposal is uncertain, it illustrates one of the many forms that the movement toward fuller autonomy in Africa can take and demonstrates the understanding which enlightened African leaders have of the interdependence of Africa and Western Europe.

Britain Encouraging Self-Government

Great Britain, too, has been consistently encouraging the development of self-government in its dependent territories. A major problem facing British East and Central African territories, however, is the promotion of harmonious relations and policies among the many races and diverse tribal and religious groups living side by side.

Fortunately in the case of the British West African Federation of Nigeria the racial issue hardly exists. Of the total population of almost 34 million—making Nigeria the most populous political entity in Africa—only 16,000 are non-Africans, and these are transient or temporary commercial, professional, or civil service elements. This country, which includes three large federal regions—the western, eastern, and northern, with the latter containing more than half the population—is scheduled to determine with Great Britain in 1960 the exact timetable for its independence within the British Commonwealth. Nigeria today has both regional and federal ministerial governments, the latter headed by a federal Prime Minister. Although the Federation faces numerous unresolved problems, such as the separatist tendencies among the three regions, the major emphasis throughout the territory is on achieving independence in 1960.

In that same year the presently self-governing central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will work out with the British Government the next constitutional step to be taken along the road to full Commonwealth status. The great problem facing this rich, industrious federation of three territories with a population of 7.3 million, including about 300,000 Europeans and 30,000 Asians, is the achievement of a successful racial policy. There has been notable progress in developing harmonious race relations in the Federation, particularly in Southern Rhodesia, in the last 10 years. It is to be hoped that the declared policy of racial partnership, in which the African is to be brought gradually forward to an equal status in political and economic fields, will succeed. The question is simply whether progress will be fast enough to satisfy the increasingly vocal Africans or too fast to be acceptable to the present dominant white minority.

Time does not permit a comparative analysis of the current political situation in the remaining British, French, Belgian, Portuguese, and Spanish territories of this vast region. However, in all of these areas the force of nationalism—the self-conscious African desire to assert his identity—is at work, although the degree of pressure being developed and the results of that pressure vary greatly.

We can readily conclude that this emergent nationalism will soon transform the political map of

Africa, beginning not later than 1960 in Somalia and probably Nigeria and steadily continuing in other territories in the years to follow. A new relationship will therefore develop between the once dark continent and Europe. We are confident that, with wise, farsighted, and responsible leadership on both sides, this new relationship will bring enduring political, cultural, and trade ties redounding to the mutual benefit.

U.S. Position on African Nationalism

There should be no misunderstanding about the United States position on the subject of African nationalism. As Secretary Dulles has declared on numerous occasions, the United States recognizes that the "shift from colonialism to independence" is in process and the United States role "is to try to see that the process moves forward in a constructive, evolutionary way."

The United States recognizes the tremendous contribution which the European metropolitan powers have made and are continuing to make to the economic, social, and political development of modern Africa. The United States seeks neither to displace any European state in Africa nor to promote premature independence movements there. On the other hand, we believe that the irrevocable trend toward self-government requires the support and understanding of the United Nations and the free world to remain in constructive, mutually beneficial, evolutionary channels.

With greater freedom always comes greater responsibility. We believe that the emerging peoples of Africa, including the newly independent nations, must recognize their responsibilities to the world community, with which they are interdependent. We feel that responsible leaders in territories now gaining greater degrees of local autonomy must also realize that premature independence can be as harmful as prolongation of a dependent status.

A vast expectancy develops among dependent peoples as they move toward the threshold of independence. Current African leadership is moderate and friendly to the West. But clearly the ability of these moderate leaders to continue to cooperate with the West will depend principally on what the West does in enabling them to meet the legitimate and mounting aspirations of their people by insuring the steady economic, social, and cultural development of their countries.

Increasingly, the African is looking beyond the confines of his continent for ideas, assistance, and even leadership. Conversely, new ideas, knowing no boundaries, are reaching Africans of every walk of life, even in the bush and the jungle. And these new ideas are not all coming from the West. It is evident that we regard it far better, in the African's interest and in ours, that these ideas, this assistance, and this leadership should come from the West to which Africa is, by the very nature of its recent history and development, normally oriented.

The United States has much to offer Africa. We are dedicated to the ideals of democracy and government by consent of the governed, to the preservation of world peace and prosperity—ideals which the African respects and seeks to follow.

The future of Africa rests, of course, primarily with the Africans. Large sections of Middle Africa, nevertheless, are still primarily the responsibility of the European metropolitan powers. The United States must, as the African expects, apply its ideals to its foreign policy. We must, as the European expects, contribute to the maintenance of African stability.

In short, we must do our part to help Africa develop along the moderate, evolutionary path to progress, strength, and stability. We are now laying the groundwork in Washington to do this—with increased economic aid, improved foreign service, educational exchange, and information programs, and encouragement of private business and philanthropic endeavor.

This we consider to be an expression of the theme of your forum: world leadership. True leadership in Africa, to be mutually fruitful, must take the form of partnership, a partnership of close cooperation with Africans and other members of the free world, dedicated to furthering the economic, social, and political advancement of this old continent which is new in its awakening.

United States Asks Departure of Czechoslovak Attaché

Press release 205 dated April 21

On April 17, 1958, Joseph R. Jacyno, Second Secretary of the American Embassy at Prague,

was improperly detained by three Czechoslovak plainclothes men while visiting a friend to whom he had taken musical recordings. The frameup perpetrated by the Czechoslovak secret police resulted in a note from the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 18, 1958, which ordered Mr. Jacyno to leave Czechoslovakia immediately.

The Department of State on April 21 sent the following note to the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Washington:

"The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Czechoslovak Republic and has the honor to inform him that the continued presence in this country of Dr. Roman Skokan, Commercial Attaché, is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States. The Secretary of State would appreciate the Ambassador's cooperation in arranging for the immediate departure of Dr. Skokan."

The New Federation of The West Indies

by Frederick W. Jandrey
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs¹

I appreciate very much being invited to join you tonight in saluting the new federation of The West Indies. I know that the Under Secretary of State and your former Governor, Mr. Herter, feels with me that it is most appropriate to honor this occasion in Boston, a city which for so many years has enjoyed ties with the West Indies.

Not only has Boston traded directly with these islands for a considerable period, but it was often by way of the West Indies that cargo and passenger ships from Europe came to New England. It was in the West Indies that these ships made their first landfall and received their first welcome to the New World. After an exhausting crossing of the Atlantic, the Caribbean stop offered passengers and crew alike an opportunity to refresh themselves in a friendly atmosphere. That

friendly atmosphere and fine climate still attract many to the islands and will, I am sure, continue to be a major economic asset to the federation.

Just as our past historical ties with the individual islands of the West Indies were most cordial, so now we look forward to a mutually happy relationship with the new federation.

As I am sure you all know, we are keenly interested in the progress of a people toward nationhood through the lawful processes of democracy. In the light of our own political heritage and experience, in which Boston played an early role, it is only natural that our foreign policy should reflect this keen interest. We are anxious to assist those who are moving toward self-government to the extent we can through such means as are at our disposal, sharing with them the experience and technical skills we have accumulated. It is with this tradition and interest that we stand ready, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, to assist The West Indies.

In these days the West is frequently accused of a desire to obstruct the progress of dependent territories toward independence, and much propaganda is devoted to charges of imperialism. All one needs to do is examine a map to discover how far the West, led by the United Kingdom, has gone in just the opposite direction. A new type of relationship has been developed. In terms of this relationship, the United Kingdom, as a true "mother country," has tried with marked success to prepare the people of such territories for self-government and independence. The list of countries which have thus acquired their independence, just since the war, is most impressive—India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, the Sudan, Ghana, and most recently Malaya.

The union of the West Indies islands in the federation is acknowledged as an important step in this same progression from a status of dependence to one of independence within the Commonwealth. We desire to associate ourselves with this process and to work closely with our British allies in helping The West Indies to achieve statehood under the most favorable conditions possible.

Where there is evidence that a people and its leaders have the political maturity to guide their own future through democratic institutions, we wish them the greatest success. As far as The West Indies is concerned, we have full confidence

¹ Address made at the West Indian Federation Celebration Dinner at Boston, Mass., on Apr. 22 (press release 207).

in the ability and integrity of its national leaders, and the federation is to be congratulated for choosing Sir Grantley Adams, an experienced and devoted statesman, as its first Prime Minister.

Although, as I have already mentioned, our connections with the Caribbean area were historically in terms largely of trade, they have, in more recent times, involved visits to the area by many of our people, both as traders and as tourists. Since the early days of the last war they have also involved a number of important defense relationships. We recognize that these arrangements, important to our own defense and that of the Western Hemisphere—and indeed of major value to the free world's security system—have caused certain concern within The West Indies. It might be noted in connection with one aspect of this problem that approximately 75 percent of the total land acquired by the United States in the West Indies since 1941 has, in fact, been turned back to the local governments for agricultural and other uses. The people of The West Indies can be sure that we are mindful of their needs for land and will continue to turn it back whenever the requirements of defense permit.

As well, there are certain positive advantages which accrue as a result of our defense relationship with The West Indies. I do not speak alone of the revenues which result from the presence of United States defense installations in the area. Fully as important is the opportunity which these associations give us both to develop a higher degree of mutual understanding and a sense of our interdependence.

Although the territories of The West Indies have great beauty and are endowed with natural resources, the standard of living still needs to be improved. The problem of population in relation to developed resources is a serious matter and clearly calls for further economic development. We are desirous to assist in attacking this problem. To this end we are prepared to consider ways in which we may be able to help the new federation. Today we have also announced that immigration quotas to the United States from The West Indies will be increased by 100 percent.²

² On Apr. 22 the Department of State instructed its consulates at Barbados, Kingston, and Port-of-Spain that they could make available to the local press an announcement of the increase in the subquotas for The West Indies under the mother-country quota.

U.S. To Discuss Assistance to The West Indies

Press release 213 dated April 24

The U.S. Government has advised the Government of Great Britain of its interest in the new federation of The West Indies. It is the United States desire to foster the success of the federation and to assist, where practicable, its balanced economic growth. Accordingly it has requested the British Government to advise the Government of The West Indies that the United States would welcome in Washington a group representing The West Indies to discuss ways in which the U.S. Government may best assist the Federal Government and through it the people of the new federation.

On April 18 technical assistance agreements were signed at Washington extending American aid to the eastern territories of the federation.¹ With the technical assistance agreement already in effect with Jamaica, these agreements now extend arrangements for technical assistance to all of the federation.

¹ BULLETIN of May 5, 1958, p. 749.

These are tokens of our friendship. They are evidence of our faith and belief that The West Indies will, in the not too distant future, be an important and prosperous member of the Western Hemisphere, as well as a full member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

As evidence of our good wishes for the success of the federation, I should like to read Secretary Dulles' message of January 3 to Lord Hailes on the occasion of his investiture as the first Governor General of the federation:

It is with pleasure that I send greetings, on behalf of the President of the United States and of all Americans, on this important occasion.

Your investiture as the first Governor-General of the Federation of The West Indies marks an historic step which the American people note with deep satisfaction. We and the people of the Federation have much in common—respect for law, for the rights of the individual, and a strong love of freedom. We look forward to being good neighbors.

The ties of culture and of commerce, of brotherhood and tradition which bind us will, I know, grow even stronger under the Federation whose birth you celebrate today.

I thank you for allowing me to join with you in this salute to The West Indies.

"Freedom From Fear"

by Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹

When the "four freedoms" were enunciated in 1941, the world was faced with problems not unlike those which beset it today. Dangers then flared from the ruthless ambitions of a few individuals. Tyrants were sweeping away freedoms on three continents for the sake of amassing dictatorial power. In the face of this the world drew courage from America's declaration of faith that the four basic freedoms must prevail.

Courage and resolution were demanded of millions in those days. Resistance to evil men's schemes found inspiration in the deeds and example of many men, especially leaders such as the Philippines' Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo, now become a distinguished world figure whom we delight to honor here tonight.

Some months after the Atlantic Charter adopted the "four freedoms" and held them high as a beacon of hope to mankind, Carlos Romulo demonstrated with personal action that to achieve those freedoms meant to fight for them. And he fought his fight without fear. He fought valiantly to bring about the end of the danger of those times and the beginning of an era in which man no longer need suffer from fear.

That battle was won. An era of peace dawned. Fear of the dictators vanished, and the world organized itself in a promising association dedicated to preservation of the "four freedoms." Carlos Romulo appropriately became a prime figure in the United Nations, serving with great distinction as president of the General Assembly in 1949-50.

But unhappily disillusionment came. We soon discovered there was not, after all, a unanimity among nations in the yearning for a truly free world. Something worse than brutal ambition exposed itself in opposition to all freedoms. Free men again rallied against the new threat. But it still exists, and so it is that now, in 1958, we find ourselves once again in the tragic circumstance of being oppressed by fear.

It is indeed an unhappy paradox that in this amazing world of today, where new discoveries

and inventions offer promise of an exciting and fabulous future, mankind should look into that future with deep anxiety. Science has opened so many new doors to us and shown us such breathtaking vistas that we are incapable of comprehending the kind of world now possible for ourselves and future generations. We already marvel at the advances so far made. Life is now not only longer and more pleasant in its relief from many old scourges and plagues; it is also more exhilarating, more comfortable, and in many respects less arduous.

The prospect of a better life has, of course, a special appeal to the hundreds of millions of people throughout the world who only in recent years have emerged from the darkness of outmoded systems. For them the urge merely to catch up with the rest of us is the basis for vibrant and determined national movements. For these awakened masses, too, the miracles of scientific advance in the last dozen years seem to open limitless possibilities, and their spirits are uplifted thereby.

A Fear of Nuclear Conflict

Mankind's optimism, however, is universally sobered by other realities. There is no *certainty* that the bright future will be realized; there is no *sure confidence* that the joys of scientific development will be available for human beings. A fear of nuclear conflict dampens the spirits of people the world over. The specter of devastation and poisoned atmosphere causes deep and universal anxiety. This fear stems from an inability to envision the outcome of the current world tension. The fear is of the consequences of a conflict so extended that it will engulf most of humanity and inevitably will affect all peoples everywhere.

We who are dedicated to the "four freedoms" are party to this conflict. We are party to it precisely because of our dedication. It is a conflict between our determination to maintain freedom for all individuals and a relentless conspiracy against that freedom—the conspiracy of international communism.

Mankind fears how this conflict will be resolved. Some feel it must erupt into mass destruction. There may be some who believe the defeat of freedom's forces is inevitable because of the driving force of the disciplined conspirators and because of free men's apparent irresolution

¹ Address made at the Four Freedoms Dinner at New York, N. Y., on Apr. 21 (press release 204).

and divergence of action. I submit, however, that there need be no despondency on this score. I cannot concede that nations are so unable to govern their relationships that they must inevitably obliterate themselves over their differences.

The problem is manmade. A manmade solution must and can be found. I am sure that close analysis of how man thinks and reacts will suggest that solution. Yet we must not minimize the danger. The steady growth of the Communist conspiracy to take over the world and reshape it in its own image is frighteningly impressive. It has indeed become a gargantuan menace in its 40 years of evil development and expansion. But I assert that it is not invincible. While it shows undeniable strengths, it also exposes its weaknesses. I do not despair of thwarting its objectives. Nor do I subscribe to the pessimistic contention that the conspiracy will destroy everything rather than permit itself to fail.

Scientific advancements are proof that man is continually learning. He now has harnessed many elements of nature and learned to direct them to his own benefit. Moreover, he is continuing to learn about himself. In the 40 years that the Communists have pursued their conspiracy, we have learned much about it. We know precisely how it works. We also have learned the immensely valuable lesson, though we have learned it at great cost, that the conspiracy can be stopped with the weapons it fears most: strength and determined unity. With these weapons we already have obliged the enemy to change his tactics. He no longer blusters and threatens military invasions. He poses rather as a lover of peace and democracy, and, while offering a smiling countenance, he moves as relentlessly as ever on his course of subversion, enticement, and propaganda. He exploits our differences with one another and seeks to divert our attention.

These weapons of ours—strength and unity—need now to be reinforced with alertness and renewed determination. We know our enemy. Unremitting opposition, sparked by clear understanding of his methods and his objectives, can stop the Communist conspirator's march, no matter what tactic he chooses. We can do it, that is, if we do not relax our vigil nor reduce our strength. We could fail, however, if, even for a short time, we were to let down our guard in the

mistaken impression the new smiling approach means he no longer seeks to engulf us. We must ever remember that our enemy has not changed. He has given up none of his gains. Examination of his inducements reveals benefits only to himself. He has not abandoned his intention to obliterate our freedom. We therefore cannot for a moment be distracted from the threat of destruction that is aimed at our individual liberties and at our concept of acceptable civilization.

Also, no matter how compelling the circumstances that tend to divert us from a steadfast course, we cannot, if we are successfully to counter the Communist conspiracy, afford to be overimpressed with considerations of temporary expediency. Specifically, we must be ready to pay the cost in taxes; we must be constant in our determination to stand by reliable allies; we must persevere in the maintenance of our own and our allies' military strength; we must continue patiently our program of assisting the economic growth of those newly developing nations that are so eager to catch up with us, for as they gain in strength they will present additional deterrents to the Communist plotters. Properly assisted, they can be relied upon to defend their own liberty and thus prove great assets in the struggle for freedom everywhere.

No Need To Whistle in the Dark

Those who seek "freedom from fear" in today's world can take heart from the comradeship of this great union against threatening conspiracy. There is no need to whistle in the dark. There is no need to pose in bravery, any more than to cower in a sense of impending doom. Our union is well armed materially, and it is invincible in its spirit.

The greatest encouragement of all should be in the knowledge that the will for freedom never dies. Throughout human history the yearning to be free and to stay free has led to great deeds. Less than 20 years ago it united men around the world. Carlos Romulo, who along with his countrymen so courageously upheld the cause of freedom, wrote during that conflict:

The essence of our world struggle is that all men shall be free.

It is the essence of our struggle today. And he was never more right than when he also wrote:

To create peace we must devote to it the same enthusiasm and industry we have shown in our preparations for war.

He saw the need to approach a task such as ours with enthusiasm. If we sometimes approach the present task too grimly, it may be because we know the stakes are high and the danger is great. But there is cause for confidence, and this confidence should give us enthusiasm. Certainly the brightness which the future could hold for us justifies an enthusiastic approach to the achievement of it. I am sure that, if we persist in seeing

our problem clearly and maintain an unclouded vision of our goal, we can substitute a resolute and fearless enthusiasm for our anxiety over the future.

In short, by a renewed determination and reaffirmed dedication of purpose we can achieve that "freedom from fear" for which all men yearn and which is essential to the fulfillment of mankind's most cherished hopes.

It is in this sense that we can proclaim with Franklin Roosevelt that there is nothing to fear but fear itself.

The People Who Wage the Peace

AN ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORY AND MISSION OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹

The 24th Secretary of State, William H. Seward, once explained the appointment of a certain private citizen to a diplomatic post in these words: "Sir, some persons are sent abroad because they are needed abroad, and some are sent because they are not wanted at home." It's about the first category, the people who wage the peace—the Foreign Service of the United States of America—that I speak to you today.

Under our constitutional system the President makes United States foreign policy. He relies in particular for advice and guidance on the Secretary of State, who is also charged with coordinating the formulation and execution of the President's program. A number of Federal agencies share the implementation of the President's foreign-policy decisions. They include the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, the United States Information Agency, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Other departments, such as Treasury, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, and Labor, as well as the Atomic Energy Commission, also are concerned with certain aspects of United States foreign relations.

But, of course, it is the Department of State, led by the Secretary of State, which by law and practice must bear the main and, I might add, awesome burden of insuring in peacetime that our country's interests are protected and strengthened. At home and in 87 countries abroad State Department personnel are on the job—and it's a 24-hour job, too. Our code rooms in Washington and in our larger embassies never close. A telegram which arrives captioned NIACT, meaning "night action," results in an immediate telephone call, nights and weekends, regardless of the hour, to the home of a State Department official. Weekends, too, in Washington and at all overseas posts, a duty officer is always available, and there's no overtime pay involved either. At those few places where one-man posts are located—Belo Horizonte, Brazil, for example—the American consul is, in reality, never off duty.

The Department of State, I might point out, although historically the oldest and consequently in precedence the first, is next to the smallest executive department, both in terms of personnel and money spent. This year's budget of \$193 million must be stretched literally around the world, including special United States missions at the seat of the United Nations in New York, the Organization of American States in Washington, the North

¹ Address made before the Great Issues Forum at Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tex., on Mar. 25.

Atlantic Treaty Organization in Paris, and so on. By way of contrast, a squadron of B-52 bombers costs around \$120 million and a Forrester-type aircraft carrier runs around \$220 million.

I've been talking about State Department employees. Where does the Foreign Service come in? Let me try, without becoming too technical, to explain their relationship.

Until very recently the differentiation could be made that, generally speaking, civil-service employees manned State Department offices in Washington while Foreign Service employees ran State Department offices abroad—embassies, legations, consulates general, and consulates. Thus, an interchange of both domestic and foreign experience was rarely possible in the Department of State. Since 1954, however, virtually all officer positions which are directly concerned with the conduct of United States foreign affairs, both in the Department—which means Washington—and overseas, are staffed by Foreign Service officers. The result, in effect, is that Foreign Service officers now move freely from Washington to the field and back as the needs of efficient administration dictate.

Tradition of the Foreign Service

Our Foreign Service has a tradition going back to the founding of the Republic. The American diplomatic service preceded the consular service by more than 4 years. The first diplomatic agent sent abroad by our Government was Silas Deane, who went to France in 1776 in the guise of a merchant. Benjamin Franklin and John Adams had to take time out from their diplomatic negotiations at the Court of Louis XVI in 1778 to help shipwrecked American seamen. The consular service dates from the appointment of William Palfrey as Consul to France in 1780 and was thus nearly 10 years old when Thomas Jefferson took office as the first Secretary of State.

Some of our other great statesmen, John Jay, James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, also represented the fledgling nation abroad. Of the first six Presidents of the United States, four had previous diplomatic experience. Interestingly enough, the middle of the 19th century found some of our most illustrious literary figures also serving the United States in foreign lands. One can cite James Russell Lowell, Minister to Spain and later to the Court of St. James; Nathaniel Hawthorne,

Consul at Liverpool; Washington Irving, Minister to Spain; and Bret Harte, Consul at Glasgow.

Because our country was a part of the New World, our diplomatic and consular services were, of course, among the latest of their kind. By some accounts there were agents who performed consular functions as long ago as the days of Tyre and Carthage. But the consul as we know him probably derives from the consular tribunals, *consules artis maris*, of the medieval cities of Italy and southern France. These tribunals settled quarrels arising at sea, and still looming large among a consul's duties today are the care and protection of American vessels and seamen. The first consuls fostered trade and commerce and protected the interests of their fellow countrymen in foreign lands. For a time, too, they held court and exercised judicial powers for settling disputes among their nationals.

The diplomat, as a representative of one head of state accredited to another sovereign, has an equally misty origin. Certain early writers trace the first ambassadors to God himself, who created the angels to be His legates. But the real beginnings of diplomacy, involving intercourse between nations, the rise of permanent missions, and the development of a diplomatic hierarchy, are more clearly traceable to Italy during the Middle Ages. You will recall that Florence counted among her envoys Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, and, later, Machiavelli.

Undoubtedly because diplomacy was associated with kings and courts, intrigue and rivalries, the Continental Congress and subsequently the early Presidents chose our first diplomats carefully and well. Thanks to their achievements in establishing mutual understandings with Old World states, we first won assistance to gain independence and, then, safeguards for our sovereignty. What has been termed the golden age of American diplomacy helped preserve the United States through its vulnerable youth until it could develop strength and self-sufficiency as a nation.

But with the advance of the 19th century, the United States became increasingly preoccupied with domestic affairs. We grew so rapidly that both need and fear of Europe were outgrown. Few people cared about the kind of representation our country had abroad. Only gradually did the feeling spread that the United States needed a professional foreign service. But not until early

in this century was anything done to stop the practice of making appointments on political or personal grounds. Steps were also taken to increase inadequate salaries and allowances, which had obliged appointees to draw on private funds of their own.

It was only 34 years ago that the organization known as the Foreign Service of the United States of America actually came into being through the amalgamation of the diplomatic and consular services. The Rogers Act, in effect, provided the first statutory foundation for a disciplined and dedicated body of career officers at the service of the President and the Secretary of State.

To illustrate how the Foreign Service and its members fit into the Department of State organization, I want to employ a few figures. The grand total of Department of State American personnel, by most recent counts, is 12,847. Of this number, 8,025 are in the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service, in turn, can be divided statistically. The principal representatives of the United States Government in foreign countries are usually Foreign Service officers, who now total 3,430. They are supported by the Foreign Service Reserve corps and the Foreign Service Staff corps. When the need arises for highly specialized skills or experience, the Secretary has authority to make special appointments of Foreign Service Reserve officers. There are now 739 of them, limited by legislation to a maximum term of 5 years. The Foreign Service Staff corps is also career, with both officers and clerks. Its size has been considerably reduced as part of the 1954 Department of State reorganization recommended by the Secretary's Public Committee on Personnel headed by Dr. Henry M. Wriston. There are now 1,273 Foreign Service Staff officers. The balance of the Staff corps handles stenographic, clerical, technical, and custodial work of the Foreign Service.

In addition I should mention here, not only for the sake of the record but to give credit where it is due, that the Foreign Service employs at its 279 posts abroad 9,337 foreign nationals. Many of these local employees have decades of invaluable experience.

How Foreign Service Officers Are Selected

Unlike many other countries, the United States does not require that aspiring Foreign Service officers present certificates of any kind; although

the overwhelming majority are college graduates, yet there is no kind of diploma which will qualify one automatically. Foreign Service officers are selected through competitive examination, open to any American citizen 20 to 31 years of age. First comes the written examination, which takes one day and consists of four parts—English expression, general ability, general background, and modern language. The oral examination, for those who pass the written, usually runs an hour and a half and is conducted by a three-man panel. Having successfully completed his written and oral tests, the candidate is given a physical examination. Foreign Service officers being subject to assignment anywhere, certain disorders which do not seriously interfere with work at home may disqualify one for foreign service. Qualified candidates are also given the regular background investigation required of all prospective Department of State employees. This investigation seeks to assure that a person's character, reliability, and loyalty are such that he can be trusted with the responsibility of United States Government employment.

You will get some idea of the selective nature of the Foreign Service examination process from the following summary: Of 2,616 young men and women who took the written tests last June, 556 passed. So far, 279 of this successful 21 percent have gone on to take the oral: 55 were accepted; 16 were deferred—probably to make up foreign-language deficiencies; and 208 failed.

There is not only competition, as you have just seen, to enter the Foreign Service. There is also competition to stay in—and to advance. Nominated by the President of the United States and confirmed by the United States Senate, Foreign Service officers enter in class 8. They can rise to class 1, then to career minister and career ambassador. Each year every officer is rated by selection boards in comparison with all the others in his class. A number with the highest ratings are promoted. Unless an officer is promoted after a certain number of years, he faces separation. As in the military services, it's either "up—or out." Almost two-thirds of our ambassadors and ministers today came up from the ranks—some without the benefit of a university education, I might add. Of the Department's three Deputy Under Secretaries, two are Foreign Service officers. Sometimes Foreign Service officers are assigned as Assistant Secretaries of State.

A Foreign Service officer, when appointed by the President, receives three titles: one as a Foreign Service officer, one as a diplomatic officer, and one as a consular officer. The first determines his class; use of the others depends on his assignment. His salary is based on his class in the Foreign Service, not his post or his job. For example, in Washington he may be assigned as Bolivian desk officer in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs; later he may be sent to Tijuana as consul and then to Caracas as Second Secretary of Embassy. Barring a promotion from, say, class 5 to 4, meanwhile, his salary in all three places would be the same.

Before this student audience, some of whom I hope will seek to join me as career officers in the Foreign Service of the United States, I should like to emphasize how, in a sense, it is a profession which, while requiring careful preparation, does not lend itself to exact textbooks. There are a number of institutions of higher learning which concentrate on international relations, even specifically in Foreign Service. Yet there are no specific courses on how to become a Foreign Service officer. The reason is evident when it is noted that the written examination covers: (1) correctness, effectiveness, sensitivity, and organization in written English; (2) ability to read and to interpret tabular and quantitative data; (3) understanding of the ideas and concepts basic to the development of the United States and other countries; and (4) ability to read with comprehension French, German, Russian, or Spanish.

During the oral examination the panel studies the candidate's personality, resourcefulness, and versatility. It probes the breadth and depth of his interests, his ability to express and defend his views, his ability to work with people, and, in general, his suitability as a representative of the United States abroad. The candidate is judged primarily on his ability to express clearly and understandably thoughtful opinions based on facts at his disposal rather than on the factual accuracy of his answers. He is asked about American history and geography, economic theory, current events, the United States and foreign governments, and cultural developments. His motivation for entering the Foreign Service, his outside interests, and his general personality are also taken into account.

Once a Foreign Service officer, one's education

only begins. His work requires intimate knowledge of the political customs, governmental forms, and cultural patterns of people who may work, think, and worship in a manner quite different from our own. Understanding in these matters cannot be acquired quickly or easily. It must be the result of continuous and supervised growth through experience, study, social contact, and perceptive observation.

Career Planning and In-Service Training

Career planning and in-service training of Foreign Service officers have a high priority in the Department of State. A career development and counseling staff in the Office of Personnel has under constant review the records of individual officers, to whom they are readily available for advice and assistance. The Department's Foreign Service Institute offers a wide range of courses. All newly appointed officers must attend a 3-month, full-time basic course prior to their first assignment. There are numerous types of part- and full-time orientation and substantive courses, ranging in duration from half a day to 9 months.

It may surprise you to know that this morning 88 Foreign Service officers, before putting in a full day's work in the Department, voluntarily spent from 7:30 to 9 o'clock studying either French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, or Russian. This goes on 5 days a week. Another 83, with the Department paying their tuition, go after work to one of the various Washington universities offering night extension classes. And final grades go into their personnel folders for consideration in connection with promotions.

During the last fiscal year the Institute assigned 27 selected Foreign Service officers of unusual promise to seven colleges and universities for advanced economics and political science courses. An additional 29 studied at the National War College and other colleges maintained by the United States Armed Forces. The Institute provides instruction 4 to 6 hours daily in 25 languages, including Hausa and Vietnamese, and also maintains full-time language programs at schools in Mexico, France, and Germany and language and area programs for Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese in Lebanon, Formosa, and Japan. In all there are now 99 Foreign Service officers training to become what we call language-and-area

specialists for Eastern Europe and the Near and Far East.

This increasing recognition of the need for Foreign Service officers with specialized advanced training and experience bespeaks the realignment of power and commitment following World War II which affected profoundly the position of the United States in world affairs. The functions of the Foreign Service, as envisaged in the classical image by the Rogers Act of 1924, were to represent the United States abroad, to report significant developments in foreign countries, and to extend official protection as required to American nationals and interests. These functions still continue, but added to them have been many others of varying degrees of specialization which Foreign Service officers are expected to perform in connection with the postwar expanded responsibilities of the United States Government. Therefore, we now find ourselves engaged in highly technical studies. Negotiation and elaboration of complicated agreements of economic, scientific, or military character is another new task. We report on social and labor problems and participate in multilateral organizations.

I could expand at some length on the many other new functions which would at one time have been considered the exception but are now the rule in modern diplomacy. But I should rather emphasize that this expansion of scope has been accompanied by an increase in volume of problems. This has required considerable decentralization of organization, thereby placing importance on individuals and their judgment. In the light of this important development the suggestion that Foreign Service officers are merely messenger boys at the end of a telegraph line is completely fallacious.

Correction of this and similar misconceptions of what Foreign Service officers do as well as who they are is difficult, due to the very nature of their work. Regrettably, they are too little known to most of their fellow Americans. Their lives are spent predominantly around the face of the globe, often at personal hardship and even danger, broken by occasional assignments in Washington and irregular brief periods of home leave with their families in other parts of the United States.

Actually the Foreign Service Officer corps is representative of every area of our country and every walk of life. There is no monopoly of Ivy

Leaguers nor of any other single small group. All in all they represent a thoroughly American cross section of hard-working, down-to-earth, straightforward men and women whose main difference from the rest of the population is that they are professionally concerned with upholding United States interests abroad. Tempering this concern is a healthy perspective to make them realize that everything they do in the field of foreign affairs should stem from domestic fundamentals right here in the United States.

Foreign Service Heroes

To speak of danger in the Foreign Service is not mere rhetoric. A flag-flanked plaque on one marble-lined wall in the lobby of the Department of State Building in Washington testifies to the death of 71 diplomatic and consular officers of the United States "who while on active duty lost their lives under heroic or tragic circumstances." This honor roll of Foreign Service heroes is headed by the name of William Palfrey—"lost at sea 1780." The last name on the list is that of David Le Breton, Jr., "drowned saving lives—Tunis 1953."

In the 173 years spanning these two names and dates, the words "lost at sea" have been inscribed under seven names. Forty-two were killed by fevers and diseases, such as yellow fever, malaria, cholera, and smallpox. Exhaustion and exposure, suffered on the job, have claimed three others. Four have been murdered. Six gave their lives trying to save others. Volcanic eruptions and earthquakes killed another seven. And, reflecting United States efforts to mediate recent civil disturbances, one was shot by a sniper and another was killed by gunfire.

This list does not include more than a score of Foreign Service officers who have been killed in recent years while flying from one post of assignment to another. Since 1942 three diplomatic couriers have died in plane crashes. Some of you may recall a crash near Vienna in October 1955 when a courier, disregarding serious internal injuries, extensive burns, and intense pain, salvaged his diplomatic pouch before extricating himself from the burning wreckage. Despite pain and shock he refused all medical attention after arrival in a hospital until he delivered his pouch into safe hands.

Of course, I do not mean to imply that the life of the average Foreign Service officer verges on

death's door every day. Rather than dangerous adventure, his lot more often is dull hardship. Trying climate, absence of modern conveniences, lack of medical facilities, isolation, and hazards to health and bodily safety—from one to all of these factors may plague his daily existence. At times, I confess, there is also a lighter side. Of the experiences of the wife of a Foreign Service officer, the *Saturday Evening Post* wrote this headline several years ago: "Disinfected in Ethiopia, terrorized in Tunisia, and pinched by a Very Important Foreigner—all in the line of duty."

Even where life offers the more normal amenities, a Foreign Service officer often has comparatively little time to call his own. Not for a moment can he forget his primary obligation, which is not only to strengthen and understanding and friendly relations between the United States and the country in which he serves but also to strengthen the global position of the United States. The fulfillment of this obligation, which entails presenting the United States position to foreign officials and influential citizens as well as to sound out their views, depends principally on personal contacts and interchange. Personal contacts take time and, in great numbers, can be exhausting. Social functions, while an important part of his duties, may afford little pleasure when crowded together and attended out of necessity. Spending a quiet evening with his family becomes a privilege dependent on the absence of official exigencies.

This brings us to another of the canards involving striped pants. I would be less than candid if I did not admit that sometimes—but not often—Foreign Service officers wear formal dress on certain ceremonial occasions. But nearly everyone I know usually outgrows the outfit before he has a chance to wear it out. Wearing striped pants, when required, is a part of protocol, and protocol simply means following certain rules and procedures in order to regularize and facilitate relations with other people. That is especially important with people of other countries and other civilizations, whose customs, including dress, may differ widely from our own.

But whatever the dress of a Foreign Service officer at any particular time and on any particular occasion, you can be sure that he feels deeply both the honor and responsibility of participation in our Nation's first line of defense. Deprived of the possibility of spending his life in a hometown,

the wide world is his hometown. Certainly the frequent changes of post to which Foreign Service officers are subject offer them the pleasure of travel and the stimulation of association with new peoples and places. But it also means endless farewells—and that isn't so pleasant.

One of my colleagues tells this illustrative story: About to leave a post in Spain, a friend said: "You know, when we say goodbye next week, it will be very sad. Since I probably won't ever see you again, it will be like going to your funeral." My colleague, touched by this sentiment, had the inspiration to reply: "What of me! When I have to say goodbye to all the friends I have made here, it will be as if I am attending scores of funerals simultaneously."

Threefold Role of Women

At this point, before the distaff side of the audience complains, I want to emphasize the threefold role of growing importance in the Foreign Service being played by women. First, as Foreign Service officers, they number 306, led by the United States Ambassador to Norway, Frances E. Willis, with 31 years' experience. Second, 70 percent of the Foreign Service Staff corps is female. Without their efficient assistance in making the wheels of organization turn, the Foreign Service would be as a car without an engine. Third, but far from least, are the wives. While this is a subject which, I am certain, Mrs. Rubottom could discuss far better than I, permit me these few words of praise for helping their husbands do their job better.

On arrival at a new post, for instance, husband can go right into an already functioning office, but wife has to find and set up a new home and a new life for herself and family under strange and sometimes difficult circumstances. She has to assume a heavy load of representational responsibilities and obligations dictated by ever-present protocol. Nevertheless she usually finds time to indulge also in such typical American women's activities as organizing and conducting charity benefits and community betterment projects of all kinds. It's no secret that a Foreign Service officer is judged not only on his own merits and demerits but also those of his wife.

Foreign Service children also deserve their share of credit and praise. If they haven't been born abroad, they are reared in various foreign

lands. They start school in one language and may go on to finish in a second or third; meanwhile, they have been learning to speak English at home with their families. They have to learn to make and lose friends with unexpected rapidity, and home for them, too, is where they hang their hats. Their good spirits and equanimity in the face of the inevitable minor, if not major, disasters that accompany this kind of seminomadic existence are a constant source of inspiration and comfort to us adults, I assure you. And let's admit one of their most vital contributions: Thanks to their quick proficiency in languages, we parents often make shameful use of them as interpreters until our trailing linguistic abilities finally catch up.

I have tried in this summary scanning of the United States Foreign Service to give you, as I stated at the start, a factual account of its history, its mission, its members. Foreign Service officers are no supermen, but neither are they "cookie pushers." In full conscience they have chosen to dedicate themselves to the loyal service of their country, if need be, in farflung, isolated, and disease-ridden posts. (Let me point out here that over one-third of the 279 Foreign Service posts have living conditions classified officially as "hardship." Sixty percent have fewer than 15 American personnel.)

The Foreign Service of the Department of State is in a very real sense the official "eyes and ears" of the United States Government abroad; it is, in fact, our first line of defense in peacetime. Foreign Service officers, if they have any request of Americans at home, do not ask increased benefits or higher salaries. They would rather receive your moral support and confidence and possibly a minimum of recognition as they wage peace and defend freedom on distant ramparts for their fellow countrymen and all mankind.

President Heuss of Germany To Visit United States

The Department of State announced on April 24 (press release 212) that arrangements had been completed for the arrival at Washington on June 4 of Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, who will visit the United States at the invitation of President Eisenhower.

President Heuss and his party will remain in Washington until June 7, when they will begin a trip scheduled to include visits to Philadelphia, Pa., Hanover, N. H., Detroit, Mich., Chicago, Ill., San Francisco, Calif., the Grand Canyon National Park, Williamsburg and Charlottesville, Va., and New York, N. Y. They will leave from New York on June 23.

Mutual Security and World Trade

by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon¹

For the past 10 years the rapidly developing military might of the Soviet bloc has threatened the peace and security of the world. Actually, the threat of international communism has been with us from the dawn of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To explain what I mean, here are two statements made by Lenin shortly before his death in 1924. This is what he said:

As long as capitalism and socialism exist, we cannot live in peace; in the end, one or the other will triumph—a funeral dirge will be sung over the Soviet Republic or world capitalism.

Now that statement covers a lot of territory—the entire world. It refers to Great Britain and France and Latin America and Asia as well as to the United States.

But Lenin's other effort at prophecy was very specific. Here it is:

First we will take Eastern Europe, next the masses of Asia, and finally we will encircle the last bastion of capitalism—the United States. We shall not have to attack it; it will fall like overripe fruit into our hands.

I don't need to point out to this audience that the Soviet Union has accomplished the first step. Most of what the mapmakers called Eastern Europe 20 years ago now lies behind the Iron Curtain. And the Soviet Union is still following the strategy and the doctrine laid down by Lenin more than a quarter of a century ago.

The military potential of the Soviet Union today is impressive. At their disposal is the largest peacetime standing army in the history of the world. They have a submarine fleet six times larger than our own. Tactical and intermediate-

¹ Address made before the National Machine Tool Builders' Association at Chicago, Ill., on Apr. 24 (press release 209 dated Apr. 23).

range missiles with nuclear warheads back up this menace. We know that Soviet scientists are working around the clock to perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile.

This is the *military* threat of international communism.

We are countering this threat. Very briefly, I would like to tell you how.

First, we have strengthened and modernized our own military establishment. The more than 2,600,000 men and women in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are equipped with the latest nuclear weapons, atomic submarines, guided-missile ships, fighters, bombers, and ballistic missiles. This combined force, dispersed, ready for action, and capable of instant retaliation, is a mighty deterrent to any aggressor.

But we have not stopped there. The world today is a world of interdependence among nations. No nation—not even the United States—can go it alone.

That is why we have joined with other nations to further our mutual security against Communist military aggression. We have established military alliances with 42 nations of the free world, either through bilateral treaties such as those with Japan and the Philippines or through multilateral arrangements such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Rio Pact with our Latin American friends.

During the past 7 years the United States has contributed \$20 billion in mutual defense assistance to its free-world allies. But—and this is the significant point for the American citizen to fully understand—during this same period our partners in these defensive alliances have expended \$122 billion of their own funds to develop and maintain their military strength. No one, therefore, can honestly call our military assistance a give-away program; and no one can deny that it is mutual.

An equally important contribution of our allies has been in making real estate available for our joint defense. On the real estate loaned for American forces we have constructed more than 250 major overseas bases. From these bases the Strategic Air Command and the Navy can launch forces capable of destroying any aggressor.

This power in being has earned the respect of the Soviet Union. Mr. Khrushchev knows that, because of the free-world defense system main-

tained by the United States and its allies, a third world war would mean the end of civilization rather than the victory of communism. The Soviet leaders are realists. They know that civilization is at the crossroads and that the survivors of another war might be reduced to living in caves and throwing rocks at each other.

Soviet Economic Offensive

The Kremlin rulers, well aware that new efforts at military conquest could result in the destruction of the Soviet homeland, have nevertheless *not* changed their ultimate objective, which is world domination. They have only shifted their tactics. They have now added a new and formidable weapon to the Soviet arsenal. I am not referring to the earth satellites but to the Soviet economic offensive. This got under way shortly after the death of Stalin in 1953. It has been gaining in momentum ever since.

The Soviet economic offensive is presented with colorful propaganda. I would like to read to you just one sentence from a statement made by a Russian delegate at the recent Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Cairo:

We are ready to help you as brother helps brother, without any interest whatever, for we know from our own experience how difficult it is to get rid of need.

Language such as this seems transparent to us. We wonder how other people can believe these soft words coming from the brutal oppressors of Hungary. Unfortunately such blandishments are too often believed in the less developed areas of the world. For the Soviet leaders are not relying upon propaganda alone. They have now launched a massive program of trade and economic assistance designed to swing the less developed countries into the Communist orbit.

Starting from zero in 1954, Soviet-bloc economic assistance to the less developed nations had risen to \$1.6 billion by the end of 1957. Soviet-bloc loans are being used to finance such projects as a steel mill and electric power station in India; shipyards and textile mills in Egypt; a sugar factory in Ceylon; and many other enterprises in these and other less developed countries. The Soviet bloc has also increased its trade with the less developed nations from \$840 million in 1954 to about \$1.7 billion in 1957—more than double; and the number of trade agreements signed has leaped from 49 to 147.

President Eisenhower in a message to Congress² made it clear how we as Americans must regard this new threat. Here is what the President said:

If the purpose of Soviet aid to any country were simply to help it overcome economic difficulties without infringing its freedom, such aid could be welcomed as forwarding the free world purpose of economic growth. But there is nothing in the history of international communism to indicate this can be the case. Until such evidence is forthcoming, we and other free nations must assume that Soviet bloc aid is a new, subtle, and long-range instrument directed toward the same old purpose of drawing its recipient away from the community of free nations and ultimately into the Communist orbit.

Now the greatest mistake we could make would be to assume that this Soviet economic offensive is something that "will pass in the night"—that it is a "flash in the pan"—that it will peter out.

The industrial growth of the Soviet Union is moving along at a pace more than twice that of the United States. Their rate of industrial growth is 9 or 10 percent a year compared to America's 4 percent. Five years from now Russia's industrial production may well reach a figure of over \$100 billion.

Despite their propaganda there are a number of things which the men in the Kremlin cannot hide behind the Iron Curtain. The Soviets have not tried to hide from us their determination to weaken United States friendship with the newly developing nations and at the same time increase the dependence of these young nations on the Soviet bloc.

Countering the Threat

Now, what are we doing under the mutual security program to counter this Soviet economic threat?

Since World War II, 20 new independent nations have been created. These new countries represent about 750 million people—almost one-third of the world's population. Within their boundaries lie immense natural resources, some of them scarcely tapped.

These newly independent countries have lived with poverty, disease, hunger, and despair since the dawn of man. But in winning their independence they have set in motion a powerful force. It has been called the "revolution of rising expectations." These new nations know that the

rest of the world lives far better than they do. Their own per capita income of about \$75 a year is barely sufficient to provide subsistence.

But despair has given way to hope and an impatient determination to find "a place in the sun." Intense nationalism characterizes these young nations. The leaders of these 750 million people are being pressured to produce a higher standard of living—and quickly. We are working with these less developed nations in an effort to help them help themselves.

They need higher levels of health, education, and sanitation. They need to learn new methods of agriculture, of irrigation, of conservation. They need nurses, doctors, teachers, engineers, administrators. Through our technical cooperation program we are helping in all of these areas.

There are strong moral and humanitarian reasons for this effort to bring these hundreds of millions of people into the community of modern free nations. But there are even more compelling reasons from a self-interest standpoint. If the less developed countries should turn to communism in a mistaken effort to speed up their development, our own security would be gravely endangered. Moreover, this one-third of the earth's population represents both a source of vitally needed raw materials for our economy and a tremendous potential market for the goods of America, the world's largest trading nation.

Development Loan Fund

We are not trying to "prime the pump" of these underdeveloped countries. We are helping them to get the basic industry—the pump itself—for them to prime. Most of these new countries do not yet have the basic facilities required before they can attract private "risk capital." They lack good harbors, port facilities, roads, communications, power, railways.

To help meet the needs of these countries we established late last year the Development Loan Fund, as a part of the mutual security program. Congress appropriated \$300 million last year for this fund, and this year we are requesting an additional \$625 million.

The Development Loan Fund lends money for specific, economically sound, and technically feasible projects. It does not extend credit when other financing is available on reasonable terms. It concentrates on long-range, economic-growth projects.

² BULLETIN of Mar. 10, 1958, p. 367.

Applications for more than \$1.5 billion in such projects are now being carefully screened.

The total budget for the mutual security program for the coming fiscal year is \$3.942 billion. The military aspects of the program represent about two-thirds of this total, and the economic part the other third.

Now, in my talks and travels I get the impression that most Americans believe in the mutual security program but feel that because of economic troubles on the home front we may not be able to afford the full program.

There are two fallacies to this line of reasoning. First of all, this program is vital to our national security, and the United States must always be able to afford whatever it costs to maintain its own security and freedom.

Second, the mutual security program is today a very strong bulwark in our efforts to pull America out of the recession. Eighty cents of every dollar spent on our mutual security program is spent right here in the United States.

Here are a few figures showing purchases from American farms and factories in just 1 year under the MSP:

Iron and steel	\$35 million
Bread grains	\$94 million
Chemicals	\$25 million
Cotton	\$84 million
Motor vehicles	\$20 million
Petroleum	\$35 million
Coal	\$20 million

—and military equipment, the sum of \$1.443 billion. Now I am sure you gentlemen know that the effect of these purchases is felt by hundreds of subcontractors and suppliers in every walk of American life, including, of course, your own very vital industry.

As a matter of fact, in the last fiscal year the International Cooperation Administration financed the purchase by foreign governments of \$70 million worth of machinery and equipment, including \$2.5 million in machine tools. During the current fiscal year ICA's financing of American machine-tool exports has already amounted to \$1,184,000.

In addition to these direct purchases the mutual security program benefits other segments of the economy. For example, United States flag shippers received \$58 million last year for carrying MSP goods overseas.

Any cut in the sums requested for the mutual security program will be reflected directly in smaller orders for American factories. What sense does this make at a time when we are striving to keep the wheels of industry turning? It is estimated that about 600,000 jobs are directly or indirectly due to the mutual security program. This hardly seems the time to add these workers to the ranks of the unemployed.

Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program

In connection with the hundreds of millions of dollars of American-made goods that are shipped abroad under the mutual security program, I would like to say just a few words about the reciprocal trade agreements program. As you know, this is now before Congress for renewal.

I know that this industry is concerned about machine-tool imports. Mr. Olsen and Mr. Lundell, who are here from the Department of Commerce, are experts in the field of machine tools, and I am not; but I would like for you to consider two or three facts.

Trade statistics show that machine-tool imports to the United States increased from \$22 million in 1954 to \$36 million in 1957, but U.S. exports of machine tools increased during this same period from \$121.5 million to \$183 million. This industry not only has an export balance of \$147 million, but this balance is actually larger than it was in 1954, when it was only \$99.5 million.

Under the reciprocal trade agreements program the United States has become the largest exporter and the largest importer in the world. In 1957 our exports totaled \$19.5 billion while imports were \$13 billion.

We often hear about import competition in this country, but we seldom hear the other side of the story. For example, in the month of February, 114 Japanese textile concerns went bankrupt. Now I am not asking you to worry about these 114 firms or about the thousands of employees who lost their jobs when these concerns closed their doors. But the cold algebra of trade shows that Japan is our second best export customer—better than a billion-dollar-a-year customer. And when a billion-dollar-a-year customer shows signs of sickness, we had better take an interest.

Japan desperately needs a "smoothing out" of her trade relations with the United States. Last

year her trade deficit with the United States was \$624 million. Japan is the most industrialized nation in Asia, and the Japanese are a dependable ally in the Far East. The situation in which Japan finds herself—90 million people to support in an area less than the size of California and with few natural resources—illustrates vividly the interrelationship between trade and defense.

I use Japan only as an illustration. We could move around the world and point to many others—in Western Europe, in Latin America, in Asia. Wherever we look, we find that international trade is of vital interest to nations whose well-being and security is essential to our own. Trade and national security cannot be separated in the modern world.

To safeguard the Nation's defense through effective alliances while at the same time adequately protecting American business interests is the challenge we face. I believe that the reciprocal trade agreements program with its built-in protections can accomplish both purposes. I believe, too, that if the businessmen of the United States lose confidence in their ability to meet world competition, at home and abroad, we will see the new nations move one by one into the Soviet orbit, taking with them resources vital to our own economy. This would leave America encircled and beleaguered. Eventually it would mean the end of the freedom we hold so dear.

This is the problem. The stakes were never higher. We face a ruthless and determined foe. The machine-tool industry has played a major role in the history of this country, in peace and in war. To win this economic struggle with the Soviet Union we will need from you all the skills, all the resourcefulness, all the ingenuity, and all the daring which you can summon.

Above all we need from you and from every American industry renewed confidence—confidence in the free-enterprise system and confidence in the trading system that has made us the envy of the world. This cold war is one for America's businessmen to win. It is down our alley. I have unbounded faith in the outcome.

U.S. Sends Medical Supplies to East Pakistan

The Department of State announced on April 23 (press release 208) that the United States is sending emergency medical supplies to East Pakistan to help combat serious outbreaks there of smallpox and cholera.

The shipments, which have already started by commercial air express, are in response to a request from the Government of East Pakistan, which is the most populous section of the Republic of Pakistan. Pakistan is comprised of the two provinces of East Pakistan and West Pakistan, which are separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. No outbreaks of the diseases have been reported from West Pakistan.

Reports from Dacca, provincial capital of East Pakistan, indicate that the incidence of the diseases in the eastern province has reached as many as 1,900 cases of smallpox in one week, with about 750 deaths, and 330 cases of cholera with more than 200 deaths in the same period. The reports describe the outbreaks as epidemic in proportion.

The medical supplies being procured by the International Cooperation Administration for air express to East Pakistan include 6 million doses of smallpox vaccine, 1 million tablets of sulfadiazine, 1 million tablets of sulfaguanidine, and 12,000 hypodermic needles.

Atoms for Power: International Status

by Robert McKinney

U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency¹

I have been asked to speak on some of the broad international political and economic implications of atomic power. A few prefatory remarks about the new world organization in this field would therefore seem in order.

The charter of the International Atomic Energy Agency is the product of unanimous agreement between 82 nations which belong to the United Nations or its specialized agencies. At present it has been ratified by the governments of 65 nations. We are an independent world agency, autonomous, and associated with but not a subsidiary of the United Nations.

We are not a political assembly. We are not a trade association. We are a technical operation which may eventually pay its own way. Depending on the particular circumstance, we may function as manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, broker, as purveyor of scientific, technical, engineering, auditing, or financial services, or as a research complex.

The Agency will sponsor research throughout the world, it will assist in reactor construction, and it will handle isotopes and reactor fuels. Undoubtedly at a later period it will have its own processing and storage plant. International regulation of waste disposal and establishment of radiological standards are Agency business. The Agency will conduct an extensive training program aimed particularly at developing a body of atomic specialists in the less advanced countries able to carry on their national programs.

Let us think of the International Atomic Energy Agency, therefore, as a business, as a new but practical venture in which the member nations

have invested in the firm expectation that we will earn a good return.

I should note that only 9 out of 65 member nations, 3 out of 23 governors, and 4 out of 26 senior Agency officials are from Iron Curtain countries. Certainly our balance of geographical representation will make ideological subversion most difficult. If the performance during our first 6 months is any indication, I believe the board members and Agency officers now working together will surprise us by their progress. And our high enthusiasm cannot help but bring about an understanding which will make itself strongly felt in negotiations among our member nations in other fields.

Atomic Training

The relatively few people now at work in atomic fields throughout the world largely chose their vocations and finished their university training before nuclear energy had been given much attention by our basic educational systems. In consequence, many of those now pioneering on this exciting frontier have entered from other fields, often too late and with too little background for their own fullest attainment and satisfaction.

Our hopes for the future must rest on our ability to interest young people in science and engineering, particularly in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The attractions are many and great. Already atomic energy has attracted some of the world's most brilliant minds. Yet I am convinced that the really great figures of the atomic age are still to come. It is the young men and women in high school and college laboratories today who will be the Nobel Prize winners of tomorrow. And some of them will undoubtedly owe the prizes for their atomic discoveries to the training programs the IAEA is establishing today.

¹Address made before the Southwestern Assembly, sponsored by the Rice Institute, at Bracketville, Tex., on Apr. 18 (press release 196 dated Apr. 16).

Many countries have already made constructive contributions to the Agency's training programs. For our part the United States has contributed \$1 million in fellowships. We plan to contribute a research reactor and laboratory facilities. Such essentials as these are not "give-aways." Instead they represent a planned and balanced scheduling of the things we have to do today to insure that the next generation of nuclear workers will be equal to their tasks.

The Less Advanced Countries

The Agency statute specifically charges us with a responsibility for assisting the less advanced countries with their atomic programs for electric power, medicine, agriculture, industry, and research. New and underdeveloped nations are acutely conscious of the potential benefits of atomic energy. They are resolved that they shall not be passed over by the atomic age as they feel they were by the industrial revolution. Regardless of the poverty of their means, they aspire to earn their share and not be petitioners for an atomic dole. Anxiety that nuclear energy was destined to become just one more big-power advantage explains why the President's creative proposal of 4 years ago for creation of the Agency uncovered such abundant response.

We hope to give these countries the benefit of our long and costly experience in nuclear development. A pooling effort such as the Agency provides will mean for these countries a great saving in time, resources, and money.

The Need for Atomic Power

Everywhere, every day, need for electricity is growing, particularly in fuel-short nations. For example, Italy, with 12 million kilowatts of electric generating capacity now installed, sees her power demand doubling in 9 years. Turkey, which has only one-half million kilowatts of installed capacity, sees her requirements doubling in less than 5 years. Careful surveys of future power requirements in many countries convince us that the world demand for electric power would at least double over the next 10 years—given any expectation of meeting that demand.

Without atomic power that expectation cannot be fulfilled. Four out of every ten people in the

world live in countries where any significant expansion of electric output is impossible unless that expansion is based on the uncertainty of imported fuels. As I see it, this means that through the Agency and otherwise we must stimulate the early construction of civilian atomic power plants abroad in as many countries as are able to make use of them.

The essential raw material of the Agency is nuclear fuel for firing civilian atomic power plants abroad. We will not have carried out one of the main charges laid upon the Agency by our founding nations unless and until we have made civilian atomic power an important contributor to the energy needs of a world at peace. If all goes well, by far the largest part of our business will be eventually devoted to dealing in one way or another with enriched and natural uranium, with thorium and plutonium.

Here for the first time, by international agreement, we have at hand the means for furnishing dependable supplies of nuclear fuels and reactor materials to fill the world's otherwise inevitable energy deficit. Certainly there is no comparable international organization which can assume long-term obligations for supply of conventional fuels—that is, of oil and coal—stable in quantity and stable in price. So, when viewed in perspective, the Agency takes on truly great significance.

World Technological Leadership

The goal of the United States must be to maintain and continuously make visible world technological leadership in all fields. If we are the first to make civilian atomic power cheap, safe, and simple, we will have won an important advantage in this struggle. But if another nation does so first, the defeat will be even more important, for it could be taken, by extension, as evidence that we are no longer first in the military atomic field. This is true because atomic military developments are necessarily shrouded in secrecy. There can, however, be firsthand observation of atomic supremacy in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The degree of leadership displayed in civilian atomic energy may be projected by many into estimates of military nuclear strength.

Because of the way world opinion works, it seems to me necessary for the United States to establish and hold world leadership in civilian

atomic power as a cornerstone to technological leadership because we want to do all we can to insure that our military atomic capability remains a deterrent to aggression. It is essential that the world be kept aware of this leadership. In this endeavor there can be no better evidence of leadership than reactors of American design or fired with American fuels feeding electricity into light globes and electric motors throughout the world. Over the long run news stories of new reactors built abroad will do more than news stories from weapons proving grounds.

And the task of demonstrating leadership in nuclear power development is one which our friends and allies in the free world must help to bear. For our part we can provide people, know-how, and materials for research and development and testing; we have built and can continue to build demonstration plants here in the United States. For their part our friends and allies must, by building additional demonstration plants, help gather the body of broad operating experience which can only come from actually running on-the-line atomic power stations. Our friends cannot, and I am sure they will not, sit back and play no part in this competition. The stakes are as high for them as they are for us. Nor can any of us do our parts by often establishing goals for atomic power development but seldom starting actual construction.

The Icepack Begins To Break

The reactor construction programs which are now shaping up in Western Europe, Great Britain, and Japan give promise that the icepack in which atomic power has long been frozen is finally breaking and that international collaboration will give great impetus to these and other programs for civilian atomic power, leading to actual on-the-line operation of more civilian reactors at an earlier date than was thought possible even a few months ago.

An extensive market is beginning to take definite form, and American industry's stake in it is real. Because the International Atomic Energy Agency will be an international focal point for all these projects, by assuring that potential weapons materials are accounted for and through other forms of support and assistance, the Agency cannot help but be a focal point in the American

atomic energy industry. In one or another of the Agency's activities throughout the world our presently suffering atomic industrialists will see new markets and new help to their salesmen.

But the manufacturing volume implied by the growth of civilian atomic power programs throughout the world is only part of the benefits the United States can expect. International collaboration in the peaceful uses of atomic energy invariably and inevitably is accomplished by a further release from the restraints of atomic secrecy. Perhaps the most noteworthy example occurred in connection with the first Geneva conference in 1955. I feel confident that the second Geneva conference will be the occasion for further presentation of new data on exploitation of both fission and possible fusion power. And there can be no doubt that the effect of our joint activities in Vienna, as need is demonstrated and confidence gained, will be the gradual but positive broadening of existing atomic knowledge and the generation of new knowledge.

Problems of Reactor Development

As I said a moment ago, what we need most of all to speed our search for low-cost reactors is a large body of actual operating data from plants designed for civilian purposes. We all know the difficulties involved in dealing with new systems as expensive as reactors. Every atomic decision, by business or government, has many ramifications. How will the research and development be financed? What about fuel costs and buy-back prices? Who should have first crack at being permitted to sponsor specific projects? Should public-power enterprises be given priority, or should they bid competitively against private utility systems? Where should the first reactors be located? What are the potential hazards to people who live near these reactors, and how should these risks be insured?

In our United States program each atomic power demonstration plant is a special case, characterized by its own special problems and special design. A few precedents are being established in limited areas, but the large sums of money involved make it imperative that, until our experience is broader, these precedents be regarded as part of a developmental and transitional phase of the progress toward economic nuclear power.

Advantages of an International Program

Not all problems of domestic reactor development apply in making decisions about atomic power programs abroad. Yet reactor-operating data developed abroad would make a marked contribution to the body of technical knowledge and fund of operating experience required to hasten low-cost atomic power here in the United States.

Such an international atomic power demonstration program, however, carries with it the further important values I touched upon before.

International development of nuclear power, under the American and now the Agency concept, will be accompanied by the means of insuring against diversion to military purposes. This requires a sound and certain inspection system. Our proposals to this effect during negotiation of the statute were first received with misunderstanding and apprehension by many governments. Yet in the end it was unanimously acknowledged that such controls were indispensable to an atmosphere of mutual confidence in which the peaceful uses of atomic energy could flourish.

What International Inspection Means

The nations which founded the IAEA were willing to pay the price for controls, even if it included outside audit. What was achieved was indeed a political breakthrough. For the first time East and West agreed that an international body should have an inspection system as an integral part of enforcing international agreements. Foreseeing the growth of civilian atomic power throughout the world, our statute provides that the Agency inspectors "shall have access at all times to all places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this statute to be safeguarded, as necessary to account for source and special fissionable materials supplied and fissionable products and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against use in furtherance of any military purpose. . . ."²

Already have the somewhat technical phrases of the Agency statute covering safeguards been spelled out in black and white in this world's great

languages. To men like you, their deep meaning requires no interpretation. But let me paraphrase them in the basic language of hope, so that men in the street do not find themselves overwhelmed by the scare headlines of the space age: We now have the prospect that men and women everywhere can watch the building up of supplies of nuclear fuels in the hands of their neighbors or even of their potential enemies without fear that they will be used as weapons against them.

For this interpretation of our statute into the language of hope to achieve its full meaning, the International Atomic Energy Agency must and will now get on with the task of designing specific procedures which will be workable and compatible with technical and economic considerations. The criteria employed in the system so designed I am sure will have worldwide application. Compatible standards must be applied not only in Agency projects but also in atomic plants brought into being under regional or bilateral arrangements. This step is a matter of the highest priority because it can lead eventually to our real goal of universal atomic inspection. Looking to this ultimate goal, we will press for early coordination by the Agency's Board of Governors of measures to develop a materials-accountability program, including the important first step of training Agency inspector personnel.

Civilian Atomic Power vs. Military Stockpiles

As I come toward the end of my remarks, I should like to summarize and emphasize the reasons why civilian atomic power is one of the main product lines of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

One reason is that atomic power holds promise of becoming profitable because it alone can make available an extensive new energy source to fuel-short, energy-hungry nations.

Another reason is the significant consideration that, if fissionable materials in substantial amounts are devoted to the generation of civilian atomic power under an arms-control agreement, the world can create a device—backed up by a real profit motive—which will siphon off nuclear materials from weapons stockpiles. This will not only lessen military potentials throughout the world; it will convert an extremely costly component of these military potentials—fissionable ma-

²For text of IAEA statute, see BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1956, p. 820.

terials—from a sterile status into a status of financial gain and economic benefit.

There is a third important reason. There must be uniform, worldwide rules for health and safety in the atomic field in order to remove this controversial subject from the arena of national political bias and ideological propaganda. When mankind intrudes on nature's balance of matter, there sometimes result dangerous sources of radiation, the malignancy of which cannot be extinguished or shortened. The most extreme form of radiation danger would, of course, arise from a war fought with nuclear weapons. Certainly hazards inherent in using radiation to treat or diagnose man's diseases, accidents involving atomic plants, or in weapons tests, for that matter, would be microscopic by comparison. In this problem of radiation we will all agree that the world must move into every aspect of the atomic age with caution, lest we open a Pandora's box to plague our children.

It takes all kinds of people to make a world—even to make a single field such as atomic energy. In the West many people are working to bring forth to fruition the promise of peaceful applications of the atom. I am sure there are some folks on the other side of the Iron Curtain who want to do the same thing.

There can only be one answer on either side of the Iron Curtain to the problem of controlling hazards of radiation. That answer is obvious, simple, and direct: practical and feasible international standards strictly enforced. That the International Atomic Energy Agency is the pioneer in the field of world atomic regulation and is empowered by its statute to move broadly in the entire field of radiation hazards is genuine cause for worldwide enthusiasm about this new organization.

I do not mean to imply by what I have said here tonight that civilian atomic power is any panacea. I would be the first to agree that, by itself, civilian atomic power is certainly not the answer to the world's quest for peace. Our quest for peace will test our genius to develop many different but complementary mechanisms. If we do succeed in ending the threats to civilization inherent in atomic war—and we must—we will owe our success to the sum total of the workable mechanisms which we devise. Here we lay open the fundamental

problem of our age—that progress in human technology has seriously outstripped progress in human relations. While science has led the way to new conquests in both the microcosmos and the macrocosmos, with pushbutton war ever more feasible, the nature of international relations is such that we can expect no equivalent mockup for pushbutton peace. Our hopes boil down to the hope for political breakthroughs by men intent on achieving international understanding.

Some folks think the United States objective of diverting fissionable materials from military to peaceful uses is no more than a pious, unattainable dream. Because of what I have already seen of the Agency's operation, however, I do not share these doubts. I have been convinced by the evidence. Bit by bit this evidence piles up in the earnest conversations among earnest men about what we have been thinking in long, wakeful flights to Vienna from Ankara, Karachi, Djakarta, Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, Rio de Janeiro, Stockholm, London, Paris, Rome, Bucharest, and Moscow. None can realize better than we the great pressures on the nations most advanced in nuclear technology—that is, on those nations now able to make weapon materials in quantity—to get on with concrete action for using substantial amounts of these weapon materials for civilian atomic power. These pressures come not only from the forces of world opinion; they come also from the deep, diastrophic forces of history.

By itself and alone, propaganda can make no answer to these pressures. They will intensify until countered by action. And the climax of these forces and counterforces approaches because the world has now created in Vienna a proving ground in which the technical prowess and the moral determination of the great powers are on permanent, continuous, open demonstration in side-by-side comparison for judgment by men of all nations. This proving ground is no place for disembodied promises. Like the proving ground of any other practical business, it must be filled by real, live products which people can see and touch. Because the world has the Agency as a proving ground, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not be able to convince anybody that its known allocations of uranium 235 to civilian purposes, and particularly the 50 kilograms offered to the Agency, are in any way comparable to the dedication by the

United States of America of 100,000 kilograms to these uses. Half of our commitment is earmarked for power plants abroad. Five thousand kilograms is our commitment to start the IAEA in business, and we have also offered to match the commitments of other nations until mid-1960.

No juggling with figures can overcome the significance of this offer. In fact, as a result of side-by-side comparison at the Agency proving ground, the world has begun to realize that the Soviet offer to contribute to the growth of international civilian atomic power must be increased—substantially increased. Otherwise the parsimonious offer of reactor fuel and the Soviet claim that they have curtailed their military potential by suspending weapons tests, standing side by side, will make each other look hollow with every passing day.

And if the world had at hand a like opportunity for comparison and inspection in the military atomic field, it would soon learn that the Soviet pronouncement now current in the headlines is only the peculiar way of saying, Moscow style, that Russian bomb experts must return to shop and laboratory to work on their 1959 and 1960 models. Only by this process of continuing, open comparison in both peaceful and military atomic fields will the U.S.S.R. be forced into bona fide agreements, enforceable by inspection.

Conclusion

How great have been the peaceful atomic achievements of the United States the world is only now beginning even faintly to understand. These achievements, however, will become visible to the world at large as the International Atomic Energy Agency moves toward its objective of applying the peaceful atomic achievements of all nations on a worldwide scale.

Success in this endeavor could eventually point the way to international cooperation on the limitation of nuclear armaments.

Establishing international standards for health and safety of workers, communities, and nations involved in reactor operation leads logically to international studies of general radiation hazards.

Misuses for propaganda poison the wellsprings of every household in the world. I therefore hope that it is as clear to you as it is clear to me that,

just as the threat to peace lies in the hostile uses of atomic energy, our real promise lies in the peaceful uses.

President Asks Reexamination of Cotton Import Quota

White House press release dated April 8

The President has requested the U.S. Tariff Commission to reexamine the quota upon imports of cotton having a staple length of $1\frac{1}{8}$ inches or more. The President asked the Commission to determine whether changed circumstances require the modification of the quota to carry out the purposes of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. The Commission will include in its consideration the possible subdivision of the quota on such bases as physical quality, value, or use.

President's Letter to Chairman of Tariff Commission

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture that changed circumstances require modification of the quota established under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, upon cotton having a staple length of $1\frac{1}{8}$ inches or more.

The changed circumstances are the entry within the quota of large and increasing quantities of Mexican upland cotton having staple lengths of less than $1\frac{1}{8}$ inches. This results in the exclusion of substantial quantities of cotton having a staple length of $1\frac{3}{8}$ inches or more.

The United States Tariff Commission is requested to undertake an investigation under Section 22 (d) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and re-examine the quota upon cotton having a staple length of $1\frac{1}{8}$ inches or more to determine whether changed circumstances require the modification of the quota to carry out the purposes of Section 22. The Commission should include in its consideration the possible subdivision of the quota on the basis of physical qualities, value, use, or other basis. The Commission's findings should be completed as soon as practicable.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Tenth Anniversary of the OEEC

by Under Secretary Herter¹

It is with great pleasure that I bring you on this memorable occasion greetings and congratulations from President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles.

We in the United States have felt ourselves particularly close to the OEEC. This is partly because the OEEC was originated in response to United States efforts to help Europe in its economic recovery after World War II. But it is also a recognition of the important part the OEEC has played and continues to play in furthering the stability and strength of the free world.

The 10th anniversary of the OEEC is an especially happy occasion for me personally. It was my good fortune to play a small part in the work which created the OEEC and helped Western Europe on its way to the remarkable recovery which has taken place in the last 10 years. In June 1947, when General Marshall made his historic call for cooperation in solving the imminent and ominous problems with which the nations of Europe were faced, I was serving in the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Several months earlier I had filed a resolution for the creation of a special committee of the House of Representatives to make a study of the needs of the European nations for assistance from the United States as well as the impact of such assistance on the domestic economy of the United States.

After General Marshall's speech the Congress took up my resolution and some weeks later passed it by a large bipartisan vote. The committee was authorized to travel to Europe to make its studies,

and I had the honor to be appointed vice chairman of that committee and, in the absence of the chairman, to lead it on its mission abroad. At that time it was our privilege to work very closely with many of you who are here today. In our study of Western Europe's needs and potentialities we came unanimously to the inescapable conclusion that only through cooperation, through working closely together, shoulder to shoulder, could the countries of Europe bring their economies to the point where they would again meet the needs of their peoples and, equally important, go on to meet these peoples' growing aspirations.

I remember in particular in those days the hopelessness that was felt by many people, both in my country and in Europe, who feared the situation in Europe was already beyond remedy. There were those who argued that we should do nothing because nothing could be done—that the situation in Western Europe had deteriorated to a point where its economy and political structure alike would inevitably collapse. It sounds odd today, but there were even a few people who shrank from the idea of a powerful initiative to cure the situation, on the grounds that a joint Western effort of this kind might give offense to the Soviet Union. Fortunately we did not listen to the counsels of despair and timidity. We were firmly convinced then—as we are today—that Western civilization has both the *right* of survival and the *means* of survival.

At this point I would like to point out a historical fact of some significance. The initiatives which came from the United States Government through General Marshall and the visits made by the members of the committee of which I was acting chairman contemplated that aid furnished by the United States should be available to all the nations of Europe. The Soviet Government decreed that this should not be and so exercised its influence that including the nations of Eastern Europe was rendered impossible. From that time the division of Eastern Europe and Western Europe can be clearly dated.

¹ Address made at official ceremonies observing the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation at Paris on Apr. 25 (press release 215 dated Apr. 24).

In April of 1948 the Congress of the United States adopted the Economic Cooperation Act. The nations of Western Europe welcomed this action and responded a few days later by establishing the Organization for European Economic Cooperation. Thus was provided a formal framework for the cooperative efforts that had already begun during the preceding months.

Continuing Usefulness of OEEC

In creating the OEEC, the countries of Western Europe recognized the need to solve their economic problems as a group, to permit examination of their national economic policies in a European forum, and to remove barriers to trade. The usefulness of the Organization therefore did not end when, in the ensuing years, the economic recovery program reached and surpassed its goals. The value of cooperation in the economic field had been made so evident that the Organization became the framework for vital new programs for freeing trade and payments among the member countries and for finding joint solutions to many of the common problems that stood in the way of Europe's progress.

I cannot in this brief message hope to cover fully, or even to mention, all of the aspects of the OEEC's work that have fostered the well-being and the spirit of cooperation of Western Europe and the entire Atlantic Community. The OEEC's many committees, working groups, and other subsidiary bodies have all contributed in full measure to this overall goal. The work of the Organization touches on almost every sphere of European economic endeavor, and we recognize and appreciate its versatility and efficiency.

I do want to mention, however, the OEEC's great accomplishments in the liberalization of trade among the member countries. By coordination and persuasion it has played a major role in swelling European trade and in setting goals for the removal of barriers to commerce within Western Europe. We sincerely hope that all of the member nations will be able to move rapidly toward the fulfillment of those goals. We believe at the same time that it is in the interest of all that this freedom from restriction should be extended as rapidly as possible to imports from other areas of the world.

New payments arrangements were a necessary corollary to this increased international flow of

goods. The European Payments Union has proven itself to be a valuable instrument, not only by facilitating the financial aspects of European recovery but also by providing a forum within which the financial problems of the member countries could be thoroughly explored and means of assistance agreed on in times of general and individual crisis and need.

Since the peaceful conquest of the atom is of such importance to us all, I would also like to pay brief tribute to OEEC work in this field, culminating in the recent establishment of the European Nuclear Energy Agency. The United States wishes the agency well and hopes to participate as may be appropriate in activities undertaken under its aegis.

There are two other phases of the OEEC's current activity that are of particular interest to my own country at this time.

There are, first, the efforts that the member countries have made together, with the support of the United States, to apply the tools of productivity to the age-old problem of producing goods in greater abundance and at prices within the reach of all. The participants in the program of the European Productivity Agency have demonstrated their increasing interest as the potentialities of these techniques have become apparent. I am sure that we shall develop an increasingly close and fruitful collaboration in the field—to the benefit of all.

There are also the steps that we are taking with you in the scientific manpower program, which is aimed at developing one of our inestimably precious resources—our specialists, trained in the vital fields of science and technology, and our young people looking forward to service in these spheres. Here also cooperation in education and utilization is essential and will lead to greater strength, prosperity, and security for all of our countries.

In addition to the obvious practical accomplishments of the OEEC, it has had other less tangible but equally significant results. To men faced with a disintegrating economy and society it opened vistas of hope. The continued achievements of the OEEC gave courage and pride and a renewed sense of destiny to many people in many European countries. These people had felt previously that they were floundering in an effort to find solutions to their national problems rather than

moving with purpose and direction. The success of this mutual undertaking instilled a heartening confidence in men that common problems could be solved by a common will and by cooperative efforts. And it created a resolve that such will and such efforts should not be lacking in the future.

U.S. Interest in OEEC

The United States has maintained a deep interest in the OEEC since its inception. In addition to watching its progress with much satisfaction, the United States has closely associated itself with the work of the Organization and has, wherever appropriate, participated regularly and with deep interest in its activities. This sympathetic interest in the activities of the OEEC has been founded on the same recognition of the need for unity and strength in Europe that prompted our initiative in 1947. This has in fact constituted for many years a central feature of our foreign policy.

It is in this context that we have given our strong support to the historic efforts of six of the European nations to find in economic integration a basis for increasing political unity. This support continues as these countries now enter a new stage in their progress toward unity—the successful establishment of two new European communities, one in the field of broad economic integration, the other in the vital area of nuclear energy development. The understanding, confidence, and experience which have developed in building the OEEC surely contributed substantially to the later formation of the European Coal and Steel Community and more recently to the European Economic Community and to EURATOM.

It is in this same context of support for European unity that I wish also to emphasize the deep interest of the United States in the patient, imaginative, and constructive efforts now under way within the OEEC framework to establish a system of association between the other 11 countries of the Organization and the 6-nation European Economic Community. We hope that these efforts will result in multilateral arrangements, mutually satisfactory to the member countries, that will lead in time to a broader union. We trust that, in the interests of Europe and of other areas,

the arrangements will be such as to promote a long-term expansion of trade with the rest of the world in keeping with our common international obligations. The United States has given strong support to every postwar proposal which has held promise of strengthening Europe economically and reinforcing its cohesion, thereby strengthening the free world. In keeping with this general aim I wish to state here today that the United States warmly supports the European Free Trade Area negotiations and wishes them success.

Looking ahead now for a moment we can foresee a future that offers the hope of untold benefits for mankind. Many things remain to be done, however. Our first task is to preserve both the principle and the fact of cooperation. There will always be some people, both in Europe and in America, who will try to deal with any economic problem or difficulty by headlong retreat into isolation. But, if the Western World learned anything from the painful period between the two World Wars, it learned the utter insanity of this kind of approach. I am sure we all recognize today that there is no longer such a thing as self-sufficiency. None of us can hope to solve economic problems without the cooperation of others.

By preserving and extending the cooperation we have so successfully achieved we can approach with confidence our second great task—the maintenance and progressive improvement of our overall economic health. A sound and expanding economic life is not only essential to the happiness and well-being of our peoples but also to their security and, in fact, to their very survival. In a world threatened by the danger of subversion as well as the danger of military aggression, we cannot afford economic weakness any more than we can afford military weakness. We must work together to develop our resources, to promote the flow of free-world trade, to build up our scientific and technological capabilities, to solve our fiscal problems, and to do all the other things that may be needed to assure the material and spiritual strength upon which Western civilization depends.

Finally, we must stand ready to use our own strength to help build political and economic strength in other parts of the free world. We can never consider ourselves secure as long as many areas of the earth still suffer poverty, sick-

ness, and ignorance. The encouragement of economic and technical development in these areas is not a job for any one of us alone but for all of the industrialized countries who are interested in promoting the true welfare and independence of these areas. It is our duty to share with the peoples of less developed countries the fruits of our technological advancement and to help them achieve their potential for development and growth. In this way we will not only enable these peoples to withstand the malevolent forces loose in today's world but will also be building a positive relationship between them and ourselves—a relationship that will serve our mutual interests for many years to come.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished guests, let me extend to the OEEC once more our sincere congratulations and best wishes on the successful conclusion of its first 10 years. May the Organization continue to fulfill its evolving role in Europe for many years to come. And may our association with it continue to be as fruitful and cordial as it has been during the past decade.

U.S. Participation in Work of ECE

Statement by Henry J. Heinz II¹

I wish to take advantage of your earlier invitation to the delegates to make general statements concerning the work of the committees even though we have now passed to the discussion of the work of the individual committees. I think the United States has demonstrated by its cooperation in the work of these committees the importance which it attaches to their endeavors, and I wish to join the other delegates in expressing our appreciation for the excellent work produced by the chairman and members of these committees and by the secretariat.

We have no specific proposal to make at this time with regard to the work of the committees in general but will be more precise about the reports of the individual committees at the appropriate time. However, since the delegate of the U.S.S.R. took the occasion on this item on the

agenda to make some very general comments on the work of the Commission itself, I do wish to comment briefly on certain points he made.

The representative of the U.S.S.R. referred to his Government's desire for peace and supported this by reference to certain proposals which his Government has made. May I suggest that the Economic Commission for Europe is scarcely the appropriate forum from which to provoke a debate on the relative dedication of various governments to peace. I would remind the Commission of the proposals that have been made by the Western countries for utilizing the machinery of the United Nations in an effort to achieve a reasonable and safe basis for disarmament.

The Governments of the United States and of Western Europe have demonstrated in many ways that they yield to no country in their conviction that expanding trade is essential not only to the peace but to the prosperity of the world as a whole. I am sure I do not need to cite the efforts which have been made in ECE by these countries and in the GATT, which it is well known is open to universal membership. Speaking for my own Government, the pursuit by the United States of liberal trade practices has been made clear, not only by words but actions, with but one qualification. This qualification is that, no matter how strong our convictions are as to the importance of trade, I think all sovereign governments would agree that at all times considerations of national security must also be taken into account.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I feel I should make some reference to the remarks of the Soviet delegate concerning the present business recession in the United States. I shall not try to forecast coming events, but I should like to place this recession in some perspective.

I am sure all the delegates here are aware that the decline which has taken place in United States business activity has been relatively modest and that it is a decline from the highest levels of income and production we have ever attained. From the standpoint of human welfare (about which the delegate of the U.S.S.R. expressed such concern), it is worth while to call to the attention of the delegates the fact that personal incomes have fallen only one-third as much as total national output. Moreover, substantial unemployment-compensation programs, other social-welfare benefits, and the relatively high level of savings

¹ Made at the 13th session of the Economic Commission for Europe at Geneva, Switzerland, on Apr. 11. Mr. Heinz was U.S. delegate to the 13th session.

among working people have alleviated a large part of the problems.

Naturally, Europe is interested in the level of business and employment in the United States. The Government of the United States has already taken important action to speed recovery, and the President has indicated that the Government is ready to take whatever action is necessary to foster economic recovery and growth.

Mr. Chairman, the United States is convinced that the Economic Commission for Europe and its subsidiary bodies offer an excellent forum for appropriate discussion and necessary action in the solution of mutual economic problems and expanding the European economy.

We have noted with satisfaction the increasing availability to the Commission of statistical and other data, particularly from the U.S.S.R. and other countries of Eastern Europe. We hope that this trend will continue to the point that information submitted by all member countries of ECE will be comparable. The United States has made available its know-how and experience to the subsidiary bodies of the Commission and has sent leading representatives of American industry and government to these meetings. And, Mr. Chairman, we wish to assure you that the United States will continue to take an active role in the work of the Commission.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Sweden Sign Amendment to Nuclear Energy Agreement

Press release 219 dated April 25

The Governments of Sweden and the United States on April 25 signed an amendment to the agreement for cooperation between the two countries concerning peaceful applications of nuclear energy which has been in effect since January 18, 1956.¹ Assistant Secretary of State C. Burke Elbrick and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Lewis E. Strauss signed the amendment for the United States, and Ambassador Erik Boheman signed for Sweden.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 181.

The amendment extends the term of the agreement to 10 years from the effective date of the amendment. It will provide for the transfer over the duration of the agreement of up to 200 kilograms of uranium enriched in the fissionable isotope U-235 for fueling research reactors and a materials-testing reactor.

The great majority of this material will be utilized in a 30,000-kilowatt materials-testing reactor being designed and constructed by the Nuclear Products-Erco Division of ACF Industries, Inc., and to be located at the Swedish research center at Studsvik, about 70 miles south of Stockholm. The expected completion date is the fall of 1958.

The amendment will become effective after all of the statutory requirements of both nations have been fulfilled.

Exchange of Ratifications of Commercial Treaty With Nicaragua

Press release 217 dated April 24

Ratifications were exchanged on April 24 of the treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the United States and the Republic of Nicaragua. The treaty was signed at Managua on January 21, 1956.¹ The exchange also took place in the Nicaraguan capital. The treaty will by its terms enter into force one month from the date of the exchange of ratifications.

The treaty consists of 25 articles and a protocol. In these provisions each of the two governments (1) agrees to accord, within its territories, to citizens and corporations of the other country treatment no less favorable than it accords to its own citizens and corporations with respect to many commercial and industrial pursuits; (2) affirms its adherence to the principles of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and shipping; (3) subscribes to fundamental guaranties assuring personal and property rights; and (4) recognizes the need for special attention to the problems of stimulating the flow of private capital investment for economic development. The treaty deals with the following broad subjects: (1) entry, travel, and residence; (2) basic personal freedoms; (3) guaranties with respect to property rights; (4) the conduct and control of business enterprises;

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 174.

(5) taxation; (6) exchange restrictions; (7) the exchange of goods; (8) navigation; (9) exceptions, territorial applicability, and miscellaneous matters.

This treaty with Nicaragua is the 16th commercial treaty negotiated by the United States since the current program was initiated at the end of World War II.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Narcotic Drugs

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931, as amended by protocol signed at Lake Success December 11, 1946. Entered into force July 9, 1933, and December 11, 1946. 48 Stat. 1543; 61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796.

Accession deposited: Indonesia, April 3, 1958.

Sugar

Protocol amending the international sugar agreement (TIAS 3177), with annex. Done at London December 1, 1956. Entered into force January 1, 1957; for the United States September 25, 1957. TIAS 3937.

Ratification deposited: Haiti, February 6, 1958.

BILATERAL

Greece

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 18, 1957 (TIAS 3959). Effected by exchange of notes at Athens March 20 and April 3, 1958. Entered into force April 3, 1958.

Italy

Research and power reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 3, 1957.

Entered into force: April 15, 1958 (date each government received from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

Research reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 28, 1955. Entered into force July 28, 1955. TIAS 3312.

Terminated: April 15, 1958 (superseded by agreement of July 3, 1957, *supra*).

Peru

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1951, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U. S. C. 1701-1709), with memorandums of understanding and exchanges of notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima April 9, 1958. Entered into force April 9, 1958.

Sweden

Agreement amending research reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy of January 18, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3477 and 3775). Signed at Washington April 25, 1958. Enters into force on date on which each government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Confirmations

The Senate on April 22 confirmed Walter Howe to be Ambassador to Chile and Whiting Willauer to be Ambassador to Costa Rica.

Designations

Selden Chapin as Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs of the National War College, effective about July 15. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 218 dated April 24.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 21-27

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Releases issued prior to April 21 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 196 of April 16 and 198 and 200 of April 17.

No.	Date	Subject
204	4/21	Robertson: "Freedom from Fear."
205	4/21	Czechoslovak attaché asked to leave U.S.
*206	4/21	U.S. resolution on fishing approved by U.N. conference committee.
207	4/22	Jandrey: West Indies federation.
208	4/23	Emergency medical assistance to East Pakistan (rewrite).
209	4/23	Dillon: "Mutual Security and World Trade."
210	4/23	Dulles: Military Chaplains' Association.
*211	4/23	ICA insures investment of Chicago firm.
212	4/24	Itinerary for visit of President of German Federal Republic (rewrite).
213	4/24	U. S. and West Indies to discuss assistance.
†214	4/24	Renegotiation of fruit and vegetable concessions by Canada.
215	4/24	Herter: 10th anniversary of founding of OEEC.
216	4/24	Tripartite statement presented to U.S.S.R.
217	4/24	Treaty of friendship with Nicaragua.
*218	4/24	Chapin designation (biographic details).
219	4/25	U.S.-Sweden atomic energy agreement amended.
220	4/25	Foreign newsmen invited to observe U.S. nuclear tests.
†221	4/25	Jandrey: "Nationalism and Collective Security."
†222	4/25	Palmer: "Nationalism in Africa."
*223	4/25	Delegation to inauguration of President of Argentina.
†224	4/26	Becker: "Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser."

*Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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May 19, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The Strategy of Peace

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

There is nothing mysterious about the goals of United States foreign policy. It seeks to defend and advance the interests of the United States. These interests are of several kinds:

(1) There is the life of our people and the physical safety of our homeland. These would be endangered by war.

(2) There is the well-being of our economy. This would be gravely impaired if hostile forces dictated the pattern of world trade.

(3) There is the integrity of the principles for which our nation was founded. Our nation is more than population, more than real estate. Our nation represents ideals. These ideals are an integral part of America, to be defended and promoted by our foreign policy.

Now let me comment briefly on these three aspects of our foreign policy.

Peace

We defend our people and our homeland against armed attack by having the power to hit back hard at anyone who attacks us or our allies. This causes any potential aggressor to pause, for he knows that he could not, by aggression, gain as much as he would stand to lose. In order to have that assured capacity to strike back we need cooperation with other countries.

Potential aggressors need to be put on notice that they cannot, with impunity, pick up nations one by one, leaving the United States to the last, when even we will be relatively weak. Accord-

ingly, we have made collective-defense treaties and similar arrangements with nearly 50 other countries. These commit each nation to help the other in the event of armed attack.

A further benefit from these arrangements is that under them the burden of the military effort is shared. For example, the ground forces of the cooperating free-world nations amount to about 5.6 million men. But only about 950,000 of these are American.

Also our Strategic Air Command is afforded well dispersed positions around the world. This dispersal greatly increases the effectiveness of the deterrent.

Our collective-security arrangements are serviced by our mutual security program. It supplies our allies with a certain amount of military equipment. In a few cases it helps them financially to maintain military establishments which are needed but which their economies are too poor to support without some outside help. And we provide development assistance to certain less developed free-world countries. We do that to help them build their societies on the principles of freedom and to escape pressure to turn to the Communist bloc with the peril to liberty which that involves.

The Soviet Union tries hard to disrupt our defensive efforts. It portrays the United States as militaristic and our collective-defense groupings as "aggressive military blocs."

Of course, as you and I know, the American people are among the least militaristic of any people in the world. George Washington called upon us to maintain what he called a "respectable defensive posture." By that he meant a military

¹ Made before the Atomic Power Institute sponsored by the New Hampshire Council on World Affairs at Durham, N. H., on May 2 (press release 239 and 239-A).

posture strong enough so that others would respect it. Unfortunately, we have not always done that. At times our military strength has been so negligible that militaristic despots treated us as a cipher, not to be taken into account in their aggressive plan.

We are trying not to commit that fault again. We do not intend to make ourselves weak merely because the Soviet imperialists urge that we do so to prove our "idealism."

Our collective arrangements are defensive, as specifically authorized by the United Nations Charter. These groupings are more than expedients. They introduce a fresh concept into the structure of world order.

Within our own country and every civilized country, local security is sought on a collective basis. We unite to provide a central police force, a central fire department, and the like.

Now at last, within the free world, we are beginning to apply that enlightened collective concept. In that way weaker nations can be made secure from being picked up one by one. In that way a strong nation can avoid having to become a garrison state and, even then, being encircled and strangled as a result of the smaller nations being picked up one by one. On a collective basis nations get maximum security at minimum cost.

No doubt our people would not hesitate to provide the vast funds needed for our solitary defense, and our youth, if necessary, would give a greatly increased measure of their time to military service. But even with that maximum effort we would be less secure.

Every American who wants to see his country safe and solvent ought to get out and actively support our mutual security program now before the Congress.

Economic Welfare

Our foreign policy also tries to assure our people a prosperous home economy. That depends in good part upon foreign trade. Our exports are running at a rate approaching \$20 billion a year. Our foreign trade employs about 4.5 million people. Our imports provide many important things that we need and could not readily, or at all, produce here at home. Furthermore, our trade relations help to keep the free world together. Without ample trade with the United States many countries would be virtually forced

to accept absorption into the Communist economic bloc.

The major expression of our foreign trade policy is the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. The principle of the act was first adopted in 1934, and 10 times the Congress has acted to renew it. Under it our trade has flourished. In 1934 our total foreign trade—exports and imports—amounted to \$3.7 billion. Last year it amounted to \$32.4 billion, *excluding* military exports.

The latest renewal expires next month, and further extension is now being sought from the Congress. Failure to extend would be a major disaster. A very few might temporarily benefit. But very many, and in the long run all, would suffer gravely.

Surely we do not want to go back to the early 1930's. Then our high tariff and monetary devaluation policies wreaked havoc upon international trade and boosted into power, in Germany and Japan, extreme nationalists who later plunged the world into World War II.

Every American who wants to see his country economically sound, who wants allies, and who wants peace should work for the extension of our Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

Ideals

Let me speak now about our efforts to promote the ideals of America.

Our nation was founded by men of religious faith. They believed that our Declaration of Independence was not merely rhetoric but truth and that all men were in fact endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights. They believed that they had a mission to help men everywhere to have the opportunity to exercise their God-given rights.

Under the impulsion of their faith and works there developed here an area of unusual spiritual, intellectual, and economic vigor. It became known as the Great American Experiment. The ideals that stimulated it have been projected throughout the world. They have more than once helped to turn back the tides of despotism.

America would not be America if it were stripped of such idealism.

The values of personal liberty are, of course, best demonstrated by individuals. It is they who have liberty, and it is their use of liberty that can make it a dynamic force. On the other hand,

their misuse of liberty plays into the hands of despots. That means that individuals should exercise self-discipline and self-sacrifice and not turn liberty into license. The individual department of free Americans is the most decisive force, for good or evil, in the present contest with despotism.

I do not imply that government has no part to play. It too can find ways to reflect the ideals of the people whom it serves.

Government may *not* interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. That is contrary to accepted international law and practice and forbidden by many of our treaty engagements. But your Government can, and does, make clear to all the world what are the ideals for which our nation was founded.

We can, and do, refuse through our Government to give official sanction to the oppression of other peoples and the denial to them of the rights by which they are endowed by their Creator.

Your Government can, and does, see to it that captive peoples know that they are not forgotten and that their hopes for freedom have the sanction of a vast mass of world opinion.

World Order

One of the ways to protect and advance the interests of our people is by strengthening the fabric of world order. Peace will never be secure until there is an adequate body of international law, and effective means of enforcing that law, and means of changing that law as needed to promote justice.

The United Nations was a great step forward. It was largely a United States initiative. But its Security Council is hobbled by the veto power.

President Eisenhower recently proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council should exercise greater restraint in the use of the veto power. The Soviet Union reacted violently against that proposal. Nevertheless, we shall persist in seeking to strengthen the United Nations.

We seek, under its auspices, a rule of law for such newly developing areas as Antarctica and outer space. A law-of-the-sea conference has just been concluded at Geneva as an effort to create and modernize international law. The 86 nations attending reached agreement on important segments of that law. We are making progress in this field.

Still, the United Nations has not yet found the way to guarantee law and order. That is why we

have to maintain the system of regional collective-defense arrangements to which I have referred and which the charter authorizes. It is our ardent hope, however, that the United Nations can more and more be the framework within which all may find justice and peace.

Agreements With the U.S.S.R.

In the meanwhile, there is an immediate problem that concerns us greatly: Can we reach agreements with the Soviet Government which would mitigate the sharpness of our conflict and reduce the danger of friction which could flare into war?

I can assure you that that is constantly in our minds. There are, however, great difficulties.

For one thing, the Communists do not look upon agreements as we do. We consider ourselves bound to live up to our agreements. This is important because nations, unlike individuals, are under no superior force that compels them to live up to their promises.

But the Communists feel no obligation to perform their agreements. They have broken one agreement after another, confirming what Lenin said that, to the Communists, "promises are like pie crusts, made to be broken." It would obviously be reckless for the free world to weaken itself merely in reliance of Soviet promises to perform in the future.

A second obstacle is that the purposes of the Communist rulers are so basically acquisitive and aggressive that there is very little common ground between them and us.

Recent exchanges of views with the Soviet Union disclose their negotiating goals. They want:

- (1) Our acceptance of Soviet Communist domination of the nations of Eastern Europe. They want us to abandon there the concept of our Declaration of Independence and the explicit provisions of the Atlantic Charter and of the Yalta agreements, that the peoples of these countries are entitled to choose the form of government under which they will live;
- (2) Our acceptance of the continued partition of Germany, or its reunification only on conditions that would give the Communist puppet regime in East Germany an opportunity to extend its rule over all of Germany;
- (3) Liquidation of our collective-defense associations, such as NATO, and abandonment by the

United States of the concept and practice of collective security;

(4) United States recognition of Communist China, its seating in the United Nations with veto power on the Security Council, and acknowledgment of the Chinese Communist claim to Taiwan (Formosa);

(5) Elimination of the present trade controls by which the free world avoids sending strategic war goods into the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Each of these objectives represents an immense gain for the Soviet Union and a great loss to the free world. Soviet propaganda suggests that, if we would accept these losses, then the Communists might end the cold war. However, Mr. Khrushchev has, in other contexts, stated that it was inevitable that the cold war should go on and he intended that it should go on.

It would be reckless to weaken the free world on the gamble that that would end the cold war. It is more likely that it would continue under far more difficult conditions for us.

A few days ago Mr. Khrushchev said in Moscow: "We Bolsheviks are ravenous people. What we achieved through struggles in the past is not sufficient for us. We want more—tomorrow." They already have a billion people—and are still ravenous. I wonder how many more they need before their appetite is sated.

Now I do not, of course, conclude that there are no areas for useful agreement.

In 1953 we made an armistice agreement with the Communists which ended the fighting in Korea.

In 1955 we, with the British and the French, concluded with the Soviet Union the state treaty that liberated Austria.

Earlier this year the United States concluded with the Soviet Union a cultural exchange agreement of limited scope.

We believe that there can be other carefully negotiated agreements of mutual interest. We have been trying hard to get an agreement for reciprocal inspection in the Arctic area. The Soviet Government professed to fear our air maneuvers in the north. It took these alleged fears to the United Nations Security Council and complained of our activities.² We explained that we needed to keep some planes in the air all the

time because we fear that a massive and sudden surprise attack might be launched over the top of the world. So to allay both fears we proposed international inspection on both sides of the Arctic area to give assurance that there could not be any surprise or accidental attack.³ The matter came to a vote just a few hours ago. Ten of the 11 members of the Security Council supported our proposal. There was only one vote against—that of the Soviet Union. But that one negative vote constituted a veto. So, at the choice of the Soviet Union, the fears and risks continue. They continue for one reason alone, and that is because the Soviet Union rejects international inspection against surprise attack.

The significance of that is frightening. The result is tragic. It means that at the will and choice of the Soviet Union we have to go on living on the edge of an awful abyss from which we could, so readily, be rescued if only the Soviet Union did not insist upon retaining for itself the possibility of massive surprise attack.

But we refuse to be discouraged. We remain willing to join in any dependable arrangement which will reduce the risk of surprise or accidental attack or, on a fair basis, reduce armaments.

The Strategy of Victory

We must, however, assume that we face a long period of effort, sacrifice, and strain. That will come to an end when the Soviet rulers moderate their imperialist and ideological urges.

Today the Soviet Communist rulers seek to implement their materialistic doctrine. They believe that human beings are in effect material particles to be fitted together as cogs in some well-oiled machine. Also they believe that that "fitting together" should be carried out throughout the world under Soviet Communist dictation. They profess to believe that this would assure world harmony, peace, and maximum productivity. All of this is a way of rationalizing the usual desire of despots for more and more power.

Experience, however, is teaching the Soviet rulers what has been taught so many times before that man is *not* just a vivacious particle of matter. Men have souls and minds and individuality. They can never for long be forced into con-

² BULLETIN of May 12, 1958, p. 760.

³ See p. 816.

formity. The Soviet Communist Party has undertaken the impossible, as they are beginning to learn.

They are learning a lesson in the satellite countries. A former adherent, Yugoslavia, is independent. In the other Eastern European countries there is a sustained and growing demand for independence. It has manifested itself in violent outbreaks that occurred in 1953 in East Germany and in 1956 in Poland and, most conspicuously, in Hungary in late 1956. There has been a constant flow of refugees from East Germany into West Germany.

In the case of the revolts and in the case of the refugees it is the youth who figure most largely. Throughout their mature lives they have never known anything but intense Communist indoctrination and discipline. But love of God and love of country still survive. Human differences still persist. No materialistic regime can wholly or permanently crush them out. Sooner or later the Soviet rulers are going to have to face up to these practical facts. Indeed there are occasional signs that they are already beginning to do so.

Even within the Soviet Union itself the Communist Party finds that human beings cannot be forced into a single mold of conformity. Under Stalin this was sought to be effected by the brutal terrorism of the secret police. There was a revulsion against that, and the system has been moderated.

As the Soviet Union competes in the field of modern weapons and modern industrial techniques, increasing numbers have to be given a high degree of education. Thus there is developed an intelligentsia. And minds trained for one purpose cannot be kept thinking merely in the channels that the party chooses. They think about other matters, including the unsoundness of the Communist dogma and the cheapness of Communist slogans.

There is more personal security and independent thinking within the Soviet Union now than there has ever been since the October 1917 revolution.

The Soviet economic centralization has proved unworkable, and now there is economic decentralization. This means more local administration of affairs, with more regard to local differences and local habits.

There has also been a change in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union. In 1939, and between 1945 and 1950, it resorted primarily to violence. It attacked Poland and Finland. It took over Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia by military occupation. It assisted, and in some cases instigated, Communist warfare in China, Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, Burma, and Indochina. It used force or the threat of force to take over Czechoslovakia and to blockade Berlin. It backed open war in Korea.

But these violent techniques no longer pay off. They are checked by the free-world network of collective security. So the Soviet rulers now smile and pretend to be friends and to adopt what they hope will be winning ways, giving aid in the form of trade, technicians, and loans, and giving pleasure through ballets and the like. In this way the Soviet Union has gained increased influence and acceptability as against the time when it only growled and bared its teeth. But it is impossible to go on smiling for a long time without its having an internal effect on character. In the long run a nation, like an individual, tends to become what it pretends to be.

The essential is that, for this long run, the free world should stay strong and united. It must be willing to make the sacrifices needed to prevent the Soviet rulers from gaining external victories bringing new victims into the Communist camp. That would enhance the prestige of the Communist extremists and embolden them and enable them to hold back the evolutionary trends at work within the Soviet bloc.

The United States, as the strongest of the free nations, can contribute immensely to giving evolutionary forces of freedom a chance to make themselves decisively felt.

President Eisenhower, speaking at Paris last December at the NATO meeting, said that "there is a noble strategy of victory—not victory over any peoples but victory for all peoples."⁴

The essential is that the American people hold fast to the ideals bequeathed us by our founders and implement those ideals with courage that is traditional with us. We shall need a sustained, sacrificial effort. We may have to do some of the things that we do in war—but without the killing and being killed.

⁴ BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

Why should we not make that effort? The stakes are perhaps the greatest for which men have ever had to strive, in peace or in war. And, if we strive aright, these stakes can be won in peace, without the awful horror of world war III. Surely for the averting of war and the safeguarding of freedom men should be willing

to make a sustained and sacrificial effort. We can do so in confidence that peaceful victory is attainable and that our efforts can bring the day when the dark shadows which now oppress humanity will give way to an era of light and gladness.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 1

Press release 236 dated May 1

Secretary Dulles: I have a statement which I would like to make. I understand that copies of it have been made available to you.¹

I should like to make some observations regarding the United States resolution before the United Nations Security Council, which calls for the establishment of an Arctic inspection zone.²

The establishment of international inspection in an Arctic zone is proposed by the United States not as a maneuver, not as propaganda, but in a sincere effort to meet the admitted problems of a particular area. The United States, not only publicly but privately, has done its best to make clear to the Soviet Government the sincerity of its purpose and its desire to avoid turning this grave matter into a propaganda battle.

The Soviet Government has said that it is worried by the flights of United States aircraft in this area. We have said that we need to keep planes aloft because we are fearful that the Soviets may launch a nuclear attack against us over the top of the world.³ It seemed to us that, if both sides are animated by really peaceful intentions, there is a natural solution—that is to have international inspection which would allay the fears on both sides. If the Soviets do not have bomber and missile bases in the north of their country available for a sudden surprise attack upon the United States,

then our own problem of security is greatly altered. Perhaps we would then feel it safe greatly to minimize the flights of which the Soviet Union complains. In any event the Soviet Union would know that any United States flights are so safeguarded, beyond risk of misadventure, that they cannot be a threat to the Soviet Union unless the Soviet Union first attacks.

The establishment of one important zone of international inspection, as proposed by the United States, would be a constructive first step toward easing world tensions. It is a step that can be taken at once without awaiting any high-level conference. The United States believes that an addition, along the lines proposed by Sweden, is totally consistent with this initiative. It is also consistent with the position taken by the United States regarding a possible heads-of-government meeting.

We continue to believe that the present situation requires that every attempt be made to reach agreement on the main problems affecting the maintenance of peace and stability in the world. In the circumstances a summit meeting would be desirable if it would provide opportunity for conducting serious discussions of major problems and would be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects. Before a summit meeting can take place, however, preparatory work is required so that some assurance can be given that meaningful agreements can be achieved.

We believe the discussions initiated by certain governments in Moscow can constitute a useful prior preparatory phase before any possible sum-

¹ The following six paragraphs were also released separately as press release 234 dated May 1.

² See p. 816.

³ For a statement made in the Security Council on Apr. 21 by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, see BULLETIN of May 12, 1958, p. 760.

mit meeting. Similarly, we believe that the steps contemplated by the United States resolution before the Council, in addition to their intrinsic merit, could also serve, as the Swedish Government suggests, as a useful prelude for the discussion of the disarmament problem at any possible summit meeting. We therefore hope that the U.S.S.R. will agree to sit down with the interested states at once to begin the necessary technical discussions looking toward the establishment of an Arctic inspection zone.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Russians were to accept an Arctic inspection system, would we abandon or modify our present "fail safe" system?

A. I say in this statement that the question of what we would do would depend upon what we learn as a result of inspection. I cannot tell you in advance what that would be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the reason I ask the question—if there were an inspection system, it would seem to be inconsistent with the takeoff flights of planes in the Arctic at a time when the inspector would be there, and it would be difficult to see how the present system of unilateral flights, based on our radar installations, could be continued if there were international inspection.

A. I have the strong belief that, if there were established this international inspection system, it would, in fact, lead to a considerable modification of our practices. That assumes that we do not find, or the international inspection system does not find, something that is so alarming that it makes it necessary to continue. On that assumption, and the assumption the inspection system would give us a more effective notice of a possible attack than we get now when we are dependent on radar information, which is not always reliable in the first instance—then I would think the other precautions would be moderated.

The Inspection Area

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Russian reaction—Mr. Gromyko's reaction—the other day was, in part, that it did not include any of the United States excluding Alaska whereas it includes part of the Soviet Union. Is the area described by Mr. Lodge in the United Nations negotiable, or is it that area of the Arctic and nothing else?

A. Well, I don't think it is anything that we would haggle about in detail. A few changes or variations here and there, I suppose, would not be objectionable. But, broadly speaking, this is the area which we think should be covered now, and we do not want to get into areas which are remote from that particular area and which carry with them a whole new set of political problems.

This area was thought of as a useful beginning place for two reasons: first because it is an area of very high strategic importance, second because it is relatively free from the political complications that exist, for example, in Europe; so, consistently with that principle, we would want to stick at this stage to that particular area.

I don't say that the particular details are sacrosanct. For instance, our resolution suggests that we would be glad to include the portions of Sweden and of Finland and, I think, a little bit of Iceland, which are not in the zone as was originally proposed. That indicates that we are not totally inflexible on the subject.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to clarify one point, you said our flights would depend on whether we found something so alarming as to warrant their continuation. Is it likely the Russians would leave, in an area to be inspected, something so alarming as to warrant continuation of the American flights?

A. I think it unlikely. I think it almost certain that, if there were inspection, that would allay the fears of sudden surprise attack to a degree that might make these flights unnecessary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your statement you thought this plan could be put into effect without awaiting any high-level conference. If the Soviets continue to insist that this be discussed at a summit conference, would we have any objection?

A. Well, of course we don't know yet whether there will be any summit conference. If there is going to be a summit conference and if the preparatory work shapes up in that way, I assume that it would be something we would be prepared to discuss. I will say that the attitude of the Soviet Union at this time toward that matter would, I suppose, have a bearing upon or influence our own thinking as to the value of the summit conference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said in your statement that the seriousness of the purpose of the United States has been put forward both privately and

publicly. Could you illustrate what you meant by that? Was it a message from the President to Prime Minister Khrushchev?

A. There was a message which I gave to the Soviet Ambassador here on Saturday afternoon, which I made with the authority of the President. There was also a private meeting at about the same time in New York between Ambassador Lodge and Mr. Sobolev, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations.

Q. Was the Soviet reaction in private as shocked and hostile as it was in public?

A. I would say that there was not the use of some of the extravagant phrases that were used by Mr. Gromyko. But the initial reaction wasn't exactly heartwarming. (Laughter)

Q. These two incidents you just spoke of, Mr. Secretary—does it indicate, in your opinion, any new phase in developments between this Government and the Soviet Government in the context of actually getting off the ground in private conversations?

A. Well, I can hardly overstate my view that, if something of this sort [Arctic inspection zone] got started, it might mark a real turning point in this whole cold-war situation. I attach very great importance to it, and that is the reason why we have tried so hard to avoid seeming to make it a propaganda exercise or just a maneuver. We have tried to make it clear to the Soviet Union that we did take this very seriously and we are extremely anxious, if possible, to make good.

You see, this offer to get started, at least with technicians, on this area has been along the lines we have been thinking about for some time. If we could get started even at that level, and as a preliminary to any heads-of-government meeting, it would make it much more likely that a heads-of-government meeting could do something substantial.

If there is no preliminary work which clears away the underbrush in some of these matters, it is not very easy for me to see the ability of the heads of government themselves to make any meaningful decision. It would be a good deal, I am afraid, like the last summit meeting, where the heads of government agreed on a directive to be carried out by the foreign ministers. The foreign ministers found themselves unable to carry it out, so the whole effect was zero.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Ambassador on Saturday indicate, as Mr. Sobolev did on Tuesday, that any agreement on an Arctic zone must be part of a package deal and their package, which includes a banning of nuclear weapons altogether?

A. I did not get any immediate response from the Ambassador when I informed him about this.

U. S. Disarmament "Package" Broken

Q. Mr. Secretary, the fact that you offered this separately—does it mean that to an extent we have broken our own package?

A. Yes, it means to that extent we have broken the package. However, as you will recall, the original proposal of President Eisenhower for an open-skies inspection system⁴ and his acceptance, as a supplement of that, of the Soviet proposal for ground posts⁵ was put forward as a prelude to what you might call disarmament talks. You see, an inspection system is not disarmament. It doesn't take any arms away from anybody. But it could create, and I believe it would create, an atmosphere under which a genuine disarmament would, in fact, take place. It was put forward by President Eisenhower at Geneva in 1955 as a step which, if taken, would make it possible thereafter to take disarmament steps. So that, while it was included as part of the total package that was presented to the Soviets last August in London,⁶ it has never, in the contemplation of the United States, been a step which we would be unwilling to take unless other steps were also taken. We were willing to take it believing, if it were taken, other steps, in fact, would be taken.

Q. Have other parts of the package also been separated out or broken, Mr. Secretary?

A. Only to the extent of our willingness to begin technical studies of the problems involved without prejudice—as it was put in our last note to the Soviet Union⁷—to the position of any government as to their interdependence or separability.

Q. That means that the testing issue and the cutoff of production of fissionable materials are still linked together?

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

⁷ See p. 811.

A. They have not yet been disjointed, although we are prepared to have studies carried on as to how you would supervise a suspension of tests without anybody being committed on the proposition of whether or not that was to be interconnected with the cutoff, for example, of fissionable material or other aspects of the disarmament package.

Q. Are those studies to be conducted within this Government, or are these international studies that you are talking about?

A. Well, those would have to be conducted, presumably, on an international basis—the ones you are speaking about.

Relations With the United Arab Republic

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you could change the subject for a moment, sir, the Suez Canal compensation issue has been settled, and we have unblocked Egypt's funds in this country. On the other hand, President Nasser has gone on a visit to Russia. I wonder, sir, if you would care to give us your thinking as to what all this portends in terms of America's relations with the United Arab Republic in the immediate or near future.

A. The unblocking of these funds⁸ came about because the reason for their blocking ceased to exist. They were blocked, in the first instance, because of the fact that there was an unresolved legal controversy between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Canal Authority as to who was entitled to collect tolls. There was a danger that American ships, which were paying the tolls to the Egyptian Canal Authority, might still be subject to being sued and a judgment given against them in the American courts on the theory that the confiscation decree was not effective and they should pay the canal company. I have pointed out, I think, several times that that was the reason why the funds were blocked and when that situation came to an end they would be unblocked. Therefore, I would not think it was wise to try to read into the unblocking any significance beyond what automatically attaches to it because of the fact that the reason for the blocking has ceased; therefore, the unblocking becomes virtually automatic.

Now, as far as our general relations are concerned, I have said here before that we hope to get

along in a correct, friendly way with the United Arab Republic. We recognized it on the assumption that it would conduct itself in a way that would be consistent with the peace and security of the area, and on that assumption we would expect to have normal and, we hope, friendly relations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the occasion of Nasser's visit to Moscow one of the leading Soviet economic papers came out with a major article directed to the Arab nations, pointing out that their resources are being exploited for the benefit of the capitalist world, according to this article, and suggesting that they take some action to take over their oil themselves and also hinting that, if they do, they will not be left in the position of the Iranians, unable to exploit them, meaning Soviet technicians would come, perhaps, and help them. I wonder if you could give us your comment on the significance of this report at the time when Nasser is in Moscow.

A. The problem as to the use of the oil resources relates not to the technical problem of being able to produce the oil or refine it. Many people can do that. The problem is the marketing of the oil. The Soviet Union cannot provide a market for the oil. It is itself an exporter of petroleum products. The problem is to find the marketing facilities. When the Abadan refinery was closed down, the difficulty arose for Iran because the seizure was not recognized as legal and, in consequence, the companies which had the distributing facilities, the marketing facilities, refused to handle the oil. If anyone thinks that a pool of oil in the Middle East is of value by itself, I think he is mistaken. The value is derived not only from the oil but from facilities for distributing and marketing.

Why U. S. Bombers Are Kept Aloft

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us some of the reasons why this Arctic inspection system would make it safe for us to curtail our SAC flights, our bomber flights?

A. If there were international facilities which satisfied us by inspection, which is more dependable than radar inspection at a distance, that there were not, in fact, any plane or missile bases prepared for the takeoff of planes or missiles toward the United States, then that would diminish

⁸ See p. 830.

the occasion to have our planes constantly in the air. They are in the air now because of the fact that, with a growing missile capacity, they could be destroyed on the ground over a large area with virtually no notice—a matter of 10 or 15 minutes, during which planes could not be gotten off the ground. Therefore, it is prudent to keep a certain number of planes flying as against that risk. Now, if an inspection system demonstrates that that risk is not present, then the reason for keeping the planes aloft would correspondingly diminish.

Q. Mr. Secretary, about a month or 6 weeks ago Mr. Gromyko and the Kremlin were making various proposals along easing East-West tensions and you were standing where you are now and saying this was a lot of propaganda. Now Mr. Gromyko seems to be in the same position; he is calling news conferences in the Narkomindel and saying that our proposals on the Arctic inspection plan are also propaganda. Now, I wonder, did this happen because of a change of our policy, or a change of their policy, or a little of both, or what?

A. You mean as to why they call it propaganda?

Q. No, the position seems to have been changed. I would like to know your assessment.

A. The circumstances are that we have conducted this operation in a way which is designed to make as clear as we can that it was not a propaganda exercise but we were seeking an honest result. We talked to the Soviets about it 2 days before we introduced our resolution. We would have been willing to talk about it with them outside to any extent that they wanted. I think that kind of approach differentiates it a good deal from when you write a letter purported to be signed by the head of the Soviet Government to the President of the United States and then publish it before we can get it translated.

"Soldiers of Fortune" in Indonesia

Q. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask you a question about Indonesia. Yesterday the President said there were American soldiers of fortune, as he put it, meddling in the Indonesian rebellion. Can you tell me whether this Government has any way of stopping that, any control over American citizens?

A. I don't think that the President said that there were Americans there because, as a matter of fact, I don't think we know. He said that it could be they were there. There are Americans around the world who engage in such enterprises. I know today we are alerted to the fact that it may be possible that some Americans are flying Soviet arms into Yemen. I don't know whether they are or are not. But that is also a conceivably possible thing that we cannot control. And we have no legal obligation to control the activities of Americans of this character.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when we first put forward the Arctic inspection plan in London, it was linked with an alternative, a suggestion, that we would open up the whole of the United States in exchange for the whole of the Soviet Union for inspection. It was also linked with a suggestion for a smaller—in fact, several alternatives—smaller inspection areas in Europe. Do we still stand on those proposals?

A. Yes, we do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with your remarks on Indonesia there, that we have no legal obligation to control Americans who might be engaged in this, is this the substance of your answer to Prime Minister Djuanda? He asked that the United States make every move possible to order its citizens out of that area, to tell them to stop assisting this rebellion. Has there been a reply to that, and would this be the substance of it?

A. We have made no reply as yet. As a matter of fact, I have not seen the full text of the conversation that took place between the Foreign Minister and our Ambassador yesterday, which I think, shortly followed the public statement that was made by the Prime Minister. We will give very serious consideration to any proposals that were made to us by the Indonesian Foreign Minister. As the President said yesterday, it is our purpose to conduct ourselves in this affair in the most correct way possible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how does this Government view the proposal of the Tangier meeting for the establishment of an Algerian government-in-exile, so-called, and how much do you assess—how much will the coming NATO meeting in Copenhagen, in your assessment, be involved in the North African question?

A. I doubt if we will get involved in it at all, or the same reason which leads me not to want to get involved in it here, and that is that there is at the present time no French Government. Efforts are being made to form a French Government, and I think it would be undesirable to muddle the waters, by mischance, at a time when there is no French Government. I do not know who will represent France at the meeting or whether the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Pineau, will be there or not. It is quite possible he will not be there. But I understand, in any event, if he is there, he will not feel in a position to participate in any discussion of the Algerian matter.

Q. I asked the question regarding Tangier, Mr. Secretary, because yesterday there were a lot of speculative reports to the effect that this Government wouldn't look with disfavor on the establishment of some kind of Algerian government-in-exile. Were those speculative reports completely wrong?

A. I would not attach credence to that speculation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of Mr. Hammarstrand's statement to the Security Council on Tuesday, does the United States Government still consider the Soviet suspension of nuclear tests as propaganda gimmick?

A. It was certainly handled in that way. And don't think one can tell what, if any, sincerity was back of it until we see what happens, if indeed we can see what happens.

One of the aspects of the statement was that it involved no inspection and, secondly, that it reserved the right to resume testing if and when the United States or the United Kingdom test. We are going to be testing right away, so whether there is anything in there beyond propaganda we do not know at the present time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been represented in some press reports recently as being on the opposite side of the question from Admiral Strauss on the nuclear test halt issue. Can you tell us whether or not there is any accuracy in those reports, and could you outline some of your thinking on the advisability of halting nuclear tests from a foreign-policy point of view?

⁹ Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

A. I think I should not do that for this reason: There are many angles to this question of the suspension of testing. There is a judgment of the relative technical positions of the United States and the Soviet Union. There is a military judgment, you might say, as to whether, given our different postures and the fact that they presumably will use their weapons only for an attack whereas we would need them for defensive purposes, whether any technical discrepancy in our favor is adequate and adequately takes account of the different needs of our two countries. There is the question of what future testing might be expected to produce and how valuable it is. There is a question of our international relations, the question of the attitude of the United Kingdom and other countries who are interested in this field and may desire themselves to be more qualified nuclear powers, the question of public relations with many other countries.

Now, we all of us in Government—Admiral Strauss, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dr. Killian,¹⁰ myself—we each contribute from our own field of interest and concern to the estimating of this problem, which is then decided by the President. He has not yet taken any decision. Any point of view of mine would be reflective of only part of the problem, and I recognize quite well that there are other aspects of the problem with which I am not independently familiar. So I would think it unwise to present here just one aspect of the problem before the matter has been considered by the President.

NATO Council Meeting

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect to accomplish at the NATO meeting which you will attend beginning, I think, on Monday?

A. These spring meetings of the NATO Council attended by the foreign ministers are usually meetings which are designed primarily to have an exchange of views about the general international situation, particularly relations between East and West as it affects the NATO area. They do not generally deal with specific problems or reach specific decisions. But by bringing about an exchange of views and a common understand-

¹⁰ James R. Killian, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

ing of the basic elements of the problem, it makes it more likely that the actions of the particular countries will be in harmony with each other. That is the main purpose that will be served here.

Now it may be that because of the pendency of the question of whether or not to have a summit conference and the nature of the talks going on at Moscow and the studies being conducted under the auspices of NATO, as against the possibility that there may be a summit conference, it may be that that will come up for particular consideration at this time. But basically it is to have an exchange of views between the different foreign ministers to be sure that we see the general situation alike or, if initially we don't see it alike, to try and iron out our differences so that the action which we take will be taken from a common premise.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said, in answer to an earlier question, that you would not attach any credence to speculation that we would not look with disfavor on the formation of an Algerian government-in-exile. Does that mean, sir, that we would be opposed to such, to the formation of such a government, or that we just believe it's none of our business at this stage?

A. This meeting, as I recall—wasn't that the Tangier meeting to which the question was asked?

Q. Yes.

A. That was a meeting of parties and not of governments, and we have not given any particular consideration to the conclusions that were arrived at.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we received any responses from the nations which we invited to send scientists to the Pacific tests, and, if not, what kind of response do we expect to receive from the Soviet-bloc nations?

A. We have not received any responses from any of the nations involved. As I understand it, we communicated our invitation to the Secretary-General, who in turn transmitted it to the nations that were members of this scientific body. None

of them have a response as yet. I recall, I think, that there were some remarks made in Moscow which indicated that there was doubt as to Soviet acceptance of the invitation. But I know no more about that than you do who have read those press reports.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of the importance that you have attached to making a first step on inspection of the Arctic, would it be an undue risk in your judgment to offer a temporary suspension of SAC bomber flights into the Arctic, pending negotiations on this question?

A. I would not want to answer that here because I would be encroaching into a field which is primarily that of the military and where I do not know what the reasons are or whether they would think that it was undue risk or not. I just think that is out of my proper area.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Secretary of the Interior presented to the Senate the other day a plan for stabilization of minerals in this country, which has been received with some encouragement in countries which produce similar minerals, but they are not sure that it means that we are to embark on a no-tariff policy. Could you explain something of that plan to us, please?

A. I think that the purpose was pretty adequately explained by Secretary Seaton when he made his statement to the congressional committee that he was before. I think he indicated there that it was our hope and expectation that such a program would avoid any new tariffs or quotas upon the minerals in question and that, indeed, the plan for subsidy was an alternative to that and there would not be both of them.

There is some duty, I think, on copper, which is more or less automatic, which comes back on the 30th of June. I don't really know just what the position on that is. But I think that, as far as any new duties are concerned or new quotas, this plan is intended to be an alternative and that both reliefs would not be available.

Q. Thank you, sir.

President Urges U.S.S.R. To Support U.S. Proposal for an International Inspection System in Arctic

Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

White House press release dated April 28

APRIL 28, 1958

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your communication of April twenty-second in reply to mine of April eighth.¹ I regret that it is not an affirmative response to my proposal.

You refer in your letter to the question raised recently by the Soviet Union in the United Nations Security Council which also touches upon the disarmament question.² I am sure that you would agree that with the growing capabilities in the Soviet Union and the United States of massive surprise attack it is necessary to establish measures to allay fears. The United States has just asked the Security Council to reconvene in order to consider the establishment of an international inspection system for the Arctic zone.³ The United States has submitted a constructive proposal to this end. I urge you to join with us in supporting the resolution of the United States now before the Council. Your support of this proposal and subsequent cooperation would help to achieve a significant first step. It would help to reduce tensions, it would contribute to an increase of confidence among states, and help to reduce the mutual fears of surprise attack.

The United States is determined that we will ultimately reach an agreement on disarmament.

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1958, p. 679.

² *Ibid.*, May 12, 1958, p. 760.

³ See p. 816.

In my letter of April eighth, I again proposed an internationally supervised cutoff of the use of new fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the reduction of existing weapons stocks by transfer to peaceful purposes; an agreed limitation or suspension of testing; "open skies", and the international use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

As an effective means of moving toward ultimate agreement on these matters and other disarmament matters, I proposed that we start our technical people to work immediately upon the practical problems involved. These studies were called for by the United Nations General Assembly. They would include the practical problems of supervision and control which, you and I agree, are in any event indispensable to dependable disarmament agreements.

The solution of these practical problems will take time. I am unhappy that valuable time is now being wasted.

You say that we must first reach a final political agreement before it is worthwhile even to initiate the technical studies. But such studies would, in fact, facilitate the reaching of the final agreement you state you desire.

For example, why could not designated technical people agree on what would be required so that you would know if we violated an agreement to suspend testing and we would know if you should commit a violation?

Would not both sides be in a better position to reach agreements if we had a common accepted understanding as to feasibility of detection or as to method of inspecting against surprise attack?

Studies of this kind are the necessary preliminaries to putting political decisions actually into effect. The completion of such technical studies in advance of a political agreement would obviate a considerable period of delay and uncertainty. In other words, with the practicalities already

worked out, the political agreement could begin to operate very shortly after it was signed and ratified.

I re-emphasize that these studies are without prejudice to our respective positions on the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, my offer to you still and always will remain open. I hope you will reconsider and accept it. In that way we both can make an important contribution to the cause of just and lasting peace.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of April 8, containing a reply to my message to you in which, on behalf of the Soviet Government, I called upon the Government of the United States of America to join in the decision of the Soviet Union to terminate the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Why did the Soviet Union make this decision?

First, because we deem it necessary to terminate at long last a situation where as a result of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests the health and life of human beings are subjected to a constant and ever-increasing danger even in peacetime.

Secondly, for the purpose of putting an end to the production of ever more terrible means of destruction, since the production of new and even more destructive types of weapons in itself increases the threat of atomic war.

Thirdly, because we regard a cessation of the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons by states as the first practical step which is not only fully practicable at the present time but would also make it possible to break the deadlock in which the problem of disarmament now finds itself.

More than enough has already been said concerning the desirability of disarmament. Concrete deeds are what is needed now. A cessation of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons by all states possessing such weapons would be such a concrete deed. Such a measure would be appropriate for the beginning. If only for the reason that its execution would not prejudice the defense interests of any of the powers possessing nuclear weapons—the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, or the United Kingdom—and would, on the contrary, greatly strengthen the feeling of security of all nations.

Finally, it is our deep conviction that the realization of such a step would mark the beginning of a real change in all international relations, a change in their development in the direction of creating a feeling of trust among nations, which is so necessary for the solution of other international problems and for strengthening peace.

The initiative of the Soviet Union has created a situation where the solution of the question concerning a cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests depends entirely on the governments of two powers, of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom, since, aside from the Soviet Union, only these powers possess such weapons at the present time. It is for this very reason that we address you and Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, with an appeal to support this initiative of the Soviet Union and also to terminate nuclear weapons tests.

Your negative reply to my message has caused profound disappointment among us. I shall not speak of the tone of the message or of the inclusion in it of a number of assertions in which the position of the U.S.S.R. on the problem of disarmament is knowingly distorted.

The main point is that in your reply we have found no statement concerning the willingness of the United States of America to follow the example of the Soviet Union and to terminate, in its turn, the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons.

Moreover, in your message an attempt is made to cast doubt on the sincerity of the step taken by the Soviet Union. To be frank, I became perplexed when I learned that in a statement at your press conference of April 2 you evaluated the decision of the supreme organ of the Soviet state as a "propaganda gesture." How can an act aimed at erecting the first barrier against the nuclear armaments race and at protecting the life and health of mankind from the danger of atomic radiation be called propaganda?

In your message you deemed it necessary to state that the Soviet Union had adopted this decision after having conducted tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons. But is it not a fact that the United States of America has conducted a considerably greater number of tests of nuclear weapons than has the Soviet Union? Did not the United States of America have the opportunity after any of these tests to display initiative in the matter of terminating further tests? I can assure you, Mr. President, that if the United States had been the first to take such a step, we would have welcomed it sincerely.

It is well known that negotiations among states on the question of terminating nuclear weapons tests have not yet resulted in any agreement. But does this mean that we must resign ourselves to the present situation and undertake no steps to achieve a solution of this problem? Of course not. Peoples demand of us practical steps, and it is the duty of statesmen to do everything in their power to bring about a realization of the aspirations of peoples.

In such an important matter as the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests someone had to take the first step. We have taken that step, and we are waiting for the Government of the United States of America to follow our example. If we proceed on the principle of strengthening peace and preventing the threat of nuclear war, it should be stated directly that there are no reasons which would prevent the Government of the United States of America from taking such a step.

Indeed, can a cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests by the United States, following a similar

step by the Soviet Union, really prejudice in any way the interests of security or the prestige of the United States? Unquestionably, it cannot. If the point is that the United States needs tests to perfect atomic and hydrogen weapons, then, since the United States has already conducted a considerably greater number of these tests than has the Soviet Union, it follows that in this respect also the United States would lose nothing at all by terminating the testing of nuclear and hydrogen weapons in a situation where the Soviet Union has already ceased such tests.

With the testing of atomic weapons terminated, all parties would find themselves in an equal position, from the standpoint of their security interests. One could object to terminating nuclear weapons tests in the event, for instance, that one of the parties would like to obtain military or strategic advantages over the other party. However, I believe that you, Mr. President, agree that none of the parties should strive toward such an objective.

As to the matter of prestige, I believe that you will agree with me that a power acting in the interest of strengthening peace will never impair its prestige. On the contrary, peoples will only be grateful to any state if it undertakes actions directed toward strengthening peace. It is never too late for good deeds.

In your reply you speak of the possibility of conducting certain types of tests in secrecy, thereby giving us to understand that it will be impossible to verify the suspension of tests and that deception is possible here. We cannot agree with this appraisal, for in reality the situation is quite different. It is a known fact that at the present time there do exist such apparatus, such instruments, and such methods of detection as to make it possible to record any explosions of atomic and hydrogen weapons, wherever they may be detonated. You have even spoken of this yourself. Thus, no state can violate its commitment to cease testing atomic and hydrogen weapons without other states becoming apprised of this violation.

It should be added to the foregoing that the Soviet Government not only does not object to the establishment of a system of control over the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests but has even introduced its own specific proposals in this regard. Unfortunately, the Western Powers have not accepted the proposal of the Soviet Union, and it has not yet been possible to reach an agreement on the matter of control over the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

There is no need for me to put particular emphasis here on the enormous moral and political responsibility which would be assumed by states declaring a cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Is it conceivable that in time some state might violate the obligations assumed, knowing beforehand that it would thus expose itself in the eyes of nations?

You also say that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests must be part of a broad agreement on disarmament. It is entirely impossible to agree with this statement, considering the many years of experience of essentially fruitless negotiations on problems of disarmament. Authoritative scientists are already giving

warnings concerning the dangerous consequences of radioactive fallout for the health of people throughout the entire globe.

What then, Mr. President, awaits us in the future, if along with conversations about disarmament the testing of ever more powerful means of destruction continues? Is it not obvious that the baneful character of radioactive particles which fall out in nuclear weapons tests will not be diminished at all by the fact that the conducting of these or other tests will be announced in advance and that representatives of various countries will be present at these tests?

Only one thing can put an end to the increasing threat to the health of human beings, and that is the cessation of tests of any kind of atomic and hydrogen weapons. Such a decision by three powers in possession of these weapons would be, at the same time, a great practical contribution to the cause of lessening international tension and strengthening trust and confidence in relations between states. There is no doubt that if the U.S.A. and Great Britain would follow the example of the Soviet Union and cease testing atomic and hydrogen weapons, this would also undoubtedly contribute to the settlement of other unsolved international problems, including that of disarmament.

These are my observations on the matter of ceasing the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

In your message, Mr. President, you recall, as if to counterbalance the proposal of the U.S.S.R. to cease testing atomic and hydrogen weapons, your previous proposals regarding "open skies," the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes.

In this connection I should like to state that the position of the Soviet Union on all these questions is well known.

We have already stated repeatedly, and we do so again, that the flights of aircraft of one country over the territory of another, provided for by the "open sky" plan, would contribute nothing to the solution of the problem of disarmament.

The peoples of our countries will hardly feel more secure or acquire peace and tranquillity from the fact that American aircraft will be flying over our country from one end to the other and that Soviet aircraft will be plowing through American skies under circumstances where attitudes of tension and mistrust prevail. Is it not more correct to assume the opposite?

Under conditions where all our proposals to prohibit atomic and hydrogen weapons or at least to renounce their use are categorically rejected, where preparation is being made for atomic warfare, as is proven by decisions of the December session of NATO and by the continuing, intensive construction of newer and newer military bases which, according to the candid admission of certain political and military figures of the U.S.A. and other countries belonging to NATO, are designed for inflicting an "atomic blow" against the Soviet Union—under these conditions aerial photography might increase international tension and suspicion among nations. This would not only fail to contribute to the liquidation of the "cold war" and

the establishment of friendly relations among states but would play into the hands of forces which are attempting to find a pretext to engulf humanity in a destructive atomic war.

In this connection I should like to state that the Soviet Union could not fail to note the report that the military command of the U.S.A. has already repeatedly sent aircraft of the Strategic Air Command with a hydrogen bomb load in the direction of the U.S.S.R. According to these reports, the orders for the flight of the aircraft were issued in connection with reports from American radar stations to the effect that Soviet guided missiles were allegedly approaching the territory of the U.S.A. Of course, no Soviet missiles have threatened or do threaten the U.S.A., and the American radar stations' signals were in error, as was to be expected.

There is no special need for me to speak of what a serious danger to the cause of peace is represented by such flights of American aircraft with a hydrogen bomb load toward the borders of the Soviet Union. Is it not clear that in such a situation a simple error in transmitting signals may cause a world catastrophe?

Imagine for a minute, Mr. President, what would happen if the Soviet command, acting in a manner similar to that in which the American military command is now acting, should send aircraft with an atomic and hydrogen bomb load in the direction of the U.S.A., citing the fact that radar stations are sending signals of the approach of American military aircraft, or if the Soviet military command, in reply to the provocative flights of American aircraft, should in its turn decide to send Soviet military aircraft with a hydrogen bomb load in the direction of the United States of America. And yet such flights of Soviet aircraft under these conditions would be absolutely justified.

It suffices to present the problem in this manner to make it clear how dangerous such actions of the American command are. You may say that I am too sharp in my description when I speak of these irresponsible and provocative actions of the American military command. However, I speak of this in this way only because I am compelled to do so by my alarm when I think that, in the atmosphere of the military psychosis which is so characteristic of certain circles in your country, a world tragedy, with millions and millions of human victims, could develop, unexpectedly by any of us.

We expect from the Government of the United States that it will put an immediate end to this dangerous playing with fire.

Furthermore, I should like to touch upon the matter of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

In the course of the exchange of views in connection with the preparations for convening a summit conference, you proposed that the question of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes be discussed at that meeting. We seriously considered this proposal of yours, and we stated that we were prepared to consider at a summit meeting the question of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes and the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories. In this connection we proceed from the premise

that any solution of this problem must take into account the security of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and other countries. The proposal of the Soviet government for the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes, the liquidation of bases in foreign territories, and international cooperation in the field of the study of outer space meets this objective. We are prepared to conclude an agreement which would provide for the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes and would permit the launching of rockets into outer space only in accordance with an agreed international program of scientific research. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that atomic and hydrogen weapons can be delivered to the target not only by means of intercontinental rockets but also by means of intermediate and short-range rockets, as well as by means of conventional bombers stationed at the numerous American military bases located in areas adjacent to the Soviet Union.

Your proposal for the use of outer space for peaceful purposes provides, in fact, for the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles alone, leaving aside the other important aspects of this problem. It is easy to see that you propose such a solution of the question as would correspond to the interests of the security of the United States alone, but would not provide any measures that would remove the threat to the security of the Soviet Union or to that of many other states created by the existence of numerous American military bases in foreign territories. The essence of your proposal is to prevent, through the prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles, a nuclear counterblow through outer space from being delivered against yourselves. Of course, it is impossible to agree to such an inequitable solution, which would put one side in a privileged position with regard to the other. Therefore we stated that an agreement on the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes must also provide for the liquidation of military bases located in foreign territories, and primarily in Europe, in the Near and Middle East, and in North Africa.

Such a solution of the problem, in our opinion, is equitable because it fully meets the interests of security of the United States, of the Soviet Union, and of other countries, and offers no advantage to any of them. As for the states on the territories of which American military bases are located, it may be said with assurance that they would only profit from such a solution of the problem, in as much as a liquidation of bases would fully meet the interests of the national security of these states by averting the deadly peril which could threaten their populations in case of war.

In your message, Mr. President, you pass over our proposal in complete silence and state that you await the acceptance of your proposal by the Soviet Government. An impression is created that it is desired to impose upon us a solution of the problem of the use of outer space such as would correspond to the interests of the United States alone and would completely ignore the interests of the Soviet Union. Such a one-sided approach is absolutely inadmissible in negotiations between

independent states and, of course, cannot lead to the achievement of an agreement.

In your letter, Mr. President, in touching upon the question of the peaceful use of atomic energy, you attempt to present the matter in such a way as to create the impression that the United States of America is the champion of the peaceful use of atomic energy. However, the actual facts do not bear this out. Indeed, on the basis of facts, one cannot fail to recognize that the Soviet Union is a resolute advocate of the idea that atomic energy must not serve the purpose of exterminating human beings but should rather be fully directed toward serving the peaceful needs of humanity. Since the early days of this problem the Soviet Government has consistently striven in the United Nations for a prohibition of the use of all kinds of atomic and hydrogen weapons, for the elimination of these arms from the armaments of states, for the destruction of the stockpiles thereof, and for the discontinuance of the manufacture of such weapons and the establishment of international control over the execution of these measures.

What has prevented the acceptance of this proposal, the aim of which was to lay a foundation for the use of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes? As is well known, the United States, together with its Western allies, also since the early days of this problem, has objected to these proposals and has prevented their acceptance, continuing to build its foreign policy on the use of nuclear arms. Thus, a deep abyss has appeared between the words of the United States about its desire to direct its atomic energy toward peaceful purposes, and its deeds.

It is understandable that the Soviet Union, which considers it its sacred duty to rescue mankind from the threat of a destructive atomic war, could not and cannot agree to such proposals, which would lead away from the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons and would play into the hands of those forces which strive to have the threat of atomic war constantly hang over mankind like the sword of Damocles.

Unfortunately, your letter of April 8 also contains no proposals directed toward the solution of the problem of disarmament and removal of the threat of nuclear war. Instead of that you proposed that we engage in a study of the question concerning the necessary measures of control by appointing appropriate experts for this purpose. But is it possible for technical experts to contribute anything to the solution of the problem of disarmament if no agreement between Governments has been reached on this point? During the thirteen years of negotiations on disarmament hundreds of speeches were delivered and mountains of paper were written on the subject of control, but this did not bring us one step closer to the solution of the problem of disarmament. It is impossible to permit the solution of

the problem of disarmament itself to be endlessly delayed under the pretext of studying the problems of control.

The Soviet Union has not only never objected to control but also repeatedly introduced proposals itself concerning the establishment of a reliable system of control over the execution of specific measures for disarmament. However, the refusal of the Western Powers to take any practical disarmament steps made the problem of control aimless, because it is of course, impossible to control the execution by states of commitments which do not exist.

The present international situation demands of all states—and, above all, of the great powers, which bear the main responsibility for the destinies of the world—not general phrases about the desirability of disarmament but concrete action in this field.

The Soviet Union has made its contribution to the cause of lessening international tension, to the cause of peace. From now on not a single atomic bomb nor a single hydrogen bomb will be exploded by the Soviet Union unless the United States and United Kingdom compel us to do so. We address the Governments of the United States and Great Britain with the appeal: do not commence a chain reaction of experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs.

The solution of the problem of whether an end will be put to nuclear tests forever or whether these tests will continue poisoning the air and increasing the threat of the outbreak of a destructive atomic war now depends on two powers only, the United States of America and Great Britain, and the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom bear a great responsibility before the entire world.

Perhaps, Mr. President, you do not share all the considerations presented by me, but I should still like to express a desire: would it not be possible to put an end to polemics on this subject, close the book on the past, and agree that the United States of America and Great Britain will discontinue atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, just as the Soviet Union has done?

I assure you that humanity would breathe a deep sigh of relief if all three powers which manufacture atomic and hydrogen weapons would stop the tests of such weapons.

It is our profound hope, Mr. President, that you will use all your authority and influence for these noble aims.

With sincere respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

THE KREMLIN, MOSCOW, April 22, 1958

[Initialed:] MM

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

U.S. Recommends Arctic Zone of Inspection Against Surprise Attack; U.S.S.R. Casts 83d Veto

The U.N. Security Council met on April 29 and May 2 to consider a draft resolution submitted by the United States recommending establishment of a "zone of international inspection against surprise attack, comprising the area north of the Arctic Circle . . ." and a draft resolution submitted by the U.S.S.R. calling upon the United States "to refrain from sending its military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs towards the frontiers of other States for the purpose of creating a threat to their security or staging military demonstrations." Following are the texts of three statements made at these sessions by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge.

OPENING STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE, APRIL 29

U.S./U.N. press release 2918 dated April 29

I begin my presentation to the Security Council this morning by referring to the letter which President Eisenhower sent to Chairman Khrushchev yesterday.¹ In that letter he stated:

The United States has just asked the Security Council to reconvene in order to consider the establishment of an international inspection system for the Arctic zone. The United States has submitted a constructive proposal to this end. I urge you to join with us in supporting the resolution of the United States now before the Council. Your support of this proposal and subsequent cooperation would help to achieve a significant first step. It would help to reduce tensions, it would contribute to an increase of confidence among states, and help to reduce the mutual fears of surprise attack.

The United States has asked the Security Council to meet today to take a step which we believe can, in all truth, swiftly and significantly lessen the danger to world peace.

Last week the Security Council met to consider the complaint of the Soviet Union that flights by the United States military aircraft made in the direction of the Soviet frontiers constituted a threat to the security of nations.² We believe the Council's discussions were useful in that they

demonstrated beyond question that the Soviet charges were groundless. We showed that the activities of United States military aircraft represent purely defensive measures which are altogether reasonable and necessary in view of the conditions with which they must cope.

Our flights are a necessary defensive measure against massive surprise attack, and it follows therefore that, if the danger of such attack were removed, the need for this defense would be correspondingly lessened. The United States and many other independent nations have been concerned for a long time about the possibility of such an attack. We must continue to be concerned until a workable solution is found. Despite the strictures made against the United States by the Soviet Union last week, Soviet emphasis upon this problem leads us to hope that the Soviet Union may this week be prepared constructively to join hands with the rest of us.

The awesome destructive power of modern armaments makes it at least theoretically possible to wipe out the military capacity of a state—even one of the greatest powers—in a single attack. But such an attack must come without warning if it is to succeed. If there is a way to guard against such massive surprise attack or to allay fear of such an attack—and the United States believes that there is—we here must leave no stone unturned in our effort to find it. In re-

¹ See p. 811.

² BULLETIN of May 12, 1958, p. 760

convening the Security Council today on the item submitted by the Soviet Union, the United States hopes to find such a way.

Finding means to guard against surprise attack can have an important bearing on the prospect for future progress on the lowering of tensions and the continued maintenance of international peace. If each country knew for certain that there was no possibility of a surprise attack being launched against it, the fear of war would decrease and we could move forward toward important disarmament measures. The time is long overdue for such a beginning.

The United States believes that, given good faith and willingness to engage in purposeful negotiations, the time has come to agree to international inspection to remove the fear of surprise attack in the vital Arctic region. Assuming that the Soviet Union meant what it said last week concerning its fears of surprise attack and knowing that other countries do truly fear the prospect of such an attack, we must try to eliminate this danger. We seek a measure which would give us a start toward making great surprise attack virtually impossible, which consequently would reduce the scale of military activity and which could ease the way to significant arms reduction. We propose going ahead with this proposal for an inspection zone in the Arctic without awaiting agreement on disarmament as a whole. This is entirely consistent with the original "open skies" proposal made by President Eisenhower in Geneva in 1955, which we have always been ready to accept as an independent measure. Our present proposal in no way diminishes our belief that discussions should be renewed urgently on the general question of disarmament.

During the Council's discussion last week, various representatives referred to the need to deal with the problem of surprise attack. The Canadian representative reaffirmed his Government's willingness to cooperate in measures of inspection and control involving Canadian territory. He emphasized that it was open to the Soviet Union "to bring about an improvement in the international situation . . . by concerning itself with cooperation in the Arctic region on a system of control and inspection." The representative of Japan urged the states concerned to make a serious effort to resume disarmament negotiations, along with "ways and means to prevent surprise attack."

In a statement of the Soviet Foreign Minister, which was circulated as document S/3991 at the request of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Gromyko made reference to the possibility of a flight of United States aircraft approaching the frontiers of the Soviet Union, in which case, Mr. Gromyko says, "the need to ensure the safety of the Soviet people would require the U.S.S.R. to take immediate measures to remove the approaching threat." Now, although we have made it wholly clear that the United States will not attack any country, yet, if Mr. Gromyko's statement represents a sincere concern—no matter how groundless—surely the Soviet Union will agree that the establishment of an acceptable system of inspection would be desirable. Let us attack the cause of the Soviet concerns, not their symptoms. Surely this is what Soviet Premier Khrushchev had in mind when he said last November: "Our belief and our position is today that conditions should be created that would preclude the possibility of a surprise attack by some countries against others." The United States believes that what is now needed is the will to take constructive action.

Geography makes it apparent that inspection in the Arctic area can be at least the first line of approach to the problem of surprise attack. We are loath to believe that the Soviet Government really wants to deny to its people the kind of safeguards which would make surprise attack virtually impossible. We trust that Mr. Sobolev favored providing such safeguards when he referred to the Soviet Union's wish "to promote an improvement in the international situation and to establish the necessary trust among States" and when he stated that the Council should take "steps designed to reduce the threat of war."

Background of U.S. Proposals

Now, gentlemen, let me review briefly some of the background of the proposals we are making today.

In July 1955, at the Geneva summit meeting, President Eisenhower introduced a proposal which called for "open skies" inspection over the United States and the U.S.S.R. and a mutual exchange of blueprints between the two countries.³ At that time he said:

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting and, when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.

This he envisaged as a practical step which would reduce the danger of surprise attack, reduce tension, and thus create an atmosphere which could lead to further progress. Also at the Geneva conference, former Soviet Premier Bulganin reaffirmed an earlier Soviet proposal for a system of ground control posts. We recognized this as a sound measure at the time, and President Eisenhower, on October 11, 1955, wrote to Mr. Bulganin:⁴

I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with stationing inspection teams at key points in our countries, and if you feel this would help to create the better spirit I refer to, we could accept that too.

Since the President's Geneva proposal, the United States, along with other countries, has continued to emphasize the importance of aerial and ground inspection.

In Secretary Dulles' words of May 29, 1957,⁵ we were "trying to get something started quickly; and as far as we are concerned, we will take any area which is sufficiently free of political complications so that the whole process does not get bogged down." To this end the United States suggested that we make a beginning in the Arctic region, where Soviet and American territory significantly adjoins.

No action was taken at that time. Then came the Soviet agenda item of last week. Clearly it gave new significance to this earlier Arctic zone proposal. After careful consideration we concluded that this proposal was applicable to present circumstances.

Let me make clear that this United States proposal is made entirely apart from the general topic of disarmament. The United States is not now attempting to bring the subject of disarmament before the Security Council. There is before the Security Council an alleged "threat to the peace." We want to dispel any possibility of fear that the peace will be disturbed even accidentally.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 643.

⁵ For the transcript of Secretary Dulles' news conference of May 29, 1957, see *ibid.*, June 17, 1957, p. 961.

The United States has never considered that inspection against surprise attack was in itself "disarmament." The President put forward his "open skies" proposal as a prelude to disarmament, as something that might make disarmament easier. But it was never a part of disarmament, and we do not now put forward this proposal as an entering wedge to bring the disarmament proposal before the Security Council, although we do recognize that, under article 26 of the charter, the Security Council does have responsibility for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. However, that is not now being brought before the Council.

Provisions of U.S. Resolution

Now let me talk about the provisions of the resolution which the United States has introduced.

It looks toward an agreement establishing mutually acceptable safeguards against surprise attack in an important area.

It recommends prompt establishment of a northern zone of inspection against surprise attack.

It calls upon five countries, which engaged in lengthy negotiations on this problem last year, together with Denmark and Norway, both of whom have also concurred concerning their territories, to designate representatives to participate in immediate discussions "with a view to agreeing on the technical arrangements required." This proposal would also apply to any other states having territory north of the Arctic Circle which desire to have such territory included in the inspection zone.

The zone open to inspection would include all territory north of the Arctic Circle of the Soviet Union, Canada, the United States (that is, Alaska), Denmark (that is, Greenland), and Norway; all the territory of Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union west of 140 degrees west longitude, east of 160 degrees east longitude, and north of 50 degrees north latitude; all the remainder of the Kamchatka Peninsula; and all of the Aleutian and Kurile Islands. This proposed inspection zone encompasses a principal area over which the bulk of any attack might pass. We believe that this vital region should be brought under international inspection.

The United States is openminded about the technical arrangements for such an international

inspection system. This is a matter to be worked out during the course of discussions among the participating states. That is why we have proposed that technical discussions on this matter begin as soon as possible.

Let me emphasize several important considerations regarding an inspection system in the Arctic zone: It should be an agreed international system and not just a national system; any such system should include some means of advance notification of flights and any other movements of military significance in the Arctic zone; there should be radar monitoring of all such flights; and the concept of ground inspection posts, as suggested by the Soviet Union, should be included.

In order to make possible the inclusion of several additional segments of territory within the Arctic Circle which are not specifically covered, we have provided in this resolution for the participation in our discussions of such other states as have territory within this area and desire its inclusion in the zone of inspection.

The resolution makes clear that the states concerned must work out the actual inspection system, which means that the final product must be satisfactory to all of them. And this provision protects us all.

The United States believes that mutually acceptable arrangements along these or similar lines can be devised, that our proposal is serious, and that it affords a reasonable basis for a discussion which can lead to an agreement.

If we can proceed gradually and first experiment with limited measures of aerial and ground inspection, it should facilitate the subsequent expansion of inspection. Once this limited inspection system has proved its value and begun to rebuild mutual confidence, any suspicions that ulterior motives underlie proposals for aerial-inspection arrangements should be removed, once and for all.

We urge all members of the Council—and all countries concerned—to join in making this beginning. Let us at least lessen our worry—our mutual worry—over surprise attack. Let us create by our action in this Council today that mutual confidence so essential to progress toward peace. Let us begin the long-sought, long-awaited, and long-hoped-for step which will lead us and other nations of the world to the just and durable peace all mankind seeks.

Gentlemen, this session of this Security Council here in New York today could mark the turn in the road for which humanity has been looking. Let us reassure the world by reaching agreement on this important matter. Let us rise to the occasion.

STATEMENT ON SWEDISH AMENDMENT, MAY 2

U.S./U.N. press release 2922 dated May 2

The United States accepts the amendment submitted by the representative of Sweden.⁵ In doing so, I would like to suggest a change to the representative of Sweden. I hope that he would agree that the word "the" before the word "submit" could be changed to the word "a." The paragraph would then read:

Expresses the view that such discussions might serve as a useful basis for the deliberations on the disarmament problem at a summit conference on the convening of which talks are in progress.

REBUTTAL STATEMENT, MAY 2

U.S./U.N. press release 2924 dated May 2

The Soviet representative has characterized the United States proposal as merely an intelligence-collection scheme. Obviously, this proposal would, if put into effect, collect new information. But what is of utmost importance is that such information would be collected under international auspices as part of an internationally approved system, to which the states concerned would all have to agree. It is precisely this lack of openness and information about intentions and military capabilities that creates the present tensions and fears. As long as we try to keep this secrecy and maintain this secrecy, the present situation will not improve.

The Soviet representative has dwelt on the danger of an accidental outbreak of war and has suggested that this could only occur as a result of an American error. But it is common knowledge, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union has also a long-range air force and it also has nuclear weapons. If the Soviet leaders are, in fact, ap-

⁵ U.N. doc. S/3908 dated Apr. 29.

Draft Resolution on Arctic Inspection Zone¹

The Security Council, Considering further the Item of the U.S.S.R. of 18 April 1958,

Noting the development, particularly in the Soviet Union and the United States of America, of growing capabilities of massive surprise attack,

Believing that the establishment of measures to allay fears of such massive surprise attack would help reduce tensions and would contribute to the increase of confidence among States,

Noting the statements of certain members of the Council regarding the particular significance of the Arctic area,

Recommends that there be promptly established the Northern zone of international inspection against surprise attack, comprising the area north of the Arctic Circle with certain exceptions and additions, that was considered by the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee of Canada, France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States during August 1957;

Calls upon the five States mentioned, together with Denmark and Norway, and any other States having territory north of the Arctic Circle which desire to have such territory included in the zone of international inspection, at once to designate representatives to participate in immediate discussions with a view to agreeing on the technical arrangements required;

Expresses the view that such discussions might serve as a useful basis for the deliberations on the disarmament problem at a summit conference on the convening of which talks are in progress;

Decides to keep this matter on its agenda for such further consideration as may be required.

¹ U.N. doc. S/3995 as amended; 10 members of the Security Council voted in favor of the resolution, but it was defeated by a Soviet veto.

prehensive about an accidental outbreak of war, it is difficult to understand their objection to an arrangement which would so manifestly reduce the likelihood of an outbreak of war. If we could, with the aid of the United Nations and the ingenuity of our scientists, erect a great wall of vigilance in the Arctic wastes, surely many of our apprehensions would be reduced.

Let me add one word of agreement with one of the comments of the Soviet representative. We have never claimed that the disarmament problem can be solved by vote. We agree that

negotiations are needed. We have submitted proposals on all aspects of disarmament. We are ready and anxious to begin discussions of this problem again, either in the United Nations Disarmament Commission or as part of the preparatory discussions looking toward a possible conference of heads of government. But here and now an important start could be made through the discussions which are called for in the pending resolution.

The question has been raised whether the area described in the resolution is subject to negotiation. I said in my statement last Tuesday that we believe our proposal affords a reasonable basis for a discussion which can lead to an agreement. Of course our Geneva "open skies" proposal also remains open. The Arctic is the area which we think should be covered now. As Secretary of State Dulles commented yesterday,⁷ we thought of this area as a useful beginning place because it is an area of strategic importance and because it is relatively free from the political complications that exist elsewhere. For these reasons we think this is the area on which to concentrate.

But, Mr. President, I stress this: We are not inflexible. This is shown by the fact that our proposal makes possible the inclusion of other areas within the Arctic, such as those of Sweden and Finland. The point is that, since Soviet concern related specifically to the Arctic region, this seemed to be the logical place to start. But obviously there are more ways than one in which to work this out.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to repeat the thought which I submitted at an earlier meeting of the Council: that an inspection system which would give reassurance about surprise attack might make our flights unnecessary. Secretary Dulles said yesterday that such an inspection system "would, in fact, lead to a considerable modification of our practices."⁸

I say to Mr. Sobolev, if, therefore, you really mean what you say about your objection to American flights, your course is perfectly clear: you have but to vote for the United States resolution.⁹

⁷ For the transcript of Secretary Dulles' news conference of May 1, 1958, see p. 804.

⁸ Following the Soviet veto of the U.S. draft resolution (S/3995 as amended), the Security Council rejected the Soviet draft resolution (S/3997) by a vote of 1 to 9, with 1 abstention (Sweden).

U.S. Replies to Polish Note on Rapacki Plan

U.S. NOTE OF MAY 3

Press release 242 dated May 4

United States Ambassador to Poland Jacob D. Beam delivered on May 3 the U.S. Government's reply to the Rapacki plan proposals elaborated in the memorandum attached to the Polish Government's note of February 14. Ambassador Beam handed the U.S. note to Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Winiewicz. The text of the U.S. reply is as follows:

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Rapacki's note of February 14, 1958, enclosing a memorandum elaborating on the Polish Government's proposals concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.

Recognizing that the initiative of the Polish Government stems from a desire to contribute to the attainment of a stable and durable peace, my Government has given these proposals serious and careful consideration. On the basis of this study it has concluded that they are too limited in scope to reduce the danger of nuclear war or provide a dependable basis for the security of Europe. They neither deal with the essential question of the continued production of nuclear weapons by the present nuclear powers nor take into account the fact that present scientific techniques are not adequate to detect existing nuclear weapons. The proposed plan does not affect the central sources of power capable of launching a nuclear attack, and thus its effectiveness would be dependent on the good intentions of countries outside the area. The proposals overlook the central problems of European security because they provide no method for balanced and equitable limitations of military capabilities and would perpetuate the basic cause of tension in Europe by accepting the continuation of the division of Germany.

An agreement limited to the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the territory indicated by your Government without other types of limitation would, even if it were capable of being inspected, endanger the security of the Western European countries in view of the large and widely deployed military forces of the Soviet Union. Unless equipped with nuclear weapons, Western

forces in Germany would find themselves under present circumstances at a great disadvantage to the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of Western Europe which are, as the Soviet leaders made clear, being equipped with the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds.

The considerations outlined above have caused the United States in association with other Western Powers to propose that nations stop producing material for nuclear weapons, cease testing such weapons and begin to reduce present stockpiles. The United States has further proposed broader areas of inspection against surprise attack, including an area in Europe, roughly from the United Kingdom to the Ural mountains. We remain willing to do this. You will recall, moreover, that the Western nations offered at the London disarmament negotiations to discuss a more limited zone in Europe. With regard to missiles you will recall that over a year and a half ago the United States proposed that we begin to study the inspection and control needed to assure the exclusive peaceful use of outer space now threatened by the development of such devices as intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

The United States, in association with other Western Powers, has also proposed that a comprehensive and effective European security arrangement be established in conjunction with the reunification of Germany. The proposed arrangements would provide for limitations on both forces and armaments, measures for the prevention of surprise attack in the area, and assurances of reaction in the event of aggression.

Your note speaks of the existence of opposing military groupings in Central Europe as being responsible for tensions in the area. It should not be necessary for me to recall that the present division of Europe stems primarily from the decision of the Soviet Union not to permit Eastern European nations to participate in the European Recovery Plan. Nor need I repeat the many assurances given as to the defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is reflected in its entire organizational and command structure. The entire history of its creation and development testify to this, though persistent efforts are made in some quarters to portray it otherwise.

In the absence of effective arrangements either general or regional in character which would promote real security and in view of the present policies and armaments of the Soviet Union, the countries of Western Europe along with Canada and ourselves, joined in alliance with them, have no other recourse than to develop the required pattern of integrated NATO military strength and to utilize for defensive purposes modern developments in weapons and techniques.

The views which I have presented above on behalf of my Government point out the basic reasons why the United States considers that the Polish Government's proposals for establishing a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would not serve to advance their expressed objectives. Nevertheless, the United States appreciates the initiative of the Polish Government in seeking a solution to these problems. It hopes that this exchange of correspondence will enable the Polish Government better to understand American proposals in the fields of European security and disarmament. I trust that the improved relations between Poland and the United States will serve as a basis for a better understanding between our two countries on these problems, as well as on other matters.

POLISH NOTE OF FEBRUARY 14¹

I wish to refer to the conversation which I had on December 9, 1957, with the Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the United States in Warsaw. In this conversation I have presented the position of the Polish Government in respect to the tendencies to make the nuclear armaments in Europe universal and particularly towards the acceleration of armaments in Western Germany. The threat of further complications, primarily in Central Europe, where the opposing military groupings come into a direct contact and the apparent danger of an increase in the international tension have prompted the Polish Government to initiate at that time direct discussions through diplomatic channels on the Polish proposal submitted to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957, concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.

This proposal has evoked a wide interest in government and political circles as well as in the broad strata of public opinion in many countries.

Taking into account a number of opinions expressed in declarations made in connection with the Polish pro-

¹ Handed to Ambassador Beam at Warsaw on Feb. 14 by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki.

posal and with the view to facilitate negotiations, the Polish Government has resolved to present a more detailed elaboration of its proposal. This finds its expression in the attached memorandum which is simultaneously being transmitted by the Polish Government to the governments of France, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as well as to the governments of other interested countries.

The Polish Government is conscious of the fact that the solution of the problem of disarmament on a world-wide scale requires, first of all, negotiations among the great powers and other countries concerned. Therefore, the Polish Government supports the proposal of the U.S.S.R. government concerning a meeting on the highest level of leading statesmen with the participation of heads of governments. Such a meeting could also result in reaching an agreement on the question of the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, should an agreement among the countries concerned not be reached in the meantime. In any event the initiation at present of discussions on the question of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would contribute to a successful course of the above mentioned meeting.

The Polish Government expresses the hope that the Government of the United States will study the attached memorandum and that the proposals contained in it will meet with the understanding of the Government of the United States. The Polish Government on its part would be prepared to continue the exchange of views on this problem with the Government of the United States.

MEMORANDUM

On October 2, 1957, the Government of the Polish People's Republic presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations a proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. The governments of Czechoslovakia and of the German Democratic Republic declared their readiness to accede to that zone.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic proceeded with the conviction that the establishment of the proposed denuclearized zone could lead to an improvement in the international atmosphere and facilitate broader discussions on disarmament as well as the solution of other controversial internal issues, while the continuation of nuclear armaments and making them universal could only lead to a further solidifying of the division of Europe into opposing blocks and to a further complication of this situation, especially in Central Europe.

In December 1957 the Government of the Polish People's Republic renewed its proposal through diplomatic channels.

Considering the wide repercussions which the Polish initiative has evoked and taking into account the propositions emerging from the discussion which has developed on this proposal, the Government of the Polish People's Republic hereby presents a more detailed elaboration of its proposal, which may facilitate the opening of negotiations and reaching of an agreement on this subject.

I. The proposed zones should include the territory of: Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and German Federal Republic. In this territory nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured nor stockpiled, the equipment and installations designed for their servicing would not be located there; the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited.

II. The contents of the obligations arising from the establishment of the denuclearized zone would be based upon the following premises:

1. The states included in this zone would undertake the obligation not to manufacture, maintain nor import for their own use and not to permit the location on their territories of nuclear weapons of any type, as well as not to install nor to admit to their territories of installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.

2. The four powers (France, United States, Great Britain, and U.S.S.R.) would undertake the following obligations:

(A) Not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of their forces stationed on the territories of states included in this zone; neither to maintain nor to install on the territories of these states any installations or equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment.

(B) Not to transfer in any manner and under any reason whatsoever, nuclear weapons nor installations and equipment designed for servicing nuclear weapons—to governments or other organs in this area.

3. The powers which have at their disposal nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to use these weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets situated in this zone.

Thus the powers would undertake the obligation to respect the status of the zone as an area in which there should be no nuclear weapons and against which nuclear weapons should not be used.

4. Other states, whose forces are stationed on the territory of any state included in the zone, would also undertake the obligation not to maintain nuclear weapons in the armaments of these forces and not to transfer such weapons to governments or to other organs in this area. Neither will they install equipment or installations designed for the servicing of nuclear weapons, including missiles' launching equipment, on the territories of states in the zone nor will they transfer them to governments or other organs in this area.

The manner and procedure for the implementation of these obligations could be the subject of detailed mutual stipulations.

III. In order to ensure the effectiveness and implementation of the obligations contained in Part II, paragraphs 1-2 and 4, the states concerned would undertake to create a system of broad and effective control in the area of the proposed zone and submit themselves to its functioning.

1. This system could comprise ground as well as aerial control. Adequate control posts, with rights and possibilities of action which would ensure the effectiveness of inspection, could also be established.

The details and forms of the implementation of control can be agreed upon on the basis of the experience acquired up to the present time in this field, as well as on the basis of proposals submitted by various states in the course of the disarmament negotiations, in the form and to the extent in which they can be adapted to the area of the zone.

The system of control established for the denuclearized zone could provide useful experience for the realization of broader disarmament agreement.

2. For the purpose of supervising the implementation of the proposed obligations an adequate control machinery should be established. There could participate in it, for example, representatives appointed/not excluding additional personal appointments/by organs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the Warsaw Treaty. Nationals or representatives of states, which do not belong to any military grouping in Europe, could also participate in it.

The procedure of the establishment, operation and reporting of the control organs can be the subject of further mutual stipulations.

IV. The most simple form of embodying the obligations of states included in the zone would be the conclusion of an appropriate international convention. To avoid, however, implications, which some states might find in such a solution, it can be arranged that:

1. These obligations be embodied in the form of four unilateral declarations, bearing the character of an international obligation deposited with a mutually agreed upon depository state.

2. The obligations of great powers be embodied in the form of a mutual document or unilateral declaration/as mentioned above in paragraph 1/;

3. The obligations of other states, whose armed forces are stationed in the area of the zone, be embodied in the form of unilateral declarations/as mentioned above in paragraph 1/.

On the basis of the above proposals the government of the Polish People's Republic suggests to initiate negotiations for the purpose of a further detailed elaboration of the plan for the establishment of the denuclearized zone, of the documents and guarantees related to it as well as of the means of implementation of the undertaken obligations.

The government of the Polish People's Republic has reasons to state that acceptance of the proposal concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe will facilitate the reaching of an agreement relating to the adequate reduction of conventional armaments and of foreign armed forces stationed on the territory of the states included in the zone.

Nationalism in Africa

by Joseph Palmer 2d

Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

The sense of privilege that I feel at the opportunity to speak at this distinguished institution of higher learning is reinforced by my recognition of the importance that the Institute of Ethnic Studies is attaching to the problems attendant upon "Nationalism in Africa," my subject today. This emphasis is perhaps best illustrated by a fact: Within a few short years the Continent of Africa has trebled its participation in the community of nations. In the light of this development I do not need to point out to such an audience as this that the urge to create a national entity and to exercise the prerogatives of self-government is, at least in major portions of the continent, probably the major political, economic, and social force in Africa today. This pervasive inner drive is weaving profound changes in the fabric of African societies and, in its international aspect, has the most direct and fundamental importance for the rest of the world—Europe, first of all, but assuredly also for both Asia and the Americas. Any effort to foresee the character of world society a decade hence must certainly take account, as a primary consideration, of nationalism in Africa.

We cannot expect to find, in our study of Africa, many generalizations that will serve as a common key to full interpretation of the various national dramas which are unfolding on this continent. The geographic sweep is too immense, the contact with different European or Middle Eastern cultures too compartmented and varied, and the basic cultural, ethnic, and politico-economic heritage too diverse to expect too much

¹Address made before the Institute of Ethnic Studies at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., on Apr. 25 (press release 222).

from the search for generalizations about Africa as a whole.

With these reservations in mind, however, there are certain observations about Africa as a whole that contribute much to our understanding of the various national movements there. Many of these, it seems to me, originate in the fact that the time span of so much of Africa's self-expression has been compressed into the last 2 decades. Every state in Africa today was deeply affected by, if not actually conceived in, the aftermath of World War II. The sweep of large sections of Asia toward nationalism, the development of the cold war between the Soviet bloc and the Western World, the rise of the United Nations, and a new emphasis on international collaboration in a truly mutual sense, as well as the peculiar economic problems of our era, have obviously left their mark on African nationalism, the more so because it had so few expressions before these developments.

I would like to speak to you today, first, about the way some of these external factors have influenced nationalism in Africa and then about a number of considerations of a more indigenous nature. My remarks will relate primarily to Africa south of the Sahara, where the greatest number of new states are being readied to emerge, but they also have similar application to the North African area in many instances.

In the main the influences of world events in this decade have been salutary ones for an orderly development of African nationalism. The primary reason for this is that those European states which are dedicated to a policy of transferring administrative powers and responsibilities to the new African nations have, by and large, accurately

read the lessons of the history of our times. They have subordinated their own more narrowly national interests and muffled their instruments of power in recognition of a larger world and regional interest in which progress through cooperation is the keynote. This breadth of vision by the former administering powers need not be attributed only to altruism in order to be commended. Rather, the fact that it reflects a true community of interest indicates that there is a more effective and reliable basis for collaboration in a relationship based on equality than one based on a subordinate status.

Trends Toward Beneficial Collaboration

Even in these favorable circumstances, it is also to their great credit that the leaders and peoples of the new Africa are displaying a comprehension of opportunities which often equals and sometimes even surpasses that of the older states with which they are developing channels of beneficial collaboration. These possibilities, in fact, hold great hope that, in the next decade, African nationalism in general will continue to move in this direction, first because this trend will be consistent with the mainstream of world affairs and secondly because it will become increasingly apparent that a very great potential for the benefit of the inhabitants of that continent can best be realized within the context of such collaboration.

To take this optimistic view is not to ignore the day-to-day problems over which European and African states have their differences. Mankind is not perfect, and the search for a new equilibrium has never been without blind alleys and pitfalls anywhere or any time in human history. But the long series of great wars during the last hundred years has demonstrated convincingly—not least of all to the African peoples—the futility and destructiveness of self-centered nationalism, devoted to autarky, vengeance, and solutions by force. There is, in fact, a basis for the hope that, given continued mature and moderate leaders and understanding by the administering powers, the transition of much of Africa will be so rapid that the new states which emerge may leapfrog the early destructive phase which nationalism has often demonstrated in other regions and fall more naturally into stride with the free world's widespread trend toward a cooperation transcending national borders. Certainly there can be no question as to the desirability of such a trend, and it is inherent in

our policy that we give appropriate encouragement to such mutually beneficial collaboration. At the same time, we must realistically recognize that any initiative for such relationships must come freely and voluntarily from the new states themselves if a firm basis is to be established on which to build.

There are, of course, compelling factors of vital national interest which tie Africa and Europe together. As new African states come to self-government and independence, it is natural and advisable that the benefits inherent in their former relationship with the metropolitan powers be fully explored as a basis for future mutually advantageous collaboration. With and beyond these considerations, it is possible also to envisage a healthy trend toward closer regional ties, sought freely and independently by states having similar interests and recognizing in cooperation of this sort an opportunity to strengthen capacities for true national self-expression.

Ghana's decision to seek membership in the British Commonwealth is a clear-cut example of the first trend. The conference of African states just concluded at Accra is a timely example of the second. One can hardly refrain from contrasting these developments as authoritative expressions of nationalism in Africa with the Soviet relationship with Eastern Europe and with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo last December. You will recall that virtually all African governments refrained from official representation at the latter meeting—a decision which constituted clear recognition that the directors of this conference were obviously preoccupied with ulterior motives. Their use of almost every nationalistic cliché to paint the Soviet bloc in a sanctimonious light and the Western World as the epitome of evil was labored and transparent. Their purpose, of course, had nothing to do in reality with Africa. In fact, it is clear that the Cairo meeting was nothing more than an obvious and abortive effort to foist a non-African initiative and non-African interests on African governments. As such, it was essentially an anti-nationalistic undertaking.

There is every reason to believe that the states of Africa will jealously defend their independence and will not permit its compromise through entanglement with the devious political designs of the Soviet bloc. As many neighboring states

have found, Communist imperialism is a much heavier yoke than even the earlier Western models. Moreover, this Soviet product continues in very active manufacture these days, whereas the Western World is closing out this commodity as obsolete.

Communist influence on African nationalism has, in a positive sense, been comparatively small up to the present time. In one or two isolated cases it has succeeded in a degree of penetration of national movements which will counsel careful attention by dedicated Africans. By and large, however, the African nationalist has been astute to realize the conspiratorial nature of international communism and its incompatibility with true national independence.

Since the efforts of international communism to penetrate have been largely unsuccessful, its agents have sought to spread their influence by less direct means. For example, there are thousands of African students in Western Europe, and the Communists are making a continuing effort to capture their minds and divert their energies from constructive nationalism to the false doctrine of international communism. Practically all of these students are strong nationalists, and, by appearing to support their nationalist aspirations, the Communists often gain a sympathetic hearing. The admirable quality of idealism in African students, in common with students the world over, unfortunately induces some of them to take Communist propaganda at its face value, their experience being as yet inadequate to reveal the reality behind the sham. Here is a challenge to the Western World to recognize in African students in our midst the national leaders of tomorrow and to give them freely of our time and sympathetic attention. Georgetown and other leading American universities deserve high credit for their contribution to this field.

Constructive Role of the United Nations

There can be no doubt that the United Nations has been an immensely constructive force in the development of responsible nationalism in Africa, both before and after independence. The trust territories, of course, have been most directly affected. Under the terms of the United Nations Charter, each administering power is charged with promoting the advancement of its trust territories toward self-government or independence.

As a result of progress in this respect, the former British Togo opted to join Ghana, Somalia is due to obtain its independence in 1960, and the other trust territories in Africa are evolving rapidly toward the ultimate objectives of the trusteeship system, either as separate entities or in association with neighboring states.

At the same time that the United Nations has provided opportunities for African nationalism to appeal to international conscience, it has also induced a sense of responsibility in holding out the prospect of membership in the community of nations when statehood is realized. Once membership in the United Nations has been obtained, it provides a framework for continued responsibility, as well as security, by relieving, at least to a degree, the moderate leaders of the new state from excessive preoccupation with the danger of external attack and, conversely, enabling them in domestic politics to demonstrate more easily the danger of resorting to national adventure themselves. Nor should we fail to point out that the close observation of Soviet policy and actions which the U.N. forum affords to African governments has, as for example in the case of Hungary, helped vividly to bring home to them the harsh reality which lies behind the façade of Soviet pretensions to support nationalist causes.

In another sense, also, the U.N. Charter will, I feel sure, play a most salutary and necessary role in African affairs, in providing a guide for the peaceful solution—either outside or within the organization—of disputes arising from boundaries which were drawn (and often ill defined) in a different international context. There are few frontiers in Africa which were drawn originally with an adequate knowledge of ethnic, economic, and even geographic considerations. It is not always easy for political leaders to withstand extremist pressures—with their attendant short-term domestic political rewards—to engage in an old-fashioned border dispute or to encourage a dubious irredentism. This is not to say that there may not be cases in which territorial adjustments will be necessary, desirable, and in accordance with the desires and interests of the nations and populations concerned. But the ability to rise above mere chauvinism—of which there have been many heartening demonstrations already—may well be one of the key considerations in assessing the ultimate success of African na-

tionalism in terms of a better life for the African peoples. In this regard, a salutary emphasis on a cooperative regional approach to the exploitation of natural resources lying in frontier or disputed areas may well offer a touchstone by which many of the difficult territorial questions can be reduced to negotiable terms.

In much of Africa south of the Sahara, the concept of a nation has not hitherto existed in the historical experience of the area. The national vision, in fact, often materializes only in the course of, and almost as a means of, acquiring governmental autonomy. In this respect, the movement often has the explicit or implicit blessing of the administering authorities, and in such cases the construction of the nation becomes a cooperative venture of indigenous and external forces. But, however nurtured, the concept of the nation has amazing capacity for taking root and flourishing in this virgin territory. The heroes of the national movement acquire by their successes the stature which enables them to exert an appeal and influence throughout the extent of their territory. There can, in short, be little doubt that the national self-consciousness formed in this fashion, under conditions prevailing in Africa and the rest of the world today, is no less real and viable than nationalisms which have the sanction of long histories.

Rivalries Between Traditionalists and Modernists

I would like now, with your indulgence, to turn to some considerations about African nationalism which are primarily indigenous in nature.

Even where transition from a colonial to a self-governing or independent status has evolved smoothly and favorably, internal divisions are likely to emerge once the new state is established. Newly formed nations or nascent national movements in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, normally undergo a serious struggle between domestic factions for control of the national destiny. Just as the effort to obtain or to force the pace of concessions from the former colonial power tended to galvanize the national movement into existence, so later does this confrontation serve as a basis of rivalry for popular appeal between nationalist parties. This is one issue that is easy to dramatize. Thus, and not necessarily related to the merits, a former colonial power sometimes

continues as the apparent target of vocal sections of nationalist agitation long after much greater or more serious problems have come to confront the new state. In many cases, however, the responsibilities of government begin to weigh heavily on the party in power, which may become increasingly aware of the importance to the national existence of the continuance of close and mutually beneficial economic and cultural ties with the former metropole. In some cases, the prospect of power even tends to mitigate extremist tendencies by opposition elements. There may thus emerge a moderate and responsible concept of the national interest based on the continuance of close and friendly cooperation with the former administering power.

In these circumstances domestic rivalries revolve around both personalities and issues, but the majority arise over the pace and direction of social change. A major distinction arises between what we might distinguish as traditionalists and modernists. Within each group, moreover, there are usually moderate factions favoring evolutionary tactics opposed to those extremists who would assert more drastic methods.

Traditionalists, who fear loss of position, influence, or prestige in a rapidly changing world, seek to retain or even return to the old social and political systems. At most, they would concede the changes in power distribution which have already taken place, while seeking to preserve as long as possible the remnants of what power still remains to them. In their more extreme form, such traditionalist movements may aspire to revert completely to the social and political patterns which prevailed before the advent of colonial rule.

The modernists, on the other hand, find the traditional institutions inadequate and seek to recast their societies in a Western image. The modernists tend to divide into conservatives and radicals, these terms being used in an African rather than Western context. For example, both groups tend to advocate what they call "socialism," with the conservatives leaning toward state supervision of the economy, while the radicals favor state ownership and operation; both reflect basic African social concepts in their rejection of individualism and acceptance of a considerable degree of authoritarianism in the interest of the community.

Africa's nontraditional conservatives generally retain status in the traditional society at the same time that they accept Western political and eco-

conomic and cultural values as offering the best method to maintain and expand their influence. They tend to dominate the civil service, the professions, and trade, to the extent these activities are open to them. Some hedge their acceptance of modernization with the proviso that it be implemented on a slow and piecemeal basis. At the opposite end of the conservative spectrum are leaders who seek to enlarge the impact of the West as rapidly as possible, in their desire to obtain for their people the scientific enlightenment, the material advantages, and the modern governmental and social structure which they believe essential in their country for fulfillment of the promises and hopes raised by independence.

Africa's minority of radicals is largely composed of young men who have failed to find, in the traditional patterns of African society or in the modifications proposed by the conservatives, outlets commensurate with their skills and ambitions. Consequently, they seek a far-reaching revision of traditional institutions in a manner which is often considerably influenced by the more extreme byways of Marxist socialism. Although there are some African extremists of African Communist persuasion, most of the radical minority in African nationalism tends to reject the leadership of the U.S.S.R.

As we have previously noted, some or all of these various nationalist groups tend to coalesce and submerge their fundamental differences in favor of a common front in the preindependence period. The prevailing outlook of the coalition, especially if a long and bitter struggle is involved, tends to become that of the most dynamic partner. Then, when independence is achieved, this partner may be reluctant to concede to the other factions a share in governmental power. In fact, there is often a tendency to consolidate power at the expense of opposition elements. It is at this point that a danger exists of discarding traditional values and of impugning the motives of other groups who may be equally dedicated and capable of contributing to the national interest and well-being. If these assets are destroyed, what may appear to emerge as a monolithic expression of the national will may be less strong than the system it replaced. At the same time, there are sometimes different shades of opinion built into such monopolistic political movements, with certain elements performing a similar function to that of a "loyal

opposition." On balance, it would appear that the pressure of problems affecting the new African states is such that, without the free and effective mobilization of all responsible sectors of national opinion in the common interest, the ability of the new state to meet the exigencies of history may be placed in jeopardy.

Problems of Tribal Tensions

Similar considerations apply to the problem of racialism, tribal rivalries, and religious discrimination. It has been pointed out that in British East Africa tribal tensions have been as serious a problem as interracial stresses. In Kenya there is a history of hostility among the tribes which frequently erupted into warfare before the advent of British control. Even more than half a century later, the antagonisms thus generated are far from having disappeared. In Uganda, where the racial problem is negligible, a serious difficulty in the political evolution of the country is the rivalry between the province of the Buganda tribe—large, advanced, and prosperous—and the less highly developed three other provinces. Tanganyika has a somewhat similar (although less acute) problem in the disparities between, for example, the prosperous and advanced Wachagga and the various other African peoples of the Trust Territory.

These ancient tribal antipathies are slowly breaking down under the impact of social and economic progress. Urbanization, in particular, is having its effect. Although about 85 percent of all Africans still live in rural areas, more and more young men every year are leaving farms and villages to join the labor force in the towns and cities, in the mines, and on the great estates. In so doing they often move in one step through a span in development that elsewhere took hundreds of years.

These migrants inevitably feel insecure when faced with the impersonal and competitive life of the industrial world. They have a sense of being torn in two directions: The old ties and traditions draw them back; the material and philosophical rewards of the modern world pull them forward. The forward attraction, in the long run, usually proves to be the stronger.

Where statehood has not been long or firmly established, African nationalism seems to grow in proportion as tribal loyalties and intertribal divi-

sions are weakened. This phenomenon has, in recent years, become apparent even in the heterogeneous East African territories where African nationalism is beginning to cut across intertribal lines. Just as the pull of the city is gradually proving stronger than loyalty to the rural village, so is modern nationalism slowly proving stronger than the traditional tribal divisions. If this unity is to be carried over successfully into the era of independence, magnanimity and tolerance will be required of the African national leader in particularly large measure.

Interracial Stresses

Racialism in Africa takes many forms, all of them divisive to a regrettable degree but most of them presently under what is remarkable control considering the stresses involved. We may note in this connection not only misunderstanding and friction between Africans and Europeans but also between Asians and Africans, between Arabs and Negroes.

While African nationalism heretofore has been closely concerned with African relationships with Europeans, this problem has, to the great credit of both sides, tended to reduce itself to relative obscurity as independence has become an accomplished fact. In the independent states of North Africa, for example, where the European and Arab populations live side by side, the two communities have within a few short years developed a remarkable capacity for getting along together and adjusting to the new roles brought by independence. In some cases, in fact, this compatibility on the scene has actually exceeded that prevailing between the respective governments. In any event, such experiences represent a hopeful sign for the future of better community relations elsewhere on the continent.

It is often pointed out that relationships between Europeans and Africans have been strained primarily in areas where Europeans have come as permanent settlers in large numbers, generally where the climate and the economic potential have favored European settlement, such as in the Union of South Africa, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Kenya. In contrast, racial problems have been relatively minor or temporary in those regions where white settlers are few and where the role of the European has been almost exclusively that of administrator, missionary,

teacher, or technician. Apparently, therefore, it is not contact between Europeans and Africans *per se* which gives rise to the most serious racial problems but an actual or potential economic and social competition between these two permanently established racial groups.

It would be both wrong and futile to draw from these comments any inference that it was an historical error for Europeans to settle permanently on African soil. This would be to dismiss the great benefits which the industry, imagination, and skills of the European settlers have brought to their African neighbors. As a moral judgment, it would ignore the facts that the European settlement occurred largely on land which was not being utilized by the Africans and that the countries involved are, in most cases, the only homes the Europeans know. More importantly, such a conclusion would imply a lack of confidence that men of differing races and colors, living side by side, can work out a common destiny based on ideals of partnership, brotherhood, and justice. This objective is, of course, difficult of realization, and, in the light of our own experience in developing harmonious race relations and balancing precept with practice, it behooves us to approach racial problems elsewhere in the world in all humility. At the same time we must reject the pessimistic premise that racial partnership is an impossible ideal.

Insofar as racial problems are a basic consideration in the development of African nationalism, their solution will undoubtedly assist the ability of the administering authorities to come to harmonious terms with that nationalism. This is proving to be a slow and difficult process in such territories as Kenya and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But we may take encouragement from the fact that the declared policy of the Governments of these territories is one of racial partnership and achievement of a harmonious and mutually beneficial plural society.

The Course of African Nationalism

Nationalism as a force makes one think of a mighty river, inexorable in its movement to empty into the sea, whether through an even and beneficial flow in an orderly channel or through a sudden floodtide of destructive energy.

Thus far, at least, the course of African nationalism, especially when compared with the

development of other continents, has, in most instances, been a remarkably sound and reasonable one. The African national movements which led their countries to statehood in the post-war period have to a gratifying degree controlled the temptations, usual to their historical position, of chauvinism, blind rejection of constructive external influence, and neglect of economic needs for eye-catching but sterile political maneuvers. The leaders of African states in this decade have, by and large, assured themselves of a distinguished place in their national histories—and in international esteem—by virtue of statesmanlike moderation and ability to plan soundly for their countries' futures. Nor should we for a moment forget that in many cases it has been the farsighted policies of the metropolitan powers themselves which have given the impetus to this wholesome development. I think it is not too early to conclude that the faith that prompted their decisions has been fully justified.

If future developments are characterized by the same moderation, restraint, and sense of responsibility by both African nationalism and the administering powers, there is every reason to be confident of the future peace, stability, and prosperity of an African continent cooperating voluntarily and fruitfully with the rest of the free world.

U.S. Acts To Revoke Egyptian Assets Control Regulations

Press release 233 dated April 30

The Department of State has been informed of the signature in Rome on April 29 of an agreement covering the terms to be embodied in a final settlement between the United Arab Republic and the Universal Suez Canal Company.

The United States has made clear that the principal reason for the freezing of certain Egyptian and canal company assets in this country has been the uncertain legal situation resulting from the dispute between the Government of Egypt and the company and the risk of double jeopardy to which American users of the Suez Canal might thus be exposed. It has also been indicated that, if an agreement or substantial progress toward an agreement were reached on this matter, thereby

clarifying the legal situation, the United States would expect to release the blocked funds of the United Arab Republic and the Suez Canal Company.

The Rome agreement, which the United States welcomes, is considered to satisfy the above conditions. The Treasury has been informed of the Department's views and has taken action to revoke the Egyptian Assets Control Regulations, effective May 1, 1958.

U.S.—Soviet Discussions On Exchange of Films

Press release 230 dated April 29

The Soviet and U.S. delegations which started meetings at Washington a month ago¹ on the film section of the U.S.S.R.—U.S. cultural affairs agreement² have decided to postpone further discussions until a later date. The time and place for the reconvened sessions will be determined through diplomatic channels within 30 days.

The two delegations screened a number of films from each country and feel that a basis has been laid for definite future arrangements to carry out the objectives of the two Governments. Most of the emphasis during the discussions so far has related to the selection, terms, and conditions for the purchase and sale of motion pictures.

The Motion Picture Export Association of America has been acting as the agent of MPEAA member companies to license U.S. films, while Sovexportfilm represents the Soviet film industry. Independent U.S. motion picture companies and their films have also been included in the discussions.

A number of specific understandings were reached:

1. Films are to be licensed in each country for a period of 5 years;
2. Licensing of pictures shall be on a flat-sum, dollar, cash basis;
3. Each side has the right to approve the dubbing and subtitling of the other's pictures.

Tentative views were expressed on other aspects of the film section, but discussions were tem-

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1958, p. 552.

² For text of agreement, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

porarily put aside until there is definite agreement on the purchase and sale of pictures.

The Soviet delegation consisted of Aleksandr Slavov, of the Soviet Ministry of Culture; Aleksandr Davydov, director; and Yuri Dobrokhov, of Sovexportfilm. Mr. Slavov returned to Moscow on April 26. Messrs. Davydov and Dobrokhov return April 30.

The U.S. delegation consisted of Eric Johnston, president, Motion Picture Association of America, and Turner B. Shelton, director, Motion Picture Service, U.S. Information Agency.

Freedom Under Law

*Statement by President Eisenhower*¹

White House press release dated April 30

Thursday—May first—has by proclamation been designated "Law Day."² The reason is to remind us all that we as Americans live, every day of our lives, under a rule of law.

Freedom under law is like the air we breathe. People take it for granted and are unaware of it—until they are deprived of it. What does the rule of law mean to us in everyday life? Let me quote the eloquent words of Burke:

The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storms may enter; the rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of that ruined tenement!

But the rule of law does more than insure freedom from high-handed action by rulers. It insures justice between man and man—however humble the one and however powerful the other. A man with five dollars in the bank can call to account the corporation with five billion dollars in assets—and the two will be heard as equals before the law. The law, however, has not stopped here. It has moved to meet the needs of the times. True, it is good that the King cannot enter unbidden into the ruined cottage. But it is not good that men should live in ruined cottages.

The law in our times also does its part to build a society in which the homes of workers will be invaded neither by the sovereign's troops nor by

the storms and winds of insecurity and poverty. It does this not by paternalism, welfarism, and handouts but by creating a framework of fair play within which conscientious, hardworking men and women can freely obtain a just return for their efforts.

This return includes not only good wages and working conditions but insurance as a right against the insecurities of injury, unemployment, and old age. In the words of a great American lawyer:

The law must be stable, but it must not stand still.

Another direction in which the rule of law is moving is that of displacing force in relations among sovereign countries. We have an International Court of Justice. We have seen the exercise of an international police function, both in the United Nations force in Korea and in the United Nations force assigned to the Gaza Strip. We have agreements in article 2 of the United Nations Charter to the most fundamental concepts of international conduct.

We have elaborate rules of international law—far more complete and detailed than most people realize. More than once nations have solemnly outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, most recently in the charter of the United Nations. We have, in short, at least the structure and machinery of an international rule of law which could displace the use of force. What we need now is the universal will to accept peaceful settlement of disputes in a framework of law.

As for our own country, we have shown by our actions that we will neither initiate the use of force or tolerate its use by others in violation of the solemn agreement of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, as we contemplate the destructive potentialities of any future large-scale resort to force, any thoughtful man or nation is driven to a sober conclusion.

In a very real sense the world no longer has a choice between force and law. If civilization is to survive, it must choose the rule of law. On this Law Day, then, we honor not only the principle of the rule of law but also those judges, legislators, lawyers, and law-abiding citizens who actively work to preserve our liberties under law.

Let history record that on Law Day free man's faith in the rule of law and justice is greater than ever before. And let us trust that this faith will be vindicated for the benefit of all mankind.

¹ Recorded in advance for television and radio observance of Law Day.

² BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1958, p. 293.

Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser

by Loftus Becker
Legal Adviser¹

The topic that you have chosen for discussion at this meeting of the society—"International Law and the Political Process"—has a very real meaning for those of us who are charged with legal responsibilities in the Department. One of the first things that we learn is that abstract conceptions of international law, as it should be, must, of necessity, be qualified in application by the realities of the political process.

I know that there are those who assert that international law, in order to be worth its salt, must be based solely upon logic and principle. But international law, notwithstanding the reasoned theses of the commentators, consists, in the last analysis, of those principles upon which sovereign nations can agree. Such agreement is seldom, if ever, reached without regard to the political process.

Please do not imply from my remarks that I would throw logic and principle overboard in favor of pure political pragmatism. There is, however, a mean, a balancing between legal theory and political capabilities, that must be taken into account both in the formulation and in the application of the principles of international law.

The panel discussions upon which you have been engaged here are by no means abstract or academic insofar as the office of the Legal Adviser is concerned. The first time that I looked over your program I was impressed to note that important problems under each of the topics under discussion here had been brought before me personally, even though I have been with the Department for only a short time. That is the reason for the subject I have chosen, for I thought that it might

be of interest to you to have explained the context in which such problems are presented to the Legal Adviser.

Very often the Department of State is urged in the strongest terms to make a greater effort to induce other nations to refer their disputes to established international tribunals. We are, of course, in complete sympathy with these proposals and seize upon every opportunity to do just that.

One of the major political problems which we encounter in so doing arises from the fact that the submission of the United States to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice contains a reservation, commonly referred to as the "Connally rider." This, as you know, is to the effect that this Government's submission to the Court's jurisdiction does not apply to disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America, *as determined by the United States of America*. A number of other states have reservations similar to or identical with that of the United States, while still others have an even broader reservation with respect to the matters which may be kept from the Court by unilateral determination.

I shall not attempt to interpret the precise meaning of the United States reservation under the Connally rider, but it is clearly more restrictive than a reservation of the right not to submit matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States, *as determined by the principles of international law*.

There can be little doubt that reservations of this type have tended to minimize the number of disputes determined by the International Court of Justice, particularly in view of the possibility

¹Address made before the American Society of International Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 26 (press release 224).

that a state which does not have such a reservation may, when sued by one which does, invoke the doctrine of "reciprocity."

So long as the Connally rider continues in existence, it is the obligation of the Department of State to act in accordance with its provisions. The question of whether or not this rider should be deleted or watered down is essentially political. Specifically, the issue is whether the United States, in order to promote a more widespread recourse to the legal processes of the Court, is willing to take the lead in sacrificing to some extent its ability to make a unilateral determination of what is or is not a matter essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. Those of you who believe that it should must seek your relief through political processes.

Personally, I believe that such an effort would be worth while, for we cannot in all honesty urge upon others a course of action which we ourselves are not prepared to adopt. Moreover, I have a serious question whether "as determined by the United States of America," if fairly applied, would mean any more in the way of excluding the International Court from passing upon truly domestic issues than the words "as determined by the principles of international law."

When I stated that it is the obligation of the Department of State to act in accordance with the provisions of the Connally rider so long as that reservation is on the books, I did not intend to state or imply that we in the Department regard it as our duty to determine that all matters involving the United States brought before the International Court are of "essentially domestic concern."

The Interhandel Case

A case in point is the position taken by the Department of State, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, in the preliminary stages of the well-known *Interhandel* case now pending before the International Court of Justice. Since the case is now pending before the Court, it would not be appropriate for me to discuss its merits. It is appropriate, however, for me to inform you as to the position that this Government took on the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court to indicate interim measures, since, so far as I have been able to ascertain, there has been some misunderstanding on this point in the public mind.

Shortly after Switzerland filed its application against the United States,² it requested that the Court indicate certain interim measures to be observed by the United States during the pendency of the international proceeding. One of the measures requested was an indication that the United States Government should not during this period sell certain vested shares of General Aniline & Film Corporation.

In responding to this request the United States Government informed the Court that it had determined that the matter of the sale of the General Aniline & Film shares was one of "essentially domestic concern" and that, therefore, the Court lacked the power to give any indication as to what the United States should do respecting the sale of these shares. The Court agreed with the United States in result, but, in so doing, the majority of the Court relied not upon our rationale but upon certain supervening circumstances, including the granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States in a domestic case involving Interhandel.

I cannot and do not wish to discuss the merits of the Court's decision. The one thing that I wish to make clear is that, in arguing our case before the Court, I, as agent for the United States, was authorized as a matter of policy to make the following statement, and I quote from the transcript of the oral argument:

The United States Government by its Preliminary Objection of October 9, 1957, does not intend to imply that it envisages use of paragraph (b) of the Condition dated August 14, 1946, with respect to all aspects of the Interhandel controversy which may be involved in the submission of October 1, 1957. The United States Government will in due course, upon further study, disclose its position in these respects in further detail.

The United States Government intends, during the pendency of future proceedings on the Application filed by Switzerland on October 1, 1957, not to dispose of the proceeds which will be derived from the sale of the shares of General Aniline & Film. In that connection, it is our duty to point out to the Court that under the Constitution of the United States the legislative and judicial branches of the United States Government are independent and they cannot be legally bound by a statement of

²The Swiss application to the Court followed the refusal of the United States to arbitrate respecting the matter under the Washington Accord of 1946 or the U.S.-Swiss treaty of 1931. For text of a U.S. note of Jan. 11, 1957, and accompanying memorandum setting forth detailed reasons for the U.S. position, see BULLETIN of Mar. 4, 1957, p. 350.

intention on the part of the Executive Branch of the United States Government which I represent.

The point is this. It was made plain to the Court that the sole issue in the *Interhandel* case, to which the original preliminary objection based upon the Connally rider was addressed, was whether or not the United States was entitled to make a sale of the General Aniline & Film shares while the case before the International Court was pending.

The United States has not as yet indicated its position with respect to the remaining issues in the case. It will do so at the appropriate time, namely, at the time additional preliminary objections are filed, if any are to be filed. In the meantime we have assured the Court that our reliance upon the Connally rider on the single issue of the sale of the General Aniline & Film shares should not be taken as any indication that our Government will rely upon that reservation in order completely to defeat the jurisdiction of the International Court.

Naturally I cannot here indicate the position that the United States will take upon each of the remaining issues of the case. I would suggest, however, that those who have been critical of the position taken by the United States in this proceeding reserve further comment until that position has finally been disclosed.

The Girard Case

Turning now to another subject, that of jurisdiction over American armed forces stationed abroad, I recall vividly that the *Girard* case became a national issue during my first week in the Department. That case, as you all know, was a hard case, which might well have made bad law. Strong public pressures were exerted upon the two Departments concerned—State and Defense³—and upon the Congress. Such pressures were based upon a misunderstanding or a refusal to understand the applicable rule of international law that any sovereign state has the right to impose such conditions as it sees fit upon the stationing of foreign troops within its territory.

There was no doubt in our mind as to the applicable principle of international law and, as well, no doubt as to the fact that the United States

Government, acting in accordance with the provisions of an agreement with Japan, had made a commitment which it could not in honor retract. Because of this we felt impelled to stand upon the law and to fulfill our international commitment, despite the heavy political pressures brought to bear upon us. That is what we did, and our view as to the law was sustained by the Supreme Court.

The lesson to be drawn from the *Girard* case, as I view it, is that there are instances where the stated requirements of the political process cannot be reconciled with established principles of international law. In such a case the Legal Adviser may be overruled, but he cannot acquiesce.

Conference on Law of the Sea

Now I should like to discuss with you some personal observations as to the conditions under which international law is being formulated today.

On February 24, 1958, there was convened in Geneva, Switzerland, an International Conference on the Law of the Sea. Eighty-six states are participating in this conference, which is now drawing to a close—more than double the number that attended the Hague conference of 1930. We regard this conference as one of the most important of those convened since the end of World War II.

Perhaps the most important single issue that came before this conference was the breadth of the territorial sea in which a state may exercise sovereign rights.⁴ That is the sole issue to which I shall advert this evening.

As all of you know, the United States adopted a 3-mile limit for its territorial sea in 1793 and our Government has not since departed from that position. The United States Government believes that the 3-mile limit, which affords a maximum freedom of the seas, is in the best interests of all states—large and small, old and new.

By the latter part of the 19th century or the early part of the 20th century, the 3-mile limit was firmly established as customary international law. It has been the consistent position of the Department of State that no greater breadth of territorial sea can be justified in international law, and numerous protests have been filed on this basis when broader claims have been asserted.

³ For a joint statement by Secretary Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, see *ibid.*, June 24, 1957, p. 1000.

⁴ For a statement by Arthur H. Dean, chairman of the U.S. delegation, see *ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1958, p. 574.

There have, of course, been various states which have asserted from time to time a right to a broader territorial sea—to 6, to 12, and even to 200 miles. In some instances such broader claims have been based upon security grounds, as, for example, in the case of the U.S.S.R., which claims 12 miles. In other instances these broader claims were based upon the alleged economic requirements of the coastal states, which maintained that they were entitled to appropriate to their own use all fishing grounds lying between 3 and 12 miles off their coasts or even farther, even though such offshore fishing grounds had theretofore been regarded as the common property of all nations. Insofar as the United States is concerned, such unilateral appropriations of vast areas of the high seas are contrary to the common good, contrary to our own security interests, and contrary to the valuable economic interests of our overseas fishing industry.

Unfortunately, at Geneva, from which I have just now returned, there was a minimum of debate and even less inclination to vote upon the merits, as principles of international law, of the various specific proposals submitted for conference approval. The reasons for this are even more important than the proposals made and the various votes cast for or against them, which I shall not attempt to detail.

The principle of the freedom of the seas, with its corollary, the 3-mile limit, was established before many of the states represented at the Geneva conference had gained their independence. In large measure at the conference such states made no serious effort to weigh the advantages they might retain by maintaining the freedom of the seas as against the disadvantages of an extension of territorial seas, such as the obligation of patrolling such an expanded territorial sea. They opposed the 3-mile limit upon the ground that it had been adopted by the major maritime powers before they had come into existence. For that reason alone, the preexisting rule had to be changed. That was regarded as progress.

Such states, moreover, took the position that they must be free to fix the breadth of their territorial sea up to 12 miles or to exercise exclusive fishing control for the same distance from their coasts because that was the only rule that would be consistent with their dignity and sovereignty as new nations.

These same new states regarded the freedom of the high seas—rather than as a common heritage—as a legal fiction invented by the major maritime nations, or their lawyers, in order to rob the populations of newly created nations of the living resources of the seas located off their coasts. Those other states which desired to fish up to 3 miles off the coasts of these newly created nations, or to overfly the high seas between 3 and 12 miles off their coasts without express permission, were regarded as motivated wholly by selfish motives. The use of large mother or cannery ships off coastal waters was frequently denounced as a means of taking the bread out of the mouths of local coastal fishermen operating out of port on small boats on a 1-day basis.

They were wholly unmoved by the fact that a nation such as Portugal had fished for centuries on the high seas off the coasts of other nations and relied upon such fishing for the protein in the diet of its population, particularly the poorer elements thereof.

Those who opposed a coastal state's legal right to annex neighboring areas of the high seas in order to improve its economic position—additional land being unavailable—were denounced as reactionary or predatory.

These same new nations viewed as progressive and desirable—because it constituted a change from the existing order—the Mexican proposal, supported without deviation by the entire Soviet bloc, that the territorial sea could be fixed by the coastal state anywhere between 3 and 12 miles off its coast.

Bloc Voting

With these views there was combined the practice of bloc voting. The entire Soviet bloc came to the conference instructed to support a 12-mile limit and never deviated from this position from beginning to end of the conference. The Arab bloc in its entirety was also pledged to the 12-mile limit, and the members of that bloc had no hesitation in declaring that their position was principally motivated by their desire to close off the Gulf of Aqaba. Argument or persuasion, even with the most friendly members of that bloc, was wholly wasted. A vote against this principle by any member of the bloc for any reason whatever was regarded as disloyalty to the bloc.

In caucuses of the Afro-Asian and the Latin American blocs every effort was made to exert pressure to insure that members of the bloc would vote as a unit. Even countries to which the United States had extended extensive aid and which have a long record of friendship with the United States deemed themselves bound to vote solidly with the other bloc members. Nations which indicated an intention to vote in favor of the United States, contrary to the bloc, were threatened with economic reprisals.

In one instance, in Committee I, when it appeared that the chairman was about to announce a tie vote on the optional 3- to 12-mile proposal advanced by Mexico, one delegate favoring this proposal ran to the seat of a South American delegate and sought to coerce him into changing his vote from abstention to an affirmative vote in favor of the Mexican proposal not only by shouting at him but also by lifting his arm in order to attract the attention of the chair. I am glad to note that, even though the other delegate was coerced into making this attempt, the chairman ruled that the vote, once having been made and recorded, could not thereafter be changed, and his ruling was sustained on appeal by a vote of 48 to 17 with 17 abstentions. The tactics used in that instance clearly shocked the conscience of the conference.

These, I regret to say, are the practicalities of the development of one branch of international law today. Principle, reason, and persuasion, as well as common security interests of the utmost importance, are subordinated to "ward politics" of the most ruthless character. Whether we like it or not, this is a political reality of which we must take account.

We are fortunate, indeed, that, notwithstanding the attitudes and practices that I have just described, the compromise proposal made by the United States at Geneva gained the largest majority of any of those voted upon in plenary session (45-33-7), although none received the two-thirds required for conference approval. This, I should like to make plain, we owe to the outstanding performance of the United States delegation under the leadership of Mr. Arthur Dean of New York, who is well known to most of those here present. This result could not have been accomplished, moreover, had not a number of our good friends firmly resisted bloc pressure to vote against us.

The United States Government has made it plain that unless the conference approved its compromise proposal—involving a 6-mile territorial sea with a contiguous fishing zone of an additional 6 miles, in which historical fishing rights would have to be respected by the coastal state—this Government would continue to conform, and to expect others to conform, to the 3-mile limit now firmly established as customary international law. It is interesting to note that, as among the 3-, 6-, and 12-mile limits, the 3-mile limit was the only one that was not expressly rejected by the Geneva conference.

The attitudes and activities of the newly formed nations and the members of blocs at the Geneva conference pose a serious and continuing problem for which I have no immediate answer. Such attitudes and activities in the political sphere are regrettable, but they are even more reprehensible when they appear at a conference dedicated to the statement, the codification, or the formulation of sound international law.

I do not wish to end upon too gloomy a note. The 86 nations represented at Geneva did get together constructively in order to agree upon many important facets of the law of the sea. These included agreement upon important rules relating to fisheries, to the high seas generally, and to the continental shelf, the last mentioned being the first time agreement has been reached upon this principle.

As far as this Government is concerned, the United States comes out of the Geneva conference with a greatly enhanced international reputation. I was deeply impressed by the fact that speaker after speaker, even those who were opposing the United States proposal, paid tribute to the honesty and sincerity of the United States and its clearly demonstrated willingness to compromise and, in so doing, to sacrifice valuable interests of its own. The attitude of our Government and its delegation compared most favorably with the monolithic immobility of the U.S.S.R. and its bloc. Again, we owe a deep debt of gratitude to Mr. Dean and the members of the delegation and their advisers.

As a closing note, I may inform you that the next political problem upon which the Legal Adviser will have occasion to speak involves, not the depths of the sea, but the far reaches of outer space.

Import Quota on Tung Nuts

White House press release dated April 28

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President has adopted the unanimous recommendation of the U.S. Tariff Commission in the case of tung nuts. Accordingly, the President issued a proclamation subjecting imports of tung nuts to the existing quota on imports of tung oil established by the President's proclamation of September 9, 1957,¹ under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended.

On February 19, 1958,² the President requested the Tariff Commission to investigate the need for restricting imports of tung nuts. The Commission reported on March 19, 1958, its unanimous findings and recommendation. The Commission's investigation and report were made pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, which authorizes the limitation of imports that interfere with the price-support programs of the Department of Agriculture.

The proclamation also makes a technical adjustment which provides that only direct shipments from supplying countries may be imported under the quota on tung oil and tung nuts.

PROCLAMATION 3236³

IMPOSING IMPORT QUOTAS ON TUNG NUTS

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), the Secretary of Agriculture advised me he had reason to believe that tung nuts are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render ineffective, or materially interfere with, the price-support program undertaken by the Department of Agriculture with respect to tung nuts and tung oil, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic tung nuts or tung oil with respect to which such program of the Department of Agriculture is being undertaken; and

WHEREAS, on February 19, 1958, I caused the United States Tariff Commission to make an investigation under the said section 22 with respect to this matter; and

WHEREAS the said Tariff Commission has made such investigation, and has reported to me its findings and recommendation made in connection therewith; and

WHEREAS, on the basis of the said investigation and report of the Tariff Commission, I find that tung nuts are practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to interfere materially with the said price-support program; and

WHEREAS I find and declare that the imposition of the limitations on imports of tung nuts hereinafter proclaimed is shown by such investigation of the Tariff Commission to be necessary in order that the entry of tung nuts will not materially interfere with the said price-support program; and

WHEREAS, on September 9, 1957, I issued Proclamation No. 3200 (22 F. R. 7265) limiting the quantity of tung oil that may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the periods specified in that proclamation; and

WHEREAS I find that the limitations on imports of tung nuts hereinafter proclaimed will not reduce the permissible total quantity of tung nuts which may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption to proportionately less than 50 per centum of the average annual quantity of tung nuts entered during the representative period from November 1, 1952, to October 31, 1956, inclusive;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, do hereby proclaim that no tung nuts shall be permitted to be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in any quota period specified in the proclamation of September 9, 1957, after the total aggregate quantity of tung nuts and tung oil entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption in any such quota period has reached, in terms of oil, the equivalent of the quota for tung oil specified in that proclamation for such quota period. For the purposes of this proclamation the oil content of tung nuts shall be computed on the basis of 15.9 pounds for each 100 pounds of whole nuts, and on the basis of 35.8 pounds of oil for each 100 pounds of decorticated nuts.

In order to assure equitable treatment to supplying countries, all tung oil and tung nuts entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption pursuant to the proclamation of September 9, 1957, or this proclamation, shall have been a direct shipment destined to the United States on an original through bill of lading from the country of production.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 28th day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and [SEAL] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.

By the President:
JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1957, p. 542.

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 468.

³ 23 Fed. Reg. 2959.

Renegotiation of Fruit and Vegetable Concessions by Canada

Press release 214 dated April 24

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Committee for Reciprocity Information on trade agreement matters is requesting views from interested persons on certain additional modifications of tariff concessions which Canada proposes to negotiate under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Views are requested with respect to the attached list of fruit and vegetable concessions to be modified. No U.S. tariff reductions are involved.

On September 16, 1957, and again on November 8, 1957, the Committee for Reciprocity Information announced U.S. participation in tariff negotiations at Geneva arising from the desire of Canada and other countries to modify or withdraw certain of their GATT concessions.¹ In addition, Canada has announced its intention to negotiate the modification of concessions on certain fresh and canned fruits and vegetables. Most of these concessions were initially negotiated with the United States. The proposed modifications consist chiefly of increases of the higher specific rates of duty now applicable during particular seasons and of the length of the period for which such higher seasonal rates of duty are applied.

During July, August, and September 1957 the Canadian Tariff Board held public hearings in the course of an investigation ordered by the Minister of Finance respecting the production, distribution, and imports of fruits and vegetables. The Board recommended certain tariff changes, which are shown on the attached listing. These recommendations do not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Government.

Under procedures established by the Contracting Parties to the agreement, a country proposing to renegotiate a concession by modifying or withdrawing it is required to negotiate regarding compensatory adjustments with the country with

which the concession was originally negotiated and with any other country having a principal supplying interest in the concession item. It is required to consult with countries having a substantial trade interest. In such negotiations the country proposing the modification or withdrawal usually offers new concessions by way of compensation. If no settlement is possible on the basis of such new concessions as may be offered, the countries adversely affected may withdraw or make upward adjustment of one or more concessions to the first country which are of a value substantially equivalent to the concession which the first country is modifying or withdrawing.

The Committee for Reciprocity Information is an interagency group which receives the views of interested persons regarding proposed or existing trade agreements. The committee consists of a member of the U.S. Tariff Commission and representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury, and the International Cooperation Administration.

In preparation for the proposed negotiations with Canada the Committee for Reciprocity Information would welcome views from interested parties with regard to the possible effect on U.S. trade of modification or withdrawal of the concessions on the items in the attached list. In addition the committee invites the submission of views regarding concessions which the United States might seek from Canada as compensation, as well as views concerning possible upward adjustment in U.S. rates of duty on commodities of which Canada is an important supplier and which are now the subject of concessions to Canada in the General Agreement.

Views on the foregoing matters should be submitted to the Committee for Reciprocity Information by the close of business on June 16, 1958. All communications, in 15 copies, should be addressed to: The Secretary of the Committee for Reciprocity Information, Tariff Commission Building, Washington 25, D. C.

If any interested party considers that his views cannot be adequately expressed to the committee in a written brief, he should make this known to the secretary of the committee, who will then arrange for oral presentation before the committee.

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1957, p. 581, and Nov. 25, 1957, p. 850.

LIST OF ITEMS

GATT Concessions on Certain Fresh and Canned Fruits and Vegetables Proposed for Modification by Canada

Tariff item number	Description of product	Present rate of duty	Canadian Tariff Board recommendations*
83 (b)	New potatoes (January 1-June 14, inclusive)	Free	No duty-free period
84 (h)	Onions, in their natural state, n. o. p., per lb. (40 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1½¢ Split period: maximum 44 weeks
85 (a)	Mushrooms, fresh . . . per pound (52 weeks maximum)	3½¢ or 10 p. c.	5¢
85 (b)	Mushrooms, dried or otherwise preserved	12½ p. c.	15 p. c.
87 (a)	Asparagus . . . per pound (8 weeks maximum)	3½¢ or 10 p. c.	3½¢ - 14 weeks maximum
87 (c)	Brussels sprouts	10 p. c.	3¢ - 16 weeks maximum
87 (d)	Cabbage . . . per pound (Split period: maximum 26 weeks)	½¢ or 10 p. c.	½¢ - Split period: maximum 30 weeks
EX 87 (e)	Carrots . . . per pound (Split period: maximum 26 weeks)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1¢ - Split period: maximum 40 weeks
87 (f)	Cauliflower, fresh . . . per pound (12 weeks maximum)	¾¢ or 10 p. c.	¾¢ - Split period: maximum 20 weeks
87 (g)	Celery . . . per pound (Split period: maximum 24 weeks)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	2¢ - Split period: maximum 24 weeks
87 (h)	Cucumbers (except for pickling) . . . per pound (12 weeks maximum)	2½¢ or 10 p. c.	2½¢ - Split period: maximum 22 weeks
87 (i)	Lettuce . . . per pound (Split period: maximum 18 weeks)	.85¢ or 10 p. c.	.85¢ - Split period: maximum 26 weeks
EX 87 (p)	Witloof or endive	Free	10 p. c.
87 (q)	Eggplant	Free	10 p. c.
EX 87 (r)	Peppers	10 p. c.	1¢ - 8 weeks maximum
EX 87 (r)	Parsnips	10 p. c.	1¢ - Split period: maximum 36 weeks
EX 87 (r)	Corn on the cob	10 p. c.	1½¢ - 8 weeks maximum
EX 89 (e)	Canned asparagus	15 p. c.	22½ p. c.
EX 90 (e)	Asparagus, frozen	17½ p. c.	22½ p. c.
EX 90 (e)	Brussels sprouts, frozen	17½ p. c.	22½ p. c.
92 (a)	Apricots . . . per pound (10 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1½¢
EX 92 (b)	Cherries, sour . . . per pound (7 weeks maximum)	2¢ or 10 p. c.	3¢ - 10 weeks maximum
92 (c)	Cranberries . . . per pound (12 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	2¢
92 (d)	Peaches . . . per pound (9 weeks maximum)	1½¢ or 10 p. c.	2¢
92 (e)	Pears . . . per pound (15 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1¢ - 22 weeks maximum
EX 92 (f)	Fresh prunes . . . per pound (10 weeks maximum)	1¢ or 10 p. c.	1½¢ - 12 weeks maximum
EX 105 (f)	Cranberry jelly and cranberry sauce or preserve . . . per pound	3¢	3½¢
EX 105 (i)	Cherries, frozen . . . per pound	2¢	3¢
EX 105 (i)	Peaches, frozen . . . per pound	2¢	2½¢
109 (a)	Peaches, canned . . . per pound	2¢	2½¢
EX 106 (b)	Apricots, canned . . . per pound	2¢	2½¢
EX 106 (e)	Cherries, canned . . . per pound	1¢	1½¢
EX 106 (e)	Prunes, canned . . . per pound	1¢	1½¢

The Canadian Tariff Board also recommended an additional duty of 5 percent on green beans, brussels sprouts, carrots, beets, cauliflower, lettuce, peas, parsnips, or corn on the cob, when imported during the period of application of the seasonal specific duty, in packages weighing 5 pounds or less.

* Report by the Tariff Board Relative to the Investigation Ordered by the Minister of Finance Respecting Fruits and Vegetables, Reference No. 124, Oct. 15, 1957.

The Board recommends no change in the off-season rate of duty of 10 percent ad valorem where it is at present applied. The recommendations of the Canadian Tariff Board do not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Government.

President Amends Procedures on U.S. Citizens Employed by U.N.

White House press release dated April 23

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on April 23 issued an Executive order relating to investigation of U.S. citizens employed or being considered for employment on the secretariat of the United Nations.

Heretofore it has been required, under Executive Order No. 10422,¹ that a full field investigation be conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in all cases involving U.S. citizens employed or being considered for employment on the internationally recruited staff of the United Nations for a period exceeding 90 days. The order issued on April 23 transfers the jurisdiction to investigate these cases to the Civil Service Commission. However, the Commission will continue to refer to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for a full field investigation cases in which there is developed derogatory information reflecting on the loyalty of the individual concerned.

The change effected by this order implements one of the recommendations of the Commission on Government Security (the Wright Commission). It is anticipated that the time elapsing between the initiation and completion of an investigation will be shortened considerably under the order and that substantial annual savings in expenditures for investigations will be realized.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10763²

AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10422, AS AMENDED,
PRESCRIBING PROCEDURES FOR MAKING AVAILABLE TO THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CERTAIN
INFORMATION CONCERNING UNITED STATES CITIZENS
EMPLOYED OR BEING CONSIDERED FOR EMPLOYMENT ON
THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, including the Charter of the United Nations, and as President of the United States, it is ordered that paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Part I of Executive Order No. 10422 of January 9, 1953, as amended by Executive Order No. 10459³ of June 2, 1953, be, and they are hereby, amended to read as follows:

"2. The Secretary of State shall forward the information received from the Secretary General of the United Nations to the United States Civil Service Commission, and the Commission shall conduct an investigation.

"3. The investigation conducted by the Civil Service Commission shall be a full background investigation conforming to the investigative standards of the Civil Service Commission, and shall include reference to the following:

- (a) Federal Bureau of Investigation files.
- (b) Civil Service Commission files.
- (c) Military and naval intelligence files as appropriate.
- (d) The files of any other appropriate Government investigative or intelligence agency.
- (e) The files of appropriate committees of the Congress.
- (f) Local law-enforcement files at the place of residence and employment of the person, including municipal, county, and State law-enforcement files.
- (g) Schools and colleges attended by the person.
- (h) Former employers of the person.
- (i) References given by the person.
- (j) Any other appropriate source.

However, in the case of short-term employees whose employment does not exceed ninety days, such investigation need not include reference to subparagraphs (f) through (j) of this paragraph.

"4. Whenever information disclosed with respect to any person being investigated is derogatory, within the standard set forth in Part II of this order, the United States Civil Service Commission shall forward such information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Bureau shall conduct a full field investigation of such person."

This order shall become effective on July 1, 1958.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 23, 1958.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 62.

² 23 Fed. Reg. 2767.

³ BULLETIN of June 22, 1953, p. 882.

9th Plenary Assembly of CCIR To Meet at Los Angeles in 1959

The Department of State announced on April 28 (press release 227) the acceptance of Mayor Norris Poulson's invitation to hold the 9th plenary assembly of the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) at Los Angeles, Calif., from April 2 to 30, 1959.

The International Radio Consultative Committee is one of the principal organs of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and is concerned with the improvement of radio communications throughout the world. The work of the CCIR [Comité consultatif international des radiocommunications] is carried on largely by special study groups which examine technical radio questions. Meeting every 3 years, the plenary assemblies of the CCIR adopt the recommendations of these study groups, formulate a program of study-group activity for the 3-year period until the next assembly, and decide administrative and budgetary matters for the operation of the CCIR.

The plenary assembly will provide an excellent forum for the exchange of information between American radio communications experts and their counterparts from all over the world. Official delegations from some 50 countries as well as representatives from private operating agencies, international organizations, science, and industry are expected to attend the CCIR plenary assembly.

TREATY INFORMATION

President Withdraws Certain Treaties From the Senate

Message of President Eisenhower

White House press release dated April 22

To the Senate of the United States: With a view to further study and consideration of certain treaties in the light of developments since they were formulated, and in order to assist the Senate in

placing its Treaty Calendar on a relatively current basis, I desire to withdraw from the Senate the following treaties and understanding:

Executive C, 80th Congress, 1st Session—
Conciliation treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Manila November 16, 1946.

Executive T, 80th Congress, 1st Session—
Convention Concerning Social Security for Seafarers, adopted by the International Labor Conference, Seattle, June 6-29, 1946 (ILO Convention No. 70).

Executive III, 80th Congress, 1st Session—
Inter-American Convention on the Rights of the Author in Literary, Scientific, and Artistic Works, signed at Washington June 22, 1946 (Inter-American Copyright Convention).

Executive G, 81st Congress, 1st Session—
Convention Concerning Statistics of Wages and Hours of Work in the Principal Mining and Manufacturing Industries, Including Building and Construction, and in Agriculture, adopted by the International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 2-22, 1938 (ILO Convention No. 63).

Executive B, 82d Congress, 1st Session—
Convention Concerning the Organization of the Employment Service, adopted by the International Labor Conference, San Francisco, June 17-July 10, 1948 (ILO Convention No. 88).

Executive II, 82d Congress, 1st Session—
Understanding with respect to ILO Convention No. 63, concerning statistics of wages and hours of work in principal mining and manufacturing industries, including building and construction, and in agriculture.

Executive J, 82d Congress, 1st Session—
Convention Concerning Vacation Holidays With Pay for Seafarers, adopted by the International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 8-July 2, 1949 (ILO Convention No. 91).

Executive K, 82d Congress, 1st Session—
Convention Concerning Crew Accommodations on Board Ship (revised 1949), adopted by the International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 8-July 2, 1949 (ILO Convention No. 92).

Executive L, 82d Congress, 1st Session—
Convention Concerning Wages, Hours of Work on Board Ship and Manning (revised 1949), adopted by the International Labor Conference, Geneva, June 8-July 2, 1949 (ILO Convention No. 93).

If found to be desirable in the light of the further study and consideration, one or more of the treaties listed above may be resubmitted with a fresh appraisal of their provisions.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
April 22, 1958

Agreement Concluded With Argentina on Meteorological Sampling Tests

Press release 226 dated April 28

The United States and Argentina have concluded an agreement under which the U.S. Air Force is authorized to conduct in Argentina, for a period of about 18 months, meteorological sampling tests in the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere. The U.S. Air Force unit will consist of approximately 150 members and equipment necessary to insure successful completion of its scientific research task.

The final conclusions drawn from the tests, which will be available upon completion of the program, are expected to be of general scientific value and will be furnished to the Government of Argentina. It is believed that the scientific data gained will make the sampling program of benefit to both countries. The valuable support extended by the Argentine Government and the Argentine Air Force to this scientific research mission is another example of the cooperative spirit existing between the two countries.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, April 29, 1958.

Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and acceptance: Morocco, April 25, 1958.
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Opened for signature at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance: Morocco, April 25, 1958.

Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.
Adherence effective: Ireland, May 14, 1958.

Safety at Sea

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic ice patrol. Opened for signature at Washington January 4, 1956. Entered into force July 5, 1956. TIAS 3597.
Acceptance deposited: Liberia, April 23, 1958.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Reciprocal trade agreement. Signed at Washington February 2, 1935. Entered into force January 1, 1936. 49 Stat. 3808.

Terminates: June 19, 1958.¹

Agreement supplementing reciprocal trade agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro April 17, 1935. Entered into force January 1, 1936. 49 Stat. 3808.

Terminates: June 19, 1958.¹

Agreement supplementing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of October 30, 1947 (TIAS 1700). Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro June 30, 1948. Entered into force June 30, 1948. TIAS 1811.

Terminates: June 19, 1958.¹

Colombia

Agreement amending the memorandum of understanding attached to the agricultural commodities agreement of March 14, 1958 (TIAS 4015). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá March 20 and April 23, 1958. Entered into force April 23, 1958.

Agreement further amending the memorandum of understanding attached to the agricultural commodities agreement of March 14, 1958 (TIAS 4015). Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá April 10 and 23, 1958. Entered into force April 23, 1958.

Iran

Air transport agreement. Signed at Tehran January 16, 1957.

Entered into force: April 17, 1958 (date of receipt by the United States of notification by Iran of its ratification).

Nicaragua

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Managua January 21, 1956.

Ratifications exchanged: April 24, 1958.

Enters into force: May 24, 1958.

Philippines

Agreements supplementing and amending the military assistance agreement of April 27, 1955 (TIAS 3231), as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila April 14, 1958. Entered into force April 14, 1958.

Spain

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of January 27, 1958 (TIAS 4010). Signed at Madrid April 10, 1958. Entered into force April 10, 1958.

¹ Notice of intention to terminate given by Brazil Dec. 19, 1957.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 28-May 4

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Releases issued prior to April 28 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 214 of April 24, 222 of April 25, and 224 of April 26.

No.	Date	Subject
†225	4/28	Delegation to NATO ministerial meeting.
226	4/28	U.S.-Argentine agreement on meteorological sampling tests.
227	4/28	CCIR assembly to be held at Los Angeles (rewrite).
†228	4/29	Delegation to 41st (maritime) session of International Labor Conference (rewrite).
*229	4/30	Five FSO's sworn in as career ministers.
230	4/29	U.S.-Soviet meetings on film exchanges.
*231	4/30	Shipment of pesticide to Iran.
*232	4/30	Merchant, Whiteman to receive National Civil Service League awards.
233	4/30	U.S. release of blocked Egyptian funds.
234	5/1	Dulles: Arctic inspection zone (combined with No. 236).
†235	5/1	Holmes: "The United States and Africa: An Official Viewpoint."
236	5/1	Dulles: news conference.
†237	5/2	Dulles: departure for NATO meeting.
†238	5/2	Robertson: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
239	5/2	Dulles: "The Strategy of Peace."
239-A	5/2	Partial revision of above text.
†240	5/2	Haitian financial mission.
†241	5/3	Tripartite statement on summit meeting.
242	5/4	Reply to Polish note on Rapacki Plan.
*243	5/2	Delegation to inauguration of Costa Rican President.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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TREATIES IN FORCE

A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1958

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

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Bulletin

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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Superintendent

VOL. XXXVIII, No. 987 • PUBLICATION 6646

May 26, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

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The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 20, 1958).

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Our Changing World

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

I have just arrived a few minutes ago from Europe. I attended, at Copenhagen, a meeting of the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.² That beautiful city of tradition and culture is a vivid reminder of the high ideals and vigorous endeavors by which Europe enriched our own American heritage. From Copenhagen I went to Berlin and saw that citadel of freedom being sustained by the stalwart people of Germany. Minnesota bears the imprint of the North Atlantic nations. One finds here the Viking zest for adventure, industry, thriftiness, devotion to the rights of the individual, and love of liberty.

One of the outstanding characteristics of the Scandinavian people has been that, on the one hand, they are stubborn when it comes to fundamental principles and, on the other hand, they readily change the political framework within which those principles make themselves manifest. For example, three of the five Scandinavian political units as we know them today assumed their present national independence only within this century—Norway, 1905; Finland, 1917; and Iceland, 1944—but within a somewhat kaleidoscopic political scene they have ever maintained spiritual and cultural solidarity. That is the theme I would emphasize today. We live in a world of change. Indeed, change is the law of life, and vitality is often measured by change. That, however, does not mean that everything changes. There are basic truths which are enduring and to which we must hold fast if change is to be orderly and conducive to good.

Sometimes rigidity and flexibility are posed as concepts that are mutually exclusive. Actually they can and should go hand in hand. Enduring concepts of justice and right provide the dynamism that assures both the fact of change and the character of change.

The United States has sought to play worthy its part in a world where change is inevitable and where change can be made benign if it reflects fundamental concepts as to the proper relation of man to God and of man to man.

Our nation was founded by men of faith. They sought here not just to build a secure home for themselves but to conduct a great experiment in human liberty, the impact of which would be felt throughout the world. They were imbued with a sense of mission. When our nation was small, at its beginning, we conceived that our ability to change the world would be primarily through the influence of our conduct and example. We built our society as one of extraordinary political, economic, and spiritual vigor. It did, indeed, attract attention all around the world and thus influenced the course of world events. We grew in stature, largely because sharing was a central theme. We welcomed here those from other lands to partake equally the advantages and opportunities of the founders. The original States did not make of themselves a closed preserve. Their union was open to adherence by others, and the 13 original States on the Atlantic seaboard became 48 spanning a continent.

As our nation has grown, the whole world has shrunk under the impact of new means and speeds of travel and communication. The world of today is relatively much smaller than was our continent 100 years ago. Under these changed condi-

¹ Made at the Statehood Day ceremonies of the Minnesota Statehood Centennial at Minneapolis, Minn., on May 11 (press release 258).

² See p. 850.

tions our nation continues to seek to propagate the enduring concepts of our founders.

Our States could not have survived in peaceful prosperity had each asserted total independence and rejected interdependence. Likewise, in the world of today nations cannot survive in peaceful prosperity if each emphasizes only independence and neglects interdependence.

Those whose spirit faithfully reproduces the spirit of the past—be it the past of the North Atlantic or of the United States—must seek to apply on a worldwide basis this principle of interdependence.

United Nations

The United Nations represents such an effort. It exerts a great influence throughout the world. Nevertheless it fails to satisfy all of the needs of the nations. Its Security Council can be rendered impotent by the veto of any one of the five permanent members. Nine days ago the Soviet Union cast its 83d veto³ and thereby struck a grave blow to the good neighborliness and harmony which the charter prescribes.

The General Assembly makes recommendations, but it cannot act. Its influence is great with those countries which have what our Declaration of Independence calls a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." But it is otherwise with nations which lack such respect. For example, the General Assembly resolutions with regard to Korea have been ignored to this day by the Soviet Union and by Communist China, and its resolutions with respect to Hungary have been defied by the Soviet Union.

The United States does its very best to support the United Nations. But for the reason I have indicated it has been necessary to supplement the United Nations by other security measures. These have taken the form, principally, of collective defense associations, as specifically authorized by the United Nations Charter.

One of these collective security arrangements is established by the North Atlantic Treaty. The foreign ministers of the 15 NATO countries have just been meeting in Copenhagen. That meeting has provided a good demonstration of consultation and coordination without the sacrifice of independence.

There are, of course, other such associations.

There is the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization—SEATO—the Baghdad Pact, and the oldest of all, the Pan American Union, now the Organization of American States.

By participation in such regional and defensive groupings the nations supplement the United Nations where it is weak.

Mutual Security Program

A further expression of the principle of interdependence is our mutual security program, sometimes called foreign aid. We have been conducting this program in various forms now for 10 years since the first such major program, the Marshall plan, was adopted. That plan was designed to bring economic recovery to a Europe that had been dislocated and devastated by war.

The nations which originally benefited from that European recovery plan no longer need economic aid. Their economies flourish, and they have become important trade customers of the United States, contributing greatly to our own economic welfare. They also contribute significantly to the collective military establishment of NATO. Our 1948 investment in Europe has paid off many times over.

Today our mutual security programs serve primarily to provide military assistance, and in a few cases financial assistance, to equip and maintain armed forces needed to protect areas which are vitally important to the free world, including the United States. For example, the cooperating free-world countries have ground forces of about 5.6 million men. But less than one million of these are Americans. Nearly 5 million are from other lands. They are to some extent equipped and otherwise helped out by our mutual security program.

I can assure you that it is far cheaper to give security that way than for the United States to raise and maintain the additional military force that we would need if we stood alone.

We are providing a certain amount of economic assistance—principally in the form of loans not gifts—to the less developed countries and particularly the newly independent countries. They are desperately eager to improve the lot of their people. They want to do this in freedom. But if they cannot find the way in freedom, they will be under strong compulsion to accept the assistance of the Soviet Union in building a materialistic totalitarian society. These Soviet offers are

³ BULLETIN of May 19, 1958, p. 816.

alluring on their face. But they are motivated—and conditioned—by a desire to subvert the genuine independence of the countries which accept them. That would be tragic for them and for us. Our nation wants and needs an environment of freedom. We dare not sit idly by to be more and more closely encircled by a hostile despotism which seeks to strangle us.

Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program

Collective security measures cannot alone suffice to serve our ideals. The independence and prosperity of nations must also be served and enriched by trading the products of their labors. In the modern world, trade is inevitably a part of the whole complex of a nation's international relations and, indeed, of its security. In the United States we have given recognition and expression to this fact through our reciprocal trade agreements program. That program, originated 24 years ago and since extended 10 times by the Congress, provides our farmers and our industrial workers with assured markets throughout the world. Since the program was inaugurated, our foreign trade has expanded nearly tenfold. The program is not just one of tariff reduction; it realistically takes account of the needs of some segments of our economy by providing restraints on foreign competition where protection is justified by the totality of our national interest.

Our reciprocal trade program not only contributes to our economic welfare. It contributes to our political and military security. To see this one needs only recall the period of the early thirties. We then sought relief from economic depression by raising our tariffs and devaluing our currency, without regard to the effect on others who were largely dependent on international trade. We did not get the relief we expected at home. But worse than that was the fact that our example was taken by others, notably Germany and Japan, as justification for policies of extreme nationalism and of expansion, on the theory that economic livelihood was no longer attainable by normal methods of peaceful trade.

We cannot afford now to risk repetition of the disaster that followed that period. The renewal of the reciprocal trade agreements legislation is necessary both for our economic welfare and for our peace.

We seek also to apply the principle of inter-

dependence to the fields newly opened by science and exploration. There is the vast new area of physical power now made possible by the splitting of the atom. There we seek such international controls and safeguards as will assure "atoms for peace" and, as President Eisenhower put it, "find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

Take outer space. It is now for the first time becoming accessible to the devices of man, and soon to man himself. We seek that the new world beyond the limits of our earthly sphere shall be used only for peaceful purposes and not for purposes of war.

Then there is the continent of Antarctica now being intensively explored by the scientists of many countries cooperating in the Geophysical Year. We propose to establish in Antarctica an international regime which will prevent the monopolizing of any part of this new continent for the military purposes of any nation but assure an "open door" for the peaceful pursuits of all mankind.

Then, if we look north, we see new arteries of travel opening up over north polar regions. We want to see established in the neighborhood an international system of inspection so that none need fear that these new polar routes will be traveled by bombers or by missiles unleashing surprise attack. We want only peaceful travel along these new paths, such as is developed by our Scandinavian friends to bring our nations closer.

Adapting to Change

In such ways as these we seek to carry forward in this foreshortened world the dynamic concepts of our founders. The spirit is the same—the spirit of the Viking, the spirit of the American frontiersman, constantly seeking new horizons, facing new challenges, and responding to them. These responses manifest our recognition of the fact that change is inevitable, that it is the law of life, and those who do not adapt themselves to change, who only oppose it blindly, not only lose the thrill of adventure and the joy of creation but are themselves destroyed by change.

As we thus partake of change, we strive that that change shall reflect certain values that are timeless and unchangeable. We hold to the basic truths expressed by all the great religions—that

man is spiritual, having his origin and his destiny in God. We hold to certain political applications of those truths, as proclaimed by the Magna Charta, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and our own Declaration of Independence.

We continue to believe that men are indeed endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights including the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and that just government derives its powers from the consent of the governed. And we believe, as Abraham Lincoln said of our Declaration of Independence, that its principles mean "liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weights would be lifted from the shoulders of all men. . . ."

These are principles that are challenged today by the adherents of materialistic atheism. In the face of that challenge we do not stubbornly stand still. We continue to pursue the path of change. But we do not change our principles.

In that respect we are unchanging, steadfast, and uncompromising. Only thus can we be true to the ideals brought to this nation from so many lands by God-fearing peoples, who consolidated here a new nation, who began here a new experiment, and who, through those who inherit the great tradition, bring a new and dynamic approach to the problems of an ever-changing world.

NATO Ministerial Council Meets at Copenhagen

Following is the text of the final communique issued at Copenhagen on May 7 following a 3-day meeting of the Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, together with a statement made by Secretary Dulles upon his departure from Washington on May 2 and an announcement of the U.S. delegation.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 251 dated May 7

The North Atlantic Council held its spring ministerial meeting in Copenhagen from May 5 to 7, 1958.

2. The Foreign Ministers of the fifteen NATO countries have deepened and strengthened their mutual understanding and their unity of purpose. NATO, a defensive organization, is now much more than merely a military alliance. It is becoming a true community of free nations. Within this community, to a degree unprecedented in history, countries are carrying out a policy of close cooperation in peacetime without abandoning their independence. This development is one of the most significant and promising events of our time.

3. The Council reviewed the activities of the alliance and examined the international situation. For the first subject of discussion, the Council had before it the report submitted by the Secretary General. The Council was in agreement with this analysis of the work of the alliance in the past year. They agreed in particular that the outstanding achievement had been the remarkable progress made in the strengthening of political consultation. This has been successfully applied to an increasing number of problems and has led to coordination of policy on major questions of common interest. The Council also expressed its satisfaction with the results of the recent conference of Defence Ministers and with the good start made in the field of scientific cooperation.

4. The Ministers recognized that political unity and the efficient organization of defence were not enough. Economic cooperation is also essential between the members of the alliance. Every effort should be made to ensure economic prosperity, notably by the expansion of international trade and by aid to underdeveloped countries. Consultations on methods and machinery for such cooperation will take place within the alliance. The Ministers attach special importance to the successful conclusion of the economic negotiations now being undertaken and to the establishment of close ties between the European countries and the whole free world.

5. During their consideration of the international situation the Ministers had a discussion on the question of a possible summit conference. The Council believes that summit meetings are desirable if they offer prospects of reaching settlements on important questions. The Council considers that conferences at the summit are not the only way, or necessarily the best way, of conduct-

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ing negotiations or reducing international tensions. In any event, such conferences must be properly prepared and take place in a favorable atmosphere.

6. The Ministers regretted that during the last few weeks the Soviet Union has made the preparations for a possible summit conference more difficult by posing unreasonable conditions. The Soviet Union has recently aggravated international tension by its veto in the Security Council of the United States proposals to reduce the risks of surprise attack over the Arctic.¹

7. Despite the disappointment and doubts to which the Soviet attitude gives rise, the NATO Governments will not be discouraged nor give up their attachment to the principle of negotiation.

8. Should a summit conference take place at this time it should consider certain important problems, among others the German problem, which were identified by the Heads of Governments meeting at Geneva in 1955 and on which, unfortunately, little or no progress towards a solution has been made. Controlled disarmament, desired so ardently by all peoples, should be one of the main questions on the agenda. The proposals made by the Western Powers on 29th August, 1957 and approved by a large majority in the United Nations could afford a reasonable basis for this discussion.

9. The Council expressed the hope that it might yet prove possible, in spite of repeated Soviet refusal, to inaugurate expert technical discussions, between representatives of the Soviet Union and of the Western Powers principally concerned, on detailed measures on control over disarmament. Agreement on measures necessary, for example, to prevent surprise attack or to detect nuclear explosions might go far towards demonstrating the possibility of agreement on disarmament, improving its prospects and accelerating its application when reached. In order to prepare the way for such agreement the Council will consider the possibility of carrying out studies and experiments on the technical problems of inspection and control.

10. In conclusion, the Ministers confirmed the full agreement of their governments on the basic principles of the alliance, its goals and the methods of obtaining them.

¹ BULLETIN of May 19, 1958, p. 816.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY DULLES

Press release 237 dated May 2

As in past years I am going to meet with the other Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries. Together we will take stock of progress made since the Heads of Government met in Paris last December, and we will discuss the problems which lie ahead.

Our meeting this spring takes place in the ancient and beautiful city of Copenhagen.

During the course of this meeting we expect to review the international situation in the light of current developments with particular reference to the various subjects of interest to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO has for 9 years made its vital contribution to the preservation of peace and stability in Europe. We now face new challenges in this common endeavor. I am confident that we will face these challenges firmly resolved to maintain and develop the effectiveness of our defense while we continue in our search for just and lasting peace.

On the way home from Copenhagen I will stop in Berlin for a few hours to observe the progress which has been made in this remarkable city since my last visit there in 1954. Thereafter I will go to Paris for a day, where I will attend the regular annual meeting of American ambassadors to Western European governments.

U.S. DELEGATION

Press release 225 dated April 28

The U.S. Representative at the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers scheduled to be held at Copenhagen May 5-7 will be Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

In addition to the Secretary of State the U.S. delegation will consist of the following:

Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
W. Randolph Burgess, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Phillip K. Crowe, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Phillip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Edward L. Freers, Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs

Joseph N. Greene, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
John S. Guthrie, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Robert H. McBride, Deputy Director, Office of European Regional Affairs
Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Val Peterson, American Ambassador to Denmark
William J. Porter, Director, Office of Northern African Affairs
G. Frederiek Reinhardt, Counselor of the Department of State
Jacques J. Reinstein, Director, Office of German Affairs
Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
Mansfield D. Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
B. E. L. Timmons, Director, Office of European Regional Affairs

U.S., U.K., and France Agree to Separate Talks at Moscow

TRIPARTITE STATEMENT OF MAY 3

Press release 241 dated May 3

Following is the text of an identical statement presented to the Soviet Government on May 3 by the British, French, and United States Ambassadors at Moscow.

The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France have noted with regret that the Soviet Government, in its Aide Memoire of April 26, has rejected their proposal for joint meetings between the three Ambassadors and the Soviet Foreign Minister to begin the preparatory work for a Summit meeting and, in doing so, has raised an unnecessary obstacle in the task of carrying this work forward. As the Soviet Government points out in its Aide Memoire, no progress has been made toward agreement on the range of questions to be dealt with nor in determining what questions offer prospects for agreement.

The three powers have not changed their view that progress could be made more rapidly by joint meetings rather than by a series of separate interviews. Since they desire to move ahead with the work itself, however, and in view of the fact that the Soviet Government agrees that the Ambassadors will discuss substantive issues, they are prepared to meet the Soviet Government's prefer-

ence for separate interviews. Their acceptance of this procedure, however, does not prejudice in any way the composition of any future meetings. Following the discussion of the agenda for a Summit meeting as proposed in the tripartite statement of April 24, the three Ambassadors will be prepared to discuss the matter of a date and place of a Foreign Ministers' meeting and what countries should be invited to be represented at this meeting.

The three Ambassadors, therefore, stand ready to meet the Soviet Foreign Minister for this purpose.

SOVIET AIDE MEMOIRE OF APRIL 26¹

Unofficial translation

The Soviet Government has studied the considerations of the Government of the United States set forth in its statements of Apr. 16² and 24 in connection with the Soviet Government's proposal for earliest completion of preparations for a summit meeting made in its aide-memoire of Apr. 11, 1958.³

The aforementioned statements made it clear that the Government of the United States has agreed to the Soviet proposal to begin an exchange of opinion in Moscow on preparing a foreign ministers meeting. At the same time, a study of the statements leads to the conclusion that the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France are actually acting in such a way as to delay the convocation of a summit meeting indefinitely.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw attention to the fact that though more than four months have elapsed since the Soviet Union introduced its proposal to hold a summit conference, the Government of the United States, like the governments of Great Britain and France, has not yet replied to the questions pertaining to preparations for such a conference, namely, its date, place, and composition. The coordination of the range of questions to be discussed at the conference is in no better state.

The exchange of opinion which has so far taken place with the Western powers, including talks by the Soviet Foreign Minister with the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, and France on Apr. 17 and 18, does not allow a determination of what questions, in their opinion, are ripe for discussion which could yield positive results.

As is known, the Soviet Government, for its part, has not only introduced concrete proposals about a summit agenda as well as about other issues pertaining to the

¹ BULLETIN of May 12, 1958, p. 759.

² Handed to U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson at Moscow on Apr. 26 by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

³ BULLETIN of May 5, 1958, p. 727.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 728.

convocation of the conference, but has also met the desires of the Western powers half way by agreeing to carry out preparatory work for the conference through diplomatic channels and a meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs.

At the moment the main task is the earliest completion of the preparatory work for a summit conference which should insure a decisive turn toward an improvement of the international climate as a whole. In this connection the Soviet Government reaffirms its considerations set forth in its aide-memoire of Apr. 11 on the question of speeding up the preparations for a summit meeting.

As for the exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels on the preparations for a foreign ministers meeting, it is intended that that exchange of opinion should concentrate on issues pertaining directly to the organization of that meeting, namely, the time and place of the foreign ministers meeting and its composition. It is not precluded that during the meeting at the ambassadorial level, and in the course of the foreign ministers conference, an exchange of opinion may be held, in case of necessity and by common agreement, on some of the issues which the sides propose to place on the summit agenda in order to explore the advisability of placing this or that question on the agenda of such a conference and the possibility of adopting mutually acceptable decisions on them.

As for the question touched upon in the statements of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France on Apr. 24 concerning joint talks between a Soviet representative and the three ambassadors, that statement makes it clear that the governments of the three powers are now proposing to hold joint meetings of the three ambassadors with the Soviet Foreign Minister to carry out the necessary preparations for a foreign ministers meeting.

That proposal, which, incidentally, the Western powers had not advanced in any of their previous documents, cannot be considered acceptable because such a conference would be tantamount to a four-power conference in which three states of the North Atlantic alliance and only one state of the Warsaw treaty organization would be taking part. This circumstance was already pointed out by the Foreign Minister in his talks with the three ambassadors. It was stressed that this might give rise to certain complications in the talks and therefore should be avoided.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state that, as before, it regards a preliminary exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels by means of talks between the Soviet Foreign Minister with each of the ambassadors separately to be the most expedient and conforming to the standing practice of exchanging opinion through diplomatic channels in such cases.

If, however, the governments of the three powers should prefer to exchange opinions through diplomatic channels in some other form, in the form of a conference of ambassadors in Moscow with the Soviet Foreign Minister, in that case the parity principle should be adhered to as the basic principle in determining the composition of a summit conference with the participation of the

heads of government, which would preclude any discrimination and would guarantee their equality.

Needless to say, at the summit conference, or in the course of its preparation, no questions may be solved by a vote, by an adoption of decisions by a formal majority vote.

But at the conference, at which an exchange of opinion will be held for the purpose of arriving at decisions acceptable to both sides, both sides should naturally be represented equally and only such an approach is objective and justified.

In this connection the Soviet Government proposes that a conference of ambassadors with the representative of the U.S.S.R., together with the ambassadors of the United States, Great Britain, and France, should also be attended by the ambassadors of Poland and Czechoslovakia. This was announced by the Soviet Foreign Minister in his talks with the ambassadors of Great Britain and France on Apr. 18.

The conference of such composition would take due cognizance of the parity principle and guarantee the equality of the sides so necessary for a fruitful preparation of a summit meeting. The prestige of the sides would also be fully maintained.

The Soviet Government believes that the course of preparations it has proposed facilitates the convocation of a summit conference in the nearest future if, naturally, such a conference is sincerely desired.

The Soviet Government would like to hope that an exchange of opinion through diplomatic channels would help the earliest solution of that issue.

In conformity with the above, the Soviet Foreign Minister is prepared to meet the ambassadors as soon as they are ready.

Eighty-first Anniversary of Rumanian Independence

Press release 255 dated May 9

Rumanians throughout the world will celebrate on May 10 the 81st anniversary of Rumania's achievement of national independence in 1877. This event, which followed upon long years of struggle by the Rumanian people against foreign domination, enabled Rumania to take its rightful place as a sovereign member of the community of nations.

The Government and people of the United States extend warm greetings to Rumanians everywhere on the occasion of the observance of this traditional Rumanian national holiday. The memory and the meaning of this historic date cannot fail, despite all difficulties, to sustain the faith of the Rumanian people in the ideals of freedom and their aspirations for a truly independent national existence.

The Lessons of Berlin

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

It is an inspiration to be again in Berlin—my fourth visit since the end of World War II.

I was here a few months after the close of hostilities. I then saw Berlin as a mass of rubble. It seemed that the city was beyond the possibility of reconstruction. I felt at the time that the plight of Berlin presented a challenge which was beyond human response. But that almost unbelievable challenge was in fact met through a display of human energy and human faith which has few parallels in history.

Then, in 1948, I rode the airlift to Berlin. The Soviet Union was at that time imposing an economic blockade which it seemed would force the city to succumb. But the courage and resourcefulness of the people of Berlin, and of the free nations which mounted and sustained the airlift, demonstrated that freedom had a resourcefulness and resilience which the despots had grossly underestimated. Berlin was not isolated. The attempted blockade was abandoned, and Berlin continued proudly to demonstrate within the captive world the good fruits of freedom.

I was next here in January 1954 to attend the four-power conference which it was hoped would bring about the reunification of Germany in freedom and the liberation of Austria. We were spurred in our effort by the tragic events of the preceding June and July, when the workers in East Berlin and the Soviet-occupied zone rose in a rebellion usually known as "June 17." This spontaneous, courageous, and brutally repressed demand by the workers for decent conditions made it the more urgent that the alien occupation should

be ended and the liberation of Germany accomplished.

The Western representatives struggled valiantly, but in vain. The conference failed to achieve its specific goals. But the conference itself was not a vain thing. All the world judged the issues, and I said on my return home from that conference,² the conference "cleared the way for other things. . . . The unification and the strengthening of West Europe may now go on." It did, in fact, go on. Sovereignty was restored to the Federal Republic of Germany; it became a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a party to the Treaty for Western European Unity. And today the Federal Republic not only helps to build the institutions which, militarily and economically, will unify Western Europe, but, under its great Chancellor Adenauer, it plays a major role in the councils of the free world.

Today I am in Berlin for the fourth postwar visit and marvel at the accomplishments of your people, who, in the face of unprecedented handicaps, make Berlin a center of cultural and intellectual life and of industry. On behalf of the President and people of the United States, I say "all honor" to the people of Free Berlin. It has been for us a privilege and an inspiration to be associated with you.

On the basis of my experience, Berlin ought to be required visiting, or, if that is impossible, the story of postwar Berlin ought to be required reading, by all who would understand the significance of the worldwide struggle which now preoccupies so much of the human race.

¹ Made at a reception given in Mr. Dulles' honor by the Berlin city government at Berlin, Germany, on May 8 (press release 253).

² BULLETIN of Mar. 8, 1954, p. 343.

Berlin, a Tragic Symbol

A first lesson of Berlin is taught by your environment. You live here encircled by a surrounding ring of Communist rule. Your position in this respect is itself a tragic symbol of disregard for the pledged word. The Potsdam agreements of 1945 made it perfectly clear that the purpose of the military occupation was not to dismember Germany or permanently to divide it. And indeed until recently the Soviet Union admitted that it shared a responsibility to bring about the reunification of Germany. At the Geneva summit meeting of July 1955 President Eisenhower, together with the Prime Ministers of France and the United Kingdom, obtained formal recognition by the heads of the Soviet Government, including Mr. Khrushchev, that the four powers had "common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany," and they agreed that "the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections" should be carried out.³ Those engagements, it now seems, are evaded by the Soviet Union.

This illustrates the great difficulty of dealing with the Soviet Union.

Most governments believe that a moral sanction attaches to their engagements. They do not undertake solemn and precise international undertakings except with the intention of carrying them out. Their record of performances is not always perfect. But at least they do not look upon the making and their breaking of agreements as a legitimate technique for advancing their interests.

In the case of the Soviet Union it is otherwise. Its rulers are atheistic materialists. So far as they are concerned, their agreements carry no moral sanction. It often seems as though they treat the making and breaking of agreements as a legitimate international technique and that their promises are, as Lenin said, "like pie crusts, made to be broken."

That is why we find it so difficult to make progress in resolving political problems and in achieving limitation of armament. The attitude of the Soviet Union toward its agreements constitutes a grave obstacle.

You yourselves here in Berlin, you who are a

living exhibit of Soviet violations of international agreements, surely understand. And your plight ought to teach the world that it is reckless to make concessions in reliance on Soviet promises merely because those promises are alluring.

Also you here see about you the tragic results of the application of the Communist thesis that individuals are not spiritual beings but merely physical particles to be used to promote the glorification of the Soviet Communist state and the extension of its dominion throughout the world. The steady flow of refugees from East Germany which continues at the high level of about 20,000 per month is an indisputable demonstration of which of our societies provides the most in the way of human opportunity, both in terms of economic livelihood and in terms of spiritual and cultural satisfaction. This steady flight from the East to West is the more significant because those who seek the West are in large part young people who throughout most of their mature lives have been subjected to the intense application of Communist doctrine and practice.

The Lesson of Faith

A second lesson that Berlin teaches is the immense capacity of human beings who are endowed with faith.

To me one of the most inspiring portions of the Holy Scripture is found in the letter of Paul to the Hebrews, where he recounts the great acts of faith which had marked the history of the Hebrew people. He concludes, "Seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, . . . let us run with steadfastness the race that is set before us."

Surely the people of Berlin are writing a new and epic chapter in the history of steadfast faith and works. And even since these lines were written, you face a new obstacle in the arbitrary action of the Communist authorities in imposing what in effect is a confiscatory tax on waterway traffic between East and West Germany. But in the face of such discouragements and obstacles the like of which few have ever had to encounter, you have rebuilt your city from its rubble. You have established here your Free University. You have reconstructed the Hall of the Technical University within the shattered ruins of its former imposing structure. You have rebuilt the Haans Viertel as one of the most impressive urban developments in Europe. You have rebuilt your

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

churches. And there has been a revival of drama, music, and of religious and intellectual life which demonstrates that the physical shackles to which you were subjected could be broken, and were broken, by faith in your great destiny and by hope and expectation of a richer and freer life to come.

No one can see the West Berlin of today without recognizing the extraordinary courage and inspiration that is making Berlin one of the great cities of Europe.

Let me say to you that I believe that your faith and hope in the future are not misplaced and will be rewarded.

I recall the somber meeting here in 1954 when the Soviet delegation adamantly opposed both the liberation of Austria and the reunification of Germany. But in 1955 the Soviet Union suddenly decided to liberate Austria. That decision came as a surprise and in reversal of the uncompromising position which the Soviet Government had held for nearly a decade.

It shows that we need not despair for Germany and for Berlin. The day will come when, probably unexpectedly and without predictability, the Geneva pledge of 1955 will be fulfilled and Germany will be reunified in freedom.

Cooperative Action of the Free

A third lesson of Berlin is that there is a vast potential in the spiritual unity and practical cooperation of those everywhere who love freedom. Free Berlin and free Germany would never have achieved their present advances without the faith and works of their own people. But equally indispensable was the support of other free peoples.

Americans are proud of the part they have been privileged to play in this connection. The first clearing of the city and the reestablishment of the basic facilities—light, heat, power, sewers, and transport—were all carried out with German labor and planning and with financial contributions from the United States.

The airlift which surmounted the Soviet blockade was conducted by the Western powers.

Following the end of the blockade there has been a well-planned development in the way of construction, both industrial and cultural, in all of which the United States has been glad to help. Here in Berlin cooperation has become real in

stone and mortar, in halls of learning, in places of work and conference, in labor and in recreation.

Perhaps most important of all is the shield of power behind which these tasks of peace are carried forward. I recall here the declaration which the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and France and I made on October 3, 1954.⁴ We said:

The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

I went over that declaration with President Eisenhower an hour before I left. We read it together. He authorized me to say that it stands and can be reaffirmed as a declaration of the solemn determination of the United States.

I know that the people of Berlin realize how significant for them has been the military deterrent which has provided the shield behind which their works of peace have gone forward. I hope that you and others will realize that the peace and security of all of the free world equally depend upon such a shield.

The Soviet Government is attempting by every device of propaganda to compel the abandonment of that shield. It claims that those who create that shield are proved by that fact to be evil militarists. It claims that those who draw together to get protection from that shield are "aggressive groupings." It claims that those who seek only defense should prove it by renouncing all but inferior weapons, leaving modern weapons to be a monopoly of those who have a tragically long record of expansion by the use of violence.

It claims that certain of our aerial defense precautions are dangerous and frightening. But when we try to make it possible to revise them on the basis of reciprocal international inspection that will give a large measure of assurance against surprise attack, the Soviets say "nyet." They did so again at the United Nations Security Council last week.⁵

The Soviet Union professes not to want to use nuclear weapons but insists upon continuing at

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 1954, p. 521.

⁵ *Ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 816.

a feverish pace to multiply such weapons in their own arsenals. It calls the free world to rely upon Soviet promises not to use its nuclear weapons in the event of war despite the long record of broken promises to which I have alluded.

This Communist propaganda line is designed to produce a world dominated by the military power of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Freedom would have no adequate defense. There is a duty to look behind words that sound alluring and to see and reject the underlying plot against freedom.

I hope that the lessons of Berlin—the lesson taught by its surroundings, the lesson taught by its faith, and the lesson taught by the cooperative action of the free—will be applied to the larger context of world affairs.

All peoples in all the world, including the peo-

ples of the Soviet Union, look with horror at the prospect of a new war. All would take any dependable steps to reduce that prospect and, above all, to eliminate the new weapons which threaten humanity with virtual extinction. But Berlin teaches that there cannot be confidence in mere Soviet Communist promises, that there cannot be safety in weakness. It also teaches that man is a spiritual being able, by faith, to perform miracles and that men of faith are not prepared to succumb to a rule that is atheistic and militaristic merely in the hope of thus insuring continued existence.

All men who are free—and all who having lost freedom would regain it—can pay homage to Berlin and learn and apply the lessons that it teaches.

The United States and Africa: An Official Viewpoint

by Julius C. Holmes

Special Assistant to the Secretary¹

It is a very great honor to be asked to make the opening address of the American Assembly on the vital topic of "The United States and Africa."

As the ancient Greeks sought the heights of Mars Hill as conducive to clear discussions of the affairs of state, so we, through the courtesy of Columbia University, have the idyllic setting of Arden House on this beautiful Ramapo mountain top to inspire thoughtful analysis of the many issues concerning Africa and the United States. Let us hope that, like the ancient Greek philosophers, we, too, shall have the necessary vision to discern the forests from the trees as we look at Africa's broad panorama during the next 3 days.

The scholarly papers that have been prepared for this conference on all phases of our relations with Africa and of the contemporary scene there leave very little of either a fundamental or a detailed nature untouched. However, one event that

has occurred since these papers were prepared is worthy of our attention this evening. That is the Pan-African Conference held at Accra [Ghana] from April 15 to 22 on the invitation of Prime Minister Nkrumah. At this meeting major African objectives were set forth by authentic spokesmen of the independent African peoples. It is my purpose this evening to consider some of these objectives and United States policy relating to them.

You will recall that the eight countries sending representatives to Accra were, besides Ghana: Liberia, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, the Sudan, and the United Arab Republic. As the historic meeting closed, a member of one of the delegations declared: "Africa has spoken. It is for the rest of the world to respond." Before we do so, let us review what Africa has said.

In their resolution entitled "Exchange of Views on Foreign Policy" the Accra delegates stated in part that the conference "believes that as long as the fundamental unity of outlook on foreign policy is preserved, the independent African states

¹Address made before the American Assembly (Columbia University) at Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., on May 1 (press release 225).

will be able to assert a distinctly African personality which will speak with a concerted voice in the cause of peace in cooperation with other peace-loving nations at the United Nations and other international forums.²

We Americans welcome the constructive contributions which the independent African nations can make in international forums and councils. But what of this new "African personality"? What are its essential characteristics?

Judging by the 11 resolutions and final communique adopted at Accra, it would appear that the new "African personality" which was enunciated at this conference is something vigorous, but comparatively moderate; zealous to strengthen and safeguard its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; anxious to eliminate colonialism and racial discrimination rapidly from its continent; vitally interested in advancing its domain economically, socially, and culturally; and intent on playing an important and responsible role in world affairs.

We should remind ourselves, of course, that there is no personality, including our own, without failings and negative aspects. The African personality is no exception. It should not be assumed, further, that the United States is in agreement with all that has been said or advocated at Accra. Indeed, there were a few resolutions which might have been wiser and more constructive had they been somewhat more restrained. Nevertheless, we are in the happy position of finding ourselves in broad agreement—or at least broad understanding—with much of what emerged from Accra.

The general attitude of the United States toward independent Africa was well expressed by Secretary Dulles in the following personal message to Prime Minister Nkrumah delivered at the opening of the Accra gathering:²

... Through you, I wish to assure the African nations that they can count on the sympathetic interest of the people and government of the United States. The United States will continue to stand ready to support the constructive efforts of the states of Africa to achieve a stable, prosperous community, conscious of its interdependence within the family of nations and dedicated to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

² BULLETIN of May 12, 1958, p. 765.

Even though all of Africa was not represented at Accra, it is fitting that we address ourselves to a few major subjects raised there.

Transition From Colonialism to Self-Government

In an important resolution the conference urged speedy termination of colonialism on the African Continent. The United States has long recognized that old-fashioned, 19th-century colonialism is dying—dying by mutual consent of both Africans and Europeans. We believe that the transition from current, progressively liberal colonialism to self-government and eventual self-determination should be completed in an orderly manner, with the speed of its evolution being determined by the capacity of local populations to assume and discharge the responsibilities of government. This, of course, is not the counsel of perfection. Decisions must be balanced and mutually reached.

President Eisenhower, in his second inaugural address,³ voiced a great truth about our role in this dynamic development when he said:

The American experiment has for generations fired the passion and the courage of millions elsewhere seeking freedom, equality, and opportunity. . . . These hopes that we have helped to inspire we can help to fulfill.

He also warned:

... wherever in the world a people knows desperate want, there must appear at least the spark of hope—the hope of progress—or there will surely rise at last the flames of conflict.

The United States role in the dynamic trend toward self-government in Africa, then, might be stated somewhat as follows: As a responsible world power and friend of European and African alike, we believe that we can assist peaceful African political evolution on the one hand by supporting liberal metropolitan measures designed to provide African self-government and eventual autonomy, and on the other by encouraging, insofar as we are able, moderate African leaders who recognize the benefit to their own people of following the evolutionary rather than the revolutionary approach to social, political, and economic progress.

As entire books and certainly full-length speeches could be devoted to the complicated subject of African nationalism, I, of necessity, must limit myself to a few observations on the subject.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1957, p. 211.

The most pertinent point I can stress is that Africa's basic ethnic, cultural, economic, and political heritage is so diverse, its geography so vast, its contact with different European, Middle Eastern, and Asian cultures so varied that most generalizations about African nationalism are subject to serious reservations.

In addition, the broad divisions of the African continent must be recognized. Among these are: (1) the difference between the Arab-Berber Mediterranean coast and the territory south of the Sahara; (2) the differences among the colonial policies and administrations of Great Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain; and (3) the differences between colonial territories with a large white-settler population and those with a small or transient white population. The Union of South Africa, an independent member of the British Commonwealth since 1910, falls into still another category.

The African desire for speed in cutting the strings of metropolitan control is understandable in view of the "revolution of rising expectations" that now grips most of the continent. But it behooves all responsible African leaders to consider seriously the numerous pitfalls that confront a newly independent state today and to realize that premature independence can carry with it more dangers than a temporary prolongation of a dependent status.

African dependent areas today vary greatly in the degree of their assimilation of Western institutions and culture. In my opinion one of the most difficult problems impairing the modernization of Africa and disturbing its stability and orderly evolution is detribalization.

Africans are being pulled away from a long-accepted way of life toward a more complicated existence which produces many stresses and strains. The change to modernity involves the abrupt abandonment of ancient folkways which provided a sense of social, economic, and even religious security and the attempt to take on a new set of rules of life. This transition is uprooting the African violently from the old and leaving him groping for new principles to give meaning to his place in society. New loyalties must replace the old, and it is in the search for the new that much of Africa's turbulence arises.

Other problems that must be overcome by territories rushing pell-mell toward local autonomy and eventual self-determination are developing eco-

nomie viability; training educated civil administrators; constructing sound, broadly based economic, social, cultural, and political institutions; and, above all, accumulating basic experience in practical self-government prior to attaining full autonomy.

Yet, despite these problems, it is possible that one result of Africa's lack of "national" histories, and above all its capsuling into decades what other continents have taken centuries to achieve, may be the development of larger independent political structures, such as federations or confederations, that will bring the continent quickly into step with the 20th-century movement toward supranational collaboration.

In French West Africa, for example, two major and five regional African parties recently merged into a single political movement and called on the French Government: (1) to create and recognize the right of independence of the federations of French West and Equatorial Africa; (2) to authorize complete internal autonomy for all French African territories; and (3) to amend the French constitution to transform the French Union into a confederal republic in which metropolitan France, the two federations, and remaining nonfederated African territories would be equal partners.

In a word, these African leaders, while stressing their demand for equality and independence, nevertheless clearly demonstrated their understanding of the basic interdependence of Africa and France.

In this connection and in view of the importance which the United States places on recognition of interdependence, it is encouraging to note that the United Nations constitutes a stabilizing force for African nationalism. The U.N. Charter, to which the Accra conferees dedicated themselves in their first resolution, provides opportunities for African nationalism to appeal to world opinion; holds out the stabilizing prospect of U.N. membership when independence is achieved; and creates, through membership, a framework of responsibility and security for newborn independent regimes.

The charter also provides the means for peaceful solution of disputes that will surely arise from arbitrarily drawn boundaries, tends to relieve Africa's moderate leaders from concern with the dangers of external attack, and assists them in preventing the buildup of domestic pressures to launch unprofitable aggressive campaigns.

The United Nations trusteeship system, finally, charges each administering power with promoting the development of its trust territories toward self-government or independence.

To sum up: The movement toward self-government is now going forward in Africa along lines based on the Western European parliamentary system of government. Social and economic advances are guided by concepts which Africans have acquired from Europeans and which were developed over the centuries and were suited to and expressive of Europeans. It is, however, incontestable that in time political, social, and economic systems will evolve in Africa that are consistent with and expressive of the distinctive African personality. We may confidently anticipate that this African system will preserve the essentials of democracy and the universal concept of the dignity of man.

Although one seldom hears kind words for colonialism today, I am sure that, if the historians among us were to project themselves forward another decade or two, they would probably emphasize what the colonial powers brought to Africa rather than what they took from it. My recent trip around the continent convinced me that both Africa and the world owe the metropolitan powers a great debt for the administrative techniques, methods of economic development, the great capital investment and construction, and the educational and public-health measures they have brought the area.

Although at the moment the African may look principally at the defects in these contributions—and there have been differing standards of European performance throughout the continent—the day may come, following his present mood of great expectations, when the African may well look back with satisfaction and gratitude on his associations with the metropolitan powers. However, let there be no mistake about the African atmosphere of 1958 for, although the manner of expression will vary with the area, the general theme is: "Better the ragged shirt of self-government than the warm blanket of colonial protection."

In the long run, of course, the primary factor in African nationalist development is the African himself. He alone will finally determine his own future. Let us help him on the road to peaceful,

orderly progress and fruitful collaboration between Africa and the free world.

The Question of Algeria

There is a cloud on the African horizon, much bigger than a man's hand: the question of Algeria. The Pan-African Conference expressed deep concern over this question, among other things urging France "to recognize the right of the people of Algeria to independence and self-determination."

There is perhaps no problem in all of Africa today which disturbs more people and nations than the question of Algeria. The United States most certainly is gravely preoccupied with the situation there. Many hours of debate at the United Nations General Assembly have exposed the pertinent aspects of this serious and complicated matter that deeply involves the interests of two areas of great importance to both the United States and the whole free world—France and North Africa.

As we have stated on more than one occasion, and I repeat again this evening, the United States has consistently favored a "peaceful, democratic, and just solution" of the Algerian problem. We sincerely hope that no avenue will be left unexplored to bring about such a solution.

It is my firm belief, based on some personal experience in both North Africa and France, that this above all is a situation that urgently requires more than usual patience and farsighted statesmanship on the part of all concerned. Between metropolitan France and Algeria there is a genuine community of interests founded on historical association, geography, and mutual advantage. These are assets important to the free world and should not be lost.

The Problem of Racialism

Another cloud hanging over the prospects for fruitful collaboration between Africa and the free world is the problem of racialism. The Accra conference condemned in strongest terms the practice of racial discrimination and segregation all over the world and called for its speedy elimination from Africa.

The United States opposes racial discrimination and segregation. Our Constitution and our Bill of Rights affirm the principle of racial equal-

ity and nondiscrimination. These principles have been reaffirmed recently by the Supreme Court and the President. We are attempting to solve our very real problems at home by the process of orderly law enforcement.

But in view of our difficulties in squaring practice with precept, it is imperative that we bear in mind that our moral influence on other nations in the question of racial policy is in direct relation to our achievements at home. We must therefore be humble and, while adhering steadfastly to our basic principles, attempt to exert a moderating influence upon extremists and oppose those who seek to exploit racial tensions for ulterior purposes, always avoiding, as we are bound to do by our historic tradition and by the United Nations Charter, unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

Let us examine, for a moment, racialism in Africa today and see if we cannot ascertain the root of the problem.

Although there has been racial friction from time to time throughout the continent, the principal strain between Europeans and Africans develops mainly in areas where there are many permanent European settlers. This is particularly true in the east and the south. Racial problems, on the other hand, have been relatively minor or temporary in such regions as West Africa, where white settlers are few or where the European has come almost exclusively as an administrator, missionary, teacher, trader, or technician.

We can conclude then that it is probably not contact between African and European *per se* which gives rise to serious racial problems but economic and social competition between these two permanently established racial groups, the African frankly envious of the higher European living standard and determined to improve his lot and increase his share of his country's national product.

The need, obviously, is for the development of a sense of multiracial cooperation based on the ideals of brotherhood and equal justice. It is also essential for all concerned to demonstrate the necessary faith that men of differing races can live side by side and work out a mutually beneficial destiny.

There can be no doubt that the European settler has shown the less advanced African much that he can emulate. European industry, imagination,

skill, and development have all shown or provided the African a way of life that will contribute to his long-term progress.

We cannot, however, ignore the dangers inherent in any failure to meet the problem of harmonious relationships between the many races inhabiting Africa's dependent and independent territories.

African Economic and Social Cooperation

The Pan-African Conference recommended numerous measures to increase African regional economic and social cooperation.

The United States recognizes the pressing need for regional and international cooperation in Africa's economic and social development. Through our own mutual security and reciprocal trade programs, which have been in effect some years now, we are demonstrating clear recognition of our interdependence and mutuality of interest with other nations of the free world, including the African nations.

Africa's economic and social problems are so numerous, its need for capital, technical assistance, and economic development so great, that no one nation can possibly fill the requirement. It will clearly call for a great cooperative effort of all nations of the free world.

The United States has shown a clear willingness to help in this effort in every way possible and is providing economic, technical, and military assistance as well as Export-Import Bank and Development Loan Fund loans to various independent and dependent African territories. The United States is also contributing substantially to such U.N. activities as those of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the U.N. Expanded Technical Assistance Program. In addition we have supported creation of the new U.N. Economic Commission for Africa and have announced that we are agreeable to becoming associated with the new multinational Fund for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA) if such association is desired by the member nations.

All of these governmental activities are necessary and good. But in order to build a sound and enduring economy, investment and expanding trade are called for. And here private enterprise must play its part.

American business is finding many opportunities

in Africa and is planning new investments there to the mutual benefit of both Africa and the companies concerned. American private foundations and institutions are also expanding their African operations in such basic fields as public health, education, community development, and race relations. American newspapers and magazines are increasing their staffs and communications with the continent, thus improving their reporting to the American public and business community on current developments in the increasingly active area.

We cannot stress too heavily how imperative it is that the free world help the moderate regimes now in power in Africa to provide their peoples with the essentials of economic progress—with an increasing share of the wealth that lies in their soil and forests and which their labor is producing. Africa today is generally friendly to the West. Threatening this attitude, however, are forces which would win the area away from its natural Western orientation to Communist domination or neutralist uncertainty. We must not lose time in Africa. We must anticipate events and meet them before they develop critical proportions.

Let no one assume, however, that the West is asleep. The European metropolitan powers have already committed extensive resources to African economic development and are now trying to strengthen, diversify, and improve the internal economic structure of their dependent territories. The United States, for its part, plans to continue providing aid to Africa, and Congress has been asked for increased funds for this purpose in fiscal year 1959. It must remain crystal clear to all that the United States has a basic interest in African stability, that this in turn is clearly dependent on continuous progress, and that we must contribute to that progress.

Time has obviously forced me to omit comment on many other African objectives and problems set forth at the Pan-African Conference at Accra. But I am sure that during the course of the next 3 days we shall have ample opportunity to discuss them all.

Meanwhile, a few conclusions may be in order.

Opportunities for World Cooperation

First, we must see opportunities in Africa, not problems.

Africa's resources, human and material, are vastly underdeveloped. We must strengthen the moderate regimes now in power by assisting them in the constructive process of developing their new nations.

Second, free-world leadership is being challenged in Africa today and requires vision, dynamism, and fidelity to principle to maintain its vigor and strength.

Moscow Radio in a broadcast on April 19 said of U.S. intentions in Africa:

With the assistance of the slogan of anticolonialism, which they have been disseminating with increasing frequency in recent times, the United States is attempting to grab the countries which are liberating themselves from the chains of old colonialism and to put them under their domination. Further they are making numerous endeavors to weaken the positions of their European friends in the colonies and to fill the vacuums thus created.

The United States has no fear of such lies. We know that our strength and our leadership are based on honest relations with all nations and on respect for the free way of life and human dignity. We are ready to be measured by the universal standard: "By their fruits ye shall know them."

Third, the United States contribution to the achievement of constructive African objectives must be to assist the underdeveloped, emerging African states as one would a member of his own family. Many speak of enlightened self-interest as motivating U.S. policies in Africa—and so be it! But I ask why we should be ashamed of offering Africa friendship for friendship's sake? Is there anything weak about believing and following your own instinctive ideals? Our history is one of generosity, and we can take pride in continuing it.

Africa is on the move. We are prepared to move with it as generous and understanding partners in all endeavors designed to further world cooperation, prosperity, and peace.

Nationalism and Collective Security

by Frederick W. Jandrey

Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs¹

I hope to turn the spotlight on a subject which needs some illumination and which vitally affects the everyday work of the American diplomat. It is my thesis that the movement toward collective security and the nationalist movement represent two of the most significant developments of our era and that these two trends are essentially useful and harmonious.

Our first task is one of definition. Although the concept of collective security is much newer than the idea of nationalism, the former is easier to define. In essence the development of the concept of collective security proceeds from an awareness of the fact that an individual nation—whether great or small, strong or weak—is no longer capable alone of assuring peace, safety, and freedom to its peoples. On the basis of this fact, the nations of the world have undertaken various kinds of cooperative arrangements in order to deter aggression, achieve peace and stability, and promote the well-being of their populations.

These arrangements have taken two basic patterns—worldwide and regional. The first major attempt at a worldwide arrangement, of course, was the League of Nations. Today, the League is generally regarded as having been a failure. The memory of World War II is still too recent for us to dispute this reputation. The League had many weaknesses, not the least of which was its failure to include all the major powers in its membership.

In retrospect it is interesting to note that the League did manage to achieve certain limited

successes. Out of a total of 63 disputes submitted to it, the League settled 36 and assisted in arbitrating 18 others. But it failed—or, more correctly, its members failed—miserably in dealing with aggressions by the big powers. It appeared equally helpless in dealing with the seemingly irresistible series of events leading to the Second World War, in the flames of which the League itself perished.

Those who blueprinted the United Nations at the end of World War II made a successful effort to cure many of the defects which had doomed the League. The United Nations today is a going concern, an important fact of international life, with far greater prestige and influence than the League ever attained. It has a substantial record of accomplishment in the field of international security, as well as a record of having contributed to human advancement and well-being in many other fields.

One of the most important activities of the United Nations, moreover, is to promote the orderly attainment of self-government or independence for all peoples and to familiarize them with the principles and techniques of our international society, including those of the United Nations and the concept of collective security. The United Nations provides a means for influencing order and progress among states and peoples while guiding inevitable change constructively. We have reason to expect that the United Nations system will become ever more important and vital in the years ahead, because its purposes are responsible to the desires of men and women everywhere for the maintenance of peace and security; for the pacific settlement of disputes; for economic advancement and social progress; for civil and

¹ Address made before the Institute of Ethnic Studies at Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., on Apr. 25 (press release 221).

political rights; and for the self-determination of nations and peoples.

United Nations Limitations

The United Nations, however, mirrors the world we live in, and, in the present climate, it is evident that the United Nations has its limitations as a collective-security agency. Major power relationships are not such as to permit the full operation of the U.N. security system. The U.N. force comprising national contingents which was contemplated by the U.N. Charter has not been established, and the Soviet attitude continues to make that plan impractical. Nevertheless, the U.N. has shown that it can respond to emergencies, as when it established the United Nations Command in Korea and repelled the Communist aggression. It responded again when a United Nations Emergency Force was desired in the Near East. Whenever the members are willing to take the necessary collective action, the United Nations can provide the desired forum, the necessary recommendations, and the appropriate agency.

It is true that the Security Council has not played the primary role that was envisaged for it. The Soviet Union's abuse of the permanent member's veto in the Security Council, where the Soviet representative has exercised the veto 82 of the 86 times it has been used, has led to this result. It has, however, contributed also to the growth of the veto-free General Assembly, which is equipped to recommend collective measures, including the use of armed force, if the Security Council fails to perform its function.

The United Nations limitations are not mechanical. They flow from the basic fact that among the 81 sovereign members there are many divergent interests, which in particular situations may outweigh their common interest in universal security. Moreover, the U.N. has had to develop in an unsettled postwar era in which the principal problems have arisen from fundamental disagreements concerning the very nature of the desired postwar order. The problem of greatest concern to us, of course, has been the Soviet drive to communize the world.

Regional Collective-Security Arrangements

The U.N. Charter recognizes the right of members to individual and collective self-defense, and it provides for regional arrangements to supple-

ment the U.N. security system. In the situation we have faced over the last 10 years, particularly since the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, the free nations have found it essential to bolster or establish various regional collective-security arrangements in order to strengthen their posture. These regional arrangements today provide the free world its primary protection against the Soviet drive for a Soviet world, because they constitute today the principal institutions available to the free world or the United Nations for collective-security action.

The most important of these arrangements, in the order of their establishment, are the Organization of American States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Baghdad Pact. While these regional systems differ among themselves in membership, structure, and function, they have certain important elements in common, including their relationship to the United Nations system. None of them involves any surrender of sovereignty on the part of the member states. At the same time, their size and selective membership permit a much higher degree of cohesion than is possible in the larger and more heterogeneous forum of the U.N.

Each of the regional arrangements is specifically designed to enable the member states more effectively to resist aggression, and each recognizes that the principal source of aggression is the Soviet empire. Each regional system embodies the principle of mutual assistance in the event of aggression. It is also significant that these regional arrangements represent something more than a mutual exchange of pledges to take action in the event of armed attack. They provide for a continuous peacetime working relationship among the members.

Equally important is the fact that the regional arrangements not only look toward military cooperation among their members but also toward extensive political and economic and cultural cooperation. This flows from a general recognition that Soviet aggression itself is not limited to a threat of military attack but embodies a variety of political, economic, and psychological techniques.

The regional collective-security arrangements I have mentioned also differ considerably as to the type and degree of cooperation undertaken.

NATO has gone farthest in the direction of unified action. Here we have a sizable collective-defense force under international command; joint strategic planning; a commonly developed and financed system of bases and other military facilities; mutual efforts in military production; and various other collective activities aimed at achieving a high level of defensive power that can be maintained in a constant state of readiness. This defense activity is matched by a great deal of cooperative activity in political, economic, and other matters. Political consultations within NATO, for example, have attained a degree of intimacy and detail that is probably unprecedented among 15 sovereign governments. Similarly, the NATO countries are now embarking on certain potentially far-reaching experiments in scientific and technological cooperation. There are other examples that I will not try to describe at this time.

The regional systems of collective security, taken all together, clearly represent the free world's main barrier to Soviet ambitions. Partly for this reason, these regional systems have become subjects of controversy. Their very effectiveness has made them the targets of an unceasing propaganda attack by the Communists. In any case, it is the regional system of collective security that I will consider primarily in examining the relationship between collective security and the concept of nationalism.

Combinations and Contradictions of Nationalism

As we turn to a consideration of nationalism, I must repeat my observation that nationalism is difficult to define. The term embodies a wide range of concepts and emotions. It applies to a primitive native who is just beginning to feel a vague discontent toward the presence of foreigners, just as it applies to an American who sternly demands that our Government "go it alone." It includes the zealous pride that citizens of a newly independent state feel in their new institutions, just as it includes the pride that a European may feel in his country's overseas empire. It lay at the core of our forefathers' struggle for independence, just as it also lay at the core of the hideous Nazi dream of world conquest. It embraces the gradual evolution of a colonial people toward freedom and dignity, just as it also embraces the ineradicable yearning for a restora-

tion of national freedom among those who have lost that freedom, such as the enslaved peoples of most of Eastern Europe.

Nationalism is a bundle of combinations and contradictions. It may be compounded of the deepest love and most vicious hatred of which the human being is capable. Sometimes nationalism is inseparable from racial and religious passions. Sometimes it pushes all other passions and loyalties into the background. Sometimes it is a fountainhead of progress and sometimes a cesspool of retrogression. Everything depends upon the form it takes, and it takes many forms.

But the most important fact about nationalism is simply the fact that it exists. We may admire it or deplore it, but we cannot escape it. It is one of the most powerful forces of our age and, in the long run, may well prove to be the most powerful of all.

As we all know, the most dynamic manifestation of the nationalist spirit in our generation is found in Asia and Africa. On these two continents, 20 countries have attained national independence during the last 15 years. There are several additional territories, primarily in Africa, which are standing today on the threshold of self-government.

To some students of history, it may seem an anomaly that the fierce upsurge of the national spirit in Asia and Africa is taking place at the same time that many of the older nations of Europe, North Africa, and South America are becoming increasingly aware of the limitations upon the capacity of any individual nation to shape its own destiny. But this difference of attitudes is wholly understandable. Most Western nations achieved national independence long ago. They have had many years to learn that national self-sufficiency is a myth and to develop aspirations that cannot be satisfied within the confines of national boundaries. Their freedom to choose between a purely national and a collective approach to their problems, including the possible choice of supernational arrangements, has long been taken for granted. On the other hand, most of the peoples of Africa and Asia have just attained—or have not yet attained—the precious privilege of self-determination. To many of them, national independence means the end of a long and arduous road and has an intrinsic quality that transcends mere politics. The need for close political and

economic association with other states—which many of the emerging peoples fully recognize—often cannot be fulfilled until they feel completely secure in the possession and exercise of their right of choice. In brief their political development must be expected to follow the same basic pattern found in the histories of the older nations—in that national consciousness must usually precede international consciousness.

I do not want to imply that 20th-century nationalism is confined to the continents of Asia and Africa. Some of the nations of Western Europe, in past years, have exhibited forms of nationalism more extreme and dangerous than have been seen anywhere else on the globe. I need not dwell at length upon the deadly virus of nazism and fascism. Even today, despite their sharper awareness of the dangers of excessive nationalism and their recent drive toward new forms of association, most of the countries of Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere have deep-rooted nationalist feelings. We would do well not to forget this fact, for many things would be inexplicable without it. The present dilemma in Algeria, for example, requires consideration of French nationalism as much as Algerian nationalism. Similarly, much of the Communist propaganda now being directed toward the Western nations is designed to arouse latent nationalist passions in opposition to collective security and other cooperative endeavors. Nevertheless, I think we cannot avoid recognizing as a fact that the appeal and impetus of nationalism in Asia and Africa today are more fundamental and more intense than what we find in most Western countries.

To many of the newly emerging peoples, nationalism is a religion, a magical answer to all human strivings. Those scholars who are inclined to accept the facile assumption that economic motives are the prime determinants of human behavior will find little support for their theories in a spectacle of thousands of hungry and ragged human beings demonstrating their readiness to subordinate everything to their urge for national identity and freedom.

In reality, of course, the emerging peoples see no conflict between the desire for self-determination and their personal and social aspirations. They believe independence will automatically mean more bread, more clothes, more education, better health, and greater personal freedom and

dignity. In some instances these expectations will be realized. In others, the peoples concerned will be badly disappointed and disillusioned.

Exaggerated expectations represent one of the very real problems produced by the wave of nationalism. Modern-day nationalism also presents certain other problems which we should examine objectively and frankly.

U.S. Policy on Self-Determination

When I stress the problems presented by nationalism, I do not want to imply that the existence of such problems would justify an effort on the part of the United States or any other nation to obstruct evolution toward self-determination. This would be a losing game, even if we wanted to attempt it, and the United States most certainly does not. On the contrary, I doubt that any other nation in history has been so thoroughly committed to the principle of self-determination. We took a strong initiative to have this principle inscribed in the United Nations Charter. We have also used our influence repeatedly to make self-determination a reality in particular situations. The records of history—which cannot be obliterated by any quantity of malicious propaganda—show clearly that the United States made a major contribution to the achievement of independence by a large number of African and Asian states during the past 15 years.

Self-determination, of course, is not synonymous with nationality. Essentially, it means the right to choose. The peoples of some territories may determine that their best interests are served by maintaining a tight political relationship with the mother country or perhaps by uniting their destiny with that of another state. Other peoples may decide that independence is the only status acceptable to them. We cannot quarrel with either choice so long as the peoples concerned are able to exercise this choice in a free and orderly manner. Where formerly dependent territories have chosen independence, we have not only welcomed them into the community of nations but have also in many instances given concrete assistance to help establish a firm foundation for their national existence.

Our country's devotion to self-determination has been manifest in other ways. Our record with respect to our own former territories, such as the Philippines and Puerto Rico, is one of

which we can be justly proud. We have also worked unceasingly to encourage the restoration of self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe, and we will never abandon this goal. In some parts of the world there has been a regrettable lack of concern about the enslavement of Eastern European peoples, but we are convinced that the validity of the principle of self-determination is not limited to any race or continent. Whenever the curtain of tyranny is lowered on any people, we hope that all peoples who are seeking to establish or maintain their own right of self-determination will understand "for whom the bell tolls."

I think we realize that the concept of self-determination is not as simple as it sounds. It is sometimes difficult, for example, to determine what groups are properly covered by the word "people," or what areas are encompassed by the concept of a "nation." Similarly, we find that the freedom of one segment of a people to choose self-determination may vitally affect the freedom of associated peoples. But these considerations do not impair the fundamental validity of the principle itself.

It is equally important to recognize that the spirit of nationalism, which so often underlies the urge for self-determination, is intrinsically a valuable and productive force. Without national pride and devotion, a great deal of man's cultural, social, and technical progress might have been impossible. The "nation" will probably remain the principal focal point of mankind's political, social, and economic life for many years to come. However, as I said before, a clear and balanced view of modern international relations requires us to be aware of the problems and dangers of nationalism as well as its virtues—to be aware of the perils as well as the opportunities created by the nationalist revolution.

In the first place, we must recognize that the peoples of some dependent areas are likely to experience great difficulties in achieving or sustaining an independent political existence and may find advantages in considering alternative political relationships. One fairly common problem is the lack of economic viability. Another may be the absence of any real sense of national identity. Some areas are made up of groups which have little in common except, in some instances, a common resentment toward their for-

eign rulers. This alone is obviously not a strong foundation for statehood.

The free world needs to give the most careful and sympathetic attention to areas where the capacity for national existence is questionable. We all know that a colonial territory seething with revolt represents a festering sore which may threaten the health and stability of an entire region. But a nominally independent state which cannot sustain its national existence may be equally malignant. In the final analysis, of course, the peoples concerned must make their own choice. All we can do is to make available our experience and cooperation, both in connection with the making of the choice and in helping to maximize the success of the course chosen.

Danger of Premature Independence

Another closely related problem emerging from the nationalist movement is the danger of premature independence. Even where a particular area has a good prospect of eventually maintaining an independent existence, this prospect may be seriously endangered if it attains nominal sovereignty before its peoples are prepared for the tasks and responsibilities that accompany sovereignty.

There is no objective standard, of course, by which a people's readiness for self-government can be measured. Even with the best of motives, the natural tendency of a metropolitan authority is to insist that the dependent territory should "wait a little longer." By the same token, a dependent people is likely to overestimate its capacity for self-government.

The need for continued help and guidance by the metropolitan powers in many dependent areas is widely recognized. In some areas the very idea of a national community relationship has not yet crystallized. There are areas where the population is just learning to deal with disease, famine, floods, insect plagues, and other forces of nature. There are areas which need substantial help in developing their economic resources. There are areas which cannot alone undertake the burdens of military defense. There are areas where there is still much work to be done in establishing modern forms of political and social administration. In other words, there are several dependent areas where the sudden withdrawal of foreign presence

and cooperation would be dangerous to the people concerned and to the whole world.

The biggest danger of premature independence is that it can lead all too easily to the loss of independence itself. It is no secret that there are malevolent forces loose in the modern world. Every new state must inevitably engage in political experimentation. Experimentation is one of the sacred privileges of freedom. But the risks of failure are much greater today than they were a generation ago. Whenever a newly independent state stumbles and falls, the buzzards circling overhead are ever ready to swoop down for the remains.

It is in the interest of the United States, of the Western World, and of the dependent peoples themselves that there be a steady and orderly movement toward self-government in Africa and Asia. Where the people of a territory wish to retain political ties with Europe, they should be able to make this choice freely. Where they choose independence, they should have a form of independence that will endure and grow.

I have placed considerable emphasis upon the danger of premature independence. But there is a parallel danger which is no less acute—namely, that self-determination in some instances may be too long delayed. The states which administer dependent territories have accepted the obligation to help prepare these territories for self-government. The United States believes that this preparation should follow a pattern of orderly evolution. But the principle of "orderly evolution" should never be used as an excuse for procrastination.

Whenever any dependent people reaches a stage of material and psychological preparedness to determine its own destiny, unreasonable delay in the exercise of self-determination may have disastrous consequences. Prolonged delay may convert an orderly nationalist trend into an eruption of irresponsibility and violence. It may cause a legitimate nationalist movement to be infiltrated and perverted by Communists or by agents of other imperialisms. It may utterly destroy all prospects of continued political and economic association between the territory and the administering power, thus damaging both parties. Moreover, we have ample evidence that "delaying actions" of this kind are almost never successful. It is like trying to put a cork into a volcano.

Need for Continuing Free-World Relationships

Another problem sometimes arising from nationalism is the disruption of free-world relationships. Just as nationalism often originates as a resentment toward the dominant presence of foreign authorities, so it may, in its most extreme form, involve an attempt to achieve total isolation from foreign influences. In the name of national autonomy, long-standing political and cultural links may be broken, common-defense arrangements canceled, mutually beneficial trading relationships destroyed, and mutually beneficial investments prohibited or confiscated. At a time when the free world needs maximum unity in order to survive, the nationalist spirit may be used as an instrument of division and dispersion.

The newly independent states, of course, have no monopoly on this kind of nationalism. Even in our own country there are some who, at the first hint of economic difficulty, are quick to suggest that we cut down foreign investments, place barriers on imports, and eliminate foreign aid. But wherever it may be found, this aspect of nationalism is injurious. Our own national security and well-being is closely linked with the strength and prosperity of nations in all parts of the world. This means that we have an important stake in the relations of these nations with one another. We recognize, for example, the political and economic interests which several of our European allies have in Africa and Asia and the continuing interests which many newly independent states have in maintaining a close relationship with Europe. Europe needs raw materials and markets, just as the less developed areas need European manufactures, technical skills, and educational facilities.

Still another problem connected with nationalism is the frequent failure to understand that sovereignty involves obligations and responsibilities as well as rights and privileges. This is often a hard lesson for newly emerging peoples to learn. Young nations have a habit of being somewhat uninhibited. Our own was no exception. We can recall that the War of 1812 was fought over issues that might easily have been settled through quiet negotiation by a nation less sensitive to insults and less eager to demonstrate its muscle. But we were "feeling our oats," just as many other newly independent peoples have done before and since.

The struggle for national existence typically unleashes powerful emotional energies, and these energies do not subside with the attainment of statehood. In America's own history our vast revolutionary energies found an outlet in the westward movement, but in many new nations no such convenient diversion is possible. The result may be a period of internal turmoil and attempts at external expansion.

Communism's Danger to Nationalism

Related to the problems I have already mentioned is another danger which overshadows them all. This is not so much a danger arising *from* nationalism as it is a danger *to* nationalism. I refer to the possibility that particular national movements may be perverted by the international Communist conspiracy and, in the process of perversion, destroyed.

Fundamentally, of course, nationalism and communism are wholly antithetical. On the one hand, we know that a deep and enlightened national consciousness can be one of the strongest psychological bulwarks against communism. On the other, we know that communism always seeks to destroy the independent nation—and eventually to make all nations provinces of a universal Communist empire. In 1947 Stalin himself revealed the true aim of Soviet policy when he said:

Let us hope that . . . the new confederate state will be another decisive step toward the amalgamation of the toilers of the whole world into a single World Socialist Soviet Republic.

But we do not need to rely upon abstract expressions of Communist philosophy to comprehend Soviet purposes. The postwar history of Eastern Europe offers unmistakable evidence of the Soviet Union's destructive designs. A number of ancient and proud nations have been utterly crushed, some formally integrated into the U.S.S.R. and others permitted to retain only the hollow shell of national existence. The efforts of local populations to regain self-determination have been ruthlessly stamped out, as in Hungary and the Soviet Zone of Germany.

While the Soviet rulers will not tolerate nationalism within their own system, they have nevertheless found nationalism in other areas potentially useful to their program of conquest. First, of course, they appreciate the impetus of

nationalism and wish to ride with the tide—to create the false impression that nationalism and communism are natural allies. Second, they know that a period of national revolution is almost always a time of political and social turmoil and that Communists have a unique opportunity to pour acid on troubled waters. By the same token, a period of social upheaval enables Communist agents and sympathizers to gain respectability, to infiltrate legitimate nationalist organizations, and to spread Communist ideas. Third, the Soviet strategists hope that nationalist movements in certain areas will result in the creation of weak and unstable states which will be unable to resist Communist penetration and which will eventually disintegrate, leaving the Communists to pick up the pieces. Finally, even in areas where the prospect of a Communist takeover is remote, the Soviet rulers hope that nationalism can be used to destroy established political and economic ties among the free nations, to create cleavages and strains, and thereby to weaken the free world's total powers of resistance.

Thus, nationalism offers the Communists a wide range of opportunities. Where they see a dependent territory seeking independence, they hope, as a maximum, to set in motion a train of events which will ultimately convert this area into a Soviet colony. As a minimum, they hope to drive a wedge between this territory and the West. In either case, the Soviet Union would be the winner.

Soviet purposes and tactics are but dimly understood in many newly emerging areas, where an obsession with Western colonialism has blinded many nationalists to the infinitely greater threat of Soviet imperialism. During the last 15 years, about 750 million people formerly under Western rule have gained independence. During this same 15 years, more than 800 million people have been added to the Communist empire. The Western colonial systems are rapidly giving way to new relationships, while the Soviet colonial system is relentlessly pressing forward in all directions. It would be one of the profound disasters of human history if the great movement toward self-determination should prove no more than an illusory interval between Western rule and a form of degradation and slavery much more terrible than any people subject to Western rule have ever known.

Collective Security and Nationalism

The United States Government is committed to the belief that the aversion of this tragedy requires maximum unity of spirit and action among the peoples of the free world. To a considerable extent, this unity has been pursued through collective-security arrangements. This brings me directly to the question of the relationship between collective security and nationalism.

I think it is obvious at the outset that there is no real conflict or inconsistency between the national idea and the concept of collective security. All our collective-security systems are made up of free and sovereign nations. Moreover, the basic purpose of collective security is to preserve the nation—not to compromise or destroy it. The underlying principle of collective security is simply the fact, demonstrated time and again, that the safety of the individual nation, the maintenance of its position in world affairs, and the attainment of the aspirations of its people can only be assured through association with other nations. John Donne said that all mankind is one continent, and the passage of 300 years has gradually turned this observation from an expression of poetic idealism to an expression of inescapable fact.

It must be recognized, of course, that the conjunction of the two concepts sometimes presents difficulties. There is a conflict, an inexorable conflict, between collective security and the kind of nationalism that causes a country to ignore obligations and responsibilities or to engage in imperialism against its neighbors. But this form of nationalism, fortunately, is not very prevalent.

There is also a conflict between collective security and the obsolete notion that a nation is able to isolate itself from the world or to maintain complete freedom of action in its relations with other nations. This aspect of nationalism is familiar even here in America. It is reflected by those persons who scorn the processes of consultation between the United States and its allies and who demand that even the tiniest American interest be given absolute precedence over all foreign interests. It is reflected by those who oppose foreign trade, foreign aid, foreign assignments of American troops, cultural exchanges, and other acts aimed at increasing the total strength and cohesion of the free world. It is reflected by

those who ask repeatedly why the United States does not "compel" one or another of its allies to knuckle under to American policies.

Now I fervently believe that the development of our collective-security systems has afforded vast rewards to America and its allies alike, but I don't want to suggest that anyone is getting something for nothing. Collective security isn't "for free." Whenever you join together with others in any enterprise, you automatically assume certain limitations on your own freedom of action and certain obligations toward the other fellow. This is true of a bridge club or a Boy Scout troop, and it is certainly no less true of NATO, SEATO, or the OAS.

There are some who have confused the restraints and obligations of collective security with a loss of sovereignty. In fact, this may be one reason why certain states have been reluctant to enter into collective-security arrangements. But the comparison is false. As a practical matter, no individual nation ever has complete freedom of action in international affairs. Its power and influence are limited, and its alternative courses of action are limited. In actuality, a nation's ability to exert effective influence on the course of international events is enhanced rather than diminished by cooperation with other nations. As long as I am a citizen of the United States, there are going to be certain legal and social limitations on my freedom of action. But I have a lot more genuine freedom of action than I would have if I tried to live alone on a desert island. Most of us wouldn't make very good Robinson Crusoes.

All told, I would say that there are no serious conflicts between collective security and responsible nationalism. This conclusion is underscored by the fact that virtually all countries have accepted United Nations membership and that nearly two-thirds of the nations of the free world have entered into one or more of the regional collective-security arrangements. This includes several of the newly independent states, who have suffered no impairment of nationality nor weakening of national spirit by their commitment to collective security.

At the same time, we must try to understand the attitudes of other states which are not yet prepared to undertake such commitments. Among some of the newly independent states, as

I have noted, there is much suspicion and fear of regional collective-security systems. A state which has only recently gained independence may feel that any close relationship with other nations is a threat to that independence. This may be especially true where a former governing power is involved. Similarly a state, whether new or old, may feel that it can retain greater influence or maneuverability through a neutral policy than through the principle of collective security. Or again, certain states may fail to recognize any threat to their existence which would justify collective action. One of the most unfortunate myths current in certain parts of the world is the notion that the Soviet empire and the Western nations represent two great "bloes" which are engaged in a struggle for power and that other nations have no significant stake in the outcome of this struggle.

We fully respect the right of any state to choose neutrality. We would never try to compel a nation to join a collective-security system against its will. But this does not mean that we are obliged to agree with its reasoning.

U.S. Commitment to Collective Security

It would have been comparatively easy for the United States itself to have retreated to a policy of neutrality and isolation after World War II. We had ample precedent in a history of isolation. Our immediate survival and safety were probably in less immediate danger than the safety and survival of any other nation. We were strong; we were free; we were prosperous. We had no territorial designs nor compulsion to assert our power and prestige. If we had been shortsighted and lazy, we might very well have sat on our hands and watched Soviet imperialism gobble up the nations of Europe, Asia, and Africa one by one.

Fortunately for ourselves—and fortunately for the whole world—we took a more farsighted view. We recognized that, in the long run, we could not survive unless the free world as a whole survived—that we could not live forever as an isolated island in a Communist ocean. So we committed ourselves to help other free nations to survive. This is the sole basis of the so-called "power struggle" in which we are said to be engaged. Allies and neutrals alike have drawn im-

mense benefits from our commitment to collective security.

But just as we ourselves have recognized our inability to "go it alone," so do we believe that, in the long run, no free nation can successfully go it alone. We can understand how a newly independent state may be jealous of its position. We can understand that some devout nationalists may be sincerely fearful of international association. Where nationalism leads to a choice of neutrality, we will respect that choice. But this does not mean that neutrality can be preserved. The Soviet Union and its Communist handymen have never respected either neutrality or nationality. To them, a neutral is simply a potential victim.

The Soviet rulers are well aware that the impulse of nationalism is mighty. They are equally aware that their designs for world conquest have been held in check primarily by the collective-security systems established by the free world. It is natural and inevitable, therefore, that Communist propaganda should strive constantly to convince the world that collective security is inconsistent with the pursuit of national aspirations. The phrase "divide and conquer" is as old as history, but rarely has the principle been used to such effect as by the Soviet schemers. Where they are unable to capture and control the movement toward national independence, they are determined at least to make sure that emerging nations deny themselves the political, economic, and military protection that collective security offers.

I do not believe the Communists will succeed in this maneuver. Time is on our side, for time brings knowledge and understanding. I believe that nationalism is a healthy instinct and that it will diligently seek out and choose the pathway of its own survival. With the passing years, we have good reason to hope that those governments and peoples most devoted to their national existence will, for this very reason, be most ready to protect that existence through collective action.

Both the new and the older forms of national society still have a lot to learn—about each other and about the perilous world we inhabit. We must live together and learn together until we have the mutual understanding and trust that will permit us to work together and survive together.

Nationalism and the United Nations

by Wallace Irwin, Jr.

If one were to ask an educated, liberal-minded young person today what the relation is between nationalism and the United Nations, he might well receive an answer something like this: "Nationalism is a political disease from which the world has been suffering for about 200 years, and the United Nations is an institution which can cure that disease and bring us peace, if it is only given a chance."

Such an answer is good but not good enough. There is truth in it, but there is also a simplification and distortion of the drama of history.

Both in theory and in practice the United Nations is far from being an enemy of nationalism or a victor over nationalism. It is rather an institution which has come into being during a certain phase of the history of nations. The United Nations and the nations which compose it, being human institutions, may be either good or bad—depending on the use made of them and on the human qualities which go into them.

Anyone who has visited the United Nations knows how austere the United Nations architecture is in design and ornament. It is simple and massive but almost expressionless in most of its aspects. Except for the General Assembly Hall, the interiors especially seem almost self-effacing

in their simplicity. Among the blank walls and angles and rectangles of quiet colors, most of the decoration is national in origin—murals, rugs, curtains, sculpture, and other works of art from many of the member states.

The United States has made its contribution, of course, the most important part of which is the headquarters site itself. From the big windows in the North Lounge, where much diplomatic business is done, delegates can look out at the East River, with its incessant commercial traffic and its wheeling gulls, and at the Queensborough Bridge and the skyline of industrial New York.

Thus the austere, somewhat colorless, almost transparent United Nations buildings take most of their color and variety from the decorative contributions of member nations—and from the American environment which surrounds them on every side.

All this is a reflection, in design and decoration, of political facts. Evidently human history has not reached a point when we can speak of a world culture. Instead, the United Nations—aesthetically as well as politically—seems to provide a sort of neutral ground against which the sovereign nations of the world express themselves. In art as in politics, their self-expression makes a mixture which is sometimes pleasing and harmonious, and sometimes not.

But there is something more to the United Nations than that. The great sloping dome of the General Assembly Hall with its huge ribs of gilt, like enormous golden wings spread high above the delegates' desks, and between those wings the high, dark marble rostrum, and above that the enormous emblem of the United Nations in white on a field of gold—all that gives an effect of great majesty. Insofar as architecture and design can speak, that

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hall seems to say that the nations whose representatives meet there have made themselves morally subject to something higher than themselves: some single thing which all acknowledge through the clashes of culture and tradition, of doctrine, and of the quest for domination.

Symbol of the Oneness of Man

That single thing, of course, is not a government—not even remotely. It is an idea: the oneness of mankind. That idea is seen very differently in different cultures. Some see it in a religious context, some in a secular context; to some it is a moral imperative, to others a distant ideal or even possibly a threadbare slogan; to some it suggests vast social and political changes, to others it suggests preserving what they have. The common denominator, the vital minimum thing which it suggests and even commands to all members, is that there shall be no great war. The even greater goal which it sets before all nations is that, in the words of the charter, they shall “live together in peace with one another as good neighbors.”

In whatever terms the common goal may be defined, it is certainly one of the striking facts of our incredible century that, in the name of this goal, there have come together every year in that great hall, before the eyes of all the world's people, the spokesmen and ranking ministers of nearly every sovereign government in the world. The diversity of background and of attitude, even on fundamentals, is so great as to be almost chaotic.

There are Europeans, with experience of great power and rich civilization, creators of modern nationalism, still in the forward ranks of nations in spite of the price they have paid in terrible wars.

There is the Commonwealth under British leadership, a free association which provides valuable links between the Atlantic region and other countries in other regions and acts as a vehicle for the spread of Britain's great liberal institutions through what was once her colonial empire.

There are Americans, heirs to the liberal political philosophies of the Mediterranean and Atlantic, on whom history has now laid a tremendous burden of world leadership.

There are Latin Americans, with a long tradition of liberal nationalism and a rapidly growing civilization unlike any other.

There are the Arab States, heirs of imperial Islam, formerly under European influence and now in a ferment of growth and change and conflict, struggling to express their own national and cultural identities amid the shocks of great-power politics.

There are African and Asian countries with a great variety of ancient cultures, not long ago existing in the shadows of world history or as bit players in a European drama but now much closer to the center of the stage and claiming what they consider the rightful dignity and benefits of their new national status.

Finally, there are the states dominated by Soviet communism, whose rulers remain committed to a total world revolution and look on the United Nations as expressing that stage of “coexistence” among states preliminary to the world victory which they say will one day be theirs.

Twelve years ago 51 of these member states gathered in London for the first session of the United Nations General Assembly. At the last General Assembly meeting in New York there were 82—more than half again as many. Among them there is much deep conflict, but there is also that very broad sense of a single human community.

The United Nations, then, is a *symbol* of the oneness of mankind and of the universal longing for a lasting peace. That symbolic power is one source of the United Nations authority—an authority so great that in 12 years not one single member state, whatever the provocation or how-ever deep the cleavage involved, has taken the step of resigning its membership.

Impact on World Affairs

More than that, the United Nations is an effectively functioning *organization*—a going concern which gets things done. Here are a few of the important events in which United Nations action has played a significant part:

1. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran in 1946.
2. The dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, which has smoldered ever since 1947 but has been prevented from breaking out into a shooting war.
3. The Palestine conflict, which from 1949 until the fighting in 1956 remained in a state of truce because of United Nations supervision.

4. The war to defend Korea against Communist aggression from 1950 to 1953—a war to which the United Nations made important contributions of troops, supplies, and moral support.

5. The Suez crisis of 1956-57, in which the United Nations brought about a withdrawal of the attacking forces, posted a United Nations Emergency Force at the two most dangerous points of tension, cleared the Suez Canal of the wrecks which had been sunk in it—and, by all these steps, managed to avert the imminent danger of a larger war.

There are political debits in the ledger too, of course. Korea remains divided by Communist stubbornness. The tragedy of Hungary taxed the United Nations heavily, although its moral stand on the issue exerted a lasting effect on world opinion. In Palestine, although there is now practically no shooting, many basic difficulties remain. Disputes over Cyprus, Algeria, and West New Guinea are still with us. But, considering that the United Nations is a place of last resort where the world's most intractable political problems wind up, the political record is not altogether bad.

There are other United Nations achievements outside the strictly political sphere:

1. The United Nations has carried on a big refugee care and resettlement program in Europe, a program arising out of World War II and prolonged by the continuing flow of refugees from communism.

2. The United Nations maintains at a subsistence level nearly 1,000,000 Arab refugees from Palestine—a barely humane answer to a problem whose real solution lies in the political realm.

3. The United Nations operates a most effective technical assistance program in underdeveloped countries, and the International Bank—a United Nations specialized agency—has lent many hundreds of millions for economic development projects.

4. The United Nations laid the foundations for the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is now operating in Vienna in line with the atoms-for-peace proposal which President Eisenhower made to the General Assembly in 1953.

5. Finally, and not least important, the United Nations oversees administration of 11 trust territories in Africa and the Pacific Ocean area, territories which under the charter are to be brought to

self-government or independence. The new state of Ghana in West Africa, which is now a member of the United Nations, includes the former Trust Territory of British Togoland, which voted in a United Nations plebiscite to join with Ghana. Two years from now Somaliland, another trust territory, is also scheduled to join the United Nations as a sovereign state.

In fact, the United Nations Charter provides for advancement not only of the 11 trust territories but of all non-self-governing territories. Reports are made regularly by governing countries to the United Nations, and the debates on them—though they may attract little attention in New York—are big news in the African and Asian countries. Some of these territories will soon join the community of independent nations and take their seats in the United Nations.

That list of activities and achievements is enough to show that the United Nations is not only a powerful symbol but also an important center of practical influence in the affairs of nations.

Combining for a Common Purpose

This influence comes mainly from the sovereign member states, who by diplomacy and debate combine their own influence to pursue common purposes through the United Nations. They act under the United Nations Charter, the most solemn treaty in existence, which provides both a general code of conduct for member states and a book of rules of organization and procedure. They have in New York a convenient meeting place, a place where they can harmonize their actions on a worldwide scale. They have a most potent propaganda forum in which contending sides can strive for the backing of world opinion. And they have important diplomatic facilities not otherwise available to sovereign nations—notably, a Secretary-General with a unique position in world diplomacy, a position Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld has used on several occasions to great effect.

Now a word about national power. Since the United Nations depends for its effectiveness on member states, its methods of operating have to take into account the very uneven distribution of power among nations. Originally this was done by assigning basic responsibility for keeping the peace—in other words, police power—to the Security Council, where the United States, Britain,

France, China, and the Soviet Union each have the veto, the power to prevent action by voting "no." But the frequent use of that veto—83 times by the Soviet Union alone—has caused a transfer of much U. N. peace activity to the General Assembly.

Now the General Assembly, in its formal organization and rules of procedure, takes hardly any account of power realities. Each of the 81 members has just one vote, regardless of size or wealth or population. But in practice the leadership of the big powers is just as evident in the General Assembly and shows much the same patterns there as elsewhere in the world. Actually the influence of each member in the General Assembly depends on many factors, but one of the greatest of these is certainly national power and the acknowledged responsibilities which flow from power.

Another important factor is how well a nation is trusted and the extent to which other nations believe that it shares their purposes.

The United States, in the 12 years of United Nations history, has, of course, not had everything its own way. But it has never lost a decision on any matter of first-rate importance.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is respected because of its power but comparatively isolated because of its known purposes. Unlike any other member, it controls outright an actual bloc of votes—its own and those of its satellites in Eastern Europe, making a total of 9. But outside of that bloc Moscow has very little positive influence. When it comes to a resolution on which the Soviets are at odds with the Western nations, the most they can hope for outside their own empire is that perhaps 10 or 15 countries of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East will abstain from voting.

The moral influence of the General Assembly would not exist if the middle and small powers did not also have a great share in the General Assembly's proceedings. They are not by any means helpless followers in a game of follow-the-leader. They make up to a great extent for their relative individual weakness by their numbers and by their ability to combine.

Combinations in the United Nations tend to follow certain established patterns, although there is a good deal of variation from one issue to the next. There is a longstanding and quite formal-

ized caucus of the 20 Latin American countries. It does not impose voting discipline on substantive issues, but it is a vehicle for concerting views and tactics voluntarily. In 1955 the countries of the Afro-Asian region—the so-called Bandung group—formed their own caucus at the United Nations. It has 29 members and is effective in concerting its members' tactics on questions where most of them agree—notably questions with a colonial aspect and questions relating to economic development.

There are other caucuses and groupings, more or less formal. Within the Afro-Asian group, the Arab States at times meet separately. On some matters the countries of Western Europe occasionally meet. The Commonwealth countries, under British leadership, also meet frequently among themselves. And, of course, the Soviet Union meets often with its followers to pass the word—a process of command and obedience which can scarcely be compared to a democratic caucus.

For the United States the consulting process is constant and is far more complex than these caucus arrangements would suggest. The United States controls only one vote—its own—as United Nations voting records amply prove. The United States belongs to no caucus. During the General Assembly the U.S. delegation holds many special tactical meetings with cosponsors on important resolutions, in which the language of the resolution and all the tactics connected with it are thoroughly aired. There are hardly any delegations among the 81 with which the United States does not consult now and then.

"Harmonizing the Actions of Nations"

Sometimes it is quite difficult to keep in a single focus, so to speak, these activities at the United Nations and all the other, more familiar events of international politics. The United Nations is still a relative novelty on the world stage, and its actual functioning is still somewhat obscured by the cloud of almost Utopian glory in which it was born. It would be a tremendous pity if the United Nations were ever to lose that special quality of idealism, which is one of its priceless assets. But it would be just as great a pity if the United Nations work were to lose its vital relation to the hard, often ugly world of struggling nations, because if that ever happened its whole reason for being would disappear.

On that heading the present picture is by no means discouraging. The most hopeful signs, perhaps, are those which show how much serious, top-level effort by ambassadors, foreign ministers, and even heads of leading governments can go into the framing of an important General Assembly resolution. When the Assembly takes a position, say, on such a matter as terms for final settlement of the Korean question; or whether an international atoms-for-peace agency should be established; or whether to set up a new United Nations fund to spur economic development in preindustrial countries; or what ought to be done about the crushing of freedom in Hungary, the future of the Suez Canal, or the argument over Cyprus—these positions usually represent a remarkable amount of serious diplomacy by many governments. It is true enough that a General Assembly resolution is legally no more than a recommendation; but what gives it force is that it is a solemn commitment, made in full view of the world, not only by the United Nations as a whole but by every government voting for it. For years after its adoption it will stand as an authentic statement of policy by the community of nations. Thus the resolution-making process is at the core of what the charter calls "harmonizing the actions of nations."

There are wise limits to what the United Nations may undertake in this business of "harmonizing." The charter forbids the United Nations—which, after all, is not a government—to intervene in any matter "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." In some cases, such as those of Algeria and Cyprus, where a claim of domestic jurisdiction is made but where the matter in question has become a cause of public concern abroad, the Assembly holds a debate in which both sides can compete for the support of world opinion but refrains from expressing itself on terms or means of settlement.

There is another wise restraint which the charter places on the United Nations as an organization. It provides in article 33 that the parties to any dispute, before they ask the United Nations to take it on, shall first try negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, or judicial settlement. Thus the United Nations as a code of conduct extends much further than does the United Nations as a piece of machinery.

The present trouble between France and Tunisia

illustrates this principle. Both sides, rather than arguing the matter out in the United Nations, have accepted the good offices of the United States and the United Kingdom. Sometimes procedures of this kind are criticized as "bypassing the United Nations," but in fact they are United Nations action at its best. A more immediate resort to direct United Nations action, in fact, could properly be criticized as bypassing the charter.

Certainly that is as it should be. It would make no more sense for United Nations rules of behavior to apply only within the portals of the United Nations itself than for Christian ethics to apply only in church.

Over and above these charter limits there are, naturally, faults and weaknesses at the United Nations which are purely human. There is now and then an emotional attack by one nation against another, motivated at least in part by considerations of domestic politics. There is a preoccupation, perhaps excessive, with treaty law as a sovereign cure for all the world's ills. There is a vast amount of speechmaking—some of it very moving, some of it of doubtful value to mankind, but all of it much better than making war. And there is, perhaps, the same mixture of brilliance and wrongheadedness, nobility and meanness of soul, that can be found among the members of most parliaments around the world: the same pressures, careful ambiguities, temporary alliances, horse trading, bluffing, rounding up votes, motions to adjourn, writing and amending resolutions. The delegates who do it know what an exhausting and frustrating process this can sometimes be.

Nobody can say accurately, of course, how much it is all worth. But without a doubt the United Nations is one of the great centers of influence in the world today, perhaps ranking with the leading sovereign nations in the massiveness of its impact on world affairs.

Among some students of international politics there is a tendency to believe that influence without power—real physical power—is nonexistent. Yet here is the United Nations, possessing no real power of its own, radiating influence. That influence is, of course, a synthesis of the influence of its members; but the whole is certainly greater than its parts.

Actually, between the United Nations and its members the currents of influence flow both ways.

Member states individually contribute their influence to the proceedings and, in turn, are influenced in their own policies by what the United Nations says and does. Repeatedly, in many different situations, proceedings at the United Nations imbue national policies with a forbearance from violent conflict, a willingness to bear with stubborn wrongs, an awareness of universal human values, and a readiness to join in cooperative ventures for the common good. When two powers are locked in a dispute, the more disinterested speakers in the United Nations debate constantly urge patience and restraint, argue for peace, offer means for settlement. They are almost like the chorus in a Greek drama, criticizing the main action, passing judgment on it, reminding the protagonist of his duty, warning him against yielding to passion. At their best they are the authentic voice of the United Nations. And oftentimes, also, that authentic voice speaks through the greatly respected Secretary-General.

Let us suppose for a moment that the influence exerted through the United Nations could somehow be measured as a percentage of all the influences that govern international affairs. In this day and age it would be hard to imagine the United Nations and all its programs as exerting more than 2 or 5 or conceivably 10 percent of the total. But, whatever the quantity, it is certainly in the main a benign influence. It would be a rash man who would say, in the precarious state of the world's affairs, that this 2 or 5 or 10 percent will not tip the balance between disaster and success for the community of nations.

An Age of Simultaneous Revolutions

Bearing in mind this picture of the place which the United Nations occupies in world affairs, we can now take a closer look to see how nationalism fits into the picture. From the United Nations vantage point it appears as one of the most dynamic and powerful forces in the world today—a force full of promise and also, no doubt, full of danger.

There are other forces, of course. We seem to be living through an age of several simultaneous revolutions, with all of which the United Nations is involved.

One revolution is scientific and technical. It has become technically possible to unify mankind in a single civilization—or to destroy a very large

part of the human race. The atomic energy work generated by the United Nations, and the innumerable technical and scientific activities of the United Nations specialized agencies, are factors in keeping this revolution on the right track. Another factor is the constant search in the United Nations for a safe and workable program of disarmament—one of the great focal issues which the organization has faced throughout its existence.

Secondly, there is a revolution in the emergence of new nations—a transformation of great areas from Morocco to Indonesia and the Philippines from colonial dependency into self-government and independence. The peoples of 19 United Nations member states in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia have personal experience of living under the tutelage of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, or the United States,¹ and the process is by no means finished. All these countries take their United Nations membership very seriously. In it they find not only a symbol of their sovereignty but a world pattern of cooperation which deeply influences their framework of ideas. And in their United Nations association with older nations they are reminded that liberty must be more than what Wilson once called “an insurgent madness in the blood”—that it cannot survive without the discipline of responsible government.

Then there is a third revolution which goes along with the first two—a revolution in the economies of the preindustrial countries and, even more, a revolution in their material aspirations. The idea of achieving material progress is very closely bound up with national feelings and sometimes, unfortunately, with strong suspicion of the very countries which can best help. In its economic and technical aid work the United Nations has shown a great ability to overcome that suspicion.

The word “revolution” itself suggests violence and destruction. It is up to our generation—not just in America but everywhere—to control these revolutionary energies, especially those of nationalism, so that violent destruction does not occur. Our problem is something like that of the scientists who had to subdue the force of the atom bomb so that it would produce electric power

¹ *Great Britain*: Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Iraq (until 1932), Jordan, Libya (with France), Malaya, Pakistan, Sudan; *France*: Cambodia, Laos, Lebanon, Morocco (with Spain), Syria, Tunisia; *Netherlands*: Indonesia; *United States*: Philippines.

instead of death. We have to see that the explosive political forces of our time are directed into peaceful, constructive channels. In that effort the United Nations is a real asset.

Now to appreciate the complexity of our problem we have to remember that modern nationalism did not come into existence until after the common people had begun to take part in public affairs. Then states which had been dynastic monarchies were transformed into nations, with symbols and traditions which a whole people could be induced to uphold and cherish—and even to give their lives for. All this was originally an English and a European growth and an American growth; but now it has spread over most of the world, and it has released enormous energies in all departments of life.

However, this entrance of great masses of people on the stage of history has had more than one revolutionary result. It made possible nationalism, but it also made possible satanic political spasms like Hitlerism and the imperial adventures of the Japanese military a generation ago. Furthermore, it made possible Soviet communism.

The Pressures of Communism

I mentioned three contemporary revolutions—the technical, the anticolonial, and the economic. All these are at least potentially benign. If they are managed right, they can greatly strengthen and enrich our community of nations. But the Communist revolution is something outside the community of nations—in fact, it is a mortal challenge to the community.

Within the Soviet empire Moscow gives no tolerance to nationalists. In the case of Hungary it did not hesitate to make a bloody example of them. Outside its own empire Moscow does its best to exploit and manipulate nationalist feelings for its own purposes. Its purpose, today as in Lenin's day, seems to be to see to it that communism—a system under which nationalism and liberty are impossible—will inherit the earth.

Over a year ago, after listening to the United Nations debates on the Hungarian revolution, one thoughtful reporter² wrote:

There can be little doubt that the communist world has put itself on record as being a super-state, allegiance to which is held more important than allegiance to national sovereignty or to the United Nations, and this raises a

doctrinal point that might conceivably undermine the Red countries' whole position in the United Nations.

It is quite true that the proclaimed policies and philosophy of the Soviet leaders are fundamentally at odds with national loyalties and with the United Nations; and yet this fact does *not* wholly undermine the Soviet Union's position either in the United Nations or in the free world. The explanation for this riddle lies partly in the power position of the Communist state and partly in its protean ability to speak everywhere in appealing accents—including the accents of Afro-Asian nationalism. But it also seems to lie partly in the national experience of different countries—the kind of experience which forms the attitudes of a whole generation as mere study and persuasion can never do. Among many people in free Europe war is a tragic personal experience and the idea of another war is more vivid by far than the less familiar idea of conquest by communism. Among many millions in the Afro-Asian world the burning desire to complete the transition from the colonial age, and the consciousness of poverty, create feelings stronger than any fears which reports about communism can arouse. Thus barriers exist within the non-Communist world which prevent a unified response to the pressures and appeals of communism.

Those barriers are a luxury we can scarcely afford. If freedom is to prevail against the total challenge of communism, freedom must find a better and stronger political house in which to live. That house is the community of free nations, and our chief task in the non-Communist world is to build and perfect that community. This requires several kinds of effort.

It requires much creative work to complete peacefully the transition of dependent territories to self-government and political equality—and, in some cases, to national independence.

It requires solutions to deep political conflicts among nations, like those in Palestine and Kashmir.

It requires steady and sound answers to the demand of half the world for economic development and prosperous trade.

It requires the most faithful attention to the United Nations, both as an organization and as a state of mind, in order that the community of nations may steadily develop both a method and a philosophy for living together.

² Christopher Rand in *The New Yorker*, Jan. 19, 1957.

Finally, it requires something which private individuals and institutions can best provide—contacts and working relations in the arts, in science and engineering, in education, in the churches, in many fields—so that those barriers which hold nations apart can be pierced in the way that has the most lasting effects: individual human contact.

If we can succeed in all these fields, perhaps the most stubborn and tragic problem of all can also be made to yield: the problem of the alienation of that third of the world now ruled by world communism. Until it does yield, it seems certain that the community of nations will be living under constant strain and pressure.

The Role of the United States

How should the United States fit into this community of sovereign nations? And what happens to American nationalism in the process?

Recently a college senior in a magazine article said that American youth, presumably including himself, is "probably the least nationalistic youth in the world." That is not too surprising a statement coming from a generation whose parents allowed Adolf Hitler to ruin a great part of the world under a banner marked "national socialism." Evidently, too, the way our friends abroad observe and criticize all our imperfections has made an impression among the youth of today and has helped to raise up a generation which, nationally speaking, is self-conscious and self-critical. Self-criticism is healthy, but we have to move beyond mere self-criticism because we as a nation have inherited a burden of leadership whether we like it or not, and the uncomplimentary things which are said about us abroad—some of which are true and some false—are not going to relieve us of that burden.

Now, if nationalism means arrogance, if it means combativeness and a desire for domination, if it means glorifying one's own country at the expense of others, then it does not fit at all into the picture of a true community of nations. But there is another kind of nationalism which is not only welcome in the community of nations but is essential to it. In no country is it more essential than in the United States. This nationalism is a love of country which is also a vehicle for universal values. The American tradition is precisely that. We inherited our political ideas from the

French Enlightenment, from the English Glorious Revolution, and, in a more fundamental sense still, from the Christian religion with its antecedents in Hebrew prophecy. That was our birthright of ideas. In our Declaration of Independence it was stated not that Americans are better than anybody but that all men are created equal. When Lincoln meditated on that Declaration, he found in it something giving "liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time."

Our independence, based on that principle of universal liberty and equality, lit a spark which spread immediately to France and thence throughout Europe and Latin America within little more than a generation. In the present day it is still the chief inspiration for new nations throughout the African and Asian Continents.

Not our great power alone but this heritage of humane values explains why we are more widely trusted than the Soviet Union and why much better things are expected of us.

But what form should our leadership take?

History has already answered that question to a considerable extent. Certainly we cannot be an imperial power; it is not in the mainstream of our tradition, it would destroy much of our title to moral leadership, and in any case the whole current of history is running the other way. Whatever the humane and statesmanlike accomplishments of the colonial era—and they are many—this option is simply not open to us.

Nor can we contemplate regulating the affairs of the world through a sort of concert or oligarchy of great powers, as was done by the Concert of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. This system, too, had its virtues while it lasted, but it is not in our tradition. Besides, an entente between us and the Soviet Union, affecting the destinies of third countries, is unthinkable because we have no community of purpose with Soviet communism.

The alternative which is most natural to us is that which our own American leadership since World War II has done so much to create and develop: the United Nations system. In this system the necessity of national power is recognized, but it is subordinated to universal ethical principles and it is moderated by the daily practice of accommodation among nations. In this system great powers are looked to for leadership—none more than America—but power is regarded

as a responsibility, not as a title to special privilege.

The most famous part of the United Nations Charter is its preamble, and deservedly so, because it sums up the spirit of the whole document. It speaks of preventing a renewal of "the scourge of war"; of "fundamental human rights" and "the dignity and worth of the human person"; of "the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small"; of "justice . . . treaties . . . international law"; of "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."

Most of these ideals date from the beginning of the great era of nation states nearly two centuries ago, in which our own Nation was born. Now they form, so to speak, the soul of the United Nations, and under this United Nations banner are gathered the most diverse members, many of them younger than the United Nations itself and only beginning to conquer their heritage as sovereign states. They form a conscious community, however imperfect and vulnerable and half-realized that community may be.

The United Nations has not killed off nationalism and is not likely to do so. But it has already begun to temper nationalism. It has powerfully influenced the world environment in which our own American Nation, and many other nations too, seek to play their part in history. Those who serve its member states in the spirit of the charter like to believe that they are thereby doing a service to humanity as well. How good a service it is, only time will tell.

Haitian Mission Concludes Financial Discussions

Press release 240 dated May 2

A special mission of Haitian Government officials has completed a 2-week visit to Washington to discuss financial and economic matters with officials of the U.S. Government, including the Department of State, the Treasury Department, the International Cooperation Administration, the Export-Import Bank, and the Development Loan Fund. The Haitian mission was headed by the Minister of Finance, Fritz Thebaud, and included the Minister of Agriculture, Henri Marc-Charles; the Chief Counselor of the High Court of Accounts, Jules Blanchet; the Secretary of the Council on Natural Resources and Economic De-

velopment, Louis Leveque; and Senator Arthur Bonhomme. In addition to discussions with this Government, the visitors consulted various financial institutions. The talks were carried out in the warm and friendly atmosphere which has traditionally marked relations between Haiti and the United States.

As a result of discussions of loan arrangements with the Export-Import Bank, the Government of Haiti will regularize its repayments and interest charges on a \$27 million credit. This credit from the Export-Import Bank, initially approved in 1949, has assisted in financing construction of the Peligre Dam and an irrigation system in the Artibonite Valley, potentially Haiti's greatest productive area. Approximately \$24 million of this credit have been drawn to date. Haiti will carry out a long-studied plan to reorganize the ODVA [Organisme du développement de la Vallée de l'Artibonite—Artibonite Valley Authority] which is expected to result in greater effectiveness of that Authority's operations.

The Haitian delegation discussed with officials of the Export-Import Bank, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Development Loan Fund plans to enhance the economic contributions of the Artibonite Valley and to insure the well-being of its 70,000 residents. There was general agreement that the ODVA should resume construction, particularly in the drainage areas, at the earliest possible date. These U.S. agencies are cooperating with ODVA wherever possible and appropriate.

The International Cooperation Administration agreed to make available to the Government of Haiti \$2 million in fiscal year 1958 special assistance funds for completion and construction of projects, such as farm-to-market roads, small bridges and river crossings, and irrigation and water-supply systems to supplement the Government of Haiti's economic development program. The \$2 million will also help alleviate Haiti's shortage of dollars, caused by a series of natural, political, and economic difficulties since Hurricane Hazel devastated the country in 1954. U.S. economic assistance is making an important contribution to the attempt to restore economic stability in Haiti, one of the prime objectives of the administration of Haitian President Duvalier.

The joint discussions with the financial delegation have also resulted in ICA increasing by \$625,000 to a fiscal year 1958 total of \$1.5 million

the cooperative technical-assistance program in the fields of agriculture, health, education, and public works. This increase includes studies to be made for the integrated economic development of Haiti's historically significant Cap Haitien area.

The Development Loan Fund indicated its readiness to consider financial assistance to Haiti in the form of loans for sound project proposals received from the Government of Haiti and private sources and for which adequate financing from other sources is not available. Specific project applications for agricultural processing and transportation facilities are being drafted for submission to the DLF and for certain other key economic development projects intended to help diversify and expand the Haitian economy.

The Contribution of Trade to the Cause of Peace

by Douglas Dillon

Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

It is a great pleasure for me to be here with you at this dinner on the eve of the opening of the Second Annual World Trade Fair of the City of New York. It is fitting that this World Trade Fair should be held in New York, one of the greatest ports in the world. Last year about thirty cents out of every dollar of America's export trade steamed past the Statue of Liberty en route to the Seven Seas.

We hear a good deal these days about this "shrinking world." But it is not missiles that have made neighbors of distant countries. It is the trading system of the modern world. Here in the United States we are learning that the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans are not walls which separate us from other peoples. They are highways to progress, to prosperity, and to peace.

We are learning one of the fundamental laws of nature. We are learning that the world's economic life, like its organic life, is closely interrelated. We are learning that the economy of the United States cannot continue healthy and secure if the economies of Africa or Europe or Latin

America are unhealthy or insecure. We are beginning to understand the powerful, irresistible force of hundreds of millions of people seeking an end to centuries of poverty, ignorance, and disease. They have been eking out a living from the soil since the dawn of history. Now they are on the march.

For more than a decade we in the United States have been working with these peoples of the newly developing nations of the world to help them speed the transition from the hoe to the tractor and from ox power to Diesel power. Through the mutual security program of the United States, we are working in every corner of the world to help other peoples achieve a higher standard of living, a more diversified economy, a stronger industrial base, and a longer life span.

Our mutual security program has sometimes been referred to here in the United States as a "giveaway." This is no "giveaway." This is an investment in the future of the United States and of the world.

I am an investment banker by trade, and I speak as an investment banker when I say that today's less developed nations are tomorrow's richest economic and political asset. One out of every four persons on this earth earns only about one dollar a week. One out of every three goes to bed hungry every night. We are helping these people escape from the grinding scourge of poverty. We are helping them to find a richer life in conditions of freedom. For we know that, unless they do, our own freedom and well-being will be endangered. That is the meaning, that is the purpose, of our mutual security program.

A second mighty weapon in our fight for a sounder world economy is the reciprocal trade agreements program.

The foreign economic policy of the United States has deep roots in the reciprocal trade agreements program. Its basic premise is that international trade shall be allowed to expand in response to market forces, without unjustifiable Government interference. When it was first proposed by Cordell Hull in 1934, it was a bold step—a pioneering effort to demonstrate in a practical manner that everyone is better off by exchanging goods than by trying to be self-sufficient.

Today reciprocal trade is a tried and proven program. Under it exports of the United States have leaped from \$2.1 billion in 1934 to \$19.5

¹ Address made at a dinner preceding the opening of the World Trade Fair at New York, N. Y., on May 6 (press release 244 dated May 5).

billion in 1957, and our imports have grown from \$1.6 billion to \$13.5 billion. In other words, our exports today are more than nine times what they were in 1934 and our imports are eight times greater.

The Trade Agreements Act is now before Congress for renewal. The act has been renewed 10 times in the past, and President Eisenhower is now requesting a 5-year extension in order that we may conduct beneficial trade negotiations with the great European Common Market which will soon become a reality.

In spite of the impressive world trade record built up under the Trade Agreements Act, voices are being raised against its renewal. This is a free country, and criticism of the Government is one of our favorite pastimes. We would not have it any other way. But all too frequently opposition to the trade agreements program is based on unjustified fears. And often our trade agreements are made the scapegoat for other economic problems besetting domestic industry.

The reciprocal trade agreements program has been a bridge between the United States and the world. Every man, woman, and child in this country has benefited from the trade stimulated by this creative concept. I seriously doubt if this great World Trade Fair would be opening tomorrow if the United States had built up its tariff walls instead of breaking down artificial barriers to trade.

The Trade Agreements Act expresses in a very real sense the interdependence of nations. If we are to achieve the world prosperity and security that all of us so earnestly desire, it is axiomatic that we must give our customers abroad—the countries represented at this World Trade Fair and others too—the opportunity to earn the foreign exchange they need to buy our American products.

Trade and more trade is vital to peace and progress. Trade creates understanding—understanding of each other's problems and aspirations. This fair is designed to stimulate trade. In so doing it will contribute mightily to better international relations. It will contribute to the cause of peace which we are striving to make secure for mankind. I congratulate all of you citizens of New York who have had a hand in creating this new and important institution, and I wish you every success this year and in the future.

President Increases Tariff on Clinical Thermometers

White House press release dated April 21

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on April 21 accepted the recommendation of the United States Tariff Commission in the case of clinical thermometers. Accordingly, the President issued a proclamation under the escape clause increasing the tariff on imports of clinical thermometers to 85 percent ad valorem.

The Tariff Commission reported to the President on February 21, 1958, that the domestic industry was suffering serious injury. The Commission recommended, with two members dissenting, that the tariff be increased under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended.

PROCLAMATION 3235¹

WITHDRAWAL OF TRADE AGREEMENT CONCESSION ON CERTAIN CLINICAL THERMOMETERS

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U. S. C. 1351), the President, on April 21, 1951, entered into a trade agreement providing, among other things, for the accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat. (Parts 5 and 6) A7, A11, and A2051) of certain foreign countries, which trade agreement consists of the Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including the annexes thereto, hereinafter referred to as the "Torquay Protocol" (3 UST 615);

2. WHEREAS Schedule XX in Annex A to the said Torquay Protocol (3 UST 1125) became a schedule to the said General Agreement in accordance with paragraph 3 of the Torquay Protocol (3 UST 616);

3. WHEREAS, by Proclamation No. 2929 of June 2, 1951 (65 Stat. c12), the President proclaimed such modification of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as were then found to be required or appropriate to carry out the Torquay Protocol, which proclamation has been supplemented by several notifications of the President to the Secretary of the Treasury, including a notification of September 10, 1951 (3 CFR, 1951 Supp., p. 537), as amended by a notification of September 20, 1951 (3 CFR, 1951 Supp., p. 539);

¹ 23 Fed. Reg. 2721.

4. WHEREAS item 218 (a) in Part I of the said Schedule XX (3 UST 1144) reads as follows:

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of products	Rate of duty
218 (a)	Biological, chemical, metallurgical, pharmaceutical, and surgical articles and utensils of all kinds, including all scientific articles, and utensils, whether used for experimental purposes in hospitals, laboratories, schools or universities, colleges, or otherwise, all the foregoing (except articles provided for in paragraph 217 or 218 (e), Tariff Act of 1930), finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of glass.	42½% ad val.

5. WHEREAS, in accordance with Article II of the said General Agreement and by virtue of the said proclamation of June 2, 1951, and the said notification of September 10, 1951, as amended, the United States rate of duty applicable to clinical thermometers, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of glass, provided for in paragraph 218 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and included in the said item 218 (a), is 42½ per centum ad valorem, as specified in the said item 218 (a), which duty reflects the tariff concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to such products;

6. WHEREAS the United States Tariff Commission has submitted to me a report of its Investigation No. 63 under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended (19 U. S. C. 1364), on the basis of which investigation and a hearing duly held in connection therewith the said Commission has found that, as a result in part of the duty reflecting the concession granted thereon in the said General Agreement, clinical thermometers, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of glass, provided for in the said item 218 (a), are being imported into the United States in such increased quantities, both actual and relative, as to cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive products;

7. WHEREAS the said Tariff Commission has further found that in order to remedy the serious injury to the said domestic industry it is necessary that there be applied to such thermometers, for an indefinite period, a duty of 85 per centum ad valorem, and has recommended the withdrawal, for an indefinite period, of the tariff concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to such thermometers; and

8. WHEREAS the rate of duty on such thermometers expressly fixed by statute in paragraph 218 (a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U. S. C. 1001) is 85 per centum ad valorem, which rate of duty will become applicable to such thermometers if the tariff concession thereon, set forth in the said item 218 (a), is withdrawn:

Now, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and by section 7 (c) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, and in

accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of the said General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, do proclaim that, effective after the close of business on May 21, 1958, and until the President otherwise proclaims, the tariff concession granted in the said General Agreement with respect to clinical thermometers, finished or unfinished, wholly or in chief value of glass, provided for in said item 218 (a), shall be withdrawn, and the said Proclamation No. 2929 of June 2, 1951, and the said notification of September 10, 1951, as amended by the said notification of September 20, 1951, shall be suspended insofar as they establish a rate of duty to be applied to the clinical thermometers provided for in the said item 218 (a) on which the concession is withdrawn by this proclamation.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 21st day of April in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and [SEAL] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.

By the President:

CHRISTIAN A. HEETER
Acting Secretary of State

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

85th Congress, 2d Session

- Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. Part IV, March 5 and 6, 1958, 195 pp.; Part VI, March 12, 1958, 123 pp.; Part VII, March 13, 1958, 28 pp.; Part VIII, March 13 and 14, 1958, 154 pp.; and Part IX, March 18-20, 1958, 185 pp.
- Amendments to Trading With the Enemy Act. Hearing before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 10327, H. R. 6766, and H. R. 7830. March 13, 1958. 70 pp.
- Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H. R. 10015. H. Rept. 1575, March 27, 1958. 4 pp.
- Amending Section 39 of the Trading With the Enemy Act. Report to accompany H. R. 11608. H. Rept. 1590, April 1, 1958. 10 pp.
- Communication from the President of the United States transmitting proposed appropriations for the fiscal year 1959, in the amount of \$3,942,092,500, for mutual assistance programs. H. Doc. 363, April 1, 1958. 4 pp.
- Report on the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations by A. S. J. Carnahan and Walter H. Judd of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs pursuant to H. Res. 29, a resolution authorizing the committee to conduct thorough studies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of such committee. H. Rept. 1611, April 16, 1958. 188 pp.

Promoting Progress in Human Rights

*Statement by Mrs. Oswald B. Lord
U.S. Representative in the Human Rights Commission¹*

As we in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights enter our discussion of progress in human rights, I believe people throughout the world look to us for candor, for guidance, and for hope. Both the United Nations Charter and the Declaration of Human Rights are solidly based on the proposition that the individual has an inherent dignity, that every man and woman has inherent rights which are not rightfully abridged by governments or other individuals. Nevertheless, in such times as our own the desire in many countries for security, for national stability, or promotion of national interests crowds in upon the area of rights which are guaranteed to each individual. In other countries such considerations result in failure to carry out in practice what has been declared in theory. In still other countries the interests of the state as a whole have become so overinflated that not even a pretense is made of guaranteeing rights against state power.

In such times it is appropriate, indeed essential, that such a body as this Human Rights Commission represent a counterforce by assessing the condition of human rights in order to encourage future progress.

The story of mankind is a story of the struggle for increasing political freedom and economic abundance. In each of the cultures represented at this Commission there have been milestones along the path toward an increasing standard of human rights and freedoms.

People for centuries have yearned for both se-

curity and adventure—for peace and freedom. Other bodies of the United Nations are primarily concerned with achieving peaceful relations among nations. It is their task to take up the political disputes which are often at the heart of violations of human rights. It is their task to deal with individual violations of human rights which may be threats to international peace. We in the Human Rights Commission have the task of setting the goals for which men should aim and of discovering the techniques to achieve them.

It would be gratifying to all of us here if we could achieve the fundamental freedoms which the charter and the declaration speak of by passing resolutions, or even by drafting conventions or treaties. But unfortunately peaceful progress toward human rights depends above everything else on changing the beliefs and ideas by which men live. Ideas and beliefs change slowly.

In the process of promoting progress in human rights good laws are essential, but they are not enough. Frequently a community or a country may have good laws but ruthless administration. It may state the noblest ideals in its legislation but in practice eliminate any defense for individual rights against intrusions by the state.

"Human rights" are a bundle of relationships starting with personal and family attitudes, spreading to church and social affiliations, to schools, to legal systems, and eventually to the basic philosophy of governments. That is why human rights cannot be controlled solely by law, nor should they be judged solely by legalisms. The state of human rights in a country is largely

¹ Made in the Commission on Apr. 1 (U.S./U.N. press release 2891).

affected by what nongovernmental organizations do and by what individual citizens do. We in the United States consider the work of local citizens and nongovernmental organizations to be the key part in the process by which we strive for the realization of human rights.

Mr. Chairman, the Commission now has before it the first triennial report on the condition of human rights.² It is obviously up to governments—my own included—to make available material sufficiently in advance for proper processing. It is regrettable that only 35 countries have responded to the Secretary-General's request for information. I would like to suggest, therefore, that the Commission begin discussion of the triennial report this year and finish the debate next year. I shall come back to this suggestion at the end of my statement.

Encouraging Developments in Many Countries

During the 3 years under consideration there have been a few cases when countries have made great strides forward and others where unhappy strides backward have been taken. For other countries the record is more mixed. Certainly, however, the examples of progress are numerous and encouraging.

The report before us shows that progress can come and it can come rapidly. Thomas Jefferson in 1825 caught the spirit of another time in words which sound very modern:

All eyes are opened or opening to the rights of man. The general spread of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately by the Grace of God.

It is encouraging in my opinion to note how many countries during the period under review included in their constitution statements of fundamental rights guaranteed to their citizens in keeping with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Nepal, in the Government of Nepal Act of 1951 with the subsequent amendments of 1954, is one striking example. Another is the statement of fundamental rights in the constitution of Pakistan of February 29, 1956.

The Austrian State Treaty, which became a

part of the municipal law of Austria, reaffirmed the principle of equality of all citizens before the law.

On November 18, 1955, His Majesty Mohammed V presented the fundamental statement of policy for the newly independent state of Morocco. He referred expressly to the objective of a democratic regime free from all racial discrimination and inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In the constitution of the Republic of Korea of July 12, 1948, chapter II contains 22 articles presenting the "Rights and Duties of Citizens." In clear language are stated the human rights presented in the Universal Declaration. During the period of the reports before us the constitution of the Republic of Korea was amended for the second time since its adoption in 1948 to provide, among other things, for popular referendum of certain types of legislation upon a petition of 5,000 qualified voters.

In Denmark a comprehensive act now empowers the lower house of the legislature to appoint a commissioner to investigate a complaint by an individual concerning official faults or negligence in public duty.

The tremendous increase in communications facilities today has contributed to the danger that rights of privacy will be invaded. In the United States the legality of wiretapping of telephone conversations was the subject of a far-reaching decision by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court restricted this practice even when carried on by law-enforcement officers. An important judicial decision in Switzerland on the secrecy of correspondence supported a magistrate's refusal to divert telegrams and mail of a suspected individual even to the law-enforcement authorities. The Federal Court of Justice in the Federal Republic of Germany ruled that personal papers of a confidential nature were entitled to the same kind of protection as copyright works, to be published only with the author's permission. And in France the privacy of an individual in a judicial proceeding was protected by an act making it an offense to photograph, broadcast, or televise judicial proceedings.

A number of countries took action to enfranchise or extend the right to vote for women. Suffrage was granted to women in Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Laos, and Nicaragua and extended in

² U.N. doc. E/CN.4/757 and Adds. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Honduras, Peru, and Haiti. The right was also established for women in Ghana and Malaya.

The interest of governments in the field of health and social security has shown a tremendous increase in the number of provisions covering benefits for retirement, compensation, and insurance.

We see from the report by UNESCO³ that article 27, which provides the right to participate freely in the cultural life of the community, has been also considerably extended during the 3 years under review. Italy, for example, has written into its constitution a provision to protect linguistic minorities. In India any group of citizens having a distinct language, script, or culture has the right to conserve it.

Adult education is a growing concern in many countries. To mention India again, we find that some 75,000 literacy classes have been established with an enrollment of over 600,000. In 1956 the President of Viet-Nam called upon the entire population to join in evening courses for workers with participation by all the country's intellectuals. The state of Israel reports great emphasis on the teaching of language and fundamental education, as well as vocational and professional education for new immigrants. A number of countries report active efforts to encourage and assist writers through literary funds and also through the purchase of prize-winning books for distribution to schools and public libraries. Others report success in bringing books and exhibits to rural areas by mobile libraries.

Civil Liberties in the United States

If I may refer to the United States again, our Constitution sets forth the basic human rights which may not be invaded by governmental authority. These basic rights, generally designated as "civil liberties" or "political rights," include the right to life, liberty, freedom of expression, conscience, and assembly, the right to a fair trial and to participate freely in the government. It is the function of the courts, which are independent of the executive and the legislature, to review all alleged violations of these basic rights, and the courts' decisions, after full and fair hearings, are final. There is, of course, an appeals system whereby rulings by lower courts may be reviewed

by higher courts, all the way up to the United States Supreme Court.

The United States reports to the United Nations Yearbook on Human Rights cite many cases which show how our courts are ever watchful of the rights of the individual. It has always been our belief that civil liberties can be safeguarded for all only when the rights of every individual are safeguarded.

A moment ago I mentioned that there had been examples during the 3 years under review where events had taken place of fundamental importance for human rights. We in the United States feel that one of these was the unanimous decision in the case of *Brown v. The Board of Education of Topeka* handed down May 17, 1954. In this case the United States Supreme Court decided that segregation on the basis of race in all publicly supported schools is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with the guaranty in the Constitution of the "equal protection of the laws."

By this decision the school system in 17 States was declared to be inconsistent with the Constitution. The Court recognized that a social change of such a sweeping character would require many adjustments and recognized that time would be needed to implement its decision. But the Court said a reasonable start should be made, and in 1955 the Supreme Court again stated that the decision should be carried out "with reasonable speed."

Before 1954 all Negro children were attending public schools daily in the 17 southern States as elsewhere. Since 1896 the Court had permitted States to maintain "separate but equal" facilities for Negro and white public schools. What we are now reaching for is something more—something far more subtle and difficult—namely, psychological equality.

At the present time the great majority of our schools are fully integrated. In 31 of our 48 States all children have attended the same public schools without distinction because of race, color, or creed. In 10 other States integration is progressing and in most cases without commotion, without difficulty, without law suits. In these 10 border States almost 25 percent of the 3,000 bi-racial school districts have begun to place Negro and white children in the same classes. In some areas such as the Nation's Capital and the State of West Virginia all formerly separate but equal

³ U.N. doc. E/CN.4/758.

schools have been integrated. In Kentucky 75 percent of the State has now integrated schools, with only two incidents of friction in some 200 counties.

As for higher education, in April 1957 it was estimated that in 1956 there were 196,000 non-white students between the ages of 14 and 34 enrolled in colleges or universities. This represented an increase of about 620 percent over non-white enrollments in 1930. While the 1956 figure includes all nonwhites, the vast majority are Negroes. The rate of increase in the number of nonwhite institutions of higher learning is currently reported to be about six times that of the number of white students. In 1951 it was reported that 6 out of every 1,000 Negroes of all ages were enrolled in colleges or universities. The percentage would be higher now, but even the 1951 figure is a very large one, and as a matter of fact it represents the existence of greater opportunities for higher education among the members of a single segment of our population than are offered by almost any other country to *all* of its people.

We are witnessing today nothing short of a peaceful social revolution. Some say progress has been too swift for orderly adjustments, others say it has been too slow; but none would deny that a social revolution is in progress. As the publisher of a Negro magazine recently said, "The Negro has made more progress in the last 10 years than any other group of people in the world—and I cannot think of any major field in which the Negro has not achieved success in the past few years."

Economic and Social Development

In the field of economic, social, and cultural development there is a great deal I could report since under the years covered by our study the American people attained a level of well-being surpassing anything known before. President Eisenhower in his annual economic report of January 1957 concerning major economic and social developments during the years 1953-56¹ pointed out that the enormous productive power of the American economy has made possible the release of more time for creative personal development as well as for the more complete enjoyment of material things. Mr. Eisenhower also said:

¹ H. Doc. 29, 85th Cong., 1st sess.

Moreover our free economy gives indispensable support to the form of political life that we cherish. There are instructive parallels between our political and economic institutions. No form of government offers greater opportunity for individual expression, or places heavier reliance on individual leadership and integrity. Similarly no type of economic system offers greater opportunity for individual achievement or places heavier responsibilities on the individual.

Let me refer to certain other facts of American economic life during the period under discussion, facts which have fundamental social significance.

The share of the national income going to wages, salaries, social-security benefits, and related payments increased during the period from 73.8 percent to 75.8 percent.

A growing proportion of our people own their own homes: 60 percent of our homes were owned by their occupants in 1956 compared to 55 percent in 1950.

Significant gains were also made in health and life expectancy. Some 116 million persons were covered in 1956 by hospital insurance and 101 million by some insurance against the cost of surgical care.

Social security was extended through a number of acts of Congress. By the end of 1956, 9 out of every 10 workers were covered or eligible for coverage under old-age, survivors, and disability insurance. In addition, private pension plans now cover about 15 million workers.

Mr. Chairman, the developments in many countries to which I have referred represent the open pages of progress in the book of human rights. I wish it were possible for us to limit ourselves only to the frank and honest discussions which these bright pages make possible.

Unfortunately there are also dark pages of repression in this same book.

It would be cynical and unreal beyond belief if we were to pretend that the specter of Hungary does not sit silently at this table today. I do not intend here to detail the tragedy hinted at in the report submitted by Hungary or to single out those responsible. The United Nations itself has already done this far more effectively than I could, and the world knows from its report—as each of us here today knows—the truth.

Nor do I suggest that tragic Hungary is the only chapter in the annals of human rights which records a sad lack of progress or an even sadder regression in the field of human rights today.

Elsewhere there are peoples whose sufferings call out to us—often mutely—that they should not be forgotten. And we will certainly not forget them.

Our Commission this year can only begin the discussion of periodic reports. There is too much to be reported, too much to be studied, and too much to be discussed for the Commission to complete consideration of this item in one session. I propose, therefore, that we decide to continue our discussion next year. Many governments, including my own, have been slow in submitting information. We would be failing to deal with many replies and would be dealing with others too quickly if we didn't continue our discussion next year.

I began my remarks by referring to the fact that human rights are an organic aspect of all of life's activities, not just matters for laws and courts. To make progress in human rights, we must emphasize what will affect the practices and beliefs by which men live. In future reports the Commission should ask governments increasingly to indicate practices as well as legislation in their replies.

Mr. Chairman, we have before us examples of progress during 3 years. Our task is not only to debate what has happened but to note what needs to be done and press ahead. Our task is to seek those places where we can assist in making progress. Our task is to note the progress being made. By so doing we can find light to shine on dark places where human rights are now dimmed.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

41st (Maritime) Session, International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on April 29 (press release 228) the following U.S. delegation to the 41st (maritime) session of the International Labor Conference to be held at Geneva, Switzerland, April 29 to May 16.

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

Albert Charles Jacobs, *chairman*, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Labor
Louis S. Rothschild, Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation

Alternate

David H. Popper, Deputy U.S. Representative for International Organizations, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

Advisers

Harry J. Gardner, Lieutenant, U.S. Coast Guard, Merchant Marine Detail Office, London, England
Leo J. Gehrig, Assistant Chief for Professional Services, Division of Hospitals, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Joseph P. Goldberg, Special Assistant to the Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor
Edward L. Keenan, Deputy Director, Bureau of Employment Security, Department of Labor
Graham W. McGowan, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce
William L. Morrison, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard, Department of the Treasury
M. K. O'Sullivan, Captain, Maritime Administration, Department of Commerce
George Tobias, Attaché for International Labor Affairs, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Ralph E. Casey, President, American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N.Y.

Advisers

Albert E. Benson, Secretary-Treasurer, Pacific American Tankship Association, San Francisco, Calif.
Edward S. Bischoff, Employee Relations Manager, Marine Transportation Department, Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc., New York, N.Y.
John E. Murphy, American President Lines, San Francisco, Calif.
Maitland S. Pennington, Assistant Vice President, Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., New York, N.Y.
Halert C. Shephard, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), Washington, D. C.
Lyndon Spencer, Vice Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), President, Lake Carriers' Association, Cleveland, Ohio

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

John Hawk, Secretary-Treasurer, Seafarers International Union of North America—A and G District, San Francisco, Calif.

Advisers

Elmer Cope, International Representative of Economics and International Affairs, United Steel Workers of America, Washington, D. C.
Wesley A. Ferron, Member, National Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association Executive Committee, and Business Manager, NMEBA No. 97, San Francisco, Calif.
Peter Heule, Associate Director of Research, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D. C.

Lane Kirkland, Assistant Director, Social Security Division, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D. C.

R. D. Lurvey, Captain, President pro tem, International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Boston, Mass.

Secretary of Delegation

William Kelley, Office of International Conferences, Department of State

The International Labor Conference is the principal policymaking organ of the International Labor Organization (ILO), a specialized agency of the United Nations comprising 79 member countries. This session of the International Labor Conference, which is being convened by the Governing Body of the ILO, is a special meeting devoted exclusively to maritime matters. Such maritime sessions are held at approximately 10-year intervals, the last having met at Seattle in 1946.

The agenda of the conference, as determined by the Governing Body with the recommendations of the Joint Maritime Commission, is as follows: the Director-General's report; general revision of the Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention (Revised) 1949; engagement of seafarers through regularly established employment offices; flag transfer in relation to social conditions and safety; contents of ships' medicine chests and medical advice by radio to ships at sea; jurisdiction over the suspension of officers' certificates of competency; and reciprocal or international recognition of seafarers' national identity cards.

The maritime session will be followed by the 42d annual session of the International Labor Conference convening at Geneva on June 4.

ECE Committee on Electric Power

The Department of State announced on May 7 (press release 250) that John E. Corette, president and general manager of the Montana Power Company, Butte, Mont., will again serve as U.S. Delegate to the Committee on Electric Power, which will convene its 16th session at Geneva, Switzerland on May 19.

Established in 1947, the Committee on Electric Power is one of the subsidiary organs of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, in whose work all the European countries as well as the United States participate. At the coming session the Committee will examine the factors influencing future development of electric power

with a view to identifying problems that require international action such as the legal and administrative difficulties hampering the transfer of power across frontiers.

ECE Working Party on Gas Problems

The Department of State announced on May 8 (press release 254) the designation of Edward G. Boyer of Norristown, Pa., as the U.S. Delegate to the 4th session of the Working Party on Gas Problems of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe to be held at Geneva, Switzerland, May 28-30.

The Working Party provides a forum where experts in the field of gas production may meet periodically to consider and discuss problems of common interest. Discussions in the coming session will concern papers on the improvement of the flexibility of gas production; legal protection of international gas pipelines; liquefying, transporting, and regasifying of natural gas; and exchange of experience on variation in gas demand according to temperature and on charging for gas on a thermal basis. The Working Party will also consider the discussions and decisions of the 13th session of the Economic Commission relevant to its work program.

Current U. N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Economic and Social Council

- Statistical Commission. Progress Report on Balance of Payments Statistics. Memorandum prepared by Balance of Payments Division of the International Monetary Fund. E/CN.3/253, January 30, 1958. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Statistical Commission. The International Standard Classification of Occupations. Memorandum prepared by the International Labour Office. E/CN.3/251, January 31, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Statistical Commission. Problems of Adapting External Trade Statistics for Special Types of Economic Analysis. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/CN.3/235, February 3, 1958. 15 pp. mimeo.
- Commission on Human Rights. Study on Discrimination in Education. Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.3/760/Add. 2, February 5, 1958. 5 pp. mimeo.
- Consideration of the Establishment of an Economic Commission for Africa. Note by the Secretary-General. E/3052, February 6, 1958. 39 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, May 1, 1958.
International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Costa Rica, May 1, 1958.

Cultural Property

Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹

Ratification deposited: Rumania, March 21, 1958.
Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹
Accession deposited: Rumania, March 21, 1958.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 25, 1955 (TIAS 3247). Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires April 11 and 22, 1958. Entered into force April 24, 1958.

Bolivia

Military assistance agreement. Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz March 21 and April 22, 1958. Entered into force April 22, 1958.

China

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U. S. C. 1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Taipei April 18, 1958. Entered into force April 18, 1958.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume

Press release 248 dated May 6

The Department of State on May 10 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1939, Vol-*

¹ Not in force for the United States.

ume V, *The American Republics*. This is the last of a series of five volumes of diplomatic documents to be published for the year 1939.

About one-fourth of the documentation printed in this volume relates to multilateral subjects, chiefly with respect to official actions taken or proposed by the various American states in their concern over the outbreak of war in Europe and its possible extension to the Western Hemisphere.

The remaining three-fourths of the volume covers the relations of the United States with individual American Republics. Four subjects dominate the correspondence: economic cooperation, debt payments, financial assistance, and trade agreements.

Copies of this volume (v, 827 pp.) may be obtained from the Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$4 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Cultural, Technical, and Educational Exchanges. TIAS 3975. 27 pp. 15¢.

Agreement, with exchange of letters, between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—Signed at Washington January 27, 1958. Entered into force January 27, 1958.

Weather Stations—Betio Island. TIAS 3976. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 20, 1958. Entered into force January 20, 1958.

Extension of Charter Lease of United States Vessels to Japan. TIAS 3977. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo January 13, 1958. Entered into force January 13, 1958.

Scholarship Exchange Program. TIAS 3978. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ireland, supplementing agreement of June 17, 1954—Signed at Dublin March 16, 1957. Entered into force December 23, 1957.

Mutual Aid Settlement. TIAS 3979. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and France—Signed at Washington January 30, 1958. Entered into force January 30, 1958.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Equipment, Materials, and Services. TIAS 3980. 8 pp. 10¢.

Understanding, with exchange of letters, between the United States of America and France, relating to agreement of January 27, 1950—Signed at Washington January 30, 1958. Entered into force January 30, 1958.

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Releases issued prior to May 5 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 221 of April 25, 225 of April 28, 228 of April 29, 235 of May 1, 237 and 240 of May 2, and 241 of May 3.

No.	Date	Subject
244	5/5	Dillon: World Trade Fair.
†245	5/6	Operation of Wilkes Station, Antarctica.
†246	5/6	Interseasonal meeting of GATT.
†247	5/6	Kohler: "Negotiation as an Effective Instrument of American Foreign Policy."
248	5/6	Foreign Relations volume.
†249	5/7	Eisenhower meeting with Thai Supreme Commander.
250	5/7	Corette named delegate to ECE Electric Power Committee (rewrite).
251	5/7	NATO communique.
†252	5/8	Rountree: Foreign Relations Committee.
253	5/8	Dulles: Berlin.
254	5/8	Boyer named delegate to ECE gas committee (rewrite).
255	5/9	81st anniversary of Rumanian independence.
*256	5/9	Loan to Honduras for highways.
*257	5/9	Assistance to Pakistan in smallpox vaccination campaign.
258	5/11	Dulles: Minnesota Statehood Day.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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Bulletin

Vol. XXXVIII, No. 988

June 2, 1958

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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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June 2, 1958

The Department of State **BULLETIN**, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The **BULLETIN** includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 20, 1958).

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American Trade Policy and the Lessons of the 1930's

by Thomas C. Mann

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹

One of the topics which my fellow panelists and I have been asked to talk about this afternoon is "The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act—Stimulant or Depressant?" The appropriateness and importance of that question in our present period of economic setback is undeniable.

Last September the Office of the President prepared a statement on the foreign economic policy of the United States.² "The broad objective of United States foreign economic policy," the statement said, "is identical with that of our general foreign policy and, in fact, of the overall policy of the United States Government: to protect and advance the national interest, to improve the security and well-being of the United States and its people."

The statement divided this broad objective of our foreign economic policy into three major components: first, to promote the economic strength of the United States; second, to promote the economic strength of the rest of the free world; and third, to build and maintain cohesion in the free world. These parts of our policy are inseparable. Any program which hinders the achievement of any one of these three objectives is clearly unwise and unsound.

The trade agreements program contributes a basic, essential element to America's economic strength; it is both a stimulant to, and an expanding force for, our economy. President Eisenhower, in recommending to Congress that his

authority to negotiate trade agreements be continued,³ said,

Reciprocal trade agreements negotiated since the advent of the Trade Agreements Act have helped bring a more vigorous, dynamic growth to our American economy. Our own economic self-interest, therefore, demands a continuation of the trade agreements program.

Nothing demonstrates the accuracy of this statement better than the experience of the United States in foreign trade between 1930 and 1934. The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 was not passed in a vacuum. It was written, considered, and enacted against the background of 4 years' experience with the highest tariff wall in our history, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. It was the view of the executive branch and of Congress in 1934 that the Smoot-Hawley tariff had contributed to the depression of that era and that the Trade Agreements Act, by expanding our foreign trade, would help to bring us out of that depression. I suggest that that conclusion is still valid today with reference to our present, much less severe, economic decline.

The depression of the 1930's actually began, you will remember, in the 1920's, with a serious decline in the prosperity of American agriculture. Late in 1928 the United States Congress began consideration of a bill to provide higher tariffs on agricultural imports as a means of alleviating the difficulties of the farmer. During the 18 months that elapsed before final passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff the depression had spread from agriculture to every sector of American life.

¹ Address made before the National Industrial Conference Board at New York, N. Y., on May 15 (press release 265 dated May 14).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 4, 1957, p. 723.

³ For text of the President's message, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 263.

What had begun as a limited revision of the United States tariff soon broadened into a bill to establish a completely new tariff.

Much of the support for the Smoot-Hawley bill came from individuals and firms seeking to protect their particular economic interests. Others, however, supported the bill in the sincere conviction that a high tariff would somehow "export the depression." This interesting notion arose from the assumption that high tariffs, by excluding foreign products, would make it possible for the prohibited imports to be produced in the United States, thereby raising the level of our economic activity at home.

It does not seem to have occurred to the believers in this theory that foreign goods were imported for many reasons—because we wanted to sell our own products abroad, which is impossible unless we buy from countries which wish to sell to us; because similar products were not produced domestically; because the domestic product was more expensive; or because buyers preferred the imported product over similar ones produced at home. If imports are to be replaced by domestically produced goods, it can only be done at increased cost to the United States economy and the United States consumer. And increased costs and higher prices are no way to lick a depression.

The supporters of high tariffs also seem to have ignored the importance of exports to the American economy and the effect on American exports which high tariffs would have. If we exclude the products of other nations from our markets, they have no choice but to exclude our products from their markets. They cannot continue to spend dollars without some means of earning them. This simple fact is of even greater significance today than in 1930 because our exports are now at a record \$19.5-billion level.

Nevertheless, the Smoot-Hawley tariff was enacted. The debate on the bill had not been confined to this country. Well before June 1930, when the bill became law, foreign governments and commercial interests had expressed concern at the proposed revision of the United States tariff. It was obvious to many both here and abroad that a radical hike in United States tariff barriers would only intensify the world depression and increase the payments and exchange difficulties of many countries. All told, 33 foreign

nations launched formal and official protests to the United States Government before and after passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff.

Reaction of Other Nations

This action on the part of the world's leading creditor and one of the major trading nations was an invitation to other nations to take action to prevent the United States from exporting its unemployment to them. Within a few months after the enactment of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, many countries had followed suit by increasing tariffs. Some also adopted other highly effective measures for restricting imports, such as import quotas and exchange controls, and various administrative devices which retarded trade. A few specific examples of this retaliation might be in order.

Canada reacted swiftly to the new United States tariff and adopted the highest level of protection in its history. The principal American exports affected by the four upward revisions of the Canadian tariff which were enacted between 1930 and 1932 were iron and steel, farm products, farm implements, electrical machinery, gasoline, shoes, paper, fertilizers, household equipment, automobiles, and chemicals. In addition Canada imposed "antidumping" duties and other administrative measures directed against United States products.

Italy also reacted quickly to the drastic extension of United States protection. As in several other countries throughout the world, there developed in Italy a boycott of selected American goods. On June 30, 1930, Italy adopted a virtually prohibitive tariff on United States autos, thus forcing out of business almost all dealers of United States cars in Italy. Shortly thereafter, United States radios and radio equipment were effectively shut out of the Italian market by higher tariffs. The Italian Government also retaliated by switching imports of raw and unfinished materials from the United States to nations which were buying reciprocally from Italy. Between 1929 and 1931 United States exports to Italy dropped 66 percent, while Italian exports to this country were down 39 percent.

A week after the President signed the Tariff Act of 1930 the Spanish Government promulgated a new tariff aimed principally at the United States and France. Duties on cars were raised

100 to 150 percent, and those on other manufactured goods generally imported from the United States were increased as much as seven-fold. At the same time the United States lost, for the first time since 1906, most-favored-nation treatment by Spain.

Switzerland was particularly hard hit by the Smoot-Hawley tariff, especially by paragraph 367, which had the effect of increasing United States tariffs on certain types of watches from 53 percent to 266 percent, and on others from 83 to 242 and 44 to 253 percent. The Swiss reacted with a surprisingly effective boycott of American products. Between 1929 and 1931 Swiss imports from the United States declined 45 percent, compared with a fall of only 17 percent in Switzerland's total imports. During the same period Swiss exports to the United States fell 56 percent and her total exports 33 percent. Within a year or two Switzerland, in effect, abandoned its most-favored-nation treatment of United States imports and, in addition to raising tariffs, established import quotas, many of which were aimed directly at reducing the American share of Swiss imports.

One result of the tariff competition initiated by Smoot-Hawley was to push the world's exports onto the few remaining low-tariff countries, notably the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, which had never fully recovered from the depression of the early twenties, clung to its historic free-trade position long after other countries had retreated behind high-tariff walls and/or reverted to quantitative restrictions and bilateralism. In 1931 Britain found it necessary to abandon the gold standard; and in 1932 a combination of trade and payments problems, plus mounting domestic demands for protection, led to the adoption of the first British general tariff in almost a century.

In addition to the growing demands of British industry for the protection enjoyed by their foreign competitors, the argument was advanced that England needed a tariff for bargaining purposes in order to force down foreign tariffs and other restrictions. Having failed to achieve an international tariff truce through the mechanism of the League of Nations, of which the United States was not a member, the British were obliged to fall back upon their own bargaining power,

which, in the absence of a general tariff providing a basis for bilateral or multilateral negotiations, was limited. The Smoot-Hawley tariff was not the sole cause of Britain's adopting a general tariff, but it substantially influenced this development. Other countries also used the argument that higher tariffs were needed for bargaining purposes to justify increased levels of protection.

The British general tariff of 1932 made possible, and the Ottawa conference of the same year firmly established, a tariff-preference system within the British Empire which worked to the particular detriment of American exports. Cordell Hull once described the Ottawa agreements as "the greatest injury, in a commercial way, that has been inflicted on this country since I have been in public life." One result of the Ottawa conference was a further deterioration of the United States export position in Canada. The United Kingdom benefited at the expense of the United States, especially with respect to chemicals and iron and steel products.

Shrinkage in World Trade

Total world trade fell from \$68 billion in 1929 to \$55 billion in 1930 and to \$26.5 billion in 1932. During the same period the foreign trade of the United States declined from \$9.6 billion in 1929 to \$6.9 billion in 1930 and to under \$3 billion in 1932. While not all the shrinkage in either United States or world trade can be attributed to United States trade barriers, there can be little doubt that the Smoot-Hawley tariff and the retaliation it engendered were major factors not only in the reduction in world trade but in the general breakdown of the international economy which occurred in the 1930's.

I find it especially interesting that, although trade barriers adopted abroad during the depression exceeded those adopted by the United States, foreign countries in general maintained a higher level of imports than we did. The reason was that the commercial policies of other governments tended to divert their countries' imports away from the United States, so that our exports not only fell sharply after 1930 but declined, in relative terms, more than those of other nations. Between 1929 and 1932 the physical volume of all foreign countries' imports fell 25 percent, but

imports from the United States were almost halved.

This, then, was the background with which Congress was faced in 1934 when it came to consider the Trade Agreements Act for the first time. Today the Congress is in the process of considering the act for the 12th time. By leading you through the chamber of despair which the consequences of the Tariff Act of 1930 constitute, I do not mean to suggest that any responsible person in American public life today advocates a return to the trade policies of that period. I believe that we have all learned something from history and that, regardless of what turn our foreign trade policies may take, we are unlikely to repeat the mistakes of 1930.

Danger of Making New Mistakes

But there are always new issues and new circumstances confronting us and, therefore, always the danger of making new mistakes. Let me speak quite plainly. I think it will be a mistake if the Trade Agreements Act is not renewed for 5 years, with a delegation of authority to the President to negotiate tariff reductions of 5 percent a year, and without crippling amendments. And I think that American business will be mistaking its own interests if it fails to give the President's program vigorous support.

My reasons for this view are threefold. First, if the trade agreements program is crippled, American exports will be hurt—immediately in some cases, over the longer run in others. Second, we endanger our present close economic cooperation with our Western European allies. Third, we lend a helping hand to the Communist effort to link the economies of the underdeveloped countries inseparably to the economy of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

On the first point, the importance of America's economic interest in foreign trade, I think the evidence of our depression experience speaks for itself. A United States trade policy aimed at excluding the products of other nations will be retaliated against swiftly and effectively, now as then. And we have almost \$20 billion worth of export business at stake in 1958, as opposed to less than \$4 billion in 1930. Seven percent of our labor force is dependent on foreign trade; throw these people out of work, and we more than double the number of unemployed.

A short while back the American Bankers Association joined the list of organizations which are

supporting the President's proposals for extension of the trade agreements program. The statement of the Association's Executive Council contained these important words:

It would be fallacious and dangerous for us to try to stimulate economic recovery in the United States by placing greater restrictions on the entry of products from abroad. Such restrictions would serve to increase the impact of the current recession on other nations of the free world and to depress further the demand for products of our own export industries. By broadening the market for our own products and stimulating world trade in general, we can make an important contribution to the economic well-being both of the United States and of the entire free world.

My second point—that a reversal of our 24-year-old trade policy could endanger our political and economic interests in Western Europe—is also supported by the evidence of the 1930's. The British imperial preference system is but one example of the regional trading blocs that developed in the disintegration of world trade which followed the Smoot-Hawley tariff. International economic cooperation rests on mutuality of interests. When that mutuality of interests disappears, the fabric of cooperation between the nations of the free world disappears with it. It cannot survive on sentiment and words alone.

GATT and the European Common Market

One of the major instruments of cooperation between the free nations is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The meetings of the parties to this agreement provide an opportunity to work out in friendly discussion the conflicts of interest which arise in international trade.

The six-nation European Economic Community, or Common Market, has just been formed. The 17-nation European free-trade area is still under negotiation. These developments have great significance in strengthening the economic unity of this vital area of the free world. They will help to eliminate the economic and political rivalries which have divided Europe for centuries and will greatly stimulate the economic progress and well-being of the area.

The EEC has already been discussed at length in GATT meetings, and the free-trade area will be examined in its turn when it comes into being. You are all aware, I am sure, of the important stake which the United States has in these discussions; the Common Market area bought \$3.2

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billion worth of United States exports in 1957, over 17 percent of our total exports.

The GATT does not forbid the formation of regional trading arrangements among its members; indeed, it recognizes "the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies" of member countries. But it insists that such regional arrangements must facilitate trade, both within and without the region, and not raise new barriers to it.

Because of their commitment to this objective as participants in GATT, the Common Market countries will present our exporters with a common tariff no higher, on the average, than the present rates. But the gradual elimination of all barriers to internal trade among the six countries will automatically place our exporters at a competitive disadvantage within the area, unless we are successful in negotiating the common external rates below the projected averages. Thus, simply to maintain our present export position, significant negotiations with the Common Market must be possible.

Adequate time to prepare for and conclude these negotiations, and adequate authority to work with, are essential to success. This is one of the reasons why the President has requested an extension of the Trade Agreements Act for 5 years and the authority to reduce our tariffs, in return for equivalent concessions by other nations, up to 25 percent.

A Challenge We Cannot Ignore

But our economic and political interests in Western Europe are not the only ones at stake in the debate over trade agreements legislation. The increasingly energetic Soviet effort to achieve economic penetration of the underdeveloped countries also presents a challenge we cannot ignore.

Retaliation against the United States following passage of the Tariff Act of 1930 was chiefly economic and, while damaging to many domestic industries and the United States trade position in general, did not seriously threaten our national security. Today the issues are of a wholly different character and are more urgent than simple commercial advantage.

With the free world and the Communist bloc competing for the allegiance of vast numbers of

people in the less developed areas of the world, an expansionist foreign trade policy on the part of the United States has become more important than ever before. Since 1955 the Soviet bloc has skillfully combined offers of aid and trade in an effort to develop a network of bilateral commercial accords linking the Communist bloc with key underdeveloped countries. Soviet loan agreements with these countries typically make provision for commodity exports by the borrower to the Soviet Union as one means of liquidating the loan. This device not only paves the way for expanded trade between the Communist world and the underdeveloped countries; it also provides an alternative to the conventional system of loan repayment through the foreign-exchange proceeds of export sales on the world market.

Consequently, any actions by free-world countries to restrict market opportunities will, directly or indirectly, have the effect of enhancing the attractiveness of Soviet state-trading. Those countries dependent on one or a very few commodities for their livelihood are particularly vulnerable to Soviet economic penetration whenever the markets for those commodities are restricted.

Perhaps all that I have been trying to say this afternoon can be summed up in one word: interdependence. We cannot adopt policies which injure the interests of the rest of the free world without, at the same time, injuring our own interests. We cannot deprive other nations of markets without losing our own markets, encouraging ingrown, inward-looking regional self-sufficiency, and giving up the economic competition with the Soviets by default. We must cooperate to survive.

Educational Exchange Agreement With Germany Renewed

The Department of State announced on May 14 (press release 260) that Heinrich von Brentano, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, and U.S. Ambassador David K. E. Bruce had on that day signed diplomatic notes extending the Fulbright educational exchange program in Germany for at least 5 years. The ceremony took place in Bonn at the Foreign Ministry in the presence of the five German and five American members of the U.S. Educational

Commission and representatives of the two Governments.

The exchange of notes prolongs an agreement, signed at Bonn on July 18, 1952, which made available the equivalent of \$5 million for exchanging lecturers, scholars, researchers, teachers, and students in the interests of improving mutual understanding. It increases the amount specified in the original agreement to the equivalent of \$10 million.

Under the Fulbright program nearly 1,500 Germans visited the United States and a comparable number of Americans traveled to the Federal Republic and Berlin within the last 6 years.

During the current (1958) fiscal year there are exchanges between the United States and 33 other countries under similar agreements.

The worldwide program dates back to 1946, when the U.S. Congress passed a law usually referred to as the Fulbright Act after its author, Senator J. William Fulbright. Approximately 33,000 men and women have received Fulbright grants for study, teaching, lecturing, or research.

Mr. Dulles Exchanges Greetings With Chancellor Adenauer

Following is the text of a telegram sent by Secretary Dulles to Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on May 8, at the time of Mr. Dulles' visit to Berlin, together with the Chancellor's reply.¹

Press release 259 dated May 13

Secretary Dulles to Chancellor Adenauer

MAY 8, 1958

MY GOOD AND HONORED FRIEND: On the occasion of being on German soil, I send you my greetings and best wishes. It is a heartening experience to visit this citadel of freedom. No one who does so can fail to look with certainty to the time when it will be the capital of a Germany reunited in freedom.

¹ For text of an address made by Secretary Dulles at Berlin on May 8, see BULLETIN of May 26, 1958, p. 854.

I am sorry that my schedule is such that I could not come to Bonn to see you. However, I had an opportunity in Copenhagen to have a comprehensive talk with Foreign Minister von Brentano on important problems which confront us in common and to learn from him of your views. Such exchanges of views, our periodic NATO ministerial meetings, and the continuing process of consultation through the North Atlantic Council, all contribute to that mutual understanding and community of outlook which is essential to the maintenance of our freedom and security.

DULLES

Chancellor Adenauer to Secretary Dulles

MAY 13, 1958

MY DEAR FRIEND: Many cordial thanks for your visit and your talk in Berlin and your telegraphic greetings. Our hope and our trust in the success of our common policy has received thereby a further strengthening.

It was a shame that your program did not leave you the possibility for a short stop in Bonn. Ambassador Bruce will have set forth for you my views on the situation.

Like yourself, I view with great satisfaction the cooperation in the North Atlantic Council, which secures the harmony of our views in the battle for peace and freedom which has been imposed upon us.

ADENAUER

President and Secretary of State To Visit Canada

The White House announced on May 2 that President and Mrs. Eisenhower have accepted an invitation from the Prime Minister of Canada, John G. Diefenbaker, to pay an informal visit to Ottawa from July 8 to 10.

The President and Mrs. Eisenhower will be accompanied by the Secretary of State and Mrs. Dulles. During the visit President Eisenhower will address the Members of both Houses of Parliament at a joint session.

Negotiation as an Effective Instrument of American Foreign Policy

by Foy D. Kohler

Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs¹

Whatever difficulties tonight's assignment may pose for me, at least it doesn't suffer from being too narrow. The role of negotiation in the conduct of foreign relations, I would say, is roughly equivalent to the role of an egg in an omelet.

According to my dictionary, the word "negotiate" means "to transact business." More specifically, it means "to hold intercourse with a view to coming to terms on some matter." Under this definition it is evident that negotiation is part and parcel of almost everything we do in the realm of foreign affairs. It is not an occasional undertaking but a constant process. It embraces an incredibly wide area of subject matter, ranging from life-and-death issues to the most trivial problems of protocol. It is necessary to the conduct of relations among friends and allies as well as among competitors and adversaries. In fact, one might say that there are basically only two ways to conduct relations among states—by negotiation or by war.

A great deal has been written about the arts and techniques of diplomatic negotiation, dating from the earliest stages of our civilization. It will undoubtedly be a fitting subject of academic inquiry for many years to come. Fortunately you have spared me, and yourselves, from an exploration of the broader aspects of the subject by placing it within the context of your theme of "Soviet-American Relations." And indeed I suspect that to the average citizen these days the term "diplomatic negotiation" acquires meaning only when we add the phrase "with the Russians." The achievement of successful negotiations be-

tween the Soviet Union and the Western nations today absorbs the interest of millions of human beings throughout the world.

During recent months, as we all know, this interest has reached a new peak of intensity. And it is not hard for us to understand the reasons. We are painfully aware that we are living in a dangerous world, which is also a burdensome and expensive world. In simple dollar terms the amount of money being spent by the American people today for national defense and the conduct of foreign relations is greater than the total national income of the country 25 years ago. Even with this immense sacrifice our people realize that we have not achieved security—that neither peace nor safety has yet been assured. We are familiar with the awesome power of modern weapons and recognize that a major military conflict might mean the end of civilization and perhaps of human life itself. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the American people and other Western peoples are uncomfortable and impatient.

To many thousands of these people the idea of Soviet-Western negotiations seems to offer a magic key to a better and safer world. Again and again we hear the question: "Why don't you sit down with the Russians and talk things out?" The process of negotiation is viewed as a rosy avenue of escape from the grim realities of the 20th century. It vaguely represents a device for cutting defense expenditures, reducing foreign aid, returning our young men from overseas assignments, lowering taxes, and eliminating the terrifying shadow of nuclear war. With these things in mind, it is wholly natural for people to ask: "Why not negotiate? What have we got to lose?"

¹Address made before the National Academy of Economics and Political Science at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., on May 6 (press release 247).

A straightforward question deserves a straightforward reply. As one of the many Americans who have spent many long, late, and frustrating hours in the process, I can answer with some feeling: "That is precisely what we have been doing for the past 15 years." I might add: "And it is what we are continuing to do—or at least, to try to do—every day."

How U.S.—Soviet Negotiations Are Conducted

As I have already indicated, negotiation is a constant process, employing a variety of channels and techniques. The 20th century has witnessed a significant extension of these channels and techniques, notably a greatly increased emphasis upon the use of multilateral diplomacy and of public diplomacy. The Soviet leaders, in particular, have developed considerable aptitude for these modern forms of negotiations and have introduced some less than welcome variants into the older forms. Let us examine briefly some of the ways in which negotiations with the Russians are already being conducted.

First, we maintain a well-trained and fairly elaborate diplomatic establishment in Moscow. The Soviet Union maintains a similar establishment in this country. A considerable volume of business is regularly transacted through these missions, which have the facilities to transact a great deal more business if both parties wish to do so.

The United States and the Soviet Union also maintain diplomatic missions in many other countries. Where there are advantages in carrying on diplomatic intercourse through third parties, this is easily managed.

Let us also remember that representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union sit together almost daily with many other governments in various components of the United Nations system. We sit with them not only in the General Assembly and in the major councils and committees but also in many subsidiary committees and in several specialized agencies. These bodies provide the means for detailed negotiations on a large variety of subjects.

On occasion the United States and Soviet Union have found it profitable to establish special bodies for the conduct of particular negotiations, such as committees of military experts or other technical experts. A number of negotiations in

Berlin, for example, have been conducted through such channels.

We have also become increasingly aware of some more subtle forms of negotiation. Whenever American or Soviet leaders make a speech or whenever they issue press statements on international problems, they are engaged in a form of negotiation. When the other side replies, whether publicly or privately, it is, in fact, joining in such negotiations. The validity and utility of the Wilsonian concept—public diplomacy publicly arrived at—is still the subject of much dispute, but no one can doubt that it exists and that it plays an important part in modern relations among states.

Growth of "Summit Diplomacy"

Finally, we should remember that we have engaged in several high-level meetings with Soviet representatives during the past 15 years, including both meetings of foreign ministers and meetings of heads of governments. I think we should recognize, incidentally, that the emphasis upon this kind of negotiation is also relatively modern. While history records several notable instances of face-to-face negotiations between kings and other potentates in past centuries, this device has gained most of its impetus since the days of Wilson. The meetings of Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin during World War II contributed significantly to the growth of this so-called "summit diplomacy." Today the idea of direct negotiations between heads of government has a dramatic quality which sometimes causes people to forget that other means of negotiations are available and are, in fact, in constant use.

I will not attempt at this point to analyze the advantages and disadvantages inherent in summit negotiations. We should note only that this is merely one of many forms of negotiation and that it is a form which has been responsible for a relatively tiny percentage of the major international agreements reached during the course of human history. Nevertheless we should also remember that we have employed this form of negotiation several times and will undoubtedly use it in the future whenever it appears to offer opportunities that might otherwise be unavailable.

All told, I think there is solid evidence to support my contention that we have been negotiating pretty steadily with the Soviet Union for many

years. Equally significant is the fact that these negotiations, both direct and indirect, have produced a number of important agreements and other valuable results. Let us recall such varied accomplishments as the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, the elimination of the Berlin blockade, the Korean truce, the Austrian state treaty, the arrangements for the International Geophysical Year, and the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Most of these things involved a mixture of diplomatic methods—public and private, multilateral and bilateral—and all of them were important. In addition, of course, there have been understandings and agreements on a much larger number of secondary problems.

I feel fairly certain, however, that neither my description of the negotiations constantly under way between ourselves and the Russians nor my recounting of some of the major agreements reached will satisfy those who are loudly demanding new negotiations between the Soviet Union and the West. What these people want, of course, are not merely negotiations but results. They want a settlement of the vital issues dividing the planet. They want to see an end to the cold war, to the arms burden, and to anxieties and sacrifices. For these reasons they proclaim that what we need are new techniques of negotiation, bold and imaginative new ideas, and a basic change in our attitudes.

No one can be blamed for wanting successful results. Moreover we can certainly appreciate the altogether human inclination to hope that these results can be attained with a minimum of effort and pain. But we also have a right, I think, to ask what people really mean when they speak of "new techniques" or "bold ideas" and of "more flexible attitudes." The process of negotiating with the Soviet Union involves many difficulties, and everyone should understand that these difficulties will not be removed by fuzzy generalizations.

Minor Difficulties Besetting Negotiations

It may be useful to examine some of these difficulties that beset us in our negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union. We might even start the process by considering some of the things which are frequently stressed as difficulties but

which actually are not serious impediments to negotiation.

First among the latter is the problem of channels and techniques. As I have already indicated, this isn't really a significant obstacle. Where there is a genuine desire to reach agreement on any point, large or small, the means of conducting successful negotiations are readily available. Established channels of negotiation have been used successfully in the past to reach agreements with other governments on many types of important issues, and there is no reason why these channels cannot be equally effective in the future. The United States has never insisted on one particular channel to the exclusion of others. We have been interested in substance rather than form and are willing to use any negotiating technique or instrumentality which affords reasonable hope of constructive results.

At the same time we are forced to recognize that the substance of particular negotiations sometimes limits the forms that are feasible. If we are dealing with a question of vital concern to our allies as well as ourselves, we cannot pretend to undertake a settlement of this question through bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union. Similarly there are certain questions of worldwide interest which can be handled effectively only through the United Nations. We cannot, for obvious reasons, treat any issue of universal concern as if it were a matter to be negotiated exclusively with the Soviet Union.

In this connection I should point out that the Soviet Government has usually been less than enthusiastic about conducting serious negotiations on a broad, multilateral basis. It recognizes that the United Nations system affords valuable opportunities for Soviet propaganda and seeks to exploit these opportunities to the fullest. We have noted that these outpourings of propaganda, in themselves, represent one technique of negotiation. However, the Soviet Government has been reluctant to reach major agreements within the United Nations framework and has been especially reluctant to give weight to the expressed opinions and judgments of a majority of United Nations members as a basis for the pursuit of agreements. Since most of the world's peoples have interests and views quite different from those of the Soviet Government and its satellites, the

Soviet Union typically finds United Nations voting procedures quite distasteful and has flouted United Nations recommendations more frequently and more brazenly than any other member.

We ourselves, of course, recognize that there are many issues which cannot be settled by votes in an international forum and also that there are many issues which can be negotiated more effectively in private than in public. What I want to emphasize is not the U.N. channel of negotiation or any other particular channel but rather the variety of channels available. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is confined to any particular technique or procedure. Where there is a will, there are plenty of ways open to both of us.

Next I would like to mention the fact—fairly obvious to us but not nearly so obvious in some parts of the world—that negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have not been seriously impeded by popular antagonism. This is sometimes a rather serious problem for governments whose populations have a long history of enmity. But in our case no such history exists. There has never been a war between the United States and Russia. There has been no significant history of commercial rivalry. There is no basis for racial or religious hatred. In brief, we have been remarkably free of the popular passions that sometimes foment tensions between peoples and impede agreements between their governments.

Another difficulty often cited is the fact that the Soviet leaders have the reputation of being "hard bargainers." While the description is apt, we Americans need have no sense of inferiority on this score. The tough Yankee trader is part of our national legend, and their modern descendants have retained much of their skill and cunning. I realize that our population also has a long tradition of being somewhat derisive about American diplomacy—as characterized by the old saw that "America never lost a war and never won a conference." But this saying, like the saying that "those who can, do; those who can't, teach," is a myth emerging from our great egalitarian culture and cannot be supported by objective analysis. In most situations I believe that Americans are among the best negotiators on earth.

In lay discussions of the problems encountered in negotiating with the Soviet Union our basic difficulty is often attributed to a lack of under-

standing. It is said that the United States and Russia do not adequately comprehend each other's fundamental motives, attitudes, and anxieties. It is contended that all we really need to do is to know each other better—that improved mutual understanding would automatically open the door to peace, security, and cooperation.

Now I do not want to challenge the intrinsic validity of this concept. The value of mutual understanding is one of the moral premises of our culture, so much so, in fact, that it tends at times to become something of a sacred cow. In any case I happen to believe sincerely that any real improvement in mutual understanding between two nations is never detrimental and usually beneficial to relations between those nations. At the same time I suggest that we swallow this concept with a liberal quantity of salt. Neither the Soviet people nor their government is nearly so mysterious as some Westerners assume, and I doubt that our own purposes and attitudes are really very obscure to the Russians. In some respects we understand each other very well indeed. I would even go so far as to suggest that, in the whole course of human history, it is doubtful that any major rivals ever knew each other better. This is probably one of the reasons why we have a cold war on our hands and also perhaps why the cold war has not erupted into a hot war. To understand the other fellow may facilitate an agreement or may render an agreement virtually impossible, depending upon what one's purposes are. For myself, I would like to learn a great deal more about the Soviet Union and also to have the Soviet people learn more about us, but I am not so naive as to believe that this process will automatically bring the Soviet and American Governments into perfect harmony.

Unreliability of Soviet Promises

Finally, it is frequently said that a principal impediment to successful negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union is the presence of deep-seated suspicion and distrust on both sides. The existence of such suspicion and distrust is obvious to anyone who has ever engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union. But suspicion and distrust are symptoms rather than causes. Distrust alone will not necessarily impede successful negotiations where the other conditions of agreement are present. Such negotia-

tions may be successful either if it is clear that the particular agreement serves the interest of both parties or if adequate means of enforcing the agreement are available.

Thus, while I do not regard suspicion and distrust, in themselves, as insuperable obstacles to successful negotiation with the Soviet Union, they do give us a vital clue to the real nature of our difficulties. For the first of these, in my judgment, stems from the inescapable fact that promises represent the principal coinage of international negotiations. Sometimes an agreement will provide for an exchange of concrete objects, but usually what is exchanged is a promise or series of promises. The feasibility and value of any international agreement, therefore, necessarily depends to a large extent upon the nature and reliability of these promises.

I am not revealing any dark secrets when I say that Soviet promises have not always been reliable. A recital of all the important promises that the Soviet Government has broken since the beginning of World War II would be as boring for me as for you. However, I think we can all agree that Soviet promises mean something less than "money in the bank."

Unfortunately, we have not yet reached a state of international political organization which provides for the regular enforcement of international promises. In most instances we have nothing comparable to the legal sanctions which govern private business contracts. Among nations which enjoy democratic political systems, the pressure of public opinion, parliamentary machinery, and domestic judicial procedures exercise a considerable compulsion upon a government to honor its international undertakings. Even this pressure, however, is imperfect, and in the Soviet Union it is virtually nonexistent.

The unreliability of Soviet promises does not mean, of course, that all efforts to reach agreement with the Soviet Union are futile. It means merely that we must exercise unusual care in seeking to work out agreements that will be meaningful. Where possible we must seek promises that will be more or less self-enforcing—in other words, promises supported by concrete machinery for action. As you know, this has been our principal objective in the protracted disarmament negotiations that have been conducted with the Soviet Union. We have insisted, and will con-

tinue to insist, that any disarmament agreement be supported by adequate inspection and control arrangements.

Where we are dealing with subjects that do not readily lend themselves to the application of enforcement machinery, we should try to obtain promises which the Soviet Union itself will have a definite incentive to keep, either because the promise is consistent with Soviet national interests or because of the impact of world opinion. In any case, we must always be on guard against trading concrete political, economic, and military assets of our own for the unsupported promises of the Soviet Union. We certainly cannot barter a way our collective-security arrangements, weaken our military programs, or abandon our strategic positions in exchange for nothing more than promises of this kind.

Differing U.S. and Soviet Political Structures

The second major difficulty involved in negotiations with the Soviet Union stems from the profound difference between the American and Soviet political structures. I know this is old stuff to a group such as we have here. If what I say is trite, we should recognize that it has become trite by being true. The international bargaining position of a democratic government, especially when it maintains a partnership relation with other free nations, is considerably different from the position of a totalitarian government.

Some of these differences are fairly obvious. Because of our constitutional division of governmental power, as well as the pressure of a free public opinion, no American negotiator, from the President down, is a plenipotentiary in the literal sense. Everything he does and says is subject to examination and criticism at home. Every pledge that he makes or fails to make is subject to one or another form of ratification through domestic political processes. He cannot make promises lightly, nor can he lightly reject the reasonable offers of others. He cannot make irresponsible proposals or manipulate discussions for propaganda purposes because his government must be prepared to back up his actions and because his own free press will be quick to expose any "line" that does violence to the truth.

Most other democratic governments, of course, have similar problems. These problems are further complicated by the relations of democratic

governments with one another. On issues that involve the vital interests of both the United States and a number of its allies there must be substantial agreement among the allies before effective negotiations with the Soviet Union can be carried forward. Since our allies are partners rather than puppets, this involves additional negotiation of considerable complexity and duration. To some extent it is true that the Soviet Union must also take account of the interests of its satellite states, but there is no evidence that the negotiating position of the Soviet Government has been severely hampered by this consideration. A master's relationship to a slave rarely involves the same inhibitions that are found in the relationship between two equal partners.

The basic difference between the Soviet and American political structures accounts for much cloudy thinking in this country about Soviet relations. To some extent every nation tends to conceive of others in its own image. As a consequence we hear many generalizations about Russia which fail to distinguish sharply between the Soviet rulers and the Soviet peoples. This distinction is all important. We should always remember that in our negotiations with Russia we are never dealing with the Soviet peoples or with anyone who really represents their views. We are dealing with a handful of politicians who tell their people what to think, who carefully erect barricades against conflicting facts or ideas, and who subject these people to so stern a discipline that even those ideas which may filter through to them cannot readily be translated into practical political action. The United States, of course, does not regard this condition as permanent. In fact, our strongest hope for the eventual achievement of a lasting accord with the Soviet Union rests upon our belief that the Soviet people will ultimately gain greater freedom and influence in the management of their own government. In the meantime, however, we must have no delusions about the real situation we face.

The Soviet rulers are familiar with the complications and limitations inherent in the negotiating position of the Western governments and naturally seek to exploit this situation to their own advantage. They understand, for example, that real power in the West rests with the general public rather than with the government that happens to be in power at any given moment.

Hence the Soviet leaders do not hesitate to appeal to Western public opinion over the heads of governments. They are equally quick to seize any opportunity to magnify occasional differences in interest or viewpoint among the Western governments.

This situation may help to explain recent Soviet expressions of interest in a "summit meeting," as opposed to other forms of negotiation. Aware of the deep desire for peace among Western peoples and of the awed apprehension resulting from the launching of the Sputniks, the Soviet leaders undoubtedly hoped that these peoples would pressure their own governments to enter into a summit meeting on Soviet terms and thereafter to grant concessions which would significantly weaken the Western strategic position.

The Soviet "Principle of Parity"

The men in the Kremlin probably have other reasons for emphasizing a summit meeting. Within the United Nations, as we have already noted, Soviet propaganda themes and bargaining positions have not been very convincing. A summit meeting would undoubtedly help the Soviet leaders to dramatize their arguments. What may be even more important is the possibility that the summit meeting would help to dramatize the world position of the Soviet Union itself. True Soviet purposes are usually concealed. The real "sleeper" in the current presummit negotiations may well be that disingenuous new Soviet invention which has been put forward, first by Mr. Bulganin, then by Mr. Gromyko, as the "principle of parity."

This new wrinkle is still "in the works," and you will appreciate that I can at this stage only call your attention to some of its principal elements and implications. The first thing to be said, of course, is that this formula is both unprecedented and quite extraneous to consideration of the basic issues facing the world. Indeed it may well have been advanced precisely to deflect attention from those issues and thus avoid the serious discussions which the Western powers are today seeking. There is, in fact, considerable evidence to support the hypothesis that the Soviet leaders have no real interest in serious negotiations and no expectation of an agreement, particularly with respect to the issues they themselves have chosen to emphasize. It is al-

together possible that they would be perfectly satisfied simply to arrive at such a meeting, have their pictures taken with Western leaders, and then go home, having demonstrated their ability to bring the West to an unprepared summit meeting and achieved their claim to this so-called "parity."

Now it is important to note that this Soviet concept of parity has nothing to do with sovereign equality among states. On the contrary, it is a concept of contrived inequality. The purpose would seem to be the establishment of the principle that the Soviet Union, together with such satellites as it selects, is entitled to negotiate with the whole non-Communist world, or any part thereof, on equal terms—that important international problems, whatever their nature and geographic scope, can be settled only by negotiation between two "worlds," of which one is the Communist "world." I do not have to elaborate to this audience the implications of this concept in terms of Marxist-Leninist dogma. In any event one can easily imagine that the practical result would be a vigorous campaign to extend the present Soviet veto in the United Nations Security Council to a *de facto* veto over all other international decisions of any consequence.

The fact that the Soviet leaders have ulterior motives, of course, does not mean that we are required to steer clear of any summit conference. On the contrary, our Government is ready and anxious to participate in such a conference if we find any basis for believing that it is likely to produce constructive results. We are not interested in putting on a propaganda show, and we are certainly unwilling to limit our discussions to those subjects which the Soviet leaders want to talk about. At the same time we recognize that there may be advantages in summit talks. The international climate has changed considerably in recent weeks, and, if we receive any indication that the Soviet leaders are willing to negotiate seriously, we are fully prepared to meet them halfway.

In general there is no reason for us to become especially disturbed or excited about the propaganda devices employed by the Soviet Union as standard techniques of negotiation. These techniques are inevitably made available by the very nature of our "open society." Soviet techniques sometimes produce real bargaining advantages,

but these are by no means certain or overwhelming. Actually Soviet efforts to foster confusion and division among the Western peoples during past years have been unsuccessful. Even the propaganda advantages achieved by their disregard of truth and their ability to make irresponsible proposals have had a distinctly short-term character. Falsehood has a nasty habit of backfiring sooner or later. In the long run the immediate advantage is usually lost in the general atmosphere of mistrust its exposure creates. The "open society" is sometimes vulnerable to psychological thrusts, but it also develops a toughness and resilience which assure durable strength.

"Problem of Incompatible Purposes"

Of all our difficulties in negotiating with the Soviet rulers the most important by far is what my friend Professor Charles Burton Marshall has aptly described as "the problem of incompatible purposes." Here I am referring primarily to long-range purposes rather than immediate ones.

In any negotiation the aims and objectives of the parties are usually multiple. Our Government normally has a variety of objectives, and so does the other party. In fact the immediate object of negotiation is often of minor importance in comparison with some of our more general purposes, such as the maintenance of friendship and understanding among the negotiating governments. Every negotiating situation, therefore, requires consideration of various types of objectives, specific and general, immediate and long-term.

It is also true that the aims of the parties to any negotiation are almost never identical. Often their objectives are quite dissimilar or even opposite. But successful negotiation usually requires that the purposes of the negotiating parties be at least compatible. This is the core of our problem with the Soviet Union. Given certain assumptions, it really isn't very hard to negotiate a "one shot" deal with the Soviet Government. In situations where our immediate interests coincide and where the subject of the transaction has little significance in terms of ultimate purposes, the path to agreement is smooth. However, the kind of negotiation which has understandably aroused the greatest interest and enthusiasm among the peoples of the world

is in no sense a "one shot deal." What the American people would like to have—and this goes for all other peoples who are able to express themselves—is an agreement on the basic elements of a continuing relationship. This is a horse of another color—you might even say, a horse of an entirely different species.

Soviet Drive for World Domination

Everything the Soviet rulers have done for the past 15 years and everything they are doing at the present time adds up to produce the inescapable conclusion that the Soviet Government has not deviated from its purpose of ultimate world domination. Every negotiation is conducted within the framework of this purpose. From time to time the Soviet rulers will make concessions but rarely, if ever, at the expense of their grand design. Where it is impossible for a particular negotiation to contribute directly to this grand design in a significant degree, they seek to convert the negotiating situation itself into a sort of stage setting for the pursuit of their ultimate purposes.

When State Department spokesmen refer to the Soviet campaign for world domination, we sometimes encounter a certain amount of eyebrow lifting. There are some who say that the Soviet leaders can't really be as bad as all that—who argue that a little sympathy and tenderness on our part might persuade the Soviet Government to "live and let live," to concentrate on its problems at home and forget about the rest of the world. But there is a veritable mountain of evidence to indicate otherwise. If there is any aspect of Soviet policy where words and deeds coincide, it is in their stubborn purpose to achieve the eventual triumph of world communism. I do not need to review for you the long history of annexation, conquest, subversion, political and economic penetration, military threat, and intervention. But I would remind you that as recently as last November the Soviet leaders and their minions in their worldwide Communist apparatus openly and frankly reaffirmed their allegiance to the basic goal. The declaration of the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties at that time assures us that:

The main content of our epoch is the transition from capitalism to socialism which was begun by the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. Today more than a third of the population of the world—more than 950,000,

000 people—has taken the road of socialism and is building a new life. . . .

The socialist states are united in a single commonwealth by a community of interests and aims in the struggle against imperialism and for the victory of socialism and communism. . . .

Like any progressive movement in the history of mankind, the Communist movement will inevitably encounter difficulties and obstacles. However, as in the past and in the present, so in the future, no difficulties or obstacles can change the objective laws of historical development or affect the great determination of the working class to transform the old world and create a new one. . . . The participants in the conference unanimously express their firm confidence that, by rallying their ranks and thereby rallying the working class and the peoples of all countries, the Communist and Workers' Parties will undoubtedly surmount all obstacles on the path of progress and hasten great new victories for the cause of peace, democracy and socialism on a world scale.

It is true that we should avoid oversimplification in speaking of the Soviet drive for world domination. When the average person thinks of world domination, he normally has a mental picture of a psychopathic militarist who is hellbent upon conquering the world by armed force or perishing in the attempt. It is very doubtful that this picture applies to the men in the Kremlin. Experts on Soviet affairs have also pointed out that the Soviet Government is frequently torn between the desire to foster world revolution and the desire to protect and advance Russia's purely national interests. The proponents of this view sometimes argue, for example, that a study of traditional czarist policies can offer a better clue to the present Soviet purposes than a study of Marxist dialectics. There are also those who insist that repeated Soviet references to the eventual triumph of world communism should be regarded more as expressions of a mystical faith than as statements of practical policy and who suggest that the Soviet rulers would be ready and even anxious to abandon their drive for a Communist world in exchange for solid assurances of security in their present possessions.

All these hypotheses deserve respectful attention. It is my view, however, that none of them, even if accepted, would relieve us from acting upon the assumption that the Soviet rulers are continuing to seek world domination.

In the first place, I think we realize that militarism and a program of conquest are not necessarily identical twins. There is reason to hope that the Soviet rulers are just as anxious as any-

one else to avoid the catastrophe of an all-out war. But this does not mean the abandonment of their program of aggression nor the end of the cold war which, by definition, means a struggle conducted primarily on the political, technical, economic, and psychological planes. In simple terms the Soviet attitude is like that of an intelligent burglar. He doesn't want to get into a shooting match with the householder; he just wants to "burgle" the house. Here again, the Soviet leaders speak for themselves better than I can for them. During the recent 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Suslov² put it this way:

... Communists and the working class naturally prefer more painless forms of transition from one social system to another. The form of transition, however, as has been shown here by Comrade Khrushchev, depends on concrete historical circumstances. Moreover, the question of whether the methods are more peaceful or more violent depends not so much on the working class as on the degree of resistance offered by the exploiting classes in the process of being overthrown, unwilling voluntarily to part with big property, political power, and other privileges in their hands.

Soviet Efforts To Minimize Ideological Conflict

As to the potential ideological conflict between the promotion of world revolution and the advancement of Russian national interests, I can only say that the Soviet rulers have worked hard to minimize any such conflict and have actually achieved a fearful consistency between the two concepts. We know that Soviet power underpins the Communist movement almost everywhere in the world and, in the same way, that local Communist parties have repeatedly strained themselves—and occasionally turned flip-flops—to advance Soviet national interests. This formula was stated in a speech by Marshal Malinovsky on February 22 of this year:

The strength of Soviet patriotism lies in the fact that it combines to the utmost the national interests of the Soviet people and the army and their international obligations to the workers of other countries in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism.

It is probable, I think, that the Soviet rulers have a genuine interest in national security and that they might be prepared to temper their expansionist gambits to the extent that such gambits

² Member of the Presidium and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

involve serious risk of destroying the Soviet system. But this conflict of purpose is perhaps more apparent than real. The Soviet rulers seem convinced that a sizable number of experiments in political and economic aggression can be carried out with minimum risk to their present position. Moreover we must remember that a desire for security and a desire for world domination are by no means inconsistent from the Soviet viewpoint. In fact there is considerable basis for supposing that they regard world domination as the only fully satisfactory form of security obtainable. They may well calculate that the world has grown too small for them to place reliance upon traditional bulwarks of security, and feel that the masters of a slave empire can never be completely secure so long as a substantial part of the world remains free and strong.

Here again the problem is complicated by the nature of our own society. Western governments can give the utmost assurances about refraining from aggressive acts. In fact we have already given such assurances. But we cannot guarantee that the democratic idea itself will remain dormant, either in the territories already conquered by the Soviet Union or in other areas. Even if he wanted to, the President of the United States could not promise Khrushchev to suppress all American newspapers that are critical of the Soviet regime. Nor could any Western statesman, even if he were willing, guarantee that the enslaved peoples of Eastern Europe will never again rise to demand their freedom.

What I have just said helps to illustrate what I mean in speaking of the problem of incompatible purposes. Some of the fundamental things the Soviet rulers want are not ours to give. Those who dream of a general rapprochement between Russia and the West cannot content themselves with asking what the Soviet Government might be willing to give us. An even more penetrating question is whether we have anything to offer—short of total surrender—that would really satisfy basic Soviet purposes.

Does the incompatibility of Soviet and American purposes mean that war is inevitable? I have already made it clear that in my opinion a "hot war," at least, is neither inevitable nor probable. On the other hand, the political, economic, and psychological struggle known as the "cold war" is almost certain to continue until there is a funda-

mental change in long-range Soviet purposes. It seems highly unlikely that any foreseeable efforts at negotiation can eliminate this struggle. Once we fully comprehend the necessity of being prepared to live calmly in a state of tension and danger for many years to come, we will be in a much better position to do the things that are needed to carry forward our search for lasting peace and security, including the conduct of meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union.

No Grounds for Abandoning Hope

In analyzing the difficulties of Western-Soviet negotiations I have tried to avoid any implication that such negotiations are futile. On the contrary, these negotiations are often valuable and sometimes essential. We must negotiate constantly, using every means and channel that gives promise of constructive results. We must consider the institution and continuation of all programs and activities that might help to make our negotiations more profitable. We must leave no stone unturned in the search for mutually advantageous agreements.

As I have pointed out, such agreements are not impossible to find. More than once in recent years we have engaged in lengthy, laborious, acrimonious, and seemingly hopeless negotiations with the Soviet Government on particular issues, have talked for months and years without any sign of progress, and then have suddenly found the Soviet Union ready to come to terms within a matter of hours. We can never afford to become discouraged, either with respect to specific issues or with respect to the general course of Soviet policy. The basic purposes of the Soviet rulers are almost certainly incompatible with ours at the present time, but even the most basic purposes can change. We must do all we can to encourage a change.

A realistic comprehension of the difficulties inherent in negotiations with the Soviet Union affords no grounds for an abandonment of hope. It should serve only to prevent our hopes from becoming delusions. Let us realize that there are no quick and magical solutions to most international problems. Let us understand that the process of negotiation is continuous and that the art of negotiation frequently involves more perspiration than inspiration. Let us frankly recognize both the advantages and disadvantages of our ne-

gotiating position and try to avoid expecting either too much or too little. Let us constantly keep in mind the true nature of Soviet purposes and bend our imaginations to the task of finding incentives which may induce them to alter or modify these purposes.

Most important of all, let us understand that such incentives will never be provided by a policy of weakness or appeasement by the Western powers. We cannot win the cold war with cold feet. We must be prepared to offer reasonable concessions in exchange for reasonable concessions, yes. But let us remember that no wolf was ever persuaded to become a vegetarian by a steady diet of meat. We must negotiate without hesitation or apology in the pursuit of our national interests. We can do so in the secure knowledge that these interests are fundamentally consistent with the deepest aspirations of human beings everywhere, including the Soviet peoples themselves.

United States Proposes Conference on Antarctica

The White House released on May 3 the following statement by President Eisenhower, together with the text of a U.S. note to 11 other countries proposing a conference to conclude a treaty assuring the continuation of scientific cooperation in the Antarctic.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

The United States is dedicated to the principle that the vast uninhabited wastes of Antarctica shall be used only for peaceful purposes. We do not want Antarctica to become an object of political conflict. Accordingly, the United States has invited 11 other countries, including the Soviet Union, to confer with us to seek an effective joint means of achieving this objective.

We propose that Antarctica shall be open to all nations to conduct scientific or other peaceful activities there. We also propose that joint administrative arrangements be worked out to insure the successful accomplishment of these and other peaceful purposes.

The countries which have been invited to confer are those which have engaged in scientific ac-

tivities in Antarctica over the past 9 months in connection with the International Geophysical Year. I know of no instance in which international cooperation has been more successfully demonstrated. However, the International Geophysical Year terminates on December 31, 1958. Our proposal is directed at insuring that this same kind of cooperation for the benefit of all mankind shall be perpetuated after that date.

I am confident that our proposal will win the wholehearted support of the peoples of all the nations directly concerned, and indeed of all other peoples of the world.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE¹

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the splendid example of international cooperation which can now be observed in many parts of the world because of the coordinated efforts of scientists of many countries in seeking a better understanding of geophysical phenomena during the current International Geophysical Year. These coordinated efforts of the scientists of many lands have as their objective a greatly increased knowledge of the planet on which we live and will no doubt contribute directly and indirectly to the welfare of the human race for many generations to come.

Among the various portions of the globe where these cooperative scientific endeavors are being carried on with singular success and with a sincere consciousness of the high ideals of mankind to which they are dedicated is the vast and relatively remote continent of Antarctica. The scientific research being conducted in that continent by the cooperative efforts of distinguished scientists from many countries is producing information of practical as well as theoretical value for all mankind.

The International Geophysical Year comes to a close at the end of 1958. The need for coordinated scientific research in Antarctica, however, will continue for many more years into the future. Accordingly, it would appear desirable for those countries participating in the Antarctic program of the International Geophysical Year to reach agreement among themselves on a program to assure the continuation of the fruitful scientific cooperation referred to above. Such an arrangement could have the additional advantage of preventing unnecessary and undesirable political rivalries in that continent, the uneconomic expenditure of funds to defend individual national interests, and the recurrent possibility of inter-

¹ Addressed to the Foreign Ministers of each of the 11 other countries participating in the International Geophysical Year activities in Antarctica: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom. Each note was signed and delivered by the American ambassador to that country.

national misunderstanding. It would appear that if harmonious agreement can be reached among the countries directly concerned in regard to friendly cooperation in Antarctica, there would be advantages not only to those countries but to all other countries as well.

The present situation in Antarctica is characterized by diverse legal, political, and administrative concepts which render friendly cooperation difficult in the absence of an understanding among the countries involved. Seven countries have asserted claims of sovereignty to portions of Antarctica, some of which overlap and give rise to occasional frictions. Other countries have a direct interest in that continent based on past discovery and exploration, geographic proximity, sea and air transportation routes, and other considerations.

The United States for many years has had, and at the present time continues to have, direct and substantial rights and interests in Antarctica. Throughout a period of many years, commencing in the early eighteen-hundreds, many areas of the Antarctic region have been discovered, sighted, explored and claimed on behalf of the United States by nationals of the United States and by expeditions carrying the flag of the United States. During this period, the Government of the United States and its nationals have engaged in well-known and extensive activities in Antarctica.

In view of the activities of the United States and its nationals referred to above, my Government reserves all of the rights of the United States with respect to the Antarctic region, including the right to assert a territorial claim or claims.

It is the opinion of my Government, however, that the interests of mankind would best be served, in consonance with the high ideals of the Charter of the United Nations, if the countries which have a direct interest in Antarctica were to join together in the conclusion of a treaty which would have the following peaceful purposes:

A. Freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica by citizens, organizations, and governments of all countries; and a continuation of the international scientific cooperation which is being carried out so successfully during the current International Geophysical Year.

B. International agreement to ensure that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only.

C. Any other peaceful purposes not inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

The Government of the United States is prepared to discuss jointly with the Governments of the other countries having a direct interest in Antarctica the possibility of concluding an agreement, which would be in the form of a treaty, for the purpose of giving legal effect to these high principles. It is believed that such a treaty can be concluded without requiring any participating nation to renounce whatever basic historic rights it may have in Antarctica, or whatever claims of sovereignty it may have asserted. It could be specifically provided that such basic rights and such claims would remain unaffected while the treaty is in force, and that no new rights would be acquired and no new claims made by any country

during the duration of the treaty. In other words, the legal status quo in Antarctica would be frozen for the duration of the treaty, permitting cooperation in scientific and administrative matters to be carried out in a constructive manner without being hampered or affected in any way by political considerations. Provision could likewise be made for such joint administrative arrangements as might be necessary and desirable to ensure the successful accomplishment of the agreed objectives. The proposed treaty would be deposited with the United Nations, and the cooperation of the specialized technical agencies of the United Nations would be sought. Such an arrangement would provide a firm and favorable foundation for a continuation of the productive activities which have thus far distinguished the International Geophysical Year; would provide an agreed basis for the maintenance of peaceful and orderly conditions in Antarctica during years to come; and would avoid the possibility of that continent becoming the scene of international discord.

In the hope that the countries having a direct interest in Antarctica will agree on the desirability of the aforesaid high objectives, and will work together in an effort to convert them into practical realities, the Government of the United States has the honor to invite the Government of _____ to participate in a Conference for this purpose to be convened at an early date at such place as may be mutually agreeable.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

U.S. and Australia To Continue Work at Antarctic Station

Following is the text of a joint announcement made on May 6 by the Governments of Australia and the United States.

Press release 245 dated April 28

The Governments of Australia and the United States of America have agreed to cooperate in maintaining operations at Wilkes Station, Antarctica, in order that the useful scientific activities which have been carried on there during the current International Geophysical Year may be continued without interruption after the end of the International Geophysical Year on December 31, 1958.

For this purpose the Government of the United States is contributing all the buildings and facilities of the Wilkes Station and all of the supplies, fuel and food remaining at the Station at the end of the International Geophysical Year. The Government of Australia, on its part, has agreed to provide the logistical and administrative services needed for the continued operation of the

Station. Scientists from both countries will participate in the program of technical studies, research and scientific observations to be carried on at Wilkes Station.

In harmony with the spirit of the International Geophysical Year, scientists from all countries are cordially invited to participate in the scientific program at Wilkes Station at any time, subject to the limitations of space, transportation, and accommodations.

The administrative arrangements which have been agreed upon by the two Governments have no effect on the rights or claims asserted by either country in Antarctica. Each Government maintains its traditional position in regard to such matters.

The details of this new arrangement are currently being worked out by officials of the two Governments, so that the operational, logistical, and administrative functions required for the successful operation of this Station can be continued on January 1, 1959, without interruption of the scientific program.

The Governments of Australia and the United States of America jointly express their satisfaction at this new manifestation of the friendly spirit of cooperation which animates them, and are confident that the practical results of this agreement will redound to the benefit of world science.

Field Marshal Sarit of Thailand Confers With U.S. Officials

Meeting With President Eisenhower

The Department of State announced on May 7 (press release 249) that President Eisenhower had met that day with Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (Srisidi Dhanarajata), Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Thailand, who recently underwent a successful operation at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. They enjoyed a cordial exchange of views regarding means of further strengthening the already close cooperation between Thailand and the United States.

The Field Marshal returned to Washington on May 1, following a month of rest and recuperation in Florida with his wife, Madame Wichit. He will spend the rest of the month in the capital to meet with United States Government leaders.

Field Marshal Sarit will see Secretary Dulles; Deputy Under Secretary Douglas Dillon; Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson; and George V. Allen, Director of the United States Information Agency. He will also meet with high-ranking officials of the Department of Defense and the armed services.

Discussions will center upon political, economic, and military matters, relating to Thailand and the United States, which the Royal Thai Government had requested Field Marshal Sarit to take up.

Meeting With Secretary Dulles

The Department of State announced on May 14 (press release 263) that Secretary Dulles and Field Marshal Sarit met that day to discuss means of further strengthening the existing close cooperation between Thailand and the United States. They also discussed the world situation, with emphasis on free-world defense against Communist pressures. The Ambassador of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, and Assistant Secretary Robertson were present.

Further talks on these and related subjects will be held during the next few days with Department of State officials, including Deputy Under Secretary Dillon and Assistant Secretary Robertson.

The meeting with Secretary Dulles and the other talks to follow are an outgrowth of the meeting between President Eisenhower and the Field Marshal at the White House on May 7, when they enjoyed a cordial exchange of views on matters of mutual interest.

U.S. and Philippines Establish Mutual Defense Board

Press release 268 dated May 15

The following was released at Manila as a joint Philippine-United States press announcement on May 15.

The Philippine and United States Governments today announced agreement on the establishment of a Philippine-United States Mutual Defense Board and the assignment of a Philippine military liaison officer to the staff of the Base Commander in major United States military bases in the Philippines.

One of a continuing series of actions implementing existing security and defense agreements between the two countries, today's exchange of notes marks a major step in securing effective collaboration between the two countries in the joint effort to improve and enhance the common defense.

As stated in the Exchange of Notes "the purpose of this (Mutual Defense) Board is to provide continuing inter-governmental machinery for direct liaison and consultation between appropriate Philippine and United States authorities on military matters of mutual concern so as to develop and improve, through continuing military cooperation, the common defense of the two sovereign countries." The Board will have Philippine and United States co-chairmen.

The Philippine military liaison officer, who will be assigned to a major United States military base, will cooperate with the Base Commander by advice, suggestion and/or other appropriate action to assure observance of Philippine law and regulations within the base, will advise the Base Commander concerning problems involving Philippine nationals and residents on the base, and the day-to-day relationships between the base, Base Commander and such nationals and residents. These officers will be appointed by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, will be under the Administration of the Philippine Co-Chairman of the Mutual Defense Board, and will submit reports to the Board.

The agreements announced today are designed to enable the two governments to carry out more effectively the specified purposes and objectives of the Mutual Defense Agreement, and are part of the continuing effort of both governments to further strengthen their mutual defense and to contribute to international peace and security.

Radio-TV Exchanges With U.S.S.R.

Press release 272 dated May 16

The Department of State, pursuant to section II (2) and (3) of the exchange agreement with the U.S.S.R. signed January 27, 1958,¹ announced on May 16 that it is prepared to facilitate the transmission to the Soviet Government of lists of re-

¹For text of agreement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

corded radio and TV programs or proposals for future programs which interested companies in the United States may wish to offer to the Soviet Government for sale or for exchange.

Similar lists of programs prepared by the radio and the TV authorities of the Soviet Union as suitable for distribution in the United States will

subsequently be made available to the interested domestic companies.

In the submission of lists of programs a brief description of the contents and length of broadcast time consumed should be specified. Proposals should reach the Office of East-West Contacts of the Department not later than June 1, 1958.

THE CONGRESS

U.S. Policies and Programs in the Far East

*Statement by Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs¹*

I wish to thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee today to discuss our policies and problems in the Far East. Being well aware of the wide knowledge and understanding which members of this committee have of the area, I propose to confine my opening remarks to a general evaluation of where I think we stand in the Far East. By the term "Far East" I mean that vast land and ocean area extending from Siberia all the way to the South Pacific and Indian Ocean, including Japan, Korea, China, the Philippines, Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. In this area live approximately 900 million people—one-third the population of the world.

It was only a few years ago that international communism, having acquired a huge central base of operations in Asia by overrunning the mainland of China, was carrying aggression directly against certain small, free nations along or near its borders. Force, bluster, and naked threats were used by Communist China from 1949 to 1954 in a wide variety of military or paramilitary situations involving almost all free countries along

its borders. We fought a bloody war to stem Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea. We helped shore up the defenses of free China on Taiwan. We helped build up the military strength of free nations in Southeast Asia. For 4 years now the Communists have been deterred from outright military aggression.

But the Communists are masters of tactical flexibility. Recognizing that strong-arm tactics were being effectively opposed by the free world and recognizing the success of our aid programs, the Communists have increasingly placed their accent since 1954 on so-called peaceful coexistence. You are all familiar with the hallmarks of this present coexistence campaign—good-will tours, offers of economic aid and technical assistance, trade fairs, cultural and sporting events—everything designed to conjure up a picture before the world of a friendly Soviet Union and of a Communist China wholly innocent of any designs on their smaller neighbors.

The purpose of this campaign is clear. It is aimed at inducing neutralism, weakening our alliances, and lowering the guard of those opposing Communist expansion. Meanwhile the Communists make no effort to hide their hatred of the

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 2 (press release 238).

United States. Everywhere they are seeking to stimulate anti-U.S. feeling in Asia and mobilize opinion against the country which the Communists correctly recognize as being the chief prop and support of the free world.

In all these undertakings two facts stand out. One is that there is no evidence that Peiping and Moscow, whose military power is being steadily expanded, have discarded force as a means for gaining their goals. Communist resort to force is a decided possibility whenever and wherever, in Communist thinking, free-world countries are unprepared or unwilling to resist that force. The other outstanding fact is that there is no evidence of change in communism's declared objective of ultimate world domination. It is of the utmost importance that the free world not be misled, by failing to understand this, into making basic policy concessions to the Communists in response to tactical maneuvers on their part.

Susceptibility to Communist Penetration

There are a number of features about the free Far East which make it susceptible to Communist penetration. For example, most of the Far Eastern countries, having only won their independence since 1945, have had limited experience in self-government. Some of them, like Indonesia and Laos, are still grappling with grave problems connected with preserving that newly won independence. Their recent colonial past has also left a legacy of intense anticolonialism and nationalism. While this may be advantageous in the sense that it operates against at least the more obvious forms of Communist encroachment upon these free countries, it is disadvantageous to the extent it obstructs regional and interregional cooperation and complicates economic development.

Perhaps a more serious point of susceptibility to communism is occasioned by the fact that, in the short space of 40 years, the Soviet Union has been transformed from a backward agrarian country into an industrial and scientific giant. To peoples of less developed nations seeking order, rapid growth, and industrialization, the examples of Russia and even of Communist China are not without appeal, provided one overlooks the great sacrifices in life and human values involved in Russia's and Communist China's industrial advancement. The Communists also exploit all the antipathies

existing between various free Far Eastern countries and take advantage of the difficulties these countries have in finding adequate markets for their goods and capital for development.

Yet, for all these dissensions and susceptibilities, the non-Communist countries of the Far East have this key objective in common: They are trying to remain free—and this is basically where their aims and interests conjoin with ours. Like us, they have the basic national objectives of national independence, human liberty, better conditions of life, and, last but not least, peace—genuine peace. It is for this reason that these nations, even though half a world away from the United States and lying under the very shadow of the Communist empire, look to the United States for leadership and support.

Overall U.S. Policies

For our part we recognize that the survival and progress of each and every one of these countries in the free world is of direct consequence to our own national security. It is accordingly the policy of the United States to help build up conditions of security, stability, and economic progress in free Asia as rapidly as possible. Our overall policies may accordingly be summarized under two main headings: (1) security and stability and (2) improvement of conditions of life.

1. *Security and Stability*: We have joined in security treaties which make clear that attacks or encroachments on free nations of Asia would be considered as endangering our own peace and safety and that we and they would act in the common defense. Together we have backed up these commitments with military power, which is the only language would-be aggressors understand. The free nations of the Far East now have more than one and three-quarters million men under arms. These forces, together with United States forces widely deployed across the Pacific, constitute the principal deterrent to aggression. They are essential to maintaining the peace.

Under the mutual defense assistance program the United States is currently providing around \$650 million per year in military assistance to Far Eastern countries—that is, in supplying hardware and training—and almost an equal amount for defense support. This defense support bolsters the economy, helps control inflation, and

helps pay for the armies which certain small countries with weak economies could not otherwise afford. The bulk of this category of assistance goes to our hard-pressed allies in Korea, Taiwan, and Viet-Nam, for it must be remembered that it is against these areas that Communist China and its satellites pose their most direct military threat. Moreover these three countries—Korea, China, and Viet-Nam—being divided, one part free and the other Communist-dominated, are necessarily areas of direct challenge.

At the same time we are assisting free nations, whether allied or neutral, in achieving internal security and greater economic and political stability. Certainly there can be no real progress in satisfying mankind's aspirations for improved standards of living without first creating such conditions. I therefore trust the United States will continue to support the development of adequate local security and police forces, in providing them with equipment and training and in supporting the economies of countries which must maintain security forces beyond their economic capacity to support.

2. *Improvement of Conditions of Life:* Behind the common-defense shield that is thus being built up, and in the atmosphere of security and stability we are helping to create, all the free nations of Asia can today breathe more easily. They can turn their attention to the essential task of improving conditions of human existence, which they all recognize to be their number-one long-term objective.

We thoroughly sympathize with this objective and are supporting it in the following ways:

We offer technical know-how, make grants and loans for development projects, sell our agricultural food surpluses for local currency, and then reloan much of this money on a long-term basis. We exchange teachers and students and train scientists and technicians. We encourage private investment by American industry and by the industries of other advanced free-world countries. We also endeavor to maximize the level of free-world trade through the promotion of liberal trade policies and the maintenance of a high level of economic activity.

Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive

Even if the Sino-Soviet bloc had not launched an economic offensive designed to subvert free

Asia, I believe it would still be the policy of our Government to assist less developed countries in attaining economic health and growth for, in this interdependent, shrinking world, their economic welfare and ours are clearly related. The Communist economic offensive only makes our efforts in this field the more urgent. Moreover—to paraphrase President Eisenhower's recent message to Congress²—if the purpose of Sino-Soviet aid to any nation were simply to help it overcome economic difficulties without infringing its freedom, such aid would be a welcome means of forwarding our own purpose of facilitating economic growth. Yet, as the President went on to say, there is nothing in the history of international communism to indicate this Soviet-bloc aid is anything but another Communist means of trying to draw recipient countries away from the community of free nations and ultimately into the Communist orbit.

To counter this Sino-Soviet economic offensive while maintaining an adequate military posture vis-a-vis the bloc, we must have an adequate and effective mutual security program. This program is the backbone of our security position in the Far East. A number of countries are critically dependent upon U.S. assistance programs for military hardware, training, defense-budget support, and the like. It is quite understandable that these countries, as well as other free Far Eastern countries, are highly sensitive to any indication that the United States might lose interest in them by reducing its assistance programs or commitments to help them. No one except the Communists would rejoice were this to happen, for they stand poised and eager to step in, when and where we step out.

Now I know that there is criticism regarding various features of our mutual assistance program. Some of this criticism, I believe, is entirely valid insofar as it points to things that we could and should correct. This we are striving to do. But we must nevertheless recognize that there are almost bound to be shortcomings and failings in an assistance program of this dimension. Our problem is to preserve patience and perspective, while doing everything at our command to keep the program as trim and efficient as possible in terms of our overall objectives. Surely it would be contrary to our interests to make serious cuts

² BULLETIN of MAR. 10, 1958, p. 367.

in our mutual assistance program on the basis of those instances where there was or is inefficiency or where we appear to get less than face value for our money. Let us not forget that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery: The Communist economic offensive is a real tribute to the effectiveness of our aid programs.

Closely related to this question is the problem of our trade policy. Rather than speak in generalities, let me cite the specific case of Japan. Here is a country of greatest consequence to the United States. Commercially, it is our second largest market, purchasing in 1957 some \$625 million more of U.S. goods from the United States than we bought from Japan. Strategically, it is one of the world's four major industrial complexes. Politically, it is a leader in Asia and is playing an increasingly important role in the economic advancement of free Asia. Our relations with Japan today are good and of great mutual benefit, but let us be under no illusions: Japan must trade to live. If the United States starts down the path of increased trade restrictions, then other countries will follow suit and all this will have deep and far-reaching consequences. Having Japan's huge industrial-mercantile complex humming for Sino-Soviet account is something the Communists dearly seek. It would cause a significant, quite possibly a disastrous, shift in the world's power balance, and the secondary effects on the rest of Asia are not hard to imagine. This illustrates why it is so important that we take no step—such as failure to renew the Trade Agreements Act—which would be interpreted as U.S. moves away from liberal trade policy toward high protectionism.

Where We Stand in the Far East

And now for a few concluding remarks on where we stand in the Far East.

The best way to judge the merits of a policy is by its results. For 8 years now, since the start of the Korean War, the United States has played an active role in the military, political, and economic support of free countries in the Far East. What has been accomplished in that period?

The Far East in 1950 was a discouraging sight to all except the Communists, who had just taken over the China mainland and were poised for further conquest. Korea was attacked in June 1950, and for a long time during that critical year it was

touch-and-go whether Korea could be saved from the massed, organized Communist onslaught. Later in 1950 the Red Chinese invaded and occupied Tibet. Malaya and the Philippines were terrorized by elusive Communist groups operating out of the jungles; Indonesia had just suppressed a military coup sponsored by the Communists and was still fighting a guerrilla war. There was civil war accompanied by alarming deterioration in Indochina and Burma.

The Far East today is obviously not all that we would like to see. We are deeply concerned over certain developments, such as those transpiring right now in Indonesia. But the general picture in the Far East today represents a vast improvement over that obtaining 4 to 8 years ago. Korea has made steady progress in rebuilding its war-shattered economy, combating inflation, and getting ahead with economic development, while at the same time maintaining a large military establishment that has helped preserve the uneasy truce situation and the security of the Far East area as a whole. Japan has returned to the international community as a nation with a free economy equipped and prepared to contribute in a significant way to the economic growth of free Asia. The Republic of China remains a firm and effective ally and a standing challenge to the attempts of Communist China to fasten permanently its rule on the Chinese people. The recent Philippine elections supplied further evidence of that nation's strong democratic political institutions. While there have been some disturbing developments in Laos, as in connection with the formation last year of a coalition government with Communist participation, nevertheless the Royal Government has meanwhile recovered control of two provinces long denied to it by the Viet Minh and Chinese Communist support of the Pathet Lao. It is also noteworthy that Indochina and mainland Southeast Asia as a whole have developed a better capacity to maintain internal security and a far better understanding of the many-faceted Communist threat and a capability to withstand that threat. Today neutrality rather than neutralism characterizes the foreign-policy position of certain nonallied Southeast Asian countries.

Over the past 10 years Australia and New Zealand have played an increasingly useful and constructive role in Far East affairs. SEATO is a good, going organization with headquarters in

Thailand. I agree with Secretary Dulles that the recent SEATO meeting we attended at Manila was the best we ever had and augurs well for the future of that important organization.

I repeat that I do not wish to leave the impression that all is well in the Far East today. Our alliances could be stronger; our MSA program could be more effective; the relations between some of our friends are in urgent need of improvement;

the Communist economic offensive could have serious results; and the Indonesian situation is far from reassuring. But I do believe there has been a turning of the tide in the Far East. This turn of the tide was the result of a lot of hard work and determination on the part of free nations under the leadership of the United States.

Persistence in our efforts will bring its rewards. Relaxation of our efforts will be at our peril.

Problems and Prospects of U.S. Relations With the Near East, South Asia, and Africa

Statement by William M. Rountree

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs*¹

I welcome this opportunity to come before you to review United States policy with regard to the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. In this introductory statement I propose, in accordance with your request, to summarize the situation in the area, the current state of our relations with some of the major entities, and the main problems in, and prospects for, these relations.

The situation in such a large and diverse area does not lend itself easily to generalization. Nevertheless, despite the diversity of government forms, political development, languages, races, religions, and geography, it is possible to point out broad underlying factors that determine to a great extent the nature and conduct of our foreign relations in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.

Throughout this region there are strong forces of impatient and emotional nationalism, often constructive and forward-looking but sometimes tending to extremism and political instability. Particularly since World War II the awakened national consciousness of the area has been accompanied by a steadily growing demand among the peoples, whose standard of living ranges from low to extremely low, for improvement in their status. Their governments, which vary in both strength and experience, are striving frequently with in-

adequate institutions and insufficiently organized and trained manpower to cope with demands for economic improvement. Some of the countries have valuable natural resources and relatively minor economic obstacles to overcome, but others, less well endowed by nature, face extremely difficult economic problems that have existed for generations. They know also that a failure to show significant economic progress may lead to the overthrow of existing institutions in favor of others promising quicker results, however speciously and at whatever costs in freedom.

To complicate this situation there are several critical intra-area disputes which not only have caused dangerous tension among the parties concerned but also have created opportunities for international communism to exploit by offering arms and economic assistance on a selective basis. The Communists have, so far, failed to make a satellite of any country of this area. Nevertheless, through their deceptions they have succeeded in exploiting the mistaken belief of some of these countries that they can deal closely with the Soviet Union without risking subversion and ultimate loss of independence. The Soviets have also attempted to misuse the neutralist position of some of these countries to achieve their own imperialist aims and to discredit the West. The cynical nature of these Soviet tactics was well exemplified by the Soviet performance in connection with the

¹Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 8 (press release 252).

artificial Syrian "crisis" last year and in the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in Cairo last December.

The Soviets have an initial advantage in dealing with some countries because of suspicions arising from past association with the West, because some leaders feel their critical national problems require that they accept help from any source, and because of their unfamiliarity with the methods of the Soviet Union and its international performance. Playing upon these factors the Soviets have hypocritically refrained from joining in efforts to find constructive solutions to disputes and instead have attempted to play upon the fears and aspirations of one side or the other.

Some Significant Recent Events

In a brief review it is impossible to provide details about the situation in each of the countries of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. I would therefore like to underline some of the more significant recent events.

There have been major new moves toward the realization of Arab unity as evidenced in the establishment early this year of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria and the pending formation of the Arab Union composed of Jordan and Iraq. Subsequently the Yemen joined a loose federation with the United Arab Republic under the designation of the United Arab States.

The maintenance of the uneasy peace between the Arab states and Israel is assisted by the continued presence of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza and Sinai and of United Nations observers elsewhere in the area. A permanent solution to the lamentable problem of more than 900,000 unfortunate Palestine refugees has not yet been found, despite our persistent efforts.

Our efforts to promote the collective security of the Middle East have continued. In January of this year the Ankara meeting of the Baghdad Pact allies was marked by the participation of Secretary Dulles.² This strategic alliance of nations continues to show determination to stand

resolute against the threats of international communism and to cooperate in the pursuit of regional peace and progress.

Our relations with the Government of the United Arab Republic have posed special problems for us. We would like to see established a basis from which more normal relations could develop. A few days ago agreement was reached by the United Arab Republic and the Suez Canal Company to settle the company's compensation claims. This by no means settles all of the problems arising from the Suez Canal nationalization, but it is a promising development. In line with our previous statements, we promptly released Egyptian assets that had been frozen in the United States as a result of the canal controversy.³

In the past 2 years four African states, Ghana, Morocco, the Sudan, and Tunisia, have joined the older independent African states, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, and the Union of South Africa. The emergence of these independent states in Africa has been largely marked by moderation and understanding. It is to their great credit that the leaders and peoples of the new Africa are showing an objective awareness of the mutual advantages involved in some form of continued collaboration with Europe. Admittedly the continuation of the Algerian conflict and the feelings of the North African peoples about it present a great and serious obstacle to the achievement of such collaboration.

The conference of African states at Accra last month was a good example of a healthy trend in Africa toward the establishment of cooperative regional ties. Indigenously inspired and organized, the Accra conference as a display of authoritative and, on the whole, responsible African nationalism contrasted sharply with the Soviet and Communist Chinese attempts to control the Cairo-held Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference for propaganda purposes. You will recall that virtually all African governments refrained from official representation at the latter meeting. Their decision was proved correct by the obvious and abortive efforts made by the Soviet and Communist Chinese outsiders in the Cairo meeting to foist a non-African initiative and non-African interests on African governments.

² For statements by Secretary Dulles and text of communique issued at the close of the meeting, see *BULLETIN* of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 250.

³ *Ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 830.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to summarize for you the state of our relations with the countries of this area. You are aware that the area contains major sources of important materials such as oil which are essential to us or to other nations of the free world. Portions of this area also include strategic connections and historic crossroads that are not only involved in trade and transportation with the rest of the world but at the same time offer invasion paths for would-be aggressors. We and other free nations have well-established trade relations based upon mutual advantage with many of these countries. As the new nations of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa succeed in developing their economies, the possibilities of mutually beneficial trade will increase. We have long realized that because of our interdependence with the rest of the world it is very much in our interest to help the peoples of this area to achieve their aspirations for security and well-being.

In recognition of those interests we have made it the principal objective of our foreign policy in this part of the world to help the countries to maintain their political independence and territorial integrity against aggressors. We have sought also to help them achieve the progressive realization of their national aspirations by truly democratic and peaceful means.

In pursuing these objectives we have used a number of instrumentalities. For example, the economic and military assistance aspects of the mutual security program and the new Development Loan Fund have been of primary importance for the achievement of our economic and military objectives throughout this area. The information and cultural activities of the United States Information Agency have helped us to present a true picture of the United States and its aims and to counteract Soviet lies and distortions. The efforts of private Americans in missionary and philanthropic endeavors are also important in reflecting the broad cultural and humanitarian outlook of the American people. Hospitals, schools, and universities demonstrate the contribution which has been made and which is still being made in this way. I cite particularly the American University of Beirut as a great center of learning.

To deal with specific situations, such as the threat of aggression in the Middle East by states under the control of international communism, we have had such tools as the so-called Middle East doctrine. This doctrine continues to be an important element in United States policy in the Middle East. The joint resolution embodying the doctrine forcefully expresses our policy of assisting those states of the area desiring such assistance to maintain their independence and integrity against aggressors and to develop their economies.⁴ It is thus intended to promote peace and stability. By proclaiming the intention of the United States to assist Middle Eastern nations to maintain their independence against the threat of international communism, we believe that the resolution leaves no possibility of miscalculation in the minds of potential Communist or Communist-controlled aggressors as to the results of aggressive action on their part.

United States relations with the new nations of Africa are uniformly warm and friendly. We are proud that the nations of Africa today look to us for support for their legitimate political, economic, and social aspirations. They are today, for the most part, governed by moderate regimes dedicated to the maintenance of their independence, but those regimes must be able to demonstrate to their peoples, in concrete and understandable terms, the advantages of cooperation with the West and of middle-of-the-road approaches to the solution of their current pressing problems.

Without seeking to displace anyone in Africa, but recognizing the necessity for encouraging the pro-Western orientation of the peoples of that continent, we have developed important economic, technical, and military aid agreements with several African countries. In Libya, Liberia, and Ethiopia, for example, after some years of operation these programs are now showing solid achievements in terms of better agricultural methods, better health, better education, and more opportunities for increased industrialization. A United States technical-assistance program dealing with agricultural and community development has just been started in the new state of Ghana. Programs are getting under way also in Morocco and Tunisia. In this vital North African area these programs are helping to build stability,

⁴ For text of resolution, see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.

although the pall of the Algerian problem increasingly overshadows future prospects and underlines the importance of a peaceful, democratic, and just solution.

Our longstanding close and friendly relations with our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, continue. Next month we are expecting a visit from an old friend of the United States, the Shah of Iran. With most of the other Middle Eastern states we enjoy basically good relations today, even though there are some serious disagreements about specific issues. In the case of the United Arab Republic there has recently seemed to be some improvement in atmosphere. With Saudi Arabia we continue as in the past to maintain the special relations that began to develop toward the close of the Second World War. We have been happy to extend assistance to Lebanon, where there has been a highly successful endeavor of people of different faiths and creeds to live and work together. With both economic and military assistance we are continuing to help the state of Jordan in maintaining its courageous and successful stand against Soviet imperialism and other foreign subversion. We are providing technical assistance to Iraq, which is making great progress in responding to the needs and wishes of its people through an enlightened development program. Iraq is also cooperating actively in the Baghdad Pact. We have encouraged Iraq in the maintenance of this attitude through, among other measures, provision of military assistance.

On November 29, 1956, we reaffirmed our support of the collective efforts of the Baghdad Pact nations to maintain their independence and stated that we would view with the utmost gravity a threat to their territorial integrity or political independence. Although several of the states of this region have chosen not to join actively with us in building up regional collective security, we have noted encouraging signs of a growing realization of what constitutes true neutralism and of what wholesale Soviet offers of assistance are really worth in the long run.

The committee will recall that, with respect to the participation of nations in the area in collective-security arrangements, Greece and Turkey are members of NATO; Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan are members of the Baghdad Pact; and Pakistan is a member of SEATO.

Israel has just celebrated the 10th anniversary

of its independence. United States assistance has played its role in fostering the economic and human development of that country.

Our friendly relations with India and Pakistan and the other South Asian states have been strengthened by an increased mutual understanding of each other's objectives. With Nepal our relations have been consistently friendly. We maintain amicable relations with Afghanistan, and we are looking forward in June to the visit of Prime Minister Daud. Although Ceylon follows a nonalignment policy in foreign affairs, U.S.-Ceylonese relations have been cordial, a cordiality which was augmented by an American aid program including expeditious American relief assistance during a flood disaster last January.

In summing up the state of our relations with this large area, I would offer you the analogy of a spectrum. At one end are our very friendly relationships with those close allies associated with us in mutual-security arrangements. At the other end, through various gradations, are those few countries that still misconstrue our motives. It is, of course, not a full spectrum—far from it—for there are no Soviet satellites. Although today there is probably considerably less danger of the satellization of any of the Middle Eastern states than there seemed to be several months ago, we realize that there is room for considerable improvement of our relations with some of those states. Important also, there is considerable room for improvement in the relations among the states themselves.

Problems Resulting From Intra-Area Disputes

Much of what I would tell you about the problems and prospects of our relations with the Near East, South Asia, and Africa has been implied in what I have already said in summarizing the situation in the area and the state of our relations. I have referred to the fact that there are several major intra-area disputes. These disputes cause many collateral problems and seriously aggravate the sense of insecurity among our friends in the area. For the most part we are not ourselves directly involved as a party to these disputes; but in the world of today the United States, as a leader of the free nations, cannot escape playing a role in matters of this kind. It is our policy to deal with all of the states of the area on a basis of equality, impartiality, and respect. This pol-

icy is sometimes misunderstood by some of our friends who desire our unqualified support for their point of view.

Thus the Algerian question poses many serious problems for us because it has arrayed France and many of our friends in the area on opposite sides. The principal parties to the festering Cyprus dispute are, apart from the Cypriots themselves, our good friends: Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The Arab-Israeli tension has clouded almost every issue in the Near East and has given rise to much bitterness and misunderstanding. British disagreements with Saudi Arabia over the Buraimi Oasis and with Yemen over the Aden frontier have posed problems in our own relations. The unresolved Kashmir question seriously hampers the amelioration of relations between our Pakistani and Indian friends.

The great rivers and waterways of this region are also the focus of disputes. There are several outstanding differences on the Gulf of Aqaba as well as on the division of the waters of the Nile, the Jordan, the Indus, and the Helmand rivers. These disputes are bad enough in themselves, but they also cause us harm because our friends in ardently pursuing, understandably, their individual interests sometimes fail to understand our impartiality. I have already described how the Communists use some of these disputes to try to discredit us and to achieve propaganda advantages for themselves at the expense of progress toward just and peaceful solutions.

We have no quick or easy solutions to the many problems that face us. In the last analysis the answers must come—but, I trust, with our full cooperation and encouragement—from the area itself. In bettering the prospects for our relations in this area, it is in our interest to keep in mind four fundamental considerations:

First, to support the development of strong and independent nations able and willing to resist the subversive efforts of international communism;

Second, to contribute, if requested by the nations of the area, to their security, recognizing that in a broad sense their security is our security;

Third, to assist and encourage the countries of the area to resolve their disputes in accordance with the principles of the charter of the United Nations;

Fourth, to contribute to the economic progress and development of the nations of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.

In following these objectives our relations will probably still have their ups and downs. But I believe that the fulfillment of the national interests of the United States will flow naturally from the pursuit and realization of these objectives. Through them our foreign relations in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa will be on a basis of understanding and mutual respect. The resources of this area will continue to be available to the other members of the free world on conditions advantageous to both the producing and consuming countries. Vital transportation and communications facilities will continue to be available to us. Doors will be open to cultural exchanges, to commercial intercourse, and to increased diplomatic cooperation.

The pursuit of these objectives will thus enhance the peace and stability of the whole world.

President Reports to Congress on International Travel

White House press release dated May 12

The President on May 12 sent to Congress, as required by the Mutual Security Act of 1957, a report¹ on the barriers to international travel and the ways of promoting and facilitating such travel in the mutual interests of the United States and countries assisted under the Mutual Security Act.

The report was prepared by Clarence B. Randall, Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Economic Affairs, with the assistance of Government agencies concerned with travel.

In submitting the report to the President, Mr. Randall pointed out that tourism has vast international cultural, political, and economic aspects and can contribute significantly to the cause of peace.

The report recommends that greater emphasis be given to the operations of the United States in the field of international travel, and specifically create a separate travel office under the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs. It also recommends several steps for facilitating travel, including an increase in customs allowances and in the life of the passport, and improvement of accommodations to encourage moderate-income tourists.

¹ H. Doc. 381, 85th Cong., 2d sess.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During May 1958

U.N. Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: 9th Session	New York	Apr. 14-May 9
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 25th Session	New York	Apr. 15-May 2
ITU Administrative Council: 13th Session	Geneva	Apr. 21-May 17
UNESCO Executive Board: 50th Session	Paris	Apr. 21-May 24
4th FAO Conference on Mechanical Wood Technology	Madrid	Apr. 22-May 2
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Apr. 24-May 3
Pan American Highway Congresses: 3d Meeting of Permanent Executive Committee	Washington	Apr. 25-May 1
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 13th Session	Geneva	Apr. 28-May 23
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 10th Session	New York	Apr. 28-May 16
International Labor Conference: 41st (Maritime) Session	Geneva	Apr. 29-May 16
WMO Executive Committee: 10th Session	Geneva	Apr. 29-May 17
11th International Cannes Film Festival	Cannes	May 2-18
NATO: Ministerial Session of the Council	Copenhagen	May 5-7
U.N. Advisory Committee on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy: 8th Session	Geneva	May 7-8
ICEM Council: 8th Session	Geneva	May 7-14
U.N. Good Offices Committee on South-West Africa	London	May 8-23
FAO Cocoa Study Group: 3d Meeting	Hamburg	May 16-22
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 16th Session	Geneva	May 19-21
ITU International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCITT): Study Group VIII Working Party	Warsaw	May 19-23
UPU Consultative Commission on Postal Studies (CCEP): 1st Meeting	Brussels	May 19-29
2d Regional Meeting of Latin American National Commissions for UNESCO	Panamá	May 25-30
23d Congress for the Protection of Industrial Property	Stockholm	May 26-31
10th WHO Anniversary Commemorative Session	Minneapolis	May 26-27
FAO Legal and Constitutional Committee	Rome	May 28-30
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Gas Problems: 4th Session	Geneva	May 28-30

In Session as of May 31, 1958

GATT Tariff Negotiations with Brazil	Geneva	Feb. 14-
Brussels Universal and International Exhibition of 1958	Brussels	Apr. 17-
U.N. Trusteeship Council: Standing Committee on Petitions	New York	May 6-
ICAO Assembly: 11th (Limited) Session	Montreal	May 20-
U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration	New York	May 20-
11th World Health Assembly	Minneapolis	May 28-
Caribbean Commission: 26th Meeting	Trinidad	May 28-
FAO Regional Nutrition Meeting for Europe	Rome	May 28-
ITU International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR): Study Group XI (Television)	Moscow	May 28-
UNESCO Special Intergovernmental Committee on the Preparation of a New Convention for the International Exchange of Publications	Brussels	May 28-

Scheduled June 1 Through August 31, 1958

International Cotton Advisory Committee: 17th Plenary Meeting	London	June 2-
FAO Group on Grains: 3d Session	Rome	June 2-
6th U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians	Geneva	June 2-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, May 14, 1958. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCEP, Commission consultative des études postales; CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radiocommunications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; PAIGH, Pan American Institute of Geography and History; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNREF, United Nations Refugee Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled June 1 Through August 31, 1958—Continued

IMCO Preparatory Committee	New York	June 3-
17th International Conference on Large Electric Systems	Paris	June 4-
International Labor Conference: 42d Session	Geneva	June 4-
12th International Ornithological Congress	Helsinki	June 5-
International Rubber Study Group: 14th Meeting	Hamburg	June 9-
U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation: 5th Session	New York	June 9-
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 8th Meeting	Halifax	June 9-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee and Working Parties	Geneva	June 9-
WMO Working Group on Numerical Weather Forecasting and Analysis	Stockholm	June 10-
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 8th Session	Rome	June 10-
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	June 16-
FAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 5th Session	Rome	June 16-
WHO Executive Board: 22d Session	Minneapolis	June 16-
5th International Electronic Nuclear Energy Exhibition and Conference	Rome	June 16-
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 16th Session	Geneva	June 16-
6th Inter-American Seminar on Overall Planning for Education	Washington	June 23-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of Experts on Travel Plans	Washington	June 23-
UNESCO Committee on International Standardization of Educational Statistics	Paris	June 23-
International Whaling Commission: 10th Meeting	The Hague	June 23-
International Wheat Council: 24th Session	London	June 25-
ILO Governing Body: 139th Session	Geneva	June 26-
8th Berlin Film Festival	Berlin	June 27-
UNREF Standing Program Subcommittee: 7th Session	Geneva	June*
UNREF Executive Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	June*
International Tonnage Measurement Experts: 6th Meeting	Hamburg	June*
FAO International Poplar Commission: Executive Committee	Rome	July 1-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 26th Session	Geneva	July 1-
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 2d Meeting	Montreal	July 3-
Joint UNESCO/IBE International Conference on Public Education: 21st Session	Geneva	July 7-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of Experts on Tourist Travel Promotion	México, D. F.	July 7-
International Union of Biological Sciences: 13th General Assembly	London	July 12-
Inter-American Technical Committee on Cacao: 7th Meeting	Palmira, Colombia	July 13-
15th International Congress of Zoology	London	July 16-
International Union of Architects: 5th Congress	Moscow	July 20-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Technical Committee of Experts on the Removal of Travel Barriers	Buenos Aires	July 21-
4th FAO Inter-American Meeting on Livestock Production	Jamaica	July 22-
Inter-Parliamentary Union: 47th Conference	Rio de Janeiro	July 24-
Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council: 5th Meeting	London	July 28-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee for the Revision of the Agreement for Establishment of the Caribbean Commission	Trinidad	July*
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Permanent Executive Committee	Lima	Aug. 4-
International Union of Mathematics: 3d General Assembly	St. Andrews, Scotland	Aug. 11-
International Astronomical Union: 10th General Assembly	Moscow	Aug. 13-
11th International Congress of Mathematicians	Edinburgh	Aug. 14-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 3d Session	Geneva	Aug. 18-
ICAO: Special Communications Preparatory Meeting for the ITU Radio Conference	Montreal	Aug. 19-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 6th Session	Guatemala	Aug. 20-
19th International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 24-
12th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 24-
International Union of Theoretical and Applied Mechanics	Oxford, England	Aug. 24-
PAIGH Directing Council: 3d Meeting	Washington	Aug. 25-
WMO Regional Association II (Asia): 2d Session	Tashkent, U.S.S.R.	August*

Intersessional Meeting of GATT Contracting Nations

REVIEW OF MEETING OF INTERSESSIONAL COMMITTEE

Press release 246 dated May 6

In a 3-week meeting at Geneva that concluded May 2 the Intersessional Committee of the 37 GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] contracting nations carried forward the work of bringing into harmony the trade arrangements of the European Economic Community, which is still in an early formative stage, and the GATT framework of international trade rules and tariff concessions. The Committee also urged the German Government to take further steps to eliminate quota restrictions on imports.

The Intersessional Committee held consultations on the intensification of quantitative import restrictions which New Zealand had felt obliged to make because of its worsening foreign-exchange situation. It received the final report on the execution of the transitional provisions of the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, which became fully operative on February 10, 1958, and heard a report by a representative of the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation] on the negotiations on the proposed European Free-Trade Area. It also considered complaints involving Italian discrimination against imports of tractors, French subsidies of wheat and flour exports, and the U.S. escape-clause action increasing the tariff on spring clothespins.¹

Isaiah Frank, deputy director of the Office of International Trade of the Department of State, was the chairman of the U.S. delegation to the meeting. The delegation consisted of representatives from the Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and Treasury.

European Economic Community

The Intersessional Committee reached general agreement that the normal procedures of the

GATT were well adapted for consideration of trade questions relating to the EEC treaty. The representative of the Community undertook to refer the conclusions of the Intersessional Committee to the Council of Ministers of the EEC and to inform the Contracting Parties of the results.

The problems raised by the association of overseas territories with the EEC were discussed in detail by the Intersessional Committee, which had before it a series of reports on specific commodities and a general report which had been prepared by a working party that met in February and March. These reports and the discussions that have been carried out constitute a substantial accomplishment by the Contracting Parties in their examination of the EEC treaty. There was considerable support for the view that it would be most fruitful now to direct attention to specific practical problems, leaving aside for a time the questions arising out of differing legal interpretations of the GATT.

The chairman of the U.S. delegation reiterated the importance the United States attaches to the successful evolution of the European Economic Community. He also took cognizance of the desire of Contracting Parties, including the United States, to move forward as rapidly as possible in GATT consideration of the EEC treaty. He noted, however, that firm judgments on some important issues were not practicable because the institutions of the Community were still in the process of organization and much depended on future decisions and actions to be taken by these institutions.

Commenting on the historic importance of the EEC treaty, the U.S. representative noted the similarity of the objectives of the General Agreement and those of the EEC treaty in relation to the expansion of world trade. In particular, he expressed the view that these objectives would be furthered if the Community set its common ex-

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 958.

ternal tariff as low as possible. The Community was also requested to make the tariff available as soon as possible, but not later than July 1, 1959, and to supply information to facilitate its study by Contracting Parties.

German Import Restrictions

The Intersessional Committee resumed the discussion begun last year on the import restrictions still maintained by the Federal Republic of Germany. The Contracting Parties agreed that the Federal Republic was no longer entitled, under the General Agreement, to maintain import restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons.

The German Government contended that, in accordance with its terms of accession to the General Agreement, it is entitled to restrict imports of certain agricultural products. Most of the members of the Intersessional Committee, after a thorough study of the matter, did not accept the German view.

The German Government was urged to reconsider its position, but the question of possible further action by Contracting Parties was left for consideration at the 13th session.

Other Items

In accordance with the General Agreement a consultation was held with New Zealand because of its intensification of import restrictions following a sharp deterioration in its external financial position. It was recognized that the action taken by New Zealand was necessary to forestall a serious loss of reserves. New Zealand gave assurances that import restrictions would be relaxed as soon as its financial position improved.

The six European countries which form the European Coal and Steel Community submitted the final report required under the waiver granted by the Contracting Parties. This report covered developments in the last stages of the transitional period which ended on February 10, 1958. Tribute was paid to the accomplishments of the Community and confidence expressed that the spirit of cooperation that had prevailed between the Community and the Contracting Parties would continue.

A complaint by the United Kingdom on the treatment of imported agricultural machinery (mainly tractors) by the Italian Government was referred to a panel of conciliation. Another com-

plaint by Australia on French assistance to exports of wheat and flour was also referred to a panel of conciliation.

The Intersessional Committee heard a report on the bilateral discussions between the United States and the Swedish and Danish Governments on their complaint against the U.S. action increasing the duty on spring clothespins.

Besides Mr. Frank as chairman, the U.S. delegation consisted of the following officials:

John A. Birch, assistant chief, Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Department of State
Carl D. Corse, U.S. Mission to the European Communities
Morris Fields, chief, Commercial Policy and United Nations Division, Department of the Treasury
Robert L. Gastineau, director, Trade Policy Division, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture
Rene Lutz, deputy director, Office of Economic Affairs, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce
Jacob M. Myerson, Office of Regional Affairs, Department of State
Murray Ryss, Trade Agreements and Treaties Division, Department of State
Robert B. Sarich, European Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce
Harry Shoshan, Technical Review Staff, Department of the Interior

U. S. STATEMENT ON EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY²

It is now 1 year since the Contracting Parties began their consideration of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community. When the Intersessional Committee took up the subject in April 1957, the treaty had only recently been signed. When our ministers met last October,³ the process of ratification had not yet been completed. Now this vital instrument is in force and steps are being taken to apply its provisions. Although much remains to be done, a great deal of progress has been made in creating the Community, in giving it form and meaning as a distinct, new entity.

My Government has welcomed the treaties of Rome—both the Common Market and EURATOM—as historic developments holding great promise for the future of all our countries. Mr. Chairman, I would like today to reiterate the impor-

² Made on Apr. 23 at Geneva by Isaiah Frank, chairman of the U.S. delegation.

³ For a review of the 12th session of the Contracting Parties, see BULLETIN of Dec. 23, 1957, p. 1004.

tance we in the United States attach to the successful evolution of the European Economic Community. Insofar as foreign trade is concerned, the General Agreement and the Rome Treaty are directed essentially toward the same goals.

When we began our review, I think we all realized that time would be required for a calm, considered study of this new development. It is undoubtedly the most complex and far-reaching single development ever to come before the Contracting Parties. Despite the obvious desire, fully shared by my delegation, to move forward as rapidly as possible in our consideration of the treaty, a practical and realistic approach is required.

Representatives of the Six⁴ and of other countries have repeatedly emphasized the fact that firm judgments on some important issues were not, and still are not, practicable. They are not practicable because so much depends on future decisions and actions to be taken in the light of circumstances which cannot now be foreseen. Moreover, the Community naturally has many problems in organizing its day-to-day work and in arranging technical facilities for its institutions.

The Community's decisions will have such a widespread impact that great care in their formulation is of obvious importance to all Contracting Parties.

On the other hand, it is essential that, in the interim, our deliberations make as much progress as possible. This is important both to the Community and to the Contracting Parties. Despite the manifest impossibility of settling everything in a short time, the Contracting Parties have made real progress in examining the Rome Treaty.

First of all, we have studied its factual content; this, in itself, represented a considerable task. Contracting Parties have explained their general attitudes toward the Community and its relationship to the GATT. Statements by ministers at the 12th session, as indicated in the communique, have

... shown the importance which all contracting parties attach to the successful operation of the European Economic Community in harmony with the objectives of the General Agreement. . . .

Some countries have, however, expressed concern about the possible impact of particular as-

pects of the treaty on their economies. There has been progress in defining, at least on a tentative basis, a number of specific issues. We have before us the detailed reports prepared by the four subcommittees at the 12th session. We have also received in the past few days the report of the working party on the overseas-territories question. I wish to join in the chairman's congratulations to Mr. [Tord Bernhard] Hagen of Sweden for the excellent job which he has done in presiding over the working party. All of this adds up to a substantial accomplishment. Nevertheless, we must recognize that much remains to be done.

In explaining the Rome Treaty's significance to the United States Congress and to the public at large, spokesmen for our Government have pointed to the General Agreement as the effective instrument for dealing with any trade problems related to the treaty. Perhaps in other countries, too, the relationship between the treaty and the General Agreement has been discussed in the same sense. We must be certain that the assurances given those to whom we are responsible will have meaning.

Mr. Chairman, the Six have already given us certain general assurances concerning their policies. But precisely because this matter is of such import, because so many questions must be decided by the institutions over a long period of time, we hope that the Six will underscore and amplify some of these points and will, moreover, be just as specific as circumstances permit.

I would also mention the importance we attach to close and effective cooperation between the Contracting Parties and the European Economic Community as the Community's commercial policies are elaborated and carried out. We do not envisage a new kind of machinery, established primarily or exclusively for this purpose. Rather we have in mind the normal procedures for exchanging information and views along lines which are in keeping with the best traditions of the GATT.

The Rome Treaty is a document of unprecedented scope. Its provisions, taken together, constitute far more than a customs union. My Government considers the achievement of the far-reaching aims of the Common Market of the utmost importance for the future of all of us. In examining a development of such magnitude narrow, sterile debate must be avoided. Such an ap-

⁴The six members of the European Economic Community are Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

proach could only cloud issues and impede our work. Rather we must concentrate our efforts along lines which will assist the development of the European Economic Community and which will, at the same time, protect the vital economic interests of all Contracting Parties.

The European Economic Community is one of the most important trading areas of the world. Its interests do not lie in Europe alone. It must look toward other parts of the world for markets and for essential supplies. Therefore the Community has a strong, direct interest in maintaining and in strengthening its multilateral trading ties.

Tariff Negotiations

Now, Mr. Chairman, I turn to some of the specific issues of interest to us.

First, for the Community's objectives to be attained the external tariff must be kept as low as possible. High levels of trade between the Community and other countries will mean greater freedom of choice and higher standards of living for the more than 160 million consumers in the Community.

At the 12th session the Six expressed their views on the external tariff. I refer particularly to the questions of "general incidence" and of bound rates. We have also noted the willingness of the Six to enter into negotiations with outside countries at some future time with a view to lowering tariffs on a reciprocal basis. At an appropriate time, Mr. Chairman, the Contracting Parties will have to consider the scope and procedures for tariff negotiations with the Six.

The Six have recognized that negotiations will be required under article XXIV, paragraph 6. Contracting Parties, however, cannot complete their studies and make reasonable judgments until the common tariff is available.

The subject of the common tariff is large and complex. What appears to be a somewhat distant target date for its submittal—July 1, 1959—is actually very close in relation to the work to be done. By this I mean that a great deal of work—preparation and negotiation—will be necessary between the time when the common tariff is available and January 1, 1962, when the first step in establishing the common tariff is scheduled to be taken. I urge the Community and its member states to make every effort to supply

the tariff earlier than July 1, 1959, if possible and, in any case, no later than that target date.

In addition, if rational judgments are to be made on this important matter, it will be necessary for Contracting Parties to have certain supplementary material on the external tariff. Our delegation believes such explanatory material should provide the following information: first, a key or concordance permitting a cross-reference and comparison of rates and commodity descriptions in the common tariff and of related statistical classifications with those in the previous individual tariffs and statistics of the Six; second, an indication of all changes in rates, commodity descriptions, and statistical classification numbers; third, an indication of how the common tariff rates are derived from the previous rates; fourth, an exact description of the products upon which concessions have been made in the individual schedules of the Six; fifth, an indication of the country or countries with which concessions were initially negotiated and of the principal suppliers with the amount of trade involved.

The information desired is primarily descriptive and statistical in nature. Much of it will certainly have been prepared in the computation of the common tariff and should be readily available. Its provision by the Community will enormously facilitate and speed the study of the common tariff by interested countries.

Balance-of-Payments Restrictions

I turn now to another aspect of the subject before us, namely those parts of the treaty pertaining to the use of quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons. This is a highly technical and important field. It will suffice at this time simply to note our general view.

We believe that, until such time as the Community integrates the financial and economic relations of the member countries so as to be considered, in effect, a unit for balance-of-payments purposes, the maintenance or imposition of quantitative restrictions for financial reasons should be justified on an individual-country basis. Thus a financially sound member ought not to be looked to to maintain or impose quantitative restrictions because of the balance-of-payments problem of another.

This does not, in the meantime, rule out the possibility of a common liberalization list, but

we believe that any such list should represent a floor rather than a ceiling on liberalization. In short, each member of the Community should continue to liberalize over and above any such common list as rapidly as the balance-of-payments position of that member warrants.

Trade in Agricultural Products

Another important subject in connection with the Rome Treaty is agriculture. Both the General Agreement and the treaty recognize the special problems of trade in agricultural products.

The agricultural provisions of the treaty are a matter of worldwide public knowledge and interest. It is known that specific preparations are now under way to harmonize the individual national agricultural policies of six great nations into a common policy for all. This common policy will have a major influence on one of the world's most important markets for farm products. As trading partners of the Six, other countries cannot but have a deep interest in this matter.

We note that the treaty explicitly provides, in connection with long-term contracts, that due account will be taken of traditional channels of trade. It is essential that in working out its general agricultural policies the Community bear in mind the importance both of traditional trade channels and the GATT objective of expanding multilateral trade.

In our view policies and programs which take into account the interests of other countries will also be those most likely to contribute to the Community's agricultural objectives. I refer to such matters as increasing productivity and assuring efficient utilization of resources, as specified in article 39, paragraph 1, of the treaty.

Within the framework of our usual methods and procedures, effective channels of communication with the Community should be established in the vital field of agriculture. This is the Community's crucial formative period. Over the next few years policies will be developed which will affect agricultural trade for a long time in the future. It is not a question of legal or contractual obligations; I wish to stress this point. Rather it is a question of normal cooperation and continuing exchanges of information and views on matters of common concern among trading partners.

For example, the Community has planned a conference on agriculture, to be held at Stresa this summer. It would be useful if, when this conference has ended, the Six, using the normal machinery of the Contracting Parties, could provide information on the conference. It would also be desirable to afford Contracting Parties some means of commenting on the information received.

Association of Overseas Areas

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I wish to turn to the subject of the association of overseas areas. The arrangements for these areas are an integral and important part of the treaty. In considering them let us avoid a legalistic approach and attempt to deal with the subject in a practical manner. No country's formal position need thereby be prejudiced.

Economic development has become a basic national aspiration in many parts of the world. Access to markets is essential if less developed countries are to earn the foreign exchange required to finance imports necessary to their growth. My country and other countries have shown their understanding of, and support for, the hopes of these peoples for a better life.

We are, therefore, sympathetic with the objectives of the Six, as stated in article 131 of the treaty. The article reads in part

... this association shall in the first place permit the furthering of the interest and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in such a manner as to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development which they expect.

We must also recognize, however, the preoccupation of less developed countries in other parts of the world with the possible implications for them of the Rome Treaty arrangements. Where problems can be shown to exist, realistic solutions are needed. It is also necessary that such solutions be sought in a multilateral framework. And any arrangements ultimately reached must be consonant with the GATT objective of nondiscrimination as among third countries.

The object of these arrangements should be to prevent any significant diminution of outside countries' present trade with the Six as a result of the overseas territories' association. They should also provide a reasonable opportunity for third countries to share in increased demand resulting from the Common Market.

How can we come to grips with this problem in a way which will, first, avoid unproductive debate on abstract questions; second, take cognizance of the realities of the present situation; third, assist the healthy evolution of the European Economic Community; and fourth, assure other countries that any trade problems they may have as a result of the overseas-territories arrangements will be settled equitably? Although we have no readymade solutions, Mr. Chairman, I

think that the key to an answer lies in the recognition that GATT principles, traditions, and methods of procedure are flexible enough to deal effectively with this problem.

My delegation will listen with great interest to the views of other Contracting Parties and will be prepared to cooperate fully in attempting to develop useful and productive channels for our deliberations.

U.N. Promotion of Equality for Women

REPORT ON THE 1958 SESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

by *Lorena B. Hahn*

The United Nations Commission on the Status of Women held its 12th session at Geneva March 17 to April 3, 1958. The Commission stressed the importance of achieving political, educational, and economic opportunities for women adequate in practice as well as law. In addition, it gave particular attention to marriage requirements and projects under the United Nations advisory services program relating to the status of women.

The Commission decided to give priority consideration in its 1959 session to the occupational outlook for women, a study of tax legislation applicable to women, the situation of women in the teaching profession, and the completion of a pamphlet on equal pay for equal work which would be made available for public distribution. For its 1960 session, the Commission requested four further studies: one on the access of women to public office; one on the age of marriage, free consent of the parties to marriage, and the registration of marriage; a study by the International Labor Office on the removal of economic discriminations against women; and a study by UN-

ESCO on the access of women to out-of-school education.

Begum Anwar Ahmed of Pakistan provided distinguished leadership as chairman of the 1958 session of the Commission. Miss Uldarica Manas of Cuba was elected first vice chairman; Mrs. Zofia Dembinska of Poland, second vice chairman; and Mrs. Mina Ben-Zvi of Israel, rapporteur.

Three countries, Canada, Czechoslovakia, and Japan, served on the Commission on the Status of Women for the first time at its 1958 session. The other 15 countries represented on the Commission were Argentina, Belgium, China, Cuba, Dominican Republic, France, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan, Poland, Sweden, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.

Political Rights

The Commission observed that some 11 states had not yet granted women any political rights and expressed concern that in a number of countries where these rights had been granted to women major obstacles continued to exist in the way of their actual exercise. It was the general view that further information should be obtained on the access of women to public office, and the Secretary-General was requested to provide a report on this subject for the 1960 session of the Commission. My statement on behalf of the United

• *Mrs. Hahn, author of the above article, is the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women.*

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States emphasized the importance of participation by women in political organizations at the local level as a means of making full use of their political rights and also of participation by women in community organizations as training for public life. The regional seminar held in Bangkok in August 1957 on civic responsibilities and increased participation of Asian women in public life received high commendation. I expressed the full support of the United States Government for the development of further regional seminars of this type as a means of assisting women to have a voice in public affairs.

Access to Higher Education

The Commission discussed a report prepared by UNESCO in collaboration with the International Federation of University Women based on a questionnaire sent to IFUW branches throughout the world. Statistical information appended to the report showed that in the majority of countries the proportion of women attending institutions of higher learning had increased significantly in the 10-year period 1945 to 1955. The United States called attention to the numerous conferences on educational trends in this country and such special studies as that recently published by the National Manpower Council of Columbia University. Since the UNESCO report observed that scholarships for girls were seldom available from business firms, my statement included a report on the substantial amounts of money allocated to grants and schools by private industry in the United States, including the Ford Foundation contribution of \$400,000 in 1956.

Economic Opportunities for Women

In the field of economic opportunities for women, the Commission considered the following four topics: (1) equal pay for equal work; (2) the situation of working women, including working mothers, with family responsibilities; (3) the right to rest and the right to social security; and (4) age of retirement and right to pension.

On equal pay for equal work the Commission reviewed a draft pamphlet prepared by the United Nations with the assistance of the ILO. It was decided this draft should be revised for further review by the Commission at its 1959 session, and the members of the Commission were invited to submit additional comments for this purpose.

The ILO report on equal pay for equal work commented on the progress made in various countries in improving women's wage rates, not only where they performed the same work as men but also in so-called women's jobs in which few men are employed. Information compiled by our Bureau of Labor Statistics proved useful in this connection since it indicated that, in the period 1940 to 1955, in a majority of occupational classifications, women's wages in the United States had shown a higher proportionate increase than men's wages. One of the larger tasks which remains to be done in the field of equal pay is to aid women in obtaining the necessary training so that they can qualify for better-paid jobs now generally held by men.

On the subject of working women with family responsibilities, the Commission discussed reports prepared by the ILO and the United Nations on factors affecting the working conditions of women in the home and on the job. The United States statement describes the employment pattern of the average woman worker in the United States, generally characterized by entrance into employment, early marriage, leaving the labor market on the birth of the first child, and return to the labor market after the youngest child has reached school age. A resolution adopted by the Commission noted that a study on crèches and day nurseries was being undertaken by the International Children's Center in Paris.

In its discussion of the right to rest and the right to social security in the event of old age, illness, or loss of capacity to work, the Commission considered the subject of women's hours of employment. The ILO prepared a comprehensive report on this subject. The United States statement called attention to the notable progress continually being achieved in the United States through collective-bargaining agreements and through such methods as premium pay for Saturday, Sunday, and holiday work and paid annual vacations, and emphasized the particular value of the 5-day work week, now almost a universal practice in the United States, to women workers with family responsibilities. On the matter of health, I noted that more than two-thirds of the population of the United States is protected against the cost of hospital bills by private health insurance and that more than 12 million workers are covered by health insurance under collective-bargaining agreements.

Considerable interest was expressed in retirement provisions for women in the United States. My statement pointed out that our legislation provides for voluntary rather than compulsory retirement, that the age at which workers may retire with full benefits is 65 for both men and women, and further that, although under our law as amended in 1956 women workers have the right to retire at 62 with reduced benefits, a relatively small proportion of women have availed themselves of this right. Actually the average age at which women retire in the United States is 68—only a few months younger than the age at which men retire. The Commission adopted a resolution recommending that all member states and specialized agencies facilitate the implementation of the same retirement and pension age for men and women, by vote of 10 to 0. The United States abstained on this resolution together with seven other representatives.

Age of Marriage

Under the general topic of the "Status of Women in Private Law," the Commission gave particular attention to the need to establish a minimum age of marriage and to require the consent of both parties to the marriage and compulsory registration of marriage. The members of the Commission favored the establishment of a minimum age of marriage, preferably not less than 16 years. To obtain further information on this subject the Commission asked the Secretary-General to circulate a questionnaire to member governments and to interested nongovernmental organizations and report to the Commission at its 1960 session. In this connection the Commission also asked the Secretary-General to prepare a draft convention on this subject for review by the Commission at its 1960 session. The United States voted against the drafting of a convention on this topic but in favor of the proposal of the Commission to obtain further information on this subject.

In the discussion of age of marriage and consent of marriage, the United States made use of the summary of the recent Women's Bureau study of marriage laws in the United States. This study showed that the legal minimum marriage age for women, where the consent of the parents is not required, is 18 years in 33 states and 21 years in 15 states. Girls who have not reached

the legal age may be married only if they obtain the consent of their parents, the usual minimum age being 16 years in 31 states. The lowest minimum age for marriage with the consent of parents is 14 years, which is in effect in 7 states.

Annual Sessions

I joined the other members of the Commission in the adoption of a resolution favoring annual sessions of the Commission for the present, pointing out that, while the United States continues to favor biennial sessions in principle, it is not pressing for the implementation of this principle at this time.

Regional Seminars

With respect to the United Nations advisory services program in the field of human rights, the Commission recommended that seminars on the status of women be held annually under this program during the next several years. The Commission felt that the seminar held in Bangkok in 1957 demonstrated the particular value of regional seminars where participants from countries with common interests and problems can benefit by sharing their experience and information. Hope was expressed that a regional seminar on civic responsibilities and increased participation of women in public life would be held in 1959 in either Africa or Latin America. The Commission also hoped that a regional seminar on the family and property rights of women could be organized in Asia in 1960 and a similar seminar could be organized in 1961 either in Africa or Latin America, with a seminar in Europe at a later date. The United States offered to act as host for a regional seminar for women if the United Nations would find this useful.

Women's organizations in consultative status with the United Nations participated helpfully in discussion of agenda items. Those represented in this session were: All-Pakistan Women's Association, Catholic International Union for Social Service, International Alliance of Social Democratic Women, International Alliance of Women, International Association of Penal Law, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, International Council of Women, International Federation of Business and Professional Women, International Federation of Christian Trade

Unions, International Federation of University Women, International Federation of Women Lawyers, International Union for Child Welfare, Open Door International and St. Joan's International Social and Political Alliance, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, World Federation of Democratic Youth, World Movement of Mothers, World Young Women's Christian Association.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

10th Anniversary Commemorative Session of WHO and 11th World Health Assembly

The Department of State announced on May 16 (press release 271) that President Eisenhower has designated Marion B. Folsom, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to head the U.S. delegation to the 2-day 10th anniversary commemorative session of the World Health Organization (WHO) opening on May 26, 1958, at Minneapolis, Minn. At the same time, the President designated Leroy E. Burney, M.D., Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, to be chief delegate and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 11th World Health Assembly convening at Minneapolis May 28-June 14, 1958.¹

Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, and Charles Mayo, M.D., of the Mayo Clinic at Rochester, Minn., have been designated delegates to serve with Secretary Folsom. Dr. Mayo and John W. Hanes, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, were designated to serve with Dr. Burney as delegates to the 11th World Health Assembly.

Honorary delegates and honorary members of the delegation to the 10th anniversary commemorative session are:

Honorary Delegates:²

Hubert H. Humphrey, United States Senate
Edward J. Thye, United States Senate

¹ The White House, in announcing the U.S. delegations, included the designation of Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower as Personal Representative of the President at the 10th anniversary commemorative session.

² The honorary delegates, in accordance with WHO procedures, will be officially accredited as alternate U.S. delegates.

Walter H. Judd, House of Representatives
Eugene J. McCarthy, House of Representatives
Joseph P. O'Hara, House of Representatives
Roy W. Wier, House of Representatives
Leroy E. Burney, M.D., Surgeon General, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
David Allman, M.D., president, American Medical Association
Frank G. Boudreau, M.D., director, Milbank Memorial Fund
Ulrich Bryner, M.D., Salt Lake City, Utah
Howard B. Calderwood, Office of Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Lowell T. Coggeshall, M.D., dean, Division of Biological Sciences, University of Chicago
Albert W. Dent, president, Dillard University
Martha M. Elliot, M.D., professor, Harvard School of Public Health
John W. Hanes, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Ira V. Hiscock, professor of public health, Yale University
H. van Zile Hyde, M.D., chief, Division of International Health, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Virgil T. Jackson, Sr., D.D.S., New Orleans, La.
Frank H. Krusen, M.D., professor of physical medicine and rehabilitation, Mayo Clinic
Mrs. Oswald B. Lord, U.S. Representative to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations
George F. Lull, M.D., assistant to the president, American Medical Association
Edward J. McCormick, M.D., surgeon, St. Vincent's Hospital, Toledo, Ohio
Aims C. McGuinness, M.D., special assistant for health and medical affairs, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Mrs. Katherine B. Oettinger, chief, Children's Bureau, Social Security Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Arthur S. Osborne, M.D., international health representative, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Thomas Parran, M.D., dean, Graduate School of Public Health, School of Medicine, University of Pittsburgh
James E. Perkins, M.D., managing director, National Tuberculosis Association
Dean Rusk, president, Rockefeller Foundation
Jonas E. Salk, M.D., Commonwealth Professor of Experimental Medicine, University of Pittsburgh
Leonard A. Scheele, M.D., president, Warner-Chilcott Laboratories, Morris Plains, N.J.
Mary Switzer, director, Office of Vocational Rehabilitation, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Herman G. Weiskotten, M.D., dean emeritus, College of Medicine, New York State University
Louis L. Williams, M.D., consultant, Pan American Sautury Bureau

Honorary Members of the Delegation:³

Donald M. Alderson, colonel, USAF, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical)
Ray Amberg, hospital administrator, University of Minnesota Hospitals
Gaylord Anderson, M.D., director, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota
Guillermo Arbona, M.D., Secretary of Health, Puerto Rico Department of Health
R. N. Barr, M.D., secretary and executive officer, Minnesota Department of Health

³ The honorary members of the delegation, in accordance with WHO procedures, will be officially accredited as advisers.

Ann Burns, chief, Division of Nursing, Ohio Department of Health
 Eugene P. Campbell, M.D., chief, Public Health Division, International Cooperation Administration
 H. Trendley Dean, D.D.S., secretary, Council on Dental Research, American Dental Association
 Harold S. Diehl, M.D., dean, School of Medical Sciences, University of Minnesota
 Charles L. Dumbam, M.D., director, Division of Biology and Radiation, Atomic Energy Commission
 Herman E. Hilleboe, M.D., Commissioner of Health, State Health Department, Albany, N.Y.
 Charles A. Janeway, M.D., Thomas Morgan Rotch Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard School of Medicine
 Richard K. C. Lee, M.D., president, Board of Health, Honolulu, T.H.
 Phillip E. Nelbach, executive secretary, National Citizens Committee for the WHO, Inc.
 Mrs. Owen B. Rhoads, Paoli, Pa.
 Robert O. Waring, Office of International Administration, Department of State
 Abel Wolman, M.D., professor of sanitary engineering, Johns Hopkins School of Public Health and Hygiene
 Laurence R. Wyatt, international health representative, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

The following have been named alternate delegates to the 11th World Health Assembly:

Howard B. Calderwood, Office of Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
 Lowell T. Coggeshall, M.D., dean, Division of Biological Sciences, University of Chicago
 H. van Zile Hyde, M.D., chief, Division of International Health, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
 George F. Lull, M.D., assistant to the president, American Medical Association
 Aims C. McGuinness, M.D., special assistant for health and medical affairs, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
 Arthur S. Osborne, M.D., international health representative, Bureau of State Services, U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

The 6 Members of Congress, named as honorary delegates to the 10th anniversary commemorative session, and the 18 honorary members of the delegation to that session have been named as congressional advisers and advisers to the U.S. delegation to the 11th World Health Assembly.

Harry V. Ryder, Jr., Office of International Conferences, Department of State, will serve as secretary of the U.S. delegation to both the commemorative session and the 11th World Health Assembly.

This is the first time that WHO has met in the United States since its organization meeting at New York in 1948. Some 300 official delegates from among the 88 member nations of WHO will attend the 1958 Assembly. Observers from the United Nations, the specialized agencies, and other intergovernmental organizations, as well as from many nongovernmental organizations in the health and medical fields, will also participate.

The 10th anniversary commemorative session will be a ceremonial review of "Ten Years of Health Progress."

The Assembly meets in regular annual session and determines the policies of the Organization. At the 11th Assembly various plenary sessions will, among other things, review the work of WHO in 1957, elect six member countries to designate health experts to fill the six annual vacancies on the 18-man executive board, and review and approve resolutions recommended by the two main committees (Program and Budget; Administration, Finance and Legal). A plenary session will witness the award of the 1958 Leon Bernard Foundation prize to Dr. Thomas Parran, former Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service, for outstanding achievements in the field of public health.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization. Opened for signature at New York July 22, 1946. Entered into force April 7, 1948. TIAS 1808.
Acceptance deposited: Federation of Malaya, April 24, 1958.

BILATERAL

Iceland

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Reykjavik May 3, 1958. Entered into force May 3, 1958.

Japan

Agreement providing for Japan's financial contributions for United States administrative and related expenses during the Japanese fiscal year 1958 under the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo May 2, 1958. Entered into force May 2, 1958.

Nicaragua

Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, and protocol. Signed at Managua January 21, 1956. Enters into force May 24, 1958.
Proclaimed by the President: May 9, 1958.

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259	5/13	Dulles-Adenauer exchange of telegrams.
260	5/14	U.S.-German educational exchange agreement (rewrite).
†261	5/14	Exchange of notes with Czechoslovakia on airplane crash.
*262	5/14	Educational exchange.
263	5/14	Dulles meeting with Field Marshal Sarit.
†264	5/14	Note from Venezuela on Nixon incident.
265	5/14	Mann: "American Trade Policy and the Lessons of the 1930's."
†266	5/14	Report of Technical Joint Commission on Chaguaramas.
*267	5/14	Peruvian legislators to visit U.S.
268	5/15	Establishment of Philippines-U.S. Mutual Defense Board.
†269	5/15	Seminar for FSO's in Africa.
†270	5/16	Development Loan Fund agreement with Honduras.
271	5/16	Delegation to WHO (rewrite).
272	5/16	Radio-TV exchanges with U.S.S.R.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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Bulletin

Vol. XXXVIII, No. 989

June 9, 1958

PRESIDENT PROPOSES MEETING OF EXPERTS TO STUDY METHODS OF DETECTING VIOLA- TIONS OF AN AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS • <i>Exchange of Correspondence Between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev</i> .	939
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XXXVIII, No. 989 • PUBLICATION 6651

June 9, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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President Proposes Meeting of Experts To Study Methods of Detecting Violations of an Agreement on Cessation of Nuclear Tests

Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, together with a statement made on May 11 by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President.

THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

White House press release dated May 24

MAY 24, 1958.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your letter of May 9, 1958. I note with satisfaction that you accept, at least partially, my proposal that technical persons be designated to ascertain what would be required to supervise and control disarmament agreements, all without prejudice to our respective positions on the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament.

Your letter of May ninth states that "the Soviet Government agrees to having both sides designate experts who would immediately begin a study of methods for detecting possible violations of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests with a view to having this work completed at the earliest possible date, to be determined in advance."

Experts from our side will be prepared to meet with experts from your side at Geneva, if the Swiss Government agrees, within three weeks of our learning whether these arrangements are acceptable to you. On our side, experts would be chosen on the basis of special competence. I have in mind, for example, experts who might be contributed not only from the United States, but from the United Kingdom which, like the Soviet Union and the United States, has conducted nuclear tests, and from France, which has advanced

plans for testing, and possibly from other countries having experts who are advanced in knowledge of how to detect nuclear tests. We assume that the experts on the side of the Soviet Union would be similarly chosen on the basis of special competence, so as to assure that we get scientific, not political, conclusions.

I also suggest that the experts should be asked to make an initial progress report within thirty days after convening and to aim at a final report within sixty days or as soon thereafter as possible.

In view of the Charter responsibilities of the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, we would propose to keep the United Nations and its appropriate organs informed of the progress of these talks through the intermediary of the Secretary General.

I will write you further shortly regarding your statements on the problem of surprise attack and the Arctic Zone of inspection which we have proposed.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

STATEMENT BY MR. HAGERTY, MAY 11

White House press release dated May 11

Premier Khrushchev's letter of May 9th seems to constitute recognition of the validity of the position long held by the United States, the other Western members of the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee, and the overwhelming majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations that examination of the technical aspects of disarmament measures should begin as soon as possible and might serve as the basis for progress toward agreement on disarmament.

It is noted that the Soviet Union's acceptance of this position relates only to discussion of the single issue of nuclear test suspension and not to the more important elements of disarmament which the General Assembly has endorsed.

It is to be hoped that this acceptance presages agreement to begin similar discussions on other measures of disarmament.

Premier Khrushchev's letter will of course receive careful study and will be the subject of early consultation with our allies.

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message of April 28.¹ Unfortunately, I have found in it no answer by the United States Government to our statement on the question of the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, which was the subject of my letter of April 22.² However, the necessity of solving this question is now all the more urgent because attempts are already being made to disrupt the efforts toward terminating nuclear weapons tests universally and forever. I refer to the nuclear bomb tests recently carried out by the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

To be frank, the fact that the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom deemed it possible to engage in conducting these tests caused a feeling of regret on our part. Such actions are in no way in accord with the peace-loving statements recently made on more than one occasion by the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom. It is quite obvious that such actions, which represent open provocation of the will of all peoples, can only push the world back to the initial positions in this most important matter and again cause a chain reaction of experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen bombs. We believe that it is necessary to do everything possible to avoid such a sequence of events.

Under these circumstances the responsibility devolving upon the Governments of our two countries is especially great. There is no doubt that a decision of the Government of the United States of America to cease the testing of nuclear weapons would be evaluated on its merits by all the peoples of the globe as a great contribution to the cause of easing international tension and eliminating the threat of atomic war.

I must say frankly that it is difficult for us to understand what reasons prevent the Government of the United States from taking such a step. A cessation of nuclear weapons tests by the United States, following the action of the Soviet Union, would in no way prejudice the security interests of the United States and would not place your country in an unfavorable position as compared to

other countries. If we are going to speak of this aspect of the problem, then a cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests by all States possessing such weapons would rather place the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in an unequal position with regard to the United States and other members of NATO, since, as you know, the U.S.S.R. has conducted a considerably lesser number of nuclear weapons explosions than the United States and the United Kingdom have done. Nevertheless, we undertook a unilateral cessation of tests in an effort to initiate in practice the cessation of the nuclear armaments race.

References are frequently made in the United States of America to the fact that, in a situation where there is lack of the necessary confidence in relations between States, an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests could be violated and any of the parties could conduct such tests in secret. However, in this case there is no ground for such apprehensions. The methods of detecting tests and the pertinent equipment available to modern science completely preclude such a possibility. It is precisely for this reason that control of the observance of an agreement on the cessation of tests would also be easy to carry out. You, Mr. President, are familiar with the specific proposal of the Soviet Government which was introduced a year ago, concerning the form of such control. The problems of control of the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests in no way represent an obstacle to an immediate cessation of such tests.

We believe that in the first instance it is necessary that the United States of America and the United Kingdom cease testing atomic and hydrogen weapons, as has already been done by the Soviet Union, and that this basic problem be solved without delay. One cannot fail to see that this is the shortest way toward a solution of the problem of ceasing experimental explosions of nuclear weapons. In my correspondence with you I have already expressed fears that—under present conditions, where, among States possessing nuclear weapons, no unity of opinion exists with regard to the basic question of the necessity of ceasing without delay the testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs—the transfer of this problem to technical experts for study might entail a delay in the solution of this urgent matter. One must not close one's eyes to the fact that such a situation could be exploited by those who are interested in such a delay. On the contrary, if the United States and the United Kingdom should also decide to cease the testing of nuclear weapons, then this very fact would create conditions under which each party would be interested in having all other States which ceased the testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons fulfill the obligations assumed by them.

Your messages indicate that you attach great importance to having experts study the technical details connected with the control of the execution of an agreement on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. Taking this into account, we are prepared, in spite of the serious doubts on our part, of which I have spoken above, to try even this course. The Soviet Government agrees to having both sides designate experts who would immediately begin a study of methods for detecting pos-

¹ BULLETIN of May 19, 1958, p. 811.

² *Ibid.*, p. 812.

sible violations of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests with a view to having this work completed at the earliest possible date, to be determined in advance.

At the same time I once again appeal to you, Mr. President, to support the initiative of the Soviet Union in the matter of ceasing atomic and hydrogen tests and thus make possible a final solution of this problem, which is ardently hoped for by the peoples of all countries.

The international situation is now such as to make particularly necessary practical action by States in the direction of easing the existing tension. This is attested with sufficient clarity by such dangerous and, of course—for peacetime—extremely abnormal occurrences as regular flights by the bombers of the United States Strategic Air Command armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the borders of the Soviet Union and over the territories of other States, to which I have already directed your attention in my last letter. In your message, Mr. President, you imply that the method of preventing such dangerous actions may be the establishment of an international system of inspection for the Arctic zone, as proposed by the United States. However, it must be stated that this proposal by the Government of the U.S.A. does not in any way eliminate the threat to the cause of international peace, a threat created by the present action of the American Air Force.

As a matter of fact, the air route over the northern polar regions is the shortest distance between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., and is therefore an important strategic area which has special significance in connection with the availability of rocket weapons. It is for this very reason that the Soviet Union, in an effort to prevent this area from becoming a hotbed of military conflict between our countries, considers it essential that no action be undertaken within its confines which might lead to tragic consequences. It is for this very reason that we consider that the dangerous flights of American military aircraft carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs in the Arctic zone must cease. This would require only one thing: an appropriate order by the Government of the U.S.A.

Unfortunately, the proposal of the Government of the U.S.A. regarding the establishment of a system of inspection in the Arctic does not solve this question at all. After all, in advancing this proposal the Government of the U.S.A. did not even promise that in the event of its acceptance flights of American atomic bombers in the direction of the borders of the Soviet Union would be suspended. Secretary of State Dulles of the U.S.A. spoke recently in a conditional manner merely of the possibility of "reducing to a minimum these flights against which the Soviet Union protests."

We cannot fail to take into consideration one other important circumstance: The Arctic is by no means the only region from which an attack can be made against our country. We must also take into account such facts as the presence of American military bases on the territory of a number of States not far from the borders of the Soviet Union: for example, in England, France, West Germany, Italy, and Turkey. Under such conditions we cannot fail to draw the conclusion that the proposal of the Government of the U.S.A. to establish an

Appointment of U.S. Technical Experts To Study Agreement on Nuclear Tests

The Department of State announced on May 24 (press release 287) that Dr. James Brown Fisk, Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, and Dr. Robert F. Bacher have been asked, and have agreed, to serve as experts from the United States to meet with experts chosen by the Soviet Union in accordance with President Eisenhower's letter of May 24 to Chairman Khrushchev. As pointed out in that letter, there might be also experts from the United Kingdom and France and perhaps other countries advanced in knowledge of how to detect nuclear tests.

inspection zone in the Arctic was dictated not by the desire to ensure the interests of universal peace and security but was calculated to obtain unilateral advantages for the United States of America. On the other hand, it is obvious that a real solution of the problems affecting the security interests of many States can be found only in the event that the narrow, selfish ends of some States are not pursued to the detriment of the interests of other countries.

I take the liberty to remind you, Mr. President, that the Soviet Union, in an effort to meet the U.S. position, proposed long ago the establishment of a zone of aerial inspection for prevention of surprise attack in Central Europe, as well as in the Far East, and in a corresponding part of the U.S.A. These proposals of ours were objective and duly considered the security interests of all parties concerned. However, although up to that time a great deal had been said by the U.S.A. about the desirability of designating individual areas for aerial inspection, concrete proposals of the Soviet Union on this question have not yet met with a positive attitude on the part of the Government of the U.S.A. I wish to emphasize that these proposals of the U.S.S.R. are still in effect.

I must touch upon one other matter concerning which we should like to have complete clarity between us. The Soviet Union has recently been reproached for not agreeing to the American proposal to establish an inspection zone in the Arctic region even though the majority of the members of the Security Council voted for this proposal. Let me say frankly: the method to which the U.S.A. resorted in the Security Council in the consideration of the question raised by the Soviet Union of the necessity of putting an end to flights of American military aircraft armed with atomic and hydrogen bombs in the direction of the borders of the U.S.S.R. does not, in our opinion, indicate any serious intention of reaching an agreement on a mutually acceptable basis but is, rather, an indication of attempts to exert pressure on the Soviet Union through the use of a majority of the votes in the Security Council. It is very well known that this majority in the Security Council has been formed by the votes of countries which are in various degrees dependent on the U.S.A., primarily from an economic stand-

point. Thus the Security Council, in its present composition, cannot be considered an impartial arbiter, and this is the reason why at the present time it does not play the important role in the matter of maintaining international peace and security with which it was entrusted by the U.N. Charter. The Soviet Government is sincerely striving for an equitable and mutually acceptable agreement with the U.S.A. and other Western powers. We are striving to establish peaceful relations between our countries and improve these relations day by day. We were also guided by such aspirations in taking such a step as unilateral cessation of nuclear weapons tests and in making our proposals for calling a meeting with the participation of heads of government.

We should like for the Government of the U.S.A. to manifest the same desire for mutual understanding and co-operation with us in the interests of both of our countries and in the interest of universal peace. Of course, this requires a different approach to international affairs from that which found expression in the recent statement by the Secretary of State of the U.S.A.

in New Hampshire, in which Mr. Dulles repeated all the old arguments and inventions of the opponents of an agreement with the Soviet Union, opponents of the lessening of international tension. To proceed in a foreign policy on such a basis means to exclude in advance any possibility of coming to an agreement. We should not like to believe that this is the aim of the Government of the U.S.A.

You, Mr. President, have emphasized more than once that strengthening peace requires deeds. We fully share this opinion and should like to hope that the Government of the United States of America will approach the solution of the problem of ceasing atomic and hydrogen weapons tests in this very spirit.

With sincere respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV

May 9, 1958.

[Initialed] M. M.

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,

President of the United States of America.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of May 20

Press release 280 dated May 20

Secretary Dulles: Any questions?

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your assessment of the French crisis and its related Algerian problem?

A. I am afraid that I am not going to feel able to talk about that situation. If I do not talk about it, it is not because there is any indifference on our part. I think, on the contrary, that every American—certainly every American who knows his history—is following the situation with the closest attention. We await, and expect that the French people will find, a solution of their present problems which is in line with the great French tradition. I feel that any utterances from this side by me would be inappropriate at the present time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems as if the United States is surrounded by international troubles. Everywhere America seems to be intensely unpopular. Today there is talk about a need for reframing American foreign policy. Would you care to comment on that?

A. I think that our foreign policy must constantly be adapted to new and to changing situ-

ations. It is nothing new that there are trouble spots in the world. If a number of them happen to come at the same time, that may be a coincidence. It may be that hostile forces plan it that way. I have constantly said that we need to keep our foreign policy flexible and adaptable to changing situations. But I do not believe that there is anything basically different that we can do.

Now there are some people who feel that we should, in effect, adopt the Communist technique, which is that, where you have power, you should use it to impose conformity. The Communist theory of peace and world order is that you have got to bring everything under a central power and, in their case, the power of the Soviet Communist Party and the governments that it controls.

We don't believe in that kind of world, and that is the basic difference between us. We admit of differences. If we did not admit differences—if we only believed in forced conformity—we would have a world perhaps for a time that looked calmer and more serene. But it would not be the kind of world we would want to live in. I have said repeatedly that, if there are

differences in the free world, this is nothing that should surprise us. We need to take them into account, particularly when fomented by hostile forces, and we should do so. But I do not think it calls for any basic change in the American policies, which are based upon our own traditions and our own faith as to how we conduct our affairs with the other countries in the world.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the time that General Perez Jiménez fell—was ousted from power in Venezuela—in January, our diplomats reported with great pleasure that there was relatively little anti-American sentiment, despite the fact that we had been very friendly in an overt manner to the passing Jiménez regime. That changed at the time Jiménez was admitted to this country about a month ago. Would you explain to us, perhaps, how this change of feeling—how the Venezuelan people were allowed to drift into this anti-American sentiment?

A. In the first place I would not say that there is any general or preponderant anti-American sentiment among the people of Venezuela. You cannot judge a people on the basis of sporadic, organized outbursts of rowdiness. I am confident that what happened there¹ is not a reflection of the general views of the Venezuelan people.

Now there have been developments which have made it easier for those who want to organize these demonstrations to do so. One of them has been the shift in the oil situation. That is an economic cause. The oil, instead of being in short supply, as it was during the Suez crisis, has come into oversupply, and that has required some voluntary restrictions on oil imports into the United States, including those from Venezuela. As an economic factor, that has come into the situation.

Then there is a political factor in that, after the overthrow of the 10-year rule of Jiménez, a good many refugees came back to Venezuela and tended to blame their situation on the United States. Furthermore, there was a sort of vacuum of power, which always encourages rowdyist elements to come to the forefront. We know ourselves that, when there is not an adequate police force, as when there is a disaster or something which eliminates the ordinary forces of law and order, rowdiness takes command. I do not think it is sound to judge the basic sentiments of the

Venezuelan nation and the Venezuelan people on the basis of what took place when Mr. Nixon was there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of what you have just said, do you think it was wise for the Vice President to have gone into Caracas, especially since he was warned of the possibility of violence and even of assassination?

A. These things, you know, are much simpler to judge after the event than before the event. I believe myself, in the light of what we knew before Vice President Nixon went there, it was a quite correct judgment on his part to go. I think, if we had all known what was going to happen there and had been able to foresee the events, probably he would not have gone. But, you know, if you don't go to places because of threats, you will be locked up at home. I have never gone to any country in the world, hardly, but what I have had threats and there have been demonstrations of one sort or another. It is so with the Vice President, who has also visited a great many countries. If you allow yourself to be deterred by threats of that kind, the result is that the Communists will imprison you at home.

I don't accept that at all. The miscalculation in the case of the visit to Caracas was primarily a miscalculation as to the adequacy and efficiency of the police force. It virtually melted away at the sight of trouble. That wasn't anticipated. I don't know whether it could have been anticipated or not. But if there had been an adequate handling of that situation by the police, such as occurs in most countries, there would not have been any reason whatever to have concluded that the trip was unwise to have undertaken.

Now we can see, in the light of after events, that that might perhaps have been foreseen. The police force that had been maintained under Estrada had been virtually liquidated, and we see now that the substitute police that had been created was inadequate and did not know how to cope with the type of organized rowdy mob such as the Communist agitators put on.

U.S. Policy of Noninterference

Q. On the subject of Latin America, it has been reported that Vice President Nixon feels strongly one of the chief shortcomings of our policy in Latin America is apparently our friendly support

¹ For background, see p. 950.

of dictator governments. First of all, do you agree with that assessment, and, secondly, is there anything we can do about that?

A. We try to conduct our relations with all the governments of the world on the basis of dealing with the government which is, in fact, in power, unless we have reasons, as we have in Communist China, for not recognizing it. (Laughter)

On the basis of noninterference with the internal affairs of countries and in the case of South America—Latin America—if we tried to deal with those governments on the basis of our appraisal as to whether they were a good government or a bad government, whether they were a dictatorial or not a dictatorial government, we would find ourselves, I am afraid, deeply enmeshed in their internal affairs.

As you know, one of the cardinal doctrines for this hemisphere, which is affirmed and reaffirmed on every occasion by the American Republics, is the doctrine of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Their economic and political interdependence with the United States is such that to a peculiar degree—a greater degree than probably any other area in the world—if we attempted to adjust our relations according to our appraisal of their government, we would become involved in their internal affairs.

I would like to point out there is no clearcut distinction. You can talk about dictators and nondictators, but it isn't quite as easy to classify on that basis. There are quasi-dictators and almost-dictators and "dictators of the proletariat" and all sorts of things in gradations. If you begin to grade and say, if it is a certain type of government, you give 100 percent support, and, if it is not quite as good by our standards, you give 90 percent, and, if it is less good, you give 70 percent support, that would get us involved in an intolerable situation.

It is obvious the American Government and the American nation and the American people like to see governments which rest upon the consent of the governed and where the governed are educated people able to carry the responsibilities of self-government. Wherever that exists, there almost automatically results a closer and more intimate friendly relationship than where that doesn't exist. But any formula whereby we try to apply a sort of slide rule to their governments would be, in fact, an interference in their internal affairs.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does that apply to Guatemala, and, for example, we are in a sense interfering in the Government of Lebanon in that we are supporting it. We do have a positive policy of helping governments that we like, wouldn't you say?

A. We respond to the requests of governments which are friendly more than we do to governments that are unfriendly. That is quite true. We take into account the friendliness of governments. But we do not take into account the question of the particular degree upon which they have our form of democracy. We deal with the Government of Yugoslavia and give it a considerable amount of assistance or aid. That doesn't mean that we are in favor of the internal type of government that they have in Yugoslavia.

Outlook for Summit Meeting

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the recent events, what is the outlook now for a summit meeting this summer or fall?

A. I think that it is more certain than ever before that there will be a summit meeting if—but will not be a summit meeting unless—it is demonstrable that such a meeting would, in fact, serve an important purpose not otherwise attainable. Now that was one of the important decisions that was taken by the NATO meeting at Copenhagen,² where they said that we recognize that a summit meeting is not the only way, and not necessarily the best way, to arrive at agreements. At first, you know, when the Soviets put forward this idea of a summit meeting, there was a sort of a psychological attraction to it, as if in some way, if you only met at the summit, everything would be readily solved. Well, that was always an illusion. I don't think it was ever an illusion that carried away the American people. But it was an illusion which took firmer hold on many of the peoples of Europe.

Now I think that the exchanges that have taken place between our governments, between the Soviet Government and the United States and other governments, which have tried to probe more deeply into the question, "If you have a summit meeting,

² For text of communique issued at the close of the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council, see BULLETIN of May 26, 1953, p. 850.

what are you going to do, what are you going to talk about, what are the prospects of getting somewhere?"—all of that has been a very educational process, and there is not the same sort of emotional fervor about the summit that there was.

Now that doesn't mean that there won't be a summit meeting. But it does mean it is going to be appraised calmly, quietly, on its merits. It does mean we are not going to be swept forward on an emotional wave.

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently there was a Soviet agreement to enter into technical discussions with the United States on problems involved in policing a nuclear-test suspension. When do you think those technical discussions might actually begin?

A. There are still quite a few problems to be resolved before they can begin. We were gratified that the Soviet Union accepted, even though in small part, President Eisenhower's proposal to get going on the basis of technical experts. But the question of where they shall meet, their terms of reference, and things of that sort are still to be resolved.

I would think it likely—I would hope at least—that the talks could get going within 3 or 4 weeks. We will, I think, unless there is some unforeseen obstacle, be making our reply, which will bring this matter down into very concrete terms, during the course of the current week.³ And unless, therefore, some new roadblocks are thrown in the way by the Soviet Union, it would only take the time that is required to make the physical preparations. You have to choose your people, you have to give them terms of reference, you have to find a place for them to function—matters of that sort have to be dealt with. But I would think that it would be a fair guess—as I say, unless unforeseen obstacles occurred—it could be done in 3 or 4 weeks.

The Middle East Resolution

Q. Mr. Secretary, during the earlier phases of the Lebanese crisis there seemed to be some non-understanding as to whether the Eisenhower doctrine applied in this case. However, it seems that later we came to feel that we liked Lebanon, although the Eisenhower doctrine probably did not specifically apply, and therefore would aid her if

requested. I wonder if you could clear up this confusion that some of us have, sir?

A. I suppose that by the Eisenhower doctrine you refer to the Middle East resolution that was adopted by the Congress.⁴ That resolution contains several provisions. It is not just one thing. It authorizes the United States to assist economically and militarily nations which want such assistance in order to preserve their independence. It says that the independence and integrity of these nations of the Middle East is vital to world peace and the national interest of the United States. It says that, if they are attacked from a country under the control of international communism, then the President is authorized, upon request, to send forces to resist that attack.

Now we do not consider under the present state of affairs that there is likely to be an attack, an armed attack, from a country which we would consider under the control of international communism. That doesn't mean, however, that there is nothing that can be done. There is the provision of the Middle East resolution which says that the independence of these countries is vital to peace and the national interest of the United States. That is certainly a mandate to do something if we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter.

There is the basic right, and almost duty, at the request or with the consent of a government, to assist in the protection of American life and property. There is the program of military assistance which we render to many countries, including Lebanon, in terms of giving them equipment and certain measures of military training and techniques and helping them train technicians to use this equipment. So that there are a number of areas of possible action if the situation calls for it.

I would say that we are not anxious to have a situation which would be in any sense a pretext for introducing American forces into the area. We hope and believe that that will not be called for, and the situation, to date, does not suggest that it would be called for.

The Situation in Indonesia

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Indonesian Government has suggested that, if you personally would make

³ For text, see p. 939.

⁴ BULLETIN of Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.

a strong statement about "outside"—as they call it—"intervention" in Indonesia's civil war, the situation would improve. There have also been reports that the Red Chinese would offer to send volunteers to Indonesia. Would you care to comment on the situation, sir?

A. I would say this: that the United States believes that the situation in Indonesia can be and should be dealt with as an Indonesian problem. The United States itself is a nation which has suffered civil war, and we have sympathy and regret when another country undergoes the losses in life and the economic dislocations that are incidental to civil war. But we do believe that the situation can be and should be dealt with as an Indonesian matter by the Indonesians without intrusion from without, and we do hope that there will be quickly restored peace and stability in the Indonesian Republic.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a good deal of differences over the estimates of intervention in the Lebanese crisis by the United Arab Republic. Would you give us your estimate of the amount of intervention by the U.A.R.?

A. The Government of Lebanon, which is the best judge of this matter, seems to feel, on the basis of what seems to us to be serious evidence, that there is such interference.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you indicated several weeks ago that a problem in the Government right now was the question of a unilateral suspension by the United States of nuclear testing and that this had not been quite resolved. I should like to ask you whether the possibility and hope of discussing with the Russians a supervised end of testing is having any effect on our consideration of a unilateral suspension?

A. That situation has not altered as far as our own governmental position is concerned from what it was at the earlier date that you allude to. I think, obviously, the results of the investigation by experts of what would be required, and whether that would be acceptable, would have some bearing on the question. But on the basic policy as to whether or not to suspend testing there has been no change in the Government's official position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to clear up one point on this Middle East doctrine or Middle

East policy you talked about a while ago. You said that there is a provision in the resolution which states that the independence of the countries of the Middle East is vital to security of the United States—the peace and security of the United States.

A. Yes. That's the so-called Mansfield amendment.

Q. Yes. Then you said that this surely is a mandate to do something if we think that the peace and security of those countries is threatened from any quarter. Does this represent a broadening by interpretation of the possibility of action to be taken under that resolution? The reason I ask is that I think most of us had always believed that the authority of the resolution applied almost exclusively to actions against international communism.

A. You recall that, as the resolution was sent up to the Congress by the President,⁶ there was not in the resolution the particular sentence to which I refer; that was introduced by the Congress itself. And I assume that the introduction of that resolution had a meaning and had a significance. You cannot, as a matter of legislative history, assume that, when you put a new sentence into a resolution, it is utterly meaningless. We assume that the Congress does not do things that are utterly meaningless. (Laughter)

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke—

A. Excuse me, this gentleman—

Importance of U.S.—Latin American Relations

Q. Sir, it has been said that our relations with Latin America have been in the category of "always important" and that now since the Nixon incident it has assumed a proportion of "top priority," and I wondered if you would care to spell out any difference in the two categories, if there is such a category?

A. I am not aware of having said what you attribute to me.

Q. No, sir, I didn't attribute it to you—but it has been said that that—

⁶ For text of proposed resolution, see *ibid.*, Jan. 28, 1957, p. 128.

A. I would like to say this: that relations with Latin America have never been in any subordinated category. In many respects we have given them primary importance, particularly over recent years. Now let me give you some examples, first pointing out that the fact that the Organization of American States is centered here in Washington and the cooperation of American states is centered here in Washington means that, when you deal with those problems, it doesn't attract the same attention that it does if I travel to Ankara to a meeting of the Baghdad Pact, or I travel to Copenhagen for a meeting of the NATO, or if I travel to Manila for a meeting of SEATO. These things are done less conspicuously because they are done mostly in Washington. But the fact that they are done in Washington does not mean that they are not done or that they do not have significance.

Now we have developed within that group of American Republics a system of meeting together to discuss the problems of the Americas and of the world which has no parallel anywhere else. Going back now for several years we meet here on fairly frequent occasions—I would say more frequently than do the ministers and ambassadors of most other organizations—to discuss problems of common concern. I have been having these meetings up in my office here. The President has had one or two such meetings at the White House. I remember I had a similar meeting out at San Francisco in 1955 at the time of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. Also we have meetings here at the office of the Organization of American States, where I went down and spoke a few weeks ago.* I suppose we devote as much time and thought to the problems of the Americas as we do to the problems of any other region in the world. I say it is less conspicuous because it is done quietly here in Washington and does not entail arrival statements and departure statements and all the business that goes with these trips. But there has never been a downgrading.

Now there is another point that I want to make, which is the fact that our relations with the American Republics are more on a basis of private activity and relatively less on a basis of govern-

mental activity than with certain other areas of the world. There is a tremendous private trade.

Now when the Soviets talk about "aid," they include trade. If we included trade, the figures would be massive. There is more private trade between the United States and Latin America than between any of the other—more than Canada and more than any other country in the world, if you lump the Latin American countries together.

There is a big flow of private American capital that goes to these countries, and there are very large loans by the Export-Import Bank. So that the activities in relation to Latin America are not all reflected by activities that take place here in the Department of State. It is a very good thing that that is the case. It is abnormal, under our form of society, to have to deal with other countries through these special grant-aid, Government-sponsored projects, and so forth. It is a healthy thing, and good for both of us, that so much can be done in this other way. But when you are thinking about what is done, the level of interest and concern, don't write off the tremendous volume of private trade, the tremendous volume of private capital, and the loaning facilities of the Export-Import Bank. If you take all those things into account, you will see that the interest and concern of the United States with Latin America is very great indeed.

Protection of U.S. Nationals in Lebanon

Q. What plans do you have to protect our nationals in Lebanon if it should develop that the present government cannot give them adequate protection? And would these plans in any way be affected by present Soviet threats against any outside interference in the Middle East area?

A. I'll answer your last question first. We are not deterred anywhere in the world from doing what we think is right and our duty, by any Soviet threats. Now what we would do if American life and property was endangered would depend, of course, in the first instance upon what we were requested to do by the Government of Lebanon. We do not introduce American forces into foreign countries except on the invitation of the lawful government of the state concerned. As I indicated earlier, we do not—while we are

*For text of Secretary Dulles' address on Pan American Day, see *ibid.*, May 5, 1958, p. 715.

making preparations, as we always make preparations, against contingencies however remote—we do not have any present reason to anticipate there will be the need for that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the last part of our 1950 Tripartite Declaration on the Middle East¹ also mentions the independence and territorial integrity of the nations of the area. Do you regard that as applicable also as part of the Eisenhower doctrine?

A. We do regard it as applicable. We don't regard it as powerful, you might say, as the phrase in the Middle East resolution that I referred to, because that Tripartite Declaration has never had specific congressional approval. We have always considered that whether action under that, or another declaration that President Eisenhower made, I think, in '56,² dealing with these problems, that the constitutional power of the President to act under those was not as great as though they had received express congressional approval. The Middle East resolution has received congressional approval, and therefore we consider that it is a stronger mandate and it gives the President a greater authority than if it would purely have been a declaration by the President himself.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Italian Government is supposed to ask for a seat in the United Nations Security Council. In view of this, do you have any comment on it by the American Government?

A. I would say this: The Italian Government has come to play a very important and very constructive role in world affairs. Its counsel, for example, in NATO is wise counsel, which is heeded by the other members of NATO. It has important positions strategically because of its location in the Mediterranean area, and, by every test that I can think of, Italy is well qualified to be a member of the Security Council.

Now you know that the policy of the United States is not to commit itself in advance as to just how it will vote in elections. But I do want to say that there is no reservation on the part of the United States as to the high measure of quali-

fication which Italy has for membership in the Security Council.

Q. You spoke about what the Government of Lebanon considers serious evidence that there has been interference by the U.A.R. And yet there has been no appeal at this time, sir, to the Security Council. Could you tell us whether, in view of this outside interference, we are suggesting to the Government of the United Arab Republic that it should stop this outside interference?

A. My impression is that the United States considers that it is up to the Government of Lebanon to try to get the U.A.R. to stop. And while the Government of Lebanon has talked with us about the matter and about possible action in the United Nations, it has made no decision on that point as yet.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you speak about this interference as perhaps coming from the U.A.R., do you mean to absolve the Communists from any complicity in this affair at all?

A. No, I wouldn't want to do that. (Laughter)

Communist China's Trade Relations With Japan

Q. Mr. Secretary, Japan is having an election within a few days. Would you discuss the implications of Communist China's cancellation of all its trade relations with Japan and also our reciprocal trade bill, which is hanging fire at the moment?

A. I'd comment on your first question as follows: The Communists have never made any secret of the fact that their trade and economic policies are motivated primarily by political considerations. Mr. Khrushchev said to a group of American Congressmen in Moscow not long ago—he said, "Trade with us is primarily political, not economic." That is always the case. And I think what has happened here in the case of Japan has been a rather dramatic demonstration of the fact that, unless through a trade arrangement they could gain what they considered to be important political advantages, they were not interested in the trade.

Now you asked me also about the status of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

Q. Yes, sir.

¹ For text, see *ibid.*, June 15, 1953, p. S34, footnote 2.

² For a White House statement of Apr. 9, 1956, see *ibid.*, Apr. 23, 1956, p. 668.

A. Well, that is under very active consideration by the Congress at the present time, and the bill is, I think, in the process of being marked up. We hope it will come out in a form which is acceptable and which will continue the tradition—I would say the very great tradition—which is embodied in this legislation since it was first adopted nearly 25 years ago. That stands, as I have often said, as a symbol in the free world, and to haul down that symbol at the present time would be a great disaster.

President Nasser's Visit to Russia

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could evaluate for us the visit of President Nasser to Russia, particularly the statement of Mr. Khrushchev that he would support President Nasser in his ambitions to unite the Arabs. I wonder if you could tell us what you think that means for us in the future and if it would change our attitude toward Mr. Nasser.

A. Possibly I have said that the official communiques after these visits are somewhat like an iceberg—about one-eighth is above the surface and seven-eighths is below. Now I can't evaluate what took place without knowing more than I now know about the seven-eighths which is below the surface—whether what you refer to was just a point of view expressed to please President Nasser or whether there was a real purpose behind it. Without being able to evaluate what really went on behind the scenes, I would not want to attempt to evaluate what was allowed to appear.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in order to prevent any misinterpretation I'm wondering if you could tell us whether it is now your position that the Mansfield amendment to the Mid-East resolution gives the administration clear authority to go to the defense of an independent government in the Middle East without further recourse to the Congress. And, by going to the defense, I mean the actual use of troops.

A. I would not want to give a categorical yes-or-no answer to that particular question. All I say is that, when the Congress by an overwhelming votes declares that the independence and integrity of a certain country is vital to the peace and national interest of the United States, that

is certainly a meaningful declaration and it places upon the President a greater responsibility to protect, in that area, the peace and interests of the United States than would have been the case had there not been such a declaration. Now when you come to apply that to a given state of facts, which is at the moment hypothetical, I would not want to commit myself. We hope and believe that the circumstances will not become such as to make it necessary to do so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on Mr. [John] Scal's [of the Associated Press] question, since you do not absolve the Communists from their responsibility in agitating in Lebanon and since you have indicated earlier that the United Arab Republic may also be responsible for some of Lebanon's troubles, would you consider that perhaps these two elements are joined in the present disorders in Lebanon?

A. It might very well be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you personally favor the restrictions that have been put on the collecting of news in the Department?

A. Now you're getting out of my depth a bit. I'm not familiar with what took place in this respect. My understanding is that there has always been a standing rule in the State Department that officers who had conversations with other persons were supposed to make a memorandum of conversation, and that is a rule which I myself try scrupulously to comply with. And my understanding is that there has been a tendency to breach that rule and what has been sought is to bring the practice back into conformity with what has been for 10, 20, 30 years a standing rule of the Department.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does a State Department officer have to be with the reporters when they are seeking news from the middle level?

A. Well, those are our State Department officers, aren't they?

Q. No, I mean a press officer.

A. I just don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been suggested that maybe some of the problems of the United States arise from the fact that you are overburdened. I'd like to read a comment by a very prominent

commentator in this morning's paper saying that "Mr. Dulles has more problems to decide than any man can possibly attend to and know about and master." Would you care to give us your reaction to that? (Laughter)

A. Well, I'm afraid my reaction might be prejudiced. (Laughter) I think only you, and ultimately history, can give the answer to that question.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Vice President Nixon Returns From South American Tour

Following is the text of remarks made by President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon at the airport at Washington, D.C., on May 15 (White House press release).

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

Mr. Vice President, Mrs. Nixon, and our friends: Some weeks ago I asked the Vice President and Mrs. Nixon to go to Argentina to represent me and the Government at the inauguration of their new President. And thereafter he visited seven other countries in Latin America in order to discuss with the leaders some of our common problems and to help in reaching a better understanding of those problems so that our friendships would be solidified—made stronger.¹

Through this entire trip he has conducted himself effectively, efficiently, and with great dignity and has performed to the satisfaction, not only of us, but of our sister countries that he was sent to.

There have been, during the course of this trip, some unpleasant incidents. Some of them came to

¹The Vice President and Mrs. Nixon, accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Samuel C. Waugh, president of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, Maurice Bernbaum, director of the Office of South American Affairs, Department of State (trip manager), and members of the Vice President's staff, left Washington on April 27, visited Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela, and returned to Washington on May 15. During the visits at Lima, Peru, and Caracas, Venezuela, the Vice President and some members of his party were the object of hostile public demonstrations.

the point that there was danger—not only to the Vice President but to Mrs. Nixon—real danger and risk of harm and even worse.

Now I want to make one thing clear: The occurrence of these incidents has in no way impaired the friendship—the traditional friendship—between the United States and any other single one of our sister republics to the south. There could be no more dramatic proof this morning of the truth of this statement than the presence here in this crowd of the ambassadors of our sister republics in the south who have been among the most enthusiastic welcomers of our Vice President and his wife.

And so I repeat America's affection for the people of those countries. The governmental relationships between them are as close as ever. And more than this, as one Latin American ambassador said to me this morning, "Really, our whole situation—our situation of cooperation and brotherhood among ourselves—is strengthened because of the fact that we stand together in condemning any kind of Communist leadership of such incidents as endangered our beloved Vice President and his wife."

All America welcomes them home. And in doing so—through its welcome—it means to say to all of our friends and other nations to the south, we send you our warm greetings and hope that some of you will come back to pay to us the call that the Nixons have paid upon you.

REMARKS BY VICE PRESIDENT NIXON

Mr. President and our friends who have so honored us by coming to the airport in such great numbers today: There is very little that I can add to what the President has said so eloquently just now.

As you know, we left the United States 18 days ago on a trip which was to take us to eight countries in South America, none of which we had visited before. And may I say that on all the trips that Pat and I have taken around the world we have been tremendously proud to represent the President of the United States—to represent the people of the United States—in what we believe are the real motives of our people in the whole area of foreign policy and our relations with other countries. And we were proud to do so on this trip.

There were occasions, as the President said, when some incidents occurred. (And I remember, before I left, one of my good friends said, "Well, you are very fortunate to get away from the Senate for a nice vacation for 18 days.") But may I say that, as the President just emphasized, while there were incidents—incidents in which a very small, violent, vocal minority were able to enlist the support of some innocent people who were misled as to what the United States' intentions really were—I can tell you, from my observations in each one of the countries we visited, that the great majority of the people—the great majority in all walks of life—are friendly to the United States today. And this is true of every one of the countries.

Now, this doesn't mean that all the people of these countries agree with all the policies of the United States because I can assure you that in country after country, in the great universities, and in conversations with government leaders and labor leaders, I found that there were many areas where people disagreed with what we were doing. And it was my purpose to try to explain to them what our policies were—to try to get away from some of the misapprehensions which existed. Sometimes we were able to do so—sometimes we succeeded, and perhaps sometimes we did not. But may I say in that connection that, as far as this part of the world is concerned, first, there is no area of the world with which we are more closely associated—there is no area of the world which is more important as far as the United States is concerned—than these, our closest neighbors in the American hemisphere. And may I say also that we can be tremendously proud of the fact that they have supported us as partners and friends in the United Nations in vote after vote, as well as in other areas.

Before I left, I said that one rule we must never forget in international relations, as well as in political and business affairs, is that we must never take our friends for granted. We do not take our friends for granted in Latin America. We don't think that we ever have, but some of them may have gotten the impression that we did. And may I say, in that connection, that what we must get across there, as well as in other parts of the world, is this very simple message: that we, the Government and people of the United States, want for other peoples just what we have for

Venezuelan Note on Caracas Incidents¹

Unofficial translation

EMBASSY OF VENEZUELA
Washington, D. C.

MAY 13, 1958

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to address Your Excellency, in accordance with instructions from my Government, in order to inform you that the Government of Venezuela has taken all the measures necessary for guaranteeing the personal safety of His Excellency Vice President Richard M. Nixon, his wife, and the members of his entourage, and for avoiding repetition of the lamentable occurrences which took place this morning in Caracas and for which I present to the Government of Your Excellency in the name of the Government of Venezuela the most sincere apologies.

I take advantage of this occasion to reiterate to Your Excellency expressions of my highest consideration and respect.

EDUARDO A. ACOSTA H.
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

To His Excellency

JOHN FOSTER DULLES
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

¹Delivered at Washington at 10:15 a. m. on May 14 (press release 264).

ourselves—*independence for our country, freedom for our people, and the greatest possibilities for economic progress that can be devised.*

In Latin America we have an area which is in a sense in a state of evolution, and as far as the people there are concerned, they are concerned, as they should be, about poverty and misery and disease which exists in so many places. They are determined to do something about it. They are moving toward democracy and freedom—sometimes slowly, but no question surely. They are moving toward economic progress. And the United States is, and should be, proud to work with them as partners in moving toward democracy—toward freedom—and in helping them and working with them for economic progress.

As the President has said, and as I repeated over and over again in every country, at every university that I met with, the only war the people of the United States want to wage is a war against poverty, misery, and disease, wherever it exists in the world.

And now this is not the time, of course, to report on observations and conclusions. I shall have

the opportunity to meet with the President and the Secretary of State and others in government at a later time to go into specific matters. But may I say a personal word at this time to those of you who have come here: We have taken many trips over the past 5 years—I think over 40 countries, perhaps 45—but I can tell you that certainly nothing could be more heartwarming than to see this crowd today—the ambassadors who represent the countries that we visited, and others as well, the Members of the Cabinet, and people in the Government, our colleagues in the House and the Senate, and, as well, this wonderful group of students from the universities and colleges in this area.

And may I say that we are always very proud to represent the United States, but I don't think that either of us has ever been as moved as we are at this time, returning as we do.

I remember yesterday, late in the evening, as we drove through the streets of San Juan, Puerto Rico, with Governor Muñoz Marín, that our car was stopped on a couple of occasions by the crowds in the streets. I remember that men and women put their hands to the windows of the car.

Review of Recent Anti-American Demonstrations

Statement by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy¹

In accordance with your invitation of May 16 I am appearing in behalf of the Department of State to discuss with the committee in executive session the recent incidents in Lebanon, South America, and elsewhere. I would say first that the Department is grateful to the committee for this opportunity both to provide whatever information it can and especially to have the benefit of the committee's wisdom in matters which are of pressing importance to our country. It is my purpose to reply frankly to any questions about which information is immediately available to me. Where I do not have it, effort will be made to supply it promptly.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 19 and released by the committee.

We finally got out and walked with them, and this is what they said: "Welcome home, Mr. Vice President—or Mr. Nixon—or Mrs. Nixon—God bless the United States."

May I say that we have enjoyed our visits to other countries. It has been a great experience, but certainly there is no greater experience than to return home to see our friends, our family, and to realize how blessed this country is—blessed with freedom, blessed with economic opportunity, blessed with stability in its government, and with fine leadership, whether that leadership is furnished by one of our great parties or by the other. So with that, may I say again, Mr. President, how deeply we have been moved by this reception, by your coming as you have to the airport.

I don't know how adequately to express our thanks. We would like to have the time to shake hands and to add a few thousand to those that we have met in other parts of the world, but that is not possible today.

May I just say, thank you again—and never forget what a great privilege it is to be an American citizen and to live in the United States.

We all share, I believe, your distress over the indignities suffered by the Vice President of the United States in Peru and Venezuela during the course of his recent tour of eight South American countries. As you know, his tour was incident to the Vice President's attendance at the inauguration of President Frondizi of our sister Republic of the Argentine at Buenos Aires.

It should be said that the purpose of the Vice President's tour was to promote better understanding and good will between this country and our southern neighbors. They had been kind enough to extend invitations, in most instances quite insistent invitations. The Vice President's acceptance was in accordance with practice of long standing to exchange visits of prominent

personalities between our countries. It reflected among other things a desire to demonstrate the importance and value this country attaches to close and friendly relations with our sister republics to the south. It was based on an awareness of the importance of firsthand exchanges of views with government officials and other opinion leaders. The Vice President, with tireless energy, successfully made similar trips to Southeast Asia and to Africa and Central America. These trips have gained political advantages of considerable importance to us.

In discussing this subject perhaps you will agree that we should examine the manner in which it fits into the general pattern of world affairs. At present our country is involved in a highly competitive situation. There continues a worldwide wave of nationalism. This has found expression in the creation since the war of some 20 new nations. In other areas additional countries are in the formative stage. In still other areas the old order is in process of change. This fermentation often provokes conflicts and offers opportunity both for constructive effort as well as exploitation by political opportunists. There is evident a worldwide ground swell of desire for a better life. This often generates intense resentments, envy, and even hatreds. There is the inevitable distrust by the have-nots of those who have. There is also the implacable crusade of the ideologists intent on destroying the capitalist system of free enterprise and individual democratic liberties. They are determined to replace it by applying the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the promotion of the totalitarian state. The Soviet Union not without success blends this effort of international communism with skillful promotion of old-fashioned Russian expansionism.

Communist Efforts To Foster Anti-Americanism

The Soviet regime and the world Communist movement since their inception have constantly sought to exploit—in Marxist language—“contradictions” or differences both between “leading imperialist powers” and between “imperialist” and “colonial” or underdeveloped countries. The dominant theme in these provocative efforts since World War II has been anti-Americanism.

Under the leadership of the Soviet Union the world Communist movement has made energetic efforts to organize and exploit hostile sentiments

toward the United States. American “ruling circles” are depicted in Communist propaganda as the dominant imperialist force in the world, everywhere seeking to oppress smaller nations and to undermine the influence of other “imperialist” countries—notably France and the Netherlands, but also including the United Kingdom—in order to extend the domination of American capital. The anti-American orientation of the world Communist movement was clearly evidenced in the November 1957 Moscow “Declaration” of 12 Communist parties and “Peace Manifesto” signed by 65 Communist parties, which singled out the United States as the main threat to “peace” and called for united action to fight for “peace,” i.e., the interests of the Soviet bloc.

The Soviet Government itself has directly used its propaganda and diplomatic apparatus to foster anti-American sentiments. In areas such as Latin America, where the United States represents the leading outside influence, Soviet efforts have long concentrated on channeling local resentments into resentment against the United States. In South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, where other Western countries are prominently involved, the Soviet line has been that the United States is the principal enemy of the local countries, sometimes using other Western powers as its “tools” but always seeking to supplant their positions. Similarly, the Soviet Government has persistently sought to turn French, British, or Italian opinion, as the case may be, against the United States.

In regard to recent manifestations of anti-American sentiments in South America, Algeria, Lebanon, Indonesia, and Burma, the anti-American content in Soviet propaganda directed at these areas has been at a high level for a considerable period of time. There was no marked step-up in Moscow’s propaganda immediately prior to the events in these areas, either in the degree of attention to the United States or in the violence of its charges, although in several cases Soviet propaganda media have sought to exploit these events after they occurred to the discredit of the United States.

There is no evidence at present of a Soviet effort to effect a coordinated worldwide demonstration of anti-Americanism coinciding with Vice President Nixon’s visit to Latin America. While there is evidence of direct Communist complicity in several of the recent anti-American incidents—in

South America, Indonesia, and Burma—the circumstances leading up to these incidents occurred more or less independently of Moscow's will. Thus the coincidence of these outbreaks, so far as their timing is concerned, would seem to be largely accidental. However, all of the recent incidents are related in that there has been a conscious, continuous effort by the Soviet Union to exploit and exacerbate potential or actual misunderstandings in these areas about the United States. These incidents, particularly those in which there was direct Communist involvement, demonstrate the scope and intensity of Soviet long-term efforts to discredit the United States.

Security Measures

Those of you who personally have had experience with mob action and group violence need no reminder that the element of surprise frequently plays an important role. Not so long ago in our own Capital of Washington we witnessed a savage attempt on the life of our President then in residence at Blair House. We also shared the indignation of the Congress over the dastardly shooting in the House of Representatives of several of its distinguished Members. We were aware of the possibility of such dangers. Our security measures were believed adequate. Yet even in our solidly established system grave incidents like those were possible. How much more so is it true in those countries where freshly established governments have not had time or others have been unable for various reasons to develop adequate security organizations. The recent deplorable assassination of the President of our sister Republic of Guatemala is a tragic case in point.

South America

Problems and issues in Latin America were known, and the Vice President was briefed on them. There was nothing in the past history of U.S.-Latin American relations to indicate the possibility of substantial violence against our representatives. In addition, innate Latin American courtesy and their respect for the guest relationship of persons coming to their homes or country were taken into consideration. After Lima and the embarrassment which the incidents there had caused to both the Government and most Per-

vians, it was felt that the governments and public opinion in the remaining countries would do their utmost to prevent similar embarrassments. As the tour progressed, and particularly after Peru, the increasing amount of Communist-inspired and directed tactics was known and reported and the increasing possibility of trouble in Venezuela was understood. It was also understood by the governments concerned.

Prior to Lima it was not even deemed necessary to seek any specific assurances of adequate security. After Lima the assurances given by the Ecuadoran, Colombian, and Venezuelan Governments appeared adequate, as they proved to be in Ecuador and Colombia. It seems evident that the trouble in Caracas was caused by the intensive exploitation by Communist and other anti-American elements of grievances against our policies and the failure to take adequate measures to prevent demonstrations and activities of which the Government was fully forewarned by its own security people and by reports from our embassies and investigative agencies.

I think it is important to emphasize that, while there has been a known resentment in Latin America over certain issues and protests concerning them could be expected, this is the first time that minority groups have been able to exploit these issues to incite actual violence against an important American representative. This is something new in Latin America, and therefore it was not expected.

There is considerable evidence that the demonstrations in the various countries visited by the Vice President followed a pattern and were Communist inspired and staged. Slogans on the banners carried by students and others were similar. "Little Rock," "Guatemala," "Yankee Imperialism," "Wall Street Agents," "McCarthyism," "Colonialism," "Nixon Go Home" were among those repeated. The tactics were much the same, with young students urged on by older persons leading the activities. Intelligence reports from Latin American capitals also support the conclusion of a leading Communist role in the demonstrations.

There is no indication of unusual efforts by Radio Moscow to step up its exploitation of anti-American sentiments immediately prior to or during the Vice President's trip. Although Soviet commentaries carried the normal type of anti-

American statements and Soviet-bloc propaganda output to Latin America increased somewhat—a normal occurrence during any major event—the demonstrations and scattered violence were not excessively stressed during Mr. Nixon's trip. Moscow Radio warned its Latin audiences of the "exploitative" motives of the Vice President's trip, designed to counter the "discontent over U.S. policies." The majority of the commentaries relied to a great extent on quotations from American newspapers and stressed that even the U.S. press "has been forced to admit" that the anti-U.S. demonstrations are not the intrigues of Communists but the result of U.S. "discriminatory" economic policy toward Latin America. Without attacking the Vice President personally, the Moscow propaganda machine asserted that "Nixon's fiasco was actually the fiasco of U.S. policy toward Latin America."

On May 15, according to FBIS [Foreign Broadcasting Information Service], Radio Moscow began in earnest to exploit the anti-American incidents during the Nixon tour. However, Radio Moscow directed no commentaries at Latin American audiences, the target of most of Moscow's comments prior to the Caracas events. In these latest efforts Moscow is attempting to exploit the incidents to foster anti-Americanism in other areas of the world.

Uruguay

We knew, took into account, and reported to the Vice President before his departure the following matters: information concerning Uruguayan resentment of U.S. economic policies, particularly the countervailing duty on wool tops; the fact that the Soviet-bloc diplomatic missions in Uruguay have been active in many sectors of Uruguay; the fact that recent approaches have been made to Uruguay by the Soviets for increased economic intercourse; and finally that there was a possibility of student antipathy or even anti-U.S. demonstrations at the university.

There was no indication that violence would ensue, and there was none. The Vice President was able by debating with the students to win them over, and his visit to the university ended with a resounding ovation and acclaim for his forthrightness in standing up to the students in friendly discussion.

Argentina

The political situation in Argentina and the circumstances surrounding the Frondizi government were explained in briefings to the Vice President. The delicate political situation caused by the coming into power of a new government, the activities outside of Argentina by Peron, and the fact that the Communist Party in Argentina had become the largest in the hemisphere were all included in the briefings and fully discussed. There were rumors that pro-Peron or other groups might stage demonstrations in opposition to the Vice President. The economic difficulties facing President Frondizi, the difficulties with economic problems which might involve the United States, were discussed before the Vice President left and were discussed by him with Argentine leaders in that country.

There was no indication that any violence could be expected, nor did any occur. On the contrary, the reception accorded to the Vice President in Argentina was extremely friendly.

The minor incidents in connection with the late arrival at the swearing-in ceremonies of President Frondizi, in which there were scattered boos for Mr. Nixon, were highlighted in the United States press but were given little importance in Buenos Aires.

Paraguay

Vice President Nixon was aware that in Paraguay there might be some attempt at demonstrations—or in other countries—on the question of a visit to the present Paraguayan Government. Recent attempts by opposition groups to overthrow the Stroessner regime had been the subject of intelligence and embassy reports several weeks before the Vice President departed. These facts were included in briefings, as were matters regarding anti-Paraguayan acts involving the provisional government of Argentina which was in power prior to Frondizi's inauguration. The warm reception given to the Vice President in Paraguay was anticipated, and there were no untoward incidents to mar the visit.

Bolivia

The tense political situation which has existed in Bolivia in recent months and which broke out into disturbances in the mining areas in March,

involving mainly the two factions of the governing MNR [Nationalist Revolutionary Movement] Party, were also included in briefings of the Vice President. Bolivia's difficult economic situation, the part which the United States is playing in helping to solve Bolivia's problems, the difficulties involving the mine owners of the expropriated mines (including U.S. owners) and the Bolivian Government, were well known. The existence of Communist and Trotskyite groups in Bolivia and the dangers which the Vice President's party might possibly encounter in passing through the narrow streets of La Paz were explained in briefings with the Vice President and to the Secret Service. The potential of Communists to incite anti-U.S. actions in Bolivia was considered but not deemed sufficiently strong to cause any change in plans.

There was no violence in Bolivia, and the hostile demonstrations were negligible. The fact that there was no violence there was a factor in considerations concerning the rest of the tour.

Peru

Dissatisfaction in Peru over the U.S. restrictions and tariffs on certain basic agricultural commodities exported by Peru is of long standing. More recently, threatened restrictions on lead, zinc, and copper had led to bitter criticism. This was further inflamed by the report of the United States Tariff Commission on lead and zinc. Recent strikes, demonstrations, and lawless acts in various parts of Peru, for which the Communists were in a large measure responsible, had been reported by embassy and intelligence sources and were part of briefings held on Peru. The fact that there had been increased lawlessness within Peru in recent months was also known and considered. The status of the University of San Marcos as an autonomous university, proud of its independence and heritage, was also known. There was, however, nothing in intelligence reports to indicate the real possibility of violence in Peru. Demonstrations were considered possible. The fact that anti-U.S. demonstrations of the nature which occurred have not heretofore been known in Lima and the historic ability of the Peruvian Government to contend with lawlessness were important factors taken into consideration in making decisions on the visit to

Peru. Peru's record of close association and ties with the United States is historical.

At the time of the Peruvian visit, mounting evidence of the possibility of student demonstrations was known.

The anti-U.S. demonstrations were the result of a small minority, estimated between 30 and 40 persons, obviously Communist led and inspired. They did not represent the attitude of Peruvians, much less that of the Peruvian Government. The demonstrations seemed to snowball once they were incited, and there is no evidence that large mass demonstrations were planned.

Ecuador

Intelligence reports received prior to the arrival of the Vice President in Ecuador showed that the Communists had undertaken considerable planning and as of May 9 their activities had been limited to fly sheets and wall paintings. It had been expected that anti-Nixon demonstrations might include throwing of water and fruit. Elaborate plans to embarrass the Vice President during his visit to the Central University failed to materialize because the visit was canceled.

Other Communist plans in Ecuador by students were said to include:

1. Presentation of what would appear to be an honorary diploma but actually would portray imperialist domination of Ecuador.
2. A receiving line to turn its back on Mr. Nixon upon his arrival.
3. A Communist student leader to read a list of United States acts of intervention in Latin America during the past 50 years.
4. Students to walk out on Mr. Nixon if there had been any attempt to quiet Communist speakers.

Intelligence reports indicated that other plans, which did not materialize because of the Ecuadoran Government's excellent security efforts and apparent poor Communist organization, included shouting squads along Mr. Nixon's travel route, throwing of water and rotten fruit, and display of derisive signs. Pedro Saad, Secretary General of the Communist Party in Ecuador, ordered no violence, according to reports, but he hoped a riot would occur at the football game.

Mr. Nixon's planned meeting with Communist and other labor leaders was canceled. This can-

cellation was due in part to the Embassy's decision that such a meeting would not be productive and might give Communist leaders a propaganda weapon. Communist plans to challenge Mr. Nixon to meet labor leaders publicly in Communist-controlled quarters did not materialize.

Two important factors in the failure of any demonstrations in Ecuador are believed to be the excellent security measures adopted by the Ecuadoran Government and the fact that Ecuadorans made an attempt to counteract the incidents in Peru. In any event, the reception in Ecuador was cordial.

Colombia

During the past 10 years Colombia has been the scene of much violence, including the famed *Bogotazo* of 1948. Deaths are reported to have totaled some 200,000 in Colombia during this period, due to guerrilla activities and other political violence. The political situation in Bogotá prior to the start of Vice President Nixon's tour was a confused one. Elections were scheduled for May 4, but no candidate had been chosen one week before the elections. The nomination by both the Conservative and Liberal Parties of Dr. Alberto Lleras Camargo produced a profound effect and gave civilian groups high hopes for political stability. Lleras' nomination, however, evoked a reaction in certain circles. During the last days of April General Rojas Pinilla moved to the Caribbean from Europe, and there was an attempted coup by sympathizers of Rojas on May 2. Details of this attempt were reported to the Vice President in Buenos Aires and elsewhere en route, and the political implications and chances of political turmoil in Colombia were fully explained.

A rumor that an attempt might be made to assassinate the Vice President was reported to Embassy Bogotá prior to the Vice President's arrival. Rumors of possible student and Communist demonstrations were also reported. A detailed report dated May 10 from reliable sources concerning Communist and Communist-front groups' attempts to organize student demonstrations was recorded and the Vice President's party informed. This report included plans to distribute leaflets; plans to demonstrate at wreath-laying ceremonies; alleged plans to throw tomatoes, eggs, etc., and to "duplicate the Lima stu-

dent incident." There were meetings of Communists to arrange for these demonstrations, and there was some talk of having weapons and a possible assassination attempt. This information was relayed to the Nixon party. It was stated that Communists would play an insignificant part and that the greatest danger came from the followers of ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla in order to discredit the present Government. The assassination talk was assessed as being largely bravado. It was concluded that it was not probable that serious incidents would occur because the Colombian Government was aware of the possible dangers and was well prepared to meet any trouble.

The reports in Colombia centered largely on Colombia's own political turbulence and on rumors which arose following the incidents in Lima. The failure of an attempted coup on May 2 and the subsequent election of President Lleras Camargo on May 4, as scheduled, helped dissipate concern over any serious trouble in Colombia. None occurred. Consideration nevertheless was given to the cumulative chain reaction which seemed to be building up as the tour progressed. This fact was assessed, along with the assurances given by the Colombian authorities. It was decided that there was a possibility of demonstrations but that the Colombian authorities were prepared to keep them under control. The few minor demonstrations were completely overshadowed by the friendly reception accorded the Vice President. This reception was particularly warm and friendly in the workers' and poorer districts, where some thought trouble might have been anticipated.

Venezuela

From the very start it had been anticipated that there might be more danger of disturbances in Venezuela than in any other place. This was made known to the Secret Service officers accompanying the Vice President prior to the party's departure from the U.S., and it was also made known to the Vice President. The unsettled political situation in Venezuela which has existed since the overthrow of the Perez Jiménez regime in January had been the subject of many reports. The rapid return of the Communists to Venezuela from exile and their intense activity in labor, student, and other civilian sectors following the over-

throw of Perez Jiménez were reported and considered in planning the visit. In February a report was received from non-Communist labor leaders that the Communists were back in force in Venezuela and working very assiduously in the labor field. The prominent role played by Communists in organizing opposition to the Perez Jiménez regime and the Communists' efforts to discredit the United States were well known. The many facets of Venezuelan political difficulties, including the delicate balance between the civilian and military power in Venezuela, were also known.

The Venezuelan criticism of U.S. voluntary restrictions on petroleum imports, the inflammability of this issue in Venezuela, the protest by many Venezuelans and particularly leftist groups against the issuance by the United States of visas to ex-President Perez Jiménez and his security chief, Pedro Estrada, were reported to the Nixon party both before and during the trip. The agitation of university students on the visa issue, as well as their criticism of the United States for allegedly supporting the Batista regime in Cuba, were also fully reported and taken into consideration in deciding on the visit to Venezuela and the question of a visit to the university.

On April 22, prior to the departure of the Vice President, a report was received that there might be demonstrations at the University of Caracas.

As Vice President Nixon's tour progressed, and particularly after the events in Lima, increased reports concerning the possibility of serious disturbances at the university in Caracas fomented by the Communists were received. The Embassy consulted with the Venezuelan Government Junta, and the Junta recommended that the Vice President cancel his proposed visit to the university. The Vice President agreed to do this and requested that the Venezuelan Government make public the fact that disturbances might be anticipated.

A report that rumors were being received of a possible assassination attempt at Caracas against the Vice President was sent ahead to the Nixon party by telegram on May 9.

By May 11 rather complete reports concerning preparations being made by students and others in Venezuela for anti-U.S. demonstrations were being received and forwarded on a regular basis to the Nixon party and, through the Embassy, to

the Venezuelan Government. Details of these preparations and renewed recommendations that the Vice President not visit the University of Caracas were accompanied by assurances from the Venezuelan Government that it was aware of these plans and was prepared to accord full protection.

On May 13 a report was received that the Minister of Education had received assurances from all political parties, including the Communists, that they would avoid acts of violence during the Vice President's visit to Caracas.

Three reports of possible assassination attempts were forwarded to the Vice President, and the matter was made public by the Secret Service on the eve of the Vice President's departure from Colombia for Caracas.

On May 10 an intelligence report commented that it believed the student manifestations would be limited to a strong verbal harassment without resort to physical violence but that this could not be guaranteed. In a telephone conversation with the Department on May 13, Ambassador Sparks reported that the university visit had been canceled and that, while difficulties in Caracas might be anticipated, the Government was taking security measures.

In view of the total of the foregoing information, it was recognized that demonstrations might occur in Venezuela. The cumulative effect of the demonstrations in Lima among the students was discussed and considered in planning for the visit to Caracas. It was also considered that the events in Lima might cause the Venezuelan Government to take more precautions in order to avoid similar demonstrations. On the basis of assurances by the Venezuelan Government of its security measures, violence in Caracas was not anticipated. The intensity of the demonstrations which followed and the failure of the Venezuelan security forces to act effectively were not foreseen.

Lebanon

We do not believe that the subversive activities now going on in Lebanon in an effort to overthrow the regime of President Chamoun and the destruction of the USIS library in Tripoli and the USIS reading room in Beirut are part of a coordinated Communist effort connected with the attacks on Vice President Nixon in South America and the developments in Algeria.

The principal source of instigation for the troubles in Lebanon are extremist nationalist elements inside and outside Lebanon aided and abetted by violent propaganda from Radio Cairo and Radio Damascus. This is supplemented by arms and armed men infiltrating from the Syrian sector of the United Arab Republic. The purpose of this attack is to overthrow the pro-Western regime of President Chamoun. We have no doubt that Communist elements in Lebanon are helping to fan the flames of this insurrection, as it would seem most unnatural for them not to seize upon this opportunity to create trouble for the United States and for a country friendly to the United States. We are inclined to believe that the troubles in Lebanon, although they are doubtless being exploited by the Communists, arise out of developments primarily concerning the Near Eastern Arab world and are not directly connected with the situation in Algeria or recent events in South America.

The USIS installations were burned by the extremist mobs, perhaps with Communist participation, because they were easily accessible symbols of the principal Western power and the nation which symbolizes the political principles to which the present Lebanese Government has given its support. The Arab extremist nationalists oppose what they consider to be U.S. efforts to line up the Arab world on the U.S. side in the East-West struggle. The Soviet Union through inflammatory broadcasts in the Arabic language is attempting to exacerbate the situation in Lebanon. There is also little doubt that the Soviet Union is attempting also to influence Cairo and Damascus in their propaganda and other activity directed against the present Government of Lebanon.

The earliest available Soviet broadcast on the Lebanese crisis—May 12 in Arabic—consisted of a news account of events and a direct comment that “it is difficult for anyone to deny that the foreign policy imposed on Lebanon by the Eisenhower doctrine has brought forth dangerous and destructive consequences.” An Arabic broadcast of May 14 declared that the United States seems ready to interfere in Lebanon’s “internal affairs” and charged that the “colonialists,” whose alleged practice is that of describing popular movements as Communist, are seeking to intervene in Lebanon. The broadcast added that the Lebanese people will give “an appropriate answer to the American

colonialists.” On May 15 Radio Moscow charged the United States, according to the Associated Press, with open interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs and asserted that the Lebanese authorities were “planning to use these American weapons to fight the anti-imperialist popular movement.”

Algeria

There is no indication that the recent developments in Algeria have been in any way related to other simultaneous disturbances in the world. Nor is there any indication that the Algerian incidents were directly Communist inspired.

The Algerian explosion is an expression of the intensity of feelings on the part of the French, particularly those in Algeria, on this neuralgic issue. There has always been a possibility, of which we were long aware, that the French settlers in Algeria might try to take matters in their own hands, if they suspected that the French Government might change its policy on Algeria.

A series of circumstances combined to favor the events which occurred last Tuesday. There was an absence of governmental authority, given the Cabinet crisis and the absence of Minister Lacoche from Algiers. The French settlers feared, moreover, that the designated French Prime Minister, Pierre Pflimlin, might negotiate with the Algerian rebels. They therefore decided to hold massive protest demonstrations to discourage Pflimlin’s investiture.

The demonstrators were estimated at around 50,000 and, incited by extremist elements, soon got out of hand. In addition to ransacking our USIS offices, the mobs finally took over the local government building, the Ministry for Algeria. It was at that point that the military came upon the scene and took over control, setting up a Committee of Public Safety.

It is, of course, possible that this coup was planned well in advance and not the sudden result of unpremeditated mob action. If so, it was planned by French settlers and certain French military elements—neither of whom, to our knowledge, have any sympathies with the Communists. That these events occurred on May 13 was due to the fact that it was the day that Pflimlin was scheduled to come up for Parliamentary investiture.

The ransacking of the USIS library was only

an offshoot of the larger action by the mobs. The library is centrally located on the ground floor along one of the main streets of Algiers. Certain elements among the French settlers have felt that we were not solidly behind France's insistence on maintaining Algeria as an integral part of France. It is likely that in the mood they were in at that time some of the demonstrators were incited by extremist elements to wreck the USIS premises. There have been no indications that these elements were Communist or Communist inspired.

The Soviet propaganda line in regard to Algeria is designed to excite anti-U.S. sentiments among the French. Moscow has consistently alleged that the U.S. sought to oust France from North Africa and to install itself there militarily, politically, and economically. Sahara oil is said to inflame U.S. desires and North African bases to play an important role in U.S. strategic designs. Such moves as the supplying of arms by the U.S. to Tunisia and the good-offices mission were said to have the aims of increasing U.S. domination over the area. According to Radio Moscow, the U.S. "intends to supersede France in North Africa as in Indochina." Moscow has simultaneously attempted to create hostility to the U.S. among Algerian Arabs by charging that the U.S. was attempting to supplant France as the colonial master. There has been, however, no marked intensification of anti-American propaganda in connection with the Algerian coup.

Burma

According to a preliminary check of Soviet-bloc propaganda output, there has been no unusual propaganda activity on the part of the U.S.S.R. or Communist China in connection with the incident which took place before the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon on May 12. According to the Embassy report, about 100 persons paused for 3 or 4 minutes before the chancery while parading in formation along the street returning from a nearby meeting of the Communist-front World Peace Congress. The crowd stopped only long enough to leave some placards bearing slogans against SEATO and against nuclear weapons, including one in English reading, "American warmongers—don't interfere in our internal affairs." Local press treatment of the incident was entirely perfunctory.

Indonesia

Since the Indonesian rebellion in February, Soviet propaganda in close consort with that of the PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) has portrayed the issue to Indonesians as one between patriotic defense of Indonesian nationalism and sovereignty on the one hand and foreign-inspired imperialism on the other. The U.S. is identified as the major inspirer of the "separatists" and is charged with intervening by military aid to the rebels.

The increasing trend of the propaganda toward pinpointing the U.S. as the major force of intervention is seen in the Soviet Government's statement of May 14 in which it charged:

... in a number of instances weapons have been and are being delivered to the rebels directly from the U.S. . . . a number of U.S. leaders, Secretary of State Dulles among them, unequivocally called for the setting up of a new government in Indonesia. . . . In the light of the events taking place in Indonesia, it is difficult to assess such statements otherwise than as direct incitement to the overthrow of the legitimate Indonesian Government.

The PKI has consistently echoed the main lines of Soviet propaganda against the U.S., relating them specifically to the internal scene. The overall goal has been to identify the U.S. as the real national enemy behind the rebels and the PKI as the foremost patriotic party. Taking advantage of the momentum generated by Premier Djuanda's April 30 statement and Sukarno's May 2 speech charging intervention and taking the U.S. to task, Indonesian Communists have initiated threats of direct action against U.S. interests. PKI Secretary General Aidit, in a May 1 telegram to the U.S. Embassy, threatened action against U.S. economic interests in Indonesia if U.S. arms to rebels were not stopped. In a speech published May 6, Aidit threatened that the PKI would launch a campaign for taking over U.S. enterprises in Indonesia as was done with the Dutch unless the U.S. stopped arms to the rebels.

A Communist-dominated "mass movement to oppose foreign intervention" was organized on May 7—probably a crystallization of an "Anti-Foreign Intervention Group" formed on May 4 by Communist unions, youth, and student front groups—and called for a mass rally on May 16 in front of the U.S. Embassy to protest U.S. intervention. The rally was subsequently postponed to May 20. The group may be identical with an

"Anti-Foreign Intervention Movement" which on May 9 reportedly cabled 20 international organizations throughout the world asking for "solidarity" in condemning foreign intervention in Indonesia.

Japan

There occurred recently a massive but peaceful manifestation, reportedly involving some 40,000 persons, before our Embassy in Tokyo. This was a protest against continued testing of nuclear weapons. This is an active popular issue in Japan resulting from wartime experience as a target of atomic weapons. In this case there is no clearcut evidence of Communist direction. It is an issue agitated by the U.S.S.R. on a worldwide basis. There is continuous effort by Communists to exploit the issue locally against the United States.

Letters of Credence

Afghanistan

The newly appointed Ambassador of Afghanistan, Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on May 23. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 285.

Iran

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, Ali Gholi Ardalan, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on May 22. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 283.

Mr. Katzen To Observe Program for Use of Funds in Israel

Press release 282 dated May 21

The Department of State announced on May 21 that Bernard Katzen, special consultant, has been asked to proceed to Israel to observe the program for the expenditure of certain funds in Israel currency which have accrued to this Government as a result of the operations of the informational media guaranty program in Israel.

It will be recalled that in 1956 Mr. Katzen was entrusted with a mission to Israel by the Secre-

tary¹ for the purpose of recommending projects in which these funds might be expended to further the common interests of the United States and Israel. Upon completion of his mission, Mr. Katzen reported to the Secretary and made certain recommendations for a number of educational, cultural, and scientific projects. These recommendations were accepted by the Department of State, and the necessary appropriations were authorized by the Congress. The American Embassy at Tel Aviv is currently engaged in the implementation of the recommended projects.

Mr. Katzen will remain about 3 weeks in Israel, after which he will submit his observations and comments to the Department in Washington.

U.S. issues Statement on Report on Trinidad Naval Base

Press release 266 dated May 14

The U.S. Government considers the report of the Technical Joint Commission on Chaguaramas,² which has been made public today, a conscientious effort to reach an objective conclusion on the economic, technical, and strategic aspects involved in relocating the U.S. naval base. It is appreciative of the thoroughness with which members of the Commission examined the matter for 2½ months and the clarity with which they expressed their conclusions.

The principal conclusions to be drawn from the report are that the U.S. naval base in the Eastern Caribbean should be located on the Gulf of Paria to fulfill its strategic and military functions; that the military superiority of Chaguaramas over any alternative site together with the expense and time required to establish a base at an alternative site make it impracticable to consider relocating the U.S. naval base at Chaguaramas; and that its partition is also not practicable.

The U.S. Government believes that these conclusions should settle the Chaguaramas question so that the countries concerned can proceed without hindrance to develop their relationships in a constructive manner.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 207.

² The commission was composed of representatives of Trinidad, the United Kingdom, the United States, and The West Indies.

Major Aspects of the Problem of Outer Space

*Statement by Loftus Becker
Legal Adviser¹*

The Department of State has a deep and abiding interest in the problems of outer space. What the United States Government should do with respect to this entirely new field of activity, with its as yet unexplored potentialities, poses highly important questions of national policy and of defense policy. It also inevitably poses highly important questions of foreign policy.

In my testimony today I propose, after referring very briefly to certain basic principles, to discuss four major aspects of the problem of outer space. These are as follows:

1. the problem of insuring that outer space is used for peaceful purposes only;
2. possible international cooperation in outer space;
3. international law affecting outer space; and
4. the pending bill.

Basic Principles

The basic pattern of our existing foreign policy with respect to space is no different from that which we have with respect to international relations here on the earth. In conformity with our undertakings under article 1 of the United Nations Charter, it is our purpose to insure that—in space as on the earth—international peace and security are maintained and that international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace are adjusted or settled in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.

¹Made before the Special Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics on May 14.

We are in favor of international cooperation in solving international problems. At the same time we are dedicated to the maintenance of the legitimate national interests of the United States, and we hold firm to our inherent right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack, which is fully recognized under article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

I believe that my testimony today will demonstrate that the Department's policy with respect to outer space is wholly consistent with the basic principles I have just described.

The Problem of Insuring That Outer Space Is Used for Peaceful Purposes Only

The most immediate problem in the field of space foreign policy is how to insure that outer space is used for peaceful purposes only. As your chairman [Senator Lyndon B. Johnson] put it in his opening statement before this committee:

The challenge of the atomic age, at the beginning, was to harness a vast destructive power to prevent its use in war.

The challenge of the space age, at the beginning now, is to open a new frontier to permit its use for peace.

You are doubtless well aware that the United States Government has already taken an initiative in this field. The United States recognized the importance of determining now what steps can be taken to assure that missiles and other outer-space vehicles, already in the development stage, will be utilized solely for peaceful purposes.

This recognition stemmed from the fact that today these military space instruments are in the early stages of development. With the passage

of time and their continuous growth and refinement, the problem of effective international control becomes more difficult. This point is best illustrated by a similar historical problem. In 1946 international control of the military use of nuclear energy could have been attained with relative ease. Today, as we well know, control of the atom has become a much more vastly complicated and difficult task.

Fully cognizant of this lesson of history, the United States proposed to the United Nations on January 14, 1957,² that:

... the first step toward the objective of assuring that future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes would be to bring the testing of such objects under international inspection and participation.

This was the first recognition by any nation of the immediate need to deal with this compelling problem.

Since that time we have repeatedly stressed the need—and our willingness—to reach agreement in this vital area. During the 1957 United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee meetings in London, in concert with our allies, we formally proposed beginning measures to control, for peaceful purposes, the sending of objects through outer space. This proposal reflected our earlier expressions of concern over the dangers of surprise attack and the outbreak of accidental war. It represents an extension upward of our aerial and ground inspection proposals. This proposal was designed to allay these same dangers which are inherent in the continued growth and proliferation of missile-delivery systems.

Again, in January of this year, President Eisenhower in a letter to former Premier Bulganin³ expressed our concern and our desire to reach agreement on this matter. I should like to quote from that letter, which reads in part:

I propose that we agree that outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes. We face a decisive moment in history in relation to this matter. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are now using outer space for the testing of missiles designed for military purposes. The time to stop is now.

I recall to you that a decade ago, when the United States had a monopoly of atomic weapons and of atomic experience, we offered to renounce the making of atomic

weapons and to make the use of atomic energy an international asset for peaceful purposes only. If only that offer had been accepted by the Soviet Union, there would not now be the danger from nuclear weapons which you describe.

The nations of the world face today another choice perhaps even more momentous than that of 1948. That relates to the use of outer space. Let us this time, and in time, make the right choice, the peaceful choice.

Today we have pending before the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations a proposal set forth at London in August 1957.⁴ It stands as one of five basic principles overwhelmingly endorsed by the United Nations as the basis for continued disarmament negotiations. This proposal calls for nations to cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would effectively cover the field of ballistic missiles and other outer-space objects to assure their development for exclusively scientific and peaceful purposes. Moreover, we have offered to join immediately in such a study, on a multilateral basis, without awaiting the conclusion of negotiations on other substantive proposals.

The Department of State believes that this proposal represents a significant first step toward preventing the use of outer space for military purposes. We intend to continue to emphasize the need to turn this proposal into constructive action.

Possible International Cooperation In Outer Space

I turn now to our second major area of interest, namely, the challenging opportunities for international cooperation in outer-space study and exploration. As you have heard from previous witnesses, this new venture into our universe opens a vast area for programs of scientific study and exploration.

At this time I have in mind certain projects from which every nation in the world can benefit: radio-relay satellites which will provide for near-perfect worldwide radio; TV and radio-telephone service; weather-charting satellites

²For text of Western proposals, see *ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451; for a statement by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the Disarmament Commission on Sept. 30, 1957, see *ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1957, p. 631; for statements by Ambassador Lodge in the 12th session of the General Assembly, together with texts of U.N. resolutions on disarmament, see *ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1957, p. 961.

³BULLETIN of Feb. 11, 1957, p. 225.

⁴*Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.

which will afford early warning against natural catastrophe; aids to navigation which will enable aircraft and ships to chart their way over the surface of the earth with great accuracy and speed; construction of space platforms as takeoff points for further outer-space exploration; and manned moon-rocket flights to the moon and other planets. These are but a few of the many valuable programs we can anticipate.

These programs can have far-reaching international implications. Without proper international coordination and cooperation such activities could lead to involved international problems and could project narrow rivalries into this new field.

Here, however, as with the military implications, one significant fact is readily apparent. The national programs of the two nations now having the technological capability to carry out outer-space exploration are still in their early developmental stage. This limitation will not long exist. Thus, early action is essential if we are to thwart narrow national objectives.

There are, moreover, certain technological relationships between areas of potential international cooperation and the military programs which involve outer space. A most obvious illustration of this is the close relationship between the missile-propulsion systems and the means of putting scientific satellites into orbits. Yet it makes clear that an international program of scientific study and exploration is related to efforts to assure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. There are many other highly technical considerations of this order involved here. Such considerations at the present time are under very active study within the Government.

The Department of State feels, however, that there are possible arrangements for international cooperation in the peaceful scientific and technological areas of outer-space activity. These arrangements could be pursued independently of control arrangements over military uses of outer space. Such cooperation would avoid conflicts of exclusively national programs. It would allow for necessary coordination of activities, thus assuring the most productive efforts. It would facilitate progress through a combination of efforts which would greatly accelerate scientific discoveries. It would provide a means by which many nations would participate in this new ven-

ture. It would insure that the scientific study of outer space is carried on in the classic tradition of scientific openness. Finally, such cooperation would set the pattern for further space activities, thus assuring the world of a logical and peaceful progression into the reaches of outer space.

To foster and guide the cooperative efforts that are possible, we believe it to be axiomatic that some appropriate international machinery should be created. Its principal responsibility would be to promote and to coordinate efforts in the field of outer space. Its functions might include, among other things, the establishment of certain international space regulations, the collection and exchange of information, and appropriate planning and coordinating of outer-space research and exploration. To undertake these functions properly, the agency might well be established under the auspices of the United Nations but, in any event, should have a suitable and necessary relationship with the United Nations and with other international organizations such as the World Meteorological Organization. In this respect a precedent has already been set. I refer specifically to the International Atomic Energy Agency. As you are aware, this Agency has the task of both promoting international exchange and scientific cooperation, as well as assuring that nuclear materials in its possession are used exclusively for peaceful purposes. There is no reason to believe that a space organization formulated along similar lines could not be just as effective—or more effective, since we have this IAEA experience from which to draw.

At this time we envisage no obstacles, political or technical, which would preclude the establishment of such an international system of cooperation and coordination. We, in fact, believe that only through the creation of such an international organization will the interests of science and humanity be amply protected and assured. I should add that international space cooperation is already imbued with some encouraging possibilities of collective action. In March of this year the Soviet Union placed on the provisional agenda of the 13th General Assembly an item calling for, among other things, "the establishment of a United Nations agency for international cooperation in the study of cosmic space." This could mean that the first imperative step has been taken—recognition of the need for international

cooperation in this field. If this is so, it allows for an initial atmosphere of hope. Yet, even here, there remain initial problems. This proposal I have just quoted is tied to a broad international agreement which includes, among other things, a provision for the elimination of foreign military bases. That is an old Soviet proposal and one we are not prepared to accept. Further, we see no link between international space cooperation and elimination of foreign bases. Thus, it is clear that a number of other steps must be taken before we can gain the staggering opportunities and benefits which await a peaceful, international venture into this new world.

We have yet to reach a practical agreement which offers assurance that space shall be devoted to peaceful purposes and that there shall be international cooperation in exploring its infinite bounds. Until a satisfactory agreement has been reached, we in the State Department shall maintain and preserve every national right of the United States in the atmosphere and in space.

International Law Affecting Outer Space

a. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter

I have read a number of articles in which it is stated that the only international agreement relating to space or to the atmosphere is the Chicago Convention of 1944, relating to civil aviation matters. I have seen it asserted that there is no international law with respect to space outside the atmosphere.

I regard such statements as incorrect because of the specific provisions of article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to which I have previously referred. Under that provision each of the members of the United Nations reserved its "inherent right" of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack.

Now the origin of an armed attack against the United States, or the particular point in space through which it would have to pass in order to reach the United States or one of its collective-security partners, is completely immaterial. The United States is prepared at all times to react to protect itself against an armed attack, whether that attack originates in outer space or passes through outer space in order to reach the United States.

If and when the United States takes such action, it will be exercising a right which it has under international law, because that law in the last analysis is what nations will agree to. And the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense has been recognized as a fundamental principle of international law in the United Nations Charter.

b. Implications of the International Geophysical Year

There is another misconception with respect to the rights of the United States in this sphere that I should like to correct. I have several times seen it stated that we do not have any right to protest or take any action with respect to satellites because of the events relating to the International Geophysical Year. Now, the facts are these:

The arrangements with respect to the International Geophysical Year were not made on an intergovernmental basis. They were arrangements made between scientific bodies in a private capacity. It is true that certain governments, including the Soviet Union and the United States, announced in advance that during the International Geophysical Year they intended to place objects in orbit around the earth. And it was also stated in connection with these announcements that the purpose of these satellites would be for scientific investigation. No nation protested these announcements.

It follows, therefore, that the only conclusion that can be reached with respect to the arrangements regarding the International Geophysical Year is that there is an implied agreement that, for the period of the International Geophysical Year, it is permissible to put into orbit satellites designed for scientific purposes. Once the year is over, rights in this field will have to be determined by whatever agreement may be reached with respect to such objects.

c. Is There Any Agreed Upper Limit of Sovereignty?

The next question of international law which I would like to mention is the position of the United States regarding its sovereignty upwards. There are those who have argued that the sovereignty of the United States ends with the outer limits

of the atmosphere and that space outside the atmosphere is either free to all or should possibly be conceded to be within the sovereignty of one or another international organization.

The United States Government has not recognized any top or upper limit to its sovereignty. This position has been taken entirely aside from article 51 of the United Nations Charter and any limitations that may be inherent in that, such as "armed attack."

It is true that, in such international agreements as the Chicago Convention of 1944, the parties thereto recognize that each of them "has complete and exclusive sovereignty of the airspace above its territory." But it is important to note that there is nowhere in the Chicago Convention of 1944 or other international agreements comparable thereto any definition of what is meant by the term "airspace."

I do not wish to take, nor has the State Department ever officially taken, a definitive position as to how this term "airspace" should be defined. I think it important to note, however, that one of the suggestions that has been made in this regard is that the airspace should be defined to include that portion of space above the earth in which there is any atmosphere. I am informed that astronomically the earth's atmosphere extends 10,000 miles above its surface.

It follows that it would be perfectly rational for us to maintain that under the Chicago Convention the sovereignty of the United States extends 10,000 miles from the surface of the earth, an area which would comprehend the area in which all of the satellites up to this point have entered. At any rate, that type of definition would afford us enough elbowroom for discussion.

Furthermore, although the United States, in its domestic law as well as agreements such as the Chicago Convention, has plainly asserted its complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, at no time have we conceded that we have no rights in the higher regions of space. One rationale for this position which seems to me self-sufficient was that the United States had no need to define its position with respect to what rights, if any, it might possess outside the earth's atmosphere until such time as mankind had demonstrated a capability of existing outside the atmosphere.

Even after such a capability is demonstrated,

there will be no imperative requirement in international law that the United States make any claims of sovereignty in order to protect its rights.

A very apt analogy is afforded by the Antarctic. There, for many, many years, the United States has been engaged in activities which under established principles of international law, without any question whatsoever, created rights upon which the United States would be justified in asserting territorial claims, that is to say, claims to sovereignty over one or more areas of the Antarctic. Notwithstanding this fact the United States has not asserted any claim of sovereignty over any portion of Antarctica, although the United States has, at the same time, made it plain that it did not recognize any such claims made by other states.

Nonetheless, the United States has been consistent in asserting that under international law and practice its activities in the Antarctic Continent have entitled it to rights in that area which it has at all times expressly reserved. It is the position of the United States Government, and one well founded in international law, that the fact that the United States has not based a claim of sovereignty over one or more areas of Antarctica, upon the basis of the activities it has engaged in there, in no way derogates from the rights that were established by its activities.

So, too, in outer space the United States has already engaged in activities which, it could be asserted, have given to it certain rights as distinguished from those states who have not engaged in such activities. Up to this time the United States has made no claims of sovereignty based upon such activities.

As in the situation with respect to Antarctica, this should not be interpreted as any concession of any kind whatsoever on the part of the United States that its activities have not given it certain rights in space which, in turn, could be relied upon as the basis of a claim of sovereignty.

d. Should Space Law Be Codified at This Time?

I would like now to turn to the question of whether or not the law of space should be codified at this time.

As you know, the development or the tendency of development of the common law as it is applied in the United Kingdom and the United States and a number of other countries has been

on a case-to-case basis. Speaking very generally, it has been felt that the soundest way to progress in the extremely complex field of the law is by means of specific decisions on specific questions presented by specific-fact situations. Even in those states which applied the principles of the civil law, it is recognized that a body of law can only be created upon a broader body of ascertained fact.

Moreover, there are very great risks in attempting to transmute a body of law based upon one determined set of facts into a body of law with respect to which the basic facts have not been determined.

Accordingly, we are inclined to view with great reserve any such suggestions as that the principles of the law of space should be codified now or that the principles of the law of the sea should be applied in space, until we ascertain many more facts with respect to conditions in space. Basically, it is the position of our Government that the law of space should be based upon the facts of space and that there is very much more that we have to learn about the conditions existing in space before we shall be in a position to say what shall be the legal principles applicable thereto.

The Space Agency Bill

I have attempted to demonstrate to you that the Department of State has a great interest in the subject of space and particularly its relationship to problems of foreign policy, foreign relations, and international law in this new field. It is the expectation of the Department that its studies and activities with respect to space would continue as before, following the establishment of the space agency provided for in the administration's bill. The difference would be that we would have a central point within the Government to which we could turn for enlightenment on non-military research and developments in space and with whom we could cooperate in the development and implementation of meaningful plans for international cooperation in the peaceful exploitation of space for the benefit of all mankind. We believe that this was contemplated by the bill, as introduced, since it would be inferred that international cooperation would be effectuated through the normal channel therefor, namely, the Department of State.

We understand that it has been proposed that

the bill be amended to include as one of the activities that the proposed agency may engage upon a program of international cooperation. It is our understanding that the specific language proposed reads as follows:

The agency may under foreign policy guidance by the Department of State engage in a program of international cooperation in work done pursuant to this Act and in the peaceful application of the results thereof, pursuant to agreements negotiated by the Department of State, or approved by that Department.

We also understand that this proposed amendment has the approval of the administration. I should like to state that it is entirely satisfactory to the Department of State. I believe that what I have already said will have indicated that this Department is fully in accord with a program of international cooperation in the field of space, so long as that can be accomplished with due regard for the common defense and security of the United States.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, in commenting upon a space proposal made by the President in a letter to former Chairman Bulganin, you stated:

I agree with the President that outer space must be dedicated to the advancement rather than to the destruction of mankind. It is the obligation of responsible leadership to proceed to specific proposals that will convert a noble goal into a noble reality.

We in the Department of State fully concur with your statement. We regard the opening of the space age as a time of great opportunity for mankind. We shall make every effort to insure that the keynote of space internationally is peace and cooperation rather than strife. We hope that other nations will join us in that high effort.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

85th Congress, 2d Session

Renewal of Trade Agreements Act. Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means. Part 1, February 17-March 7, 1958, 1,490 pp.; Part 2, March 10-25, 1958, 1,434 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. February 18-April

by Deputy Under Secretary Dillon ¹

I am highly honored to have this opportunity to talk with you today. The Foreign Policy Association is playing a vital role in the Nation. Your work can and must continue to grow in importance. During the past year I have been struck by the fact that our greatest difficulty in evolving and carrying out effective foreign economic policy lies in the general lack of understanding of what we are trying to accomplish. It has not proved too difficult to convince people once they know the facts. But the amount of misinformation or lack of information in this field is hard to exaggerate. The survival of our free-enterprise system, our own survival as a free nation, may well depend on our reactions to the economic problems facing the world today. Hence the great importance of your organization in bringing about objective discussion of the facts and issues and so a wider understanding among the American people.

Today I would like you to join me in taking an overall look at what lies ahead in this field. Last year the Committee for Economic Development asked a number of distinguished economists and statesmen a significant question. The Committee inquired, "What is the most important economic problem to be faced by the United States in the next 20 years?" They received 48 different answers. These answers naturally covered a wide spectrum of opinion. They ranged from the view of a well-known authority on military strategy, that world disarmament was the most important economic question, to the view of a well-known economist, that what was most needed was an improvement in the quality of leisure time. Some—mostly those writing from abroad—spoke of the great importance of the foreign economic policy of the United States. Others preferred to comment on some aspect of our internal economic situation.

My own answer to this question, if I had been asked, would have been the subject we are discussing today: "Economic Growth in a Divided World."

¹ Address made before the Foreign Policy Association at New York, N. Y., on May 21 (press release 277 dated May 20).

16, 1958. Part XVI, additional appendix and index. 123 pp.

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, pursuant to S. Res. 93, S. Res. 185, and S. Res. 286, 84th Cong., S. Res. 61 and S. Res. 241, 85th Cong. Part 16, March 12 and 25, 1958. 64 pp.

International Development Association. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 294, a resolution to promote the establishment of an International Development Association in cooperation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. March 18-20, 1958. 350 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 3318 to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. March 19-April 2, 1958. 806 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1958. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on draft legislation to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. Part X, March 25 and 26, 1958, 114 pp.; Part XI, March 27 and 31, 1958, 166 pp.; Part XII, April 1, 1958, 125 pp.; Part XIII, April 15 and 16, 1958, 90 pp.; Part XIV, 66 pp.; Part XV, Appendix, 25 pp.

United States Contributions to International Organizations. Letter from the Secretary of State transmitting the sixth report on the extent and disposition of United States contributions to international organizations for the fiscal year 1957, pursuant to Public Law 806, 81st Congress. H. Doc. 360, March 28, 1958. 101 pp.

Extending Greetings to the Federal Legislature of the West Indies. Reports to accompany S. Con. Res. 77 and H. Con. Res. 298. S. Rept. 1435, April 15, 1958, 2 pp.; H. Rept. 1613, April 17, 1958, 2 pp.

Extension of Wool Act. Report to accompany S. 2861. S. Rept. 1460, April 21, 1958. 8 pp.

Recruitment and Training for the Foreign Service of the United States. Staff study for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. S. Doc. 91, April 22, 1958. 197 pp.

Conference of Leading Representative Citizens of NATO Countries. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 62. S. Rept. 1470, April 24, 1958. 3 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Alumina and Bauxite. Report to accompany H. R. 9917. S. Rept. 1484, April 28, 1958. 3 pp.

Duty on Pistols and Revolvers Not Capable of Firing Fixed Ammunition. Report to accompany H. R. 1126. S. Rept. 1481, April 28, 1958. 2 pp.

Duty on Harpsichords and Clavichords. Report to accompany H. R. 5208. S. Rept. 1482, April 28, 1958. 4 pp.

Suspension of Duty on Certain Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H. R. 10792. S. Rept. 1487, April 28, 1958. 2 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Import Duties on Certain Coarse Wool. Report to accompany H. R. 2151. S. Rept. 1490, April 28, 1958. 5 pp.

Transfer of Amorphous Graphite From Dutiable List to Free List. Report to accompany H. R. 2783. S. Rept. 1491, April 28, 1958. 3 pp.

Emigration of Refugees and Escapees. Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary made by its Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected With the Emigration of Refugees and Escapees pursuant to S. Res. 53, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., as extended. S. Rept. 1493, April 28, 1958. 4 pp.

Recording the Admission of Certain Hungarian Refugees. Report to accompany H. R. 11633. H. Rept. 1661, April 28, 1958. 30 pp.

Safety of Life at Sea Study. Report pursuant to sec. 126 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public Law 601, 79th Cong. H. Rept. 1675, April 30, 1958. 5 pp.

During the past year I have become deeply impressed by the overshadowing importance to the United States of meeting the Communist challenge in the less developed countries.

The Communists control nearly a billion of the 2½ billion people who inhabit the earth. In North America, Western Europe, and Japan—the industrial heart of the free world—there are about 600 million people. Most of the remainder of the world's population, over 1 billion people, live in the less developed countries.

In my judgment the most important economic question facing the United States is: What economic system will these 1 billion people of the less developed countries ultimately choose in their struggle against poverty? Will they succumb to the antihuman, materialistic system which has been thrown up by 40 years of communism? Or will they find the way to economic well-being through the principles of individual liberty and political democracy which Western civilization has painfully evolved through centuries of effort?

Whether the verdict will go to the Communist system or to the Western system of freedom will, I believe, be heavily influenced by the effort which the industrialized countries of the West are prepared to put forth in helping the less developed areas to achieve an adequate rate of economic growth.

Most of the billion people who live in less developed lands are literally crushed by poverty. Many of them have incomes of little more than a dollar a week. But they no longer believe that their miserable lot is the unchangeable result of an inscrutable fate. They are aware as never before in history that their condition can be changed by human effort. It is no wonder that in many of these countries economic development is rapidly becoming the dominant, driving political force. There can be little doubt that, unless the governments of these countries are successful in meeting the insistent demands of their people for a better life, they will be replaced.

Communist Economic Offensive

For the past 10 years, ever since the enunciation of the famous point 4 policy, the United States has been working to help these peoples. We recognize our responsibility to lend a helping hand and our self-interest in promoting a higher standard of living throughout these areas. This is and

remains our positive reason for carrying forward our programs of economic and technical assistance in the less developed areas. But within the last 3 or 4 years a new factor has entered the picture. The Soviet Union has come to recognize the force of this political tide and has determined to harness it to the chariot of Communist imperialism. They have seen an opportunity to achieve by economic means what they have been unable to accomplish by military power.²

The Communists are now engaged in a large-scale economic offensive in the less developed areas. The main impact is being felt in Asia and the Near East. The weapons are economic assistance, trade, and technical help.

In 3 years the Communists have extended to less developed nations nearly \$1.7 billion in long-term, low-interest loans for economic development. Their trade agreements with the less developed countries have jumped from 49 in 1953 to 147 in 1957, a gain of nearly 100. Last year the trade turnover between the Soviet bloc and these countries was 50 percent greater than it had been 2 years previously, and it is continuing to increase. Some 2,300 Communist technicians are on the job in less developed countries, and about 2,000 students from the less developed areas are being trained in Moscow, Prague, and other bloc centers.

It would be comforting to believe that the foreign economic programs of the bloc will break down because of inefficiency, poor equipment, slow deliveries, and the like. But there is no sign that this will be so. On the contrary, there is every indication that the bloc programs are being managed with efficiency and dispatch.

Nor can we assume that the bloc assistance programs will impose such a strain on the Communist economic system that they will prove to be a flash in the pan. The fact is that the capacity of the bloc to sustain a substantial export of economic resources to the less developed countries is growing, not receding.

Eight years ago the gross national product of the Soviet Union was about a third of the gross national product of the United States. Now it is over 40 percent of ours. At present rates of

²For statements made by Mr. Dillon before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee on the subject of the Soviet economic offensive, see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 469, and Apr. 14, 1958, p. 627.

growth in the two countries, we may expect that Soviet output in 1962, 4 years from now, will rise to about 50 percent of our own. While our economy has been growing at roughly 4 percent per year, theirs has been increasing at 6 or 7 percent. In industry—that is to say, manufacturing and mining—the gap between growth rates is even larger. Ours is about 4 percent, while their rate is closer to 10 percent.

The reason for these differential rates is very simple. The Soviets, by severely repressing individual consumption, plow back into investment a much higher proportion of their annual output than we do. And of the total investment so plowed back they allocate a much higher proportion than we do to industry and a much smaller proportion to such things as housing.

These figures mean that we must expect that the Soviet Union, together with the rest of the Communist bloc, will be increasingly capable of providing economic resources on a large scale to the less developed countries and that the variety of the goods which they are able to supply will grow.

It may be asked, why should we be so concerned about Communist assistance to the less developed countries? Are we worried about cloak-and-dagger subversion? Are we afraid that the less developed countries will become so economically dependent upon the Soviet bloc that they cannot maintain their political freedom?

Both of these are legitimate concerns. For example, the massive Communist assistance to the United Arab Republic and Yemen could breed a dangerous degree of economic dependence.

But the main danger lies in the export of the Communist economic system as such. The main danger is that the less developed countries, in their desperate efforts to improve their economic lot, will be beguiled into the fatal shortcut to paradise proclaimed by Communist propaganda and ideology. Through aid and trade the material end product of the Communist system is brought up close, while the machinery of human degradation which lies behind it remains concealed.

Just as Hitler, in *Mein Kampf*, outlined in advance his campaign against the democracies, so the Communists are making their intent abundantly clear. Here is Khrushchev speaking to the less developed countries last month. He spoke, ironically enough, from prostrate Hungary. This is what he said:

We boldly challenge the capitalist world. Let us compete to see who can reach the highest level of productive forces, who will produce more per capita, who will insure the highest material and cultural standard of living for the people, where are the best opportunities created for the development of all the capabilities of man; whichever regime insures the best conditions for the peoples, that regime will win. We are convinced that it is the more progressive socialist regime that will win. The future is with our socialist system. Capitalism is at its ebb, heading for collapse. This does not mean that it is already lying down with its legs stretched out; much work has yet to be done to bring it to such a state. But this is inevitable, just as death inevitably comes to a living organism or plant after a specific stage of development.

U.S. Response to the Soviet Challenge

Now, how should the United States respond to the Soviet bid to capture the allegiance of the people of the less developed countries?

One thing, I am sure, we should not do. And that is, we should not try to counter the Communists on a deal-for-deal basis. We ought not to try to beat communism by imitating it or by reacting blindly to it. This is a battle of systems—the free system is allowed to work in the ways that are natural to it, as fully and effectively as possible.

The less developed countries are fully prepared to bear the major burden of their own economic development. But to acquire the industrial techniques and the machinery and equipment which they cannot yet make for themselves they need help from the industrialized countries. As the greatest industrialized country of the world we must accept the responsibility for leadership in this field.

This means that we must lift our sights. In the fields of international development assistance, international finance, world trade, and private investment, we must find ways of doing more than we are doing now. For, unless we meet the challenge of the times, our own safety—let alone our economic well-being—will surely be placed in the gravest danger.

Here are some of the things I have in mind when I say we should raise our sights:

First, we should envisage a substantial increase in the level of development assistance extended by the United States to the less developed countries. Last year Congress established the Development Loan Fund to enable the United States to extend loans to underdeveloped countries on a flexible

basis which would not overburden their balance of payments or compete with private enterprise or established lending institutions. Congress gave the Development Loan Fund an initial appropriation of \$300 million and also authorized, but did not appropriate, an additional \$625 million for the coming year. The President has now asked that this additional amount be appropriated. The fund has only been in active operation since the first of the year. We are lending at an annual rate of about \$600 million. This appropriation will allow us to maintain our present rate of lending for another year.

Applications for loans submitted to the Development Loan Fund already amount to some \$2 billion, and an additional \$1 billion are expected during the coming year.

For the future, I believe that we should contemplate a higher level of lending from the Development Loan Fund—something on the order of \$1 billion a year. I believe that such an amount could be spent wisely in stimulating development abroad and would be warranted by considerations of our national security.

Second, we should encourage the other industrialized countries of the free world to step up their efforts to help the development of the less developed countries. United States financial support for an International Development Association affiliated with the World Bank, as recently suggested by Senator Monroney,³ may well be a useful method to achieve this objective.

Third, we should consider the devotion of greater resources to international financial stability, having especially in mind the needs of the less developed countries. In periods of declining prices for primary commodities, the foreign-exchange earnings of many less developed countries—Latin America provides several examples—are frequently reduced to emergency levels and external help is needed in order to forestall serious economic crises. The International Monetary Fund has an outstanding record in stabilization lending and in promoting sound financial policies in its member countries. How-

ever, the fund's financial resources are limited by the size of national contributions agreed upon more than 13 years ago, and meanwhile world trade has increased greatly in both volume and value.

Fourth, we should enact the 5-year renewal of the trade agreements legislation which President Eisenhower has recommended and which the House Ways and Means Committee has now approved. Larger trade with the free world is an essential source of development funds for the less developed countries and a sustaining economic force vitally needed in the free world as a whole.

Finally, I believe that we can and must find new ways to promote American private investment abroad. We need much closer cooperation between government and private business. I am frequently told that this is a well-worn field, that the obstacles are too great, and that little more can be done than is now being done. I refuse to accept this judgment and believe that a fresh effort must be made if the United States is to utilize its most effective energies in meeting the Soviet economic challenge.

If we do these things, I am convinced that the outlook is bright. Our free-enterprise system will once again prove its worth, and we will see a steady growth in the prosperity of the free peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The institutions of democratic freedom will everywhere grow stronger. We will make for our children a world at once more secure and more prosperous than anything yet seen by man.

President of the Philippines To Visit the United States

The Department of State announced on May 19 (press release 276) that arrangements had been completed for the arrival at Washington on June 17 of Carlos P. García, President of the Republic of the Philippines, who will visit the United States at the invitation of President Eisenhower.

President García and his party will remain in Washington until June 20, when they will begin a trip scheduled to include visits to Chicago, New York, Phoenix, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. They will leave from San Francisco on June 29.

³ For a statement by Mr. Dillon on Mar. 19 before the Subcommittee on International Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, see *ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1958, p. 564.

A Fresh Look at the United Nations

by Joseph J. Sisco

During the past several months President Eisenhower and the Soviet Premier have exchanged a series of letters. One of the topics of this high-level correspondence was the question of how to strengthen the United Nations. This is not surprising. An exchange of views in these critical days between the leaders of the two strongest powers of the world regarding the United Nations is symbolic of the important role this organization has assumed since its birth in 1945.

To understand why the United Nations is important and how it is important as a force for world peace, a balanced assessment is essential—an assessment of the fundamental political forces and technological developments which are fast remolding the world and its institutions—an assessment of both the capacities and the limitations of the United Nations.

What are some of the fundamentals regarding this organization which each of us should bear in mind in trying to determine how the United Nations has served the interests of the United States and the cause of world peace? There are a few fundamentals regarding the United Nations, both old and new, which merit at least passing reference here.

First and foremost is the impact of technological developments which have had a profound

effect on modern international relations. Communications today are universalized. The oceans no longer divide us from other countries in the world. Nations are living in each other's backyards.

Moreover, man is now on the verge of conquering outer space. The orbiting of satellites and the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile mark the beginning of a new era of science and technology.

These technological advances have a very deep significance for us all. They serve to reemphasize the increasing interdependence of man and his institutions. The interdependence of nations today makes international organization an absolute necessity. It also lays down one inexorable condition: It means that for the United States there can be no isolation. It confirms that the peace, security, and well-being of our nation are inextricably bound with the peace, security, and well-being of other members of the international community. It underscores the need for a common attack on common problems.

A second fundamental part of any balanced assessment of the United Nations relates to its membership. The United Nations is not a superstate which can impose its will on member states. The United Nations is a voluntary association of sovereign and equal states in which agreement is derived through common consent. The authority it may exercise comes from the action of its member states.

Power as a Factor in World Politics

Moreover, the United Nations is an organization intimately concerned with the considerations of power as a factor in world politics. As Americans, we are acutely conscious of the importance

● Mr. Sisco is officer in charge of United Nations political affairs. The above article is based upon an address made before the McBride Lecture Foundation at Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, on April 21, 1958.

of our own power in the world today. In the United Nations power is linked in many respects with responsibility. The United Nations is a mirror of the world as it is, and, if it sometimes reflects an ugly image, it is not because of the mirror but because of the world itself. International institutions, like national institutions, reflect underlying conditions. The United Nations reflects in large measure the political, economic, and social conditions of the world as they confront us today. This attests to its viability as an international organization.

It is a mistake to consider the U.N. as an organization which prevents states from pursuing their own national interests through peaceful means.

True and legitimate national self-interest seldom suffers from justifying itself within the framework of a general international organization. In an interdependent society, and particularly in these days of atomic and hydrogen bombs and long-range missiles, self-aggrandizement does not promote self-interest but could promote self-destruction. Within the broad framework of the charter, states are free to pursue their national and international interests, in and outside the United Nations, with all the resources of diplomacy and statesmanship at their command. The existence of the United Nations does not in any sense dispense with the need for skilled and imaginative statesmanship and diplomacy. In fact there is a surprising amount of realistic, quiet diplomacy which goes on day in and day out under the aegis of the United Nations before issues actually burst forth in the public forum of the Security Council or the General Assembly. No one at all familiar with the actualities of the United Nations would take at face value the appearances of openness and spontaneity in its deliberations. Quiet diplomacy is an essential part of its workings.

A fourth factor which has had a marked influence on the United Nations relates to the kinds of international problems it is asked to consider. The United Nations has become in many instances an avenue of last resort. Issues have normally reached a critical stage between parties before they become a subject of United Nations consideration. This organization has played an important role in putting out fires that arise in the form of international disputes.

We should avoid underestimating the value of the United Nations even if it has not measured up fully on occasion. For the plain fact is that many of our international problems today are susceptible of only modest solution—rarely complete or ideal solutions. In these days of frequently occurring crises the United Nations cannot be a cure-all. The existence of an international organization does not mean that we have a made-to-order, all-purpose formula for solving the innumerable issues of international relations. The search for an all-purpose formula is illusory.

If we realize this, if we appreciate fully that there are no easy answers to international problems, I believe we can arrive at a more balanced understanding of why the United Nations can succeed in certain instances and is limited in others. The United Nations has served well and often as a tranquilizer, but the ultimate and more permanent remedies still rest with the attitudes and actions of states.

Influence of World Opinion

Another fundamental worth mentioning is that the primary tools of the United Nations today are persuasion, exhortation, negotiation, and conciliation—backed by world opinion. While the influence of world opinion is far from negligible, member states can give it due weight or flout it. Negotiations can be promoted by world opinion or can be made more difficult by it. World opinion can unite states on crucial issues. It also can divide them.

A final general consideration relates to the recent enlargement of the United Nations. The United Nations is a very different organization from that conceived in San Francisco in 1945. It has grown from an original membership of 51 to a total of 81.

We must face frankly that the increased diversity and size of the United Nations make it more difficult to achieve a consensus. The relative strength in the United Nations of the Latin American members has been weakened. If the states of Africa and Asia stand together, as they have from time to time, they can prevent a two-thirds vote on important issues. This is particularly significant since in the past decade the General Assembly has assumed an increasingly more important role than the Security Council.

This need not be a cause for gloom or pessimism. The United Nations has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for flexibility and adjustment in the face of new circumstances. The new alignments, both actual and potential, in the United Nations set a premium on reasonable policies reflecting the overall interests of the international community. This gives the United States tremendous opportunity for constructive leadership.

I am happy to note that the American people have come to realize this fact. Our State Department analyses show clearly that the American people are giving full support to the United Nations. More important, this support is no longer based on the roseate conception of the United Nations prevalent in the days of San Francisco. The American people have moved from an overly optimistic evaluation of the United Nations to a balanced view—one which embraces both the capacities and limitations of this organization. This is a healthy development and a good augury for the future strengthening of the organization.

This is the framework in which we should consider the record of the past decade and a few of the current problems confronting the United Nations.

Briefly stated the record since 1945 represents both successes and failures. President Eisenhower has summed up the record cogently in this way:¹

That there have been failures in attempts to solve international difficulties by the principles of the charter, none can deny. That there have been victories, only the willfully blind can fail to see. But clear it is that without the United Nations the failures would still have been written as failures into history. And, certainly, without this organization the victories could not have been achieved. . . .

In my view, the United Nations has served our interests and has been a positive force for peace in at least four ways.

Basis for Collective Action

First, the United Nations has provided, at least in one important instance, a reasonable basis for collective action. We are all familiar with the role played by the United Nations in repelling the Communist aggression in Korea. Admittedly,

the Korean action was an imperfect application of the principle of collective security. Nevertheless it is worth repeating that for the first time in history collective action through an international organization did work successfully on the battlefield, and this was done without resorting to global war.

However, after having said this, it is considerably more difficult to assess the future role of the United Nations in the field of collective security. The continuing serious differences between the Soviet Union and the United States, and the unwillingness of member states to regard advance commitments in support of future collective action as being in their national interest, compel us to rely primarily on regional collective self-defense organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These arrangements are within the framework of the charter. They support its objectives. Moreover, they are serving the forces of peace until such time as conditions may become more conducive to the development of collective security going beyond regional arrangements.

The most important requisite of an adequate United Nations system for preventing and deterring aggression is what might be called a consumer demand for it—recognition by governments and peoples that in this age of increasing interdependence and nuclear weapons peace is the first need of every nation and that the United Nations can aid and supplement the individual efforts of nations to achieve this objective. It remains to be seen whether this awareness is sufficient to stimulate the consumer demand. We know that ballistic missiles combined with nuclear warheads could mean destruction of civilization. The lesson to be learned from the era of Sputniks and Explorers and intercontinental missiles is in effect a solemn warning—find the road to peace or be destroyed. This lesson may yet develop the requisite consumer demand that would make the concept of collective security a more practical political reality.

Settling Disputes by Peaceful Means

There is a second tangible way in which the United Nations is serving our interests and those of peace. It is in the field of pacific settlement.

During its first decade the United Nations made vital contributions to the maintenance of peace.

¹ BULLETIN of July 4, 1955, p. 3.

For example, it helped to bring about the Soviet withdrawal from Iran. Its conciliatory efforts were an important factor in achieving an independent Indonesia. It contributed to an alleviation of a dangerous Communist threat in Greece. It negotiated a cease-fire between Israel and the Arab states. It arranged a cease-fire in Kashmir and has ever since policed a truce between India and Pakistan. It settled the fate of the former Italian colonies; Libya is independent, Somaliland is expected to achieve this goal in 1960, and Eritrea has entered into a federal relationship with Ethiopia. Finally, it provided the diplomatic channel in which the Berlin blockade crisis could be discussed and resolved.

In more recent years the stream of serious situations brought to the United Nations has not diminished. In Hungary the United Nations did not succeed in causing a withdrawal of Soviet forces. However, it did establish conclusively in the eyes of world opinion the brutal suppression of the Hungarian people and condemned the Soviet Union for its action. The Soviet Union is still feeling the sting of the Assembly's censure, as evidenced by Mr. Khrushchev's recent remarks in Budapest.

In the serious crisis in the Middle East in the fall of 1956, the focus of world opinion in the United Nations played a substantial part in bringing about the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egypt. At the same time the United Nations established an Emergency Force which for over a year has maintained peaceful conditions along the armistice demarcation line between Israel and Egypt and in the Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh areas. Moreover, a fleet of over 40 ships under the supervision of the United Nations cleared the Suez Canal. Today this vital artery of world commerce is carrying its normal traffic.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of the United Nations, and particularly of the role played by Secretary-General Hammarskjold, in the Middle East. The stabilizing influence of the United Nations Emergency Force is only one of several United Nations institutions operating in this area. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency continues to care for over 900,000 refugees and to help them become self-supporting members of a more viable economic community. The Truce Supervision Organization maintains an uneasy peace and polices the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements.

Through the quiet and effective efforts of Secretary-General Hammarskjold the United Nations has time and again prevented local incidents between Arabs and Israelis in the area of the demilitarized zones from mushrooming into more serious outbreaks of fighting which could have engulfed all of us. Moreover, the United Nations can be expected to and must play a crucial role in any future Middle Eastern settlement.

The peacemaking record I have sketched is not unimpressive for a fledgling organization of 12 years which was conceived in preatomic days, has withstood the scars of cold war, and faces the challenges of outer space. Many of the problems I have mentioned contained the seeds of war. Some of the crises continue in a dangerous stage, but in many instances the trend has been reversed.

There are two very current examples. Just 2 months ago Sudan appealed to the Security Council because Egypt had claimed certain border areas north of the 22d parallel. Egypt had announced its intention to hold the Arab Republic plebiscite in the disputed border area. There were charges of troop movements, real or otherwise, as tension increased.

While on the surface all that occurred was a short debate in the Security Council,² actually the fact that Sudan took recourse in Council proceedings had important results. Egypt called off the plebiscite in the disputed territory and agreed to negotiate the dispute with Sudan in the spirit of article 33 of the charter. World opinion as manifested in the Council had an important moderating influence.

A more serious situation is posed in the dispute between two of our closest friends, Tunisia and France. You will recall that the incident which touched off the crisis was the French bombing of the village of Sakiet in Tunisia last February. Tunisia brought the matter to the Council charging France with aggression. France in turn submitted a counterclaim charging the Tunisians with harboring and aiding Algerian rebels.

After France and Tunisia requested the good offices of the United States and United Kingdom, Council members took note of the willingness of the parties to try to settle their differences in the

² For a statement by Deputy U. S. Representative James J. Wadsworth, see *ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1958, p. 491.

spirit of article 33 of the charter.³ U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and U.K. Assistant Under Secretary of State Harold Beeley sought patiently to bring the parties together. Discussions revealed a substantial area of agreement. However, with the fall of the French Government the good offices have been suspended. It is unclear at the moment, therefore, how the situation will evolve and how further progress can be made.

Nevertheless these two current cases illustrate how the existence and the proper use of the United Nations machinery can promote peaceful adjustment, in one instance by stimulating direct negotiations and in another through the use of good offices.

A Forum for United States Views

The United Nations serves our interests and those of world peace in still another way, and that is through its value as a forum of world opinion.

It is too seldom realized that the source of political authority, whether national or international, is the public opinion behind it. The power of the sword, the power of the purse, the power of the laws—these are basic political powers. But in the last analysis they are probably dependent on the power of the word.

The United Nations provides the United States with maximum opportunity to put forward the American point of view and to influence the views of other states.

One of the best examples of its utility as a sounding board for the message of America may be seen from the striking effect of President Eisenhower's proposal in 1953 to promote the peaceful uses of the atom. It is significant that President Eisenhower made use of the United Nations forum for his atoms-for-peace proposal. The United States initiative in this field captured the world's imagination. It led to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is no longer a blueprint but a going concern.

And today the United States is faced with a similar challenge in the field of outer space. There is little doubt that the United Nations will play an important role in any efforts seeking to insure its peaceful utilization.

Just last month the Killian report⁴ gave us the bold outlines of what to expect. This report is not science fiction but a sober and realistic analysis made by leading scientists. It shows how space technology can extend man's knowledge of the earth, the solar system, and the universe.

An earth satellite, we are told, can sample the new environment through which it moves. It can see the earth as it has never been seen before. It can relay information that could never otherwise reach the earth's surface because of the intervening atmosphere.

For the first time it will be possible to measure magnetic fields and electric currents. Satellites will give us a detailed, three-dimensional picture of the earth's gravity and its magnetic field. Physicists will be able to conduct a crucial gravity experiment which will test an important prediction made by Einstein's general theory of relativity—that a clock will run faster as the gravitational field around it is reduced. We will know more about cosmic rays since we will be able to detect the rays before they shatter themselves against the earth's atmosphere. We will learn about the effect of weightlessness on physiological and psychological functions.

Present weather stations on land and sea can keep only about 10 percent of the atmosphere under surveillance, but two or three weather satellites could make a cloud inventory of the whole globe every few hours. From this inventory meteorologists believe they could spot large storms. We will be able to get a closeup of the moon. Today television cannot practically be beamed more than a few hundred miles because the wave lengths needed to carry it will not bend around the earth. Satellites may be able to serve as high-flying relay stations, and we may be able to develop intercontinental television. These are only a few of the awesome possibilities mentioned by the Killian report.

At the last General Assembly the United States proposed that the U.S.S.R. join in a study of an inspection system "designed to ensure that the sending of objects through outer space will be ex-

⁴The White House released on Mar. 26 an "Introduction to Outer Space" prepared by the President's Science Advisory Committee, of which Dr. James R. Killian is chairman.

³*Ibid.*, Mar. 10, 1958, p. 372.

clusively for peaceful and scientific purposes."⁵ President Eisenhower in a letter to Soviet Premier Bulganin last January⁶ proposed that "outer space be dedicated to the peaceful uses of mankind and denied to the purpose of war." Secretary Dulles a few days later noted the need for some kind of international commission under the auspices of the United Nations.⁷

If international agreement is to be achieved, the United States and the Soviet Union will have to cooperate. We hope that the Soviet proposals of last month which have been submitted to the General Assembly for consideration this fall are signs of a positive attitude. However, the Soviets have tied in with their proposals on outer space a condition that the United States withdraw from its overseas bases.

The stakes are high. It will be desirable for the United States to make further proposals indicative of our intention to develop a practical program to insure peaceful utilization of outer space. Proposals in this field affect the interests of all states. They provide the raw material for capturing the imagination of millions in every corner of the globe. The United States is fully aware of these realities. We are also aware of many practical problems which should not be underestimated. What is meant by the words "outer space"? Is it possible at this early stage to draw up meaningful legal rules to govern the use of outer space? Are there joint undertakings now that can be pursued in the field of research, exchange of information, and the launching of space platforms, or must these await a disarmament agreement?

These questions point up the difficulties. Nevertheless, as further United States proposals are made, I am confident that our position will be second to none. And the General Assembly will provide us with a golden opportunity to lead the way. We can—and I am confident we will—meet the challenge.

It is true, of course, that Communist spokesmen also use the United Nations platform. We need not be defensive about the fact that the Soviet-bloc spokesmen use the organization as a sounding

board for the Communist line. The important point about the United Nations forum is that it is one in which we can immediately and forcefully answer Communist claims. The ability to meet and defeat Communist propaganda on an intellectual level in the United Nations is a source of real strength and support for us wherever men are able to listen.

Let me give a recent example. At the General Assembly last fall Syria charged that Turkey was preparing to launch an attack across Syria's borders. As the Assembly debate evolved, it became clear that the Soviets were behind this move and their purpose was to stir up an artificial war scare and to use the situation to attack United States policy in the Middle East. The Assembly refused to support the charges.⁸

This process of revealing the nature of Communist attacks, often by self-exposure, is constantly going on in the United Nations. The Communists may scorn public opinion in their own countries, but they cannot escape it in the United Nations.

Attack on Social and Economic Problems

We have dealt so far with how the United Nations contributes to our security. We have spoken of the utility of the United Nations in the field of pacific settlement and as a molder of world opinion. Now let me turn for a moment to the long-range attacks of the United Nations on various economic and social problems. If we are to focus on prevention instead of cure, we have to get down to the fundamental root causes of war: poverty, disease, and poor living conditions. All of these normally cause instability.

The work of the United Nations in the economic and social field goes on undramatically. It does not make headlines since the headlines emphasize the political differences rather than the quiet advances being made to increase the general welfare of peoples everywhere. The ultimate objective is to establish a more secure peace by improving standards of life for all.

In considering the United Nations achievements in this field and how they might be enlarged, it is well to bear in mind that the economic development of a country depends primarily on action

⁵ BULLETIN of Dec. 16, 1957, p. 962.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1958, p. 166.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Nov. 18, 1957, p. 775.

taken by that country itself. At best the United Nations can only lend a helping hand. For example:

1. By bringing persons with different viewpoints and experiences into active, creative contact with one another, the United Nations stimulates both the enlargement and the dissemination of knowledge and the understanding of economic development and how to achieve it.

2. Through its recommendations for national action to promote economic development, the United Nations strengthens the hands of groups sponsoring such action within the different countries. This may be effective in promoting acceptance of appropriate policies both in the less developed countries and in the economically advanced nations whose cooperation is needed to make rapid development possible.

3. By sponsoring international agreements the United Nations can assist in promoting the economic well-being of underdeveloped countries.

4. By providing an instrumentality for channeling technical knowledge and assistance from economically advanced to less developed countries the United Nations can directly aid economic development.

The United Nations has to its credit some very real achievements in the four areas which I have mentioned. Few persons, however, would contend that it has done all it might have done. Criticisms of its shortcomings should be tempered, however, by recognition of the fact that the United Nations can do only what its member states wish it to do and are prepared to support by necessary national action.

Let me give just one graphic example of the important role of the United Nations in this field. In Southeast Asia, Food and Agriculture Organization technicians have taught farmers how to grow edible carp in rice paddies, thus supplementing existing food supplies with a new and valuable protein resource.

This is merely illustrative of projects undertaken by the specialized agencies. They are not "giveaway" projects. They are primarily designed to help people help themselves. Being a good neighbor in the modern world is nothing more than sound common sense. American know-how, American food, American money, American equipment, wisely spent in United Nations enter-

prises around the world—when added to our own purely national programs—is certainly all to the good in terms of our national interest. It gives people something to fight for as well as something to fight with. It builds markets and cuts down the need for direct American aid.

The U.N. in the New Era

The practical potentialities of the United Nations were obscured in the days of the San Francisco conference. The impression was then current that the great powers, dedicated to a universally accepted moral law, unaffected by considerations of power, would maintain peace and good will on earth. In the past few years a number of serious students of world affairs have reminded us that world law cannot be found in the clouds; that upon this earth we must give heed to the problems of power and of national interest; and that there is need of skilled diplomacy directed to the solution of pressing and dangerous conflicts of power and interest. These reminders are timely correctives to the notion that the United Nations stands aloof, unaffected in its work by the mundane struggle of men and nations. But it would be a grave misfortune if a reappraisal of the United Nations in light of these analyses were to weaken rather than strengthen our support of the United Nations.

We are living in the 20th century, which has been called "the century of total war." If such a war were to occur, only Toynbee's pygmies and Eskimoes might be left to describe it more appropriately as "the century of total destruction."

The United Nations can help to prevent such a frightful development. The world, and particularly the United States, has much to gain from the successful functioning of the United Nations. Our purpose is to support it whenever the cause of peace is served. The United Nations has demonstrated tremendous flexibility. Flexibility as well as steadfastness of purpose will be required in the new era. As we enter the new age of Sputniks and Explorers, it would be well to keep before us the words of Abraham Lincoln at the beginning of another new age 100 years ago. He said: ". . . the dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulties, and we must arise with the occasion. As our cause is new, so must we think and act anew."

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TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Canada Agree on NORAD Organization and Operations

Press release 274 dated May 19

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

On May 12, 1958, Canada and the United States concluded an exchange of notes regarding the principles to govern the future organization and operations of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). The notes were signed by Acting Secretary Herter for the United States and Ambassador N. A. Robertson for Canada. The Canadian note sets forth the principles to be adopted under this agreement. The United States reply expresses concurrence with the principles and agrees that the exchange of notes shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments.

Announcement of the establishment of an integrated Canada-United States Air Defense Command was made August 1, 1957.¹ Since that time NORAD has been operating on an interim basis, with headquarters at Colorado Springs, pending the conclusion of the formal governmental agreement between the two countries. Gen. Earl E. Partridge, USAF, and Air Marshal C. Roy Slemmon, RCAF, who have been serving as commander in chief and deputy commander of NORAD respectively, will continue in their present capacities.

TEXT OF CANADIAN NOTE

WASHINGTON, D. C.
12th May 1958

No. 263

SIR, I have the honour to refer to discussions which have taken place between the Canadian and the United States authorities concerning the necessity for integration of operational control of Canadian and United States air defences and, in particular, to the study and recommendations of the Canada-United States Military Study Group. These studies led to the joint announcement on August

1, 1957, by the Minister of National Defence of Canada and the Secretary of Defense of the United States indicating that our two Governments had agreed to the setting up of a system of integrated operational control for the air defences in the continental United States, Canada and Alaska under an integrated command responsible to the Chiefs of Staff of both countries. Pursuant to the announcement of August 1, 1957, an integrated headquarters known as the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) has been established on an interim basis at Colorado Springs, Colorado.

For some years prior to the establishment of NORAD, it had been recognized that the air defence of Canada and the United States must be considered as a single problem. However, arrangements which existed between Canada and the United States provided only for the coordination of separate Canadian and United States air defence plans, but did not provide for the authoritative control of all air defence weapons which must be employed against an attacker.

The advent of nuclear weapons, the great improvements in the means of effecting their delivery, and the requirements of the air defence control systems demand rapid decisions to keep pace with the speed and tempo of technological developments. To counter the threat and to achieve maximum effectiveness of the air defence system, defensive operations must commence as early as possible and enemy forces must be kept constantly engaged. Arrangements for the coordination of national plans requiring consultation between national commanders before implementation had become inadequate in the face of the possible sudden attack, with little or no warning. It was essential, therefore, to have in existence in peacetime an organization, including the weapons, facilities and command structure, which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defence plan approved in advance by national authorities.

Studies made by representatives of our two Governments led to the conclusion that the problem of the air defence of our two countries could best be met by delegating to an integrated headquarters the task of exercising operational control over combat units of the national forces made available for the air defence of the two countries. Furthermore, the principle of an integrated headquarters exercising operational control over assigned forces has been well established in various parts of the North Atlantic Treaty area. The Canada-United States region is an integral part of the NATO area. In support of the strategic objectives established in NATO for the Canada-United States region and in accordance with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, our two Governments have, by establishing the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), recognized the desirability of integrating headquarters exercising operational control over assigned air defence forces. The agreed integration is intended to assist the two Governments to develop and maintain their individual and collective capacity to resist air attack on their territories in North America in mutual self-defence.

The two Governments consider that the establishment of integrated air defence arrangements of the nature de-

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 19, 1957, p. 306.

scribed increases the importance of the fullest possible consultation between the two Governments on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America, and that defence cooperation between them can be worked out on a mutually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is regularly and consistently undertaken.

In view of the foregoing considerations and on the basis of the experience gained in the operation on an interim basis of the North American Air Defence Command, my Government proposes that the following principles should govern the future organization and operations of the North American Air Defence Command.

1. The Commander-in-Chief NORAD (CINC NORAD) will be responsible to the Chiefs of Staff Committee of Canada and the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, who in turn are responsible to their respective Governments. He will operate within a concept of air defence approved by the appropriate authorities of our two Governments, who will bear in mind their objectives in the defence of the Canada-United States region of the NATO area.

2. The North American Air Defence Command will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two Governments. The jurisdiction of the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD, over those units and individuals is limited to operation control as hereinafter defined.

3. "Operational control" is the power to direct, coordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available. No permanent changes of station would be made without approval of the higher national authority concerned. Temporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational requirements will be within the authority of commanders having operational control. The basic command organization for the air defence forces of the two countries, including administration, discipline, internal organization and unit training, shall be exercised by national commanders responsible to their national authorities.

4. The appointment of CINC NORAD and his Deputy must be approved by the Canadian and United States Governments. They will not be from the same country, and CINC NORAD staff shall be an integrated joint staff composed of officers of both countries. During the absence of CINC NORAD, command will pass to the Deputy Commander.

5. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be kept informed through the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group of arrangements for the air defence of North America.

6. The plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD in wartime shall be formulated and approved in peacetime by appropriate national authorities and shall be capable of rapid implementation in an emergency. Any plans or procedures recommended by NORAD which bear on the responsibilities of civilian departments or agencies of the two Governments shall be referred for decision by the appropriate military authorities to those agencies and departments and may be the subject of intergovernmental coordination.

7. Terms of reference for CINC NORAD and his Deputy will be consistent with the foregoing principles. Changes in these terms of reference may be made by agreement between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee and the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, with approval of higher authority as appropriate, provided that these changes are in consonance with the principles set out in this note.

8. The question of the financing of expenditures connected with the operation of the integrated headquarters of the North American Air Defence Command will be settled by mutual agreement between appropriate agencies of the two Governments.

9. The North American Air Defence Command shall be maintained in operation for a period of ten years or such shorter period as shall be agreed by both countries in the light of their mutual defence interests, and their objectives under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. The terms of this agreement may be reviewed upon request of either country at any time.

10. The Agreement between parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces signed in London on June 19, 1951, shall apply.

11. The release to the public of information by CINC NORAD on matters of interest to Canada and the United States will in all cases be the subject of prior consultation and agreement between appropriate agencies of the two Governments.

If the United States Government concurs in the principles set out above, I propose that this note and your reply should constitute an agreement between our two Governments effective from the date of your reply.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

N. A. ROBERTSON

The Honourable JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

MAY 12, 1958

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to your Excellency's note No. 263 of May 12, 1958 proposing on behalf of the Canadian Government certain principles to govern the future organization and operation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD).

I am pleased to inform you that my Government concurs in the principles set forth in your note. My Government further agrees with your proposal that your note and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments effective today.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:
CHRISTIAN A. HERTZ

His Excellency
NORMAN ROBERTSON,
Ambassador of Canada.

U.S. and Honduras Sign Agreement or First Loan From New Fund

press release 270 dated May 16

The first agreement for a loan from the new Development Loan Fund was signed on May 16 between the United States and the Central American Republic of Honduras. The fund was authorized by Congress to provide an additional source of financing to help friendly foreign nations to develop their economic resources and thus increase their productive capacity.

Honduras will use the \$5 million provided under this agreement to help finance construction of a new 45-mile paved highway to connect Puerto Cortes, the country's main Caribbean port, with the Honduran national road network and in improving Honduras' important Western and Southern Highways.

The agreement was signed for Honduras by Fernando Villar, Minister of Economy and Finance, and by Dempster McIntosh, Manager of the Development Loan Fund, for the United States. Among those witnessing the signing ceremony at DLF headquarters were Roberto Ramirez, president of the Central Bank of Honduras; Lempira Bonilla, economic counselor of the Embassy; and Rollin S. Atwood, regional director of Latin American operations of the International Cooperation Administration, which has a mutual security assistance program in Honduras.

The \$5 million which Honduras is receiving from the DLF will be used to finance the local-currency costs of highway projects estimated to cost \$10.5 million (21 million lempiras). The remaining \$5.5 million is being provided by a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to finance the cost of imported equipment, materials, and services.

The DLF loan is for a period of 20 years at an interest rate of 3½ percent. A significant feature, in addition to the relatively low interest rate, is provision for repayment of the dollar loan in lempiras—Honduran currency.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Property

Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14,

1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹
Accession deposited: Israel, April 1, 1958.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York June 23, 1953.²

Ratification deposited: Korea, April 29, 1958.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

International convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Dated at Washington February 8, 1949. Entered into force July 3, 1950. TIAS 2089.

Adherence deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, April 10, 1958.

Property

Convention for the protection of industrial property. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered into force August 1, 1938. 53 Stat. 1748.

Adherence effective: Australia, June 2, 1958.

Trade and Commerce

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to the texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.³

Signatures: Sweden, March 4, 1958; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, April 29, 1958.

United Nations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Done at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

Signature: Ghana, April 11, 1958.⁴

Weather

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Federation of Malaya, May 19, 1958.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement establishing a United States Air Force mission to conduct high level meteorological tests in Argentina. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires April 23 and 28, 1958. Entered into force April 28, 1958.

Canada

Agreement relating to organization and operations of the North American Air Defense Command. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 12, 1958. Entered into force May 12, 1958.

Italy

Agreement relating to the improvement of the child feeding program carried out by the Amministrazione per le Attivita' Assistenziali Italiane e Internazionali, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome May 8, 1958. Entered into force May 8, 1958.

Korea

Agreement amending research reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy of February 3, 1956

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

³ The instrument of acceptance by Ghana having been deposited, the constitution entered into force for Ghana Apr. 11, 1958.

(TIAS 3490). Signed at Washington March 14, 1958. Entered into force: May 22, 1958 (date on which each government received from the other written notification that it had complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

New Zealand

Agreement relating to the abolition of visa fees and the extension of the period of validity in certain types of nonimmigrant visas. Effected by exchange of notes at Wellington December 16, 1957 and May 2 and 5, 1958. Entered into force June 1, 1958.

Philippines

Agreement for the establishment of a Mutual Defense Board and the assignment of Philippine military liaison officers to United States military bases in the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila May 15, 1958. Entered into force May 15, 1958.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

20 FSO's Leave for Seminar in Africa

The Department of State announced on May 15 (press release 269) that a group of 20 Foreign Service officers would leave for Africa on May 29 to take part in a 3-month seminar which will give them a broader understanding of the problems and peoples of Africa south of the Sahara.

The seminar, conducted under the direction of the Foreign Service Institute, is being presented for the first time and is designed to meet the growing need for a greater understanding of Africa on the part of United States Government officials.

The seminar is being conducted in close cooperation with universities and government institutions in various parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and has been made possible by a grant of funds from the Ford Foundation.

Appointments

Abbot Low Moffat as director of the International Cooperation Administration operations mission in Ghana, effective May 19. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 275 dated May 19.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

International Traffic in Arms—Regulations Issued by the Secretary of State Governing Registration and Licensing Under Section 414 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and Related Laws. Pub. 6587. 48 pp. 25¢.

A pamphlet containing the regulations governing the international traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war and technical data relating thereto.

Questions and Answers on the Mutual Security Program. Pub. 6613. General Foreign Policy Series 125. 20 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet answering the questions commonly asked concerning the Mutual Security Program of the United States.

Facts About Foreign Trade. Pub. 6617. Commercial Policy Series 166. 17 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet containing a series of charts demonstrating the importance to the U.S. economy of our exports and imports.

Organization of American States. Pub. 6625. International Organization and Conference Series II, American Republics 15. 20 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet outlining the history, organization, and functions of the Organization of American States.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to May 19 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 264, and 266 of May 14, 269 of May 15, and 270 of May 16.

No.	Date	Subject
†273	5/19	U.S. protests Soviet action on John A. Baker.
274	5/19	U.S.-Canadian exchange of notes on NORAD.
275	5/19	Moffat named USOM director in Ghana (rewrite).
276	5/19	Visit of Philippine President (rewrite).
277	5/20	Dillon: "Economic Growth in a Divided World."
†278	5/20	DLF authorizes loans to 5 countries.
†279	5/20	Palmer: "The United States and Emerging Africa."
280	5/20	Dulles: news conference.
†281	5/20	U.S. mining experts to visit Soviet Union.
282	5/21	Katzen to observe informational media grant program in Israel.
283	5/22	Iran credentials (rewrite).
*284	5/22	President's semiannual report on mutual security program.
285	5/23	Afghanistan credentials (rewrite).
†286	5/24	U.S. note to Soviets on travel regulations.
287	5/24	Experts on nuclear tests chosen to meet with Soviet experts (rewrite).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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TREATIES IN FORCE

A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1958

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

The new edition of *Treaties in Force* (266 pp.) is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$1.25 a copy.

Publication 6626

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Bulletin

Vol. XXXVIII, No. 990

June 16, 1958

THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XXXVIII, No. 990 • PUBLICATION 6653

June 16, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

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The First Ten Years of the World Health Organization

**10TH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIVE SESSION OF WHO
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., MAY 26-27, 1958**

Following is the text of remarks made before the 10th anniversary commemorative session of the World Health Organization at Minneapolis by Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, together with an address by Milton Eisenhower, president of the Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Eisenhower was the personal representative of the President at the session, and Mr. Wilcox was a U.S. delegate.¹

REMARKS BY MR. WILCOX, MAY 26

It gives me great pleasure to be the first to welcome you on behalf of the Government and the people of the United States to this 10th anniversary commemorative session of the World Health Organization. Dr. Milton Eisenhower, the personal representative of the President, will have more to say in this regard when he addresses you tomorrow.

The people and the Government of the United States are deeply honored to have the opportunity of serving as hosts to the World Health Assembly. Your presence here is an expression of the keen interest of the United States in the World Health Organization, and I am certain that it will stimulate in the people of our country an even greater awareness of the vital and far-reaching work being done by this organization.

In my capacity as Assistant Secretary of State in charge of international organization affairs, I am constantly concerned with that relatively new dimension of international relations—multilateral diplomacy. Although this is a comparatively young branch of the art of diplomacy, it has been rightfully called "the diplomacy of the future."

¹ For other members of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of June 2, 1958, p. 983.

Many of its techniques are still in the formative stage, and a certain amount of trial and error are still involved; but, as an indication of what we may expect in the future from multilateral cooperation, I know of nothing more encouraging than the story of the success of the first 10 years of the World Health Organization.

The WHO has a record of solid achievement. The combined efforts of doctors, scientists, and public-health administrators of its member countries have built an ever-increasing storehouse of knowledge and experience which today is available to millions of people throughout the world for the improvement of their health and well-being. These efforts have produced significant gains in the constant fight against many communicable diseases.

Although the battle against communicable disease is the most dramatic aspect of the work of the World Health Organization, the development of public-health services may prove to be its most important contribution to the welfare of mankind, for effective public-health services will be able to prevent the very diseases which we are now fighting to control. Laying the foundations in countries where none existed and strengthening them where they did exist, the Organization is now directing a great part of its activity into this all-important field. Here, too, the story is one of accomplishment, particularly in the less developed areas of the world—rural health services established, hospital administrators and nurses trained, rehabilitation programs and physical therapy schools in operation.

A great measure of this rapid accomplishment is due to the close cooperation which has existed between the WHO and other branches of the United Nations system. Working closely with the Food and Agriculture Organization, the WHO

has made steady progress in the solution of serious health problems created by nutritional deficiencies. It has joined forces with the International Labor Organization in helping to improve industrial medicine. In cooperation with the United Nations Children's Fund, it has made vital contributions in improving the tragic plight of two-thirds of the world's 900 million children who lack adequate food, shelter, and protection against disease. Given continued support for the work of WHO, there is real reason to believe that much of the burden of disease now holding back man's progress can be brought under effective control and in some cases eradicated.

A Blend of Idealism and Practicality

This progress of the WHO, in my opinion, has been possible because it has achieved a remarkably happy blend of the highest idealism with the soundest of practical operating techniques. It has not attempted to bite off more than it can chew. It has exercised praiseworthy realism in recognizing the limits within which it has to work and in concentrating its efforts and designing programs geared to available resources. These programs not only have had great impact in the present but also serve as clear evidence of what can be expected in the future.

In your lifetime and mine, if present trends continue, this world of ours will be literally bursting at the seams. Population is increasing at such an explosive rate that it will confront man with a tremendous challenge in providing food and clothing and adequate medical care for our teeming billions. It is estimated that every week now 1.8 million new births occur. Every hour that passes welcomes 11,000 new babies into the world, and life expectancy is increasing by leaps and bounds.

Now, I am well aware of the argument that the WHO, through its efforts to improve health standards, is exacerbating the world's population problem rather than making it better. Why should we make an all-out effort to improve infant mortality rates and to increase man's longevity, the argument runs, when there are already more people in the world than can presently be sustained at a decent level of living?

Quite apart from the moral aspects of this problem, it remains a fact that people who are racked with fever, or weak from debilitating diseases,

cannot make substantial contributions to their nation's productivity. The World Health Organization is helping to give people in many lands strength and energy to build and produce and grow the things man needs to live a more abundant life.

It is highly encouraging to note that in the last few years world food production, at long last, has begun to outstrip the rapid increase in population. Overall food production in 1956 increased by close to 3 percent over the previous year, while world population increased only by 1.7 percent. It is significant, I think, that some of the substantial increases in production occurred in former malarial areas where the work of the WHO has been particularly active and effective.

Thus, the WHO is not only saving lives, but it is helping to move the world ever closer to the time when every human being can enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

In the years to come the WHO will be called upon to assume increasing responsibilities in a variety of areas relating to public health. There will no doubt be increased efforts to eliminate or alleviate cardiovascular diseases, cancer, diabetes, arthritis, rheumatism, influenza, and poliomyelitis, as well as certain tropical diseases. We can expect increased attention in such important fields as the prevention of emotional and mental disorders, occupational health, food and drug services, and the health aspects of nuclear energy. These will be the great medical problems of tomorrow.

A Contribution to Peace

In addition to the contribution which the WHO is making toward improving standards of health and productivity in the world, it is making still another contribution to peace which is somewhat more subtle but perhaps no less significant. Admittedly, the political activities of the General Assembly and the Security Council are far more glamorous than the economic and social work of the United Nations. The WHO seldom makes front-page headlines, and its efforts are carried on without a great deal of fanfare. But the WHO, in its quiet and effective way, is doing much to encourage nations to work together to solve their mutual problems. In the long run, this growing habit of working together will have a lasting impact upon the solution of problems in the political field.

White House press release dated May 27

The President of the United States has asked me to bring you the following message:

Personally and on behalf of the people of the United States, I extend to you, the delegates of governments of so many countries, a warm welcome. You have come here from all corners of the world to deal with very human and personal problems that affect us all. I wish you notable success.

The 10th Anniversary Commemorative Session of the World Health Organization directs our attention to the fact that the nations of the world are working together in harmony for the improvement of the living conditions of all peoples. As a result of the work of the World Health Organization and the stimulating leadership it has given to its member states, millions the world over are spared from disease and suffering that would have been their lot. The United States is proud of its part and the part of its health leaders in this mutual endeavor. We look forward to even greater accomplishments in the control of disease, in the building of health services and in the opening of new avenues of medical knowledge through research. We look to the World Health Organization with confidence as a proven instrument through which the nations and the peoples of the world can combine their efforts, in friendship, toward the building of true peace.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

For myself, may I say that it is a genuine privilege to address the 10th anniversary commemorative session of the World Health Assembly.

It is for good reason that the World Health Organization has won the respect of nations and the confidence and trust of people everywhere. The health of the individual is precious to the individual and to those dear to him. The health of the community and the state, to a considerable extent, depends on the health of the individual. An organization dedicated to improving human health and composed of so many of the world's nations working together in peaceful endeavor surely must succeed in its aim. The fact that its success has been so rapid must be credited to the foundations on which it was built. The founders of the World Health Organization recognized the problems and the need to extend the scope of international health activities beyond those which were carried out by its predecessors, the International Office of Public Health and the League of Nations Health Organization. The achievements of these past 10 years are largely

It is well to keep in mind that disease is international, in the worst sense of the word. Germs go from one country to another without passports or visas, and their incursions in this respect are seldom noticed. Moreover, DDT-spraying programs certainly do not have the public impact of the launching of an earth satellite or an outer-space missile. But these and other WHO efforts are equally as important, in the long run, as many of the drama-packed conferences in the political field. Through steady cooperation of this kind, we can make significant contributions to the creation of those conditions in the world which will form the basis of a lasting peace.

In the field of health we have passed the point of no return. International cooperation is not only sensible and desirable; it is essential.

In this connection I would be derelict in my duty if I did not avail myself of this opportunity to express my deep admiration for the outstanding work of two great leaders, Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Dr. [Marcolino G.] Candau, Director General of the World Health Organization. In their respective jurisdictions, these two men—aided by their able staffs—have given unstintingly of their time and their talents to further the cause of peace and to move the world ahead in its eternal quest for human betterment. They prove again that progress does not always originate with the great powers; they demonstrate once more the unique and invaluable contribution which the smaller states can make to the United Nations.

The World Health Organization has launched a program to improve the health of mankind on a scale unknown in history. Its achievements already have provided a preview of the almost limitless possibilities for international cooperation in the field of public health. If the new developments in the scientific and technological fields are devoted to the well-being of mankind everywhere, I am firmly convinced that the day will come when many of the diseases which are common today throughout the world will be unknown to successive generations.

In conclusion, Mr. President, may I say to all the delegations represented here that I sincerely hope that your stay in the United States will be most pleasant and productive. I wish you every success in your deliberations.

due to the vision and dedication of those who have given the World Health Organization leadership and direction. The very structure of the Organization, with its far-reaching network for tapping the knowledge and resources of the world's experts in health and making these available to the health authorities of the world, has been a pattern for successful international cooperation.

We congratulate the World Health Organization for what it has accomplished in these few years. Its modest beginnings, at a time when the world was struggling to emerge from the devastation of war, had the undeniably friendly effect of speeding the recovery of those who had been sorely hurt, helping them on the road to a better future.

Tuberculosis, yaws and the other treponematoses, malaria, and malnutrition are now the subject of intensive effort on the part of the countries and regions in which they exist. The catalyst—the assistance of the World Health Organization—is gradually being transferred from these increasingly self-sustaining programs to newer, urgent programs in other areas. Thus, 10 years ago, yaws was the chief health problem of Haiti. Thirty-five to forty percent of the population was afflicted. Today yaws is practically extinct there, thanks to local initiative and international assistance.

The United States has been closely associated with WHO's growth and development. Some who are here today helped in drafting its constitution. Our public-health profession has given of its time and efforts without stint to further its aims. Many have acted as consultants in WHO programs, and more have served as members of expert panels.

Public-health work, perhaps more than any other human endeavor, is conducive to intimate international cooperation. Disease is no respecter of national boundaries. Nations can acquire health without depriving any other nation of these benefits.

A Pattern for Peaceful Cooperation

The demonstration by the World Health Organization of the potentiality of such friendly and productive mutual work by nations has set a pattern for peaceful cooperation in other fields.

As president of the Johns Hopkins University,

I am proud to acknowledge a thread of kinship between our School of Hygiene and Public Health and the World Health Organization. The founders of the university recognized the vital importance of medical science and the health of people and the universal nature of progress in these fields. From the earliest days of the university, its interests have extended beyond national boundaries. Many of the graduates of our school represented their countries in the founding of this great international organization. Your distinguished Director General is one of our graduates. Many members of the staff of the Organization are alumni of the Johns Hopkins, and the names of many of the delegates to this World Health Assembly are familiar to us as former students.

The International Center concerned with treponematoses is located at Hopkins, and our faculty, in collaboration with the World Health Organization, has made contributions to the control of these diseases. Research in such problems as poliomyelitis, malaria, yellow fever, cancer, and heart disease is carried on at the university and gives promise of further improvement in the health of the people of the world. We are proud of the part we have played in the development of this effective international agency.

This 10th anniversary celebration should remind the peoples of the world of the tremendous advances made in medical science in recent years and especially in the prevention of disease and disability. Peoples everywhere should know that the World Health Organization has had a profound influence on these developments and that this influence will grow with the years.

They should know, too, that the Organization has pioneered in developing effective techniques of international action in the control of those diseases for which we now have effective preventive measures. These techniques include technical assistance and internationally coordinated efforts, demonstration of methods, training, and exchange of experience.

With this background of achievement the World Health Organization during the next 3 weeks will be looking into the future. Such a forward look suggests two general areas in which further advance can be predicted. First, eradication of those diseases that we now know *how* to control and, second, of equal importance, the discovery of measures for the ultimate conquest of

other diseases that we do *not* yet know how to control.

The World Health Organization has stimulated the imagination of men everywhere by boldly embarking upon a campaign to eradicate one of the most extensive diseases to which man is prone—malaria. It was my privilege, as personal representative of our President, to present to the Director of the Pan American Sanitary Bureau early in 1957 an initial special contribution to this campaign.² Since then, as you know, the United States has made further contributions to the WHO Malaria Eradication Special Account and to the Pan American Sanitary Organization. These will help to attain the ultimate goal but are not alone sufficient to the needs. The President of the United States in his state of the Union message of January 9, 1958,³ invited other nations to join in this campaign. It is our hope that many will do so in order that the peoples of the world, who have faith in this great eradication effort of the World Health Organization, will not be disappointed. In addition to the deep human significance of this campaign, it is a test of the ability of nations to join forces in an all-out attack upon a great killer. When the WHO initiated its work in this field, malaria afflicted some 300 million persons a year. Three million died each year from malaria. Now the incidence has been cut in half and the death rate halved as well. But the challenge of full and final victory remains.

The World Health Organization has also been occupied during the past decade with the conquest of other diseases for which the control methods are known. When the WHO took the world stage in health following the war, new methods and agents were ready at hand, while actual control of disease had in many places deteriorated. The WHO brought the new together with the old with triumphant effect—penicillin in yaws, DDT in malaria, BCG in tuberculosis. New methods were introduced promptly to speed the accomplishment. We confidently expect WHO to expand this worldwide activity.

As the infectious diseases, the historic scourges of mankind, are gradually brought under control and eradicated, we find other problems moving into the foreground of our concern. Two such are

heart disease and cancer. A certain amount is known about both—enough so that the vast uncharted areas of knowledge concerning them are recognized, as an explorer recognizes the borders of a new continent.

Yet we know that intensive exploration will solve the mysteries of heart disease and of cancer—that *a way will be found*. It is even now a question of when, not whether. *Where* is almost immaterial. For the man or woman who achieves the final breakthrough may come forward in any part of the world.

The great medical advances over the last century evoke names from many countries: Pasteur and the Curies of France, Koch and Ehrlich of Germany, Noguchi of Japan, Fleming of Britain, Houssay of Argentina, Pavlov of Russia, Florey of Australia, Semmelweis of Austria, the Mayos and Salk of the United States. India has given us the tranquilizers; Switzerland, DDT; Germany, the sulfa drugs.

What great names and what countries will take their places on the high pediment of future medical history we do not yet know. But what is clear is that, whoever they are, wherever they are, their achievements will be based on the shared knowledge of scientists everywhere and will benefit all mankind.

U.S. Proposal for Research Study

I wish to submit a proposal for your thoughtful consideration. I propose that the WHO conduct a special study during the coming year—through a staff selected for the purpose, working with the world's leaders in medical research—to determine how it may most effectively perform its fullest role in research. If this seems to you to offer promise, Secretary Folsom⁴ has told me that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, on behalf of the United States, is prepared to make a special grant to the Organization for such a preliminary study. From this study, emphasizing initially cancer and heart disease, we would anticipate the emergence of a plan that would merit the support of member states. Furthermore, the United States is prepared to consider providing substantial support for any sound program that may result from the study.

⁴Marion B. Folsom, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, was head of the U.S. delegation to the 10th anniversary commemorative session.

²BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1957, p. 565.

³*Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 115.

In research the World Health Organization has been a stimulator and coordinator, not a doer. This is as it should be, and we should assure that it can play this key role with full effect.

The first steps toward the coordination of research have already been taken. By the end of last year, the WHO had established close working relationships with 1,800 institutions and laboratories. It was making use of 35 expert panels in as many fields, with a total membership of 1,400 health experts. It thus is able to stimulate and coordinate research in a wide variety of fields through laboratories in many lands. WHO facilitation of interchange of ideas and information in 1957 included worldwide or regional technical conferences, seminars and expert committees in cancer, addiction-producing drugs, heart disease, malaria, insect resistance to insecticides, atomic energy, mental health, yellow fever, professional education, and other fields.

The sum total of these research activities represents only a small percentage of the Organization's budget. Their significance, however, cannot be measured in terms of the amounts spent. One example of this important type of work which has impressed me was the rapid development of an effective preventive vaccine against Asian influenza last year. This was the direct result of having an internationally coordinated network of laboratories that received reports on its occurrence and determined the prevalence of the causative virus strain.

The record is impressive. But much more is needed.

We need more rapid exchange of ideas and information between laboratories and scientists. We need more opportunities for scientists to meet together and discuss freely their work and their problems. We need to find the gaps in research and fill them. We need to develop research workers and give them scope and opportunity. We must search world-wide to know where disease occurs and why. We must test, in the laboratory, empirical observations that are made in the field and in the hospitals. We must examine those ma-

terials and ideas that have persisted through the centuries as traditions and superstitions in the folklore of the world.

It is our expectation that out of the special study which I have proposed the world can, through the WHO, address itself more vigorously to finding solutions to the great unsolved mysteries of disease. Thus again the WHO would establish international patterns of effort which might lead, as President Eisenhower suggested last January, to "a full-scale cooperative program of science for peace."

A reexamination and intensification of its research role is one of the significant challenges before the World Health Organization. The United States has faith in the will and ability of the WHO to meet this challenge. Our faith in the future is based on the performance of the past—indeed on a decade of accomplishment which it is our pride and our privilege to celebrate today.

U.S. Recognizes Establishment of Arab Union

Press release 293 dated May 25

The Government of the United States of America has today [May 28] recognized that the necessary constitutional and legislative measures have been taken by Iraq and by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for the establishment of the Arab Union and has extended its good wishes to the Union on this occasion.

The Government of the United States has been informed that until the time when the Union takes over the central functions of the two Kingdoms, pursuant to the provisions of the constitution of the Arab Union, their external affairs will remain as they are at the present time. The matter of the accreditation by the United States of an ambassador to the Arab Union and by the Arab Union to the United States does not, therefore, arise for the present.

The United States and Emerging Africa

by Joseph Palmer 2d

Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs¹

The march of events during the last few years and months has brought the erstwhile "dark" continent into the center of the world arena. I am sure that as a result of the lectures you have heard during participation in this pioneering course on "Africa South of the Sahara" you, too, will agree with Vice President Nixon's statement in his report to the President on his trip to the area last year that "the emergence of a free and independent Africa is as important to us in the long run as it is to the people of that continent."²

I have been asked to outline United States policy toward Africa. I shall therefore attempt to speak in general terms but know that you will bear in mind that there are, in fact, many Africas, even south of the Sahara, and our policy has to be molded to fit the facts and circumstances of the different regions and the particular countries and territories there.

For our purposes tonight, I should like to begin by outlining five facts which stand out in the postwar world and which have peculiar pertinence for Africa and must therefore be considered in any formulation of United States policy toward that continent. These are:

One, that there is increasing recognition that no state can live alone in splendid isolation as a compact self-sufficient island. The independent states and emerging territories of Africa understand their interdependence with the other nations of the free world but seek full recognition and equal status within the framework of that interdependence.

Two, that nationalism is a major world political force—a force which has resulted in the postwar creation or reestablishment in Asia and Africa of 20 independent nations inhabited by approximately three-quarters of a billion people. Of these 20 new states, 5 are African. We can all agree that nationalism in its moderate form can be constructive and bring great benefit to those who guide it wisely. At the same time we are also aware that the last 20 years are replete with examples of the dangers which this force poses in extremist hands.

Three, that the races of the world—of all colors—are increasingly awakening to the fact they cannot afford to think and act in exclusive terms. This is a matter of urgent and immediate importance in those African states and territories where two or more races live side by side.

Four, that one-third of the world is now living under Communist domination, which has brought 600 million people under a new and sinister imperialism since World War II. This imperialism is now girding itself to threaten Africa.

Five, that a new fact has played an increasing role in international relations in the last decade or so—the diplomacy of "peoples speaking to peoples." This unofficial, private diplomacy has become increasingly important in postwar Africa.

I would like to devote the remainder of the hour to discussing the application of these facts to United States policy in Africa.

Interdependence

First, the fact of interdependence.

Improved communications are fast making long remote Africans close neighbors of the rest of the world, including the United States. Along

¹ Address made at New York University, New York, N.Y., on May 20 (press release 279).

² BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1957, p. 635.

with this development has come a clear appreciation of how interrelated is free-world security and how diligent we must be to stand ready in all parts of the world to help create the conditions of stability, prosperity, and security which are so vital to our own well-being. World peace and prosperity are indivisible, and we Americans share with other like-minded nations great responsibilities in many areas far from our shores in implementation of this concept.

The interdependence of Africa and Western Europe is indisputable. The two continents are essentially complementary areas. The economies of the Western European powers would suffer greatly if they were denied access to African markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities. Africa, on the other hand, cannot expand its less highly developed economies without technical know-how, capital accumulations, export markets, and finished goods such as those which Western European and other free-world countries are in a position to provide.

Without exception the European metropolitan powers recognize the importance of a continued relationship between them and their African territories, however widely they may differ in the philosophies underlying their policies in their overseas territories and in the methodology employed to achieve this objective. Similarly, the moderate African regimes now in power recognize in most cases the mutual advantage of the continuance of close ties with the Western World. The evolution of mutually satisfactory arrangements, adjusted to changed conditions, may well be decisive in determining the future stability and prosperity of both continents.

The United States and the Western World have a basic interest in increased African economic development, which is clearly essential to its sound political evolution. The size, diversity, and needs of the continent are so great as to require the sympathetic attention of all the countries in the free world in a position to help, for the needs are beyond the capability of any one country to meet. Nor should one forget that, whereas private capital can make a tremendous contribution, it cannot always do this job alone.

The metropolitan powers themselves have recognized this problem and have committed extensive resources to economic and social development largely for the projects which are not considered

bankable either by private capital or international agencies.

The United Nations, through its extended technical assistance program, through loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and through other forms of technical assistance from its affiliated World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Children's Fund, and International Labor Organization, is contributing substantially to African social and economic development.

The United States has also demonstrated its willingness to assist in this giant task to the extent that it can, taking into account the heavy demands which are made upon it on a worldwide basis. We have been providing and intend to continue to provide, in accordance with administrative policy and subject to congressional approval, assistance to African countries.

Nationalism

Despite—and not necessarily inconsistent with—the very practical recognition of the importance of interdependence, it is evident that the dynamic trend in postwar Africa is the movement toward self-government and independence.

This great movement is both old and new. For example, Liberia this July celebrates its 111th independence day while Ethiopia's independence dates back to Biblical times. In their postwar manifestations the same forces which began in Asia and the Middle East and swept across North Africa have now spread to sub-Sahara Africa, where on March 6 last year we saw Ghana gain its independence and thereby join the new nations of Libya, the Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia, all of which have acquired their independence since 1951.

It is obvious that the success which the free world demonstrates in accommodating itself to this dynamic African nationalism may well be decisive in determining the future orientation of the continent.

An important indication of the current trend of African nationalism is found in the resolutions adopted by the representatives of the eight independent African states attending the pan-African conference held at Accra from April 15 to 22 on the invitation of Prime Minister Nkrumah. These resolutions made clear that, generally

speaking, independent Africa today is led by moderate men; is zealous to strengthen and safeguard its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; is vitally interested in advancing itself economically, socially, and culturally; and is intent on playing an important and responsible role in world affairs. Although we are not in accord with all that was said or advocated at Accra, we happily find ourselves in broad agreement—or at least broad understanding—with much that emerged from the conference.

Despite the dynamic trend of African nationalism, however, there are still large areas of the continent where the impact of Western civilization has left less of an imprint and the African remains politically inarticulate. Consequently the current problem is how to create the most desirable conditions for orderly development by educating an informed, discriminating citizenry, building durable representative institutions, and creating a stable economic and social structure in the very limited time available before pressures become too great to control.

In general it would appear that the present tempo of African development—the transformation to self-government and to independence—is proceeding at a rate commensurate with the requirements of the situation in most areas.

The United Nations has been an immensely constructive force in this development. The trust territories, of course, have been most directly affected. Under terms of the United Nations Charter, each administering power is charged with promoting the advancement of its trust territories toward self-government or independence. As a result of progress in this respect, the former British Togoland voted to join Ghana in 1957, the Italian East African Trust Territory of Somalia is due to obtain its independence in 1960, and other African trust territories such as French Togo and Cameroun are evolving rapidly toward the ultimate objectives of the trusteeship system.

The United Nations has not only provided opportunities for African nationalism to appeal to international conscience; it has also induced a sense of responsibility in holding out the prospect of membership in the community of nations when statehood is realized. Once membership in the United Nations has been obtained, it provides a framework for continued responsibility, as well as security, by relieving leaders of new states

from excessive preoccupation with the danger of external attack. Conversely, the obligations of United Nations membership also enable African leaders to demonstrate more easily to their citizens the danger of resorting to national adventure themselves.

The United Nations Charter, I feel sure, will also play a most salutary and necessary role in African affairs by providing a guide for the peaceful solution of any disputes which may arise from boundaries which were drawn originally with inadequate consideration of ethnic, economic, and even geographic factors. It is not always easy for political leaders to withstand extremist pressures to engage in an old-fashioned border dispute or to encourage a dubious irredentism. This is not to say that there may not be cases in which territorial adjustments will be necessary, desirable, and in accordance with the desires and interests of the nations and populations concerned. But the ability to rise above mere chauvinism—of which there have been many heartening demonstrations already—may well be one of the key indices in assessing the ultimate success of African nationalism in bringing a better life to the peoples of Africa. In this regard a salutary emphasis on a cooperative regional approach to the exploitation of natural resources lying in frontier or disputed areas may well offer a means by which many of the difficult territorial questions can be reduced to negotiable terms.

The concept of a nation has not hitherto existed in the historical experience of much of Africa south of the Sahara. The national vision, in fact, often materializes only in the course of—and almost as a means of—acquiring governmental autonomy. In this respect the national movement often has the explicit or implicit understanding of the administering authorities, and in such cases the construction of the nation becomes a cooperative venture of indigenous and external forces. But, however nurtured, the concept of the nation has amazing capacity for taking root and flourishing in this virgin African territory. The heroes of the national movement acquire by their successes the stature which enables them to exert an appeal and influence throughout the extent of their territory. There can, in short, be little doubt that the national self-consciousness formed in this fashion, under the time-contracted conditions prevailing in Africa today, is no less real

and viable than that nationalism on other continents which has the sanction of a long history.

The course of African nationalism, thus far at least, and particularly when compared with the development in other parts of the world, has in most instances been a remarkably sound and reasonable one. The African national movements which led their countries to statehood in the post-war period have to a gratifying degree controlled the temptations, usual to their historical position, of chauvinism, blind rejection of constructive external influence, and neglect of economic needs for eye-catching but sterile political maneuvers.

Contemporary African national leaders have by and large assured themselves of a distinguished place in their national histories—and in international esteem—by virtue of statesmanlike moderation and ability to plan soundly for their countries' futures. Nor should we for a moment forget that in many cases it has been the farsighted policies of the metropolitan powers themselves which have given the impetus to this wholesome development.

The United States favors the orderly transition from colonial to self-governing status in African territories. We emphasize in this connection that self-government and independence carry with them grave responsibilities to the world community and that therefore neither status should be conferred or acquired lightly. We soberly recognize that in the long run premature independence may contain as many dangers for Africa as the temporary postponement of this status.

We may conclude that nascent African nationalism means not only the remodeling of the political map of Africa in the years immediately ahead but also the transformation of the relationship between the European colonial powers and Africans. Mutually beneficial relationships are being sought and found, as we have already noted in discussing the importance of interdependence.

Racialism and Tribal Rivalries

Complicating the trend toward self-government and independence, however, are the problems of racialism and tribal rivalries. Of Africa's more than 220 million people, only about 6 million are European and approximately 750,000 Asian. Up to 800 tribes are included in the African population.

In British East Africa tribal tensions have been

as serious a problem as interracial stresses. In Kenya there is a history of hostility among the tribes which frequently erupted into warfare before the British assumed control. Even more than half a century later the antagonisms thus generated are far from healed. In Uganda, where the racial problem is negligible, a serious difficulty in the political evolution of the country is the rivalry between the province of the Buganda tribe and the three other provinces. Tanganyika has a somewhat similar, although less acute, problem in the disparities between, for example, the Wachagga and the various other African peoples of the trust territory.

Racialism in Africa takes many forms, all of them divisive to a regrettable degree but most of them presently under what is remarkable control, considering the stresses involved. We may note in this connection not only misunderstanding and friction between Africans and Europeans but also between Asians and Africans, between Arabs and Negroes.

It is often pointed out that relationships between Europeans and Africans have been strained primarily in areas where Europeans have come as permanent settlers in large numbers, generally where the climate and the economic potential have favored European settlement. In contrast, racial problems have been relatively minor or temporary in those regions where white settlers are few and where the role of the European has been almost exclusively that of administrator, missionary, teacher, trader, or technician. Apparently, therefore, it is not contact between Europeans and Africans *per se* which gives rise to the most serious racial problems but an actual or potential economic and social competition between these two permanently established racial groups.

It would be both wrong and futile to draw from these comments any inference that it was historical error for Europeans to settle permanently on African soil. This would be to dismiss the great benefits which the industry, imagination, and skills of the European settlers have brought to their African neighbors. As a moral judgment it would ignore the facts that the European settlement occurred largely on land which was not being utilized by the Africans and that the countries involved are in most cases the only homes the Europeans know. More importantly, such a con-

clusion would imply a lack of confidence that men of differing races and colors, living side by side, can work out a common destiny based on ideals of partnership, brotherhood, and justice. Although this objective is, of course, difficult of realization, we must reject the pessimistic premise that racial partnership is an impossible ideal.

There is no simple panacea for the race problem, and it would be presumptuous of us to propose one. We are attempting to solve our own race problems at home in accordance with our traditions and by a lawful process. We do not intend to become identified with any conflicting element in Africa. We do seek to exert a moderating influence upon all extremists, for we know from experience that the solution of interracial relationships requires light, not heat; patience, not undue pressure.

Communist Imperialism

Casting its shadow over all aspects of contemporary Africa is the divisive effort of Soviet imperialism to destroy the cooperative ventures of the free world and to subvert the area to its own design. At the recent Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo, the Communists served notice that Africa is to be a major arena for their future anticolonial activity. To implement this program they have established a new apparatus in Cairo for agitation and subversive activities throughout the continent.

It is clear that the immediate Communist objective in Africa is to deny the continent to the West through fanning anticolonialism, nationalism, and racism, encouraging neutralism, and proffering economic assistance cynically billed as being "without strings." The Communists have in fact shown some progress in penetrating individual African labor organizations, youth groups, and nationalist organizations. They have assiduously cultivated students, particularly those studying in Europe and the United Arab Republic, with some success. They have also been successful in the last 2 years in signing trade agreements with most of the independent African states. Perhaps the best example of the sort of situation to which we must be alert is to be found in the French-administered U.N. Trust Territory of Cameroun, where a Communist-influenced outlawed minority party has for the past few years attempted to

overthrow by force the freely elected indigenous government.

On the other hand, and despite some new commercial agreements, Communist trade with Africa is still at a comparatively low level; no Communist parties of importance exist openly anywhere; and African trade-union movements have affiliated with the ICFTU rather than with the Communist-dominated WFTU. In short, the African has shown a refreshing and heartening reserve toward Soviet blandishments.

However, we must not allow this comparatively favorable situation to give rise to complacency. We must recognize that the greatest danger of Communist penetration of Africa arises not so much from direct Communist activity as from Western attitudes and deeds. Should the West falter in its determination and its ability to show steady progress in the process of accommodation to the range of problems which you have been studying here at New York University these last few months—nationalism, racial problems, economic and social development—the road for Communist exploitation will be opened. I am confident, however, that there is too much wisdom in Africa and in the free world to permit this to happen.

"Peoples to Peoples" Diplomacy

Obviously the solution of Africa's many problems is going to require a great cooperative effort. And this effort cannot be limited to the public sector alone. It will require the utilization of that developing postwar international weapon—"peoples to peoples" diplomacy.

The activities of American missionaries in Africa are a prime example of the effectiveness of the private sector in achieving U.S. objectives in Africa. Not only have 5,000 American missionaries brought an understanding of Christian ethics, but they have also made a major contribution to the basic medical, educational, and community facilities of Africa. In many cases they have pioneered these fields and have penetrated far into the interior of the continent to bring their services to remote populations. Even today they continue to be responsible for a large part of the education which the African receives. Our obligation and Africa's debt to the missionary are immeasurable in material terms.

Historically, American interest in Africa has revolved around private trade and humanitarian activities. The American Colonization Society, a private group, was chartered in 1816 by the United States Congress to help settle on the west coast of Africa men who had regained their freedom in this country. Liberia, the area selected, was first settled in 1822 with both public and private funds. Subsequently, in 1847, Liberia became the first African republic.

The contribution of the United States Government to Liberian educational, agricultural, public health, sanitation, highway, and port development has been considerable since World War II. In addition American private enterprise has assisted substantially the efforts of the Liberian Government to promote this growth and development of the economy. For example, the rubber and iron exports produced by U.S. firms operating in Liberia provided that country with 45 percent of its total revenue in 1956. This is indeed a tribute both to private initiative and to the Liberian Government, which recognized the importance of fostering an atmosphere conducive to such progress.

American private-enterprise contribution to the development of African territories has not been limited purely to trade and revenue. U.S. business firms have provided health facilities, technical training, demonstration of American business methods, as well as education, housing, and cooperative marketing arrangements for their employees and dependents.

But it is not only in the traditional fields of trade, investment, and missionary activity that private initiative is helping achieve U.S. objectives in the continent; it is in other fields, where peoples go directly to peoples, as well. In addition to the American Government's exchange-of-persons programs, there are the activities of the many private groups now engaged in this field. The Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations, the Phelps-Stokes Fund, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, the Institute of International Education, the African-American Institute, and the Twentieth Century Fund are among those helping Africa and Africans in the fields of education, aid to students, social and race-relations research, village community development, and public health.

Time does not permit my listing all the organizations interested and engaged in African affairs,

but before I leave this subject I must add my appreciation for the role being played by more and more American universities and colleges, such as New York University, which are offering courses and organized studies in African affairs to educate our youth in the history, problems, and prospects of this great continent.

Conclusions

Some conclusions are perhaps now in order:

First, a stable interdependent relationship between Africa and the West will emerge in the long run only to the extent that it is based on considerations of dignity, sovereignty, equality, and mutual advantage, both as among peoples and among states.

Second, we of the West must convince the Africans that we desire close, friendly, equal relationships for the value of those associations *per se* and not solely for any advantage which may accrue to us in the balance-of-power situation in the world today. The West must, at the same time, continue to recognize the force of nationalism and, as partners, to encourage its evolution into constructive, responsible channels.

Third, while avoiding identification with any faction in Africa and preserving our basic principle of racial equality, we should continue to exert a moderating influence as appropriate and oppose those who seek to exploit racial tensions in Africa for ulterior purposes. In our own experience in this country, we must continue to demonstrate by example our ability to make progress in developing beneficial and harmonious racial relationships.

Fourth, the Communists give evidence of girdling themselves for a determined effort to deny Africa to the free world. The success of the West in preventing this may depend less on our ability to convince the Africans of the dangers of communism than on our demonstrating to them in positive terms the advantages of cooperation with the West.

Finally, the United States Government alone cannot achieve all the objectives in Africa of this nation and its free-world associates. It is essential that "peoples to peoples" diplomacy—the whole private-enterprise system—assist in doing the total job. This diplomacy truly represents the full strength, the unique versatility—in fact, the very soul—of America.

United States Relations With Canada

*Statement by Livingston T. Merchant
Ambassador to Canada*¹

Mr. Chairman, I greatly appreciate this opportunity of appearing before the Foreign Relations Committee to report on our relations with Canada. I know the deep interest which you have in our friendly neighbor and ally to the north, and I welcome your concern that all possible steps be taken to preserve and strengthen the close relationships which have developed between our two countries over the years.

I

It is almost exactly 2 years ago that I took up my post in Ottawa as United States Ambassador to Canada. Before my arrival I had some familiarity with the country through visits, both official and personal. I had many Canadian friends. In addition, in the 3 years or so from 1953 to 1956, during which I served as Assistant Secretary of State, I had been responsible to the Secretary of State for our relations with Canada.

There has never been any doubt in my mind that from every point of view there is no friendly country with which our relations are more important than our relations with Canada. This is true for many reasons: geography; magnitude of the trade between us; the size of the investments citizens of each country own in the other; the unique position of Canada as the North American member of the British Commonwealth of Nations; the influence of Canada's voice in organizations such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Council, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and the Colombo Plan, in all of which we also are represented; and, finally, because the nature of the military threat which con-

fronts us has impelled us both into common, cooperative arrangements for jointly defending this continent.

I have likewise at no time had doubts as to the fundamental feeling of friendliness existing between Canadians and the people of our own country. One should not, however, overlook the fact that, arising from different histories and particularly the disparity in size between our populations and our economies, there exists in the minds of practically all Canadians, never far from the surface, the sort of apprehension which I think we ourselves would have if across our border there were 10 times as many active, energetic, and at times restless people burdened with worldwide responsibilities in a troubled time and hence turning to our concerns only a fraction of the attention that we would believe they deserved. I have heard on all sides in Canada, from Newfoundland to Vancouver, and from all sorts of people the complaint that the United States takes Canada for granted. They don't like it; in fact, nobody wants to be taken for granted.

The variety and complexity of our points of contact and relationship with Canada mean that there are problems between us every day. Some of these arise in the sector of private business, some in our governmental relations. On the whole, I think I can say that our relations have been excellent and remain so. Certainly we could not possibly look for more effective cooperation than exists in our common defense efforts. As an example of this, within the past few days notes have been exchanged between the two Governments formalizing the arrangements for the joint air defense of the continent.² Certainly no coun-

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 16.

² For text of notes, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1958, p. 979.

try is stouter than Canada in its support of the same principles of freedom and justice that we believe in both in the United Nations and in other multilateral forums.

Having said that, I must add that, in my judgment, there have been for a year or more signs of a change in climate or temperature in our relations. This change which I think I detect is reflected in steadily growing criticism of certain policies of the United States Government and of actions which are assumed to reflect policies of the United States Government. Nonetheless, there is, as I have said, a basic friendliness and reciprocal respect between our two countries and a recognition on the part of each that there is an inescapable need for the other. This underlying attitude, however, provides no guaranty that our relations will be always smooth. I am certain that we can solve all the problems that arise between us. It will, however, require on our part—as well as on the part of Canada—the devotion of the time and attention necessary to study the facts, to learn the other's point of view, and then to find answers which are consciously equitable to both.

I am, therefore, especially pleased that this committee has chosen to study United States relations with Canada and that Canada is the one country to be the subject of a separate and individual study by this committee. Also a source of deep satisfaction to me have been several recent study trips to Canada by Members of the Congress, including one last October by the distinguished chairman of this committee [Senator Theodore Francis Green]. I sincerely believe that such congressional visits to Canada are of inestimable value in promoting a better mutual understanding on both sides of the border of our respective problems and viewpoints. I earnestly hope that Members of both Houses of the Congress will consider more trips of this sort to Canada in the near future.

II

The geographic facts of life have inextricably linked the political, economic, and defense interests of the United States and Canada. With no other foreign country are the relations of the United States as close as with Canada. Because of the wide range of common interests between the two countries, the areas of possible friction are great. This increases the importance and magnitude of the task of the maintenance of satisfactory relations.

The disparity in population and power between Canada and the United States has understandably created a defensive reaction on the part of Canadians which takes the form of sensitivity to any real or fancied slight to Canadian sovereignty. Notwithstanding the basic soundness of present Canadian-United States relations, there is in this rapidly developing nation a growing consciousness of national destiny and nationalism. The United States must be constantly attentive to this development and continue to exercise great care in all aspects of relations with this country. United States representatives both at home and in Canada must be alert to forestall local irritations or criticisms.

The growing nationalism in Canada can result in difficulties, particularly if knowingly or unknowingly the United States or its representatives act in ways which appear to Canadians to infringe on their sovereignty or appear to overlook economic interests which Canadians regard as vital. Canadian sensitivity to the actions and policies of the United States is one of the political realities which cannot be overlooked in handling the problems inherent in the close relations between the two countries. This is particularly true of problems arising in connection with plans for the defense of the North American Continent.

The tremendous importance of Canada, because of its location, to the security of the United States is self-evident. Joint defense arrangements with Canada are more extensive and more complex than with any other single country. In essence the two countries are defended cooperatively and on a continental basis. Annual United States defense expenditures on old and new projects in Canada are at least half a billion dollars a year. Substantial numbers of the United States Armed Forces are stationed in Canada. The major part of this personnel, money, and materiel is committed to the bases in Newfoundland. A large amount is in such projects as the Distant Early Warning radar network built across northern Canada at an estimated cost of \$300 million. In addition there are many other joint projects involving men, equipment, and dollars on a lesser scale. These projects require constant and careful attention because of questions and difficulties over customs duties, labor laws, and personnel and because of problems with employees, dependents, transportation, and related matters. All of these require close co-

operation with the Canadian Government and assiduous effort on the part of the United States to respect and understand the viewpoints of our Canadian host and ally.

Another important area of joint interest is the development of the power and water resources of streams and waterways which lie between or in both the United States and Canada. There are some 40 streams which cross the international border. For optimum development complete co-operation is required between our two countries. Steady progress or successful arrangements have been made in a considerable number of these involved cases. Among the complex problems outstanding are those relating to the Kootenay, Columbia, and Yukon Rivers, all of which rise in Canada. The development of the Columbia River basin, for example, involves diverse public and private entities on both sides of the border. A solution depends on the completion of joint engineering studies, which are due to be finished this fall, and on the extent to which both parties are able to proceed objectively toward a mutually advantageous agreement.

A major example of what is possible in the way of solution to transboundary water matters is the St. Lawrence Seaway, a difficult problem ultimately transformed into a magnificent engineering achievement with enormous benefits for both countries. The Seaway will be officially opened early next summer.

Canada's emergence since World War II as an important factor on the international scene has been one of the remarkable developments of the postwar period. Canada plays a major role in NATO, in the United Nations and its organs, in the Colombo Plan, and in the Commonwealth. In Indochina it is a member of the International Control Commissions. In the Middle East General Burns, a Canadian, was until recently Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and is now Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force. Canada is a close friend of the United States and a staunch supporter of the free world.

A unique factor in our relations with Canada is that Canadians are informed, as no other people are, regarding events and developments in the United States. As unfortunately so often is the case abroad, they are particularly well informed about our failings and weaknesses and

somewhat less conscious of our achievements and qualities. On the other hand, they feel deeply, and perhaps justifiably, that we in the United States are relatively uninformed on developments and the pattern of life and government in Canada.

III

Canada, as far as trade is concerned, is the best customer of the United States. With a total foreign trade in 1957 of \$10.4 billion, of which imports were \$5.6 billion and exports \$4.8 billion, Canada has the highest per capita foreign trade of any country in the world and this trade is of corresponding importance to its economy. Two-thirds, or \$6.9 billion, of Canada's entire foreign trade was with the United States. Imports from the United States were \$4 billion, constituting 73 percent of total Canadian imports. Exports to the United States were \$2.9 billion, or 60 percent of total Canadian exports. Thus in 1957 Canada had a so-called unfavorable balance of trade with the United States of \$1.1 billion. This dramatic—and, from the Canadian point of view, unfavorable—balance of trade increases the intensity of the Canadian reaction to any proposed measures by the United States to restrict imports of goods and commodities which Canada produces, such as oil, lead, zinc, and copper. This heavy dependence on external trade also adds to Canada's resentment over the impact of United States surplus agricultural sales on Canadian exports of wheat to its traditional markets. I will say more on this later.

In 1957 over a fifth of total United States foreign trade was with Canada. This includes 19.1 percent of United States exports—nearly four times the amount shipped to the United Kingdom, our next best customer—and 22.3 percent of United States imports—over four times the amount imported from Brazil, our next most important supplier. United States foreign trade with Canada was greater than with the whole of South America and nearly as great as with all of Western Europe, excluding the United Kingdom.

To illustrate the importance to us of Canada as a trading partner, Canada is a major supplier to the United States of such raw and semiprocessed products as newsprint, pulp and pulpwood, nonferrous metals—nickel, aluminum, copper—fissionable materials, sawmill products, fish, and iron ore. Canada in turn provides an important

market for United States manufactures, particularly industrial machinery, automobiles, trucks, tractors and parts, electrical machinery and apparatus, chemicals, iron and steel-mill products and metal manufactures, petroleum products, as well as fruits, vegetables, and other foodstuffs.

United States citizens have approximately \$8 billion in direct investment in Canada. In addition they hold over \$4 billion of Canadian Government and municipal bonds and other portfolio investments. This total long-term private investment represents about two-fifths of total United States private long-term foreign investment. The extent of United States control over Canadian natural resources and industry implicit in this direct investment of United States capital is a matter of deep concern to Canadians. Moreover, the concern is intensified by the concentration of this investment in certain key sectors of the Canadian economy.

IV

As a result of the importance of our economic relationship, the following five aspects of Canadian-United States economic relations are of mounting anxiety to the Canadian Government and people:

1. *The United States-Canadian trade balance.* Canada annually buys far more goods and services from the United States than it sells to us. I should note, however, that in the past 6 months this excess of Canadian purchases over exports to us has declined.

2. *The magnitude of United States direct equity investment in Canada.* Canadians worry aloud over the extent of United States control over Canadian natural resources and industry and the alleged restriction of opportunity for Canadians to participate in the ownership and management of wholly owned United States subsidiaries in Canada.

3. *Protectionist trends in the United States.* The Canadians realize that any additional protectionist measures will increase the existing imbalance of trade. Many Canadians consider the United States tariff the major reason why Canadian exports are largely raw or semiprocessed rather than products processed in Canada.

4. *United States wheat disposal policies.* This has been a major irritant between the two coun-

tries. Wheat is far greater in importance to the Canadian economy than to the United States. For the year ending June 30, 1957, United States wheat stocks were reduced by 125 million bushels, from 1,034 million to 909 million. In the same period Canadian stocks increased by 143 million bushels, from 580 million bushels to 723 million bushels for the Canadian crop year ending July 31. About 44 percent of Canadian wheat is farm-stored, and farmers are unable to obtain payment for it until it can be delivered to the local elevator. Canadians consider that we "give away" our surplus wheat, drawing on our greater resources to pay our wheat farmers, and thereby undermine Canada's export trade in wheat. Canada cannot afford to give away much wheat; it is far too essential an element of Canada's export trade.

5. *Oil.* Canadians have watched happily but warily United States capital come to develop Canada's western oil resources. They know their resources cannot be effectively developed unless there is access to their natural market in the northern and western United States. Canadians hope that we will keep this market open to their oil, and they have trouble understanding our reasons for limiting oil imports. They consider themselves closely linked with us in defense, as indeed they are. They ask why oil is different from air defense.

V

During both last year's and this year's election campaigns, Prime Minister Diefenbaker has persistently advocated vigorous remedies and strong approaches to the United States in finding solutions for these problems. Since becoming Prime Minister on June 21, 1957, he has reiterated his determination to increase Canada's wheat sales; to correct, at least partially, the imbalance of trade between Canada and the United States and the heavy dependence of Canada on the United States market; to insure that future inflow of investment capital into Canada is used for what he terms "the benefit of Canada and the Canadians"; and to promote greater processing in Canada of Canadian natural resources. Mr. Diefenbaker can be expected to continue to protest eloquently and with vigor what he considers protectionist actions by the United States, while at the same time yielding to protectionist pressure groups

in Canada by imposing restrictions on certain categories of imports. Canadian officials have repeatedly reaffirmed Canada's intention to observe its commitments under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. At the same time they point out that the flexibility of their commercial agreements provides "certain areas of maneuverability."

Canadian producers of agricultural and mineral products, and especially of manufactured goods, have been pressing their Government for action to give protection to Canadian-produced goods through tariffs, subsidies, quotas, or other means, primarily against American competition. For example, the Canadian Manufacturers Association has launched a "Buy Canadian" campaign; Alberta oil producers want a subsidized pipeline; and fruit and vegetable growers are clamoring against what they claim is United States "dumping." Canadian port and transportation interests are also alert to the possibility of persuading the Government to help them too.

We have important economic interests in the Canadian market. I do not believe that we can expect to hold our position there unless the United States Government pursues liberal trading policies. The Canadian Government will take care of Canadian interests as it sees them. Our hope must be that it will continue to consider Canadian interests best served by expanded trade and investment in a cooperative environment.

VI

You will note that I have placed the greatest emphasis in this report on our economic relations with Canada. I have done so because the problems which arise from our economic relations are today uppermost in the minds of the Canadian Government and people. I say soberly and seriously that, if we do not take all feasible steps to minimize what the Canadians regard as the harmful aspects of our economic policies, the consequences will be adverse to our otherwise basically good and close relations with Canada. They will also be harmful to our own economy in dollars and cents. I sincerely hope that mutually satisfactory solutions may be found. In this regard, for example, Canadians have been watching closely the debate in the United States on the renewal of the Trade Agreements Act, the extension of which will connote to them evidence of our desire to cooperate with Canada in the economic

field. Such action will serve to moderate the real danger of a rising protectionist trend in Canada.

The Conservative victories in the June 10, 1957, and March 31, 1958, Canadian elections inevitably will lead to a reexamination of major Canadian Government policies with significant implications for the entire spectrum of United States-Canadian relations. The strongly nationalistic attitude of the Conservatives may complicate the maintenance of relatively easy relations with the United States. Nevertheless I am convinced that with good will, effort, and attention on our part to Canadian problems and viewpoints we can overcome any difficulties which may arise.

VII

In conclusion I would like to say a word on two subjects. The first is the character of United States representation in Canada and the second on what the Congress and in particular this committee might do to maintain and improve our existing relations with Canada.

We have, of course, an Embassy in Canada's capital, Ottawa. In a sense it is one of the few prewar-type embassies in that there is attached to it no MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group], no ICA [International Cooperation Administration] mission, and no USIA [U.S. Information Agency] mission. As you know, Canada receives from us no mutual defense assistance and no economic aid. During the war and after, Canada paid cash for everything it received from us. Canada has never been the beneficiary of any lend-lease or assistance program. In fact, Canada has a very substantial program of its own in both military and economic aid. Canada's assistance to other members of NATO in the form of weapons and military aid has been over a billion dollars. Translated into terms of our own population, this is the equivalent of more than 10 billion U.S. dollars. Similarly, Canada's economic assistance to other countries, notably through the Colombo Plan, is and has been roughly comparable to our own economic aid program in the same area, if one adjusts for the difference in population between the United States and Canada. Consequently there is in our Embassy no need for a MAAG or an ICA mission. I might say, however, that it is my strong desire that a small USIA mission be established in Canada, working closely, of course, with the Embassy.

We also have across Canada, from Newfoundland to Vancouver, 12 consular posts. The competence and the devotion to duty of the entire official staff throughout all of Canada is of the highest order. I am proud of them, and I think, as you come individually to know them, you will be too.

Now, for some of the things which it seems to me the Congress in its area of responsibility can do to help our relations.

First, I would hope that all of you would maintain a continuing interest in Canada and in its problems. Canada is a proud and independent country. Any implication—however friendly and well-meant—that Canada is sort of a 49th state infuriates Canadians. They are rightly proud of their country, its bigness, and its future. In fact, they like occasionally to point out to Texans that 6 out of their 10 provinces are larger than Texas. I hope that increasingly Members of the Congress and particularly of this committee will visit Canada for the purpose of meeting Canadian officials and business and labor leaders, coming to know the country, its people, and its concerns.

Secondly, I beg that you bear in mind Canada and its importance to us in the consideration of any future legislation which may affect directly or indirectly Canada's national life, economy, and interests. Obviously we must legislate in the interest of the United States and not primarily in the interest of any foreign country. Notwithstanding, our interest must always be an enlightened self-interest, and it is to our clear advantage to consider the effect a bill may have on Canadian interests and take into account the Canadian point of view. If the resultant legislation may not be all that the Canadians would wish, at least this result should not come from negligence or inadvertence or failure adequately to consult the Canadian Government in advance.

And then I would like to leave this final thought with you: Every informed Canadian in Government and in private life is watching intently the progress of the legislation now before the Congress for the extension of our Trade Agreements Act. If tragically that act should fail or be mutilated in passage, the Canadians are going to draw a very important conclusion from such a disaster. They are going to conclude that we are not a reliable trading partner and that our great and

farsighted program of trade liberalization is dead. The consequences which would then flow from such a Canadian conclusion would have, I think, an immeasurable effect on our position as exporter to the Canadian market and on the availability to us of Canada as a dependable supplier of vital goods and materials and, last, not least, might adversely affect the general tone and character of our relationship in the defense of this continent. If I may close on an understatement—these consequences would not be good for the United States.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

85th Congress, 2d Session

Control and Reduction of Armaments. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations pursuant to S. Res. 93, S. Res. 185, and S. Res. 286, 84th Congress; S. Res. 61 and S. Res. 241, 85th Congress. Part 17, April 16 and 17, 1958. 162 pp.

Mutual Security Act of 1958. Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 12181 to amend further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and for other purposes. H. Rept. 1696, May 7, 1958. 124 pp.

Mutual Security Program in Laos. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. May 7 and 8, 1958. 78 pp.

Message from the President of the United States transmitting a report on the barriers to international travel and ways and means of promoting, developing, encouraging, and facilitating such travel. H. Doc. 381, May 12, 1958. 52 pp.

Report of the delegation appointed to attend the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association Meeting in New Delhi, India, December 9-10, 1957. S. Doc. 100, May 12, 1958. 35 pp.

Importation of Certain Sound Recordings and Film. Report to accompany H. R. 7454. S. Rept. 1554, May 12, 1958. 4 pp.

Inviting International Civil Aviation Organization To Hold Its Twelfth Assembly in United States. Report to accompany S. J. Res. 166. S. Rept. 1584, May 14, 1958. 6 pp.

Authorizing the Transfer of Naval Vessels to Friendly Foreign Countries. Report to accompany S. 3506. S. Rept. 1583, May 14, 1958. 7 pp.

Second Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the second annual report on the operation of the trade agreements program, pursuant to section 350 (e) (1) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended by section 3 (d) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955. H. Doc. 384, May 19, 1958. 55 pp.

Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H. R. 12591, a bill to extend the authority of the President to enter into trade agreements under section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and for other purposes. H. Rept. 1761, May 21, 1958. 135 pp.

Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H. R. 10015. S. Rept. 1618, May 21, 1958. 4 pp.

Authorizing Appropriation of an Additional Sum Required for Completion of the Inter-American Highway. Report to accompany H. R. 7870, May 21, 1958. 7 pp.

The National Space Program. Report of the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration. II. Rept. 1758, May 21, 1958. 236 pp.

Report of the special study mission to Canada comprising Brooks Hays and Frank M. Coffin of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, pursuant to H. Res. 29, a resolution authorizing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct thorough studies and investigations of all matters coming within the jurisdiction of such committee. H. Rept. 1766, May 22, 1958. 15 pp.

Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended December 31, 1957. H. Doc. 368, May 22, 1958. 32 pp.

Inviting International Civil Aviation Organization To Hold Its Twelfth Assembly in the United States. Report to accompany S. J. Res. 166. H. Rept. 1768, May 23, 1958. 4 pp.

Relative to the Establishment of Plans for the Peaceful Exploration of Outer Space. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 332. H. Rept. 1769, May 23, 1958. 2 pp.

Establishment of the National Space Program. Report of the Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration on H. R. 12575. H. Rept. 1770, May 24, 1948. 39 pp.

National Aeronautics and Space Act. Hearings before the Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics on S. 3609, a bill to provide for research into problems of flight within and outside the earth's atmosphere, and for other purposes. Part 1, May 6-8, 1958, 245 pp.; Part 2, May 13-15, 1958; 166 pp.

Relative to the Establishment of Plans for the Peaceful Exploration of Outer Space. Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security and Scientific Developments Affecting Foreign Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. Con. Res. 326, a concurrent resolution relative to plans for the peaceful exploration of outer space. May 20, 1958. 34 pp.

The Mutual Security Act of 1958. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on H. R. 12181 together with individual views. S. Rept. 1627, May 26, 1958. 90 pp.

Amending the Act of August 5, 1953, Creating the Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission. Report to accompany H. R. 10069. H. Rept. 1771, May 26, 1958. 5 pp.

Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds to Finance the 1961 Meeting of the Permanent International Association of Navigation Congresses. Report to accompany H. R. 11305. H. Rept. 1832, May 29, 1958. 2 pp.

Report of the Special Study Mission to the Near East and Africa comprising Wayne L. Hays, chairman, Barratt O'Hara, and Marguerite Stitt Church of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. Rept. 1834, May 29, 1958. 38 pp.

Authorizing the Appointment of One Additional Assistant Secretary of State. Report to accompany S. 1832. H. Rept. 1843, June 2, 1958. 5 pp.

U.S. Protests Soviet Action Concerning American Diplomat

Press release 273 dated May 19

On May 17, 1958, the day following his return to Moscow, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson called on Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to protest the action of the Soviet Government 3 days

earlier in declaring John A. Baker, Jr., a second secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow, *persona non grata*.

The American Embassy first learned of this Soviet action on May 14, 1958, when the chief of the American section of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the American Chargé d'Affaires ad interim to his office and read the following:

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has information that Second Secretary of Embassy John A. Baker, who last year was permitted to attend lectures in the historical faculty of the Moscow University, has systematically violated the norms of behavior for diplomatic representatives.

Inasmuch as this behavior does not correspond to his status as an accredited diplomatic representative, his further presence in the Soviet Union is considered undesirable.

The Soviet official added that he understood Mr. Baker was outside the Soviet Union, and, therefore, the reentry visa granted him before he left should be considered annulled. (Mr. Baker had departed Moscow a few days previously for Western Europe and was due to return to his post at Moscow by the first of June.)

No explanation of this action was given to the American Chargé except to admit that the Soviet complaint of improper behavior centered around his conduct at the Moscow University, where Mr. Baker was attending a weekly lecture course on Russian medieval history.

In his protest to Foreign Minister Gromyko, Ambassador Thompson was unable to obtain any details regarding Mr. Baker's alleged improper conduct. Mr. Gromyko merely reiterated the allegations that Mr. Baker's conduct had violated the norms of diplomatic conduct applicable in any country and expressed the hope that the conduct of Embassy officers would be such that similar measures would not be necessary in the future.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that the Embassy had taken great pains to assure that officers conducted themselves in a manner compatible with their status as diplomatic representatives; that he knew Mr. Baker to be an able and discreet officer; and that, lacking knowledge of what conduct had incurred Soviet displeasure, the Embassy would not know how to avoid such developments in the future.

In the absence of any further explanation, the American Government can only surmise that the

friendly contacts which grew up between the 30-year-old American diplomat and his Soviet fellow students became a source of embarrassment or concern to Soviet authorities.

The treatment accorded Mr. Baker contrasts sharply with the free opportunity enjoyed by Soviet diplomats in this country to attend courses at American universities, dependent only on admission policies of the universities themselves. During the past academic year at least 10 Soviet officials have attended university courses in Washington or New York.

United States Mining Experts Visit Soviet Union

Press release 281 dated May 20

In accordance with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange agreement of January 27, 1958,¹ a delegation of 19 American steel and iron-mining experts, organized and financed by the American Iron and Steel Institute, will leave on May 22 to observe steel and mining installations throughout the Soviet Union. Reciprocally, a Soviet delegation will visit the United States sometime this summer.

The American delegation, headed by Edward Ryerson, director and former chairman of Inland Steel Company, and John A. Stephens, vice president of the United States Steel Corporation, will spend a month visiting steel installations in Zaporozhe, Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoi Rog, Voroshilovsk in the Dombas, Sverdlovsk, Stalinsk, Tula, Magnitogorsk, Nikopol, and Moscow. Iron-mining facilities to be visited include those located at Kursk, Krivoi Rog, Kerch, Sokolov-Serbay, Tula, Magnitogorsk, Stalinsk, Leningrad, and Moscow.

Following are additional members of the American delegation:

James B. Austin, administrative vice president for research and technology, United States Steel Corporation

Floyd S. Eckhardt, assistant general manager, Lackawanna Plant, Bethlehem Steel Company

Michael O. Holowaty, chief research engineer, Research and Development Department, Indiana Harbor Works, Inland Steel Company

Stephen M. Jenks, administrative vice president for central operations, United States Steel Corporation

Everett L. Joppa, general manager, Lake Superior Iron Mining Division, Pickands Mather and Company

Kenneth C. McCutcheon, consultant, Armco Steel Corporation

Norwood B. Melcher, chief, Pyrometallurgical Laboratory, Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior
Gunther Mohling, chief metallurgist, Research Laboratory, Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation

F. M. Rich, general manager, Indiana Harbor Works, Inland Steel Company

Earl C. Smith, director of research and chief metallurgist, Republic Steel Corporation

Julius H. Strassburger, assistant vice president for engineering, National Steel Corporation

Irwin H. Such, editor in chief, *Steel* magazine

George F. Sullivan, editor, *Iron Age* magazine

Dmitri N. Vedensky, director of research and development, The M. A. Hanna Company

Michael F. Yarotsky, division superintendent for steel production, South Works, United States Steel Corporation

M. Gardner Clark, professor, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University

Merle R. Thompson, secretary, Foreign Relations Committee, American Iron and Steel Institute

U.S. Proposes Easing Travel Bans on Reciprocal Basis With U.S.S.R.

Press release 286 dated May 24 (for release May 25)

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

In a note delivered on May 22, 1958, to the Soviet Embassy at Washington the U.S. Government offered to open any or all of the areas in the United States closed to Soviet travel on the basis of reciprocity for equivalent closed areas in the Soviet Union. The U.S. note also offered to open, on the basis of reciprocity, any or all of the 25 largest cities of the United States closed to Soviet travel and a number of closed automobile routes.

In its note the Department of State pointed out that the U.S. Government remains firm in its preference for the complete abolition of closed zones and that it continues to await a reply to its proposal of November 11, 1957,² to abolish them.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 9, 1957, p. 934.

When the U.S. Government instituted travel restrictions in 1952,² it stated that these restrictions were imposed in response to Soviet restrictions, which had already been in effect for a number of years. Since that time, the U.S. Government has repeatedly proposed that the Soviet and United States Governments consider liberalizing travel restrictions on a reciprocal basis. On August 28, 1957,³ the Soviet Government stated its willingness to discuss this question, and, in reply, the U.S. Government proposed the total abolition of closed zones on November 11, 1957. The Soviet Government has neither replied to the U.S. counterproposal nor put forward any proposals of its own to open any closed areas in the Soviet Union.

U.S. NOTE OF MAY 22

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the note of November 11, 1957 from the Department of State concerning travel regulations in the Soviet Union and the United States. After making reference to the Soviet Foreign Ministry's note No. 335/Pr of August 28, 1957 in which the Ministry stated that it was ready to discuss the question of opening a number of cities and localities in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for visits by foreigners on a basis of reciprocity, the Department's note stated that the United States Government would prefer the mutual abolition of all zones in the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which are closed to travel or visits by citizens of the other country. The United States Government proposed the abolition of these closed zones. The Soviet Government has not yet made a reply to this proposal of the Government of the United States.

In view of the failure of the Soviet Government to respond to the proposal of the United States to abolish closed zones, and with the objective of facilitating an agreement to open at least some areas on a reciprocal basis, the Govern-

ment of the United States hereby proposes a partial easing of travel restrictions. This proposal is made without prejudice to the proposal to abolish closed zones contained in the United States note of November 11, 1957. The Government of the United States remains firm in its preference for the abolition of closed zones and wishes to state that it continues to await a reply to its proposal of November 11, 1957.

In the absence of any specific proposals from the Soviet Government concerning a partial easing of travel restrictions, the Government of the United States for its part has prepared certain concrete proposals to this end for the consideration of the Soviet Government.

All closed areas in the United States have been divided into individual groupings of States or zones and each of these groupings has been paired with approximately equivalent closed areas in the Soviet Union. The United States Government is prepared immediately to open any or all of these areas in the United States to Soviet travel and visits on the basis of a reciprocal opening of the paired Soviet areas. A list of these areas is enclosed.

Each of the twenty-five largest cities in the United States which are presently closed has been paired with an equivalent closed Soviet city. The United States Government is prepared immediately to open any or all of these cities in the United States to Soviet travel and visits on the basis of a reciprocal opening of the paired Soviet city or cities. A list of these cities is enclosed.

Finally, a number of automobile routes through closed zones in the United States have been paired with equivalent automobile routes in the Soviet Union. The United States is prepared immediately to open any or all of these automobile routes to Soviet travel on the basis of reciprocity. A list of these automobile routes is enclosed.

The views of the Soviet Government on these proposals would be appreciated.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 22, 1958.

Enclosures:

1. List of closed areas in the Soviet Union and the United States (List A).
2. List of twenty-five closed cities in the Soviet Union and the United States (List B).
3. List of automobile routes in the Soviet Union and the United States (List C).

² *Ibid.*, Mar. 24, 1952, p. 451.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1957, p. 936.

LIST A

CLOSED AREAS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

<i>U.S.S.R.</i> (oblasts, unless otherwise noted) *	<i>U.S.A.**</i>
1. Moscow Kaluga Vladimir	1. Maryland
2. Leningrad Western oblasts of Ukrainian S.S.R.	2. New Hampshire Rhode Island Connecticut
3. Gorki Mordvinian A.S.S.R.	2. New York State Massachusetts
4. Molotov Sverdlovsk Chelyabinsk Udmurt A.S.S.R.	3. Nebraska Kansas
5. Taimyr National Okrug	4. Pennsylvania New Jersey Delaware
6. Primorski Krai Kamchatka Chukchi National Okrug Khabarovski Krai	Virginia West Virginia Maine
7. Buryat-Mongol A.S.S.R. The Apsheroni Peninsula and the raions of the Azerbaidzhan S.S.R. located south of the automobile highway Baku-Kirovabad-Tbilisi Nakhichevan A.S.S.R. Water travel on the Yenisei River	5. North Dakota South Dakota
8. Dzhabul, Taldy-Kurgansk, Alma-Ata, Karaganda, Pavlodar, and Semipalatinsk (Kazakh S.S.R.) Frunze, Issyk-Kul, Talas, and Tyan-Shan (Kirgiz S.S.R.) Tashkent (Uzbek S.S.R.) Tadzhik S.S.R.	6. South Carolina Georgia Florida Arizona*** Nevada
9. Kara-Kalpek A.S.S.R. Krasnovodsk (Turkmen S.S.R.) Astrakhan Stalingrad Gurev and Zapadno-Kazakhstan (Kazakh S.S.R.)	Washington Idaho Montana Northern Texas Oklahoma
10. 25-kilometer zone along the frontier of the Soviet Union with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan	7. Alabama Tennessee Kentucky Southern Indiana Missouri Western & Southern Illinois Iowa
11. 25-kilometer zone along the frontier of the Soviet Union with Norway and Finland	8. Southeastern Texas*** Louisiana Colorado New Mexico*** California***
12. All of closed area within radius of 125 miles from Moscow	9. Ohio*** Michigan*** Northern Indiana Northeastern Illinois Wisconsin***
13. All of closed area within radius of 125 miles from Leningrad	10. 15-mile zone along Mexican border as specified in Department's note of January 3, 1955 ⁴
	11. 15-mile zone along shores of Great Lakes as specified in Enclosure 1 of Department's note of January 3, 1955
	12. All of closed area within 125 miles from Washington, District of Columbia
	13. All of closed area within 125 miles from New York, New York

(*) Soviet administrative units are listed by the names given them in the Soviet notes of June 22, 1953⁵ and August 28, 1957, which together with the Soviet note of November 12, 1953 informed the United States Government of Soviet closed areas. It is possible that the names and the delineation of some areas may have been changed since the time of the notes cited above. In some cases open cities and routes and other open places exist in otherwise closed areas. The closed areas are to be understood in each case to be all closed areas in that part of the Soviet Union included in the Soviet area listed, as of the time of the Soviet notes referred to above.

(**) The areas included in each State or region of a State listed are those areas which were closed to travel by Soviet citizens by the notes of the United States Government of January 3, 1955 and November 11, 1957. In some cases only a small part of a State or region of a State listed is closed to travel by Soviet citizens. In some cases, too, open cities and routes and other open places exist in otherwise closed areas.

(***) Not including 15-mile border zones as specified in Department's note of January 3, 1955.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1955, p. 163.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

LIST B

CLOSED CITIES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

U.S.S.R.*

1. Novosibirsk
2. Sverdlovsk
3. Chelyabinsk
4. Molotov
5. Omsk
6. Yerevan
7. Karaganda
8. Krasnoyarsk
9. Nizhny Tagil
10. Magnitogorsk
11. Izhevsk
12. Tomsk
13. Vladivostok
14. Ulan-Ude
15. Kopeysk
16. Dzerzhinsk
17. Zlatoust
18. Semipalatinsk
19. Kamensk-Ural'skiy
20. Sevastopol
21. Orekhovo-Zuyevo
22. Leninakan
23. Voroshilov
24. Nikolaev
25. Kerch

U.S.A.

1. Los Angeles, California (partially open)
2. Detroit, Michigan
3. San Francisco, California
4. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
5. Seattle, Washington
6. Newark, New Jersey
7. Dallas, Texas
8. Indianapolis, Indiana
9. Memphis, Tennessee
10. Oakland, California
11. Columbus, Ohio
12. Louisville, Kentucky
13. San Diego, California
14. Rochester, New York
15. Atlanta, Georgia
16. Birmingham, Alabama
17. St. Paul, Minnesota
18. Toledo, Ohio
19. Akron, Ohio
20. Long Beach, California
21. Providence, Rhode Island
22. Dayton, Ohio
23. Syracuse, New York
24. Norfolk, Virginia
25. Hartford, Connecticut

(*) The names of Soviet cities are given as they appear in *Narodnoe Khozjaistvo*, State Statistical Publishing House, Moscow, 1956.

LIST C

CLOSED AUTOMOBILE ROUTES IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES

U.S.S.R.

1. Direct highway from Moscow to Smolensk.
2. Any two of following highways from Moscow to open area: Volokolamsk, Dmitrov, Enthusiasts', Ryazan, Kashira, Kaluga.
3. Any of three highways named in 2 above.

U.S.A.

1. U.S. Highway 111 from Baltimore, Maryland to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; U.S. Highway 15 from Harrisburg to edge of open zone south of Williamsport, Pennsylvania; New York State Thruway from east edge of Erie County, New York to Buffalo, New York; Highways 265 and 324 from Buffalo to Niagara Falls, New York.
2. Following route from Washington, District of Columbia: Highway U.S. 240 and U.S. 40 to Hancock, Maryland; U.S. 522 to Warfordsburg, Pennsylvania; Pa. 126 to Pennsylvania Turnpike; Pennsylvania Turnpike to Ohio state line; Ohio Turnpike to U.S. 21; U.S. 21 to Cleveland, Ohio.
3. Route described in 2 above from Washington to Cleveland, plus Ohio Turnpike from Junction with U.S. 21 to Indiana state line, Indiana Turnpike to Illinois state line.

U.S. Replies to Czechoslovak Charges Concerning Free Europe Committee Balloons

Press release 261 dated May 14

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

John M. Allison, American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, delivered on May 14 to the Czechoslovak Government a note in reply to two notes of the Czechoslovak Government, dated June 19, 1956, and February 20, 1957. The Czechoslovak Government had, in its first note, made a demand on the U.S. Government for 5,525,374 Czechoslovak crowns on the charge that the U.S. Government was responsible for an alleged crash of a Czechoslovak Airlines DC-3 type passenger aircraft on January 18, 1956, in eastern Czechoslovakia.

In a note of October 9, 1956, the United States had reserved a reply to this claim pending an answer from the Czechoslovak Government to certain questions concerning the details of the alleged crash. That note had requested a copy of the report of the special commission which the Czechoslovak Government alleged had investigated the causes of the crash and permission for accredited U.S. investigators to examine the origination of all documents, visit and inspect the scene of the crash, make checks on the information available, and make photographs necessary to a comprehensive investigation of the facts relating to the crash and its causes. In its note of reply of February 20, 1957, the Czechoslovak Government refused to supply any of the information requested or to permit any investigation; it alleged that the airplane was Czechoslovak, the flight was domestic, and the passengers were Czechoslovak citizens, but reasserted its demand on the United States for payment in full. It gave, however, a résumé of the alleged facts.

The U.S. Government's note, delivered on May 14, is the result of careful investigation of the

allegations of both Czechoslovak notes. It points out that, in view of the Czechoslovak Government's refusal to permit an investigation by the U.S. Government, the legal presumption must prevail that the Czechoslovak Government's claim is, in fact, not supported by any evidence and certainly not by the evidence found by the investigating commission. These facts alone, it is pointed out, would justify the rejection of the claim.

Inasmuch, however, the note proceeds, as the alleged crash is claimed to have involved large loss of life, and other considerations, the U.S. Government has made its own investigation.

The United States has found that the account of the incident in the Czechoslovak Government's note is "a confection of some fact with much fiction." Specifically it points out that the alleged Free Europe Committee balloon, claimed to have been carrying propaganda leaflets for distribution in Czechoslovakia and claimed to have collided with the airplane, causing it to crash, does not correspond in description with the types of balloons used by the Free Europe Committee. It also points out that the pamphlets allegedly found near the scene of the crash by the Czechoslovak investigators were flown into Czechoslovakia the day after the crash or long before the crash, and would in no circumstances be near the scene of the crash and at the time of the crash, or at any time which would cause them to be present there. This is supported by numerous facts cited in the note.

The U.S. Government further points out that, apart from the doubts that the Czechoslovak aircraft involved was truly a DC-3, experiments with a DC-3 caused to collide with Free Europe Committee balloons have shown that disabling of the aircraft, particularly by injury to the antenna

(which the Czechoslovak Government claims was the only part of the aircraft hit by the balloon) is not possible. It points out that the Czechoslovak Government itself found no injury to the control mechanism of the crashed aircraft when it was examined. The note points out further the Czechoslovak Government's account is inherently improbable and that there are "a good many other more likely explanations for the crash of January 18, 1956, than the speculation contained in the note of February 20, 1957."

The U.S. note then considers the likely explanations of the crash, all based on actual evidence which U.S. investigators have found. These are the following:

First, the Czechoslovak Airlines authorities dispatched the plane to fly, according to the Czechoslovak Government's account, in lack of visibility under circumstances in which the airport of destination, the Poprad airfield in the High Tatra Mountains, could not be seen from the air, in extremely high wind velocity, in icing conditions, and with a maximum load. It points out that the aircraft must have been blown off course and crashed into a hill 12.6 miles north of the alleged point of destination. It is obvious that the pilot did not see where he was and had not corrected for the actual heavy turbulence and bad weather encountered.

Secondly, the note points out, the Czechoslovak Government had itself admitted to press reporters at a press conference in Prague on February 21, 1956, that the pilot had no visibility.

Thirdly, the physical description of the crash contained in the Czechoslovak note of February 20, 1957, shows that the ignition system had probably suffered failure and there was not enough fuel to carry the pilot on to a safe landing. The U.S. note points out that the airfield of destination was not suitable for any landing in such weather, being just a soddy field "drenched with winter rain and snow, having no concrete runway but only some grass in summer, lying between two rows of high mountains, and useful only in good weather."

Fourth, a meteorological study shows that the altimeter settings on the airplane were between 450 and 600 feet too low in altitude, an error which would be sufficient to cause the pilot to miscalculate the height of the hill into which the airplane crashed.

The note points out that the Czechoslovak Government's account of the flight seems fanciful (the entire crew died in the crash) and especially discredits the dispatcher at Bratislava. It indicates that the crew should never have attempted a landing, but should have returned to their home base when they found the nature of the weather, assuming even that they were compelled to depart from Bratislava on the orders of the dispatcher.

Finally, the note gives a most likely explanation. It says that a true investigation would show that the aircraft overflew an area in the Tatra Mountains, beyond its route, which has been increasingly militarized and subject to security control, and flew over antiaircraft batteries. It points out that shooting by antiaircraft batteries in itself explains the sounds felt by the four survivors who were passengers, and the crash into the hillside.

The note then analyzes the timing of the Czechoslovak Government's campaign based on the alleged incident of January 18, 1956. It points out that on the very morning following the crash the Czechoslovak Government informed the press, prior to any investigation, of the ostensibly domestic disaster. The Government said that the results of the investigation which would be made would be sent to the International Civil Aviation Organization. This campaign was built up until the date when the alleged results of the investigation were made public.

The Czechoslovak Government's case having fallen to the ground, and its assertions of fact being without foundation, the U.S. Government reserves "for some future appropriate occasion a discussion of the various, now irrelevant, legal assertions made in both of the Czechoslovak notes" and "further states that nothing in the present note is to be construed as admitting the validity, in whole or in part, of any of the legal propositions made by the Czechoslovak Government on the subject of this note."

The conclusion of the note states that it is up to the Czechoslovak Government if it wishes to "resort to the international forum provided by the International Court of Justice." The note throughout states that the U.S. Government is prepared to prove all of its assertions of fact "in an appropriate proceeding in a competent judicial forum."

U.S. NOTE OF MAY 14, 1958

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, under instructions from the United States Government, has the honor to refer further to the Ministry's note No. 123.330/56-ABO/1 of June 19, 1956 and its Note No. 105.578/57-ABO/1 of February 20, 1957 concerning the Czechoslovak Government's claim of compensation from the United States Government for damages on account of a crash of a Czechoslovak Airlines aircraft alleged to have taken place on January 18, 1956 near Levoča in Slovakia.

The Ministry's last mentioned note purports to reply to the Embassy's note No. 117 of October 9, 1956 on the same subject. The Embassy's note, among other things, sought from the Czechoslovak Government factual data in the exclusive possession of the Czechoslovak Government relating to the alleged air crash. The data which were sought were necessary to enable the United States Government to reply comprehensively to the Ministry's note of June 19, 1956; they were fully specified in the note of October 9, 1956 in eight numbered paragraphs; and they included a copy of the full report of the Special Commission which the Czechoslovak Government alleged investigated the causes of the crash of January 18, 1956 under appointment by the Ministry of Transport. In addition, the Embassy's note requested the Czechoslovak Government in as much as no representative of the United States Government had participated in any way in the alleged investigation, to permit investigators accredited by the United States Government to examine the originals of all documents, visit and inspect the scene of the crash, make checks on the information available and make photographs necessary to a comprehensive investigation of the facts relating to the crash and its causes. Since the Czechoslovak Government sought from the United States Government damages in the amount of 5,525,374 crowns, a substantial sum, as well as the admission of liability for the deaths and injuries which the Czechoslovak Government alleged had occurred, these requests were reasonable and were in accordance with accepted international practice and due process of law.

The United States Government must, therefore, express its surprise at the refusal of the Czechoslovak Government in its note of February 20, 1957 either to provide the data requested, all of which are reasonably necessary in order that experts may come to a considered and intelligent conclusion as to the true cause of the air crash alleged to have taken place near Levoča on January 18, 1956, or to permit accredited United States Government experts to check the statements of fact made by the Czechoslovak Government in this connection. These statements were made on a number of occasions, both in its notes to the United States Government on this subject as well as in variant versions given in its press and its radio broadcasts and to the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Secretary General of the United Nations. The unwillingness of the Czechoslovak Government to make available to the United States Government the report of the Investigating Commission and its supporting evidentiary material is all the more surprising

since it appears that the Czechoslovak Government, in its official press, claims that the Investigating Commission which wrote the report (as stated in *Rude Pravo* February 22, 1956), spent at least a month in its investigation of the incident, and its representatives in interviews with press correspondents of Czechoslovakia and of other countries have referred frequently to the alleged contents of the report (see, for example, *Rude Pravo*, February 26, 1956; *New York Times* despatch from Prague, February 22, 1956; *London Daily Worker* despatch from Prague, February 22, 1956; *Reuter's* despatch from Prague, February 22, 1956; *Agence France Presse* despatch from Prague, February 22, 1956, Prague Radio broadcast of February 21, 1956, 1800 hours).

It is, of course, true that the Czechoslovak Government claims in its note of February 20, 1957 "that the investigation of a crash that has occurred on Czechoslovak territory, especially the crash of a Czechoslovak airliner carrying only Czechoslovak citizens, is under the existing provisions of international air law a matter of exclusive jurisdiction of the Czechoslovak authorities," and uses this as an excuse for not providing the United States Government, whom it charges with responsibility for the air crash under international law, with the factual evidence upon which the claim is based. The United States Government notes that while the crash is thus claimed to be domestic for the purposes of evidence that it ever occurred or how it occurred, the Czechoslovak Government considers it sufficiently international to have preferred an international claim against the United States Government and to have complained to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization and to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and to have conducted an international propaganda campaign exhibiting alleged evidence to support its claim, which it now declines to subject to closer examination.

From a juridical standpoint, the failure and refusal of the Czechoslovak Government to supply the material upon which it bases its charge as to the cause of the alleged crash of January 18, 1956, must, in these circumstances, call for the application of the well known legal presumption in such cases. That presumption is that the conclusion asserted by the Czechoslovak Government, namely that the crash of January 18, 1956 was caused by a collision with a Free Europe Committee balloon, is, in fact, not supported by any evidence and certainly not by the evidence found by the Investigating Commission. This presumption is supported by the fact that the Czechoslovak Government has indeed used this alleged incident purely along propaganda lines.

The foregoing considerations are in themselves sufficient to justify a complete rejection of the Czechoslovak Government's claim for damages, regardless of other legal and factual considerations which demonstrate the Czechoslovak Government's claim to be without any merit.

In as much, however, as the incident of January 18, 1956, is claimed to have involved large loss of life as well as material damage, and in view of the Czechoslovak Government's representations to international bodies and public opinion, the United States Govern-

ment has attempted within the limits of its capabilities, considering the restrictions placed upon it by the Czechoslovak Government, to investigate the facts as well as the propositions of law asserted or implicit in the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957, and its related note of June 19, 1956.

On the basis of this investigation, the United States Government avails itself of this opportunity to state that the Czechoslovak Government's claim is rejected as wholly unfounded and that it is prepared to prove by legal evidence and proper legal argumentation in an appropriate proceeding in a competent judicial forum, and it charges, the following:

I

The Facts:

As to the Czechoslovak Allegations of Facts Concerning the Incident of January 18, 1956.

The United States Government's investigation of the allegations contained in the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957, compels it, for reasons of which the more prominent will appear below, to describe the account of the incident in that note to be a concoction of some fact with much fiction.

A.

There emerge from the account two objectively verifiable allegations which are critical to the Czechoslovak Government's claim and which the United States Government has been fully able to investigate objectively.

The Czechoslovak Government asserts that the crash of the Czechoslovak Airlines "DC-3 type" aircraft was the result of a collision between the aircraft while engaged in an attempt to land at the Poprad-Tatry airfield in the mountains in Eastern Slovakia and a Free Europe Committee balloon carrying certain leaflets for distribution within Czechoslovakia by dispersal in the air. The Free Europe Committee activities with respect to balloons and leaflets have been investigated fully with these allegations in mind.

The Czechoslovak Government states in its note of February 20, 1957, as it has stated in other correspondence and in other forums, that its Investigating Commission came to the conclusion that there had been a collision between a Free Europe Committee balloon and the DC-3 in question because during the investigation "the remnants of a balloon" were discovered "in the vicinity of the crash". The note states that the place of discovery was at two kilometers southeast of the crash. It says that one part of the balloon, measuring "about 30 square meters, was found hanging on a tree about four meters from the ground" and that "another part of the balloon skin was found after the thaw in a wooded area about 400 meters east of the place of the crash". It further states that "in the vicinity" there were found "60 or 70 copies of a bilingual leaflet marked 'Slobodná Európa' No. 42."

In other accounts, this story of the Czechoslovak Government is somewhat magnified. It has been stated that three pieces—not just two—of the balloon skin were found; that they were found "with the aid of the local witnesses"; and that the Investigating Commission, in its

report, came to the conclusion that the airplane crashed because it collided in the forepart of its fuselage with "the balloon load, the remains of which were found near the scene of the catastrophe". (See, for example, *Kudc Pravo*, February 23, 1956.)

Since the Czechoslovak Government refuses to permit the United States Government to examine the original report, it is difficult to follow the reasoning of the Special Investigating Commission report, which allegedly led it to the conclusion. But several facts emerge as certain.

First: the account of the alleged collision is completely speculative. There are no witnesses who claim to have seen any balloon in flight at the place, or at the time, or on a collision course, or much less to have seen any contact with any balloon or any part of any balloon with the airplane. As will be seen below, there are many other explanations of the crash of the aircraft into the mountainside of Skapova Hill which are much more consistent with the known facts and even with the recital of the facts in the Czechoslovak note.

In the second place: the plastic skin of the balloon described as being part of a Free Europe Committee balloon which collided and caused the crash is definitely not, as the United States Government is prepared to prove by legal evidence in an appropriate judicial forum, part of any balloon used by the Free Europe Committee at any time during the period of the alleged crash of January 18, 1956. The total square meter measurements of the plastic shroud of the balloons flown by the Free Europe Committee during the period of the alleged crash—specifically the day after the crash and four days before the crash—which were known as S-130 or P-130, were a maximum of 15.1 square meters for the entire envelope, completely deflated and spread out in a single sheet, and had a laid flat square foot measurement of no more than 130 square feet. Hence, a measurement of 30 square meters for a piece of a balloon demonstrates that wherever the Czechoslovak authorities in charge of the so-called investigation allegedly found the portion of the balloon shroud described, it did not come from any Free Europe Committee balloon which could possibly have crashed with the aircraft on January 18, 1956. The addition to this piece of one, or two, additional pieces makes the allegations all the more unfounded. In this connection, the United States Government further notes that the Czechoslovak Government has not permitted United States Government representatives to examine the pieces of the shroud of the balloon allegedly responsible for the collision.

Third: the United States Government is ready to prove by legal evidence in an appropriate judicial forum that no pamphlets entitled "Slobodná Európa" or "Svobodná Európa" were sent into Czechoslovakia by the Free Europe Committee balloons at any time so that they could be in the air attached to any balloon on January 18, 1956. There were never indeed any pamphlets marked "No. 42". There were, however, pamphlets of closely similar designation, "C-42", sent into Czechoslovakia by the Free Europe Committee by small balloons—S-130 or P-130—on January 19, 1956, the day after the alleged crash, and a few were sent in several days before the alleged crash. But it is impossible that

any Free Europe Committee balloon carrying such pamphlets could have been in the air at the time and place or altitude of the alleged collision on January 18, 1956.

Fourth: The meteorological calculations which have been made by expert authority indicate that weather conditions during January 18, 1956, at 1447-1450 hours Central European time, the time alleged by the Czechoslovak Government to have been the time of the crash, were such that even if Free Europe Committee balloons carrying leaflets had been launched by the Free Europe Committee, which they were not, they would not have been within or near the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Fifth: The United States Government is not only persuaded that the so-called balloon shroud, allegedly found during the Investigating Commission's short inquiry, was not that of any Free Europe Committee balloon flown at any relevant time in the vicinity of the crash or the alleged collision but it has legal evidence that the Czechoslovak Government itself engaged in the practice of flying balloons for various purposes, military and non-military, in that very vicinity.

Finally: The total pamphlet load carried by any Free Europe Committee balloon on or around January 18, 1956, did not exceed approximately three pounds. This would make a package of approximately 175 leaflets of the C-42 type. They were held together loosely by a piece of soft cotton string attached to the bottom of the balloon so as to disperse easily on the inversion of the balloon at a very high floating altitude of not less than approximately 18,000 feet. As the pamphlets dispersed, the balloon shroud moved on and then descended as a deflated shroud by an emptying of its hydrogen content. It was therefore not possible for a balloon carrying leaflets to hit any airplane at 1228 meters, which appears to be given by the Czechoslovak note of February 20, 1957, as the maximum height at which the alleged crash took place; or to do so in the altitude of the final descent and approach for landing at the Poprad-Tatry airfield, during which the airplane is alleged to have crashed.

It appears therefore conclusive that the alleged balloon shroud and the pamphlets described as "No. 42" were objects which had no relation to the alleged crash and do not contribute any "evidence" to support the otherwise completely speculative charge of a crash or collision of the airplane with a Free Europe Committee pamphlet-carrying balloon. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the United States Government requested in vain, in its note of October 9, 1956, to which the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957, purports to be a reply, "copies of all photographs taken of . . . the balloon claimed to have caused the collision and the literature claimed to have been found with the balloon at the time of its discovery by the investigating commission." The Czechoslovak Government further refused to permit the objects to be seen or photographs of them to be made by United States representatives.

B.

As a result of investigation and experimentation, the United States Government is prepared to produce legal

evidence demonstrating that even if, contrary to the fact, the airplane in question had collided with any Free Europe Committee balloon, or any part of such a balloon, flown into or near Czechoslovakia on January 18, 1956, or the period around it, the impact would not have affected the flight of the aircraft alleged to have crashed. This would be true assuming even that the aircraft involved was a DC-3 aircraft of which the United States Government has no evidence.

1. Although the Free Europe Committee delivered leaflet communications to Czechoslovakia from approximately July 1953 to November 14, 1956, in large enough numbers to cause a considerable campaign against the Free Europe Committee by the Czechoslovak Government and associated governments, the first allegation of any collision of a balloon with anything in the air was made after January 19, 1956.

The United States Government, upon receipt of the Czechoslovak Government's complaint with respect to the alleged crash of January 18, 1956, made intensive inquiry on the subject of the possibility and consequence of impacts in such cases. It has received unequivocal evidence that even if a Free Europe Committee balloon of the type described were to collide with a DC-3 the collision would have no effect whatever on the aircraft. Apart from this, collision is aeronautically of remote possibility and considering the wide separation of altitudes at which civil aircraft have been flown in Czechoslovakia and Free Europe Committee balloons have been flown there, it is practically impossible.

Indeed, it is highly unlikely that, particularly in the type of weather in which the "DC-3 type" aircraft involved was being flown on January 18, 1956—one of substantially complete invisibility—the balloon or its load would be either noticed or felt. Should a DC-3 hit any portion of the balloon shroud, the immediate effect would be to cause a rupture in the shroud, and the immediate dissipation of the hydrogen without any effect on the aircraft. If the leaflet package, loosely held as described, had collided, the pamphlets would have immediately separated and dispersed. If any portion of the shroud or the pamphlets had hit the propeller, the shroud would have been cut to pieces and the pamphlets would have been torn into small pieces. In any event no contact of the balloon and its leaflet load would, at the speed and altitude of a DC-3 in flight, do more than touch the DC-3 without any injurious impact or effect whatever on the control mechanism or the functioning of the aircraft, or for that matter, even the sensitivity of the passengers or crew.

2. The subject of the manner and effect of operations of the Free Europe Committee pamphlet-carrying balloons has been fully discussed by the Free Europe Committee in a document submitted to the International Civil Aviation Organization entitled "Free Europe Committee, Inc. Statement Concerning 'Releasing of Balloons Across International Boundaries', ICAO Paper C-WP/2371, 12/3/56, dated April 1, 1957." The document concerns itself with the largest type of balloon used by the Free Europe Committee, an S-260 (that is, containing 260 square feet laid out flat), carrying approximately 3.5 pounds of

leaflets in a similarly loosely held bundle. The United States Government has found that the facts recited in the document are fully supported by legal evidence.

The Czechoslovak Government itself had publicly announced that its aircraft had been engaged in the practice of ramming balloons in the air without ill effect on the ramming aircraft (See *Rude Pravo*, September 5, 1955.) A similar practice, with ill effect only when participating aircraft hit each other instead of balloons, has been noted in Hungary. (See, for example, *Esti Hirlap*, October 8, 1957).

3. The Czechoslovak Government's speculation concerning the cause of the crash is more specific. It alleges first that "several" or "a few" minutes (Czechoslovak note of February 20, 1957, page 23, and *Rude Pravo* of February 26, 1956) or "just a few" minutes (*Rude Pravo* of February 23, 1956) before the crash, the surviving passengers say they felt a "strong shock." The Czechoslovak Government's multiple accounts in other propaganda contexts vary as to the amount of time but the time given is never given as less than "one or two minutes later"—understandably this minimum version is in a letter to the International Civil Aviation Organization as published in *Rude Pravo* February 23, 1956.

The Czechoslovak Government concludes that this "strong shock" was the loss of the radio antenna; and that this "shock" was the consequence of a collision between a Free Europe Committee balloon or some part of it and the mast of the antenna. It is stated further that since the wires of the aerial were missing and could not be found by the Investigating Commission in the area of the crash, the conclusion was reached "that the whole aerial system had been damaged already during the flight by impact with a heavier object," and that this "heavier object" could only have been "the load of the balloon." It is clear from the further language of the note that by the "load of the balloon" the Czechoslovak Government means the pamphlet load carried by the hydrogen filled shroud of a Free Europe Committee balloon.

As has already been seen, such a load did not during this period exceed three pounds. Indeed the type of balloon plus its load then used by the Free Europe Committee did not, in total, weigh more than 5.07 pounds. It is difficult to understand what the Czechoslovak Investigating Commission can seriously mean when it says that the airplane collided with a "heavier object." Heavier than what? It is clear, beyond a peradventure of doubt, that the entire body of the Free Europe Committee balloon flown on or around January 18, 1956 was not heavier than any relevant portion of the DC-3 aircraft and certainly not heavier than the antenna installation consisting of metal posts and wires, which was certainly constantly subject to encounter with forces of greater magnitude and density in its continuous flight.

The United States Government has made considerable inquiry into the questions, first, of the characteristics of the loss of radio antennas of the type described in the note of February 20, 1957, and, secondly, on the effect of injuries by impact of external objects upon DC-3 aircraft in flight.

a. As to aerial antennas: It is obvious that the loss of an antenna of the type described in the note of Febru-

ary 20, 1957 could in no case affect the control of the aircraft. It would certainly not affect the flight of the aircraft in question. Indeed, the damage allegedly suffered by the aircraft in the crash, as described in the note of February 20, 1957, shows no damage whatever to the control mechanism; the note says that the rudder and vertical stabilizer were found intact, even after the plane had crashed into the trees and the ground.

Radio antennas such as those on DC-3 type aircraft occasionally corrode and get lost in flight, snapping off without any external contact whatever, but simply in consequence of metal fatigue, vibration, icing or any combination of similar factors, all of which could have happened to the antenna in question, particularly during the weather of ice and rain through which the aircraft flew on January 18, 1956.

All the foregoing is common knowledge in the aviation industry and among aviators.

One reason why the aerial could not be found, if in fact it could not be found, was that it disappeared considerably before the time of the alleged crash during the flight, snapping off first at the one end to which it was attached and then at the other, as a consequence of in-flight wind forces. Indeed, it may also have wrapped itself up in the trees during the collision on Skapova Hill in the crash.

b. The sturdiness of the DC-3 in flight is well established and universally known in the history of aviation. The DC-3 first used in the United States Army Air Corps and continued by the United States Air Force under the name of C-47, is believed to be the world's most popular airplane because of its sturdiness and safety. It was manufactured by the Douglas Aircraft Company of California beginning in 1935 and went into airline service in 1936. Large numbers of DC-3 aircraft were sought from the United States Government by, and given by it to, other governments, including the Government of Czechoslovakia, at the end of World War II and others were sold in the international aircraft market to eager buyers. The Douglas Aircraft Manufacturing Company even licensed foreign companies and governments to manufacture copies.

It is well established, as the Czechoslovak Airlines and the Czechoslovak Government well know, that DC-3's can fly and land safely though they have suffered far more serious damage to their control mechanisms and though they have been hit by forces far stronger than a three pound package of pamphlets or a Free Europe Committee balloon. This is widely known and it is the reason why DC-3's are still flown throughout the world in civil aviation although built as early as 1935 or based on plans of that era.

It is therefore wrong to assume that even if, contrary to the fact, any portion of a Free Europe Committee balloon or its pamphlet load collided with any portion of the DC-3, the pilot would have lost control of his aircraft for any period of time, particularly for "minutes," even for as few as "one or two minutes."

c. But it is even more incredible that, as the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957 and its

other widespread though varying accounts suggest, the effect of the contact was psychological on the pilot, causing him to lose control for "a few minutes." It is hardly conceivable that a pilot, even with lesser qualifications than those ascribed in the note of February 20, 1957 to Vladimir Drab or the co-pilot Vaclav Frana, would have either lost control on the impact of the 3.5 pound loosely packed bunch of paper pamphlets on an antenna wire or having lost control would not have immediately regained it in a matter of a second or two.

As any person with even limited experience in airplane flight will know, the very letting down of the wheels of the aircraft while approaching for a landing, particularly under the circumstances described in the note of February 20, 1957, will cause a much greater "shock" than would be experienced by the impact of a bird on an antenna or on any other part of the aircraft.

The United States Government will have more to say on this subject below but it is prepared to demonstrate in any appropriate judicial forum, with the support of appropriate legal evidence, that the account and conclusion given in the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957, are unsupported by any substantial evidence. The true explanation of the alleged crash lies along entirely different lines.

The United States Government again notes that the Czechoslovak Government has refused to permit the United States Government and its representatives to see the actual report of the Investigating Commission.

Any serious competent commission investigating an airplane crash would have considered a good many other more likely explanations for the crash of January 18, 1956, than the speculation contained in the note of February 20, 1957.

II

The Facts:

As to the Likely Explanations of the Crash

As has been indicated, the United States Government, within the limitations set by the obstructions of the Czechoslovak Government, has sought to ascertain more likely explanations of the crash, based on the assumption of some veracity in the Czechoslovak Government's technical account of the flight, the weather, the physical description of the wreckage and also evidence of credible character which has come into the United States Government's possession. These lead to a conclusion which throws the liability for the crash directly on the Czechoslovak Airlines.

It is the solemn and considered conclusion of the United States Government that these findings lay the Czechoslovak Airlines open to the charge of having caused the deaths and injuries of the crew and passengers by what must be described, at the minimum, as a very gross type of negligence.

A.

The United States Government has had the note of February 20, 1957 carefully examined and evaluated by experts in DC-3 operations. Based on the acceptance for purposes of discussion of the Czechoslovak Government's account of the flight from Bratislava on Jan-

uary 18, 1956, the conclusion is reached that pilot Drab and his crew and passengers were dispatched by Czechoslovak Airlines authorities at Bratislava with orders to fly over the treacherous high mountains to Poprad-Tatry Airport in zero visibility, under circumstances in which the airport at Poprad could not be seen from the air by the pilot, in an extremely high wind velocity, with a maximum load and in icing conditions. In view particularly of the fact that effective navigational aids were absent in the area of alleged destination, these conditions necessarily would have caused the pilot to overfly Tatry Airfield and be carried much farther northeast than he intended.

The only way for the aircraft to have crashed into Skapova Hill, which is 21 kilometers or 12.6 miles north of the track to Tatry airfield near Poprad, was to have flown there. But Skapova Hill was not on or near the track of any safe instrument letdown approach to the Poprad-Tatry Airport. This is obvious even though the Czechoslovak Government has failed to publish or make known to the United States Government the outstanding instrument letdown approach pattern for that airport. The only logical conclusion must be that the pilot did not correct, in his management of the airplane, for the direction and velocity of the wind he actually encountered in flight, and that he was not briefed prior to flight on the true weather conditions he would encounter en route.

In paragraph 16, page 22 of the note of February 20, 1957, it is stated that the pilot started his descent for landing at Tatry Airfield at 1441 hours, leaving 3,000 meters (9,842.6 feet) above sea level. It further says that at 1445.5 hours he reported that he was in a procedure turn at 2,000 meters (6,562 feet) above sea level and was descending to the minimum altitude of 1300 meters (4,265 feet) above sea level. Had he descended to the 1300 minimum, he should have cleared the area of the crash, which was 1100 meters, by 200 meters. Yet the pilot crashed at this point. It is obvious that the pilot did not know where he was and did not know that he was as far away from the safe instrument letdown approach pattern for the Poprad-Tatry Airfield as Skapova Hill. Obviously he had not corrected for his wind and had been blown off his course. He encountered heavy turbulence, probably exacerbated by the strong winds over the hills, and made rapid descents (which also might have made the passengers believe they were experiencing strong shocks).

These facts alone explain the crash.

B.

The Czechoslovak Government stated in its note of February 20, 1957 that at Tatry Airfield on January 18, 1956 (page 8, paragraph 4) among other things the visibility was 20 kilometers at the lower base of clouds 840 meters above the ground at 1330; at 1430 the visibility was 20 kilometers at the lower base of clouds 500 meters above the ground and $\frac{1}{4}$ at the lower base 700 meters above the ground; while at 1455 visibility was 20 kilometers, overcast $\frac{3}{4}$ at the lower base of clouds 500 meters above the ground; and at the next layer of clouds $\frac{1}{4}$ and 700 meters above the ground. It gives other data, all

of which to a meteorologist show that there was freezing temperature and complete invisibility of the ground and surrounding area to the pilot in the cockpit as he flew the plane which allegedly crashed. In this connection, the United States Government wishes to point out that these statements are particularly misleading in suggesting 20 kilometers visibility when the Czechoslovak authorities were fully aware, and had in fact so stated in the press conference in which the first specific propaganda statement on this subject was issued in Prague, on February 21, 1956, that the pilot had no visibility. The press references have been stated above. It is true that the representative of the Ministry of Transport then stated, in reply to questions, that the visibility was 22 meters; but it is hardly likely that even this figure, which in substance means zero visibility, was reported to the ground by the aircraft. This conclusion is particularly valid in view of the fact that the Czechoslovak Government has refused to permit the United States Government to see the radio logs of communication between the aircraft and the ground.

It is also true that the Czechoslovak note states that the Tatra airfield had a navigation aid known as a Lorenz beacon. But it is well known that a Lorenz beacon would be of little use to a pilot flying in invisibility, in distress, blown off course by strong unforecast winds, far away from the airfield at which he was allegedly trying to land, particularly in an area characterized by high mountains, deep valleys, local gusts of vertical winds, as well as thermal and other turbulence caused by the general bad weather and by other adverse local winds.

C.

The United States Government has also had the physical description of the crashed aircraft, allegedly discovered by the Investigating Commission, examined by experts.

The description in the note of the condition of the two blades of the left propeller (that is, "bent rearward"), of the third blade (that is, canted "slightly forward") and of the three blades of the right propeller (that is, "bent forward"), indicates that the left propeller blades had no power while some power was being delivered to the other blades. From this, either or both of two conclusions may be inferred: First, that the ignition system of the left engine failed; second, that there was not enough fuel to provide the power necessary to keep the airplane from crashing into Skapova Hill.

It is true that the Czechoslovak note of February 20, 1957 recites that it was determined that the pilot in command "determined the amount of fuel necessary for the flight as 1800 liters." The Czechoslovak Government does not say, however, whether the pilot received 1800 liters of fuel for the flight, which was a 45 minute flight. 1800 liters in any case would add enough weight to make the aircraft dangerously heavy, as shown by the other weight factors described in the note.

The United States Government bears in mind, also, the notorious fact that the Czechoslovak Government and the Czechoslovak Airlines, since the defection from Czechoslovakia began of Czechoslovak pilots seeking to escape in their aircraft, have engaged in the practice of reducing

the amount of fuel on domestic flights to little above the amount necessary for the projected flight. With 1800 liters, this pilot could have flown over the Tatra mountains to Krakow, Poland, or back to Bratislava, or to some other safer and better situated field than the dangerous sod drenched with winter rain and snow, having no concrete runway but only some grass in summer, lying between two rows of high mountains, and useful only in good weather in the summertime, which was the Tatra airfield on January 18, 1956.

D.

A close meteorological study of the statements made in the note of February 20, 1957 and known meteorological data for the time and place of the alleged crash shows that the altimeters of the aircraft were not adjusted to the actual landing conditions at Tatra airfield. On page 14 of the note, it is stated that the altimeter settings of the radio operator's and co-pilot's altimeters were respectively 936 millibars and 941 millibars. Assuming this to be the fact, these settings were probably intended to correspond to the station pressure at the proposed landing field. From this it has been expertly concluded that the sea level pressure value at Tatra airfield at 1430 Central European time on January 18, 1956 was 1003 millibars and the value for the station pressure at the airfield was 919.5 millibars.

It appears therefore that the two altimeter settings given in the Czechoslovak Government's note were in error by approximately 15 and 20 millibars which represents an error in altitude of 450 and 600 feet respectively. This means that the altimeters would indicate to the pilots and crew that the airplane was flying 450 and 600 feet higher than the plane actually was at the time.

Since, as the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957 substantially admits, all hills and mountains in the vicinity of Tatra airfield were obscured and covered by clouds, the errors in the altimeters would in themselves be sufficient to account for the crash of the aircraft into Skapova Hill, as alleged in the Czechoslovak Government's notes.

Together with this, it should not be forgotten that even if the pilot had noticed that the bottom of his aircraft was scraping tree tops, (another explanation for the "sudden shock" felt by the surviving passengers "a few minutes" before the crash), the aircraft might not, in truth, as has already been indicated, have had enough engine power, or enough fuel, to climb rapidly and avert a crash. Since the note of February 20, 1957 does not allege post-crash fire, it may very well be that fuel exhaustion had occurred even though slight amounts of fuel might have been found in the tanks after the crash.

E.

The note of February 20, 1957, with all its misleading statements, makes clear, as do the other well known meteorological data available in public sources, that the entire Tatra area, at the altitude at which the aircraft which crashed was flying, was one of icing conditions. This means that wholly apart from any failure of the

ignition system or lack of fuel, the controls and mechanism for ascent, which would be necessary to avoid a crash or to increase altitude suddenly, were not efficiently operative. This is particularly true in the light of the implications of the Czechoslovak Government's account indicating that the aircraft carried excessive weight as has been noted above.

In this connection, an impartial investigator would have to credit the hypothesis that in truth the weather conditions were such in the entire area that the airplane could not have attempted with assurance of safety to land in any airfield in the area.

The Czechoslovak Government's note states that the airfield at Kosice, much superior for landing in bad weather to the Tatry airfield near Poprad, was closed even before the airplane set off from Bratislava. Therefore the airfield at Presov, which would likely be in worse condition than Kosice, was closed. It is significant that no military concrete runway was made available by the Czechoslovak authorities to this civil aircraft loaded with passengers though the aircraft was in great distress in consequence of having been dispatched by the Bratislava Czechoslovak Airlines authorities.

Although the point may not be material, it is difficult to credit the Czechoslovak Government's statement that the aircraft was dispatched from Bratislava direct to Tatry airfield. It seems hardly credible that in the weather known to have existed at the time of departure and en route the pilot would be directed to take the summer course of flight from Bratislava to Tatry, since this was usable with safety only in good visibility and optimum flight conditions. This route would require flight over the high mountains over Sliac to the small summer resort airfield used for the Tatry resort hotel customers near the Bat'a factory at Svit, called Tatry airport. It is more likely that in such weather a competent dispatcher and a competent pilot would cause the aircraft to fly the normal course over the low lands from Bratislava to Kosice, if he had to fly at all, hoping—although for this there is no meteorological forecast evidence—for a possible improvement of landing conditions at destination. The United States Government is inclined to accept the opinion that this must have been what happened and that not being able to land at Kosice, the pilot attempted or requested permission to land at other landing places without success. He thus must have been told by radio at Poprad that he could not land there either. He therefore either was flying around in the air in the general neighborhood of Poprad in the hope of improvement of landing conditions, or he had been directed by Poprad control to try to fly to the airfield at Krakow, Poland; the fact is in any case that he hit the mountainside. It was in the direction toward Krakow, according to the note of February 20, 1957, that the airplane was found to lie when it crashed.

The Czechoslovak Government's account of the flight, if it is true, discredits the dispatcher at Bratislava. The United States Government expresses its surprise at the attempt of the Czechoslovak authorities, and the Czechoslovak Airlines, recounted in the note of February 20, 1957, to land an aircraft with crew and passengers at a

tiny summertime sod airfield, possessing no reliable navigational aids and lying between two masses of dangerous high mountains, particularly when superior landing strips were available elsewhere.

The United States Government is aware that the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957 attempts to prove the possibility of safe landing by citing an alleged landing fifteen minutes earlier by another aircraft. The United States Government has found no independent substantiation that another DC-3, like the one scheduled by the published time table of the Czechoslovak Airlines to fly to Kosice from Prague, had also been diverted to Tatry airfield, and had landed safely. But even if true, the fact, of course, proves nothing with respect to the difficulties of the aircraft which crashed. Not only was the course of the Prague-Kosice aircraft flight different, but presumably the very fact that it landed first would cause the second aircraft to hover in the surrounding air space, to wait, buffeted by high winds and in worsening freezing conditions and growing invisibility, making the likelihood of its own safe landing continuously less.

F.

The note of February 20, 1957 makes the claim directly and by innuendo that mechanical and crew failure could not have accounted for the crash because of the efficiency of the aircraft and the efficiency of the crew. On this subject the United States Government makes the following observations:

1. With respect to the aircraft:

a. As to the air frame: The aircraft is described as a "DC-3 type." It is described as having the air frame serial number 23523.

The United States Government is also aware that the Czechoslovak Airline's time table advertised the flight as being a "Douglas DC-3."

The United States Government has checked with the Douglas Manufacturing Company and finds that no model of the Douglas DC-3 aircraft was manufactured with such a serial number. The serial number 23523 was given to a bomber delivered to the United States Army Air Corps in 1944, and was long since dismantled in the United States.

However, the United States Government's records show that a cargo DC-3 type aircraft bearing a number 42-23523, but carrying engines different in serial numbers from those described in the Czechoslovak Government's last note, was sold to the Czechoslovak Government on December 20, 1946.

The point is material since the obvious purpose of the Czechoslovak Government was to make it appear that the aircraft which crashed was of the sturdiness universally known to characterize DC-3 civil aircraft and the C-47, its military counterpart. For this reason the refusal of the Czechoslovak Government to permit an examination of the wreckage is material.

It is now known that aircraft built to look like DC-3's were manufactured in the Soviet Union, and were used in Czechoslovakia among other countries. Whatever the physical attributes of such air frames might be, they

cannot claim *ipso facto* the established sturdiness of the DC-3 of the United States Douglas Aircraft Company.

b. As to the engines: The note of February 20, 1957 further states that the aircraft had two Pratt and Whitney "type" Twin-Wasp engines, of the R-1830-92 type. It gives their serial numbers as CP-254206 (in the English version of the note, but 354206 in the Czechoslovak language version of the note) and 353165.

The records of the Pratt and Whitney Company made available to the United States Government show that engines bearing these numbers were sold to the United States Army Air Corps on September 30, 1943. Engines of these numbers were not attached to the DC-3 airframe, according to the records of the United States Government.

c. The Czechoslovak Government has permitted no inspection of the maintenance records of the airplane and its parts. It appears obvious from the foregoing that the airplane which crashed on January 18, 1956 would not be entitled to claim *prima facie* color of efficiency such as that which the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957 seeks to attach to the aircraft which crashed.

2. With respect to the crew:

The United States Government is impressed by the fact that the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957 characterizes each member of the crew as having been rated "excellent" without any exception. Apart from the reserve which this universality of "excellence" in the crew itself engenders, the United States Government cannot fail to point out that the behavior—assuming it to have been voluntary—of the pilot and co-pilot during the fateful trip of January 18, 1956, would, in any expert forum, detract considerably from the acceptance of the qualification of each of them as "excellent". The crew are described as having taken off in zero visibility and extremely bad weather, carrying an extremely heavy load, with their destination an airfield of the type which has been described and without an alternate airfield.

Assuming that the pilot had no alternative but to obey the orders of the dispatcher (whose rating the Czechoslovak note of February 20, 1957 does not give and who must be characterized as far less than "excellent"), a careful pilot and co-pilot would have turned back to Bratislava when they became aware of what the flying conditions to and over their destination actually were.

G.

Sworn testimony and other evidence now in the possession of the United States Government provide a further and most likely explanation of the circumstances of the crash of January 18, 1956.

The United States Government has noted with interest the detail of the account in the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 20, 1957 of the landing pattern around Tatro airfield performed by the aircraft which crashed. In fact, the airplane was obviously many miles away from any landing pattern; it was near Skapova Hill.

The United States Government believes that a thorough investigation, such as the Czechoslovak Govern-

ment has refused to permit the United States Government to make, would show that the aircraft which crashed overflew in its blind flight the area of the Tatra mountains east of Kezmarok, flying in a north-easterly direction over the village of Torsky.

This area, particularly beginning with the village of Lubica, southeast of Kezmarok, has for several years become increasingly a zone of intense military activity and installation, closed to outsiders. Its civilian population has been expelled and resettled elsewhere while military installations of variety and high security classification have been built, particularly in the direction toward the Polish frontier.

The Torsky area has been particularly militarized and subjected to strict security regulations. The area had been formerly used from time to time for maneuvers by troops and aircraft in maneuver season, including aviation personnel. But its use has now been extended—and had been before January 18, 1956—to permanent military installations obviously looking toward the Polish border and also serving as fortifications for the protection of access to the Soviet Union.

The area over which the aircraft flew, east of Kezmarok, was unauthorized for this flight. The military personnel on the ground included anti-aircraft battery operators concerned with protection against unauthorized overflight.

The fact that the Czechoslovak Government has refused not only to permit the United States Government to see the aircraft in its state of wreckage but even to see photographs of the fuselage, in the light of the foregoing, strengthens the possibility that this aircraft may also have been subject to anti-aircraft artillery fire in its overflight of this restricted military area. The impacts of anti-aircraft shell fragments hitting the fuselage of the plane could well constitute the "strong shocks" which the surviving passengers say they felt a "few minutes" before the crash. This, in fact, in itself would have caused the plane to make a sudden turn and the pilot to lose control, fall into the trees on Skapova Hill and crash into the ground, causing the injuries and deaths which took place.

H.

The United States Government has ascertained and wishes to call attention to the fact that the Czechoslovak Government Ministry of Transport announced the fact of the aircrash, which appeared to be that of a domestic airliner on a domestic flight, the day following the crash, on January 19, 1956, and within several hours of the news reaching Prague. In response to press inquiry on that day, the Ministry of Transport stated that a special investigation commission would be appointed to investigate the causes of the crash and that the report of the commission would be sent to the International Civil Aviation Organization, which was in Montreal, Canada.

In any case, this was approximately the first time that any domestic air crash of a Czechoslovak Airliner had ever been reported in the Czechoslovak official press under the present Communist regime. A campaign to arouse public domestic and international opinion and to suggest that there were international implications began immediately and speedily, with a gradual buildup until

a press conference nominally held by the Ministry of Transport of February 21, 1956, followed by a propaganda campaign of considerable magnitude. The point cannot be overlooked that the Czechoslovak Government appears to have been waiting with a ready program for any airplane crash to take place to launch the campaign.

Promptly on January 21, 1956, the Czechoslovak Government, under the name of the "Director General of Civil Aviation", sent a cable to the European Office of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Paris saying, in part, that domestic and international air traffic over Czechoslovak territory had "in the last few days" been endangered "by the invasion of free balloons of large size" and requesting steps be taken to remove the hazard.

The Czechoslovak Government began a campaign simultaneously to make international airlines believe that flight in nighttime or in bad weather might result in crashes with balloons. This had the obvious result of a circular inquiry by the International Air Transport Association.

It is revealing of the organized propaganda campaign that on February 1, 1956, the Communist German Deutschlandsender in East Germany at 2010 GMT, in a commentary by one Wolfgang Dost, stated that "last week a Czechoslovak transport aircraft crashed after colliding with a United States propaganda balloon." He had confused the date but that appears to serve the more to indicate that a concerted program of exploitation had already been delivered by appropriate authorities to the propaganda departments of the governments associated with the Czechoslovak Government in attacking the Free Europe Committee.

On February 7, while the month-long investigation was still pending, the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a cablegram to the Secretary General of the United Nations with a long list of grievances concerning balloon traffic. It said that "balloon traffic had become a serious hazard to air traffic over Czechoslovakia in the domestic air routes as well as in the space of international air routes." Then it made the following statement:

"On January 18, 1956, a passenger aircraft of the Czechoslovak Airlines crashed near Levoča in Slovakia. In this catastrophe, which is still being investigated, 22 passengers were killed and 4 passengers suffered grave injuries."

It is significant that on September 11, 1956, the then Polish Government also announced an air crash, this in alleged consequence of a collision on August 8, 1956 between a Free Europe Committee balloon and a jet aircraft; and that on July 28, 1956, the Hungarian Government announced an air crash, this as the alleged result of a collision on July 19, 1956 between an aircraft and a Free Europe Committee balloon. Both novel stories may be deemed to have the purpose of strengthening the credibility of the alleged incident of January 18, 1956 and to build up the program described looking toward action by the International Civil Aviation Organization, on which the Czechoslovak Government was embarked.

I.

The established facts, therefore, show beyond a peradventure of doubt that the alleged crash of January 18,

1956 had no causal relation whatsoever with a Free Europe Committee balloon or its pamphlet load. On the contrary, such investigation as has been possible points clearly to the fact that the authorities in Bratislava who, according to the note of February 20, 1957, dispatched the crew and passengers of the aircraft OK-WDZ, called a DC-3 type, in freezing weather, strong winds and zero visibility to a small soggy dirt airfield sunk between dangerous mountain ranges, were guilty of what must be characterized, if the facts recited in the February 20, 1957 note are true, as homicidal negligence.

There is no need therefore to discuss the subsidiary questions as to measure of damages. It is suitable, however, that a note should be made here in this record of the fact that although, according to the communication of February 20, 1957, the crash took place at precisely 1450 hours, that is in the early afternoon, they did not—as investigation has disclosed—succor the wounded and the injured and save lives until past midnight, on January 19, 1956. Instead, the Czechoslovak authorities apparently proceeded to discuss—and no doubt to obtain clearance for—the exploitation of the incident. They were already, immediately in the working office hours of January 19, 1956, apparently embarking on a program of propaganda tying the Free Europe Committee to the disaster. The note of February 20, 1957 glosses over this time delay with a statement that in addition to the survivors "all the other passengers suffered fatal injuries and by the time the wreckage was reached, they were already dead".

III

Questions of Law

In view of the foregoing, the Czechoslovak Government's charge of liability having fallen on the issues of fact, the questions of law that are raised by the notes of June 19, 1956 and February 20, 1957 do not call for reply. The United States reserves for some future appropriate occasion a discussion of the various, now irrelevant, legal assertions made in both of the Czechoslovak notes to which reference has been made. The United States Government further states that nothing in the present note is to be construed as admitting the validity, in whole or in part, of any of the legal propositions made by the Czechoslovak Government on the subject of this note.

Nor is it necessary to discuss the question whether any aggrieved person, or the Czechoslovak Government, should not have exhausted the remedies available to them in the Courts of the United States which have jurisdiction over the Free Europe Committee, Inc., and which have the means and the practice of providing for full judicial hearing, judicial determination and collection of damages.

IV

Conclusion

The United States Government considers that the controversy between it and the Czechoslovak Government on the subject of the incident of January 18, 1956 is, in respect to diplomatic negotiations, closed and that the

channels of diplomacy have been thoroughly exhausted. Whether the Czechoslovak Government wishes now to resort to the international judicial forum provided by the International Court of Justice, the United States Government leaves to the determination of the Czechoslovak Government. In that event the United States Government will give further consideration to the matter.

The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to refer to the Ministry the assurances of its consideration.

CZECHOSLOVAK NOTE OF FEBRUARY 20, 1957

Unofficial translation

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

No. 105.578/57-ABO/1

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and with reference to the Embassy's note No. 117 of October 9, 1956, concerning the crash of the Czechoslovak transport aircraft, has the honor to advise on instructions of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic as follows:

The Czechoslovak Government has taken note of the fact that compared with its note of April 10, 1956, the Government of the United States has somewhat revised its position and that, according to its communication, it has carefully studied the notes dated February 24¹ and June 19, 1956, in which the Czechoslovak Government raised a sharp protest in connection with the crash of a Czechoslovak airliner, caused by the airliner's collision with a balloon launched unlawfully into the Czechoslovak airspace by an American organization, and asked the United States of America for compensation of the damage caused.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, however, cannot consider even the above quoted note of the United States Government as satisfactory. The Government of the United States refers, in the first place, to its previous notes in which it tried to defend the unlawful launching of balloons with provocative literature into Czechoslovak airspace and adopted towards this activity hostile to Czechoslovakia a position indicating that it backs and supports it. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic has refuted already many times the false and provocative allegations contained in the notes of the United States Government in this matter, and if the United States Government has deemed it necessary to refer to them again in its last note, this fact cannot but raise doubts as to the manner in which the United States Government is approaching a matter as grave as an air crash that had caused the death of 22 passengers and all crew members.

The Government of the United States has requested also many data, a number of which is unnecessary for the study of the causes of the air crash. The demands made in this connection are of such a nature that the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic deems it neces-

sary to point out that the investigation of a crash that has occurred on Czechoslovak territory, especially the crash of a Czechoslovak airliner carrying only Czechoslovak citizens, is under the existing provisions of international air law a matter of exclusive jurisdiction of the Czechoslovak authorities. The results of the investigation carried out by these authorities have been already communicated to the Government of the United States.

In its above note the Government of the United States has avoided a clear recognition of its responsibility under international law for the activities of the so-called Free Europe Committee, which is an American organization registered with the American authorities. The Government of the United States has made the statement of its position on this fundamental question, which is a separate question from that of the concrete consequences of the above mentioned activities, conditional on the supply by the Czechoslovak authorities of technical, meteorological and other data relating to the air crash of January 18, 1956. These data, however, are quite irrelevant as regards the evaluation of the general question of the responsibility, under international law, of the United States Government for the activities of the said American organization. This responsibility of the United States Government is quite indisputable under international law.

It must be noted at the same time that the request for detailed information concerning the air crash indicates in itself that the Government of the United States starts in fact from the recognition of its responsibility under international law for the activities of the American organization which had caused the air crash by the launching of balloons into the Czechoslovak airspace.

The divergence between the fact that on one hand the Government of the United States avoids a clear recognition of this responsibility and the fact that on the other hand it makes a request which involves such a recognition, is so clear and so serious that the Czechoslovak Government would be fully entitled to ask the Government of the United States that prior to any request for data concerning the said air crash it state openly its position on this question of international law and to recognize expressly its responsibility for the activities of the so-called "Free Europe Committee".

In order, however, to facilitate and expedite the consideration of the claim for compensation of the damages, the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic wishes to provide, despite its above reservations regarding the note of the United States Government of October 9, 1956, the following additional data concerning the crash of the aircraft of the Czechoslovak Airlines which occurred on January 18, 1956:

1) The transport aircraft which crashed was a DC-3 type aircraft bearing the registration mark OK-W1Z; its airframe serial number was 23523. The right engine was a Twin-Wasp R-1830-92 type bearing the serial No. CP-254206; the left engine was of the same type and had the serial No. 353165. The aircraft was registered in the Aircraft Register under No. 1346 and its Certificate of Airworthiness was valid until March 10, 1956. The maximum permissible weight of the aircraft was 11,880 kgs and the actual take-off weight at its take-off on January 18, 1956

¹ Not printed.

was 11,844 kgs. The flight time of the airframe since its manufacture was 8,839 hrs., since its last major overhaul on December 29, 1954, 888 hrs., and since the last "B" /75-hour/ inspection on December 22, 1955, 51 hrs. The right engine had a flight time since manufacture of 4,953 hrs. and since last inspection 22 hrs.; the left engine had a total flight time of 5,197 hrs. and since last inspection 119 hrs. After its preceding flight the aircraft was thoroughly serviced and prior to its take-off to its last flight it was again serviced and checked. No defects had been reported on the previous flights.

2) On the flight during which the crash occurred the aircraft had the following crew: Pilot-in-command Vladimír Dráb, co-pilot Václav Frána, radio operator Vlado Jorík, flight engineer Rudolf Ruzicka. Vladimír Dráb, a pilot with minima No. 1, had very good flight experience. Examined of his knowledge of flight techniques on September 17, 1955, September 22, 1955 and October 7, 1955, he passed with excellent marks. By the end of 1955 he had flown a total of 6,742 hours, of which 176 hours were flown on 121 flights in the last three months. He held a valid license authorizing him to operate aircraft of the DC-3 type as pilot-in-command. Václav Frána passed into the category of co-pilot on July 18, 1955. He passed the periodical examinations of flight techniques on December 13, 1955 and January 14, 1956 with excellent results. By the end of 1955 he had flown a total of 1,810 hours, of which 176 hours had been flown on 135 flights in the last three months. He held a valid license authorizing him to fly as co-pilot on DC-3 aircraft. Vlado Jorík was re-examined of his knowledge of aeronautical communications on August 13 and 14, 1955 and on December 14, 1955, and was classified as excellent. By the end of 1955 he had flown a total of 2,905 hours, of which 197 hours had been flown on 132 flights in the last three months. He had a valid license authorizing him to fly as radio operator on DC-3 type aircraft. Rudolf Ruzicka received excellent marks in the practical and theoretical examinations of flight engineers which he passed on January 21 and 23, 1954. He received favorable mention in the Circular of Ordinances issued by the Chief of the Civil Aviation Directorate, No. 9 of February 22, 1954. He had flown a total of 9,473 hours, 184 of which had been flown on 111 flights in the last three months. He held a valid license of flight engineer on DC-3 aircraft. All members of the crew were killed in the crash.

3) The following passengers travelled in the aircraft on its last flight: Laura Jarná, born December 14, 1912, married; Anna Paulínová, born March 4, 1910, married; Ing. Vladimír Puchý, born August 5, 1922, married; Antonín Figula, born July 27, 1914, married; František Tlaskal, born September 24, 1902, married; Karel Kaspar, born March 26, 1902, married; Ing. Jan Izák, born October 20, 1902, married; Stefan Kantor, born July 10, 1915, married; Bohumil Nociár, born November 8, 1918, married; Dr. Vladimír Jelinek, born November 17, 1913, married; Helena Kaloudová, born September 16, 1917, unmarried; Marta Balcová, born July 1, 1929, unmarried; Josef Bánský, born December 31, 1919, married; Antonín Siegrid, born June 14, 1908, married; Anna Lorinsová, born September 9, 1922, married; Dr. Ladislav

Drobný, born August 26, 1914, married; Josef Baraněk, born June 2, 1912, married; Ján Maršelák, born March 11, 1919, married; Stefan Háč, born August 16, 1904, married; Jaroslav Sevrá, born December 4, 1923; Juraj Vebec, born April 22, 1913, married; Bartolomej Bavalár, born September 29, 1914, married. Passengers Laura Jarná, Anna Paulínová, Ing. Vladimír Puchý and Antonín Figula suffered heavy injuries in the crash. All the other passengers suffered fatal injuries and by the time the wreckage was reached they were already dead.

4) The following weather conditions existed at the Tatry Airfield on January 18, 1956: At 13,30 CET: wind direction 240°, wind velocity 6 m/sec, visibility 20 km, overcast 8/8, lower base of clouds 840 meters above ground, temperature +5°C, dew point +1°C; at 14,30 CET: wind direction 240°, wind velocity 8 m/sec, visibility 20 km, overcast 3/8, lower base of clouds 500 meters above ground, next layer of clouds 7/8 with lower base 700 meters above ground, temperature +5°C, dew point +2°C; at 14,55 CET: wind direction 240°, wind velocity 9 m/sec, visibility 20 km, overcast 3/8, lower base of clouds 500 meters above ground, next layer of clouds 7/8 with lower base 700 meters above ground, temperature +5°C, dewpoint +2°C, drizzling rain. The following weather conditions were recorded by the adjoining meteorological stations: Lomnický štít /2,630 meters above sea level/ recorded at 13,00 CET: wind direction 290°, wind velocity 7m/sec, gusts of 14m/sec, visibility 60 km, below the station a cloud expanse with the upper limit reaching 2,000 to 2,500 meters above sea level, above the station cloudy 6/8 600 to 1,000 meters above ground, temperature -2°C, dew point -12°C, no icing conditions; at 16,00 CET: wind direction 290°, wind velocity 17 m/sec, gusts of 30 m/sec, visibility 200 m, station in clouds, temperature -3°C, dew point -3°C, no icing conditions. The station at Svermovo /geographical position 48°51'N, 20°11'E/ lying in the altitude of 900 meters above sea level recorded the following weather conditions at 14,00 CET: wind direction 230°, wind velocity 7 m/sec, visibility 2 km, slight drizzle, overcast 8/8, lower base of clouds 60 meters above ground, all surrounding mountains and slopes in clouds, temperature +1°C; at 15,00 CET: wind direction 270°, wind velocity 8 m/sec, visibility 3 km, moderate rain, overcast 8/8, lower base of clouds 60 meters above ground, all surrounding mountains and slopes in clouds. Freezing level in free atmosphere was 2,400 meters above sea level after a temperature correction to the free atmosphere in the mountains. The correction was obtained after a comparison of the result of a radio sonde released from the Tatry Airfield in the morning with the observations carried out by the mountain stations.

5) The aircraft carried the following navigational and communication equipment on board: Liaison transmitter with dynamotor and tuning units; Liaison receiver; S-10-L transmitter with an aerial tuning device and dynamotor; 3-4 Mc/s Command transmitter; 4-5.3 Mc/s Command transmitter; 3-6 Mc/s Command receiver; 6-9.1 Mc/s Command receiver; 190-250 Kc/s Command receiver; radio-compass with control box and inverter; 74 Mc/s marker receiver; SBA/Lorenz/equip-

ment with marker beacon receiver 38 Mc/s. The following ground equipment was available: transmitter and receiver on the frequency 3917.5 Kc/s; SBA equipment/Lorenz//; marker beacon transmitter operating on the frequency 38 Mc/s; NDB medium-wave at Sliac and Tattr; medium-wave D-finders. Air to ground communication was maintained throughout the flight on short- and medium-wave channels. En-route navigation was done by medium-wave direction finders, the NDBs at Sliac and Tattr, and by radio compass which was used to check the course of the flight. All the equipment was in perfect order.

6) A detailed investigation of the wreckage has shown that at the point of impact the aircraft was complete and had lost no basic part. The wings, the tail planes including the control surfaces, the ailerons, engines and propellers were all found in the place of impact. The left wing was broken about 1 meter from where it joins the centre wing section. The outer part of the wing rested on the rear part of the fuselage where it was again broken so that the wing tip was on the right side of the fuselage. All parts of the left wing were torn and deformed by the impact of the wing on a tree. The right wing was torn away at the spotlight when it hit the foot of a tree. The rest of the wing rested in upside down position along the fuselage. About two meters from its tip the wing was broken and hung down. The centre wing section was pushed into the left side of the fuselage. The left engine was torn away from its fitting and thrown to the right front so that its front part faced the aircraft. The rear engine cover was embedded in the ground, the engine accessories were damaged or destroyed. The propeller reduction gear was torn away from the front part of the engine cover. The engine was not jammed. There were signs of a fire around the carburettor, which flamed up apparently on the ground after the impact and did not last long. The right engine was torn away from its fitting and thrown to the right front. Four cylinders on the right bottom were torn away, the same as the front part of the cover including the propeller reduction gear. Some of the engine accessories were damaged. The engine did not jam. The exhaust tube was deformed and damaged. There were signs of a fire around the carburettor, but the fire did not spread. The left propeller was torn away together with the propeller reduction gear and was found on the left side of the fuselage in an opposite direction to that of the flight at about the level of the cabin door. Two blades were bent backwards and one slightly forward. The blades were set roughly in cruising position. The right propeller was found with a part of the propeller reduction gear near the rear part of the fuselage at its right side. The blades were bent forward. Their setting corresponded roughly to cruising conditions. The rear part of the fuselage was unbroken to the level of the third window from the rear. From there to the front it was broken and torn. The monocoque was split on hitting four large trees into two parts all the way to the place of the holder of the aerial of the main radio station. The front part of the fuselage was completely crushed. The centre wing section was pushed with its front part up into the fuselage. All the passenger seats

were torn off the floor and thrown out with the exception of five seats which were left in the cabin. The rear part of the fuselage was mostly undamaged and was completely empty. Not found among the accessories in the wreckage was the holder of the aerial and the aerial of the main radio station and the Command station; these parts could not be found even in the near vicinity of the crash.

7) The cockpit was completely destroyed. Parts of the cockpit ceiling were found in the shapeless mass of wreckage in the front, and parts of the cockpit floor, including the steering equipment, were found somewhat to the left rear. The elevator trimmer was found in a position of -1° , while the rudder trimmer was set at 2° left. The left gas lever was roughly in a position corresponding to cruising conditions. The right gas lever was pushed more forward towards full throttle and was bent by the impact somewhat to the left. The left mixture control lever was secured in a position corresponding to poor mixture. The right mixture control lever was pushed fully forward and was bent to the left by the impact /it could not be moved/. The left fuel cock was found in a position between the right and left main tanks, while the right fuel cock in the position "right main tank". The master magneto switch was turned on. The magneto switch of the left engine was found in "on" position for both magnetos, while the magneto switch of the right engine was "on" for the right magneto. The lever of the propeller speed governor of the left engine was found in a position about a width of the diameter of the lever knob behind the position corresponding to cruising conditions. The lever of the propeller speed governor of the right engine was in a position corresponding to cruising conditions. The carburettor air-warming control levers were not secured and the safety device was damaged. The static pressure bleed cock was in "cabin" position; the lever was apparently forced into this position by the impact. It was bent down and could not be moved. The battery switch was on, the heating of one Pitot tube was switched on, while the other was switched off; the de-icing of the propellers was in "off" position. The radio compass was switched on the same as the "Fasten your safety belts" and "No smoking" sign. The SBA equipment was switched on on the pilot's switch panel.

8) The instruments on the instrument panel were mostly broken. All three altimeters were found. The relatively best preserved of them was the radio operator's altimeter, but its setting screw was broken away; when found, the altimeter indicated the pressure of 936 mb; the altitude indicated at the time of its finding was 860 meters. The co-pilot's altimeter, which was partly broken and the gauge of which was missing, indicated the pressure of 941 mb. Only remnants of the captain's altimeter were found, and nothing could be ascertained from them. The rudder was undamaged and could be easily turned. The left half of the elevator was broken at its outer part together with the stabilizer; the right half was only slightly damaged. The ailerons remained in their fittings but were broken, the same as the wing. The control cables in the rear part of the fuselage were undamaged; they were slack but stayed in the control

pulleys. The trimming tabs were deflected in a position corresponding to the setting in the cockpit. The undercarriage was out and was damaged by the impact; it was secured, however, in the "out" position. The rear wheel was practically undamaged. The fuel tanks were deformed, but there were no leaks. All contained fuel, with the exception of the right rear tank, from which fuel leaked out through the purging valve which was torn away. The left oil tank was completely destroyed; it was pushed up towards the fuselage and the oil flowed out. The front part of the right oil tank was destroyed and the rear part was deformed; it was lifted up and its upper part was damaged. Some of the oil remained in the tank. Both oil coolers were torn away and damaged. The battery was completely broken and the wiring in the front part of the aircraft was torn and destroyed.

9) After the examination of the radio equipment which was not completely destroyed in the crash, the following was found: the Liaison transmitter, serial No. 1005, was tuned to the frequency of 333.5 Kc/s; the transmitter itself and the exchangeable tuning units were considerably damaged. The Liaison receiver, serial No. 1023, was tuned to the frequency of 338 Kc/s; the front panel and the side walls were considerably damaged. The Command transmitter, serial No. 0017, was tuned to the frequency of 3923 Kc/s; it was completely destroyed by the impact. The Command transmitter, serial No. 1147, was tuned to the frequency of 5600 Kc/s and was also completely destroyed. The Command receiver, serial No. 0328, was tuned to the frequency of 3917 Kc/s and was destroyed by the impact. The front panel of the radio compass, serial No. 1003, was damaged. The tuning capacitor, including the worm gear, was torn out, so that from the position of the tuning capacitor it could not be ascertained to which frequency it was tuned at the moment of the crash. The upper part of the cover was indented, thus deforming the first high-frequency unit. The deformation of the cover caused several short circuits between the trimmers and the frame. When tested, the equipment functioned but with a considerably reduced input sensitivity caused by the damage.

10) The detailed examination of the wreckage of the aircraft ascertained the fact that it was complete at the place of impact, with the exception of the aerial holder and the aerial of the main radio station and the Command radio station. The positions of the gas levers, the mixture control levers, the speed governor levers, the magnetto switches in the "on" position, and of the fuel valves show that as far as the engines are concerned, the aircraft had no defects. The complete condition of the wings and all controls as well as the setting of the trimming tabs, which corresponded to the positions of the respective controls in the cockpit, indicate that the aircraft was in perfect order also as regards the fuselage. The fact that the undercarriage was down and that the sign "Fasten your safety belts" and "No smoking" was switched on show that the aircraft was preparing for a normal landing at the airport. The technical examination thus indicates that: a) the aircraft had no technical defect during the flight, which could have caused the crash; b) the fact that the aerial system was not found

in the wreckage shows that in the last stage of the flight the cockpit was damaged and the aerial was torn off by a collision with a heavier object.

11) In considering the causes which might have brought about such a collision, it was pointed out to the investigating commission that on the day of the crash a larger number of balloons of the type used by American organizations for the unlawful sending of printed matter over the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic had been spotted over Central Slovakia.

Further investigation ascertained the following facts: On January 17 and 18, 1956 winds in the direction of 230° to 300° and a velocity of 37 to 83 km per hour prevailed in the altitude of 1,500 to 3,000 meters over the territory of Western Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia. This southwesterly to northwesterly wind enabled the launching of balloons from the west over the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic. On January 17, 18 and 19, 1956—i. e. on the day of the crash, a day before and a day after it—balloons of the so-called "Free Europe Committee" were spotted e. g. in the following areas: Blatná, Horská Tůň, Susice, Stod, Klatovy, Domazlice, Saratice, Povázská Bystrice, Bytča, Turčianske Teplice, Rajec, Ružomberok, Kezmarok, Levice, Mikulas, Hradek, Levoca, Zilina, as well as in the area of the Tatry Mountains. The printed matter which had dropped on those days on Czechoslovak territory was marked "Svobodná Európa" or "Slobodna Európa". It was printed partly in the Czech and partly in the Slovak languages and was numbered 40, 41 and 42.

12) According to statements of witnesses, balloons had been spotted on the day of the crash also directly in the area of the disaster. Between 7 and 8 a. m. witnesses spotted a balloon carrying a load over the town of Poprad which lies 27 kilometers west-southwest of the place of the crash. Two groups of three balloons each were spotted about 3 p. m. in the area of the town of Kezmarok which is about 18 kilometers west of the place of the crash. Moreover, a larger group of balloons appeared around noon over the town of Levice which is about 160 kilometers southwest of the place of the crash; at that time a strong wind was blowing from the area of Levice in a 240° course, i. e., towards the area of the crash. These data indicate clearly that in the afternoon hours of January 18, 1956, several groups of balloons drifted in the area of the crash.

13) A search of the terrain in the vicinity of the crash discovered remnants of a torn balloon and its load. About 2 kilometers east-southeast from the place of the crash, i. e. in the direction from which the airliner had been flying, a part of the plastic skin of a balloon, measuring about 30 square meters, was found hanging on a tree about 4 meters from the ground. In the vicinity about 60 to 70 copies of a bilingual leaflet marked "Slobodna Európa" No. 42 were found spread over the ground. Another part of the balloon skin was found after the thaw in a wooded area about 400 meters east of the place of the crash.

14) After examining the wreckage of the aircraft, a study of the records of the ground control services and the remnants of the records on board, a search of the

vicinity of the crash, and after hearing witnesses from among the local population, members of the ground personnel of the airports and ground control stations with which the airliner had maintained contact, as well as the crew of the aircraft of the Czechoslovak Airlines, registration mark OK-WDP, which had landed at the Tatry Airfield at 14.34 hours on the same day, i. e., about 15 minutes before the crash of the OK-WDZ airliner, the investigating commission carried out a reconstruction of the flight of the crashed airliner. The airliner's crew was to carry out on January 18, 1956, the flight on the Praba-Bratislava-Kosice route, which is marked as flight No. OK 07. Before the flight the crew made the usual pre-flight preparations on the Prague airfield and these preparations were checked by the navigator of the airfield. The crew was notified of a change in the call signs of the radio beacon at the Kosice airfield and of a change in the frequency of the radio beacon at Sliac. Prior to the flight the crew was briefed on the weather situation and the weather forecast for the route and the terminal airfield, and it picked up a written weather forecast for the flight. At the Bratislava airfield the crew received instructions to carry out a flight on the Bratislava-Tatry route because the weather situation at the Kosice airfield did not correspond to the prescribed weather minima; for the same reason the OK-WDP airliner which was to fly to Kosice as flight No. OK 05 was also rerouted to the Tatry Airfield. After receiving his instructions to fly to the Tatry Airfield, the pilot-in-command ascertained the number of passengers and the cargo, informed himself of the weather situation and the forecast for the flight at the meteorological service, and determined the amount of fuel necessary for the flight as 1,800 liters. The co-pilot and the radio operator made the preparations for the flight to the Tatry Airfield according to the route forecast which they received from the meteorological service. Together with the flight permit, they received from the area control center the latest data concerning the actual weather conditions at the Tatry Airfield. The flight engineer supervised the fuelling of the airliner. All the prescribed regulations were observed at the take-off of the OK-WDZ airliner from the Bratislava airfield. The Tatry Airfield gave permission for the airliner's landing, no weather conditions dangerous to the flight had been forecast for the route or area of the airfield by the meteorological service. The weather conditions at the Tatry Airfield corresponded to the valid weather minima. There were no defects on either the aircraft or the radio-navigational equipment of the Tatry Airfield. The aircraft was equipped with the usual instruments required for controlled approach to the Tatry Airfield, and the crew had the required qualifications.

15) The OK-WDZ airliner took off from the Bratislava airfield at 13.56 hours. Prior to the take-off it received from the airfield control tower at Bratislava on the frequency 3,917.5 Kc/s take-off clearance and instructions for the ascent. At 14.08 hours the aircraft established contact with the area control center Bratislava on the frequency 4,689.5 Kc/s. After take-off it steered into the course of 073° and ascended to the flight level of 3,000 meters /the altimeter being set for standard

pressure/. It reached this altitude at 14.11 hours. At 14.26 hours the aircraft changed over to the Sliac direction finder on the frequency 333 Kc/s, and at 14.27 hours it announced its overflight of the Sliac airfield. It also requested that the SBA equipment and the NDB at the Tatry Airfield be switched on. From the Sliac direction finder it received a report on the weather conditions at the Tatry Airfield. After passing over the Sliac airfield, the aircraft proceeded on the course 060° to the Tatry Airfield, still at 3,000 meters. At 14.37 hours it established contact with the Tatry direction finder, received a weather report and tuned in on the frequency 3,917.5 Kc/s. The aircraft arrived over the Tatry Airfield at 14.41 hours.

16) After arriving over the Tatry Airfield, the aircraft began its controlled approach at 14.41 hours. For this purpose it used the SBA equipment, the switching on of which it had previously requested. According to calculations the time necessary for the flight from the beginning of the approach to the standard procedure turn has been set at 5.5 if there is no wind. In view of the expected wind the crew shortened this time by about one minute, i. e., to 4.5 minutes. The actual wind in the area of descent reached a velocity of over 100 kilometers per hour blowing in the probable direction of 240°; it had this velocity even at lower altitudes above ground. At about 14.45½ hours the crew began the standard procedure turn 1,300 meters above the level of the Tatry Airfield. After completing the turn, which took about 2 to 2.5 minutes, the aircraft set a course to the airfield, left the altitude of 1,300 meters above the level of the Tatry Airfield, i. e., 2,000 meters above sea level, and began its descent to the altitude of 650 meters above the level of the airfield, at which altitude it was to fly over the SBA outer marker /radio beacon operating on the frequency of 38 Mc/s, which lies about 5 kilometers east of the airfield. In normal flight the aircraft could not descend from the time it completed the procedure turn /14.47 to 14.48 hours/ until the time it hit the ground /14.50 hours/, i. e., within two to three minutes, from the altitude of 2,000 meters above sea level to the altitude of 1,100 meters above sea level at which it crashed, i. e., by 900 meters.

17) Until the time the aircraft completed the standard procedure turn the flight was normal; this is shown by the normal radio contact and by the record of the aircraft's radio operator on the completion of the procedure turn and the reception of the information concerning the direction of the runway and the direction and velocity of the wind at the Tatry Airfield. This indicates that the sudden drop in altitude and the change in the aircraft's course were caused by external influence. The passengers who survived the crash do, in fact, confirm that a few minutes before the crash they felt a strong shock, an unusual swerving of the aircraft and its rapid descent. The aerial of the main radio station, which was not found either in the wreckage or in the vicinity of the place of crash, could not have been torn away by impact on the trees, the tops of which the aircraft had brushed only with its front and bottom parts before hitting the slope. In the place where the aerial holder is fixed the fuselage was damaged in such

a way that the holder would have had to be found in the wreckage if it were torn away only after the aircraft had hit the ground. The rear part of the fuselage, including the fin, was not damaged, but despite this fact the wires of the aerial were missing. Thus the commission reached the conclusion that the whole aerial system had been damaged already during the flight by impact with a heavier object. Such an object could have been only the load of the balloon, the remnants of which were found near the place of the crash. The aircraft apparently hit the bottom of the balloon and its load with the upper front of its fuselage, and the collision caused a partial damage of the aircraft and a loss of speed, and disturbed the normal controlled descent of the aircraft. The unexpected impact on the fuselage probably caused at least a temporary loss of control over the maintenance of the correct course, and reduced substantially the overall maneuverability of the aircraft. Thus it happened that the aircraft swerved into a course of about 310°, slipped into a steep glide and in one or two minutes hit the Skapová Hill.

18) The aircraft was found northeast from point 1228 Skapova. The heading of the aircraft at the impact was about 300°. Judging from the way in which the aircraft broke the trees and from the general conditions of the place of crash, the aircraft's course of approach had been about 310°; the aircraft first crashed with its left wing into the crown of a large tree and thus turned several degrees to the left. The first impact of the aircraft on the tree tops occurred at a distance of 30 to 40 meters from the spot where it hit the ground, which lies at the altitude of about 1,100 meters above sea level.

19) On the basis of the results of the investigation, the investigation commission reached the conclusion that the crash of the OK-WDZ airliner was caused by a collision of the aircraft with a balloon launched unlawfully into Czechoslovak airspace by the American organization called the "Free Europe Committee". This conclusion has been confirmed both by the reconstruction of the flight and by the discovery of the remnants of a balloon in the vicinity of the crash.

The above data exceed by far the extent of information sufficing to convince the Government of the United States of America of the correctness of the conclusions reached by the Czechoslovak investigating commission and of the fact that the crash of the transport aircraft of the Czechoslovak Airlines, which occurred on January 18, 1956, is the tragic result of the activities of the said American organization, of activities constituting a gross violation of international law, for which the Government of the United States bears full responsibility under international law. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic demands therefore most emphatically that the Government of the United States of America take immediately steps to compensate the damages caused to Czechoslovak citizens and to the Czechoslovak Airlines by this air disaster, which amount to 5,525,374 crowns.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurance of its consideration.

PRAHA, February 20, 1957.

U.S. NOTE OF OCTOBER 9, 1956

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, under instructions of the United States Government, has the honor to refer to the Ministry's Note No. 123.330/56-ABO/1 of June 19, 1956.

The United States Government addresses itself to the Czechoslovak Government's charge that the United States Government is liable for the crash of a Czechoslovak Airlines passenger aircraft on January 18, 1956 near Levoča in Slovakia on the ground, among others, that the crash was due to the collision of the aircraft with a balloon launched into Czechoslovak airspace by the Free Europe Committee, and to the Czechoslovak Government's demand of compensation for damages on account of the crash totaling 5,525,374 Kcs.

The United States Government has studied the Czechoslovak Government's note of June 19, 1956, as well as the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 24, 1956 on the same subject, with considerable care. The United States Government's position on the questions raised in these two notes of the Czechoslovak Government respecting the activities of the Free Europe Committee, a private organization, has been fully and completely set forth in the interchange of diplomatic correspondence with the Czechoslovak Government on this subject, particularly in the United States Government's notes of July 31, 1953,¹ May 24, 1954² and May 18, 1955.³ Aside from the question regarding the alleged legal liability of the Government of the United States for allegedly wrongful acts by a private entity, the Free Europe Committee, there remains the critical question whether the incident was, in fact, the proximate result of a collision between the Czechoslovak aircraft and a Free Europe Committee balloon. The communications received from the Czechoslovak Government on this subject contain statements which must be characterized as mere conclusions, inadequate in themselves to support the charge that the crash was due to any collision with a balloon or that it was a Free Europe Committee balloon which collided with the aircraft.

In view of the reported loss of life and injury which was involved in the incident and the Czechoslovak Government's insistence on its version of the facts, the United States Government desires to study all the available evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion only after such study.

For this purpose, the United States Government requires, and requests the Czechoslovak Government to make available in original or duly certified form, the following documents:

1. The full report, together with all supporting evidentiary and related material, of the special commission appointed by the Ministry of Transport which investigated the causes of the crash of the Czechoslovak Airlines aircraft on January 18, 1956.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1953, p. 210.

² For text, see *ibid.*, June 7, 1954, p. 881.

³ Not printed.

2. A copy of the flight plan filed by the pilot of the aircraft in question at the origin of the flight, together with all instructions issued to the pilot en route and all changes in the flight plan requested or reported, whether in writing or by radio, covering the entire flight from origin to destination and to the points of diversion and rash.

3. A full transcript of all weather observations and reports of weather conditions as observed on the ground and at all altitudes aloft between the point and time of origin and the point and time of destination as well as the point and time of crash as found and reported by ground observers and by all aircraft in flight (including the DC-3 aircraft involved in the crash), giving all meteorological data recorded, including winds, visibility, temperatures, rain, snow and ice conditions, cloud conditions, and the like.

4. Copies of all the radio log entries of ground radio stations and of aircraft in the air and, if available, of all the entries of the logs kept on board the aircraft which crashed relating to the flight of the DC-3 aircraft involved. There should be included transcripts of all conversations with the aircraft in flight from the time of origin to the time of crash, giving the time of each conversation, positions reported or observed, all evidence of communications and of attempts at communication with or by the aircraft, such as messages from the aircraft as well as messages and conversations conducted by other stations in the area of flight and crash, including particularly but not exclusively, stations at Bratislava, Zvolen, Kosice, Presov and Spisska Nova Ves.

5. Copies of all photographs taken of the wreckage of the aircraft, of the balloon claimed to have caused the collision and the literature claimed to have been found with the balloon at the time of its discovery by the investigating commission.

6. A copy of the maintenance record of the aircraft for a period covering not less than fifteen days prior to the accident, showing the technical and operational condition of the aircraft and all its equipment and parts, and showing repairs, adjustments of mechanical parts, and electronic and electrical action advised or made with reference to the aircraft and its equipment and parts.

7. A copy of the instrument approach procedure for the airfield to which the aircraft was flying, described in the Czechoslovak Government's note of February 24, 1956 as the Tatry Airfield (but assumed to be the airport shown on maps of Slovakia as Poprad), a description of all the navigational aids available in working order on the ground for use of the aircraft making its instrument approach and the capacity of each of such navigational aids, together with a description of the type and capacity of the usable navigational equipment available on board the aircraft. The radio frequencies in use during the flight at the ground station and the frequencies used by the aircraft in communication with the ground station should also be given.

8. If not included among the foregoing documents, the Czechoslovak Government is requested specifically to state in detail the evidence upon which the conclusion was reached, as stated in the note of February 24, 1956,

that the aircraft was "in perfect technical order", that "its flight had been quite normal" up to the time of the approach and, that "it completed the prescribed procedure turn in its controlled approach to the Tatry Airfield". The Czechoslovak Government is also requested to state specifically the reasons for the diversion of the aircraft from its destination at Kosice to Poprad.

The Czechoslovak Government is further requested, particularly inasmuch as no representative of the United States Government participated in any way in the investigation, to permit investigators accredited by the United States Government at their discretion: (1) to examine the originals of all documents, (2) to visit and inspect the scene of the crash and make checks upon the information available at ground stations, including the Tatry Airfield and other places in the vicinity of the route of flight at which information concerning the flight and the crash may be available, and (3) to make photocopies of all documents and take photographs of all objects and places involved.

When the Czechoslovak Government has responded to the foregoing requests, the United States Government will, after careful consideration and study, reply in detail with respect to the points raised by the Czechoslovak Government's notes of June 19, 1956 and February 24, 1956.

The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Ministry the assurances of its consideration.

CZECHOSLOVAK NOTE OF JUNE 19, 1956

Unofficial translation

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

No. 123.330/56-ABO/1

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America with reference to its Note of February 24, 1956 concerning the crash of a Czechoslovak passenger aircraft caused by a balloon as well as to the Embassy's Note No. 385 of April 10, 1956, has the honour to advise the following:

In its Note of February 24, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on instructions of the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, informed the Embassy of the United States of America that on January 18, 1956, a passenger aircraft of the Czechoslovak Airlines crashed near Levoca in Slovakia, in which crash 22 persons were killed and 4 passengers suffered heavy injuries. The investigation established that this catastrophe had been caused by a collision of the aircraft with a balloon launched over Czechoslovakia territory by American organizations from bases in Western Germany. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic at the same time again expressed its emphatic protest against the launching of any balloons into the Czechoslovak air space, requested the Government of the United States of America to take the necessary measures so that the persons who by this activity had caused the crash of the aircraft in Slovakia be punished with utmost severity and reserved its right to raise against the Government of the United States of

America, which together with the Government of the German Federal Republic, bears full responsibility for these activities under international law, claims for the compensation of all damage caused to Czechoslovak citizens and enterprises by the sending of balloons into the Czechoslovak air space.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that the Government of the United States of America, in its Note of April 10, avoids making any reply on the merit of the Czechoslovak Note of February 24, concerning the crash of the Czechoslovak passenger aircraft and seeks to shift responsibility for the launching of balloons over Czechoslovak territory which caused the airplane accident to "a private American organization" to which it apparently would wish to leave the taking of a position on the entire matter. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot, of course, consider the statement of the Chairman of the Board of the so-called "Free Europe Committee" a reply to its Note addressed to the Embassy of the United States of America and refuses to take note thereof.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs further notes that the Government of the United States not only hesitates to give a substantive reply to the data and requirements set forth in the Czechoslovak Note of February 24, but has likewise refrained from stating its own position with regard to the statement of the so-called "Free Europe Committee". This cannot fail to give the impression that the Government of the United States of America, itself, has serious doubts as to the contents of this provocative statement and is reluctant to associate itself with the assertions of the so-called "Free Europe Committee".

The Government of the United States is apparently well aware of the fact that the "reasons" which allegedly have obliged the "Free Europe Committee" to launch balloons over Czechoslovak territory are completely irrelevant under international law and can in no way justify the flagrant violation of Czechoslovak air space, nor can they lessen the responsibility of the United States of America for the crash of the Czechoslovak passenger aircraft caused by a balloon of an American organization launched illegally over the territory of Czechoslovakia.

The responsibility of the United States of America for the launching of balloons into Czechoslovak air space and for the damages caused thereby to the lives and health of Czechoslovak citizens as well as to Czechoslovak property, primarily in connection with the crash of the Czechoslovak passenger aircraft on January 18, 1956 is beyond any dispute under international law. This follows, in particular, from these reasons and facts:

1/ The sovereignty of a State over its territory and air space is one of the fundamental principles of international law. This principle has found expression in a number of international conventions, inter alia, also in the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944. Article 1 of this Convention provides: "The Contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory". The United States of America and Czechoslovakia are both Signatories to the aforesaid Convention and Members of the International Civil Aviation Organization formed under this Convention. By their signature to the

Convention on International Civil Aviation the United States of America explicitly and specifically undertook an obligation under international law to recognize Czechoslovakia's complete and exclusive sovereignty over Czechoslovak air space and to refrain from any activities infringing upon this sovereign right. The launching of any balloons into Czechoslovak air space constitutes a flagrant violation of this obligation.

The launching of balloons into Czechoslovak air space is equally contrary to Article 8 of the aforesaid Convention dealing with aircraft without a pilot and stipulating an explicit prohibition of the flight of such aircraft over the territory of a Contracting State without special authorization by that State.

The Government of the United States of America knows full well that Czechoslovakia has not given its authorization for the launching of balloons into Czechoslovak air space, and has, on the contrary, repeatedly raised emphatic protest against the launching of balloons over Czechoslovak territory ever since 1953. The Government of the United States, however, has thus far not taken any steps against the launching of balloons into Czechoslovak air space, but on the contrary has given every possible support to these activities. Such an attitude with regard to fundamental provisions of international law and explicitly accepted contractual obligations is in diametrical opposition to the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

2/ The American organization which has assumed the name "Free Europe Committee" has launched and is launching over Czechoslovak territory balloons up to 15 meters in diameter bearing a load of up to 150 kilograms. Balloons of this size have been publicly exhibited in Czechoslovakia and likewise described by correspondents of the foreign press.

The Czechoslovak authorities have at their disposal the statements of the pilots and other witnesses which prove that the balloons fly at cruising altitudes of commercial aircraft. This is likewise confirmed by the observations of the air personnel of foreign airlines cited in publicly accessible documents of the International Air Transport Association, as for instance in its Circular of April 20, 1956.

In its documents the International Air Transport Association has likewise confirmed the fact that the balloons launched by the so-called "Free Europe Committee" constitute an aeronautical hazard. In a letter of April 13, 1956 in which the Director-General of the International Air Transport Association, Sir William P. Hildred, has addressed himself in this matter to the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization, Mr. G. Ljungberg, it is said with reference to the launching of balloons that "At the present time, an aeronautical hazard exists which is causing considerable apprehension among Member Airlines". That is also why IATA has requested ICAO "to investigate this matter with all speed, in order that civil airline operations may resume without hindrance or risk of collision".

3/ The so-called "Free Europe Committee" which launches balloons into Czechoslovak air space styles itself as a "private American organization", incorporated

in the State of New York in 1949, and the Government of the United States of America makes reference to the private nature of this organization whenever it wishes to elude responsibility under international law for the subversive activity of this organization. Yet it is a matter of public knowledge that this is an organization formed especially for the purposes of "cold war", designed to carry out hostile activities and subversive propaganda against Czechoslovakia and other countries of People's Democracy. There exist a number of documents on the true character and activities of this organization as well as on its relations with the Government of the United States of America.

However, be the legal status of the so-called "Free Europe Committee" in the United States formally whatever it may, under international law there applies the generally recognized principle that a State bears responsibility not only for its own action, for the action of its Government and Agencies, but also for the action of private persons and organizations carried out at the order, with the concurrence or support of the Government, as well as for any unlawful action of private persons and organizations which the State concerned has not prevented although it is bound to do so under international law. If the action of private persons or organizations has constituted a violation of international law, the Government which exercises sovereignty over any such persons or organizations, bears responsibility for such action, if it has not fulfilled its obligation to prevent any violation of international law. There can be no doubt that both under the general principles of international law and pursuant to accepted contractual commitments the Government of the United States has the obligation to prevent the violation of Czechoslovak air space by any persons or organizations over which it exercises sovereignty, the more so since the Czechoslovak Government has repeatedly and for a considerable period of time drawn the attention of the Government of the United States to the unlawful activities violating Czechoslovak air space. It is, however, a matter of general knowledge that the Government of the United States of America not only does nothing to prevent the subversive activities of the so-called "Free Europe Committee", but that these activities are carried out with the concurrence of the Government of the United States and with its full support in every respect. Under international law responsibility for the violations of Czechoslovak air space committed by the American organization, the so-called "Free Europe Committee", as well as for the damages caused by such violation of international law, therefore rests with the Government of the United States of America.

On the basis of all these facts the Government of the Czechoslovak Republic demands that the Government of the United States of America compensate for the damage caused to Czechoslovak nationals and the Czechoslovak Airlines by the disaster of the passenger aircraft which crashed near Levoča, in Slovakia, on January 18, 1956 due to the collision of the aircraft with a balloon launched unlawfully into Czechoslovak air space by the American organization, the so-called "Free Europe Com-

mittee"; according to preliminary data the total damages come to 5,525,374 kcs out of which sum the amount of 4,970,703 kcs represents compensation for damages incurred by the passengers on board of the aircraft, eventually by their dependents, and the amount of 554,671 kcs compensation for the damages incurred by the Czechoslovak Airlines. Moreover, the Czechoslovak Government insists on its demand that the United States of America punish the persons who by their activity have caused this tragic disaster in the course of which 22 persons were killed and 4 passengers suffered serious injuries with utmost severity.

The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic considers the reply of the Embassy of the United States of America to its Note of February 24 as completely unsatisfactory, fully maintains the position expressed in this Note and calls upon the Government of the United States with all emphasis to take without delay the necessary measures to prevent the launching of balloons into Czechoslovak air-space and thereby to check the activities which constitute a serious hazard to air traffic over Czechoslovak territory and a threat to the lives, health and property of Czechoslovak citizens.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurance of its high consideration.

PRAHA, June 19, 1956

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Property

Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹

Ratification deposited: Syria, March 6, 1958.

Accession deposited: Holy See, February 24, 1958.

Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹

Ratification deposited: Syria, March 6, 1958.

Accession deposited: Holy See, February 24, 1958.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol bringing under international control drugs outside the scope of the convention limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force December 1, 1949. TIAS 2308.

Acceptance deposited: Jordan, May 7, 1958.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

Protocol for limiting and regulating the cultivation of the poppy plant, the production of, international and wholesale trade in, and use of opium. Dated at New York June 23, 1953.²
Acceptance deposited: Jordan, May 7, 1958.

BILATERAL

Saudi Arabia

Economic assistance agreement for the expansion of the Port of Dammam. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda March 1 and May 1, 1958. Entered into force May 1, 1958.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Treaties in Force—A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1958. Pub. 6626. 266 pp. \$1.25.

This publication contains a list of treaties and other international agreements to which the United States has become a party and which were in force on January 1, 1958.

Highlights of Foreign Policy Developments—1957. Pub. 6631. General Foreign Policy Series 126. 22 pp. 20¢.

Another issue in the popular *Background* series, this pamphlet discusses basic objectives and major developments in U.S. foreign policy.

Defense—Release of Air Bases and Training of German Air Force Personnel. TIAS 3968. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bonn December 10, 1957. Entered into force December 10, 1957.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Facilities Assistance Program. TIAS 3969. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ethiopia. Exchange of notes—Dated at Addis Ababa December 26, 1957. Entered into force December 26, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3970. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and

Yugoslavia, amending agreement of November 3, 1956 as amended—Signed at Belgrade December 27, 1957. Entered into force December 27, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3971. 15 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with memorandum of understanding and exchange of letters, between the United States of America and France—Signed at Paris December 27, 1957. Entered into force December 27, 1957.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 3972. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Afghanistan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Kabul Jun 5 and 9, 1957. Entered into force June 9, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3973. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Poland, amending agreement of June 7, 1957, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 4, 1958. Entered into force January 8, 1958.

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes. TIAS 3974. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with exchange of notes, between the United States of America and Australia—Signed at Washington January 24, 1958. Entered into force January 24, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3981. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with exchanges of notes, between the United States of America and Turkey—Signed at Ankara January 20, 1958. Entered into force January 20, 1958.

United States Educational Commission in Japan. TIA 3982. 21 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo January 1, 1958. Entered into force January 11, 1958.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3983. 13 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador—Signed at Washington May 31, 1957. Entered into force February 6, 1958.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Equipment, Materials, and Services. TIAS 3984. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo January 25, 1958. Entered into force January 25, 1958.

Military Bases in the Philippines—Manila Air Station. TIAS 3985. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, relating to agreements of March 14, 1947, and June 18, 1957. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila January 27, 1958. Entered into force January 27, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3986. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement, with memorandum of understanding between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea—Signed at Seoul February 5, 1958. Entered into force February 5, 1958.

² Not in force.

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Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to May 26 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 261 of May 14, 273 of May 19, 279 and 281 of May 20, and 286 of May 24.

No.	Date	Subject
*288	5/26	ICA insures U.S. firm's investment in French subsidiary.
*289	5/27	Wailes nominated Ambassador to Iran.
†290	5/27	Delegation to Caribbean Commission (rewrite).
†291	5/28	Itinerary for visit of President Heuss.
†292	5/28	Holmes: "Africa's Challenge to the Free World."
293	5/28	Statement on Arab Union.
†294	5/28	Delegation to International Labor Conference (rewrite).
*295	5/29	\$10 million loan to Burma.
*296	5/29	Educational exchange.
†297	5/29	Exchange of notes with U.S.S.R. on medical cooperation.

*Not printed.
 †Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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TREATIES IN FORCE

A List of Treaties
and Other International Agreements
of the United States
in Force on January 1, 1958

This publication is a guide to treaties and other international agreements in force between the United States and other countries at the beginning of the current year.

The list includes bilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by country or other political entity, and multilateral treaties and other agreements, arranged by subject with names of countries which have become parties. Date of signature, date of entry into force for the United States, and citations to texts are furnished for each agreement.

Documents affecting international copyright relations of the United States are listed in the appendix.

Information on current treaty actions, supplementing the information contained in *Treaties in Force*, is published weekly in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

The new edition of *Treaties in Force* (266 pp.) is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for \$1.25 a copy.

Publication 6626

\$1.25

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XXXVIII, No. 991 • PUBLICATION 6656

June 23, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 30 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 30, 1958).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

The Challenge of Change

THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY, THE RATIONALE, WHICH UNDERLIES U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Statement by Secretary Dulles¹

Mr. Chairman: My associates in charge of regional and economic affairs have made detailed expositions of United States foreign policy in relation to particular subjects. I shall present the basic philosophy, the rationale, which underlies those policies.

I. Our Basic Goals

United States foreign policy is designed to protect and promote the interests of the United States in the international field. It is based upon certain facts and convictions:

(a) That the peoples of the world universally desire the elimination of war and the establishment of a just peace;

(b) That the designs of aggressive Communist imperialism pose a continuous threat to every nation of the free world, including our own;

(c) That the security of this nation can be maintained only by the spiritual, economic, and military strength of the free world, with this nation a powerful partner committed to this purpose;

(d) That change is the law of life, for nations as well as for men, and that no political, economic, or social system survives unless it proves its continuing worth in the face of ever-changing circumstances;

(e) That the effectiveness of our collective-security measures depends upon the economic advancement of the less developed parts of the

free world, which strengthens their purpose and ability to sustain their independence;

(f) That in all international associations and combinations within the free world, of which the United States is a member, it considers all nations, including itself, as equals. The sovereignty of no nation will ever be limited or diminished by any act of the United States.

The interests of the United States, which our foreign policy would safeguard and promote, include:

The lives and homes of our people; their confidence and peace of mind; their economic well-being; and their ideals.

These interests are not mutually exclusive; rather they are overlapping and interdependent. Yet, of them, ideals rank first.

Our people have never hesitated to sacrifice life, property, and economic well-being in order that our ideals should not perish from the earth.

So we often have a narrow path to tread. We must avoid war and still stand both firm and affirmative for what we deem to be just and right.

Success in our purposes requires that we have vision to see, hearts to understand, and minds to resolve the problems of the world in which we live.

II. The Challenge of Change

We face the challenge of change. Long-established political relationships are evaporating; massive fresh human aspirations demand new responses; physical limitations within and without this globe are being swept away by the advances of science.

¹Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 6 (press release 309).

1. We are witnessing a political revolution that is drastic and worldwide in its repercussions. For 500 years Europe was predominant in the world through a political system known as colonialism, backed by preponderant industrial and military power.

That political system is now in process of rapid transformation. Within the last 15 years 700 million people of 20 countries have won political independence. This trend will continue.

But stability is not achieved and a new order comfortably established merely by the grant of political independence. That is but the beginning of a two-phased struggle.

To preserve political independence requires a people who themselves exercise self-restraint and who acquire education. Without these qualities, political independence may mean but a brief transition from benevolent colonialism to ruthless dictatorship.

The second front is the economic front. The grant of independence has generated mass aspirations, which have spread contagiously to all who, having been bogged down for centuries in a morass of abject poverty, demand a prospect for rising in the economic scale.

Thus, we face a world new both in terms of its political structure and its economic demands.

2. We face another new world in terms of physical power. The splitting of the atom revealed sources of power so vast, so omnipresent, as to imply a new industrial revolution. Also it changes the very nature of war, in that general war now would menace the very existence of human life upon this planet.

3. A third new world opens in terms of outer space. Throughout history, until now, man has assumed that the atmosphere put a limit on man's reach. Now his satellites and missiles go far beyond. Soon they will be carrying human beings far beyond. Just what this means we do not know. We sense but dimly what we realize must be new possibilities of infinite purport.

4. Even on this globe, old areas take on new aspects. What were barriers of forbidding cold and ice now, in the north, offer the routes whereby many can most quickly establish contact with each other. And in the south, Antarctica, probed by the Geophysical Year, reveals a new and exciting possibility of service to mankind.

5. And peace must be better assured within the society of nations.

Today no international wars are being fought. For that we can be thankful. But our peace is a precarious peace, because it depends too much on individual and national restraints, upon accurate calculations, and upon avoidance of miscalculations and mischances. It is not sufficiently rooted in a system of law, order, and justice.

Unless we build a better international order, all of the new prospects which beckon mankind forward and upward will come to the naught of a blackout that has no ending.

III. The Goals of International Communism

These challenges of a changing world are the more demanding of us because international communism seeks to dominate the change and thereby itself ride to world rule.

It professes a creed which, it claims, shows the way to assured peace and great productivity. According to it, human beings are animated particles of matter; order and maximum productivity require that they be directed in accordance with a master plan which will assure conformity of thought and act, and eliminate the discords inherent in a society which gives freedom of thought and choice to the individual human being. The Soviet Communist Party, as the "general staff of the world proletariat," would devise and administer the worldwide master plan.

International communism emphasizes science and scientific applications. It seeks to dominate the world with a military establishment so powerful that its will will not be challenged. It strives for superiority in all material ways, including economic productivity. It makes intensive efforts in the new fields of nuclear energy and in the exploration of outer space.

Thus, the challenge of change that confronts us offers, not a choice between freedom and stagnation, or even between freedom and chaos. The choice is between freedom and a world in which great power, strong discipline, and a materialistic creed are combined to end everywhere the exercise of human freedom.

IV. Our Responses to the Challenge of Change

The United States responds to the challenge of change. As an equal among equals, and in willing partnership with others, we play a positive and

creative part. We do so not merely as a counter to Communist imperialism. We do so because to play such a part is natural to us and comports with our great tradition. We do so in no partisan mood, but with policies that reflect solid bipartisan cooperation.

The Independence Movement

1. On September 8, 1954, at Manila, acting under the inspiration of President Magsaysay, the United States and other Western powers joined with free Asian nations to proclaim the Pacific Charter.² The signatories declared:

... they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities.

We realize full well that the solid establishment of independence is a hard task. We take every appropriate occasion to assist it.

We encourage educational exchanges and "leader" visits.

We provide technical assistance, both bilaterally and through the United Nations.

We provide funds for economic development. Private capital plays the primary role, but the Export-Import Bank and the Development Loan Fund are essential supplements.

The leaders of the new countries are not blind to the danger to independence that stems from international communism. They seek to find, in freedom, the way to solve their countries' problems. They look to the United States as the nation from which they can most dependably obtain assistance which will add to, not subtract from, their lasting independence.

Atoms for Peace

2. The United States pioneers in the world of the atom. Our first concern is that this incredibly great force should not be used for human destruction.

In 1946, when atomic power was still our monopoly, we sought through the Baruch plan such international control as would assure that atomic power would never be an instrument of war. The Soviet Union rejected that proposal. We nevertheless continue our efforts. President

Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace proposal, made to the United Nations in 1953, finally led to positive results which should grow with time.

The International Atomic Energy Agency was established in 1957 with a present membership of 66 nations, including the U.S.S.R. But that government still fails to join to implement that vital part of the President's proposal which would have drawn down nuclear war stocks for peace stocks under international control.

We continue to press the Soviet Union in that respect.

We continue to develop and to spread the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

We have made bilateral arrangements with 39 nations and have supplied research reactors to 16 nations. Negotiations are under way with others.

We are developing close and constructive relations with EURATOM, the atomic agency of six Western European nations.

President Eisenhower expressed, in 1953, to the United Nations our determination "to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

We are doing much to assure that the new world of power which is developing will, in fact, serve that noble purpose.

Outer Space for Peace

3. We also give leadership in planning for the use of the new world of outer space. I recall President Eisenhower's letter of January 13, 1958, to Mr. Bulganin,³ where he said:

I now make, Mr. Chairman, a proposal to solve what I consider to be the most important problem which faces the world today.

I propose that we agree that outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes. We face a decisive moment in history in relation to this matter.

So far the Soviet reply has been evasive. But we feel confident that our viewpoint will prevail, if for no other reason than that the Soviet Union will finally see its own welfare in that result.

Meanwhile we plan our civilian space agency, legislation for which is now before the Congress.⁴ It will help us devise and implement programs for the peaceful use of outer space.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 126.

⁴ For a statement by Loftus Becker, Legal Adviser, see *ibid.*, June 9, 1958, p. 962.

The Polar Areas

4. In Antarctica we have actively participated in the scientific studies of the Geophysical Year. We have become deeply impressed with the danger if that unfolding continent should become a scene of international rivalry and if its physical possibilities were to be used to threaten world peace and security. So the United States has proposed that a conference be held to negotiate a treaty guaranteeing peaceful use of Antarctica and continued international scientific cooperation there.⁵ We invited 11 countries which had heretofore shown particular interest in Antarctica, including the Soviet Union. All of them have replied favorably.

We look upon the north polar region as another changing area which should be organized for peace.

Mr. Khrushchev has pointed out to us that "the air route over the northern polar regions is the shortest distance between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., and is therefore an important strategic area which has special significance in connection with the availability of rocket weapons."⁶

That fact makes it the more imperative that these new routes of rapid communication shall be only peaceful and not carry threats leading to new fears, new armaments, and more "preparedness."

We recently proposed to the United Nations Security Council to initiate in this area President Eisenhower's open-skies proposal.⁷ We were supported by all of the members of the Council except the Soviet Union. We shall persist to assure that the new world of the Arctic shall be impressed into the service of peace, not of war. Our concept is so sound and just, and so much in the interest of all mankind, that we expect the Soviets to come to accept it, as they already accept the principle of reserving Antarctica for peace.

The Organization of Peace

5. Our most intensive efforts are those designed to create a world where peace is stably ensconced.

(a) The United Nations is, of course, a primary reliance, and it has well served the cause of peace.

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 2, 1958, p. 910.

⁶ *Ibid.*, June 9, 1958, p. 941.

⁷ *Ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 816.

Through the collective action of its members, aggression in Korea was repelled. Through the United Nations, peace was restored in the Middle East.

We strive in all possible ways to invigorate the processes of the United Nations and have, under difficult circumstances, shown our loyalty to its principles. There are, however, built-in limitations.

The Soviet Union does not share the concepts of justice and of law which are enjoined upon the organization. It has "veto" power in the Security Council. Invoking a so-called "principle of parity," it boycotts the General Assembly's Disarmament Commission because it cannot count upon enough votes on the Commission to control, at least negatively, its proceedings. Where the Soviet Union cannot legally block United Nations action, it flouts such actions as cross its will, as, for example, in the case of armed attack on Korea and on Hungary.

(b) Since the United Nations cannot dependably safeguard the peace, freedom, and independence of the nations, we must, and do, build elsewhere.

The United States has its own military establishment. This has two principal components. One is the Strategic Air Forces, so organized as to be able to wreak great destruction upon the Soviet Union should it initiate armed aggression against the United States or its allies. This is an effective deterrent to general war.

It is essential that we should have this capacity to deter war. But we are not tempted into military buildups merely out of a competitive desire to be superior at every point to those who glory in military grandeur. We seek what George Washington called "a respectable military posture," that is, a military establishment that others will treat with respect.

A second component is those forces, land, sea, and air, which, of course, have indispensable roles in case of general war and could, if need be, participate in limited hostilities.

Our military establishment is, however, more than national. The time for military isolation has passed, as we live in a new world of national interdependence. Our military establishment is charged with a trust for the benefit of many other nations.

The United States has made cooperative de-

fense treaties with 42 other nations. Further commitments of United States power are authorized by the Formosa and Middle East resolutions.

The deterrent power of the United States thus acts as a shield to protect all nations with which we have or may make such arrangements. Senator Vandenberg, speaking in 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty, said, "It spells out the conclusive warning that independent freedom is not an orphan in this western world, and that no armed aggression will have a chance to win."⁸ That warning has now been extended all around the globe, so as to eliminate the risk of miscalculations which have often tempted military despots to "take a chance"—a chance which, in fact, often meant war.

The system of collective defense that the free nations have built is not one-sided. It is not just a United States gift to the world. Other nations contribute importantly. They provide bases which greatly increase the effectiveness of our deterrent power. They contribute the bulk of the ground forces. They provide, what is most important of all, a courageous will to resist powerful forces which often knock threateningly at their very doorstep.

This collective security system we are helping to build is no mere temporary expedient. It is a constructive evolution which should persist until it becomes possible to make the United Nations security processes both universal and dependable.

Originally our collective defense arrangements were conceived of primarily as purely military alliances. However, the latest NATO communique⁹ had this to say:

NATO, a defensive organization, is now much more than merely a military alliance. It is becoming a true community of free nations. Within this community, to a degree unprecedented in history, countries are carrying out a policy of close cooperation in peacetime without abandoning their independence. This development is one of the most significant and promising events of our time.

(c) Our collective security arrangements are buttressed and made viable by our mutual security program. It supplies our allies with a certain amount of military equipment. In some cases it helps them financially to maintain military establishments which are needed but which their

economies are too poor to support without some outside help.

The free-world collective defense arrangements now cover virtually all the areas which are liable to direct military attack by the forces of Communist imperialism. They effectively deter such attacks.

Economic Well-Being

6. We see that the world of today requires better economic health than was tolerable in past times.

International trade is more than ever important. Our own foreign trade is now approximately \$32.4 billion a year and provides employment to 4½ million of our farmers and workers. International trade is even more vital to the economic life of many other free-world countries.

A principal instrumentality and the outstanding symbol of our attitude to international trade is our Trade Agreements Act. The principle of the act was first adopted in 1934, and 10 times the Congress acted to renew it. Any failure now to renew it would be a grave blow to the world's economy, including our own, and it could be fatal to security.

Public Law 480

7. Our great agricultural productivity now serves the humanitarian needs of a changing world. The time was when starvation was chronic in many densely populated areas. Now the productivity of our farmers produces surpluses which provide other free nations with the wherewithal to prevent vast starvation no longer tolerable by the standards to which the free world now adheres. Under Public Law 480 we have, since 1954, provided other nations with an aggregate of nearly \$3 billion worth of our agricultural products. To a small extent this is provided on a grant basis to meet special emergencies. For the most part it is provided against payment in local currency. The local currency is put to work to help develop the local economies so that they will in the future be better able to meet their own requirements. All this is done with care to avoid disturbing the normal pattern of commercial trade.

The Economic Problem

8. We do much to solve the economic problems of this changing world. I have referred to the promotion of international trade, the Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund, economic

⁸ *Ibid.*, July 18, 1949, p. 61.

⁹ *Ibid.*, May 26, 1958, p. 850.

aspects of mutual security, P. L. 480, etc. But economic problems still confront us.

If the Soviet Union decides to use its increasing industrial productivity primarily to serve the goals of international communism, we may face acute problems.

It now stands to gain too much from the adverse impact on certain countries, as of Latin America, of rapidly shifting free-world prices and fluctuating free-world markets.

There is another type of danger if the Soviet state engages in ruthless competition with private free-world concerns which, to survive, must make a profit.

Over a range of economic relations among the countries of the free world we shall need to seek out new initiatives to bring greater economic strength and unity. We shall be looking for the means to create a larger flow of private capital to the less developed countries, to make development assistance more effective, to bring about increased financial stability, and to cope with the serious problems which sometimes arise in commodity trade.

Disarmament

9. We are not content with a world where the potentials of destruction not only absorb vast economic effort but would, if unleashed, endanger all human life. So we strive for "disarmament," meaning measures of international inspection to diminish the danger of massive surprise attack and actual limitations or reductions of various types of armament. President Eisenhower's open-skies proposal of 1955 brought worldwide hope. But the Soviet Union has persistently evaded concrete inspection proposals.

With equal persistence it rejects or evades all proposals, such as our comprehensive proposal of last August,¹⁰ which would effectively limit or reduce Soviet military power. It tries to cover its tracks by noisily calling on others to practice pacifism and nonresistance and by advocating the general cessation of nuclear-weapons tests—which of course involves no armament reduction whatsoever.

A principal obstacle to agreements in the field of disarmament has been the reluctance of the Soviet Union to accept any internal controls. It has, however, now at long last agreed that there

should be a study of the techniques required to control an agreement to suspend nuclear testing.¹¹ This may provide a vital clue and pave the way to arrangements which will make surprise attack less likely and make it possible to reduce armaments equitably and dependably.

Agreements With the Soviet Union

10. The United States does not exclude the possibility of achieving significant agreements with the Soviet Union in certain areas of mutual interest. Within the past 5 years we have made several agreements with the Communists, notably the agreement that ended the Korean hostilities and the agreement that liberated Austria. But:

We do *not* believe that the "cold war" can be ended by a formula of words, so long as the basic creed of international communism requires world rule.

We do *not* believe that we should alter our position merely in reliance of Soviet promises. These have too often proved undependable and have entrapped and even proved fatal to those who have relied thereon.

We *do* believe that the Soviet Union, like the United States, would like to reduce the economic burden of modern armaments. We also believe that the Soviet Union, under present conditions, does not want war. Therefore, some common ground exists.

We have been encouraged by the Soviet Government's acceptance of our proposal to study what would be required to supervise at least one aspect of a possible disarmament agreement. We have also been encouraged by their acceptance of our proposal with reference to Antarctica. We believe that, if we patiently persist along sound lines, some significant agreements may emerge.

Whether or not a summit conference would be productive of such agreements remains to be seen. That matter is being intensively explored at Moscow at the present time.

V. The Free-World Balance Sheet

I have outlined some of the more important and constructive measures being taken by the United States, usually in cooperation with our allies, to assure that the challenge of change will be met by those who believe in a spiritual world, a world

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Aug. 19, 1957, p. 303.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, June 9, 1958, p. 330.

where nations are independent and where individuals are free.

I see a prospect that provides good ground for hope. We are not being tossed about rudderless on a sea of change. We are guiding and influencing the character of change so that it shall be constructive.

I realize full well that our record is not perfect. We have no doubt done some things we should not have done and not done all that we should have done. But we have moved positively and creatively to bring to the new worlds about us the basic values which this nation was founded to preserve.

I am not unmindful of occurrences which induce a mood of discouragement.

The free world seems dominated more by differences than by harmony.

Almost constantly its foreign policies become open political issues and afford our enemies the opportunity to sow discord.

Freedom almost recklessly gives its mortal enemies freedom to seek to destroy freedom.

All this is infinitely perplexing and exhausting. It is easy to feel a sense of frustration.

But we need constantly to remember that the hallmark of freedom is diversity. The United States does not seek the kind of unity that has to be bought and paid for, or that would flow from our using our power to coerce other free nations and to impose our will. The United States associates itself with those who, as a matter of conviction, want to share in common effort on behalf of independence and freedom.

But we would rather stand alone than be accompanied by those who were with us only under the influence of a carrot or a stick.

The essential is, not that diversity be wiped out, but that it be seen in the perspective of a world where, if differences disrupt cooperation, freedom and independence also go.

We should go on developing organs and practices of consultation. Much of the irritation that shows itself is due to misunderstanding.

Materialistic despotisms, with their iron discipline, their mechanistic performances, their hard and shiny exterior, have always seemed to have the advantage over democracies which visibly stumble and falter, which advertise their differences to all the world, and which seem to survive only by good luck.

The fact is that the despotisms are always weaker than they appear and the democracies are usually stronger than they seem.

VI. The Communist Balance Sheet

International communism not only has assets; it also has liabilities. The Communist rulers are faced by grave and, in the long run, insoluble problems.

(1) One dilemma is found in the main citadel—Moscow. The Soviet Union has increased education, particularly in terms of scientific theory and of applications. But minds which can find the ways to penetrate outer space can also penetrate the fallacies of Marxism.

(2) A second dilemma is economic. There is an increasing demand on the part of the ruled peoples for more consumer goods, for more of the fruits of their labor. The time will come when the Soviet rulers will have to do more for the welfare of their own people.

(3) There is within the Soviet Union a growing demand for greater personal security. Already there has been some relaxation of Stalin's brutal police-state methods. And in that less frightening atmosphere individualism tends to grow.

(4) In the satellite countries of Eastern Europe outbreaks, such as have occurred in East Berlin and East Germany, in Poland and in Hungary, show that nationalism and individualism are not extinguished even by massive and sustained pressures.

The Soviet rulers must either grant more independence, and thus liberate forces which oppose the existing regimes, or else they must revert to the Stalinist tactics of oppression with increased likelihood of violent revolt.

The vacillating policy of international communism toward Yugoslavia illustrates the dilemma. In 1955 international communism, reversing its position, acquiesced in Yugoslav independence. But that shift had such disturbing repercussions on other Eastern European states that now international communism again reverses itself and seeks, by threats and economic pressures, again to subject Yugoslavia to Moscow's rule.

(5) The basic weakness of international communism is strikingly demonstrated by the fact that, whenever an opportunity is given for

peoples to move into, or away from, a Communist area, the movement is always away.

During the Hungarian rebellion 200,000 escaped to freedom.

In Germany over 3 million have gone from East to West.

In Korea over 3 million have gone from the North to the South.

In Viet-Nam nearly 1 million went from the North to the South.

Of the Chinese Communist prisoners taken in Korea, two-thirds rejected repatriation, and from Communist China they flee to Hong Kong and Macao.

Such movements, at so many different times and places, show that there is something basically repellent in the Communist rule.

The Communist rulers have shown an immense capacity to extend their rule. But nowhere have they developed a capacity to make their rule genuinely and freely acceptable to the ruled.

(6) Soviet policy faces a grave dilemma in terms of its foreign policy. Brute force no longer brings results in the face of free-world collective defenses. The Soviet rulers have therefore switched to policies which, overtly, are policies of friendliness and not obviously designed to be predatory. By so doing they develop a vested interest in respectability.

That is a trend which we welcome and encourage. It may bring nearer the day when Soviet leaders will be primarily interested in improving the welfare of their own people and there will be an end to the unnatural exploitation of the ruled peoples by international communism. Then our relations may be happily dominated by the natural good will and friendship that has always prevailed between the American and Russian people.

VII. The Strategy of Victory

President Eisenhower, speaking at Paris last December,¹² said,

There is a noble strategy of victory—not victory over any peoples but victory for all peoples.

We find that strategy of victory in the manifold opportunities that open up before us—in the new world of political independence; in the new world of atomic power; in the new world of outer

space; in the new polar areas; and, above all, in the organized cooperation of free peoples whereby they preserve peace and promote welfare.

An essential part in this strategy of victory must be played by the American people as individuals.

In a struggle where freedom is the issue government cannot carry all of the responsibility. Governments of the free can do much, and we do not shirk our task. But the best exponents of freedom are free people. Our pride is not in what government *does* but in what government *does not do*. Religion, the greatest single force, is divorced from state control or influence. Our system of education is local and free from federal government influence. Labor organizes itself for its own protection. Our business is privately conducted. Our most potent ambassadors are not those who have that official title but the millions of individual Americans who each year travel about the world giving and receiving impressions, establishing contacts, and exchanging ideas.

Last month I was in Berlin. At the Town Hall we stood in silence while the Freedom Bell was tolled. The bell bears this inscription, "That this world under God shall have a new birth of freedom." The bell was donated by individual subscriptions, largely by schoolchildren of America.

If, indeed, there is to be a new birth of freedom in the world, and if everywhere bells of freedom are triumphantly to ring, then it will have to be through the efforts of the individuals who, having freedom, cherish it, ennoble it, and make it a dynamic force throughout the world.

Dr. Eisenhower Delays Trip to Central America

Press release 305 dated June 4

As was announced on March 29, 1958, Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower has been planning to make a factfinding trip as personal representative of the President in response to invitations extended him by the Governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. Up until now it has not been possible to schedule the visits at mutually convenient dates for all of the countries concerned. Dr. Eisenhower will delay his trip in the expectation that satisfactory dates can shortly be arranged for travel to the six countries concerned.

¹² *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

The Battlefield of Ideas

by Andrew H. Berding

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

In the last few weeks we have witnessed numerous events that have caused a certain amount of inquiry as to where we stand in the psychological field, whether our methods are adequate, whether the means we employ are sufficiently skillful, whether we are going to take any new actions or follow any new procedures in this psychological field. We have seen what happened in Latin America; we have seen rioting in Algiers and Lebanon; and the question arises: What is the world attitude toward the United States and what are we doing about it?

I think there are a certain number of points that we should make in what undoubtedly is a very vital sector of foreign affairs. I think it is a fact that we have reached a military stalemate more or less with the Soviets. There is a kind of balance of military power which lessens the likelihood of military adventure on their part. At the same time, that military balance conduces to a greater effort on their part in other fields—that is, political, economic, and psychological—because it is an undoubted fact that they have not given up their basic ideal, which is dominance of the world. If they can't achieve it militarily, then they will still seek to achieve it through other means and along other patterns.

Beginning some 8 months ago—that is, October 4, when the Sputnik went up—we have seen Soviet propaganda very much to the forefront. Let me pay tribute—honest tribute—to the skill with which they conduct propaganda. They are no

mean antagonist in this field. They make use of every opportunity. Take Sputnik, for instance: It was just about 48 hours after Sputnik went up that they were putting out lists of the foreign cities over which Sputnik would pass. And it isn't at all odd or curious that they should have mentioned two cities particularly. One was Little Rock, and another was Bandung. Little Rock, of course, has been very greatly in the world's news. Bandung was the seat of the Afro-Asian conference that was conducted a couple of years ago and which the Soviets had sought to use then and still seek to use as a kind of sounding board for their propaganda to the Asiatic and African peoples. So right away they were using Sputnik for all the propaganda advantage they could get out of it.

Operational Advantages of the Soviet Union

Of course the Soviets do have certain advantages in the propaganda field that we don't have. Sometimes you may wonder whether you would call these advantages, but there is no doubt that certain values accrue to them because of these factors that I want to mention.

I think the first is that they have—and seem to need to have—no regard whatever for the truth. They can say one thing in one part of the world and something 180° opposite in another part of the world right at the same time. Now, obviously, we can't do that, and we don't want to do that. Certainly, if we did, we would be called very quickly into question. But the fact remains that the truth is no obstacle in Soviet propaganda.

Another advantage they have is that they can take the action they want to take without the need to consult anyone. We feel that, when we take action or make statements, we need to consult our

¹ Remarks made at Washington, D.C., on May 23 before representatives of national nongovernmental organizations at a conference on foreign affairs arranged by the Department of State.

close allies, possibly all the members of a given group of states in a mutual security arrangement, like, say, NATO. We also feel the need—in fact, the requirement—to consult with other elements in our own Government. We feel the need to consult with Congress often because we have to go to Congress for approval of and authorization of the action we want to take or the financing of the action that we would like to decide upon.

The Soviets have no such compulsion. They get the appropriations for their propaganda effort without the need to justify any request. We estimate, for instance, that they spend more money on jamming the Voice of America than the Voice of America spends for all its output. That conclusion is not reached by guesswork. We know the approximate number of transmitters engaged in this jamming operation, and we can figure out the cost of transmitters and the cost of operation, and the like. It adds up to a surprising total, which, as I say, is more than that expended by the whole of the Voice of America program.

Imagine our going to Congress and asking for enough money to jam Soviet broadcasts and specifying a sum that would more than total the cost of all their broadcasts! Not that we would want to jam their broadcasts—we don't feel that they produce any particular effect in the United States anyway.

Effects of a Controlled Press

A third advantage that the Soviets have is the fact that there is a controlled press in the Soviet Union. Now, I say immediately, thank the good Lord for the fact that we have a free press in the United States. It is a foundation of our democracy. I don't think our democracy could exist without a free press. But the Soviets can draw from their controlled press certain factors on their side.

Because they don't have to inform their own people of certain things, they can transmit those ideas overseas with far less restraint than would otherwise be the case. I will give you an example by turning it into reverse. Suppose for the sake of argument that we had wanted to make the announcement the Soviets made about unilateral suspension of nuclear tests. Let's say that all the circumstances were the same except that they existed on our side. Let's say that we ourselves had just completed a very extensive series of tests,

and let's say that we knew that the Soviets were going to have in the near future a series of tests on their part, and then we came out with our announcement. Now what would have been the effect?

I am quite sure that our press would have caught us up on that right away and labeled it a phony maneuver. We had just completed a series. The Soviets were about to start a series, and then we were saying what the Soviets said, that if the other side continued testing we would resume testing. In other words, it would have had very little meaning.

I have written many headlines in my newspaper career, and I jotted down two headlines that I think would have come out of such an American announcement. I think they would have been quite typical. One is, "Test Ban Branded Hoax." The other is, "Atom Decision a Phony."

Also there would have been many speeches up on the "Hill" branding this as a hoax and a phony. What would have been the result? The Soviet propaganda would have picked all that up. They wouldn't have had to charge that we had committed a hoax, that we were uttering a phony. They would have had all the quotations they needed from the American press and from speakers in and out of Government. We couldn't possibly have achieved the effect that the Soviets achieved with their announcement of the unilateral suspension of testing.

Let me say in that connection that I feel that we were given over here too much the impression that the Soviet announcement was a great propaganda triumph. I think the foreign press saw through the announcement. According to the survey that we made, the foreign press saw the loopholes in that Soviet announcement and called attention to them. And the Soviets, I myself am convinced, did not produce the effect, the full effect, that they had hoped for.

Failures Never Reported

Another aspect of that controlled press is that you never hear anything about Soviet failures. I am sure, for instance, that the Soviets had Sputnik failures before they had the Sputnik success. But you never heard anything about those. I wouldn't be at all surprised if they had had Sputnik failures following the first two and before—after some considerable delay—they put this third

one in orbit. But if that was the case, of course you heard nothing about it.

There is complete suppression of news in the Soviet Union. None of the output of our commercial press and none of our own official Government output is released in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Soviet propaganda makes use of many quotations and speeches and the like made in this country which are critical of Government policies. Frequently they don't even have to write their own commentaries. The commentaries in essence are a compilation of statements made on this side which are critical of various actions of the United States Government. All the Soviets have to do is to select the material, put it together, and broadcast or disseminate it in some way or other.

One further advantage of a controlled press is that, because that press does not publish material which is disadvantageous to the Soviet Union or which is critical of the social system in the Soviet Union—and by that I mean stories of crime, disension, internal struggle, and the like—there is nothing that the press stationed there has to pick up and send overseas. Quite the contrary is the case here. When I go abroad on these various international conferences, I am sometimes appalled at the news that comes out of the United States and appears in the foreign press. Now, it is the truth about what happens here, and it is the news. But it so often is about murder, kidnaping, loose morals in Hollywood, and the like. I am not saying that it shouldn't be sent. I am saying that you get that kind of stuff out of the United States, but you don't get it out of the Soviet Union.

Now I think the same organizations that send that kind of material out from the United States would send the same kind from the Soviet Union if they had it, for I believe they choose material solely on the basis of news judgment. But the Soviets control what goes out of the Soviet Union, and they suppress the sources of the news. I have no doubt that there is crime in the Soviet Union. Where there are human beings there probably will always be crime, and probably there is as much glaring crime in the Soviet Union as there is in the United States, but you don't ever read about it.

I will give you one example of that. You remember the Little Rock incident. Well, every day both American and foreign press associations were sending thousands upon thousands of words

overseas about all the incidents happening at Little Rock. The Soviet Union has had episodes of racial suppression that are a thousand times more intense and brutal than what has happened in the United States, but none of that news has gone overseas—certainly not out of the Soviet Union. From time to time you will hear references to it. Maybe a refugee, long after, will tell about it. But the world does not have that same impression of racial difficulty in the Soviet Union that it has of racial difficulty in the United States.

The Advantage of the "Prodigal Son"

I have been talking mostly about operational advantages that the Soviet Union has. There are also a few natural advantages. To one I will give the title, "the prodigal son." The Soviet Union, I think, is regarded by far more people in the world than is the United States as the possible starter of a war. I think public-opinion polls in various countries bear that out. Now if that is the case and people think that the Soviet Union is much more likely to start a war than the United States, then talk about peace by the Soviet Union is received with greater acclaim than talk about peace by the United States. The Soviet Union is the one that would start war? Well, then, all the more do people welcome talk about peace by the Soviet Union. It has been one of the major themes of the Soviet Union, and it has made a certain impact on the world—this constant talk that it is the Soviet Union which is the great proponent of peace and that the United States, ruled by this Wall Street clique, is the warmongering nation desirous of war and putting obstacles in the way of any efforts to reach peace.

Another natural advantage that they have is the fact that we have had a higher standard of behavior throughout history, and therefore people of other countries expect more of us than they do of the Soviet Union. Moreover, we are a far wealthier nation; so people look to us for greater economic benefits and grants and loans, and the like, and if they don't receive them and don't receive them in the amount that they would like to become accustomed to, then there is often a feeling of dissatisfaction, sometimes even resentment.

There is also the fact that we ourselves threw off colonial rule, and therefore nations that have

nationalist and even supernationalist views think that we should automatically be with them 100 percent regardless of what our friendships with other nations might be. We throw off colonial rule, so why are we not with them 100 percent when they want to be independent? Whether they have reached the point where they could possibly be independent or not does not seem to matter.

And of course many peoples resent our high standard of living and what seems to them an undue preoccupation with military security.

Soviet Propaganda Techniques

Soviet propaganda is interesting in some ways. When you study it, it is most revealing. One approach they always adopt is what I call the accusatory line. They are always accusing, always attacking. They very seldom defend. And with many people that makes a certain impression.

Another approach is that a great percentage of their material is devoted to the idea of "divide and rule"—create dissension; create dissension between the United States and Great Britain; create dissension between Great Britain and the continental countries, dissension between France and Germany, dissension between agricultural countries and industrial countries, dissension between Eastern countries and Western countries; and never lose an opportunity to sow seeds of doubt and resentment between and among countries which seek to remain together.

Another interesting line they follow is what I call the "wave of the future." It is sometimes called the "bandwagon" technique. It appears in many of Khrushchev's speeches where he seeks to give the impression that the future is the Soviets', that at some time they will surpass us in production in this and that commodity, and the like. What he is trying to sell to other countries is the idea that, since the Soviet system is the wave of the future, they should get on the bandwagon now. "Don't wait, get on the bandwagon now and go ahead with us." And we will find that theme, I think, being developed evermore by the Soviet Union and particularly by Khrushchev—that they are the wave of the future.

And of course they use every means at their disposal to put over a propaganda message. I was very much interested the other day in a report I

had from Mr. Wilkinson² here, who had been to the Brussels World Fair just a couple of weeks ago. He gave me just a couple of paragraphs about the American pavilion and the Soviet pavilion, and I would like to read them to you:

The American and the Soviet pavilions at the Brussels World Fair provide a good case in point on the use of Soviet propaganda on all occasions. You take our pavilion for what it is. The American story is there in simple display cases, in color television, in store windows, and in art and crafts exhibits. But you have to absorb it.

In the Soviet pavilion, great, icy monolith that it is, you see what the U.S.S.R. would like to be, would like the world to think it is: massive machinery; a statue of Lenin 50 feet high; happy children in photos, each allowed—so the captions say—to pick his or her profession at will. Only we know it isn't so. And incidentally every bit of space that is in the Soviet pavilion has a propaganda message on it. You come out feeling stunned by the weight of it.

That, I think, is a pretty good description of a propaganda effort.

The Meaning of Words

I want to speak for a moment about words. I think sometimes we are taken in by certain words that the Soviets use. Take the word "socialism," for example. The Soviets constantly speak of their system as a socialist system. It is not. In essence it is a Communist system. And we pick up that terminology too much. You remember last year, when Khrushchev made his TV address, he made the prediction: "Your children will live under a socialist government." American editorials by the scores thereupon very bitterly attacked that theory. Really, what should have been said was that he made the prediction that our children would live under a Communist system.

Now the reason this word causes difficulty, if we pick it up and use it like that, is that there are some very fine socialist governments in the world with whom we are either allied or on very friendly terms, like those in the Scandinavian countries. And Nehru says he has a socialist government. So there is nothing the Soviets would like better than to have us lump all those socialist countries together with the "Commies." And there is no reason why we should play their game.

We find in our newspapers and on our radio the

² J. Burke Wilkinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs.

erm "People's Democracy"—"The People's Democracy of Czechoslovakia," or something like that. It is no more a people's government, it is no more a democracy, than the wildest comparison could possibly think of, but you find it used thousands of times in our press.

And then, too, when it comes to words, what an advantage they have with those simple slogans that they adopt: "ban the bomb" or "ban testing." Our disarmament proposals are more far-reaching by a wide degree than their proposals, but the Soviets constantly get a great propaganda advantage through those simple slogans that mean nothing. You can't ban the use of the bomb, for no one would agree to it. We certainly couldn't trust the Soviets in that field. But, as I say, with words they do gain certain advantages.

Words vs. Actions

With all these propaganda advantages that the Soviet Union enjoys, there is one important thing we should keep in mind and that is that results are produced not so much by words as by actions. I would say that words account for no more than 10 percent of impact; actions account for probably 90 percent. Of course the Soviets have been skillful at combining action and words.

I think we, too, are beginning to learn the value of a combination of action and words. We showed it certainly in the atoms-for-peace program. We took action. First, the President made his speech of December 1953 to the United Nations, making the specific proposal of an international agency to which we would contribute fissionable material if other nations would do likewise. Then we had bilateral agreements with about 30 nations for the provision of atomic materials and reactor stations, and the like. The Atomic Energy Commission gave atomic libraries to many nations.

At the same time a very vigorous worldwide propaganda campaign was put on by the U.S. Information Agency. Or you may call it an information program, if you like. That had a curious result. The day after the President made his speech in the General Assembly, the Soviet Union through Radio Moscow turned down his proposal bluntly and sharply. But the campaign of action and words kept going, and finally a year and a half later, at the summit conference,

Bulganin promised that the Soviet Union would join the atomic energy agency and would make a contribution of fissionable materials. And that agency, as you know, has come into being.

Another example of the combination of action and words was the President's open-skies proposal. I think, as I say, we are learning the lesson of action combined with words.

People sometimes ask who has the initiative in the cold war. Well, I would like to answer that on the basis of what I was just saying: action 90 percent, words 10 percent. Often we get the impression that the Soviets have the initiative simply because they have sent another letter or something like that. We ourselves have taken the initiative on the substantive side again and again and again—in the disarmament field literally a dozen times, going right back to Barney Baruch's proposals in 1946 and 1947. And in many other ways we have taken the initiative in action. So I refuse to believe that the Soviets have the initiative in this field even though there is this constant outpouring of effort.

Sometimes, frankly, I think the outpouring backfires a little bit, as in the Bulganin-Khrushchev exchange of letters with the President, where we began, through the very letters themselves, to become aware of what the Soviets' true ideas were with regard to a summit conference. I think those letters served a useful purpose from our point of view.

Where We Stand

There are a few basic factors that enable us to see where we stand in the cold war, or the battlefield of ideas, whatever you want to call it.

One such basic factor is the fact that there is a certain suspicion among many peoples, and particularly among educated peoples, of what the Soviet Union does and says. I think there is, generally speaking, more disposition to place credence in our actions and words than in those of the Soviet Union.

Another basic factor is that people are more inclined to rely on American promises. I think also that the greater devotion we have to humanity and to human life, for instance, is something that inclines people in our favor.

At the same time, I think we must adopt the conclusion that Secretary Dulles has: We are not seeking—we are not asking—to be loved. We are

asking and we are seeking to be respected. It is oftentimes quite difficult for a big, powerful, and wealthy country to be loved. They say no one loves a millionaire. But it is possible for that big, wealthy, powerful country to be respected.

I found myself a little surprised at the almost incredible degree of unity we found at the recent NATO conference at Copenhagen. Foreign minister after foreign minister was adopting the same attitude we had with regard to such basic issues as a summit conference. And I think there is that feeling of unity among certain nations of the free world. It is something that is absolutely antagonistic to Soviet wishes. If there is one thing that seems to rile them more than anything else, it is this idea of unity of certain groups of states in the free world.

The Soviet Union has had some disasters in this field in the last few years: Hungary is certainly one, and the worldwide effect produced by that; East Germany is another; Poland is another; and Yugoslavia is another. The flow of refugees from East Europe to West Europe is another case in point.

I firmly believe that, when the chips are down, we still can count on a friendly feeling in the majority of the peoples of the world and the active support of the nations whose support we need.

The Role of the Citizen

I don't want to conclude without one further thought. Every time I meet with a group like this, there are several people who say, "Well now, that is all well and good and interesting enough, but what can I do?" Let me say that there is a lot that people like yourselves can do in a situation like this, for in a cold war we can all be soldiers.

I will give you a few examples.

There are thousands of foreign students coming to the United States every year. There is nothing that makes a greater impression on those students than being received in American homes. Many of you could do that.

Many of you travel, go to foreign countries. I should think you would take every occasion to talk with foreign peoples and make them acquainted with our basic ideals and our thinking.

You yourselves, of course, want to keep well informed on foreign policy, and this visit to Washington that you are making now is, in my

opinion, a wonderful step in that direction. It is really heartwarming that so many of you have come from such long distances—Los Angeles and the like—to attend these briefings in the Department and to talk with us. We try not to talk to you but to talk with you.

Many of your organizations have connections abroad, with branches or with corresponding organizations. Those contacts can well be developed to the benefit of our country. You are likewise in correspondence with many foreigners. I think that certainly should be stimulated and developed. And you have your publications, many of which go abroad. Adequate descriptions of American life in those publications can often produce a very fine effect abroad. They are *your* views; they are not United States Government views. They are what you are saying, and that is significant. That private message is, in my opinion, very important.

There is also a very extensive system of people-to-people contacts that President Eisenhower started. Many different committees in different aspects of American life are in contact with corresponding sectors of life overseas and in many cases producing excellent results.

These are just a few of the things that you as private citizens can do. In conclusion I say that there are many, many things, and many more than I mentioned, that you can do which would be of great help in winning the victory on this battlefield of ideas.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Notes on Medical Cooperation

Press release 297 dated May 29

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State on May 29 released the texts of notes exchanged with the Soviet Union concerning suggestions made by President Eisenhower for international cooperation in the struggle against disease. These suggestions in the President's state of the Union message on January 9, 1958,¹ invited the Soviet Union to join with the United States and other nations in the existent campaign against malaria and in other

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1958, p. 115.

campaigns against illnesses such as heart disease and cancer.

In a note delivered May 26, 1958, the Department of State expressed gratification at the positive response given in a note from the Soviet Embassy dated May 19, 1958. The note contained specific suggestions for cooperative measures in the field of public health and indicated that the Soviet Union was prepared to cooperate in the programs of the World Health Organization.

The Department's note in reply pointed out that the United States was presenting proposals to the World Health Organization relating to a cooperative program of research, with initial emphasis on cancer and heart disease, and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would support these proposals and cooperate in the proposed program. Should some aspects of the Soviet suggestions not be covered by the current programs of the World Health Organization or those adopted in the near future, the Department expressed willingness to discuss these aspects under the arrangements established for Soviet-American discussions of exchanges between the two countries.

The American note pointed out that the recent agreement on exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union² provided for exchanges of medical delegations, reciprocal trips of medical specialists, and the exchange of medical films and medical journals. These features of the agreement are being actively developed at present. A delegation of American women doctors has been visiting medical installations in the Soviet Union in reciprocity for a previous visit by Soviet women doctors to the United States. Exchanges of medical publications are being expanded. Plans are being developed for American medical scientists to deliver lectures at Soviet medical institutes and for Soviet scientists to reciprocate. An exchange of technical films on medical subjects is under discussion.

The American proposals to the WHO, mentioned in the Department's note, were outlined by Dr. Milton Eisenhower on May 27, 1958, at the current session of the World Health Assembly at Minneapolis.³ Dr. Eisenhower proposed that the WHO conduct a special study during the coming year to determine how it may most effectively perform its fullest role in international coopera-

tive research, with initial emphasis on cancer and heart disease. He stated that the United States is prepared to make a special grant for such a study and would consider providing substantial support for any sound program resulting from it. He also reaffirmed United States support for the current campaign sponsored by WHO against malaria. Dr. Eisenhower praised the great strides which have been made in this cooperative effort, which has already halved the incidence of malaria and saved millions of lives. He recalled the President's invitation for nations, including the Soviet Union, which were not yet participating to join in this international effort and expressed the hope that many would do so.

U.S. NOTE OF MAY 26

The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of note No. 14 dated May 19, 1958 from the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Department is gratified that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has found it possible to respond positively to the suggestion which President Eisenhower made in his State of the Union Message on January 9, 1958 that the Soviet Union join with the United States and other nations in the existent campaign against malaria and in other campaigns against illnesses such as cancer and heart disease. As the Embassy's note states, the President's suggestions were discussed during the negotiations on the agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning cultural, technological and educational exchanges. It was agreed during the discussion that the exchange of opinions on the President's suggestions would be continued. The agreement on exchanges between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the cultural, technological and educational fields which was signed on January 27, 1958, provides for certain exchanges of medical delegations in 1958-59, reciprocal trips of medical specialists and the exchange of medical films and medical journals.

The Embassy's note contains certain specific proposals for further cooperative measures in 1958-60 in the field of public health. The note also refers to the World Health Organization as an organization through which the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is prepared to cooperate with other nations in this field. The Department considers that some aspects of the proposals in the Embassy's note might most appropriately be discussed and carried out through the World Health Organization. At the forthcoming Commemorative Tenth Anniversary Session of the World Health Assembly at Minneapolis the United States will have certain proposals to present relating to a cooperative program of research, with initial emphasis on cancer and heart disease. The United States hopes that other governments, including the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, will find it

¹ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

² *Ibid.*, June 16, 1958, p. 989.

possible to support these proposals and to cooperate in the proposed program.

Some aspects of the proposals set forth in the Embassy's note may not be encompassed by the cooperative measures which the World Health Assembly has adopted or may adopt. The Department is prepared to discuss these aspects of the Soviet proposals under the arrangements established for Soviet-American discussions of cultural, technical, and educational exchanges between our two countries.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 26, 1958

SOVIET NOTE OF MAY 19

Unofficial translation

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
No. 14

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and upon instructions from the Soviet Government has the honor to communicate the following:

During the Soviet-American negotiations about working out an agreement between the USSR and the USA concerning exchanges in the field of culture, technology, and education, the question was touched upon as to whether the USSR and the USA should agree upon uniting their efforts in the struggle against cancer, vascular heart ailments, and malaria, and it was agreed that an exchange of opinions on this question would be continued.

As is well known, the Soviet Union joined the World Health Organization for the purpose of co-operating with other countries in improving and preserving the health of all nations, and it also co-operates with other countries in the field of public health even outside the framework of this organization.

At the suggestion of the Soviet Union there were also included measures in the field of public health in the agreement between the USSR and the USA for exchanges in the field of culture, technology, and education, which was concluded on January 27, 1958. In particular, the agreement provides for the exchange between the USSR and the USA of medical delegations in 1958-59, reciprocal trips of specialists for giving lectures in the field of medicine, and the exchange of medical films and medical journals.

The Soviet Government considers that in addition to the measures which have been provided for by the said agreement the Soviet Union and the United States might also agree on adopting other measures in the field of public health.

For the consideration of the Government of the USA the Soviet Government introduces the proposal to agree on carrying out the following measures in 1958-60:

Mutual exchange of plans and results of scientific research on the development of the problems of cancer and vascular heart ailments of scientific research institutes of the USSR and the USA.

Periodic sending of leading American specialists in cancer problems and vascular heart ailments to the USSR and of Soviet specialists to the USA for a more profound study of the setup of scientific research.

A mutual publication of works by American research men in Soviet journals and of works by Soviet research men in American journals on cancer problems and vascular heart ailments.

Organization of mixed Soviet-American groups for combatting malaria and smallpox, to be sent, with the consent of the respective governments, to the regions of Africa and South America where those illnesses are endemic.

The Soviet Government would appreciate a prompt reply to the above-mentioned proposals and, on its part, is prepared to examine the proposals that might be presented by the American side.

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1958

U.S. To Distribute Magazine in Poland

Press release 300 dated June 2

On May 30 the United States and Poland exchanged notes providing for the distribution in Poland of a monthly Polish-language magazine to be published by the U.S. Government. The magazine will be devoted to presenting various aspects of life in the United States. The Polish Government has informed the U.S. Government of its plans for the possible distribution of a similar magazine in the United States.

Soviet Diplomat Declared Persona Non Grata

Press release 314 dated June 7

Department Announcement

On June 6, 1958, the United States Government declared Nikolai I. Kurochkin, a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, *persona non grata*. This action was taken because Mr. Kurochkin was found to have paid hundreds of dollars to an American citizen for the improper procurement of United States Army manuals and other materials. Some of the documents he sought were classified as high as "secret." The Soviet Embassy had already been advised that activity of this kind would not be condoned. On January 14, 1957, when Major Yuri P. Krylov of the

Soviet Embassy was expelled for similar actions,¹ the Department of State requested the Soviet Embassy to insure that procurement of materials and documents by means of improper payments to American citizens be discontinued immediately. Notwithstanding this specific request, Mr. Kurochkin has engaged in this practice during the past months.

Text of U.S. Aide Memoire²

The Department of State informs the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the Government of the United States has ascertained that Mr. Nikolai I. Kurochkin, Third Secretary of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has engaged in highly improper activities incompatible with his diplomatic status. Mr. Kurochkin has paid hundreds of dollars to an American citizen for the improper procurement of United States Army manuals and other materials. Some of the documents he sought were classified.

Mr. Kurochkin's continued presence in the United States is no longer considered acceptable and the Embassy is requested to arrange for his immediate departure.

U.S. To Provide Cobalt Equipment for Hospital in Thailand

Press release 303 dated June 3

Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson on June 3 informed Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (Srisdi Dhanarajata), Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Thailand, that the U.S. Government will provide cobalt-60 teletherapy equipment to the Siriraj Hospital at Bangkok.³ The announcement was made in a brief ceremony in which As-

sistant Secretary Robertson presented Field Marshal Sarit a letter describing the facility. The equipment, which is used in the treatment of cancer, was requested by the Thai Government.

The Field Marshal was accompanied by the Ambassador of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, and Dr. and Mrs. Chamlong Harinsuta of the staff of Siriraj Hospital. Also present were representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

Mr. Robertson said that the provision of the cobalt teletherapy equipment is evidence of United States interest in sharing scientific knowledge with other countries. He also stated:

The United States is happy to participate with an ally in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in developing knowledge and experience in the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind.

The cobalt equipment is part of a project for the peaceful uses of atomic energy under which the U.S. Government is furnishing certain other equipment to Thailand for nuclear research and training.

Although many cobalt machines are in use in U.S. hospitals, other institutions in this country are awaiting their turns for the cobalt, which requires 2 years for processing at the National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. In Bangkok the unit, complete with cobalt, will supplement present X-ray equipment and permit the treatment of additional patients.

The cobalt unit is a small piece of radioactive metal at the center of a large ball of lead or other heavy shielding. This unit must be supported by a machine in such a way that its powerful beam can be directed as desired in the treatment of a particular patient. The machines offer several radiological and instrumental advantages over conventional X-ray therapy equipment. The radiological advantages are less reaction of the skin, less discomfort to the patient when deep therapy is necessary, and increased penetration into the body for treatment of deep-seated lesions. The instrumental advantages are simplicity of operation, no special power supply requirements, and mechanical reliability.

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1957, p. 181.

² Handed by Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, to Sergel R. Striganov, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy, on June 6.

³ For announcement of meetings of Field Marshal Sarit with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, see BULLETIN of June 2, 1958, p. 912.

Proposed Treaty Opens Way for International Bus and Truck Operations on Pan American Highway System

by H. H. Kelly

Drafting of a new treaty to permit international operation of buses and trucks on the Pan American Highway System, traversing the entire length of North, Central, and South America, was accomplished at a meeting of the Permanent Executive Committee of the Pan American Highway Congresses held at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., April 25-May 1, 1958.

This new intergovernmental instrument bears the title "Draft Agreement on International Commercial Motor Vehicle Traffic on the Pan American Highway System."¹ It is the first of its kind and scope in the Americas, and its preparation is especially timely in view of the anticipated opening to through traffic in 1959 of the segment of the overall system known as the Inter-American Highway, a modern 3,200-mile route between the United States-Mexico border and the Panama Canal Zone.² Its eventual adoption by the American Republics will constitute an important factor in the economic development of the countries concerned.

The agreement has been referred to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council for study. If approved by that body and by the Council of

the Organization of American States, it will be submitted to the 21 American Republics for signature and ratification and will come into force after ratification by 4 states. In the case of the United States, such ratification will require the advice and consent of the United States Senate.

So far as actual operations are concerned, the agreement is expected to prove of most immediate interest to the eight countries touched by the Inter-American Highway—the United States, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama. On portions of the Pan American Highway System in South America which are already passable for large vehicles, the agreement may also have immediate

¹ Copies of the draft agreement may be obtained from the Pan American Union, Washington 6, D.C.

² The Pan American Highway System is a far-looking project for continuous highway connections from Alaska to Argentina. The Alaska Highway already provides a connection from the United States north to Fairbanks. In the United States there is no expectation of designating a single highway or highways as units in the system; instead, the entire network of modern highways in this country will doubtless be regarded as offering a wealth of possible routes for north and south travel. There are now several highway points of entry into Mexico, and these converge at or near Mexico City, from where a road continues south to the Guatemala border. Here begins the new route officially designated by congressional legislation as the Inter-American Highway. It traverses the five Central American Republics and Panama, a total distance of about 1,600 miles. South of the Panama Canal Zone into Colombia lies the undeveloped Darien area, presenting a 400-mile construction problem as yet unsolved. In South America there are numerous highways, not all interconnected, which are open to traffic as far as Chile and Argentina, and these are parts of the Pan American Highway System.

• Mr. Kelly is Director of the International Travel Division, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce. He was an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the meeting of the Permanent Executive Committee of the Pan American Highway Congresses reported in the above article and served as chairman of the subcommittee which drafted the agreement described.

interest as a means of regularizing and encouraging the beneficial development of bus and truck traffic. The first applications for permits to operate on the Inter-American Highway are expected to be submitted to the designated governmental authorities as soon as the agreement comes into effect. Thereafter, the expected development of commercial motor vehicle traffic will be watched with interest throughout the Western Hemisphere and the world.

Background

Soon after World War II widespread interest arose in measures to facilitate international motoring on a worldwide scale. In 1949 the United Nations promulgated a Convention on Road Traffic,³ which has been ratified to date by 36 nations. The United States, which ratified in 1952, was the first so to act. This convention applied primarily to private passenger automobiles, although it contained an annex setting forth the maximum permissible dimensions and weight of large buses and trucks. As progress proceeded on the Inter-American Highway in this hemisphere—on which the U.S. Government has already expended \$128 million, with the Central American Republics and Panama contributing about half as much—the need for special arrangements to cover buses and trucks became apparent.

The Pan American Highway Congresses and the Inter-American Travel Congresses, working under the aegis of the Organization of American States, made initial recommendations on the problem in generalized terms. U.S. Government officials held discussions with the authorities of various countries along the route. The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, composed of the officials of 48 States and the District of Columbia who have responsibility for regulations applicable to motor vehicles and drivers, adopted resolutions favoring conclusion of an inter-American agreement on bus and truck operations. In August 1957 an initial draft, prepared by a working group of representatives of the interested Government agencies at Washing-

ton,⁴ was submitted by the United States delegation to the Seventh Pan American Highway Congress at Panamá, R. P., for purposes of discussion, and that assembly referred the matter to its executive committee for preparation of a final draft. This task was performed at the meeting at Washington April 25-May 1, the drafting work being done by a subcommittee composed of representatives of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the United States. The resulting final draft was approved unanimously by the executive committee, whose membership includes the four countries named above, together with Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

Mexican Reservation

A single country found it necessary to file a reservation on one section of the agreement, relating to the granting of operating rights and to the freedom of in-transit traffic. This was Mexico, whose special problem in this respect was well recognized by the other members of the executive committee. One-half of the total mileage of the Inter-American Highway lies in Mexico, and that country has constructed its part of the highway entirely with its own funds. The Mexican delegation explained that the price of gasoline is low in Mexico and the gas-tax receipts available for road purposes are correspondingly scanty, while the diesel fuel used by large commercial vehicles is not taxed at all. Furthermore, the present laws of Mexico virtually prohibit operation by foreign commercial vehicles or drivers except in certain special cases.

Since Mexico has such a large section of the highway and since it lies between the United States and the other countries traversed by the route, its strategic importance to the successful operation of the new agreement is manifest. On the other hand, Mexican operators will presumably wish to benefit from the agreement in operations north to the United States and south to other countries. This is the basic problem that confronts Mexico under the agreement and one that can only be corrected by changes in Mexican legislation, in the view of that country's delegation.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Dec. 12, 1949, p. 875a. An earlier instrument of regional scope is the Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic (Washington 1943), which provided a useful basis for many of the provisions of the world document of 1949.

⁴ Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Department of State.

Details of the Agreement

Because of its "pioneer" nature the entire text of the agreement is worthy of careful study by all of those interested in international transportation matters. However, a brief summary of its principal provisions may be made.

The document contains 21 articles and 3 annexes. A preamble states:

The Contracting States, desirous of encouraging and promoting the fullest possible utilization of the Pan American Highway System for the international exchange of persons and goods in order that all the countries served by it may receive mutual economic and social benefits, have agreed upon the following provisions. . . .

The first four articles contain general provisions, including definitions, exclusion of cabotage operations, and assurance of nondiscrimination. Two basic definitions are of special importance:

"International traffic" means any commercial transportation of passengers or property between a point or place in one country and a place in another country. . . .

"Pan American Highway System" means the highway, or highways, within a Contracting State, which has, or have been designated by that State as being a part of the Pan American Highway System, including adjacent city streets and feeder roads to a distance of not less than one mile from the line of the Pan American Highway. In the absence of such designation by a Contracting State, all roads in that State will be considered as parts of the Pan American Highway System.

Article 5 establishes the Permanent Executive Committee of the Pan American Highway Congresses, through its secretariat, as a coordinating body for the purpose of supplying appropriate information to the Contracting States.

Article 6 requires that each motor vehicle be registered by the state or subdivision thereof in which the registrant has domicile, in the manner prescribed by its legislation, and that each vehicle shall display a registration number and an identifying sign to show the country of initial registration.

Article 7 sets up the procedure for filing application for permission to operate, with a provision that the application shall be filed through diplomatic and/or consular channels on a prescribed form. Paragraph 3 of this article, to which the Mexican delegation filed its reservation, reads as follows:

If need therefor is found to exist, each Contracting State may limit the number of carriers or vehicles permitted to operate in international commercial motor

vehicle traffic, it being understood that any such limitation will be taken into account by the other Contracting States in granting operating rights, on a basis of reciprocity. This provision shall not apply to in-transit traffic.

Article 8 provides that each Contracting State may establish financial responsibility or insurance requirements.

Articles 9 and 10 specify certain special customs regulations for vehicles and cargoes.

Article 11 provides that every driver operating under the provisions of the agreement "shall be subject to the laws and regulations of each Contracting State in which he operates," with the additional proviso that the Contracting States "agree to facilitate, within the framework of their respective laws, the entry and departure of such drivers."

Articles 12 and 13 establish the principle of full reciprocity on vehicle identification plates and drivers' licenses, each participating country recognizing validity of the others' plates and licenses without additional fees. However, "each Contracting State may require a driver to possess an adequate knowledge of the language of that State."

Article 14, on taxation, may be quoted in full:

Each for-hire or private carrier in international commercial motor vehicle traffic shall either purchase motor fuel in each Contracting State in an amount necessary for the operation of the vehicle in said State or pay the State tax on the amount of such fuel which would have been purchased in such State. The rate per gallon or litre of such motor fuel tax shall not be in excess of that which is applicable to domestic motor vehicles of the State. The collection of such tax shall be the responsibility of each Contracting State.

Article 15 specifies, through an annex, that the permissible maximum dimensions and weights of motor vehicles in international traffic shall be identical with those established by the Convention on Road Traffic of 1949 (Geneva), permitting a maximum overall width of 8.2 feet, height of 12.5 feet, overall length ranging from 33 to 36 feet, and length of articulated vehicles from 46 to 72 feet (the latter figure being subject to a provision that a Contracting State may limit the number of trailers).

Article 16 provides that each driver and vehicle shall be subject to the laws and regulations relative to safety of operation in any of the Contracting States in which he or it is operating.

Article 17 recognizes the right of the Contracting States to apply measures required to maintain

international peace and security or protect the national interest.

Articles 18 to 21 embody the usual provisions relative to the ratification and entry into force of the agreement.

Annex A suggests, subject to confirmation by the respective states, the identifying letters showing national origin of the vehicle. Examples are "COL" for Colombia, "GUA" for Guatemala, "MEX" for Mexico, and "USA" for the United States. In this annex a provision for the future is embodied in a footnote which reads:

If additional countries (such as Canada) eventually become parties to this Agreement, appropriate symbols shall be provided for them.

Annex B is a standard form of "Application for Commercial Motor Vehicle Permit To Operate in International Traffic on the Pan American Highway System." It embodies in eight sections the necessary identifying description of the applicant and his vehicles and the proposed type and scope of operations.

Annex C sets forth the permissible maximum dimensions and weight of vehicles operating under the agreement. Its provisions are identical with those in the worldwide instrument in this field, the 1949 Convention on Road Traffic.

Development Loan Funds Authorized for Projects in Five Countries

The Department of State announced on May 20 (press release 278) that the Development Loan Fund has been authorized to establish eight loans, totaling \$39,386,000, for economic development purposes in five countries—Ceylon, the Republic of China, Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Three of the loans, totaling \$6,386 million, are for the Republic of China on Taiwan; two, totaling \$2.5 million, for Ceylon; one of \$15 million for Israel; one of \$5.5 million for Pakistan; and one of \$10 million for Turkey. Dempster McIntosh, Manager of the Development Loan Fund, said he expected the formal agreements for these loans to be executed in the near future.

These loans bring to \$119,386,000 the total of authorized loans announced under the DLF program.¹ The fund was established last year by the Congress to help finance economic development projects in the newly developing countries of the free world and to encourage the participation by private investment and enterprise in the development of these areas.

The funds to be made available under these loans will be used to assist the five countries involved, both through private enterprise and governmental operations, to finance the purchase of equipment and materials needed for a varied list of development projects. Terms of the loans will vary according to the type of the agreement being negotiated.

President Approves Payment to Denmark

*Following is the text of a statement made by President Eisenhower on approving S. 2448, an act which authorizes a payment to Denmark in connection with the requisitioning by the United States of 40 Danish ships in 1941.*²

White House press release dated June 6

I am particularly gratified that the Congress has enacted this legislation authorizing the full and final settlement of an extremely complicated problem that has been outstanding between the United States and Denmark for 17 years. It is notable that the discussions between the two countries have throughout been characterized by an unremitting desire to arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement and by the patience and understanding traditionally characterizing relations between the United States and Denmark, its close ally.

¹ For Department announcements of DLF loans to India and Honduras, see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1958, p. 464, and June 9, 1958, p. 981.

² For a statement made by Under Secretary Herter before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 21, 1957, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1957, p. 1020.

U.S. Policies and Programs in Europe

*Statement by C. Burke Elbrick
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs¹*

It is a privilege to be able to discuss with you once again our policies and problems in the part of the world covered by the European bureau of the Department of State. As you know, my bureau deals with two broad areas which are fundamentally different but which are both of the utmost significance to American interests. The first of these—Communist Europe—represents the main threat to our freedom, security, and well-being. The second—free Europe—constitutes our principal source of external strength and support.

With the members of this committee it is hardly necessary for me to undertake any detailed exposition of our basic European policies. You gentlemen know these policies as well as I do. You have contributed to their development and implementation over a period of years. At this time, therefore, I think it would be most useful for us to concentrate on the application of these policies to the current situation in Europe.

During recent weeks there has been considerable talk about the need for a general revision of our foreign policies, both in Europe and elsewhere. This talk is inevitable when our Government faces a critical situation abroad. To some extent the demand for change is altogether reasonable. As Secretary Dulles has pointed out, our policies are never static. They are constantly being reexamined to meet the changing world situation. While this fact may not be widely understood by the general public, I am sure it is obvious to the members of this committee.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 3 (press release 302).

With respect to our really basic foreign policies, however, I believe demands for change must be viewed with considerable caution. These basic policies are grounded in basic American interests and are tailored to the hard facts of the international situation as it actually exists. Unless there is a far-reaching change in our national interests or in the fundamental character of the international situation itself, a radical change in basic policy would be a perilous experiment.

U.S. Relations With Soviet Europe

Let us examine first our relations with the Soviet Union and the part of Europe under Soviet control. Here our fundamental purposes are relatively simple to express, although immensely complicated to carry into effect. We want to prevent the spread of international communism dominated by the U.S.S.R., which means that we must constantly resist the further expansion of Soviet territory, power, and influence. We want to avoid military conflict. Wherever possible, we want to settle our differences with the Soviet Government through peaceful negotiation. We want to encourage the development of conditions which will permit the enslaved peoples within the Soviet system to regain their freedom. We want to promote better understanding between people living in the Soviet orbit and free peoples. Finally, we want to create incentives which will induce the Soviet Union gradually to alter its basic policies—to abandon its ambitions for a universal empire and to enter sincerely into peaceful and constructive cooperation with the rest of the world.

In several important respects we have made

significant progress toward the realization of these purposes during the past 10 years. There has been no war on the European Continent. Since the beginning of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the Communists have made no territorial gains in the European area. Communist political influence in the free nations of Europe has substantially lessened. Behind the Iron Curtain Soviet rule has encountered increasing popular resistance, as demonstrated by the violent uprisings in East Germany and Hungary. Yugoslavia has established and maintained its independence from Soviet control, and Poland has demonstrated a heartening tendency toward greater freedom of action.

There has been a significant expansion of contacts between the Western peoples and the peoples under Soviet rule. You will recall that on January 27 of this year we concluded an exchange agreement with the Soviet Government which provided for a series of exchanges of persons in the cultural, educational, and athletic fields over the next 2 years.² As a result of that agreement, for example, there will be for the first time in the recent history of our relations with the Soviet Union American students studying this fall in Soviet universities and Soviet students enrolled in American institutions. Much remains to be done, of course, especially in removing the obstacles to the free flow of information to the Soviet peoples, but we hope to make some progress toward this objective by pressing for implementation of those sections of the agreement of January 27 which relate to exchanges of radio-TV programs on world events, reciprocal purchase and sale of films, and improved distribution of *Amerika* magazine.

At the same time we must recognize that these favorable developments are offset by certain considerations that are distinctly unfavorable. The most important single factor in our relations with the Soviet Union remains unchanged. All available evidence indicates that the Soviet rulers are still firmly determined to achieve world domination through whatever means may be required.

It is true, I think, that the growing strength and unity of the free world has stretched out the Soviet timetable of conquest. We know that the Soviet strategists have always thought and

planned in fairly long-range terms, but conditions during the early postwar period seemed to offer them opportunities for immediate success in a number of critical areas. They were tempted to grab while the grabbing was good. Today the grabbing is no longer good in the European area, and Soviet strategy to absorb the vital territory, manpower, resources, and industrial facilities of free Europe has had to take account of this fact. While there is no doubt that the Soviet rulers will remain alert to any new opportunities for quick and cheap victories that may arise, military or otherwise, they are clearly planning in terms of years and decades and are concentrating their immediate attention primarily upon promoting neutralism in Europe, seeking to break up NATO and other Western cooperative arrangements, exploiting weak spots in the European economic and social structure, and attempting to outflank and strangle free Europe by achieving Communist domination of Asia and Africa.

It is also true, I feel sure, that the Soviet rulers would greatly prefer to achieve their ambitions without the risk of all-out warfare. They have come to realize that direct military aggression would invite a nuclear catastrophe, and they are therefore concentrating more heavily upon political, economic, and psychological aggression. Nevertheless they have continued to proclaim world empire as their ultimate goal, and, as long as this remains their objective, the peace and security of the world will be constantly threatened.

We must also recognize that the Soviet capacity to wage its cold war against the free world has substantially increased. The overall Soviet economy has grown stronger, and the Soviet rulers have clearly indicated their willingness to use a sizable portion of their economic power to finance aid and trade programs designed to penetrate and ensnare free nations. The remarkable advances of Soviet science and technology are familiar to all of us. Finally we must remember that the Soviet Union is still maintaining an enormous military establishment, supported by nuclear power and missiles, as well as the more conventional military forces. While they undoubtedly hesitate to use this military power under present circumstances, we could expect this hesitation to vanish rapidly if we and our allies should permit ourselves to be weakened to the point where the Soviet rulers might have reason

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243.

to believe they could destroy us with minimum damage to themselves.

In view of the situation I have described, I feel considerable assurance in saying that our basic policies toward the Soviet Union are sound. We frequently hear demands for more boldness in our relations with Russia—and simultaneously hear counterdemands for more flexibility—but these demands are rarely translated into specifics. I do not believe that any sane American who is familiar with the horror of modern warfare would propose that we pursue our interests through suicidal military adventures. On the other hand, I do not believe that any American who is concerned with our ultimate survival would suggest that we abandon our resistance to Soviet expansionism. We have no alternative but to steer a course between these extremes, and that is exactly what we are now doing.

The Role of Negotiation

Some people have repeatedly emphasized the importance of negotiations with the Soviet Union as a means of achieving a peaceful settlement of differences. This emphasis is altogether proper, but I think we should remember two things. First is the simple fact that negotiation with the Soviet Government is not a "one shot" deal but a constant process. In one way or another we are almost continuously engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union. We negotiate through our diplomatic missions, through the United Nations, through the U.N. specialized agencies, through special committees of experts, and even by means of public statements. We have participated in one meeting of heads of governments and are fully prepared to hold another if it appears that such a meeting offers any reasonable prospect of constructive results. Whether or not such a meeting takes place, however, we should understand that negotiations with the Soviet Union will continue through a variety of channels. Where the Soviet rulers have a genuine desire to reach agreement on any subject, there are plenty of ways and means available.

Next we should remember that there are inevitable limitations upon what we can expect from any kind of negotiations with the Soviet Government. These limitations stem first from the fact that most international agreements necessarily

involve promises and that Communist promises are not what we would call gilt-edged collateral. They stem also from the fact that the Soviet rulers do not truly represent their own people, or any other people, and that the peoples under their control have relatively little practical influence upon the policies and actions of their rulers. Finally, they stem from the fact that the fundamental Soviet goal of world domination, which lies behind all their negotiations and other international activities, is utterly incompatible with our own interest in peace and security. These limitations do not mean, of course, that we should abandon efforts at negotiation.

In the past we have been able to reach accord with the Soviet Government on several important matters, such as the Austrian state treaty, the cessation of the Berlin blockade, the recent exchange program, and the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I am convinced that other valuable agreements are possible in the future. But we should be aware of the fact that we can never expect a complete settlement with the Soviet Union without a fundamental change in the Soviet Union's own purposes. We certainly cannot enter into any agreement which implies an abandonment of resistance to Communist imperialism.

There are also those in this country and abroad who insist the United States and its Western allies should demonstrate a greater readiness to make concessions to Soviet demands. I'm not sure I know exactly what this means. We should always be prepared, of course, to match Soviet concessions with concessions of our own, provided these result in a genuine improvement in the outlook for peace and security, or provided they give the Soviet Government real incentives to alter its attitudes and designs. But we should also understand that such incentives are unlikely to be provided by a policy of appeasement. The Soviet rulers will never call off their program of world conquest so long as they feel they have a good chance of being successful. Therefore we have nothing to gain and much to lose by concessions which merely whet their appetites or which enlarge their capacity for pursuing their goals.

While we are always ready to meet the Soviet half way in the search for a lasting peace, there are several things that we simply cannot afford

to do. We cannot be satisfied with a mere illusion of peace. We cannot accept empty words as a substitute for the concrete arrangements upon which a workable peace must depend. We cannot accept the permanent enslavement of any nation which wants its freedom. We cannot break up our collective-security systems nor weaken the bonds of unity with our allies. Most of all, we cannot barter away the solid military, economic, and political strength which we and our allies have achieved in exchange for shallow promises. There is nothing we could do that would be more dangerous to world peace than to give the Soviet rulers the mistaken impression that free nations are too stupid, too decadent, or too weak to resist.

Military and Nonmilitary Aspects of Defense

It has been said on occasion that we are devoting too much effort to the military aspects of defense—that we need to give more attention to the fierce political, economic, and psychological offensive which the Soviet Union is waging against the free world. I think both the executive branch and the Congress have long been aware of the grave dangers presented by the nonmilitary techniques of aggression employed by the Soviet Union. In Europe, for example, we should recall that we undertook the Marshall plan to restore Europe's economy some time before we began the NATO military buildup. It is also true, I believe, that the Soviet shift of emphasis from military to nonmilitary expansion is one of the most striking developments of recent years and that we must be prepared to adapt our own policies to meet the new situation. We need to tighten our collective-security relationships, extend political consultation with friendly nations, improve the effectiveness of our programs of economic assistance, maintain realistic trade policies, strengthen our informational and cultural operations, and do many other things. But we should also understand that the need for greater effort in the political, economic, and psychological fields does *not* justify *less* effort in the field of military defense. There is no reason to believe the shift in Soviet tactics was occasioned by any sudden burst of tenderness or generosity. It was almost certainly based upon their recognition of the fact that military adventures have become too dangerous. This, in turn, resulted from the position of military strength which the United States and

its allies have attained. We should remember that, despite Soviet announcements of force cuts, there have been no real reductions in overall Soviet military power. In fact, modern weapons have increased this power, and a renewal of Soviet military pressure could occur at any time. Let us lead them not into temptation. Nobody should discount the importance of the nonmilitary aspects of the cold war, but I think every sane person would rather fight the battle against communism on this front than to be compelled to fight with missiles and nuclear weapons. Only by keeping our military defenses strong can we have reasonable assurance that Soviet aggressive action will be confined to other channels. Strong military defenses, in fact, are the indispensable foundation of all our diplomatic, economic, cultural, and informational efforts to stop the nonmilitary advances of communism.

U.S. Relations With Free Europe

Our prospects for success in carrying out our policies toward Soviet Europe depend to a considerable degree upon our relations with free Europe. In this important area, also, our basic purposes are fairly simple. We want the nations of free Europe to remain free. We want them to be strong—strong enough to provide for the well-being of their peoples, strong enough to protect themselves against Communist political and economic penetration, strong enough to give us real help in maintaining an adequate system of military defense. We want to see the nations of free Europe attain maximum cooperation among themselves and also want them to cooperate with us on a broad Atlantic basis. We want friendship, understanding, and mutually beneficial commercial and cultural relationships between the European countries and the United States. Finally, we want our European friends to use their considerable resources and influence in non-European areas to promote peace, freedom, strength, and unity among the peoples of the free world as a whole.

Here again I do not believe there is much doubt about the general success of our policies during the last 10 years. I have already mentioned the fact that the Communists have failed to capture any of these countries and that Communist influence inside their borders has appreciably diminished. I am sure the members of this committee

are also familiar with the gigantic strides these countries have taken toward greater strength and stability. They have made a truly remarkable recovery from the economic chaos which threatened them 10 years ago. Most of them have also achieved a measure of political stability that once seemed impossible. Through NATO they are now making a substantial contribution not only to their own military defense but to the total defensive power available for the protection of the entire free world. They have granted independence to a number of former colonies in Africa and Asia and are gradually evolving new political and economic relationships with other dependent areas. This process has been extremely difficult and is all the more laudable for this reason.

Meanwhile the nations of free Europe have made tremendous progress in the development of cooperative relationships with one another. The OEEC is a valuable substitute for the economic nationalism that characterized the last generation. The Community of Six represents a bold new experiment in supranational integration which is moving step by step toward a united Europe. This cooperation within Europe is matched by growing cooperation between Europe and North America. As you know, the joint military effort developed under NATO is steadily being extended to political, economic, and psychological activities. I believe the recent NATO meeting at Copenhagen, from which I returned a few days ago, marked a new peak of Atlantic political unity.⁵

When I speak of the political unity achieved within NATO, I do not mean to suggest that there are no disagreements among the members. You all know that disagreements frequently exist, sometimes on fairly important issues. It is not surprising that 15 sovereign nations will often have differing attitudes and interests with respect to specific problems. What is surprising is the remarkable measure of agreement attained on fundamentals. Our processes of political consultation are not designed to *eliminate* all differences but rather to achieve an essential accord in basic policy and action *despite* these differences. In this we have done very well indeed. I doubt that human history records any other instance in which 15 independent nations have managed to

work together so effectively and to maintain such a closely knit community of purpose.

All things considered, I would not hesitate to say that the success of our policies in Western Europe during the last 10 years has been little short of miraculous. At the same time, of course, we cannot blind ourselves to the fact that our European friends still face a number of serious problems. Despite the substantial improvement of European production and trade the economies of several countries are subject to severe and constant strain. Communist influence, despite its decline, remains too strong for comfort in certain areas of Western Europe. Little concrete progress has yet been made toward the important objective of German reunification, without which there can be no enduring stability in central Europe. There is evidence of a significant volume of neutralist sentiment in some countries, and this sentiment is constantly being stimulated and exploited by Communist elements.

The relations between certain European nations and their overseas territories, as you know, still produce a number of exceedingly complex problems. The United States has consistently sought to promote the orderly evolution of dependent peoples to self-government. At the same time we have been aware that premature independence and irresponsible nationalism may present grave dangers to the dependent peoples themselves, as well as to the whole free world. We have also hoped that the peoples evolving toward self-government will voluntarily choose to maintain intimate political, economic, and cultural ties with the nations of Europe. Our policies with respect to these matters have not always been satisfactory to our European allies, and we have sometimes been critical of their own policies and practices. On the whole, however, we have recognized that the processes of political and social evolution are not easy, and we feel that the European governments have made long strides in dealing with the intricate problems involved.

Even in the field of military defense we and our allies are a long way from being out of the woods. Science and technology move at a breathtaking pace, and military weapons and facilities are growing more complicated and more expensive every day. The maintenance, improvement, and progressive modernization of NATO forces will continue to present problems of tremendous mag-

⁵ For text of final communique issued at Copenhagen on May 7 following a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council, see *ibid.*, May 26, 1958, p. 850.

nitude. In addition we are confronted by the fact that the German defense buildup has been slower than expected and that the French have considered it necessary to divert a large portion of France's military forces to Algeria. The NATO defense program certainly cannot be taken for granted, and there is no basis for any relaxation of interest or effort.

Finally, we know that certain European governments have had difficulties of an internal nature. France, in particular, has been going through a severe domestic political crisis.

For obvious reasons I would prefer to avoid making extensive comment on the internal French situation at this time. It would be inappropriate for Americans to do or say anything which might be construed as interference in a matter that is essentially the concern of the French people themselves, or which might complicate the enormous tasks facing the De Gaulle government. I do not want to suggest any lack of interest in the situation nor to gloss over the seriousness of the problems that may arise from recent events in France. It has been necessary for us to give this situation a great deal of thought and to follow developments very closely. At the same time, I think, Americans would do well to avoid going off the deep end in considering the possible effects of the French situation upon the Western World as a whole. We should view this situation in the broad perspective of history. I am convinced of the profound dedication of the French people and their government to the cause of human freedom. I am equally convinced that the basic interests of the French nation are inextricably tied up with the future of the European community and the Atlantic community. The Western World needs France, just as France needs its association with the Western World. France has played a leading role thus far in the building up of Western defense, and I do not believe that any French government, other than a government under Communist control, would wish to try to undermine or halt the progress that is being made.

Dealing With the Current Problems

With respect to the various other problems I have mentioned I believe that we should take a similarly calm and constructive attitude. We should not try to sweep any of these problems under the rug. On the other hand, we should not

exaggerate their difficulty. Here again I feel that perspective is essential, because we are going to have to live with some of these problems for a long time to come.

Actually, none of the problems that we face today in Western Europe is nearly so difficult as those we faced 10 years ago. I remember when a number of people sincerely opposed the Marshall plan with the argument that European economic recovery was hopeless and that any effort to promote recovery would simply amount to pouring money down a rathole. I remember when NATO was also opposed on the grounds that Europe was politically and militarily indefensible and that any effort to build an effective defensive structure would be a waste of effort. If we had followed these counsels of despair, we probably would not be sitting here today discussing our policies of Western Europe because Western Europe would already have been lost to the free world.

In dealing with the current problems of free Europe I believe our policies should follow the same general patterns that have been successful in the past. While economic aid to Europe has been virtually eliminated, with the exception of assistance recently given France, we must keep the European economic picture under close observation and must take account of the need for European economic health in developing our own financial and commercial policies. We must do our part in maintaining the NATO defense structure and must continue to help our allies to improve and modernize their forces. We must develop further the processes of political consultation in NATO in order to insure a fundamental unity of policy and action among the member governments. We must explore constantly with our allies the possibilities of joint effort in all fields of endeavor where a combination of skills and resources may offer mutual advantage. In particular, I believe we should give full support to the recent NATO program for scientific cooperation.

We must encourage our European allies to settle occasional differences among themselves in a peaceful and constructive manner. Without interfering in the internal affairs of friendly nations, we should use our influence to promote political and social stability. We should encourage our friends to adopt progressive and re-

alistic policies in dealing with their territorial and economic interests in other parts of the world. We should continue our cultural and information programs, both as a means of counteracting Communist propaganda and as a means of inspiring a greater unity of spirit throughout the Atlantic community. One of the strongest bulwarks of Atlantic cooperation is the widespread and direct contact that has developed among the peoples themselves—among businessmen, professional bodies, labor groups, legislators, and many other elements of national populations. These contacts produce a kind of understanding and community of interest that could never be achieved through governmental contacts alone.

In carrying forward our multiple policies and programs in the European area we must give constant consideration to new methods and techniques of operation. In the final analysis, however, there is no substitute for old-fashioned diplomacy—for the ability to move rapidly and decisively in all fields of common interest, for the day-to-day diplomatic cooperation on a host of little problems which, if effectively handled, we can keep from becoming big problems. It may be trite to say that diplomacy is not only our first but our only satisfactory line of defense, but I believe the statement is nevertheless true.

All things considered, I would say that our European policies have paid off. I believe they will continue to pay off in the future. I do not mean to imply, of course, that there is no room for improvement. As I have already indicated, all our policies and programs are in a constant state of revision. We must always be on the alert for better ways of doing things. However, I honestly believe that our *basic* policies are on the right track and that our principal task is to improve their practical application to particular situations.

We cannot expect that these policies are going to result in an immediate relaxation of international tensions or a sudden termination of the cold war. On the contrary, I think we should face up to the fact that an early end to the cold war just doesn't seem to be in the cards. The road ahead will probably be long and hard, with many twists and turns, but we already know better than to expect any smooth-surfaced freeway to peace and survival. We will certainly make mistakes, and the enemies of freedom will do everything they can to capitalize on these mistakes.

However, I am sure that the Soviet rulers are not nearly so hopeful about any particular mistakes we may make as they are hopeful that we will ultimately quit trying. It is their fondest dream that we will eventually "run out of gas"—that we will succumb to a sort of "cold-war weariness"—that we will become "fed up" with a troublesome and perplexing international situation and decide to let the world go by default. A major part of our job is to convince them that this dream is never going to come true. If we display the same energy, imagination, and determination that we have shown in the past, we have reason for confidence that we can meet the challenges of the future.

The Problem of Development of the Upper Columbia River

Statement by Douglas McKay¹

I am Douglas McKay, chairman of the United States Section of the International Joint Commission, United States and Canada. I appear before the committee in response to the letter of the chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, dated February 25, requesting that I testify to provide details of the developments within the International Joint Commission on the Upper Columbia problem since the previous hearings of this committee, which were concluded on May 23, 1956.

As requested, I will outline the developments in the International Joint Commission in this statement. In addition, I have obtained the concurrence of our Canadian colleagues to furnish the committee with a copy of the verbatim transcript of the proceedings within the Commission at the four regular semiannual meetings and one special meeting, which are the only occasions since May 1956 at which there have been discussions of the Columbia River problems. Accordingly, a copy of the proceedings at those meetings has been furnished for the use of the committee and its staff.

In general, since May 1956 the United States

¹Made before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and a special subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations on Upper Columbia River development on May 7.

Section of the International Joint Commission has continued to press for the earliest possible solution of the problems of development of the Columbia Basin to the mutual satisfaction of all interests concerned in both Canada and the United States. The role of the International Joint Commission in dealing with these problems is twofold:

First, we have the responsibility for investigation and report to the Governments of Canada and the United States on the possibilities for such development of water resources of the Columbia as would be practicable and in the public interest from the points of view of the two Governments. The Commission has this responsibility under a reference dated March 9, 1944, from the two Governments pursuant to article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty.

The Commission's second responsibility is to consider and take action on an application from the Government of the United States for approval of the construction of the Libby project pursuant to article IV of the 1909 treaty.

I will outline the developments of the last 2 years under each of these responsibilities.

Progress under the 1944 reference has been discouragingly slow but, fortunately, has increased considerably in tempo in the last few years. Due to the comprehensive studies completed in 1948 in the United States for the Columbia River Review Report,² the United States was in a favorable position to participate in joint planning under the reference very soon after it was approved by the two Governments. Canada, however, was not in such a fortunate position and had to embark on many basic mapping and data-gathering projects before undertaking surveys and studies of specific development possibilities. The rate at which studies of the possibilities in Canada have been undertaken has, of course, been a matter for determination by Canada, and, according to the information furnished to us from time to time in the formal progress reports under the reference and in the information obtained from the chairman of the Canadian Section of the Commission, sufficient information on the projects in Canada will become available in the next several months to permit submission of a report to the Commission by the International

Columbia River Engineering Board in December 1958. Fortunately the United States has been able to provide complete and up-to-date information for its part in this international report by virtue of the current review of the 1948 report on the Columbia which is nearing completion and is scheduled to be received by the Chief of Engineers in July of this year.

The report which the Commission expects to receive from the International Columbia River Engineering Board in December will contain, in addition to the general appraisal of the needs and possibilities for development of a comprehensive plan on an international basis, specific analyses of three plans known as sequences 7, 8, and 9, which encompass three general types of possible development of the Upper Columbia Basin:

Sequence 7 is a plan which includes the Libby project plus development of Mica and other sites on the Columbia in Canada without diversion of the Kootenay to the Columbia.

Sequence 8 also includes the Libby project and the Columbia developments in Canada but contemplates partial diversion of the Kootenay to the Columbia at Canal Flats.

Sequence 9 is a plan which does not include the Libby project but contemplates maximum practicable diversion of the Kootenay to the Columbia.

None of the aforementioned plans involves analyses of the possibility of diversion from the Columbia to the Fraser, since that is a matter beyond the scope of the reference from the two Governments to the Commission and is a matter being studied unilaterally by Canada.

When the international report is received by the Commission and the Commission's report to the two Governments is formulated, a proper framework of engineering and economic data will be available for the consideration of the two Governments on possible joint developments and on sharing of costs and benefits of such developments. Until such data are available, neither Government has all the information it needs to propose or consider specific arrangements for joint development.

As to our second job, that of taking action on the Libby application, the United States Section of the Commission has, of course, been ready to proceed at any time since submission of the second application on May 22, 1954.

² H. Doc. 531, 81st Cong.

Both the Government of Canada and the Government of the Province of British Columbia, however, have stated in their formal statements in response to the application that they are not prepared to consent to or to oppose the Libby project and are therefore not prepared to have the Commission proceed with consideration of the application pending completion of certain additional studies of development possibilities in Canada. To date, neither the Government of the United States nor the United States Section of the International Joint Commission has been advised further with respect to the attitude of the Governments of Canada and the Province of British Columbia or as to their readiness for consideration of the Libby application. The United States Section of the Commission has, of course, regularly reminded the Canadian Section of the Commission of our urgent need for the Libby project and of our desire for the earliest possible action. A recapitulation of all of the circumstances and a reiteration of the urgency of the matter was presented to the Canadian Section of the Commission on April 2, 1957.³ Also, a special meeting of the Commission was proposed by the United States Section and held in New York in January 1958 for the purpose of clarifying the United States position on possible terms of settlement of the Libby application, about which many misconceptions appear to have arisen. In this special meeting, the United States Section of the Commission gave assurance to our Canadian colleagues of our willingness to proceed with discussions of terms of settlement for the Libby project in the spirit of a willing buyer and a willing seller and that we expected that recompense for use of natural resources of Canada in the Libby project could be arranged on the basis of consideration of all pertinent factors. As the result of that special meeting, it was generally agreed among all members of the Commission that considerable progress had been made in clarifying the respective views of interests on both sides of the boundary. Nevertheless, no definite information was obtained at that time as to when the Governments of Canada and the Province of British Columbia will be prepared to make a further statement on the Libby project to the Commission. The situation within the

Commission at this time is that we have received continued frank and discouraging statements from the Canadian chairman to the effect that the Libby project is unlikely to be favorably regarded by Canada, and during meetings of the Commission we have received polite but noncommittal statements from representatives of the Government of Canada indicating that the further studies considered necessary in Canada have not yet been completed but are still under way.

The foregoing outline of the status of the Commission's two functions with respect to Upper Columbia developments indicates generally the role of the International Joint Commission in these matters. With reference to the committee's question as to ways in which the Commission's role has been changed by the decision of the two Governments to discuss this question at the diplomatic level, the answer is that the Commission's role has not been changed by the action of the two Governments referred to. The Commission's responsibilities remain as described previously, to complete its report under the 1944 reference and to take action on the Libby application when and if the Governments of Canada and the Province of British Columbia indicate that they are ready to have the application considered. The role of those who are participating in the diplomatic discussions is not a superseding role but an additional and supplementary function. Insofar as the United States Section of the Commission is concerned, we are hopeful that those discussions will improve understanding of the problems between the agencies of both Governments who are concerned with these matters and may lead to the formulation of, and agreement upon, principles which would be useful when the Commission's report is made available to the two Governments.

Aside from the statements by members of the Commission during its regular proceedings concerning which I have already advised the committee, there has been only one public statement by a member of the U.S. Section of the Commission bearing on the Upper Columbia River problems, and that is a statement which I delivered at the Pacific Northwest Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law at the University of Washington on April 19, 1958. Copies of that statement have been furnished the committee.

³ For text of U.S. statement, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1957, p. 34.

The committee's letter of February 25, 1958, included a request for a summary of any discussions or negotiations which have taken place within the Commission relative to the development of the Saint John River or any other river resources which may be related to an overall settlement of these problems.

In January 1954 the Commission submitted a report on the Saint John River Basin to the Governments of Canada and the United States in response to the Governments' reference of 28 September 1950. That report outlined the possibilities for development of the Saint John River Basin but did not offer any suggestions for joint undertakings or contain any information pertinent to the situation in the Upper Columbia at this time. Subsequently the possibilities for development on the Saint John in conjunction with an analysis of the feasibility of the Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project have been under consideration by the Commission pursuant to the reference from the two Governments dated August 2, 1956. To date, these studies have only been concerned with an analysis of the engineering possibilities and have not extended to consideration of a basis for sharing of costs and benefits of developments in which both countries are involved. I can assure the committee that, if the studies on any other rivers should lead to discussions or negotiations which would be pertinent to the Upper Columbia situation, it will be made known to all concerned and will be taken fully into account.

The chairman's letter of February 25, 1958, also requested my comments on the position of the chairman of the Canadian Section as presented during his appearance before the Committee on External Affairs of the Canadian House of Commons on December 12, 13, and 16, 1957. We have, of course, studied these and other statements of the Canadian chairman very carefully, and I must confess that we have continued to find the statements discouraging with respect to the prospects for satisfactory completion of the Commission's two current assignments; namely, early settlement of the Libby application and formulation of mutually beneficial plans which do not require diversion of the Columbia to the Fraser. Nevertheless we are hopeful that the completion of the joint studies later this year will provide a frame-

work on which discussion of specific projects of mutual benefit to both countries can be carried on successfully. I can assure the committee that the United States Section of the Commission is unanimous and steadfast in its desire to achieve the earliest possible adoption by the two countries of mutually satisfactory plans for development of the Upper Columbia, plans in which cognizance can be taken of the costs and benefits, upstream and downstream, which should equitably be allocated to interests in each country. We are ready to consider any procedures and any principles by which this goal can be accomplished.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

Ratification deposited: India, May 5, 1958.

Customs convention on temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Ratification deposited (with reservations): India, May 5, 1958.

BILATERAL

Burma

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Rangoon May 27, 1958. Entered into force May 27, 1958.

Germany

Agreement amending the agreement of July 18, 1952 (TIAS 2553) for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn May 14, 1958. Entered into force May 14, 1958.

Sweden

Agreement amending research reactor agreement concerning civil uses of atomic energy of January 18, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3477 and 3775). Signed at Washington April 25, 1958.

Entered into force: June 2, 1958 (date each government received from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements).

International Cooperation To Solve Food and Agricultural Problems

**NINTH SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
ROME, NOVEMBER 2-22, 1957**

by Ralph S. Roberts

The ninth session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations was held at FAO headquarters in Rome, Italy, from November 2 to 22, 1957. Over 450 representatives of 76 of FAO's 77 member countries participated. The United States delegation included representatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and State, congressional advisers, and advisers from agricultural, fisheries, and forestry organizations.¹ Forty-seven inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations were represented by over 70 observers.

This session of the Conference functioned through plenary meetings and meetings of its three major commissions dealing with: I—World Food and Agriculture Situation; II—Current and Prospective Activities of the Organization; and III—Constitutional, Administrative, and Financial Questions. It was, on the whole, a constructive, businesslike, and efficient session.

Plenary meetings were held during the first week to hear statements by leaders of delegations and at other times during the course of the Conference when decisions were required. In the

plenary meetings most delegation leaders confined themselves to specific topics in their statements. United States Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, who was in Rome for a brief period during the Conference, presented the United States statement. He concentrated on the questions of (1) surplus disposal and (2) national self-sufficiency versus specialization, and emphasized United States policy on surplus disposal operations in this way:

In our export operations, we have been governed by FAO's principles of surplus disposal and have set for ourselves three principles: (1) We will compete fairly on the world market. (2) We will compete in quality. (3) We will participate in a mutually profitable international trade that gives our customers abroad continuous opportunity to earn the foreign exchange they need to buy our products.

Secretary Benson also took this occasion to reaffirm support of FAO by the United States. In this connection he observed that:

The flow and exchange of commerce and ideas between nations is basic to maintenance of world peace and the strengthening of economies. The exchange of ideas through sessions of the Conference and through other means is one of the principal values of FAO.

The finest work of FAO, it seems to me, lies not in doing things for people, or for governments, but through

¹ For a Department announcement and a list of the U.S. delegation, see BULLETIN of Nov. 18, 1957, p. 812.

• *Mr. Roberts, author of the above article, is Administrative Assistant Secretary of Agriculture. He was head of the U.S. delegation to the ninth session of the FAO Conference.*

inspiring, encouraging, and assisting people and governments to do things for themselves. In this FAO has done an effective job since its founding. I have no doubt that FAO will continue and improve upon this effective role in the years that lie ahead.

WORLD FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SITUATION

This general subject was discussed in plenary meetings during the first full week of the Conference under two headings: disposal of surpluses and their use for economic development, and national self-sufficiency versus specialization and the resulting international trade. Discussions of these subjects were continued in Commission I during the second week of the Conference. Congressman W. R. Poage outlined the U.S. position on the state of food and agriculture. Congressman Charles B. Hoesen stated the U.S. policies on surplus disposal.

Delegations were seriously concerned about the worsening terms of trade facing farmers both in domestic and international markets. World surpluses and their useful disposal without serious disruption of markets was one major topic, closely followed by concern about the international effect of domestic pricing policies and possible measures to improve terms of trade. Resolutions were adopted on each of these topics.

The U.S. delegation led off the surplus-disposal discussion with a presentation of current activities and the philosophies supporting their policies. It was argued that large quantities of surplus goods had been usefully moved into consumption with substantial effects on the levels of living of underprivileged people and the economic development plans of less developed areas. Disruption of markets had been minimal, and great care had been and was being exercised to see that our competitors were not hurt. Most delegation comments were moderate. One conclusion was to encourage the subcommittee on surpluses to strengthen its operations.

In the discussion of price policies that might lead to surpluses and other trade difficulties, exporting nations took an active part. The U.S. delegation pursued a passive role, while delegations from several countries blunted some rather drastic proposals put before the Conference. The resolution finally adopted was aimed at stimulating studies in the broad field of price policy and

creating principles of national price policies.

The Conference also endorsed the intention, outlined by the Director General, B. R. Sen, to arrange for three main documents to be presented to the Economic and Social Council in the summer of 1958 in line with requests made by that Council and by the United Nations General Assembly:

1. A brief general report on action taken, in line with various intergovernmental requests, on subjects relating to food reserves;

2. A more detailed study by the Director General on national food reserves, taking full account of the conclusions reached by the FAO working party on national reserves;

3. A consolidated record on FAO expert studies and administrative arrangements on questions of famine relief, including a brief summary review of existing intergovernmental procedures and relief facilities.

The resolutions finally adopted included one which requested the Director General to call to the attention of member governments the existing international machinery for stabilization of the prices of agricultural products and the studies made and action taken by other intergovernmental bodies on price stabilization and on the terms of trade.

ACTIVITIES OF FAO

Under this topic in Commission II the Conference reviewed the work of the major divisions of the Organization, adopted the program of work, and determined the biennial budget for 1958-59.

Agriculture

The Conference was well satisfied with the value, integration, coordination, and balance of the regular program of the Agriculture Division. No increase in its basic program had been proposed by the Director General, except for the filling of two or three posts previously authorized but vacant for most of 1956-57. The division will be more or less involved, however, in several expansion items, including those for strengthening the regional offices, documentation, Mediterranean development, rural welfare, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

In the general review of the basic program,

notable interest was shown by many countries in land and water management, fertilizer use, irrigation, plant and animal pests and diseases, tropical crops, extension services, and some aspects of land-tenure problems.

A joint session of the technical committees on agriculture and forestry endorsed a proposal for a tour of the United States to see the work on watershed management, as well as joint meetings of agriculturists and foresters in Europe and in the Far East on this subject. Other proposed activities relating to flood control, soil erosion control, and shifting cultivation, especially in the tropics, were supported.

Economics

The discussion of economics was favorable to the work of this division and indicated that delegates generally gave highest priority to work on statistics and commodity analysis. Delegates felt that, if necessary, some adjustments might be made in the economic analysis branch of the division.

Fisheries

In general, the Conference felt that the Fisheries Division had done a good job on the current program and endorsed it as sound, adequately balanced, and well oriented. The program of work was discussed in considerable detail, but there were no strong differences of opinion as to the eventual recommendations.

Minor changes in the Expanded Technical Assistance Program and fellowship procedures were suggested in the interest of greater efficiency of operations, and there was a very definite feeling that biological projects should lead to relatively immediate practical results. This was expressed in the sense of giving primary attention to those projects which had a direct bearing on increased food production and fullest use of aquatic resources.

Forestry

Major attention in forestry discussions was focused on the proposed increases in the forestry budget, on the proposed Mediterranean development project, and on the World Forestry Congress. The delegations from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and some of the

European countries pressed for priority ratings of the various elements in the proposed program. The debate on these priority ratings led to some prolonged arguments and finally to a vote in Commission II, where the priorities were retained.

There was a lively discussion of the World Forestry Congress to which the United States will be host in 1960. Numerous suggestions were offered by delegations on tours and subjects of interest to them which might be included in the program of the Congress. Complete acceptance was given to the U.S. proposal that all suggestions should be relayed to the U.S. organizing committee for its consideration and decision. Also, a draft resolution concerning the Congress, presented by the United States delegation, was unanimously adopted.

Nutrition

The Conference concluded that impressive accomplishments had been made by the Nutrition Division with a small staff and limited financial resources. The proposed 1958-59 budget for this division was approved in its entirety. Top priority was given to the provision of an additional specialist and consultants in education in nutrition and two additional regional officers in Latin America, one for food technology and one for home economics.

Special importance was attached to the food consumption and planning work of FAO, which assists member countries to formulate and carry out national policies and programs concerned with the production and consumption of food, taking full account of the nutritional requirements of the people. Dietary surveys among family groups are now being made more extensively in many countries, and there is growing recognition of the need for surveys of diets of individuals for specific nutritional objectives.

Increasing interest has been shown by underdeveloped countries in receiving help in adapting modern developments in food technology and improving food-preservation methods. Work on food additives is now being carried out by FAO and the World Health Organization.

Adequate national scientific and technical nutrition services are needed for developing practical programs, and appropriate national services are needed to coordinate activities to improve the nutrition of populations. In this, more emphasis on

the training of nationals through fellowship and other programs was urged. FAO was urged (in collaboration with UNESCO, WHO, and UNICEF) to encourage and assist governments to develop suitable teaching methods and materials and to use WHO maternal and child-health centers and U.N. community-development activities as opportunities for nutrition education.

Increasing assistance has been given in planning and organizing supplementary feeding programs and related educational activities. Since in many countries such programs benefiting school children, mothers, and preschool children are often initiated with dried skim milk made available temporarily by the United Nations Children's Fund, simultaneous attention is given to developing local resources of foods which can replace the imported milk.

The rapid development of the FAO home economics program was gratifying because it can contribute significantly to raising levels of living. Particular stress was laid on the importance of beginning the work in each country or region with comprehensive surveys to gain understanding of conditions of family living and of existing contributing programs. As examples of the interest in home economics, several countries and territories in Africa have requested assistance from FAO in training women for participation in community development.

Information

In examining the activities in 1956-57 of the editorial, audiovisual, and documents branches and the legislative and library services of this division, the Conference paid particular attention to clarifying the division's general purpose. It studied the program of work and the budget estimates for these branches and services for the period 1958-59, as well as the trends of the program in their various fields.

Great importance was attached to the need for establishing the basic principles that must underlie the activities of the Organization in the sphere of information. The Conference stressed the need to organize the activities of the division internally so that they may all be directed toward the same general purposes.

The Conference noted that activities in the field of information are of a dual nature: On the one hand, there has to be created interest and under-

standing among all people, in and outside the farming sector, of the problems of agriculture and particularly the role of FAO in the overall effort to promote social and economic development. On the other hand, it is important to disseminate technical information which governments can use for the benefit of farmers and professional agriculturists. The latter task devolves mainly on the technical divisions, which carry it out through the meetings they hold and through their publications and other communications. The creation of a favorable opinion among people implies the supplying of more than technical information since that alone fails to arouse sufficient interest in influential circles.

The point was made that the member nations have a responsibility that they must accept to achieve adequate results in the Organization's information work. The Conference recognized, too, the responsibility of the national FAO committees to advise the Organization of their needs in regard to information material and to adapt the latter to the different languages, mentalities, psychology, requirements, and general environments of the countries concerned.

The Conference recognized that difficulties on publications requirements of the Organization outlined by the Director General were mainly of a programing and budgetary nature. It requested the Director General to establish priorities on manuscripts in all the divisions within the budgetary ceiling set for documents and to eliminate the backlog as soon as possible.

In establishing future priorities, it was felt that the Director General could be greatly aided by a procedure whereby member governments would take a more active part in the selection of titles to be published and in giving advice on how to satisfy the most urgent publication needs.

Proposed Expansions in FAO Work

Commission II reviewed a number of proposals for major expansion in some phases of the Organization's work.

Strengthening the Regional Structure. The first of these proposals involved measures to strengthen the regional structure. The problem of the regional organization of FAO had been examined on several occasions by the Conference and by the Council of FAO. However, the Di-

rector General recommended measures to assure fuller development of regional activities and presented to the Conference detailed proposals toward this end. He envisaged the strengthening of the responsibility of the regional representatives and the posting of additional technical officers to the regional offices, together with appropriate administrative and secretarial assistance. He also proposed to establish a regional office in Africa.

The Conference considered the plan for strengthening the regional activities of the Organization sound and desirable. At the same time it drew attention to certain difficulties which would have to be kept in mind, particularly in the initial stages of implementation. Special attention should be paid to the qualifications of the staff to be recruited, and this might lead to delays in the full implementation of the proposals. The Conference considered that such delays in recruitment would be preferable to any relaxation of standards of recruitment. Attention should also be given toward delineation of territory covered by regional offices.

Interagency Cooperation. The Conference decided that provision for meeting new activities requiring interagency cooperation during 1958 and 1959 should be met by establishing the unallocated contingencies chapter at \$100,000 in the budgets for 1958 and 1959. The original proposals included provision of \$50,000 for unallocated contingencies and \$100,000 for interagency cooperation.

The Conference indicated that the Director General, in using such funds, should make sure of the importance and urgency of the projects in relation to FAO and that FAO should take the initiative in sponsoring activities within its competence that may be of interest to several agencies.

Mediterranean Development Project. There was a great deal of vocal support for this project, but there were also many words of caution. The U.S. position was to discourage the development by FAO of a large regional project based on large-scale regional planning and external financing; to recommend instead that FAO assist countries on a national basis in making surveys and studies for better national agricultural and forestry-development programs; and to suggest that a regional technical meeting might be useful at a later stage as a means of exchanging information

and techniques. The Conference finally approved the project in a somewhat reduced form and with a considerable number of safeguards which met in part, although not entirely, the United States reservations.

Atomic Energy. The Conference approved the establishment of a second professional post within the atomic energy branch, which deals with the applications of atomic energy in agriculture and food processing, and, so far as resources permit, the holding of such meetings or training courses as would be most useful to member countries. The Conference also requested the Director General to enter into consultations with the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the purpose of drawing up a draft relationship agreement. In this connection the Conference also requested the FAO Council to establish a committee composed of government representatives to be available for consultation by the Director General in his negotiations with the designated representatives of the Board of Governors of the IAEA in preparing a final draft agreement for submission to the 10th session of the Conference.

Expanded Technical Assistance Program

Although there was considerable interest in this subject, there could be little definitive action by the Conference since it has no direct control over either the resources or the programming procedure. However, an entire day was devoted to a review of FAO's activities under this program, with a larger number of delegations participating than in most previous sessions. Most of the delegations commented on the technical assistance activities carried on in their countries and, in many cases, put forward their ideas for various improvements in the technical operations of these programs.

The allocation of funds for ETAP projects in each country is made by the Technical Assistance Board, composed of representatives of all participating agencies, including FAO, subject to final approval by the Technical Assistance Committee of the Economic and Social Council and the U.N. General Assembly. However, the Conference of FAO is responsible for determining the policies guiding FAO's participation and for reviewing FAO's activities under ETAP for technical soundness. The Conference made

recommendations for use by the Director General in negotiating and administering FAO's program under ETAP and, in some cases, for consideration by governments which are members of the TAC and General Assembly.

Regional Conferences

The Conference stressed the importance of regional meetings as a basis for developing broad guidelines for FAO's future activities in the regions and endorsed the principle established by the eighth session of the Conference that such regional meetings should be held in nonconference years in order best to fulfill the above purpose.

It was emphasized that the regional meetings should concentrate on the broad fields of agricultural policy and programing suitable for discussion by government representatives at a policy-making level and should remain flexible within the broad lines proposed by the Director General.

Adoption of Program of Work and Budget

The level of the budget was first discussed in technical committees and in Commission II to allow for full discussion prior to final consideration in a plenary meeting. The Director General, in presenting his program of work and budget for 1958-59, to be financed from assessed contributions, compared the shares for the technical assistance program determined by ECOSOC and the U.N. General Assembly for the different agencies with the relative sizes of their regular budgets devoted to the respective fields of activity for 1957. Mr. Sen stressed the fact that the resources available to FAO fall far short of the services it is called upon to provide, particularly if FAO is to keep in step with the educational and health-control activities which nations are undertaking through other international agencies. He said that therefore he was submitting to the Conference what he felt was a minimum program of work framed in the light of the world's needs: \$8,610,400 for 1958, which was just over \$1,000,000 for the further development of the work program. Budget proposals, as they actually emerged, were \$8,610,400 for 1958 and \$8,818,100 for 1959, plus \$11,000 in each year to cover costs arising from increased postal rates in Italy.

In the initial discussion in Commission II approximately 16 leaders of delegations spoke.

About half of these, mostly from developed countries, were in favor of a somewhat smaller budget while the others, mostly from underdeveloped countries, supported all or most of the Director General's proposals.

The General Committee of the Conference then examined further the procedures to be followed and agreed upon an arrangement under which Commission II would discuss major expansions and attempt to reach a provisional decision on each. This would be followed by a summarization of reports of the technical committees and a determination on the level of the budget to be recommended to plenary. Attempts would then be made to reconcile any differences which might exist between the total level agreed upon in Commission II and provisional decisions reached on major expansions and increases in the regular program of work.

The U. S. delegation moved a biennial budget of \$16 million, and the Netherlands proposed an amendment altering the figure to \$17 million. The Director General had indicated he needed \$17,450,000, including \$22,000 for increased postal costs, but in view of discussion was prepared to accept \$17,314,500. The Netherlands amendment was carried with 50 voting for, 13 (including the United States) against, and 4 abstaining. The countries voting with the United States were Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, and Pakistan abstained. The 17 countries either voting against the resolution or abstaining contribute about 70 percent of the FAO budget.

The final vote in a plenary meeting on the level of the budget for the 1958-59 biennium at \$17,000,000 was 42 votes for and 15 votes against, with no abstentions.

CONSTITUTIONAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

In Commission III the Conference acted upon the following constitutional matters: (1) recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on Organizational Structure, involving primarily the organization and structure of the FAO Council and its relationship to the Conference on the one hand and subsidiary bodies on the other; (2) in-

crease in membership of the Council; (3) revised elections procedures; (4) cooperation with international organizations; (5) "observer status" for governments and international organizations; (6) principles governing conventions and agreements; (7) FAO policy and agreements with regional research and training institutes; and (8) consequential amendments to constitution and rules of procedure.

The principal administrative and financial questions acted upon by the Conference were concerned with (1) review of the financial position of the Organization, (2) working capital fund, (3) scale of contributions for 1958-59, (4) a number of routine financial and administrative items, and (5) biennial budgeting.

Organizational Structure of FAO

The fundamental question here for the Conference to decide was whether to accept Plan A submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Organizational Structure, providing for retention of the Council as an executive body composed of 24 governments with retention of biennial Conference sessions, or to accept an alternative Plan B, providing for abolition of the Council, with annual Conference sessions and establishment of a number of permanent Conference committees. The Conference voted to accept Plan A.

Proposed Increase in Council Membership

This proposal was made to provide an additional seat for the African region. After an extended debate in the plenary session, in which a large number of delegations favored the objectives of the proposal, the matter was thoroughly considered in the General Committee of the Conference. The Committee and the Conference agreed in principle that it is desirable to increase the membership of the Council from 24 to 25, allocating the additional seat to the African region, and requested the Council to prepare a draft constitutional amendment to be circulated to member governments before the next Conference of FAO, in accordance with the rules of procedure.

Methods of Election of Council Members

The Conference adopted new procedures for Conference elections of Council members. The

most important new feature was the method of calculation of the required majority for each election, the purpose of which is to avoid various types of "minority vote" elections and the use of such devices as "plumping." Many other features of the new procedures are an obvious improvement, especially in regard to the form of ballots, secret election booths, and scrutiny of counting.

Cooperation With International Organizations

The Conference agreed that relationships with international governmental and nongovernmental organizations were progressing satisfactorily, that no change in the procedures was required, and that emphasis should be placed on development of practical arrangements for cooperation on specific problems.

Granting of Observer Status

On this question the Conference adopted a report of the Council, with a few minor amendments, in the form of a Conference resolution, the terms of which shall apply to all conferences and meetings called under FAO auspices. Subsidiary bodies of FAO which have adopted their own rules of procedure were requested to bring their rules into harmony with the Conference resolution at the earliest possible date. The report provided that, under certain specified conditions, nonmembers of FAO may send observers to FAO meetings, but it also provided that "Nations which are not Members or Associate Members of the Organization or members of the United Nations shall not be permitted to send observers to any meeting of the Organization." This latter provision was strongly supported by the United States in order to rule out any possibility that representatives of certain unrecognized regimes which are not members of the U.N. might be invited to FAO meetings.

Principles and Procedures Governing Conventions and Agreements

With some modification, the Conference adopted the Council's report which will serve as a guide for future FAO conventions and agreements and for subsidiary bodies under FAO auspices. This report clarifies the purposes and circumstances under which conventions and agree-

ments shall be drawn up and subsidiary bodies established. As an outgrowth of this particular discussion, the Conference adopted a new article XV to the constitution establishing the authority of the Conference to enter into agreements with member nations for establishment of international institutions dealing with questions relating to food and agriculture. This provision will be more important if FAO expands its relationships with, and assistance to, regional research and training institutes.

FAO Policy Regarding Regional Research and Training Institutes

The Director General requested policy guidance from the Conference in regard to FAO assistance in establishing regional research and training institutes. The Conference adopted a U.S. delegation recommendation that this whole question should be referred to the Council as it involved important legal, constitutional, and financial, as well as program policy problems.

Amendments to Constitution, Rules of Procedure, and Financial Regulations

The Conference, after deciding on the principles and policies involved in regard to the numerous constitutional and financial proposals referred to above, adopted appropriate amendments to the constitution and a series of detailed amendments and revisions to the rules of procedure and financial regulations.

Scale of Contributions

The 1958 U.N. scale of contributions was adopted for FAO, with suitable adjustments owing to differences in membership. The United States percentage contribution for FAO for 1958-1959 is 32.51.

Election of New Members

Requests were made by the Ukrainian S.S.R. and Hungary just before the Conference opened to have consideration of their applications postponed until 1959. Ghana, the Federation of Malaya, and the Polish People's Republic were elected to membership in FAO. Poland had formerly been a member but, having withdrawn, was subject to the same election procedure as new members.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONFERENCE

The breakdown of Conference sessions into three commissions appears to be about the best organizational arrangement that can be achieved. However, several problems emerging in review of this ninth session point to ways of improving future sessions of the FAO Conference.

For the Conference as a whole, the focusing of attention more directly on substantive matters is, to a considerable extent, a matter for governments themselves and requires continued improvement in the degree of governmental preparations, in the caliber of delegations, and in the extent to which governments will utilize the FAO Conference as an important forum for discussion of national and international food and agricultural policies. Some procedural improvements in the planning and organization of the plenary sessions and Commission I sessions could also be made, but these alone will not achieve the objective without parallel improvements in governmental participation.

The method of arriving at a budget level still presents problems. Projects and programs of work have been considered apart from their cost implications. Great improvement could come from a change in procedure to take into account both the limits which governments must place on their expenditures and the needs of the Organization, with balanced emphasis on the two factors. With these considerations in mind, Conference delegates should be able to work in an environment wherein they could arrive at a mutually agreeable budget level with a minimum of time pressures or group pressures for particular projects.

A related problem, that of closing-rush pressures, might be solved in part by starting the work of Commission II during the first week of the Conference, with its meetings being scheduled to avoid undue overlapping with plenary meetings.

An important problem involves most effective use of the expert knowledge of technical members of delegations. Faced with a going program operated by a permanent staff and with little time for discussions of technical questions in Conference, technicians on delegations can contribute relatively little to current programs. With careful planning it should be possible for delegation technicians to make more positive contributions

in evaluating proposals for the total program of work and, more particularly, in developing long-range plans.

There is an evident need for much more consultation among governments prior to the Conference, through the Council and other channels, if objective, reasonable, and generally acceptable solutions are to be found to many major problems. Such consultations should, in the earlier stages, center around positive and constructive program proposals. At later stages financial positions could be related to the program proposals.

President Extends Benefits to Hydrographic Bureau

White House press release dated May 29

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

President Eisenhower on May 29 issued an Executive order designating the International Hydrographic Bureau a public international organization entitled to the benefits of the International Organizations Immunities Act of December 29, 1945.

The International Organizations Immunities Act provides that certain privileges, exemptions, and immunities shall be extended to such public international organizations as shall have been designated by the President through appropriate Executive order and to their officers and employees and the representatives of member states to such organizations.

The International Hydrographic Bureau began to function actively in September 1921 as the outgrowth of a conference initiated by the British Admiralty to which maritime states having hydrographic offices were invited to send delegates. The organization, now numbering 37 members, has its headquarters in Monte Carlo.

The basic objectives of the International Hydrographic Bureau are the establishment of a close and permanent association between the hydrographic services of its members and the coordination of the hydrographic work of these services with a view to rendering navigation safer in all seas of the world and to obtain uniformity insofar

as possible in charts and hydrographic documents.


The United States has been a member of the International Hydrographic Bureau since 1922

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10769¹

DESIGNATING THE INTERNATIONAL HYDROGRAPHIC BUREAU AS A PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ENTITLED TO ENJOY CERTAIN PRIVILEGES, EXEMPTIONS, AND IMMUNITIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act approved December 29, 1945 (59 Stat. 669), and having found that the United States participates in the International Hydrographic Bureau under the authority of an act of Congress approved March 2, 1921 (41 Stat. 1215), I hereby designate the International Hydrographic Bureau as a public international organization entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred by the International Organizations Immunities Act.

The designation of the International Hydrographic Bureau as a public international organization within the meaning of the International Organizations Immunities Act shall not be deemed to abridge in any respect privileges, exemptions, and immunities which such organization may have acquired or may acquire by treaty or congressional action.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
May 29, 1958.

U.S. Delegations to International Conferences

26th Meeting Caribbean Commission

The Department of State announced on May 27 (press release 290) the following U.S. delegation to the 26th meeting of the Caribbean Commission to be held at Trinidad, The West Indies, May 28-June 2:

U.S. Commissioners

Arturo Morales Carrión, *chairman*, Under Secretary of State for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
Leonard Brewer, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands
José Trias Monge, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

¹ 23 Fed. Reg. 3801.

Polard More, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

Advisers

José Luis Colom, Director, Office of Technical Cooperation, Department of State, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Frederick H. Lawton, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State

Walter W. Orebrough, American Consul General, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, The West Indies

An outgrowth of the original Anglo-American Caribbean Commission, the Commission is an international advisory body. It serves to coordinate activities of the four member governments—France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States—in their efforts to improve the economic and social well-being of the inhabitants of their territories in the Caribbean area.

The principal items for discussion concern the preparations for the Conference on the Revision of the Caribbean Commission Agreement, scheduled to be held at Trinidad in November 1958. The Commission will also review technical assistance projects, primarily in the fields of education, fisheries, forestry, and cooperatives, being undertaken in cooperation with the International Cooperation Administration, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

42d Session, International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on May 28 (press release 294) the following tripartite delegation to the 42d session of the International Labor Conference to be held at Geneva, June 4-26:

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

James P. Mitchell, *chairman*, Secretary of Labor
Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs

Advisers and Substitute Delegates

George C. Lodge, special assistant to the Secretary of Labor

Graham W. McGowan, special assistant to the Secretary of Commerce

David W. Wainhouse, counselor of embassy, American Embassy, Vienna, Austria

Howard S. Carpenter, Near East specialist, Office of In-

ternational Labor Affairs, Department of Labor
Charles C. Finch, labor adviser, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of State

Daniel Goott, special assistant for international labor affairs, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State

Joseph E. Johnson, consultant to the Secretary of Labor
Harold J. Magnuson, chief, Occupational Health Program, Bureau of State Services, Public Health Service, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Marion E. Martin, commissioner, Maine Department of Labor and Industry

Otis E. Mulliken, deputy director, Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State

John F. Skillman, director, Division of Agricultural, Construction, and Mining Equipment, Business and Defense Services Administration, Department of Commerce

Marshall M. Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs

Charles B. Stewart, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for Research and Development

James F. Taylor, chief, Foreign Service Division, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

George Tobias, attaché for international labor affairs, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

Philip A. Yahner, special assistant to the Solicitor, Department of Labor

Arnold Zempel, executive director, Office of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Cola G. Parker, director, Kimberly-Clark Corp., Neenah, Wis.

Advisers

A. Boyd Campbell, chairman of the board, Mississippi School Supply Co., Jackson, Miss.

Charles E. Jackson, general manager, National Fisheries Institute, Inc., Washington, D.C.

R. H. Nichols, publisher and editor, *Daily Record*, Vernon, Tex.

Mrs. Sybil S. Patterson, associate director, Employee Relations Division, National Association of Manufacturers, New York, N.Y.

William G. Van Meter, attorney, Labor Relations and Legal Department, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, D.C.

W. H. Winans, Larchmont, N.Y.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegate

Rudolph Faupl, international representative, International Association of Machinists, Washington, D.C.

Advisers

Harry C. Bates, president, Bricklayers, Masons, and Plasterers International Union of America, Washington, D.C.

George P. Delaney, director of organizations, International Union of Operating Engineers, Washington, D.C.

Engene E. Frazier, president, United States Transport Service Employees, Chicago, Ill.

Isidore Nagler, vice president, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, New York, N.Y.

Bertrand Seidman, economist, Research Department, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Washington, D.C.

George L. P. Weaver, assistant to the president, International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers, Washington, D.C.

Secretary of Delegation

Virgil L. Moore, attaché, American Consulate General, Geneva, Switzerland

The International Labor Conference is the principal policymaking organ of the International Labor Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations comprising 80 member countries. At the annual meeting of the Conference representatives of governments, workers, and employers of the member countries of the ILO formulate suggested standards for the improvement of working and living conditions around the world. Through the other organs of the ILO the Organization also performs the functions of providing expert advice and technical assistance in the form of national and regional training programs, advisory missions, surveys, and other direct assistance to governments. The Organization also collects and disseminates information about labor, industrial, and social conditions. The functions of the Organization cover a wide range of subjects including work hours, minimum employment age, workmen's compensation, social insurance, paid vacation, employment services, worker migration, freedom of association, trade union rights, and forced labor.

The 42d session of the Conference will review the report of the Director General, which emphasizes the major trends in the work of the ILO in recent years. It shows the steady growth of operational activity over a period of years in response to the practical needs of the current world social situation and indicates the beginnings of a new educational approach comprising a series of educational and promotional activities aimed at helping to deal with certain labor and social problems. The report also suggests the key areas of ILO program concentration today—the manpower, productivity, and related activities aimed at helping in the raising of living standards in urban and rural areas; the labor and social security measures needed to adjust to the new

conditions of industrialization and to maintain social stability in a period of rapid economic transition; the protection and promotion of human rights in the economic and social fields with in the province of ILO; and the technical and educational activities needed to facilitate social adjustment to technological change, including automation and the industrial application of atomic energy. The report invites comments on the member governments on these subjects.

Following the Director General's report, major consideration will be given to substantive agenda items which include discrimination in the field of employment and occupation, conditions and employment of plantation workers, organization of occupational health services in places of employment, conditions of work of fishermen, and a general discussion on the question of hours of work.

ECE Steel Committee

The Department of State announced on June 4 (press release 306) the appointment of Harry I. Jeter of Cleveland, Ohio, vice president of operations of the American Steel and Wire Co. as U.S. delegate to the 20th session of the Steel Committee of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), to be held at Geneva, Switzerland, June 9-13, 1958.

Discussions in the coming session will primarily concern the long-range trends and problems in the European steel industry and the preparation of the annual steel-market review.

ECE Housing Committee

The Department of State announced on June 5 (press release 307) the appointment of Mortor Bodfish, chairman of the board and president of the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Chicago, Ill., as the U.S. delegate to the 16th session of the Housing Committee of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), which will be held at Geneva, Switzerland, June 16-20 1958.

Discussions at this session will focus on such matters as financing of housing, European housing trends and policies in 1957, formulation of house building programs, housing for the disabled and particular questions on urbanization and town planning in relation to the cost of building.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

- Letter Dated 11 April 1958 from the Representative of Pakistan Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3987, April 11, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Letter Dated 24 April 1958 from the Representative of India Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3994, April 24, 1958. 2 pp. mimeo.
- Letter Dated 1 May 1958 from the Representative of India Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3999, May 1, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Letter Dated 2 May 1958 from the Representative of Yemen Addressed to the Secretary-General. S/4001, May 2, 1958. 2 pp. mimeo.
- Letter Dated 6 May 1958 from the Representative of Pakistan Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/4003, May 6, 1958. 4 pp. mimeo.
- Letter Dated 7 May 1958 from the Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Addressed to the Secretary-General. S/4004, May 7, 1958. 1 p. mimeo.
- Letter Dated 22 May 1958 from the Representative of Lebanon Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/4007, May 23, 1958. 1 p. mimeo.

General Assembly

- Letter Dated 3 April 1958 Addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. A/3820, April 8, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.
- Communication Dated 10 April 1958 Addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America on Behalf of His Government in its Capacity as the Unified Command. A/3821, April 10, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.

Disarmament Commission

- Letter Dated 1 May 1958 from the Representative of Japan Addressed to the Secretary-General. DC/138, May 1, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.

Economic and Social Council

- United Nations Programme of Technical Assistance. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3081, April 4, 1958. 34 pp. mimeo.
- Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. Report and recommendations of the Preparatory Committee for the Special Fund. E/3098, April 22, 1958, 25 pp. mimeo.
- Development and Co-Ordination of the Economic, Social and Human Rights Programmes and Activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies as a Whole. Co-Ordination at the National Level. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3107, May 6, 1958. 29 pp. mimeo.
- Technical Assistance in Public Administration. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3085, May 7, 1958. 16 pp. mimeo.
- Twenty-Second Report of the Administrative Committee

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

- on Co-Ordination to the Economic and Social Council. E/3108, May 13, 1958. 11 pp. mimeo.
- Human Rights. Report of the Council Committee on the Tenth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. E/3125, May 19, 1958. 13 pp. mimeo.
- Statistical Commission. Report to the Economic and Social Council on the tenth session of the Statistical Commission held in New York from 28 April to 15 May 1958. E/3126 (E/CN.3/255, May 23, 1958). 69 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

- Report of the United Nations Advisory Council for the Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration, covering the period from 1 April 1957 to 31 March 1958. T/1372, April 22, 1958. 110 pp. mimeo.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

- Horace E. Henderson as Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, effective June 2. (For biographic details, see press release 299 dated June 2.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Your Department of State. Pub. 6598. Department and Foreign Service Series 73. 13 pp. 10¢.

An illustrated pamphlet describing the history, functions, and objectives of the Department of State.

Defense—Offshore Procurement Program. TIAS 3987. 26 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Denmark. Exchange of notes—Signed at Copenhagen June 8, 1954. Entered into force June 8, 1954.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3988. 21 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Spain, superseding agreement of July 19, 1955—Signed at Washington August 16, 1957. Entered into force February 12, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Sale of Fruit and Fruit Products. TIAS 3989. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at London January 30 and February 3, 1958. Entered into force February 3, 1958.

Defense—Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. TIAS 3990. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 22, 1958. Entered into force February 22, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3991. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with exchange of notes, between the United States of America and Poland—Signed at Washington February 15, 1958. Entered into force February 15, 1958.

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 3992. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Argentina, amending agreement of November 5, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at Buenos Aires February 26 and December 27, 1957. Entered into force December 27, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3993. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and India, amending agreement of August 29, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 13, 1958. Entered into force February 13, 1958.

Development of Transportation Facilities. TIAS 3994. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America, Nepal, and India—Signed at Kathmandu January 2 and at New Delhi January 6, 1958. Entered into force January 6, 1958.

Money Orders. TIAS 3995. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and China—Signed at Taipei October 8 and at Washington November 14, 1957. Operative October 1, 1957.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 3996. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement, with exchange of notes, between the United States of America and Finland—Signed at Helsinki February 21, 1958. Entered into force February 21, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Sale of Tobacco and Construction of Housing or Community Facilities. TIAS 3997. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, amending agreement of June 5, 1956, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at London February 12 and 17, 1958. Entered into force February 17, 1958.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 3998. 14 pp. 10¢. Agreement between the United States of America and Nicaragua—Signed at Washington June 11, 1957. Entered into force March 7, 1958.

Informational Media Guaranty Program. TIAS 3999. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Poland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Warsaw Feb-

ruary 12, 1958. Entered into force February 12, 1958, operative retroactively January 1, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4000. 10 p. 10¢.

Agreement, with exchange of letters, between the United States of America and Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrad February 3, 1958. Entered into force February 3, 1958.

Weather Stations—Nauru Island. TIAS 4001. 5 pp. 5

Agreement between the United States of America and Australia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Canberra February 19 and 25, 1958. Entered into force February 25, 1958.

Status of Personnel of Military Assistance Advisor Group and Offshore Procurement Program. TIAS 4003 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Denmark, relating to agreements of January 27, 1950, and June 8, 1954. Exchange of notes—Dated at Copenhagen December 12, 1956. Entered into force December 12, 1956.

Informational Media Guaranty Program. TIAS 4003. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, amending agreement of October 14, 1954, and January 19, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at Manila December 12, 1955, and February 10, 1958, with related note. Entered into force February 10, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4004. 20 p. 15¢.

Agreement, with exchange of notes and memorandum of understanding, between the United States of America and Italy—Signed at Rome March 7, 1958. Entered into force March 7, 1958.

Money Orders. TIAS 4005. 8 pp. 10¢.

Convention between the United States of America and British Guiana—Signed at Georgetown, British Guiana, October 8 and at Washington November 4, 1957. Entered into force January 1, 1958.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4006. 2 p. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Israel, amending agreement of November 7, 1957. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington January 29 and February 4, 1958. Entered into force February 4, 1958.

Air Transport Services. TIAS 4007. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ireland, amending agreement of February 3, 1945, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Dublin March 4, 1958. Entered into force March 4, 1958.

Military Bases in the Philippines—Exploitation of Natural Resources. TIAS 4008. 4 pp. 5¢.

Interim arrangement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of notes—Dated at Manila April 8, 1957. Entered into force April 8, 1957.

Claims—Damages Arising from Maneuvers at Laur Train ing Area. TIAS 4009. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of aid memoir—Dated at Manila February 6, 1957. Entered into force February 6, 1957.

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Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to June 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 278 of May 20, 290 of May 27, 294 of May 28, and 297 of May 29.

No.	Date	Subject
298	6/2	Itinerary for visit of Prime Minister Nkrumah (rewrite).
299	6/2	Horace E. Henderson appointed special assistant (biographic details).
300	6/2	Exchange of notes with Poland on Polish-language magazine.
301	6/2	ICA cholera program for Thailand.
302	6/3	Elbrick: policies and programs in Europe.
303	6/3	Cobalt equipment for Bangkok hospital.
304	6/4	Foreign Relations volume.
305	6/4	Milton Eisenhower trip delayed.
306	6/4	Jenter named delegate to ECE Steel Committee (rewrite).
307	6/5	Bodfish named delegate to ECE Housing Committee (rewrite).
308	6/5	Increase in nonimmigrant visas.
309	6/6	Dulles: "The Challenge of Change."
310	6/6	NATO parliamentarians visit U.S.
311	6/6	Itinerary for President Heuss.
312	6/6	Educational exchange.
313	6/6	Educational exchange.
314	6/7	Soviet third secretary declared <i>persona non grata</i> .

* Not printed.

‡ Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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JAPAN - Free World Ally

the
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of
State

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Publication 6516

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Bulletin

Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992

June 30, 1958

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XXXVIII, No. 992 • PUBLICATION 6662

June 30, 1958

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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PRICE:
52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 29, 1958).

Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

President Proposes July 1 Starting Date for Talks at Geneva Between Western and Soviet Technical Experts

Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

THE PRESIDENT TO PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV

White House press release dated June 10

JUNE 10, 1958

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have your letter of May 30 and am glad to note you have accepted my proposal that technical experts meet to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on suspension of nuclear tests. These talks would be undertaken without commitment as to the final decision on the relationship of nuclear test suspension to other more important disarmament measures I have proposed.

I propose that these discussions begin on or about July 1 in Geneva. While we appreciate your offer to hold these talks in Moscow, we believe that Geneva would be preferable from our standpoint, and note that it would be acceptable to you. The Swiss Government has agreed to this location.

With respect to participation I suggest that initially at least we adhere to the concept expressed in your letter of May 9, 1958,¹ where you say, "the Soviet Government agrees to having both sides designate experts." As indicated in my letter of May 24, 1958,² our side at this discussion will include experts from the United States, United Kingdom, France and possibly from other countries which have specialists with a thorough knowledge in the field of detecting nuclear tests, and we note that you have no objection to this. With regard to the inclusion on your side of ex-

perts from Czechoslovakia and Poland, we have no objection to this. With respect to experts of nationalities not identified with either side, we have no objection in principle to their joining later in the discussions if it is agreed during the course of the talks that this is necessary or useful from the point of view of the purposes of the technical talks.

It may be possible for the experts to produce a final report within three or four weeks as you suggest. However, I believe that there should be enough flexibility in our arrangements to allow a little longer time if it is needed to resolve the complex technical issues involved.

I propose that further arrangements for the meeting be handled through normal diplomatic channels.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV TO THE PRESIDENT

Official translation

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received your message dated May 24 in reply to my letter of May 9.

As in your preceding messages, I have, unfortunately, found no answer to such an urgent problem as that of immediate cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests, which was the subject of my previous messages to you. There is no need to speak once again of the fact that, under present conditions, with no agreement among states possessing nuclear weapons as to the basic question—the necessity to cease without delay the testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs—a study by technical experts of the methods of detection of possible violations of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests may lead to a delay in the solution of the main problem, namely, that of a cessation of tests. This is a matter of serious concern to us. At this time, therefore, when we are agreeing on convening a meeting of experts, it would be necessary to take steps toward having the work of the experts completed at the earliest possible date, to be established in advance.

¹ BULLETIN of June 9, 1958, p. 940.

² *Ibid.*, p. 939.

We agree to your proposal that the experts should undertake their task within the next three weeks with a view to beginning the work as soon as possible.

In your reply you also express yourself in favor of instructing the experts to prepare a report on the first results of their work within 30 days, or as soon as possible after the expiration of that period.

The Soviet Government considers that in the interests of the earliest possible universal cessation of nuclear weapons tests it would be advisable to agree that the entire work of the experts be concluded within three or four weeks after the date of the beginning of the work of the conference and that within this period a final report of the experts, with their conclusions and findings, be submitted to the governments of those states whose experts take part in the conference.

Furthermore, you state that experts not only from the USSR and the USA might be designated but also from Great Britain and France and, possibly, from other countries which have specialists with a thorough knowledge in the field of detecting nuclear tests. The Soviet Government has no objection to this, and it proposes that experts from Czechoslovakia and Poland likewise take part in the work of the conference.

Nor does the Soviet Government consider that the work of the experts should be confined to this group of countries. Therefore it seems advisable to invite experts from India also, and possibly from certain other countries, to participate in the conference.

As to the site of the conference of experts, we do, of course, share the opinion that Geneva is a suitable place. However, we would prefer that this conference be held in Moscow. I can assure you, Mr. President, that all the facilities necessary for the experts to conduct their work will be provided in Moscow. The Soviet Government agrees to the proposal that the Security Council, as well as the UN General Assembly, be kept informed through the Secretary General as to the progress of the work of the conference of experts.

I hope, Mr. President, that the considerations I have presented will meet with a favorable attitude on your part.

Upon receiving a reply from you, the Soviet Government will communicate the list of experts from the Soviet Union who will participate in the said conference.

With sincere respect,

N. KHRUSHCHEV
May 30, 1958

[Initialed:] M. M.

His Excellency

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

National Olympic Week, 1958

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the XVIIth Olympic Games of the modern era will be held in Rome, Italy, beginning August 25 and ending September 11, 1960; the Winter Games will be held at Squaw Valley, California, from February 19 to March 1, 1960; and the Pan American Games will be held in Chicago, Illinois, from August 27 to September 7, 1959; and

WHEREAS in these games men and women of more than seventy nations, and of many races, creeds, and cultural backgrounds, will be brought together to match their athletic abilities against one another under established rules of sportsmanship which offer an equal opportunity for all; and

WHEREAS the Olympic and the Pan American Games of past years have contributed in a unique way to greater understanding and mutual respect among the peoples of the world; and

WHEREAS the United States Olympic Association is presently engaged in obtaining maximum support for the teams representing the United States at these three athletic events; and

WHEREAS the Congress by a joint resolution approved June 4, 1958, has authorized and requested the President of the United States to issue a proclamation designating the week beginning October 13, 1958, as National Olympic Week;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning October 13, 1958, as National Olympic Week; and I urge all our citizens to give their full support to the XVIIth Olympic Games, to the Olympic Winter Games of 1960, and to the Pan American Games of 1959 so that the United States will be fully and adequately represented in these games.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 4th day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and [SEAL] fifty-eight, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-second.

By the President:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3244; 23 Fed. Reg. 4025.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of June 10

Press release 319 dated June 10

Secretary Dulles: Any questions?

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect that the technical talks on atomic test suspension, which presumably will begin about July 1, at the nearest, will foreshadow political agreement to suspend tests?

A. I don't think that it is possible to answer that question definitively at this stage. Obviously they will have a bearing upon it. If there is a great gap between what our technicians say is necessary and what the Soviet technicians say is necessary, that would almost automatically exclude any agreement. On the other hand, if we do come to an understanding, it will facilitate an agreement to suspend testing, although I would anticipate that any agreement to suspend testing, if made, would not be an isolated agreement but be a part of other arrangements and anticipate that there would be progress made in other fields.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will there be any political advisers sitting with our scientific advisers? Do you expect that the Soviet Union might want political advisers sitting with them?

A. I suspect that there will be some political guidance given at least to the Soviet experts. Our experts may or may not need such advice, depending upon developments. Our guidance to the United States experts, at least—I talked to them a few days ago and told them to look upon their job as a purely technical scientific job. They are to come to their own conclusions as to what is necessary to detect an explosion. Perhaps, in the light of the Soviet proposal, they may have to report on the evaluation of a lesser than complete detection system—bearing on the likelihood that there would be an evasion attempted. For example, it may be they would

say this system isn't 100 percent perfect but it is good enough that we would think there would be a 75 percent chance that any evasion would be caught. They may have to make calculations of that sort. But we have given them complete authority to work on this matter as a purely scientific technical matter, to use their best judgment and report to us accordingly. I do not anticipate that there will be any need for political guidance. If that need arises, perhaps as a result of proposals that might be made from the Soviet side, then we would have to be in a position to respond.

Q. I have in mind these talks would have to involve geography, wouldn't they, and wouldn't that enter into a political area?

A. I would suppose that we would want to have—that the experts would feel we needed to have—inspection posts with some mobility not only in the Soviet Union but also on the mainland of China and other areas of that sort. We would not want to have a situation where the Soviets merely move their testing into a neighboring territory and then it was beyond control or check. So I think that, after the experts decide where it is necessary to have these posts, then there will have to be a political problem dealt with. I would suppose, for example, they may decide it necessary to have one in Australia and perhaps some place in the Pacific islands, perhaps in Communist China, perhaps in the Sahara Desert. I don't know what their recommendations will be, but I anticipate there will be recommendations made for checking sites in a number of countries in the world that would then raise afterward the political problem: How do you work it out?

Q. Mr. Secretary, you just said they talked about the possibility of putting inspection posts in Communist China and we would probably

¹ See p. 1083.

have to have some sort of political agreement with them on the stationing of inspectors in Communist China.

Some time ago in another press conference you said you thought you did not believe Russia would ever entrust Communist China with any kind of atomic testing data or testing program and, therefore, you did not anticipate there would ever be a need for an agreement with Communist China on a testing program run by the Soviet Union.

A. Your memory of what I said is a lot better than mine. I don't remember having said all those things. I do think I said that I did not believe that it was likely that the Soviets would turn over their nuclear knowledge to the Communist Chinese or to any of the Eastern European satellites.² I don't think I ever said that I excluded the possibility that the Soviets might themselves conduct tests on Chinese Communist territory.

Latin American Policy

Q. *Mr. Secretary, in discussing Latin American policy at the last press conference³ you said: "It is obvious the American Government and the American nation and the American people like to see governments which rest upon the consent of the governed and where the governed are educated people able to carry the responsibilities of self-government." Would you tell us how this perhaps is made obvious in terms of our policy toward those countries or in terms of our information program?*

A. I think I said that where those conditions exist there is almost automatically a better response than where those conditions do not exist. And I was speaking in terms not merely of government but of private relations, travel, and the like. I did not advocate—in fact, I think I said we did not want to have—a slide rule whereby we try to measure the degree of popular government that exists in various countries, the degree of education in various countries. But where those conditions exist, there is an almost automatic spontaneous response.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow it up with the statement made today by former Presi-*

dent Figueres of Costa Rica that the United States seems to be ashamed to publicize abroad the democracy practiced at home, and he suggested we would win the Latin American people more easily if our policies would clarify our way of life in Latin America more clearly. Do you have any comment?

A. I am not aware of any sense of being ashamed of our democratic processes. On the contrary, I think those are the things we are extremely proud of. Now, if there is any failure to make that apparent in Latin America, then I think we ought to correct it. Perhaps there is more that we can do along those lines. I would not take any great exception to that thought, as you quote it to me.

Talks With Prime Minister Macmillan

Q. *Mr. Secretary, what can you tell us about the talks with Mr. Macmillan?*

A. The talks so far, I might say, if it does not involve disrespect, have been of a rambling character. Now this afternoon we expect to have talks here at the State Department which may be a little more pointed up in terms of the economic and financial problems of the world. I hope that Secretary of the Treasury [Robert B.] Anderson and Mr. [Douglas] Dillon [Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs] will be present at those talks. You may recall that that was a point which the Prime Minister emphasized in his speech at DePauw University; it was a point to which I directed particular attention in the statement which I made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last Friday.⁴ I think we both said, in effect, that we recognized that the area was one of great importance; that it was necessary to take, as I put it, new initiatives in this field, but we were not quite clear as to just what to do. I think the Prime Minister said that there was a task primarily for experts, but that the statesmen, the heads of government, could give impetus to the experts.

Now a large part of the world's trade is done in terms of dollars and sterling, and I think that it is an area where there can be useful exchanges of views between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the

² BULLETIN of July 22, 1957, p. 141.

³ *Ibid.*, June 9, 1958, p. 944.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 23, 1958, p. 1035.

United States. And I hope this afternoon we will be able to break some new ground, not in terms of any decisions but in terms of exchanges of views as to how to enlarge international trade, to stimulate increasingly the flow of investment to the less developed countries of the world, and, in general, how to improve the economic health of the free nations. I would say that would probably be our principal topic of discussion this afternoon.

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, what objection, if any, would you have to Adlai Stevenson's specific suggestion about calling a committee of experts to mobilize the economic and financial policies of the non-Communist world?

A. Well, all I can say is that setting up a committee of experts is, of course, a device for dealing with problems which goes back for a long, long time, and, certainly, we do not exclude that well-tried method of solving problems by setting up a committee to solve them.

I don't know what will come out of the talks this afternoon or of talks that may be had with the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation] and the World Bank and the Monetary Fund—all those that are interested in this problem. It isn't a problem that any one country or any two countries can solve, but I think it is possible to stimulate some new initiatives in this field. Certainly, as the Prime Minister said last Sunday, it is a field where expert advice is going to be required.

Question of Expansion of IMF Resources

Q. Mr. Secretary, 2 weeks ago in New York Mr. Dillon suggested that it might be a good idea to expand the resources of the International Monetary Fund.⁵ Has the administration under serious consideration advocating an expansion of those resources?

A. We believe that the time is approaching when it will be important to consider whether the resources of both the so-called World Bank and the Monetary Fund should be increased. They have been in business for some considerable time now with their initial capital funds. These are

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 9, 1958, p. 968. For a statement by Mr. Dillon on Mar. 19 before the Subcommittee on International Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, see *ibid.*, Apr. 7, 1958, p. 564.

pretty well committed, and in the normal course of events the time would come when consideration should be given to increasing them. We do not have in mind any measures which would call for any action, for example, by the present Congress with respect to this matter. But, between now and the end of the year, I think that these problems should be studied.

Q. Are you considering also a secondary World Bank which would make low-interest, long-term loans available in local currencies, such as suggested by Mr. [Eugene R.] Black [president, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]?

A. Well, I think we would certainly consider any proposals from a responsible source to deal with this problem, and, certainly, Mr. Black is a responsible source. There are all kinds of variations. There is the problem of the use of local funds that are obtained through P. L. 480 exports and matters of that sort. It is a very complicated field, and there are many possibilities not yet fully developed which ought to be studied.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the United States prepared to deal with East Germany in trying to procure the release of the nine Army men and the helicopter forced down in Communist Germany?

A. The normal procedure which heretofore has been followed, and followed successfully I think on both sides, has been that in the case of military people we deal through the military authorities of the occupying powers. But, when it comes to getting Americans out of a country, we don't stand on ceremony; we deal with any people to get them out. I may say that that does not involve any recognition. We have been getting Americans out of Communist China, not with the completeness or rapidity that we had hoped, but we have been getting them out through dealing with the Chinese Communists. There was a report today that I just saw as I came down here that two more have been released. I hope that's true. When you have people kidnaped, you deal with the kidnapers. If the authorities don't want to deal with this matter through the established channels which have been operating for the past 12 years, we will deal with them in whatever ways necessary, but with the clear understanding that we deal with a practical situation and that it does not carry any implication at all of recognition.

The Disarmament "Package"

Q. Mr. Secretary, in reply to the first question you said that any agreement to suspend nuclear tests should be part of other arrangements that would anticipate agreements in other fields. Could you expand on that a bit?

A. Yes. We believe that suspension of testing, in isolation, is a very inadequate measure. It does not involve any disarmament, or limitation of armament, whatsoever. To call it a "disarmament" measure is a misnomer. All it means is that the arsenal of nuclear weapons that you have is accumulating without any exact knowledge as to what the consequences of their use would be.

Now we believe that it is extremely important to make progress in terms of getting inspection against surprise attack. We think it is extremely important to have a cutoff of fissionable material for weapons purposes. We think it is important also that there be some reductions in the way of conventional weapons, particularly of a kind and type that are readily identifiable.

We are not satisfied at all just to do something which has no implications whatever in the field of limitation of armament and to act as though that was a great accomplishment. We don't think that it would be. And I think it is very unlikely that we would do that without any prospect of progress or any agreement on the part of the Soviets to attempt progress in these other fields which are far more vital.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last Friday that there was active consideration being given to detaching the idea of a nuclear-testing ban from the rest of our disarmament package. You give the impression now that it will not be detached from the package and that you will insist that it be accompanied by other measures on disarmament. Is that correct?

A. There are two ways of handling this, and perhaps a certain confusion has arisen because of my failure not to make it clear. There are what you might call "conditions precedent" and "conditions subsequent." Now, in the package proposal that we put up in London last August,⁴ they were tied together in the sense that they were all to get started at the same time and all be

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

agreed upon at the same time. The separation that is under consideration is in terms of not necessarily insisting that they should all be agreed to and get started at the same time but that we would start perhaps at different times but with the understanding that there would be a freedom of action restored if progress was not made in some of these other fields.

German Unification

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the last issue of Newsweek it said that you told associates, "I seem to be much stronger for unification than he is"—meaning Adenauer. I was wondering whether you can confirm that.

A. I do not think that I am stronger for German unification than Chancellor Adenauer is. I think that there is a slight difference in our respective positions. I can see that, quite understandably, the Government of the Federal Republic does not want to seem to be in a position of blocking disarmament by saying that, unless there is first a reunification of Germany, nothing can be done in any field. None of us want to take that position.

On the other hand, the United States is a country which was at the last summit conference, as the Federal Republic was not. We are a party, as the Federal Republic was not, to certain agreements at that time with the Soviet delegation. We feel, quite independently of any other considerations, that integrity in dealing with the Soviets and the ability to deal with them in other respects would be put in question if we go back again to the summit meeting and say, "Well, now, the first thing we do, Mr. Khrushchev, is to wipe off the books the last things we agreed to." Now that goes not just to the question of the reunification of Germany. That goes to the question of the integrity of our agreements. It just happens that those agreements related to the reunification of Germany. But we have a certain position to claim that the agreements of the last summit conference, whatever they were, should not be wiped off the books as we start, if we should start, a second summit conference.

Now, you see, that is something which is a little apart from the particular merits of the reunification of Germany. It goes to the question of whether or not agreements made at the last sum-

mit conference, whatever they are about, should still be a topic for discussion or whether we are willing to see them wiped off. We are not willing to do that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, for the past few years Admiral [Lewis L.] Strauss has served as the principal adviser to the President in the field of atomic energy that related to atoms. Now that he is resigning that part of his job, could you tell us who will serve as the principal adviser to the President in that field?

A. Since you have mentioned the resignation of Admiral Strauss, I would like to take the occasion to pay a very high tribute to Admiral Strauss. I think he has made an immense contribution of great ability, great patriotism, and very considerable sacrifice. I'm very sorry that he is leaving the Government—at least leaving in this capacity. I hope he will continue to be available in some other capacities and carry forward the thinking, in terms of atoms for peace, to which he is so dedicated.

Now, as to the question you put as to who will take his place, I assume that role will be taken by his successor when he is named by the President.

Credits to Raw-Material-Producing Countries

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Foreign Minister of Colombia is scheduled to arrive here Thursday [June 12] to sign a \$103-million loan. The loan was very rapidly negotiated, and I wonder if you could tell us whether that reflects some sense of urgency on our part to help the raw-materials-producing countries? Would you care to comment on the negotiations in general?

A. We are trying to help the raw-material-producing countries both by extending credits in appropriate cases and by trying to deal with the problem on a somewhat more fundamental basis. These economic troubles that confront us are, in a sense, a tragedy of errors. In part the errors are due to the unwitting mistakes of the producing countries themselves who, acting without adequate knowledge, often go in for overproduction.

Now, you take the coffee situation. I don't think there has been any appreciable reduction in the amount of coffee that is being drunk by the American people. The trouble is not that there is a fall in consumption, but there has been over-

production largely because the producing countries have not had the statistics or the figures to know what they were doing. And we in the past have followed a policy of detaching ourselves from that phase of the problem. But we are hoping now, expecting now, to get into that phase of the problem and to help in consultations and discussions which will tend more to keep production in line with consumption. And there are similar talks that are envisaged in relation to lead and zinc and other matters. So both in terms of extending credits to the raw-material-producing countries and also with respect to bringing this problem within the scope of reason, we are trying to tackle it.

Arab Nationalism

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past you referred to Arab nationalism in the Middle East, sir, as a healthy development for the unity among the Arab nations that could lead toward stability in that area. Do you think the present aspect of United Arab Republic nationalism as it relates to the present troubles in Lebanon falls in this kind of category?

A. I am afraid I must answer that question in the negative. There is irrefutable evidence of the intervention through radio and press—government-controlled radio—in the internal affairs of Lebanon and inciting of the people to violence. Also there is increasingly coming in evidence that that violence is abetted by the actual supply of military equipment and ammunition.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the question of world trade again, could you relate for us the effect of the Khrushchev letter asking for American traders to expand trading with the United States on this whole question of new initiative in world trade?

A. The Soviet Union, according to Chairman Khrushchev, has, as he put it, declared economic warfare on us. And that warfare is largely being pursued by means of credit which the Soviet Union is extending to countries to enable them to buy Soviet goods. And now it looks as though the Soviet Union wanted to get credit from us so that it could more successfully pursue its economic warfare against us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what consideration, if any, has been given to inviting General de Gaulle to come here?

A. It is an instinctive and natural desire on the part of President Eisenhower to want to talk again at some convenient time and place with General de Gaulle, whom he knew in a very friendly way during the past. It is, I think, quite apparent that General de Gaulle is, for the time being, rather preoccupied with internal problems. That means that the question of such a meeting has not come up for any specific consideration at the present time.

Inspection Posts in Communist China

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have said that we would like inspection on the test suspension or on other measures of disarmament to be under the authority of the United Nations, if possible. Do you think Communist China would agree to the establishment of inspection posts on its territory while it is not a member of the United Nations?

A. We don't insist that it should be the United Nations that exercises these controls. There are other ways of having controls. I don't know what the attitude of Communist China will be to having control posts on its territory. It doesn't seem to want to have outsiders in its territory. It pretended it wanted American correspondents there, as long as they thought we wouldn't give them a passport. As soon as we gave them a passport, they said "No." So I don't know what attitude they will take on this matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you would expect, in view of the requirement you see that at some point there would have to be negotiations involving Red China, would you not?

A. I think that, as far as I can see from the initial reports to me of our experts, an adequate system to supervise a suspension-of-testing agreement would have to cover the possibility of testing being conducted by the Soviet Union within Communist China. Now, just how we deal with that, I don't know. But the initial experts' report indicates that, just as there would have to be testing posts in the Pacific and probably in Australia and in Africa and so forth, so there might have also to be some in Communist China.

Q. Thank you, sir.

U.S. and Brazilian Presidents Reaffirm Inter-American Solidarity

Following is an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Juscelino Kubitschek, President of the United States of Brazil.

President Eisenhower to President Kubitschek

White House press release dated June 10

JUNE 5, 1958

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: This morning your Ambassador delivered to me the letter you wrote under date of May twenty-eighth. I found it intensely interesting.

To my mind you have described accurately both the existing situation and the desirability of corrective action. I am delighted, therefore, that you have taken the initiative in this matter.

While Your Excellency did not suggest any specific program to improve Pan American understanding, it seems to me that our two Governments should consult together as soon as possible with a view to approaching other members of the Pan American community, and starting promptly on measures that would produce throughout the continent a reaffirmation of devotion to Pan Americanism, and better planning in promoting the common interests and welfare of our several countries. There is a wide range of subjects to be discussed and explored, including, for example, the problem of implementing more fully the Declaration of Solidarity of the Tenth Inter-American Conference held at Caracas in 1954.¹

Because I deem this matter so important, I am instructing Mr. Roy Richard Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, to deliver my letter to you personally in Rio de Janeiro, to explore with you further your thinking on these matters. Your thoughts and ideas thus obtained at first hand can be the subject of further consultation through normal diplomatic channels, preparatory to a later visit to Brazil by the Secretary of State. With your concurrence, Mr. Rubottom will make final arrangement with your Government for the timing of Secretary Dulles' visit.

With assurance of my highest consideration, and

¹For text, see BULLETIN of APR. 26, 1954, p. 638.

with best wishes for the continued well-being of Your Excellency and of the Brazilian people, I remain,

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

His Excellency

DR. JUSCELINO KUBITSCHEK DE OLIVEIRA,
President of the United States of Brazil.

President Kubitschek to President Eisenhower

White House press release dated June 6

MAY 28, 1958

MR. PRESIDENT: I want to convey to Your Excellency, on behalf of the Brazilian people as well as for myself, an expression of sentiments of solidarity and esteem, the affirmation of which is become necessary in view of the aggressions and vexations undergone by Vice President Nixon during his recent visit to countries in Latin America.²

The widespread reaction of aversion on the part of the governments and of public opinion in the very nations in which occurred those reprobable acts against the serene and courageous person of the Vice President, constitutes proof that such demonstrations proceeded from a factious minority.

Nonetheless, it would be hardly feasible to conceal the fact that, before world public opinion, the ideal of Pan American unity has suffered serious impairment. Those disagreeable events, which we deplore so much, have nevertheless imparted an inescapable impression that we misunderstand each other on this Continent. The propaganda disseminated by the tools of anti-Americanism is apparently now directed toward presenting such supposed misunderstandings as actual incompatibility and even enmity between the free countries of the American community. Fortunately, this is far from being the truth.

It appears to me, Mr. President, that it would be utterly inconvenient and unfair to allow this false impression to prevail, morally weakening the cause of democracy, to the defense of which we are pledged.

In addressing these words to Your Excellency, my sole purpose is to acquaint you with my deep-seated conviction that something must be done to restore composure to the continental unity. I

have no definite and detailed plans to that effect, but rather ideas and thoughts which I could confide to Your Excellency should an early opportunity to do so arise.

I might venture at this juncture, however, that the hour has come for us to undertake jointly a thorough review of the policy of mutual understanding on this Hemisphere and to conduct a comprehensive reappraisal of the proceedings already in motion for the furtherance of Pan American ideals in all their aspects and implications. The time has come for us to ask ourselves the pertinent question as to whether or not all of us are doing our utmost to weld the indestructible union of sentiments, aspirations and interests called for by the graveness of the world situation.

As a soldier who led democracy to victory, as an experienced statesman and, above all as a man sensitive to the ways of truth, Your Excellency is in an unique position to evaluate the seriousness of the question which I postulate with the exclusive purpose of defining and subsequently eliminating an entire range of misunderstandings that are easily capable of being removed at this moment but which may perhaps suffer a malignant growth should we fail to give it proper and timely attention.

It is hoped that the unpleasant memory of the ordeal undergone by Vice President Nixon will be effaced by the results of earnest efforts towards creating something deeper and more durable for the defense and preservation of our common destiny.

As I have already said to Your Excellency, it is advisable that we correct the false impression that we are not behaving in a fraternal way in the Americas; but besides this corrective effort, and in order that it be durable and perfect, we must search our consciences to find out if we are following the right path in regard to Pan Americanism.

It is my earnest hope that Your Excellency will feel that this letter was written under the impulse of a desire to reaffirm the warm and sincere fraternal sentiments which have always bound my Country to the United States of America, in perfect attunement with the ideas outlined by Your Excellency on the occasion of the meeting of the Chief Executives of the American nations in Panama.

May God guard Your Excellency and the people of the United States of America.

JUSCELINO KUBITSCHEK

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1958, p. 950.

Africa's Challenge to the Free World

by Julius C. Holmes

Special Assistant to the Secretary¹

I am very happy to have this opportunity to visit New Orleans and to speak on a subject which is daily gaining greater importance, "Africa's Challenge to the Free World."

I propose to concentrate on Middle Africa—that area which lies south of the Sahara and north of the Union of South Africa—but shall take into consideration certain problems and issues that apply to the continent as a whole. I shall survey major elements of the political, economic, and social challenge of Africa to the free world and outline how the free world, and in particular the United States, is reacting to these challenges.

The Political Evolution of Africa

From an intensive study tour of Africa which I made last fall I came away with one major conclusion; namely, that the most dynamic force currently at work on the continent is nationalism and the trend toward self-government and independence. The free world is challenged to accommodate itself to this force in such a manner as to insure continuing fruitful African cooperation in the mutual interest.

The political evolution of Africa is developing unevenly and progressing at widely varying tempos in different areas. Many areas are advanced or at least advancing; others, on the other hand, are just awakening to the urge for self-assertion. The metropolitan powers still responsible for most of the sub-Sahara region follow varying

policies based on differing philosophies. As a result there is neither uniformity nor simplicity in the African nationalist movement.

To gain perspective we must recognize that current African nationalism is a part of a great postwar development, worldwide in scope, that began in Asia, swept across the Middle East and North Africa, and is now a major force through the rest of the continent. Of the 20 new nations created—or in some cases re-created—since World War II, 5 are in Africa. These are Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, the Sudan, and Ghana. At this point, too, it should be recalled that Liberia, the continent's first republic, will be celebrating its 111th independence day this July and that Ethiopia can trace its independence back to early Biblical days. African nationalism, therefore, is both old and new.

The pan-African conference held at Accra from April 15 to 22 on invitation of Prime Minister Nkrumah made clear that a major objective of the eight independent states of Africa which participated is to end the colonial system in the area as rapidly as possible and to strengthen and safeguard their own independence and territorial integrity.

What then is the status of the more than 30 African territories that have not yet achieved their independence? Is their development meeting the political requirements of their peoples?

Let us answer these questions by reviewing some case examples.

An important and constructive force in the current African trend toward self-government is the United Nations. The purpose of the trusteeship system is to promote the orderly development of these six African trust territories toward

¹ Address made before the Foreign Policy Association of New Orleans at New Orleans, La., on May 29 (press release 292 dated May 25).

either self-government or independence on a basis which assures that they will have sufficient political stability and economic viability to maintain themselves under the difficult conditions of this century.

The United Nations provides a forum through which the peoples of the trust territories of French Togo, British and French Cameroons, Ruanda-Urundi, Tanganyika, and Somalia can be heard and their wishes taken into account. Under this system provision is also made for periodic visiting missions to the territories under trusteeship and also for hearing petitioners in person at sessions of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council.

Although we speak of six U.N. trust territories in Africa, it is well to recall that there were seven, the seventh, British Togo, having joined the newly independent nation of Ghana early in 1957 in accordance with the will of the Togoland population expressed in a popular plebiscite conducted under U.N. supervision.

The Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration is scheduled to become an independent state in 1960 in accordance with the trusteeship agreement entered into by the General Assembly and Italy in 1950. Elections are scheduled to be held there this fall for a new legislative assembly which will be charged with preparing the constitution for the new state. Although the territory has two basic unsolved problems—that of a large budgetary deficit and a disputed border with Ethiopia—there is no reason to question that the orderly transition of this country to full independence will be achieved as anticipated. The disputed border problem has been submitted to arbitration,² and the Trusteeship Council has been concerned with exploring the possibilities of providing economic assistance when independence is achieved.

As a result of a General Assembly resolution passed in November 1957, the French Trust Territory of Togo last month held elections to an enlarged legislative assembly on the basis of universal suffrage. These elections resulted in victory for the former opposition parties, which generally appear to favor independence, although the present position of these groups, now that

they are in power, remains to be defined. The territory, under its new Prime Minister, Sylvanus Olympio, may soon be in a position to request the United Nations to terminate the trusteeship agreement.

Similarly, two other West African trust territories—the British Cameroons and French Cameroun—are approaching achievement of the final objectives of the trusteeship system. Within the next few years it is expected that the future status of these two territories will be determined on the basis of the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants in close consultation with or under supervision of the United Nations. This autumn a U.N. visiting mission, including a U.S. member, will tour the territories for the purpose of preparing recommendations to the Trusteeship Council.

The British East African Trust Territory of Tanganyika—largest and most populous of all African trust territories—will hold its first national elections in 1958 and 1959 for a new, enlarged legislative council. As soon as these elections are completed, the Tanganyika Government intends to call a conference to review the constitution and examine possible broadening of the franchise.

The Trusteeship Council recently endorsed the views of the 1957 U.N. visiting mission to Ruanda-Urundi that this Belgian trust territory has achieved numerous advances and is now in a position to assimilate a still larger number of far-reaching changes.

Progress toward self-government and independence in Africa is not, of course, limited to U.N. trust territories. Great forward strides are now being taken in numerous other British and French territories as well.

The Federation of Nigeria expects to attain full independence in 1960. Developments in this West African territory of more than 32 million people, inhabiting a land equal in area to the States of Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana combined, are of prime importance to the whole continent. It is reassuring to note that Nigeria's leaders have already accumulated 10 years' experience in self-government under forward-looking British tutelage. Under terms of the 1948 and 1954 constitutions, as revised at the London conference of 1957, the federation already has achieved a high degree of self-government, with a federal prime

² For a U.S. statement and text of a U.N. resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1958, p. 150.

minister and cabinet having full responsibility for matters within their portfolios. The British Governor-General, acting as the representative of the British Crown, retains only certain very carefully circumscribed reserve powers and is generally bound by the decisions of the federal cabinet. In addition a large measure of self-government has also been achieved by Nigeria's three federal regions: the western, eastern, and northern.

Considerable progress toward autonomy has also been made in the British East African territory of Uganda and Sierra Leone in West Africa. In Kenya, where there has been considerable agitation over issues involving an increase of African participation in the government of that multiracial crown colony, the Capricorn African Society, comprised of Europeans, Asians, and Africans, recently sponsored a 4-day conference to consider various aspects of "education for nationhood." Three Kenya Government ministers participated, and emphasis was placed on the basic need for formation of adult education agencies and an independent "college of citizenship" in the colony to prepare it for further constructive advances along the road to fuller autonomy.

France's progressive policy in tropical Africa, resulting in passage of the *loi cadre* or "framework law" in 1957, has provided Africans with municipal, territorial, and federal legislatures in their own countries as well as representation in the French Union and national legislative bodies in Paris.

In March 1957 Africans were elected to legislative assemblies throughout French West and Equatorial Africa, Somaliland, and Madagascar on the basis of universal suffrage on single electoral rolls. African cabinet ministers and French associates have been working together in full cooperation in each of these territories, and a widespread recognition of the interdependence of Africa and France has been evident. For example, the prominent Malgache leaders of the Madagascar Territorial Assembly, the first in Madagascar's history to enjoy wide deliberative and executive authority in local affairs, have called for a program of gradual and full self-government within the French Union, with the final goal being a relationship with France somewhat like the relationship of members of the British Commonwealth with Great Britain.

Racial and Tribal Conflicts

Complicating the trend toward self-government in Africa is the problem of racial and tribal conflicts. This problem is particularly acute in East, Central, and Southern Africa. In British East Africa it has been said that tribal tensions are as serious a problem as the interracial stresses. But the latter is perhaps the more divisive as misunderstandings and friction arise not only between Africans and Europeans but also between Asians and Africans and between Negroes and Arabs.

In general terms the major reason for increased racial problems in East, Central, and Southern Africa is the presence there of permanent settlers in large numbers. It may be concluded from this that it is not just contact between Europeans, Asians, and Africans by itself that causes racial problems but social and economic competition among permanently established racial groups.

It is obvious that some means of fostering racial partnership and cooperation in a spirit of brotherhood and justice is required. There is no simple panacea, obviously, and we must take encouragement from the efforts that are being taken to develop equitable multiracial policies in some of the areas where the problem is acute.

Another factor disturbing the trend toward orderly evolution to self-government and independence in Africa is Soviet imperialism, which as recently as January, through the medium of the Cairo Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, notified the world that Africa was to be its next area of anticolonial agitation.

The Communists have made some progress in penetrating individual African labor organizations, youth groups, and nationalist organizations such as the *Union des Populations Camerounaises* (UPC) in the French Cameroun. They have worked hard to influence the thousands of African students studying in Western Europe and the United Arab Republic, bringing many to either bloc countries or the Soviet Union on scholarships and grants. They are devoting increasing study and research to African subjects and training more Soviet and Soviet-bloc specialists in African affairs. They have been successful in signing trade agreements with most of the independent African states in the last 2 years. Their

purpose is to deny the continent to the free world through fanning racism, extreme nationalism, and anticolonialism and offering economic assistance deceptively advertised as "without strings."

Despite their new commercial agreements, Soviet and Soviet-bloc trade with Africa is still at an extremely low level—well below that of the United States; no Communist parties of any importance exist anywhere; and African trade-union movements have chosen to affiliate with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, headquartered in Brussels.

We cannot, however, be complacent because the current Soviet cultural, economic, and political offensive in Africa has not yet shown spectacular results, for their dogged agitation and ingenuity born of revolutionary and subversive training and practice must be reckoned with. Our success in meeting this challenge, therefore, will depend on our success in helping Africa to realize its legitimate political aspirations in an orderly yet progressive manner.

Africa's Economic and Social Needs

Closely related to the political and racial challenge that Africa poses to the free world are the pressing economic and social needs of this vast continent, which automatically constitute a major challenge to free-world wisdom, generosity, and good will.

Africa's economic and social problems are formidable. They may be summarized as: (1) lack of public and private capital for investment and development; (2) lack of technical, organization, and executive skills and abilities; (3) lack of adequate education and public-health programs; (4) lack of transportation and communication facilities; and (5) lack of diversification of national economies.

How is the free world answering this challenge to assist Africa in meeting such an impressive array of needs?

First, European governments are spending between \$600 million and \$700 million annually in African areas, principally for economic assistance to their dependent territories.

Second, the United Nations is contributing in numerous ways to meeting these needs. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for example, has lent about \$95 million to

African states and territories from 1955 through 1957 and just this month awarded Nigeria a loan of \$28 million for railroad development. The United States, I might add, contributes at least 40 percent of the funds of the IBRD, and the U.S.S.R., significantly, is not even a member.

The United Nations Technical Assistance Program has been devoting more than \$3 million annually to Africa and is expected to expand this program greatly in the coming years.

Such United Nations technical agencies as the World Health Organization—which this year celebrates its 10th anniversary—the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund, the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization are all contributing importantly to African social and economic development.

Private investment from the free world is proving of growing significance to African economic development. U. S. investment alone totals about \$600 million and European investment many times that amount.

The United States Government has several means through which it is assisting African economic and social development. For the last 2 fiscal years the mutual security program alone has provided more than \$60 million annually in economic and technical assistance to Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Liberia, Ghana, and British East Africa.

In addition the Export-Import Bank has been providing African countries with between \$10 million and \$15 million annually in loans for development.

As our African aid programs are still in their early stages, spectacular achievements cannot yet be recorded. However, in Libya our development programs of the last few years are beginning to show good results and national output is estimated to have increased almost 50 percent between 1954 and 1957. In Liberia 21 technical-assistance projects, including an outstandingly successful rural elementary-education development, have been completed.

In the next fiscal year, for which larger aid funds have been requested of the Congress, it is planned to sponsor numerous technical-cooperation projects in various regions of Africa in the

fields of agriculture, industry, transport, education, health, public administration, and resources development. While no funds have yet been allocated to African states, it is expected that Development Loan Fund loans to African states and territories may run as high as \$100 million annually if sufficient capital is made available.

The Role of the United States in Africa

Having surveyed the political, economic, and social challenge of Africa to the free world and the United States in particular, what can we conclude about the success of our efforts to meet the challenge?

First, the political aspect of the challenge:

Having long recognized that traditional colonialism is coming to an end, the United States believes that the transition to self-government and eventual self-determination should be completed in an orderly manner in the interests of all parties involved. The capacity of local populations to assume and discharge the responsibilities of self-government alone should determine the speed of this evolution.

We believe that our role in this trend in Africa should be to support liberal European measures designed to provide African dependent territories self-government and eventual autonomy after suitable preparation and experience and to encourage, insofar as we are able, moderate African leaders who recognize the benefit to their own people of evolutionary rather than revolutionary progress. In this connection we believe that responsible African leaders should consider the dangers that confront a newly independent state today and recognize the pitfalls of premature independence.

In view of our difficulties in solving our own race problems by the lawful process, we must in all humility recognize that it would be presumptuous of us to propose solutions to the race problems of the multiracial states of Africa. We can, however, attempt to exert a moderating influence on all extremists and stand steadfastly at all times for the principle of nondiscrimination and racial equality.

To meet Soviet threats to African evolutionary political development, we must assist the Africans to show steady progress in meeting the problems that now confront them. The attitude and deeds of the free world and the United States will de-

termine how effective or ineffective the Soviet blandishments to Africa will be.

Second, the economic and social aspect of the African challenge:

I have already enumerated the U.S. intention to provide continuing economic and technical assistance to African states that request and need it. In addition through our educational exchange and information programs, both of which we hope to expand in Africa in the years immediately ahead, we are attempting to increase mutual understanding between Africans and Americans—in particular to spread the understanding of the principles and advantages of the free way of life.

American private enterprise—business interests, private and educational foundations, information media, missionaries, students, and tourists—has a major “people to people” role to play in meeting the African social, economic, and political challenge to the free world. This private sector is increasing its constructive activities in Africa and I hope will continue to do so with every passing month. It is in this section that the strength of the free world is often best expressed to Africans.

The African challenge to the free world is in effect a challenge to us to live up to the highest ideals and principles of freedom and justice, to demonstrate full respect for the dignity of all men, to support the legitimate aspirations of all peoples to eventual self-determination and self-government, to strengthen the sovereignty of independent nations, and to provide mutual economic assistance for the common good—in a phrase, to live the precepts which we preach.

The United States, as a leader in the free world, must accept this challenge and meet it on time. For perhaps, more than anything else, timeliness of action will determine our success.

Prime Minister of Ghana To Visit United States

The Department of State announced on June 2 (press release 298) that arrangements had been completed for the arrival at Washington on July 23 of Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, who will visit the United States at the invitation of President Eisenhower.

Prime Minister Nkrumah and his party will remain in Washington until July 26, when they will begin a trip scheduled to include visits to Hershey, Harrisburg, and Philadelphia, Pa., New York, N.Y., and Chicago, Ill. They will leave New York for London on August 2.

With the renewed assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honour to remain,

MAHMOUD FAWZI
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the United Arab Republic

Arab Republic and Suez Stockholders Agree on Compensation Terms

Following is a letter of May 20 from Mahmoud Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic, to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, transmitting the text of the Heads of Agreement¹ signed at Rome on April 29 in connection with compensation of the Suez stockholders.²

U.N. doc. A/3827, S/4014

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

20 May 1958

With reference to my letter to you on 24 April 1957,³ relating to the Declaration on the Suez Canal and the Arrangements for its Operation, I have the honour, with particular reference to paragraph 8 of that Declaration, to enclose the text of Heads of Agreement in connexion with compensation of the Suez Stockholders, which was signed on 29 April 1958 in Rome by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and of the Suez Stockholders.

It is with pleasure and gratitude that I avail myself of this opportunity to recall Your Excellency's, the Secretariat's and the International Bank's co-operation in this connexion.

¹ "Heads of agreement" is a term denoting a type of preliminary agreement on main aspects of a problem, with details remaining for further implementation.

² On June 11 the International Bank issued the following statement: "Subsequent to the signature of the heads of agreement in Rome on 29 April 1958 by representatives of the Government of the United Arab Republic and of the Suez shareholders, further discussion between the parties, with International Bank participation, has been held in Cairo and subsequently in Paris during the past several weeks. As a result of these discussions, agreement has been reached on the text of a final agreement, providing for the implementation of the Rome heads of agreement. It is expected that this final agreement will be signed about mid-July, after the necessary formalities have been completed by the parties."

³ BULLETIN of May 13, 1957, p. 776.

TEXT OF HEADS OF AGREEMENT

The representative of the Government of the United Arab Republic (as successor to the Government of Egypt), and the representatives of the Suez stockholders, namely, the shareholders, the holders of founder shares, and the holders of the Parts Civiles (Société Civile pour le recouvrement des 15% des produits nets de la Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez attribués au Gouvernement égyptien), hereinafter referred to as "the Stockholders", have agreed the following Heads of Agreement:

1. As a full and final settlement of the compensation due to shareholders and holders of founders shares as a consequence of the Nationalization Law No. 285 of 1956, and in full settlement of claims of the holders of the Parts Civiles, the Government of the United Arab Republic will make a payment equivalent to £E28.3 million (Twenty-eight million and three hundred thousand Egyptian pounds) and will leave all the external assets to the Stockholders.

2. In consideration of the above, the Stockholders will accept responsibility for all liabilities outside Egypt as of 26 July 1956, including liability for the service of the outstanding debentures (principal and interest) and for pensions in accordance with paragraph 4 (b) below.

3. The Government of the United Arab Republic continues to assume responsibility for all liabilities within Egypt as of 26 July 1956, including liability for pensions in accordance with paragraph 4 (a) below.

4. (a) The Government of the United Arab Republic will assume liability for pensions, as follows:

(i) Pensions already granted as of 26 July 1956 and being paid by Egypt to pensioners resident in Egypt on the date of signature of the present Heads of Agreement;

(ii) Pensions accruing to staff who were employed in the service on 26 July 1956 and who are still in the service of the Suez Canal Authority, or who, having remained in the Authority's service, retired on pension after that date in accordance with the regular pensions regulations.

(b) The Stockholders will assume liability for all pensions other than those specified in (a) above.

(c) Each party to these Heads of Agreement will afford facilities for the preparation of lists of individual pensioners falling within the various categories mentioned in this paragraph 4 in order that the liability for payment of pensions to each individual may be properly determined.

(d) The Stockholders will pay to the Government of the United Arab Republic the capital value of the pensions payable to persons who, having remained in the

Authority's service after 26 July 1956, retired on pension after that date in accordance with the regular pensions regulations, but ceased to reside in Egypt prior to the date of the signature of these Heads of Agreement, and who, at the date of signature of these Heads of Agreement, do not receive their pension from the Stockholders.

(e) Liability for pensions after the date of signature of these Heads of Agreement will not be affected by any subsequent change of residence by a pensioner.

5. The payment specified in paragraph 1 will be made as follows:

(a) An initial payment of £E5.3 million (Five million and three hundred thousand Egyptian pounds), through the retention by the Stockholders of the transit tolls collected in Paris and in London since 26 July 1956.

(b) The balance in instalments as follows:

£E

- 1 January 1959, 4 m. (Four million Egyptian pounds)
- 1 January 1960, 4 m. (Four million Egyptian pounds)
- 1 January 1961, 4 m. (Four million Egyptian pounds)
- 1 January 1962, 4 m. (Four million Egyptian pounds)
- 1 January 1963, 4 m. (Four million Egyptian pounds)
- 1 January 1964, 3 m. (Three million Egyptian pounds)

6. The instalments specified in paragraph 5 (b) above will be free of interest and will be payable in pounds Sterling in London or in French francs in Paris, calculated at the fixed rate of US\$2.8715576 to £E1. Not less than 40 per cent of each instalment shall be payable in pounds Sterling.

7. (a) If the Government of the United Kingdom provides a special release from Egypt's No. 2 Sterling account for the specific purpose of making advance payments on the instalments specified in paragraph 5 (b), amounts so released will be paid over forthwith by the Government of the United Arab Republic for application to the payment in advance of the two next maturing instalments specified in paragraph 5 (b).

(b) In the event of a release by the Government of the United Kingdom of the total of Egypt's No. 2 Sterling account, the Government of the United Arab Republic will pay over forthwith an appropriate amount of the funds so released for application to the payment in advance of the two next maturing instalments specified in paragraph 5 (b).

(c) If either of the releases under (a) or (b) above takes place before the effective date of the final agreement referred to in paragraph 9 below, the appropriate amounts will be paid over forthwith on the effective date.

8. The conclusion and implementation of the final agreement referred to in paragraph 9 will be done in such a way that the rights and liabilities attributed to the Stockholders under the present Heads of Agreement are effectively exercised and assumed by an entity acceptable to both parties as representing regularly all the Stockholders and duly qualified to give full and final discharge to the Government of the United Arab Republic.

9. In view of the fact that the present Heads of Agreement have been negotiated under the good offices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Bank having accepted the capacity of the signatories

for the purposes of concluding the present Heads of Agreement, the parties hereby request the Bank to continue its good offices until the conclusion and documentation of a final agreement implementing these Heads of Agreement and to act as fiscal agent for the purpose of receiving and paying out the monies provided for in paragraphs 4 (d), 5 (b) and 7 above.

Done in triplicate at Rome on 29 April 1958 in the presence of a Vice-President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. One copy to be retained by the Government of the United Arab Republic; one copy to be retained by the representatives of the Suez Stockholders; and one copy to be deposited in the archives of the International Bank.

On behalf of the Government of the United Arab Republic:

ABDEL GALIL EL EMARY

On behalf of the Suez Stockholders:

J. GEORGES PICOT

Witnessed by:

W. A. B. ILLIF

Vice-President

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

U.S. Airlifts Anticholera Serum to Thailand

Press release 318 dated June 9

The U.S. Government's offer of a plane for the airlift to Bangkok of anticholera vaccine and serum-producing laboratory equipment for combating the growing cholera epidemic in Thailand has made it possible to concentrate on a single plane 20,000 pounds of vitally important material. This serum and equipment has been provided by the American Red Cross, the Canadian Red Cross, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the International Cooperation Administration.

The plane, a U.S. Air Force C-118, is scheduled to take off from McGuire Air Force Base Terminal on June 10. The Ambassador of Thailand, Thanat Khoman, and representatives of the cooperating organizations will be present when the plane departs.

The plane's cholera-fighting cargo will include:

Vaccine production equipment, requested by the King of Thailand from UNICEF for the Queen Savabha (Pasteur) Institute in Bangkok;

5,000 saline transfusion sets and saline solution bottles, 2,350 pounds of dextrose, 500 pounds of agar-agar, procured through UNICEF for the King of Thailand;

Intravenous fluid production equipment given

by the American Red Cross to the Thai Red Cross; 60,000 cc. vaccine given by the Canadian Red Cross to the Thai Red Cross;

400,000 cc. vaccine made available for distribution in Thailand by the International Coopera-

tion Administration. Further deliveries of vaccine will be available for later shipment if needed.

All agencies and private suppliers have cooperated in meeting the Thai requests with speed and all available resources.

Visit of Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, made a state visit to Washington June 4-7. Following are texts of the welcoming remarks made by President Eisenhower at the Washington National Airport on June 4, the toasts of President Eisenhower and President Heuss at the state dinner at the White House on June 4, and the address made by President Heuss before a joint session of the Congress on June 5, together with a list of the members of the official party.

WELCOMING REMARKS BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

White House press release dated June 4

President Heuss and ladies and gentlemen: Never before in history has the head of a German state visited this land. So it is with unusual warmth that I welcome you this morning to this Capital City and to this country.

In your lifetime and mine, Mr. President, the power of your nation and the power of this nation have been tragically plunged into war on opposite sides. The wounds of those wars seem to be, I think, almost wholly cured.

So today I think that the feeling of a friendship between the American people and the German people of the Federal German Republic is the stronger, the more intense, because of the tribulations that we have been through and because of the way our two countries have met in peaceful conference, peaceful arrangements, to overcome those old memories and disasters.

And so I am sure that, as you visit this country, you will discover that the American people reflect

the same sentiments as I now give to you, which are: Welcome here, very, very heartily.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated June 4

President Eisenhower:

President Heuss, ladies and gentlemen: Rarely has this house had a greater honor than has come to it this evening in the opportunity to entertain the President of the Federal German Republic. Never before has the head of the German state visited this nation.

And so this evening, President Heuss, there are people here who have come to see you because they are old friends; they come here with an affectionate regard for you.

All of us are here in admiration and esteem for the nation of which you are head and for the characteristics they reveal and you symbolize—their dedication to freedom, to liberty, to the rights of men.

Those are the values that tie this nation to your people so firmly, and we feel especially tonight that it is not only a great honor but a great privilege to ask this company to rise and drink to you a toast.

President Heuss (as reported in English by the interpreter):

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I think you have said and you have done me two great honors by saying that this house received an historical honor tonight through my visit.

I have read quite a lot about American history, but what I am getting here are living impres-

sions of American history. This afternoon I was at Mount Vernon. Tonight you were kind enough to show me Lincoln's chair in the Lincoln Room. And we are surrounded by history, we are determined by history, and we are influenced by history.

Tonight, when I was privileged to receive together with you, Mr. President, I have seen many faces—well-known faces, loved faces, the faces of Americans whom I have met in Germany, at a time when they met us with some restraint and reserve, and perhaps also with mistrust and perhaps also with a raised finger.

But it did not take very long before they became very good friends of ours, and they supported us in our efforts to reestablish our country, to rebuild our economy, to restrengthen our nation. And I think that was the greatest achievement of the last American generation in turning out to be such a great helper and supporter of the German people in their efforts to rebuild their country after the misery, after the horrors of the war through which they had been.

But I think I am going too far now—that goes beyond an after-dinner speech. I will say something about that tomorrow in the speech I am going to make to Congress. But because of what you said just now, I think I was forced, I was compelled, to make these remarks to that effect.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT HEUSS¹

Official translation

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress of the United States, permit me first to make a personal remark.

I have chosen not without hesitation to address this august assembly in my own language. I would much rather have addressed the Congress of the United States in English—and have established thereby, perhaps, a more immediate communication with Members of both Houses. But I have come reluctantly to the conclusion that my command of your language is not what it used to be—that it has, in fact, become somewhat rusty. I must ask your indulgence, therefore, to allow me to speak to you in German.

I am grateful to President Eisenhower for his

invitation because it gives me an opportunity to see for myself the reality of these United States. I think I know a little about this country's history. I know many of its citizens and I have had a great many discussions about the development and mentality of the people of this vast country. But already I feel that I shall not advance on my visit here beyond some very modest elementary lessons; and I, who have written a number of books, promise you that I shall not write a book as an expert on the United States when I return home. Nor do I want to compete with de Tocqueville. The dimensions to be grasped compel humility. But I do appreciate the honor of being able to address this distinguished assembly whose debates and acts today profoundly influence the world's destiny. It is a world responsibility which the American citizen has not sought but which he does not shirk.

I shall speak to you with the utmost candor. After Hitler's recklessness had forced the United States as well into his war, a shadow fell upon the American view of the German people: Every German seemed to be a Nazi. Today there is not much point in complaining about this distortion of the picture. After 1945 I said to many an officer of the occupation forces: You, who have never experienced the meanness and technical perfection of a totalitarian dictatorship, you are in the happy position in which you cannot even imagine the terrible moral pressure to which a people can be subjected. When we attempted, after 1945, to reestablish something like public life on the basis of justice and democracy we, too, suffered much distress resulting from an outlook distorted by the passions of war. After a time, however, we saw how the reality of German life, little by little, was understood and interpreted.

Ten years ago I said that this was something quite new in world history: Up to May 8, 1945, the American citizen had to pay heavy taxes in order to destroy the German State whereas after May 8 he had to pay taxes in order to save the German people. But there was not merely the taxpayer's burden which after a few years was absorbed into the grand design of the Marshall Plan which, in turn, had evolved from the Hoover Report. In addition there was the aid given by the individual American, by the churches, the charitable organizations, by the countless and uncountable men and women no matter whether they

¹ *Congressional Record*, June 5, 1958, p. 9151.

were of German origin or not. The love of one's fellow man dissolved fear and hatred. I do not come to you as a petitioner. I wish simply to express my gratitude for the action which your Government has taken as well as for the help rendered by millions of individual Americans. The material side of this assistance was important but not decisive: It gave us moral uplift and encouragement. Without the help of the United States it would have been inconceivable for 10 million Germans expelled from their homeland to be offered food, work and shelter. The fact that week after week several thousand people flee to the West from intellectual and spiritual slavery in the Soviet-occupied zone continues to weigh heavy on the Federal Republic—their numbers have swelled to many hundreds of thousands. That stream of human beings is at once a lasting grievance and a perpetual reproach.

I do not wish to take up the time at my disposal by discussing, in terms of personalities, the German contribution to the growth of American statehood and the development of the American way of life. But I think I may say this much: The two great Presidents of the United States, who have become legendary figures, come to mind—George Washington knew that he could depend on the solid work of organization done by the German General von Steuben just as Abraham Lincoln could rely on the German champion of freedom, Carl Schurz, the most prominent representative of the many young Germans who came to the United States in quest of those civic and political rights for which they had fought vainly in Germany in 1848. The liberal and idealistic element represented by those groups was easily integrated into the American historical concept. And this concept was expanded and strengthened by the tradition of diligent, skillful labor of the millions of people of German descent who have been absorbed—for which they are grateful, I may say—into the substance of the American Nation.

We in Germany found ourselves in a strange situation after 1945. The people were exhausted and starving; the attitude of many toward the victorious powers was "Do what you like with us." At that time the reproach was heard—also from this country—that the Germans were sorry for themselves. There was something in that. But with the coming of a sound currency and of the Marshall Plan, people in Germany saw that there

was purpose again in hard work and effort. So the Germans set to work and put life into their economy again. In 1949 and 1950, I told prominent American businessmen frequently that the Marshall Plan funds were well invested in Germany. Can you hold this against a people that they have regained economic strength through industriousness and skill, and thanks to the economic commonsense displayed by the United States which was the essential condition for German economic recovery? I find nothing more interesting than to read in some newspapers of the Western world—though not in the United States—that the Germans are once more becoming imperialists because they have more or less recovered their share of the world's market. Surely, there is no imperialism but much useful work in building sturdy cranes and manufacturing medical supplies.

During the past 50 years Germany has had the misfortune to acquire the reputation of being the nation which embodied, so to speak, eternal unrest and overweening ambition. A hundred years earlier—following the French revolution and the first Napoleon—other countries enjoyed this reputation. It would seem to me a good idea to get rid of such clichés encountered here and there in newspapers and schoolbooks.

We, all of us, must shed this habit of thinking, while, at the same time, not abandoning our traditional values. The German people—who here and there are still strangely suspected of exemplifying aggressive nationalism—existed as the Holy Roman Empire, as a European entity, imbued with a sense of responsibility toward Europe as a whole. And that was at a time when Spain, Britain, France, and later Russia, had long embarked upon a very concrete policy of expansion. I do not say this because I want to engage in polemics against historic events of bygone centuries—that is always a senseless thing to do—but in order to make the discussion about our present situation a little easier.

It is remarkable: The Korean crisis—a scene of secondary importance in the traditional European concept of history—has laid open, both materially and psychologically, the fundamental issue—respect for law or for arbitrary power, for violent action or for free self-determination. I cannot here dwell on this. But I can say what the effect has been on us in Germany. National free-

dom—including that aspect of it which concerns the social order—is a value which must be defended. It must be defended not only by those who are immediately affected but by all those to whom peace is a value per se and democracy a moral value. Believe me, it was not easy in Germany to explain the duty to do military service to the man-in-the-street who had been persuaded by propaganda that his military service had been some sort of crime because the supreme command had been in the hands of criminals. And yet it was possible to establish in people's consciousness the natural feeling—that he who cherishes the security of his native soil and the maintenance of freedom must also help to safeguard them.

You must not expect of me a detailed exposition of our domestic German difficulties. National reunification not only remains the object of German longing but also the prerequisite for Europe's recovery. The slogan of coexistence may imply the coexistence of different ideologies in different national territories but it is absurd to base it on a relationship of total power on the one hand and total impotence on the other, which—look at the situation of 1945—disrupts a nation and denies it democratic self-determination.

The settlement of the Saar question has shown that a patient policy which recognizes democratic rights can lead to a happy result. An onerous burden has been lifted from German-French understanding, the cornerstone for strengthening an all-European consciousness. The German and the French people have equally contributed to this success and thereby have at long last brought about a good neighborly relationship between the two countries.

This much is evident: The Germans know where they belong. Their history, their intellectual and Christian-religious traditions have made them an integral part of what is called the Western World. On this point there can be no neutrality for us. There is something disquieting in the fear sometimes expressed in the Western press: Tomorrow they will reach an understanding with Soviet totalitarianism—that is what we term the "Rapallo complex"—or in the specter sometimes evoked in Germany: Washington and Moscow will come to an agreement and Germany will be the victim. It was very important to us—reassuring in a way—that President Eisenhower repeatedly

made it very clear how much he felt Germany's tragic partition to be one of the heaviest mortgages on Europe's future. We shall never, never forget how President Truman by means of the so-called airlift in 1948-49, with the approval of the entire American people, saved Germany's old capital of Berlin—literally saved it—and thus decided the fate of Europe at a crucial point. The Germans, too, have perceived it as their duty to participate as free and active partners in the potentialities of peace and freedom implicit in this concept of the fate of Europe. Hence, the Federal Republic's loyal cooperation in the overall defense planning of NATO. Never again in the future shall German and American soldiers fight each other. And we realize that the sacrifice made by American mothers in having their sons in German garrisons—not, indeed, for the purpose of preparing wars but to prevent them by their presence and thereby to secure the democratic way of life for the future—we realize that this sacrifice corresponds to the great sense of duty which marks your tradition of liberty. And I am pleased to be able to state that, apart from a few unhappy incidents, many good, personal, and even, in some cases, family connections have developed, as well as much fruitful cooperation in the cultural and intellectual spheres.

It is not the case—as simple-minded people sometimes will have it—that it took two lost wars to force the Germans into the school of democracy. One of my pleasant memories is how a scholarly American officer in 1945 or 1946 explained to me that not only the Americans but also the Germans should know more about Germany's old democratic traditions which were preserved amidst the absolutism of the princes, and he gave me a lecture about the self-government of the old free and imperial cities of Germany. I have never forgotten this conversation, which struck a chord in my own family tradition. That was, indeed, a great German contribution to the evolving burgher civilization. And here, I suppose, is the point of contact and of mutual stimulation between the two sides. Behind us lie the bad times when the exchange of views and of knowledge was stopped. It is among the agreeable experiences of our time that people, through exchange visits, have been able to get to know one another; tens of thousands of Germans were able to absorb in this country the breath of

your intellectual and political climate. And we on our part are glad to see the many Americans visiting our country once more—not only to see the romantic Rhine, which 100 or 50 years ago was the main attraction for travelers, but to acquaint themselves with our people, their achievements and their opinions.

I am coming to the end now, grateful that you have listened to me with patience. Believe me that our Germany will never again depart from the path of democracy and freedom. It is our sincere resolve to be good and dependable allies. As an institution the office of the German Federal President cannot be compared to that of the President of the United States. I would ask all those to appreciate this who expect declarations about such technical matters as the conclusion of a European security pact, methods of disarmament, and other problems. What we must aim at is to ease the social, economic, military, and political problems causing tension in the world—problems which have always existed but which have been aggravated since 1914. I have no illusions; I know that the pressing questions of giving substance to European political and economic cooperation, of achieving enduring settlement in the Near East, of safeguarding the free world against all dangers—that these are not to be minimized. These issues are full of difficulties, but examples have shown us that they are capable of solution; one need only recall the problems of Trieste and the Saar. It is my firm conviction that the peoples of the free world—deeply rooted as they are in the Christian faith—possess the moral strength to maintain their position and uphold their ideals. All that is required is to set in motion some of the all-pervasive forces inherent in human nature: reason, a sense of proportion, and perhaps a little love.

MEMBERS OF OFFICIAL PARTY

The Department of State on May 28 (press release 291) announced the members of the official party accompanying President Heuss on his visit to the United States.² They are as follows:

Heinrich von Brentano, Minister of Foreign Affairs^a
Wilhelm Grewe, German Ambassador to the United States
Felix von Eckardt, State Secretary, Chief of the Government Press and Information Office
Hans Bott, Principal Assistant to President Heuss
Sigismund Baron von Brann, Chief of Protocol
Maj. Gen. Martin Harlinghausen, Aide to President Heuss (Commanding General of the Air Force Group North)^a
Peter Limbourg, Executive Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs^a
Ernst Ludwig Heuss, son of President Heuss
Dr. Alfred Wuetz, personal physician to President Heuss
Axel Herbst, American Desk Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs^a
Richard Balken, First Secretary, German Embassy
Erich Raederscheidt, Press Secretary to President Heuss
Werner Ahrens, American Desk Officer, Federal Press Office
Gunther von Hase, Press Secretary, Minister of Foreign Affairs^a
Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., Chief of Protocol of the United States
David K. E. Bruce, American Ambassador to Germany^a
Brig. Gen. Milton F. Summerfelt, USAF, American Aide to President Heuss^a
Clement E. Conger, Acting Deputy Chief of Protocol, Department of State
Robert T. Hennemeyer, Protocol Officer, Department of State
Edward J. Savage, Press Officer, Department of State

² President Heuss left Washington on June 7 for a tour of the United States, including stops at Philadelphia, Pa., Hanover, N.H., Detroit, Mich., Chicago, Ill., San Francisco, Calif., the Grand Canyon National Park, Williamsburg and Charlottesville, Va., and New York, N.Y.

^a Washington only.

The Vice President's Visit to South America in Perspective

Statement by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹

I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before your committee today because I recognize the significance of the inquiry you are undertaking. There is no area of the world more important to us than Latin America. The Department welcomes your inquiry, which I am certain will help to bring into focus for the American public, for the executive departments, and for the Congress the need for all of us to be aware of what is happening in this part of the world and the nature of our own vital interests which are involved.

Before proceeding with the inquiry, Mr. Chairman, I would be grateful if you will allow me to comment briefly on the significance of the Vice President's recent tour of eight South American countries² and on the character of our interests and relations with the countries of Latin America. I hope that these comments will help give perspective to the proceedings which will follow.

In the first place I am concerned that the sensational and even dangerous character of certain incidents which occurred on the Vice President's trip has obscured what Mr. Nixon himself, as well as those of us from the State Department and Mr. Waugh, president of the Export-Import Bank, who accompanied him, consider to have been the positive and beneficial accomplishments of the trip. As the Vice President has said, violence and attempted violence is front-page news while quiet accomplishment is page-8 news. It is no

failing of the press that this is so; it is in the nature of the interests of the reading public. Nevertheless, it remains for us today to headline the page-8 news of the Vice President's trip so that it may, by this committee and through it by the American people, be evaluated against the other.

To do this let us review the activities and effects of the Vice President's visit in each of the countries on his itinerary. We should keep in mind that in each country he had opportunity to meet with and discuss with government leaders the vital issues affecting our relations. We should also keep in mind that in each country he had opportunity to meet with in fair and friendly debate citizens of those countries from all walks of life. Everywhere—and I must stress the word "everywhere"—he was accorded a genuinely friendly and warm welcome by those people, broadly representative of their nations, who received him and who had not been influenced by a small, insidious, and organized minority to commit inhospitable or violent acts against him. Among all such people—government leaders, labor leaders, students, newspapermen, businessmen, intellectuals, and the man in the street—we are confident that the Vice President's visit will be long and favorably remembered. As we are likewise confident that among the women and children of these countries—in their homes, schools, hospitals, and orphanages—the sympathetic, understanding visits of Mrs. Nixon will be appreciated and not forgotten.

Uruguay

In Uruguay the Vice President's visit was outstandingly successful, both from the point of view

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Latin America of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 3.

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 9, 1958, p. 950 and p. 952.

of his discussions with government leaders and his contacts with the people. Mr. Nixon, in an unscheduled visit to the university, won the applause and friendly support of the student body in general, overcoming the small number of Communist-oriented students who attempted to mar his otherwise enthusiastic reception in Montevideo. This action, and his open, positive presentation of American aims, ideals, and policies, was widely acclaimed in the Uruguayan and international press as an important step toward breaking down the Communist-inspired attitudes implanted with some success among the politically minded student body.

Similarly successful were the Vice President's meeting with Uruguayan labor leaders, as well as a hitherto unpublicized meeting with a group of Uruguay's most prominent political leaders, representative of the entire spectrum of opinion, and publishers, who welcomed being consulted by him on the issues of United States-Uruguayan relations. In his talks with government officials themselves Mr. Nixon explored the problems affecting our governmental relations as well as the interests of American business in that country. Our Embassy in Montevideo has reported that the resulting clarification of these problems will have an important bearing on their early, positive solution. Among the problems discussed were those affecting various American business interests in Uruguay; United States trade policies in relation to specific Uruguayan commodities; United States attitude toward dictatorships in Latin America; and the significance and implications of the Soviet economic and trade offensive.

Argentina

In Argentina the Vice President's primary mission was to represent the President and the American people at the inauguration of the new Argentine President, Dr. Arturo Frondizi. This was an historic occasion for the Argentine people, representing as it did for them the restoration of democratic institutions after many years of dictatorial denial and 2 years of careful preparation under a caretaker-government interregnum. We have every reason to believe that the Argentine people recognize in our choice of the Vice President to represent us a demonstration of our sympathetic interest in and support for this great milestone in their history.

The Vice President's welcome in Buenos Aires was overwhelmingly friendly. Although his route on the long drive from the airport to the heart of the city had not been preannounced, he was enthusiastically greeted by thousands along the way.

One situation which arose in the course of this visit—the Vice President's late arrival for the inauguration ceremonies—did not constitute a mar- roring feature. Actually two unforeseen circumstances were involved: (1) the friendly enthusiasm of crowds along the way who so detained the Vice President that he was late in reaching the legislative palace and even had difficulty making his way inside when he arrived and (2) the fact that the ceremony itself was begun a few minutes before the scheduled hour of 10:00 a. m. As a matter of fact, we have a press photograph of the President already making his inaugural address, before a clock in the background showing 3 minutes to 10:00.

But the Vice President's trip to Buenos Aires was not exclusively ceremonial. There, as elsewhere, he undertook substantive discussions with government leaders and friendly contact with the people. Significant among the latter was the Vice President's enthusiastic reception by over 2,000 labor-union members at an *asado* (Argentine barbecue) at a labor sport camp near Buenos Aires. In private discussions with the new leaders of Argentina Mr. Nixon gave assurance of our Government's keen interest in and support for the success of their democratic progress and of our desire to be constructively helpful in the solution of basic problems affecting their economic recovery and development. Their needs for electric power, the restoration and expansion of transportation equipment, and the development of petroleum resources figured, among other topics, in their discussion. We are confident they have at least laid the groundwork of understanding, from which more fruitful and constructive cooperation between the United States and Argentina may result.

Paraguay

In Paraguay the Vice President was acclaimed wherever he went, in what many Paraguayans termed the most enthusiastic reception ever accorded a foreign dignitary. He was met by cheering throngs at every turn, addressed a special session of the legislature held in his honor, and

talked with the people, as is his custom. In speaking to President Stroessner at a dinner given in his honor, the Vice President underlined the importance of the establishment of democratic principles and institutions in Paraguay. The President revealed his awareness of dictatorial charges made against him, and later, in a press conference for United States newsmen accompanying Mr. Nixon, President Stroessner expressed his willingness to move toward greater freedom for the Paraguayan people.

Bolivia

No one could mistake the warmth and friendliness of the Vice President's reception in La Paz, Bolivia. This country, scene of some of the most violent political episodes the continent has ever witnessed, and still beset by economic problems perhaps more serious than those facing any country in the hemisphere, expressed its gratitude to the Vice President in no uncertain terms for the moral support and economic assistance which the United States has given Bolivia in the last 4 years. The 5-mile route from the La Paz airport to the city was lined with cheering crowds who welcomed Mr. Nixon with placards, miniature American flags, and showers of confetti reminiscent of the Wall Street ticker-tape parades. Here, as elsewhere, he met with labor leaders, "opinion" makers, students, and, by no means the least of all, the man in the street. At the Municipal Palace he was made an "honorary campesino" (peasant) and was decked out with the typical wool poncho and wool cap with ear flaps. Later, at a special celebration organized by skilled workers, Mr. Nixon entered into the spirit of the occasion where derbied Indian women were dancing. With government officials Mr. Nixon held important discussions on the severe problems attendant to efforts to solve Bolivian economic problems, the stimulation of private investment, the compensation for expropriated property, and the character and scope of American aid.

Peru

It was in Lima that the first serious incident of the trip occurred. However, as the Vice President himself has observed, it was perhaps inevitable that the unexpected character and violence of the incident caused it to be magnified out of all

proportion. It has thus unfortunately obscured the real nature of his generally cordial welcome in Peru and the mortification and shock of Peruvian officials and the vast majority of Peruvian people over the actions of a small, organized, and influenced minority.

This is not to suggest that there are no problems with Peru. There are problems, and they are difficult. And by exploiting these problems the Communists were able to organize in Peru, in spite of the historic friendship between Peru and the United States, the first of two attacks on the Vice President's mission and on his person.

I shall not go deeper at this time into the nature of this attack nor into its apparent causes. I would, however, like to comment on other aspects of the Lima visit which, I hope, will bring it into perspective in all fairness to ourselves and to the people of Peru who were not represented by the actions of a tightly organized minority.

As I have said, with the exception of the incident at San Marcos University and later in the square before his hotel, the Vice President was cordially received by the Peruvian people. His reception at the Catholic University, where he made an unscheduled call following the scene at San Marcos, was genuinely friendly. So was his reception by the people at the port of Callao and by labor leaders and other groups with which he met. Finally, in his discussions with Peruvian officials he was able to review the serious issues—largely economic problems relating to Peruvian exports affected by United States trade policies—which have produced resentments and frictions in recent years.

Top officials of the Peruvian Government, responsible journalists, and literally hundreds of Peruvians in all walks of life have in one way or another, directly or indirectly, expressed their deep regret for the incidents which marked the Vice President's visit. There is ample evidence that the Peruvian people see in these incidents a warning of the danger of Communist subversion and the manner in which the character, aspirations, and objectives of their great majority can be so distorted by a very, very small minority. There is evidence, in this regard, that the nucleus of demonstrations in Peru consisted of no more than 50 to 75 people (the same people in each case) and that the real leaders were probably no more than 8 or 10.

Ecuador

In Quito the Vice President's visit was an unqualified success and did much to improve and cement the good relations existing with Ecuador. This country, which has in the past been the scene of much political violence and upheaval, is now enjoying its third successive democratically elected administration. In addition to talks with Ecuadoran officials on economic matters, the Vice President had many contacts with the people. At a football game, for example, he was given a splendid ovation following his announcement of an award of a cup for the winner of the day's game.

Colombia

In Bogotá the Vice President's reception was as friendly as anywhere on the trip, in spite of the charged political atmosphere of that country, which had just elected a new and distinguished President following years of dictatorial rule and which has been plagued with widespread guerrilla war for many years. The streets from the airport to the city were lined with thousands of cheering school children dressed in their Sunday best. The small group of unfriendly demonstrators, who obviously tried to provoke incidents such as had occurred in Peru, was soon swallowed up and forgotten as the overwhelming majority of Colombians made evident their good will toward Mr. Nixon.

At a theater Mr. Nixon was accorded a tremendous ovation by a packed house of labor leaders. His visits to the workers' sections of Bogotá, to a cafeteria serving some United States surplus foodstuffs, and to a nursery sponsored by the Colombian National Manufacturers Association created an excellent impression. Finally, his discussions with the caretaker government, and with the newly elected officials who will be inaugurated soon, helped, we are confident, to lay the basis of improved understanding between the United States and Colombia.

Venezuela

I shall say but a little about the visit to Caracas since I know it will be explored by your committee. I would like to point out, however, that, despite the dissatisfaction probably felt by many Venezuelans with certain economic and political aspects of our recent relations with their country,

there is ample evidence that the violent attacks on the Vice President were organized and spearheaded by a small Communist minority. The Vice President himself has suggested that true Venezuelans would not jeer when their own national anthem was being played. This is the act of people with another allegiance. Nor would the true Venezuelan, who is imbued with the characteristic Latin American respect for womanhood and motherhood, engineer or participate in demonstrations endangering the life of a distinguished lady who was a guest in their country. These were the acts of people whose sentiments and allegiance have been distorted by alien concepts.

This fact was amply attested to when, on the following day, a parade of delegations representing Venezuelans in all walks of life called voluntarily on the Vice President at the Embassy to express their regret and, thereafter, to engage with him in serious, free discussion of the problems affecting our two countries. Thus, finally, some few Venezuelans at least were able to exercise the privilege of free discussion, which the Communist-inspired minority tried to deny.

Importance of Political Relationships

Now, before concluding this statement, if you will indulge me a bit longer, I would like to comment briefly on the political and economic importance of the United States relationship with Latin America. Just as what I have already said will, I trust, help to bring the results of the Vice President's trip a bit more into perspective, I hope that what I am about to say will furnish similar perspective for your inquiry into our relations with this part of the world by providing the highlights from which can be judged Latin America's importance to us and our importance to Latin America.

Our interests in this area—and they are mutual—are broadly speaking political, economic, and strategic. My concentration on these, for the sake of brevity, should not obscure, however, the ever-increasing importance of cultural contact and the efforts being made in both directions to bridge the cultural gap produced by differences in historic evolution, by language barriers, and the like. Nor would I wish to omit mention of our common spiritual ties in the Americas, which help to make of this hemisphere a bulwark of the free world.

A glance at the map will show how interdependent the United States and the 20 other American Republics are for their security. We form a distinct geographic unit, relatively remote from the rest of the world. Together we have a wide variety of natural resources to make us self-sufficient in all important respects, if necessary.

Therefore, while a free and cooperative Latin America is a decided asset to our own security and a friendly, strong United States a decided asset to Latin American security, the converse in either case makes one a serious liability to the other. It is thus to the interests of us all that we develop as a politically compatible association of free nations, economically productive and progressive and militarily capable of defense against any aggressor.

The value of close political relationships which have developed over the years, and the heartening, persistent progress of all Latin America toward ever more democratic forms of government, which promises to increase our compatibility and area of understanding, evidences itself in a multitude of ways. In world history there is no comparable example of such a harmonious relationship between a group of smaller, less developed nations and a larger, more powerful neighbor.

Consider, for example, the security afforded these nations by the firmly established and respected principle of nonintervention, which is the cardinal feature of our relations with Latin America. Consider the atmosphere for free give and take which it provides, in which our interests may be pursued on a basis of absolute equality and mutual respect, regardless of size and military might. Consider also, in the context of the entire free world, the importance of American solidarity in defense of the policies and principles to which we are all committed. This has made itself felt decisively in the U.N., the OAS, and other world consultative bodies. I need not emphasize to you that, in addition to the example this affords for peoples in other areas of the world only newly emerged to independence and national formation—who live dangerously close to the shadow of a totally different kind of world power—this solidarity has more than once provided the margin by which crucial free-world issues have been upheld in these forums.

Just a few facts, I believe, will serve to highlight the importance of our economic interdependence. Our trade with Latin America is almost as large as our trade with Europe—larger than our trade with Asia or Africa—larger than our trade with any other single area. Almost 29 percent of all our imports (\$3.7 billion) came from Latin America in 1957, and about 24 percent of all our exports (\$4.7 billion) went to that area in that year. Unlike some other parts of the world, almost all of these exports to Latin America are paid for; only slightly more than 1 percent represents grant aid. As for the Latin American countries, they depend on us as the major market for their exports (44.2 percent in 1957) and as the primary source of their imports (48.8 percent in 1957). But so much for amount. What does this trade involve?

Coffee, sugar, and other foods account for somewhat more than one-half of Latin American shipments to the United States. Copper, lead, zinc, tin, iron ore, and a wide variety of other strategically important metals total about 19 percent while petroleum accounts for about 18 percent. Compared to their total production, this represents a market in the United States for more than three-fourths of their copper, two-thirds of their coffee, one-half of their raw wool, and two-fifths of their petroleum. In the other direction, Latin America buys from us about 35 percent of our exports of automobiles and trucks, about one-third of our exports of chemicals, electrical machinery, and iron and steel-mill products, over one-fourth of our exports of industrial machinery and textiles, and about 17 percent of our exports of foodstuffs.

Finally, there are the private investments that go with trade. They now total \$8.5 billion in Latin America, which is about 40 percent of all our investment abroad, an amount exceeded only by our investment in Canada. While these investments have increased at an average rate of about \$500 million in recent years, the figure was \$600 million in 1955. These investments, moreover, produced about \$5 billion worth of goods in 1955 and accounted for the production of almost a third of all Latin American export products in that year. They employed 600,000 Latin American people in 1955 and made a net contribution to the Latin American balance of payments of about \$1 billion the same year.

If this trade and economic interdependence is important to us today, think of the future—and the not-too-distant future at that. Today our populations are almost in balance at about 180 million persons in the United States and the same number in Latin America. But the rate of growth in Latin America is about 2.5 percent per year as against only 1.4 percent in the United States. At this rate, by the year 2000 our own population will be about 250 million; the population of Latin America will be over 500 million. Consider this in terms of economic, political, and military power and of markets and trade and investment. Consider also the strategic, geographic relationship involved. The importance of the area, and the importance of mutual interdependence in every field of contact, becomes only too self-evident.

One last point. It is high time that Americans in general discover Latin America. It is high time that they have brought home to them some of the facts which I have sketched and the far more profound picture which I am confident this committee's inquiry will produce. This is no longer an area of sambas and mañana, to borrow the Vice President's language, as it is so often picturesquely portrayed. It is an area of dynamic progress and vigorous people. It is an area which can produce and support metropolitan complexes like Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Mexico City—which together with New York and Chicago are the six largest cities of the hemisphere. It is an area whose governments and peoples look to us for leadership and support, whose ideals and aspirations are more and more akin to our own, and who, we are confident, would vastly prefer to walk the path of peace and progress with us rather than with any other nation.

These are the factors which have played a dominant role in our thinking about the area and in the continuing review of our policies toward it. The Vice President's firsthand observations have naturally added impetus to this review. And we anticipate further contributions to this process from the inquiry your important committee is making today into our Latin American policies. I am confident, however, that you will find that our bipartisan policies for Latin American relations are, by and large, sound in concept and in principle.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Notification by United Kingdom of extension to (with reservations): Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, January 14, 1958.

Aviation

Agreement on joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Done at Geneva September 25, 1956.¹
Accession deposited: Switzerland, May 16, 1958.
Agreement on joint financing of certain air navigation services in Iceland. Done at Geneva September 25, 1956.¹
Accession deposited: Switzerland, May 16, 1958.

Cultural Property

Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.²
Ratification deposited: Italy, May 9, 1958.
Accession deposited: Thailand, May 2, 1958.
Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.²
Ratification deposited: Italy, May 9, 1958.
Accession deposited: Thailand, May 2, 1958.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958.
Proclaimed by the President: June 2, 1958.

Sugar

International sugar agreement. Done at London under date of October 3, 1953. Entered into force May 5, 1954. TIAS 3177.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, February 21, 1958.
Protocol amending the international sugar agreement (TIAS 3177), with annex. Done at London December 1, 1956. Entered into force January 1, 1957; for the United States September 25, 1957. TIAS 3937.
Accession deposited: Indonesia, February 21, 1958.

BILATERAL

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 2, 1956 (TIAS 3513). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta May 22, 1958. Entered into force May 22, 1958.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Iran

Agreement for the furnishing of assistance to Iran for the construction of an airfield and supporting facilities in the Qazvin-Hamedan-Zenjan triangle. Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran May 10, 1958. Entered into force May 10, 1958.

Philippines

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the

Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U. S. C. 1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Manila June 3, 1958. Entered into force June 3, 1958.

Poland

Agreement relating to the distribution in Poland of a Polish-language magazine on life in the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw May 30, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 1958.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U. N. Conference on the Law of the Sea

The U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea concluded at Geneva on April 28 a 9 weeks' session during which it had adopted four international conventions, a protocol thereto, and nine resolutions. The conventions are presently open for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Following is a statement made by Arthur H. Dean, chairman of the U.S. delegation, on the closing day of the conference, April 28, together with texts of the conventions, protocol, and resolutions.¹

CLOSING STATEMENT BY MR. DEAN, APRIL 28

In putting before this conference the United States proposal relating to the breadth of the territorial sea and to exclusive fishing rights in a contiguous zone constituting a part of the high seas, under certain limitations recognizing certain rights of others than the coastal state, I made it clear that the United States regarded this as a realistic compromise and that it was made at considerable sacrifice to United States interests.²

Our proposal was made in a sincere effort to meet other countries' points of view with the sole purpose of achieving international agreement on these important matters. It was an effort to reconcile the diverse and often conflicting interests of those coastal states desiring a larger share in the resources of the seas off their coasts and the in-

terests of those states desiring the broadest possible freedom of the seas.

We greatly appreciate and wish to thank all those who supported our proposal, which received 45 votes, or some 7 votes short of the two-thirds majority required and yet considerably greater support than any other proposal on this subject. Every country must be the judge of its own position and needs, and, while we are disappointed, we have nothing to say about the decision made here.

Our offer to agree on a 6-mile breadth of territorial sea, provided agreement could be reached on such a breadth under certain conditions, was

¹ For a statement made by Mr. Dean on Mar. 11, see BULLETIN of Apr. 7, 1958, p. 574.

² The U.S. compromise proposal provided:

"1. The maximum breadth of the territorial sea of any state shall be six miles.

"2. The coastal state shall in a zone having a maximum breadth of twelve miles, measured from the applicable baseline, determined as provided in these rules, have the same rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation of the living resources of the sea as it has in its territorial sea; provided that such rights shall be subject to the right of the vessels of any state whose vessels have fished regularly in that portion of the zone having a continuous baseline and located in the same major body of water for the period of five years immediately preceding the signature of this Convention, to fish in the outer six miles of that portion of the zone, under obligation to observe therein such conservation regulations as are con-

simply an offer and nothing more. Its nonacceptance leaves the preexisting situation intact.

We are happy with the 3-mile rule. In our judgment it is the principle giving the greatest opportunity to all nations, large and small, new and old, coastal and landlocked, because it is the doctrine most consistent with freedom of the seas, a time-tested and universally recognized principle.

We have made it clear from the beginning that in our view the 3-mile rule is and will continue to be established international law, to which we adhere. It is the only breadth of the territorial sea on which there has ever been anything like

sistent with rules on fisheries adopted by this Conference and other rules of international law.

"3. Any dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of this article shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, be submitted to arbitration unless the parties agree to another method of peaceful solution.

"4. For the purposes of this Convention the term 'mile' means a nautical mile (which is 1,852 meters), reckoned at sixty to one degree of latitude.

"5. As respects the parties thereto, the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article shall be subject to such bilateral or multilateral arrangements, if any, as may exist or be entered into.

"NOTE: It is proposed that this article be entered into with the express understanding that each party to the Convention undertakes to consider sympathetically the request of another party to consult on the question of whether the rights granted by this article are being exercised in such manner as to work an inequity upon one or more of the other parties and, if so, what measures should and can be taken to remedy the situation."

While this proposal indicated the United States was prepared to depart from its traditional adherence to the 3-mile limit in order to achieve conference agreement, Mr. Dean made it clear that the United States would continue to adhere to the 3-mile limit unless the conference agreed on a change in the traditional rule. He stated, for example:

"My government stands firmly upon the view that the three-mile limit is fully established as a principle of international law and that this principle can only be changed by agreement. If we do not agree, our work here will be a nullity and no statement, or proposal or argument, will have any effect whatsoever to extend the breadth of the territorial sea beyond three miles."

The vote on the U.S. compromise proposal was 45 for and 33 against, with 7 abstaining. (The Yemen delegation was absent.) While the U.S. proposal narrowly missed obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority, it was the only proposal on the subject which obtained the affirmative vote of an absolute majority of the 86 conference participants.

common agreement. Unilateral acts of states claiming greater territorial seas are not only not sanctioned by any principle of international law but are, indeed, in conflict with the universally accepted principle of freedom of the seas.

Furthermore we have made it clear that in our view there is no obligation on the part of states adhering to the 3-mile rule to recognize claims on the part of other states to a greater breadth of territorial sea. And on that we stand.

While we consider that the 3-mile rule is existing international law, nevertheless we are still optimistic that upon reflection the great majority of our good friends in the international community will come to realize that international agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and on fishing rights is necessary in order that a regime of law may be effected and that the diverse and often conflicting interests of national states may not jeopardize the peace of the international community.

To this end we pledge our cooperation.

We sincerely believe that such international agreement is possible, and we shall continue to lend our efforts to that end.

CONVENTIONS ADOPTED BY CONFERENCE

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone*

*The States Parties to this Convention
Have agreed as follows:*

PART I: TERRITORIAL SEA

Section I. General

Article 1

1. The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea.

2. This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provisions of these articles and to other rules of international law.

Article 2

The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.

Section II. Limits of the Territorial Sea

Article 3

Except where otherwise provided in these articles, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the terri-

* Adopted Apr. 27 (U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 52).

torial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.

Article 4

1. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

2. The drawing of such baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the régime of internal waters.

3. Baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently above sea level have been built on them.

4. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under the provisions of paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining particular baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.

5. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas the territorial sea of another State.

6. The coastal State must clearly indicate straight baselines on charts, to which due publicity must be given.

Article 5

1. Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State.

2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with article 4 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously had been considered as part of the territorial sea or of the high seas, a right of innocent passage, as provided in articles 14 to 23, shall exist in those waters.

Article 6

The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the territorial sea.

Article 7

1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State.

2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation.

3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points.

Where, because of the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were part of the water area of the indentation.

4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters.

5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area of water that is possible with a line of that length.

6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied.

Article 8

For the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming part of the coast.

Article 9

Roadsteads which are normally used for the loading, unloading and anchoring of ships, and which would otherwise be situated wholly or partly outside the outer limit of the territorial sea, are included in the territorial sea. The coastal State must clearly demarcate such roadsteads and indicate them on charts together with their boundaries, to which due publicity must be given.

Article 10

1. An island is a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide.

2. The territorial sea of an island is measured in accordance with the provisions of these articles.

Article 11

1. A low-tide elevation is a naturally-formed area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low-tide but submerged at high tide. Where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation may be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea.

2. Where a low-tide elevation is wholly situated at a distance exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, it has no territorial sea of its own.

Article 12

1. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The provisions of

this paragraph shall not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance with this provision.

2. The line of delimitation between the territorial seas of two States lying opposite to each other or adjacent to each other shall be marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal States.

Article 13

If a river flows directly into the sea, the baseline shall be a straight line across the mouth of the river between points on the low-tide line of its banks.

Section II. Right of Innocent Passage

Sub-Section A. Rules applicable to All Ships

Article 14

1. Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.

2. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose either of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to internal waters, or of making for the high seas from internal waters.

3. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by *force majeure* or by distress.

4. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with these articles and with other rules of international law.

5. Passage of foreign fishing vessels shall not be considered innocent if they do not observe such laws and regulations as the coastal State may make and publish in order to prevent these vessels from fishing in the territorial sea.

6. Submarines are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag.

Article 15

1. The coastal State must not hamper innocent passage through the territorial sea.

2. The coastal State is required to give appropriate publicity to any dangers to navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea.

Article 16

1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.

2. In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters, the coastal State shall also have the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to those waters is subject.

3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the coastal State may, without discrimination amongst foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published.

4. There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State.

Article 17

Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conformity with these articles and other rules of international law and, in particular, with such laws and regulations relating to transport and navigation.

Sub-Section B. Rules applicable to Merchant Ships

Article 18

1. No charge may be levied upon foreign ships by reason only of their passage through the territorial sea.

2. Charges may be levied upon a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea as payment only for specific services rendered to the ship. These charges shall be levied without discrimination.

Article 19

1. The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connexion with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, save only in the following cases:

(a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; or

(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; or

(c) If the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the captain of the ship or by the consul of the country whose flag the ship flies; or

(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.

2. The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State to take any steps authorized by its laws for the purpose of an arrest or investigation on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters.

3. In the cases provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article, the coastal State shall, if the captain so requests, advise the consular authority of the flag State before taking any steps, and shall facilitate contact between such authority and the ship's crew. In cases of emergency this notification may be communicated while the measures are being taken.

4. In considering whether or how an arrest should be made, the local authorities shall pay due regard to the interests of navigation.

5. The coastal State may not take any steps on board a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connexion with any crime committed before the ship entered the territorial sea, if the ship, proceeding from a foreign port, is only passing through the territorial sea without entering internal waters.

Article 20

1. The coastal State should not stop or divert a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea for the purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction in relation to a person on board the ship.

2. The coastal State may not levy execution against or arrest the ship for the purpose of any civil proceedings, save only in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed or incurred by the ship itself in the course or for the purpose of its voyage through the waters of the coastal State.

3. The provisions of the previous paragraph are without prejudice to the right of the coastal State, in accordance with its laws, to levy execution against or to arrest, for the purpose of any civil proceedings, a foreign ship lying in the territorial sea, or passing through the territorial sea after leaving internal waters.

Sub-Section C. Rules applicable to Government Ships other than Warships

Article 21

The rules contained in sub-sections A and B shall also apply to government ships operated for commercial purposes.

Article 22

1. The rules contained in sub-section A and in article 19 shall apply to government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.

2. With such exceptions as are contained in the provisions referred to in the preceding paragraph, nothing in these articles affects the immunities which such ships enjoy under these articles or other rules of international law.

Sub-Section D. Rule applicable to Warships

Article 23

If any warship does not comply with the regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance which is made to it, the coastal State may require the warship to leave the territorial sea.

PART II. CONTIGUOUS ZONE

Article 24

1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:

(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;

(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.

2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

3. Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond the median line every

point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of the two States is measured.

PART III. FINAL ARTICLES

Article 25

The provisions of this Convention shall not affect conventions or other international agreements already in force, as between States Parties to them.

Article 26

This Convention shall, until 31 October 1958, be open for signature by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly to become a Party to the Convention.

Article 27

This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 28

This Convention shall be open for accession by any States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in article 26. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 29

1. This Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession.

Article 30

1. After the expiration of a period of five years from the date on which this Convention shall enter into force, a request for the revision of this Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article 31

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States Members of the United Nations and the other States referred to in article 26:

(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession, in accordance with articles 26, 27 and 28.

(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force, in accordance with article 29.

(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article 30.

The original of this Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all States referred to in article 26.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention.

Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.

Convention on the High Seas¹

The States Parties to this Convention

Desiring to codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas,

Recognizing that the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958, adopted the following provisions as generally declaratory of established principles of international law,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The term "high seas" means all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State.

Article 2

The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, *inter alia*, both for coastal and non-coastal States:

- (1) Freedom of navigation;
- (2) Freedom of fishing;
- (3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
- (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.

These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.

Article 3

1. In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal terms with coastal States, States having no sea-coast should have free access to the sea. To this end a State situated between the sea and a State having no sea-coast shall by common agreement with the latter and in conformity with existing international conventions accord:

(a) to the State having no sea-coast, on a basis of reciprocity, free transit through their territory, and

(b) to ships flying the flag of that State treatment equal to that accorded to their own ships, or to the ships of any other States, as regards access to sea ports and the use of such ports.

¹Adopted Apr. 27 (U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L.53 and corr. 1).

2. A State situated between the sea and the State having no sea-coast shall settle, by mutual agreement with the latter, and taking into account the rights of the coastal State or State of transit and the special conditions of the State having no sea-coast, all matters relating to freedom of transit and equal treatment in ports, in case such States are not already parties to existing international conventions.

Article 4

Every State, whether coastal or not, has the right to sail ships under its flag on the high seas.

Article 5

1. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.

2. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to that effect.

Article 6

1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.

2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.

Article 7

The provisions of the preceding articles do not prejudice the question of ships employed on the official service of an intergovernmental organization flying the flag of the organization.

Article 8

1. Warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.

2. For the purposes of these articles, the term "warship" means a ship belonging to the naval forces of a State and bearing the external marks distinguishing warships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government and whose name appears in the Navy List, and manned by a crew who are under regular naval discipline.

Article 9

Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial service shall, on the high seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.

Article 10

1. Every State shall take such measures for ships under its flag as are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard *inter alia* to:

(a) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions;

(b) the manning of ships and labour conditions for crews taking into account the applicable international labour instruments;

(c) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships.

2. In taking such measures each State is required to conform to generally accepted international standards and to take any steps which may be necessary to ensure their observance.

Article 11

1. In the event of a collision or of any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas, involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or of any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against such persons except before the judicial or administrative authorities either of the flag State or of the State of which such person is a national.

2. In disciplinary matters, the State which has issued a master's certificate or a certificate of competence or licence shall alone be competent, after due legal process, to pronounce the withdrawal of such certificates, even if the holder is not a national of the State which issued them.

3. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation, shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag State.

Article 12

1. Every State shall require the master of a ship sailing under its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers,

(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;

(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him;

(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, her crew and her passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, her port of registry and the nearest port at which she will call.

2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service regarding safety on and over the sea and—where circumstances so require—by way of mutual regional arrangements co-operate with neighbouring States for this purpose.

Article 13

Every State shall adopt effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag, and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag

for that purpose. Any slave taking refuge on board any ship, whatever its flag, shall *ipso facto* be free.

Article 14

All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.

Article 15

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:

(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.

Article 16

The acts of piracy, as defined in article 15, committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private ship.

Article 17

A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 15. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act.

Article 18

A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such nationality was originally derived.

Article 19

On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.

Article 20

Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the

nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft, for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.

Article 21

A seizure on account of piracy may only be carried out by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft on government service authorized to that effect.

Article 22

1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting:

- (a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
- (b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
- (c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.

2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraph (a), (b) and (c) above, the warship may proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible consideration.

3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.

Article 23

1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters or the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, as defined in article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was established.

2. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own country or of a third State.

3. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship has satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that the ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship are within the limits of the territorial sea, or as the case may be within the contiguous zone. The pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop has been given

at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship.

4. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft on government service specially authorized to that effect.

5. Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft:

(a) The provisions of paragraph 1 to 3 of the present article shall apply *mutatis mutandis*;

(b) The aircraft giving the order to stop must itself actively pursue the ship until a ship or aircraft of the coastal State, summoned by the aircraft, arrives to take over the pursuit, unless the aircraft is itself able to arrest the ship. It does not suffice to justify an arrest on the high seas that the ship was merely sighted by the aircraft as an offender or suspected offender, if it was not both ordered to stop and pursued by the aircraft itself or other aircraft or ships which continue the pursuit without interruption.

6. The release of a ship arrested within the jurisdiction of a State and escorted to a port of that State for the purposes of an enquiry before the competent authorities, may not be claimed solely on the ground that the ship, in the course of its voyage, was escorted across a portion of the high seas, if the circumstances rendered this necessary.

7. Where a ship has been stopped or arrested on the high seas in circumstances which do not justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been thereby sustained.

Article 24

Every State shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or resulting from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, taking account of existing treaty provisions on the subject.

Article 25

1. Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from the dumping of radioactive waste, taking into account any standards and regulations which may be formulated by the competent international organizations.

2. All States shall co-operate with the competent international organizations in taking measures for the prevention of pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from any activities with radioactive materials or other harmful agents.

Article 26

1. All States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the bed of the high seas.

2. Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources, the coastal State may not impede the laying or maintenance of such cables or pipelines.

3. When laying such cables or pipelines the State in question shall pay due regard to cables or pipelines already in position on the seabed. In particular, possibilities of repairing existing cables or pipelines shall not be prejudiced.

Article 27

Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures to provide that the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject to its jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done wilfully or through culpable negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to interrupt or obstruct telegraphic or telephonic communications, and similarly the breaking or injury of a submarine pipeline or high-voltage power cable shall be a punishable offence. This provision shall not apply to any break or injury caused by persons who acted merely with the legitimate object of saving their lives or their ships, after having taken all necessary precautions to avoid such break or injury.

Article 28

Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures to provide that, if persons subject to its jurisdiction who are the owners of a cable or pipeline beneath the high seas, in laying or repairing that cable or pipeline, cause a break in or injury to another cable or pipeline, they shall bear the cost of the repairs.

Article 29

Every State shall take the necessary legislative measures to ensure that the owners of ships who can prove that they have sacrificed an anchor, a net or any other fishing gear, in order to avoid injuring a submarine cable or pipeline, shall be indemnified by the owner of the cable or pipeline, provided that the owner of the ship has taken all reasonable precautionary measures beforehand.

Article 30

The provisions of this Convention shall not affect Conventions or other international agreements already in force, as between States Parties to them.

Article 31

This Convention shall, until 31 October 1958, be open for signature by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the Specialized Agencies, by any other State invited to take part in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly to become a Party to the Convention.

Article 32

This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 33

This Convention shall be open for accession by any States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in article 31. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 34

1. This Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of

ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instruments of ratification or accession.

Article 35

1. After the expiration of a period of five years from the date on which this Convention shall enter into force a request for the revision of this Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article 36

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States Members of the United Nations and the other States referred to in article 31:

(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession, in accordance with articles 31, 32 and 33.

(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force, in accordance with article 34;

(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article 35.

Article 37

The original of this Convention of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations who shall send certified copies thereof to all States referred to in article 31.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention.

Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.

Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas⁵

The States Parties to this Convention,

Considering that the development of modern techniques for the exploitation of the living resources of the sea, increasing man's ability to meet the need of the world's expanding population for food, has exposed some of these resources to the danger of being over-exploited,

Considering also that the nature of the problems involved in the conservation of the living resources of the high seas is such that there is a clear necessity that they be solved, whenever possible, on the basis of international co-operation through the concerted action of all the States concerned,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of coastal States as provided for in this convention, and

⁵ Adopted Apr. 26 (U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54 and Add. 1).

(c) to the provisions contained in the following articles concerning conservation of the living resources of the high seas.

2. All States have the duty to adopt, or to co-operate with other States in adopting, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.

Article 2

As employed in this Convention, the expression "conservation of the living resources of the high seas" means the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products. Conservation programmes should be formulated with a view to securing in the first place a supply of food for human consumption.

Article 3

A State whose nationals are engaged in fishing any stock or stocks of fish or other living marine resources in any area of the high seas where the nationals of other States are not thus engaged shall adopt, for its own nationals, measures in that area when necessary for the purpose of the conservation of the living resources affected.

Article 4

1. If the nationals of two or more States are engaged in fishing the same stock or stocks of fish or other living marine resources in any area or areas of the high seas, these States shall, at the request of any of them, enter into negotiations with a view to prescribing by agreement for their nationals the necessary measures for the conservation of the living resources affected.

2. If the States concerned do not reach agreement within twelve months, any of the parties may initiate the procedure contemplated by article 9.

Article 5

1. If, subsequent to the adoption of the measures referred to in articles 3 and 4, nationals of other States engage in fishing the same stock or stocks of fish or other living marine resources in any area or areas of the high seas, the other States shall apply the measures, which shall not be discriminatory in form or in fact, to their own nationals not later than seven months after the date on which the measures shall have been notified to the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The Director General shall notify such measures to any State which so requests and, in any case, to any State specified by the State initiating the measure.

2. If these other States do not accept the measures so adopted and if no agreement can be reached within twelve months, any of the interested parties may initiate the procedure contemplated by article 9. Subject to paragraph 2 of article 10, the measures adopted shall remain obligatory pending the decision of the special commission.

Article 6

1. A coastal State has a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea.

2. A coastal State is entitled to take part on an equal footing in any system of research and regulation for purposes of conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area, even though its nationals do not carry on fishing there.

3. A State whose nationals are engaged in fishing in any area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a coastal State shall, at the request of that coastal State, enter into negotiations with a view to prescribing by agreement the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area.

4. A State whose nationals are engaged in fishing in any area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a coastal State shall not enforce conservation measures in that area which are opposed to those which have been adopted by the coastal State, but may enter into negotiations with the coastal State with a view to prescribing by agreement the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area.

5. If the States concerned do not reach agreement with respect to conservation measures within twelve months, any of the parties may initiate the procedure contemplated by article 9.

Article 7

1. Having regard to the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 6, any coastal State may, with a view to the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources of the sea, adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of fish or other marine resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea, provided that negotiations to that effect with the other States concerned have not led to an agreement within six months.

2. The measures which the coastal State adopts under the previous paragraph shall be valid as to other States only if the following requirements are fulfilled:

(a) That there is a need for urgent application of conservation measures in the light of the existing knowledge of the fishery;

(b) That the measures adopted are based on appropriate scientific findings;

(c) That such measures do not discriminate in form or in fact against foreign fishermen.

3. These measures shall remain in force pending the settlement, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention, of any disagreement as to their validity.

4. If the measures are not accepted by the other States concerned, any of the parties may initiate the procedure contemplated by article 9. Subject to paragraph 2 of article 10, the measures adopted shall remain obligatory pending the decision of the special commission.

5. The principles of geographical demarcation as defined in article 12 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone shall be adopted when coasts of different States are involved.

Article 8

1. Any State which, even if its nationals are not engaged in fishing in an area of the high seas not adjacent

to its coast, has a special interest in the conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area, may request the State or States whose nationals are engaged in fishing there to take the necessary measures of conservation under articles 3 and 4 respectively, at the same time mentioning the scientific reasons which in its opinion make such measures necessary, and indicating its special interest.

2. If no agreement is reached within twelve months, such State may initiate the procedure contemplated by article 9.

Article 9

1. Any dispute which may arise between States under articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall, at the request of any of the parties, be submitted for settlement to a special commission of five members, unless the parties agree to seek a solution by another method of peaceful settlement, as provided for in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The members, one of whom shall be designated as chairman, shall be named by agreement between the States in dispute within three months of the request for settlement in accordance with the provisions of this article. Failing agreement they shall, upon the request of any State party, be named by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within a further three-month period, in consultation with the States in dispute and with the President of the International Court of Justice and the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, from amongst well-qualified persons being nationals of States not involved in the dispute and specializing in legal, administrative or scientific questions relating to fisheries, depending upon the nature of the dispute to be settled. Any vacancy arising after the original appointment shall be filled in the same manner as provided for the initial selection.

3. Any State party to proceedings under these articles shall have the right to name one of its nationals to the special commission, with the right to participate fully in the proceedings on the same footing as a member of the commission but without the right to vote or to take part in the writing of the commission's decision.

4. The commission shall determine its own procedure, assuring each party to the proceedings a full opportunity to be heard and to present its case. It shall also determine how the costs and expenses shall be divided between the parties to the dispute, failing agreement by the parties on this matter.

5. The special commission shall render its decision within a period of five months from the time it is appointed unless it decides, in case of necessity, to extend the time limit for a period not exceeding three months.

6. The special commission shall, in reaching its decisions, adhere to these articles and to any special agreements between the disputing parties regarding settlement of the dispute.

7. Decisions of the commission shall be by majority vote.

Article 10

1. The special commission shall, in disputes arising under article 7, apply the criteria listed in paragraph 2

of that article. In disputes under articles 4, 5, 6 and 8 the commission shall apply the following criteria, according to the issues involved in the dispute:

(a) Common to the determination of disputes arising under articles 4, 5 and 6 are the requirements:

(i) That scientific findings demonstrate the necessity of conservation measures;

(ii) That the specific measures are based on scientific findings and are practicable; and

(iii) That the measures do not discriminate, in form or in fact, against fishermen of other States.

(b) Applicable to the determination of disputes arising under article 8 is the requirement that scientific findings demonstrate the necessity for conservation measures, or that the conservation programme is adequate, as the case may be.

2. The special commission may decide that pending its award the measures in dispute shall not be applied, provided that, in the case of disputes under article 7, the measures shall only be suspended when it is apparent to the commission on the basis of *prima facie* evidence that the need for the urgent application of such measures does not exist.

Article 11

The decisions of the special commission shall be binding on the States concerned and the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 94 of the Charter of the United Nations shall be applicable to those decisions. If the decision is accompanied by any recommendations, they shall receive the greatest possible consideration.

Article 12

1. If the factual basis of the award of the special commission is altered by substantial changes in the conditions of the stock or stocks of fish or other living marine resources or in methods of fishing, any of the States concerned may request the other States to enter into negotiations with a view to prescribing by agreement the necessary modifications in the measures of conservation.

2. If no agreement is reached within a reasonable period of time, any of the States concerned may again resort to the procedure contemplated by article 9 provided that at least two years have elapsed from the original award.

Article 13

1. The regulation of fisheries conducted by means of equipment embedded in the floor of the sea in areas of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a State may be undertaken by that State where such fisheries have long been maintained and conducted by its nationals, provided that non-nationals are permitted to participate in such activities on an equal footing with nationals except in areas where such fisheries have by long usage been exclusively enjoyed by such nationals. Such regulations will not, however, affect the general status of the areas as high seas.

2. In this article, the expression "fisheries conducted by means of equipment embedded in the floor of the

sea" means those fisheries using gear with supporting members embedded in the sea floor, constructed on a site and left there to operate permanently, or if removed, restored each season on the same site.

Article 14

In articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, the term "nationals" means fishing boats or craft of any size having the nationality of the State concerned, according to the law of that State, irrespective of the nationality of the members of their crews.

Article 15

This Convention shall, until 31 October 1958, be open for signature by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly to become a Party to the Convention.

Article 16

This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 17

This Convention shall be open for accession by any States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in article 15. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 18

1. This Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instruments of ratification or accession.

Article 19

1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 12 inclusive.

2. Any Contracting State making a reservation in accordance with the preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 20

1. After the expiration of a period of five years from the date on which this Convention shall enter into force a request for the revision of this Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article 21

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States Members of the United Nations and the other States referred to in article 15:

(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession, in accordance with articles 15, 16 and 17;

(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force, in accordance with article 18;

(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article 20;

(d) Of reservations to this Convention, in accordance with article 19.

Article 22

The original of this Convention of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all States referred to in article 15.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention.

Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.

Convention on the Continental Shelf⁴

*The States Parties to this Convention,
Have agreed as follows:*

Article 1

For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.

Article 2

1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.

2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this article are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State.

3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.

4. The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or

⁴ Adopted Apr. 26 (U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55).

under the sea-bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil.

Article 3

The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above those waters.

Article 4

Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources, the coastal State may not impede the laying or maintenance of submarine cables or pipe lines on the continental shelf.

Article 5

1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the intention of open publication.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 6 of this article, the coastal State is entitled to construct and maintain or operate on the continental shelf installations and other devices necessary for its exploration and the exploitation of its natural resources, and to establish safety zones around such installations and devices and to take in those zones measures necessary for their protection.

3. The safety zones referred to in paragraph 2 of this article may extend to a distance of 500 metres around the installations and other devices which have been erected, measured from each point of their outer edge. Ships of all nationalities must respect these safety zones.

4. Such installations and devices, though under the jurisdiction of the coastal State, do not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea of the coastal State.

5. Due notice must be given of the construction of any such installations, and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained. Any installations which are abandoned or disused must be entirely removed.

6. Neither the installations or devices, nor the safety zones around them may be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation.

7. The coastal State is obliged to undertake, in the safety zones, all appropriate measures for the protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents.

8. The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any research concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless, the coastal State shall not normally withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a qualified institution with a view to purely scientific research into the physical or biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso that the coastal State shall have the right, if it so

desires, to participate or to be represented in the research, and that in any event the results shall be published.

Article 6

1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.

2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two adjacent States, the boundary of the continental shelf shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.

3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental shelf, any lines which are drawn in accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should be defined with reference to charts and geographical features as they exist at a particular date, and reference should be made to fixed permanent identifiable points on the land.

Article 7

The provisions of these articles shall not prejudice the right of the coastal State to exploit the subsoil by means of tunnelling irrespective of the depth of water above the subsoil.

Article 8

This Convention shall, until 31 October 1958, be open for signature by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly to become a Party to the Convention.

Article 9

This Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 10

This Convention shall be open for accession by any States belonging to any of the categories mentioned in article 8. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 11

1. This Convention shall come into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the twenty-second instrument of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter

into force on the thirtieth day after deposit by such State of its instruments of ratification or accession.

Article 12

1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1 to 3 inclusive.

2. Any Contracting State making a reservation in accordance with the preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 13

1. After the expiration of a period of five years from the date on which this Convention shall enter into force, a request for the revision of this Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General.

2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request.

Article 14

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States Members of the United Nations and the other States referred to in article 8:

(a) Of signatures to this Convention and of the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession, in accordance with articles 8, 9 and 10.

(b) Of the date on which this Convention will come into force, in accordance with article 11.

(c) Of requests for revision in accordance with article 13.

(d) Of reservations to this Convention, in accordance with article 12.

Article 15

The original of this Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all States referred to in article 8.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention.

Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.

Optional Protocol of Signature Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes⁷

The States Parties to this Protocol and to any one or more of the Conventions on the Law of the Sea adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea held at Geneva from 24 February 1958 to 27 April 1958,

Expressing their wish to resort, in all matters concerning them in respect of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of any article of any Convention on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958, to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, unless some other form of settlement is provided

in the Convention or has been agreed upon by the Parties within a reasonable period.

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of any Convention on the Law of the Sea shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to this Protocol.

Article II

This undertaking relates to all the provisions of any Convention on the Law of the Sea except, in the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, to which articles 9, 10, 11 and 12 of that Convention remain applicable.

Article III

The Parties may agree, within a period of two months after one party has notified its opinion to the other that a dispute exists, to resort not to the Court but to an arbitral tribunal. After the expiry of the said period, either Party to this Protocol may bring the dispute before the Court by an application.

Article IV

1. Within the same period of two months, the Parties to this Protocol may agree to adopt a conciliation procedure before resorting to the Court.

2. The conciliation commission shall make its recommendations within five months after its appointment. If its recommendations are not accepted by the parties to the dispute within two months after they have been delivered, either party may bring the dispute before the Court by an application.

Article V

This Protocol shall remain open for signature by all States who become Parties to any Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and is subject to ratification, where necessary, according to the constitutional requirements of the signatory States.

Article VI

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all States who become Parties to any Convention on the Law of the Sea of signatures to this Protocol and of the deposit of instruments of ratification in accordance with article V.

Article VII

The original of this Protocol, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all States referred to in article V.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Protocol

Done at Geneva, this twenty-ninth day of April one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight.

⁷ Adopted Apr. 26 (U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 57).

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY CONFERENCE³

Nuclear Tests on the High Seas

Resolution adopted on 27 April 1958, on the report of the Second Committee, in connexion with article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Recalling that the Conference has been convened by the General Assembly of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 1105 (XI) of 21 February 1957,

Recognizing that there is a serious and genuine apprehension on the part of many States that nuclear explosions constitute an infringement of the freedom of the seas,

Recognizing that the question of nuclear tests and production is still under review by the General Assembly under various resolutions on the subject and by the Disarmament Commission, and is at present under constant review and discussion by the Governments concerned,

Decides to refer this matter to the General Assembly for appropriate action.

Pollution of the High Seas by Radioactive Materials

Resolution adopted on 27 April 1958, on the report of the Second Committee, relating to article 25 of the Convention on the High Seas

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Recognizing the need for international action in the field of disposal of radioactive wastes in the sea,

Taking into account action which has been proposed by various national and international bodies and studies which have been published on the subject,

Noting that the International Commission for Radiological Protection has made recommendations regarding the maximum permissible concentration of radio isotopes in the human body and the maximum permissible concentration in air and water,

Recommends that the International Atomic Energy Agency, in consultation with existing groups and established organs having acknowledged competence in the field of radiological protection, should pursue whatever studies and take whatever action is necessary to assist States in controlling the discharge or release of radioactive materials to the sea, in promulgating standards, and in drawing up internationally acceptable regulations to prevent pollution of the sea by radioactive materials in amounts which would adversely affect man and his marine resources.

International Fishery Conservation Conventions

Resolution adopted on 25 April 1958, on the report of the Third Committee

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Taking note of the opinion of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, held in Rome in April/May 1955, as expressed in paragraph 43 of its report, as to the efficacy

of international conservation organizations in furthering the conservation of the living resources of the sea,

Believing that such organizations are valuable instruments for the co-ordination of scientific effort upon the problem of fisheries and for the making of agreements upon conservation measures,

Recommendations:

1. That States concerned should co-operate in establishing the necessary conservation régime through the medium of such organizations covering particular areas of the high seas or species of living marine resources and conforming in other respects with the recommendations contained in the report of the Rome Conference;

2. That these organizations should be used so far as practicable for the conduct of the negotiations between States envisaged under articles 4, 5, 6 and 7, for the resolution of any disagreements and for the implementation of agreed measures of conservation.

Co-Operation in Conservation Measures

Resolution adopted on 25 April 1958, on the report of the Third Committee

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Taking note of the opinion of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the Sea, held in Rome in April/May 1955, as reported in paragraphs 43 (a), 54 and others of its report, that any effective conservation management system must have the participation of all States engaged in substantial exploitation of the stock or stocks of living marine organisms which are the object of the conservation management system or having a special interest in the conservation of that stock or stocks,

Recommends to the coastal States that, in the cases where a stock or stocks of fish or other living marine resources inhabit both the fishing areas under their jurisdiction and areas of the adjacent high seas, they should co-operate with such international conservation organisations as may be responsible for the development and application of conservation measures in the adjacent high seas, in the adoption and enforcement, as far as practicable, of the necessary conservation measures on fishing areas under their jurisdiction.

Humane Killing of Marine Life

Resolution adopted on 25 April 1958, on the report of the Third Committee

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Requests States to prescribe, by all means available to them, those methods for the capture and killing of marine life, especially of whales and seals, which will spare them suffering to the greatest extent possible.

Special Situations Relating to Coastal Fisheries

Resolution adopted on 26 April 1958, on the report of the Third Committee

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Having considered the situation of countries or territories whose people are overwhelmingly dependent upon

³ U.N. doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 56.

coastal fisheries for their livelihood or economic development,

Having considered also the situation of countries whose coastal population depends primarily on coastal fisheries for the animal protein of its diet and whose fishing methods are mainly limited to local fishing from small boats,

Recognizing that such situations call for exceptional measures befitting particular needs,

Considering that, because of the limited scope and exceptional nature of those situations, any measures adopted to meet them would be complementary to provisions incorporated in a universal system of international law,

Believing that States should collaborate to secure just treatment of such situations by regional agreements or by other means of international co-operation,

Recommends:

1. That where, for the purpose of conservation, it becomes necessary to limit the total catch of a stock or stocks of fish in an area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a coastal State, any other States fishing in that area should collaborate with the coastal State to secure just treatment of such situation, by establishing agreed measures which shall recognize any preferential requirements of the coastal State resulting from its dependence upon the fishery concerned while having regard to the interests of the other States;

2. That appropriate conciliation and arbitral procedures shall be established for the settlement of any disagreement.

Regime of Historic Waters

Resolution adopted on 27 April 1958, on the report of the First Committee

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Considering that the International Law Commission has not provided for the régime of historic waters, including historic bays,

Recognizing the importance of the juridical status of such areas,

Requests the General Assembly of the United Nations to arrange for the study of the juridical régime of historic waters, including historic bays, and for the communication of the results of such study to all States Members of the United Nations.

Convening of a Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea

Resolution adopted by the Conference on 27 April 1958

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,

Considering that, on the basis of the report prepared by the International Law Commission, it has approved agreements and other instruments on the régime applicable to fishing and the conservation of the living resources of the high seas, the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the continental shelf and other matters pertaining to the general régime of the high seas and to the free access of land-locked States to the sea,

Considering that it has not been possible to reach agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and some other matters which were raised in connexion with this problem,

Recognizing that, although agreements have been reached on the régime applicable to fishing and the conservation of the living resources of the high seas, it has not been possible, in those agreements, to settle certain aspects of a number of inherently complex questions,

Recognizing the desirability of making further efforts, at an appropriate time, to reach agreement on those questions relating to the international law of the sea which have been left unsettled,

Requests the General Assembly of the United Nations to study, at its thirteenth session (1958), the advisability of convening a second international conference of plenipotentiaries for further consideration of the questions left unsettled by the present Conference.

Tribute to the International Law Commission

Resolution adopted by the Conference on 27 April 1958

The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, on the conclusion of its proceedings,

Resolves:

To pay a tribute of gratitude, respect and admiration to the International Law Commission for its excellent work in the matter of the codification and development of international law, in the form of various drafts and commentaries of great juridical value.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

Letter Dated 29 May 1958 from the Representative of Israel Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/4011, May 29, 1958. 4 pp. mimeo.

Letter Dated 29 May 1958 from the Representative of Tunisia to the President of the Security Council. S/4013, May 29, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.

Letter Dated 29 May 1958 from the Representative of France to the President of the Security Council. S/4015, May 29, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.

Letter Dated 2 June 1958 from the Representative of Lebanon Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/4018, June 2, 1958. 1 p. mimeo.

Letter Dated 1 June 1958 from the Representative of Tunisia to the President of the Security Council. S/4019, June 3, 1958. 3 pp. mimeo.

General Assembly

Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities. Addendum to observations of Governments on the Draft Articles concerning Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities. A/CN.4/114/Add.1, April 15, 1958. 24 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

Economic and Social Council

World Economic Situation. Facilities and Methods Which Now Exist for the Conduct and Development of Inter-Governmental Economic Consultations. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3119, May 7, 1958. 33 pp. mimeo.

World Economic Situation. International Machinery for Trade Co-Operation. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3127, May 26, 1958. 8 pp. mimeo.

International Commodity Problems. Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements. 1958 Review of International Commodity Problems. E/3118, May 28, 1958. 74 pp. mimeo.

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. International Tax Problems. Taxation in Capital-Exporting and Capital-Importing Countries of Foreign Private Investments. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/3074, June 3, 1958. 18 pp. mimeo.

Human Rights. Proposed Second Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations Interested in the Eradication of Prejudice and Discrimination. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3130, June 3, 1958. 6 pp. mimeo.

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. International economic assistance to the under-developed countries, 1956/57. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3131, June 3, 1958. 69 pp. mimeo.

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. The International Flow of Private Capital, 1957. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3128, June 4, 1958. 92 pp. mimeo.

United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration. Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Adopted by the Conference at Its 24th Meeting. E/Conf.26/8/Rev.1, June 10, 1958. 7 pp. mimeo.

Final Act of the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration Adopted by the Conference at Its 24th Meeting. E/Conf.26/9/Rev.1, June 10, 1958. 6 pp. mimeo.

Trusteeship Council

Conditions in the Trust Territory of New Guinea. Working paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.851, May 3, 1958. 18 pp. mimeo.

Conditions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Working paper prepared by the Secretariat. T/L.850, June 29, 1958. 18 pp. mimeo.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Lester W. Manning as director of the International Co-operation Administration operations mission in Chile, effective June 5. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 324 dated June 14.)

Designations

Seaborn P. Foster as deputy director of the Foreign Service Institute, effective June 10.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume

Press release 304 dated June 4

The Department of State on June 14 released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, Volume III, The British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, the Near East and Africa*. This is the third volume to be published in a series of five volumes covering the diplomacy of the United States for the year 1940. Previous volumes published in this series are *Volume II, General, Europe and Volume IV, The Far East. Volume I, General and Volume V, The American Republics* are still in preparation.

Copies of volume III (vi, 1,028 pp.) may be obtained from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$4.50 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4010. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Spain—Signed at Madrid January 27, 1958. Entered into force January 27, 1958.

Claims—Maneuvers in Laur-Dingalan Bay Area. TIAS 4011. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines. Exchange of aide memoir—Dated at Manila February 20, 1958. Entered into force February 20, 1958.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 4012. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Jordan, amending agreement of July 10 and September 24, 1956. Exchange of notes—Signed at Amman November 20, 1957, and February 22, 1958. Entered into force February 22, 1958.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Disposition of Military Equipment and Materials. TIAS 4013. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ethiopia, relating to agreement of May 22, 1953. Exchange of notes—Dated at Addis Ababa January 2 and 6, 1958. Entered into force January 6, 1958.

Economic, Technical, and Related Assistance. TIAS 4014. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Sudan. Exchange of notes—signed at Khartoum March 31, 1958. Entered into force March 31, 1958.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to June 9 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 291 and 292 of May 28, 298 of June 2 and 304 of June 4.

No.	Date	Subject
*215	6/9	Mutual security program in Morocco.
*216	6/9	Educational exchange.
*217	6/9	Educational exchange.
318	6/9	Cholera supplies to Thailand.
319	6/10	Dulles' news conference.
†220	6/13	Garcia itinerary.
†221	6/12	Wilcox: "The Soviet Challenge and American Education."
*222	6/13	Investment guaranty in France.
†223	6/13	Publication of study on Sino-Soviet economic offensive.
*224	6/14	Manning named USOM director in Chile (biographic details).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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