




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Corrections for Volume XLIII

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following errors in Volume XLIII:

August 22, page 282, second column, italic paragraph: Mr. Rubottom's first name is Roy.

August 22, page 285, table of independent states: The capital of the Republic of Chad is Fort Lamy.

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July 4, 1960

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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July 4, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Role of the Department of State in the National Policy Machinery

Statement by Secretary Herter¹

I welcome the opportunity to offer this committee my views on those aspects of the national policy machinery with which I am most familiar. My comments are based on reflections arising from my service as Under Secretary and Secretary of State and of course as a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

It seems to me that several fundamental considerations underlie the questions concerning the Department of State which you have asked me to discuss today. While these are generally well understood, they might bear restating to be sure we are on common ground.

First of all, under the Constitution and the historical development of our Government, executive responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations and the enunciation of foreign policy resides squarely with the President. As this committee knows so well, the course of events of the past two decades has given to these responsibilities dimensions that are awesome, to say the least.

Secondly, it follows that the fundamental mission of the Secretary of State is to assist and support the President in the discharge of his responsibilities for foreign affairs. Unlike, I believe, any other major department, the basic authority of the Department of State is left completely to the discretion of the President. The basic statute of the Department of State provides that the Secretary of State

... shall perform and execute such duties as shall, from time to time, be enjoined on or entrusted to him by the President of the United States, agreeable to the Constitution. . . .

¹Made before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations on June 10 (press release 317).

Thirdly, as became evident after the conclusion of the last war and as becomes more apparent with each passing year, international affairs no longer have an existence separate from domestic affairs and they can no longer be treated except in the context of the entire range of governmental activities. Practically every Government department and agency has to a varying degree a proper concern, and in some instances responsibility, for one facet or another of international affairs. Conversely, the Department of State is properly concerned with facets of domestic affairs which have major impact upon our foreign relations.

Secretary of State's Relation to President

Before proceeding further, I should like to make several observations on the considerations I have just enumerated.

The burden of the President's responsibilities for international affairs is almost indescribably heavy. I think all of us must be sympathetic and helpful in doing what we can to provide the President with the highest possible caliber of assistance, both with respect to his immediate staff and in each of the various departments of government concerned.

The relationship between the President and the Secretary of State is, of necessity, a very personal one. It has, over the years, varied with circumstances and personalities and will undoubtedly continue to do so. The relationship can never be considered fixed beyond the tenure of either incumbent, and any effort to make it so would hamper rather than enhance effective performance.

Every President, in his own way, has defined the role he wishes the Secretary of State to carry out. President Eisenhower has set forth quite clearly on repeated occasions his concept of the

function of the Secretary of State. Typically, he stated on June 1, 1953, that:²

I personally wish to emphasize that I shall regard the Secretary of State as the Cabinet officer responsible for advising and assisting me in the formulation and control of foreign policy. It will be my practice to employ the Secretary of State as my channel of authority within the executive branch on foreign policy. Other officials of the executive branch will work with and through the Secretary of State on matters of foreign policy.

These principles have been adhered to in succeeding years. I would doubt that any more explicit or enlarged statement is necessary.

I do not wish to leave the impression by my emphasis on the discretion that must be available to the President that there are not enduring guideposts within which we can approach the questions we are considering today. In my opinion the Secretary of State should, under the President, have in his relations with other departments a clear primacy in foreign relations and in all matters with a substantial effect upon foreign relations. This is not to say that the Secretary of State should be charged with operating all of the programs carried on abroad in support of our national security goals but that he should have clear primacy as to policy on these programs. Nor is it to say that the Secretary of State need normally have the power of decision upon matters crossing departmental jurisdiction simply because they involve foreign affairs. Rather, the Secretary of State should be looked to for formulation of recommendations to the President, when appropriate through the NSC [National Security Council] mechanism, which take into account the considerations and views set forth by other departments. Assistance of this nature enables the President to focus effectively on foreign affairs problems of transcendent importance. In following through on these principles it is hard to state general rules which will be self-enforcing. It is more a matter of recognizing that the activities and programs are for a foreign affairs purpose and should therefore be guided by the official responsible for foreign affairs.

In my opinion good organization alone will not suffice for the solution of foreign affairs problems of the magnitude and complexity which confront us today. While I am well aware of the value of good organization and soundly conceived relation-

ships, I find that I subscribe to the sentiments of those who place even greater value on the human element—on the devotion, ability, and experience of the personnel of the Department of State and the other principal departments of government. This is why I have been such a strong advocate of the moves made in recent years to strengthen the Foreign Service—and, indeed, the entire Department of State. While I have been pleased with the progress made in matters such as training and integration of the foreign and domestic officer corps, I have recognized that there is much that remains to be done. This is a long-range program, and I very much hope that it will continue to have the support of my successors and of the future Congresses of the United States.

The ability of any Secretary of State to serve the President is dependent not only on his own capacities but also on the support available to him from the Department of State. The responsibilities customarily assigned to the Secretary of State for providing leadership to the Government as a whole in the international field require the participation of many parts of the Department. The capacity of the Department of State to provide leadership at all levels is dependent, in the final analysis, not upon fiat but rather upon the competence, judgment, energy, and comprehension of the many officers who are involved.

Formulation of Overall National Security Policy

I should now like to speak to the questions relating to the Department of State which were posed in the interim report³ of this subcommittee.

First are those concerned with whether the Secretary of State should have a more dominant role in the formulation of overall national security policy.

“Are the responsibilities of the State and Defense Departments in national security policy-making now correctly defined and divided? If not, what changes are needed?”

In my judgment they are correctly defined and the division is working well. I do not believe that any major improvement in the relationships between the Department of State and the Department of Defense would result from further efforts to define their respective responsibilities. A more immediate and profitable target is for the

² BULLETIN OF JUNE 15, 1953, p. 849.

³ S. Rept. 1026, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

Department of State to seek to improve its capacity to provide timely political guidance to the Department of Defense and, reciprocally, for the latter to seek to improve its capacity to provide timely military advice. I should emphasize that this is being done not only at the senior levels but at all levels in the two Departments. The advice worked into problems at the lower levels is frequently the most helpful.

The functional and organizational aspects of State-Defense relations are, of course, important. More important, however, is the continuing development of personnel in both departments who share understanding and perspective in the gray area where foreign policy and military policy come in contact or overlap. In this regard the common experience shared by personnel of the two Departments who attend the War Colleges and the Foreign Service Institute is very helpful. In addition, I think it would be worth while to have an exchange of personnel between the two Departments. The men loaned would function as an integral part of the host agency, contributing their own special knowledge, and would return to their parent agency at the end of the tour with the broadened perspective which is acquired through shoulder-to-shoulder work. We might, over a period of years with such a program, develop a nucleus of highly trained senior officers within the two Departments, each having a profound and comprehensive understanding of the subject matter and viewpoint of the other Department. If this understanding were regularly and consistently brought to bear on the solution of problems of mutual concern, much more good would be accomplished than could result from efforts to adjust and refine the respective responsibilities of the two Departments. I should add that the broadening of personal contacts among senior officers resulting from such an interchange would be a major asset in insuring the continuity of a productive relationship between the Departments of State and Defense.

"Should the Secretary of State be formally charged with more responsibility in connection with our defense posture and the defense budget?"

No. First of all, I regard somewhat skeptically the word "formally" as contravening the basic concept that the Secretary of State is the agent of the President and that it is unwise to prescribe how the President may utilize him. More to the point,

however, is my belief that participation by the Secretary of State in the NSC, in the Cabinet, and in confidential discussions with the President affords ample opportunity to advise the President on the defense posture and the defense budget. In addition, I feel free to advise and consult with the Secretary of Defense on these topics, and I do so.

"Should the Secretary of State be asked to testify in the Congress concerning foreign policy implications of the defense budget?"

The Congress, of course, is entitled to obtain whatever advice it deems necessary to insure the enactment of wise legislation. In recent years a number of steps have been taken in the executive branch to insure consideration of foreign policy implications in determining the defense budget. It must be recognized, I think, that should the Secretary of State testify on the defense budget, he would undoubtedly be supporting decisions in which he has already participated. These budget decisions, as I have seen them, have not been made in a vacuum, and the Departments are fully aware of each other's interests.

"Would it be desirable to create a 'super Secretary of State' who would be responsible for the overall direction of foreign affairs, and who might have under him additional Secretaries of Cabinet rank for such areas as diplomacy, information, and foreign economic matters?"

Although I can fully understand and sympathize with the general objectives desired by those who advocate a so-called super Secretary of State with Cabinet-level agencies reporting to him, I do not believe that such a proposal would be desirable. There are a number of factors that cause me to question this proposal. Among them is the assumption of equivalence for areas such as diplomacy, information, and foreign economic matters. I do not believe the areas are, in fact, equivalent. If these three principal areas are to be equated, it will then become necessary to establish what I fear would be an excessively large coordinating mechanism at the level of the super Secretary of State. Instead of being relieved of burdens, he might find his load increased.

This is not to say that I disagree with the concept that our foreign economic and foreign information activities ought to be under the control of the Secretary of State. It may be desirable at some time for the overseas information activities

to be brought into the Department in a semi-autonomous status somewhat similar to that successfully followed with respect to the ICA.

Lightening Burdens of Secretary of State

Next in the interim report are those questions concerned with lightening the burdens of the Secretary of State.

"Would it be desirable to create a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cabinet rank, responsible to the Secretary of State, who could represent the United States at foreign ministers' meetings? Would any other arrangements help, such as appointments of Ambassadors at Large?"

The underlying question here is whether it is possible to lighten the negotiating burdens of the Secretary of State in order to give him more time to discharge his responsibilities at home. I do not consider feasible the proposal to create a Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cabinet rank, responsible to the Secretary of State, who would represent the United States at foreign ministers' meetings. When foreign ministers meet, they are meeting as their governments' chief advisers on foreign affairs. Since the Secretary of State would continue in this country to be that chief adviser, another representative, no matter what his rank and title, would create problems for the other foreign ministers.

I am coming to the conclusion that it would be desirable for the foreign ministers to curtail the occasions upon which they themselves attend meetings. To do this would require greater delegation to principal subordinates and greater reliance upon the normal mechanisms of diplomacy. Additionally, in this day when there are some 85 nations who must deal with each other, we may have to dispense with some of the ways of protocol which we no longer have the time to afford.

Matters Affecting State and Defense Departments

Next are those questions which concern State-Defense relations.

"What is the proper relationship between State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and/or the Joint Staff of the JCS)? Should a representative of the Secretary of State participate in discussions of the JCS when appropriate?"

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do, and should

continue to, form a well-coordinated and smoothly working team in both the planning and execution of national security policy.

The two Departments naturally have very extensive relationships on a multitude of subjects which enable the Department of State to inject foreign policy considerations into military affairs at all stages. Secretary [Thomas S.] Gates [Jr.] and I confer with each other frequently, and we also participate in larger meetings such as the NSC and the Cabinet. An Under Secretary of State confers regularly with the JCS, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning meets regularly with the Joint Staff of the JCS and officers of the Department of Defense. State, Defense, and military officials work directly together across the board and without any formalities and especially so when there is a premium on speed of action. In addition to our broad and fruitful policy relationships with Defense through ISA [Office of International Security Affairs], we have direct relationships with the three services on a variety of subjects.

I believe it would be a mistake to have an officer of the Department of State sit with the JCS as a representative of the Department of State, but I would not rule out the long-term possibility that a senior officer of the Department might be assigned to the JCS in an advisory capacity. While such an official might not participate in the deliberations of the JCS as an official spokesman for the Department of State, he might have a role comparable to that of a political adviser to a unified military command.

Next are the questions directed toward improvement of planning in the Departments of State and Defense.

"Should officials with more diverse backgrounds and experience be brought into the policy planning process in State and Defense? Is there a need for a joint State-DOD-JCS Planning Staff? Can greater use be made of ad hoc interdepartmental task forces on special issues of national security policy?"

We have long recognized the need for officers of diverse backgrounds on our Policy Planning Staff. I think that we have succeeded fairly well in meeting this need. Naturally, we shall continue to select with great care the members of this staff so as to insure a balance of knowledge and background.

A Joint State-DOD-JCS Planning Staff would have the merit of bringing together diverse backgrounds but might have the drawback of being apart from the operating departments and out of the mainstream. The firm connection with reality which proximity to operations gives is certainly a requisite of useful planning. This is one of the reasons why the Planning Board of the NSC has been so useful; its members are active participants in the operations of their own departments as well as members of a joint planning staff. Additionally, we have utilized interdepartmental task forces for planning on special issues, and we have found it to be an excellent means of bringing to bear upon a problem the best knowledge of several agencies.

Lastly, there is the question about a joint career service embracing senior officers selected from State, Defense, and related national security agencies.

"Is the proposed joint career service practical and worthwhile?"

The joint career service proposal strikes me as being a rather drastic and administratively cumbersome approach to the very desirable objective of developing policymakers with nonparochial viewpoints and wide breadth of experience. As I suggested earlier, I believe the interchange of selected personnel between the Departments of State and Defense and the use of joint task forces on planning might go a long way toward meeting this objective and should be tried before we resort to the more drastic proposal for a joint career service.

In conclusion I wish to thank the committee for this opportunity to meet with it. I will be glad to answer questions on this statement.

United States Asks Withdrawal of Two Cuban Officials

Press release 327 dated June 18

The Department of State on June 18 delivered to Dr. Enrique Patterson, Cuban Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, the following note.

SIR: I wish to inform you that the Government of the United States has ascertained that Dr. Berta Pla, Cultural Attaché in the Cuban Consulate General at New York City, and Carlos Manuel

Lazaro Felix Sanchez y Basquet, assistant to the Cuban Consul at Miami, Florida, have engaged in highly improper activities incompatible with their status as consular officials.

In these circumstances I must state to you that the continued presence in the United States of Dr. Pla and Mr. Sanchez is no longer acceptable and you are requested to arrange for the departure of these officials within forty-eight hours.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

For the Acting Secretary of State:

L. D. MALLORY

President Eisenhower Departs for the Far East

Statement by President Eisenhower¹

My friends: Through recent weeks my mail has been heavy with personal messages from thousands of Americans and friends of America overseas, messages of calm faith that our decent, peaceful purposes will not be obscured in the world's eyes by propaganda and invective.

These messages, written in fullness of heart, have been inspiring proof that, far from Washington and the world centers of power, men and women are deeply concerned with the world role of the Republic—for peace with justice in freedom. To all those who have written and cabled me heartening words I am most thankful.

As you know there have been public warnings, based on a variety of considerations, that I should not visit the Far East at this time. With these I did not agree. However, they moved me to rethink and to reexamine my individual responsibility within the American mission of free-world leadership. In that process I decided neither to postpone nor to cancel my trip to the Far East.

This is the reason for my decision: so that I can continue to learn more about the immediate problems and purposes of our friends and to continue to promote a better understanding of America abroad, which, particularly in the circumstances of the moment, is a compelling responsibility on me as the President of the United States.

¹Made at Washington National Airport on June 12 (White House press release).

If the trip now ahead of me were concerned principally with the support of a regime or a treaty or a disputed policy, if it were intended merely to bolster a particular program or to achieve a limited objective, such a journey would have no real justification. But this trip is not so concerned, not so intended.

Rather, it represents an important phase of a program whose paramount objective was, and is, to improve the climate of international understanding. Toward that goal we have worked in many ways: for instance, by the exchange of students and by our economic assistance program.

Not the least among these means has been a long series of visits, through 7½ years, by chiefs of state and senior officials of other governments to the United States and like trips abroad by myself, the Vice President, and our associates at all levels of American Government.

Never, I believe, in the history of international affairs has there been so massive a program of communications between government officials and between peoples. We should not permit unpleasant incidents and sporadic turmoil, inspired by misled or hostile agents, to dim for us the concrete and gratifying results. They have been to the great profit and to the great good of the entire world.

For one thing, America's sincere dedication to the pursuit of a permanent peace, with justice for all, is becoming more clearly understood than ever before throughout the free world.

For another, the free-world economy, including our own, has been steadily strengthened.

For a third, among most of the world's peoples there now is a genuine consensus of conviction that we can, by negotiation, solve even the most difficult of international problems.

We, in truth, have made immense progress. In the devout hope that I can help further, even a little, this forward movement, I go to the Philippines, the Republic of China, Japan, and Korea.

In these countries we have many millions of warm and devoted friends, in every case the vast majority of the population. But because these are

countries of freedom, where men and women are free to assemble, to speak out, and to criticize, we must not expect a regimented unanimity on any subject—any more than we expect it here at home.

I am going to these countries:

Because with the Republic of the Philippines we have the closest ties of association beginning six decades ago and because it was in the Philippines many years ago that we launched our first major program to help a developing people achieve a prosperous independence.

Because with the Republic of China we have helped demonstrate to the world that a free people can hold high its precious national heritage against all efforts to destroy it and can in adversity build soundly for the future without a fatal sacrifice of human values.

Because with Japan we have just completed our first century of relations and we can now so plan and order our partnership that through the new century ahead we may work together for the prosperity and peace of the entire world.

Because with Korea we have been joined since the establishment of its Republic in maintaining there a bulwark on the frontier of the free world, essential to the security of this Nation and the honor of the United Nations.

Our associations with these four nations are vital to our own security and to the security of the free world. In my personal mission through the next 2 weeks I shall strive to my utmost that our friendships may grow warmer, our partnerships more productive of good for us all.

I am stopping briefly in Okinawa, where we have important responsibilities for the welfare of the Ryukyuan people.

I am also happy to visit our newest States, Alaska and Hawaii. They are important bridges of communication to the free nations of Asia.

I know that all Americans will want me to express their warm friendship to the peoples I shall visit. I know also that I shall bring back to you the friendly greetings of our Asian brothers.

And now, goodbye to all of you for a short while.

Some Conclusions From the Summit

by W. Randolph Burgess

U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council¹

Every spring Paris is transformed from somberness to a brilliance that lifts the heart. This year, particularly, the heavens smiled and the white and pink blossoms of the horse chestnut trees seemed more gay than usual. Even the Paris fashions seemed to reflect the heightened spirit of brightness and cheer. The people of Paris were delighted by the prospect of being host to the summit conference in mid-May and by the hope that it might help lessen the tensions with the Soviet Union.

There was an immense human investment in this undertaking. The heads of four great Western governments and their principal advisers were taking time away from all other duties of state to concentrate their efforts on this move along the pathway to peace. The summit meeting was in response to repeated urging by Mr. Khrushchev; that in itself seemed a good augury.

Long Preparation

There had been long and exacting preparation for this conference, including individual visits among the four Western chiefs of government and weeks and weeks of labor of experts. Last summer the foreign ministers of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, with German observers, had spent 10 weary weeks at Geneva, reviewing every aspect of problems relating to Germany and Berlin. They had not reached an agreement, but they had boxed the compass on the possible and the impossible solutions.

For nearly 20 months, in Geneva also, representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. had been attempting to

reach agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear testing under controls which would insure against any abuse of the agreement. The negotiators were making substantial—if laborious—progress.

Six months before, France, the U.K., U.S., and U.S.S.R. had created a 10-nation disarmament committee on which the Soviet bloc and the West were equally represented.² The four powers hoped that the work of the committee would provide a useful basis for disarmament negotiations in the United Nations. This group had begun meetings in March after extensive preparation. The meetings reached no conclusions but succeeded in exposing and exploring the various positions.

The Western team included in its proposals a group of concrete, practical, and relatively simple first steps which could be taken without delay and which would begin the climb toward broader measures.³ But the Soviet team refused to talk about these practical, simple steps and instead kept sounding off with sweeping generalities of complete and universal disarmament with no adequate assurance of controls. However, although the U.S.S.R. conceded no single practicable point, the discussions defined the issues and there seemed reasonable hope that at the summit some directive might get the negotiations on the road to progress on specific disarmament steps.

It should be emphasized that during this whole period the three Western Powers—England, France, and the United States—who were to take part in the summit were in continuing contact and consultation with their partners of the Atlantic Alliance. Besides individual consultations the discussions were centered in NATO [North At-

² BULLETIN of Sept. 28, 1959, p. 438.

³ For text of a working paper on disarmament presented by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1959, p. 511.

¹ Address made before the General Federation of Women's Clubs at Washington, D.C., on June 15 (press release 332).

lantic Treaty Organization], on which I have the honor of representing the United States. Many hours of discussion were held in this 15-nation forum. Thus the three Western Powers went to the summit knowing they had the understanding and support of the whole alliance.

Our Hopes Blasted

We who had been working on these questions had hope, not of great, sweeping solutions but of some concrete, if modest, forward steps toward better understanding between the free world and the Soviet bloc which might gain a few yards on the road to a stabilized peace. But those hopes were blasted in the very first moments of the summit conference by Mr. Khrushchev. You all know how he did it. The President and Secretary Herter have reported it fully and directly to their fellow Americans.⁴

There was some previous evidence of a change in the Soviet attitude when, at a speech at Baku, U.S.S.R., a week before the U-2 incident,⁵ Mr. Khrushchev changed his tone to greater belligerency, especially renewing his threat of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. This the Western countries generally interpreted as simply following earlier Soviet patterns of talking tough before a conference in an effort to improve their trading position.

But when Mr. Khrushchev reached Paris, the storm broke. On Sunday, the day before the meeting was to begin, he told General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan that he would go on with the conference only if the President of the United States punished those responsible and guaranteed that such flights would be discontinued—a demand so extreme he must have known that it could not be met.

When the meeting began on that historic Monday, May 16, he unleashed an unprecedented attack on our President and repeated the same demands, adding to them the further demand that the President himself apologize for the flights. When these demands were not met, Mr. Khrushchev refused to attend meetings, and the con-

ference was over. Khrushchev even refused the President's offer to meet with him in private.

For a full understanding of the whole episode, we need time for the dust to settle. But by now each of you has probably evolved your own explanation of why it all happened as it did. One thing seems evident: The incident of the U-2 plane was an excuse rather than a reason. For Mr. Khrushchev admits he had known about these flights for nearly 4 years and consequently was fully aware of them when he visited President Eisenhower in September 1959. But he never mentioned them at that time. The reason seems fairly obvious: He did not want to put himself in the position of admitting that the Soviet Union did not have what it takes to shoot down planes flying at that great altitude. Moreover, in view of the tremendous and continuing espionage apparatus and activity of the Soviet, it is ridiculous for Mr. Khrushchev to appear so shocked at this overflight by an unarmed plane.

The reasons for his breaking up the summit meeting probably lie deeper. While the evidence is inconclusive, difficulties at home may have played a role in Mr. Khrushchev's decision. But more important is the fact that Mr. Khrushchev had not succeeded in his attempts either to split or wreck the Western alliance. He realized he could not have his way at the summit meeting. His propaganda to turn France against Germany and to develop resentment by the smaller nations against the three great Western Powers had all failed. He was put on notice of this failure by reason of the unanimous action of the 15-nation NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Istanbul on May 2 to 4,⁶ at which the foreign ministers joined in a statement in full support of the Western position for the summit. Mr. Khrushchev therefore faced the prospect of failure at the summit to win any easy gains from the West, and he badly needed some way of getting off the hook.

There is every evidence that the Soviet leaders had come to a decision that it would be advisable to postpone the summit discussions until a more propitious time. You will remember that Mr. Khrushchev even indicated his hope that the successor to Mr. Eisenhower in the White House might be more approachable and that there might be favorable changes toward the Soviet position in other countries too. Patience is an attribute of

⁴ For President Eisenhower's report to the Nation on May 25, see *ibid.*, June 6, 1960, p. 899; for Secretary Herter's statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 27, see *ibid.*, June 13, 1960, p. 947.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1960, p. 851, and June 13, 1960, p. 955.

⁶ *Ibid.*, May 23, 1960, p. 840.

the U.S.S.R. policy, and they think time is working for them. The Soviet leadership also seems to have a deeply ingrained belief that strength can best be indicated by rudeness and overbearance.

Evidence of this was the vitriolic 2¼-hour press conference given by Mr. Khrushchev in Paris on May 18, which shocked even the most case-hardened journalists. American reporters came away with the feeling that they and their President and their country had been personally insulted. Moreover, his unbridled outbursts have more than offset his efforts to gain sympathy from the airplane incident.

Our Future Policy

In the face of this behavior, one might be tempted to write off the whole endeavor—to go back to a policy of shutting down on relations with the Soviet Union. But that is not the answer. We have to live in the same world with the Soviet Union. Each of us has the power to inflict frightful damage on the other. So, no matter how outraged we feel, we must continue to do our best to understand the Soviet mind and to find ways of reducing the deadly peril.

The President has stated the future policy of our country as follows:⁷

We must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts between our own and the Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it.

I should like to assure you that the members of the NATO alliance are all agreed upon this policy. The Geneva conference on disarmament has resumed its work, as has also the conference on banning nuclear weapons testing.

But the Western World has learned one clear lesson from all this: to take nothing for granted. Any agreement on disarmament must carry such built-in inspection and control provisions as to make certain that it will be carried out. Furthermore, we have been reminded again of the danger of being lulled by apparently softened attitudes on the part of the Soviet leaders.

Is There Any Silver Lining?

The sudden collapse of the summit conference was indeed a shocking destruction of many hopes, but as we gain the perspective of distance, we can see some advantages from it. One of these is to

⁷ *Ibid.*, June 6, 1960, p. 839.

give us and our partners evidence to support a greater faith in our defense forces than many critics have implied.

The development and effective operation of the U-2 planes for 4 years was an important achievement and has given us most valuable knowledge of the Russian potential. The fact that these overflights were feasible suggested that Soviet defenses are not proof against our manned bombers. This supports the assessment that we are still ahead of Russia in our massive military power.

Our Alliance Is Strong

The second favorable factor emerging from this experience is its testimony to the essential unity of our alliance: first, of the three Western negotiating powers working together as a strong team, and second, of the wider 15-nation organization which has formed a solid protective front for the Western World. Not only was there no split in the ranks of the alliance despite Mr. Khrushchev's most rigorous efforts to sow seeds of dissension and distrust, but his threats actually pulled the organization closer together. And not for the first time!

In 1957, after the startling evidence, implicit in sputnik, of Russian scientific achievement, NATO laid out a new program of interdependence and cooperation, especially in science and its military applications.

In 1958 Mr. Khrushchev's series of letters threatening unilateral action on Berlin again led the alliance to renew its pledges of unity and to strengthen its forces.

Much the same is happening this time. At a meeting of the NATO Council held in Paris 2 days after the breakup of the summit conference, the French Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, and our own Secretary of State, Mr. Christian A. Herter, reported fully what had happened and took part in an extended discussion. At the conclusion the Council regretted that Mr. Khrushchev's position had made negotiations in Paris impossible.

The resolution of the North Atlantic Council then went on to say:⁸

Reaffirming complete solidarity of the countries of the Alliance, it fully approves the statement of the three

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1307.

Heads of State or Government that "all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiations" and remains "ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future".

To complete the picture of Paris in May 1960 it should also be reported that the week following the summit representatives of 20 countries of Western Europe and North America—including the NATO countries and the five other countries which are members of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation—met there to consider a new charter of economic cooperation. There was, of course, no organic connection between this group and the summit meeting or the NATO alliance. But the failure of the summit not only placed no damper on this economic program but instead gave to the members of the group an added impetus to push forward with their project. Cooperation of the Western World had moved another pace forward.

This reaction of other nations which have been our partners and friends was reinforced when the U.S.S.R. attempted to pass a resolution of censure against the United States in the United Nations Security Council. They failed dismally, obtaining only the vote of Poland in addition to their own.⁹ Nine of the eleven members of the Security Council joined instead in a resolution urging continued consultations and negotiations in accordance with the program of the President quoted earlier.

A Personal Vote of Confidence

This heartening support for the Western position was not a coldly impersonal judgment. I think it was a vote of confidence in the three Western leaders who took part in the conference, and particularly in the President of the United States, who was so personally involved and attacked.

These are matters which cannot be measured on a computing machine. I can simply give you the reaction of someone who lived close to these tremendous events and who watched the evidence pile up.

Some thought we should have said less or admitted less in the U-2 incident. But out of it all came a recognition of the courage and integrity of the President. He himself took the full re-

sponsibility. This did not follow the usual procedure of intelligence operations. But it was the only possible course consistent with the character of Dwight D. Eisenhower. The people of the free world have respected him for it.

I like to think also that the handling of this incident is somehow typical of America. The Soviets would never have told the truth about such an event. So perhaps there is a lesson here of broad significance. We as a people believe that in the long run governments to succeed must account honestly to their peoples and that there is inherent in everyone a sense of truth and falsehood. The *willing* cooperation of a people depends in the long run on its government's appealing to that sense in its citizens. This is a basic truth we need to recall over and over again.

Broad Conclusions

For these great problems of international relations—which may hold peace or war in the balance—there is no simple or easy solution. We face a long contest between two different ways of life based on fundamentally different moral principles.

Under present conditions we should, as the President said in his report to the American people, approach negotiations with the Kremlin leaders as "a careful search for common interests between the Western allies and the Soviet Union on specific problems."

We can make progress toward reducing the burden of armaments by specific arrangements laid down by inspection and control.

If peace is maintained by a military deadlock, then the scene of the contest will shift to prolonged economic competition and to increased efforts in the battle to capture men's minds, which for our part might more appropriately be called the battle to *free* men's minds.

The Soviet principle is based on the belief that an unavoidable conflict exists between the classes which they think in the end must result in victory for communism by all feasible means, including, if necessary and practical, the use of armed force. They will use every mechanism to stir up that conflict. They are today actively engaged in doing so in many parts of the world. They are sure that success will come to them inevitably. Again I want to remind you of their belief that history is on their side.

⁹ *Ibid.*, June 13, 1960, p. 955.

But we believe that history shows it is on our side, because we think man is made for freedom and truth and in the long run will win his way through to them. But there is nothing automatic about this. Progress will reflect the leadership of individuals and nations, and especially the great free nations with their heritage of culture and freedom. The future path of history may well depend on us—our efforts, our sacrifices, our understanding.

We are not alone in this responsibility. We share it with other countries of the free world and particularly with the NATO member countries. The challenge of communism is not a challenge of the Soviet Union to the United States alone. It is, as NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri Spaak has said, "the challenge of the *whole* Communist world to the *whole* free world, and the countries of the free world must accept the challenge collectively in all fields and everywhere."

These are general terms that slip off the tongue quite easily in many a speech. We need to think what they mean in our daily life as a nation and as individuals. This is especially important this year when we are electing new national leaders.

Let us make a few practical comments. One is that to keep the military balance of power we shall have to continue military spending at about the present level. We cannot let up.

We must also continue to help the nations which are our allies and our friends to keep up their military and economic power. Our defense dollar brings us greater return this way than in almost any other.

To do these things effectively we shall have to keep on paying taxes at approximately present rates. No relief is in sight.

Meantime, we cannot afford new luxuries in governmental spending. New and expensive non-essential programs will have to wait.

To buttress our economic strength we shall have to follow sound monetary and fiscal policies to keep the U.S. dollar strong—a firm base for the economic growth and stability of the Western World.

In other words we must have the same carefully planned management of national affairs as you ladies know is necessary for the successful management of the family budget. At the same time we must also have imaginative leadership which will, along with our allies, seek in every possible way to penetrate the cloud of misunderstanding

and fears which separates us from the Communist world.

To summarize, the recent events serve notice on this country and our allies that we face a long period of testing. The key thought for us must be to maintain our strength—military, economic, and moral. Only by strength can we ultimately win this contest, and every national policy should be judged by its contribution to that strength.

Commencement and Crisis

by Lane Duinell

*Assistant Secretary for Administration*¹

If we look back over the years that have passed since the death of Stalin, we can see the development of certain trends in the Soviet Union which we can view with some hope. No matter how closed a society may be, change is irresistible today.

In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, people basically want simple things: a decent job, an opportunity to improve themselves, and, most important, the chance to educate their children, in the knowledge that tomorrow's world will be better for them than it has been for those who have lived through the tumultuous and often bloody first half of the 20th century.

These goals conflict with attempts to impose upon people any preconceived ideology, or any form of social organization, which calls upon men to sacrifice the good they can win for themselves today at the altar of a Utopian tomorrow.

So it has been that, despite an enormous apparatus of compulsion and indoctrination, signs have appeared in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death that indicate the reassertion, slow and halting as it may be, of these basic human goals.

Let us take one example.

You are all familiar with the Soviet-American exchange program, in which we have been engaged for the past 2 years. Under it, a great many Soviet citizens—officials, technicians, performing artists—have come to the United States and comparable numbers of Americans have gone to the U.S.S.R. In the field of tourism, the Soviets are still cautious and hesitant, so that only a few hundred Soviet tourists have visited our coun-

¹ Excerpt from an address made at commencement exercises at Colby Junior College, New London, N.H., on June 5.

try, while thousands of Americans have gone to theirs. But a beginning has been made, a beginning that was unthinkable during the "deep freeze" of the Stalin period, when the Soviet Union was almost hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world.

Obviously, the changes that have occurred in the Soviet Union do not add up to an "open society," as we understand it. Obviously, too, the development of "openness" in the Soviet Union will be slow, painfully so, from our point of view. What is important about this is not the degree of change that has taken place over the past 7 years but the fact that there is any change at all and the direction of those changes that have occurred.

One important thing, of course, has not changed. The Soviet leadership continues to be intent upon its goal of creating a Communist world and declares itself ready to do whatever it can get away with in order to achieve this goal.

We, on our side, are confident that this Soviet goal is unattainable. We believe that every people, if left to itself, will eventually choose freedom, not subjugation, will choose good neighborliness, not belligerence, will choose liberty and not blind obedience to the dictates of a falsely conceived theory imposed by a self-perpetuating dictatorship.

We believe that the peoples of the world will make this choice if they have the opportunity to work out their own destinies for themselves. In order that they may do this, they need the assurance that they will be able to solve their own problems in their own way, without pressure or undue influence from outside. For them to be able to do this, the world needs peace.

That is why, during the past year, we have sought to explore the readiness of the Soviet Government to agree to meaningful measures which would reduce international tension and increase the chances for peace. That is why the President went to Paris 3 weeks ago. And that is why, despite Soviet tactics at the summit, the President, upon his return from Paris, firmly restated our policy in the following words:²

We must keep up our strength, and hold it steady for the long pull. . . . So doing, we can make it clear to everyone that there can be no gain in the use of pressure tactics or aggression against us and our allies. . . . We must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts be-

tween our own and the Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it.

Among the lessons of Paris, the most important, it seems to me, is a fresh realization of the dangers we face and the consequent need to move ahead with our own programs for strengthening the free world.

The free world cannot defend itself, or win friends for itself, only by rockets and bombers and all the rest. These are necessary, but they are not enough. In the long run the free world will defend itself, and win adherence to itself, because our way of life gives a better way of living, a fuller life to the individual; it gives security and hope.

Refugees—A Changing Challenge

by John W. Hanes, Jr.

Administrator of Security and Consular Affairs¹

Many people have been shocked by the events of the past 2 months—the collapse of the summit meeting, Premier Khrushchev's outbursts in Paris, and his unprecedented personal attacks on our President—shocked, because this series of events once more and so brutally shows the unchanging nature of the Communist threat to those who had hoped that, somehow, the beast had changed his spots.

I doubt, however, that anyone in this room was shocked; disappointed, apprehensive, yes—but certainly not shocked. For all of us here are concerned with refugees, and those who deal daily with the human tragedy which international communism spews out as a waste product can scarcely harbor any illusions about its nature. Through the years, while the Communist leaders were alternately cooing of peace and blustering about war, and always praising their workers' paradise, the refugees have kept coming. The refugees have been a personal, awful warning—to those who would see and hear—of the terror behind the Communist curtain.

Let us, then, consider what has been happening in recent weeks and seek a perspective about our basic policy, especially as that policy affects our common concern—refugees.

¹ Address made before the advisory board of the United States Committee for Refugees at Washington, D.C., on June 16 (press release 334).

² BULLETIN of June 6, 1960, p. 899.

First of all we must ask what has changed. Has Soviet policy changed? Not one bit. Soviet tactics, however, have changed; and it is crucial for us to distinguish between tactics and policy if we are to avoid falling into the trap that the Communists set for us by deliberately confusing the two. Never have the Communists deviated from their declared course of seeking world domination. That is policy—and it has been consistent from 1917 to the present. Only the tactics have changed. The recent rantings of Premier Khrushchev are but the latest demonstration of such tactical change. We would do well to remember, by the way, that such a performance, and such a violent shift of tactics, is possible only to the leader of a totalitarian state.

Since it is only tactics which have changed, we should view the prospect in perspective. Recent events have been unpleasant, but they are no more a sign that we face a greater actual danger than would be a declaration of total sweetness and light by Mr. Khrushchev a signal that our danger was lessened. I have always marveled at the ability of so many well-informed people persistently not to understand the unchanging basic Communist objective, or almost eagerly to lose sight of it and alternate between unjustified hope and unwarranted fear after each wave of the olive branch or of the sword by the Communist leaders.

I believe deeply that, with firmness, patience, and comprehension, it will continue to be possible for our country and the free world to preserve peace in the world without impairing the vitality of freedom or imperiling its ultimate spread throughout the world. But we will never achieve these ends unless we first achieve a sufficiently broadly based political maturity among our people—and all free peoples—to support the uncomfortable corollary. That is simply to be as persistent in refusing to accept injustice and wrong as the Communists are patient in seeking to make us accept them.

Therefore it is not without some relief that I view the recent outbursts of the Soviet Premier. For he has, ironically, done us the service of again unmasking the never-changing objective of Communist policy as no one else could possibly do.

Premier Khrushchev has also given an immense, if unintended, boost to the refugee cause by reminding the world that the conditions which produce refugees continue without change. Thus it has never been more important—not only in hu-

man terms but in terms of our foreign policy—that we continue to offer asylum and help to the victims of communism and tyranny. For it is a fact that our treatment of every person who escapes from the Communist world is symbolic of our concern for those who remain; but, also, in a much more basic sense, of whether we mean by deeds what we say about freedom.

It is not news to this group that our country has a proud record of assistance to refugees. Most of you helped build that record.

I would like to remind you that in just the past 12 months—the period known as the World Refugee Year—our *Government* contribution alone to refugees was over \$70 million. The bulk of this \$70 million, of course, went to meet our substantial regular annual commitments, although most of these were also supplemented by special World Refugee Year donations.

This enormous sum is perhaps more meaningful if we highlight just three of the things it enabled us to do:

A new four-story community center has been built in Hong Kong as a gift of the American people which will provide facilities for education, recreation, and vocational training as well as a day nursery and a clinic. Such a center has long been needed, and it will fill an enormous gap in the disrupted and harsh life of the Chinese refugees.

In the Middle East tons of our surplus food were sent this year to provide the basic diet for Algerian refugees who were facing starvation.

And in Europe thousands of people have left camp life forever as a result of the dramatic camp clearance program of the United Nations High Commissioner, which we have supported substantially.

I could go on at great length about our other programs, but this would be highly misleading; for the record of the Government during World Refugee Year is only part of the picture. Of at least equal importance is the continuing generosity of the American people, who have given untold millions this year, as every year since the end of the last World War. And it is in keeping with our American tradition that the efforts of our citizens have not been channeled through the Government but through the myriad voluntary agencies, churches, and other independent expressions of our varied society.

It is you, the leaders of this effort, who have

taken upon your conscience responsibility for the refugees; and you have not followed the easier path of leaving it to the Government "to do something."

I would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of your Government, officially to thank the United States Committee for Refugees for its achievements and for its important contribution to our total national participation in World Refugee Year. In doing so, I want most sincerely to express my personal gratitude to each of you individually for the heart and the enthusiasm that you have brought to this difficult task. We are all greatly in your debt.

You and I have come here today, however, mainly to look to the future; and in speaking of the future I cannot help but be aware of the grave decision facing the United States Committee for Refugees: What should be its future beyond this special year? Because of my great interest in the committee, I have been asked several times for my opinion. I have steadfastly refused to give such an opinion because I believe it would be thoroughly improper for the Government to interfere in any manner in a policy decision that only the committee can make. I will say, most emphatically, that whatever decision is reached will be understood and respected by the Government.

The Government, too, has been giving serious thought to what lies ahead. We all know that, although the World Refugee Year ends officially in 2 weeks, the problems will not be magically resolved by that time. As George Meany said to the United Nations 3 years ago,²

... the refugee problem is a dynamic and not a static problem. It continually changes in its dimensions, in its nature, and in its location. It is constant only in one respect: that it will continue to exist so long as conditions exist which create it.

These conditions, unfortunately, are still with us. The Department of State, therefore, has made searching inquiries during the past year into our basic refugee policy, and I would like to share with you some of the thinking resulting from this study.

The first point is that the problems of refugees remain a basic concern of the United States. I am pleased to tell you that, as a result of this thorough and current study of the refugee problem, there has been a reaffirmation of the importance of continuing governmental programs

of aid to refugees. This is more significant than you may at first realize. For in a time of grave national peril, no policy can be taken for granted; and every policy that requires an outpouring of our effort must be weighed against other demands having to do with our very survival. What this means, then, is that suitable assistance to refugees will continue to form part of the basic policy of the United States.

Obviously, however, the problems ahead of us are not now those we faced when our refugee programs first took shape at the end of World War II. Great changes have taken place since then. The most significant change is that the overriding problem is no longer Europe. The telling figure here is that in 1945 there were 8 million displaced persons in Europe. Today the number of unsettled refugees in Europe is in the vicinity of 100,000.

At the same time other problems in other parts of the world are emerging.

In light of the accomplishments in Europe during the past decade, and notably during the World Refugee Year, we feel very strongly that the backlog of the European caseload, which has been an international responsibility for so many years, can be shrunk within 3 years to a point that the basic responsibility for the residual problem may be transferred to the countries involved. This presupposes, of course, no major new refugee emergency.

This means, then, that we must plan a continually diminishing governmental effort devoted to this diminishing problem in Europe and a refocusing of more of our attention and resources on the millions of refugees who are in such desperate need in the Far East, in the Middle East, and in Africa. Such a redirection of assets is, in my opinion, as necessary to private organizations as it is to governmental programs. I am convinced that the needed changes, however difficult they may be in the short run, will be made.

As an American I am proud that no threats or problems of the complex struggle we are waging can frighten us into abandoning our longstanding and honorable policy of help to the needy and to the homeless of the world. For as President Eisenhower has said, "as long as there are refugees, we cannot ignore them."³ Indeed, we have not ignored them in the past, and we shall not ignore them in the future.

² BULLETIN of Dec. 9, 1957, p. 937.

³ *Ibid.*, June 15, 1959, p. 872.

The People of Louisville and America's Cultural Relations

by Robert H. Thayer¹

I am not going to carry coals to Newcastle this evening by telling the members and friends of the International Center about the importance of international educational and cultural exchange programs. This center and the city of Louisville are continually cited by our active operations staff of the Department as outstanding examples of what communities can do to contribute to the objectives of this program, which we believe foster the type of mutual understanding essential as a basis for lasting peace.

I bring with me the deep appreciation of the Department of State for the magnificent work performed by this center and the people of Louisville not only in support of the exchange programs of the Government but more important the initiative you have yourselves shown. Your inexhaustible hospitality for our distinguished foreign leaders and specialists, your careful orientation and guidance for foreign students, your summer work exchange program with France, your assistance to Americans in undertaking international cultural projects, and most important of all, your expanding horizons that are bringing the world into the everyday life of the citizens of Louisville—all of these things and many more have placed this city in the vanguard of this extraordinary ground swell of interest and activity by the people of America in the field of cultural relations with foreign countries.

This exciting movement has quietly but surely gathered momentum in the last few years and has today reached a point which, I believe, makes it

imperative for us to pause and take stock of where we are going.

One of the amazing characteristics of the people of America is the individual enthusiasm with which they seize upon an activity which catches their imagination and concentrate all their energies upon it. This is a very great quality, but as is always the case where enthusiasm and energy flow in an ever-increasing stream, someone, sometime, must step back and take a broad, objective look at what is being done and make sure that the objectives have not been lost sight of in the hurly-burly of the activity itself.

Don't misunderstand me: I am not about to propose that we curtail our activity in the field of international education and cultural relations. On the contrary, I believe that this activity should be not doubled but tripled and quadrupled. But if this is to be done, the basis of our effort must be sound, our objectives must be clear, our operations must be efficient and not clogged with the duplication and confusion and absurd selfish competition that comes with massive uncoordinated effort.

Let us take a quick look at the situation today. There are 17 different agencies of the Government engaged in one way or another in bringing people from other lands to study and train in this country and sending Americans abroad to learn and teach. Hundreds and thousands of individuals, organizations, foundations, service clubs, universities, and other institutions are doing the same things and engaging in many other fields of cultural activities. For instance the Smithsonian Institution has for over 100 years been engaged in exchanges of all kinds with other countries. Did you know that the Smithsonian Institution has the greatest collection of grasses in the world and has been exchanging blades of grass of every size, quality,

¹ Address made at the International Center, University of Louisville, Louisville, Ky., on June 14 (press release 325). Mr. Thayer is Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for the Coordination of International Educational and Cultural Relations.

color, and kind with every section of the world for many decades? I am told that this exchange continued without interruption between the United States and the enemies we fought in both World Wars. Let us not overlook the lesson to be found in the bond between those who spend their lives profoundly absorbed in the study of a blade of grass—a bond so strong that two world wars could not shake the confidence of their relationship or slow the urgency of their need to exchange their views.

Both the Government and the people of the United States are building, with increasing rapidity, interest and activity in the field of cultural relations. In one country that I know of, there are 12 different Government agencies and 93 private organizations and institutions engaged in this field. What is the relationship between the activities of Government and these private groups? If the public is carrying on this work, why must the Government bother with it?

That is a question very close to my heart. It is a question that is constantly thrown at every Government official when he appears, as I did this spring, before the congressional committees charged with examining the spending of public funds, and it is a question that every Government official should be prepared to answer. I become somewhat impatient with many of my friends in private life who complain bitterly about how Congress hinders the progress of important work by searching investigations into the detail of operations. What they don't realize is that the very basis of our American system of government lies in the responsibility of Congress to inquire into the spending of every cent of taxpayers' money, and the greatest safety valve in the world against the normal excesses of the enthusiasm and zeal of American public or private enterprise sparked by the great freedom of thought and action which abound in this country is the searching questions of congressional appropriations committees. It is the obligation of Government to be able to answer these questions intelligently and accurately.

Varied Forms of Cultural Relations

What exactly is "cultural relations"? My answer is a very simple one. Cultural relations are the relations of the people of one country to the people of another. They should be differentiated from diplomatic relations, which are the

relations of government to government, or public relations, which are the relations of government to people. The best example of public relations is that of Benjamin Franklin, who, when he first went to France, was not accepted by the French Government as a diplomatic envoy of the United States, and so he spent his time writing articles about this country and distributing them among the people of France. The Government of the United States spoke directly to the people of France through these articles—it was a government-to-people relationship. After the Battle of Saratoga, when it became evident that the United States was establishing itself in a way that could no longer be ignored, Benjamin Franklin became U.S. Minister, and diplomatic relations, government to government, were established. It wasn't until much later that cultural relations between the United States and France began to develop—when transportation across the ocean made it easier for Frenchmen to come to the United States and Americans to go to France as students or traders or businessmen or artists—and, through personal contact with all facets of the everyday lives of each other's citizens in their native land, made it possible for the living culture of France to be made known directly to Americans and vice versa.

Cultural relations take varied forms. The most popular of these and most important are exchanges of individuals in which students, teachers, leaders, and specialists in all fields are brought over to this country and are sent abroad for educational purposes in the broadest sense.

Then there are cultural information activities carried on particularly by USIA [U.S. Information Agency] in the field of English teaching, the creation of binational centers and the holding of art exhibits, the distribution of books and the setting up of American libraries abroad.

Cooperation between educational institutions is carried on by the universities themselves and, in non-European areas especially, by ICA [International Cooperation Administration] through their university-to-university contracts.

The President's Special International Program for Cultural Presentations enables us to send American performing artists abroad. Trade fairs, under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce, also have a cultural impact. Although the Department of State operates the program for sending performing artists abroad,

the Director of USIA coordinates this work and that of the trade fairs.

In 1959, 104,300 foreigners visited the United States for educational, scientific, and cultural purposes. 49,000 came to study or do research in American schools and universities and 55,300 for nonacademic projects such as observation and consultation and inservice training.

Less than one-third of our foreign visitors came under Government programs, including 15,293 military personnel brought over by the Defense Department for military training, 6,500 by ICA for technical training, and 5,500 by the Department of State.

30,600 Americans went abroad either for academic purposes or to work on special scientific or medical projects. Here the proportion sent by the Government is even lower, only about 12 percent.

It should be noted that this number does not include U.S. Government employees, who, with their dependents, would raise the total to over a million and a half Americans abroad.

It is interesting to compare these programs with the Soviet exchange program. In 1958 only 19 Soviet students left the U.S.S.R. for the free world. Seventeen of these students came to the United States. Of 654 free-world students who went to the Soviet Union, only 22 came from the United States. In 1959, out of a total of 70 Soviet students sent to the free-world countries, 27 came to the United States. Under the recently signed agreement with the U.S.S.R. they have agreed to send up to 35 students in 1960 and up to 50 in 1961, with approximately equal numbers of American students going to the Soviet Union.

In 1959 under the President's Special International Program for Cultural Presentations, through the 454 performances of great American symphony orchestras, smaller chamber-music orchestras, and quartets and individual artists, the United States has certainly offered sufficient proof of the high quality of its cultural attainments in the field of classical music. At the same time we are trying to reach a larger audience in each country with more of the grassroots music and song of America. A four-member folk-music group spent a rigorous 3 months this year touring many of the remote areas of India, including communities where they were the first Americans ever to perform. The group, consisting of three guitar players and a vocalist, presents the best in

American folk music—not hillbilly—ranging from early American ballads to the pre-jazz folk blues. We have sent orchestras, ballets, and choral groups abroad. We are now studying the ways and means of sending examples of our great American theater.

In the field of sports we are getting more and more demands from our missions abroad, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, for athletic coaches and groups of athletes to be sent over during the summer months. These groups have had great success in helping to train the young people of these countries and demonstrate techniques in different sports.

American performing artists under the President's program have covered every corner of the globe in a total of 1,183 performances in the last year.

One of the important facets of our cultural program is direct aid to American-sponsored schools abroad. These schools, founded in many cases originally by church groups but now nondenominational in character, are windows of American education. But they are woven into the educational system of the country in such a way as to make an indigenous educational contribution.

Among these schools is the outstanding farm school in Thessaloniki, Greece, where young Greeks are trained in modern agricultural methods; Robert College in Istanbul, where it is said that 80 percent of the political and economic leaders of Turkey received their education; and the American University of Beirut, with its influence over the entire Middle East. We are also assisting the American School of Tangier, the American community schools in Paris and Rome, and the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University. We hope very soon to complete an agreement to assist the American International School in Vienna.

The relations of people to people, whether through the performing arts, the exchange of persons, or the exchange of the thoughts and ideas of persons through the exchange of books, libraries, schools, and universities, are the means by which people come to learn to know and to understand one another.

What is the reason for the great wave of interest in cultural relations which is sweeping throughout the world today? Here again it seems to me that the answer is a simple one. People as people have reached a position of supreme

importance everywhere today. Their voice is being heard in the new countries of Africa clamoring for independence. Their impact is also being felt elsewhere, where the tyranny of the rule of dictators has held sway. The influence of people makes it of the utmost importance that people understand each other, and the firmest basis for mutual understanding is through cultural relations.

Government Support for Cultural Activities

Let us consider more carefully now this question of Government and public activity in the field of international education and public relations. That, after all, is the title of my speech—"The People of Louisville and America's Cultural Relations." If the people of Louisville are as effectively active in the field as I originally pointed out, why should we not let the Government bow out and leave it to all of you?

You will have noted in my description of what the Government is doing in the field of cultural relations that except in the field of the exchange of persons we are engaged in doing things which private initiative could not afford. In the performing arts we are sending abroad individual artists or groups of artists who could not go commercially since the price of living and transportation would eat up their income from their performances. Our great orchestras, ballets, and choral groups could not possibly make ends meet on their tours abroad unless they had Government support. The same is true of books. If you add to the price of American books the cost of translation, packing, and transportation, you would reach a prohibitive price for most American books; so the Government steps in and gets out cheap editions, pays for their translation and distribution. The same is true of the lending libraries of USIA, which are dotted throughout the world.

As for the exchange of persons, the Government is conducting a carefully selected exchange program in certain special fields under certain special conditions. The binational commissions which serve the Fulbright program represent a unique cooperation between the United States and a foreign country to give an opportunity to especially selected individuals to study abroad. The Smith-Mundt Act permits us to invite individuals in leading positions in a particular country to visit

the United States and get to understand how we have met and solved some of the problems of a rapidly developing country and also enables us to satisfy the needs of a country by furnishing that country at its own request with American specialists in a particular field.

It is the policy of the Government to lead the way in establishing mutual understanding as a basis for our international relations. This educational process cannot be left to chance. It needs the stimulus of strong public purpose backed by Federal funds. The Government's example and encouragement are essential elements in the movement of American educational institutions into the new world of the 1960's. But the clearing away of cultural barriers to peace is a job that no Government agency can accomplish alone. It is a massive task that requires a vigorous effort by every community and every citizen of the United States.

Working for Better International Understanding

Let us be realistic. No matter how actively we work to bring about international understanding, the road to world peace will be long and difficult. The recent failure of the Big Four conference in Paris was one more indication that there are no easy and immediate solutions to the major problems that beset our troubled world. We must learn to discard the natural American impulse to seek quick ways out of unpleasant situations. We must be prepared for a very long haul. We must break out of our fiscal-year obsession and begin to think in terms of working out solutions over periods of a minimum of 10, 25, and even 50 years.

Two years ago last month the late Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pointed out this basic American failing in a report to the Senate Appropriations Committee that was considering the educational exchange budget:²

I think that one of the respects in which the Soviet Communists have an advantage on us is that they think in terms of long-range projects more than we do. They have always said, we are not going to win soon, or quickly, or easily. . . . what we do today should be the kind of stuff that will bear fruit in 1 or 2 generations from now.

Cultural and educational exchange constitutes one major aspect of American foreign policy that is based upon the long-range view of our pres-

²Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on H.R. 12428, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 17.

ent international situation. Our exchange programs represent the theory that our day-to-day efforts to reduce tensions and avoid conflict must be supplemented by a painstaking year-to-year and decade-to-decade effort to establish communications between nations. Government officials of different countries can talk each other blue in the face, but they cannot get very far if they fail to understand each other's basic concepts.

To the Soviets, the word "aggression" means the flight of an unarmed photographic plane over its territory. To the Hungarians, it means the brutal crushing of a fight for freedom and the reestablishment of a "people's democratic republic." What does the word "independence" mean to a citizen of the Belgian Congo as he casts his first ballot? What does it mean to a refugee from Tibet in the mountains of India? What does the word "liberty" signify to a university student in Seoul, Korea, a gold miner in South Africa, or a graduating senior at the University of Louisville?

No matter how capable translators may be, words are too often inadequate to convey the underlying attitudes and basic aspirations of an entire people. That is why cultural exchange is so vital as our growing interdependence with other countries makes extensive cooperation necessary. Among the 50,000 foreign students enrolled at American universities this year are some of the future cabinet ministers and professional leaders of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These are the people who will plan and build the new societies of tomorrow. I neither expect nor hope that these societies will be patterned after the United States. It is not our task to remake the world in our image. But we can hope that the leaders and future leaders of these new societies will think rationally and realistically in their relationships with the United States because of their experiences as students, lecturers, or visitors here. We can hope also, and with a marked degree of optimism, that these people will have been able to identify their own drives for freedom and social justice with the traditions and ideals of the American people.

Cultural exchange, therefore, is more than just a matter of bringing foreign peoples to the United States and sending Americans abroad. It is a matter of relating different cultures to each other through free exchanges of ideas and frank expressions of opinion. It is in this type of process that

the American Nation excels and through cultural exchange can make the other peoples of the world understand that their problems are our problems—their striving for freedom, our striving—their fight for justice, our fight.

At the same time cultural exchange is accelerating the movement of all American citizens into the arena of world consciousness. Our country has assumed enormous world responsibilities in a short period of time. Have our citizens kept pace in their thinking and personal preparation for international living in a jet age?

I wish I could answer yes to that question, but unfortunately I cannot. We need far more professors and students who can speak Spanish and Portuguese for the purposes of lecturing and studying in Latin America. We need more people who can speak Arabic, Swahili, and Indonesian for the purpose of assisting the peoples of the newly developing nations to help themselves. We need more people who are prepared to work and live in countries that have vastly different cultural environments than the United States and can engage in fruitful cultural interchange with people who think, speak, and dress differently from Americans.

As more and more Americans meet foreign students and visitors in their homes, clubs, churches, and recreation centers, they will gain the necessary perspective of the United States as a world leader and will find the incentive to communicate with their world neighbors. Cultural exchange will act as a major catalyst in this major transformation of the American outlook. The acquisition by the American people of a basic understanding of the ideals, desires, problems, and achievements of other peoples will provide the substance for our world leadership toward economic growth and the final victory over totalitarianism.

People-to-People Relationships

The Government of the United States is a service organization. Our objective is to stimulate activity on the part of the people and to assist them in their task. The relationship of the people of the United States to the people of other countries is, above all, your business.

This idea that cultural exchange is a function of the people was strikingly reemphasized in my mind last week when I ran across a series of articles by a Dutch journalist and music critic who visited the

United States during the fall of 1958. This particular journalist had received a Department of State grant to come here, and through the generosity of Messrs. Mark Ethridge, Barry Bingham, and Norman Isaacs he was given the opportunity to become a short-term staff member of the Louisville *Times and Courier-Journal*. Several of the articles were written in Louisville for his readers in the Dutch capital city, The Hague. This journalist's descriptions of the music facilities at the Louisville Public Library, the organization of the Louisville Symphony Orchestra, and the work of Moritz Bomhard and the Louisville Opera Company are more than just technical descriptions of a city's musical offerings. They are colorful and penetrating excursions into the life of a charming and culturally alive community. Because of this journalist's visit and because of the way he was received by the people of this city, hundreds of thousands of Western Europeans have been able to relate their own lives to the life of urban America. Before the Dutch music critic came here, the Louisville newspaper played host to a cartoonist from India and a reporter from New Zealand. This month a young Israeli newspaperman named Meir Romen is experiencing Kentucky hospitality. This is truly a people-to-people experience in the fullest sense of the term.

I hope this evening that I have been able to clarify and place into its proper perspective the role of Louisville in this growing area of endeavor known as international cultural relations. It is a role that I hope many other cities will be able to emulate.

Let us remember that in building our world community we are only beginning to conquer the frontiers of cultural understanding. We have a long row to hoe before Singapore and Brasilia will be as meaningful to Americans as Washington, D.C., and St. Louis, Missouri. And to those who claim that the United States is too rich, too fat, and living too high on the hog to develop a renaissance of the pioneering spirit that made our country great, I offer the example of Louisville and the International Center.

I urge you therefore to maintain your visionary spirit and to continue your imaginative advance toward these lasting goals. I urge you to lead the way in the development of that world outlook our Nation needs to fulfill its international responsibilities. These responsibilities are not only for

today or next year but for generations to come. For the sake of our children and their descendants let us build a strong and lasting people's movement toward international understanding. I can think of no more important task in the pursuit of lasting peace.

Corrections to List of Products for GATT Negotiations

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on June 14 (press release 328) that the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements had given notice on June 8, 1960, of several errors and omissions in the list of products to be considered in the tariff negotiations announced on May 27.¹

Following are the changes required to correct the list of products to be considered for possible U.S. concessions, as contained in Department of State publication 6986:

Paragraph 59: The following is inserted between paragraph 58 and paragraph 60:

Paragraph 59. Opium.

Paragraph 60: "Ambergris;" is changed to read "Ambergris and civet ;."

Paragraph 355: A comma is inserted after "butchers;."

Paragraph 372: The language "for manufacturing or processing vegetable fibers (other than cotton) prior to making of fabrics or crocheted, knit, woven, or felt articles not made from fabrics;" is changed to read "for manufacturing or processing cotton prior to making of fabrics or crocheted, knit, woven, or felt articles not made from fabrics) ;."

Paragraph 397 [second]: The words "cooking and eating stoves" are changed to "cooking and heating stoves."

A closing parenthesis is inserted before the period at the end of this paragraph.

Paragraph 710: The word "grading" (in two places) is changed to "grating."

Paragraph 1504(b): The word "earludovia" is changed to "earludovia."

The language "and not bleached, dyed, colored, or stained" in the first clause is changed to read "and not bleached, dyed, colored, stained, or sewed."

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 13, 1960, p. 968; for the list of products, see Department of State publication 6986, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. (40 cents).

Paragraph 1-59 (c) : In the third clause of the exceptions, the language "goat, kid, pig, and shark" is changed to read "goat, kid, and pig."

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE'S NOTICE

CORRECTIONS TO LIST OF ARTICLES IMPORTED INTO THE UNITED STATES PROPOSED FOR CONSIDERATION IN TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

In the FEDERAL REGISTER of May 28, 1960, there was published a notice of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements of intention to conduct trade-agreement negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade with various foreign governments, to which notice was annexed a list of articles imported into the United States to be considered for possible modification of duties and other import restrictions (25 F.R. 4764-79). Certain errors and omissions have appeared which require correction.²

By direction of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements this 8th day of June 1960.

JOHN A. BIRCH,
*Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Trade Agreements*

Greetings Sent to Conference of Independent African States

Press release 326 dated June 14

Following is the text of a message from Secretary Heister to His Excellency Yilma Deressa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and chairman of the Conference of Independent African States, on the occasion of the opening of that conference at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on June 14.

JUNE 10, 1960

DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER: On behalf of the United States Government I send greetings to the Second Conference of Independent African States, which is now meeting at Addis Ababa.¹ The political progress of the peoples of Africa is most gratifying. This progress represents the steady implementation of the principle of self-determination—a principle that our Government has endorsed throughout its history.

² For the list of corrections included in the Committee's notice, see 25 Fed. Reg. 5197.

¹ The first conference convened at Monrovia, Liberia, on Aug. 4, 1959.

In your efforts at this Conference to foster peace and prosperity in your Continent, as well as to enhance the contribution of Africa to the peaceful solution of world problems, you have the best wishes and support of the Government of the United States.

Most sincerely,

CHRISTIAN A. HEISTER
Secretary of State

U.S. To Support International Indian Ocean Expedition

The White House announced on June 13 that the Federal Government will lend support to the Nation's leading oceanographers in an international expedition to the Indian Ocean.¹ The expedition, a scientific project of extraordinary scope and magnitude, will begin late this year and extend through 1964. It will greatly extend man's knowledge of these least known waters of the world, which cover a seventh of the earth's surface.

Like the recent International Geophysical Year,² the International Indian Ocean Expedition will incorporate a many-sided scientific attack on a single area of interest under the leadership of a special committee of the International Council of Scientific Unions, a nongovernmental organization with headquarters in The Hague. Scientific responsibility for U.S. participation will be borne by the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, national representative to the International Council.

Acting upon the recommendation of the Federal Council for Science and Technology and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the President approved a plan calling for key contributions by the Department of the Navy and the National Science Foundation. The Navy will make available oceanographic ships sponsored by the Navy and operated by leading U.S. oceanographic institutions. The foundation will be responsible for planning and coordinating Federal support for U.S. participation in the program including the provision of financial support.

Responsibility for planning the scientific content of the U.S. program has been assigned by the

¹ For a more complete description of the expedition, see White House press release dated June 13.

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 11, 1959, p. 682.

Academy-Research Council to its Committee on Oceanography. The committee has expressed the hope that the expedition, in addition to its anticipated contributions to fundamental knowledge, will afford unusual benefits to the heavily populated, protein-deficient nations on the ocean's perimeter, both in terms of increased fish harvests and in the further training of local scientists and technologists in the techniques of oceanographic research.

The expedition's peak activity is expected to

occur during 1962 and 1963, when ships and scientific personnel from well over a dozen nations will be conducting basic research in physical and chemical oceanography, meteorology, marine biology, geophysics, and submarine geology.

Details of the U.S. program will be worked out following a general planning session of participating nations to be convened in Copenhagen in July by the Special Committee on Oceanic Research of the International Council of Scientific Unions.

THE CONGRESS

European Aspects of the Mutual Security Program

*Statement by Foy D. Kohler
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs¹*

It is a pleasure and a privilege to meet with this committee, together with my colleagues from the Defense Department, General Miller [Brig. Gen. Fredric H. Miller], and from ICA [International Cooperation Administration], Mr. Oliver Sause, to discuss with you the European aspects of the Mutual Security Program.

The Mutual Security Program for Europe in fiscal year 1961 is, as you know, almost entirely military. Its purposes, as in the past several years, are to encourage and assist our European allies in developing the military forces required for the common defense of the West.

I have always considered it unfortunate that in newspaper and public discussions our contributions to the European NATO forces should be lumped under the general heading of "foreign aid." These contributions represent mutual security in the truest sense of the word. As has been made clear by spokesmen of the Defense Depart-

ment who have appeared before you, our ability to deter and resist Soviet aggression does not depend upon United States military power alone. It depends upon the combined military power of the free world as a whole. Our allies in Western Europe are making a substantial contribution to supplementing and supporting the military defense of the United States, and our own security requires that we help to make their military efforts meaningful and adequate.

We have often heard certain fellow citizens emphasize the tremendous threat represented by international communism and have also heard some of them argue that United States defenses are not adequate to meet this threat. It seems highly anomalous to hear some of these same citizens advocate the elimination or drastic reduction of foreign military assistance. The Communist threat is indeed serious, and the need for adequate defense is imperative. But we delude ourselves dangerously if we ignore the fact that the defensive power which really counts is the total de-

¹ Made before the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 3.

ensive power of the United States and other free nations. And in this total picture nothing would be more shortsighted than to deny ourselves the enormous dividends we receive from our investments in the military programs of our European allies.

Need for Maintaining Strength of Western Alliance

The past year has been one of intense diplomatic activity. It was to be capped only 2 weeks ago by a meeting "at the summit" in Paris. The Western Powers made exhaustive preparations and sincerely hoped to come to grips with the major problems disturbing the world. For reasons still obscure but certainly much deeper and broader than the airplane incident which he cited as a pretext, the Soviet participant decided to scuttle the conference.² Although no precipitate action has followed immediately, Mr. Khrushchev has since repeated his threat to take unilateral action with respect to Germany and Berlin "in his own good time," and both he and his Minister of Defense [Marshal Rodion Y. Malinovsky] have menaced our allies and ourselves with rocket attacks. We thus face a period of uncertainty at best and danger at worst. I think we can easily agree that the maintenance of the strength and effectiveness of the Western alliance in the face of this situation is more important than at any time since the alliance was founded.

At the same time I want to stress that the torpedoing of the summit conference does not mean that attempts to negotiate with the Soviet Union are at an end. In their communique³ regretting that the Soviet attitude had made the Paris discussions impossible, the Western Heads of Government reiterated "their conviction that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through negotiation." Indeed, the nuclear test negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union have been continuing in Geneva. Moreover, it seems clear that the 10-power disarmament negotiations will be resumed in Geneva next week as scheduled. The United States and its allies have carefully prepared concrete and realistic proposals for safeguarding disarmament and are proceeding in the

hope that genuine progress can be made toward that goal. However, here too the basic fact must be kept in mind that we can never expect to obtain a safe and workable disarmament agreement if we are so foolish as to make substantial reductions in our own armaments while we are attempting to negotiate such an agreement. If the Soviet Union could succeed in inducing the West to disarm itself while retaining the essence of its own military power, a genuine disarmament agreement would become a pipedream. We certainly intend to negotiate with the Soviet Government in good faith, but we do not intend to give them something for nothing.

On the other principal problem slated for summit discussion, no one now knows whether or how any real progress can be made toward a just solution of the problem of Germany, which, due to Soviet intransigence, remains divided, or of Berlin, whose people are determined to remain free and maintain their links with the West. There is, however, one thing that can be said with absolute certainty. Neither will the Soviets be deterred from unilateral action nor will just and honorable solutions to these problems be promoted by any weakening of our posture or our will.

We might, in fact, take a lesson from the opposition in this latter regard. Not only have the Soviet leaders been reiterating their basic positions, but they have also been vaunting their military prowess. While Soviet propaganda has tried to make capital of the Soviet announcement that the U.S.S.R. plans to reduce armed force personnel over the next 18 months or so to a level approximating that of the United States Armed Forces, Mr. Khrushchev declared to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 that "the Soviet Army now has combat means and firepower never before possessed by any army" and "would be able to literally wipe the country or countries which attack us off the face of the earth." Moreover, during his recent tours, he has been proclaiming that "the Soviet Union is the world's most powerful nation in the military sense."

Thus I would repeat that the unity and the strength of the free world are of the greatest importance. Solutions to outstanding problems will not come easily. They will take a long time to accomplish. While we continue to seek these solutions, as we have in the past, it would be folly to weaken our collective military posture in the

² For a statement by Secretary Herter on the events at Paris, see BULLETIN of JUNE 13, 1960, p. 947.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, June 6, 1960, p. 905.

uncertain period ahead. If we are not serious about our defenses now, we will never be able to convince anyone of the seriousness of our intentions in what may well be a prolonged period of negotiations.

Proposed Military Aid for Europe

Military assistance proposed for European country programs for the next fiscal year totals \$159 million. The total for NATO countries, including Greece and Turkey, is \$740 million. In addition there are certain regional programs—international military headquarters, infrastructure, mutual weapons development, weapons production, the NATO Maintenance Supply Services Agency—intended to support activities entirely or almost entirely within the NATO area. Including these regional programs there is a total of a little over \$1 billion in military assistance programed for the NATO area.

Military assistance proposed for Europe for fiscal year 1961 is approximately the same amount as that proposed last year. It is an increase over the amount finally programed for the area in fiscal year 1960. Reduced appropriations in fiscal year 1960 as well as in fiscal year 1959 necessitated deferral of a number of important NATO requirements. Consequently increased allocations are now necessary to help offset the reduced appropriations of prior years, which have resulted in a serious depletion of the pipeline. The executive branch is gravely concerned over the weakening effects on NATO's military strength which will follow unless steps are taken to remedy this steady reduction.

The program which is now submitted for fiscal year 1961 is, in the considered judgment of the executive branch, the minimum required to support a level of expenditures adequate to finance items which are of critical importance to NATO plans in the next few years and which our NATO allies would be unable to procure themselves except at the expense of other important sectors of their NATO defense effort.

There is certainly more agreement on the necessity for building up our defenses today than there is on the question which logically follows from it, namely, how this is to be accomplished. The question which is uppermost in the minds of many concerned with our common defense is this: Granted that our Western defenses must be

strengthened, are all NATO allies making as substantial a contribution to this end as they should or is the United States carrying a disproportionately heavy share of the Western defense burden?

The recently improved international payments and reserve position of Western European countries, coupled with a decline in United States reserves, has prompted the proposal that European NATO members might now take over entirely the burden of meeting their military requirements. However, examination of the nature of military assistance to the European area shows that this is not essentially a problem of balance of payments. Indeed, as the committee knows, most of the money appropriated for military assistance is spent in the United States. Furthermore, military assistance to Europe generates purchases in the United States of spare parts and maintenance materiel which exceed the value of aid money spent in Europe. Last year such purchases were substantially more than the United States military assistance funds expended in Europe. I think it is accordingly clear that drastically reducing or closing out our military assistance to Europe would not solve this country's balance-of-payments problem.

To the more general question as to why our European allies, in view of their remarkable economic progress, cannot be expected to bear the entire cost of their military programs, the answer is also clear. Our European allies would be able to pay their own defense costs, provided we and they were willing to accept a substantially lower level of total defensive power. Our contributions are designed to maintain a level of defensive strength which is much greater than could be expected from Europe's efforts alone.

It is true that our European allies have made general economic progress. However, they continue to suffer a number of serious economic limitations. Living standards in most NATO countries are still only one-third to one-half as high as American living standards. At the same time, tax rates in other NATO countries on the average are higher than United States tax rates despite the relatively deeper cut this means into consumption levels. Several European countries have joined us in undertaking substantial economic assistance to the underdeveloped areas of the world. Also the governments of these countries encounter some of the same political obstacles to increased defense efforts with which we are familiar in our

own country. Since modern weapons are incredibly expensive, some of our allies simply cannot afford to equip their forces with these weapons and at the same time bear the heavy maintenance costs they have already undertaken.

In view of the very real financial limitations of our European allies as well as the ever-present political pressures for arms reduction, an elimination or drastic cutback of United States assistance would almost certainly provoke a downward chain reaction throughout the NATO area. The allied governments and peoples would say, in effect, "If the United States Government no longer considers our defense programs important, why should we strain our economy to maintain these programs?" In other words, if we are unwilling to accept the concept that *total* defense is what really counts—if we should make the mistake of accepting the idea that each country must finance its own defense programs through its own resources—then we must face the fact that the net result would be a dangerous reduction in the combined defensive power of the free world.

Increase in European Defense Expenditures

Having made these cautionary remarks, I am glad to be able to report certain positive steps that are being taken to increase European contributions to the common defense.

We are constantly engaged in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with our NATO allies to bring about a more equitable sharing of the costs of our mutual defense. In consonance with established U.S. policy, which is directed toward eliminating grant aid as other countries become able to pay their own way, we are pressing these countries to assume greater responsibility for their individual and collective defense; and in fact they are doing so.

The economies of some NATO countries—the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—have improved to the point where they are considered financially capable of purchasing their own military needs, and grant materiel assistance is no longer programmed for these countries. For all other countries military grant aid is extended only after careful examination to determine whether the country can purchase the materiel and how the assistance can elicit a greater or more effective effort by the country itself. In addition, certain items such as spare parts and other conventional maintenance requirements of the Euro-

pean NATO countries, which were formerly covered by the military assistance program, are now financed for the most part by the countries themselves.

We think the record shows that we have had a very considerable measure of success in eliciting increased contributions from our NATO allies for our common defense. In fact, considering the political and other impediments involved, we are surprised at the favorable showing ourselves. The total of defense expenditures for the European NATO countries last year was \$13.6 billion, an increase of 11 percent over the \$12.2 billion spent in 1958 and more than double the 1950 expenditures.

Furthermore, the trend toward significantly increased defense expenditures is expected to continue. The Netherlands is planning a significant increase in its defense budget in 1961; the United Kingdom has announced a 7.6 percent increase; the Italian Government has already put into effect a 4 percent progressive annual increase; the Belgian defense budget for 1960, now before Parliament, represents a 3 percent increase over 1959. Following the resolution of certain problems of training sites and types of equipment, German defense expenditures rose steeply by 68 percent from the 1958 level of \$1.6 billion to \$2.7 billion in 1959. Let us not ignore the fact that in 1953 the United States was paying about 28 percent of the total defense costs of our European NATO allies; today we are paying about 8 percent.

An abrupt termination of all grants of military equipment would seriously weaken the alliance system upon which the security of the United States depends. The actions of the United States in this field in the last analysis must be directed to the building of stronger allies who will make progressively larger contributions to the common defense.

Economic Assistance

We all know, of course, that the threat of international communism is not military alone—that the contest between the free world and the Soviet system is waged on many fronts. Our freedom and security are always endangered by Soviet capture of the territory, population, and resources of other nations. This is true whether the capture results from direct military aggression or whether it results from internal subversion, creation and exploitation of social chaos, political pressures,

or economic blandishments. This means that we must continue to assist the lesser developed nations of the world in securing a greater measure of stability and well-being.

At present, economic assistance from the United States to Europe has practically disappeared, except for a few small programs designed to deal only with special situations. Far more important is the contribution which our European allies are themselves making to the social and economic development of vast areas of Asia and Africa—a contribution which adds significantly to our own efforts and which we hope will increase in future years. We should recognize that these grants and loans by European governments for purposes of helping the lesser developed areas contribute to our common defense just as truly as their military expenditures do. Meanwhile I would like to comment briefly on our special economic projects within Europe itself which, though small, are nevertheless important to our national security.

We believe defense support for Spain has been instrumental in maintaining the spirit of cooperation which has made possible the construction and effective utilization of the air- and sea-base complex jointly operated by the United States and Spain. Defense support was an element in the Spanish import requirements which contribute to economic stability in Spain. Defense support was also an element in the Spanish economic stabilization program, which has brought about sounder fiscal and monetary policies and so far reversed the serious loss of foreign exchange. A small technical cooperation program is contributing toward modernization of Spain's civil aviation system and improvement in its agricultural and industrial productivity.

The Federal Republic of Germany is now providing the help necessary to maintain Berlin's economic well-being. United States special assistance for Berlin, although modest in amount, underlines our undiminished interest in the city's survival in freedom and is a support to the Government and the people of the city in their resistance to the unrelenting Communist pressures to which they are subjected. American aid is being used jointly with West German and West Berlin financing for the construction in Berlin of a medical teaching center. The center, when completed in 1964, will not only help to relieve the present hospital-bed shortage but will stimulate

the training of medical personnel and will introduce American research techniques while at the same time generally furthering development of German medical research.

The program for Yugoslavia for next year is limited to a small amount of technical cooperation and special assistance. This assistance is designed to familiarize Yugoslav technicians with modern American methods in agriculture, industry, mining, transportation, and public administration. The fact that we are continuing assistance to Yugoslavia does not imply approval of the Yugoslav political or economic system. It should be regarded rather as a demonstration to the satellites of Eastern Europe, and to the uncommitted nations of the world, that the United States is ready to support the efforts of any country which needs help in preserving its independence from Soviet domination.

In summary, our ability to make progress toward a secure and peaceful world will depend in large measure upon the strength, unity, and determination displayed by the Western World as a whole. I do not need to stress the dangerous consequences that could follow if the Soviet Union, or even our friends, gained the mistaken impression that United States support for NATO was slackening at this critical time. I am convinced that the Mutual Security Program is one of the surest and most effective means of mobilizing our strength in NATO. It is for this reason that I believe favorable congressional action on the Mutual Security Program is of greatest importance in carrying out our defense and foreign policy objectives.

Department Expresses Grave Concern on Proposed Cuts in MSP Funds

Statement by Acting Secretary Dillon

Press release 333 dated June 15

The action of the majority of the House Appropriations Committee on the Mutual Security Program appropriation bill is a matter of grave concern to me. If uncorrected by the Congress, it will severely impair the effectiveness of the program and require the assumption of risks to our national security which are both unnecessary and dangerous.

Reductions

The reductions in amounts to be appropriated total \$790 million below the amount the President has repeatedly declared to be indispensable in the national interest.¹

1. The reduction of \$400 million in military assistance and of \$124 million in defense support assistance below the amounts determined to be essential by the President and all of his principal advisers in the foreign policy and national security area—including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—will mean the weakening of our collective frontline defenses at a time when the need for a steadfast and strong position is critical.

2. The reduction of \$62 million, or almost 25 percent, in the special assistance program is crippling in its effect. It is this form of aid which enables us to assure the use of military facilities and bases vital to our deterrent strength, which maintains stability in the troubled Middle East, which avoids economic disaster in Bolivia and in Haiti, which supports the efforts of Israel to promote progress and stability, which combats and seeks to eradicate malaria, which supports American schools abroad, and with which we plan to provide a modest program of educational and training aid to the newly emerging states of Africa. The reduction made by the committee would require the mutilation or sacrifice of a number of these essential programs, with results that could only be deeply injurious to our national interests and security.

3. Similarly, reductions in the funds for technical cooperation and the Development Loan Fund will decrease our ability to respond effectively either to the needs of emerging nations or to the increasing challenge of the Soviet economic offensive.

Restrictions

The committee action in recommending a series of highly restrictive amendments is also of grave concern. These amendments would unreasonably restrict and inhibit the uses of the funds appropriated.

¹ For text of the President's message to Congress of Feb. 16, see BULLETIN of Mar. 7, 1960, p. 369; for an excerpt from a special message of May 3, see *ibid.*, May 23, 1960, p. 837.

1. The committee would deny the use of funds for U.S. participation in a multinational effort under the direction of the World Bank to assist India and Pakistan to carry out an agreed plan for development and use of the Indus Basin waters. If this restriction is permitted to remain, the United States will bear the unhappy responsibility of having effectively sabotaged the multinational effort designed to eliminate a major difference between India and Pakistan and to improve the welfare of hundreds of millions of people. This is all the more incomprehensible since the Congress, just 1 month ago, after full consideration specifically affirmed the desirability of U.S. participation in this project.

2. The committee bill also proposes to provide contingency funds to the President but to deny him the right to use them to adjust programs in the light of changing circumstances, a limitation which serves no purpose but to deny the flexibility which is essential to effective management of our foreign affairs.

3. The committee bill also would impose, after 10 years of successful operations, new and unjustified restrictions which would severely limit the effectiveness of the tried and tested technical cooperation program. These restrictions would bind the United States to particular technical cooperation projects approved in advance by Congress; the programs proposed to the Congress must necessarily be illustrative and subject to negotiation with foreign countries after funds are appropriated. The committee proposal that the funds appropriated for technical cooperation can be used for no projects other than those illustratively proposed removes the possibility of making adjustments in the course of negotiation or to meet new needs of higher priority. In short, we would be shifting this program from one of cooperation to a unilateral take-it-or-leave-it program. Nothing in the 10-year history of point 4 technical assistance warrants any such restrictive action.

4. Illustrative of the general effort of the committee to impose restrictions on the use of funds for the purposes authorized is its action in limiting funds for the Inspector General and Comptroller. Congress, to meet criticisms of inefficiency and maladministration, established this office last year to permit and assure better management, inspection, and evaluation of the program. The committee action would deny the funds necessary for

this purpose. It is in effect a move to weaken our ability to remedy the type of errors which the committee itself has long criticized.

In short, the committee majority proposes in-

sufficient funds and hamstringing these. The Department is profoundly convinced that correction of these defects is essential in the interests of the United States.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During June 1960

Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament	Geneva	Mar. 15-June 28
U.N. Trusteeship Council: 26th Session	New York	Apr. 14-June 30
GATT Contracting Parties: 16th Session	Geneva	May 16-June 4
IMCO International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea	London	May 17-June 17
International Cotton Advisory Committee: 19th Plenary Meeting	México, D.F.	May 23-June 1
ICAO Panel on Origin-and-Destination Statistics: 2d Meeting	Montreal	May 23-June 3
U.N. Tin Conference	New York	May 23-June 22
International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property: 24th Congress	London	May 28-June 4
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture	Geneva	May 30-June 3
International Commission on Irrigation, Flood Control, and Drainage: 4th Congress	Madrid	May 30-June 14
International Commission for Northwest Atlantic Fisheries: 10th Meeting	Bergen, Norway	May 30-June 4
SEATO Council: 6th Meeting	Washington	May 31-June 2
FAO Group on Grains: 5th Meeting	Rome	June 1-8
International Labor Conference: 44th Session	Geneva	June 1-23
World Power Conference: 13th Sectional Meeting	Madrid	June 5-9
U.N. ECE Housing Committee: 20th Session (and Working Parties). Subcommittee of COAS Special Committee To Study Formulation of New Measures for Economic Development (Committee of Nine).	Geneva	June 6-10
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 33d Session	Washington	June 6-24
Inter-American Seminar on Strengthening the Family Institution	Rome	June 7-23
UNESCO Committee of Governmental Experts on a Draft International Convention and Draft Recommendations on Various Aspects of Discrimination in Education	Caracas	June 11-18
U.N. ECE Subcommittee on Road Transport: Working Party on Construction of Vehicles	Paris	June 12-29
7th Annual Electronic, Nuclear, and Cinematographic Exposition	Geneva	June 13-17
IAEA Board of Governors: 17th Session	Rome	June 13-29
International Conference on Large Electric Systems: 18th General Assembly	Vienna	June 14-24
UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget	Paris	June 15-25
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: 50th Session	New York	June 20 (1 day)
U.N. ECE Rapporteurs on Comparisons of Systems of National Accounts	Geneva	June 20-22
International Whaling Commission: 12th Meeting	Geneva	June 20-24
ILO Governing Body: 146th Session	London	June 20-27
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 2d Session of Standing Committee	Geneva	June 24 (1 day)*
International Wheat Council: 30th Session	New York	June 27-28
	London	June 28-30

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 16, 1960. Asterisks indicate tentative dates and places. Following is a list of abbreviations: COAS, Council of the Organization of American States; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IAIAS, Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

In Session as of June 30, 1960

Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests	Geneva	Oct. 31, 1958-
ITU Administrative Council: 15th Session	Geneva	May 28-
U.N. ECOSOC Consultants on Standardization of Cartographic Names	New York	June 20-
ICAO Panel of Experts To Consider the Arab League Request for Interpretation of Article 77	Montreal	June 23-
10th International Berlin Film Festival	Berlin	June 24-
International Association for Bridge and Structural Engineering: 6th Congress	Stockholm	June 27-
WHO Executive Committee: 12th Session	Geneva	June 27-
UPU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies: Annual Meeting of Management Council	Eastbourne, England	June 27-
GATT Working Party on Polish Participation in the Tariff Conference	Geneva	June 27-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 24th Session (and Working Parties)	Geneva	June 29-

Scheduled July 1 Through September 30, 1960

Development Assistance Group: 2d Meeting	Bonn	July 5-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 30th Session	Geneva	July 5-
23d UNESCO/IBE Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 6-
IBE Council: 26th Session	Geneva	July 9-
8th International Grassland Congress	Reading, England	July 11-
International Union for Protection of Industrial Property: Meeting of Heads of Industrial Property Offices	Geneva	July 11-
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 2d Meeting	Petropolis, Brazil	July 11-
UNESCO Intergovernmental Conference on Oceanographic Research	Copenhagen	July 11-
U.N. ECOSOC Ministerial-Level Meeting	Geneva	July 11-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Experts Statistical Committee	Geneva	July 12-
South Pacific Commission: 11th Meeting of South Pacific Research Council	Nouméa, New Caledonia	July 12-
Caribbean Commission: 30th Meeting	San Juan	July 18-
GATT Inter-Sessional Committee	Geneva	July 18-
3d Inter-American Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	Petropolis and Brasilia	July 18-
International Sugar Council: 7th Session	London	July 18-
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics: 12th General Assembly	Helsinki	July 25-
IAEA <i>Ad Hoc</i> Preparatory Panel on Third-Party Liability for Nuclear Shipping	Vienna	July
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board	México, D.F	July
International Sugar Council: Executive and Statistical Committees	London	July
3d FAO/IASAS Latin American Meeting on Soils and Fertilizers	Raleigh, N.C	Aug. 1-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party on Standardization of Conditions of Sale for Cereals	Geneva	Aug. 1-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 7th Session	undetermined	Aug. 5-
10th General Assembly of International Geographical Union and 19th International Congress of Geography	Stockholm	Aug. 6-
5th Inter-American Conference on Agriculture and 6th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	México, D.F.	Aug. 8-
2d U.N. Conference on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders	London	Aug. 9-
7th International Congress of Soil Science	Madison, Wis.	Aug. 12-
12th Meeting of PAHO Directing Council and 12th Meeting of Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas	Havana	Aug. 14-
International Union of Crystallography: 5th General Assembly	Cambridge, England	Aug. 15-
21st International Geological Congress	Copenhagen	Aug. 15-
U.N. ECOSOC Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: 13th Session	Geneva	Aug. 15-*
WHO Commission for Maritime Meteorology: 3d Session	Utrecht	Aug. 16-
UNESCO World Conference on Adult Education	Montreal	Aug. 22-
21st International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 24-
COAS Special Committee To Study Formulation of New Measures for Economic Development	Bogotá	Aug. 25-
5th World Forestry Congress	Seattle	Aug. 29-
<i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee of U.N. General Assembly To Consider General Questions of Transmission of Information	New York	Aug. 29-
14th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	August
PAHO Executive Committee: 41st Meeting	Havana	August
GATT: 5th Round of Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Sept. 1-
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Sept. 4-
GATT Working Party on Low-Wage Imports	Geneva	Sept. 4-

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled July 1 Through September 30, 1960—Continued

International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 2d Session	Geneva	Sept. 5-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture	Geneva	Sept. 5-
International Scientific Radio Union: 13th General Assembly	London	Sept. 5-
ICAO Legal Committee: 12th Session	Montreal	Sept. 6-
UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget	New York	Sept. 7-
FAO Regional Conference for the Near East	Tehran	Sept. 12-
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain: 8th Congress	Buenos Aires	Sept. 12-
WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 11th Session	Manila	Sept. 16-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Sept. 19-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 48th Annual Meeting	Moscow	Sept. 19-
International Rubber Study Group: 15th Meeting	Kuala Lumpur, Malaya	Sept. 19-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: 51st Session	Vienna	Sept. 19-
IAEA General Conference: 4th Regular Session	Washington	Sept. 20-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors		Sept. 26-
ILO <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting on Civil Aviation	Geneva	Sept. 26-
6th International Technical Conference on Lighthouses and Other Aids to Navigation	Washington	Sept. 26-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 8th Session	Geneva	Sept. 26-
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 3d Session	Madrid	Sept. 26-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning	Bangkok	Sept. 27-
Interparliamentary Union: 49th Conference	Tokyo	Sept. 29-
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 8th Session	Geneva	September
U.N. Conference on Outer Space Science and Technology	Geneva*	September
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: Seminar on Highway Transportation	undetermined	September
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 9th Session	undetermined	September*

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Indonesia Sign Atomic Energy Agreement

Press release 213 dated June 8

Representatives of the Governments of Indonesia and the United States on June 8 signed an agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The agreement was signed by Ambassador Moekarto Notowidigdo of Indonesia. Chairman John A. McCone of the Atomic Energy Commission and Assistant Secretary of State J. Graham Parsons signed for the United States. The signing ceremony was held at the U.S. Department of State.

Under the proposed agreement the Governments

of the Republic of Indonesia and the United States will cooperate in a nuclear project to be carried out at the Bandung Institute of Technology. This will include the exchange of information on the design, construction, and operation of nuclear research reactors and their use as research, training, development, and engineering devices and in medical therapy. American industry would be authorized by the agreement to supply appropriate nuclear equipment and related services to the Indonesian Government or to authorized individuals or organizations under its jurisdiction.

The proposed agreement also provides that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission may lease to the Indonesian Government up to 6 kilograms (13.2

pounds) of contained U-235 in uranium enriched up to a maximum of 20 percent U-235 for use in research reactors. Indonesia also will assume responsibility for assuring that material obtained from the United States will be used only for peaceful purposes. The agreement further provides for the exchange of unclassified information in health and safety matters related to research reactors and in the use of radioisotopes in physical and biological research, medical therapy, agriculture, and industry.

Both countries also affirm their common interest in availing themselves of the facilities and services of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The agreement will become effective after statutory and constitutional requirements have been fulfilled by both Governments.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention. Signed at Buenos Aires December 22, 1952. Entered into force January 1, 1954. TIAS 3266.
Accession deposited: Liberia, June 1, 1960.

Trade and Commerce

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1955.¹
Declaration confirming signature deposited: Belgium, April 5, 1960.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 29, 1959. Entered into force October 9, 1959; for the United States December 19, 1959. TIAS 4384.

Signature (subject to ratification): Federal Republic of Germany, April 13, 1960.
Declaration confirming signature deposited: Belgium, April 5, 1960.

Declaration on relations between contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Government of the Polish People's Republic. Done at Tokyo November 9, 1959.¹

Signatures: Australia, April 22, 1960; Czechoslovakia, April 29, 1960.
Statement confirming signature deposited: Belgium, April 5, 1960.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21, 1960; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4408.
Signature: Czechoslovakia, April 29, 1960.
Statement confirming signature deposited: Belgium, April 5, 1960.

¹ Not in force.

Argentina

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 29, 1955 (TIAS 3289). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Brazil

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of August 3, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3303 and 4255). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Canada

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3394, 3771, and 4271). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

China

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 18, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3397 and 4176). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

European Atomic Energy Community

Agreement additional to agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy of November 8, 1958 (TIAS 4173). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each party receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Germany

Agreement relating to a weapons production program. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn May 27, 1960. Entered into force May 27, 1960.

Greece

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of August 4, 1955 (TIAS 3310). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Israel

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311 and 4407). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Japan

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreements of May 31, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3284 and 3579), and February 10, 1956 (TIAS 3589), in order to provide yen for the purpose of assisting in the financing

of typhoon rehabilitation activities in the Ryukyu Islands. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo May 31, 1960. Entered into force May 31, 1960.

New Zealand

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 13, 1956 (TIAS 3826). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Philippines

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 27, 1955 (TIAS 3316). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Portugal

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 21, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3317 and 3889). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Switzerland

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 21, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3745 and 4236). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

Thailand

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of March 13, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3522 and 3842). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. Enters into force on date each Government receives from the other written notification that it has complied with statutory and constitutional requirements.

PUBLICATIONS

Foreign Relations Volume

The Department of State announced on June 18 (press release 318 dated June 10) the release of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume 1, General, The British Commonwealth, The Far East*. This is the first of the six regular annual volumes scheduled for publication in the *Foreign Relations* series for 1942.

Subjects treated in the General section include the United Nations Declaration, the Permanent Court, war crimes, relief problems, postwar economic and financial planning, exchange of officials and nonofficials with enemy countries, protests by neutrals against certain features of the Selective Service Act, and international agreements regarding wheat, sugar, and tin.

The section on the British Commonwealth of Nations relates to agreements with the several members of the Commonwealth in connection with the conduct of the war and to the interest of the United States in situations affecting the war effort. Documentation relating to the conferences in Washington between President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill with their advisers in December 1941-January 1942 and in June 1942 is scheduled for publication subsequently in another volume of *Foreign Relations*.

The Far East section contains correspondence regarding Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Correspondence for the year on relations with China has been published previously in the special volume *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China*.

Copies of *Foreign Relations, 1942, Volume 1, General, The British Commonwealth, The Far East* (xi, 963 pp.) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for \$3.50 each.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Sale of Fruit and Fruit Products. TIAS 4417. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, amending agreement of January 30 and February 3, 1958. Exchange of notes—Signed at London January 28 and February 4, 1960. Entered into force February 4, 1960.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Loan of Submarines to Italy. TIAS 4418. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Italy, amending agreement of April 27, 1954. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rome January 29, 1960. Entered into force January 29, 1960.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Project on Jamaica and Grand Cayman Island. TIAS 4419. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, amending and extending agreement of December 30, 1958. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington February 15, 1960. Entered into force February 15, 1960. Operative retroactively June 30, 1959.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

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Don C. Bliss as Ambassador to Ethiopia. (For an exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Ambassador Bliss, see White House press release dated June 13.)

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to June 13 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 313 of June 8 and 317 and 318 of June 10.

No.	Date	Subject
*319	6/13	Farland nominated ambassador to Panama (biographic details).
*320	6/13	Chapin nominated ambassador to Dominican Republic (biographic details).
*321	6/13	Richards nominated ambassador to Ethiopia (biographic details).
*322	6/13	Barrows nominated ambassador to Togo (biographic details).
*323	6/13	Summers nominated ambassador to Luxembourg (biographic details).
*324	6/14	Phleger: Foreign Relations Committee.
325	6/14	Thayer: "The People of Louisville and America's Cultural Relations."
326	6/14	Herter: conference of Independent African states.
*327	6/14	Graduation of senior seminar class in foreign policy.
328	6/14	Corrections to list of products for tariff negotiations.
*329	6/14	Visit of King and Queen of Thailand (rewrite).
*330	6/15	Proclamation of application of copyright law to Austrian citizens.
*331	6/15	Cultural exchange (Latin America).
*332	6/15	Burgess: "Some Conclusions From the Summit."
333	6/15	Dillon: cuts in mutual security appropriation bill.
334	6/16	Hanes: advisory board of U.S. Committee for Refugees.
*335	6/17	Cultural exchange (Canada).
337	6/18	U.S. asks withdrawal of two Cuban officials.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

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1942, Volume I, General,
The British Commonwealth, The Far East

the
Department
of
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The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume I, General, The British Commonwealth, The Far East*. This is the first of the six regular annual volumes scheduled for publication in the *Foreign Relations* series for 1942.

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The section on the British Commonwealth of Nations relates to agreements with the several members of the Commonwealth in connection with the conduct of the war and to the interest of the United States in situations affecting the war effort.

The Far East section contains correspondence regarding Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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July 11, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Secretary Herter's News Conference of June 24

Press release 353 dated June 24

Secretary Herter: Ladies and gentlemen, I have one or two very brief preliminary statements I would like to make. One deals with the 10th anniversary of the attack on the Republic of Korea.

Ten years ago Communist armies in north Korea launched an unprovoked surprise attack across the 38th parallel on the Republic of Korea, a Government established less than 2 years before under United Nations auspices.

On June 25, 1950, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt withdrawal of the north Korean forces to the 38th parallel.

At the call of the United Nations, 16 nations contributed forces to the struggle against aggression in Korea. They succeeded in repelling this aggression, but only at a tremendous cost in blood and treasure.

The 10th anniversary of the United Nations collective action in Korea, therefore, calls for a reaffirmation of the free world's determination to resist aggression and our support for the United Nations. By maintaining the free-world position in Korea, we hope, as President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Huh Chung stated in their joint communique last week, to preserve "a climate in which free Asian nations can enjoy independence, promote human rights, and improve the spiritual and material welfare of the people."¹

The second announcement I would like to make is that our Ambassador to Chile, Walter Howe, is in the United States today, and he will be holding a press conference this afternoon at 2:30 and will go into details of our operations in connection with the great Chilean disaster. As he has reported them to me, they are operations of which the United States, I think, can be very proud. They

¹The above four paragraphs were also released separately as press release 351 dated June 24.

were operations, as you know, that were conducted by very large units of our Military Establishment and were conducted in a spirit and in a way which I think has brought great credit on that establishment. And I hope that as many of you as can will get that firsthand report from our Ambassador, as it is a very interesting, timely, exciting story.

The third thing that I wanted to say a few words about was in relation to the general public discussion that has taken place in recent days and weeks in regard to so-called personalized diplomacy. I think that there has been a confusion that I want to straighten out as far as I can with respect to the purpose of the President's visits to countries abroad.

With the exception of the trip that he took to Europe last year, in which he met with General de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan, and Chancellor Adenauer for the purpose of discussing matters that might be raised in the summit conference, and the second trip that he took to Paris in anticipation of a summit conference, all of his other trips were taken not as diplomatic missions in the sense of negotiating anything with anyone but entirely for the purpose of good will, for the purpose of indicating our interest in the United States in the countries that he visited, of conveying to the peoples of those countries our very genuine concern over their welfare, and over promoting the peace of the world. These trips have been eminently useful.

It is true that the Secretary of State has in recent years been obliged to go to a great many conferences, and this likewise has been called personalized diplomacy. These trips have increased in number largely because of our alliance system, because of the greater facilities for moving from one capital to another, and because of the necessity of conferring frequently among our allies in formalized conferences. These conferences in a

sense are personal diplomacy only in that the Secretary of State, in most instances, must attend because of the makeup of the conferences and the fact that other nations were sending their foreign ministers.

One of the reasons that I emphasize this is that the impression seems to have gained some currency that because of these trips there is less of a need for our ordinary channels of diplomacy through our ambassadors communicating directly with their home offices. In no way has that need been reduced. If anything, with the facilities of travel and the much greater contact that exists between nations, the new number of nations that are coming into existence, the actual burdens—the actual responsibilities—of our regularly established diplomatic services, our ambassadorial missions, have achieved an entirely new and more important significance. This is particularly true because of the fact that in our foreign missions the individuals who are responsible as the chiefs of mission for what is called the country team have got to apply themselves not alone to what are the matters of ordinary diplomacy but also to matters of military concern, of cultural concern, of social concern, so that their responsibilities are being constantly enlarged.

Those are the only preliminary statements I have to make.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you evaluate the prospect for United States bases in Japan under the new security treaty in the light of the political disorders which we have seen there?

A. Well, as you know, we are convinced that the great majority of the people of Japan are in favor of the mutual security treaty that has just been ratified.² Certainly every election that has taken place in Japan since 1952 has indicated a strong support for Japan's own determination to ally itself with the West. Just what the coming internal developments in Japan will be, of course, we cannot tell. In the Diet there is still nearly a two-thirds majority in both branches for the existing Liberal Democrat Party. Whether or not elections will be held, we do not know. Just how a new government may be formed, with the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi, we don't know.

² For a statement by Secretary Herter before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 7, see BULLETIN of June 27, 1960, p. 1029; for text of treaty, see *ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1960, p. 184.

But we have every confidence that the basic good will of the Japanese people and their willingness to continue to align themselves with the West still remains.

OAS Peace Committee

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been recent reports in newspapers that the United States has decided to bring an omnibus indictment against Cuba before the OAS [Organization of American States]. The information we have got from here is that no such decision has been taken so far. Can you clarify that?

A. Yes. As you know, at the Santiago conference this last year that I attended,³ the Peace Committee of the OAS was instructed to examine into the tensions existing in the Caribbean area with possible violations of human rights and to report to the OAS with respect to those tensions and such steps, if any, as it could take to lessen those tensions. That committee has been in the process of collecting information. We have furnished certain information to that committee; we propose in the near future to supply it with still further information. But, as you know, that is an autonomous body—on its own. It so happens that an American has been chairman of that committee, but his term will expire and the United States will not be represented on that committee after the 1st of August. Nevertheless, it will carry on, and we will continue to furnish it with such information as we feel is relevant to its studies.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since U-2 there has been a rising amount of critical comment—not all of it irresponsible—to the effect that our system of defensive alliances with other countries in various continents has been badly damaged by international developments and may indeed be open to question in terms of future effectiveness. Would you comment on that type of criticism, and would you say whether the State Department is now engaged in a reappraisal of what emphasis in the future might be dictated by these events?

A. Yes, I would be very glad to comment on that. I do not share the views that you have expressed as coming from responsible sources, that our alliance system has been damaged by the U-2 incident. In fact, as I think I have expressed

³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

before, the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] alliance meeting that I attended since that time in Paris⁴ indicated a greater firmness and a greater cohesion than I have seen at any time whatsoever. Such indications as we have had from either the OAS, from SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], from CENTO [Central Treaty Organization], with which as you know we are affiliated through committees, have indicated a continuing firmness, a continuing solidarity, that I do not feel has been injured in any way by the U-2 incident.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. May I just add one thing to that? I beg your pardon. The SEATO conference, which took place here in Washington,⁵ largely of Far Eastern nations, indicated a degree of solidarity which was likewise very complete. There was no sign whatsoever of any weakening there. If anything, there was a stronger feeling of solidarity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, before the House Agriculture Committee the other day you said that the time had come to diversify our sources of sugar supply and you asked for Executive authority for the President to cut quotas.⁶ Is it contemplated that you would cut more than the annual increment and Cuba's share in shortfall, or would the cuts possibly go deeper than that?

A. As you may recall, my testimony was to the effect that we were supporting the administration bill which was filed in March—I think it was on March 15th—which would give to the President discretionary authority in the cutting of quotas. Obviously I'm not going to comment on the degree to which he might exercise that authority, or even whether he would exercise that authority, because we feel that it's important with the Congress out of session for the President to have that authority, both to insure our own domestic sugar supplies and in the national interest.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have long been a friend of Vice President Nixon. Should the Vice President be elected President in November and should you be asked, would you be willing to stay on in the Nixon administration as Secretary of State, or do you intend to retire on January 20th?

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 6, 1960, p. 907.

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 20, 1960, p. 983.

⁶ See p. 58.

A. I will answer that very frankly. I do not expect to continue in any administration as Secretary of State. You may recall that at the time that I was asked to serve in this capacity I was asked to take a physical examination to ascertain to what extent the particular affliction from which I suffer would become progressively worse. And I was given a clearance for the period of time which would end with this administration. I very frankly feel likewise that, both because of my age and the possibility that this may become worse, a younger man should take on, even if I were asked to serve.

Q. Sir, there have been indications that Peking and Moscow are at odds over whether to pursue a hard or tough foreign policy, particularly toward the "imperialist countries." What effect do you see that this cleavage, if it does exist, may have on future relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China?

A. Well, it's very difficult to assess this ideological row that is going on at the present time. It seems to be a very real and rather deep-seated difference in interpretation of Communist ideology. Whether it has any practical implications from the point of view of the relationship between Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists it is impossible to ascertain at this time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your inventory of personal diplomacy, where would you class a journey to Camp David to meet with Mr. Khrushchev or, for that matter, Mr. Macmillan? Is that the sort of thing for which you see no future?

A. The Camp David visit was a rather exceptional type of visit. It was the first visit of a Communist leader to the United States. It was arranged there to ascertain whether, through personal discussions, any of the existing problems might be resolved. As you know, very little came out of that conference. This was a rather exceptional type of visit by the head of one state to the head of another state. So that I wouldn't call that a typical case. It certainly isn't comparable in any way with the good-will visits that the President has taken to the many countries that he has gone to in the last year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to come back one moment to your remarks before about our presenting information to the peace commission, does that mean

we at this point are not bringing any charges or any indictment as had been reported before?

A. At this moment, no.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, yesterday you conferred with other people in the Cabinet about a reported new approach on disarmament at Geneva. Can you tell us what the purpose of this new approach would be—how quickly you feel it might be made and what you hope to accomplish by it?*

A. Well, it is true that Mr. [Fredrick M.] Eaton, who is our chief negotiator in Geneva, came back to consult with us on the new proposals that had been made by the Soviet Union and our own approaches in Geneva. We have had very thorough consultations. We have in mind a certain line of action which might well come in Geneva some time in the middle of next week. I am obviously not at liberty to talk about any specifics at the present time. Mr. Eaton is just returning to Europe today and will be in consultation with our allies on the Western side who are likewise members of that disarmament committee. And until their discussions are completed, I wouldn't feel free to discuss details.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev seems to have had a number of things to say about various presidential candidates in this country. I'd like to ask you this question: Looked at from the standpoint of American foreign policy and Soviet foreign policy, do you think that it makes any difference from the Communist point of view which party or which President is elected in November?*

A. Well, I wouldn't want to pass any judgment on that. That obviously is anticipating things well beyond the election period that I wouldn't want to get into.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, do you see any evidence in the events of the last 8 weeks that suggests a basic change in Soviet policy, or in the tactical handling of Soviet diplomacy, or of the personal position of Mr. Khrushchev in the Soviet hierarchy?*

A. No, I don't think that we have any evidence on any one of those points. From the point of view of basic policy, as far as we know, it has remained very much the same. I think that perhaps the attitude of the Soviets in the two negotiations that are now going on in Geneva may give some future indication as to whether there has

been any change, but up until now I don't think we can detect any specific change.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, on this political question, in several public comments Mr. Khrushchev has said he, of course, had no intention of interfering in United States internal affairs. At the same time, he has expressed certain standards and certain preferences which he thought would apply to the American election. What do you think of the propriety of Mr. Khrushchev's suggestions to the American people about whom they might elect?*

A. Well, it comes about as close to interference in the internal affairs of a country as anything I could describe.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, what is your interpretation of Mr. Khrushchev's interpretation—new interpretation—of Leninism, et al.?* (Laughter)

A. Well, I am not a particular expert in this field, but to put it into a nutshell he is apparently trying to give greater flexibility to some of the early doctrines of Lenin and Marx than the Chinese Communists are willing to give, particularly in connection with the matter of the inevitability of war and peaceful coexistence. I think that is what he is trying to do in some ways possibly to justify his own orthodoxy with his present policies.

Disturbances in Tokyo

Q. *Mr. Secretary, if the difficulties in Japan are to be attributed only to a Communist minority that obviously led these demonstrations, and if there is much basic support, I mean for the treaty, why do you think it is necessary that Premier Kishi feels he must resign?*

A. Well, I don't want to discuss the internal politics of Japan here, but I think that the question of his resignation is a matter within his own party, much more than it is a question of opposition from the outside party.

Q. *Mr. Secretary, you have told Senators this week that the State Department misjudged certain aspects of the disturbances in Tokyo. But according to the dispatches that we are getting from Honolulu, the White House concentrates all of its explanation of events on the Communist minority, seeming to admit no fallacy at all. Is there a discrepancy here? Is there a conflict of interest between the State Department and the White House interpretation?*

A. No, I don't think there is any discrepancy whatsoever. When I spoke about misjudging, we at no particular time knew exactly to what extent the demonstrations would continue, what size they might be, or the degree of violence that might accompany them. We had no way of foretelling those things. I think the phrase that has been attributed to me in connection with misjudging those things was the impossibility of our being able to determine ahead of time just what form they would take. There is no question but what has inspired those demonstrations. I think that the facts there are very clear, and I think they would be agreed to by and large in Japan.

Q. Well, may I just follow that up on one point, sir? If it had not been impossible to judge the events beforehand, would you have recommended a different procedure?

A. I don't think so. I have got to go back here to the original invitation to the President, which, as you know, took place last January. The invitation was with respect to the exchange of high-ranking personalities in this 100th anniversary year of the opening up of Japan to diplomatic missions elsewhere, with the sending of their first ambassador to the United States. That invitation was accepted, and the time that it was arranged for was the time after the President had planned to leave Russia.

When the Russian trip was called off, the question came up at once as to whether the President should extend his trip in the Far East, as he had been asked to do by many Far Eastern countries, and it was decided that he should. And then, as you know, other countries were added to his schedule.

The question of the President's not going to Japan was, we felt, always a matter of decision for the Japanese Government, not for us. The Japanese Government was, of course, watching the situation very carefully and finally made its decision, which the President regretted but for which he expressed sympathy and understanding.

It would have been a very different thing if we had taken the initiative in order to cancel that visit.

Q. Well, Mr. Secretary, on that question, though, it is true, isn't it, that the American security officers recommended that the visit not take place?

A. I don't know that they ever recommended that. I think that they had always been nervous about it and anxious about it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some information and report to us on the work of the President's Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs? Do you anticipate a report to the President at any time soon?

A. Well, I doubt very much whether they will be issuing formal reports. They have from time to time put on paper some of their ideas that have been extremely helpful. We have meetings at regular intervals. I think the next one is scheduled for early in July. And much of our consultation is on the basis of these meetings and exchanges of views and very little on the basis of formalized reports.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I recheck on one point here which you just made about the American security officers? You said, I don't know that they ever recommended it, that they had been very concerned about it, that is, the President's personal security. There has been quite a bit of controversy about the relative roles of the United States and Japan, or specifically the roles of Mr. Fujiyama and Mr. MacArthur on the question of initiative in canceling the invitation. I'd like to ask you this specific question. Did the United States at any time suggest to the Japanese Government that it might be better to cancel the trip, or that if certain assurances could not be given the trip should perhaps be canceled?

A. No. The United States never took the initiative in that respect. Those matters were, of course, discussed by MacArthur with the Japanese Government, which itself was very much concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when and why did this Government discard its assumptions that you had to deal with Mr. Khrushchev at the summit because his power of decisionmaking in the Soviet Union was singularly high?

A. Well, I couldn't tell you when that particular decision was made. I know that the decision was made after Camp David by the President that he would be willing to go to a summit conference. That decision was not made until after the Camp David conference.

Q. Thank you, sir.

Department Requests Restoration of Funds in 1961 Budget

Statement by Secretary Herter¹

I am grateful to the chairman and the members of the committee for the opportunity to appear this morning. In appearing in support of the Department's request for restoration of funds for fiscal year 1961, I am mindful of the words of the chairman at the opening of the Senate hearing 2 years ago. "When we deal with the budget," he said, ". . . we are dealing with the specifics of what our Government will do in the year ahead. The budget is not just a measurement of dollars; it is a measurement of effort."

Those words in today's context are much to the point. At the moment many things about the future are unclear, but this much is entirely clear: We are not in a time when we can afford to slacken our effort—in defense, in development, or in maintaining and strengthening the apparatus of American diplomacy.

The international climate today underlines the need for maintaining the unity and increasing the strength of our alliances. This requires, among other things, continuing diplomatic activity of a high order.

No less is the need for cooperation with and support of the newly developing countries. Here again our representatives abroad will play a central role.

And as President Eisenhower has made clear, we must also continue to do all we can to increase communications between ourselves and the Soviet Union and to resolve outstanding issues. For this purpose it appears that increased emphasis should now be placed upon traditional channels and procedures of international contact, rather than on more informal methods.

There is every indication, therefore, that pri-

ority demands will be made upon the Department of State and the Foreign Service in the year to come. Within these guidelines let me review our request for restorations in the budget.

For the fiscal year to come the Department originally requested slightly more than \$247 million. To this amount has since been added \$15 million to cover budget amendments which have been presented since the original request was made. This brings the total to \$262 million as shown on the tables before you.² This total is the lowest request of any of the major government agencies, substantially less than the cost of a single modern aircraft carrier, less than one-third of 1 percent of the total Federal budget.

Considering the fundamental contribution the Department and the Foreign Service make to American security and the chance for peace, it seems to me this sum is exceedingly modest.

Furthermore the request itself was a conservative one. In preparing it we were fully mindful of the desire of the Congress that the Department operate as prudently and economically as possible. Perhaps our original request was too conservative. Time may even show that in our effort to keep our request for increases at a minimum we did not ask for enough to meet the urgent needs of our country in the field of foreign affairs during the critical year that lies ahead. In that event we shall, of course, ask for supplemental funds. In any case, it would appear that we failed to give the House committee an adequate picture of our needs.

The Department's appropriation as approved by the House is approximately \$23 million, or nearly 10 percent, below the Department's original request. Although the House bill provides \$1.2 million more for salaries and expenses than was

¹ Made before the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 21.

² Not printed here.

provided last year, the increase is far from adequate even to cover increases in mandatory costs such as the opening of new posts, overseas price and wage increases, the elevation of posts, and the Federal Employees Health Benefit Act contributions.

Furthermore, the Congress at this session has just passed a 1960 supplemental appropriation to enable the Department to meet certain unforeseen requirements for the current year, and many of those activities continue into fiscal year 1961.

Thus, if the House bill is allowed to stand there must inevitably be a slackening or hampering of the efforts of the Department of State and the Foreign Service during the coming year.

Downward Revision of Budget Figures

Despite the minimal nature of our original request, however, we decided not to ask the Senate to restore all the cuts made in the House. After a careful review we revised our figures downward, in an effort to take account of the attitude of the House and at the same time to discharge our responsibilities. In our letter of appeal, therefore, we requested a restoration of only \$11.6 million of the \$23.2 million reduction made by the House and 339 of the 532 positions not provided in the House bill.

I must confess that we revised our figures downward with considerable misgivings. Then after the outcome at the summit we again gave serious thought to the wisdom of asking for additional restorations.

But despite our keen disappointment at the outcome of the summit, and despite the propaganda campaign being waged against us, it appears that the basic conditions of the world situation have not so far been greatly changed. What is needed under present circumstances is not a drastic increase in the *quantity* of our diplomatic effort or a major change in its *direction*. What is demanded is that its *quality* and *continuity* be sustained and strengthened, and not impaired through skimping of needed financial support or by any other cause.

Certain developments, as I say, may require additional requests later. But we shall do our utmost to discharge our responsibilities within the fiscal and personnel framework of our present request to the Senate.

Let me outline the requested restorations.

Items Bearing on East-West Relations

First there are items which bear directly upon the future of East-West relations. The most important of these is the request for disarmament studies and staff.

Disarmament negotiations are continuing at Geneva, as you are aware, both those dealing with a possible nuclear test ban and those looking toward broader arms reductions. The prospects for early progress are, frankly, a bit uncertain at present. Nevertheless, discussions continue. The problems of disarmament are so important that we must exhaust all avenues in seeking meaningful, enforceable agreements. We must by every action demonstrate the continuing good faith of our side. We must by our preparations be ready to deal promptly and realistically both with technological change and with any eventual progress in negotiation.

The international exchange program, which makes an important contribution to unity and progress among the free nations, also has a direct impact on East-West relations. East-West exchanges are continuing and every effort must be made to support them. In the interest both of free-world unity, therefore, and of East-West communication, we are asking restoration of the full amount for international exchange.

Strengthening of Overseas Posts

A second category of restorations relates to the broadening and strengthening of our establishment overseas. The developments in communication and transport multiply contacts between the people and institutions of the United States and those of an increasing number of countries. This increases the burden on our diplomatic missions and consular offices. Furthermore the role which the United States is called upon to play in the world today makes it necessary for us to be kept fully informed of developments anywhere which might affect the prosperity, the stability, or the attitudes of the countries with which we deal. The responsibility for such reporting rests on our representatives abroad.

The most important of the restorations in this category relates to the opening and staffing of new posts in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Europe, as political developments require, and the elevation of others to embassy status.

I want to note here that developments in Africa

are moving at such a rate that we may also find it necessary within a matter of months to elevate to mission status five posts in addition to those already proposed in the budget estimates. These would require supplemental funds.

Also important to the overall Department effort in the coming year are the restorations we have requested for funds to provide specialized attachés who strengthen our ability to evaluate trends overseas as they relate to the American national interest.

These would include labor attachés. Labor movements, as you are well aware, are among the most sensitive areas in the affairs of many nations today.

They include science attachés to evaluate and report on scientific developments in other countries in such matters as satellite tracking, deep-space probes, and joint activities in the Antarctic.

They also include additional commercial and related attachés to promote this nation's interest in international trade, travel, and investment.

Maintaining Efficiency of Department and Foreign Service

A third important area of restorations involves various items which make possible the continued day-to-day efficiency of the Department and Foreign Service and the well-being of its personnel. These include needed consular staff, training in the so-called "hard" languages, modernized communication facilities, improved support for existing staff, and proper completion of the new building here in Washington.

Included in this category also is a request for restoration of the full amount for representation. Every American Foreign Service officer, regardless of his rank or post, has certain expenses incident to establishing and maintaining the relationships necessary to his work. His full effectiveness depends upon these relationships. Representation funds do not pay all costs in this connection. The figure of our original request by no means covers our full needs. Even if this figure is granted, much of the needed representational activity either will not be carried on or will be conducted at the personal expense of our personnel abroad.

Without reasonable provision by the Congress for representation, therefore, those of our diplomatic and consular officers abroad who have no

private means will inevitably have their effectiveness reduced. It is not the intent of Congress that men and women without private means should be handicapped in Foreign Service. No well-run American private corporation denies its employees needed operating expenses. They could not afford to do so.

Tariff Negotiations

The fourth area in which we are requesting restoration has to do with the fifth round of international tariff negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to be held in Geneva starting in September. This conference will play a vital part in our effort to continue worldwide reduction of tariffs and other barriers to world trade. This is important both to the prosperity of the United States and the strength and stability of other free nations. The conference will also provide an opportunity we cannot afford to miss to develop from the outset a favorable relationship with the European Economic Community. We have requested a restoration of funds necessary for United States participation in the GATT conference.

Funds for Budget Amendments

In addition to budget restorations the Department has requested, as I noted at the beginning, funds for budget amendments submitted to the Congress since the regular budget submission. These requests are being presented initially to the Senate because of the shortness of time in this session.

These items will require an additional \$15,348,000 to provide for the acquisition of a Washington headquarters site for the Pan American Health Organization, United States participation in the Mexico-United States interparliamentary group, the presentation of a statue of George Washington to Uruguay, a payment to the Government of Japan to settle claims of the displaced residents of the Bonin Islands, and the development of a center for cultural and technical interchange between East and West in Hawaii. I am pleased to note that a number of members of Congress have expressed a particular awareness of the importance of this last project.

This completes my presentation on the budget this morning. The witnesses who follow me will furnish such details as the committee may require.

The central point we have borne in mind in preparing and reviewing our request for restorations is the degree to which freedom, prosperity—and survival itself—continue to depend upon the processes, and therefore upon the apparatus, of diplomacy. I turn to other words of the chairman, spoken 2 years ago, “At the moment, our future rests upon the shoulders of the diplomatic corps. If diplomacy fails, our future will rest upon other shoulders and no one can contemplate the result with a feeling of ease.”

That, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, is the thought we have in mind when we ask for your firm and full support, in the coming fiscal year, of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

Secretary Replies to Senator Wiley on President's Missions Abroad

Press release 355 dated June 24

Following is an exchange of correspondence between Secretary Herter and Senator Alexander Wiley, ranking minority member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Secretary Herter to Senator Wiley

JUNE 24, 1960

DEAR SENATOR: I welcome your inquiry about my testimony of June 21 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The articles to which you refer correctly report my words; the implications and interpretations drawn within and outside the Committee are grossly misleading.

You recall the chronology of the Japan visit. Before the Soviets withdrew their invitation to the President to visit their country, the President had firm plans to visit not only the Soviet Union but also Japan and Korea. The President had been publicly invited to visit these countries. He had publicly accepted. These arrangements were crystallized well before May 23 when the President returned from Europe and the disturbances in Japan first began to assume troublesome proportions. Thereafter there were constant reassessments of the developing situation, so that our information remained as current and accurate as possible, but always with the President maintain-

ing this position—that having accepted this invitation he could not and would not fail to go until and unless the Japanese Government should themselves cancel or postpone his visit. It is neither in the character of the President nor in the true spirit of America to turn and run when trouble looms ahead.

Perhaps, had the Japanese Government realized before our President left the United States that the domestic turmoil would reach menacing proportions, they would have withdrawn their invitation earlier. But this I emphasize: the President would definitely have proceeded, these disturbances notwithstanding, had the invitation not been withdrawn.

In world affairs one cannot advance from a premise that when difficulties threaten, carefully prepared plans should be timorously set aside. In foreign affairs the calculated risk is as key a factor as in military affairs. The President is deeply sensitive to this fact. All of us need to be.

I deeply believe, in retrospect even, that the President moved soundly and wisely for America in proceeding with his trip to Japan despite the manufactured disturbances—that he properly relied upon his host, the Japanese Government, to decide whether or not the trip should be deferred—and that, regrettable though the rioting in Japan turned out to be, it smacks a bit of the hypercritical to say now, after the fact, that our friends in Japan should have discerned in advance what befell them, and that their failure to do so somehow becomes now an American lapse. I believe quite as deeply that it would have been a grave disservice to the cause of freedom in the Far East had the President canceled his trip to Japan after having accepted the invitation to come. Others holding different views are, of course, entitled to hold them. My own opinion is that had the President himself canceled this journey in these circumstances, the present disposition of some to view critically the subsequent events would have become, instead, an avalanche of virulent abuse both at home and abroad.

In summary, and as I sought repeatedly to emphasize to the Committee, it was an important and a necessary trip; it was blocked by violent methods which, feeding upon themselves, ultimately reached unmanageable proportions; the disturbances were a communist tactic; and, finally, until the Japanese Government withdrew its invitation, the President was determined to go.

As for Presidential missions abroad, you are correct that excepting the Summit Conference, these have not been diplomatic ventures but rather have been missions of good will. As such they have been extraordinarily successful, so much so that the Soviet Union and communist influences in Japan were driven to extreme lengths to block their continuance. I believe the world will not fail to measure well the import of desperate communist contortions to keep America's symbol, so magnificently presented abroad by President Eisenhower, from entering the heartland of the Soviet Union and Japan.

Efforts to belittle the value of the President's goodwill missions are, in my opinion, completely unjustified. Those who have witnessed his reception in a score of nations will bear testimony to the fact that he, as an individual and as President of the United States, is beloved and respected by free people everywhere to a degree unmatched by almost any other man in history. By their actions the communists have clearly revealed to the entire world that they know this well.

I warmly appreciate the motivation of your letter.

Most sincerely,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

The Honorable
ALEXANDER WILEY,
United States Senate.

Senator Wiley to Secretary Herter

JUNE 23, 1960

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: You know that the Press has been highlighting statements attributed to you to the effect that State Department information and judgment in respect to the President's trip to Japan were faulty. I personally don't believe these statements, though at first I was taken aback by the same.

Now what is the fact? Did the State Department have inadequate and inaccurate information on the subject as to the extent of the Japanese riots, and was the Department's judgment as to the advisability of the trip faulty?

I thought that David Lawrence in the *Evening Star* of Thursday, June 23rd had the straight facts on that subject when he said:

The invitation was extended at a time when Nikita Khrushchev was on friendly terms with the United States and long before the events occurred that started the Soviet Premier and his agents on a tactic of demonstrations unfriendly to America. But then, it is asked, why couldn't the President have cancelled the trip immediately after the "summit" conference in Paris collapsed? If he had done so, he would have disappointed the peoples of the Philippines, Formosa and Korea. He could, on the other

hand, hardly have gone to some Far Eastern countries allied with us and not to Japan. Mr. Eisenhower was ready to take the risks, but the Japanese government finally admitted that it might not be able to control the mobs.

I have seen also, Mr. Secretary, that it is asserted that the President has been engaging in "personal diplomacy" throughout the world to the detriment of traditional diplomatic relationships. One article before me states that you concede that such trips will be discontinued in the future, thereby implying that such trips have been undertaken in the past. My understanding has been that, with the obvious exception of the recent Summit undertaking, the President has been engaged upon missions of good will, not diplomatic negotiations. Is this correct?

I have raised these points, Mr. Secretary, because of the contrived clamor, political and otherwise, over alleged planning, informational and judgment errors in the field of foreign relations. Having probed into the details of foreign policy for many years and having closely observed recent international developments, I believe that the words attributed to you are being distorted. Nevertheless, I would like your own assessment.

Sincerely,

ALEXANDER WILEY

The Honorable
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

110 American Teachers Participate in Summer Seminars Abroad

The Department of State announced on June 21 (press release 341) that 110 American secondary school and college teachers of foreign languages, the classics, and social studies are spending part of the summer abroad this year in order to become better acquainted with the languages, literature, peoples, and cultural heritage of five foreign countries. The teachers are participating in special seminars in Brazil, Colombia, France, Germany, and Italy under the educational exchange program of the Department of State.

The teachers have been chosen to take part in the seminars through nationwide competitions administered for the Department of State by the U.S. Office of Education. The seminars and the cost of the teachers' round-trip travel are being financed with currencies of the host countries that have accrued to the U.S. Treasury as the result of war surplus purchases or loan repayments and are being conducted under the authority of Public Law 584, 79th Congress, the Fulbright Act.¹

¹ For a summary of the seminars by country and a list of the participating teachers, see press release 341.

The Antarctic Treaty

Statement by Herman Phleger¹

The opportunity to appear before your committee in support of the Antarctic treaty is deeply appreciated. I believe this treaty is in the best interests of the United States. Beyond that it is a significant step forward in international cooperation in the field of peace, disarmament, and scientific cooperation.

The Antarctic treaty was signed at Washington on December 1, 1959, at the termination of the Conference on Antarctica, which was convened at United States initiative.

On May 2, 1958, the United States invited 11 other states to take part in a conference to draw up a treaty concerning the future of the vast Antarctic Continent.² The 11 countries invited were those which, with the United States, had participated in the Antarctic programs of the International Geophysical Year, namely Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.

The United States has long had important interests in Antarctica. Its explorers and scientists have discovered and mapped large areas of the continent. While the United States had never made a claim of sovereignty, it frequently reasserted its interests and has not recognized the claims of seven other states which had asserted claims to sovereignty over large areas, several of them overlapping. Commencing in 1956 the Soviet Union moved in with scientific expeditions and has since engaged in extensive operations. It

does not recognize the validity of any claims to sovereignty in Antarctica.

In preparation for the conference and as a result of this United States initiative, talks were held in Washington over a period of a year and a half among representatives of the 12 countries concerned. These meetings paved the way for the negotiation of the treaty at the conference. The conference convened in Washington on October 15, 1959, and terminated on December 1 with the signing of the treaty, which incorporates the main objectives of the United States.

I served as United States representative and head of the United States delegation to the Conference on Antarctica. Ambassador Paul C. Daniels was alternate representative. Mr. George H. Owen of the Department of State also served as alternate representative.

The Honorable Frank Carlson, Senator from the State of Kansas, and the Honorable Gale W. McGee, Senator from the State of Wyoming, served as congressional advisers to the delegation.

Captain Eugene W. Davis, USN, representing the Department of Defense, was a member of the delegation and participated in its deliberations.

Dr. Larkin H. Farinholt, Deputy Science Adviser of the Department of State, also was a member of the delegation. At the request of the Department of State the National Academy of Sciences appointed a committee of seven distinguished scientists, headed by Dr. Laurence M. Gould, to advise the United States delegation. This committee included Dr. Francis W. Reichelderfer, Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, Dr. Merle A. Tuve, Dr. Harry Wexler, Dr. John C. Reed, and Mr. Albert P. Crary.

Mr. Alan F. Neidle of the Legal Adviser's Office of the Department of State served as legal adviser of the delegation.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 14 (press release 324). Mr. Phleger was head of the U.S. delegation at the Conference on Antarctica, which convened at Washington Oct. 15, 1959. For background and text of the treaty, see BULLETIN of Nov. 2, 1959, p. 650, and Dec. 21, 1959, p. 911.

² *Ibid.*, June 2, 1958, p. 910.

Importance of Inspection Provisions

One of the important provisions of this treaty is the provision, in article I, that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. This stipulation that a continent greater in extent than the United States and Europe will be used for peaceful purposes only is implemented by an unlimited unilateral right of inspection, set forth in article VII, which includes the right of overflight at any time.

The treaty's provision for inspection has great significance. It will not only serve to protect the parties against any violation of the treaty but should also prove a valuable source of practical experience in the detailed processes of international inspection. As you know, the unwillingness of the Soviet Government to accept an effective inspection arrangement has thus far been the principal stumbling block to successful negotiations on such vitally important matters as nuclear testing, surprise attack, and general disarmament. While the inspection provisions of the Antarctic treaty apply to an area where neither the Soviet Government nor the United States claims territorial sovereignty, it is nevertheless important that an agreement has been reached to conduct practical inspection operations in this area. This right of inspection includes the right to inspect ships, aircraft, and stations and also the right of overflight, comparable to what President Eisenhower proposed earlier as his "open skies" plan of inspection. In this connection it would appear unfortunate if the United States Government should hesitate to ratify the first international agreement affording an unlimited right of inspection.

Article II of the treaty provides that the freedom of scientific investigation and international cooperation in science, which were so successful during the International Geophysical Year, shall be continued, subject to the provisions of the treaty. Under article III of the treaty the parties agree to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica in the manner in which this has, in fact, been done during the past several years.

The difficult question of territorial claims, which have been made in Antarctica by seven countries, is in effect held in *status quo* during the duration of the treaty by article IV, which provides that nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as a renunciation or recognition of claims

or bases of claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. The United States has not asserted any claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. Nor has the United States recognized any claims made by others there, but has consistently reserved all of its rights throughout the whole of Antarctica.

These rights and interests are substantial and are based on a long record of discovery, exploration, and other activities. The article on claims represents a mutually acceptable solution to a difficult problem on which agreement was reached by both claimants and nonclaimants only after long and careful consideration and negotiation. This holding in *status quo* for the duration of the treaty of the question of claims will permit cooperation in scientific and administrative matters to be carried out in a constructive manner without being hampered or affected by rivalry regarding the question of claims.

Another provision of the treaty is its prohibition in article V of nuclear explosions and the disposal of atomic waste in Antarctica, pending general international agreement on this subject. This provision is of great importance to the Southern Hemisphere signatories, who live in much closer proximity to Antarctica than we do and where there is great public concern over the possible effect of radioactive fallout. As you know, the prevailing winds blow northward from the south polar regions.

Membership, Jurisdiction, and Disputes

Accession to the treaty (article XIII) is permitted to any member of the United Nations, and any other state invited to do so with the unanimous consent of all the contracting parties which either were original signatories or are active in Antarctica. By these means additional states may acquire the rights and assume the obligations of the treaty. It is hoped that there will be widespread accession to the treaty, thus strengthening its status in the realm of international law.

Article VIII deals with certain aspects of the problem of jurisdiction over persons in Antarctica. It is provided, without prejudice to the basic position of any contracting party concerning jurisdiction over persons in Antarctica in general, that persons designated as observers in implementation of the provision on inspection and scientific personnel exchanged under programs of scientific co-

operation are subject only to the jurisdiction of the country of which they are nationals. This is important as making more effective the provisions regarding the right of inspection.

Article XI deals with the settlement of disputes arising among parties to the treaty, concerning its interpretation or application. It provides that the parties shall seek to solve such disputes by peaceful means and that, with the consent of all parties to a dispute, the dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice.

Article IX provides for consultative meetings of the treaty parties. Under this article representatives will meet periodically to consult on matters of common interest and to consider and recommend measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty. The participants at these meetings will be all of the original signatories and, in addition, those acceding states during such time as they demonstrate their interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there. The measures recommended will not be effective until unanimously approved by the treaty parties, but it is specifically provided that any party may exercise any right given it under the treaty without further approval by the other parties.

The treaty is of indefinite duration but may be amended at any time by the unanimous agreement of the consultative parties. After 30 years amendments may be proposed by majority agreement, and if not agreed within 2 years any party may withdraw on 2 years' notice.

This treaty does not settle all of the problems of Antarctica for all time, nor does it attempt to do so. It does, however, represent a significant advance in the attempt, based on United States initiative, to bring some form of international order to a large area of the earth's surface where none has existed heretofore.

Summary of U.S. Objectives

The main objectives of our Government in negotiating this treaty may be summarized as follows:

First, to prevent the use of Antarctica for military purposes and to assure that this continent should continue to remain an area where only peaceful activities are pursued. As regards this objective, article I stipulates that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only and that all measures of a military nature there are forbidden.

Of course, we know that agreements prohibiting military activity in a certain area must necessarily be complemented by some system of effective control in order to assure their observance. Now, in this treaty, the provisions of article VII which I have outlined establish sweeping, immediate, and unilateral rights of inspection pursuant to which U.S. observers may go anywhere throughout Antarctica at any time. In addition, there are established absolute, unrestricted rights of overflight for aerial observation.

Second, to continue the valuable scientific investigation throughout Antarctica which our scientists have been engaged in for the past several years and to promote the continuation of international cooperation for the purpose of such scientific investigation among the parties to the treaty, in the manner that was instituted during the International Geophysical Year. In this regard, article II of the treaty provides that scientific investigation and cooperation to that end, as practiced during the International Geophysical Year, will continue, subject, of course, to the provisions of the treaty.

Third, to eliminate controversies arising out of territorial claims asserted in Antarctica and to eliminate, insofar as possible, any political rivalry which accompanies them. In this regard article IV provides a mutually agreeable solution to a delicate problem, and, in particular, by expressly establishing that activities conducted in Antarctica while the treaty is in force shall not constitute a basis for assertion or enlargement of a claim, it discourages activities motivated by political rivalry and facilitates continued scientific investigations unhampered by problems of this kind.

Finally, to establish a system of continuing consultation among the governments of countries actively engaged in scientific investigation in Antarctica. In this regard article IX provides for periodic meetings at suitable intervals for consultation on matters of common interest and for the consideration of measures recommended in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the treaty. This provision is designed to perpetuate the spirit of cooperation among the nations active in the Antarctic and to provide machinery for dealing with problems and opportunities in the Antarctic which only time will disclose.

Secretary of State Herter declared in his report

to President Eisenhower on February 4³ that the Antarctic treaty is a substantial achievement and that its ratification will further peaceful cooperation in the attainment of scientific progress in an entire continent. He also declared that this treaty, based on the will to maintain peace in an important area of the world, should be ratified because it is in the best interests of the United States and of all mankind.

In conclusion I point out that this treaty was conceived by the United States, the conference which drafted it was called at the instance of the

United States, and the treaty contains all the provisions which the United States conceived were required for the protection of its national interest. It is also a significant step forward in the field of international cooperation for peaceful purposes.

Because of the fact of United States initiative, it cannot be expected that other parties will ratify this treaty until the United States has first acted. It is therefore important that the United States act promptly so that the other parties may act and the treaty, with its benefits, go into effect at an early date.

Department Supports Industrial Property Convention Revision and Commercial Treaties With Pakistan and France

Following are two statements presented by Edwin M. Martin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, on June 21 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one in support of the Lisbon revision of the Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and a congressional resolution authorizing U.S. contributions to the administering bureau, and the other in support of a treaty of friendship and commerce with Pakistan and a convention of establishment with France.

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CONVENTION

Press release 336 dated June 21

Mr. Chairman, I am appearing in support of the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property of March 20, 1883,¹ as revised at Lisbon in October 1958. The convention has previously been revised four times. The revised convention was transmitted to the Senate by the President on February 17, 1960.² The United States was a party to the original convention and became a party to the four later revisions. Under

the convention's provisions, the United States and the other 49 member countries are constituted into an International Union for the Protection of Industrial Property. They are parties to one or more of the last three revisions, which are currently in force.

The Secretary of State, in his report to the President in February of this year, stated that United States participation in the new convention will not only significantly improve the protection in this field accorded United States private interests abroad but will also insure continuing and sound cooperative relations with the other 49 countries that are parties to one or more of the revisions of the convention presently in force.

Background of Industrial Property Convention

The industrial property convention, with the revisions presently in force, is the major inter-governmental instrument assuring protection of industrial property rights of United States nationals abroad, namely, patents, trademarks, designs, commercial names, and related rights. It is based on two important underlying principles: that of national treatment and that of the extension of special rights or advantages. Under the national treatment principle, each member government is required to extend to nationals of other member countries the same protection and

¹ For text, see S. Ex. B, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

² 78 Stat. 1645, 47 Stat. 1789, and 53 Stat. 1748.

³ S. Ex. D, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

rights which it grants to its own nationals in this field. Under the second principle, each country is required to provide certain rights or special advantages for other members' nationals, one of the most important of which is the right of priority for foreign patent applicants. Such applicants have a 1-year period, from the date of filing of the first application in their own country, in which to file corresponding applications which are given the benefit of the date of the first filing and receive protection thereon in other member countries.

Prior to the adoption of this international arrangement in 1883 there were no internationally uniform grounds for industrial property protection and inventors sometimes encountered almost insurmountable obstacles in efforts to protect their inventions in various foreign countries. This situation was markedly improved when the industrial property convention, which was negotiated and signed in Paris in 1883, came into force the following year. The United States, which was not one of the original members, acceded to the convention in the spring of 1887. After 1883 there were four successive revisions prior to the Lisbon conference of 1958. The United States became a party to each of these four revisions, which brought about significant improvements in the convention's protective framework. The changes which were made over the years strengthened and made more effective the patent and trademark protection to be afforded nationals of member countries.

During the 76 years of the convention's existence, additional countries have become parties to one or more of its revisions, bringing the current total to 50. Practically all of the important industrial and commercial countries are members, with the exception of the Soviet Union.

New Revision Adopted in 1958

The latest conference of revision at Lisbon was attended by representatives of 40 member countries and by observers from 9 additional countries as well as numerous intergovernmental and private organizations. Thirty member countries signed the revised convention at the conference, as did one nonmember country. Two other member countries signed at a later date.

The conference considered a large number of proposals for revision of the convention which had been submitted by governments as well as leading

international organizations interested in this field. It eventually adopted some changes in all but 5 of the 19 existing articles of the convention. Six new articles were added.

One of the chief accomplishments was a complete rewriting of the basic provisions concerning the protection of trademarks in such a way as to increase substantially the protection accorded for the trademark rights of nationals of member countries. For example, under the provisions adopted at Lisbon, an American national now clearly may register a trademark in any member country by complying with the formalities of such country without having to prove the existence of a registration in the United States.

Further, the conference was able to agree on the inclusion of a requirement that all countries grant protection to industrial designs. It also included in the convention for the first time specific reference to the protection of trademarks associated with services, as distinct from those used to identify goods.

A longstanding deficiency in the convention has been the lack of machinery for interim meetings by the member governments between conferences of revision to study and discuss problems arising under the convention and to supervise more closely the operations of the International Bureau, presently located at Bern, which administers the convention. One of the most significant steps taken at the conference, therefore, was to include in the revised convention a provision for regular triennial meetings of representatives of the convention members. This will enable such representatives to discuss more frequently than in the past common problems respecting the administration of their respective patent and trademark laws in relation to their convention obligations. They will also be in a better position to coordinate the preparatory work and resolve administrative details in connection with future conferences of revision.

Support for the Convention

Leading business and professional groups in the United States interested in the industrial property rights field worked closely with United States Government representatives preparatory to the adoption of instructions to the United States delegation to the Lisbon conference. These groups included, among others, the American Patent Law Association, the American Bar Association, the

International Patent and Trademark Association, the United States Trademark Association, the National Foreign Trade Council, and the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce. The delegation also included three leading private patent and trademark attorneys as advisers, namely, Mr. Albert R. Teare, president, International Patent and Trademark Association; Dr. Stephen P. Ladas of the law firm Langner, Parry, Card, and Langner of New York City; and Mr. John D. Myers of Philadelphia.

The Department is not aware of any leading business or professional group that is opposed to the United States' becoming a party to the revision adopted at Lisbon. Further, it is known that the new convention has received the specific approval of some of the most important organizations interested in this field, as, for example, the National Foreign Trade Council, the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, and the Patent and Trademark Section of the American Bar Association.

In the Department's opinion the new convention merits this strong support because of the improvements which it will effect in the international system for protecting industrial property rights. In this connection it might be noted that the convention is not designed to replace existing international agreements of a regional nature in this field.

As to the implementation of the latest revision, under the terms of article 17 it is clear that the new revision is not self-executing; that is, its ratification would not by itself modify our domestic law. Any changes in the United States patent or trademark laws that are necessary to apply the provisions of the new revision must be enacted by the Congress. A draft bill for this purpose was transmitted to the Senate on March 7, 1960, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. A similar bill, H.R. 11070, is currently before the House Committee on the Judiciary. Only a rather minor change in the United States patent and trademark laws will be needed in connection with the new revision. It will be necessary to amend the patent and trademark laws to permit applicants to claim their right of priority in the United States not only from the date of their first filing but also from the date of a subsequent filing in a member country should the first filing be withdrawn under certain specified conditions. The United States instrument of ratification will not be

deposited until after the above-cited bills embodying these changes are enacted. This treaty creates no problem with regard to Federal-State relations.

Improved Relations in Industrial Property Rights Field

It is the view of the Department of State that United States acceptance of the new revision will significantly improve the protection in this field accorded to United States private interests abroad. Such acceptance will also set an excellent example for other countries who are considering adherence to the new revision. Finally, United States participation in the new revision will insure that our relations with the other 49 countries which are parties to one or more revisions will continue on a sound basis in this important field of industrial property rights protection.

For these important reasons the Department is firmly convinced that ratification of this new revision is highly desirable. It therefore strongly endorses the new revision and implementing legislation.

U.S. Contributions to International Bureau

Mr. Chairman, I also wish to comment on another important matter related to the industrial property convention; that is, Senate Joint Resolution 149 to authorize certain contributions incident to United States participation in the International Bureau, which administers this convention. House Joint Resolution 627, which is identical to this Senate resolution, was approved by the House on June 6, 1960.

The International Bureau, which is located in Bern, Switzerland, is supervised and staffed by the Swiss Government. The Bureau draws its financial support from contributions paid by the member governments in accordance with the relevant provisions of the convention. The Bureau performs special functions on behalf of the convention members, including the preparatory and administrative work of the conferences of revision and the collection and distribution of specialized information in the international industrial property rights field. It has been used to great advantage by the United States as a forum for encouraging other governments to afford protection for the patent and trademark rights of American inventors and businessmen comparable to that which they enjoy in the United States.

Request for Payment of Arreages

The convention, as currently in effect, provides that the budget of the Bureau shall not exceed 140,000 Swiss francs, approximately \$33,000 per annum. On this basis the United States share is 7,500 Swiss francs, about \$1,767, or slightly over 5 percent. The convention further provides that the budget maximum may only be increased by a unanimous decision of a diplomatic conference of the member states. Late in 1947 the Swiss Government, on behalf of the Bern Bureau, attempted to raise the budget ceiling in order to meet the higher administrative costs of the organization. Instead of calling a diplomatic conference, the Swiss Government circulated a diplomatic note to member governments asking that the budget ceiling be raised. The ceiling was in fact subsequently raised, and by 1949 virtually all the members were contributing at a higher budget level except the United States. The United States maintained that, in the absence of congressional authorization, it could not contribute at this higher level because the new budget ceiling had not been established in accordance with relevant provisions of the convention (article 13(6)). This article provides that increases in the budget ceiling are to be made by unanimous decision of the member governments at a diplomatic conference of revision. The sum of \$10,514 (approximately 45,000 Swiss francs) requested in Senate Joint Resolution 149 constitutes the difference between the amounts we have already paid on the basis of the convention limitation and the amount we would have paid had we been able to contribute on the same basis as the rest of the membership of the Bureau.

Request for an Increase in Future Annual Contributions

The Bureau is now operating within a ceiling of about 235,000 Swiss francs, which has proven inadequate for the Bureau's administrative work under the convention. The Bureau has covered its additional costs by utilizing credits extended by the Swiss Government, as the Administering Authority, and funds received for rendering certain international trademark and design registration services which it performs for approximately 20 governments, under other conventions to which the United States is not party. Based on the Bureau's expenditure for administering industrial

property convention activities, it is estimated that the Bureau will require a future budget of 588,000 Swiss francs (approximately \$138,000).

At the 1958 conference of revision at Lisbon, the United States supported a proposed resolution to raise the budget ceiling to 588,000 Swiss francs and also to amend the provisions of the convention so as to permit periodic revisions of the budget ceiling without the need of a diplomatic conference of revision. However, the Soviet bloc countries that were present opposed these proposals on the grounds that since East Germany had not been invited as a member country nothing could be approved in its absence, thus making unanimity on this issue impossible. Soviet bloc compromise solutions were so worded that approval could have been construed as an acceptance of the argument that East Germany should have been present. This was entirely unacceptable to the West German and United States delegations, and unanimous agreement was not possible.

As a compromise, the conference finally adopted a resolution, which invites

The countries of the Union to raise their contribution, beginning on the 1st of January 1955, in order to bring the funds of the International Bureau to the amount of 600,000 Swiss francs annually.

The United States annual share, calculated on the basis of this new amount would be approximately \$7,250. We have informed the Bureau that it would be advised in due course whether or not this Government would be able to accept the invitation to increase its contribution. The most recent information available to us shows that 34 countries have already responded affirmatively to this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that there was ample justification for the Bureau's requesting increased contributions from its members as a result of the expanded operating costs during the postwar period, based on a higher budget ceiling than contained in the convention revision of 1934. The United States is the only country still paying on the 1934 basis. In the meantime we have continued to receive the additional benefits from the Bureau's activities without having paid what could be considered our proportionate share of the costs. It is thus considered in the best interests of the United States to make the contributions constituting the difference between the annual amounts paid for the United States fiscal years

1950-59 and the amounts it would have paid based on the Bureau's actual costs of operation for these years. It is also our view that the activities of the Bureau should be continued at least at the same level. Finally, the benefits accruing to the United States warrant our acceptance of the invitation embodied in the 1958 resolution to raise our future annual contribution to the Bureau so that there is no impairment of the Bureau's activities and programs. The Department, therefore, recommends that this committee give favorable consideration to Senate Joint Resolution 149.

TREATIES WITH PAKISTAN AND FRANCE

Press release 340 dated June 21

I am appearing before the committee in support of the treaty of friendship and commerce with Pakistan³ and the convention of establishment with France.⁴ These treaties, although differing from other agreements of the type as to official designation and somewhat as to content, are units in the series of commercial treaties initiated by this Government shortly after the Second World War. They constitute, respectively, the 18th and 19th signed treaties in this series.

These treaties, aside from certain omissions, conform to the general pattern of the usual United States commercial treaty, numerous examples of which have received Senate approval in recent years. Their broad objectives are the same: to encourage investment and commerce and to provide an agreed basis for the protection of American citizens, their property, and other interests in foreign countries. Their provisions are based upon existing precedents and contain no innovations raising problems as to their effect upon domestic law.

What are regarded as the principal features of these treaties are referred to in the report of the Secretary of State that accompanies each treaty. To supplement and amplify that material the Department has prepared a paragraph-by-paragraph summary,⁵ which indicates the very considerable degree of correspondence between the provisions of these treaties and provisions in the Treaty of

Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and the Netherlands, signed March 27, 1956, approved by the Senate July 11, 1956,⁶ and now in force. I offer this tabulation for the record. I also offer for the record an up-to-date list⁵ of the commercial treaties negotiated under the current program and of commercial treaties negotiated prior to the initiation of the current program and now in force.

Treaty of Friendship and Commerce With Pakistan

The treaty with Pakistan is regarded as falling particularly within the terms of congressional policy expressed in section 413 of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. That section provides that the President

... shall accelerate a program of negotiating treaties for commerce and trade . . . which shall include provisions to encourage and facilitate the flow of private investment to . . . nations participating in programs under this Act.

Pakistan has long participated extensively in such programs. The aim of the treaty is to help to assure conditions favorable to foreign private investment.

The signature of this treaty is only one of a number of steps recently taken by the Government of Pakistan looking to promotion of the economic development of the country. Others include a treaty for the avoidance of double taxation, an investment guaranty agreement, and several domestic measures, of which special mention may be made of provision for the exemption, in certain circumstances, of new investment from taxation for a period of years. The completion of this treaty would seem to add a fitting keystone to the steps the two countries have taken in cooperation to give Pakistan a satisfactory basis for economic growth. It is hoped that acceptance of the treaty by Pakistan will facilitate negotiations for similar treaties with other countries in southern Asia.

Convention of Establishment With France

France, of course, being a highly industrialized country, is not now in great need of the basic requirements of economic development. It con-

³ S. Ex. F, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

⁴ S. Ex. G, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

⁵ Not printed here.

⁶ For text, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3942.

stitutes, however, an attractive field for the establishment of American investment and trading enterprises, and a growing group of French enterprises operate in the United States. The treaty provides the type of assurances that are regarded as advantageous to such enterprises. In this connection may be mentioned especially the matter of rights of employment, particularly of personnel essential to an enterprise. Heretofore, in the absence of a commercial treaty, French enterprises in the United States have not enjoyed the advantages provided by the immigration act with regard to treaty-traders and treaty-investors. France does not, of course, restrict immigration in the same manner as the United States. Entry into France is relatively free, but employment of aliens is highly restricted through a system of work permits. In the provisions of the treaty and the accompanying joint declaration, a sincere effort has been made to assure that Americans will be able to obtain work permits in France to an extent fully commensurate with the rights of entry and employment that accrue to French nationals under the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Two other aspects of the convention with France are worthy of note. First, the establishment of the European Economic Community has given rise to concern as to the possibility of preferential treatment of the interests of member countries, to the disadvantage of the interests of nonmembers. The Rome treaty contemplates the extension by each member state of a considerable degree of national treatment to enterprises established under the laws of other members. Therefore treaties such as this convention with France, which assure national treatment to United States enterprises with respect to establishment and the carrying on of a wide range of activities, should have the effect also of contributing to favorable treatment of certain types of United States enterprises throughout the Community. Moreover, the United States will have, upon the completion of this treaty with France, treaties with the four largest members of the Community (the others are Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands) which contain extensive assurances of nondiscriminatory treatment for American enterprises.

The other aspect has to do with this Govern-

ment's policies directed to reaffirming and strengthening the principles of international law concerning the property rights and other rights of aliens. Persons concerned with the problems of foreign investment, not only in this country but throughout the world, are disturbed at the lack of respect shown for private property interest from time to time in many areas. Treaty assurances are widely regarded as an important means of preventing such disrespect. The formal endorsement by France of the property-protection rules expressed in our treaties, particularly that regarding just compensation for property taken for public use, serves as a significant and timely reinforcement of our own efforts in this regard. We cannot consider subscription to these principles as a duty of the less developed countries alone; the readiness of the more developed countries to set a good example by incorporating these rules in agreements between themselves is a very important consideration in establishing them as worldwide standards of conduct.

Principal Omissions From Treaties

I should now like to refer briefly to the principal omissions I mentioned at the beginning of my statement. Neither of these treaties contains provisions on shipping. Such provisions are to be found in all the other treaties in the current series, but there are precedents for such omissions in earlier agreements. In the case of Pakistan we are dealing with a young nation that has not yet settled fully its policies on all matters related to international relations. One of the country's serious problems concerns transportation and communications between East Pakistan and West Pakistan. Government officials in Pakistan have taken the position that it would be advantageous to their country if a common coasting trade could be established for Pakistan, India, and Ceylon, in which vessels of all three countries could participate on equal terms but with vessels of all other countries excluded. They wished to include a reservation in the treaty to permit such an arrangement. According to U.S. policy, such a system would constitute discrimination in international trade, and it was felt that such a reservation would establish an undesirable precedent in our treaties. Hence it was decided to omit the shipping provisions. Pakistan does not now discriminate against

foreign shipping in any way, except to favor national vessels in the coasting trade when such vessels are available.

In the case of France, certain existing arrangements favor French national shipping. An agreement with Tunisia limits trade between the two countries to Tunisian and French vessels, thus continuing the situation prevailing before Tunisian independence. In addition, French vessels are favored in the importation of a very limited number of commodities into France. The French Government concluded that it could not undertake to abandon these arrangements at the present time. Again, in order to avoid seeming to compromise with discriminatory practices, the Department concluded that it would be best to drop navigation provisions from the treaty. Representatives of United States shipping interests have in the past advised the Department that they preferred no treaty commitments on shipping to commitments that departed in any way from the usual assurances of nondiscrimination. It is understood that the French practices above referred to do not in fact affect injuriously United States shipping interests at the present time and that the French Government, through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, has joined in a policy of not extending existing discriminatory practices.

There have also been omitted from the treaty with France the reciprocal commitments to accord most-favored-nation treatment to imports and exports and the usual ancillary provisions relating to trade in goods. These provisions in our treaties are comparable to provisions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and are consequently not regarded as essential in treaties with countries that are parties to the general agreement, as is the case with France. Along with other governments in Western Europe, the French Government is much preoccupied with developments in connection with the European Economic Community and is reluctant to enter into long-term engagements on trade matters for fear of resulting difficulties for the European integration plans. A similar attitude was encountered in the Netherlands negotiation in 1955-56 but was satisfactorily solved through a special arrangement incorporated in an exchange of notes. This type of solution was not acceptable to the French, and it was mutually agreed not to attempt to negotiate new trade provisions in connection with this treaty.

Presidential Authority Sought To Reduce Sugar Quotas

Statement by Secretary Herter¹

The administration's recommendations for amendment on the Sugar Act were submitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Vice President on March 15, 1960, by the Acting Secretary of Agriculture. Very few changes were recommended. These recommendations included a 4-year extension and certain technical changes in the act which were designed to make the Sugar Act operate more smoothly and effectively.

In addition the Congress was asked to delegate to the President authority to reduce the quota of any country other than the Republic of the Philippines (whose quota is established by treaty) when he found it necessary to do so in the national interest or to insure adequate supplies of sugar. The Secretary of Agriculture, who administers the Sugar Act, and the Secretary of State, who must consider the effect which any change in domestic legislation may have on our international commitments, were agreed that such authority was necessary under existing circumstances.

The primary reason for requesting this grant of interim authority to adjust quotas was to safeguard consumers in this country from possible interruptions in supply and fluctuations in price. I need not tell you that our concern was with conditions in Cuba. Under the terms of the Sugar Act presently in effect Cuba enjoys a quota of 3,119,655 tons, or approximately one-third of the total United States requirements for sugar, currently estimated at 9,400,000 tons for 1960. In addition the present law provides that the Cuban quota be increased if deficits are declared in the domestic areas, as now appears certain. This is a very large proportion of our total sugar supply.

In the past Cuba has been a dependable source, responsive to United States needs and responsible in situations of emergency. Cuban production in recent years, approximately 5,800,000 tons in 1958 and 6,000,000 tons in 1959, has been more than adequate to meet the needs of the United States and to supply Cuba's traditional world markets. It

¹ Made before the House Committee on Agriculture on June 22 (press release 343).

should be noted that, for most of the time since the Sugar Act went into effect, the price received by Cuba for sales to the United States has been higher than the price prevailing on world markets. However, for a period of several months in 1950 and 1951, during the Korean war, and again in 1957, following the Suez crisis, Cuba continued to supply sugar to the United States even though the world price was at levels considerably higher than those prevailing in the United States.

Recent developments, however, have raised questions in our minds as to whether Cuba will be a dependable source in the future. Cuban official spokesmen have announced, not once but on many occasions, their desire to diversify agricultural production and to eliminate what they have termed "the evils of monoproduction" and "the dependence on foreign markets." Steps already taken to achieve this professed objective, in addition to the problems inherent in the Government's plan to redistribute the land under the agrarian law, have led knowledgeable observers to predict that Cuba's sugar production will soon register a decline of at least 1,000,000 tons from current levels. What implementation of this program will do to Cuba's sugar production over the long term is uncertain at this time, but we cannot exclude the possibility of a further progressive decline in years to come.

It should also be borne in mind, in connection with Cuba's future ability to supply the United States market, that the Cuban Government has recently entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union under which it is committed to supply 1,000,000 tons of sugar annually during the next 5 years. Trade agreements have also been signed recently with East Germany and Poland calling for shipments of 60,000 tons and 50,000 tons, respectively. Reports are current that an agreement involving the shipment of a half million tons of sugar to Communist China is presently under active consideration. This would be in addition to 50,000 tons sold to Communist China in March.

Because of these and other circumstances this would be an appropriate time for the United States to seek ways to diversify its sources of supply and reduce the dependence of its consumers on Cuban sugar, the supply of which may become increasingly uncertain. It is noted that, on the last two occasions when the Sugar Act was re-

vised, the Congress made changes which had the effect of giving more of our market to other producers and limiting the share of the market going to Cuba. However, even with a substantial reduction from present levels Cuba would be by far the largest single source of sugar for the United States.

In conclusion, while of course we are convinced that the original administration recommendations were sound, our position on the bills which I understand are still actively before the committee or the House as they relate to Presidential authority is as follows. We believe it would be a serious mistake to deny the President authority to act in this area. And while we believe that the national interest could be better protected under the flexible authority to the President as provided in H.R. 12534, I nevertheless believe we could operate within the less flexible authority which would be provided in H.R. 12624.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 2d Session

- Operations of the Development Loan Fund. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee. August 18, 1959-March 7, 1960. 936 pp.
- Semiannual Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Letter from the chairman of the National Advisory Council, together with text of the report for the period January 1-June 30, 1959. H. Doc. 380. April 19, 1960. 77 pp.
- International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil. Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Ex. C, 86th Congress, 2d session. May 17, 1960. 28 pp.
- Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Part VI. Testimony of Edward J. Whitehouse. May 26, 1960. 16 pp.
- Events Incident to the Summit Conference. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. May 27-June 2, 1960. 302 pp.
- World Newsprint Supply-Demand: Outlook Through 1961. Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce pursuant to section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Public Law 601, 79th Congress, and House Resolution 56, 86th Congress. H. Rept. 1669. May 27, 1960. 30 pp.
- Favoring Active Participation by Federal Agencies in the Fifth International Congress on High-speed Photography. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 75. H. Rept. 1733. June 1, 1960. 5 pp.
- Extension of Marketing Order Quality Standards to Imported Walnuts and Dates. Report to accompany H.R. 12341. H. Rept. 1734. June 1, 1960. 6 pp.

International Communism in Latin America

*Statement by R. R. Rubottom, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs¹*

I welcome this timely opportunity to join the subcommittee at this time in a discussion of international communism in Latin America.

The events of the past few months have brought to the surface the greatly intensified effort of the Soviet Union and Communist China in Latin America to break down the common front which all of the nations of this hemisphere have traditionally presented against totalitarian dictatorships in the Old World.

Chairman Khrushchev, shortly after returning to Moscow after shattering the hopes vested by all peaceful people in the summit meeting and brusquely canceling the invitation extended to our President to visit the Soviet Union, accepted an invitation to visit a Latin American country. This country, he made plain at his Paris press conference after the summit breakdown, should serve as a *model* for revolutions in other Latin American countries. Several times in the last several months Chairman Mao Tse-tung appears to have gone out of his way to receive Latin American Communist leaders and to exhort them to give their full backing to the kind of revolution which he and Chairman Khrushchev like. Everywhere in Latin America the Communist parties have now reverted to a belligerent and revolutionary line aimed as much at trying to capture sincere nationalism and weakening the democratic governments of Latin America as at fanning hatred of the United States.

¹Made before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 20.

To understand the intensity of the current Communist drive in Latin America, I think it is necessary to examine the fundamentals of our relations with Latin America. These relations are based on common principles, and these principles are alien to Communist ideology. Latin Americans, just as we in the United States, set the highest value on freedom, and we believe that this freedom is best assured by the effective exercise of representative democracy. Neither Latin Americans nor the peoples of this country believe that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is a desirable goal for political activity, nor do we believe that it is a necessary or desirable phase which society inevitably must go through to achieve the better material life to which we all aspire.

Latin America does not believe, any more than we do, that suppression is the road to freedom. We see this clearly in the great ground swell which has swept so many dictatorships from the Latin American scene in the last several years, and we may rest assured that ultimately Latin America will just as decisively reject dictatorships masquerading behind a totalitarian, atheistic ideology. Peoples in the American Republics aspire to societies in which the individual free man can, through the ballot box, have a voice in his destiny.

Another outlook which unites the Americas is a common concept of the goal of economic activity. Latin America shares with us the concept that the goal is a better life for all citizens. Like us they deplore the existence of totalitarian systems in which citizens are forced to devote their energies and dissipate their wealth to maintain a high level of armaments and to subsidize the

foreign subversive and propaganda activities designed to impose that system on other peoples. Latin Americans, a highly individualistic people, believe in economic as well as political freedom and, in the last analysis, reject the regimentation which all totalitarian ideologies seek to impose upon them.

And what of moral and spiritual values which are the antithesis of communism? They constitute a great bulwark of strength against Communist penetration of the Americas, which would destroy them if successful, although obviously they need to be reinforced by visible evidence of economic and social progress.

Finally, Latin America joins with us in a firm determination that the hemisphere we share with it shall be secure from aggression from the outside and resistant to the fifth column, subversive activity directed by totalitarianism. This was their stand during World War II, and during the 15 years that the free world has been overshadowed by the threat of Communist aggression and subversion, the Latin American countries—alone of the great underdeveloped areas—have virtually always been strong allies on all questions involving the security of the free world against communism.

I say all this to emphasize strongly that the Latin American countries themselves have as great a stake as we do in countering communism in the Western Hemisphere and that we must work together with them to meet this threat. At the same time Latin America offers conditions which greatly tempt the Communists: It is an area in transition, facing myriad problems in attempting rapidly to raise the standards of living and economic productivity of its people; profound changes are occurring in its political and social structure; its population is growing more rapidly than that of any other area; and widespread dissatisfaction with existing conditions and an urge to reform are the order of the day. Inevitably this process of change—although ultimately leading toward the goals of greater freedom and a higher living standard for the individual—brings temporarily frictions, frustrations, and maladjustments which the Communists seek to exacerbate and to use to their advantage. Like the judo fighter, they seek cleverly to use the points of weakness to make the area's strength work against itself.

Maximum and Minimum Goals of Communism

At the present time it is clear that the Communists have maximum and minimum goals in Latin America. As indicated by Mr. Khrushchev's remarks at his Paris press conference, this maximum goal is that a revolutionary pattern should spread throughout Latin America, characterized not only by virulent anti-Americanism but also by a radical economic transformation in which the private property of the local population as well as foreigners would be seized without compensation and the economy subjugated completely to the control of the state. It is also clear that the revolutionary pattern which Mr. Khrushchev desires is also to be characterized by the leading role which the Communist Party is to play in the management of the revolution he hopes to see spread in the Latin American area. Should the Communists succeed in spreading this revolution in Latin America, they would have (1) dealt a heavy blow to the strength and unity of the free world and (2) doomed the peoples of the countries involved to the spiritless captivity which has always followed massive Communist intervention and takeover.

The Communists must, of course, realize that the chances that they will achieve this maximum objective are slim. Ultimately the Latin American peoples themselves will not accept playing the role of a Soviet instrument against the forces of freedom of which they are a part. The Communists, therefore, have a minimum objective as well. That minimum objective is to provoke the United States into actions and attitudes inconsistent with the spirit of partnership which regulates inter-American relations and thus not only permanently to damage our relations with Latin America but also to offset the image of Hungary and Tibet by portraying the United States before the world as an "aggressor" intervening in the internal affairs of its neighbors.

It is important to note that these maximum and minimum objectives represent a slight but important shift in international Communist tactics in Latin America, adding up to a more aggressive policy. Some years back, during Stalin's time, the Communists in Latin America as elsewhere generally had as their goal that the Communists should gain open control, and they considered "mited front" tactics and the like merely as means to that goal. At that time the Communists were

almost everywhere in Latin America openly dedicated to the overthrow of existing governments. Although the Communists, of course, still retain the seizure of power and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as their ultimate goal, Khrushchev in the mid-1950's introduced more subtle policies. He thought that the short- and intermediate-term interests of international communism would best be served by collaboration with nationalist elements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, who he thought could be relied upon to be anti-U.S. even if they were non-Communists. Accordingly, on the international plane he launched a government-to-government diplomatic and trade-and-aid offensive with nationalist governments, some of whom in Latin America as in the Near East and Africa were actually suppressing or restricting the local Communist parties. Within the countries the Communist parties were ordered to conceal their true revolutionary and subversive purposes and as respectable "democratic" parties seek alliances with nationalist and leftist elements. It was evidently Khrushchev's hope that, by sacrificing to some extent the immediate ambitions of Communist parties and having them adopt a "soft" line, he could bring about a break between the nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America on the one hand and the United States and its European allies on the other.

Khrushchev's policy was soon revealed to have substantial deficiencies from the Communist point of view. Although several nations of Africa and Asia accepted his aid and were visited by him, they did not turn against the United States and they in many cases vigorously checked the subversive and illegal activities. In Latin America, although the Communists gave their support to non-Communist candidates and parties, they had little success with this method. In some cases the electorate rejected the candidates whom the Communists supported; in others, candidates who had won with Communist support subsequently excluded the Communists. Thus among Communists a question arose as to whether the short-term "peaceful coexistence" policy meant the liquidation or weakening of the Communist parties on which the international Communist leadership ultimately had to depend if the long-range goal of communization was to be reached.

Interestingly enough this question was very much in the foreground when the 21st Congress of

the Soviet Communist Party met in Moscow at the end of January 1959, approximately a month after the Batista government in Cuba was overthrown. This Congress was attended by Latin American Communist Party leaders from at least 18 of the 20 Latin American Republics, and most of them subsequently went on to Peking. During their sojourn behind the Iron Curtain it was apparently decided that the full weight of the Communist apparatus in Latin America should be thrown behind the Cuban revolution and that there should be improved coordination between all of the Latin American Communist parties to make this more effective.

Cuban Revolution

The question arises: Why did international communism select the Cuban revolution at that time as the type of revolution to support? The answer perhaps may be found by an examination of the characteristics which differentiate the Cuban revolution from other nationalist revolutions in Latin America as well as in Africa and Asia. From the Communist point of view one criterion must have been the degree of collaboration with the Communist Party. The difficulty they had seen in other nationalist revolutions was that the nationalists excluded rather than welcomed the collaboration of the Communist Party and the revolution thus ultimately served the purpose of local nationalism rather than Communist internationalism. A second attractive characteristic in Communist eyes was the determination of the Cuban revolutionary government to carry forward ruthlessly and without regard to the individual and property rights of free people a fundamental social and economic revolution which had as its professed aim to put all power in the hands of the "workers and peasants," this being a euphemistic expression to cover an utterly cynical dictatorship. In dealing with other nationalist movements the Communists had always encountered opposition from the democratic classes, which resisted efforts of communization of the society. Finally, the Communists doubtlessly saw advantage in a revolution which claimed universal applicability throughout Latin America as distinct from nationalist revolutions confined to one country. We saw and heard Chairman Khrushchev take the Castro kind of government to his heart and then offer it to the rest of Latin America.

In deciding to throw their weight behind the Castro kind of revolution, the Communists brought into play considerable resources. In Latin America it is estimated that there are 250,000 card-carrying Communists. Although it is sometimes said that this is a small portion of the population, we must bear in mind that this represents at least 20 times as many Communists as there are in the United States, which has a population approximately equal to that of Latin America. The leaders of these Communists have been fully trained behind the Iron Curtain and have demonstrated extraordinary skill in establishing Communist-front groups and in infiltrating into student, labor, and other groups. It has been estimated that it would take \$100 million to finance a propaganda effort of the scope which the Communists are carrying out in Latin America today. This propaganda offensive includes not only the huge amounts of Communist propaganda which are being published and disseminated within Latin America but also large amounts of propaganda imported from the Communist bloc and distributed through bloc missions in the area. Communist-bloc radio broadcasts to Latin America extensively, and last year the Spanish-language broadcasts of Radio Peking were increased to the point that they are now second only to the worldwide English-language broadcasts.

All of these assets are now concentrated on supporting and spreading the Castro kind of revolution throughout Latin America. To this extent the Communists have moved away from the policy of collaborating with other non-Communist groups and are now emphasizing to a greater extent the hitherto revolutionary approach, which constitutes a direct threat to the other Latin American governments. Khrushchev has in speeches made it abundantly clear that he fully supports the Cuban revolution. He first made a reference to it in a speech before the Indian Parliament during his trip to that country earlier this year and has favorably referred to it on several occasions in addition to the endorsement which he gave at his Paris news conference. Communist theoretical publications in Peking, as well as Moscow, have also endorsed the Cuban revolution. It is noteworthy in this respect that the Cuban revolution is singled out while there no longer are favorable references to the other national movements of Asia and Africa which the Soviets formerly

warmly endorsed. The Cuban revolution, in short, represents the pattern of revolution which the Communists would like to see spread throughout the underdeveloped world to replace national independence and strengthening of individual political and economic freedom.

Counteracting Communist Penetration

This stepped-up aggressiveness of Sino-Soviet policy, and the extent to which it involves using Cuba and the Cuban revolution as its instrument, is obviously of serious concern to the United States; and I am confident that this concern is widely held elsewhere in the hemisphere. The problem of preventing its encroachments is one which calls for the most effective utilization of the resources available to those who value human liberty and the maintenance of the freedom and independence of ourselves and our allies.

One of these resources is, of course, the constant attention which all responsible persons and governments must give to the elimination of those social and economic evils for which international communism offers false and damaging panaceas. It would be dangerous to assume that the fact that extremist and even chaotic programs of social reform are actually contrary to the general well-being is perceived by everyone in Latin America. Some elements tend to look uncritically at claims and assertions of reform in the interests of those who need land and homes, and this tendency is exploited to the full by the Communists. This means, of course, that all concerned with general economic and social progress in Latin America must be certain not only that forward-looking steps are taken but that their purpose and usefulness are more widely understood. This involves our own programs of cooperation and assistance, but it also involves the governments and responsible groups in Latin America which have such an important stake in the maintenance of orderly, democratic, independent government in this hemisphere. I point this out, not because it necessarily offers our best approach to counteracting Communist penetration, but because it is often overlooked or misunderstood.

The views of the Department of State with regard to the specific resolutions which are before this subcommittee have been set forth in considerable detail in letters to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dr. [Thomas E.]

Morgan, as well as to certain of the sponsors of the proposals. It is our view that the problem of international Communist intervention in the Americas, when this goes beyond what can be done by each government within the framework of its existing obligations to the OAS [Organization of American States] and the U.N., should be approached on a multilateral basis in conformity with the international instruments available for that purpose. We think it is in our national interest to maintain this course, and another course could have seriously injurious effects upon our country and its standing and influence throughout the hemisphere and the world.

It is my view that ways and means can and will be found within the framework of procedures available and our international obligations to counteract such threats to the peace and security of the American states. A prerequisite to multilateral consideration of this problem within the OAS must be the effective accumulation and presentation by all concerned of the evidence of the case in a manner which will convince the governments and people of the American Republics of the full nature and scope of the danger confronting all of us. In this respect particularly, I believe that the statements and actions of international communism and its leaders in recent weeks amply demonstrate that it is engaged in a new and intensified campaign of intervention in the internal and external affairs of this hemisphere and that this campaign is aimed at preventing genuine progress through orderly representative government in the Americas.

U.S. and Norway Agree To Extend Educational Exchange Program

Press release 342 dated June 21

The Governments of the United States and Norway agreed to extend for 3 years the educational exchange program that has been carried out between the two countries since 1949. The program, which is authorized by Public Law 584, 79th Congress, the Fulbright Act, was extended officially by an exchange of diplomatic notes at Oslo on June 21. Under the terms of the original agreement the program was due to expire in 1960.

The exchange program provides round-trip

travel grants to Norwegian graduate students, professors, research specialists, and teachers so that they can undertake teaching, study, or research projects at American institutions of learning. American students, professors, and teachers going to Norway for similar purposes under the program receive maintenance stipends in Norwegian currency in addition to their round-trip transportation. The program is financed with Norwegian currency that has accrued to the U.S. Treasury in payment for surplus properties purchased by the Norwegian Government after the Second World War. Since 1949, 1,218 Norwegian citizens and 405 American citizens have won grants under this exchange program.

The agreement to extend the program provides for the expenditure of the equivalent of \$200,000 in Norwegian kroner during each of the next 3 years.

The overall exchange program carried out under the Fulbright Act is under the supervision of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, a 10-member public body appointed by the President. The exchange program with Norway is administered in Oslo by the binational U.S. Educational Foundation. At the present time exchange programs under the Fulbright Act are conducted between the United States and 35 other countries.

U.S. Gives Austria 1-Year Extension on Copyright Registration, Renewal

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 330 dated June 15

The President has signed a proclamation dated June 15, 1960, giving Austrian citizens an extension of 1 year to comply with formalities necessary to bring their literary, artistic, and musical works within the protection of the U.S. copyright law. An exchange of diplomatic notes on June 15 between the Governments of Austria and the United States affirmed the continued existence of conditions of substantial reciprocity in copyright relations between the two countries.

The new proclamation permits citizens of Austria who were unable to apply for U.S. copyright registration or renewal from March 13, 1958,

through July 26, 1956, to do so during the year following the date of the proclamation. Affected are those Austrian works that were either first published or produced outside the United States or became subject to renewal of U.S. copyright during that period.

Austrians lacked the facilities essential for compliance with the conditions of the copyright law for several years before, during, and after World War II. The 1938 date marks the beginning of the occupation of Austria, and the 1956 date is 1 year after the effective date for the United States of the Austrian state treaty of 1955. Under that treaty, occupation troops were withdrawn from Austria.

A number of significant Austrian literary and musical works are eligible for protection under the extension arrangement. Among the works to which the proclamation is believed to apply are operettas and other musical works by composers Oscar Straus and Franz Lehár.

The U.S. copyright law provides that there shall be no liability for the lawful use of any of the affected works prior to the proclamation date or for the continuation during the subsequent year of any undertaking that involves expenditure or contractual obligation in connection with the lawful exploitation of any such work.

PROCLAMATION 3353¹

COPYRIGHT EXTENSION: AUSTRIA

WHEREAS the President is authorized, in accordance with the conditions prescribed in section 9 of title 17 of the United States Code, which includes the provisions of the act of Congress, approved March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075, as amended by the act of September 23, 1941, 55 Stat. 732, to grant an extension of time for fulfillment of the conditions and formalities prescribed by the copyright laws of the United States of America, with respect to works first produced or published outside the United States of America and subject to copyright or to renewal of copyright under the laws of the United States of America, by nationals of countries which accord substantially equal treatment to citizens of the United States of America; and

WHEREAS satisfactory official assurances have been received that since December 14, 1967, citizens of the United States have been entitled to obtain copyright protection for their works in Austria on substantially the same basis as citizens of Austria without the need of com-

plying with any formalities, provided such works secured protection in the United States; and

WHEREAS, by virtue of a proclamation by the President of the United States of America, dated April 9, 1910, 36 Stat. 2685, citizens of Austria are, and since July 1, 1909, have been, entitled to the benefits of the aforementioned act of March 4, 1909, other than the benefits of section 1 (e) of that act; and

WHEREAS, by virtue of a proclamation by the President of the United States of America, dated March 11, 1925, 44 Stat. 2571, the citizens of Austria are, and since August 1, 1920, have been, entitled to the benefits of section 1 (e) of the aforementioned act of March 4, 1909:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid title 17, do declare and proclaim:

That with respect to (1) works of citizens of Austria which were first produced or published outside the United States of America on or after March 13, 1938 and prior to July 27, 1956, and subject to copyright under the laws of the United States of America, and (2) works of citizens of Austria subject to renewal of copyright under the laws of the United States of America on or after March 13, 1938 and prior to July 27, 1956, there has existed during several years of the aforementioned period such disruption or suspension of facilities essential to compliance with the conditions and formalities prescribed with respect to such works by the copyright laws of the United States of America as to bring such works within the terms of the aforesaid title 17, and that, accordingly, the time within which compliance with such conditions and formalities may take place is hereby extended with respect to such works for one year after the date of this proclamation.

It shall be understood that the term of copyright in any case is not and cannot be altered or affected by this proclamation, and that, as provided by the aforesaid title 17, no liability shall attach under that title for lawful uses made or acts done prior to the effective date of this proclamation in connection with the above-described works, or with respect to the continuance for one year subsequent to such date of any business undertaking or enterprise lawfully entered into prior to such date involving expenditure or contractual obligation in connection with the exploitation, production, reproduction, circulation, or performance of any such work.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fifteenth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-fourth.



By the President:

DOUGLAS DILLON,
Acting Secretary of State.

¹ 25 Fed. Reg. 5373.

ILO Conference Votes "No Decision" on Hungarian Delegation's Credentials

Statement by Horace E. Henderson.¹

For the fourth consecutive year the International Labor Conference has before it a report of the Credentials Committee recommending that the Conference refuse to admit the delegation of the Hungarian Government, and I must point out that in the 4 years since the tragic events in Hungary not one single member—I repeat not one single member—of the Credentials Committee of the International Labor Conference has ever voted for the admission of the Hungarian delegation.

One year ago the United States supported the rejection of the Hungarian Government Credentials, which was endorsed by the Conference by the necessary two-thirds majority vote.² Regrettably, the situation has not changed. In spite of all protestations to the contrary the Hungarian people continue to live under a repressive regime which was installed and maintained by the armed forces of the Soviet Union in violation of the charter of the United Nations. While a partial amnesty was announced by the Hungarian authorities on March 31st of this year, the details as to the exact number of patriots affected by this partial amnesty are not known, and the regime has refused to permit the United Nations Special Representative [Leslie Munro] to visit Budapest to discuss this matter; still we welcome the March 31st announcement. We hope that it may—and I stress the word "may"—be a first indication that the present authorities in Hungary are finally showing some heed to world opinion. If they modify their reliance on repressive measures and

¹Made before the 44th International Labor Conference at Geneva on June 10 during debate on the third report of the Credentials Committee, which dealt with the credentials of the Hungarian delegation. Mr. Henderson, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, was a U.S. delegate to the Conference.

²BULLETIN of July 20, 1959, p. 99.

if the true Hungarian patriots are spared, the partial amnesty deserves to be welcomed.

On the other hand, the United Nations Special Representative, at his press conference in this city on April 8th, reminded us that rumors of secret executions for the 1956 activities continue to circulate. The world knows that the record of the present Hungarian regime has not been good when it comes to fulfilling promises. We need recall only the fate of Imre Nagy, General Pal Maleter, and the Hungarian freedom fighters. It is clear that any real improvement in the international position of the present Hungarian regime can come about only by an improvement in its relations with the United Nations. In this connection the United States believes that the present Hungarian authorities, in their own interest and in the interests of the Hungarian people and of the world, should without further delay invite the United Nations Special Representative to visit Budapest. Thus we see—and I say regretfully—that, while there has been no change in the situation in Hungary, we continue to look for some indication of hope for the welfare and freedom of the workers and people of Hungary.

We now have before us the third report of the Credentials Committee. Whereas last year there was a majority report for rejection, this year a majority of the Credentials Committee has recommended "that a decision on the validity of the contested credentials must be postponed." The majority report refers to the following facts in justification of this recommendation: (1) the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary,³ which found that the Hungarian revolution was a spontaneous, national uprising and that the present Hungarian regime had been imposed on the Hungarian people by the armed intervention of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (2) the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly

³U.N. doc. A/3592. For text of the final chapter of the report, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1957, p. 62.

which condemned the action of the U.S.S.R., which, in violation of the charter of the United Nations, had deprived Hungary of its liberty and political independence and denied the Hungarian people of the exercise of their fundamental human rights;⁴ and (3) the decision by the ILO to invalidate the credentials of the Hungarian Government delegation in 1958 and 1959.

The majority report further states that the authors of the objection refer to the fact that since last year "the U.S.S.R. has continued unchanged its domination and mastery of the Hungarian people through the regime in Budapest." It is also noted in the credentials report before us that as in previous years both the workers' and employers' members of the Credentials Committee have associated themselves with a severe condemnation of the present Hungarian regime.

The position of my Government today is influenced by three considerations: first, that there has been no improvement in the situation in Hungary; secondly, that the Conference has before it a majority report for "no decision" rather than for rejection; and thirdly, that a succession of actions for "no decision" has been clearly adopted in the General Assembly and in other agencies of the United Nations. In view of these circumstances the Government of the United States supports the proposal of the majority report contained in the third report of the Credentials Committee to take no decision regarding the credentials submitted on behalf of the representatives of the Government of Hungary in order to conform to the action confirmed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1959, by 72 votes to 1, with 1 abstention.⁵

The United States delegation therefore supports the amendment to the minority report of the third report of the Credentials Committee submitted by the government delegation of the Philippines. This is the only way by which the Conference can adopt the "no decision" proposal contained in the majority report, since under ILO procedures only a proposal to reject credentials is presented to the Conference for discussion. The adoption of this amendment will make the action of this Conference on the Hungarian Government credentials conform to that taken by the General

Assembly. Thus the United States supports the recommendation for "no decision," but we wish to make it completely clear that this in no way indicates a change in the United States position concerning the situation in Hungary. The adoption of this amendment will replace the minority report for rejection now before the Conference and will, in effect, substitute for it the majority report that a decision on the validity of the contested credentials will be postponed.

The United States continues firmly to support the strong sentiments of indignation and censure which underlay the action of the 42d and 43d sessions in refusing to admit the Hungarian delegation. Last year's action had the merit of demonstrating that the 1958 decision was not just an isolated reaction taken in a moment of shock and outrage. Having driven home the strength of this feeling, we are confident that, if we now take action on the Hungarian Government credentials similar to that of the General Assembly, the condemnation reflected in the past actions of the ILO on Hungarian credentials will stand permanently in the record and our present action of "no decision" cannot be misunderstood as a change in our attitude toward the present Hungarian regime or in our desire to continue to give hope to the Hungarian people's tragic and heroic struggle for freedom.⁶

Confirmation of U.S. Representatives to Fifteenth General Assembly

The Senate on June 22 confirmed the following to be representatives of the United States to the 15th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, to serve no longer than December 31, 1960:

Henry Cabot Lodge
George D. Aiken
Wayne Morse
Francis O. Wilcox
Mrs. Oswald B. Lord
Mrs. Zelma Watson George
Arthur F. Lamey
Frederick Blake Payne
Charles Rosenbaum
Miss Frances E. Willis

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1957, p. 515, and Jan. 12, 1959, p. 55.

⁵ For statements made by Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative, see *ibid.*, Jan. 4, 1960, p. 17.

⁶ The amendment was adopted on June 10 by a vote of 159 to 80, with 15 abstentions.

Agreement for Establishment of Caribbean Organization Signed at Washington

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 339 dated June 21

The agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Organization was signed at Washington on June 21.

His Excellency Hervé Alphand, Ambassador of France, signed on behalf of the Government of the French Republic.

His Excellency Dr. J. H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands to the United States of America, signed on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

His Excellency Sir Harold Caccia, G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., British Ambassador to the United States of America, signed on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

The Honorable Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and the Honorable Roderic L. O'Connor, United States cochairman of the Caribbean Commission, signed on behalf of the Government of the United States of America.

The Caribbean Organization will be the successor body to the Caribbean Commission, established in 1946 to encourage cooperation in economic and social development throughout the French, Netherlands, British, and United States areas in the Caribbean. The Organization will have broadly the same objectives as the Commission, but its activities will be directed by a Council on which the following are eligible to be represented:

The Republic of France for the Departments of
French Guiana, Guadeloupe and Martinique
The Netherlands Antilles
Surinam
The Bahamas
British Guiana

British Honduras
The British Virgin Islands
The West Indies
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
The Virgin Islands of the United States

This change has been made in response to the express wishes of the peoples of the area. The new Organization will reflect the significant constitutional and economic changes which have taken place in the area since 1946.

After the agreement has been approved or accepted by the signatory parties, they will issue a joint declaration bringing the new Organization into existence. It is hoped that this will be done as early as possible in 1961. The headquarters of the new Organization will be located in San Juan, Puerto Rico, to which the Commission headquarters have recently been transferred.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT AND DRAFT STATUTE

AGREEMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CARIBBEAN ORGANIZATION

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, the KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, the UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Having reviewed the work of the Caribbean Commission since the entry into force of the Agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Commission, signed at Washington on October 30, 1946:¹

Recognizing that the Commission has done much to further regional cooperation in many fields, and has rendered valuable services in the Caribbean area;

Having considered the statements by representatives from the area calling for a revision of the Agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Commission in the

¹ 62 Stat. 2618.

light of the new constitutional relationships in the Caribbean area;

Having considered that the purposes and functions as set out in the Agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Commission should be the basis of a new organization designed to replace it;

Having noted the views expressed at the West Indian Conference convoked in Special Session commencing on July 28, 1959;

Having considered the draft Statute prepared by this Conference and transmitted to them by the Caribbean Commission;

Noting that the purposes and functions as set out in this draft Statute accord with those which were the basis of the Agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Commission; and

Noting that nothing in this draft Statute is intended to alter or conflict with the respective constitutional relations between the Governments hereinbefore named and the prospective Members of the Organization respectively;

Hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. The Contracting Parties agree upon the establishment of the Caribbean Organization in accordance with the Statute annexed to this Agreement.

2. The Republic of France for the Departments of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique; the Netherlands Antilles; Surinam; the Bahamas; British Guiana; British Honduras; the British Virgin Islands; The West Indies; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and the Virgin Islands of the United States are eligible to become Members, and are referred to in this Agreement as "prospective Members".

ARTICLE II

No provision of this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the present or future constitutional status of the prospective Members of the Organization or, where applicable, the present or future constitutional relations of any of the aforesaid prospective Members with the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE III

On the termination of the Agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Commission, signed at Washington on October 30, 1946, the assets of the Caribbean Commission shall be and are by virtue of this Agreement transferred to and vested in the Caribbean Organization. The Caribbean Organization is hereby authorized to assume at the same time the liabilities of the Caribbean Commission and shall be regarded as the successor body to the Caribbean Commission.

ARTICLE IV

The Agreement for the establishment of the Caribbean Commission shall terminate at the end of the first meeting of the Caribbean Council provided for in the Statute annexed to this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

1. This Agreement shall be subject to approval or acceptance by the signatory Governments. Instruments of approval or acceptance shall be deposited with the

Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as the depositary Government, which shall notify the other signatory Governments of each such deposit.

2. This Agreement shall enter into force on signature of a joint declaration to that effect by the signatory Governments, following deposit of instruments of approval or acceptance by the signatory Governments, and after the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Commission has received notification, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Statute annexed to this Agreement, from not less than six of the prospective Members of the Caribbean Organization.

3. This Agreement shall have indefinite duration. Any Contracting Party may at any time withdraw from the Agreement. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of the receipt by the depositary Government of the formal notification of withdrawal and shall be without prejudice to any liability already vested in the withdrawing Contracting Party by or under this Agreement in respect of the period before the withdrawal takes effect. This Agreement shall continue in force thereafter with respect to the other Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE VI

This Agreement, done in a single original in the English, French, Netherlands, and Spanish languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the other signatory Governments.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington this twenty-first day of June, 1960.

For the Government of the Republic of France:

HERVÉ ALPHAND

For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:

J. H. VAN ROJEN

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

HAROLD CACCA

For the Government of the United States of America:

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
ROBERT L. O'CONNOR

STATUTE OF THE CARIBBEAN ORGANIZATION

WHEREAS the Caribbean Commission since its establishment in 1946 has done much to further regional cooperation in many fields and has rendered valuable services in the Caribbean area; and

WHEREAS since the establishment of the Caribbean Commission significant constitutional and economic changes have taken place in the area, and the peoples concerned have expressed their desire to accept increased responsibility in solving the problems of the area; and

WHEREAS in order to facilitate the continuance of social, cultural and economic cooperation in the area, it

is considered advisable to establish a successor body, the Statute of which reflects these changes and the new responsibilities which the prospective Members (as defined in Article III of this Statute) have undertaken since 1946; and

WHEREAS the objectives herein set forth are in accord with the Charter of the United Nations;

NOW THEREFORE there is established the Caribbean Organization which is governed by the following provisions:

ARTICLE I

Establishment and Powers of the Caribbean Organization

1. There is hereby established the Caribbean Organization (hereinafter referred to as the "Organization").
2. The Organization shall have consultative and advisory powers and such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.

ARTICLE II

Functions and Purposes of the Organization

Within the scope of its powers, the functions and purposes of the Organization shall be to concern itself with social, cultural and economic matters of common interest to the Caribbean area, particularly agriculture, communications, education, fisheries, health, housing, industry, labor, music and the arts, social welfare and trade.

ARTICLE III

Eligibility for Membership of the Organization

1. The following are the prospective Members of the Organization, and are hereby declared eligible to become Members:

The Republic of France for the Departments of
French Guiana, Guadeloupe and Martinique
The Netherlands Antilles
Surinam
The Bahamas
British Guiana
British Honduras
The British Virgin Islands
The West Indies
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
The Virgin Islands of the United States.

2. The Republic of France, as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, shall be represented in the Organization by one delegation having three votes.

ARTICLE IV

Notification of Membership and Withdrawal

1. Any prospective Member of the Organization may at any time declare by notification given to the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Commission, or the Secretary-General of the Organization, that it accepts the obligations imposed by this Statute and that it elects to become a Member.
2. Any notification in accordance with the preceding paragraph of this Article received by the Secretary-General on or before the date on which the Statute comes into force shall take effect on that date. Any notification

received after the date on which this Statute comes into force shall take effect on the date of its receipt by the Secretary-General.

3. Any Member may at any time declare by notification given to the Secretary-General of the Organization that it elects to cease to be a Member. This notification shall take effect one year after the date of its receipt by the Secretary-General of the Organization. On the withdrawal from the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed of any Party to that Agreement, the Members for whose international relations that Party is responsible shall cease to be Members of the Organization.

4. Where a Member ceases to be a Member in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, such cessation shall be without prejudice to any liability already vested in that Member by or under this Statute in respect of the period before the cessation takes effect.

5. The Secretary-General shall notify all Governments signatory to the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed and all Members and prospective Members of the receipt of any notification referred to in Paragraphs (1) and (3) of this Article.

ARTICLE V

The Caribbean Council

The governing body of the Organization shall be the Caribbean Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Council").

ARTICLE VI

Composition of the Council

1. Each Member shall be entitled to send to each session of the Council one delegate and such advisers as it may consider necessary, but the Republic of France shall be entitled to send one delegation and such advisers as it may consider necessary. Such delegates or delegation, as the case may be, shall be appointed in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Member. The Secretary-General shall be notified by the Members of the appointment of each delegate or delegation, as the case may be.

2. Each Member may at any time, by notification given to the Secretary-General, appoint a person to act as alternate during the absence of its delegate from any meeting of the Council. The Republic of France shall have similar rights with respect to its delegation. The alternate, while so acting, shall stand in all respects in the place of the delegate.

ARTICLE VII

Functions and Powers of the Council

Within the scope of the powers of the Organization, the Council shall:

- (a) study, formulate and recommend to Members measures, programs and courses of action in social, cultural and economic matters designed to contribute to the well-being of the Caribbean area;
- (b) assist in the coordination of local projects which have regional significance and in the provision of technical guidance on a regional basis;
- (c) arrange for or provide technical guidance not otherwise available;

(d) promote the coordination of research on a regional basis;

(e) make recommendations to the Members for carrying into effect action in regard to social, cultural and economic problems;

(f) further cooperation with other international and national organizations and with universities, foundations and similar institutions having common interests in the Caribbean area and, subject to the principle expressed in Article XVII, may

(i) on behalf of the Organization, conclude technical assistance agreements with other international or national organizations, being agreements which every Member is competent or authorized to conclude and the conclusion of such agreements being dependent on a unanimous vote;

(ii) on behalf of the Organization, or, as may be appropriate, on behalf of such of the Members as may make the specific request, conclude arrangements or contracts in pursuance of the aforesaid agreements;

(iii) conclude appropriate cooperation agreements with universities, foundations and similar institutions, and arrangements or contracts in pursuance of these agreements;

(g) summon such conferences, appoint such committees, and establish such auxiliary bodies as it may find necessary and desirable;

(h) direct and review the activities of the Central Secretariat and the aforementioned conferences, committees and auxiliary bodies;

(i) issue the staff rules of the Central Secretariat;

(j) issue the financial regulations of the Organization;

(k) appoint a Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IX and paragraph 4 of Article X.

ARTICLE VIII

Meetings and Procedures of the Council

1. The Council shall establish its own rules of procedure.

2. Meetings of the Council shall be presided over by a Chairman, chosen from among the delegates to the Council.

3. The Council shall hold at least one meeting each year at which the annual budget for the ensuing year shall be considered. It is empowered to convene and hold meetings at such times and at such places as it may decide. The Chairman shall cause a meeting to be convened if requested to do so by not less than one-half of the Members. The first meeting of the Council (which shall be a budget meeting) shall be held at such time after the coming into force of this Statute and at such place as may be designated by the Caribbean Commission.

4. Meetings of the Council shall preferably be held in the territory of each of the Members in turn, and a similar principle, where appropriate, shall be followed with regard to all other activities of the Organization.

5. The first Chairman shall be elected at the first meeting and shall hold office until the end of the ensuing year. Thereafter the Chairmanship shall rotate in accordance with such rules of procedure as the Council may adopt, provided always that a Chairman shall not be of the same nationality as the preceding Chairman.

ARTICLE IX

Voting in the Council

1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article, each delegate shall be entitled to cast one vote, but the delegation of the Republic of France shall be entitled to cast three votes.

2. Matters of procedure shall be decided by the Council by a simple majority of the votes cast. Except as provided for in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article, subparagraph (f)(i) of Article VII, and paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article XII, all other matters, including disputes as to the classification of any matter as procedural or substantive, shall be decided by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast. However, when a decision or recommendation is adopted by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, any Member may declare that the decision or recommendation will not be applicable as far as it is concerned. Where, in respect of a matter to be decided by a simple majority of the votes cast, the votes are equally divided, the Chairman shall have a casting vote. If the Chairman does not in such a case use his casting vote, the motion for decision shall be lost.

3. The Council shall examine drafts of the annual budget and any supplementary budgets submitted by the Secretary-General. Voting on the total figure of a budget, annual or supplementary, shall be preceded by a vote on each budget head. Each budget head shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast. The total of a budget, annual or supplementary, shall be approved by a unanimous vote. In the event that it is not possible to obtain a unanimous vote on the budget for any year, the budget voted for the previous year shall remain in force and the Members shall continue to make the same contribution as they made during the preceding year.

4. The adoption and amendment of the Rules of Procedure shall require unanimity of the votes cast.

5. The appointment of the Secretary-General shall require unanimity of the votes cast.

6. For the purpose of this Statute, "the votes cast" means votes cast affirmatively or negatively. Abstentions shall not be considered as votes cast.

ARTICLE X

The Central Secretariat

1. The Organization shall maintain in the Caribbean area a Central Secretariat to serve the Council and its conferences, committees and auxiliary bodies.

2. The Secretary-General shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization. He shall be responsible for carrying out all directives of the Council.

3. Subject to the staff rules issued by the Council and any further directives he may receive from the Council, the Secretary-General shall appoint and dismiss the staff of the Organization.

4. In the appointment of the Secretary-General and other members of the staff of the Central Secretariat, primary consideration shall be given to the technical and personal qualifications of the candidates. To the extent possible consistent with this consideration, the staff shall be recruited within the Caribbean area and with a view to obtaining equitable national representation.

5. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and staff shall not seek, receive or observe instructions from any Government, from any Member, or from any authority external to the Organization. The Secretary-General and staff shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

6. Each Member undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the functions of the Secretary-General and staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

ARTICLE XI

Finances

1. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members in proportions to be specified in an appropriate arrangement arrived at unanimously by the Members.

2. The fiscal year of the Organization shall be the calendar year.

3. The Secretary-General shall prepare and submit to the Council the draft of an annual budget and such supplementary budgets as may be required by the Organization and shall submit them to the Members at least one month prior to their discussion by the Council. Upon approval of the budget, the total amount thereof shall be allocated among the Members in the proportions arrived at in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. Each Member shall undertake, subject to the requirements of its constitutional procedures, to contribute promptly to a Joint Fund to be established by the Members such annual and supplementary sums as may be charged to each in accordance with the arrangement referred to in paragraph 1.

4. The Secretary-General shall hold and administer the Joint Fund of the Organization and shall keep proper accounts thereof. The Council shall make arrangements satisfactory to the Members for the audit of the accounts of the Organization. The audited statements shall be forwarded annually to each Member.

5. The expenses of delegates or delegations attending meetings sponsored by the Organization shall be borne by the Members whom they respectively represent.

ARTICLE XII

Observers

1. The Parties to the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed shall be entitled to send to all meetings held under the auspices of the Organization observers who shall have the right to speak but not to vote.

2. Any prospective Member of the Organization shall be entitled to send to all meetings held under the auspices of the Organization observers who shall have the right to speak but not to vote.

3. The Council may, if it so decides by a unanimous vote, and subject to the approval of the Parties to the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed, authorize the Secretary-General to issue to any Government having interests in the Caribbean area not being a Party to the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed an invitation to send observers to any meeting held under the auspices of the Organization.

4. The Council may, if it so decides by a unanimous vote, authorize the Secretary-General to issue to the organizations, universities, foundations and similar institutions as referred to in subparagraph (f) of Article VII, an invitation to send observers to any meeting held under the auspices of the Organization.

ARTICLE XIII

Relationships with Governments not Parties to the Agreement

The Organization in all its activities shall bear in mind the desirability of strengthening international cooperation in social, cultural and economic matters with Governments having an interest in such matters in the Caribbean area but not being Parties to the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed.

ARTICLE XIV

Immunities

Each Member undertakes to accord, so far as possible under its constitutional procedures, to the Organization, the Secretary-General and appropriate personnel of the Central Secretariat such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for the independent exercise of their functions, and to the Central Secretariat inviolability of its buildings, premises, archives and assets.

ARTICLE XV

Languages

The English, French, Netherlands and Spanish languages shall be the official languages of the Organization. The working languages shall be English and French.

ARTICLE XVI

Transfer of Assets and Liabilities of the Caribbean Commission

With effect from the termination of the Agreement for the Establishment of the Caribbean Commission under Article IV of the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed, the Organization, as the successor body to the Caribbean Commission, is authorized to take over all the assets and shall assume all the liabilities of the Caribbean Commission.

ARTICLE XVII

Saving Clause

No provision of this Statute shall be interpreted as affecting the present or future constitutional status of the Members of the Organization, or, where applicable, the present or future constitutional relations of any of the aforesaid Members with the Parties to the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed.

ARTICLE XVIII

Amendment of Statute

Amendment to this Statute shall require the unanimous approval of the Members of the Organization and of the Parties to the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed.

ARTICLE XIX

Entry into Force

This Statute shall enter into force immediately after:

(a) there has been received by the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Commission notification pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article IV from at least six of the prospective Members of the Organization; and

(b) the Parties to the Agreement to which this Statute is annexed have signed a Joint Declaration under paragraph 2 of Article V of that Agreement.

ARTICLE XX

Transitional Provisions

Until such time as the Secretary-General of the Organization is appointed and is able to assume the duties of his office, the Secretary-General of the Caribbean Commission shall be the Secretary-General of the Organization with power to appoint a staff on a temporary basis.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959.¹

Ratification deposited: Union of South Africa, June 21, 1960.

Caribbean Organization

Agreement for establishment of the Caribbean Organization, and annexed statute. Signed at Washington June 21, 1960, by France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States. Enters into force on signature of a joint declaration by signatory Governments following deposits of instruments of approval or acceptance with the United States and receipt by the Secretary General of the Caribbean Commission of notifications of acceptance of obligations imposed by the statute from not less than six prospective members of the Organization.²

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement providing a grant to assist in the acquisition of certain nuclear research and training equipment and materials. Effected by exchange of notes at Buenos Aires September 9, 1959, and May 23, 1960. Entered into force May 23, 1960.

Austria

Agreement for the extension of time for the fulfillment by Austrian citizens of the conditions and formalities prescribed by the copyright laws of the United States.

¹ Not in force.

² The prospective members are: the Republic of France for the Departments of French Guiana, Guadeloupe, and Martinique; the Netherlands Antilles; Surinam; the Bahamas; British Guiana; British Honduras; the British Virgin Islands; The West Indies; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and the Virgin Islands of the United States.

Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 15, 1960. Entered into force June 15, 1960.

Chile

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with memorandum of understanding and exchanges of notes. Signed at Santiago June 2, 1960. Entered into force June 2, 1960.

Dominican Republic

Agreement extending the technical cooperation vocational education program agreement of March 16, 1954, as amended (TIAS 2244; 2544, 2594, and 23258). Effected by exchange of notes at Ciudad Trujillo June 2 and 7, 1960. Entered into force June 7, 1960.

Japan

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, with agreed minute and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington January 19, 1960.

Senate advice and consent to ratification given: June 22, 1960.

Ratified by the President: June 22, 1960.

Ratifications exchanged: June 23, 1960.

Entered into force: June 23, 1960.

Agreement under article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security regarding facilities and areas and the status of U.S. armed forces in Japan, with agreed minutes and exchange of notes providing for the settlement of certain claims against the U.S. forces by former employees. Signed at Washington January 19, 1960.

Entered into force: June 23, 1960.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Belgrade June 3, 1960. Entered into force June 3, 1960.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

African Posts Elevated to Embassies

Dakar

The Department of State announced on June 20 (press release 238) that the American consulate general at Dakar, Federation of Mali, was elevated on that date to an embassy upon formal attainment of independence by the Federation, which is composed of the former autonomous republics of the French Community, Senegal and Soudan. The Federation attained its independence through negotiation with France.

Donald A. Dumont, a career Foreign Service officer, who has been consul general at Dakar since December 1957, has been named Chargé d'Affaires.

The United States has been represented in Dakar since December 1940, when a consulate was opened there.

Official celebration of the independence of the Federation of Mali has been scheduled for January 17, 1961, the second anniversary of the Federation of Senegal and Soudan.

Tananarive

The Department of State announced on June 25 (press release 352 dated June 24) that the American consulate at Tananarive, Malagasy Republic, is being elevated to an embassy on June 26, 1960, upon formal attainment of independence by this former autonomous republic of the French Community. Malagasy attained its independence through negotiation with France.

John Roland Jacobs, a career Foreign Service officer, who has been consul at Tananarive since April 1959, when the consulate was reopened there, has been named Chargé d'Affaires.

Official celebration of the independence of the Malagasy Republic has been scheduled for July 30-31, 1960.

Designations

John W. Johnston, Jr., as ICA Deputy Regional Director for Latin America, effective June 26. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 349 dated June 24.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

- Air Force Mission.** TIAS 4410. 3 pp. 5¢.
Agreement between the United States of America and El Salvador, extending agreement of November 21, 1957, as modified. Exchange of notes—Signed at San Salvador January 15 and 22, 1960. Entered into force January 22, 1960. Operative retroactively November 21, 1959.
- Surplus Agricultural Commodities.** TIAS 4412. 3 pp. 5¢.
Agreement between the United States of America and Indonesia, amending agreement of May 29, 1959, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Djakarta November 18, 1959. Entered into force November 18, 1959.
- Economic Assistance to Yemen.** TIAS 4413. 10 pp. 10¢.
Agreement between the United States of America and Yemen. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taiz August 3 and 5, October 18, and November 8, 1959. Entered into force November 8, 1959.
- United States Educational Foundation in Thailand.** TIAS 4414. 5 pp. 5¢.
Agreement between the United States of America and Thailand, amending agreement of July 1, 1950, as

amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bangkok February 1, 1960. Entered into force February 1, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4415. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Poland, amending agreement of June 10, 1959, as amended. Signed at Washington February 11, 1960. Entered into force February 11, 1960. With exchange of notes.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. TIAS 4416. 20 pp. 15¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Venezuela, superseding agreement of July 21, 1955. Signed at Washington October 8, 1958. Entered into force February 9, 1960.

Grant for Procurement of Nuclear Research and Training Equipment and Materials. TIAS 4421. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá July 31, 1959, and January 11, 1960. Entered into force January 11, 1960.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 20-26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to June 20 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 324 of January 14 and 330 of June 15.

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336	6/21	Martin: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
338	6/20	Post at Dakar raised to embassy (rewrite).
339	6/21	Agreement for establishing Caribbean Organization.
340	6/21	Martin: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
341	6/21	Educational exchange (rewrite).
342	6/21	Educational exchange agreement with Norway extended.
343	6/22	Herter: House Committee on Agriculture.
*344	6/22	Cultural exchange (Finland).
*345	6/22	Delegate to ECE Steel Committee (rewrite).
*346	6/23	Thai paintings and exhibit.
*347	6/23	Brown nominated Ambassador to Laos (biographic details).
*348	6/24	Thayer: "African Problems and U.S. Programs."
*349	6/24	Johnston designated ICA Deputy Regional Director for Latin America (biographic details).
*350	6/24	Thayer: "Advancing Freedom in a Scientific and Technical World."
351	6/24	Herter: anniversary of U.N. action in Korea (combined with No. 353).
352	6/24	Post at Tananarive raised to embassy (rewrite).
353	6/24	Herter: news conference.
*354	6/24	Visit of King and Queen of Thailand.
355	6/24	Herter-Wiley: correspondence on President's visit to Japan.

*Not printed.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

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1942, Volume I, General,
The British Commonwealth, The Far East

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume I, General, The British Commonwealth, The Far East*. This is the first of the six regular annual volumes scheduled for publication in the *Foreign Relations* series for 1942.

Subjects treated in the General section include the United Nations Declaration, the Permanent Court, war crimes, relief problems, postwar economic and financial planning, exchange of officials and nonofficials with enemy countries, protests by neutrals against certain features of the Selective Service Act, and international agreements regarding wheat, sugar, and tin.

The section on the British Commonwealth of Nations relates to agreements with the several members of the Commonwealth in connection with the conduct of the war and to the interest of the United States in situations affecting the war effort.

The Far East section contains correspondence regarding Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Copies of the volume may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. for \$3.50 each.

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July 18, 1960

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UNITED STATES
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLIII, No. 1099 • PUBLICATION 7032

July 18, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Note: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

United States Submits to Inter-American Peace Committee Memorandum on Provocative Actions of Cuban Government

Press release 366 dated June 29

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States Government submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee on June 27, 1960, for its information, a memorandum entitled "Provocative Actions of the Government of Cuba Against the United States Which Have Served To Increase Tensions in the Caribbean Area." A copy of the memorandum is attached.

The memorandum was submitted in response to previous requests made by the Peace Committee to the American governments for information and points of view regarding international tensions in the Caribbean area. This is a subject which is being studied by the Committee in accordance with the assignment given it by resolution IV of the meeting of American Foreign Ministers held in Santiago, Chile, last August.¹

The memorandum refers only to one aspect of the problem of Caribbean tensions. The United States has already furnished certain information to the Peace Committee in connection with this problem and will continue to provide such information as is relevant to the Committee's study.

TEXT OF MEMORANDUM

PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA AGAINST THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAVE SERVED TO INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA

For over a year the Government of the United States and other governments of the hemisphere have been increasingly concerned over the rising tensions in the Caribbean area and the consequent threat to the peace and stability of the hemisphere. In response to the previous requests made by the Inter-American Peace Committee of the American governments for information and

points of view regarding this subject, this memorandum is being presented to provide information to the Committee about one aspect of the foreign policy of the Government of Cuba which, because of its provocative character, has contributed, and continues to contribute, to international tensions in the Caribbean area.

The Government of Cuba has for many months conducted an intense campaign of distortions, half-truths, and outright falsehoods against the United States Government, its officials, and the people of the United States. The United States has responded to these hostile attitudes and actions of the Cuban Government with patience and forbearance in the hope of avoiding to the extent possible impairment of the friendliness and mutual confidence which traditionally have existed between the two countries and their peoples.

This exercise of restraint, however, has been in vain. The reaction of the Government of Cuba has been to intensify its attacks and expressions of hostility toward the Government and people of the United States. The United States Government considers this systematic campaign of hostile propaganda to be offensive and unwarranted and so informed the Government of Cuba in an aide-memoire of June 4, 1960, a copy of which accompanies this memorandum (annex 1). A continuation of these attacks cannot fail, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, to contribute further to tensions in the Caribbean area.

When problems or difficulties develop between member governments of the Organization of American States, the principles of the Organization require that those governments make an earnest effort to ascertain the facts and to seek solutions in good faith. This the United States has sought to do with respect to the frequent charges and attacks leveled by the Government of Cuba at the United States. It is clear, however, that the Government of Cuba, far from seeking to ascertain facts, has preferred to exploit opportunities for exciting suspicion and hostility on the basis of unfounded charges, distortions and half-truths. The continuation of this policy on the part of the Government of Cuba can in the long run only result in undermining the principles of inter-American cooperation and in making more difficult the maintenance of conditions of friendly, cooperative relations to which all members of the Organization of American States are committed.

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

La Coubre Incident

An illustration of the provocative attitude of the Government of Cuba is given by the charges leveled against the United States in connection with the explosion aboard the French vessel, *La Coubre*, while it was discharging ammunition in the Bay of Habana on March 4, 1960. The loss of life, the injury to persons and the damage to property in connection with this tragic incident were the cause of widespread sorrow. The United States Government promptly expressed its condolences to the Government of Cuba over this tragedy. However, within a few hours the propaganda agencies which reflect the views of the Cuban Government implied that the United States was responsible for the disaster. No evidence whatsoever was adduced to support this implication, but statements made by the controlled Cuban press, and by such well-known spokesmen of the Cuban Government as radio commentator José Pardo Llada, left no doubt whatsoever that the United States stood accused by the Cuban Government of perpetrating the explosion.

This attitude of the Cuban Government was then confirmed by Prime Minister Fidel Castro himself in a speech on March 5 at the funeral of the victims of the *La Coubre* incident. The Prime Minister identified the United States as the responsible agent of the explosion while at the same time admitting that "we do not have conclusive evidence."

The United States has, of course, categorically rejected these charges as having no foundation whatsoever. Nevertheless, the Government of Cuba has preferred to continue its campaign of charging the United States with responsibility for the blowing up of this vessel while failing to provide any kind of substantiating evidence. It has further aggravated the situation, exceeding the bounds of normal diplomacy, by having its ambassadors throughout Latin America give wide distribution, under diplomatic frank, to Prime Minister Castro's speech of March 5 in a pamphlet filled with tragic pictures of this disaster. The obvious intent of this pamphlet was to leave the impression that the United States was responsible for the *La Coubre* incident. The same pamphlet was also sent by the Cuban Ambassador on the Council of the Organization of American States to other members of the Council. The Delegation of the United States on the Council protested this action in a note of June 7, 1960, to the Cuban representative, a copy of which is enclosed for the records of the Committee (annex 2).

In addition, the text of Prime Minister Castro's speech of March 5 was recently issued in a pamphlet of the Government-controlled *Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba* (CTC). By means of the illustration on the cover and in the statements appearing in the introduction to this pamphlet, the CTC clearly accuses the United States Government as being responsible for the *La Coubre* disaster.

Attack on U.S. Submarine

Recently a potentially grave incident involving armed attack occurred on the high seas. A United States naval vessel, the U.S.S. *Sea Poacher*, a submarine, while navigating on the surface on the high seas in a recognized and well-traveled sea lane, was fired upon without warning

by a Cuban Coast Guard patrol vessel on May 6, 1960. The submarine was at the time approximately 11 miles from the Cuban coast, as verified in a careful investigation of the incident made by the United States naval authorities.

In line with its policy of attempting to maintain an atmosphere of peace and calm in the Caribbean area and to avoid misunderstandings, the Government of the United States originally made no public mention of the incident. Neither the submarine commander nor this Government could quite believe that what at first appeared to be a question of identification at sea (since red tracers from the Cuban boat were mistaken by the submarine for emergency distress signals and a failure of communications) was really an armed attack. It simply did not occur to the commander that it was possible that the naval vessel of an American country with which the United States was at peace would open fire on a United States vessel without cause.

It was not until May 13, 1960, when the Prime Minister of Cuba, Dr. Fidel Castro, in a televised speech in Habana, referred to the matter, that the Government of the United States learned for the first time what actually had happened. This is a translation of Dr. Castro's words:

"On the sixth of May at 22 hours, the coast guard cutter *Oriente* sighted five miles off the coast of Matanzas a North American submarine which it followed and reached near Cape Blanco, firing several shots at it until it identified itself as the C-4-CL."

It must be stressed that Dr. Castro in his remarks stated that the U.S.S. *Sea Poacher* was five miles away from the Cuban coast. The point is important because four paragraphs later in the same speech the Cuban Prime Minister stated categorically that three miles is the limit of Cuban territorial waters. Hence there can be no question even in Dr. Castro's mind about the fact that the United States craft was on the high seas.

On May 14, 1960, the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires was asked to call at the Department of State and was informed of the astonishment and of the protest of the Government of the United States over the Cuban action. An explanation of this action was requested; however, none has been received from the Cuban Government, and on June 11, 1960, Dr. Castro said in a television speech that none will be given. Thus, in this hostile act on the high seas Cuban authorities demonstrated a preference for promoting unfriendly relations rather than for ascertaining facts and seeking amicable solutions.

For purposes of the record, there is attached a statement prepared by the United States Department of the Navy giving the facts of the encounter on May 6 of the Cuban coast guard vessel *Oriente* and the U.S.S. *Sea Poacher* (annex 3).

Air Incursions

The President of Cuba, while recently visiting other countries in Latin America, continued the Cuban Government's attacks against the United States. At a press conference in Montevideo, Uruguay, for instance, President [Osvaldo] Dorticos spoke about air incursions against Cuba by "North American" planes flown by "North American" pilots from "North American" bases, implying that

these flights were inspired or tolerated by the United States Government. He referred to the circumstances that in Argentina he had been asked if the planes and pilots belonged to the United States Air Force. He dismissed the inquiry as a naive question, but then made clear his intent by referring to "two North American pilots" blown up at the Cuban sugar mill "Central España." He said that he did not want to assert that the United States Government was sponsoring these incursions because he did not have evidence, but he then proceeded to imply that the United States Government looked with favor on these flights.

This matter of air incursions over Cuba and the implication that the United States Government is a party to these operations is a constant theme expounded by Cuban Government officials and by the official press and radio in Cuba, despite repeated United States reassurances to the Cuban Government on this point.

On October 27, 1959, Ambassador [Philip W.] Bonsal discussed with the Cuban President and Minister of State the over-all state of current United States relations with Cuba. The Ambassador made clear the sympathetic interest which the people and Government of the United States had taken in the freedom and well-being of the Cuban people and nation, and said that it remained the sincere desire of the United States that relations between it and Cuba should be based on friendship, mutual respect, and mutual interest. The Ambassador also stated that the United States Government and its officials had scrupulously avoided statements or actions, especially those of an intemperate nature, which would impair the mutual respect and feeling of confidence necessary to healthy and productive relations between Cuba and the United States. He referred specifically to the problem of air incursions and assured the Cuban Government that the United States would continue diligently to investigate and take all appropriate action within the law in any such cases and would welcome specific information and evidence from the Government of Cuba to assist in law enforcement. The Ambassador stated that the United States deeply deplored incidents of this kind and that it was prepared to use to the full measure all of its facilities to prevent infractions of the law. At the same time the Ambassador rejected all inferences that the Government of the United States, its officials, or the people of the United States would give support to or countenance illegal activities against the Government of Cuba. A copy of the Department of State press release of October 27, 1959, issued in conjunction with Ambassador Bonsal's call on the President of Cuba, is attached for the information of the Committee (annex 4).

Despite these assurances, the Government of Cuba and its controlled propaganda agencies continue to make implied charges of United States-inspired air incursions against Cuba in an obvious attempt to stir up animosity toward the United States within Cuba and throughout the hemisphere. Speeches and sensational news articles containing deliberate distortions have been resorted to in the making of these charges.

Because of the seriousness of these oft-repeated charges against the United States, it is considered important to review the facts concerning such flights as well as the

actions taken by the United States Government to prevent the use of its territory as a base of illegal activities against Cuba.

In October 1959, Major Diaz Lanz, former Chief of the Cuban Air Force in the Cuban Government, left United States territory in an unarmed plane without the knowledge of the United States authorities. Major Diaz Lanz flew over Cuba and dropped propaganda leaflets on the City of Habana. Prime Minister Castro promptly charged that Major Diaz Lanz had also dropped bombs on the City of Habana causing damage to human life and property. His charge completely disregarded the report of the National Police of Cuba that the Diaz Lanz plane had not been observed to have engaged in either bombing or strafing.

On his return to the United States, Major Diaz Lanz was apprehended by United States authorities and his plane was seized and examined. It was clearly established that the plane could not have carried or dropped bombs or mounted machine guns and that the only activity in which Major Diaz Lanz had engaged was the dropping of propaganda leaflets. The United States Government expressed its regret for this incident publicly and issued a press release on November 9 (copy attached as annex 5) concerning the results of its investigation which showed that only propaganda leaflets had been dropped. The information obtained in the investigation was also communicated officially to the Cuban Government by the United States in a note of November 9, 1959, a copy of which is attached (annex 6).

Despite the prompt and energetic action taken by the United States Government, and its expressions of regret for the incident, the Cuban Government and its propaganda agencies have continued to foment the idea that Habana had been "bombed." As recently as May 31, 1960, the United States Government had to protest strongly in a note (copy attached as annex 7) the dissemination in the United States by the Cuban Consulate General in New York City and Miami of a pamphlet entitled "Cuba Denounces Before the World." This pamphlet repeated the unfounded allegations that on October 21, 1959, the City of Habana had been bombed with explosives and strafed from two aircraft based in the United States and implied that the United States Government countenanced these flights. This continued disregard by the Cuban Government of facts surrounding a serious international incident, and its continued use of proven untruths, is an outstanding example of the provocative policy being followed by the Cuban Government with respect to its relations with the United States.

A second illegal harassment flight which is believed to have originated in the United States involved a light plane which on February 18, 1960, exploded in mid-air over a Cuban cane field under circumstances which have never been clarified. The two pilots, one a United States citizen and the other a Cuban, were killed. Again the United States expressed publicly to Cuba its regrets over this illegal flight.

A third flight on March 20-21 involved two United States citizens, William J. Shergalis and Howard Rundquist, whose plane was damaged by Cuban gunfire as it landed on a highway in Cuba. A Grand Jury in a United States

District Court, Miami, Florida, has completed an investigation of this flight, and as a result has indicted Shergalis and one Hector Garcia Soto for acting as agents of the Cuban Government without having filed with the Attorney General of the United States the registration statement required by United States law. The indictment, a copy of which is attached (annex 8), states that acting under the direction of the Government of Cuba, Shergalis and Garcia arranged for the airplane flight which left Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on March 20, and ended in Cuba on March 21. It may be added that Garcia, at the time, was a Cuban employee of the Cuban Consulate in Miami.

A fourth apparently illegal flight, which took place in May, resulted in the death of a light plane's single occupant, the pilot, a United States citizen, who was shot and killed in Cuba reportedly when attempting to pick up several Cuban passengers. This incident is still under investigation by the United States authorities.

There are no other cases where there is any substantial evidence known to the United States authorities that air incursions over Cuba have originated in the United States. Nevertheless, it is recognized that the long Florida coast line, the presence in that state of considerable numbers of Cuban political refugees, and the numerous airports in the general area constitute a combination of factors conducive to the undertaking of adventures against Cuba. Therefore, the United States has taken most unusual precautions against illegal air incursions from its territory affecting Cuba.² These measures have been explained in detail in United States communications³ to the Inter-American Peace Committee dated November 9, 1959, and March 30, 1960. They constitute the most rigorous and elaborate system of controls ever adopted by the United States Government in time of peace. Yet the Cuban Government has shown no recognition of the efforts of the United States to stop such activities, and has continued to picture the United States Government as permitting and encouraging continuous and numerous deliberate air incursions against Cuba, an allegation which is completely unfounded.

Furthermore, the United States Government has on various occasions formally requested the cooperation of the Government of Cuba in supplying data with regard to air incursions (such as time, type of plane, its movements, etc.) which would assist United States authorities in determining their origin and otherwise aid them in investigative and policing efforts. At no time has the Government of Cuba provided the United States with the information requested, thus demonstrating once more its lack of interest in ascertaining facts as a basis for resolving problems.

Falsely Allegations by Cuban Officials of United States Aggression Against Cuba

According to *Revolucion*, officially inspired news organ published in Habana by the 26th of July Movement, President Dorticos in his recent Montevideo press confer-

ence was asked about the danger of armed aggression against Cuba. The President said in effect that when it came it would be from the United States. He said that the revolutionary government was not worried by the threat of invasion from Batista followers, counterrevolutionaries, or war criminals. But he added that there was a maneuver for aggression afoot. It is obvious from Dr. Dorticos' position that he was accusing the United States Government of planning an armed attack on Cuba, for which it was using Communist penetration in Cuba as an excuse.

As recently as June 8, 1960, in a particularly hostile and vitriolic speech, Dr. Fidel Castro again accused the United States of planning an armed attack on Cuba when he said that if the United States invaded Cuba, this island would become another Algeria. Throughout this speech, Dr. Castro frequently referred to an impending invasion and when he stated that "if they try to attack us, they shall be defeated" there was no question but that "they" referred to the United States.

In a speech on the following day, June 9, 1960, Dr. Castro charged that blind egotistical forces of the United States threatened to sow more violence and death in Cuba than the blind forces of nature had caused in Chile. In the same speech, Dr. Castro injected the *La Coubre* disaster once more, stating that this incident was still fresh in everybody's mind and that it was provoked by powerful interests which wanted to destroy the revolution. He further said that this type of disaster was much worse than those resulting from natural causes because it was criminally conceived and executed. The reference to the United States within the context of his speech was very clear.

The United States has repeatedly stated that it has no aggressive designs against Cuba. Its conduct toward Cuba has consistently and repeatedly demonstrated that it has no such designs. It strongly supported the recommendation of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers for the strict observance of the non-intervention principle by all member states of the Organization. Nevertheless, high officials of the Cuban Government have continued to make false and provocative accusations to the effect that the United States intends to attack Cuba directly or indirectly. These irresponsible efforts of the Cuban Government to portray the United States Government as planning an armed attack reflect a provocative policy designed to foment tension and undermine the fabric of inter-American solidarity and cooperation.

If the Cuban Government has any serious reason to believe that attacks on Cuba are being organized in the United States, its first obligation as a member of the inter-American community is to bring any information it may have on the matter to the attention of the United States Government in order that the facts may be obtained. Should these efforts fail, the appropriate procedure would be for the Government of Cuba to bring the matter to the attention of the proper organ of the Organization of American States in order that it might be considered in accordance with established inter-American procedures. The Cuban Government has on the contrary taken neither action but has consistently preferred to air

unfounded charges without substantiation and without resorting to the methods which the American States have established for the solution of such problems.

Cuban Propaganda Activity in the Diplomatic Sphere

The continuous attacks by the high officials of the Cuban Government against officials of the United States Government have been augmented by vicious propaganda carried out by many Cuban diplomatic missions and consular establishments, including those within the United States. For example: The Cuban Ambassador in Bolivia [José Antonio Tabares del Real] recently stated, "... words written in blood remain, reads the Spanish proverb, yet the Yankees who surely must know the old adage do not cease in their eagerness to civilize. They bomb us, shell us, and impose treaties upon us."

Aside from the dubious propriety of this extraordinary extension of the diplomatic function, statements of this nature by Cuban diplomatic officials, which have been made against other American governments as well, serve also to cause difficulties for the governments to which these officials are accredited.

False Allegation of United States Complicity in a Plot to Invade Nicaragua

On June 10, 1960, Prime Minister Castro in a television program made statements that officials of the United States Department of State had been participants in a plot to embarrass the Cuban Government. The plot was described as one in which an invasion attempt against Nicaragua was to be mounted in Cuba under the leadership of one Chester Lacayo, a Nicaraguan exile.

The allegations of United States involvement in any such plot were, of course, entirely false. It can only be said that this was a part of the deliberate campaign of slander being undertaken by the Cuban Government to create a false picture of the motives and actions of the Government of the United States.

Some of the false statements which were made by Prime Minister Castro were: (1) that Chester Lacayo met with Secretary of State Herter and Assistant Secretary Rulhotom (the fact is that he did not meet with either of these officials); and (2) that a telegram was sent to Lacayo notifying him of an appointment with the Secretary of State (no such telegram was ever sent by any official of the Department of State). It must be assumed that these false statements were made for the purpose of lending some appearance of credibility to the fictitious account as a whole.

False Allegations by Cuban Press and Radio

The attacks against the United States by the Government-inspired press and radio of Cuba have been and continue to be even more virulent. A few of the more extreme diatribes broadcasted by *Unión Radio* and *Radio Mambi* are included below as evidence of the obvious intent of the Cuban Government to further disturb relations between the two countries.

On December 11, 1959, Tony Fernández, deputy director of the Cuban Government-controlled station of the Cuban Workers' Confederation, *Unión Radio*, commented:

"... Secretary Herter, with the characteristic hypocrisy he inherited from Foster Dulles, said that the United

States was making sincere efforts to better its relations with Latin America in general and with Panama and Cuba in particular. Christian Herter knowingly lied. He lies because what the United States has done and is doing in Latin America is nothing but maintaining tyrants in power . . . The Secretary of State lies when he says that numerous attempts have been made to achieve a better understanding with Cuba . . . Christian Herter brazenly lies when he says the American Government has taken all steps to discuss the differences that affect relations between the two countries and that the Cuban Government gives no indication of being disposed to negotiate . . . What Christian Herter calls negotiating is for the Republic to give itself over to the voracity of the octopuses . . . Christian Herter's hypocrisy is such that he avoids making his threatening statements through the official news agency of the Yankee government, UPI, and appears on a televised program to say that if Cuba does not want to sell its sugar to the United States it will accept the offers of other countries who are interested in selling their sugar . . ."

Radio Mambi, an outlet of the Government-controlled FIEL network (Frente Independiente de Emisoras Libres), stated on January 15, 1960:

"... We believe that the United States needs a good revolution to sweep away completely that bunch of prejudices that weighs on North American reality. We believe that a good revolution is needed in the United States to do away with the imperialist and colonialist mentality of certain exploiting castes and to eliminate forever from that grand nation the reactionary remora, represented by the majority of its politicians."

Radio Mambi on January 22, 1960, stated:

"... Within the revolting panorama of international intrigues the most repugnant one is the shady, hypocritical, and moronic policy of the U.S. State Department. Greatly to blame for this was a certain John Foster Dulles—may God confound him for the immense pool of innocent blood which his stupidity formed in the unrequited fields of Korea! That good man, fortunately now dead, collected in a basket all the residues of the worst systems put into effect by imperialism and then poured the bag of evil onto the anguish of the nations . . . John Foster Dulles died of a terrible disease and was replaced by his favorite disciple, a Mr. Herter, a robust wolf of the imperialist den. Mr. Herter took over and began to work to foil our revolution . . . To the invocation of his favorite disciple, errant and asinine spirit of Mr. Foster Dulles appeared enveloped in sulphurous smoke and whispered in Mr. Herter's ear several words which brought a smile to the lips of the U.S. Secretary of State. We do not know what Foster Dulles disembodied soul said to that rogue of a Mr. Herter, but we do know that one fine day the old golf player who misrules the United States packed his baggage and his little balls, together with a map of the world, Mr. Herter, it is time you stopped your filthy little game. Roll up your sleeves and let us lay our cards on the table. Let us begin the game, Mr. Herter, again if you like, but let us play without tricks and without marked cards . . ."

Radio Mambi on March 1, 1960, referring to President Eisenhower's trip to Latin America, stated:

"... What a visit! It is a political joke. Why did Eisenhower decide to visit only four South American republics? He chose Brazil because a Mr. Kubitschek is there. That gentleman still maintains the old prurid idea of Pan Americanism. He chose Argentina because Mr. Frondizi is an unhappy comedian who believes in the democratic farce maintained by bayonets and who is ready to sell his soul to the U.S. devil as long as he can remain in power. Mr. Eisenhower chose Chile because a

Mr. Alessandri is there, a man who is ruling behind the back of his people. He chose Uruguay because he could not do otherwise. Since the country is in the path of his tour, it would have been discourteous not to visit it. The rest of America does not mean a thing."

These attacks are the more insidious because the Cuban authorities are aware that they are deliberate distortions presented in such a manner as to inflame uninformed Cuban and Latin American public opinion. Cuban officials have protested when the press and public of the United States have expressed resentment over these unjustified attacks. They could hardly have expected any other reaction to such distortions. Furthermore, since freedom of the press has been so drastically curtailed in Cuba, there is virtually no opportunity for the Cuban people to learn the facts in this situation.

In conclusion, it must be stated that the Cuban Government's systematic and provocative campaign of slander and hostile propaganda against the United States, of which various examples have been cited in this memorandum, is a major contributor to international tensions in the area of the Caribbean and of the hemisphere as a whole.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.
June 21, 1960

Annexes:

1. Text of aide-memoire to Foreign Ministry of Cuba, June 4, 1960.
2. Note to Cuban Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, June 7, 1960.
3. Statement of the United States Department of the Navy, May 6, 1960.
4. Department of State press release no. 760, October 27, 1959.
5. Department of State press release no. 751, November 9, 1959.
6. U.S. note to Cuban Ambassador, November 9, 1959.
7. U.S. note to Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, May 31, 1960.
8. Indictment of Shergalls and Garcia.

ANNEXES TO MEMORANDUM

Annex 1

[For text of aide memoire to Foreign Ministry of Cuba, June 4, 1960, see BULLETIN of June 20, 1960, page 964.]

Annex 2

[For text of note to Cuban Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, June 7, 1960, see BULLETIN of June 27, 1960, page 1028.]

Annex 3

ENCOUNTER OF A CUBAN COAST GUARD VESSEL AND THE UNITED STATES SUBMARINE SEA POACHER ON MAY 6, 1960

On the evening of May 6, 1960, the United States Navy Submarine *Sea Poacher* (SS 406) was en route from the Naval Station, Guantanamo, Cuba to the Naval Base at Key West, Florida. The *Sea Poacher* was navigating by piloting along the north coast of Cuba through the Old

Bahama and the Nicholas Channels. At approximately 9:30 p.m. while running on the surface on course 325° true, speed 15 knots, at position 23 degrees 20 minutes north latitude, 80 degrees 16 minutes west longitude, a position approximately eleven miles north of the coast of Cuba, the bridge personnel on the *Sea Poacher* sighted the lights of an approaching ship dead ahead. The *Sea Poacher* attempted to exchange identifying signals with the approaching ship by the use of flashing light; however the unidentified ship replied with unintelligible light flashes and appeared to be maneuvering toward the *Sea Poacher*. The *Sea Poacher*, in accordance with International Rules of the Road, sheered to starboard in order to effect a "port-to-port" passage as required in a "meeting" situation. The unidentified ship then maneuvered to port in such a manner that had the *Sea Poacher* resumed her original course, a collision would have been probable. Therefore *Sea Poacher* continued turning to starboard until she was approximately 90 degrees from her original course, and increased to maximum speed in order to open the distance between the two ships and thus avert any chance of collision. The unidentified ship fell in astern of the *Sea Poacher* and, at a range of 2500 yards, fired what appeared to be several red "flares". The *Sea Poacher* continued opening the range to 4000 yards and then slowed on the assumption the flares might have been distress signals. The unidentified ship continued to follow the *Sea Poacher*, extinguishing its running lights, and fired three more bursts of "red flares" while at a range of 3000 yards. *Sea Poacher*, still thinking the flares might be distress signals, allowed the identified ship to close to 1500 yards on a parallel course off the port beam. The unidentified ship then passed astern of *Sea Poacher* and assumed a parallel course on the *Sea Poacher's* starboard beam. During the period the unidentified ship was in close proximity, the *Sea Poacher* again endeavored to communicate by flashing light but received in turn only occasional unintelligible flashes. The *Sea Poacher*, however, was able to see the unidentified ship sufficiently well to identify it as a sub chaser. When it became apparent that the ship was not in distress the *Sea Poacher* increased speed and departed the area in a northwesterly direction. Through reference to recognition manuals the submarine chaser was later identified as the former United States Navy submarine chaser (SC-1000), now the Cuban Coast Guard Patrol Vessel *Oriente* (GC 104).

The initial encounter between the two ships and all subsequent maneuvering were in international waters well clear of Cuban territorial seas. The *Sea Poacher* was operating on the surface and displaying the proper navigational running lights at all times. From analysis of the trajectory and appearance it was believed that the red "flares" which were fired at the *Sea Poacher* were 20 mm tracer type ammunition. This belief was later corroborated by a statement by the Prime Minister of Cuba.

Annex 4

[For text of Department statement of October 27, 1959, see BULLETIN of November 16, 1959, page 715.]

⁴ For a Department statement of May 14, see BULLETIN of May 30, 1960, p. 854.

Annex 5

[For text of Department statement of November 9, 1959, see BULLETIN of November 30, 1959, page 787.]

Annex 6

NOVEMBER 9, 1959

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to a brochure received on November 6 from the Press Department of the Ministry of State of the Government of Cuba which bears the imprimatur of the Public Relations Department of that Ministry. This publication is in the English language and is entitled, "Cuba denounces before the world".

After carefully reviewing this brochure I must state to Your Excellency that I consider it to be a shocking compilation of half-truths, innuendos and insinuations published in what seems to be a deliberate attempt to inflame world opinion against the Government of the United States on the malicious pretext that it countenanced or gave tacit approval to the flight of a plane or planes over the City of Habana on October 21. I find it almost unbelievable that the Government of Cuba has seen fit to distort and misrepresent this matter in this way. I am particularly aggrieved at this action in view of the categorical statement of the Ambassador of the United States to the President of Cuba on October 27 that the Government of the United States possesses no evidence that the B-25 aircraft which distributed leaflets over the City of Habana on October 21 had also dropped bombs or strafed during its flight. In the interim since that date a careful examination of this plane has revealed that at the time of the flight its bomb bay was fitted with a permanent luggage rack which made it impossible for it to drop bombs. Furthermore, the automatic weapons positions were found to be permanently sealed making it impossible to mount machine guns or cannon on this plane. No trace was found of explosives or weapons or any evidence that weapons had been fired from this plane; nor does it bear any marks of damage from anti-aircraft fire. The Government of the United States has no evidence that any other aircraft from the United States was flying over Habana on this occasion. Furthermore, the Government of the United States, in spite of its request, has received no official information on this subject from the Government of Cuba.

The Government of the United States has also noted that in addition to the press report of the National Police of Cuba various other informed sources in Cuba have reported that the above-mentioned plane was not observed to drop bombs or strafe. An analysis of the available evidence, including eye-witness reports, indicates that many, if not all, of the persons injured received their wounds either from stray rounds of 20 or 40 mm shell fragments from fire by the Cuban Armed Forces or from grenades or bombs thrown from automobiles by terrorists.

I have noted that the brochure makes reference to "fugitives from justice who now, under the protection of political asylum, violate international law by launching new and criminal attacks against Cuba." This statement and other remarks in a similar vein made in the past by officials of the Government of Cuba imply that the Government of Cuba considers that the Government of the

United States in some unexplained manner has been unduly protecting individuals in the United States from Cuban persecution. This is not the case. I must emphasize to Your Excellency that the Government of the United States is a Government of laws and that the Treaty of Extradition which exists between our countries is a part of the body of law under which we are governed. This Treaty clearly delineates the conditions and the procedure to be followed in seeking the return to Cuba of alleged fugitives from Cuban justice who are in this country. Ten months have elapsed since the formation of the present Government of Cuba, during which several consultations have been held between officials of our respective governments as to the procedures to be followed under the above Treaty and other United States laws on the subject. Despite the time elapsed and the consultations since early 1959, no formal requests have been made to the Government of the United States by the Government of Cuba under the terms of the Treaty for the purpose of obtaining the return of these "fugitives" to Cuban jurisdiction for crimes allegedly committed under the previous regime.

The Government of the United States most deeply deplores the deaths and injuries suffered by innocent Cuban citizens on the evening of October 21. However, in view of the publication to which I have referred and numerous other false reports which have been spread throughout the world concerning the alleged bombing and machine gunning of Cuban citizens by a plane which departed from the United States, I must ask Your Excellency for an explanation of the reason the Government of Cuba saw fit to publish this document so inconsistent with the good faith and mutual respect essential to the maintenance of good relations between our two countries. It is my sincere hope, Your Excellency, that the account contained therein does not represent the official position of the Government of Cuba in this matter.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

R. R. RUBOTTOM, Jr.

His Excellency DR. ERNESTO DIHIGO,
Ambassador of Cuba

Annex 7

MAY 31, 1960

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Cuba and notes that the Cuban Consulates General in New York City and Miami have been disseminating political propaganda of an objectionable character. The Department refers particularly to a pamphlet entitled, "Cuba Denounces Before the World" which contains the unfounded allegations that on October 21, 1959 the City of Habana was bombed with explosives and strafed from two aircraft based in the United States and carries the implication that the United States Government countenanced these flights. It will be recalled that on October 27, 1959 Ambassador Bonsal informed President Dorticos and Minister of State Rao that there has been no evidence submitted by the Govern-

ment of Cuba or in the possession of the Government of the United States that the one aircraft in question, piloted by Pedro Diaz Lanz, former Chief of the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force, was armed, dropped bombs, or strafed during its flight over Cuba.

The attention of the Chargé d'Affaires is also directed to the Department's note of November 9, 1959, to Ambassador Dihigo, requesting an explanation of the shocking compilation of half-truths, innuendos and insinuations contained in the publication entitled, "Cuba Denounces Before the World". The Department has not received a reply to this request, and despite the notification that the pamphlet contains objectionable material, the Cuban Consulates within the United States continue to distribute this publication. It must be assumed with regret, therefore, that the account contained in the pamphlet represents the official position of the Government of Cuba in this matter.

The Department is of the opinion that this pamphlet contains political propaganda of a misleading and objectionable character, the dissemination of which is not considered as being within the scope of the functions of a duly accredited Consular Officer of a foreign government. Accordingly, it is requested that the dissemination of this, and other pamphlets containing similar objectionable material, be discontinued immediately by the Cuban Consular establishments or any other offices of the Cuban Government in the United States.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 31, 1960.

Annex 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
MIAMI DIVISION
No. M-Cr.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
WILLIAM J. SHERGALIS and
HECTOR GARCIA SOTO

INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

1. WILLIAM J. SHERGALIS, the defendant herein, has been at all times from on or about February 16, 1960 and until March 22, 1960 a "person" as defined in Title 22, United States Code, Sections 611 et seq. (known as the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended), hereinafter referred to as "the Act."

2. Juan Orta Cordova, Alfredo Guerra, Abelardo Colome Ibarra, also known as "Captain Fury," Ramiro Valdez, Hector Garcia Soto, also known as "Guillermo," Carlos Hernandez, as well as the Government of the Republic of Cuba, its officials and representatives, have been foreign principals, as defined in the Act, at all times from on or about February 16, 1960 and up to and including March 22, 1960.

3. By virtue of his conduct and activities,

WILLIAM J. SHERGALIS,

the defendant herein, from on or about February 26, 1960 until March 22, 1960, was an "agent of a foreign principal"

as defined in the Act, in that the said defendant, (following conferences in Havana, Cuba, during the period February 16 to February 26, 1960, with representatives of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, including Juan Orta Cordova, Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister, and others), within the United States of America and within the Southern District of Florida, did collect information for and report information to a foreign principal, to wit, the Government of the Republic of Cuba, its officers and representatives as hereinafter set forth, including information regarding the activities of persons opposed to the present Government of Cuba; and in that the said defendant, within the United States of America and within the Southern District of Florida, agreed to and did act under the direction of a foreign principal, to wit, the Government of the Republic of Cuba, its officials and representatives, including Juan Orta Cordova, Alfredo Guerra, Abelardo Colome Ibarra, Ramiro Valdez, Hector Garcia Soto and Carlos Hernandez, and in furtherance thereof did arrange for and participate in an airplane flight beginning on or about March 20, 1960 at Ft. Lauderdale in the Southern District of Florida and ending on or about March 21, 1960 in the Republic of Cuba; and in that the said defendant, within the United States of America and within the Southern District of Florida, did solicit compensation and other things of value from a foreign principal, to wit, the Government of the Republic of Cuba including its officials and representatives as aforesaid.

4. During the period from on or about February 26, 1960, and until March 22, 1960,

WILLIAM J. SHERGALIS,

the defendant herein, has unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly acted, in the respects as alleged in Paragraph 3 of this indictment, within the United States of America and the Southern District of Florida, as an agent of a foreign principal without having filed with the Attorney General of the United States the registration statement required by the Act.

5. By reason of the nature of his activities and his relationship with the Government of the Republic of Cuba, its officials and representatives,

WILLIAM J. SHERGALIS,

the defendant herein, does not fall within the purview of any of the exemptions from registration provided by the Act.

In violation of Section 612, 618, Title 22, United States Code.

The Grand Jury further charges:

COUNT TWO

1. HECTOR GARCIA SOTO, also known as "Guillermo," the defendant herein, has been at all times from on or about November 5, 1959 and until the date of the return of this indictment, a "person" as defined in Title 22, United States Code, Sections 611 et seq. (known as the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended), hereinafter referred to as "the Act."

2. The Government of the Republic of Cuba, its officials and representatives, have been foreign principals, as defined in the Act, at all times from on or about November 5, 1959 until on or about April 12, 1960.

3. By virtue of his conduct and activities,

HECTOR GARCIA SOTO,

the defendant herein, from on or about November 5, 1959 until on or about April 12, 1960, was an "agent of a foreign principal" as defined in the Act, in that the said defendant within the United States of America and within the Southern District of Florida, did collect information for and report information to a foreign principal, to wit, the Government of the Republic of Cuba, its officers and representatives, including information regarding the activities of persons opposed to the present Government of Cuba; and in that the said defendant, within the United States of America and within the Southern District of Florida, agreed to and did act under the direction of a foreign principal, to wit, the Government of the Republic of Cuba, its officials and representatives, and in furtherance thereof within the United States of America and within the Southern District of Florida, in or about March, 1960, did arrange for and participate in meetings with WILLIAM J. SHERGALIS, and others, and did make arrangements for an airplane flight beginning on or about March 20, 1960 at Ft. Lauderdale in the Southern District of Florida and ending on or about March 21, 1960 in the Republic of Cuba.

4. During the period from on or about November 5, 1959 until on or about April 12, 1960,

HECTOR GARCIA SOTO,

the defendant herein, has unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly acted, in the respects as alleged in Paragraph 3 of this indictment, within the United States of America and the Southern District of Florida, as an agent of a foreign principal without having filed with the Attorney General of the United States the registration statement required by the Act.

5. By reason of the nature of his activities and his relationship with the Government of the Republic of Cuba, its officials and representatives,

HECTOR GARCIA SOTO,

the defendant herein, does not fall within the purview of any of the exemptions from registration provided by the Act.

In violation of Sections 612, 618, Title 22, United States Code.

A TRUE BILL

MAY 3, 1960

Foreman

E. COLEMAN MADSEN
United States Attorney

WILLIAM S. KENNEY
Special Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice

ROGER P. BERNIQUE
Special Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice

ALTA M. BEATTY
Special Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice

President Eisenhower Congratulates Malagasy Republic on Independence

White House press release dated June 26

Following is the text of a message sent by President Eisenhower to His Excellency Philibert Tsiranana, President of the Malagasy Republic, on the occasion of the independence of that nation on June 26, 1960.

JUNE 26, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On the occasion of the independence of the Malagasy Republic, I extend in my own name and on behalf of the people of the United States most cordial greetings and felicitations to you and your countrymen.

The independence of the Malagasy Republic achieved in friendly cooperation with France is a source of deep satisfaction to the United States. The Government and people of Madagascar and of France in their efforts to achieve social and economic advancement in Madagascar through democratic means have earned the admiration of all free nations.

On this historic occasion the Government and the people of the United States look forward to close and friendly relations with the Government and people of the Malagasy Republic.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Secretary Herter Sends Regards to Somaliland on Independence

Press release 357 dated June 27

Following is the text of Secretary Herter's message to the Council of Ministers of Somaliland on the occasion of the independence of that nation on June 26, 1960.

JUNE 26, 1960

Their Excellencies,
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF SOMALILAND,
Hargeisa.

YOUR EXCELLENCIES: I extend my best wishes and congratulations on the achievement of your independence. This is a noteworthy milestone in your history, and it is with pleasure that I send my warmest regards on this happy occasion.

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
*Secretary of State,
United States of America*

Ten-Nation Conference on Disarmament Terminated by Soviet Walkout

Negotiations in the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which convened at Geneva on March 15, 1960, ceased on June 28 after the Communist walkout of June 27. Following are texts of (1) a U.S. note of July 2 to the Soviet Union in reply to a letter of June 27 to President Eisenhower from Nikita S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.; (2) a Department statement of June 27; (3) U.S. disarmament proposals of June 27 presented subsequent to the Soviet walkout; and (4) Mr. Khrushchev's letter of June 27.

U.S. NOTE OF JULY 2¹

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, in response to the letter of June 27, 1960 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to the President of the United States, has the honor to state the following.

The Government of the United States deeply regrets the arbitrary action of the Soviet Government and its Allies in precipitously breaking off negotiations in the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament without prior consultation, contrary to the accepted rules of procedure and for reasons which remain unclear. The United States Government hopes that the Soviet Government will reconsider its decision and resume these negotiations on disarmament in the Ten Nation Committee.

The Government of the United States rejects as wholly inaccurate the Soviet version of events within the Ten Nation Disarmament Committee.

¹ Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Moscow on July 2 (press release 379).

Nor can it fail to reject the Soviet Government's unfounded allegations referring to the aborted Summit Conference.

The United States Government was profoundly disappointed when the Soviet Government refused to participate in the meeting of the Heads of State and Heads of Government in Paris last month.² The hopes of the world that the government leaders assembled there would be able to take constructive steps toward settlement of their differences and toward the strengthening of the peace were dashed by the arbitrary action of the Soviet Government.

The Government of the United States, nevertheless, retained the hope that the Soviet Government might be willing to continue the search for meaningful agreements in the negotiations already in progress in the areas of disarmament and nuclear testing. When the Soviet Delegation tabled its disarmament proposals on June 7, the United States Government undertook to give them the most thoughtful and serious consideration.³ In view of the complex character of arms limitation and the long history of disarmament negotiations, it was obvious that the process of negotiating agreements would of necessity be long and arduous and would require serious effort, great patience and abundant forbearance. The Soviet allegation that the disarmament negotiations were proving fruitless and had reached a state of deadlock, only three weeks after the revised Soviet proposals had been tabled, cannot but

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 6, 1960, pp. 899 and 904, and *ibid.*, June 13, 1960, p. 947.

³ For a U.S. note to the U.S.S.R. concerning the Soviet proposals, see *ibid.*, June 27, 1960, p. 1018. For details of the proposals, which were contained in a Soviet note of June 2 sent to all Heads of Governments with representatives in Moscow and to the United Nations, see U.N. doc. A/4374. Rev. 1.

give rise to question as to the Soviet Government's true motivation in torpedoing the Conference.

The withdrawal of the Soviet delegation stands in sharp contrast to the repeated Soviet official declarations of intent to settle by peaceful means through negotiation all outstanding international issues, among which, it would have been expected, would be the question of disarmament, acknowledged by the Soviet Government to be the most important question facing the world today.

The decision of the Soviet Government to break off the disarmament negotiations was particularly surprising and regrettable because it occurred at the very time the Western delegations were preparing to submit new disarmament proposals. The Soviet Government was aware that the United States had undertaken a review of its position on disarmament in the hope of finding helpful and practical revisions which would further the work of the Ten Nation Committee. This review was announced by the United States Secretary of State on June 24⁴ and, indeed, was acknowledged in *Pravda* the following day. Moreover, the Head of the United States Disarmament Delegation informed his Soviet counterpart prior to the meeting at Geneva on June 27, at which the Soviet delegation broke off negotiations, that new proposals were being worked out for early submission. These proposals were designed to take into account all views advanced during the course of the discussions and would have provided an adequate basis for substantive negotiations.

The abrupt termination of these negotiations is additionally disturbing in the light of the adoption by the Security Council of the UN on May 27 of the resolution submitted by Ceylon, Tunisia, Argentina and Ecuador,⁵ which specifically "requests the Governments concerned to continue their efforts to achieve a constructive solution of the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in accordance with Resolution 1378 (XIV) of the General Assembly and the discontinuance of all nuclear weapons tests under an appropriate international control system as well as their negotiations on measures to prevent surprise attack, including technical measures, as recommended by the General Assembly."

⁴ BULLETIN of July 11, 1960, p. 39.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, June 13, 1960, p. 961.

The urgent need to begin a program of disarmament demands that no opportunities for negotiations be lost. In this spirit, the delegation of the United States and those of its Allies have remained at Geneva in the hope that the Government of the Soviet Union and its Allies will see fit to return to the task of serious negotiation.

The goal of disarmament is an aspiration common to all mankind and an objective which all Governments must relentlessly strive to achieve. For its part, the United States Government remains determined to spare no effort to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements on concrete measures, the implementation of which would represent a solid advance toward the goal of complete and general disarmament under reliable and effective international control.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF JUNE 27⁶

The Soviet bloc's walkout today indicates their desire to avoid any further discussion on the problem of controlled disarmament within the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference. This action by the Communist delegations is both deplorable and disappointing. It is deplorable because it shatters the hopes of all peoples who earnestly seek progress on the road to peace. It is disappointing because it casts serious doubt on the sincerity of the Communist desires for a solution to the disarmament problem.

As the Soviet bloc well knew, the Western allies were preparing to present, within the 10-nation negotiating forum, modifications to the Western plan of March 16.⁷ This initiative by the West, based on an effort to accommodate certain aspects of the Soviet bloc's June 2 proposal was undertaken to find common areas through which the negotiations could be advanced. The walkout in the face of the Western Governments' willingness to move ahead makes fully transparent the desire of the Soviet bloc to see the negotiations end in total failure.

The five Allied nations intend for the time being to remain at the negotiating table. If the Communist side is prepared to seek a solution to the disarmament problem, the way is still open. It is

⁶ Read to news correspondents on June 27 by Lincoln White, Director, Office of News, Department of State.

⁷ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1960, p. 511.

our earnest hope that the Soviet bloc will reconsider its irresponsible action and join with the Allied nations in a determined and continued search for a just and durable peace. This would be but a fulfillment of each side's responsibility to all mankind.

U.S. DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS OF JUNE 27

Press release 358 dated June 27

PROGRAM FOR GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

JUNE 27, 1960

Introduction

The ultimate goal is a secure and peaceful world of free and open societies in which there shall be general and complete disarmament under effective international control and agreed procedures for the settlement of disputes in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

General and complete disarmament in a secure, free and peaceful world requires:

1. The disbanding, through progressive stages, of all armed forces of all States and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever, except for those contingents of agreed size required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens and for agreed contingents for the international peace force.

2. The cessation of the production of all kinds of armaments, including all means for delivering weapons of mass destruction, and their complete elimination from national arsenals, through progressive stages, except for those armaments agreed upon for use by an international peace force and agreed remaining national contingents.

3. Strict and effective international control, from beginning to end, of the carrying out of all disarmament measures, to ensure that there are no violations.

4. The establishment of effective means for enforcement of international agreements and for the maintenance of peace.

Controlling Principles

1. Disarmament under effective international control shall be carried out in such a manner that at no time shall any State, whether or not a party to a Treaty, obtain military advantage over other States as a result of the progress of disarmament.

2. General and complete disarmament shall proceed through three stages containing balanced, phased and safeguarded measures with each measure being carried out in an agreed and strictly defined period of time, under the supervision of an International Disarmament Control Organization, within the framework of the United Nations.

3. Each measure within each stage shall be initiated simultaneously by all participating States upon completion of the necessary preparatory studies and upon establishment of the arrangements and procedures necessary for the International Disarmament Control Organization to verify the measure on an initial and continuing basis.

4. Transition from one stage to the next shall be initiated when the Security Council of the United Nations agrees that all measures in the preceding stage have been fully implemented and effective verification is continuing, and that any additional verification arrangements and procedures required for measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively.

5. The Treaties shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations thereunder if the provisions of the Treaty, including those providing for the timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed.

6. The International Disarmament Control Organization shall comprise all participating States whose representatives shall meet as a conference periodically as required. There shall in addition be a control commission and a Director General. The specific responsibility and authority of the conference, control commission and the Director General, the staffing arrangements and criteria, the responsibilities of participating States to the Organization, and provisions for any necessary preparatory or interim group to aid in the establishment of the Organization shall be specified in the Treaty.

7. The specific arrangements, procedures and means required for effective initial and continuing verification of satisfactory performance of each measure by the International Disarmament Control Organization shall be specified in the Treaties. These shall provide for all necessary means required for effective verification of compliance with each step of each measure. Verification of each agreed disarmament measure shall be accomplished in such a manner as to be capable of disclosing, to the satisfaction of all participating States, any evasion of the agreement. Specifically, from the initiation of implementation of each agreed disarmament measure, there shall be effective verification by the International Disarmament Control Organization; verification shall be in no way dependent upon declarations by States for its effectiveness; verification shall include the capability to ascertain that not only do reductions of armed forces and armaments in agreed amounts take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

Task of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament

The task of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament is to work out a Treaty for general and complete disarmament under effective international control governed by the foregoing controlling principles as follows:

1. Negotiate and agree upon a Treaty, to be acceded to in the first instance by the States represented on the Ten

Nation Disarmament Committee, embodying the first stage of the program. This stage shall consist of those initial and controllable measures which can and shall be undertaken without delay by the States participating in the Committee to preclude the expansion of their armed forces; to bring to a halt the growth of their weapons stockpiles; to reduce the levels of their armed forces and armaments to the extent possible without jeopardy to their security; and to provide measures for protection against surprise attack.

2. In the course of negotiating such a Treaty, arrange for and conduct the necessary technical studies to work out effective control arrangements for measures to be carried out in the program. These studies shall provide an agreed basis for proceeding with implementation of the measure studied in the appropriate stage. Among the early studies shall be a technical examination of the measures necessary to verify control over, reduction and elimination of agreed categories of nuclear delivery systems, including missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery.

3. After reaching agreement on a Treaty on the first stage of the program, prepare for submission to a world disarmament conference an agreed draft Treaty on the second and third stages of the program as set forth below, in accordance with the foregoing controlling principles.

4. Thereupon, arrange for a world-wide conference of all States, to be held at the earliest possible time, for the following purposes:

- a. Accession to the Treaty covering stage one by States which have not already done so;
- b. Accession to the Treaty covering stages two and three by all States.

Stage One

1. An International Disarmament Control Organization shall be established within the framework of the United Nations, and expanded as required by the progressive implementation of general and complete disarmament.

2. The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of vehicles carrying weapons capable of mass destruction shall be prohibited.

3. To give greater protection against surprise attack, (a) prior notification to the International Disarmament Control Organization of all proposed launchings of space vehicles and missiles and their planned tracks; (b) the establishment of a zone of aerial and ground inspection in agreed areas including the U.S. and U.S.S.R.; (c) exchange of observers on a reciprocal basis at agreed military bases, domestic and foreign.

4. Declaration of and institution of on-site inspection at mutually agreed operational air bases, missile launching pads, submarine and naval bases in order to establish a basis for controls over nuclear delivery systems in subsequent stages.

5. Initial force level ceilings shall be established as follows: 2.5 million for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and agreed appropriate force levels for certain other States. After the accession to the Treaty of other militarily significant States and after these initial force levels have been verified, force levels of 2.1 million shall be established

for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and agreed appropriate force levels shall be established for other militarily significant States.

6. Agreed types and quantities of armaments in agreed relation to the established force levels shall be placed in storage depots by participating States within their own territories, under supervision by the International Disarmament Control Organization pending their final destruction or conversion to peaceful uses.

7. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped upon installation and effective operation of the control system found necessary to verify this step by prior technical study and agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons uses, including stockpiling for peaceful purposes, conditioned upon satisfactory progress in the field of conventional disarmament.

8. The submission by the various States to the International Disarmament Control Organization of data relating to: the operation of their financial system as it affects military expenditures, the amount of their military expenditures, and the percentage of their gross national product earmarked for military expenditures. The data to be submitted will be drawn up in accordance with predetermined and mutually agreed criteria.

Stage Two

1. Force levels shall be further reduced to 1.7 million for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and to agreed appropriate levels for other States.

2. Quantities of all kinds of armaments of each State, including nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction in existence and all means for their delivery, shall be reduced to agreed levels and the resulting excesses shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. Agreed categories of missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines and artillery designed to deliver nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction shall be included in this measure.

3. Expenditures for military purposes shall be reduced in amounts bearing a relation to the agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments.

4. An international peace force, within the United Nations, shall be progressively established and maintained with agreed personnel strength and armaments sufficient to preserve world peace when general and complete disarmament is achieved.

Stage Three

1. Forces and military establishments of all States shall be finally reduced to those levels required for the purpose of maintaining internal order and ensuring the personal security of citizens and of providing agreed contingents of forces to the international peace force.

2. The international peace force and remaining agreed contingents of national armed forces shall be armed only with agreed types and quantities of armaments. All other remaining armaments, including weapons of mass destruction and vehicles for their delivery and conventional armaments shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

3. Expenditures for military purposes by all States shall be further reduced in amounts bearing a relation to the agreed reductions in armed forces and armaments.

4. There shall be no manufacture of any armaments except for agreed types and quantities for use by the international peace force and agreed remaining national contingents.

Following completion of Stage Three, the program for general and complete disarmament shall continue to be adhered to and verified.

MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S LETTER OF JUNE 27*

JUNE 27, 1960

MR. PRESIDENT, In supplement to my letter dated June 2, 1960 enclosing the Soviet Government's proposals concerning the basic provisions of an agreement on general and full disarmament, I consider it necessary to communicate the following.

The situation created in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament caused the Soviet Government grave concern.

During our negotiations last fall we stated that the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world at the present time, and we agreed that both our governments should make every effort to arrive at a constructive solution of this problem. It is well known that in questions of disarmament the Soviet Government has acted and acts precisely in this manner.

On September 18, 1959 the Soviet Government introduced a program of general and full disarmament for the consideration of the United Nations.⁸ Desiring to make a new contribution to the cause of ensuring peace and creating the most favorable conditions for the achievement of an agreement on general and full disarmament, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a law on January 15, 1960 concerning a further considerable reduction of the Soviet armed forces by 1,200,000 men.⁹

Seeking to achieve as soon as possible a practical agreement on the urgent problems of disarmament, the Soviet Government, in developing the program of disarmament put forward by it on September 18, 1959, worked out and prepared comprehensive proposals for the implementation of a general and full disarmament for discussion at the conference of the leaders of the four powers. In these proposals we took into consideration the views expressed by the Western powers on a number of important questions, particularly with regard to prohibiting and liquidating all means of delivery of atomic weapons first of all (including the elimination of military bases), working out disarmament control in detail, taking measures for preserving peace and security

⁸ Delivered to Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, by Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy at Washington, on June 27.

⁹ For text, see U.N. doc. A/4219.

¹⁰ For a statement by Mr. White on the Soviet proposal to reduce armed forces, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1960, p. 147.

under conditions of general and full disarmament, et cetera.

Since the Summit Conference failed as a result of the inadmissible acts undertaken by the United States with relation to the Soviet Union the Soviet Government, taking into consideration that a discussion of the problem of disarmament could not be delayed, sent proposals prepared by it to the governments of all countries and introduced them for discussion by the Ten-Nation Committee. These proposals were supported by the governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, members of the Committee, as well as by governments of a number of other countries.

However, it must be stated that the delegations of the Western powers, and first of all the delegation of the USA, took a position in that Committee calculated to accomplish anything but success in the cause of disarmament. They not only are failing to do anything on their part to facilitate the immediate achievement of an agreement on disarmament but on the contrary they apparently are seeking to do everything to prevent such an agreement, to keep the Committee from settling practical questions of disarmament, and to smother the cause of disarmament in sterile and endless discussions on the topic of control without disarmament.

More than three months have passed since the Committee of Ten started its work in Geneva. Concrete plans worked out in detail concerning disarmament under effective international control were presented by the Soviet Union for the Committee's consideration, and willingness was expressed to consider any constructive views of other members of the Committee aimed at achieving general disarmament. However the Western powers, whose governments very recently voted for the resolution of the General Assembly concerning general and full disarmament, actually are avoiding consideration of any concrete proposals on disarmament in the Committee.

On their part, the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Canada presented in the Committee of Ten a plan that, with the best will in the world, could not be considered a disarmament plan. It is, rather, a plan of control without disarmament, i.e., of a legalized military espionage which apparently some one in the USA would not be averse to using as a supplement to the practice of invading the airspace of other countries for espionage purposes, which practice was recently proclaimed by the American Government as the state policy of the USA. Actually, the Western powers are trying to reduce the whole thing to the establishment of control over intercontinental ballistic missiles and artificial earth satellites. The idea of such a plan is not difficult to guess: it represents an attempt to gain one-sided military advantages for the NATO countries at the expense of the security of the Soviet Union. Naturally, it is impossible to arrive at an agreement on such a basis. It appears that the prevention of an agreement on questions of disarmament was precisely the goal which the Government of the USA and the other Western powers had set for themselves in connection with their participation in the Committee of Ten. The Committee is being used by those Powers as a screen behind which they attempt to hide their reluctance to have disarmament.

The Delegations of the USA and the other Western states in the Committee of Ten are continuing to follow the same line at the present time, after resumption of the Committee's work at the beginning of June. This shows clearly that the USA did not intend to take at the Summit Meeting a position that would have permitted freeing the question of disarmament from the deadlock that was created through the fault of the Western powers, and first of all by the USA.

As has been shown by the experience in the negotiations that took place in the Committee of Ten, the governments of the Western states participating in the work of this Committee clearly do not desire the prohibition and destruction of such terrible weapons of mass annihilation as nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Nor do they desire the liquidation of armed forces and conventional armaments. The representatives of the Western powers have been systematically rejecting and smothering in fruitless discussions—under various pretexts—all concrete proposals on these problems.

Instead of discussing concrete measures for disarmament, the representatives of the Western states, especially the USA, are attempting to justify the military preparations and the existence of networks of numerous bases created by them on foreign territories.

I would not be frank if I did not state in this letter that the main responsibility for the situation created in the Committee of Ten and for the fact that the position of the Western powers does not make it possible to take even one step toward solving the disarmament problem, falls on the Government of the United States of America. As a matter of fact, this is not concealed even by the allies of the USA in NATO, those represented in the Committee in question as well as those not represented. It is namely the Government of the USA which is piling one obstacle upon another during the discussion of disarmament questions, whether it concerns conventional armaments or nuclear weapons and missiles.

Every time a proposal submitted by the Soviet Government for consideration by its partners in the talks facilitates the possibility of an understanding and takes into consideration any of the wishes of the Western powers, this proposal is declared to be unacceptable and the discussion of disarmament questions is again pushed back to the initial point. It is not the first time that we have witnessed such tactics, which, perhaps are used by those who are frightened by the very idea of disarmament, but which hamper all progress in the discussion and even more in the solution of the disarmament problem. All of this is unfortunately confirmed by the conduct of the American representatives in Geneva.

Looking at things realistically, we must state that as a result of the position taken by the Western powers the work of the Committee of Ten has come to a deadlock and has degenerated into fruitless discussions, while the Committee has become anything but an organ promoting the cause of disarmament. Apparently there are influential forces in the West that are not interested in bringing about disarmament and are in every way obstructing an agreement on disarmament, and these forces have succeeded in placing their stamp on the position of the Western powers in the Committee of Ten. Not only is

this Committee failing to further the cause of disarmament but, on the contrary, it is doing it considerable harm, in so far as it misleads the peoples of the world by creating the impression that something is being done in the area of disarmament, while actually the Western powers are again intensifying the armaments race which day after day increases the danger of the outbreak of a destructive nuclear and missile war.

The Soviet Government cannot reconcile itself to such a state of affairs. It cannot consent to have the participation in the Committee of Ten of the Soviet Union, whose sincere desire for an agreement on disarmament is well known, be used as a cover to conceal activity that has nothing in common with real disarmament.

To all appearances, the position of the Government of the USA on the disarmament question is determined by the same general policy in international affairs which it presently pursues and which led to the breakdown of the Summit Conference, and which made impossible a fruitful discussion of the most important international problems by the heads of the four States.

Permit me to say very frankly, Mr. President, that the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion, considering the situation that has arisen in the Committee, that the Western powers, judging by the position of their representatives at Geneva, do not wish to conduct serious negotiations on disarmament. They clearly have their own special ideas which have nothing in common with the problem of disarmament. This finds expression in the continued armaments race being carried on by those powers, and also in the fact that during the discussions of disarmament questions in the Committee, they are seeking merely to create the appearance of negotiations and thereby to deceive the peoples, who are sincerely longing for a solution to the disarmament problem.

Taking all of this into consideration, the Government of the USSR has come to the conclusion that it is necessary to discontinue its participation in the fruitless discussion in the Committee of Ten in order to submit to the regular session of the General Assembly the question on disarmament and the situation resulting from the implementation of the General Assembly's Resolution of November 20, 1959¹¹ on this question. Of course, the matter of the composition of the Committee will also arise in this connection.

The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that a practical solution can and must be found to the question of disarmament, on which peace or war depends, and that no artificial obstacles or delays can be tolerated in this important matter.

Such are the considerations on the question of disarmament which I deemed it my duty to communicate to you.

N. KHRUSHCHEV

His Excellency
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

¹¹ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1959, p. 766.

The Balance of Payments Between the United States and Latin America in 1959

by Walther Lederer and Nancy F. Culbertson

The aggregate value of the transactions between the Latin American Republics and the United States in 1959 was lower than in 1958, but the rate of decline was somewhat less than from 1957 to 1958.

U.S. payments dropped from 1958 by about \$300 million and receipts by about \$550 million.

The contraction in our transactions with Latin America contrasts with the expansion during 1959 in our business with other foreign areas. Various factors account for this difference, the significance of which for the longer run developments will be discussed in this article.

Payments made directly to Latin America in 1959 exceeded U.S. receipts from that area by about \$300 million, according to the U.S. balance-of-payments tables. Indirect transactions, particularly U.S. imports of Latin American petroleum refined

in the Netherlands Antilles, resulted in net payments to Latin America of more than \$200 million.

Total estimated net payments by the United States in 1959 were over \$200 million more than in 1958. This increase continued the trend which seemed to have prevailed during most of the 1950's but was temporarily interrupted in 1957. Last year's rise, however, was somewhat faster than the average rate in the previous years.

Although transactions with Latin America contributed to the overall deficit in the U.S. balance of payments, Latin America returned a much higher share of its dollar receipts directly to the United States than did the rest of the world. Even including the payments to Latin America through U.S. imports from the Netherlands West Indies, about 91 percent of the dollar outflow from the United States was returned through purchases of goods and services, investment income, and debt repayments, as compared with approximately 83 percent returned by the other areas of the world. (The return flow includes only receipts from recorded transactions; net receipts from unrecorded transactions cannot be allocated by areas.) U.S. sales to Latin America are thus considerably more closely linked to the outflow of funds from the United States through imports of goods and services, Government grants and loans, and private investments than U.S. sales to most other areas.

The net transfer of dollars from the United States to Latin America did not result in an increase in gold and liquid dollar holdings by the countries in that area. To the contrary, the Latin American Republics as a whole reduced their holdings in 1959 by about \$230 million, including net payments of about \$40 million to the International Monetary Fund through exchange transactions and capital contributions. This would indicate

• This article is the seventh in a series on the balance of payments between the United States and the Latin American Republics. The first six articles appeared in the BULLETIN of March 26, 1956, p. 521; December 24 and 31, 1956, p. 983; July 8, 1957, p. 79; January 6, 1958, p. 23; August 25, 1958, p. 311; and March 2, 1959, p. 300. The authors are members of the Balance of Payments Division, U.S. Department of Commerce. The data on which this article is based were prepared by the Balance of Payments Division and published in the March 1960 issue of the Survey of Current Business, the monthly periodical of the Office of Business Economics.

that, in 1959, dollar expenditures by Latin America in countries other than the United States or on unrecorded transactions with the United States exceeded dollar receipts from sources outside the United States by about \$700 million. In 1958 these dollar payments to other countries were about 10 percent less.

The experience during these 2 years differs considerably from the net dollar flow in 1955 and 1956, when dollar transactions between Latin America and countries other than the United States (and unrecorded transactions with the United States) appear to have been approximately in balance. This raises the question whether other countries have become more successful in attracting dollars from Latin America or whether special developments were responsible for this change.

Structure of U.S.-Latin American Balance of Payments

In 1959 about two-thirds of the payments to Latin America resulted from U.S. imports of merchandise and nearly 17 percent from purchases of services. Government grants and capital, net of repayments, accounted for less than 7 percent of the dollar outflow from the United States and private capital for slightly over 7 percent.

The share of U.S. expenditures for goods and services in total payments to Latin America was about the same as in total payments to all areas in 1959, but the share of merchandise imports alone was somewhat larger in the transactions with Latin America. This was offset, however, by the relatively small amount of military expenditures in Latin America. (The latter are concentrated mainly in Europe and the Far East.) Government aid—net of loan repayments—as well as private investments comprised a slightly smaller proportion of total payments to Latin America than in the overall balance of payments of the United States. The differences were of little significance, however.

Changes in 1959 Relative to Prior Years

Government assistance and private capital outflows to Latin America were smaller in 1959 than during the years 1956 to 1958 and, with imports of goods and services relatively stable, did not provide as large a share of the total dollar outflow. Nevertheless, this share was still considerably higher than during the first half of the 1950's. In

the years 1956 and 1957, private investments were exceptionally high, in part because of the purchases of petroleum concessions in Venezuela, and in 1958 several large Government loans were made to countries which were in acute financial difficulties.

The 1958-59 decline in U.S. receipts was mainly in merchandise exports, while incomes from U.S. investments in Latin America and from the export of services were only slightly reduced.

The share of merchandise in total Latin American payments to the United States was relatively stable during the last years, fluctuating by a narrow margin around 70 percent.

Relation of Investment Income to Other Parts of Balance of Payments

Investment incomes (including interest on U.S. Government loans) comprised slightly over 14 percent of total U.S. receipts in 1959, compared with 13 percent in 1958. With U.S. investments in Latin America rising in recent years at an annual rate of more than \$1 billion, one might expect that gradually investment incomes would absorb a rising share of the funds received by the Latin American countries from the United States and consequently constitute an increasing part of their expenditures here. That does not appear to be the case, however. Although investment income paid to the United States rose last year in relation to total Latin American receipts from the United States, it absorbed a smaller share of Latin American receipts from the United States than during the period 1955-57 and no more than during the years 1951-54 or the years 1946-50.

This suggests that, during the postwar period at least, U.S. investment income from Latin America was more closely related to U.S. expenditures there than to the size of the investment itself. There may be several reasons for this relationship. There is a direct association between such income and imports of goods produced by American-owned enterprises there. High imports will generally result in relatively high investment incomes from those enterprises. About 40 percent of our imports from Latin America are produced by branches or subsidiaries of U.S. enterprises. Investments in these industries accounted for 70-75 percent of our income on all direct investments in Latin America.

Equally important are the indirect relationships

between U.S. expenditures and U.S. investment incomes, as both are related to business activity and general incomes in Latin America. The more prosperous the countries in that area are, the higher will be the profits of American enterprises operating there, since a large part of their sales—even of those enterprises which sell to the United States—are made in Latin American markets.

Business conditions in Latin America are, in turn, to some extent both actively and passively related to U.S. expenditures in the area: actively, because higher prices for the principal export products produced there may increase our expenditures for merchandise imports; passively, because a higher import demand and higher investments by the United States will raise Latin American incomes.

The size of past investments is, of course, a factor determining the potential investment incomes, but the actual realization of this potential depends upon other factors. It appears that current incomes are related to the current growth of the economies in which they are located. When industries are relatively stagnant and the economies with which they are associated are developing relatively slowly, investment incomes will be comparatively low. High incomes generally signify a vigorous industry associated with an expanding economy.

The rate of return on past investments thus is flexible rather than fixed, although the flexibility depends to some extent upon the type of investment. Income on equity investments will generally be more flexible than income on loans.

The relatively close relationship between our foreign expenditures and investment incomes is not unique to Latin America. It may be found also in our overall balance of payments, although the relationship between our foreign expenditures and business conditions in the rest of the world as a whole is not likely to be as close as in the case of Latin America. Nevertheless, over most of the 1950's, the relation of investment income to total U.S. expenditures abroad fluctuated within a narrower range than the relation between investment income and the value of the past investment.

The share of Latin American receipts from the United States used for the payment of investment income to the United States appears to be

more stable than the share of investment income in Latin American expenditures here.

Latin American expenditures here are affected not only by current receipts from the United States but also by drawings on, or additions to, reserves and by the balances in dollars or convertible currencies on transactions with other countries. Thus U.S. investment incomes were about 11.5 percent of total Latin American expenditures here during the years 1946-50, when Latin American purchases here were in part financed from prior dollar accumulations, as against 15.5 percent during 1955-57, when some of the Latin American dollar receipts were added to reserves. The increase from 13 percent in 1958 to slightly over 14 percent in 1959 appears to have been due to a decline in drawings on reserves and larger dollar expenditures outside the United States (or through unrecorded transactions in the United States).

Excess of Investment Income Over Net Capital Outflows

U.S. investment income exceeded the net outflow of U.S. capital in 1959 by nearly \$100 million. (If Government grants are considered a form of capital, the amounts were approximately equal.) This represents a reversal of the situation during the years 1956-58, when the net outflow of capital was larger. During the first 2 of these years, private direct investments were extraordinarily high, particularly in the petroleum industry, and in 1958 Government loans were increased by some special credits. The excess of capital outflows over income receipts during these 3 years appears to have been an interruption of the previous trend of a rising excess of investment income. During the 5 years 1946-50, incomes averaged about \$165 million higher than net capital outflows, and during the following 5 years, 1951-55, the excess was about \$265 million. The change from 1958 to 1959 may represent a return to relationships which were characteristic for most of the postwar period.

An excess of investment income over net capital outflows is, of course, common in the economic transactions between mature creditor and mature debtor countries. It does not involve a net drain on incomes or foreign exchange resources of the debtor countries as long as the operations of the

TABLE I: U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS, 1955-59 (EXCLUDING MILITARY GRANT AID)

(Millions of dollars)

	U.S. transactions, including shipping companies incorporated in Panama				U.S. transactions, excluding shipping companies incorporated in Panama	
	1955	1956	1957	1958	1958	1959
U.S. payments:						
Imports of merchandise	3, 470	3, 782	3, 930	3, 749	3, 749	3, 724
Imports of services	833	1, 010	1, 102	1, 088	901	914
Private remittances and Government pensions	40	42	55	54	54	55
Government grants (net)	68	83	112	118	118	105
Government capital (net)	51	96	146	471	471	261
Private capital (net):						
Direct investments	193	592	1, 090	325	288	193
Other	185	223	305	163	163	190
Total payments	4, 840	5, 828	6, 740	5, 968	5, 744	5, 442
U.S. receipts:						
Exports of merchandise	3, 282	3, 835	4, 642	4, 130	4, 117	3, 553
Income on investments	745	878	1, 015	767	741	734
Exports of other services	753	887	965	909	840	829
Foreign long-term investments in the United States	22	33	19	-1	-1	27
Total receipts	4, 802	5, 633	6, 641	5, 805	5, 697	5, 143
Net receipts by Latin America through recorded transactions with the United States	38	195	99	163	47	299
Estimated net receipts by Latin America from oil imported by the United States through the Netherlands Antilles	175	188	217	243	243	220
Net receipts by Latin America through transactions with the International Monetary Fund		-44	160	58	58	-43
Estimated net receipts of gold and dollars by Latin America through transactions with other countries, other international organizations, or through unrecorded transactions with the United States	-68	3	-236	-747	-631	-708
Increase in Latin American gold and short-term dollar holdings	145	342	240	-283	-283	-232

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

enterprises financed by foreign funds increase income and output of the debtor countries (net of their payments of investment income to the foreign investors) by more than they would have been able to achieve with their own resources.

U.S. purchases of goods and services in 1959 exceeded U.S. sales (excluding investment income and exports financed by private and Government gifts and grants). In 1958 the two sides for these transactions were nearly in balance, but in 1957 sales exceeded purchases by a considerable margin. The year 1957 was exceptional, however, and the import surplus in 1959 corresponds to the pattern that had developed since 1950.

An excess of purchases over sales of goods and services (other than investment income) also is typical for transactions between mature creditor and mature debtor countries, although in many cases the pattern may be modified by transactions with third countries.

Merchandise Imports Slightly Lower

As indicated earlier, merchandise imports from Latin America were slightly lower in 1959 than in the year before, in strong contrast to the extraordinarily steep rise in imports from other areas. Two questions arise as to the reasons for this discrepancy: first, whether it reflected the commodity composition of our imports from Latin America; and second, whether there has been a shift in our purchases from Latin America to other sources of supply.

Latin America is our principal source of supply of foodstuffs. Over half of such imports in 1959 came from that area, and foodstuffs comprised over half of all our imports from Latin America. In the aggregate, imports of these commodities expand relatively slowly. In 1959 they were about 10 percent higher in value than the average during 1950 to 1954, compared with an increase

of over 60 percent for other commodities. In part this difference between these commodity groups over this period may be found in price movements. However, even after adjustment for a 10 percent price decline, imports of foodstuffs increased only 22 percent, while those of other products rose in volume approximately as much as in value.

While the expansion in imports of foodstuffs in general is thus much more moderate than in imports of other products, imports of foodstuffs from Latin America did not even keep pace with those from other areas but actually declined in 1959 by about 5 percent from the average of 1950-54.

The following may be the most significant reasons for this difference.

First, price declines since the first half of the 1950's affected coffee more than most other foodstuffs, and coffee constitutes a much higher share in our Latin American imports than in those from other countries.

Second, imports of foodstuffs from Latin America are, more than those from other areas, dominated by commodities which are generally not produced within this country. These imports, aside from inventory movements, will in the longer run depend upon overall consumption. Imports from other areas have been more heavily weighted by commodities which are supplementary to our own production. The increase in imports can be relatively more than that in overall consumption when domestic supplies lag behind requirements.

For instance, purchases abroad of animal food products, including cattle, nearly doubled over that period, and in dollars their increase was higher than that of total food imports. Latin America's share in these imports improved slightly in the last 2 years but still remained lower than one-fourth of the total. Some of the rise in these imports was due to temporary circumstances, however, and a decline has set in during the latter part of 1959.

Another factor adversely affecting imports from Latin America was shifts in the sources of supply. Latin America's share in our coffee imports declined from about 95 percent of the value in the early 1950's to about 88 percent during the years 1957-59, but cocoa imports increased during the same period from less than 40 percent to about 50 percent. These shifts, which are the most significant among food products imported from Latin America, were on balance adverse to Latin American sales here, but the net effect for 1959 was a decrease of hardly more than about \$50 million to \$60 million.

From 1958 to 1959 imports of foodstuffs from Latin America fell off by about \$80 million, while those from other areas increased by about \$40 million. The principal reasons for the decline in the value of imports from Latin America were the drop in prices of coffee and cocoa and the decrease in the volume of sugar imports. The volume of coffee imports increased substantially from 1958 to 1959. About 5 percent of the 1959 imports from all areas were added to inventories, however, and

TABLE II: RELATION OF U.S. INCOME ON INVESTMENTS FROM LATIN AMERICA TO U.S. INVESTMENTS AND TO RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS ON ALL TRANSACTIONS

	Unit	Including shipping companies incorporated in Panama				Excluding shipping companies incorporated in Panama	
		1946-50	1951-54	1955-57	1958	1958	1959
U.S. investment income from Latin America (excluding reinvested earnings)	million \$	444	644	879	767	741	734
Value of U.S. investments in Latin America at beginning of year	billion \$	5.1	7.1	9.5	12.2	11.8	12.8
Income in percent of investment value	%	8.7	9.1	9.1	6.3	6.3	5.7
Total U.S. receipts from Latin America	million \$	3,868	4,783	5,692	5,805	5,697	5,143
Income in percent of receipts	%	11.5	13.4	15.5	13.2	13.0	14.3
Total U.S. payments to Latin America	million \$	3,293	4,728	5,803	5,968	5,744	5,442
Income in percent of U.S. payments	%	13.5	13.6	15.1	12.8	12.9	13.5

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

by that amount exceeded current consumption. While imports this year may be smaller than in 1959, prices appear to have stabilized since the spring of last year.

Nearly one-fourth of our imports from Latin America consists of petroleum and its derivatives. Until 1958 petroleum was one of our fastest growing import items. During the years 1950-58 the average yearly increase in total petroleum imports was close to \$80 million, but in 1959, because of lower prices, imports were about \$80 million less than in the preceding year. The share of direct imports from Latin America in our total imports was lower in recent years than during the first half of the 1950's, but it increased slightly from about 51 percent in 1958 to 53 percent last year. Because of the Suez crisis, the value of petroleum imports from Latin America reached a peak in 1957; it has fallen off slightly since then. Inclusion of imports of Latin American oil products through the Netherlands West Indies would raise somewhat the share of Latin American petroleum in our total imports but would not alter the basic import development, which changed from a substantial rise in the earlier part of the 1950's to relative stability in the last 2 or 3 years.

Decline in Industrial Imports

The remaining fourth of the imports from Latin America consists mainly of industrial materials, such as metals and ores, wool, lumber, and hides. Manufactured goods are a relatively small part of our purchases in that area. U.S. expenditures in Latin America for these commodities in 1959 were about 5 percent higher than in the previous year but still 12 and 14 percent, respectively, lower than in 1956 and 1957 and almost equal to those in 1955.

In contrast, total U.S. imports of industrial materials associated with nondurable goods production in 1959 were about 18 percent above 1957 and over 43 percent above 1955; those associated with durable goods production were 16 percent above 1957 and 20 percent above 1955.

Two major factors seem to be responsible for the difference in the development of our total industrial material imports and those from Latin America.

First, among those major materials for which Latin America is a large supplier, shifts in our sources of supply have taken place which reduced the share of Latin America in our imports. Of

such nondurable materials as hides and skins, non-edible vegetable oils and oilseeds, tobacco, wool, and other textile materials, the Latin American share of our imports fell from a high of nearly 28 percent in 1956 to about 24.5 percent in 1959. Most of the relative decline has occurred since 1957. Of selected metals and ores, the Latin American share rose from 33 percent in 1955 to close to 39 percent in 1958 but fell to about 32.5 percent last year. This decline occurred in imports of most of the major metals, including iron ore, copper, lead, and zinc. Latin America's share in iron-ore imports had reached a peak of about 62 percent (compared to 43 and 44 percent during the years 1955 and 1956) but declined to about 54 percent in 1959, although in absolute amounts imports were at a new high. Copper imports from Latin America were 41 percent of the total compared with 56 percent in 1956, lead imports 34 percent compared with 45 percent in 1956, and zinc imports 28 percent compared with 43 percent in 1957.

Second, our imports of these materials, with few exceptions, have not risen as much as our total imports of industrial materials. Of the commodities which are used primarily in nondurable goods industries, imports of those of which Latin America is a major supplier fell gradually from 57 percent in 1955 to 46 percent in 1959. Of those which are primarily used in durable goods industries, the decline was from 48 percent in 1957 to 32 percent in 1959. In part the decline in the share of these more traditional imports (except perhaps iron ore) may be explained by the rise in imports of semimanufactured steel products due to the steel strike here and a relatively slack steel demand in other producing countries. Even omitting these steel imports, the share of those metals for which Latin America is an important source dropped from 52 percent of total imports of metals and ores in 1957 to 38 percent in 1959.

Thus, for those materials of which we purchase relatively large amounts in Latin America, other sources have become more important and other commodities—including substitutes such as aluminum, for which Latin America is not a major source—apparently have found a faster developing market in this country.

The failure of imports from Latin America to expand to the same extent as those from other areas thus was due in part to certain special circumstances such as the decline in prices of coffee and petroleum, in part to the large share of food-

TABLE III: U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, EXCLUDING MILITARY GRANT AID, WITH CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1955-58

(Millions of dollars)

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Cuba	Mexico	Peru	Venezuela	Total 8 countries	Other Latin America
U.S. payments, total:										
1955	145	630	217	516	591	923	162	709	3,893	947
1956	173	874	296	467	596	1,000	221	1,117	4,744	1,084
1957	185	838	421	651	651	1,093	269	1,793	5,537	1,293
1958	240	884	270	353	699	1,116	240	1,014	4,816	1,152
Imports and private remittances:										
1955	142	660	214	463	493	845	127	593	3,537	800
1956	155	775	253	429	551	898	157	725	3,943	882
1957	150	737	215	399	583	949	161	958	4,122	955
1958	156	608	175	355	626	990	151	928	3,989	891
Merchandise:										
1955	126	634	203	446	424	419	121	576	2,949	521
1956	133	746	240	421	457	421	148	702	3,259	523
1957	129	700	199	385	483	447	152	895	3,390	540
1958	133	566	158	335	529	479	139	879	3,218	531
Services, military expenditures, and private remittances:										
1955	16	26	11	17	69	426	6	17	588	279
1956	22	29	13	17	94	477	9	23	684	359
1957	21	37	16	14	100	502	9	33	732	415
1958	23	42	17	20	97	511	12	49	771	360
Grants and loans by U.S. Government:										
1955	-5	37	5	2	2	-10	11	(1)	42	83
1956	12	28	10	9	-4	24	24	-1	70	118
1957	6	15	31	18	10	26	54	-1	147	121
1958	48	145	47	91	12	80	59	3	485	115
Private capital, total:										
1955	8	-67	-2	51	96	88	24	116	314	64
1956	6	71	33	29	49	110	40	393	731	84
1957	41	86	41	4	58	118	53	866	1,268	127
1958	36	131	48	-93	61	46	30	83	312	146
Direct investments:										
1955	9	30	1	16	15	51	7	31	160	33
1956	(1)	55	33	21	28	33	27	350	350	42
1957	15	48	24	9	51	39	47	736	1,029	61
1958	8	26	25	2	17	-12	29	132	223	102
Other:										
1955	-1	-97	-3	35	81	37	17	85	154	31
1956	5	16	(1)	5	21	77	13	70	181	42
1957	26	38	17	-5	7	79	7	40	259	66
1958	28	105	23	-91	44	58	1	-49	119	41
U.S. receipts, total:										
1955	202	386	199	418	585	957	176	1,035	3,978	821
1956	278	442	289	415	703	1,131	211	1,271	4,706	927
1957	359	639	387	323	703	1,202	258	1,789	5,446	995
1958	314	693	221	250	692	1,200	218	1,357	4,945	860
Export, total:										
1955	201	385	195	417	576	955	175	1,057	3,961	819
1956	275	439	282	403	682	1,126	213	1,270	4,676	924
1957	354	638	286	323	788	1,200	258	1,786	5,633	989
1958	314	694	224	250	692	1,197	219	1,359	4,949	857

Merchandise:																				
1955	148	253	93	339	458	717	123	572	2,703											579
1956	212	312	158	323	519	856	163	674	3,217											618
1957	284	477	195	242	618	907	199	853	3,975											667
1958	249	530	149	185	546	890	167	809	3,525											605
Income on investments:																				
1955	13	63	72	27	41	42	28	406	692											53
1956	16	51	96	29	48	44	26	510	823											55
1957	14	69	53	32	70	56	31	624	949											66
1958	12	68	42	16	57	61	25	425	706											61
Other services:																				
1955	40	69	30	51	77	196	24	79	566											187
1956	47	73	34	51	95	226	24	86	636											251
1957	56	92	38	49	100	237	28	109	709											256
1958	53	96	33	49	89	246	27	125	718											191
Foreign long-term investments in United States, excluding Government security transactions:																				
1955	1	1	4	1	0	2	1	-2	17											5
1956	3	3	1	2	11	2	1	4	30											3
1957	1	1	1	1	4	3	(1)	3	13											6
1958	(1)	-1	-3	(1)	(1)	3	-1	-2	-1											3
Net receipts of Latin American countries through recorded transactions with the United States:																				
1955	-57	244	18	98	6	-34	-14	-346	-85											123
1956	-105	432	7	62	-77	-131	17	-157	-38											157
1957	-170	199	(1)	97	-141	-109	11	4	-109											208
1958	-74	191	49	103	7	-84	22	-343	-129											292
Estimated net receipts by Latin America, from all imported by the United States through the Netherlands, Antilles and from transactions with the IMF:																				
1955	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	175											(1)
1956	-38	-28	19	(1)	13	(1)	(1)	188	135											9
1957	75	38	12	(1)	12	(1)	(1)	217	361											16
1958	(1)	37	11	5	-5	(1)	10	243	301											(1)
Estimated net receipts of gold and dollars by Latin American countries through transactions with other countries, other international organiza- tions, or through unrecorded transactions with the United States:																				
1955	36	-224	9	-191	2	199	30	245	106											-174
1956	4	-318	-8	-65	21	176	-24	362	148											-145
1957	-13	-323	-39	-95	139	74	-39	280	-16											-220
1958	27	-225	-36	-84	-73	83	-31	-114	-453											-294
Increase in Latin American total gold and dollar holdings:																				
1955	-21	20	27	-93	8	165	16	74	196											-51
1956	-139	86	-1	-3	-43	45	-17	393	324											21
1957	-108	-86	-20	2	10	-35	-28	501	236											4
1958	-47	-3	24	24	-71	-1	-1	-214	-281											-2

1 Negligible

2 Less than \$500,000.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

stuffs in total imports, for most of which—particularly those obtained from Latin America—the demand tends to rise less than for industrial products, and in part to the fact that relatively few of the imports from Latin America are showing a strong tendency to grow and that petroleum, which had been a fast-rising import until 3 years ago, did not continue that trend. The newer imports, such as steel, aluminum, and, of course, manufactured products, have so far been obtained almost entirely from areas other than Latin America.

Expenditures for Services

Payments to Latin America for services in 1959 amounted to slightly more than \$900 million, approximately one-fourth of the amount paid for merchandise imports but considerably higher than net payments through Government grants and loans and private capital outflows. The aggregate of services expenditures has not changed materially over the last 3 years.

Nearly half of the services expenditures resulted from international travel. Of the approximately \$440 million spent in Latin America last year for that purpose, all but about \$93 million accrued to Mexico; South America received about \$35 million to \$40 million and the Caribbean and Central American Republics about \$55 million.

Expenditures in Mexico, a large part of which consists of border transactions, were somewhat higher than in 1958, but in certain of the other Republics they were smaller.

Government Assistance

Net contributions to Latin America by the U.S. Government through grants and capital transactions declined from a record high of nearly \$600 million in 1958 to about \$365 million last year. The change was mainly in loan disbursements, which declined by nearly \$200 million, and in repayments, which rose by \$30 million. Nevertheless, net Government disbursements were as high as in the pre-1958 peak year of 1953 and substantially higher than in all other postwar years.

About half of the 1958-59 decline in new loans was in disbursements to Brazil, which were at an exceptionally high rate in 1958, in part to meet financial difficulties in that country at that time. The remainder affected several countries, principally Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and Cuba.

The decline in Export-Import Bank disbursements was somewhat larger than in total new loans. Loans under somewhat easier terms, particularly by the Development Loan Fund, and loans in foreign currencies acquired through the sale of U.S. agricultural commodities increased. Among the latter, loans to private enterprises, while still small, increased steeply from \$2 million to nearly \$8 million.

Private Capital Movements

Direct investments dropped from about \$300 million in 1958 to \$200 million in 1959, with most of the decline in the Venezuelan petroleum industry. Direct investments in other industries were about as high as in 1958 but did not recover to the rate achieved in 1956 and 1957.

The net outflow of other private capital, principally bank loans, was about \$30 million higher than in 1958 but, more important perhaps, consisted to a larger extent of long-term funds. The net outflow of funds through long-term loans was about \$140 million, as compared with \$60 million in 1958, while the net outflow of short-term funds declined by a smaller amount. The longer term loans went mainly to Mexico, Argentina, and Chile, while the net repayments were made by Cuba and Venezuela.

Of the short-term loans Venezuela received about \$100 million, which offset most of the decline in direct investments and in longer term bank loans. Short-term claims also increased on Colombia, but those on Brazil and Cuba were reduced. Combining both long- and short-term U.S. claims as reported by U.S. banks, the most important movements were net outflows of about \$87 million to Venezuela, \$68 million to Mexico, \$50 million to Argentina, \$50 million to Chile, and net returns of \$84 million from Cuba and \$36 million from Brazil.

Decline in Exports

Total receipts from Latin America, as indicated earlier, declined from 1958 to 1959 by about \$550 million, or more than 10 percent. Most of the decline was in merchandise exports, but receipts from services and income on investments were also slightly lower.

Merchandise exports were about \$3,550 million. This was about \$1.1 billion less than at the 1957 peak and halfway between the 1955 and 1956

amounts. The decline was widespread and occurred in our sales to all but 3 of the 20 Republics. Most important in dollar terms was the drop in Mexico, Brazil, and Cuba, with a decrease of over \$100 million in each of these countries. The increases were primarily in Uruguay and Colombia, but exports to the latter country were still at a very low level compared with recent years prior to 1958.

More than half of the decline was in Latin American purchases of machinery and transport equipment, and over 20 percent affected metal manufactures. Most of the remaining decline was in foodstuffs, particularly grains. Only a very small part of this decline was due to lower sales for foreign currencies under Government programs. Among the commodities which maintained their markets were chemicals including synthetic rubber and fibers, coal, pulp and paper, and some other industrial materials. It may be too early to conclude that these changes reflect longer term shifts in our exports from finished to semi-finished goods, but the industrial development in Latin America, spurred by our own investments, would favor this tendency.

The major reason for the more than \$1-billion decline in U.S. exports to the Latin American Republics since 1957 is the drop in their foreign exchange receipts. During the same period, however, exports from Europe to Latin America declined only by about \$60 million, or 2 percent (all of which occurred during 1958) and exports from Japan increased by about that amount. Thus the entire decline in Latin American purchases from industrial countries was, in the aggregate, limited to goods from the United States, and consequently our share in total Latin American imports declined. If Latin American imports from all industrialized countries had declined in the same proportion, our exports would have shrunk by about \$400 million less than they actually did. Although the larger loss in our sales may in part be due to special circumstances affecting particular countries or products, it does point to the possibility of a weakening, at least temporarily, in our competitive position.

Gold and Dollar Holdings

The overall decline in Latin American gold and liquid dollar assets of about \$230 million during 1959 includes losses of over \$400 million by Venezuela and about \$150 million by Cuba. Many

of the other countries, however, increased their liquid funds. Among the countries which had the largest gains in their reserves were Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico.

The recovery in reserves by these countries may permit them to expand their foreign purchases again. This may improve our exports. The future of our exports to all of Latin America in the longer run, however, depends basically upon the foreign exchange receipts of these countries and the success with which we compete with other nations.

Country Data

The data on the transactions between the United States and Latin America as a whole do not indicate whether the major changes are due to conditions affecting a few countries only or are characteristic for a major part of the area.

Table III provides, for the first time, data on U.S. transactions with eight of the major Latin American Republics for the years 1955-58. (Details for 1959 are not yet available.) The decline from 1957 to 1958 in our total payments to Latin America was mainly due to the drop in payments to Venezuela, mostly because of lower private investments. Of the other countries shown here, payments to Chile, Colombia, and Peru dropped slightly, but Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico had higher receipts from the United States, although business activity in the United States had declined during that period.

The largest decline in U.S. receipts from 1957 to 1958 was also from Venezuela, but receipts from all but two of the other seven countries also declined. The exceptions were Brazil, to which U.S. exports increased (reflecting higher Government loans), and Mexico, which continued expenditures in the United States at the 1957 level.

Of the eight countries shown here all except Venezuela improved their balance with the United States from 1957 to 1958; most important was the improvement of the balance of Cuba (by about \$150 million), of Argentina (by about \$100 million), and of Chile (by about \$50 million). The decline in the balance of Venezuela with the United States was about \$350 million, however, and about \$25 million more if the oil purchases through the Netherlands Antilles are included.

As indicated earlier, the changes in transactions between the United States and Latin America and

the gold and dollar transactions with the International Monetary Fund do not explain the changes in Latin American gold and dollar holdings. The residual reflects either dollar transactions with countries other than the United States, international institutions other than the International Monetary Fund, or unrecorded payments to or by the United States.

For the area as a whole, these transactions resulted in net payments by Latin America (including the Panamanian shipping companies) of about \$750 million in 1958, or approximately \$500 million more than in the previous year. The rise in this dollar flow, which cannot be explained by recorded transactions with the United States and the International Monetary Fund, was largest between these 2 years. The further increase from 1958 to 1959 was less than \$100 million.

The data on U.S. transactions with the major Latin American countries indicate which of the countries account for a major part of these residual transactions and which countries account for the major changes in them during recent years. An association of these transactions with specific countries may in turn shed some light upon their nature.

First, it may be of some interest to note that over the years examined here these residual transactions resulted in consistently large net payments by Brazil and Colombia. Among the countries having large net receipts were Mexico for all of the 4 years, Venezuela for the years 1955 to 1957, and Cuba for 1957. Some of the large net payments, especially by Brazil, and large net receipts by Venezuela were for oil and oil products originating in the latter country.

The increase in these net payments from 1957 to 1958 was mainly in the transactions by Venezuela and Cuba and apparently also by some of the 12 countries for which separate estimates have not been made. The rise in net payments by these countries was in part offset by a large decline in net payments by Brazil and by minor changes in the balance of other countries. This indicates that the large rise in the net dollar payments by Latin America as a whole, not explained by recorded transactions with the United States or the International Monetary Fund, was largely due to transactions by two countries and was not characteristic for the area as a whole.

A comparison of these computations with balance-of-payments tables prepared by Venezuela

does not indicate an increase in net payments through recorded transactions with countries other than the United States in the magnitude indicated here. Instead, the nearly \$400-million shift in the movement of Venezuelan gold and dollar holdings which cannot be explained on the basis of U.S. data or recorded transactions with the United States or the International Monetary Fund appears to correspond to a nearly equal shift in unrecorded transactions, perhaps capital movements in the Venezuelan balance of payments.

The balance of payments of Cuba does not show a similar change in "errors and omissions." About two-thirds of the change in the movement of Cuban gold and dollar holdings not explained by U.S. data on transactions with the United States and the International Monetary Fund can be explained by shifts in Cuba's trade balance with other areas. The major factor in this shift from 1957 to 1958, however, was a decline in exports to other areas by about \$100 million, rather than a rise in imports from them, which expanded only by \$40 million.

Thus it appears that a large part of the increase from 1957 to 1958 in net payments by Latin America through transactions other than those recorded in the U.S. balance of payments was due to unrecorded capital movements to the United States or to other countries, mostly from Venezuela. Shifts in trade or recorded capital transactions in favor of other areas were minor in comparison.

Mr. Dillon Attends Meetings, Talks at Geneva, Vienna, Belgrade, Paris

The Department of State announced on July 1 (press release 375) that Under Secretary Dillon would leave Washington on July 9 for Geneva, where he will represent the United States at the ministerial meeting of the 30th session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, July 11-14.

Later he will visit Vienna, July 14-17, and Belgrade, July 17-20, to discuss matters of mutual interest with officials of the Austrian and Yugoslav Governments and U.S. representatives. While in Vienna Mr. Dillon will address the Austrian Society for Foreign Policy on July 15. From Yugoslavia he will go to Paris to attend the ministerial conference on the reconstitution

of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation on July 22 and 23.

Members of his party will include: Graham Martin, John M. Leddy, Robert C. Brewster, and Dixon Donnelley, Special Assistants to the Under Secretary; Dudley W. Miller, Executive Secretariat; Mrs. Dorothy de Borchgrave, personal assistant to the Under Secretary; and Miss Eva Hallam, Mr. Leddy's secretary.

U.S. Makes Loan to Guatemala for Development Work

The Department of State announced on June 29 (press release 368) that the United States and Guatemala had on that day signed an agreement by which the International Cooperation Administration will lend \$3,500,000 to help Guatemala carry forward its economic development program.

The funds, which are in addition to approximately \$2,300,000 made available by ICA to Guatemala for technical cooperation in 1960, will be used to help finance development projects in the fields of aided self-help housing, water supply, malaria eradication, environmental sanitation, vocational education, school construction, highways, and rural community services.

The loan agreement was signed by the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States, Carlos Alejos, on behalf of his Government and by Samuel C. Waugh, President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, on behalf of the United States. The bank administers ICA loans made under provisions of the Mutual Security Program.

U.S. Welcomes French Trade Liberalization

Department Statement

Press release 356 dated June 27

The U.S. Government welcomes the announcement made on June 27 of the action of the French Government in freeing further goods from import quota controls. We understand that as a result of this move only two industrial products remain under discriminatory quota control from the dollar area. We appreciate this additional step by

France in its steady progress toward the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] objective of elimination of quota controls on imports. We regret, however, the absence of agricultural products from the new list and hope to see early removal of French import quota controls on agricultural products.

We understand that the list includes unvulcanized rubber, steel chains and link belts, saws, pumps and compressors, typewriter-accounting machines, statistical machines, hydraulic valves, electronic tubes, liquid meters, printed silk, rainwear, linoleum, refrigeration machinery, earth-drilling equipment, printing machinery, machine tools, vacuum cleaners, and air navigation equipment. We expect to receive a detailed list of the newly liberalized products, which we will make available to the press upon receipt and which will be published in the Department of Commerce publication *Foreign Commerce Weekly*.

Freedom Day

by Richard H. Davis

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*¹

We have come together on this island—now named Liberty Island—on a day set aside to honor the cause of freedom. The statue at whose base we stand is a world symbol of the devotion to liberty which we share with that great nation, France, whose gift it was and whose traditions have inspired us and other nations of the world.

It is fitting that we speak on this day of the meaning of freedom. Since man began to live as a member of a group, he has concerned himself with achieving and expanding his freedom as an individual in society. As civilization developed, the goals of personal freedom broadened. Starting from the basic freedom of his person, man sought the freedom to acquire and hold property, to move about freely, to practice his religion, to think and express himself freely, and in order to protect these freedoms, to influence the way he was to be governed.

As man gained these personal freedoms and began to share in the life of his nation, he identi-

¹ Address made at the Freedom Day ceremonies at the Statue of Liberty, New York, N.Y., on June 29 (press release 363 dated June 28).

fied himself with the nation and with its freedom. He recognized that, if his nation were to fall under foreign control, this would almost surely cost him some of his own freedom.

Thus the search has been for both individual and group freedom, man recognizing how much one depended upon the other. As a nation born in a search for personal freedom, which soon fought a war of national independence in order to protect this freedom, we can hardly forget that the two are often inseparable. From our own history and traditions we support the hopes and efforts of others to live as free men in free nations. As we have grown as a nation, we have joined increasingly in efforts to build a world in which this would be possible for all men. This world, as we see it, is one in which free men and free nations, joined in the United Nations and in other regional and international organizations, may move toward common goals.

Let me speak briefly of some of these goals and of our role in seeking to attain them.

All mankind hopes for a world free from the threat and fear of war—a world in which arms and armies are not necessary, in which the awesome power of the atom is exploited only to serve mankind, in which tensions and disputes have given way to agreement and understanding. We have joined actively in attempts to achieve these ends. We shall continue to pursue them firmly and patiently in spite of difficulties which are placed in our path.

But we do not stop there. The world we seek is one which is not only free from the fear of war and destruction. It is one in which all men live in freedom to decide their own destinies, to govern themselves in ways of their choosing, and to enjoy the fruits of nature and knowledge in gaining a fuller and richer life.

We live in an era when new nations are emerging into independence while others, once free, are denied the freedom which is their right.

In the free world during the past 20 years nation after nation has achieved independence—including three African nations [Malagasy Republic, Republic of the Congo, and Somali Republic] during this very week—and others are moving toward it with the understanding and assistance of the

former metropolitan powers. In the same period nine Eastern European nations have fallen under the yoke of Communist imperialism. We will never recognize this as a normal situation. We will always support the rights and aspirations of these peoples to have governments and institutions of their choosing. The world was told recently that the Soviet Government adheres to the principle of national self-determination. If this be so, then the peoples of these nine European nations are no less entitled to the right of self-determination, the exercise of political freedom, than those peoples of Africa and Asia who have so recently won their independence.

In the free world we are witnessing the process of self-determination in action as nations emerge into independence. One after another they are seeking to establish and strengthen the institutions of free government.

Many of these nations are faced with the challenge of building their economies, of enlarging the means of education, communication, and transportation, of securing for their populations the means for a fuller life. Upon this depends to a considerable extent the growth of democratic institutions, which are themselves crucial to the realization of the goals which they—and we—seek. We have no wish to influence the patterns of government of these societies. We wish only that they have the maximum opportunity to develop as open and free societies in accord with the expressed will of their populations.

Both directly and within the framework of the United Nations we are assisting these nations in their development. Our purposes are clear. Our nation was born and grew with a vision of freedom and a full life. We have worked and fought to preserve this freedom for ourselves and for others. We now have the opportunity and the obligation to play a role in the spreading of conditions in which the peoples of the emerging nations may realize their own visions of freedom.

As the great lady who stands above us holds high the torch of liberty, we must hold high the light of freedom for all so that we may move together toward a world free of want, free of fear, governed by the rule of law, in which man is limited only by the range of his vision.

Mutual Security Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1961

Following are statements made by Secretary Herter and Under Secretary Dillon before the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 28 in support of the Mutual Security Program for fiscal year 1961.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY HERTER

Press release 361 dated June 28

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you in support of the request for appropriations for the Mutual Security Program. I want to speak to you briefly regarding the significance of this program and the importance of adequate appropriations for it. I am accompanied by Under Secretary Dillon, who is, as you know, directly responsible for the coordination of the Mutual Security Program. With your permission I will ask him to address himself specifically to the effect of the mutual security appropriations bill which has been passed in the House of Representatives.

Just a little over 3 months ago I appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to support the mutual security authorizing legislation.¹ I spoke at that time of the fact that we faced a period of negotiations of critical importance and of the uncertainty as to whether these negotiations would succeed in reducing international tensions. I pointed out then that negotiations in and of themselves did not alter the basic conflict of ideas and ideologies. I said that the fact of negotiations did not warrant any relaxation of our efforts to safeguard ourselves and our friends and allies from the menace of international communism.

The events of the past 3 months underscore, if underscoring were needed, the harsh and basic realities with which we are confronted—realities which necessitated the institution of the Mutual Security Program and which compel its continuance and strengthening. There can be no possible doubt that the goal of the Communists to achieve world communism remains unchanged. There can be no possible doubt that the leaders of this powerful bloc believe that the end justifies the means and will employ any means which they believe will help achieve their goal.

The present thrust of Communist effort is also indisputably concentrated on attempting to divide the free world, to weaken the confidence of other free nations in the leadership of the United States, to pressure and to persuade such nations to draw back from association with us. These are obvious moves designed to isolate us from our friends and allies and them from us.

This is not of course a new objective, nor are these present pressures without numerous precedents. Rather it is a reaffirmation of the constancy of the Communist purpose, an unmistakable notice that the determination to establish a Communist world continues unaltered and undiminished.

Basic Purposes of Mutual Security Program

Peoples everywhere, in this country, in the nations allied with us and in those uncommitted, and indeed those in the Sino-Soviet bloc, are concerned with and will be affected by the nature of our response to the challenge renewed by recent events. They will examine our actions carefully, seeking indications as to whether our adherence to our principles and our purposes will be altered. The resoluteness with which we provide for our

¹ BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1960, p. 566.

Mutual Security Program, which is the principal instrument through which we give support to our established principles and purposes, will be the object of particular attention.

Thus, the action taken by the Congress on this bill takes on special significance at this time. It will symbolize to millions of people the character of our reaction to recent developments.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to be clear about this. I believe the Mutual Security Program is neither more nor less necessary because of the events of recent months. It was necessary before these events occurred; it is still necessary. The renewed Communist pressures do demonstrate and emphasize the threat to all free peoples which the Mutual Security Program helps to resist and rebuff. These pressures do spotlight the action of the Congress on the program and will intensify the impact of the nature of that action on world opinion.

Our course is and must be based on a steadfast adherence to the purposes which are advanced in the Mutual Security Program. We seek to defend ourselves and to assure our own security; we seek equally to support the right of every nation freely to determine its own system of government; we seek equally to help in the progressive betterment of human beings. It is for these reasons that we have had a Mutual Security Program; it is for these reasons that we should and must continue it.

House Appropriation Bill

The House of Representatives has enacted an appropriation bill which would provide \$3,584 million, approximately \$600 million less than we believed to be needed and justified. The House Appropriations Committee reduced the amounts requested by nearly \$800 million, almost evenly divided between military and nonmilitary programs. Action on the House floor resulted in a restoration of half the cut in the military funds. There was *no* restoration of economic funds.

Certainly, the full amount requested by the President² for military assistance is urgently needed to maintain an adequate defensive strength in our allied nations. The action of the House in effecting a partial restoration is most helpful. However, I want to make two points.

² For text of the President's message to Congress, see *ibid.*, Mar. 7, 1960, p. 369.

First, the maintenance of defensive strength in our allies does not depend solely on the provision of military assistance, vital as it is. Economic assistance in the form of defense support is equally essential not only to maintain the forces which use the arms but to safeguard the economies of the recipient nations from the strains imposed by their military effort. Military assistance and defense support are of equal importance in maintaining strong allies.

Second, I wish to emphasize that, if we confine our response to the threat of communism to the erection of defensive military forces, we shall surely lose the contest in the end. Deterrent defensive strength is essential; it must be maintained; but it is futile if the societies it protects do not concurrently progress.

We must recognize—and in this legislation we do recognize—that there is at work in the world today a ferment of freedom and of progress stirring hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These people want and require a better life; this desire for improvement is a major and unquenchable human motivation. In the less privileged nations of the world this desire is a growing force based on an increasing recognition of the possibilities for advance and an increasing rejection of second- or third-class status as world citizens.

The challenge which the need for progress presents cannot be ignored and the response to it must be no less vigorous or adequate than the response to threats of military force. To the majority of the underdeveloped people of the world, preoccupied with the enormous obstacles to self-improvement, this challenge is the significant and important one. It would be most unwise if our actions gave credence to the false concept that our interests were purely selfish and the welfare of others a matter of no concern.

One further point—and Under Secretary Dillon will have more to say on this subject—has to do with restrictions. The House bill has imposed a number of restrictions on the use of funds provided and on the administration of them. I ask you in reviewing these to consider quite seriously whether there is real justification for restricting the administrators of this program, both those now in office and those of the administration to be elected this fall, in ways which we sincerely believe will seriously and adversely impede the

effective employment of this program to protect and advance our national interests.

One such amendment in particular I want to comment on. This amendment is set forth in section 101 and concerns the furnishing of documents. I must tell you that section 101 is totally unacceptable to the executive branch and is deemed by it to be unconstitutional. It raises an issue which was the subject of intensive discussion last year and involves both congressional and executive powers about which each is highly and properly sensitive. This committee took the lead last year in resolving the issue and succeeded in writing a provision of law, section 111(d) of the Senate Appropriations Act, 1960, which has proved acceptable to both branches of the Government and reenactment of which was recommended by the President. It is my earnest hope that, in order to avoid prolonged and unnecessary controversy, the amendment proposed in the House bill will be rejected and the mutually agreed section 111(d) reenacted.

In summary, gentlemen, I urge the provision of adequate funds both for the maintenance of strong defenses and for the promotion of human betterment. I also urge appropriations free of crippling and unwarranted restrictions. Such actions on your part will make possible a sound and balanced program and will demonstrate to all the world that the United States maintains its principles and purposes, without fear or alarm but with dignity and steadfastness.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY DILLON

Press release 362 dated June 28

I appreciate the opportunity to come before you again in order to indicate to you our position with respect to certain provisions of the Mutual Security Appropriations Act adopted by the House of Representatives which give us concern.³

The Mutual Security Appropriation Act passed by the House of Representatives fails in five significant ways to respond adequately to the requirements of our national interests and security:

1. It provides insufficient funds to support the policies and programs authorized in the substan-

tive legislation and needed to maintain U.S. leadership.

2. It imposes restrictions on the use of the funds appropriated which are inconsistent with and would seriously impede the effective execution of these policies and programs.

3. It provides limitations on administrative funds which would severely restrict the capacity of the executive branch to assure efficient management of the funds appropriated and the programs authorized.

4. It includes two other amendments which seriously threaten the execution of the program.

5. It fails to include two provisions important to the execution of the program.

Insufficiency of Funds

First, as to funds: The House bill provides \$1.8 billion for *Military Assistance*, which is \$200 million less than the amount needed for essential military equipment and training for modernization of our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and Far Eastern allied forces.

It provides but \$600 million for *Defense Support*. This is \$95 million less than the current year's appropriation, \$124 million less than the executive branch believed necessary, and \$75 million less than the Congress itself has authorized to be appropriated. The action of the Congress in sharply reducing the authorization for defense support was taken prior to the recent intensification of Communist pressures. The full appropriation of the authorized defense support amount will scarcely permit our allies to maintain the forces for which equipment is being furnished. A cut of the dimensions proposed by the House will jeopardize the economic stability of our staunch allies along the Sino-Soviet perimeter and thus decrease essential military strength at the very moment Sino-Soviet pressures are being intensified.

The severe reduction in *Special Assistance* also presents an especially critical problem. It would force the early mutilation or abandonment of current programs required by specific U.S. interests and make it impossible to respond to new needs such as those posed by the emerging countries of Africa. Special assistance covers a wide range of situations, including assuring to the United States the use of military facilities in North Africa, the maintenance of stability in the Middle East, the prevention of economic chaos in Bolivia and Haiti,

³ For a statement issued by Under Secretary Dillon on June 15, see *ibid.*, July 4, 1960, p. 28.

participation in malaria eradication, and support of American-sponsored schools abroad. The purposes which are served by special assistance have not been challenged during the congressional review; indeed each committee has stressed the importance of the components of particular interest to it. Yet the amount provided in the House bill, \$206 million, is \$39 million less than last year's appropriation, \$50 million or nearly 20 percent below that authorized by the Congress, and \$62 million less than the executive branch believed necessary to carry out the programs authorized. The full amount authorized is urgently required.

The reductions in the amounts requested for the *Development Loan Fund* and *Technical Cooperation* are in the long run equally inimical to our national interests. These are the primary instruments through which we aid and encourage the less developed nations of the world to satisfy the needs and wants of their peoples for progress without resort to communism. A failure on our part to provide such help in adequate measure seriously restricts their freedom of choice. The House appropriation of \$150 million for bilateral technical cooperation is \$22 million less than what was requested and authorized and nearly \$11 million less than the current fiscal year 1960 program. The clear need for new and increased programs in Africa cannot be met unless additional funds are provided.

Restrictions on Use of Funds

Second, as to restriction on use of funds: The House bill imposes new restrictions on the use of contingency funds and on technical cooperation funds which would severely limit their effective employment to achieve the purposes for which their appropriation was authorized. Neither restriction is justified; much harm and no benefit can result from their retention.

The amendment regarding contingency funds would deny the President a degree of flexibility of proven value, clearly intended by authorizing legislation to be available, and would seriously and adversely hamper the effective use of these funds to advance our security interests.

The principal need for the contingency fund has been, and is expected to continue to be, to meet the needs of situations which are totally unforeseen. The need to use such funds as the fiscal year progresses to make minor but vitally important

adjustments in country programs which cannot be made within the appropriations for the various categories of aid is of equal importance even though the extent of such use has been relatively small. Projections of aid requirements set forth in the congressional presentation necessarily are based on forecasts of the economic and political situations likely to develop over the ensuing fiscal year. *Neither the executive branch nor the Congress can afford to jeopardize our national interests by forcing rigid adherence to projections which may be and often are invalidated by changing circumstances.*

It is in these cases that the power to adjust aid levels using a small portion of contingency funds has proven most valuable. The flexible use of these funds, which total less than 5 percent of the entire mutual security appropriation, is essential to carry out the policies and programs of the legislation.

The restriction contained in the House bill could be construed not only to prevent the use of these funds to effect necessary adjustments in going programs but to preclude the use of contingency funds to augment aid to any recipient of such aid irrespective of the extent to which changes in circumstances justified such action. Under such an interpretation, for example, contingency funds could not be used to augment a military program in a given country, even if overt Communist attack should occur. Thus the language of the provision is subject to the interpretation of imposing an even greater degree of inflexibility than presumably intended by the sponsors of the restriction.

The restriction is contrary to the established use of the contingency fund, repeatedly made known to the Congress and accepted in congressional action in this year's authorization bill. Its rejection is strongly urged.

The limitation prohibiting the use of technical cooperation funds to initiate any technical cooperation project or activity which has not been previously justified to the Congress would destroy the flexibility which has been at the heart of a decade of success of the point 4 program. This prohibition removes the possibility of making adjustments in technical cooperation programs during the course of negotiation or to meet new needs of higher priority. It alters the program from one of cooperation with foreign countries to a unilateral take-it-or-leave-it program.

Restrictions on Administrative Funds

Third, as to restrictions on administrative funds: The House bill denies funds in the amounts needed to assure effective administration of the Mutual Security Program.

In the case of ICA administrative expenses the amounts provided are inadequate to effectively administer its programs. Restoration of the \$2 million authorized is urgently needed.

In the case of *Military Assistance*, the *Development Loan Fund*, and the *Inspector General and Comptroller* the House bill does not save any money. It merely limits the amount of the funds appropriated which can be used for administration. This ignores the substantially increased supervisory and implementation workload of the Development Loan Fund with respect to the 150 loans in being at the start of the new fiscal year. Funds for this work must be made available to assure that appropriations already committed by the Development Loan Fund are well spent. It impedes and restricts the efforts of the Defense Department to improve administrative management in the military assistance program. In the case of the Inspector General and Comptroller, the limitation virtually makes it impossible for his duties to be faithfully and fully performed. This office, created last year by the Congress to assure better management, inspection, and evaluation of the program, is now to be denied the funds required to do the job. This would weaken our ability to remedy the type of errors which Congress has long criticized.

Restriction on Employment of Personnel

Fourth, as to other provisions: Two provisions which appear in the House bill by virtue of amendments on the House floor are particularly objectionable. The first of these, section 101, dealing with the furnishing of documents, has been discussed by Secretary Herter. The second is section 112 restricting employment of ICA personnel. This amendment also raises anew a proposal which was rejected by the Congress last year and which was not recommended by the House Appropriations Committee.

The amendment in section 112 would prevent the major segments of American industry and the academic community from employing former ICA employees for 2 years. It should be rejected, as it was last year, as unnecessary to prevent im-

proper activity, for which adequate legislation exists, as an unwarranted penalization of American business as well as of ICA employees, and as a crippling restraint on recruitment of skilled technicians.

Provisions Omitted From House Bill

Fifth, as to omitted provisions: An important omission in the House bill is provision for the continued availability of obligated balances of prior-year funds for use for the general purposes of the new appropriations. This authority has been in every previous act for the last 10 years and is essential to the businesslike and effective conduct of this complex program. Its denial would preclude the deobligation and reobligation of these funds even though they were to be used for the same general purposes as those for which they were appropriated and obligated. This would seriously impede efficient program management and, in certain circumstances, require repudiation of outstanding commitments. The reinstatement of this authority is essential.

Finally, the deletion on the floor of the House of the reapportionment of unobligated balances, despite the intention of the House Appropriations Committee that these be available in addition to the specific new appropriations, has the effect of a reduction of \$42 million. These funds are essential and their addition was intended by the House Appropriations Committee. The restoration of these funds is urged.

Gentlemen, the provision of adequate funds and the removal of unnecessary and impeding restrictions on their use are essential to an effective Mutual Security Program.

Department Urges Senate Approval of Tax Convention With India

*Statement by Under Secretary Dillon*¹

It is a pleasure to appear before you in support of the tax convention with India.² In doing so I wish to discuss the foreign policy considerations involved in this convention, particularly as they relate to the tax-sparing provision, article XII of the convention.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 28 (press release 360).

² For text, see S. Ex. H, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

The committee is fully aware of the importance the United States attaches to economic progress in the less developed countries of the free world and to the vital role which private capital can and does play in that progress. You are also aware of our policy to stimulate further the flow of private capital to encourage the maximum of private participation in the development of less developed areas. We all recognize the fact that Government funds, while still required in large measure, cannot do the developmental job alone.

United States direct private investment abroad has tended to increase in recent years; however, the share of this investment in the less developed countries, particularly Asia and Africa, remains disappointingly low. The average annual flow of U.S. direct private investment in the general area including Africa, the Middle East, and Asia since 1953 has amounted to about \$158 million, a mere 13 percent of the global amount. At least 60 percent of this investment has been in the petroleum industry. Even the sharp spurt in our total foreign investment in 1956 and 1957 did not appreciably increase the flow to Asia and Africa.

I shall not go into the reasons for the low level of our private investments in the less developed countries. They are many, and the committee has heard them before. But I would like to emphasize that an important factor deterring an increased flow of private capital to less developed countries is the existence in many of those countries of an unfavorable investment climate. We are constantly seeking to encourage and assist these countries to improve their investment climates in order to promote investment and development.

Need for Private Investment in Development

The Government of India shares with us a recognition of the importance of the private sector generally and of the need for foreign private investment to supplement India's own resources in its great developmental effort. In the past few years the Indian Government has taken concrete steps to improve the investment climate for domestic private enterprise and as a means of encouraging an inflow of foreign private capital. It has, for example, established a number of institutions to provide medium- and long-term credits to private firms. In addition to the successful Government-owned Industrial Finance Corporation, a

completely privately owned investment institution has been in operation since 1955, aided by a large interest-free loan from the Indian Government. That Government has also used various tax concessions to encourage private industrial development. Since 1949 all new industrial undertakings have been exempted, for 5 years from the start of manufacture, from the payment of corporation income tax on income up to 6 percent per annum of their invested capital. Since March 1954 all industrial enterprises have been granted a development tax rebate equal to 25 percent of the cost of new plant and machinery in addition to existing liberal depreciation allowances. The wealth tax introduced in 1957 was abolished this year. There have been other tax incentives as well, described more fully in the technical memorandum which I understand the Treasury Department has prepared for your committee's use.

Of particular significance to U.S. investors was an invitation issued in 1957 by the Indian Government to foreign investors to construct fertilizer plants in India and the conclusion in 1957 and amendment in 1959 of an investment guaranty agreement with the United States. Under this agreement investment guaranties of \$7 million have been issued and applications are being processed for an additional \$77 million. In addition, the Indian Government has warmly welcomed the four U.S. trade missions which visited India over the past 18 months. The members of these missions were favorably impressed by the prospects for expanded trade with and investment in India.

These developments are, of course, highly encouraging to the United States and the free world. I am sure you will agree with me that the success of the Indian experiment—an experiment toward economic progress in a free and open society—is of vital concern to us, particularly when many countries of Asia and Africa are watching closely the relative efforts of India and Communist China. India is one of the few less developed countries in which conditions are particularly favorable for economic growth. We are supporting a greater concentration of effort in economic assistance for these countries and are seeking to supplement this governmental effort by private means wherever possible.

One of the ways in which we hope to support the endeavor of the Indian Government to attract more private capital is by concluding the tax

convention which is now before your committee. In the past we have found tax conventions extremely valuable in our economic relations with the more developed countries because they minimize or eliminate the extra tax burden which would otherwise exist. Tax treaties also create a favorable trade and investment atmosphere by bringing about a broad adjustment of two tax systems in such a way that movements of trade and investment are facilitated and conflicts of tax policy are greatly reduced or even eliminated. We now have tax treaties with 21 countries which place our economic relations with these countries under a clear and consistent tax regime.

Our tax treaties are, with only two exceptions (Honduras and Pakistan), with the more fully developed countries. Despite their obvious value to the United States and other developed countries, the reciprocal advantages of the treaties have unfortunately been far less apparent to the less developed countries. Their general lack of interest in concluding conventions with us in the past has been due primarily to the fact that they are capital importers, not exporters, and their companies do not as a rule invest abroad. Accordingly, benefits appeared to be largely in our favor and revenue losses almost entirely on their side. It is only recently that the less developed countries have begun to view with considerable interest the tax convention as a vehicle for attracting U.S. private investment. This is essentially because we have on a number of occasions announced our willingness to introduce a new element in our conventions which would give recognition by means of a credit to tax incentives adopted by less developed countries to attract new capital. I am referring here to the tax-sparing provision such as the one contained in the convention with India. We have included this provision in two other conventions which have been negotiated but not yet signed. In addition, discussions have been held with six other countries on tax conventions which would include a credit for tax sparing.

As you know, such a provision was also contained in the convention originally negotiated with Pakistan. However, the expiration of Pakistan's incentive law before final ratification of the convention removed the basis for the tax-sparing provision, and it was therefore excluded from the treaty by recommendation of your com-

mittee.³ In taking this action you will recall that your committee made it clear that it did so without prejudice to its future consideration of the tax-sparing principle.

U.S. Position on Tax-Sparing Principle

The tax-sparing provision in the Indian treaty is inherently reasonable, is in line with our treaty policy, and will accomplish our policy objectives. A few words about each one of these points will clarify our position.

Tax sparing is inherently reasonable. We should make it possible for underdeveloped countries to use tax incentives as a policy device for the encouragement of private investment in a given field. If a less developed country wishes to attract domestic and foreign capital into new industries, tax incentives are clearly among the techniques which that country may utilize. Such a country would be expected to welcome action by the United States which would recognize the special benefit which it is granting to an industry.

Tax sparing is, further, an extension consistent with our treaty policy. Our basic principle of taxing all income of all United States nationals, residents, and corporations, no matter where such income originates, requires modification at many points. Its main corrective is the policy, confirmed in our treaties, of granting credit for foreign taxes—a policy by which we give foreign tax authorities a first claim on income arising under their jurisdiction. By the tax-sparing principle we concede to them the further power not only to tax but to forgo taxes. The credit for tax exemption leaves the foreign tax authorities free to exempt new investments from taxation secure in the knowledge that these exemptions will not be nullified by the operation of the U.S. tax-credit mechanism.

The tax-sparing principle will improve our relations with many less developed countries, because they consider tax sparing a significant step toward a reconciliation of their and our tax philosophies.

The tax-sparing device, almost alone among measures for the encouragement of private investment, permits us to extend tax benefits selectively to areas and under conditions which will directly further our economic policy. It is in the

³ For background, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1959, p. 853.

less developed areas that this device proves to be most useful, and it is our intention to continue to negotiate tax-sparing provisions only after careful examination of the local tax concessions and the way they are administered.

Tax sparing is geared directly to the economic policy objectives of less developed countries. It operates only if and when new industries are actually established. Thus the prospect of increased economic activity, and the prospect of a broader tax base, is tied directly to the temporary revenue concession offered. By enabling less developed countries to use this tool as far as American investors are concerned, we can hope to open up a broader field for the private sector in general.

In conclusion I wish to state that the tax treaty with India should make an important contribution to sound economic relationships between our two countries, and accordingly, on behalf of the Department of State, I urge its ratification.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Mexico Agree To Extend Aviation Agreement Until August 14

Press release 572 dated June 30

Manuel Tello, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, and Robert C. Hill, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, on June 30 concluded at Mexico City an exchange of notes extending for 45 days the provisional arrangement on civil aviation between the two countries, which was due to expire on that date.

The agreement to extend the present arrangement until August 14, 1960, was based upon the mutual desire of both Governments to provide additional time to complete the air transport talks which were initiated at Washington on April 26, 1960.¹ These talks were recessed on May 13, 1960, at which time both delegations agreed to consult their respective Governments to review the progress made and obtain further instructions. It is expected that the talks will be resumed at Mexico

City in 2 or 3 weeks, the exact date to be established in the near future by mutual agreement between the two Governments.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. Acceptance deposited: Korea, June 22, 1960.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1959, with annex. Opened for signature at Washington April 6 through 24, 1959. Entered into force July 16, 1959, for part I and parts III to VIII, and August 1, 1959, for part II. TIAS 4302. Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, June 27, 1960.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement extending the technical cooperation agricultural and livestock program agreement of January 16, 1951, as amended (TIAS 2430, 2514, and 3268). Signed at Santiago June 15, 1960. Entered into force June 15, 1960.

Denmark

Agreement approving the procedures for the reciprocal filing of classified patent applications in the United States and Denmark. Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen June 13 and 20, 1960. Entered into force June 20, 1960.

India

Agreement providing for a grant of nuclear research equipment in the field of agriculture (gamma irradiation and fly sterilization facility). Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi April 22 and June 13, 1960. Entered into force June 13, 1960.

Israel

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of January 7, 1960 (TIAS 4401). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 30, 1960. Entered into force June 30, 1960.

Mexico

Agreement extending the provisional air transport agreement, as amended (TIAS 3776, 4099, 4269). Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico June 30, 1960. Entered into force June 30, 1960.

Turkey

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 22, 1959 (TIAS 4391). Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara May 31, 1960. Entered into force May 31, 1960.

United Kingdom

Agreement concerning the establishment in the Bahama Islands of a long-range aid to navigation station. Signed at Washington June 24, 1960. Entered into force June 24, 1960.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 16, 1960, p. 804, and June 6, 1960, p. 941.

Security Council Considers Argentine Complaint on Eichmann Case

The U.N. Security Council on June 22 and 23 debated an Argentine complaint concerning the transfer of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina by Israel. Following are two statements made in the Council by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, together with the text of a resolution adopted on June 23.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 22

U.S./U.N. press release 3420

The matter before the Council concerns the removal from the territory of Argentina of Adolf Eichmann, for the purpose of putting the said Eichmann on trial before an Israeli court on charges of responsibility for systematic mass murder of Jews and others in World War II.

Clearly the way in which Eichmann was apprehended has been the cause of an unfortunate strain in the relations between the two countries most concerned, whose relations normally are friendly.

In these circumstances the United States believes that three considerations are uppermost.

First, nothing which we do or say in the Council should further impair or complicate or embitter the otherwise normal and good relations between Argentina and Israel, or make a fair settlement of this matter more difficult.

Second, in the interests of peace and good order among nations, international law and practices in such matters as this should be upheld.

And third, the whole matter cannot be considered apart from the monstrous acts with which Eichmann is charged. He has been charged with the systematic slaughter of some 6,000,000 people whose offense under the Nazi law, which he served, was that they were Jews. It is a record of mur-

der so savage, and so staggering in its extent, that even our century of colossal tragedy and endless brutalities has witnessed nothing to surpass it.

In lists submitted to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Eichmann was described as a war criminal by at least three of the countries which suffered under Hitler: I refer to France, Czechoslovakia, and the Netherlands. He is reported also to have supervised mass murders during World War II in Hungary—that unhappy land.

Mr. President, in view of this all too extensive background we can well understand the strong feeling of the Government of Israel, many of whose citizens are the children, brothers, sisters, and parents of people murdered in Europe hardly more than 15 years ago.

The United States with its allies fought World War II against nazism. We were against it then; we are relentlessly against it now.

If the Council will forgive a personal recollection, I saw the concentration camp at Dachau at the time that it was captured by the Army. The memory of those literally thousands of piled-up human bodies will stay with me through life.

We believe, therefore, that whatever action the Council may take on this matter, and whatever is said in this debate, we must make it clear that not only do we not condone the monstrous acts with which Eichmann is charged; we remember them with horror and with boundless pity for his victims.

We may also, I think, repudiate the totally baseless Soviet innuendo that there is Nazi influence in NATO. NATO exists to defend freedom from totalitarianism. Let the Soviet Union attack it on that ground, if attack it they must in this debate.

Mr. President, this issue with which the Council must deal is the complaint of Argentina that her sovereignty has been infringed by the manner in which Eichmann was removed. It is on this account that Argentina seeks appropriate reparation.

We understand clearly the concern of Argentina that its laws and its sovereign rights shall be respected so that order shall prevail. It is legitimate.

Mr. President, the draft resolution before the Council¹ appears to meet the considerations which I have described. It is drawn up in moderate terms which in our view should not prejudice a peaceful solution.

The United States would, however, like to suggest two additions which we hope will be accepted. We propose first an additional preambular paragraph to precede the paragraph which reads, "Noting at the same time that . . ." and so forth. This new paragraph would read as follows:

Mindful of the universal condemnation of the persecution of the Jews under the Nazis, and of the concern of people in all countries that Eichmann should be brought to appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is accused,

I think that expresses what is in the hearts of many of us in the United States and in many other countries.

We also propose that a new third operative paragraph be added which would read as follows:

Expresses the hope that the traditionally friendly relations between Argentina and Israel will be advanced.

Mr. President, we believe that these additions would improve the text and be in accord with the views of most members of the Council. We believe they also express the hope of Argentina and Israel.

To sum up, we wish to see this question disposed of in a way which will make clear the world's abhorrence of the crimes with which Eichmann is charged; which will uphold the rule of international law; and, finally, which will help Argentina and Israel to solve this matter between themselves and to renew their traditionally friendly relations. We believe the pending resolution with the amendments which I propose meets those requirements.

¹ U.N. doc. S 4345.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 23

U.S./U.N. press release 2421

In her speech yesterday the Foreign Minister of Israel [Golda Meir] drew attention to the phrase "adequate reparation" and inquired as to its precise meaning. She made the thoroughly reasonable contention that if the Council was to accept the phrase "adequate reparation" the Council should know beforehand what "adequate reparation" was intended to mean.

Accordingly the United States now wishes to state its view of what this phrase means.

The United States considers that "adequate reparation" will have been made by the expression of views by the Security Council in the pending resolution taken together with the statement of the Foreign Minister of Israel making apology on behalf of the Government of Israel. We therefore think that when we have adopted the pending resolution "adequate reparation" will have been made and that the incident will then be closed. The normal and friendly relations between the two Governments can then progress.

It is on this understanding of the meaning of this resolution that the United States yesterday stated its position.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION²

The Security Council,

Having examined the complaint that the transfer of Adolf Eichmann to the territory of Israel constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the Argentine Republic,

Considering that the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations,

Having regard to the fact that reciprocal respect for and the mutual protection of the sovereign rights of States are an essential condition for their harmonious coexistence,

Noting that the repetition of acts such as that giving rise to this situation would involve a breach of the principles upon which international order is founded creating an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust incompatible with the preservation of peace,

Mindful of the universal condemnation of the persecution of the Jews under the Nazis, and of the concern of

² U.N. doc. S/4349; adopted by the Council on June 23 by a vote of 8 to 0, with 2 abstentions (Poland, U.S.S.R.). In accordance with the charter provision that "a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting" (art. 27(3)), Argentina did not participate in the vote.

people in all countries that Eichmann should be brought to appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is accused.

Noting at the same time that this resolution should in no way be interpreted as condoning the odious crimes of which Eichmann is accused,

1. *Declares* that acts such as that under consideration, which affect the sovereignty of a Member State and therefore cause international friction, may, if repeated, endanger international peace and security;

2. *Requests* the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law;

3. *Expresses the hope* that the traditionally friendly relations between Argentina and Israel will be advanced.

FAO Freedom-From-Hunger Campaign Receives Active U.S. Support

Statement by President Eisenhower

White House press release dated July 1

On this day the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has begun an international freedom-from-hunger campaign.¹ The basic objectives of this campaign are to raise levels of food production and nutrition for the people of the world. These objectives have the earnest support of us all.

The world is confronted by two great problems in hunger: the needs of the present and the future. And the last is greater than the first. We must try to raise the level of nutrition for many millions who now subsist on an inadequate diet, and we must find new sources of food for the rapidly expanding family of man. To achieve this end all countries will have to exert supreme efforts and inventiveness.

The United States took an active part in the formation and development of the Food and Agriculture Organization. We continue to support it as an instrument for intergovernmental consultation, for the exchange of information, and to sponsor separate and collective actions by its member countries in raising levels of nutrition. We wish the Director General of FAO and his staff all success as they carry forward their program of work, of which this campaign is a special part. Through our food-for-peace efforts we are advancing the objectives of the campaign, and we are working with other countries in the common task

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 18, 1960, p. 94.

of improving humanity's standard of living which gives substance to our hopes for the peace and freedom of all peoples.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

ECE Steel Committee

The Department of State announced on June 22 (press release 345) that Maxwell D. Millard, Administrative Vice President—International, United States Steel Corporation, will serve as delegate to the 24th session of the Steel Committee of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which is scheduled to be held at Geneva June 29—July 1.

Mr. Millard will be assisted by Robert D. Woodward, economist, Bethlehem Steel Co., and George M. Pollard, First Secretary and Economic Officer, U.S. Mission to the European Communities, Luxembourg, alternate delegate and adviser respectively.

The U.S. delegation will present a proposal for the study of comparative factors which affect production and trade in steel products in both Europe and the United States.

International Conference on Public Education

The Department of State announced on July 1 (press release 374) the members of the U.S. delegation to the 23d International Conference on Public Education, sponsored jointly by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Bureau of Education (IBE), which will be held at Geneva, July 6–15.

The U.S. Government will be represented at this annual conference by the following delegation:

Samuel M. Brownell, *chairman*, Superintendent of Schools, Detroit, Mich.

Leo P. Black, Assistant Commissioner in Charge of Instructional Services, State Department of Education, Denver, Colo.

Romaine P. Mackie, Chief, Services for Exceptional Children and Youth Section, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

Fredrika M. Tandler, Assistant Director, International Educational Relations Branch, Division of International Education, Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

African Posts Elevated to Embassies

Léopoldville

The Department of State announced on June 29 (press release 370) that the American consulate general at Léopoldville, Republic of the Congo, would be elevated on June 30, 1960, to an embassy upon the formal attainment of independence by the former Belgian Congo. The United States first opened a consulate at Léopoldville in 1884.

Clare H. Timberlake has been nominated by the President to be the first U.S. Ambassador to the new Republic. Until Mr. Timberlake's appointment has been confirmed by the U.S. Senate, John D. Tomlinson, who has been consul general at Léopoldville since 1958, will serve as Chargé d'Affaires.

Mogadiscio

Press release 371 dated June 30

The American Consulate General at Mogadiscio, Somali Republic, will be elevated on July 1, 1960, to an embassy upon formal attainment of independence by that nation. The Somali Republic incorporates the former Somalia, a U.N. trusteeship under Italian administration, and the former British Somaliland, known simply as Somaliland since it obtained its independence from Great Britain on June 26, 1960. The United States first opened a consulate at Mogadiscio on July 1, 1957.

Andrew G. Lynch, consul general at Mogadiscio since 1958, has been nominated by the President to be the first U.S. Ambassador to the newly independent Somali Republic.

Consular Agency Established at Beira

Press release 376 dated July 1

The Department of State on July 1 established a consular agency at Beira, Mozambique, to provide normal services for American citizens who visit that city. Robert Lee Peace, an American businessman resident at Beira, has been designated acting consular agent.

Mr. Peace's initial functions will be to assist American merchant ships and seamen and other American citizens who frequently visit this east African port. When commissioned as consular agent upon completion of formal procedures already initiated, he will perform notarial and other consular services.

The consular agency at Beira will be under the supervision of the consulate general at Lourenço Marques, Mozambique, which lies 500 miles south of Beira.

Beira is the second city of Mozambique, an important port, and the largest industrial center in the Portuguese overseas province. It is the principal eastern terminus of the railroad from the Belgian Congo and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Beira is served by many shipping lines, including U.S. companies.

Designations

John M. McSweeney as Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, effective June 16.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 27-July 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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357	6/27	Herter: independence of Somaliland.
358	6/27	U.S. program for disarmament under international control.
*359	6/27	Delegation to Somali Republic independence ceremonies.
360	6/28	Dillon: income tax convention with India.
361	6/28	Herter: Senate Appropriations Committee.
362	6/28	Dillon: Senate Appropriations Committee.
363	6/28	Davis: Freedom Day ceremonies.
*364	6/28	Lynch nominated Ambassador to Somali Republic (biographic details).
*365	6/29	Career ambassadors sworn in.
366	6/29	Memorandum submitted to Inter-American Peace Committee on provocative actions of Cuban Government.
*367	6/29	Timberlake nominated Ambassador to Republic of the Congo (biographic details).
368	6/29	Loan to Guatemala (rewrite).
*369	6/29	Nomination of career ministers.
370	6/29	Post at Léopoldville raised to embassy (rewrite).
371	6/30	Post at Mogadiscio raised to embassy.
372	6/30	Civil aviation agreement with Mexico.
373	6/30	Independence of Somali Republic.
374	7/1	Delegation to International Public Education Conference (rewrite).
375	7/1	Dillon attends meetings and talks in Europe (rewrite).
376	7/1	Consular agency opened at Beira, Mozambique.
*377	7/1	Amendments to itinerary of King and Queen of Thailand.
378	7/1	Delegation to Development Assistance Group meeting.
379	7/2	U.S. note to Soviet Union.
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*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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State

1942, Volume I, General,
The British Commonwealth, The Far East

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume I, General, The British Commonwealth, The Far East*. This is the first of the six regular annual volumes scheduled for publication in the *Foreign Relations* series for 1942.

Subjects treated in the General section include the United Nations Declaration, the Permanent Court, war crimes, relief problems, postwar economic and financial planning, exchange of officials and nonofficials with enemy countries, protests by neutrals against certain features of the Selective Service Act, and international agreements regarding wheat, sugar, and tin.

The section on the British Commonwealth of Nations relates to agreements with the several members of the Commonwealth in connection with the conduct of the war and to the interest of the United States in situations affecting the war effort.

The Far East section contains correspondence regarding Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Copies of the volume may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. for \$3.50 each.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLIII, No. 1100

July 25, 1960

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLIII, No. 1100 • PUBLICATION 7035

July 25, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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President Eisenhower Visits the Far East

President Eisenhower returned to Washington on June 26 after a trip to the Far East during which he visited the Republic of the Philippines, June 14-16, the Republic of China, June 18-19, the island of Okinawa, June 19, and the Republic of Korea, June 19-20. On June 27 the President made a report on his trip to the American people by radio and television.

Following are texts of the President's report, his major addresses during the trip, and joint statements issued at Manila, Taipei, and Seoul.

REPORT TO THE PEOPLE, JUNE 27

White House press release dated June 27

My friends: I have just returned to Washington from a trip to the Far East. It has been a trip so marked by events of significance that I shall try this evening to give you a simple background of fact against which these recent events can be viewed in perspective.

To begin, a few personal observations on the trip I have just concluded:

First, American relations with the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, and Okinawa have been strengthened.

Second, the people of these Far Eastern lands took advantage of the opportunity given by this visit to demonstrate anew their long and ardent friendship with and for the people of America. The American people are gratified, I am sure, as am I, by these heartwarming demonstrations.

Third, the ratification of the mutual security treaty between the United States and Japan¹ represents an important victory for the free world—a defeat for international communism.

And now let's look at the background of this trip—and the others I have taken in the interest of world peace.

This trip was planned as one of a series which have, *in toto*, taken me nearly around the world, to 27 nations of Europe, the Middle East, South

Asia, North Africa, the Americas, and the Far East. Those nations I have visited during the last 10 months have populations reaching an aggregate of over a billion people.

To understand where these visits fit into the overall foreign relations of this Government we must go back to 1953, to the time when I was assessing the world situation with the late Secretary of State Dulles, preparatory to my assumption of the office of the Presidency. At that time we recognized that the Communists had, for some years following the conclusion of World War II, taken advantage of the chaotic aftermath of conflict—and of our own self-imposed military disarmament—to indulge in a continuous campaign of aggression and subversion in Asia and Eastern Europe. They had disrupted the lives of millions of free people, causing lowered living standards and exhausted economies. China and its half billion people had been lost to the free world. The war in Korea, then in condition of stalemate, still dragged on.

We began our studies with one essential fact before us. It had become clear, by 1953, that the accumulation of atomic weapon stockpiles, whose use could destroy civilization, made resort to force an intolerable means for settling international disputes. Only in the rule of law, which meant the attainment of an enduring peace with justice, could mankind hope for guarantee against extinction.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1960, p. 184.

With these facts in mind we concluded, and have since been guided by the conviction, that there were several things which we should do simultaneously, all of them in conformity with the ideals expressed in the charter of the United Nations.

It was, and is, mandatory to present before the world, constantly and vigorously, America's great desire for peace and her readiness to sit at the conference table to discuss specific problems with anyone who would show an equal readiness to negotiate honestly and in good faith. This we continue to do in spite of difficulties such as the regrettable action of the Soviet delegation in walking out of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference at Geneva this morning.² But from the very beginning we have made it clear that, until real progress toward mutual disarmament could be achieved, our first concern would be to keep our own defenses strong, modern, and alert.

We tried to identify all those areas in the world where serious trouble could erupt suddenly and developed suggestions for correcting the causes of unrest and of enhancing stability in such localities. Through cooperation with our friends we have succeeded in removing causes of friction in many of these areas.

In support of these purposes we have sought, from the beginning, frequent personal contact with responsible governmental officials of friendly nations. Indeed, we have felt it wise, also, to seek to improve communications between ourselves and the Soviet Government. Akin to this effort was one which has come to be called the people-to-people program, a completely new type of venture in international relations which has been amazingly successful.

Along with these objectives we have constantly striven to devise better methods of cooperation with our friends, working out with them programs by which together we could improve our common security and raise living standards. Our Mutual Security Program has been, and is, a vital means of making such cooperation effective.

To carry out the purpose of proclaiming and demonstrating to the world America's peaceful intentions, we first made a number of policy statements and a series of concrete proposals that might lead to fruitful discussions with the Soviets.

As early as April of 1953, I suggested disarmament

talks with the Soviets and pledged that I would urge the United States to apply a substantial portion of any savings realized through mutually acceptable disarmament to the improvement of living standards in the less developed nations.³

Later that year I proposed, before the United Nations General Assembly, that we devote all discoveries in atomic science to peaceful uses.⁴ Nineteen months later at Geneva I suggested the open-skies method of mutual inspection.⁵

Exchanges of Visits

In the meantime the Secretary of State set out tirelessly to make calls on friendly governments and to strengthen collective security. In return we issued invitations to heads of state to visit America and her people. Other good-will visits were concurrently made by the Vice President and other personal representatives.

Many heads of government or state responded promptly to our invitations to visit this country. In the past 7½ years more than 70 heads of state and prime ministers have come to the United States—some of them several times—in visits extending from a few days to some weeks. In this respect the period has been without precedent. Other visitors are to come in the near future. Indeed, tomorrow we shall be honored by the arrival in Washington on such a visit of the King and Queen of Thailand and later in the year the Crown Prince and Princess of Japan and the King and Queen of Denmark.

I early began to receive urgent invitations to make return visits to the countries whose heads had paid us the courtesy of coming to see America and our way of life. Many months ago we concluded that I should personally accept some of these invitations as opportunity should present itself. Secretary Herter, first as Under Secretary of State and later as Secretary of State, enthusiastically concurred. Overseas visits by me, all of us felt, would be a strong support of other successful programs.

The great value resulting from these journeys to 27 nations has been obvious here and abroad.

² For text of the President's address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on Apr. 16, 1953, see *ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

Throughout the world there has been opportunity to emphasize and reemphasize America's devotion to peace with justice, her determination to sustain freedom and to strengthen free-world security through our cooperative programs, her readiness to sacrifice in helping to build the kind of world we want.

These visits involved, of course, valuable conversations between heads of state and government, as well as the promotion of understanding among peoples. However, except for the so-called summit and the NATO heads-of-government meeting, none of my visits has been planned or carried out solely as a diplomatic mission seeking specific agreements, even though discussions have invariably involved important issues.

Incidentally, I believe that heads of state and government can occasionally, and preferably on an informal basis, profitably meet for conversations on broad problems and principles. They can, of course, also convene to give solemn approval to agreements previously prepared by normal diplomatic methods. But heads-of-government meetings are not effective mechanisms for developing detailed provisions of international compacts and have never been so considered by this Government.

On the other hand, the good-will aspects of a visit by a head of government can frequently bring about favorable results far transcending those of normal diplomatic conferences. They have resulted in the creation of a more friendly atmosphere and mutual confidence between peoples. They have proved effective in bringing closer together nations that respect human dignity and are dedicated to freedom.

Communist Opposition

Indeed it seems apparent that the Communists, some time ago, reached the conclusion that these visits were of such positive value to the free world as to obstruct Communist imperialism. Thus they have sought every possible method to stop them. Through their propaganda they bitterly opposed my entry into the Philippines, in Taiwan, in Okinawa, in Korea, and, of course, Japan.

In Paris last month they advanced false and elaborate excuses for canceling my invitation to visit the Soviet Union, when all that was necessary to say was that they found it inconvenient to receive me.

With their associates in Peiping they went to great lengths and expense to create disorders in Tokyo that compelled the Japanese Government to decide, under conditions then existing, that it should revoke its longstanding invitation for me to visit that sister democracy.

These disorders were not occasioned by America. We in the United States must not fall into the error of blaming ourselves for what the Communists do; after all, Communists will act like Communists.

One clear proof of the value to us of these visits is the intensity of the opposition the Communists have developed against them.

Respecting Japan, in spite of the outrageous conduct of a violent and disorderly minority, I have been assured that the people there were, in overwhelming majority, anxious to welcome me as a representative of a nation with which they wished to cooperate and to have friendly relations.

Of course, the basic objective of the Communist-inspired disorders in Tokyo was to bring about the rejection by the Japanese Government of the treaty. That the Communists were defeated in their frantic efforts to prevent ratification of that treaty speaks well for the future of Japanese-American relations. Obviously that signal defeat for international communism far outweighs in importance the blocking of my scheduled visit.

Another purpose of the Communist-inspired riots in Tokyo was to weaken confidence between our peoples and to persuade the United States to change its basic policies toward Japan. It would be a tremendous victory for international communism if we were to permit the unhappy events of the past several weeks in Japan to disrupt our economic relationships with that nation or to weaken the feeling of friendship and understanding which unites the vast majority of the Japanese and American people.

Role of Japan in Far East

Japan has once again become a great nation. Over the postwar years she has painstakingly created a new image of herself, the image of a responsible, peaceful, and cooperative free-world nation, mindful of her obligations and of the rights of others. Japan has made a fine record in the United Nations as well as elsewhere on the international stage.

Since the loss of mainland China to the Com-

munists in 1949, the need to link the other nations of the Far East with the United States more strongly, in their mutual interest, should be apparent to all. We seek and continue to build and strengthen these links, with Japan as well as with the other countries, by actions of many kinds—of which my recent trip was but a single example. In the present circumstances a Far Eastern policy of “waiting for the dust to settle” will not meet the free world’s need.

The other free countries of the Far East, small in relation to the massive area and immense population of Red China, can survive in freedom and flourish only in cooperative association with the United States and a free Japan. Through our aid programs, through our bilateral and collective defensive arrangements such as SEATO [South-east Asia Treaty Organization], through our very presence in the area, we help them greatly. And a free and friendly Japan can reinforce this American effort, as indeed she is already doing through aid programs of her own.

Because of the Prime Minister’s necessary withdrawal of his urgent invitation of last winter for me to visit Japan on June 19th, I was of course unable to meet with the Japanese Government and people or to bring to them assurances of American good will. This was disappointing, but we should not forget the favorable effects of visits elsewhere in the Far East, as well as the final approval of the Japanese-American treaty by both Governments. Moreover, the general improvement that has come about through exchanges of visits by friendly heads of government is recognized and appreciated throughout the free world.

I wish that every one of you could have accompanied me to Manila, Taipei, and Korea and thus witnessed for yourselves the outpouring of friendship, gratitude, and respect for America. The throngs of people there, like the many millions who, during earlier journeys, lined the streets of great cities in the mid-East, Europe, North Africa, South America, as well as in Canada and Mexico, had one overwhelming message for our nation.

That message, expressed in glowing faces, friendly shouts, songs, gaily painted placards, and homemade signs, was that they wanted to be partners with the United States. They share our ideals of the dignity of man and the equality of all before the law; they believe in their God; they

believe that the American people are their friends. They believe that Americans are sincerely devoted to their progress, which means so much to them and which is so evident on every side.

These demonstrations have been inspiring to all who have not closed their eyes and minds to their meaning. Moreover, the leaders of the free people I have met here or abroad have assured me, privately and publicly, that they approve of America’s purposes and policies, even though details of implementation are frequently subjects for discussion or negotiation. They have expressed the hope that visits to their countries by the senior officials of our Government might be of greater frequency. They have shown to me evidence of their marked material progress through American cooperation. They have testified to the reborn hope and restored confidence of their peoples.

Let me stress, however, that all the profit gained by past and any possible future trips will be quickly dissipated should we Americans abandon our present course in foreign relations or slacken our efforts in cooperative programs with our friends.

This is what the Communists want. It is imperative that we act with mature judgment. We must recognize their tactics as a deliberate attempt to split the free world, causing friction between allies and friends. We must not fall into this trap; all of us must remain firm and steadfast in our united dedication to freedom and to peace with justice.

Above all, we must bear in mind that successful implementation of any policy against Communist imperialism requires that we never be bluffed, cajoled, blinded, or frightened. We cannot win out against the Communist purpose to dominate the world by being timid, passive, or apologetic when we are acting in our own and the free world’s interests. We must accept the risks of bold action with coolness and courage. We must always be strong, but we must never forget that peace can never be won by arms alone; we will be firm but never truculent; we will be fair but never fearful; we will always extend friendship wherever friendship is offered honestly to us.

Now a final, personal word: So far as any future visits of my own are involved, I have no plans, no other particular trip in mind. Considering the shortness of the time before next Janu-

ary and the unavoidable preoccupations of the few months remaining, it would be difficult to accept any invitation for me again to go abroad.

But so long as the threat of Communist domination may hang over the free world, I believe that any future President will conclude that reciprocal visits by heads of friendly governments have great value in promoting free-world solidarity.

And this I assure you: If any unforeseen situation or circumstances arising in the near future should convince me that another journey of mine would still further strengthen the bonds of friendship between us and others, I would not hesitate a second in deciding to make still an additional effort of this kind. No consideration of personal fatigue or inconvenience, no threat or argument, would deter me from once again setting out on a course that has meant much for our country, for her friends, and for the cause of freedom and peace with justice in the world.

Thank you, and good night.

ADDRESS TO PHILIPPINE CONGRESS, MANILA, JUNE 15

White House (Manila) press release dated June 15 (as-delivered text)

Mr. President of the Senate, Mr. Speaker of the House, Members of the Congress, distinguished guests, and my friends: I am keenly sensible of the high honor this assembled body has paid to me and to my country by inviting me to be present here and to address this body, a body representing the political leadership of a great Republic in the Asian sector. I am indeed overwhelmed by your kindness, and I can say only *mabuhay*.

You will understand the flood of memories that swept over me on coming back to this land, where I feel that I am revisiting an old home and old friends and renewing ties of long standing. Here my wife and I spent 4 happy years, making friendships that we shall ever cherish. Here our son went to school and grew into young manhood. Here I saw the first beginnings of this Republic and worked with men whose vision of greatness for the people of the Philippines has been matched by its realization.

Through many days I could talk of life as I knew it here a quarter of a century ago. For

hours on end I could make comparisons of what was in those days and what is now. But I have only minutes in which I can address myself to this subject.

Even in the short space I have been here, however, I have been struck by the vigor and progress that is evident everywhere. I see around me a city reconstructed out of the havoc and destruction of a world war. I know of the Binga Dam, the Maria Cristina Power and Industrial Complex, the Mindanao highway system, rural electrification, the disappearance of epidemic diseases, the amazing growth of Manila industry.

Significance of Constructive Nationalism

Everywhere is inescapable physical evidence of energy and dedication and a surging faith in the future. But of deeper significance is the creation here of a functioning democracy—a sovereign people directing their own destinies, a sovereign people concerned with their responsibilities in the community of nations. Those responsibilities you have discharged magnificently even as you toiled to rebuild and to glorify your own land.

Certainly we Americans salute Filipino participation in the Korean war, the example set the whole free world by the Filipino nurses and doctors who went to Laos and to Viet-Nam on Operation Brotherhood, your contribution to SEATO and the defense of your neighbors against aggression, your charter membership and dynamic leadership in the United Nations, your active efforts to achieve closer cultural and economic relations with other southeast Asian countries.

The stature of the Republic of the Philippines on the world scene is the creation of its own people—of their skill, their imagination, their courage, and, above all, their commitment to freedom. But their aspirations would have gone unrealized were they not animated by a spirit of nationalism, of a patriotic love of their own land and its independence, which united and directed them in their efforts.

This spirit was described by your late great leader and my personal friend, Manuel Quezon, when he with great eloquence said:

Rightly conceived, felt, and practiced, nationalism is a tremendous force for good. It strengthens and solidifies a nation. It preserves the best traditions of the past and adds zest to the ambition of enlarging the inheritance of the people. It is, therefore, a dynamic urge for continuous self-improvement. In fine, it enriches the

sum total of mankind's cultural, moral, and material possessions through the individual and characteristic contribution of each people.

Significantly, President Quezon had this caution to offer, "So long as the nationalistic sentiment is not fostered to the point where a people forgets that it forms a part of the human family; that the good of mankind should be the ultimate aim of each and every nation; and that conflicting national interests are only temporary; and that there is always a just formula for adjusting them—nationalism then," he said, "is a noble, elevating, and most beneficial sentiment."

In these words of clarity and timeless wisdom President Quezon spoke a message forever applicable to human affairs, particularly fitted to the circumstances of this era.

Nationalism is a mighty and a relentless force. No conspiracy of power, no compulsion of arms, can stifle it forever. The constructive nationalism defined by President Quezon is a noble, persistent, fiery inspiration, essential to the development of a young nation. Within its ideal my own country since its earliest days has striven to achieve the American dream and destiny. We respect this quality in our sister nation.

Communist leaders fear constructive nationalism as a mortal foe. This fear is evident in the continuing efforts of the Communist conspiracy to penetrate nationalist movements, to pervert them, and to pirate them for their own evil objectives.

To dominate, if they can, the eternal impulse of national patriotism, they use force and threats of force, subversion and bribery, propaganda and spurious promises. They deny the dignity of men and have subjected many millions to the execution of master plans dictated in faraway places.

Communism demands subservience to a single ideology, to a straitjacket of ideas and approaches and methods. Freedom of individuals or nations to them is intolerable. But free men, free nations, make their own rules to fit their own needs within a universally accepted frame of justice and law.

Protecting the Rights of Free Nations

Under freedom, thriving sovereign nations of diverse political, economic, and social systems are the basic healthy cells that make up a thriving world community. Freedom and independence for each is in the interest of all.

For that very reason—in our own enlightened self-interest, in the interest of all our friends—the purpose of American assistance programs is to protect the right of nations to develop the political and social institutions of their choice. None, we believe, should have to accept extremist solutions under the whip of hunger or the threat of armed attack and domination.

We—free, self-governing peoples—readily accept that there is a great variety of political, social, and economic systems in the world; and we accept the further fact that there is no single, best way of life that answers the needs of everyone, everywhere.

The American way satisfies the United States. We think it is best for us. But the United States need not believe that all should imitate us. But what all of us do have in common with the free nations in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America are basic and weighty convictions, more important than differences of speech and color and culture.

Some of these convictions are: that man is a being capable of making his own decisions; that all people should be given a fair opportunity to use their God-given talents, to be worthy heirs of their fathers, to fulfill their destiny as children of God; that voluntary cooperation among groups and nations is vastly preferable to cooperation by force—indeed, voluntary cooperation is the only fruitful kind of effort in the long run.

True enough, in a too lengthy period of history some European nations seemed convinced that they were assigned the mission of controlling the continents. But always powerful voices within those countries attacked the policy of their own governments. And we of the American Republics—21 independent nations once European colonies—denied in arms and in battle the validity of the assumed mission. Colonialism died there because true nationalism was a more potent force.

Since 1945, 33 lands that were once subject to Western control have peaceably achieved self-determination. These countries have a population of almost a billion people. During the same period, 12 countries in the Sino-Soviet sphere have been forcibly deprived of their independence. The question might be asked: Who are today the colonialists?

The basic antagonism of the Communist system to anything which it cannot control is the single, most important cause of the tension between the

free nations in all their variety on the one hand and, on the other, the rigidly controlled Communist bloc.

One purpose of the Communist system's propaganda is to obscure these true facts. Right now the principal target is the United States of America. The United States is painted by the Communists as an imperialistic seeker of limitless power over all the peoples of the world, using them as pawns on the chessboard of war, exploiting them and their resources to enrich our own economy, degrading them to a role of beggarly dependence.

What America Stands For

The existence, the prosperity, the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines proves the falsity of those charges. You, as a people, know that our American Republic is no empire of tyranny. Your leaders repeatedly have so testified to the world. But for a few minutes I should like to speak to you on what America stands for: what it stood for before I became President and what it will continue to stand for after I have left office.

More important than any one year, any one incident, or any one man is the role we have played through our whole history—the role we shall continue to play so long as our Republic endures.

Two hundred years, lacking 16, have passed since our forefathers proclaimed to the world the truths they held self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed with unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that governments are instituted among men to secure those rights, deriving their just powers only from the consent of the governed.

On the day of that proclamation you and we and scores of other now-free nations were colonies. Mankind everywhere was engaged in a bitter struggle for bare survival. Only a few by the accident of birth enjoyed ease without backbreaking toil. Naked power, more often than not, was the decisive element in human affairs. Most men died young after an all-too-short life of poverty.

Since then, free men—using their rights, embracing their opportunities, daring to venture and to risk, recognizing that justice and good will fortify strength—have transformed the world.

The wilderness and jungle of nature have been conquered. The mysteries of the universe are being unlocked. The powers of the elements have

been harnessed for human benefit. The ancient tyrannies of hunger and disease and ignorance have been relentlessly attacked and ceaselessly reduced in their domains.

The evils of our forebears' times were manifold and entrenched and often accepted without murmur. But to free men who saw in their fellow men the image of God, who recognized in themselves a capacity to transform their circumstances and environment—to such free men, those evils were unbearable.

Not all of these evils were vanquished at the first assault. Indeed, many still survive. Not always was success persistently prosecuted to ultimate triumph. Free men, however mighty their inspiration, are humanly frail.

At times they may be fearful when they should be girding and bracing themselves for more vigorous effort, trading words when they should be working, bickering over trifles when they should be uniting on essentials, rioting when they should be calmly planning. Often they may dissipate their energies in futile and wasteful exercise. Often they are mistaken or for a while misled. Being human, these things are true about all of us. Nevertheless, the resources of free men living in free communities, cooperating with their neighbors at home and overseas, constitute the mightiest creative temporal force on earth.

In your sister Republic of the United States the greatest achievement of our history is that our rebels against colonialism, against subjection, against tyranny, were the first in this era to raise the banner of freedom and decent nationalism, to carry it beyond our shores, and to honor it everywhere.

What we stood for in 1776, when we were fighting for our freedom, we still stand for in 1960.

To maintain our stand for peace and friendship and freedom among the nations, the United States must remain strong and always faithful to its friends, making clear that propaganda pressures, rocket rattling, and even open aggression are bound to fail.

Beyond the guarantees of American strength, we seek to expand a collective security. SEATO demonstrates what can be accomplished. Since its inception not one inch of free southeast Asia territory has been lost to an aggressor.

Collective security must be based on all fields of human endeavor, requiring cooperation and mu-

tual exchange in the areas of politics, economics, culture, and science. We believe in the expansion of relations between nations as a step toward more formal regional cooperation. In accord with this belief, we support the initiative taken by the Government of the Philippines during the past several years in establishing closer ties with its neighbors.

Patience, forbearance, integrity, an enduring trust, must between our two countries characterize our mutual relations. Never, I pray, will the United States, because of its favored position in size and numbers and wealth, attempt to dictate or to exercise any unfair pressure of any kind or to forget or to ignore the Republic of the Philippines—its equal in sovereign dignity. And never, I pray, will the Philippines deem it advantageous either at home or abroad to make a whipping boy of the United States. Each of us proudly recognizes the other as its sovereign equal.

And my friends, at this point I just want to interpolate one simple thought on the cooperative efforts for our own security, for advancing the standards of living of peoples, for everything that we do together: There are of course differences in the ability of each nation to make contributions. Each of us as an individual is different from every other individual. Physically, mentally, and in the possession of the world's goods, we are somewhat different. But I submit, Members of the Congress, that there is one field where no man, no woman, no nation, need take a secondary place and that is in moral leadership.

The spirit of a people is not to be measured by its size or its riches or even its age. It is something that comes from the heart, and from the very smallest nation can come some of the great ideas—particularly those great inspirational ideas that inspire men to strive always upward and onward.

Therefore, when I say that our two nations are sovereign equals, I mean it just in that spirit, in the sense that you have just as much to contribute to the world and to yourselves and to freedom as the greatest and the most powerful nation in the world.

Now finally, in this great cause of peace and friendship and freedom, we who are joined together will succeed. The eternal aspirations, purposes, ideals of humanity inspire and hearten and urge us to success.

But we face repeated challenges, endless temptations to relax, continuous campaigns of propa-

ganda and threat. Let us stand more firmly together against them all. And so doing, and with God's help, we shall march ever forward toward our destiny as free nations and great and good friends.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS AT PUBLIC RECEPTION, LUNETTA, JUNE 16

White House (Manila) press release dated June 16 (as-delivered text)

Mr. President, you, on behalf of the Filipino people, have just bestowed a great honor upon me. Proudly I accept, in the name of the American people, the award of Rajah in the Ancient Order of Sikatuna.

My friends, this Luneta was for more than 4 years the scene of my habitual evening walks. To this day it lives in memory as one of the most pleasant, indeed even one of the most romantic, spots I have known in this entire world. Leaving the front entrance of the Manila Hotel of an evening, I could walk to the right to view the busy docks, where Philippine commerce with the world was loaded and unloaded. From here, looking across the peaceful waters of Manila Bay, I could see the gorgeous sunsets over Miravales. Walking toward the club of the Army and the Navy and looking down toward the city itself, I nearly always paused for a moment before the statue of the great José Rizal before returning to my quarters. One thing that made those evening promenades so pleasant, so meaningful, was the deep sense of feeling I had of Philippine-American friendship.

To you assembled before this platform, to Filipinos and Americans everywhere, and to those who are gone from among us is due the credit of having our close friendship in war and in peace. Now upon both our peoples still rests the grave responsibility of working together tirelessly in the promotion of liberty and world peace.

Voluntary Association of Free Peoples

The voluntary association of free peoples produces, from the sharing of common ideals of justice, equality, and liberty, a strength and a moral fiber which tyrannies never attain by coercion, control, and oppression. Such tyrannies can, of course, concentrate upon a single objective the toil of millions upon millions of men and women,

working endless hours, denied even the smallest happiness of human living, sometimes whipped, sometimes cajoled, always treated as robots bereft of human dignity. For a space of years, particularly if the peoples they regiment have known little of freedom or of a decent prosperity, such dictatorships may seem to achieve marvels. But in their denial of human dignity, their destruction of individual self-esteem, they write the eventual doom of their system.

Long before many of us here today were born, a great Filipino, José Rizal, in vivid and eloquent language foretold the eruption of these tyrannies and predicted their ultimate fate. He said:

Deprive a man of his dignity, and you not only deprive him of his moral strength but you also make him useless even for those that wish to make use of him. Every creature has its stimulus, its mainspring. Man's is his self-esteem. Take it away from him and he is a corpse. . . .

Now tyrannies of many sorts still exist in the world. All are rejected by free men. Some authoritarian governments, being narrow in ambition, content themselves with local and confined dominance. Others are blatant in their boasts of eventual supremacy over continents and even the world—constant in their boast that eventually they will bury all systems of freedom.

That boast will never come true. Even in the lands that Communists now master with an iron rule, the eternal aspirations of humanity cannot be forever suppressed. The truth enunciated by José Rizal is universal in its application. But tyrannies, before their fated deterioration and disappearance, can, sometimes for many years, enslave and enslave free peoples unable to resist them.

In that knowledge, the free world—two-thirds of the earth's population—step by step moves forward toward a more effective partnership that freedom, human dignity, the noble heritages of many centuries may withstand successfully all aggression.

Some nations are still reluctant to commit themselves fully; others are divided on commitments already made. Minorities in some—possibly the victims of subversion or of bribe, possibly confused by propaganda and threat—oppose even the most obviously profitable associations. But most stand firmly together.

The free world must increase its strength—in military defenses, in economic growth, in spiritual

President Postpones Trip to Japan at Japanese Government's Request

Statement by James C. Hagerty
Press Secretary to the President

White House (Manila) press release dated June 16

The President has been informed of the Japanese Government's request that he postpone his visit to Japan. Although he would have liked to fulfill his long-held ambition to pay his respects to the Emperor and to the people of this great sister democracy and ally of the United States, he, of course, fully accepts the decision of the Japanese authorities and therefore will not visit Japan at this time.

In so doing, the President wishes to express his full and sympathetic understanding of the decision taken by the Japanese Government. He would like also to express his regrets that a small organized minority, led by professional Communist agitators acting under external direction and control, have been able by resort to force and violence to prevent his good-will visit and to mar the celebration of this centennial in Japanese-American relations.

At the same time the President remains confident that the deliberate challenges to law and order which have caused the Japanese Government to reach its decision will not and cannot disrupt the abiding friendship and understanding which unite our two nations and our two peoples.

dedication. Thus the free world will withstand aggressive pressures and move ever forward in its search for enduring peace.

Your Government has recently reaffirmed your determination to stand steadfast by joining only 2 weeks ago in the communique issued in Washington by the Council of Ministers of the eight nations of SEATO.⁶ They stated clearly that:

The Council availed itself of this timely opportunity to re-emphasize the firm unity of purpose of the member countries of SEATO and their determination to maintain and develop, both individually and collectively, their capacity to meet all forms of Communist threat to the peace and security of the Treaty Area.

May I say here that the United States is proud and indeed is thankful to be so closely associated and so staunchly allied with the Philippines both in SEATO and in the mutual defense treaty⁷ between our two countries.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, June 20, 1960, p. 986.

⁷ For text, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2529.

The Goal of a World at Peace

But in this world of continuing tension and yearnings for social change it is insufficient that the free world stand static in its defense of freedom.

We must, all of us, move ahead with imagination and positive programs to improve conditions in which human freedom can flourish.

We must, collectively and individually, strive for a world in which the rule of law replaces the rule of force.

Your country and mine have reaffirmed our faith in the principles of the United Nations Charter. We share a common desire to settle international disputes by peaceful means. The task is not an easy one. Communist intransigence at the conference table, whenever they do agree to sit at one, makes the attainment of an equitable agreement most difficult. Moreover, the record of Communist violations of agreements is a long one—indeed, a sad one. The continuation of Communist provocations, subversion, and terrorism while negotiations are under way serves only to compound the difficulty of arriving at peaceful settlements.

But we shall never close the door to peaceful negotiations. All of us—all free nations—always hold out the hand of friendship as long as it is grasped in honesty and in integrity. We shall continue to make it clear that reason and common sense must prevail over senseless antagonism and distorted misunderstandings and propaganda. The arms race must be brought under control, and the nuclear menace that is poised in delicate suspension over the heads of all mankind must be eliminated. This, I am convinced, can be done, without appeasement or surrender, by continuing a course of patient, resourceful, and businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders.

The goal of a world at peace in friendship with freedom is so worth the attaining that every feasible and honorable avenue must be explored. The support, understanding, and participation of all who cherish freedom is essential to this noblest endeavor in history. The Philippine contribution will be mighty in its impact on the future.

And now, my friends, I cannot close without attempting once more to express my very deep appreciation of all the cordial hospitality and friendliness that has been exhibited to me and to all the members of my party during our all-too-

brief stay in this lovely country. We know that in greeting us along the highway or in magnificent crowds such as this you are really expressing your basic affection for the American people.

And I assure you—all of you—as the spokesman of the American people, that their concern for you—your faith, your future, your well being—their affection for you is equally deep with yours.

Thank you, and goodbye.

JOINT STATEMENT, MANILA, JUNE 16

White House (Manila) press release dated June 16

President Eisenhower, at the invitation of President [Carlos] Garcia, paid a state visit to the Philippines on June 14 to 16, 1960, returning the visit of President Garcia to the United States two years ago.⁸

President Eisenhower recalled his personal association with the Philippines extending over a period of many years. As the first President of the United States to visit the Philippines while in office, he expressed his deep sense of satisfaction that he had been afforded this opportunity to attest to the admiration and affection which the government and people of the United States feel toward their Philippine allies.

President Garcia, on his part, viewed the affection shown to President Eisenhower by the Filipino people as a grateful remembrance of the latter's tour of duty in the Philippines some twenty-five years ago and their admiration for his military leadership in the second world war and his dedicated labors for a just and lasting world peace.

The visit afforded President Garcia and President Eisenhower, together with other officials of both governments, an opportunity for a frank and cordial exchange of views on matters of mutual interest. In a review of the international situation and of the bilateral relations of the two countries, the two Presidents:

1. Reaffirmed the bonds of friendship and mutual understanding which have historically joined the Filipino and American governments and peoples.
2. Noted the problems facing the free world at the beginning of the new decade and discussed the possibility of increased tensions in view of recent

⁸ BULLETIN of July 21, 1958, p. 120.

statements by Communist leaders in Moscow and Peiping. They renewed their determination to support the work of the United Nations and the objectives of the United Nations' Charter in the interest of true international peace and progress based on justice and the dignity of the individual.

3. Assessed the continuing threat to peace in the Far East posed by Communist China. They reaffirmed the importance of regional cooperation in insuring the independence of the nations of Southeast Asia. They emphasized the important role of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in furthering such cooperation and in developing a sense of regional solidarity; and they noted with satisfaction the contribution being made by the Philippines toward strengthening its ties with its Asian neighbors.

4. Noted that President Eisenhower's visit and the warm response thereto by the Filipino people provided renewed evidence of the strength and vitality of the alliance between the Philippines and the United States and of its essential contribution to the security of Southeast Asia. To promote the continuing strength of the alliance and to enable the Philippines to discharge its obligation thereunder, they emphasized the importance of close military collaboration and planning between the appropriate authorities of their countries. They further expressed the view that this close military collaboration and planning should be aimed at the maximum effectiveness in formulating and executing United States military assistance programs and in furthering Philippine defensive capability in the light of modern requirements.

5. Noted the recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the SEATO held in Washington and expressed satisfaction with the continuing effectiveness of the SEATO as a deterrent to Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. They were also gratified that the Washington conference had given attention to the economic objectives of the SEATO, recognizing the importance of economic cooperation between and among the members.

6. Recalled the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty. President Eisenhower, on his part, renewed the assurance he had made to President Garcia in Washington that under the provisions of this treaty and other defensive agreements between the Philippines and the United States and

in accordance with the deployments and dispositions thereunder, any armed attack against the Philippines would involve an attack against the United States Forces stationed there and against the United States and would instantly be repelled. It was noted that this understanding was included in the agreement reached between the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and the Ambassador of the United States on October 12, 1959.

7. Noted with satisfaction the considerable progress that had been made in talks between the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and the Ambassador of the United States towards settlement of problems arising from the presence of United States bases in the Philippines. They expressed confidence that the few remaining problems will be similarly resolved to the mutual satisfaction of the two governments.

8. Reemphasized the importance of strong, stable economies in furthering the objectives of peaceful development in the free world. President Eisenhower expressed his gratification at the evident progress which has been made in the Philippine economy, including notable advances in industrialization. The contribution which the United States aid programs have made and will continue to make to Philippine economic development was emphasized. In recognition of the economic interdependence of all nations in the modern world, they discussed opportunities for increased private investment and expanded trade between the two countries in a climate favorable to free enterprise and to the free movement of capital.

President Garcia and President Eisenhower concluded that the exchange of views and the renewal of personal associations made possible by President Eisenhower's visit will further strengthen the traditional ties between the two countries and will contribute significantly to the advancement of their cooperative efforts on behalf of peace and progress in this vital part of the world.

ADDRESS AT MASS RALLY, TAIPEI, JUNE 18

White House (Taipei) press release dated June 18 (as-delivered text)

Mr. President, distinguished guests, and friends: I address this gathering today fully aware of the honor you have bestowed on my country and myself in inviting me to speak here. I bring to your nation greetings from the American people.

We Americans are in a very real sense your close neighbors: We look out with you upon the same ocean—the Pacific. This largest of oceans has been narrowed by the marvels of modern communication and transportation. No longer is it a formidable barrier separating America from the nations of the Far East.

We in America have accepted this tremendously important fact of international life and recognize its implications for the future of our country. Therefore, I come to you, as to the other countries of the Pacific which I am privileged to visit, as a friend and neighbor deeply concerned with your, and our, common interests.

This concern has shaped my country's policies toward the nations of the Pacific. The realization that America's security and welfare are intimately bound up with their security and welfare has led us to foster the concept of collective defense and to contribute money, materials, and technical assistance to promote their economic stability and development.

But though the United States provides assistance to the nations of the Pacific region, many of them recently emerged from colonial status, we have not sought to impose upon them our own way of life or system of government. We respect their sovereignty as we do our own.

To do otherwise would be a betrayal of America's own traditions. Our purpose is to help protect the right of our neighbors of the Pacific to develop in accordance with their own national aspirations and their own traditions.

In this era of mass-destruction weapons the increasing intimacy in which the peoples of the world live makes resort to global war, even by the smallest of them, dangerous to the whole community of nations.

I come to you representing a country determined, despite all setbacks, to press on in search of effective means to outlaw war and to promote the rule of law among nations.

History has repeatedly shown that this high purpose is not served by yielding to threats or by weakening defenses against potential aggressors. Indeed such weakness would increase the danger of war.

You may be assured that our continuing search for peaceful solutions to outstanding international problems does not reflect the slightest lessening

of our determination to stand with you, and with all our free neighbors of the Pacific, against aggression.

The United States does not, of course, recognize the claim of the warlike and tyrannical Communist regime in Peiping. In the United Nations we support the Republic of China, a founding member, as the only rightful representative of China in that Organization.

The American people deeply admire your courage in striving so well to keep the cause of liberty alive here in Taiwan in the face of the menacing power of Communist imperialism. Your accomplishments provide inspiration to us all.

The search for lasting peace comprehends much more than the erection of sure military defenses. Perhaps nothing offers greater hope to a war-weary world than the new opportunities for a better life which have been opened up in the past few decades by the magnificent achievements of science and technology. If the peoples of the world can not only master the forces of nature but can find also the way to use them for peaceful ends, we are on the threshold of a new era.

Free China's Economic Progress

One of the great peaceful battles for a better life, which the Republic of China is now in the midst of fighting here on Taiwan, is on the front of economic progress. For you, the past has been full of hardships. But for the people of this island each difficulty was a challenge to be mastered.

During the years of this progress, freedom has not been a free ingredient, like air or water. Indeed, freedom has been the costliest component of your daily lives. Even in sheer economic terms you have devoted a larger share of your incomes to keeping your independence than have most other peoples on the globe. To do this you have had to adopt progressive measures.

A great economic accomplishment of the past 10 years was your program in land reform. Due to its fair and democratic conception and execution it has become a model for similar reforms in other lands. It dealt successfully with one of the fundamental problems the Chinese people have faced throughout history. Moreover, in it you achieved much more than a fair and equitable ad-

justment: You produced both social dynamism and economic growth.

That reform, founded on Sun Yat-sen's three people's principles and executed with due regard for law and for private property, stands in sharp contrast to the brutal regimentation of your countrymen on the mainland. There they are often herded into the soul-destroying labor brigades of the commune system. But free China knows that a system in which the farmer owns the land he tills gives him the incentive to adopt advanced fertilization, irrigation, and other farming techniques.

We are proud that we have been of some help technically in carrying through your agricultural reform program. We too have learned much from our association in the Chinese-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. We have been able to use this experience to good advantage in helping other countries. In the industrial field your friends in the United States and all over the world have watched with satisfaction your growing productivity and diversification. You have demonstrated, under adverse conditions, the moral and physical strength, the imagination and the perseverance, to achieve this near miracle. Now I learn that, not satisfied with the impressive rate of progress already attained, you are entering upon a new program for further speeding up your economic growth.

In today's world, where many new nations of Asia and Africa are seeking a path of economic development to satisfy the growing expectations of their people, free China provides a shining example. Thanks in large measure to the vigor and talents of its population and its leaders, it has advanced to the threshold of the kind of self-sustaining economic growth that has brought other free nations to wealth and power.

Free China thus has an opportunity, which is at the same time a responsibility, to demonstrate to less developed nations the way to economic growth in freedom. Confronted with the harsh example of the Communist way on the mainland, you here are in a position to show how a nation can achieve material strength and advance the well-being of its people without sacrificing its most valued traditions.

Your success in this field can sustain and guar-

antee your secure standing in the community of nations. And it will become, for your own fellow countrymen on the mainland, an ever more insistent refutation of the false Communist thesis that modern economic development can be purchased only at the price of freedom.

Meeting the Challenge of the Future

We in the United States have studied your plans for social and economic changes and do not underestimate the difficulties you will have to endure during a period of transition. Economic growth, especially accelerated growth, constantly calls for recurring revolutions in thinking, in the way we do things, indeed in every phase of our lives.

As you know, we intend to join hands with you in this great enterprise. By doing so we shall not lighten your load, because you have already pledged yourselves to maximum effort, but our partnership should demonstrate how rapid progress can be achieved by the methods of free peoples freely joined in friendship for mutual benefit.

As representatives of the great and numerous Chinese nation, heirs to one of the world's most ancient and honored cultures, you, the people of free China, can play a unique role in the future of mankind. By grasping the opportunities for the improvement of human welfare now made possible by the advancement of science and technology, you can blaze a trail of progress here on Taiwan that may ultimately shape the destiny of all your fellow countrymen, of nearly one-quarter of the human race. This is indeed a challenge of gigantic proportions.

In meeting that challenge, the United States—and all the free world—wishes you every success.

My friends, this morning I encountered an unforgettable experience. I met thousands of you people along the road from the airport, and everywhere I encountered only friendliness, courteous greetings, and a face lighted up with smiles. To each of you who lined that route, to each of you who today came out to do me the courtesy of listening to what I had to say, I give you my grateful thanks on behalf of my party, myself—indeed for the American people, whose concern for every one of you is deep and lasting. So from your President to the humblest citizen of the land, I say thank you very much and God be with you.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, TAIPEI, JUNE 19

White House (Taipei) press release dated June 19

At the invitation of President Chiang Kai-shek, President Dwight D. Eisenhower visited the Republic of China from June 18 to June 19, 1960. This historic journey of the President of the United States of America and the warmth and enthusiasm with which he was received by the Chinese people demonstrated anew the strong bonds of friendship between the two countries.

Both President Chiang and President Eisenhower welcomed the opportunity afforded them by this visit for an intimate exchange of views on various matters of common interest and concern, calling to mind that the two countries have always stood closely together as staunch allies in war as well as in peace. The talks between the two Chiefs of State were held in an atmosphere of utmost cordiality.

In the course of their discussions, the two Presidents reaffirmed the dedication of the two Governments to an untiring quest for peace with freedom and justice. They recognize that peace and security are indivisible and that justice among nations demands the freedom and dignity of all men in all lands.

Taking note of the continuing threat of Communist aggression against the free world in general and the Far Eastern free countries in particular, the two Presidents expressed full agreement on the vital necessity of achieving closer unity and strength among all free nations.

They pledged once again that both their Governments would continue to stand solidly behind the Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty in meeting the challenge posed by the Chinese Communists in this area. They deplored the outrageous and barbaric practice of the Chinese Communists in shelling and ruthlessly killing Chinese people on alternate days and noted that this practice emphasized the necessity for continued vigilance and firmness in the face of violence.

Discussions were also held on the importance of accelerating the economic expansion of the Republic of China in order to enhance the prosperity and well-being of its people. President Chiang explained the steps which his Government is taking to assure the early accomplishment of his goal. He expressed the appreciation of his Government

and people for the valuable assistance which the United States of America has rendered to the Republic of China. President Eisenhower expressed the admiration of the American people for the progress achieved by the Republic of China in various fields in recent years and gave assurance of continuing United States assistance.

Finally, the two Presidents voiced their common determination that the two Governments should continue to dedicate themselves to the principles of the United Nations and devote their unremitting efforts to the intensifying of their cooperation and to the further strengthening of the traditional friendship between the Chinese and American peoples.

ADDRESS TO NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, SEOUL, JUNE 20

White House (Seoul) press release dated June 20 (as-delivered text)

Mr. Speaker, Members of the National Assembly, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: First, I offer my apologies to the Members of this Chamber because of my tardiness in arriving here. I assure you that the delay was unintentional.

You have signally honored me by your invitation to address this National Assembly. To you is entrusted the realization of the Korean people's hopes and aspirations. This is no local, narrow, or limited mission. What you do and what you say in the discharge of your trust is of deep significance and powerful impact far beyond the boundaries of this Republic. You are watched by the entire world.

Korea, once a battlefield for survival over aggression, is now a proving ground for responsible, representative self-government. This is a testing time of Korean integrity, perseverance in the democratic process, loyalty to the ideals on which the Republic was founded.

In all your efforts you have the sympathetic understanding and the best wishes of the American people.

Impressive changes of many kinds have occurred here since I visited your country in 1952. Then your land bore the deep scars of war. But you of free Korea have struggled to rehabilitate your war-torn nation. You have achieved better

standards of living against odds that for a less sturdy people would have been overwhelming.

Equally inspiring to us all in recent days has been the purposeful revitalization of the free institutions and practices on which democracy rests.

American Pledge of Support Reaffirmed

You have reason today to be confident that your military forces, together with those of your friends and allies, will permit no intrusion across the borders of free Korea. On behalf of the Government and people of the United States I solemnly reaffirm the pledge of full American support to the Republic of Korea in accordance with our commitments under the mutual defense treaty.⁹

The primary responsibility, of course, rests squarely on the Korean people and their Government. External aid to any nation can be used effectively and indeed is deserved only as the recipient shows by stability, energy, unity, and steadfastness of purpose its determination to sacrifice for the ideals it deems paramount in its way of life.

Certainly, in its agonizing tests during 3 years of war, Korea showed itself so determined. We shall forever pay tribute to the heroic soldiers, sailors, and airmen of Korea who, together with their fellow fighting men from 16 member nations of the United Nations, gave their lives in the cause of freedom.

So long as a like spirit, a like will to sacrifice, animates the people of Korea, other nations will be inspired and, I think, anxious to help you in every way they can. They have already proved such a readiness.

The United Nations response to the attack in 1950 was one of the significant events of history. This united determination of free countries will not be forgotten by those who would wage aggression or by those who seek to maintain their full independence and security.

The cause for which free nations fought here in Korea transcended physical stemming of Communist aggression. Their greater and more far-reaching purpose was to strengthen and safe-

guard, on the mainland of Asia, a nation founded on the principles of government by and for the people.

This kind of government cannot endure without such basic institutions and practices as:

1. a free press;
2. responsible expression of popular will;
3. a system of public education;
4. an assembly truly representative of the Korean people.

Events over the past few months in the Republic of Korea have demonstrated how aware its citizens are of the rights and obligations of a free people.

Members of the National Assembly, I repeat that yours is a great trust. You, and those new members who will soon be gathering here in the next Assembly, have the opportunity and the heavy responsibility to show that human freedom and advancement of the people's welfare thrive even in the very shadow of Communist aggression.

The prompt and judicious fulfillment of the recently expressed wishes of the Korean people is a momentous challenge. Your friends throughout the world hope and believe you will meet this challenge with courage and with moderation. And success in this undertaking will provide inspiration to your countrymen to the north, who, I earnestly pray, will one day join you in a free, united Korea.

Working Together in Cooperative Purpose

Over the past years, I have had an unusual opportunity to visit many people throughout the world. In race, in color, in language, in creed they were a cross section of all mankind. But they were united in their recognition that responsible and representative self-government best serves the needs and welfare of free men. This National Assembly, for example, has its counterpart in all free countries, which, like you, are striving for liberty, progress, and peace with justice.

All free nations cherish these goals. All aspire to achieve them. But not a single one—even the most rich and powerful—can hope, of itself, for fullness of attainment in the circumstances of this time. All of us—Asian and European, American and African—must work together in cooperative

⁹ For text, see TIAS 3097.

purpose, or we shall lose the right to work at all in freedom.

That we may effectively work together we must come to understand more clearly and fully how much we have in common—the great goals of free men, their eternal aspirations, a common destiny. As we grow in such understanding, I am firmly convinced that all artificial, manmade differences will shrink and disappear. In their stead will develop full recognition of the tremendous opportunities for mutual advancement that lie in cooperative endeavor. And we will use these opportunities for our own good and the good of all mankind.

Free people, of course, must stand together resolutely against aggression. But they must also stand together in combat against the enemies of humanity: hunger, privation, and disease. The American people have devoted much of their resources to this cause. Here in Korea are some of our largest programs for contributing to the economic progress of a close ally and for strengthening its military capabilities.

Cooperation between our two countries has, as you know, extended into many spheres: education, industry, defense, agriculture, social welfare. Through Korean-American cooperation in all these diverse fields, we have come better to understand each other. This common understanding, which reflects our common stake, will, I am convinced, grow deeper and firmer as we continue jointly to face the problems and demands of the future.

Now, on the eve of the 10th anniversary of the Communist invasion of your nation, let us rededicate ourselves to the cause of peace and friendship in freedom among nations and men.

My friends, I come before you this afternoon as a representative of one sovereign nation speaking to the legislative representatives of another sovereign nation. My message from America to you is this: We will be watching your progress with ever-growing concern. You can always count on our friendship so long as we endure.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, SEOUL, JUNE 20

White House (Seoul) press release dated June 20

Accepting an invitation of long standing from the Government of the Republic of Korea, President Eisenhower today visited Korea where he

met with Prime Minister Huh Chung and other Korean leaders, including members of the Korean National Assembly, which he addressed. President Eisenhower also visited the United Nations Command and reviewed contingents representing United Nations Forces which are helping to defend this key Free World position.

President Eisenhower's visit highlighted the vital purposes served by collective Free World action to preserve peace initiated almost exactly ten years ago in response to international communism's attack on the Republic of Korea. The manner in which the United Nations responded in June, 1950 to aggression and the retention over the past decade of a strong Free World position in the Republic of Korea have been major factors in preserving the peace in Asia and creating a climate in which Free Asia nations can enjoy independence, promote human rights and improve the spiritual and material welfare of these people.

The visit impressively reaffirmed the strong bonds of friendship and close cooperation between the Republic of Korea and the United States. The visit also provided an opportunity for discussions between Prime Minister Huh Chung and President Eisenhower on questions of common concern to their two countries. President Eisenhower reaffirmed the assurance of the Government and people of the United States of their continued support for the Republic of Korea and their solemn pledge to preserve the independence of Korea.

The two leaders gave unqualified endorsement to the principles of the United Nations Charter as standards for international behavior. They pledged that their countries would continue to uphold United Nations principles and work unreservedly and unceasingly toward maintaining peace. To this end, both leaders recognized the vital importance of preserving the alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America and of maintaining vigilance and strength, patience and foresightedness, in carrying out the purposes for which this alliance stands.

In the course of the discussions, Prime Minister Huh Chung and President Eisenhower took cognizance of the deep longing of the Korean people for reunification of their homeland. They agreed that every effort must be continued to bring a peaceful end to this tragic division in accordance with the principles set forth in United Nations resolutions, envisaging the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and

democratic Korea under a representative form of government and full restoration of peace and security in the area.

Prime Minister Huh Chung outlined measures being taken by his country to broaden its international ties and he affirmed his nation's strong desire to be a full member of the United Nations. Prime Minister Huh Chung and President Eisenhower agreed that the Republic of Korea is entitled to United Nations membership and that its membership would strengthen the United Nations.

Prime Minister Huh Chung and President Eisenhower agreed that efforts should be made to encourage private investment and increase the flow of trade between countries of the Free World.

Prime Minister Huh Chung and President Eisenhower examined Korean and American economic and social programs and agreed that they should be designed and executed so as to foster economic independence, assist social progress, and provide a strong foundation for democratic institutions. Both leaders agreed that continued United States economic assistance is required to help the Republic of Korea maintain economic growth and achieve economic viability as soon as possible.

Prime Minister Huh Chung and President Eisenhower expressed their resolve to continue to serve the cause of peace and strengthen the bonds of friendship between their two peoples.

U.S. and Canada Meet in Quebec To Review Joint Defense Problems

The Department of State announced on July 8 (press release 385) that the third meeting of the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense will convene at Montebello, Quebec, July 12-13.

The Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense was established by mutual agreement of the two Governments as a result of discussions in July of 1958 between Prime Minister Diefenbaker and President Eisenhower.¹ The second meeting of the Joint Committee was held at Camp David, Md., on November 8-9, 1959.²

¹ For text of a joint statement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 4, 1958, p. 204.

Canadian members of the Committee will be Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard C. Green, chairman, Minister of National Defence George R. Pearkes, Minister of Finance Donald M. Fleming, and Minister of Defence Production Raymond J. M. O'Hurley. United States members will be Secretary of State Christian A. Herter,³ who is the chairman of the U.S. delegation, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, Jr., and Secretary of the Treasury Robert B. Anderson. In addition, key officials of both Governments will advise and assist in the substantive work of their respective delegations.

The Committee was established to provide for periodic consultation at the Cabinet level on matters affecting the joint defense of Canada and the United States. The periodic review includes consideration of military questions together with a study of the political and economic aspects of defense problems.

U.S. Affirms Commitment To Oppose Communist Intervention in Americas

Statement by President Eisenhower

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 9

The statement which has just been made by Mr. Khrushchev¹ in which he promises full support to the Castro regime in Cuba is revealing in two respects. It underscores the close ties that have developed between the Soviet and Cuban Governments. It also shows the clear intention to establish Cuba in a role serving Soviet purposes in this hemisphere.

The statement of the Soviet Premier reflects the effort of an outside nation and of international communism to intervene in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. There is irony in Mr. Khrushchev's

² The first meeting was held at Paris in December 1958 during the regular annual ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. For announcement of the second meeting and text of a communique, see *ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1959, p. 788.

³ Secretary Herter did not attend the meeting. The Department of State was represented by Under Secretary Livingston T. Merchant, and the Secretary of Defense acted as chairman of the U.S. group.

¹ Premier Khrushchev addressed a meeting of teachers from the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic at Moscow on July 9.

shehev's portrayal of the Soviet Union as the protector of the independence of an American nation when viewed against the history of the enslavement of countless other peoples by Soviet imperialism.

The inter-American system has declared itself, on more than one occasion, beginning with the Rio Treaty, as opposed to any such interference. We are committed to uphold those agreements. I affirm in the most emphatic terms that the United States will not be deterred from its responsibilities by the threats Mr. Khrushchev is making. Nor will the United States, in conformity with its treaty obligations, permit the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the Western Hemisphere.

President Reduces Cuban Sugar Quota for Balance of 1960

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

White House press release dated July 6

I have today [July 6] approved legislation enacted by the Congress which authorizes the President to determine Cuba's sugar quota for the balance of calendar year 1960 and for the 3-month period ending March 31, 1961. In conformity with this legislation I have signed a proclamation which, in the national interest, establishes the Cuban sugar quota for the balance of 1960 at 39,752 short tons, plus the sugar certified for entry prior to July 3, 1960. This represents a reduction of 700,000 short tons from the original 1960 Cuban quota of 3,119,655 short tons.

This deficit will be filled by purchases from other free-world suppliers.

The importance of the United States Government's action relating to sugar quota legislation makes it desirable, I believe, to set forth the reasons which led the Congress to authorize and the Executive to take this action in the national interest.

Normally about one-third of our total sugar supply comes from Cuba. Despite every effort on our part to maintain traditionally friendly relations, the Government of Cuba is now following a course which raises serious question as to whether the United States can, in the long run,

continue to rely upon that country for such large quantities of sugar. I believe that we would fail in our obligation to our people if we did not take steps to reduce our reliance for a major food product upon a nation which has embarked upon a deliberate policy of hostility toward the United States.

The Government of Cuba has committed itself to purchase substantial quantities of goods from the Soviet Union under barter arrangements. It has chosen to undertake to pay for these goods with sugar—traded at prices well below those which it has obtained in the United States. The inescapable conclusion is that Cuba has embarked on a course of action to commit steadily increasing amounts of its sugar crop to trade with the Communist bloc, thus making its future ability to fill the sugar needs of the United States ever more uncertain.

It has been with the most genuine regret that this Government has been compelled to alter the heretofore mutually beneficial sugar trade between the United States and Cuba. Under the system which has existed up to this time, the people of Cuba, particularly those who labor in the cane fields and in the mills, have benefited from the maintenance of an assured market in the United States, where Cuban sugar commands a price well above that which could be obtained in the world market. These benefits also reached many others whose livelihood was related to the sugar industry on the island.

The American people will always maintain their friendly feelings for the people of Cuba. We look forward to the day when the Cuban Government will once again allow this friendship to be fully expressed in the relations between our two countries.¹

PROCLAMATION 3355²

DETERMINATION OF CUBAN SUGAR QUOTA

1. WHEREAS on December 17, 1959, the 1960 sugar quota for Cuba was determined pursuant to the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1100 *et seq.*), at 3,119,655 short tons, raw value, of which 2,379,903 short tons, raw value, have heretofore been certified for entry, pursuant

¹ For a statement made by Secretary Herter before the House Committee on Agriculture on June 22, see BULLETIN of July 11, 1960, p. 58.

² 25 *Fed. Reg.* 6414.

to regulations issued by the Secretary of Agriculture (7 CFR 817), leaving 739,752 short tons, raw value, not yet so certified; and

2. WHEREAS section 408(b) (1) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended by the act of July 6, 1960, entitled "An Act to Amend the Sugar Act of 1948, as Amended", provides that the President shall determine, notwithstanding any other provision of Title II of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, the quota for Cuba for the balance of calendar year 1960 and for the three-month period ending March 31, 1961, in such amount or amounts as he shall find from time to time to be in the national interest: *Provided*, however, That in no event shall such quota exceed such amount as would be provided for Cuba under the terms of Title II of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, in the absence of section 408(b); and

3. WHEREAS section 408(b) (1) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, further provides that determinations made by the President thereunder shall become effective immediately upon publication in the Federal Register; and

4. WHEREAS, pursuant to section 408(b) (1) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, I find it to be in the national interest that the quota for Cuba under the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, for the balance of calendar year 1960 shall be 39,752 short tons, raw value, plus the sugar certified prior to July 3, 1960, for entry but not yet entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 408(b) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States:

1. Do hereby determine that in the national interest the quota for Cuba pursuant to the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, for the balance of calendar year 1960 shall be 39,752 short tons, raw value, plus the sugar certified prior to July 3, 1960, for entry but not yet entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption; and

2. Do hereby delegate to the Secretary of Agriculture the authority vested in the President by section 408(b) (2) and section 408(b) (3) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, such authority to be exercised with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.

This proclamation shall become effective immediately upon publication in the Federal Register.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this sixth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty.
[SEAL] and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-fifth.



By the President:
DOUGLAS DILLON,
Acting Secretary of State.

U.S. Protests Cuban Seizure of American Oil Refineries

Press release 381 dated July 5

The U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Philip W. Bonsal, on July 5 delivered to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations the following note protesting the seizure of U.S.-owned oil refineries by that Government.

I have the honor to refer to the recent intervention and seizure by the Government of Cuba of the American-owned Texaco and Esso Standard Oil Company refineries in Cuba on the grounds that these companies, in refusing to refine crude oil not obtained from their own sources of supply, had violated Cuban law. The Government of the United States vigorously protests the actions of the Government of Cuba in issuing the orders to these companies to refine such crude oil and in intervening the companies thereafter. The Government of the United States deems these actions to be arbitrary and inequitable, without authority under Cuban law, and contrary to commitments made to these companies. It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that the Government of Cuba will, in justice and equity, promptly reconsider and rescind the actions which it has taken against these American companies and permit them to continue to operate their businesses under fair and reasonable conditions.

As Your Excellency is aware, these two American-owned oil companies, in which thousands of investors have interests, have operated in Cuba for over fifty years as law-abiding entities and have made a valuable contribution to the growth and development of the Cuban economy. The modern refineries which have been seized represent the investment of many millions of dollars of new capital and re-investment of earnings, and reflect responsible and careful planning for the future as well as the present fuel needs of Cuba. Moreover, despite the fact that the Government of Cuba has refused to release more than a small percentage of the dollars required to pay for the crude oil imported since the revolution, the companies, nevertheless, have continued voluntarily to provide crude oil by financing it on their own account, thus insuring normal supplies of petroleum products for the Cuban people. The backlog of dollar remittances due these companies is now in excess of fifty million dollars even though

the Government of Cuba expressly undertook with these companies to provide payment on a more current basis. I must state to Your Excellency that, in viewing the history and record of these companies, and apart from legal considerations, my Government regards the actions taken against them as a violation of accepted standards of ethics and morality in the free world.

I have been informed of the assertion made to the companies by the President of the National Bank of Cuba, Dr. Ernesto Guevara, that the companies are legally obligated to refine petroleum from the USSR as demanded by the Government of Cuba under the terms of the Mineral Fuel Law of 1938. I have also been informed of the threat made that these refineries would be seized if they failed to comply with the order to refine such petroleum. However a careful reading of the whole of this law of 1938 and a review of experience in the years ensuing since its passage, make clearly evident that the article cited by Dr. Guevara was intended to apply solely to the refining of petroleum drawn from Cuban soil.

The Government of the United States has noted, in any event, that the refineries which have been intervened and seized were constructed or enlarged under the provisions of the Law Decree No. 1758 of November 2, 1954, which established a special, non-alterable 20-year regime for the refineries qualifying under this law and expressly provided that such refineries were to be exclusively governed by its provisions. Your Excellency's attention is called to the fact that nowhere in these provisions or in the regulations issued thereunder is there any requirement that these refineries process Government crude oil of any kind. Furthermore, events and circumstances leading to the passing of the law of 1954 and the construction of the Texaco refinery in 1957 and the enlargement of the refinery of the Esso Standard Oil Company in the same year establish that such actions were undertaken with the understanding that the companies had the right to supply and refine their own crude oil. Otherwise, one of the principal purposes in the establishment and enlargement of their refineries would be defeated. In the view of the Government of the United States, therefore, the 1954 law constitutes a commitment to the companies binding on the Government of Cuba, and any order of the Government of Cuba such as was transmitted to them is inconsistent with the basic

concept of the 1954 law and in breach of the Cuban Government's commitment to the companies.

Nor is there any legal basis in the Mineral Fuel Law of 1938 or in Law Decree No. 1758, or in any other Cuban law to our knowledge, for this act of intervention and seizure which has been perpetrated by officials of the Government of Cuba. Therefore, it is the opinion of the Government of the United States that this act is without sanction in Cuban law; that it constitutes a further breach of the Cuban Government's commitment to the refineries; and that it is a violation of the operating rights of these companies as provided by Cuban law. Even if the intervention were otherwise lawful, which the Government of the United States does not consider to be the case, it was clearly improper to use the intervention as a device to enforce compliance with an illegal order, and any subsequent intervention must be considered as tainted with illegality.

The Government of the United States cannot but feel, with profound regret, that the intervention and seizure of these refineries is further evidence and confirmation of a pattern of relentless economic aggression by the Government of Cuba designed to destroy Cuba's traditional investment and trade relations with the free world.

U.S. Sends Wheat to Jordan for Drought Relief

The Department of State announced on July 7 (press release 384) that in response to a request from the Government of Jordan, the United States on July 7 made available 25,000 tons of wheat for free distribution in drought-stricken Jordan.

Shipment of the grain, one-half as soon as possible and the remainder before the end of the year, was authorized with the signing of an acceptance document by Dr. Yusuf Haikal, the Ambassador of Jordan.

The document was signed at the offices of the International Cooperation Administration, which will supply the wheat under the emergency provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Title II, P.L. 480).

Because of severe drought, Jordan's current wheat crop is only slightly larger than the amount needed for seed next year. The 25,000 tons of U.S. wheat will help to meet the immediate food needs of the country.

United States and Thailand Express Mutual Desire To Maintain and Strengthen Cooperation

King Bhumibol Adulyadej and Queen Sirikit of Thailand visited the United States from June 14 to July 14. Following are texts of an exchange of greetings between President Eisenhower and His Majesty the King at the Washington National Airport on June 28 and an address made by His Majesty before a joint session of the Congress on June 29, together with a joint communique released on July 1 and a list of the members of the King's official party.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, JUNE 28

White House press release dated June 28

The President

Your Majesties and members of our visiting party from Thailand, and friends:

Your Majesty, it is indeed a great privilege to welcome you to this country. The record of the friendly relationships between our two countries is a bright one, and it is therefore with unusual pleasure that we welcome here in this country the head of that nation.

You will find, sir, in all parts of this nation a similar readiness to bid you welcome and to express their friendship for your fine country in southeast Asia. We sincerely trust that the journey that you make through our country will be for you and for Her Majesty the Queen very interesting and enjoyable, and indeed we hope to some extent instructive, as you will learn more of our country and of our people and of their way of life, just as visitors to your country learn about yours.

So, sir, again welcome to you and to Her Majesty, and our very best wishes for an enjoyable stay in our nation.

Thank you.

The King

Thank you so much, Mr. President, and thank you for the kind words you have just spoken now and for the rousing welcome you have given us. In fact, we have arrived in this country when we set foot on the island of Hawaii, just on the 14th, and then to California and to Pittsburgh. Everywhere we received a very friendly welcome. So we are all very grateful to you, Mr. President, for making this visit possible.

And before coming on this tour I had told my people the object of such a state visit; that is, when we are friends, between friends and relatives we like to go and visit each other, for the ties of friendship; but now, with nations, it is quite impossible for the people of each nation—24 million of them—for my people to come and visit your 190 million people in this country. So I have to come as the Head of State and as their representative.

That is why I am here, and the people understood very well. The day we left Bangkok they gave us a very big sendoff and they showed by that they were quite ready to give me support and to give their good will. So now, as the representative of my people, I bring to you as the representative of the American nation the greetings and the good will of the Thai people.

Both countries have had long and very happy relations for a long time. That is because we have the same convictions. We say that we cannot have happiness without freedom and independence. Since we have been here we have seen many similarities. Among the similarities, in dress—ordinarily, privately, the Thai people don't like to dress too formally; they like to be easily comfortable, as you people do. And between meals we take snacks, as you do. But the difference is in the food. You have popcorn, you

have hotdogs and ice cream. Oh, that is very good. We have noodle soup, and we have pickled fruit. So among the differences we have many similarities. And especially in the train of thought; that is, we like to live simply. And above all, we like freedom.

Now this visit is something more for me personally. In Thailand we say—we call the motherland the land of our birth, the land where we live . . . [Here the King spoke in Thai]. I was born here in this country; so I can say that the United States is half my motherland. This visit is somewhat of a sentimental journey, and this I feel with quite genuine emotion in coming back here. I say “coming back here.” I never say “come” or “go” to the United States. I say “return” to the United States. All that emotion gives me the conviction that our visit here will be of great use for the strengthening and reinforcement of the bonds of friendship which have existed for a long time already between the United States and my country.

So I thank you once again, Mr. President.

ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, JUNE 29¹

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and Members of Congress, it is a privilege and a pleasure for me to address you in this stately building, which is the scene of many grave decisions in the history of your great country and, I may even say, of the world.

When the President of the United States kindly invited me to visit this country, I was happy to accept; and was glad to travel halfway round the world in order to be here. My reason is threefold. I would like to mention them briefly to you and, through you, to the people of the United States.

First, I have long desired to see and learn more of your country. When I hear of intolerance and oppression in so many parts of the world, I want to know how, in this country, millions of people, differing in race, tradition, and belief, can live together freely and in happy harmony. I want to know how these millions, scattered over a large territory, can agree upon the major issues in the complicated affairs of this world, and how, in short, can they tolerate each other at all.

Second, I wished to bring to you, in person, the

greetings and good will of my own people. Although the Americans and the Thai live on opposite sides of the globe, yet there is one thing common to them. It is the love of freedom. Indeed, the word “Thai” actually means free. The kind reception which I am enjoying in this country enables me to take back to my people your friendship and good will. Friendship of one government for another is an important thing. But it is friendship of one people for another that assuredly guarantees peace and progress.

Third, I have the natural human desire to see my birthplace. I expect some of you here were also born in Boston; or, like my father, were educated at Harvard. I hasten to congratulate such fortunate people. I am sure that they are with me in spirit. We share a sentiment of deep pride in the academic and cultural achievements of that wonderful city.

Just as in ancient days all roads led to Rome, so today they lead to Washington. And now that I am here, I should like to say something about two subjects which are fundamentally important to my country, namely, security and development.

As I look at history, I see mighty military empires rise, through conquest and subjection of alien peoples. I see them decline and fall, when the subject peoples threw off their yoke. It is only in this present century that we find a great military power refrain from war, except for the defense of right and peace. I refer to the United States of America. This signal example is a long step forward toward the security of mankind.

You, of course, know by heart all the words of President Lincoln's address at Gettysburg. They lay down basic principles which should inspire the conduct of all nations and all governments. One of those principles is contained in the following words, “a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”

In accordance with that broadminded proposition, your people have given, by their own sovereign will, full freedom and equity to a southeast Asian nation. When a Far Eastern country was being overwhelmed by a war for its oppression, the United States without hesitation went to war to save that country. There Thai soldiers fought side by side with your GI's. It is such prompt actions as this that have given great encouragement and confidence to a small country like mine.

¹ Reprinted from the *Congressional Record* of June 29, p. 13894.

Furthermore, U.S. initiative has brought forth SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], the international alliance which is the pillar of my country's security.

When a country feels reasonably confident of its own security, it can devote more attention to economic development. As you are all aware, my country is classified as underdeveloped. The average income of a Thai is only about \$100 a year. You will understand what great urgent need there is to increase the income and raise the living standard of my people.

One of the handicaps of countries in our region is the lack of capital and technical know-how. It is at this point that the United States has so generously come to our assistance. And here I should like to refer to the economic and technical cooperation agreement between our respective Governments.² Its preamble states that liberty and independence depend largely upon sound economic conditions. It then goes on to say:

. . . the Congress of the United States of America has enacted legislation enabling the United States of America to furnish assistance . . . in order that the Government of Thailand through its own individual efforts . . . may achieve such objectives.

In that preamble, there is one concept that needs to be emphasized. American assistance is to enable the Thai to achieve their objectives through their own efforts. I need hardly say that this concept has our complete endorsement. Indeed, there is a precept of the Lord Buddha which says: "Thou art thine own refuge." We are grateful for American aid; but we intend one day to do without it.

This leads me to a question in which some of you may be interested. The question is: What do we Thai think of U.S. cooperation? I shall try to explain my view as briefly as I can.

In my country there is one widely accepted concept. It is that of family obligations. The members of a family, in the large sense, are expected to help one another whenever there is need for assistance. The giving of aid is a merit in itself. The giver does not expect to hear others sing his praises every day; nor does he expect any return. The receiver is nevertheless grateful. He too, in his turn, will carry out his obligations.

In giving generous assistance to foreign coun-

²Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2170 and 2304.

Thai Paintings and Exhibit Mark Visit of King and Queen

The Department of State announced on June 23 (press release 346) that a special showing of Thai paintings would be placed on exhibition in the Department of State June 27 in connection with the official visit to the United States of Their Majesties King Bhumibol Adulyadej and Queen Sirikit of Thailand. The King and Queen arrived in Washington on June 28.

The paintings—16 in all—were hung in the south mezzanine on the second floor of the State Department Building. At the same time, a large paneled exhibit of photographs and artifacts reflecting various aspects of Thai culture was constructed and placed on view in the Department lobby for the period of Their Majesties' stay in Washington from June 28 to July 2.

Later this year, in October, the State Department will assist in bringing to the United States a comprehensive exhibition of Thai art treasures drawn from national museums and private collections. The exhibition is scheduled to open at the University of Indiana in October.

The paintings, from the private collection of James H. W. Thompson, an American businessman in Bangkok, are the first representative group of paintings by Thai artists ever shown in the United States. In subject matter the paintings are almost exclusively religious and are executed on silk, cotton, paper, or wood surfaces. They have been brought here under the auspices of the Smithsonian Traveling Exhibition Service as one of a series of exhibitions of oriental art which the Service will present here and in other cities in the United States.

tries, the United States are, in my Thai eyes, applying the old concept of family obligations upon the largest scale. The nations of the world are being taught that they are but members of one big family; that they have obligations to one another; and that they are closely interdependent. It may take a long time to learn this lesson. But when it has been truly learned, the prospects of world peace will become bright.

Some of you may recall that my great-grandfather, King Mongkut, was in communication with President Buchanan during the years 1859 to 1861—100 years ago. President Buchanan sent him a letter dated May 10, 1859, with a consignment of books in 192 volumes. The King was very pleased with the books and in a letter dated the 14th of February 1861, he sent certain

presents in return as gifts to the American people and an offer that became historic.

At that period, there was much demand for elephants in our and neighboring countries. Elephants had been sent to Ceylon, Sumatra, and Java and turned loose in the jungles for breeding purposes, and the result is that elephants are plentiful in those countries.

In the past, elephants had great potentialities. From the economic point of view, they could be used in the timber industry for hauling big logs and other heavy materials, like tractors do in present days. As they could go through thick jungles, they were also used as beasts of burden for transport purposes. And in view of their enormous size and strength, in time of war they struck awe into the enemies. Since elephants could be put to such various good uses and since they were available in large number in our country, as a friendly gesture to a friendly people, my great-grandfather offered to send the President and Congress elephants to be turned loose in the uncultivated land of America for breeding purposes.

That offer was made with no other objective than to provide a friend with what he lacked, in the same spirit in which the American aid program is likewise offered. And understanding and appreciating the sentiment underlying your aid program, the Thai Government welcomes the program and is grateful for it.

Our two countries have had the best of relations. They started with the coming of your missionaries who shared with our people the benefits of modern medicine and the knowledge of modern science. This soon led to official relations and to a treaty between the two nations. That treaty dates as far back as 1833.

It can be said that from the beginning of our relationship right up to the present time no conflict of any kind has arisen to disturb our cordial friendship and understanding. On the contrary there has been mutual good will and close cooperation between our two countries. In view of the present world tension and the feeling of uncertainty apparent everywhere, it is my sincere feeling that the time is ripe for an even closer cooperation. It will demonstrate to the world that we are one in purpose and conviction, and it can only lead to one thing—mutual benefit.

I thank you for your kind indulgence.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, JULY 1

White House press release dated July 1

The President of the United States and His Majesty the King of Thailand have held a friendly and useful exchange of views on matters of mutual interest.

Their Majesties the King and Queen of Thailand are visiting the United States upon the invitation of the President. At the conclusion of their stay in Washington on July 2, during which His Majesty the King addressed a joint session of the United States Congress, Their Majesties will begin a 12-day coast-to-coast tour of the United States, during which they will meet with various civic, cultural, and business leaders. The President recalled the fact that the King was born in the United States and expressed the hope that this personal link would enhance the pleasure of His Majesty's visit to the land of his birth.

The President expressed great admiration for the steps taken under the King's leadership to foster the economic and social development of Thailand in harmony with the aspirations and ideals of the Thai people. He voiced profound respect for the moral inspiration which the King's devotion to the welfare of his people continues to provide.

In their review of the world situation, the President and the King expressed their mutual concern with the vital problem of preserving freedom and independence as well as achieving lasting peace and establishing a world order based on international justice. They reasserted their determination to work toward these goals, the achievement of which will contribute immensely to the general progress, prosperity, and welfare of mankind. They noted that the staunch adherence of Thailand and the United States to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization demonstrates a mutual belief in the indispensability of collective security as a means of preserving the frontiers of the free world from aggression and of promoting the peaceful objectives shared by both countries. The President took this occasion to pay tribute to the steadfast partnership of Thailand and the United States in all fields and reaffirmed to His Majesty the unwavering determination of the United States fully to honor its treaty commitments undertaken in the cause of collective security.

The President and the King expressed a com-

mon belief in the ideal of enhancing human dignity as the wellspring by which a free society prospers and is nourished. They agreed that the American and Thai peoples are dedicated to abiding respect for the principles of the sovereignty and independence of nations and of genuine non-interference in the affairs of others. They voiced their profound conviction that any attempt by any nation to impose its own economic system or political beliefs on any other country should be condemned.

In recalling the long and fruitful tradition of friendship which binds the United States and Thailand the President assured the King of the continuing determination of the United States to assist the Royal Government of Thailand in its noble objective of promoting the economic and social development of the country for the lasting benefit of the Thai people. The President and the King expressed their mutual desire to maintain and further to strengthen the bonds of close and cordial collaboration between Thailand and the United States, both directly and through the United Nations and other appropriate international organizations in which the two countries share membership, confident that in so doing they are responsive to the highest aspirations of their peoples for a world in which peace, freedom, and the sanctity of human dignity are honored and cherished.

MEMBERS OF OFFICIAL PARTY

The Department of State announced on June 24 (press release 354) that the following would be accompanying King Bhumibol Adulyadej and Queen Sirikit as members of the official party:

Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand
Phya Srivisar, Privy Councillor

Visutr Arthayukti, Ambassador of Thailand

Mrs. Visutr Arthayukti, wife of the Ambassador of Thailand

Gen. Luang Sura Narong, Chief Aide-de-Camp General
Dr. Kalya Isarasena Na Ayudhaya, Grand Chamberlain

Mom Rajawongs Kittinadda Kitiyakara, Private Secretary to His Majesty the King

Princess Vibhavadi Rangsit, Lady-in-Waiting

Capt. Mom Rajawongs Bhandhum Davivongs, R.T.N.,
Aide-de-Camp

Group Capt. Kaivulya Thavaradhara, Aide-de-Camp

Poonperm Krairiksh, private secretary to Her Majesty the Queen.

U.S. Sends Congratulatory Message to First President of Ghana

White House press release dated July 1

The White House on July 1 made public the following message from President Eisenhower to His Excellency Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana, on the occasion of the accession of Ghana to the status of republic and on the occasion of the inauguration of Dr. Nkrumah as its first President on July 1, 1960.

JULY 1, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Upon the accession of your country to the status of Republic and upon your inauguration as its first President I extend in my own name and on behalf of the people of the United States most cordial greetings and felicitations to you and your countrymen.

In the more than three years of close relations between an independent Ghana and this country strong bonds of friendship and mutual interests have developed. It is the sincere hope of the Government and people of the United States that these bonds will continue to grow stronger in the years to come.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Shrimp Conservation Commission Meets at Habana

Press release 353 dated July 6

The Commission for the Conservation of Shrimp in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico held its first meeting at Habana, Cuba, from June 30 to July 1, 1960. Donald L. McKernan of the United States was elected chairman and Isabel Pérez Farfante of Cuba was elected vice chairman.

The Commission agreed upon a coordinated research program that would meet its obligation under the convention to maintain the maximum sustainable productivity of stocks of shrimp of common concern to Cuba and the U.S.A. in waters of the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Cuba and the Florida coast of the United States. The scientific program is designed to provide information required for:

1. Identification of the stocks of common concern and the area they occupy.

2. Determination of the necessity for any conservation measures to assure the maximum sustainable yield, taking into account particularly the growth and death rates of shrimp in the area, the effect of the fishery on the stock, and the type of measure which would be most effective.

3. Determination of the effect of environment on the stocks.

It is expected that the program of the Commission will be inaugurated in the near future.

The next annual meeting of the Commission will be held in April 1961 at a place to be later determined.

Inter-American Advisory Committee Holds Fifth Meeting

Press release 382 dated July 5

The Department of State announced on July 5 that the National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs is meeting in the Department on July 6-7. The Acting Secretary [Douglas Dillon] will participate in the meeting of the Committee.

This will be the fifth meeting of the Committee since its creation by President Eisenhower on November 14, 1959.¹ The purpose of the Committee is to consider, on a continuing basis, current and long-range problems of our relations with Latin America and to make recommendations thereon to the Secretary of State.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 2d Session

Khrushchev's Strategy and Its Meaning for America. A study presented by the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee which was prepared by the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania. 40 pp. [Committee print]

Amendments to the Foreign Service Act. Hearings before the Subcommittee on State Department Organization

and Foreign Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. February 1-June 2, 1960. 258 pp.

Exports, Imports, and the United States Balance of International Payments. A special study prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress and presented by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. S. Doc. 105. April 1960. 43 pp.

Organizing for National Security: Science, Technology, and the Policy Process. Hearings before the National Policy Machinery Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee. Part II. April 25-27, 1960. 174 pp.

Staff Memorandum on International Lending Agencies. Prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee. April 27, 1960. 175 pp. [Committee print]

Foreign Commerce Study: Export Credit Guarantees. Hearings before the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on measures to expand U.S. exports—present export credit facilities and proposals for new mechanisms. April 28-29, 1960. 279 pp.

Exposé of Soviet Espionage, May 1960. Prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and transmitted by direction of the Attorney General for the use of the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 63 pp. [Committee print]

Foreign Commerce Study: Trade With the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Hearings before the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. May 5-6, 1960. 194 pp.

Atlantic Convention. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on various resolutions calling for a convention of delegates from the NATO countries to explore methods of achieving more effective and democratic unity in advancing their common interest. May 17, 1960. 42 pp.

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. Report to accompany Ex. C, 86th Congress, 2d session. S. Ex. Rept. 6. June 2, 1960. 10 pp.

Sugar Act of 1948. Report to accompany H.R. 12311. H. Rept. 1746. June 6, 1960. 44 pp.

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security With Japan. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Ex. E, 86th Congress, 2d session. June 7, 1960. 101 pp.

International Development Association. Report to accompany H.R. 11001. H. Rept. 1766. June 8, 1960. 13 pp.

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee to review for the period December 1, 1958-November 30, 1959, the operation of article VII of the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, together with the other criminal jurisdictional arrangements throughout the world. June 8, 1960. 29 pp.

Philippine War Damage Claims. Supplemental hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 12078, a bill to authorize the payment of the balance of awards for war damage compensation made by the Philippine War Damage Commission under the terms of the Philippine Rehabilitation Act of April 30, 1946, and to authorize the appropriation of \$73 million for that purpose. June 9, 1960. 25 pp.

International Telecommunication Convention, With Annexes, and the Final Protocol to the Convention. Message from the President and texts of the convention with annexes and final protocol which were signed on December 21, 1959. S. Ex. J. June 9, 1960. 106 pp.

Radio Regulations, With Appendixes and an Additional Protocol. Message from the President and text of the regulations, appendixes, and protocol which were signed on December 21, 1959. S. Ex. I. June 9, 1960. 571 pp.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1960, p. 815.

New African Nations Recommended for Membership in United Nations

REPUBLIC OF TOGO¹

The United States welcomes this meeting of the Security Council because it gives us the opportunity to demonstrate in a tangible way our pleasure over the achievements of the Government and the people of Togo.

After 42 years of international status under the League of Nations as well as under the United Nations, the people of Togo reached the fulfillment of their inherent right to govern themselves on April 27, when the independence of Togo was proclaimed. The United States delegation, headed by our Attorney General, Mr. William Rogers, had the honor of participating in the ceremonies marking this memorable occasion.

Togo is the smallest of the African territories to achieve independence thus far. But while Togo might be small in comparison to the vastness of the African continent, it is interesting to note that there are 21 independent states whose area is less than that of Togo and 15 which are smaller in population.

The United States has, from the beginning, taken a keen interest in the work of the United Nations trusteeship system, and we are naturally proud of the part it has played in the political development of Togo. We are also happy to acknowledge the success of the Government of France in carrying out its responsibilities under the United Nations trusteeship system.

The United States has no doubt that the voice of Togo should and will be heard with respect and attention at the United Nations. Its people have a reputation for hard work. The Prime Minister of Togo, Mr. Sylvanus Olympio, whom it has been

my good fortune to meet on several occasions, has for many years participated in the work of the United Nations and is, for good reason, held in great esteem here. The United States takes particular pleasure in conveying congratulations to him and in sending sincere best wishes to the Government and the people of Togo.

The United States will vote in favor of the resolution as submitted by the Governments of France and Tunisia which recommends the admission of Togo to membership in the United Nations.²

FEDERATION OF MALI³

The United States welcomes the application for United Nations membership of a great new African state, the Federation of Mali.

Mali will add to the list of United Nations members an ancient name with deep significance for the people of West Africa and elsewhere. It symbolizes the renaissance of a great people, whose culture and wealth flourished brilliantly 6 centuries ago.

Today Mali means something more. It stands for a new nation formed by the union of two dynamic African states. Here is a place where the aspiration for African unity is becoming a reality. Its constitution provides for a full exercise of political and personal freedom. Its capital, Dakar, is the center of the most industrialized region in West Africa. Mali national production figures have risen 30 percent in 4 years.

The Mali Federation will add a powerful African voice to the councils of the United Nations. Its leaders are well known to us as men of broad scholarship and culture as well as experience in government. I, personally, have had the

² A resolution recommending to the General Assembly "that the Republic of Togo be admitted to membership in the United Nations" was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on May 31.

³ Statement made in the Security Council by Ambassador Lodge on June 28 (U.S./U.N. press release 3425).

¹ Statement made in the Security Council by Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on May 31 (U.S./U.N. press release 3412).

good fortune to meet some of them both here in New York and on several occasions in Dakar. Before that, in 1944, I saw the heroic soldiers from Senegal in combat in southern France—a vivid memory of first-class fighting men which will always stay in my mind. For all these reasons I look forward to welcoming them again as colleagues in the work of the United Nations.

Today's meeting, Mr. President, is another occasion to commend France on a job well done. Last year the French Government decided to create a community of self-governing and independent states. Speaking at Dakar, President de Gaulle stated that members of this new community which so desired would evolve toward international sovereignty "with the support, the approval and the assistance of France."

The Mali application for membership in the United Nations, sponsored by France, demonstrates this spirit of cooperation and friendship.

Mr. President, the United States supports the admission of the Federation of Mali and will vote for the resolution introduced by France and Tunisia.

[Mr. Lodge concluded his statement by speaking in French, the translation of which follows:]

Speaking as an old friend of France who knows the Federation of Mali as well and who has worked with France for many things, I wish to congratulate France and I wish to tell the representative of Mali that I welcome him most warmly and in a most friendly way.⁴

MALAGASY REPUBLIC⁵

The United States welcomes the application of the Malagasy Republic for membership in the United Nations. We believe it will make an important and valuable contribution to our work.

The tremendous island it occupies is a world in itself. From north to south it is some one thousand miles long, approximately the distance from Massachusetts to Florida. Its climate and topography are varied. It has for centuries been a meeting place for diverse cultures, races, and religions. Africa, Asia, and Europe have all left

⁴ A resolution recommending U.N. membership for the Federation of Mali was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on June 28.

⁵ Statement made in the Security Council by Ambassador Lodge on June 29 (U.S./U.N. press release 3428).

their mark. Surely in an organization like the United Nations, where we seek to build bridges among people, such an experience as this has very special value.

Malagasy comes to independence with a stable economy and an experienced government. It has had a popularly elected Assembly since 1947 and has been self-governing since 1957.

The independence of Malagasy and its application for United Nations membership represents the culmination of peaceful political evolution in which both Malagasy and France can take justifiable and honest pride. The close relations between the two countries will happily continue through the participation of Malagasy in the French Community.

The "father of Malagasy independence," President [Philibert] Tsiranana, recently stated that the foreign policy of Malagasy would be to defend "the interests of small peoples, the needs of poor countries, and the cause of peace and fraternity." Mr. President, these are our sentiments too.

I had the pleasure of welcoming President Tsiranana to the United States during the 14th General Assembly. He made a lasting impression as a man of wisdom and of long experience in the service of his country.

1960 has been called the "year of African independence." Already four new states have applied for United Nations membership. It is gratifying to see the high place which the United Nations holds in Africa. In the case of Malagasy as well as Cameroun, Togo, and Mali, one of the first official acts has been to apply for United Nations membership. We welcome this willingness to share in the vital work of the United Nations.

Mr. President, the United States will vote in favor of the draft resolution submitted by France and Tunisia.⁶

SOMALI REPUBLIC⁷

The United States is pleased to support the admission of the Republic of Somalia to membership in the United Nations. It is a thrilling thing

⁶ A resolution recommending U.N. membership for the Malagasy Republic was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on June 29.

⁷ Statement made in the Security Council by Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, on July 5 (U.S./U.N. press release 3430/Rev. 1).

to witness the birth of a new state. Membership in the United Nations is the logical culmination of events set in motion on December 2, 1950, when the former Italian Somalia became the Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration. Since that day the Somali people, their elected officials, and the Italian administration have worked with good will and with diligence toward one goal: to bring the territory to independence and full sovereignty.

During this period parallel progress was being made in the neighboring British Somaliland protectorate toward the same great goal. In late June of this year British Somaliland became independent and freely decided to join with the former trust territory of Somalia to form the Republic of Somalia, which we are welcoming here today.

To both Italy and the United Kingdom we offer our commendation for their aid in furthering the aspirations of the Somali people. We must also give full credit to the wisdom of the people of Somalia and the dedication of their leaders.

At the 14th General Assembly the United States had the privilege to cosponsor a resolution which was adopted unanimously on December 5, 1959, and which advanced the date of independence for Somalia by 6 months. This resolution was motivated by the recognition of the political growth of the Somali people and by the striking advances in self-government achieved in a few short years.

The United Nations has been fortunate in the past in having distinguished Somalis participate in its work. Many of us in this room have been privileged to work with Haji Farah Ali Umar, Minister of Industry and Commerce, and with the Under Secretary to the Presidency of the Council of Somalia, Ali Daar, who is with us today. The United Nations will be fortunate to have yet another distinguished African voice added to its councils, this from the fabled Horn of Africa, from the Republic of Somalia.

From the outset of the trusteeship period it was made abundantly clear by a series of detailed studies that Somalia's major problem would be in the economic field. For the realization of its plans in this field the Somali Republic will need the continued assistance of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. I certainly hope the United Nations will be in a position to respond positively and promptly.

For its part, my Government has assured the Somali Republic that the United States is prepared, if the people of Somalia so wish, to assist Somalia to maintain its economic stability and to achieve a proper level of development in the period of independence that lies ahead. On this occasion, which marks in United Nations circles the birth of a new nation, I am glad to repeat that assurance.

We have confidence in the Somali people; we have confidence in the Republic of Somalia as indeed we do in the dynamic Africa of today; and we have confidence that the problems facing this new nation will be resolved through statesmanship and without rancor.

One cannot go to Africa in 1960 without being profoundly impressed by the far-reaching changes that are taking place there. These changes, in my view, constitute one of the most important developments of the 20th century.

It is already apparent that more new sovereign states will be created in Africa during 1960 than have ever been created before during any comparable period in world history.

These developments will bring in their wake a great challenge and a great opportunity for the United Nations. With the help of this organization, I am confident that the peoples of Africa will succeed in establishing their rightful place in the family of nations. I am confident, too, that they will make a significant contribution to the United Nations and the cause of world peace.

The United States shall vote for the resolution in document S/4363, submitted by Italy, Tunisia, and the United Kingdom. In doing so I want to extend the warm and sincere congratulations of the United States to the people of Somalia on this important step in their national life.*

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO¹

The purpose of our meeting today is to extend the hand of friendship to the people and Government of the Republic of the Congo. The United States warmly welcomes its application for membership in the United Nations. We are happy to see the Congo join the growing family of inde-

* A resolution recommending U.N. membership for the Somali Republic was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on July 5.

¹ Statement made in the Security Council by Assistant Secretary Wilcox on July 7 (U.S./U.N. press release 3431).

pendent nations, and we wish the new state every possible success.

I had occasion recently to visit this great new central African Republic, and I returned to the United States concerned with its pressing problems and impressed with its unparalleled opportunities. The Congo is large and diverse. The United States is likewise large and diverse, and our own experience therefore has some relevance. Diversity, far from posing a problem for the United States, has been one of its major sources of strength. If there are some 70 major ethnic groups in the Congo, there may be nearly as many in the United States, including some 20 million Americans of African origin. If the issue of the rights of the local governmental units versus the central government is a vital one in the Congo, it is of continuing importance in the United States. The new Republic of the Congo will have a long and difficult road to travel. But the difficulties will make the achievements of its leaders all the greater.

If the new Republic faces difficulties, its potential is virtually unlimited. The proven capabilities of its people and the richness of its natural resources should form the foundation for a strong and healthy state. The Congo has inherited a primary-education rate which is one of the highest in Africa. It has a large corps of highly trained and skilled technicians who have run the Port of Léopoldville, for example, and the country's mines for many years. It has two very good universities where administrators, doctors, and others who are so desperately needed can be trained. There is an excellent system of vocational education. Moreover, the Congo has a relatively large capital base and reasonably well developed natural resources which should facilitate further progress. Its hydroelectric potential, for example, is tremendous.

In reviewing the assets of the Congo, I have referred to only a few examples. Our attention is inevitably drawn to the extensive work of economic and social development carried out by Belgium. Let me congratulate the Government and people of Belgium on the many constructive contributions they have made to the well-being of the Congolese people. If I may once again draw a parallel with my own country, Mr. President, by comparison with the 13 States that banded together to form the United States in the

beginning, the Congo is considerably richer in natural resources and has several times the population. We are confident therefore that the Congo can prosper in freedom.

The United States has abiding faith in the capacity of the people of the Congo to build a great, new, modern state. The United States stands ready to demonstrate in concrete terms its interest in and support for the welfare and progress of the Congo. Our assistance will include, if the people and Government of the Congo desire, training grants and scholarships and technical aid in other forms. Whatever the precise form of program finally established, it will be solely for the welfare of the people of that country.

The United States is particularly pleased that independence has been achieved with full Belgian support. We are happy to note that both Belgian and Congolese officials, now that independence has been attained, agree on the principle of continuing Belgian assistance to the new state and continuation of close ties between the two. By putting these relations on a new basis which safeguards the rights and the dignity of both sides, the Congo and Belgian Governments have contributed positively to the cause of human liberty and world peace.

We hope that other United Nations members will review the possibility of assistance to the Congo, either on a bilateral basis or through multilateral channels. We believe also that the Congo will look for strong moral and material support from the United Nations. We can assure the Congo today that, so far as we are concerned, it can expect to find sympathy and encouragement in New York as well as concrete aid in Léopoldville and other parts of the country.

In the last analysis, of course, the Congo will count upon the resources of its own country and people. As the Chief of State of the Republic of the Congo declared recently: "In order to succeed, the complete cooperation of our entire population is necessary." If the people of the Congo follow the admonition of their leader and work together for the development of their country, if they apply themselves with vigor and imagination, their future can hold all the benefits of freedom and prosperity.

No one, Mr. President, can doubt that the newly emerging states of Africa have an exceedingly difficult task ahead. A new state cannot be

built in a day. It will take time and energy and money and sweat and tears. But as they move on toward their goal of human betterment, they know that they have the sympathetic interest and the support of the Government and the people of the United States.

Mr. President, the United States wishes to extend its warm and sincere congratulations to the Government and the people of the Congo on this important occasion. I shall vote with real pleasure for the resolution introduced by Tunisia proposing the admission of the Republic of the Congo to membership in the United Nations.¹⁰

William A. Nierenberg Appointed NATO Science Adviser

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization announced on July 8 that the appointment of William A. Nierenberg, professor of physics at the University of California at Berkeley, as Science Adviser to succeed Frederick Seitz has been approved by the Secretary General. Dr. Seitz, NATO Science Adviser since June 1959, will be returning to the University of Illinois to resume his duties as professor and head of the Department of Physics.

The Science Adviser is concerned with the NATO science program, which stems directly from the principles laid down by the Heads of Government in December 1957¹ and which is moving forward in the promotion of scientific cooperation among NATO countries. Under the guidance of a distinguished group of scientists who comprise the NATO Science Committee, a program of scientific research fellowships for 400 students is planned for 1960, funds have been made available to sponsor 12 advanced study institutes on scientific subjects, and a program of research grants is getting under way to encourage cooperative scientific projects among NATO countries. Additional programs in the field of scientific and technical cooperation, including oceanography and meteorology, are being planned by the NATO Science Committee, of which Dr. Nierenberg will be the chairman.

¹⁰ A resolution recommending U.N. membership for the Republic of the Congo was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on July 7.

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 12.

United States Delegations to International Conferences

Development Assistance Group

The Department of State announced on July 1 (press release 378) that T. Graydon Upton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, is heading a U.S. delegation to Bonn, Germany, for the second meeting of the Development Assistance Group, July 5-7, 1960.¹

Edwin M. Martin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, will serve as vice chairman. Other members of the delegation include:

Samuel C. Waugh, President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank
Leonard J. Saccio, Deputy Director, International Cooperation Administration
Hart Perry, Deputy Managing Director, Development Loan Fund

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence deposited: Nepal, June 29, 1960.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Belgium, May 31, 1960.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Belgium, May 31, 1960.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Belgium, May 31, 1960.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1960, p. 139, and Apr. 11, 1960, p. 577.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance or of accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Belgium, May 31, 1960.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

Notification of approval: Czechoslovakia, May 25, 1960.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement providing for emergency relief assistance necessitated by recent disasters in Chile. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 29, 1960. Entered into force June 29, 1960.

Japan

Treaty of mutual cooperation and security, with agreed minute and exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington January 19, 1960. Entered into force June 23, 1960.
Proclaimed by the President: June 27, 1960.

Norway

Agreement amending the agreement of May 25, 1949, as amended (TIAS 2000, 3118, and 3282), relating to the United States Educational Foundation in Norway. Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo June 21, 1960. Entered into force June 21, 1960.

Pakistan

Agreement to supplement the agricultural commodities agreement of November 28, 1958 (TIAS 4137), as supplemented (TIAS 4257, 4331, 4353, 4426, and 4469), and exchange of notes. Signed at Rawalpindi May 27, 1960. Entered into force May 27, 1960.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Volta Transferred to Abidjan Consular District

Department mailing notice dated June 29

Effective April 15, 1960, the Autonomous Republic of Upper Volta was transferred from the Dakar, Senegal, consular district to that of Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

Confirmations

The Senate on June 24 confirmed the following nominations:

Joseph S. Farland to be Ambassador to Panama. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 319 dated June 13.)

Arthur L. Richards to be Ambassador to Ethiopia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 321 dated June 13.)

A. Burks Summers to be Ambassador to Luxembourg. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 323 dated June 13.)

The Senate on July 2 confirmed the following nominations:

Winthrop Gilman Brown to be Ambassador to Laos. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 347 dated June 23.)

Andrew G. Lynch to be Ambassador to the Somali Republic. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 364 dated June 28.)

Clare H. Timberlake to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 367 dated June 29.)

Designations

Belton O. Bryan as Executive Director, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effective June 27.

Resignations

Gerald A. Drew as Ambassador to the Republic of Haiti. (For an exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Ambassador Drew, see White House press release dated July 1.)

Julian F. Harrington as Ambassador to the Republic of Panama. (For an exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Ambassador Harrington, see White House press release dated July 1.)

Robert S. McCollum as Deputy Administrator of Security and Consular Affairs, effective July 8. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 187 dated April 12.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 4-10

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to July 4 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 346 of June 23, 354 of June 24, and 378 of July 1.

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382	7/5	National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs.
383	7/6	U.S.-Cuba shrimp conservation commission.
384	7/7	Drought-relief aid to Jordan (rewrite).
385	7/8	U.S.-Canada joint defense committee (rewrite).

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

The *basic source* of information on
U.S. diplomatic history

1942, Volume I, General,
The British Commonwealth, The Far East

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Volume I, General, The British Commonwealth, The Far East*. This is the first of the six regular annual volumes scheduled for publication in the *Foreign Relations* series for 1942.

Subjects treated in the General section include the United Nations Declaration, the Permanent Court, war crimes, relief problems, postwar economic and financial planning, exchange of officials and nonofficials with enemy countries, protests by neutrals against certain features of the Selective Service Act, and international agreements regarding wheat, sugar, and tin.

The section on the British Commonwealth of Nations relates to agreements with the several members of the Commonwealth in connection with the conduct of the war and to the interest of the United States in situations affecting the war effort.

The Far East section contains correspondence regarding Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Copies of the volume may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. for \$3.50 each.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLIII, No. 1101

August 1, 1960

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLIII, No. 1101 • PUBLICATION 7038

August 1, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Security Council Considers Situation in Republic of the Congo

The Security Council convened on July 13 to consider a request for military assistance (S/4382) addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo. Following are statements made by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge and the text of a resolution adopted by the Council.

FIRST STATEMENT

U.S./U.N. press release 3427

On July 7 the Security Council met to extend the hand of friendship to the people and Government of the Republic of the Congo by endorsing its application for United Nations membership. On that occasion the United States called attention to the pressing problems inherited by this great new central African nation and its need for sympathy, encouragement, and concrete aid from the United Nations.¹

No one could foresee at that time the rapidity with which general statements of support here in the Council would need to be translated into concrete action. This need tonight is self-evident and urgent.

The unfortunate sequence of events in the Congo which makes the speediest possible United Nations assistance imperative is well known to us all. In general we understand that certain elements of those responsible for the maintenance of public order are turning against a democratically elected and legally constituted government. While we have been concerned primarily with the loss of life and destruction of valuable national assets, the departure of many of the foreign technicians whose assistance to the new state was con-

sidered crucial by the Government must also be noted. The specter of famine and disease implicit in the breakdown of security and communications is appalling. While no aggression has been committed, certain aspects emerge from the confusion which do justify urgent United Nations action and which, we think, can be stated as follows:

First, there is a popularly elected, duly constituted Government of the Republic of the Congo. That Government has asked for a United Nations force on an urgent basis.

Second, speed is essential. The longer the present state of near anarchy continues, the heavier the toll of lives, the greater the prospect of hunger and epidemic, and the greater the difficulties in future economic development. We confront a situation which is developing hourly—not daily, or weekly, but hourly.

Third, it is not only futile but positively harmful to seek to apportion blame at this time for what has happened. What is required is an instantaneous response to the urgent request of the Congo Government rather than ill-advised or malicious attempts to make political capital of the serious difficulties of the Congolese people.

The United States, therefore, welcomes the initiative of the Secretary-General in requesting this meeting of the Security Council. We believe that the recommendation which he has made for a United Nations force is reasonable and proper.² For its part the United States is prepared to respond to the call before us. Indeed, we will respond to any reasonable United Nations request in the fields of transport and communications. We have also taken measures to insure that food supplies adequate to the needs of the capital, where we understand a food shortage is threatening, will

¹ BULLETIN of July 25, 1960, p. 151.

² For statements made by the Secretary-General during the debate, see U.N. doc. S/PV. 873.

be forthcoming. These food supplies will be of assistance to the United Nations in Léopoldville. Surely the beleaguered Government and unhappy people of the Congo have the right to such assistance, and we will not fail them.

In the course of this statement, Mr. President, I have used the words "urgent" and "speed" several times. I mean them literally and precisely. United Nations assistance would be most useful this very evening. It will still be of great service if it arrives in the Congo before the weekend.

Finally, Mr. President, let me pay tribute here to the efforts of the Government of the Congo to restore peace, security, and tranquility in the country. It has our full moral support in this effort. Let us hope that it receives material assistance very soon. Then the people and Government of the Congo can get on with the all-important job of building a great, new, modern state in the very heart of Africa.

The Secretary-General has outlined a reasonable and effective course of action. The United States believes this Council should move ahead speedily to approve a resolution giving effect to the proposal of the Secretary-General.

SECOND STATEMENT

U.S./U.N. press release 3438

I have asked to be recognized under my right to reply to the outrageous and untrue statements which have been made about the United States in the statement which was read by the representative of the Soviet Union [Arkady A. Sobolev].

As I have said to the Soviet representatives here for many years, I do not start these altercations. But when they begin them, as they seem irresistibly tempted to do—whether because of fear or whether because of envy or for what reason I know not—I always undertake to make an adequate reply.

Now, any man of good will knows that this is a time for reason and for constructive action. This is a moment which is putting the United Nations on trial. This is not a time for provocative and reckless charges. And it is regrettable that the Soviet Government should have interjected itself into the situation with the truly incendiary statement which Mr. Sobolev has just read.

It has made totally unfounded allegations. For

example, that the United States Government has undertaken measures "directed at undermining the sovereignty and liquidation of the independence of the Republic of the Congo." Of course, everyone here knows that nothing could be further from the truth, and I am sure the men who wrote this statement know it too.

The Soviet Union slanderously accused the United States Government, and those of several other states, of military intervention. It hasn't happened. It isn't going to happen. We were invited yesterday [July 13] by a Minister in the Government of the Republic of Congo to send troops, and we declined the invitation on the same day. Now those are the facts.

What is gained by ignoring those facts?

The statement talks about the 15th United States Infantry and the 24th Infantry Division. They are not going to the Congo.

The statement talks about our sending troops to Lebanon. Yes, we sent troops to Lebanon at the request of the Government of Lebanon, and we withdrew the troops. Contrast that with the Soviet Union, which sent troops to Hungary—and the Soviet troops are still in Hungary, with their heel on the neck of the unhappy Hungarian people. It doesn't lie well in Mr. Sobolev's mouth to talk critically about troops being sent, when the Soviet Union never withdraws its troops and we withdraw ours upon request.

Then he said—the statement said, because I don't hold Mr. Sobolev personally responsible for it; he was reading a Soviet press release—the statement said that the United States had been condemned for having sent troops to Lebanon. It is the exact opposite. The Soviet Union introduced a resolution into that General Assembly to condemn the United States, and then they withdrew it at the end because they saw they could not get the votes for it. And what resulted was the statement by the General Assembly validating what the United States had done. Now, let us get things straight. This is not Moscow, where only one person can talk. This is a free and open forum, where the truth can come out.

Then the statement emits the gross untruth that the American Ambassador in Léopoldville [Clare H. Timberlake] "is interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo Republic." There is not one scintilla of evidence to that effect, and I deny it

categorically; and he did not submit one word of proof.

So all in all the statement is mendacious; it is calumnious; it is a ponderous, long-winded bit of Communist nonsense. And that is the way it should be regarded.

Now, the United States has long since become accustomed to slanderous allegations by the Soviet Union, and I think we can take them at their true value, and we are able to stand up for ourselves. But it is malicious for the Soviet Government to seek to besmirch the character of [U.N.] Under Secretary Ralph Bunche, who is respected throughout the world for his devotion to peace and to the goals of the United Nations and for the proposition that all men should be recognized on their merits, regardless of any condition of race, creed, or color. He is the man whom the Soviet Union has chosen to besmirch.

Well, Mr. President, I shall devote no further time to this intervention by the Soviet Government, but I simply commend it as an exhibit to the members here, as an example of the Soviet attempt at world domination in accordance with Marxism and Leninism by making just as much trouble as possible and making every bad situation worse as rapidly as they can.

THIRD STATEMENT

U.S./U.N. press release 3439

The United States voted for the Tunisian resolution in spite of its doubts about the wisdom of the first operative paragraph, and we did so because of the vital urgency which we attach to prompt United Nations action to meet the tragic and highly dangerous situation in the Congo.

In voting for this resolution the United States expressly interprets the first paragraph calling upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops as being contingent upon the successful carrying out by the United Nations of the second paragraph, that is, in providing the Government of the Republic of the Congo with the military assistance necessary until national security forces are able to fulfill their task.

The situation we face in the Congo is unique. At the outset of its independence, as power was being passed from the Government of Belgium

to the Government of the Republic of the Congo, public law and order collapsed. In these circumstances the United Nations must not contribute to the perpetuation of public disorder by insisting upon the withdrawal of military units capable of assisting in the protection of life and property without establishment of alternate methods to accomplish the task.

The resolution can only be read as a whole in this sense, and it is with this understanding that the United States has supported it.

The United States has confidence that the Government of Belgium will cooperate wholeheartedly with the United Nations along these lines, in accordance with the long tradition which it has of loyal membership in support of the Organization. May I say to the representative of Belgium [Walter Loridan] that he has in fact just this evening made a statement expressing his Government's willingness to withdraw its troops upon introduction of United Nations forces, a statement of Belgium's full cooperation with the United Nations for which the Belgian Government should be congratulated and which reflects credit on the Belgian representative here.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION³

The Security Council,

Considering the report of the Secretary-General on a request for United Nations action in relation to the Republic of the Congo,

Considering the request for military assistance addressed to the Secretary-General by the President and the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (document S/4382),

1. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to withdraw their troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo;

2. *Decides* to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate.

³ U.N. doc. S/4387; adopted by the Council at its meeting of July 13 (July 14 a.m.) by a vote of 8 to 0, with 3 abstentions (China, France, the United Kingdom).

President Greet's Newly Independent Republic of the Congo

White House press release dated June 30

The White House made public on June 30 the following message from President Eisenhower to Joseph Kasavubu, Chief of State of the Republic of the Congo, on the occasion of the independence of that nation, June 30, 1960.

JUNE 30, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: On the occasion of the independence of the Republic of the Congo I extend in my own name and on behalf of the people of the United States most cordial greetings and felicitations to you and the Congolese people.

The independence of the Republic of the Congo is a source of deep satisfaction to the United States, especially since this freedom was achieved in friendly cooperation with Belgium. The attainment of independence by 13.5 million Congolese is one of the most significant events in Africa during this unprecedented year of 1960.

On this historic occasion the Government and people of the United States look forward to close and friendly relations with the Government and people of the Republic of the Congo.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

U.S. Welcomes Independence of Somali Republic

Department Announcement

Press release 373 dated June 30

The United States will welcome another new African state into the family of nations on July 1, 1960, when the Somali Republic attains its independence. The President has sent a warm message of good will which will be delivered by the President's personal representative with the rank of special ambassador, Secretary of Commerce Frederick H. Mueller, in formal ceremonies at Mogadiscio on July 1. The message will be published at that time.

The ceremonies have been designed to celebrate not only Somali independence but also the union,

in the new Somali Republic, of Somaliland, the former British protectorate which became independent on June 26, 1960, with Somalia, the former U.N. Trust Territory under Italian administration. Secretary Herter welcomed the independence of Somaliland in a message addressed to the Council of Ministers of that nation on June 26, 1960.¹

The President has nominated Andrew G. Lynch, a career Foreign Service officer with broad experience in African affairs, to be the first Ambassador of the United States to the Somali Republic. The consulate general at Mogadiscio will be elevated to an embassy on July 1, 1960.

Message From President Eisenhower

White House press release dated July 1

The White House made public on July 1 the following message from President Eisenhower to Aden Abdulla Osman, President of the Somali Republic, on the occasion of the independence of the Somali Republic, July 1, 1960.

JULY 1, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: It is with the greatest of pleasure that I extend in my own name and on behalf of the people of the United States most cordial greetings and heartfelt congratulations upon the independence of the Somali Republic.

We share deeply in your joy in this occasion for not only does a new state join the family of nations but your country's accession to independence marks the successful conclusion of another United Nations trusteeship. This, understandably, is a source of great pride and satisfaction to all who have dedicated themselves to making the United Nations an effective instrument of world peace and progress and I am confident that in the years to come your country will strengthen the ranks of those devoted to this noble purpose.

The Government and people of the United States welcome the independence of your country and look forward to a lasting friendship with your Government and people.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of July 18, 1960, p. 87.

U.S. Protests Downings of USAF Plane by Soviets Over International Waters

STATEMENT BY JAMES C. HAGERTY¹

The American RB-47 plane was over international waters and at no time flew over Soviet territory, Soviet territorial waters, or Soviet airspace. The shooting down of this plane, as the Soviet Government alleges, can only have been a deliberate and reckless attempt to create an international incident.

For 11 days the plane has been reported as missing. Indeed, it has also been reported that at least one Soviet ship was assisting, in good faith, in the search for the missing aircraft.

Any attempt to connect the flight of this aircraft with the U-2 flight of May² is completely without foundation, and the Soviet authorities, including Mr. Khrushchev, know this.

The Government of the United States is answering the Soviet note of yesterday [July 11]. The United States note will be made public at the State Department today [July 12].

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE³

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with reference to the Ministry's note No. 67/OSA of July 11 has the honor to convey, upon instruction of the Government of the United States of America, the following:

The Ministry's note cannot, in view of the nature of the circumstances concerned, represent other than willful misinterpretation and misstatement of fact.

The United States Air Force airplane in question, with a crew of six, was proceeding on an entirely legitimate mission over international wa-

ters and at no time penetrated Soviet territory or even areas which have been claimed at one time or another as territorial waters or air space of the Soviet Union. At no time was the airplane closer to Soviet land territory than about 30 miles (approximately 48 kilometers).

It is therefore evident that pursuant to instructions of the Soviet Government airplanes of the Soviet Air Force wantonly attacked the American airplane over international waters with the admitted loss of that aircraft and of the life of at least one of the members of its crew. Two other members of the crew have, according to the Soviet note, been taken into custody without any legal basis and are to be subjected to trial under what is called "full severity of Soviet law." The three other members of the crew remain unaccounted for.

The Ministry's note attempts to establish some kind of link between this flight of an American Air Force airplane over international waters with the incident which occurred over Soviet territory on May 1. These flights were, as must be known to the Soviet Government, entirely different in character. The Air Force flight on July 1 was one of a continuous series of electromagnetic research flights well known to the Soviet Government to have taken place over a period of more than ten years. Instructions to the crews of these airplanes rigidly require that the aircraft remain well outside the air space of Soviet territory.

The Government of the United States of America rejects the completely unfounded allegations contained in the Ministry's note under reference. It solemnly and vigorously protests the unwarranted shooting down of an American airplane over international waters and the cynical failure of the Soviet Government to make its action known for a period of days during which a search for the missing men was known to be in course, in which the Soviet Government was voluntarily participating in what was apparently good faith. It demands release to its custody of the two United States Air Force officers admitted to be in Soviet custody. It further demands that a representative of the United States Embassy in Moscow be permitted to see these men without delay. Additionally, it demands that the body of Captain [Willard G.] Palm be returned to the custody of United States officials immediately.

¹ Made at Newport, R.I., on July 12 (White House (Newport) press release). Mr. Hagerty is Press Secretary to the President.

² For background, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1960, p. 816, and May 30, 1960, p. 851.

³ Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow on July 13 (press release 288 dated July 12).

The Government of the United States is prepared to undertake in cooperation with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other authority as might be acceptable to both sides, a thorough search for the downed airplane and the missing members of its crew and examination of such remains of the aircraft as may be located.

The Government of the United States of America reserves its right to demand full compensation from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for its unjustified action in this matter. It should be clear to the Soviet Government that a repetition of acts of this nature cannot fail to have the most serious consequences, responsibility for which would rest upon the Soviet Government alone.

TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE¹

Unofficial translation
No. 67/OSA

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addresses the United States Government with this note in connection with the new rude violation of the airspace of the Soviet Union by an aircraft of the Armed Forces of the United States.

On July 1, 1960, an unknown military aircraft moving toward the border of the Soviet Union was detected in the Barents Sea near the Kola Peninsula by the air warning service of Soviet anti-aircraft defense troops. A fighter aircraft was sent up to establish the nationality of this aircraft and to prevent it from an intrusion into the territory of the U.S.S.R.

The pilot of the Soviet fighter aircraft established that the unknown aircraft was a bomber with identification marks of the U.S. Air Force. The American aircraft violated the state borders of the U.S.S.R. 22 kilometers north of Cape Svyatoy Nos and was moving in the direction of the city of Arkhangelsk.

Despite signals given by the Soviet fighter to follow it and proceed to landing, the aircraft-violator continued to penetrate deeper into the borders of the airspace of the Soviet Union. In accordance with a standing order of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union concerning the defense of Soviet borders, the aircraft-violator was brought down at 18 hours 3 minutes Moscow time over Soviet territorial waters east of Cape Svyatoy Nos.

After some time two persons from the crew of the downed American aircraft were picked up by a Soviet ship in territorial waters of the U.S.S.R. They proved to be: the navigator of the aircraft, First Lieutenant of the U.S. Air Force John Richard McKone, born in 1932 in the

State of Missouri, and the second pilot, First Lieutenant of the U.S. Air Force Freeman Bruce Olmstead, born in 1935 in the State of New York.

As McKone and Olmstead stated on interrogation, the aircraft on which they flew, a six-motor reconnaissance bomber, type "RB-47", belonged to an aviation subunit of American military-strategic reconnaissance included in the 55th Wing, and was executing special assignments of a military intelligence character. The aircraft was armed with two 20-millimeter cannons, with a supply of ammunition for them, and had a compartment in which special reconnaissance photo and radioelectronic apparatus was located.

According to Olmstead and McKone, four other persons were included in the crew of the aircraft in addition to themselves: the commander of the aircraft, Captain Palm, and three officers—specialists on photo and radioelectronic apparatus—Captain [Eugene E.] Posa and First Lieutenants [Capt. Oscar L.] Goforth and [Dean E.] Phillips. The body of the first pilot of the downed aircraft, Captain Palm, was found by a Soviet vessel in a rubber boat and was taken on board. A search for other members of the crew of the aircraft produced no results.

According to the evidence of Olmstead and McKone, the aircraft "RB-47" on which they were flying took off July 1, 1960, at 1000 hours Greenwich time from an American military base located in Brize Norton (England) on a course along the northern boundaries of Norway and the Soviet Union with orders to return upon completion of its assignment to the same base in England, where the subunit of the U.S. Air Force to which this aircraft belonged is located. Before takeoff the crew of the aircraft was warned by the commander of their subunit at the Brize Norton base, Major DeBelle, that the flight must be kept in strict secrecy and therefore the crew was forbidden to maintain regular radio contact with the base.

Just two months ago aggressive activities of the United States which expressed themselves in the premeditated intrusion of an American military aircraft into the U.S.S.R. with espionage purposes, and in the declaration of such provocative acts as the national policy of the United States, led to the breakup by the Government of the United States of the summit conference and were unanimously condemned by the public opinion of the entire world. The new violation of the borders of the Soviet Union by an American military aircraft shows that the Government of the United States is continuing to proceed on the same path dangerous for the cause of peace. Now everyone sees what is the real value of the solemn assurances of the Government of the United States and of President Eisenhower personally concerning the order supposedly given by the President to stop espionage flights by American aviation over the territory of the U.S.S.R.

The question arises, what purposes the Government of the United States is pursuing, continuing the policy of aggressive intrusions into the airspace of the Soviet Union. There can only be one answer. The actions of the Government of the United States represent premeditated violation of generally accepted norms of international law, a policy of conscious provocations directed

¹ Delivered to Edward L. Freers, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, at Moscow on July 11 by Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs.

toward inflaming the situation and increasing the threat of war.

In this, as previously, the United States is continuing the use for its aggressive actions toward the Soviet Union of military bases established by it on territories of other countries which are allies of the United States in military blocs.

If the fate of American pilots whose lives, evidently, are little valued by the Government of the United States and are consciously sacrificed by it in organizing espionage flights over the U.S.S.R., may be regarded as an internal affair of the United States, then this can by no means be said of the enormous threat to the general peace which arises from the provocative actions of the Government of the United States. This is a question to which neither the Soviet Union nor any other state showing genuine concern for the preservation of peace can be indifferent.

Considering that a violation of the border was in the present case cut off in its initial stage, the Soviet Government considered it possible to limit itself to destruction of the violating plane and calling to account of the surviving members of its crew, who will be judged according to the full severity of Soviet law.

At the same time the Soviet Government in all seriousness warns the Government of the United States of those dangerous consequences to which continuation of provocative actions by American aircraft will lead and the responsibility for which will rest on the Government of the United States.

The Government of the United States cannot but know to what consequences its policy of conscious provocations against the Soviet Union can lead. It can for one reason or another conceal this from its people. However, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it its duty to warn the Government of the United States that it has no right to play with the fate of the world. The American people should know about this warning as well as of the fact that the Soviet Union has done and is doing everything possible not to bring upon the peoples the disasters of a new war and that the guilt for the grave trials to which the world is today subjected wholly rests on the Government of the United States.

The Soviet Government with deep regret has to state that the governments of some states who are allies of the United States in military blocs have not yet drawn the necessary conclusions from known facts connected with the aggressive actions of the U.S. Air Force. Permitting the use of American military bases situated on their ter-

ritory, they continue to pursue a policy of participation in the aforementioned aggressive actions, and through this bring great danger upon the peoples of their countries.

In connection with the new violation of the Soviet border by an American military aircraft which took place July 1, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics makes a decisive protest to the Government of the United States.

Moscow, July 11, 1960.

U.S. Postpones Aviation Talks With Soviet Union

Press release 391 dated July 14

Following is the text of an aide memoire handed to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 14 by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow.

Pursuant to the Scientific, Technical, Educational and Cultural Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America dated November 21, 1959,¹ arrangements had been made for the initiation of negotiations with regard to an Air Transport Agreement at Washington on July 18. The United States Government maintains its serious interest in the successful conclusion of negotiations on this subject. It therefore believes that such negotiations should take place in an atmosphere conducive to the achievement of agreement.

Having in mind, however, recent Soviet actions and utterances which could not fail to affect adversely the atmosphere surrounding such negotiations at this time, the United States Government believes that it would be appropriate now to postpone the date of initiation of negotiations looking toward an Air Transport Agreement until a more suitable time.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1959, p. 951.

President Pledges U.S. Cooperation To Promote Social Progress and Economic Growth in the Americas

On July 11 President Eisenhower held a news conference at the U.S. Naval Base, Newport, R.I., at which he pledged U.S. cooperation to promote social progress and economic growth in the Americas. Secretary Herter was also present. Following are texts of a statement read by the President and the exchange with correspondents during the question-and-answer period which followed.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 11

I

During my trip to South America in February¹ and in numerous talks in Washington, I have obtained the views of leading Latin American statesmen on the problems which their countries and the area in general now face. They have told me of the aspirations and needs of their peoples for homes and land and a better life, and of their efforts to meet those needs.

I know that other leaders in the Americas are thinking and working along similar lines. I have given a good deal of thought to how the United States might do more in helping these efforts.

The National Advisory Committee on Inter-American Affairs, which I appointed last year to advise the Secretary of State and myself on matters of hemispheric concern, has given us the benefit of its knowledge and experience.²

¹ President Eisenhower made a 2-week trip to South America, Feb. 22-Mar. 7, where he visited Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. For text of his report to the Nation, together with his addresses and joint declarations and statements, see BULLETIN of Mar. 28, 1960, p. 471.

² For background, see *ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 148.

II

Within the Organization of American States joint action is under way. The Council of that Organization, on the initiative of Venezuela, voted 3 days ago [July 8] to call a meeting of their Foreign Ministers to consider matters of extreme gravity in the Caribbean area—matters that involve a challenge to the ideals and purposes of the American community. The United States supported this move.

In September the economic representatives of the 21 American Republics will convene in Bogotá, Colombia, to consider an equally important component of our hemispheric future—the problem of social reform and economic growth. This problem is embraced within a joint hemispheric concept known as Operation Pan America—a concept initially suggested by President Kubitschek of Brazil.³ This will be further developed at Bogotá.

These two meetings will give the United States opportunities for frank consultations with our sister Republics on measures to advance the political, economic, and social welfare of the peoples of the Americas.

III

I believe it would be well for me to state the basic ideas which will guide the United States' participation in these forthcoming meetings.

First, widespread social progress and economic growth benefiting all the people and achieved within a framework of free institutions are the imperatives of our time.

Second, our nation's history and traditions place us in accord with those who seek to fulfill the

³ For background, see *ibid.*, June 30, 1958, p. 1000, and Oct. 13, 1958, p. 574.

promise of the future through methods consistent with the dignity of free men. Our interests and sympathies are with them.

Third, a new affirmation of purpose is called for in our cooperation with friendly developing countries in their efforts to progress.

In the Americas as elsewhere change is the law of life, and the interests of the people will be better served if that change is effected constructively and peacefully, not violently. Clearly, the aspirations and needs of the peoples of the Americas for free institutions and a better way of life must be met. Our desire is to help the American nations to meet their own responsibilities—to help them develop their institutional and human resources, to strengthen the framework of freedom, to protect individual dignity, and to gain a better life for those who are underprivileged, underemployed, and undereducated.

Latin America is passing through a social and political transformation. Dictatorships are falling by the wayside.

Moderate groups, seeking orderly reform, are contesting with dictators of both right and left who favor violence and authoritarianism. Many of the extremists frequently endeavor to introduce dogmas which are inimical to the traditions of the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics met last August in Santiago, Chile, to consider the problems caused by the blatant intervention of certain extremists in their neighbors' affairs.⁴

The interests of the United States no less than those of all the Americas are directly involved in this struggle, a threat to the security of the hemisphere. It is imperative that institutions be developed and strengthened sufficiently to permit the peoples' needs to be met through orderly processes of change.

A renewed hemispheric determination to preserve principles of liberty and the dignity of man is needed. There is also an urgent need for a broader and more vigorous cooperative attack by all American governments and peoples if adequate economic progress with freedom is to be achieved.

IV

Among the specific needs which it seems to me must be met through cooperative action are:

First, we need to consider with the other Ameri-

can Republics practicable ways in which developing countries can make faster progress in meeting their own needs and ways in which their friends can most effectively cooperate with them. A better knowledge and mobilization of resources, their more effective use, and the improvement of legal and institutional means for promoting economic growth are among the subjects which require special consideration.

I have in mind the opening of new areas of arable land for settlement and productive use. I have in mind better land utilization, within a system which provides opportunities for free, self-reliant men to own land, without violating the rights of others. I have in mind housing with emphasis, where appropriate, on individual ownership of small homes. And I have in mind other essential minimums for decent living in both urban and rural environments.

Second, in our common efforts toward these goals more attention needs to be given, in a manner which respects the dignity and rights of all, to improving the opportunities of the bulk of the population to share in and contribute to an expanding national product. Soundly based economic and social progress in any of our countries is of benefit to all. Each nation must of course resolve its own social problems in its own way and without the imposition of alien dogmas.

Third, within this framework we need to consider whether there are better ways to accelerate the trend which is already evident toward greater respect for human rights and democratic government based on the will of the people as expressed in free and periodic elections. The United States with its tradition of democracy is opposed to tyranny in any form—whether of the left or of the right.

V

Each period in history brings its call for supreme human effort. At times in the past it took the form of war. Today it takes the form of social evolution or revolution. The United States will not, cannot, stand aloof. We must help find constructive means for the underprivileged masses of mankind to work their way toward a better life. Indeed, so far as this hemisphere is concerned, every American nation must cooperate in this mighty endeavor. Even the poorest nation can contribute its spiritual and

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

intellectual strength. The important consideration is that every member of the American family of nations should feel responsible for promoting the welfare of all.

I have requested the Secretary of State to take the lead in conferring with our Latin American friends on these principles and purposes. Assuming their agreement, he will prepare for my approval as promptly as possible specific recommendations along these lines.

I intend to submit a message on this subject to the Congress promptly. I shall seek authority for such additional public funds as we may deem appropriate to assist free men and neighbors in Latin America in cooperative efforts to develop their nations and achieve better lives.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

THE PRESIDENT: Now, as far as the message itself is concerned, I am ready to entertain two or three questions.

Q. Robert Pierpoint, CBS News: Mr. President, you mentioned here, I believe, that every American nation must cooperate in this new plan or program. Would that include Cuba, the present Cuban Governments?

THE PRESIDENT: It would be only those nations who have shown a willingness and a readiness to cooperate with the others in this great effort—specifically with ourselves, because we are the ones making the statement.

Q. Felia Belair, New York Times: Mr. President, is it possible at this time to give any kind of estimate as to the order of magnitude of assistance contemplated, and would the proposed program operate as did the European recovery program with the so-called shopping list?

THE PRESIDENT: No. You are talking about the so-called Marshall plan?

Q. (Mr. Belair) Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Marshall plan was to repair and rehabilitate a destroyed industrial plant already existing. This is an entirely different problem, and I think it would be unfair to compare the effort we are now talking about, raising the social standards of the people—the social and economic standards of the people—with the effort of the Marshall plan.

Now, when it comes to terms of magnitude of the sums that would be effected, let us remember this, that I am talking about two meetings still in the future which we are calling with our own friends and in which we are examining our own efforts, and it would be impossible to make any kind of even rough guess.

But I do want to say this, which I have said so often: The only real investment that is going to flow into countries that will be useful to them in the long term is private investment. It is many times the amount that can be put in from the public coffers. And normally the public loans are made so as to encourage and make better opportunities for the private investments that follow.

Q. (Mr. Belair) Does it follow from what you just said, Mr. President, that no larger expenditure would be made than is now being made?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I would think this—I just say this—that in my opinion some additional sums would be probably necessary. But there are many ways in which this could be done. For example, all nations could agree to increase the capital and the lending capacity of the American Bank [Inter-American Development Bank]. In other words I would not think of it just as a great—anything as remotely resembling the Marshall plan.

Q. Marvin Arrowsmith, Associated Press: Mr. President, I wonder if you would be willing to tell us in what context the current Cuban crisis was considered in your and the Secretary's discussion of this program? We have been told that you were analyzing that situation too. Is there anything further you can say this morning?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Marvin, this has been on our minds and thinking and even almost written preparation for some months—ever since I came back from South America, and with the—my associates and the Presidents of those countries that I met or visited, this Cuban problem was discussed. Very naturally, every day that this thing has been under preparation there has been discussion of the Cuban problem. But I don't for the moment see any benefit in going further in giving our attitude than was expressed in my statement, I think it was the day before yesterday, in answer to the—Khrushchev's rather crude threat.⁵ And I think that statement speaks for itself.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 139.

Q. (Mr. Arrowsmith) I wonder, you probably have seen that the President of Cuba [Osvaldo Dorticos] last night strongly implied that Cuba might demand that we give up the Guantanamo Naval Base. Did you have any discussion on that? Do you have any reaction to that?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I will wait till I hear the demand on that one.

Q. Charles Roberts, Newsweek: Mr. President, sir, do you have the feeling, or do you have assurances from the other American Republics, that they favor going ahead on this regional hemispheric basis rather than appealing to the aid—or accepting aid from powers outside of this hemisphere?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, so far as all the countries I have spoken to personally, this particular question has not been placed in specific terms. But the whole attitude and atmosphere of our conversation was to make a more effective and stronger organization among all the states to work in a cooperative—I mean all the American states—to work in a cooperative basis rather than to go each individually seeking outside help somewhere. Now, if there's any specific difference outside of what we have seen in Cuba, why I think you should ask the question of the State Department, because I am not aware of it.

Q. (Mr. Roberts) If I might rephrase that—

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. (Mr. Roberts) Do you feel the other powers are opposed to any aid coming from outside this hemisphere to any country in the Western Hemisphere—such as the aid that Russia has offered to Cuba?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would—I don't want to speculate on what their general attitude is. I know the very cooperative attitude they have shown to me in conversations with me, and I think it's a question I would rather have you put to the State Department, and put it in more specific fashion, and let them give a specific answer.

Q. Stewart Hensley, United Press International: Mr. President, you of course talked at some length with Mr. Kubitschek [President Juscelino Kubitschek of Brazil], Mr. Alessandri [President Jorge Alessandri of Chile], Mr. Fron-

dizi [President Arturo Frondizi of Argentina], about this plan. From what you know of their aspirations, and what you have in mind in the nature of the size of the American contribution, do you believe that your plan is going to satisfy all their hopes in that respect?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what I would say is this: If we can ever get a true coordination and meeting of minds on the problem itself and its scope and how it should be arranged in priorities, then I think the United States would feel it should do its own proper share.

Now I do not believe that any nation can be saved merely by outside help. The first need is the heart and the brains and the wills and the determination and the morale in the nation itself, and to do those things which it can itself do.

When it comes, though, to the need of foreign exchange and so on, and assistance in technical and scientific fields which can be given from a country such as ours, I think that our nation will never quail from doing what it needs to do. But I do not believe that just great sums of money is the answer.

Q. Daniel Karasik, NBC News: Mr. President, would a question on your Saturday statement be in order?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I put it on this—I wanted to put the questions directly on this, and therefore I don't believe this is the place for that—

Q. Mr. President—

THE PRESIDENT:—because I think you'll start a precedent for me.

Q. Frederic W. Collins, Providence Journal-Bulletin: In your soundings do you have a feeling that the other Latin American Republics would go ahead with a general cooperative plan of this nature if it excluded Cuba?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think that no nation of course can come in unless it wants to cooperate, and I would see no reason why the other—so that the remaining 20 of us could not go ahead—and as a matter of fact, even if there were two or three excluded for any reasons of their own choosing, I think this would still be a practicable thing.

Q. Lawrence H. Burd, Chicago Tribune: Does this require any action by Congress, apart from the funds, for this plan?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't tell for sure yet, Larry, for a very simple reason, that there may be something in the authorization. For example, suppose they want to authorize a little bit different kind of loan in the American Bank, then each country's Congress would have to approve.

Q. (Mr. Burd) Are you hoping to get it through in the next session of Congress?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. And the timing is just something that I cannot predict.

Q. (Mr. Burd) Otherwise it might be done after you are gone—after you have left office?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would think that this plan would appeal to any thinking American and so I would—if I have—now I would like to get it done better, of course—quicker, but always as I think it's a soldier's attitude, if you know what you want to do, get it done in a hurry. But in this, you take some time to get exactly the agreements that you want.

Q. (Mr. Burd) Have you had any discussions with the Democrats on this?

THE PRESIDENT: Not on this one. Well, I think, gentlemen, that will cover the subject?

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

U.S. Reaffirms Principles of Monroe Doctrine

Department Statement

Press release 392 dated July 14

In his remarks concerning the Monroe Doctrine at his press conference on July 12, Mr. Khrushchev again displayed his extraordinary ability to ignore facts.

In the first place, the principles of the Monroe Doctrine are as valid today as they were in 1823 when the Doctrine was proclaimed. Furthermore, the Monroe Doctrine's purpose of preventing any extension to this hemisphere of a despotic political system contrary to the independent status of the American states is supported by the inter-American security system through the Organization of American States. Specifically the Organization of American States Charter and the Rio Treaty provide the means for common action to protect

the hemisphere against the interventionist and aggressive designs of international communism. Likewise, Mr. Khrushchev failed to mention that the Rio Treaty is the first of the regional treaties for which provision is made under article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. Khrushchev might appropriately reflect on the fact that one of the considerations for establishing the Rio Treaty was that:

... the American regional community affirms as a manifest truth that juridical organization is a necessary prerequisite of security and peace, and that peace is founded on justice and moral order and, consequently, on the international recognition and protection of human rights and freedoms, on the indispensable well-being of the people, and on the effectiveness of democracy for the international realization of justice and security. . . .

One of the principal purposes of the Rio Treaty was to provide a method for dealing with threats of imperialistic powers seeking to establish their domination in the Western Hemisphere.

A further remarkable development was revealed in Mr. Khrushchev's meeting with the press. Speaking as the Head of the Soviet Government, he arrogated to himself the power to determine what international agreements should or should not be binding—even though the Soviet Union is not a party thereto. In this particular instance it was not only the Rio Treaty but also the treaty between the United States and Cuba covering Guantanamo which he has sought to abrogate. While disregard for treaties to which it is a party may be viewed by the U.S.S.R. as a convenient approach to international relations, such an effort can only be regarded by law-abiding states as another example of Soviet intervention in the affairs of other countries.

Mr. Khrushchev's latest references to U.S.—Cuban relations are of a piece with his threat of July 9.¹ As a pretext for his threat, he conjured up the straw man of a nonexistent menace of U.S. aggression against Cuba.

The threat of the use of force, made so blatantly by the Soviet Chairman in relation to the affairs of nations of the Western Hemisphere, is contrary to the basic principle of the United Nations Charter which rejects the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. This naked menace to world peace, brandished so callously by

¹For background, see BULLETIN of July 25, 1960, p. 139.

the Soviet leader, reveals the hypocrisy of his protestations in behalf of peace.

Moreover, these statements of Mr. Khrushchev appear to be designed to establish a "Bolshevik doctrine" providing for the use of Soviet military power in support of Communist movements anywhere in the world. Mr. Khrushchev speaks approvingly of the historically positive role of the Monroe Doctrine during the 19th century, when it was applied against the European imperialisms of that day, but declares that "everything has changed abruptly" now that it stands in the way of the new imperialism: international communism.

The principles which the United States Government enunciated in the face of the attempts of the old imperialism to intervene in the affairs of this hemisphere are as valid today for the attempts of the new imperialism. It consequently reaffirms with vigor the principles expressed by President Monroe:

We owe it . . . to candor . . . to declare that we should consider any attempt on their [European powers] part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

Today, nearly a century and a half later, the United States is gratified that these principles are not professed by itself alone but represent through solemn agreements the views of the American community as a whole.

U.S. Protests New Cuban Law Directed at American Property

Press release 397 dated July 16

The U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Philip W. Bonsal, on July 16 delivered to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations the following note protesting the "Nationalization Law" of Cuba.

I have the honor to refer to the law issued by the Council of Ministers of the Government of Cuba on July 6, 1960, which is entitled the "Nationalization Law" and which applies exclusively to nationals of the United States who own property in Cuba. I have been instructed by my Government to emphasize to Your Excellency that

the Government of the United States considers this law to be manifestly in violation of those principles of international law which have long been accepted by the free countries of the West. It is in its essence discriminatory, arbitrary and confiscatory.

The Nationalization Law is discriminatory in that it is specifically limited in its application to the seizure of property owned by nationals of the United States.

It is arbitrary because it was admittedly enacted in retaliation for recent actions taken by the Congress and President of the United States to assure the needs of the sugar consuming public of the United States.¹ These actions were required because of the publicly stated intention of the Government of Cuba to reduce its dependence on sugar concomitantly with its efforts to enlarge sales of sugar in newer markets and to alter radically its traditional pattern of trade with the United States. Moreover the hostile attitude toward the United States so often expressed by the present Government of Cuba has made abundantly clear the economic imprudence of relying on Cuba for a very high proportion of the United States need for this important commodity.

The Nationalization Law is both arbitrary and confiscatory in that its provisions for compensation for property seized fail to meet the most minimum criteria necessary to assure the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation and in its specific prohibition of any form of judicial or administrative appeal from the resolutions of the expropriating authorities.

I have been instructed by my Government to convey to Your Excellency a most solemn and serious protest against this hostile measure. I am further instructed to inform Your Excellency that should this law be employed by the Government of Cuba to seize properties of American nationals, it will be viewed by the Government of the United States as further evidence and confirmation of a pattern of economic and political aggression against the United States under the guise and pretext of accelerating the social and economic progress of the Cuban people.

¹ BULLETIN of July 25, 1960, p. 140.

U.S. and Canada Conclude Review of Joint Defense Problems

Communique

Press release 398 dated July 16

The third meeting of the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense was held at Montebello, Quebec, on July 12 and 13, 1960.¹

The United States was represented at the meeting by the Honorable Robert W. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury, the Honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of Defense, and the Honorable Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter regretted that developments requiring his personal attention obliged him to cancel his plans to come to the meeting.

Canada was represented by the Honorable Howard C. Green, Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honorable Donald M. Fleming, Minister of Finance, the Honorable George R. Pearkes, Minister of National Defence, and the Honorable Raymond J. O'Hurley, Minister of Defence Production.

Ambassador [Richard B.] Wigglesworth and Ambassador [A. D. P.] Heeney, with other senior officials of the two Governments, were also in attendance.

The Committee was established as a result of discussions in July 1958, in Ottawa, between Prime Minister Diefenbaker and President Eisenhower.² It was established to consult periodically on all matters affecting the joint defense of Canada and the United States and reviews not only military questions but also the political and economic aspects of joint defense problems.

The members of the Committee welcomed the opportunity which this meeting afforded them to have a timely discussion on a broad range of recent international developments of interest and concern to the two Governments. They agreed that situations which arise should always be dealt with in a manner which will promote the objec-

tives of the United Nations and contribute to international peace and stability.

By its nature the Committee's discussions are largely concerned with matters involving the vital security interest of the two countries.

The Committee reviewed the current position concerning negotiations aiming at complete and general disarmament under an effective system of control. They deplored the recent action of the Soviet Union in withdrawing from the ten-nation meetings,³ thus frustrating its work. The Committee agreed that efforts for the resumption of meaningful negotiations must be continued. They were further agreed that pending the achievement of general and controlled disarmament there could be no relaxation of defensive measures.

Particular attention was given to a review of the progress achieved on cooperative measures designed to improve the defenses of North America and the Committee reaffirmed its conviction that these contribute importantly to the greater strength of collective security within the broader framework of NATO.

The Committee reaffirmed the common desire and intention of both Governments further to strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance and to improve consultation between members within the North Atlantic Council, and considered ways and means whereby the Alliance's objectives might be achieved in the years ahead.

The Committee also reviewed the field of defense production sharing between the two countries. They recognized that this is a long-range program. They reaffirmed the concept as one in the best interest of each country and discussed further steps which might be taken to assure a greater measure of cooperation.

The Committee noted with satisfaction that the existing machinery for consultation on defense matters between the two countries is operating effectively. It was noted in this respect that the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, created by the Ogdensburg Declaration of 1940, would this year be completing the twentieth year of its existence and the Committee expressed its confidence that the Board would continue to play a significant role within the area of its responsibilities.

The date of the next meeting of the Committee will be arranged later.

¹ For text of a communique issued at the conclusion of the second meeting, see BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1959, p. 789.

² For text of a joint statement, see *ibid.*, Aug. 4, 1958, p. 208.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development Under International Law and Application in United States Practice

by William Barnes

The freedom from local jurisdiction which diplomatic immunity confers upon certain foreign officials residing in the United States has frequently been a cause of public criticism and misunderstanding. Especially has this been the case when such officials have invoked their immunity to protect themselves from the consequences of acts which, if committed by ordinary citizens, would result in the application of penal sanctions.

This article seeks to dispel such misunderstanding by treating the principle of diplomatic immunity in its historical perspective, bringing out the reasons why the United States, in common with all other countries, recognizes and applies this principle. The legal basis of diplomatic immunity in the United States is also discussed, and examples are given of its application in United States practice.

Diplomatic immunity may be broadly defined as the freedom from local jurisdiction accorded under international law by the receiving state to duly accredited diplomatic officers, their families, and servants. Associated with such immunity is the inviolability which applies to the premises of embassies and legations and the residences of duly accredited diplomatic officers. Diplomatic immunity is a universally recognized principle included in the body of rules known as international law, which civilized nations have accepted as binding them in their intercourse with one another and which is enforceable in U.S. courts.¹

By custom, courtesy, or international agreement, diplomatic officers usually also enjoy cer-

tain privileges in the states to which they are accredited, such as exemptions from local taxation and from the payment of customs duties. Such privileges do not derive from international law but rest for the most part on domestic legislation, generally on the basis of reciprocal treatment. While often associated with diplomatic immunity, these privileges are not, strictly speaking, embraced in that term, and they are not discussed in this article.

Historical Development of the Concept

The concept of diplomatic immunity in international law may be traced back to the usages and customs of the earliest peoples of whom we have knowledge through written records. It often became necessary for primitive tribes and peoples to communicate and negotiate with one another, for which purpose certain of their members were selected as messengers or envoys. The functions of the envoys were of social significance to both the sending and receiving communities, and it was early realized that reciprocal advantages were to be gained and mutual interests served by granting them special immunities and protection.

Such envoys were sent and received for important negotiations by the kings of the Hittites, Babylonians, Assyrians, Hebrews, and Egyptians. For example, in 1272 B.C. the Hittite King,

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¹ While the principle of diplomatic immunity is firmly established in international law, its application in practice varies as among individual states.

Khetasar, sent messengers to Rameses II of Egypt to propose peace and a treaty of alliance. Immunity was accorded these messengers despite an existing state of war, and they accomplished their mission.² The ancient history of China and India records that envoys from neighboring peoples were not regarded as subject to local jurisdiction. Biblical references indicate that any violation of an envoy's immunity was regarded as justifying sharp retaliatory measures. Thus it is recorded in chapters 10 and 11 of the Second Book of Samuel that the entire race of Ammonites perished at the hands of David, King of Israel, because they treated his messengers offensively.

The use of ambassadors by the Greek city-states was a common practice, and their inviolability was recognized as necessary to the carrying on of negotiations. They were not subject to local jurisdiction even when they committed an offense in the receiving state, and any interference with them was considered a serious breach of international good conduct. Thus Thebes declared war on Thessaly because its ambassadors had been arrested and imprisoned, even though there was evidence that the Theban envoys had conspired against the Thessalian Government.³

The Romans accepted the practice of the Greeks in regard to diplomatic immunity and embodied the principle in their codes of law. Cicero expressed the Roman attitude toward diplomatic immunity as follows:⁴

The inviolability of ambassadors is protected both by divine and human law; they are sacred and respected so as to be inviolable not only when in an allied country but also whenever they happen to be in forces of the enemy.

Immunity extended to the ambassador's staff, and his correspondence was held to be inviolable. Under the Roman civil law, ambassadors were accorded an important degree of exemption from local jurisdiction, although certain of its provisions later gave rise for a time to the interpretation that such exemption applied only to acts connected with their diplomatic functions and did not extend to acts performed in a private capacity.

During the Middle Ages the immunity of ambassadors received even greater recognition than in ancient times. Both Gothic and Saxon law provided for special protection and treatment of envoys. The spiritual and temporal power of the papacy imparted a high degree of prestige and honor to papal agents and encouraged a similarly high standard of treatment for diplomatic representatives exchanged by temporal states.

In the Renaissance period the development of diplomacy by the Italian city-states, which were the first to establish permanent diplomatic missions, served to enhance the prestige and prerogatives of diplomatic agents, even though the practice of diplomacy was strongly influenced by the precepts of Machiavelli and became almost synonymous with treachery and intrigue. The diplomatic practices of the Italian city-states were adopted by the monarchs of Western Europe, who established permanent missions on a reciprocal basis and set up regular diplomatic services to staff them.

During the Renaissance the doctrine of diplomatic immunity was subject to two conflicting interpretations based on opposing views of sovereignty. One interpretation, based on certain provisions of the Roman civil law which restricted diplomatic immunity, asserted the power of the receiving state to exercise jurisdiction over diplomatic agents in certain cases. The other called for the voluntary surrender by a state of its authority over such agents, to give them the maximum of immunity in the exercise of diplomatic functions. The former theory was expressed by such 16th century writers as Conradus Brunus, Alberico Gentile, and Jean Hotman, who believed that diplomatic immunity should be restricted in order to prevent its being invoked in the case of crime or conspiracy and argued that diplomatic agents who troubled the peace of the state should be liable to prosecution.⁵

Despite these opinions and the zeal with which Western rulers were wont to assert their sovereign prerogatives, the law and practice of diplomatic immunity in the 16th and 17th centuries evolved in the direction of giving diplomats complete immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction. States were led to this course by their recognition of the necessity of undisturbed diplomatic relations and of the political expediency of preserv-

² Montell Ogden, *Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity* (Washington, 1936), p. 11.

³ Graham H. Stuart, *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice*, 2d edition (New York, 1952), p. 115.

⁴ Quoted in Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

⁵ Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

ing peace and friendly relations by treating ambassadors with special consideration.⁶

The theory of diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction did not become firmly established until the appearance of the treatises of Grotius, Zouche, and Bynkershoek in the 17th century. Yet, according to Professor E. R. Adair, the author of an intensive study of the subject,⁷

... throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries no ambassador was ever put to death nor even subjected to any very long imprisonment for crimes committed unless he was a subject of the state to which he had been sent.

Professor Graham H. Stuart observes that this statement is borne out by such incidents as the recall of French Ambassador de Noailles, implicated in a plot against Queen Mary of England in 1556; the dismissal of Spanish Ambassador Mendoza, involved in a plot against Queen Elizabeth in 1583; and the action of the Venetian Senate in 1618 in facilitating the flight of Spanish Ambassador de Cueva, who had organized a conspiracy against the republic.⁸

In the 18th and 19th centuries the doctrine of complete diplomatic immunity was generally recognized in international law and practiced by all civilized states. During this period the legal fictions of "extraterritoriality" and "representative character," derived from the classical writers on international law and their followers, notably Grotius, Bynkershoek, and Vattel, were often advanced to justify the institution of diplomatic immunity. According to the first doctrine, an envoy was immune from local jurisdiction because he was outside of the territory of the receiving state for legal purposes; the second doctrine held him to be immune because he was the personification of his sovereign, who could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of another country.⁹

These legal fictions tended to obscure the fundamental reason for the principle of diplomatic immunity and are no longer accepted as a proper basis for it. The principle needs no other justification for its acceptance in international law than the necessity and importance of protecting the persons and facilitating the work of diplo-

matic officers engaged in the conduct of relations between states.

The development of international organizations in the modern period has enlarged the scope of diplomatic immunity, since the principle has sometimes been applied, usually on the basis of agreements with the host states, to specified personnel of such organizations. In 1926 Switzerland granted immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction to certain officials of the League of Nations and recognized the inviolability of its buildings, property, and archives.¹⁰ By an agreement signed in 1928, the Netherlands accorded diplomatic immunity to the members and senior officials of the World Court.¹¹ A similar agreement was concluded in 1946 providing that members of the International Court of Justice and officials of the Court will, in a general way, be accorded the same treatment as members of a diplomatic mission of comparable rank.¹²

Under an agreement concluded with the United Nations in 1947, the United States accords diplomatic immunity to the principal resident representatives of member states to the United Nations and its specialized agencies and to certain resident members of their staffs.¹³ This agreement also recognized the inviolability of the land, buildings, and other property included in the U.N. headquarters district in New York City. Previously, in 1946, following the transfer to the United Nations of certain assets of the League of Nations in Switzerland, that country made an agreement with the United Nations extending certain immunities and privileges to the Organization and to its representatives and officials. Under this agreement full diplomatic immunity is accorded to the Secretary-General and Under Secretaries of the United

¹⁰ *Modus Vivendi Concerning Diplomatic Immunities of League of Nations Officials*, Sept. 18, 1926 (text in Manley O. Hudson, *International Legislation* (Washington, 1936), I, 224).

¹¹ Agreement Concerning the Diplomatic Status of Members of the Permanent Court of International Justice, May 22, 1928 (text in Hudson, *op. cit.*, I, 597).

¹² Exchange of Letters Recording an Agreement Between the International Court of Justice and the Netherlands Relating to Privileges and Immunities of Members of the International Court of Justice [etc.], June 26, 1946 (text in 8 United Nations Treaty Series 61).

¹³ Agreement With the United Nations Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947 (61 Stat. 3416). Text also in note to 22 U.S.C. 287 and in 11 United Nations Treaty Series 11.

⁶ Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

⁷ E. R. Adair, *The Extraterritoriality of Ambassadors in the 16th and 17th Centuries* (London, 1929), p. 64.

⁸ Stuart, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

⁹ Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

Nations; other U.N. officials and representatives of members are entitled to specified immunities and privileges, including exemption from legal process with respect to acts performed in their official capacity. In addition, the Organization itself is granted immunity from suit in the Swiss courts, and its property and archives are declared to be inviolable.¹⁴

From this brief historical review it will be observed that the principle of diplomatic immunity is one of the oldest legal concepts recognized by mankind in the field of foreign relations and that over the centuries it has become firmly established in international law. In both ancient and modern times the main forces compelling the observance of diplomatic immunity have been the necessity of safeguarding persons charged with the conduct of foreign relations, so that they may properly protect their countries' interests, and the recognition of the mutual advantages to be gained by so doing. These considerations governed the conduct of the earliest embassies on record; they were the basis of the special status accorded envoys in ancient Greece and Rome; and they have strongly influenced the development of the doctrine of diplomatic immunity in international law from the Middle Ages to the present day.

Legal Basis for Diplomatic Immunity in United States

American courts are bound to recognize and apply the law of nations as part of the law of the land.¹⁵ Since diplomatic immunity is a principle of international law, no domestic legislation is necessary to give it effect. Nevertheless, the United States, together with a number of other countries, has seen fit to enact domestic laws on the subject, which are generally declaratory of international law and are designed to give it a specific local application. The first legislation of this character was the act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 117), adopted at the outset of our national

existence. This law followed in almost identical language the English statute (7 Anne, ch. 12) promulgated in 1708, which was the first recognition of diplomatic immunity in Anglo-Saxon law.¹⁶

The principal U.S. laws on the subject are summarized under the following headings:¹⁷

Immunity From Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction

Foreign diplomatic personnel accredited to the U.S. Government and members of their suites, including their families, employees, and domestic servants, notified to and received by this Government in such capacity, are immune from arrest or imprisonment, and their property may not be seized or attached. Any writ or process sued out against such persons shall be deemed null and void (22 U.S.C. 252). Any person who obtains or executes such a writ or process in violation thereof is liable to fine and/or imprisonment (22 U.S.C. 253).

Requirements for Immunity From Judicial Process in Certain Cases

The exemption from judicial process described above is applicable to American citizens or legal residents of the United States, notified to and accepted by the Department of State, who are in the service of foreign diplomatic missions, except that such persons are not immune from suit upon a debt contracted prior to entry into such service. In the case of domestic servants of ambassadors and public ministers accredited to the United States, the penalty for wrongful suit applies only when the name of the servant has previously been registered in the Department of State and transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Marshal of the District of Columbia, who shall give it appropriate public notice (22 U.S.C. 254).

Penalty for Assaulting Diplomatic Officers

Any person who strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers violence to the person of a diplomatic officer, in violation of the law of nations, is liable to fine and/or imprisonment (18 U.S.C. 112).

¹⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, I, 903.

¹⁵ For complete texts of American laws and regulations pertinent to the subject, see *Laws and Regulations Regarding Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities*, United Nations Legislative Series, vol. VII, United Nations (New York, 1958).

¹⁴ Interim Arrangement on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations Concluded Between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Swiss Federal Council, effective July 1, 1946 (text in 1 United Nations Treaty Series 163).

¹⁵ The Constitution (art. I, sec. 8) confers upon Congress the power to punish offenses against international law. See Charles Cheney Hyde, *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States* (Boston, 1922), I, 11-13.

Prohibition on Picketing of Foreign Diplomatic Missions

An act of Congress of February 15, 1938 (52 Stat. 30), prohibits the display, without a permit, within 500 feet of any embassy, legation, consular office, or other premises in Washington, D.C., used for official purposes by a foreign government, of any placard or device designed to intimidate or ridicule any foreign government, its officers or representatives, its political or economic acts, or its views and purposes. The act further prohibits the congregation of persons within 500 feet of such premises for any purpose.

Jurisdiction in Legal Actions or Proceedings Involving Foreign Diplomatic Officers

The Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in actions or proceedings against ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign states or their domestics or domestic servants, not inconsistent with the law of nations. The Supreme Court has original but not exclusive jurisdiction in all actions or proceedings brought by ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign states or to which consuls or vice consuls of foreign states are parties (28 U.S.C. 1251).

As a practical matter the Supreme Court is not called upon to exercise such jurisdiction. Ordinarily a diplomatic officer whose conduct gives serious offense would be recalled by his government or expelled. In other cases the government of the sending state may consent to the waiver of a diplomatic officer's immunity, in which event he would be subject to process in domestic tribunals other than the Supreme Court.

Application of Diplomatic Immunity in U.S. Practice

Throughout its history the United States has recognized and applied the international law of diplomatic immunity to foreign diplomatic agents in this country and has sought from other nations reciprocal treatment for its own diplomatic officers abroad. The primary reasons for this recognition, both in law and in fact, were stated by Secretary of State Elihu Root in 1906 as follows:¹⁸

There are many and various reasons why diplomatic agents . . . should be exempt from the operation of the municipal law at [sic] this country. The first and funda-

mental reason is the fact that diplomatic officers are universally exempt by well recognized usage incorporated into the Common Law of nations, and this nation, bound as it is to observe international Law in its municipal as well as its foreign policy, cannot, if it would, vary a law common to all. . . .

The reason of the immunity of diplomatic agents is clear, namely: that Governments may not be hampered in their foreign relations by the arrest or forcible prevention of the exercise of duty in the person of a governmental agent or representative. If such agent be offensive and his conduct is unacceptable to the accredited nation it is proper to request his recall; if the request be not honored he may be in extreme cases escorted to the boundary and thus removed from the country. . . .

It should be emphasized, however, that the United States has never interpreted the principle of diplomatic immunity to mean that a diplomatic officer is freed from the restraints of American or foreign laws and police regulations and exempt from the obligation of observing them, but only that he cannot be arrested, tried, or punished in the event of his failure to respect them.¹⁹ The sanctions that may always be applied against an offending diplomatic officer consist, in ascending degree of severity, of (1) a formal complaint to his government, (2) an official request to that government for his recall, or (3) if such a request is not granted or if the officer's offense is serious enough, a declaration that he is *persona non grata* and an order for him to leave the country forthwith. The United States has made use of all three of these sanctions upon occasion.

The practice of the United States in applying the law of diplomatic immunity is illustrated by the following representative cases, which are grouped under those aspects of the law to which they apply.

Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction

The immunity of diplomatic agents from criminal jurisdiction is so universally recognized that one authority on the subject has declared that no instance can be cited where such an agent has been subjected, without his government's consent, to the criminal jurisdiction of the country to which he was accredited.²⁰ While a diplomatic representative is thus immune from arrest, trial, or punishment for any criminal offense he may commit in

¹⁸John Bassett Moore, *A Digest of International Law* (Washington, 1906), IV, 678.

¹⁹Sir Cecil Hurst, *Les Immunités Diplomatiques*, Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, XII, 92, cited by Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

²⁰Green H. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law* (Washington, 1942), IV, 513.

the country to which he is accredited, the U.S. Government takes the view that this immunity in no wise relieves him from the obligation of observing local laws and regulations. If he fails to do so, he becomes liable to the sanctions already mentioned.

When, in May 1868, Secretary of State William H. Seward learned that two official members of the Prussian Legation had been guilty as principal and second of violating a District of Columbia law against dueling, he brought the matter to the attention of the Prussian Minister. Since the persons in question were "protected by the law of nations from judicial prosecution for a violation of the statute . . .," Secretary Seward requested the Minister, in the name of the President, to bring the matter to the attention of their Government in order that they might "in a proper manner be made sensible of its displeasure."²¹

If a diplomatic representative should conspire against the safety of the state, he may be restrained and expelled as soon as possible but he may not be punished by the injured state. Several such cases occurred in the United States in the period preceding its entrance into World War I, the most notorious being those of Captain Boy-Ed, naval attaché, and Captain von Papen, military attaché, of the German Embassy, who were guilty of numerous violations of American laws and of their obligations as diplomatic officers. Captain Boy-Ed directed various attempts to provide German war vessels at sea with coal and other supplies in violation of American neutrality, while Captain von Papen furnished money to various individuals to sabotage factories and other installations in Canada and also directed the manufacture of incendiary bombs and their placement on Allied vessels.²² They were recalled by their Government at the request of the United States.

With the advent of the automobile, by far the greatest number of cases in which diplomatic immunity has been invoked have involved traffic violations. This type of offense, which ranges from relatively minor infractions of parking regulations to the killing or maiming of persons, presents a difficult problem in the application of diplomatic immunity. On the one hand, there is

the legal obligation of the host government to respect that immunity and the reciprocal advantage that it gains by so doing; on the other, there is the necessity that the application of the principle should not be regarded in the host state as an intolerable impairment of the public safety.

In November 1935 the Iranian Minister to Washington, while driving through Elkton, Md., was stopped by police, and his chauffeur was charged with exceeding the local speed limit. The Minister and his chauffeur were arrested and taken before a justice of the peace, the Minister himself having been put in handcuffs when he resisted arrest. The justice dismissed the charges, suspended a fine imposed upon the chauffeur, but compelled him to pay costs. The Minister protested to the Department of State. Secretary Cordell Hull replied that he had been informed by the Governor of Maryland that the police officers responsible had been discharged from the public service. The Governor himself expressed apologies for the incident. In expressing the regret of the U.S. Government that the Minister had been discourteously treated, Secretary Hull pointed out that the incident would not have occurred had the chauffeur observed the regulations, and concluded:²³

In this connection, I may state that this Government has at all times impressed upon its own diplomatic officers in foreign countries that the enjoyment of diplomatic immunity imposes upon them the obligation and responsibility of accordng scrupulous regard to the laws and regulations, both national and local, of the countries to which they are accredited. I feel confident that the Iranian Government will share the view that foreign diplomatic officers accredited to the United States will manifest a similar regard for the laws and regulations in force in this country.

Immunity From Civil Jurisdiction

The immunity of diplomatic officers from jurisdiction in civil questions is a principle of international law that did not gain general acceptance until some time after their immunity from criminal jurisdiction was firmly established. A few writers on international law have maintained that diplomatic officers should not be exempt from civil jurisdiction in questions of a private nature, as distinct from those involving the exercise of their official functions. However, the prevailing

²¹ Moore, *op. cit.*, IV, 634.

²² House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rept. No. 1, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (Serial 7252), pp. 5-9.

²³ Hackworth, *op. cit.*, IV, 515-516.

interpretation of international law and the one which has been followed in American practice is that complete immunity from civil process should be granted under all circumstances. This interpretation is based on the view that the exercise of jurisdiction over a diplomatic officer, regardless of whether the action pertains to his private or official acts, would interfere with and hamper him in the performance of his official functions.

In 1939, when an attachment of property in the possession of the Costa Rican Minister at Washington was contemplated, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State notified the U.S. Marshal for the District of Columbia that writs or processes in either criminal or civil actions could not properly be served on diplomatic representatives.²⁴

In 1874, however, when John Jay, American Minister to Austria-Hungary, claimed diplomatic immunity from the civil process of an Austrian court resulting from his termination of a lease on his residence, Secretary of State Hamilton Fish disapproved this action and instructed him as follows:²⁵

An envoy is not clothed with diplomatic immunity to enable him to indulge with impunity in personal controversies, or to escape from liabilities to which he otherwise might be subjected.

The assertion of these immunities should be reserved for more important and delicate occasions, and should never be made use of when the facts of the particular case can expose the envoy to the suspicion that private interest or a desire to escape personal or pecuniary liability is the motive which induced it. . . .

Immunity From Police Jurisdiction

The immunity of diplomatic officers from local police jurisdiction is inherent in their immunity from criminal and civil process. While a diplomatic officer cannot lawfully be arrested or taken into custody by the police, the government to which he is accredited has a right to expect that he will obey local laws and regulations.

Exemption From Giving Testimony

The immunity of a diplomatic officer from criminal and civil jurisdiction includes his exemption from the obligation to testify in court even though his testimony should be essential to obtain

²⁴ Hackworth, *op. cit.*, IV, 534.

²⁵ Moore, *op. cit.*, IV, 637.

conviction. This immunity, however, may be waived.

In 1923 a summons was issued to the Secretary of the Peruvian Embassy in Washington directing him to appear in a local court to testify on behalf of the United States. The Department of State pointed out to the Attorney General that, in view of the immunity of foreign diplomatic officers from the jurisdiction of local courts, the summons should not have been served and requested him to take measures to prevent the service of such papers thereafter on foreign diplomatic representatives.²⁶

The Venezuelan Minister in Washington, who had witnessed the assassination of President Garfield on July 2, 1881, asked and received the permission of his Government to waive his immunity, and he testified in court against the assassin.²⁷

Waiver of Immunities

The immunity of American diplomatic officers abroad may not be waived except with the consent of the Secretary of State. Whenever a chief of mission considers it desirable to waive immunity, he must request the Secretary's consent, setting forth facts and reasons.²⁸

Duration of Immunity

Immunity begins when the diplomatic agent arrives in the country to which he is accredited, continues during the period of his sojourn, and extends until his departure within a reasonable time after the termination of his mission.²⁹

Immunity of Diplomatic Couriers

Diplomatic couriers are regarded by all governments as immune from local jurisdiction when traveling through foreign territory, and the diplomatic pouches which they carry, bearing the official seal of their governments, may not be opened or searched.³⁰ This immunity is based on the right of diplomatic representatives to communicate freely with their governments, which is

²⁶ Hackworth, *op. cit.*, IV, 553.

²⁷ Moore, *op. cit.*, IV, 644-645.

²⁸ Foreign Service Manual, vol. 1, pt. I, sec. 221.4.

²⁹ Sir Ernest Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 4th edition, Sir Neville Bland, ed. (London, New York, and Toronto, 1957), p. 179.

³⁰ Foreign Service Manual, vol. 1, pt. I, sec. 221.3.

generally recognized as essential to the diplomatic function although it has sometimes been interfered with or curtailed in time of war or civil disturbance.

Effect of War on Diplomatic Immunity

Prior to World War II it was generally maintained that the outbreak of war between a diplomatic representative's country and that to which he was accredited did not affect his diplomatic immunity.³¹ In such an event it was held that the host government was bound to take every precaution against insult or violence being directed against him or his family. In World War II both the Allied and Axis Powers interned each other's diplomatic personnel until arrangements could be made for their exchange. This practice, which was justified on grounds of internal security, involved the exercise of wide police powers over enemy diplomats. While in theory they remained immune from the local jurisdiction, in practice the restrictions to which they were subjected as a result of their internment represented an important modification of the traditional concept of diplomatic immunity in time of war.

Inviolability of Office, Archives, and Residence

Except in case of public emergency, such as fire or other disaster, or matters affecting the public safety, the premises occupied by foreign diplomatic missions in the United States are immune from local jurisdiction.³² The immunity applies to premises occupied as offices or as residences of officers of the mission, the property contained therein, and the records and archives of the mission. Such premises cannot be entered or searched, nor can such property or records be detained or examined by the local authorities, even under process of law.

In 1924 agents of the Internal Revenue Bureau and members of the District police force, acting under a search warrant, entered rooms occupied by an attaché of the Hungarian Legation. The Hungarian Minister protested the violation of the attaché's domicile. The Secretary of State wrote the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Hungary, enclosing letters from the Superintendent of the

Police Department and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in which an apology was offered and regret expressed.³³

Persons Entitled to Diplomatic and "Limited" Immunity

The categories of persons entitled to diplomatic immunity in the United States, the bases on which such immunity is granted, and other relevant information may be summarized as follows:

(a) *Diplomatic officers duly accredited to the Government of the United States, members of their immediate families residing with them and dependent upon them for support, and servants of such officers, regardless of nationality.* Immunity is accorded to such persons on the basis of universally accepted principles of international law which have been incorporated in domestic legislation (22 U.S.C. 252, 253, and 254).

(b) *Employees of diplomatic missions in Washington, regardless of nationality.* The immunity of such employees does not extend to members of their families, who are subject to local jurisdiction. It is accorded on the basis of a provision of the act of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. 118, ch. 9, par. 27; 22 U.S.C. 254), and is subject to the condition that citizens or inhabitants of the United States are not immune from suit upon a debt contracted prior to entry into the service of a diplomatic mission.

(c) *Certain members of permanent delegations to the United Nations.* Section 15 of the headquarters agreement between the United States and the United Nations, signed June 26, 1947, provides that the principal resident representatives of member states to the United Nations, and such resident members of their staffs as may be agreed upon between the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Government of the United States, and the government of the member state concerned, shall be entitled in the United States to the same privileges and immunities as the United States accords to diplomatic officers accredited to it. These representatives and their staff members, as agreed upon, are in the same position as the diplomatic officers listed under paragraph (a) above, with the exception that the immunity covers themselves and members of their families but not their servants.

³¹ Satow, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

³² Foreign Service Manual, vol. 1, pt. I, sec. 231.3.

³³ Hackworth, *op. cit.*, IV, 564.

(d) *Certain members of permanent delegations to the Organization of American States at Washington.* In accordance with a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Organization of American States, concluded under the authority of the act of July 10, 1952 (66 Stat. 516, ch. 628; 22 U.S.C. 288g), the permanent resident representatives of member states of the Organization (other than the United States) and certain members of their staffs are accorded diplomatic immunity on the same basis as the U.N. officials in paragraph (c) above.

(e) *Principal representatives of member states to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at Washington and agreed members of their official staffs.* Under articles 12 and 13 of the multilateral agreement on the status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, national representatives and international staff, effective May 18, 1954,²⁴ such representatives and staff members are entitled to receive in the territory of member states of NATO the same privileges and immunities accorded to diplomatic representatives and their official staff of comparable rank.

Lists of Persons Entitled to Diplomatic Immunity

The *Diplomatic List*, published every other month by the Department of State, contains the names of all regularly accredited diplomatic officers of embassies and legations in Washington, together with the names of their wives and adult daughters. The names of young children of such officers, as well as those of their dependent sons attending school or college, are not listed in the *Diplomatic List*, but they are entitled to diplomatic immunity. At the present time approximately 1,300 officers and 1,100 wives and daughters are listed.

The Department also publishes a bimonthly *List of Employees of Diplomatic Missions Not Printed in the Diplomatic List*, which contains the names of all official employees of diplomatic missions in Washington, as well as the names of all servants of accredited diplomatic officers. The persons listed, all of whom are entitled to diplomatic immunity, now number approximately 2,400.

Subject to the Department's review and approval, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations at

New York City issues every other month a list of members of permanent missions to the United Nations entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities. Approximately 1,000 such persons, including members of their families, are listed at present.

While no special lists are issued to cover the foreign representatives to NATO and the OAS and members of their staffs who are entitled to diplomatic immunity, their names are registered with the Department of State. Including family members, they number about 250 in the case of NATO and 100 in the case of OAS.

The total number of persons entitled to diplomatic immunity in the United States today is estimated at 7,000, including wives and family members. All officials in the above categories are provided with identification cards issued by the Department of State, but such cards are not issued to their wives or family members.

Limited Immunity Accorded to Personnel of International Organizations

Section 7(b) of the International Organizations Immunities Act of December 29, 1945 (59 Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288g), provides that representatives in or to public international organizations of which the United States is a member, and officers and employees of such organizations, shall be immune from suit and legal process relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity. This immunity is limited, and its applicability in particular cases is a question of fact to be proved in court. The immunities, privileges, and exemptions provided by the act have been extended by Executive orders to some 20 international organizations maintaining their headquarters or branch offices in the United States, including the United Nations and a number of its affiliated specialized agencies.

Immunities Accorded to Foreign Consular Officers

Consular officers are subject to local jurisdiction for acts not performed in their official capacity. However, as a matter of international comity, a consular officer is not usually arrested or prosecuted for the commission of minor offenses. The United States has concluded a number of treaties and conventions which contain provisions according special privileges and immunities on a reciprocal basis to consular officers of one country in the territory of the other. The immunity of a

²⁴ United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 5, pt. I, 1954 (Washington, 1955), p. 1087.

particular consular officer in this country would depend upon the applicable treaty provisions. Such immunity does not extend to his wife or other members of his family, who are subject to local jurisdiction. The Department of State issues annually a list of foreign consular officers recognized by the United States, of whom there are now about 2,000.

Summary and Conclusion

The principle of diplomatic immunity originated in ancient times and has developed over the centuries into a universally recognized doctrine in international law. Its fundamental purpose is the protection of the channels of diplomatic intercourse by exempting diplomatic representatives from local jurisdiction so that they may perform their official functions with complete freedom, independence, and security. This exemption is granted as a voluntary limitation on the jurisdiction of the receiving state and is based on the expectation that reciprocal immunity will be accorded its own diplomatic representatives abroad.

The United States has, since its independence, recognized and applied the principle of diplomatic immunity, and the decisions of U.S. courts and jurists and the practices of the U.S. Government have helped to develop and clarify the concept. Congress has enacted domestic statutes to give specific effect to the international law of diplomatic immunity, and the Department of State has consistently sought to obtain, on the basis of international law and reciprocity, the same immunities for American diplomatic representatives as are accorded by this Government to foreign diplomatic officers accredited to it.

The United States adheres to a broad and liberal interpretation of diplomatic immunity, emphasizing the inviolability of the diplomatic agent's person and the national advantage that is served by the untrammelled exercise of his functions. At the same time, it considers that a person entitled to diplomatic immunity is not relieved thereby from the obligation to respect American laws. Should such a person perform acts which endanger the safety of the community or the nation, this country holds that the proper remedy is not to subject him to its jurisdiction but rather to invoke against him the sanctions of his own government by asking for his recall.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 2d Session

- Increasing Penalties for Violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Report to accompany H.R. 12533. June 9, 1960. 4 pp.
- United States Foreign Policy: Middle East. Staff study prepared for the use of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. No. 13. June 9, 1960. 115 pp. [Committee print]¹
- Exempting From the District of Columbia Income Tax Compensation Paid to Alien Employees by Certain International Organizations. Report to accompany S. 2954. H. Rept. 1790. June 11, 1960. 7 pp.
- Mutual Security and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1961. Report to accompany H. Rept. 12619. H. Rept. 1798. June 13, 1960. 24 pp.
- Crediting Periods of Internment During World War II to Certain Federal Employees of Japanese Ancestry. Hearing before the Post Office and Civil Service Committee on H.R. 7810, a bill to credit periods of internment during World War II to certain Federal employees of Japanese ancestry for purposes of the Civil Service Retirement Act and the Annual and Sick Leave Act of 1951. June 13, 1960. 6 pp.
- Providing for Adjustments in Annuities Under the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System. Supplemental report to accompany S. 1502. H. Rept. 1626, part 2. June 14, 1960. 2 pp.
- Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security With Japan. Report to accompany Ex. E, 86th Congress, 2d session. S. Ex. Rept. 8. June 14, 1960. 6 pp.
- The Antarctic Treaty. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Ex. B, 86th Congress, 2d session. June 14, 1960. 105 pp.
- Import Duties on Certain Coarse Wool. Conference report to accompany H.R. 9322. H. Rept. 1883. June 16, 1960. 2 pp.
- Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies: Supplemental Statement on Costs and Benefits to the Soviet Union of Its Bloc and Pact System—Comparisons With the Western Alliance System. Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency in cooperation with the Departments of State and Defense for the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of the Joint Economic Committee. June 17, 1960. 50 pp. [Joint committee print]
- Suspension of Import Duties on Certain Shoe Lathes and Cases. Conference report to accompany H.R. 9862. June 16, 1960. H. Rept. 1884. 3 pp.
- Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1960. Report to accompany H.R. 12547. H. Rept. 1890; June 16, 1960. 81 pp.
- International Health Research Act of 1960. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 649. H. Rept. 1915. June 17, 1960. 28 pp.
- Crediting for Retirement and Leave Purposes of Certain Internment Periods of Employees of Japanese Ancestry in World War II. Report to accompany H.R. 7810. H. Rept. 1920. June 20, 1960. 7 pp.
- Rotation of Civilian Employees of the Defense Establishment Assigned to Duty Outside the United States. Report to accompany H.R. 10695. S. Rept. 1624. June 21, 1960. 6 pp.
- Informal Entries of Imported Merchandise. Report to accompany H.R. 9240. H. Rept. 1938. June 22, 1960. 2 pp.

¹ This study replaces one prepared by the Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, Inc., which was listed with other studies in this series in BULLETIN of Feb. 22, 1960, p. 273.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During July 1960

In Session as of July 31, 1960

In the future the lists of meetings adjourned in the previous month and those currently in session will appear in the third issue of the Bulletin each month.

Scheduled August 1 Through October 31, 1960

3d FAO/IAIAS: Latin American Meeting on Agriculture and Fertilizers . . .	Raleigh, N.C.	Aug. 1-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party on Standardization of Conditions of Sale for Cereals . . .	Geneva	Aug. 1-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 7th Session	México, D.F.	Aug. 3-
10th General Assembly of the International Geographical Union and 19th International Congress of Geography	Stockholm	Aug. 6-
5th Inter-American Conference on Agriculture and 6th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	México, D.F.	Aug. 8-
2d U.N. Conference on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders	London	Aug. 8-
PAHO Executive Committee: 41st Meeting	Habana	Aug. 12-
12th Meeting of PAHO Directing Council and 12th Meeting of Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas	Habana	Aug. 14-
7th International Soil Science Congress	Madison, Wis.	Aug. 15-
International Union of Crystallography: 5th General Assembly	Cambridge, England	Aug. 15-
21st International Geological Congress	Copenhagen	Aug. 15-
WMO Commission for Maritime Meteorology: 3d Session	Utrecht	Aug. 16-
14th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 21-
UNESCO World Conference on Adult Education	Montreal	Aug. 22-
21st International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 24-
5th World Forestry Congress	Seattle	Aug. 29-
PAHO Executive Committee: 42d Meeting	Habana	Aug. 29-
GATT: 5th Round of Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	Sept. 1-
Ad Hoc Committee of U.N. General Assembly To Consider General Questions of Transmission of Information	New York	Sept. 2-
GATT Working Party on Market Disruption	Geneva	Sept. 4-
COAS Special Committee To Study Formulation of New Measures for Economic Development: 3d Meeting	Bogotá	Sept. 5-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 2d Session	Geneva	Sept. 5-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture	Geneva	Sept. 5-
International Scientific Radio Union: 13th General Assembly	London	Sept. 5-
ICAO Legal Committee: 12th Session	Montreal	Sept. 6-
UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget	New York	Sept. 7-
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain: 8th Congress	Buenos Aires	Sept. 12-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 3d Meeting of Technical Committee of Experts on Travel Plans	Washington	Sept. 12-
WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 11th Session	Manila	Sept. 16-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 48th Meeting	Moscow	Sept. 19-
International Rubber Study Group: 15th Meeting	Kuala Lumpur, Malaya	Sept. 19-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: 51st Session	Geneva	Sept. 19-
IAEA General Conference: 4th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 20-
FAO Regional Conference for the Near East	Tehran	Sept. 21-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors	Washington	Sept. 26-
ILO Ad Hoc Meeting on Civil Aviation	Geneva	Sept. 26-
6th International Technical Conference on Lighthouses and Other Aids to Navigation	Washington	Sept. 26-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 15, 1960. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: COAS, Council of the Organization of American States; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; IALAS, Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled August 1 Through October 31, 1960—Continued

U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 8th Session . . .	Geneva	Sept. 26-
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 3d Session	Madrid	Sept. 26-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 6th Session	Bangkok	Sept. 27-
Interparliamentary Union: 49th Conference	Tokyo	Sept. 29-
IAEA Board of Governors: 18th Session	Vienna	September
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 8th Session	Geneva	September
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: Seminar on Highway Transportation	undetermined	September
U.N. ECE Senior Economic Advisers: Preparatory Meeting . . .	Geneva	September
FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Desert Locust Control: 9th Session	undetermined	September*
GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 3-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee	Geneva	Oct. 3-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 18th Session	Geneva	Oct. 3-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 3d Meeting of Technical Committee of Experts on Tourist Travel Promotion	México, D.F.	Oct. 6-
International Criminal Police Organization: 29th General Assembly	Washington	Oct. 10-
FAO European Commission on Agriculture: 12th Session	Rome	Oct. 10-
U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade: 9th Session . . .	Geneva	Oct. 10-
IAEA Symposium on Inelastic Scattering of Neutrons in Solids and Liquids	Vienna	Oct. 11-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Foodstuffs	Geneva	Oct. 11-
South Pacific Commission: 21st Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Oct. 13-
FAO Council: 34th Session	Rome	Oct. 17-
FAO Technical Meeting on Coffee Production	Abidjan	Oct. 20-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 7th Meeting . .	Vancouver	Oct. 24-
ILO Permanent Agriculture Committee	Geneva	Oct. 24-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 3d Meeting of Technical Committee of Experts on Removal of Travel Barriers	Buenos Aires	Oct. 24-
WHO Executive Board: 26th Session	Geneva	Oct. 25-
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia ("Colombo Plan"): 12th Meeting		
Officials Meeting	Tokyo	Oct. 31-
Ministerial Meeting	Tokyo	Nov. 14-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Permanent Executive Committee	Buenos Aires	Oct. 31-
FAO Advisory Campaign Committee on Freedom From Hunger . .	Rome	October
FAO Group on Cocoa: Executive and Statistical Committees . . .	Rome	October
Pan American Institute of Geography and History: 7th General Assembly	Lima	October
9th Pan American Consultation on Cartography	Lima	October
6th Pan American Consultation on Geography	Lima	October
5th Pan American Consultation on History	Lima	October
IA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: 3d Meeting	Rio de Janeiro	October
IMCO Subcommittee on Unification of Maritime Tonnage Measurement	London	October

International Partnership for Economic Growth

*by Under Secretary Dillon*¹

We who are privileged to attend these meetings of the Economic and Social Council owe a debt of gratitude to Secretary-General Hammarskjöld for his initiative in bringing us together on this occasion.

The Council is recognized as the world's major forum for discussing, in the broadest sense, the great economic and social questions of the day. My Government therefore welcomes the continuing efforts of the Secretary-General to improve the procedures of the Council and enhance its effectiveness. The experiment of convening a ministerial meeting on an important subject may well turn out to be a significant contribution to this end. I sincerely hope that our exchange of views over the next few days may be mutually helpful.

The Council's central interest is, and should be, sustained economic growth, especially in the newly developing countries. Here the representatives of the industrialized countries, meeting with those of countries in the process of development, have joined as partners in creating preinvestment institutions like the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the U.N. Special Fund. Here the heads of the specialized agencies tell us of the important work they are doing to promote economic development and human welfare. Here, too, we get a picture of national and regional efforts on behalf of the newly developing countries. It is by looking at this whole broad canvas that we get a comprehensive view of what is being done to realize the aim of the United Nations Charter for a "better . . . life in larger freedom." Such comprehensive study and exchange of views helps all of us to chart our future courses of action in

this vital field of development, through the United Nations and other international institutions, through regional programs, and through national efforts. These activities all form part of an international partnership for economic growth to which the United States is dedicated.

In the Secretary-General's excellent statement to us, a statement which perceptively highlights the economic development aspects of the world economic situation, he notes the recent growth of regional or other limited economic institutions and raises the question of a trend which could be dangerous to the larger interests reflected in general or universal organizations.

How shall we answer this question?

Certainly there is need for arrangements of less than universal scope. Limited groups of countries, by joining together, often find it possible to succeed in constructive tasks which could not be carried out by a wider membership.

But certainly, also, such institutions may give rise to dangers, especially in the field of economic relations, where the interests of nations are becoming ever more thoroughly intertwined as interdependence grows.

U.S. Support for Regional Economic Arrangements

My Government is deeply conscious of both these needs and these dangers. It is the policy of the United States to test carefully the merits of specific economic institutions before deciding whether or not to endorse them. We believe that there must be persuasive evidence that they constitute the most effective available method to accomplish the objective in view. The objective itself must be a constructive one, designed to augment human welfare. And, finally, the means selected for economic cooperation must be in accordance with widely accepted multilateral princi-

¹ Remarks made at the ministerial meeting of the 30th Session of the U.N. Economic and Social Council at Geneva on July 11 (press release 387).

ples or norms so that they will not damage the economic interests of outside countries.

It is in the light of these principles that the United States has supported specific regional trade arrangements in Western Europe and in Latin America.

Similarly, under the right conditions special institutions can also be of great value in helping to promote the development of member countries without detracting from the use of other channels or from the economic development of nonmember countries. The United States, for example, is a member of the recently created Inter-American Development Bank, established as a further expression of the historic relations among the American Republics. It also participates in economic development consultations under the Colombo Plan. Our participation in these regional activities has not meant any neglect by the United States of the use of other methods of cooperation in economic development or of the needs of other areas. We continue to devote substantial resources to the development and economic stability of countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, both directly and through our contributions to the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the proposed International Development Association.

All of these economic arrangements, whether or not within the family of the United Nations, serve the purposes of the United Nations.

The proposed Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development will also reinforce the basic economic purposes of the charter. The OECD will not, of course, be a new organization but rather a reconstitution, or remodeling, of the existing OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation], which came into being as long ago as 1948.

The record of European economic growth during the period of OEEC's existence has few parallels in history. Now, with the achievement of convertibility in most member countries, the problem for the OEEC is no longer one of European economic recovery or of liberalizing intra-European trade and payments. The time has come to broaden horizons, to emphasize the contribution which the industrialized areas can make to world growth and stability and to the development of the less developed areas. For this purpose it is proposed that Canada and the United States, which

have been associated with the OEEC since the beginning, should now become full members of the reorganized institution.

The OECD would enable member governments, by consultation and cooperation, to use more effectively their capacities and potentialities in promoting the highest sustainable economic growth, improving the well-being of their peoples, and fulfilling their international responsibilities, notably the responsibility of assisting to the best of their ability the countries in process of economic development. The constitution of the OECD is still being negotiated, and therefore it is not possible to be specific about relationships between the OECD and other international institutions. It is recognized, however, that the OECD should be authorized to establish such relationships where appropriate.

Development Assistance Group

Pending establishment of the OECD, a group of 10 capital exporting countries have been participating in a Development Assistance Group,² which provides the opportunity for frank discussion and informal consultation about the best methods for mobilizing the economic resources which they can make available to the less developed countries. I wish to emphasize that it is not the function of the DAG to engage in specific operations or to discuss specific projects or areas. Such discussions and operations, of course, would only be carried out by the countries directly concerned in cooperation with the developing countries themselves.

The DAG is not meant to replace any of the functions of the existing channels of coordination and cooperation or to overlap with their activities. Rather, it should complement and strengthen existing institutions. With this in view, the DAG has placed on the agenda for its next meeting in October a discussion of the preinvestment type of technical assistance, a discussion in which all of the important international agencies directly active in the field, including the United Nations and its appropriate specialized agencies, will be invited to participate. In making these arrangements members of the DAG were mindful of the thoughts expressed by U.N. Under Secretary Philippe de Seynes in his excellent address con-

² For background, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1960, p. 139, and Apr. 11, 1960, p. 577.

cerning the OECD delivered in Washington on April 28 of this year.

The Development Assistance Group is, of course, only an interim organization. It would be replaced by a committee of similar membership and characteristics within the OECD when the OECD has been formally established.

In considering the problems of economic growth in the less developed areas, much attention has been given to the prospects for an adequate flow of external capital, recognizing, of course, that in any developing country the bulk of resources for development will come from domestic savings.

While predictions are hazardous, it is my feeling that in the years ahead difficulties in obtaining external capital for sound development will not be the significant limiting factor to the progress of the less developed areas.

The reason for this belief is that the future economic growth of the free industrial countries, based on reasonable expectations, should be high enough not only to enable these countries to continue increasing their own standards of living while maintaining adequate security and financial stability but also to provide in substantial volume the outside capital, both private and public, which the developing countries can effectively use to supplement their own resources. In other words, the capacity to assist will be there. I am confident that the will to assist will also be there.

A much more serious limitation on growth in developing areas is the difficulties loosely described by the phrase "absorptive capacity." These include all the problems which must be solved in preparing and implementing technically sound and economically feasible development projects, in improving government administration, in training private manpower in the wide range of skills essential to successful industrialization, and in achieving higher standards of general health and education.

In this broad and complex field of economic development the international institutions can be of great help, much more so in certain fields of endeavor than can the governments of the capital exporting countries. The United Nations, with its Special Fund and program for operational and executive personnel, the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, and the specialized agencies, has a most important role to play in this field. Once again my Government strongly urges full financial support by all U.N. members for the

Special Fund and Expanded Technical Assistance Program so that the immediate goal of \$100 million for these programs may be reached in 1961.

Response to Needs of African Nations

The discussions on economic development at this session of the Council are given special point and meaning with the entry this year of a large portion of the African Continent into the family of nations. During 1960, 14 new African states containing more than 80 million people will assume, through peaceful change, their rightful place as self-governing, independent nations with all of the blessings and responsibilities which freedom entails. It is of the greatest importance that this venture into freedom succeed, that the new nations of Africa develop stable and healthy societies dedicated to the spiritual and material improvement of their peoples.

The emerging African leaders have recognized the need for disinterested outside help in pursuing their national goals. The initiative in seeking such help, and the responsibility for putting it to effective use, must rest with the African states themselves. But the international community must be ready to respond. For the needs are great—in education, training, technology, capital, and basic social improvements. Outside assistance will be required from many sources, from private foundations and investors, from individual governments, and, of key importance, from the international agencies.

The international agencies have already begun to respond to the challenge. A number of organizations, among them the United Nations and its specialized agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are already expanding their operations in the area. The U.N. Economic Commission for Africa has made an auspicious start, and we trust that the development of programs of aid to Africa will take into account the contribution which the Economic Commission for Africa can make to individual as well as multilateral approaches to the member nations of that continent.

The participation by the many new countries of Africa in the U.N. system will require larger expenditures by the international agencies. My Government is prepared to support the necessary increases in the regular budgets of the U.N. and the appropriate specialized agencies, including the

U.N. program for technical assistance for public administration. We also believe that the experimental label should be removed from the OPEX program.³ This program should now be given permanent status and increased in size.

Expansion of International Trade

Countries in the process of development are giving increasing attention to the expansion of international trade, both as a means of making the best possible use of scarce resources and in order to enlarge their capacity to import and pay for the capital and other development goods which they must obtain from the outside world. The problem of gaining wider export markets for the products of the less developed areas, as the Secretary-General has observed, has become a vital aspect of development. This problem has been of deep concern to the Council's Commission on International Commodity Trade and the Interim Coordinating Committee on International Commodity Arrangements. Several other international groups have been at work on the difficulties affecting world trade in primary commodities of great importance to the less developed areas. More recently, the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade have undertaken an intensive study of ways to broaden the markets for a diversified range of exports from the less developed areas with emphasis on the removal of discriminations, the abatement of excessive restrictions, and the reduction of demand-depressing excise levies.

GATT has played a key role in expanding trade on a liberal, multilateral basis. The fact that world trade has now reached record levels is due in no small measure to the application of GATT's basic rules for the elimination of quotas, the reduction of tariffs, and the avoidance of discrimination. GATT members now account for 80 percent of the world's trade, and its membership has grown each year. This growing participation in GATT, particularly by the less developed countries, is clear evidence of the benefits of the GATT system.

It has sometimes been suggested that GATT should become a universal institution. However,

³ The OPEX program, which was approved by the General Assembly in 1958 for an experimental 1-year period, is intended to help requesting governments recruit from outside their country experienced operational, executive, and administrative personnel to work as civil servants on a temporary basis.

as is made abundantly clear in the preliminary analysis by the Secretary-General of the trading systems of centrally directed and market economies, there are fundamental differences between the objectives and methods of GATT and those of centrally directed economies. The United States could not consider as a step forward any proposal to bring about universal membership in GATT at the sacrifice of the principles of liberal, multilateral trade. It would be a service to no one to give the illusion of universality while losing the meaningful principles upon which a truly international trade organization must be based.

The less developed countries are being confronted with an increasingly serious problem by the insistence of certain states upon the adoption of bilateral or barter methods of trade, frequently in conjunction with offers of capital or technical assistance. Bilateral trade and payments arrangements closely approximate barter in their economic effects, and barter, of course, has long been discredited as the most primitive form of commerce. But for the less developed countries, bilateral arrangements have a potential cost far beyond the immediate economic one. For if they commit their exports to these arrangements, as they are often urged to do, their freedom to buy and sell in the world markets is automatically curtailed and the economic basis of their national independence is thereby jeopardized. The risk is even greater where trade is an instrument of state policy rather than a natural result of market forces.

Mr. President, the United States has come to this meeting with sincere hopes that our exchange of views over the next few days will be useful. Of course, we are all aware that international meetings, at whatever level, do not in themselves solve deeply rooted economic problems. We all recognize, for example, that there are obstacles to the harmonization of national economic policies. These obstacles exist even among countries with basically similar economic and political systems. They arise largely from the inherent difficulties and complexities of economic life. While international institutions can appropriately be used as an aid to governments in addressing themselves to many basic economic difficulties, a realistic appraisal of the prospects for success must guide the selection of the machinery to be used.

On one goal we are all agreed—that of a better life for people in the less developed countries.

The United States has constantly striven to be a good partner in this crucial endeavor. I can assure you, Mr. President, there will be no flagging in our efforts.

World Economic Survey

Now, Mr. President, I should like to comment briefly on the world economic survey for 1959.⁴

This survey is one of the best so far produced by the United Nations Secretariat. It combines a thoughtful and technically competent analysis of national policies in relation to the problem of economic growth with a comprehensive review of world economic conditions.

We agree with the emphasis given in the survey to the need for sound monetary and fiscal policies as a prerequisite for economic growth in all countries. We also endorse the view that in the less developed areas these policies need to be reinforced by adequate access to external resources to help economic development proceed without serious inflation or unmanageable pressures on the balance of payments. A very large part of the capital outflow of the United States, public and private, helps to meet this recognized need.

The survey suggests that government planning is desirable in order to increase the volume of investment and, hence, economic growth. We would agree that national goals are important to the study and formulation of economic policy. Economic goals can illuminate the road to progress so long as they leave ample freedom to productive economic forces and sufficient scope for flexible and indirect instruments of economic policy. As the information in the survey suggests, economic planning in the dogmatic sense, which subjects the economy to comprehensive and direct controls, has produced serious distortions where it has been applied and has failed to satisfy human wants.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I want to express my appreciation for the opportunity to participate in this session of the Economic and Social Council. As you know, the United States has a deep faith in the United Nations as man's best hope for progressing toward a peaceful world in which all will have an opportunity to satisfy their material and spiritual needs in freedom. We regard this Council as a major instrument in moving toward these goals.

⁴ *World Economic Survey, 1959*; U.N. publication 1960. H. C. 1.; price \$3.

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Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. Programme Allocations for 1961. A/AC.96/71/Rev. 1. April 6, 1960. 7 pp.

Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1961. Subsidy allowances for members of organs and subsidiary organs of the United Nations. A/C.5/813. April 20, 1960. 6 pp.

Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries. Report by the Secretary-General on measures taken by the Governments of Member States to further the economic development of under-developed countries in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1315 (XIII). Additional replies from Governments. A/4220/Add. 6. May 12, 1960. 3 pp.

Application of the Republic of Togo for Admission to Membership in the United Nations. Cable dated May 20, 1960, from the Prime Minister of Togo addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4377. June 8, 1960. 1 p.

Question of Disarmament. Letter dated June 2, 1960, from the permanent representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4374/Rev. 1. June 13, 1960. 15 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Annual Report, 20 March 1959-21 March 1960. E/3340. March 1960. 201 pp.

Economic Commission for Latin America. Programme of Work and Priorities, 1959-60. E/CN.12/AC.45/9. March 28, 1960. 19 pp.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

General Review of the Development and Co-ordination of the Economic, Social and Human Rights Programmes and Activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies as a Whole:

International Relations and Exchanges in the Fields of Education, Science and Culture. Report by the Director-General of UNESCO. E/3352. April 7, 1960. 491 pp.

Appraisal of the scope, trend and costs of the programmes of the United Nations, specialized agencies and the IAEA in the economic, social and human rights fields. Consolidated report submitted by the Committee on Programme Appraisals in pursuance of Council Resolution 694 D (XXVI) of 31 July 1958. E/3347. May 5, 1960. 158 pp.

Survey on international relations and exchanges in education, science and culture. E/3352/Add. 1. May 10, 1960. 9 pp.

Twenty-fourth report of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination to the Economic and Social Council. E/3368. May 10, 1960. 19 pp. and annexes.

Appraisal of the Programme of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1959-1964. E/3343. May 17, 1960. 182 pp.

Concerted International Action in the Field of Housing and Related Community Facilities. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3382. May 20, 1960. 16 pp.

Observations of the Work Programme of the Council in the Economic, Social and Human Rights Fields. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3386. May 25, 1960. 19 pp.

Commission on the Status of Women. Draft Report to the Economic and Social Council on the Fourteenth Session of the Commission on the Status of Women Held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, From 28 March to April 1960 Inclusive. Addendum to Chapter IV. Status of Women in Private Law. E/CN.6/306/Add. 1, April 8, 1960, 17 pp.; addendum to Annual Reports on Legislation and Practice in Family Law and Property Rights of Women. Add. 2, April 11, 1960, 15 pp.; addendum to Chapter VII. Access of Women to Education, Add. 3, April 13, 1960. 22 pp.

Statistical Commission. Review of International Statistics: The Statistical Situation in America. Statement submitted by the Inter American Statistical Institute, a nongovernmental organization. E/CN.3/NGO/7. April 22, 1960. 19 pp.

Economic Development of Under-developed Countries: United Nations Conference on New Sources of Energy. Report by the Secretary-General on preparatory action. E/3371. May 6, 1960. 11 pp.

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3372. May 6, 1960. 3 pp.

Provisional Agenda for the Thirtieth Session of the Economic and Social Council. E/3363. May 10, 1960. 11 pp.

World Economic Situation. Evaluation of long-term economic projections. (A preliminary report by the Secretary-General) Replies of Governments and specialized agencies of the United Nations to the questionnaire on long-term economic projections. E/3379/Add. 1. May 12, 1960. 88 pp.

Economic Development of Under-developed Countries: International Flow of Private Capital, 1958-59. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3389. May 13, 1960. 117 pp.

Technical Assistance. Increase of ICAO regional projects in the Expanded Programme. Note by the Secretary-General. E/3376. May 16, 1960. 7 pp.

Technical Assistance Activities of the United Nations. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3386. May 23, 1960. 102 pp.

Economic Development of Under-developed Countries: United Nations Capital Development Fund. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3393. June 2, 1960. 10 pp.

Economic Development of Under-developed Countries: Opportunities for International Co-operation on Behalf of Newly Independent Countries. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3387. June 3, 1960. 9 pp.

International Commodity Problems. Question of convening a joint session of the Commission on International Commodity Trade and the FAO Committee on Commodity Problems. Note by the Secretary-General. E/3392. June 3, 1960. 3 pp.

World Economic Situation: Economic Development of Under-developed Countries. Statement by the Secretary-General. E/3394. June 6, 1960. 21 pp.

World Economic Situation: Principles of International Economic Co-operation. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3396. June 6, 1960. 7 pp.

Technical Assistance in Public Administration: Provision of Operational, Executive and Administrative Personnel. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3370. June 7, 1960. 18 pp.

Trusteeship Council

Revision of the Questionnaire Relating to Trust Territories. Ninth progress report of the Sub-committee on the Questionnaire relating to the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi. T/1506. February 24, 1960. 31 pp.

Offers by Member States of Study and Training Facilities for Inhabitants of Trust Territories: Report of the Secretary-General [General Assembly Resolutions 557 (VI), 753 (VIII) and 1411 (XIV)]. Letter dated March 25, 1960, from Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. T/1510. April 1, 1960. 5 pp.

Agenda of the Twenty-sixth Session of the Trusteeship Council. As adopted by the Council on April 14. T/1515. April 14, 1960. 3 pp.

Report of the United Nations Advisory Council for the Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration, 1 April 1959 to 31 March 1960. T/1516. April 14, 1960. 101 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of Nauru for the Year Ended 30 June 1959. Observations of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. T/1517. April 19, 1960. 5 pp.

Preparation and Training of Indigenous Civil Cadres in the Trust Territories. Report of the Secretary-General. T/1519. April 21, 1960. 20 pp.

Report of the Secretary-General on Credentials. T/1520. April 25, 1960. 5 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the Year Ending 30 June 1959. Observations of the World Health Organization. T/1521. April 26, 1960. 4 pp.

Revision of the Questionnaire Relating to Trust Territories. Observation of the United Kingdom as the Administering Authority for the Trust Territory of Tanganyika concerning the seventh progress report of the Sub-committee on the Questionnaire (T.1459). T/1522. April 28, 1960. 7 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of Western Samoa for the Year 1959. Observations of the World Health Organization. T/1523. May 3, 1960. 5 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report of the Trust Territory of the Cameroons Under United Kingdom Administration for the Year 1958. Observations of UNESCO. T/1524. May 4, 1960. 11 pp.

Examination of the Annual Report of the Trust Territory of Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration. Observations of UNESCO. T/1525. May 4, 1960. 16 pp.

Report of the Administering Authority on the Separation of the Southern Cameroons From the Federation of Nigeria. Distributed according to General Assembly Resolution 1352 (XIV) adopted October 16, 1959. T/1526. May 11, 1960. 4 pp.

U.S. and Korea Act To Implement Educational Exchange Agreement

The United States and the Republic of Korea on June 30 agreed by an exchange of notes at Seoul to amend the educational exchange agreement of April 28, 1950.¹ Following is a U.S. Embassy announcement released at Seoul on June 30 and the text of remarks made by Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy at the exchange-of-notes ceremony.

Press release 380 dated July 1

U.S. Embassy Announcement

Today, with an exchange of notes between Foreign Minister Huh Chung and United States Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy, the road is clear for the Republic of Korea to join the 41 nations of the world who have active Fulbright programs with the United States. The Fulbright agreement amended today supports exchange programs by which American professors, research scholars, and students can teach or study at Korean universities; it also defrays travel expenses for Korean teachers, scholars, or students proceeding for study to the United States.

Public Law 584, 79th Congress, the so-called Fulbright Act, has enjoyed virtually unanimous support since its inception in 1948, not only within the United States but far and wide among the vast family of free nations. Its purpose is "to share with other international educational exchange programs the general objectives of furthering good will and understanding among nations." It was originally designed to carry out its programs by designating, for mutually beneficial educational exchange, funds acquired by the United States Government for the sale, at a very small percentage of original value, of the large quantities of war properties left by the American armies all over the world during and immediately after World War II. Weapons of war thus became powerful weapons for peace. Later, as such funds began to be exhausted, the American Congress

made it possible for funds acquired by the foreign sale of American agricultural products (Public Law 480) to be used to finance Fulbright programs.

Korea and the United States signed the original Fulbright agreement on April 28, 1950. Armed conflict broke out 58 days later and before the program could be implemented. The conflict, and financial questions arising from its aftermath, have prevented implementation of the agreement since. Today's exchange of notes ends long efforts by both Governments to amend the original agreement in order to implement Fulbright programs in Korea by using the hwan equivalent of \$900,000 created in accordance with the terms of the 1955 surplus agricultural products agreement between the United States and Korea.

The Fulbright agreement, which follows a more or less standard form in many countries, envisages the establishment of an educational commission in Korea composed of private and official members of the Korean and American communities concerned with education. The American Ambassador acts as chairman. The commission administers the Fulbright program in Korea.

The American and Korean Governments greatly welcome this culmination of more than a decade of efforts to strengthen the friendly bonds of knowledge and understanding between Korea and the United States by the inauguration in Korea of what is probably the world's most famous program for educational exchange.

Remarks by Ambassador McConaughy

Mr. Minister, members of the Korean Government, distinguished guests: Today will be remembered happily and long in the relations between Korea and the United States. The notes we are here exchanging, by amending the educational exchange agreement of April 28, 1950, open the road to implementing in Korea the Fulbright program, the world's most famous undertaking for international cultural exchange. I am happy, indeed, Mr. Minister, that the United States is joining with you, your talented staff, and the Government you so ably head in this great and fruitful endeavor in international friendship.

The United States is proud to welcome Korea today as the 42d nation to have active Fulbright exchange agreements with us. This number is impressive testimony to the almost unrivaled support and recognition which these programs have achieved throughout the free world. Many forms of joint action or agreement, many economic, military, scientific, and cultural bonds and ties are needed in the present day. Yet none can be counted

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2059.

happier or I think, in the last analysis, more permanent than those which individual men form with each other when, through visiting, living, teaching, or studying abroad, they come to understand other lands and men and to think of each other as partners in the family of the free world and of mankind.

Such bonds and friendly ties as these personal ones, we are forming today, Mr. Minister. These documents, now words on paper, will soon become life in the form of new faces seen among you and in your university campuses: the faces of American teachers whom the faculties of Korea's universities want to have join them in the vital job of teaching Korea's young men and women. These new faces will also include those of American scholars who will come here to study the culture and language of Korea in Korea's own classrooms. New faces will also appear in the universities of the United States as Korea's students and scholars are helped by this agreement to come to our country to study and learn. Such exchange, Mr. Minister, will broaden and strengthen the community of interests between Korea and the United States, will promote the recognition of our mutual needs, and will enlist the forces of education, science, and culture in meeting them. The Fulbright program will strengthen us both.

I am proud and happy to mark with you today, Mr. Minister, the inauguration of the Fulbright program in Korea. I am confident that we can look forward to its serving the educational needs of both our countries through many years to come.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Publications

Protocol amending the agreement for the suppression of the circulation of obscene publications of May 4, 1910 (37 Stat. 1511), with annex. Done at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force for the United States August 14, 1950. TIAS 2164.

Acceptance deposited: Iran, December 30, 1959.

Trade and Commerce

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of the schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.¹

Signature: Federal Republic of Germany, May 28, 1960. Declaration on provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 22, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960; for the United States April 29, 1960. TIAS 4461.

Signatures: Nicaragua, June 2, 1960; Pakistan, June 8, 1960; Brazil (subject to ratification), June 14, 1960.

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.¹ Declaration confirming signature deposited: Luxembourg, May 17, 1960.

Declaration on relations between contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the

Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Done at Geneva May 25, 1959. Entered into force November 16, 1959; for the United States November 19, 1959. TIAS 4385.

Signature: Japan, May 25, 1960.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 23, 1959. Entered into force October 9, 1959; for the United States December 19, 1959. TIAS 4384.

Signature: Japan, May 25, 1960.

Declaration confirming signature deposited: Luxembourg, May 17, 1960.

Declaration on relations between contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Government of the Polish People's Republic. Done at Tokyo November 9, 1959.¹

Signatures: Netherlands, May 12, 1960; Canada, May 23, 1960; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, May 24, 1960; Japan, May 25, 1960; Chile and Denmark, May 26, 1960; Luxembourg, May 27, 1960; United Kingdom, June 1, 1960.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21, 1960; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.

Signatures: Netherlands, May 12, 1960; Canada and New Zealand, May 23, 1960; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, May 24, 1960; United Kingdom, May 26, 1960; Luxembourg, May 27, 1960; Federal Republic of Germany (subject to ratification), May 28, 1960; Chile, June 14, 1960.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement relating to conditions governing the maintenance and operation of upper atmosphere research and cold weather testing facilities at Fort Churchill, Manitoba. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 14, 1960. Entered into force June 14, 1960.

Denmark

Agreement concerning establishment and operation of certain aeronautical facilities and services in Greenland. Signed at Copenhagen July 7, 1960. Entered into force July 7, 1960.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 2, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3513 and 4086). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta February 18 and March 11, 1959. Entered into force March 11, 1959.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of May 29, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4248, 4255, and 4412). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta May 23 and June 8, 1960. Entered into force June 8, 1960.

Israel

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311 and 4407). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960.

Entered into force: July 8, 1960.

Spain

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Madrid June 22, 1960. Entered into force June 22, 1960.

¹ Not in force.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Consulate Established at Mandalay

The Department of State announced on July 15 (press release 396) the establishment on that date of a new consulate at Mandalay in the Union of Burma. Mandalay, the second city of Burma, lies about 400 miles north of Rangoon, the capital, on the Irrawaddy River in the heart of the nation.

Marshall Hays Noble, a career Foreign Service officer, is consul in charge.

Recess Appointments

The President on July 14 appointed David Brewer Karrick to be Ambassador to the Republic of Ecuador. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 390 dated July 15.)

Designations

Frank L. Auerbach as chairman of the Policy Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, effective July 8. Mr. Auerbach is adviser to the Administrator of Security and Consular Affairs.

Alfred Puhon as Executive Director, Bureau of European Affairs, effective July 11.

William J. Sheppard as ICA Regional Director for Far Eastern Operations, effective July 15. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 383 dated July 15.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

International Sugar Agreement of 1958. TIAS 4389. 234 pp. 65¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Other Governments. Dated at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force with respect to the United States of America October 9, 1959.

Telecommunications. TIAS 4390. 581 pp. \$1.75.

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958), and final protocol, between the United States of America and Other

Governments—Signed at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4405. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Chile, amending agreement of March 13, 1956, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago January 26 and April 21, 1959. Entered into force April 21, 1959.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4422. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Viet-Nam, amending agreement of October 16, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon February 13, 1960. Entered into force February 13, 1960.

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes. TIAS 4423. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Denmark. Signed at Copenhagen February 19, 1960. Entered into force February 19, 1960.

Defense—Ballistic Missile Early Warning Station at Fylingdales Moor, Yorkshire. TIAS 4425. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at London February 15, 1960. Entered into force February 15, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4428. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and China, supplementing agreement of June 9, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei February 11, 1960. Entered into force February 11, 1960.

Tracking Stations. TIAS 4429. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador. Signed at Quito February 24, 1960. Entered into force February 24, 1960.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 4431. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul February 19, 1960. Entered into force February 19, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4432. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey, amending agreement of February 13, 1959, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 10, 1960. Entered into force March 10, 1960.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Program at Lima. TIAS 4433. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Peru, extending agreement of April 17, 1957, as extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lima December 30, 1959, and February 18, 1960. Entered into force February 18, 1960. Operative retroactively January 1, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4434. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo February 18, 1960. Entered into force February 18, 1960.

Tracking Stations. TIAS 4435. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Australia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Canberra February 26, 1960. Entered into force February 26, 1960.

Telecommunications—Extension of Facilities of Radio Ceylon. TIAS 4436. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ceylon. Exchange of notes—Signed at Colombo July 14 and August 23, 1954. Entered into force August 23, 1954.

Defense—Loan of Vessels to Brazil. TIAS 4437. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Brazil. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro September 18 and October 19, 1959. Entered into force October 19, 1959.

Defense—Loan of Vessels to Ecuador. TIAS 4438. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador. Exchange of notes—Signed at Quito January 20 and February 11, 1960. Entered into force February 11, 1960.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Disposition of Equipment and Materials. TIAS 4439. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador. Exchange of notes—Signed at Quito June 20 and July 19, 1956. Entered into force July 20, 1956.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4440. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and India, amending agreement of November 13, 1959, as supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 21, 1960. Entered into force March 21, 1960.

Emden-Cherbourg-Horta Cable—Return by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to German Ownership. TIAS 4441. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America (in its own behalf and in behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France) and the Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington November 4, 1959, and March 16, 1960. Entered into force March 16, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4443. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Finland—Signed at Helsinki March 23, 1960. Entered into force March 23, 1960. With exchange of notes.

Commission for Educational Exchange. TIAS 4444. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Portugal—Signed at Lisbon March 19, 1960. Entered into force March 19, 1960.

Reciprocal Trade. TIAS 4447. 3 pp. 5¢.

Understanding between the United States of America and Switzerland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 29, 1960. Entered into force March 29, 1960.

Grant for Procurement of Nuclear Research and Training Equipment and Materials. TIAS 4453. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ireland. Exchange of notes—Signed at Dublin March 24, 1960. Entered into force April 7, 1960.

Republic of the Philippines. Pub. 6940. Far Eastern Series 86. 19 pp. 20¢.

Another in the popular *Background* series, this pamphlet discusses the geography, history, government, and economy of the Philippines along with the role of the United States in the strengthening of democracy there.

Canada, Free-World Partner. Pub. 6943. European and British Commonwealth Series 59. 30 pp. 25¢.

Another issue in the *Background* series, this pamphlet discusses the geography, government, history, and economy of Canada and U.S.-Canadian relations.

Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program—For the first half of Fiscal Year 1960. Pub. 6950. General Foreign Policy Series 149. 64 pp. Limited distribution.

The seventeenth semiannual report to Congress on the operation of the Mutual Security Program for the period ending December 31, 1959.

Highlights of Foreign Policy Developments—1959. Pub. 6956. General Foreign Policy Series 150. 24 pp. 20¢.

Another issue in the *Background* series, this pamphlet discusses basic policies and objectives of U.S. foreign policy during 1959, as well as developments with regard to specific areas or problems.

Mutual Security in Action—Chile. Pub. 6969. Inter-American Series 58. 14 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet discussing the country, economy, and problems of Chile, and the extent of U.S. assistance programs.

Mutual Security in Action—Pakistan. Pub. 6981. Near and Middle Eastern Series 50. 12 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet discussing the country, government, economy, and the role of U.S. technical assistance.

Mutual Security in Action—Ethiopia. Pub. 6989. Near and Middle Eastern Series 53. 12 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet giving background information on the country and discussing its economy, problems, and the extent of U.S. assistance.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 11-17

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Releases issued prior to July 11 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 373 of June 30 and 380 of July 1.

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*386	7/11	Anniversary of Republic of Iraq (delegation).
387	7/11	Dillon: ECOSOC ministerial meeting.
388	7/12	U.S. reply to Soviet note of July 11 on RB-47.
*389	7/14	English-language teachers to Guinea.
*390	7/15	Kerrick appointed Ambassador to Ecuador (biographic details).
391	7/14	Aide memoir on U.S.-Soviet aviation negotiations.
392	7/14	Soviet intervention in Latin America.
*393	7/15	Sheppard appointed ICA Regional Director for Far Eastern Operations (biographic details).
394	7/15	Dillon: Austrian Society for Foreign Policy and International Relations.
395	7/16	U.S.-Polish claims agreement.
396	7/15	Consulate established at Mandalay (rewrite).
397	7/16	Note protesting Cuban nationalization law.
398	7/16	U.S.-Canadian Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense.
399	7/16	Dreier: OAS Council.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Bulletin

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THE
OFFICIAL
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OF THE
UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF
FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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Security Council Considers Cuban Complaint

The Security Council met July 18 and 19 to consider a complaint (S/4378) addressed to the President of the Security Council by Raúl Roa, Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, charging that the United States had intervened in Cuba's domestic affairs and had committed economic aggression against Cuba. Following are texts of statements made by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge and a resolution adopted on July 19.

STATEMENT OF JULY 18

U.S./U.N. press release 3440

The United States has engaged in no threats, harassments, intrigues, reprisals, or aggressive acts against the Government of Cuba.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of Cuba has told us that Dr. Castro would like assurance from the United States that the United States has no aggressive purposes against Cuba. Unnecessary though it most certainly seems to me, let me here and now give him this assurance, heaped up and overflowing: The United States has no aggressive purposes against Cuba.

The United States has consistently exercised restraint in the face of what seems to be deliberate and concerted efforts on the part of the present Government of Cuba to create a grievance with the United States.

We can read no other meaning into the recourse of the Cuban Government to the Security Council today. Such recourse is not in harmony with its treaty obligations under the American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, and the charter of the Organization of American States signed at Bogotá on April 30, 1948. Under these treaties the American Republics contracted to resolve their international differences with any other American

state first of all through the Organization of American States.

The United States believes that the proper forum for the discussion of any controversies between the Government of Cuba and the governments of other American Republics is the Organization of American States.

The causes of international tensions in the Caribbean area have been under consideration by the Inter-American Peace Committee since the meeting of the American foreign ministers in Santiago, Chile, in August of last year,¹ which was called to deal with that problem. Allegations of the kind which the distinguished Foreign Minister of Cuba has produced before this body, if they had any validity, could have been considered and dealt with there. At no time has the Cuban Government made any effort to contribute to that Committee's work despite repeated invitations to all the governments of the Organization of American States to do so.

On June 29, 1960, the United States Government, after Cuban refusal to engage in direct negotiations, submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee a memorandum entitled "Provocative Actions of the Government of Cuba Against the United States Which Have Served To Increase Tensions in the Caribbean Area"² and informed the Committee that it would continue to provide such information as is relevant to the Committee's studies. This memorandum is available to members of the Council in document S/4388.

Consideration of these matters in the Organization of American States has now taken a new dimension, largely as the result of the attempts at intervention by the Soviet Union. On July 13

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 31, 1959, p. 299, and Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

² For text, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 79.

the Government of Peru requested a meeting of the American foreign ministers to consider recent developments which threaten continental solidarity, the defense of the regional system, and American democratic principles. The Council of the Organization of American States met both last Saturday [July 16] and is meeting now. It is expected to call for a foreign ministers meeting to be held in the near future. As a result of the Peruvian initiative, 18 of the 21 members have already expressed support for such a meeting.³

In these circumstances, Mr. President, the United States believes that the Security Council should take no action on the Cuban complaint at least until, as contemplated by the provisions of the inter-American treaties to which I have just referred, such discussions have taken place in the Organization of American States. A solution of these differences should be found by pacific means among the American states in conformity with the charters of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States. In the meantime the Council should be alert to outside attempts—notably from the Soviet Union—to aggravate tensions.

Let me say it is not a question of which is greater or which is less—the Organization of American States or the United Nations. The point is that it makes sense—and the charter so indicates—to go to the regional organization first and to the United Nations as a place of last resort. There is no question, of course, of replacing the United Nations.

History of U.S.-Cuban Relations

Now, Mr. President, relations between the United States and Cuba have traditionally been extremely close and friendly, as befits neighbors whose fundamental national interests are similar and who are separated by less than a hundred miles of water.

The United States helped Cuba to achieve its independence in 1898, and our peoples have a history of a half century of cordial relations. We have maintained unusually close economic relations. The United States has been the traditional supplier of 70 to 80 percent of Cuba's imports and has taken 60 to 70 percent of Cuba's exports, a share higher than with other countries of Latin

America generally. We also have maintained a mutually preferential tariff with special low import duty rates. Cuba has consistently received a higher price for sugar not only above the world market price but above that of any other supplier. We were allies in two world wars.

It is no secret either that many long-time friends of Cuba in the United States and friends of Cuba elsewhere in this hemisphere were heartened by the ideals expressed by the present leader of Cuba when he assumed control of the Cuban Government. He had many friends in this country at that time. The United States was prepared to offer full cooperation to the Cuban Government in carrying out the social and other reforms which were needed in Cuba. The people of the United States shared and understood the Cuban rejoicing. At last an oppressive dictatorship had been overthrown and a government had been established which promised much for the people of Cuba.

In these circumstances the United States tried to show its understanding and its sympathy for Dr. Castro's stated aim of honest and efficient government, for the perfection of democratic processes, and for economic development leading to higher living standards and to full employment. On June 11⁴ and October 12, 1959,⁵ we expressed to the Cuban Government our full support for soundly conceived programs for rural betterment. We particularly, Mr. President, applauded his stated desire to do something for land reform, so badly needed and so long delayed.

Even the shock of the many executions in the first month following the establishment of the revolutionary government and the sharp attacks on the United States Government by high Cuban officials failed to dampen the warm and friendly feeling with which Dr. Castro was greeted on all sides when he came to the United States, here to New York among other places, in April of 1959. There was a genuine reluctance to believe that Cuba, a country for which the people of the United States have long had a special affection, could be embarked on an unfriendly course.

On January 26 of this year President Eisenhower issued a major restatement of American

⁴ For substance of a U.S. note of June 11, 1959, see BULLETIN of June 29, 1959, p. 958.

⁵ Not printed.

policy toward Cuba,⁶ reaffirming the adherence of the United States Government to a policy of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, including Cuba, and explicitly recognizing the right of the Cuban Government and people in the exercise of their national sovereignty "to undertake those social, economic, and political reforms which, with due regard for their obligations under international law, they may think desirable," and expressing sympathy for the aspirations of the Cuban people.

That, Mr. President, was the official voice of the United States. Under our Constitution there is only one person who speaks for the United States in the field of foreign affairs, and that is the President of the United States. As far as the position of the United States in the world is concerned, he is the Government of the United States. The Government of the United States is not 75 Members of Congress. It is not the American Legion. It is not the *Wall Street Journal*. It is not the attorney generals at their convention. It is not Joseph Alsop [columnist, New York Herald Tribune Syndicate]. It is not James Reston [New York Times]. It is not Senator [George A.] Smathers. It is Dwight D. Eisenhower, the President of the United States, who speaks through his agents, one of whom I am here. Incidentally, there are 535 Members of Congress; so that means that out of that number only 75 expressed themselves as not liking Dr. Castro's administration. That is not such a bad vote.

The truth of the matter is we have free speech in America. We have unrestricted free speech in our press, in our Congress, anywhere we want. You can hire a hall and say anything you want to. And it means that, of course, some things are going to be said that are not going to be liked in Cuba, that are not going to be liked in New York. But free speech by no stretch of the imagination can be called aggression.

Facts About U.S. Policies in Cuba

Mr. President, the United States has just been accused by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Cuba of harboring war criminals, providing facilities for counterrevolutionaries, of frequent violations of Cuban airspace. It has also been accused of economic aggression because of the re-

fusal of two private American oil companies to refine Soviet oil and because of the President's decision to reduce the Cuban sugar quota.⁷ Let us therefore look at the facts.

(1) The provisions for extradition of persons from the United States are well known to Cuba. These provisions are set forth in the United States-Cuban extradition treaty⁸ and United States statutes and have been discussed in detail by the Department of State with Cuban embassy officers. Cuba can file extradition requests in the United States courts, furthermore, without even notifying the United States Government. To the best knowledge of the State Department, extradition has never been requested by the Government of Cuba for any of those persons commonly defined by the Government of Cuba as war criminals from the Batista regime.

(2) A number of Cuban nationals have been required by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service to leave Florida and remain away from any area within a hundred and fifty miles of the Gulf of Mexico. This was a voluntary and cooperative action of the United States Government to help maintain stability in the Caribbean area, and it never even received an acknowledgment from the Cuban Government.

(3) The United States has taken elaborate precautions in accordance with its obligations under the 1928 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in the Event of Civil Strife⁹ to enforce our domestic laws dealing with traffic in munitions and implements of war which might be used in revolutionary activities.

(4) The United States has instituted the most vigorous and elaborate system of controls ever adopted by the United States Government in time of peace to prevent unauthorized flights in the Caribbean area¹⁰ and has deplored the very few that took place in spite of our restrictive actions. On their part the Cuban authorities have refused to cooperate with United States authorities to prevent such flights. In one case about which Cuba complained, the two individuals involved, William J. Shergalis and Hector Garcia Soto, are under indictment in United States courts for hav-

⁷ *Ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 140.

⁸ 33 Stat. 2265 and 2273.

⁹ 46 Stat. 2749.

¹⁰ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 23, 1959, p. 757.

⁶ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 15, 1960, p. 237.

ing made the flight as agents of the Cuban Government itself.¹¹ In the most celebrated case—the flight of Major [Pedro Diaz] Lanza in 1959, for whom extradition was declined for lack of evidence—the Cuban Government continues to claim that he “bombed” Havana, and I quote the word “bombed.” The claim is contradicted by Cuba’s own police reports and by the results of an investigation carried out by United States authorities as soon as this plane returned to our territory.¹² This investigation showed that the bomb bay in the plane carried a permanent luggage rack and could not have been used for dropping bombs. Likewise its gun positions were permanently sealed. No guns were there, and thus no guns could have been fired. This continued disregard by the Cuban Government of facts surrounding a flight for which the United States officially expressed its regrets—we apologized—is an example, I think, of the extraordinary policy being followed by the Cuban Government.

(5) Among the charges of economic aggression have been all sorts of fanciful charges. President [Osvaldo] Dorticos, for example, described the withdrawal of United States technical assistance¹³ as a “sign of aggression” in a speech in Montevideo in June. Dr. Castro on July 11 referred to the drop in American tourism to Cuba in a context of economic aggression. It is surely not surprising for Americans not to want to go to a place where they are not wanted and where their country is subjected to a ceaseless stream of abuse. Even the preferential sugar quota and the premium price which Cuba has traditionally enjoyed was described by Mr. [Ernesto] Guevara [president of the National Bank of Cuba] in March as meaning “slavery” for the Cuban people.

(6) No economic aggression of any sort was involved in the refusal of the American-owned oil companies to refine Soviet oil. These two companies have operated in Cuba for over 50 years as law-abiding companies and have made a contribution to the growth of the Cuban economy. Since the revolution the Cuban Government has allowed these companies to be paid only a small

percentage of their costs of importing crude oil from Venezuela to refine in Cuba. At the time of their seizure the Cuban Government owed them \$50 million for oil they continued voluntarily to provide. The law under which Cuba purported to require the companies to refine Soviet oil had never previously been considered to mean that it also required companies to refine any oil other than that from Cuban soil. The United States believes that the Cuban action in seizing these companies without compensation was arbitrary and illegal. It is further evidence and confirmation of a pattern of relentless efforts to destroy Cuba’s traditional investment and trade relations with the free world. To our knowledge not a single American property owner in Cuba has been reimbursed for the property taken away, frequently without receipt, from them.

(7) The reduction of the Cuban sugar quota was no act of economic aggression but a justifiable measure of self-protection of the United States to insure its needed supply of sugar in the face of acts on the part of the Cuban Government which made this supply extremely insecure. The United States was under no obligation under the sugar agreement to purchase raw sugar from Cuba, nor was Cuba obliged to sell.

Normally about one-third of our total sugar supply comes from Cuba. The Government of Cuba is now following a course which raises serious questions as to whether the United States can in the long run continue to rely upon that country for such large quantities of sugar. The arrangement might have continued to be mutually beneficial both to the American and Cuban peoples if Cuba had not deliberately chosen otherwise, making clear, as the distinguished Foreign Minister of Cuba said in Montevideo on June 10, 1960, that Cuba had decided to break the structure of its commercial relations with the United States. I believe that is a correct quotation from his speech. There is no escape from the intent of recent Cuban actions, and the United States regretfully—and very regretfully—has had to protect its own long-range sugar supply accordingly.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of Cuba this afternoon has also referred to the Soviet threat of rocket attacks against the United States. So that there may be no mistake at all, let me say that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine—which is another way of saying the prevention of

¹¹ For text of the indictment, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 80.

¹² For texts of Department statements, see *ibid.*, Nov. 16, 1959, p. 715, and Nov. 30, 1959, p. 787.

¹³ *Ibid.*, June 13, 1960, p. 962.

the extension of alien domination of the American Continent—are fully alive and will be vigorously defended by the United States.¹⁴ The principles of that doctrine are now embodied in the treaty obligations among the American states, notably in the charter of the Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty, which provides means for common action to prevent the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the Western Hemisphere. We are not frightened by Chairman Khrushchev's threat of rockets, and we will live up to these treaties just as we live up to our obligations in the United Nations.

Conclusion

Now, Mr. President, I come to the conclusion of my remarks; and this is a very special moment indeed.

Let me say this, that when the distinguished Foreign Minister of Cuba talks about the United States as a North American aggressor and as a butcher—I believe that was the word he used this afternoon—and charges us with a number of other offenses, I, for one, am willing to believe that at the moment that he utters these words he actually believes in them.

But in the greatest candor I assure him that the United States of America he is talking about does not exist.

The United States of America which does exist is the United States of America which helped Cuba get its independence.

It is the United States of America which sprang from the words of Patrick Henry: "Give me liberty or give me death"—a rallying cry which inspired the great Bolivar and the noble José Martí.

It is the United States of America of Thomas Jefferson, who wrote in our Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal" and that they are entitled "to Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness"—happiness as each individual conceives it and not as somebody else tells him he has got to have it.

It is the United States of America of Abraham Lincoln and the freeing of the slaves, which today

inspires our steady progress in the field of civil rights.

It is the United States of America of the victory over yellow fever in Panama, of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's good-neighbor policy, of President Eisenhower's hopes for economic collaboration¹⁵—the United States of America by which no one has ever been enslaved.

It is the United States of America which is human, of course, and therefore imperfect, but we are always eager to correct our errors.

Above all, it is the United States of America which wants to be friends with Cuba and which some day, somehow, will be friends again.

STATEMENT OF JULY 19

U.S./U.N. press release 3441

I ask to be recognized for just a few minutes in the exercise of my right of reply.

The Soviet speech was largely a rehash of the statements with which I have dealt yesterday. They were the the same old charges for which he offered not one word of proof. He set up a lot of strawmen and knocked them down. It had the same old Soviet grab bag of clippings out of the American newspapers, which, however great their entertainment value may be, certainly cannot stand as official evidence of United States policy. So I won't repeat the answers that I gave to all these charges yesterday.

But I will repeat one thing that I said yesterday about Chairman Khrushchev's threat to use rockets against us, and it is this: Neither we nor the members of the Organization of American States are frightened by these threats, nor will we be deterred from our treaty obligations to prevent establishment of a regime dominated by international communism. All we say very simply is this: Don't touch us; don't touch those with whom we are tied; don't seek to extend Communist imperialism. That's very simple and ought to be easily understood by everybody.

Now Mr. Sobolev's¹⁶ speech was unusually abusive and harsh and intemperate. He used such words as "hostile," "conspiratorial," "ban-

¹⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 166.

¹⁵ Arkady A. Sobolev, Soviet representative on the Security Council.

dit," "terrorism," "hypocritical"—words that, of course, are unparliamentary. And I think it is a pity to use these violent words when we had a session here yesterday which was marked by moderation, by a spirit of conciliation.

Record of Soviet Union Concerning Small Countries

I might say that these harsh words, if they were used by anybody else at this table, would cause me concern. But in great frankness, Mr. President, I do not admit the right of the Soviet Union to lecture the Security Council on any question at all concerning respect for the rights of small nations. There is no country on earth that has a worse record than the Soviet Union concerning small countries.

They show their contempt for small countries every year in the General Assembly when they seek to make them second-class citizens by dividing up the General Assembly between the United States and the Soviet Union in the sacred name of parity.

Mr. Sobolev has gone back to 1846 in the catalog that he has made of things that he does not like about the United States. I will not go back that far, although I cannot help but recall that in 1846 the Russians were engaged in oppressing the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and the Turkmen and various peoples of Central Asia and that they are still there.

He refers to our being in Mexico in 1846. Well, we have not been in Mexico for a hundred years. So there is that difference, but I won't go into that.

But I do think it is appropriate, when he poses as the defender of small countries, to remind the Council that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have all been absorbed by the Soviet Union within the memory of young people. It did not happen very far back. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and East Germany have been made into satellites. Hungary, of course, was made into a satellite and then brutally repressed in 1956, a repression which was, in a climactic resolution of the General Assembly, condemned by a vote of 60 to 10,¹⁷ a disgraceful thing which has not happened to anybody else in this Organization.

¹⁷ For background and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1957, p. 515.

I could go on to the Soviet contempt for the United Nations whenever the United Nations does not happen to coincide with what the Soviet Union conceives to be its interests, notably as regards Hungary, as regards Korea, as regards the setting up of the United Nations Emergency Force, which is doing such a wonderful job in the Gaza Strip and at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, which is contributing to the peace of the world, and in the benefits of which the Soviet Union is glad to share but to which they do not contribute one ten-cent piece. They can't find the money to help that worthwhile, constructive activity.

Now there is no doubt at all that the dictator Batista, bad as he was, was a very small fish indeed compared with the blood baths which were organized by the late Marshal Stalin, whose cooperation in 1941 with Adolf Hitler in the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, of unfragrant memory, the world has not forgotten and which showed a cynicism at that time which obviously persists to this day.

Mr. President, we removed our troops from Latin America, from everywhere, many years ago. We removed our troops in Lebanon in 1958 as soon as we were asked to do it.

The Soviet troops do not leave. They infest Eastern Europe. They continue to oppress the oriental races in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Sobolev, the Government that you represent does not come into court with clean hands. You are shedding crocodile tears about Cuba. You quoted a Russian proverb; so I will simply close by quoting something out of the Holy Bible: "And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?"

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹⁸

The Security Council,

Having heard the statements made by the Foreign Minister of Cuba and by members of the Council,

Taking into account the provisions of Articles 24, 33, 34, 35, 36, 52 and 103 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Taking into account also Articles 20 and 102 of the

¹⁸ U.N. doc. S/4395; adopted by the Council on July 19 by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (Poland and the Soviet Union).

Charter of the Organization of American States of which both Cuba and the United States of America are members,

Deeply concerned by the situation existing between Cuba and the United States of America,

Considering that it is the obligation of all Members of the United Nations to settle their international disputes by negotiation and other peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

Noting that this situation is under consideration by the Organization of American States,

1. *Decides* to adjourn the consideration of this question pending the receipt of a report from the Organization of American States;

2. *Invites* the members of the Organization of American States to lend their assistance toward the achievement of a peaceful solution of the present situation in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

3. *Urges* in the meantime all other States to refrain from any action which might increase the existing tensions between Cuba and the United States of America.

Secretary Herter's News Conference of July 21

Press release 410 dated July 21

Secretary Herter: I have one or two announcements to make. In some respects this is rather a unique press conference, in that there are two Secretaries of State present. Unfortunately because of another meeting I was unable to join a group here this morning, the Girls Nation, but the Secretary of State of that group is here, Miss Bea Ann Smith (of Midland, Texas), and I want you all to meet Miss Bea Ann Smith, who is likewise the Secretary of State for the time being. (Applause)

I have a brief statement here with regard to the Congo that I will read, and it will be available to you at the end of the conference.

Situation in the Congo

I want to report briefly on the situation in the Congo as it affects our interests.

Our first concern was for the welfare and safety of the some 2,000 Americans living in this wide-spread area. A number of them are members of our official family connected with the Embassy at Léopoldville and the consulate at Elisabethville. The vast majority, however, were missionaries of many denominations who have been carrying on their work for many years in remote areas. I am glad to say that our records indicate that over 1,500 American citizens have now been safely evacuated. Almost all of those who remain are doing so on their own decision.

The breakdown of public order in the Congo shortly after independence and the appeal of that

young country to the United Nations for help drew immediate response from that body. On July 13 the Security Council adopted a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General "to take the necessary steps . . . to provide . . . military assistance" in the Congo, until the Congolese Government can maintain order.¹

The United States not only voted in support of this resolution but put its logistic and communications resources at the disposal of the United Nations. At the request of the Secretary-General we have, I think, set a remarkable record in bringing aid and assistance to the Congo. Starting from scratch on July 14, the United States had as of today transported approximately 3,500 troops with 300 tons of equipment from three African countries and one European country. We have flown in 400 tons of desperately needed flour and airlifted from the United States and Europe communications and transport equipment essential to the proper functioning of the U.N. Command in the Congo. In this brief time a total of over 125 flights of transport planes provided by the United States have been made to the Congo. This support operation is continuing day and night. By the end of this week we shall have transported an additional 2,000 troops and approximately 100 tons of equipment to the U.N. Command in Léopoldville.

The United States effort, of course, is conducted entirely in response to a request of the United Nations. Our own troops are not involved in the

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159.

United Nations action. You will recall that it was mutually understood that the major powers should not supply troops. The United States has abided by the letter and spirit of this understanding. However, we have been shocked by the attitude and statements of the Soviet Union regarding this matter. The representative of the U.S.S.R. voted in the United Nations Security Council for the same resolution as the United States which I quoted above. This action had hardly been completed, however, when Mr. Khrushchev was publicly assuring the leaders of the Congo that he was prepared to intervene militarily in the Congo if the United Nations action did not proceed to his satisfaction. I submit that such statements and threats, whether intended to be carried out or not, are recklessly irresponsible. The resolution for which the Soviet delegate voted was designed to restore peace and order to the Congo. The threat to take unilateral action in the Congo, repeated again by the Soviet delegate at the Security Council last night, can only be designed to increase tensions in the area and make more likely the continuation of hostilities and disorder. We must ask ourselves which policy the Soviet Union really intends to pursue. I find it hard to believe that the Soviet Union is prepared to set itself against the United Nations in the effort to restore order to the Congo which is progressing so rapidly and well. Ambassador Lodge at the Security Council last night made clear United States policy in such event.²

In the situation in the Congo the United States will continue to back with all its moral force and material resources the action of the United Nations to restore peace and order.³

Reply to Soviet Statement on U.S. Troops in Congo

I have one other very brief statement, which is a draft reply to the Soviet statement of July 19

² See p. 221.

³ The above six paragraphs were also released separately as press release 409 dated July 21.

⁴ The following statement (also released separately as press release 408 dated July 21) was made on July 21 by Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, to Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy, in reply to a statement of July 19 by Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Edward L. Freers, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow.

on the Congo. This is being delivered this afternoon to the Soviet Embassy here.⁴

With regard to the Soviet Government's statement of July 19 concerning the presence of American troops in the Congo, the United States Government wishes to inform the Soviet Government that it has no combat troops in the Congo. As the Soviet Union is aware, the United Nations requested the United States to provide airlift facilities in support of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on July 14. The small group of United States service personnel in Léopoldville are engaged with the approval of the United Nations, but not as part of the U.N. Force, in air traffic control, aircraft maintenance and communications work essential to the operation of the airlift of U.N. supplies, food, troops, and equipment. They will remain in Léopoldville only as long as the United Nations requires assistance from the United States for this airlift from abroad to Léopoldville.

The United States Government regards the Soviet Government's demand as a deliberate, unilateral attempt to obstruct the United Nations efforts in the Congo. The United States will continue to make its fullest contribution to this important U.N. effort and will not be deterred by Soviet attempts to misrepresent its actions.

You may recall that the Soviet statement was complaining with respect to the introduction of 20 of what they called American combat troops into the Congo.

That is all I have.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past few days there has been a decided toughening in our replies to the Soviet protests and threats. Could you explain a bit for us the background of our decision to reply in this manner? And, also, could you give us your advice on what you think the Russians have in mind by this torrent of abuse that they seem to be coming up with?

A. With respect to the first question, I will say this: As you know, there have been a number of notes to us from the Soviet Government couched in very tough terms. In our opinion this has been completely unwarranted, and we have responded in terms that we felt were appropriate to the language and the purport of those notes which were sent to us. I wouldn't say that there was any toughening in the sense of being a new policy on our part. I think that they were proper responses to the types of notes that we received.

With respect to the second part of the question, I can only repeat what I said in Newport 2 days ago, and that is that we can only speculate, and for that reason I would not be specific as to the motives behind the Soviet Government's re-

peated statements and notes which in recent days have been of a provocative order or, as you characterize them, of a tough order. The secrecy with which decisions are made in Moscow makes it extremely difficult to be on certain ground when one speculates as to motivation, so that I shall not engage in that speculation at this time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when the 21 American Foreign Ministers are likely to meet next month on the Peruvian request to consider threats to the hemisphere, do you think that this meeting is likely to contribute to some improvement in the tensions between the United States and Cuba specifically?

A. Well, I think I can answer this in these terms: We naturally would hope that those tensions could be alleviated. We think that a general discussion of what has taken place would be very valuable. As yet no agreement has been reached on the date or the place or the agenda that will be presented there, but we are hopeful that that will be a very useful meeting in indicating the solidarity of the American states with regard to intervention from outside and moves toward communism within.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you intend to meet with the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. [Pierre] Wigny, and the representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Congo who are in this country now?

A. I have no plans now. They, as you know, arrived yesterday. They are fully occupied at the United Nations. I do not know whether they are planning to come to Washington or not before they return.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the officials in the Congo, Premier [Patrice] Lumumba and his associates, speak for the general will of the Congolese people?

A. Well, that is very difficult to ascertain. As you know, they have at times taken certain actions and been repudiated by their cabinet and by their legislative bodies. It is very difficult for us here to gauge whether or not they speak for the great majority of their own people. They were installed in office prior to independence through democratic processes of election.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has Vice President Nixon either been consulted or has he played any role in

the decision to respond to the Soviet notes in the manner in which we have in the last few days?

A. No. I don't think we have been in any consultation with him on this at all.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge should be the Republican nominee for Vice President, as appears possible, would you consider this would make it necessary for him as of such a nomination to resign from his position at the U.N., or would he be able to carry that through for some time?

A. Well, I think that is a little hard to determine at this point. It would depend a good deal on the agenda before the United Nations and on his own responsibilities if he should be nominated; so I don't think a firm decision could be taken on that now.

U.S.—Cuban Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, two widely circulated American columns in the last few days have named you specifically in columns in which they have alleged that a plan has been under preparation, discussion, proposal to the President involving potential U.S. or OAS [Organization of American States] intervention—military intervention—in Cuba. And one of these columns also said that American nationals in Cuba have been urged to get out of Cuba before August 10. I wonder if you can state the matter directly for the record on that point?

A. I would be very glad to state it directly for the record. I have never talked with the President about military intervention in Cuba, nor have we here in the Department made any such plans or preparation.

With regard to the latter matter of American citizens in Cuba, there we have not taken any of the what you might call regular evacuation proceedings. Individuals who wanted to leave Cuba and who have come for assistance to the Embassy we have assisted. Beyond that we have taken no formal action.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Moscow Radio is claiming that the United States is using Japan as a stop-over point for RB-47 spy flights over Communist China and the Soviet Union. And, also, there are reports within Japan that we intend to bring back the U-2's to Japanese bases. Could you clear this up, sir?

* See p. 225.

A. Yes. On the first point, as far as I know, we have never had a 47 stationed in Japan at any time.

With regard to the second point, we have no plans for returning any U-2's to Japan.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the light of some rather tough speeches in East Germany and in Moscow in the last weeks, could you perhaps review the Berlin situation for us? Also perhaps in the light of the possibility of the West German parliament meeting in Berlin at a later date.

A. Well, in reviewing that situation, perhaps the one new factor that has come into it has been Mr. Khrushchev's statement in Vienna in which he reiterated his threats of a separate peace treaty and indicated that that separate peace treaty might be signed immediately if a decision was made to have the Bundestag meet in Berlin. That has been the only change that I know of in this situation.

With respect to the Bundestag meeting there, I know of no firm decision that has yet been made on that. I think it is being discussed in Germany at the present time. However, this has been customary during the past 5 years. It has been done regularly during the last 5 years. I don't know what the decision of the German authorities will be, because this is primarily a decision for them to make. However, I think it will be perhaps more difficult for them to make that decision under the threats that have been issued by Mr. Khrushchev.

Insofar as our own position is concerned, with respect to Berlin itself, our position remains unchanged.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the absence of President Eisenhower from Washington, and considering that Vice President Nixon has sat as Chairman of the National Security Council in the President's absence in the past, could you tell us what role he is playing, how deeply he is involved in these current actions and statements of the United States Government?

A. I think he is probably very cognizant of the actions that have been taking place. We have carried on these actions pretty much as we do normally. The Vice President has been very busily engaged in other duties, but he certainly is entirely familiar with what we are doing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the main argument advanced by the Cuban Government for accepting the So-

viet proposal of intervention and of military help has been the continued fear that the United States is going to attack them. I recall about 2 months ago President [Oswaldo] Dorticos expressed this same fear in a letter to the Chilean students who later visited the United States. He alleged that we have never given them a guarantee.

Now, if we have never considered any such action as I have just said, what has prevented us from dramatically going on record with denying their repeated allegations?

A. Well, in the first place, I have some question as to whether it is necessary for us to deny that. We have a very solemn obligation under the charter of the United Nations not to take aggressive action against any member of the United Nations. We have the same type of obligation under the charter of the Organization of American States. Why we should have to repeat these obligations because of innuendoes or assumptions made by the Soviet Government I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that Raúl Castro was in Moscow to sign a mutual security alliance of some kind with the Soviet Union. Do we have any reason to believe this is true, and if such a pact were signed what would our attitude be?

A. Well, I don't know that they have any reason to believe it to be true. Our action would depend, I assume, very definitely on what kind of an agreement this was and what its purpose was.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you see the prospects for a nuclear test ban in view of the latest Soviet rejection of our offer to pool old nuclear weapons for use in research programs?

A. Well, that so-called rejection that you're referring to I have seen only in a speech that was made by Mr. [Semyon] Tsarapkin in Geneva, but at the conferences themselves he has given us no such rejection. And, too, until we get some formal rejection and see what the waiting period is, it would be a little premature to state our position.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been press reports that the United States Government may take action to prevent American tankers from delivering Russian oil to Cuba. Would you care to comment on that?

A. I know of no such specific action.

Aid Program for Latin America

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently you discussed with the President a new aid program, a new aspect of our aid program for Latin America.⁶ Could you tell us how the work in developing that program is progressing?

A. All I can say at this time is that the work is progressing and is underway. Insofar as details are concerned, until we are further along I would prefer not to go into any detail.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any reason to believe that in the last few days, especially since Cuba went before the Security Council and the Security Council referred its charges to the O.A.S., suspended debate on its charges to let the O.A.S. act,⁷ that the Cuban Government may be more willing now to reason things out?

A. Well, that is a difficult thing to answer categorically. I think that the action of the Soviet Government has had pretty strong repercussions not only through Latin America but in Cuba itself. And I don't think that the Cuban officials are very happy, in light of some of the public statements that have been made by high officials, with the perhaps unsolicited statements that were made from the Kremlin.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you be any more expansive on the remark made last night by Mr. Lodge in the United Nations as to what he referred to as possible U.S. action to prevent Russian troops from entering the Congo?

A. Well, I thought that his statement was a very clear statement, that in the event that troops moved into the Congo without the request of the United Nations and against the United Nations Force there, that we, together with other United Nations members, would take such action as we thought was required.

Q. That is only conditional, is it, sir, that the Russian troops moved against U.N. forces—not merely their presence?

A. Well, presumably they would be in without United Nations sanction—in the event they went in without the United Nations sanction.

Q. But is there a second condition, that they

would have to take some overt action against the U.N. force as well as being present?

A. Well, I wasn't speaking of taking action against the U.N. forces. I was speaking of their taking action against a U.N. resolution.

Q. Would you care to speculate whether you believe that Russian troops would go to the Congo if asked?

A. Well, in the statement that I read a few moments ago I indicated that I thought it was doubtful.

Q. Are you saying, sir, then that you think they are bluffing?

A. I think that is a fair implication.

Q. Thank you, sir.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Notes Regarding Downed USAF Plane

U.S. NOTE OF JULY 18¹

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with reference to the Ministry's note No. 73/OSA of July 15 has the honor to convey, upon instructions of the Government of the United States of America, the following:

Note is taken of the Soviet Government's present readiness in response to the Embassy's note of July 13² to deliver the body of Captain [Willard G.] Palm to United States representatives. The Embassy is under instructions to make the necessary arrangements to this end with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Government of the United States of America finds the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under reference noteworthy particularly for its failure to contribute anything new in the matter at hand. The Ministry simply continues to reassert as facts allegations which must be

¹ Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Moscow on July 18 (press release 401).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 163.

⁶ BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 166.

⁷ See p. 199.

known to the Ministry to be wholly inaccurate and incorrect.

In the Embassy's note of July 13, the Government of the United States of America, recognizing the complete incompatibility of the facts set forth in that note and the statements made in the Ministry's note of July 11,³ declared its readiness to undertake jointly with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and such other authority as might be acceptable to both sides a thorough investigation on the spot which would comprise a search for the downed airplane and the missing members of its crew, and examination of such remains of the aircraft as may be located. The United States Government must draw its own conclusions from the fact that the Ministry's note completely avoids any reference whatsoever to this offer of an objective joint investigation. The significance of this omission is underscored by the Ministry's attempt to confuse the clear issues by means of diversionary reference to an incident which occurred over two months ago⁴ and which is, as is known to the Soviet Government, completely unrelated to the present case.

In view of the reiteration contained in the Ministry's note under reference of the intent of the Soviet Government, despite the demand of the United States for the release of the two United States Air Force officers admitted to be in Soviet custody, to prosecute and judge them "with full severity of Soviet law", the Government of the United States must vigorously protest the illegal action of the Soviet Government in detaining these men. The Government of the United States of America repeats its demand for their release and its further demand that a representative of the United States Embassy in Moscow be permitted to see them without delay.

The Government of the United States of America welcomes the opportunity which will be presented by the forthcoming Security Council meeting for it further to make clear to world opinion the illegality and recklessness of Soviet behavior with regard to the downing of the RB-47 aircraft, with the known loss of life of at least one member of its crew and the arbitrary detention of two United States Air Force officers

who, proceeding on a legitimate mission over international waters in fulfillment of their orders, were so unfortunate as to come into the hands of the Soviet authorities.

SOVIET NOTE OF JULY 15⁵

Unofficial translation

No. 73, OSA

In connection with the note of the United States Government of July 13, sent in reply to the note of the Soviet Government of July 11 concerning the new violation of the Soviet border by an American military plane, the U.S.S.R. Government considers it necessary to declare the following:

The answer of the United States Government testifies to the fact that it again attempts to justify and conceal with the aid of fabrications and arbitrary denial of facts the illegal aggressive actions of its military aviation which accomplished the penetration of the airspace of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government presented in its note exact factual data concerning the time, place, and circumstances of the violation of the Soviet border by an armed American bomber RB-47, specially equipped for fulfillment of espionage tasks and which was shot down over Soviet territorial waters. However, the United States Government, faced with these undeniable facts, instead of taking measures to discontinue provocations by American military planes in respect to the Soviet Union which are dangerous for peace, again seeks a way out of the situation in which it finds itself in the groundless denial of facts.

The question arises, on what basis the United States Government permits itself to assert that the plane RB-47 "did not once enter Soviet territory" and even "did not once approach" nearer to it than a distance of 48 kilometers, if this plane was shot down when it violated the border of the Soviet Union and was in its territorial waters.

The United States Government does not have any basis to assert that the American bomber was located outside of Soviet territorial waters. If it does so, it is only in order to try to deceive public opinion. The Soviet Government knows better where this American bomber was located inasmuch as it crossed the line of the Soviet boundary and was downed under constant observation by U.S.S.R. anti-aircraft defense forces.

The aircraft-violator, as is known, was given appropriate warning which it ignored and thereafter was downed.

The fact that only a few days ago competent American organs asserted that they knew nothing of what had happened to the aforementioned bomber nor of its location draws attention to itself. But if the American organs did not know where this aircraft was located and had no

³ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, May 23, 1960, p. 816, and May 30, 1960, p. 851.

⁵ Delivered to Edward L. Freers, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, at Moscow on July 15 by Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs.

contact with it, then how can the United States Government seriously assert that it did not violate the Soviet border? Nevertheless, the United States Government now announces that it knew the location of the RB-47 aircraft with an accuracy almost to one kilometer and that this aircraft did not violate Soviet airspace. This alone testifies to the fact that the assertions contained in the note of the United States Government of July 13 are fabrication.

The United States Government note also contains an attempt to explain the motives for the flight of the downed aircraft-violator as an assignment on "study of electromagnetic phenomena." Such an explanation is not remarkable for its originality: It repeats almost entirely the device with the help of which the United States Government attempted at first to confuse world public opinion, including its own people, after the intrusion of the spy aircraft U-2 into the airspace of the U.S.S.R. on May 1 this year. Then, as is known, official U.S. organs attempted to evade responsibility for the intrusion into U.S.S.R. airspace by a most transparent method—completely denying all that had taken place. They sent an aircraft from Pakistan to the Urals with the assignment to break through to the northwest borders of the U.S.S.R. and land in Norway, but when the aircraft was downed in the Soviet Union they announced with an innocent appearance that they allegedly had the task to fly in Turkey around Lake Van for "scientific purposes," "to study atmospheric conditions and wind gusts at high altitudes" but if the aircraft happened to be within the U.S.S.R. borders, it was purely accidental: The pilot, you see, lost consciousness, and the aircraft itself violated Soviet frontiers. Insisting on this absurd device, the representative of the U.S. State Department White even had the boldness to announce that "it would be strange to confirm that the United States is trying to make a fool of the world in connection with the real purposes of the flight of the aircraft". It is not for nothing, the people's wisdom says, that lies have short legs. Not two days passed when the State Department, and then Secretary of State Herter and President Eisenhower, pushed to the wall by undeniable factual evidence of the actual purposes of the flight of the U-2 aircraft over Soviet territory and the testimony of the very pilot of this aircraft, had to admit that Washington's preceding official announcements on this score were simply lying versions, intended somehow to screen the U.S. aggressive act.

Would it not be reasonable this one time immediately to admit the facts honestly connected with the new premeditated violation by an American aircraft of U.S.S.R. state frontiers? In any event, the United States Government should know that no one has given it the right to concern itself with some sort of "studies" of electromagnetic or any other conditions within the limits of Soviet frontiers, yes, even with the help of bombers. For what purpose then, as is known, has no one yet dared to assert that the automatic cannon placed on the aircraft represent suitable equipment for carrying out scientific research?

In the light of the demonstrated facts, it becomes clear that the contents of the U.S. note of July 13 are based on complete fabrication, having the purpose in obvious vio-

lation of the facts to screen the aggressive actions of the U.S. Air Force in connection with the Soviet Union. In view of the above the U.S.S.R. Government categorically rejects as devoid of any basis whatsoever the protest contained in the note of the United States Government, and again confirms its note of July 11 and the decisive protest contained in it against the new crude violation of the Soviet border by an American military aircraft on July 1.

As regards various kinds of "demands" mentioned in the note of the United States Government of July 13, the Soviet Government wishes to direct attention to the following. The United States Government, of course, is free to use in its notes whatever words it wishes, though as a result of this, the position of the American side does not become stronger, while the position of the Soviet Union, once more catching the aggressor rehand, does not become weaker. Having carried out an illegal act of intrusion and violated the boundary of the U.S.S.R., the United States again tries to make some kind of claims on the Soviet Union. Naturally, such claims can have no force whatever. As was already stated in the note of July 11, the surviving members of the RB-47 bomber crew who were picked up by a Soviet ship will be prosecuted and judged with all the severity of Soviet law. As regards the body of the bomber commander it can be delivered to U.S. representatives at any time.

The U.S.S.R. Government wishes to draw the attention of the United States Government to the fact that there is a simple means of avoiding in the future senseless loss of lives of American airmen and of not recklessly putting the world on the brink of war. Only one thing is required for this: to stop—not in word but in deed—the aggressive policy expressed in the repeated intrusions by American aircraft into the airspace of the U.S.S.R.

If this is not done, then the Soviet Government will take care of insuring the security of the peoples of the Soviet Union by all means at its disposal.

U.S. Welcomes Security Council Discussion of RB-47 Plane Incident

Following is a statement made by President Eisenhower, together with the text of a telegram from the President to Senator Mike Mansfield concerning consideration by the Security Council of the downing of a U.S. RB-47 plane over international waters by the Soviet Union.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 13

The United States Government is ready and willing to go to the Security Council for a full discussion of the Soviet's wanton shooting down

of the United States Air Force RB-47 airplane in international waters July 1.¹

This Government itself had contemplated recourse to the Security Council but only after trying the bilateral remedies specified in the United Nations Charter. The United States has in fact proposed in its note of July 12 [13] to the Soviet Government that a joint investigation be made. The Soviet Government has ignored the provisions of the charter which call upon the parties to an international dispute to attempt to settle their differences by negotiation or similar means prior to any action within the United Nations itself.

The United States will focus attention in the Security Council on the lawless actions and reckless threats of the Soviet Government.

MESSAGE TO SENATOR MANSFIELD

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 13

JULY 13, 1960

DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD: Thank you for your telegram² in which you suggest that the matter of the shooting down of the U.S. Air Force RB-47 airplane be brought before the Security Council of the United Nations.

As you will have noted from this government's reply of July 12th [13th] to the Soviet note of July 11th, the United States has proposed to the Soviet government that a joint investigation be made. This action was taken pursuant to the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which calls upon the parties to an international dispute to attempt to settle their differences by negotiation or similar means prior to any action within the United Nations itself.

Press reports just received indicate that instead of responding to our proposal, the Soviet government is requesting a meeting of the Security Council on this subject. While we had contemplated recourse to the Security Council only after trying bilateral remedies specified in the Charter, we welcome the Security Council consideration of this question. We propose to make full use of this op-

portunity to focus world attention on the lawless actions and reckless threats of the Soviet government.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Soviet Allegations on Buzzing of Ships Rejected by U.S.

U.S. NOTE OF JULY 21¹

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's memorandum of July 13 in which certain allegations were made regarding the buzzing of Soviet vessels by United States aircraft.

According to the Ministry's statement, the alleged flights in question have created danger to life and represent a violation of "freedom of passage" on the high seas and of "generally accepted rules of international law."

The Embassy, on instructions of its Government, rejects these Soviet allegations as without foundation. An investigation of the incidents cited in the Ministry's memorandum has established that at no time has a United States plane flown over Soviet vessels in any way which would constitute a hazard to the vessel or endanger the safety of its crew.

It is, of course, common practice for ships and aircraft to establish mutual identification in international waters. In accordance with this practice, United States patrol planes often seek to identify ships encountered whose position and identity are not otherwise known, particularly in the ocean approaches to the United States. The pilots of these planes are under the strictest instructions, however, not to approach closer than is necessary for this purpose. That the Soviet Government alone should find it necessary to object to such identification gives rise to the question as to just what are the activities of Soviet vessels that require the Soviet Government to protest such routine identification.

¹ For exchanges of notes between the U.S. Government and the Soviet Union, see p. 209 and BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 163.

² Not printed.

¹ Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Moscow on July 21 (press release 406).

In this connection, the Soviet vessel *Vega*, although ostensibly a fishing trawler, was in fact discovered to be equipped with extensive electronic equipment and to be conducting an intelligence mission along the East coast of the United States for five days in April of this year. In such circumstances there is every reason for establishing the identity of such a vessel and the nature of its activity.

The United States Government has noted with interest the several references which the Ministry has made to the well established principle of freedom of the seas. The United States Government would like to hope that the Soviet Government might now begin to respect this freedom on the part of other nations, whether for ships or aircraft.

The United States Government has also noted the statement of the Soviet Government that it will be obliged "to take other measures which will be necessary to insure the safety of navigation of Soviet vessels in open seas." This cannot be interpreted other than as a reckless threat of aggressive action against United States aircraft proceeding on legitimate flights over international waters. This threat resembles other recent Soviet statements and actions. The United States Government cannot accept this threat. It will continue to exercise all the rights on and over international waters to which it is entitled under international law and practice.

SOVIET MEMORANDUM OF JULY 13²

Unofficial translation

The U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs on instructions of the Soviet Government deems it necessary to announce the following.

The Soviet Government has in the past repeatedly made representations to the U.S. Government in connection with inadmissible actions committed by the United States with respect to the Soviet Union which have found expression in the systematic buzzing of Soviet ships on the high seas by American military aircraft. In its representations the Soviet Government has indicated that such actions by American aircraft not only create danger to life and violate freedom of passage on the high seas but also represent in themselves flagrant violation of generally accepted rules of international law.

According to data available to the Soviet Government aircraft of the American Air Force continue systemati-

cally to buzz Soviet freighters and fishing vessels in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans as well as in the Mediterranean and other seas. Actions of this type are also committed by U.S. military aircraft with respect to Soviet research vessels of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences which, in accordance with international programs, are conducting scientific work in various regions of the earth's oceans and which are of universal interest.

Buzzing of Soviet vessels is as a rule carried out by American aircraft at a low level, dangerously close to the vessels and not infrequently is accompanied by dives at vessels imitating a bombing or torpedo run, dropping in the immediate vicinity of the vessels of various moving objects and incendiary materials, and also by other inadmissible actions.

As examples, the following cases of the buzzing of Soviet vessels by American aircraft may be cited.

May 4, 1960, at 1800 in the Norwegian sea at coordinates 69-36 N, 13-13 E, American military aircraft LX 135574 buzzed the icebreaker *Kapitan Voronin* and dropped unknown objects on parachutes which fell astern of the icebreaker.

May 7, 1960, aircraft number 128408 of the U.S. Navy in the Sea of Japan buzzed several times at a low level the Soviet vessels *Volga*, *Kildin*, *Yaroslavl*, and *Zaraisk*. May 15, 1960, at coordinates 36-12 N, 63-14 W, an American two-motored military amphibious aircraft number 13418 buzzed the motorship *G. Vakutenchuk* at altitude 30-50 meters and took photographs of the vessel.

May 23, 1960, at 1330 in the Mediterranean Sea, coordinates 39-25 N, 15-08 E, an aircraft of the U.S. Navy with the inscription on the fuselage "803 U.S. Navy Forrestal" and the number on the tail 2567 dived at the Soviet motorship *Ochakov* eight times, flying over it at a low level of 20-30 meters. At 1500 another American military aircraft with the inscription on the fuselage "702 U.S. Navy Forrestal" began to buzz the motorship *Ochakov* at a low level and twice dropped objects which moved through the waters in the direction of the vessel and, cutting the water, ran astern of the motorship.

May 31, 1960, at 1606 in the region of the Strait of Gibraltar an American naval aircraft number 128407 flew four times over the tanker *Kakhorka* at an altitude of 30 to 40 meters. June 2, 1960, in this same region the same aircraft buzzed the tanker *Poti* at an altitude of 25 to 30 meters. Subsequently at 1630 another American aircraft number 131516 buzzed the tanker *Poti* three times at an altitude of 20 meters and made photographs of the vessel.

June 24, 1960, at 1800 in the Atlantic Ocean an amphibious aircraft of the U.S. Navy buzzed the scientific research vessel *Lomonosov*. In connection with the fact that the vessel was towing aerial balloons with instruments on a line, grave danger of accident was created both for the vessel and for the aircraft which was carrying out the buzzing.

The buzzing of Soviet vessels, as well as, according to available data, vessels of a number of other countries by aircraft of U.S. military aviation in the open sea creates obstacles to normal shipping on international sea lanes, represents a direct threat to safety of navigation, and may lead to grave accidents and loss of vessels and personnel. In the course of five months in 1960 more

² Delivered to Edward L. Freers, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, at Moscow on July 13 by Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs.

than 250 buzzings of Soviet vessels were carried out in the open sea by U.S. military aircraft. Such activities by the United States undermine the well-established principle of freedom of navigation in the open sea, confirmed by a number of international agreements and, in particular, by the Geneva Convention on the Open Sea adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958,² to which the United States is a signatory.

These dates convincingly testify that the United States is conducting a premeditated policy directed toward the violation of the freedom of the high seas and which doubts the foundations of international law. The declarations of America's official representatives also testify to this. Thus, as was announced by the American press, the State Department in its declaration of May 31, 1960, admitted that U.S. aircraft buzz Soviet vessels in the open sea. While even earlier, the representative of the U.S. State Department White, appearing at a press conference, called the provocative flights of American aircraft over Soviet vessels in the open sea entirely precautionary measures to "secure the safety of the United States" and gave to understand that the U.S. State Department approves of such flights in all parts of the world.

Thereby the U.S. Government, as in cases of provocative flights of American military aircraft in the airspace of other states, attempts to justify the gross violation by American military aviation of the universally recognized principle of free navigation in the open sea with references to the interest of U.S. security. However, such references are entirely out of place and cannot lead anyone astray. Truly who could believe that Soviet merchant, fishing, and scientific research vessels engaged in peaceful activity represent a threat to U.S. security, especially if one takes into account that these vessels are subjected to buzzing in locations thousands of kilometers from U.S. shores?

One may ask, how would the U.S. Government react if Soviet military aircraft on the excuse of insuring the security of the Soviet Union or with other similar divine excuses carried out a similar kind of buzzing of American vessels in open seas and oceans including in the vicinity of the U.S. shore?

The policy of provocative actions toward Soviet vessels in the open sea conducted by the U.S. Government is incompatible with elementary norms of behavior of states in peacetime and contradicts the obligations undertaken by the United States in the U.N. Charter according to which states must live in peace and cooperate in the development of friendly relations among themselves.

Also, it is impossible to pass over in silence the circumstance that American military aircraft which carry out the buzzing of Soviet vessels in the open sea often conduct these activities from military air bases located in other countries. This shows once more that American military bases located on territories of other states are used by the U.S. Government to sharpen relations between states and to complicate the international situation.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to warn

that activities of U.S. military aviation conducted against Soviet vessels in the open sea create an abnormal situation in international waters fraught with serious complications. It cannot view the buzzing of Soviet vessels as other than premeditated provocative actions directed toward the detriment of normal relations between states. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that such buzzing of Soviet vessels as well as recent gross violations by American aircraft of the borders of the Soviet Union represent links in a chain of a calculated policy of violation of the sovereignty of the Soviet Union, a policy directed toward the intensification of international tension.

The U.S.S.R. Government protests to the U.S. Government in connection with the provocative buzzing by American aircraft of Soviet vessels and demands immediate cessation. If the aforementioned impermissible actions of American aviation continue, the Soviet Government will be obliged to take other measures which will be necessary to insure the safety of navigation of Soviet vessels in open seas.

JULY 13, 1960.

U.S. Requests Immediate Departure of Soviet Diplomat

Press release 411 dated July 22

The Department of State on July 22 requested the immediate departure from the United States of Petr Y. Ezhov, a Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy at Washington. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Richard H. Davis, informed the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, Mikhail N. Smirnovsky, that Ezhov had flagrantly abused his diplomatic status by engaging in espionage activity.

Ezhov paid a commercial photographer in the United States more than a thousand dollars for intelligence information, which included aerial photographs of American cities. Soviet personnel in this country were explicitly forbidden to procure such aerial photographs in a note delivered to the Soviet Embassy on January 19, 1955.¹ Ezhov also instructed the photographer to take flying lessons, paid for them upon completion, and indicated that the Soviet authorities might purchase an airplane for him in order to have him carry out systematic aerial reconnaissance photography. Ezhov also financed trips by this individual in the course of which he took photographs of U.S. Navy installations and other intelligence targets, later furnishing these photographs to Ezhov and being paid for them.

² For text of the Convention on the High Seas, see BULLETIN of June 30, 1958, p. 1115.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 31, 1955, p. 198.

Under Secretary Dillon Makes Official Visit to Austria

Under Secretary Dillon made an official visit at Vienna, Austria, July 14-17. Following are the texts of an address he made before the Austrian Society for Foreign Policy and International Relations on July 15 and a joint communique released on July 16.

ADDRESS BY MR. DILLON

Press release 394 dated July 15

I am delighted to meet here today with the members and guests of this distinguished society. You must know that we Americans have a very warm place in our hearts for the Austrian people. We admire the vigor and industry which have marked the resurgence of Austria as a free and independent nation. We rejoice at your renewed prosperity. We respect your special position of neutrality, and we fully recognize that Austria is well able to make her own interpretation of neutrality without assistance from the outside.

Like you, we value individual liberty and freedom of thought above all else.

Like you, we do not erect barbed wire barriers on our frontiers to keep our people imprisoned and isolated from their brothers in the rest of the world.

Like you, we seek instead to improve international understanding by facilitating the free flow of men and ideas across national boundaries.

Like you, we do not seek to bend other peoples to our will nor do we attempt to subvert their institutions and undermine their liberties.

Like you, we do not believe that international relations should be conducted by intemperate threats or that negotiations between nations should be reduced to the level of street brawls.

Like you, we treasure hospitality as a quality too precious to be abused.

Like you, we seek a world made bright by justice for all—a world of expanding opportunities for every human being to pursue his legitimate aspirations in peace and freedom.

In our mutual pursuit of this goal, we have witnessed over the last 10 years a series of sweeping changes which have opened a whole new vista of opportunities. At the same time these changes present us with new problems which may be ignored only at our peril.

Symbolic of this new era is the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose headquarters I visited this afternoon. Since the creation of the Agency in 1957 as a direct result of an initiative by President Eisenhower, the United States has consistently supported the greatest possible use and development of the Agency. The Austrian Government, which has extended its warm hospitality to this new institution, deserves much credit for its successful launching.

Foremost among the great developments in the free world during the past decade has been the recovery of Western Europe. It will forever be a tribute to the vitality and energy of the free peoples of Europe that recovery proceeded so rapidly and so successfully. It was made possible by their manifest will to cooperate for the common good. As an American I am, of course, proud of the role played by the Marshall plan, which enlisted the combined resources and skills of Western Europe and the United States to achieve unprecedented results.

The last 10 years have also seen tremendous changes sweep a large part of the world inhabited by well over a billion human beings. All but a tiny fraction of this great multitude are desperately searching for a better lot than has been theirs over the centuries. Thanks to modern communications and transportation, these people no longer live in remote isolation, unaware of the

world about them. They now know that there is a better life. Having obtained political freedom, they are now demanding a larger share in the fruits of modern man's ingenuity, which has increased living standards in the industrialized Western nations to unprecedented heights. They look to us, their more fortunate brethren of the free world, to help them make an adequate start toward the economic growth that is needed to lift them to a level befitting man's inherent dignity.

There can be no question that the sweeping changes which dominated the fifties are creating wholly new situations for the sixties. We of the United States are convinced that the free world can successfully meet these new situations as they arise if we exert the same energy that served us so well in the past and in the same spirit of cooperation.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Last January it was my privilege to suggest in Paris that the time had come for us to adjust the pattern of cooperation so successfully begun in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation so as to better meet present-day problems.¹ The 18 member governments of the OEEC, as well as Canada and the United States—who have been associated with it since the beginning—agreed to examine how we could best adapt past experiences to meeting the challenges of the future. You are, of course, familiar with the work now under way to draft a charter reconstituting the OEEC as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Now, you may very well ask: What do we of the United States believe should be the main purposes of the new cooperative venture, in which my Government is prepared to participate as a full member?

We view it primarily as a mechanism by which member countries can collaborate and promote healthy economic growth both at home and throughout the free world.

Our economies have become increasingly interdependent. Moreover, economic conditions in Western Europe and North America profoundly affect the course of the world economy. Through the new OECD our countries will be able to dis-

uss broad economic policies designed to promote our own well-being and that of the rest of the free world. We feel that our future economic cooperation should be directed toward achieving the highest sustainable economic growth. For, in addition to obvious benefits for member nations, accelerated growth will make it easier to allocate the resources needed by the developing areas and to provide expanding and stable markets for the products of these countries.

I should like to emphasize that we in the United States believe that it is imperative for the industrialized nations of the free world to collaborate much more effectively than in the past so as to fully mobilize their ever-growing resources to meet the needs of their less privileged sister countries.

We believe that the OECD, in addition to promoting growth in its member countries, should actively encourage and stimulate the progress of the less developed countries throughout the free world. The OECD should, in particular, foster consultation among those member nations able to provide a significant flow of long-term development funds. It should serve as a focal point for increasing the magnitude and improving the quality of development assistance to needy areas. We should welcome the establishment of a permanent Development Assistance Committee in the OECD to take over the basic functions and characteristics of the existing Development Assistance Group, which was set up on an interim basis last January.

These two major tasks—promoting world economic growth and stability and assisting countries in the process of development—are the guideposts for constructive cooperation through the OECD in the years ahead.

It has also been proposed that the OECD should play a significant role in the field of international trade. We would agree that trade, as a vital element in international economic life, will necessarily be discussed in the OECD and that for this purpose a trade committee should be established within the Organization. We also agree that the OECD is the right place for discussing relationships between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association. Moreover, we envisage that the OECD would provide a means for confrontation of the general trade policies and practices of member

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1960, p. 139.

countries having in mind the need for maintaining a system of multilateral trade, enabling member countries to exchange goods and services freely with each other and other countries.

But we feel strongly that it would be a grave mistake to try to duplicate within the OECD trade functions that are presently being handled elsewhere. The free countries have created a successful institution for multilateral trade in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Here both the industrialized and the newly developing countries meet to discuss and work out trade problems under common rules designed to further non-discriminatory, multilateral trade. It is essential that GATT remain master in its own house, that its important work not be duplicated, or its committee jeopardized, by the activities of the OECD.

The attainment of political cohesion and sound economic growth and stability in Western Europe is essential to the prosperity of the entire free world. Accordingly we have for many years supported, and continue to support, the objectives of the European Economic Community. More recently we have also actively endorsed the establishment of the seven-nation European Free Trade Association. We did so at the last meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Geneva.² We hope this will dispel the myth that our longstanding support for the six-nation European Economic Community in any way implies opposition to the European Free Trade Association.

The United States is fully aware that the implementation of the Rome Treaty and the European Free Trade Association will affect trade relations between the two groups, as well as trade with countries outside both areas. We have always felt that it is of the greatest importance to all the trading nations of the world that the regional economic groups developing in Europe should adopt liberal trade policies toward non-liberal countries.

The action taken by the Common Market countries in extending on a most-favored-nation basis the first 10 percent reduction in internal tariffs on January 1, 1959, was therefore welcomed by the United States. The declared intention of the six governments to eventually reduce their common external tariff by 20 percent is also indicative to us

of a sincere desire on the part of the European Economic Community to be liberal in its trade policies.

Meanwhile there are immediate problems of adjustment which are arising as the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association begin to take effect. A Trade Committee, consisting of the 20 governments participating in the OEEC and the Commission of the EEC, has been given the task of working out solutions to some of these immediate problems of adjustment of particular importance to the trade of the Six and the Seven. We have strongly favored negotiations on specific commodities as the most realistic and most promising means of solving these problems. We were happy to learn that these negotiations will in all probability take place as part of the forthcoming reciprocal trade negotiations between all the contracting parties of the GATT. We will do all we can to further their success.

Meeting the Needs of Newly Developing Areas

But concentration on immediate trade problems must not cause us to neglect the vast difficulties facing the newly developing areas of the free world, where the struggle is often not merely for better living conditions but for survival itself. We all realize that the main effort must come from the newly developing countries themselves. Nevertheless, external assistance and contacts can help to stimulate their efforts and to promote their success. This is a subject on which we Americans can speak with genuine feeling. For we remember that our own successful drive to build a strong nation in the 19th century owed a very great deal to European influence, example, and investment.

In summoning forth our energies, we must recognize that the needs we face are broadly of two kinds: First, the emerging countries' need for what might be called nonfinancial components of progress—skills, training, institutions. In addition to bilateral programs, this is an area in which the United Nations is making a unique contribution. Their second need is for financial assistance—the additions to their own resources which spell the difference between success or failure.

When we reflect upon their needs for capital, we cannot help but regret the tremendous economic waste represented by the funds tied up in today's armaments race. You will recall that

² *Ibid.*, June 13, 1960, p. 975.

President Eisenhower underscored this waste 7 years ago, when he pledged the United States to make available for development a substantial part of any savings which could be realized through disarmament.³

Since then many other world leaders from both East and West have echoed his words.

Since then the United States has made every possible effort to reach an agreement on honest and controlled disarmament. We had hoped that the leaders of all other nations were equally interested. We were deeply disappointed when the disarmament discussions at Geneva were abruptly broken off, without any opportunity even to discuss the new American plan.⁴

We hope that the disarmament discussions will be resumed as quickly as possible. All peoples who earnestly seek peace and a relaxation of international tensions await their resumption.

Despite the regrettable lack of progress in the field of disarmament, much is being done by the more advanced free-world countries to meet development needs. I do not have to remind you of the work of the United Nations, nor of the World Bank and Fund, whose resources have recently been heavily increased. Several new international development institutions have also been recently launched, including the United Nations Special Fund, the new Inter-American Development Bank, and the proposed International Development Association. The United States has recently established a Development Loan Fund, and other free countries are devoting increased resources to the development task.

I hope that the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program, its new open program for providing trained administrators to less developed nations, and its Special Fund for creating the preconditions for development, can be enlarged. My own country is committed to meet on a matching basis a substantial share of their total cost. We have offered to further increase our contribution as other nations increase theirs.

Here I cannot but express regret over the fact that, despite the needs of the developing countries, certain large nations with the undoubted capacity to contribute more to development have so far refused to assume their fair share of this outstanding United Nations task.

³ *Ibid.*, Apr. 27, 1953, p. 599.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

Their unwillingness to respond adequately to the needs of the United Nations in this crucial field stands in sharp contrast to their loudly and persistently proclaimed concern for the welfare of the earth's underprivileged—particularly when they couple the avowed concern with frequent boasts of ever-increasing economic strength.

Fortunately the nations of the free world stand ready to do their share in this and other tasks associated with meeting the greatest challenge of our time: the pressing need to help more than a billion human beings enter the 20th century.

It is a challenge that reaches into the four corners of the earth and extends well into the future. Our response cannot take the form of a single course of action, neatly laid out, nor can it be a massive effort compressed into a few years, as was the case with the Marshall plan. The needs are too varied and extend too far into the future. To meet them we must take many separate and continuing actions which constitute a single program only in that they are linked by a common purpose and concerted effectively with each other.

Make no mistake, the challenge is too huge to be met by government alone. A truly effective response must reflect the energy and dedication of all elements of our societies. But if we all exert ourselves to the full, the challenge can and will be met. I have confidence in the outcome because I have confidence in the vitality of our free societies and of the basic values which they share.

Our goal is a world in which peace will prevail—not the peace of the tomb or of the prison, but a peace based upon recognition by all peoples of the right of their brothers to equality of opportunity, to a just share in the bounty of providence, and to respect as free men.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, JULY 16

The Under Secretary of State of the United States, Douglas Dillon, made an official visit in Vienna from July 14 to 17, 1960. During his stay he was received by Federal Chancellor Ing. Julius Raab and Vice Chancellor Dr. Bruno Pittermann.

Mr. Dillon had a thorough exchange of views with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Bruno Kriesky, and the State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Dr. Franz Gschntzer, during which questions of bilateral interest be-

tween the United States and Austria were discussed. In addition, there was a useful exchange of views on the international situation, during which special attention was given to the present state of East-West relations. The representatives of both Governments expressed the conviction that every effort must be made to solve existing international differences through peaceful means.

In addition, there were detailed conversations, joined in by the Federal Minister of Trade and Reconstruction, Dr. Fritz Bock, covering the problems of economic cooperation now being discussed in the Committee of Twenty-one at Paris, as well as problems arising from the relations between the two countries under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Ministers stressed the necessity of an early satisfactory solution of the problems being dealt with by the Committee of Twenty-one and the GATT, and the importance of continued efforts toward the goal of successful cooperation between the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association.

The talks, which were held in a most cordial atmosphere, showed that on the part of the United States there is full understanding of Austria's international situation.

Captive Nations Week, 1960

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS many nations throughout the world have been made captive by the imperialistic and aggressive policies of Soviet communism; and

WHEREAS the peoples of the Soviet-dominated nations have been deprived of their national independence and their individual liberties; and

WHEREAS the citizens of the United States are linked by bonds of family and principle to those who love freedom and justice on every continent; and

WHEREAS it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the peoples of the captive nations the support of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations for freedom and national independence; and

WHEREAS by a joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212), the Congress has authorized and requested the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation designating the third week in July 1959 as "Captive Nations Week," and to issue a similar proclamation each year until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world:

¹ No. 2357; 25 *Fed. Reg.* 6945.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 17, 1960, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe such week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to study the plight of the Soviet-dominated nations and to recommit themselves to the support of the just aspirations of the peoples of those captive nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eighteenth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-fifth.

By the President:
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State.

President Approves New Immigration Bill

Statement by President Eisenhower

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 14

I have today [July 14] approved H.J. Res. 397, "To enable the United States to participate in the resettlement of certain refugees, and for other purposes,"¹ because of its general merit and the urgent need to accomplish the purposes of the measure. Under this provision the special authority of the Attorney General to parole into the United States certain refugees could be terminated upon the adoption of a simple resolution to that effect by either House of Congress. The Attorney General has advised me that there is a serious question as to whether this provision is constitutional. Nevertheless, in view of the short period for which this power is given² and the improbability that the issue will arise, it is believed that it would be better to defer a determination of the effect of such possible action until it is taken.

¹ Public Law 86-648; 74 Stat. 504.

² P.L. 86-648 states that the Attorney General shall discontinue paroling refugee-escapees on July 1, 1962.

World Bank Borrows \$240 Million From German Central Bank

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced on July 12 that it has arranged to borrow the equivalent of approximately \$240 million in U.S. dollars and deutsche marks from the Deutsche Bundesbank (the Central Bank of Germany). This is not only the largest borrowing ever undertaken by the World Bank outside the United States but is its largest borrowing anywhere since its issue of \$250 million of bonds in the United States in the summer of 1947. The new debt will carry interest at the rate of 4½ percent per annum and will have a final maturity of 12 years.

In announcing the transaction Eugene R. Black, President of the World Bank, said:

The willingness of Germany to lend this large amount to the World Bank is striking testimony to the desire of Germany to assist in the economic advancement of the underdeveloped areas of the world. It also gives evidence of the energy and resourcefulness of the German people. The World Bank greatly appreciates the action taken by the officials in the Bundesbank and in the Government to make this transaction possible.

In the past 3 years Germany has been the major source of funds borrowed by the World Bank, supplying more than half the approximately \$1.3 billion of net funds borrowed in that period. Giving full effect to the transaction announced on July 12, it is estimated that about 60 percent of the funded debt of the World Bank is held outside the United States, by investors in more than 40 countries.

This is the 12th direct borrowing transaction between the Bundesbank and the World Bank and raises the net total of such operations to the equivalent of almost \$600 million. It is also the longest borrowing by the World Bank from the Bundesbank; all previous transactions were for terms of 3 years or less. In addition to these transactions the Bundesbank has purchased more than \$40 million of regular issues of World Bank bonds.

Apart from its transactions with the Bundesbank, the World Bank borrowed 200 million deutsche marks (\$47 million) in Germany by the sale in 1959 of a long-term issue to the German public. Moreover, German financial institutions have purchased more than \$13 million of parts of loans out of the Bank's portfolio.

The present borrowing consists of two *tranches*. One *tranche* is U.S. \$120 million, and the other *tranche* is DM 500 million (about \$120 million). Each *tranche* has a final maturity of 12 years and will be retired in 10 equal semiannual installments beginning in the 8th year. Another interesting feature of this borrowing is that the World Bank has a year in which to draw down the funds. Until the funds are drawn the Bank will pay a standby commission of three-fourths of 1 percent. Interest at the rate of 4½ percent per annum will accrue from the dates funds are drawn.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 2d Session

- U.S. Participation in the Resettlement of Certain Refugees. Report to accompany H.R. Res. 397. S. Rept. 1651. June 22, 1959. 39 pp.
- The Antarctic Treaty. Report to accompany Ex. B, 86th Congress, 2d session. S. Ex. Rept. 10. June 23, 1960. 6 pp.
- Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property. Report to accompany Ex. D, 86th Congress, 2d session. S. Ex. Rept. 11. June 23, 1960. 5 pp.
- U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 170. H. Rept. 1957. June 23, 1960. 3 pp.
- Amistad Dam and Reservoir. Report to accompany H.R. 12263. S. Rept. 1670. June 23, 1960. 9 pp.
- Century 21 Exposition. Report to accompany S. 3552. H. Rept. 1977. June 24, 1960. 1 p.
- Providing for Promotion of Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 1157. S. Rept. 1738. June 24, 1960. 6 pp.
- Treaty of Friendship and Commerce With Pakistan and the Convention of Establishment With France. Report to accompany Ex. F and G, 86th Congress, 2d session. S. Ex. Rept. 12. June 27, 1960. 7 pp.
- Philippine War Damage Claims. Report to accompany H.R. 12078. H. Rept. 2014. June 27, 1960. 25 pp.
- Intelligence and National Security. Report of the Senate Government Operations Committee made by its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. S. Rept. 1750. June 27, 1960. 2 pp.
- Events Relating to the Summit Conference. Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, together with individual views. S. Rept. 1761. June 28, 1960. 36 pp.
- Centennial Anniversary of the Unity of Italy. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 225. S. Rept. 1762. June 28, 1960. 3 pp.
- Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1961. Conference report to accompany H.R. 11998. H. Rept. 2040. June 29, 1960. 11 pp.
- Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Report of the Senate Armed Services Committee made by a subcommittee reviewing for the period December 1, 1958-November 30, 1959, the operation of article VII of the agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, together with the other criminal jurisdictional arrangements throughout the world. S. Rept. 1774. June 29, 1960. 15 pp.

Security Council Calls for Cooperation of All States in Resolving Situation in Republic of the Congo

The Security Council continued its consideration of the situation in the Republic of the Congo July 20-21.¹ Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge on July 20, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on July 21.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR LODGE

U.S./U.N. press release 7443

The United States welcomes the report² of the Secretary-General and subsequent statements, all of which point to the real progress being made by the United Nations in carrying out the resolution adopted by the Security Council on July 13. We congratulate the Secretary-General and his staff, including Dr. [Ralph] Bunche [U.N. Under Secretary], who have worked tirelessly in bringing about the reassuring presence of the United Nations on the troubled soil of the Congo.

The report of the Secretary-General is a message of hope for all mankind, a message that tells us that calm and quiet and order will come to the Congo soon. The danger has not disappeared, but it has receded. With the continued efforts of the Secretary-General and others, with more and more United Nations troops on the ground, we can look forward hopefully to the early restoration of public order.

Now here, Mr. President, are some basic facts.

First, the United Nations has moved quickly and effectively and, I might say, decisively. Many

nations and countless individuals have contributed to the success of this operation.

In the forefront of the United Nations effort is the quick and ready response of African states whose armed contingents are already in the Congo helping to restore public order there. These men, far from their native countries and climates, are in the Congo on behalf of all of us—the entire United Nations. 3,500 United Nations troops are already in the Congo—460 troops from Ethiopia, 770 from Ghana, 1,250 from Morocco, and 1,020 from Tunisia. An additional 500 Ghanaian troops were airlifted today [July 20], as were approximately 635 men of the Swedish battalion in the United Nations Emergency Force in Palestine. About 700 men from Guinea will be airlifted starting on Friday [July 22]. Commitments have been made to airlift other battalions of African troops to Léopoldville over the next few days. These include an additional 1,250 Moroccans, 1,000 Tunisians, and 600 Ghanaians. Soon these men will be joined by other troops and police units from other states—African and non-African. We hope that in a few days the United Nations Force will reach a strength close to 10,000 men.

The United Nations has also moved rapidly on the food front. Contributions have been pledged by a number of countries. Hundreds of tons of flour and other foodstuffs have already arrived in the Congo to help alleviate a threatened food shortage. Other United Nations members are expected to provide needed assistance in other ways.

Clearly, Mr. President, this is a collective effort on the part of the United Nations.

The United States has been happy to help in the field of transport and communications. We have responded quickly to the request of the Secretary-General. The United States Air Force has flown

¹ For statements made by Ambassador Lodge and text of a resolution adopted by the Council July 13, during consideration of the situation in the Republic of the Congo, see BULLETIN of AUG. 1, 1960, p. 159.

² U.N. doc. S/4389 and Add. 1, 2, and 3.

U.S. Sends Flour to Léopoldville

*Statement by James C. Hagerty
Press Secretary to the President*

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 14

In response to an urgent appeal to the United States Government from Secretary-General Hammarskjöld of the United Nations for food supplies for Léopoldville, the President has approved the United States Government flying into Léopoldville 300 tons of flour from stocks available to it in Europe. This food, which will be provided as a gift, will be consigned to Dr. Ralph Bunche as representative of the United Nations in Léopoldville, and he will arrange with the Congolese authorities for its distribution.

many thousands of miles. It has airlifted most of the troops which are now in the Congo. It has carried great quantities of tons of food and equipment. We are providing at the request of the Secretary-General needed equipment and other logistic support to the United Nations. We will continue to respond to the requests of the Secretary-General since our objective is to do everything we can to make the United Nations effort a success. We therefore welcome the heartening announcement made by Dr. Bunche yesterday:

The United Nations is now in a position to guarantee that contingents of the United Nations Force, drawn from both European and African countries, will arrive this week in sufficient numbers to insure order and protect the entire population, European and African.

In the light of this rapid and impressive international effort, we believe the Government of the Republic of the Congo should feel protected and reassured. Problems remain for this young government, but surely the desire of the United Nations to assist and its ability to do so effectively has been made abundantly clear. The United Nations will not permit the Congo to founder, and we know perfectly well that once fear has been conquered it is possible to tackle the outstanding problems realistically and effectively.

Now, Mr. President, there is a second important fact to mention and this relates to the question of withdrawal of the Belgian forces.

We think we can understand the feelings of everyone concerned with this problem. We can understand the fears of the Congo leaders when troops of the former administering power re-

turned to the Congo. We can understand equally well the anxieties of the people and Government of Belgium and their feeling that they had to send urgent contingents to protect their nationals. Truly the atrocities committed are deplorable.

In my statement of July 13 I made clear that the United States interpreted the Security Council resolution of that date calling upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops as being contingent upon the successful carrying out of the resolution by the United Nations.

The Belgian representative stated in the Security Council early last Thursday [July 14] morning that Belgian troops will be withdrawing when security has been restored and properly assured by a responsible authority. On July 14 this declaration was confirmed in a letter presented by the Belgian Ambassador in Léopoldville to the Government of the Congo. According to this letter, which has been made public, Belgium commits itself to withdrawal of its troops when and where order is sufficiently restored by United Nations troops.

Moreover, we note the Secretary-General's report that: "... following the arrival of United Nations Forces, Belgian units amounting to one company and one platoon have left Léopoldville on 17 July 1960." We welcome further the agreement reached by the Belgian and United Nations representatives making it possible for the United Nations to take over full control of the Léopoldville area by Saturday.

Mr. President, it is regrettable to note tonight that the Soviet Union is evidently seeking to bring the cold war to the heart of Africa. Its demand tonight that the United States withdraw the few American technicians who are presently in Léopoldville with the approval of the United Nations is clearly another effort by the Soviet Union to obstruct the United Nations effort to restore order in Léopoldville. All the world knows, except apparently the Soviet Union and others who are like-minded, that the small group of American service personnel in Léopoldville are there in connection with the specific request of the United Nations to provide transport, communications, and food. They will stay there only as long as they are needed to support the United Nations efforts in the Congo.

In the sense in which the word is customarily used here in the United Nations, they are not troops at all. When we were invited to send

United States troops to the Congo last week, we declined politely and quickly and, instead, turned to the United Nations. Really I do not think petty things like that are worth taking up the time of the Security Council.

There have been reports that the Soviet Union might intervene in the Congo directly with troops, and before I yield the floor I would just like to say a word about that. The position of the United States Government on this point is unequivocally clear for itself and for others. Despite, as I have said, an official request from the Congo some days ago for United States troops, we insisted that all American help be channeled through the United Nations.

The United Nations effort, we think, offers the best way of restoring order and making possible a phased and speedy withdrawal of Belgian forces. Obviously no troops should be introduced into the Congo other than those requested by the

Summary of U.S. Support to U.N. Program for Military Assistance to the Congo

Press release 413 dated July 23

As of 11:00 a.m., e.d.t., July 22, 1960, there were 5,239 U.N. forces in the Congo. Of this total 3,272 men and more than 300 tons of equipment had been lifted by U.S. aircraft at the request of the United Nations. The units making up this total are as follows:

- 22 members of Gen. Carl von Horn's party
- 1,673 Tunisians and 50 tons equipment
- 900 Moroccans and 25 tons equipment
- 642 Ghanaians and 35 tons equipment
- 635 Swedes and 110 tons equipment

The balance of 1,967 troops have been lifted to Léopoldville by Ethiopia (617), by the United Kingdom (approximately 850), and by the U.S.S.R. (approximately 500).

In addition to the airlift of troops the United States has flown to the Congo 400 tons of flour to relieve the serious food shortage facing urban Congolese, 25,000 C-rations for U.N. forces, 4,000 helmet liners, and 4 plane-loads of technicians and equipment for aircraft communications and maintenance.

There are presently under way, and not included in the above totals, airlifts in U.S. aircraft of the following units: 1,000 Tunisians, 1,550 Moroccans, and 600 Guineans. A total of 60 flights by C-124's and C-130's will be required to transport these men and their equipment.

Secretary-General pursuant to the Security Council resolution of July 13. The United States can accordingly be counted on to continue its vigorous support for the United Nations in the Congo. With other United Nations members we will do whatever may be necessary to prevent the intrusion of any military forces not requested by the United Nations. Such forces, if they were introduced, would not only be in defiance of the United Nations but would seriously jeopardize any effort to bring stability and order to the Congo.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The Security Council,

Having considered the first report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960 (document S/4389),

Appreciating the work of the Secretary-General and the support so readily and so speedily given to him by all Member States invited by him to give assistance,

Noting that as stated by the Secretary-General the arrival of the troops of the United Nations force in Léopoldville has already had a salutary effect,

Recognizing that an urgent need still exists to continue and to increase such efforts,

Considering that the complete restoration of law and order in the Republic of the Congo would effectively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recognizing that the Security Council recommended the admission of the Republic of the Congo to membership in the United Nations as a unit,

1. Calls upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960, on the withdrawal of their troops and authorizes the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect;

2. Requests all States to refrain from any action which might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and the exercise by the Government of Congo of its authority and also to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo;

3. Commends the Secretary-General for the prompt action he has taken to carry out resolution S/4387 of the Security Council and his first report;

4. Invites the specialized agencies of the United Nations to render to the Secretary-General such assistance as he may require;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report further to the Security Council as appropriate.

¹U.N. doc. S. 4405; adopted by the Council on July 21 (July 22 a.m.) by a vote of 11 to 0.

OAS Foreign Ministers To Consider Complaint by Venezuela

The Council of the Organization of American States met at Washington July 6 and 8 to consider a request of the Government of Venezuela that a meeting of the Organ of Consultation be convoked to take up its charge of aggression and intervention against the Government of the Dominican Republic. Following are two statements made before the Council by Ambassador John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative.

STATEMENT OF JULY 6

I have listened with the greatest attention to the speech of the Ambassador of Venezuela [Marcos Falcón-Briceño] in support of the request made by his Government that the Organ of Consultation be convoked under article 6 of the Rio Treaty to consider the charges of aggression and intervention by the Dominican Republic against the Government of Venezuela, culminating in the attempted assassination of the President of Venezuela [Romulo Betancourt] on July 24. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that this attempt, whatever its origin, is deplored and condemned by public opinion throughout the Americas.

Venezuela asks that these charges be considered and that the Organization of American States take the measures which it considers desirable in defense of the sovereignty of Venezuela and for the maintenance of peace and security of the continent.

I have also listened attentively to the statement made by the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic [Virgilio Díaz Ordóñez] in which he denies these charges.

My delegation believes that the charges brought by the Government of Venezuela call for serious consideration by the Organization of American States. The disturbed situation in the Caribbean has for more than a year created problems for all of the member states of the inter-American community. It is clear from the discussion here today, as well as from other evidence of public knowledge, that the situation continues to be disturbed and that the tensions which were the subject of consideration by the fifth meeting of Foreign Ministers in Santiago¹ have not been satisfac-

torily alleviated. On the contrary, in many respects they appear to be growing, and the case presented by Venezuela today is one evidence thereof.

My delegation looks forward to hearing from others and to giving further consideration to the views and information which are placed before the Council in regard to this matter. However, my Government is strongly of the belief that a positive attitude on behalf of the Organization of American States is essential in order to eliminate the interventionist tendencies that are evident and to restore conditions of international peace and security that will enable the American Republics to dedicate themselves more fully and effectively to the fundamental goals of economic and social progress under democratic institutions.

STATEMENT OF JULY 8

At the meeting of the Council on July 6 I stated that my Government was strongly of the belief that a positive attitude on behalf of the Organization of American States was essential in the face of the situation which has been brought to the attention of this body by the Government of Venezuela. The additional information which the representative of Venezuela submitted to the Council at that meeting has strengthened this conviction on behalf of my Government. It is evident that there are serious grounds for believing that the attempted assassination of the constitutionally and democratically elected Head of State of the Republic of Venezuela may have received stimulus and support from high authorities of another government. My Government, therefore, believes that the situation which we are considering at the request of Venezuela meets the requirements of article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and that the convocation of the Organ of Consultation under that treaty is called for.

The United States believes that this matter should be dealt with promptly and energetically by the Organization of American States. We favor the convocation of the Organ of Consultation at an early date and the immediate appointment by the Council, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, of a committee that will review the evidence and make a report on the basis of which the Foreign Ministers, meeting as

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

Organ of Consultation, will be able to take the decisions they consider desirable in order to fulfill the purposes of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro in conformity with the principles of the Organization of American States.²

OAS Calls Foreign Ministers Meeting To Consider Urgent Common Problems

Statement by Ambassador John C. Dreier³

The United States welcomes the initiative of the Government of Peru in requesting a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to consider broad problems of urgent and common concern to all the member governments of the Organization of American States. My delegation supports this proposal and is ready to vote for it at any time.

On July 8 the Council convoked a meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro to consider charges of aggression and intervention advanced by the Government of Venezuela. There are, in the opinion of my Government, other and very serious matters which also require the urgent consideration of the American governments at this time. These matters, although intimately related to specific situations in the Caribbean area, are such as to involve the fundamental principles of our regional system as suggested in the note⁴ submitted by the representative of Peru.

Outstanding among these matters is the growing evidence of the desire of the Soviet Union to intervene more directly in the affairs of this hemisphere. The threat of missile warfare made by Chairman Khrushchev on July 9 is but the most spectacular example of the effort of the Soviet Union to exert an increasing influence upon the relations of the American Republics.⁵

² The Council on July 8 by a vote of 19 to 0 agreed to convocate a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers and to appoint a committee to investigate the Venezuelan charges and report to the Foreign Ministers.

³ Made before the Council of the Organization of American States on July 16 (press release 399). Ambassador Dreier is U.S. Representative on the Council.

⁴ Not printed here.

⁵ For background, see BULLETIN of July 25, 1960, p. 139.

Likewise challenging to the inter-American system is the action of the Government of Cuba in taking charges against the Government of the United States directly to the United Nations Security Council,⁶ disregarding the provisions of article 2 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and article 20 of the charter of the Organization of American States, which obligate the member states to seek solutions through the regional organization. The United States would be glad to respond to the Cuban charges at the appropriate time.

In accordance with its well-known policy to support firmly the regional organization, which has on so many occasions demonstrated its usefulness and which has established a rule of law that is without parallel among a group of sovereign and independent nations, the United States fully endorses the thesis of the proposal made by Peru that a meeting of foreign ministers is at this time necessary and desirable to "preserve in full vigor the system created and maintained by the sovereign will of the community of American nations."⁷

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

Letter Dated 24 May 1960 From the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Secretary-General. S/4325. May 24, 1960. 7 pp.

Letter Dated 10 June 1960 From the Chairman of the Inter-American Peace Committee Addressed to the Secretary-General. S/4337. June 17, 1960. 27 pp.

Letter Dated 21 June 1960 From the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council. S/4341. June 21, 1960. 2 pp.

Letter Dated 21 June 1960 From the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council. S/4342. June 21, 1960. 5 pp.

Cable Dated 23 June 1960 From the President of the Federal Government of Mali Addressed to the Secretary-General Concerning U.N. Membership. S/4347. June 23, 1960. 1 p.

⁶ See p. 199.

⁷ The Council on July 18 by a vote of 21 to 0 agreed to convocate a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers "to consider exigencies of continental solidarity, and defense of the regional system and of American democratic principles in the face of threats that might affect them."

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

- Cable Dated 26 June 1960 From the President of the Malagasy Republic Addressed to the Secretary-General Concerning U.N. Membership. S/4352/Rev. 1. June 28, 1960. 1 p.
- Cable Dated 26 June 1960 From the President of the Republic of Madagascar Addressed to the Secretary-General Concerning U.N. Membership. S/4352. June 27, 1960. 1 p.
- Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Covering the Period From 6 August 1959 to 30 June 1960. S. 4380. July 12, 1960. 56 pp.
- Letter Dated 15 July 1960 From the Permanent Representative of the United States Addressed to the President of the Security Council Concerning Cuba. S/4388. July 15, 1960. 37 pp.
- First Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960. S/4389. July 18, 1960. 12 pp.; Add. 1, July 19, 1960, 1 p. Add. 2, July 19, 1960, 1 p. Add. 3, July 20, 1960, 1 p.

Trusteeship Council

- Camerouns Under United Kingdom Administration. Supplementary information regarding developments subsequent to the preparation of the Administering Authority's report for 1958 to the General Assembly. T/1527. May 11, 1960. 8 pp.
- Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of New Guinea for the Year Ended 30 June 1959. Observations of the World Health Organization. T/1528. May 12, 1960. 5 pp.
- Report of the Administering Authority on the Process of Separation of the Administration of the Northern Cameroons From That of Nigeria. T/1530. May 16, 1960. 12 pp.
- Dissemination of Information on the United Nations and the International Trusteeship System in Trust Territories. Report of the Secretary-General. T/1533. May 23, 1960. 15 pp.
- Date of Independence of the Trust Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration. Report of the Administering Authority to the Trusteeship Council on the measures taken by the Government of Somalia in relation to General Assembly resolution 1418 (XIV). T/1534. May 24, 1960. 15 pp. and annexes.
- Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, on Tanganyika. T/1532. May 26, 1960. 111 pp.; and Annexes, T/1532/Add. 1, May 26, 1960. 8 pp.
- Offers by Member States of Study and Training Facilities for Inhabitants of Trust Territories. Report of the Secretary-General. T/1535. May 27, 1960. 18 pp.
- Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960. Report on Ruanda-Urundi. T/1538. June 3, 1960. 191 pp.
- Revision of the Questionnaire Relating to Trust Territories. Tenth progress report of the Sub-Committee on the Questionnaire relating to Tanganyika. T/1539. June 6, 1960. 24 pp.
- Examination of the Annual Report on the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi for the Year 1958. Additional information supplied by the Administering Authority. T/1540. June 8, 1960. 38 pp.
- Examination of the Annual Reports on the Trust Territory of Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration for the Years 1958 and 1959. Observations of the World Health Organization. T/1541. June 9, 1960. 71 p.

U.S. and Poland Conclude Claims Agreement

The United States and Poland signed at Washington on July 16 an agreement relating to claims by U.S. nationals against Poland. Following is a Department announcement, the text of the agreement, and an accompanying letter.

Press release 395 dated July 16

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

An agreement relating to claims by American nationals against Poland was signed on July 16 at Washington by Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Stanislaw Raczkowski, Minister Plenipotentiary, Financial Counselor, Embassy of the Polish People's Republic at Washington. The negotiations which led to the signing of the agreement began at Warsaw March 2, 1959,¹ and have continued variously there and at Washington.

The claims covered in the agreement arose out of the nationalization, appropriation, or other taking by the Polish Government of the property of American nationals. These claims must have been owned by American nationals continuously from the time their property was taken.

The agreement provides for a lump-sum payment of \$40 million to be made in 20 annual installments of \$2 million each beginning January 10, 1961.

Assets of Polish nationals which have been blocked in the United States since World War II will be released from blocking controls pursuant to the agreement.

Adjudication of claims against Poland will be handled by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States. The Commission will announce the procedures for filing claims.

¹ BULLETIN of MAR. 16, 1959, p. 381.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT AND ANNEX

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC REGARDING CLAIMS OF NATIONALS OF THE UNITED STATES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Polish People's Republic desiring to effect a settlement of claims of nationals of the United States against Poland and desiring to advance economic relations between the two countries,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

A. The Government of the Polish People's Republic, hereinafter referred to as the Government of Poland, agrees to pay, and the Government of the United States agrees to accept, the sum of \$40,000,000.00 United States currency in full settlement and discharge of all claims of nationals of the United States, whether natural or juridical persons, against the Government of Poland on account of the nationalization and other taking by Poland of property and of rights and interests in and with respect to property, which occurred on or before the entry into force of this Agreement.

B. Payment of the sum of \$40,000,000.00 by the Government of Poland shall be made to the Secretary of State of the United States in twenty annual installments of \$2,000,000.00 United States currency, each installment to be paid on the tenth day of January, commencing on the tenth day of January 1961.

Article 2

Claims to which reference is made in Article 1 and which are settled and discharged by this Agreement are claims of nationals of the United States for

(a) the nationalization or other taking by Poland of property and of rights and interests in and with respect to property;

(b) the appropriation or the loss of use or enjoyment of property under Polish laws, decrees or other measures limiting or restricting rights and interests in and with respect to property, it being understood that, for the purpose of this clause, the date of appropriation or the loss of use or enjoyment is the date on which such Polish laws, decrees or other measures were first applied to the property; and

(c) debts owed by enterprises which have been nationalized or taken by Poland and debts which were a charge upon property which has been nationalized, appropriated or otherwise taken by Poland.

Article 3

The amount paid to the Government of the United States under Article 1 of this Agreement shall be distributed in such manner and in accordance with such methods of distribution as may be adopted by the Government of the United States.

Article 4

After the entry into force of this Agreement the Government of the United States will neither present to the

Government of Poland nor espouse claims of nationals of the United States against the Government of Poland to which reference is made in Article 1 of this Agreement. In the event that such claims are presented directly by nationals of the United States to the Government of Poland, the Government of Poland will refer them to the Government of the United States.

Article 5

A. With a view to assisting the Government of the United States in its distribution among claimants of the sum to be paid by the Government of Poland, the Government of the United States, upon the request of the Government of the United States, furnish such information or evidence, including details as to ownership and value of property and rights and interests in and with respect to property, as may be necessary or appropriate for that purpose and, in the event that such information or evidence is deemed insufficient, permit examination by representatives of the Government of the United States, to the extent allowed by Polish laws, of property which it is claimed has been nationalized or taken by Poland.

B. With a view to protecting the Government of Poland from the possible assertion through third countries, or otherwise, of claims settled by this Agreement, the Government of the United States will furnish to the Government of Poland copies of such formal statements of claims as may be made by claimants and copies of decisions with respect to the validity and amounts of claims.

C. With respect to each claim found to be valid by the Government of the United States, the Government of the United States will furnish to the Government of Poland original documents of title pertaining to the property nationalized or taken by Poland by which the claim was established, including securities of juridical persons owned by the claimant if all of the property of such juridical persons has been nationalized or taken by Poland. In the event that a claim is not based on such documents, the Government of the United States will furnish to the Government of Poland a release signed by the claimant.

D. Each Government will furnish to the other the information or render the assistance referred to in paragraphs A, B and C of this Article in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

Article 6

Within thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement, the Government of the United States will release its blocking controls over all Polish property in the United States.

Article 7

The Annex to this Agreement is an integral part of this Agreement.

Article 8

The present Agreement shall enter into force on the date of signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, in the English and Polish languages, both equally authentic, this 16th day of July, 1960.

For the Government of the United States of America :

FOY D. KOHLER

For the Government of the Polish People's Republic :

STANISLAW RACZKOWSKI

ANNEX

A. For the purpose of distribution by the Government of the United States of the sum to be paid by the Government of Poland, "claims of nationals of the United States" are rights and interests in and with respect to property nationalized, appropriated or otherwise taken by Poland which, from the date of such nationalization, appropriation or other taking to the date of entry into force of this Agreement, have been continuously owned, subject to the provisions of paragraphs B and C of this Annex.

(a) directly by natural persons who were nationals of the United States ;

(b) directly by juridical persons organized under the laws of the United States or of a constituent State or other political entity thereof, of which fifty percent or more of the outstanding capital stock or proprietary interest was owned by nationals of the United States ;

(c) directly by juridical persons organized under the laws of the United States or of a constituent State or other political entity thereof, of which fifty percent or more of the outstanding capital stock or proprietary interest was owned by natural persons who were nationals of the United States, directly, or indirectly through interests in one or more juridical persons of any nationality ;

(d) indirectly by natural persons who were nationals of the United States or by juridical persons organized under the laws of the United States or of a constituent State or other political entity thereof, through interests in juridical persons organized under the laws of the United States or of a constituent State or other political entity thereof which are not included within category (b) or (c) above ;

(e) indirectly by persons within category (a), (b) or (c) above through ownership of capital stock or direct proprietary interests in juridical persons organized under the laws of Poland, any part of whose property has been taken by Poland, or in juridical persons organized under the laws of Germany, a major part of whose property has been taken by Poland ;

(f) indirectly by persons within category (d) above through ownership by juridical persons to which reference is made in the last clause thereof, of capital stock or direct proprietary interests in juridical persons organized under the laws of Poland, any part of whose property has been taken by Poland or in juridical persons organized under the laws of Germany, a major part of whose property has been taken by Poland and which have ceased their activities ; or

(g) indirectly by persons within category (a), (b), (c) or (d) above through interests which collectively are substantial in amount, through any number of juridical

persons organized under the laws of any country, a substantial part of whose property has been taken by Poland, excepting, however, interests which are compensable through any other international agreement to which Poland is a party.

B. Juridical persons organized under the laws of the United States or of a constituent State or other political entity thereof which have been reorganized through judicial proceedings after their property or rights and interests in and with respect to property were nationalized or taken by Poland shall participate in the sum to be paid by the Government of Poland only to the extent that the outstanding capital stock or proprietary interest in such juridical persons was owned, at the time of such nationalization or other taking, by natural persons who were nationals of the United States, directly, or indirectly through interests in one or more juridical persons organized under the laws of the United States or of a constituent State or other political entity thereof.

C. Claims based in whole or in part on property acquired after the application of discriminatory German measures depriving or restricting rights of owners of such property shall participate in the sum to be paid by the Government of Poland only for the parts of such claims which are not based upon property acquired under such circumstances.

LETTER ON POLISH DOLLAR BONDS

JULY 16, 1960

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the discussions held during the negotiations concerning the Agreement signed today between the Governments of the Polish People's Republic and the United States of America regarding claims of nationals of the United States.

"In connection with the interest expressed by the Government of the United States of America in the settlement of outstanding dollar bonds, issued or guaranteed by the Polish Government in the United States during the period 1919 to 1939, I have the honor to inform you that the Polish Government confirms its intention to settle the problem of this bonded indebtedness by direct talks with American bondholders or their representatives.

"Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration."

I have the honor to inform you that my Government has taken note of the statement quoted above.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

FOY D. KOHLER
*Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs*

His Excellency
STANISLAW RACZKOWSKI,
*Minister Plenipotentiary,
Financial Counselor,
Embassy of the Polish People's Republic.*

Educational Exchange Agreement Signed by U.S. and Uruguay

Press release 412 dated July 23

The United States and Uruguay have agreed to establish an educational exchange program under the provisions of Public Law 584, 79th Congress, the Fulbright Act. The executive agreement resulted from an exchange of notes at Montevideo on July 23.

Under the terms of the agreement \$300,000 in Uruguayan currency belonging to the United States will be made available to finance educational exchanges between the two countries. It is anticipated that approximately \$100,000 will be expended annually under this program. The U.S. Government obtained the Uruguayan currency as the result of the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to Uruguay. It is expected that additional funds will be made available as needed to finance the program indefinitely.

The program will enable Uruguayan students, teachers, and professors to come to the United States to study, lecture, or carry out advanced research at institutions of learning. In exchange U.S. citizens will be able to carry out similar projects at schools in Uruguay. A binational board will be established in Uruguay to administer the program.

Uruguay is the eighth Latin American country to sign an educational exchange agreement with the United States. Such agreements are currently in force between the United States and 39 other countries.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.
Notifications of approval: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, May 24, 1960; Gambia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, June 1, 1960.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 13, 1955, as

amended (TIAS 3304, 3771, and 4271). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960.
Entered into force: July 14, 1960.

China

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 18, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3307 and 4176). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960.
Entered into force: July 15, 1960.

Haiti

Agreement for the loan of a U.S. Navy net tender to Haiti. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince July 8, 1960. Entered into force July 8, 1960.

Norway

Agreement relating to a shipbuilding program for the Norwegian Navy. Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo July 6, 1960. Entered into force July 6, 1960.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 27, 1955 (TIAS 3316). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960.
Entered into force: July 15, 1960.

Poland

Agreement, with annex, providing for settlement of certain claims of nationals of the United States against Poland, and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington July 16, 1960. Entered into force July 16, 1960.

Surplus agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Washington July 21, 1960. Entered into force July 21, 1960.

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodities agreements of June 7, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3839, 3878, 3973, and 4243), February 15, 1958, as amended (TIAS 3991, 4046, and 4243), and June 10, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4245, 4288, and 4415). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 21, 1960. Entered into force July 21, 1960.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 21, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3317 and 3899). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960.
Entered into force: July 19, 1960.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 16, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4351 and 4422). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon June 30, 1960. Entered into force June 30, 1960.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Recess Appointments

The President on July 21 appointed Christian M. Ravnald to be Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 405 dated July 21.)

The President on July 18 appointed Henry S. Villard to be Ambassador to the Federation of Mali. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 402 dated July 18.)

Designations

J. Robert Fluker as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary for Communist Economic Affairs, effective July 11.

William E. Riley as Director, U.S. Operations Mission, Chile, effective July 17. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 400 dated July 18.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

World Health Organization—Additional Regulations Amending Regulations No. 1 (1948). TIAS 4409. 15 pp. 10c.

Adopted by the Ninth World Health Assembly at Geneva May 21, 1956. Entered into force January 1, 1958.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Loan of Additional Vessel to the Republic of Korea. TIAS 4411. 2 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul October 22, 1959, and January 29, 1960. Entered into force January 29, 1960.

International Sanitary Regulations—Additional Regulations Amending Regulations No. 2—Certificate of Vaccination Against Smallpox. TIAS 4420. 5 pp. 5c.

Adopted by the Ninth World Health Assembly at Geneva May 23, 1956. Entered into force October 1, 1956.

Health and Sanitation—Cooperative Program in Brazil. TIAS 4424. 4 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Brazil, extending and supplementing agreements of January 7 and February 8, 1955, and March 14, 1942, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Signed at

Rio de Janeiro December 31, 1959. Entered into force December 31, 1959.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4426. 5 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Pakistan, supplementing agreement of November 26, 1958, as amended. Signed at Dacca January 28, 1960. Entered into force January 28, 1960. With exchange of notes.

Military Advisory Mission to Brazil. TIAS 4427. 3 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Brazil, amending agreement of July 29, 1948, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Rio de Janeiro June 9 and 17, 1959. Entered into force June 17, 1959.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 18-24

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to July 18 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 394 of July 15 and 395 and 399 of July 16.

No.	Date	Subject
*400	7/18	Riley designated director, USOM, Chile (biographic details).
401	7/18	Reply to Soviet note of July 15 on RB-47.
*402	7/18	Villard appointed Ambassador to Federation of Mali (biographic details).
†403	7/20	Statement on Soviet note concerning Polaris.
†404	7/21	P.L. 480 agreement with Poland.
*405	7/21	Ravndal appointed Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (biographic details).
406	7/21	Reply to Soviet note of July 13 on alleged buzzing of Soviet ships.
*407	7/21	Cultural exchange (Viet-Nam).
*408	7/21	Davis; Soviet allegations on presence of U.S. troops in Congo (combined with No. 410).
*409	7/21	Herter; situation in the Congo (combined with No. 410).
410	7/21	Herter; news conference.
411	7/22	Soviet diplomat declared <i>persona non grata</i> .
412	7/23	Agreement on exchange program with Uruguay.
413	7/23	Summary of U.S. support for U.N. military assistance to Congo.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLIII, No. 1103

August 15, 1960

SECURITY COUNCIL REJECTS SOVIET COMPLAINT AGAINST U.S. IN RB-47 INCIDENT; U.S.S.R. CASTS 88TH AND 89TH VETOES • *Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Texts of Resolutions* . 235

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THE
OFFICIAL
WEEKLY RECORD
OF
THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ON FOREIGN POLICY

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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August 15, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Security Council Rejects Soviet Complaint Against U.S. in RB-47 Incident; U.S.S.R. Casts 88th and 89th Vetoes

The U.N. Security Council convened on July 22 to begin consideration of a Soviet complaint concerning "new aggressive acts by the Air Force of the United States of America, creating a threat to universal peace." Following are statements made in the Council by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, together with the texts of a resolution proposed by the U.S.S.R., which was rejected by the Council July 26, and resolutions proposed by the United States and Italy, which were vetoed by the Soviet Union.

STATEMENT OF JULY 22

U.S./U.N. press release 3446

I shall not comment on the routine cold-war propaganda in the Soviet speech, to its references to Cuba, et cetera, et cetera, but I shall, indeed, comment on that part which relates to the United States plane RB-47.

I do not hesitate to say that it is an unconvincing though sinister fabrication. The truth is that at the time that the Soviet Union claims that our plane was brought down in Soviet waters, it was actually 50 miles off the Soviet coast. It was still in the air 20 minutes later on the high seas, 200 miles from the point alleged by the Soviet Union, and flying in a northeasterly direction. At no time during this flight was it closer than 30 miles to the Soviet coast. That is one truth.

The further truth is that it became the victim of an action by the Soviet Union, the details of which I shall give later, which can only be described as criminal and piratical.

Moreover, when Soviet activities of their own are considered, the speech today appears as a pretty revolting bit of hypocrisy.

I would also like to point out that in our note to the Soviet Government of July 13,¹ we called for the release of the two surviving members of the aircraft crew, First Lieutenant Freeman B. Olmstead of Elmira, New York, and First Lieutenant John R. McKone of Tonganoxie, Kansas.

We heard Mr. [Vasily V.] Kuznetsov's assertions earlier today of the Soviet Union's intention to prosecute these men with the full severity of Soviet law. Those are the words he used. I again appeal to the Soviet Union to release these men promptly. Until captured by the Soviet Union they had not entered the territory or the territorial waters of the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, that is all I care to say today. I do not wish to subject the Security Council to another night session after all the hard work which the Council has had to do on the Congo. There is a great deal more that I wish to say about this monstrous performance, and I ask, therefore, that I be recognized to make my presentation at the next session of the Council.

STATEMENT OF JULY 25

U.S./U.N. press release 3448

On July 1, 1960, an American plane of the type known as RB-47 was proceeding on a mission over the international waters of the Barents Sea. The mission involved flying northward from England over the high seas to a point 200 miles north of the nearest land mass. From there the plane flew east into the Barents Sea on a prescribed course which

¹For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 163; for a subsequent exchange of notes between the U.S. and Soviet Governments, see *ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1960, p. 209.

at no time was to bring it closer than 50 miles from Soviet territory.

The plane in question was on an electromagnetic observation flight. The route was over international waters at all times. The crew of the plane had every reason to enjoy safe and uncontested passage through international air space during this flight.

The only weapons the plane carried were two 20-millimeter tail guns to protect it from attack from the rear. It carried no offensive weapons of any kind.

As the world knows, this plane disappeared.

United States personnel who monitored this flight could pinpoint the precise location of this plane at 1522 Greenwich mean time—that is 3:22—even though the plane maintained radio silence. At that moment the plane was over international waters, as it had been throughout its flight, and was on its prescribed course approximately 200 miles northeast of the Kola Peninsula.

The plane became the object of widespread search, in which the Soviet Government appeared at first to be participating in good faith.

Ten days later, however, the Soviet Union proclaimed to the world that it had shot down the missing plane. At the same time the Soviet Union claimed that the aircraft had penetrated Soviet airspace and that the plane was engaged in a premeditated aggressive mission. The Soviet Government also accompanied its announcement with new threats of force and violence of a type with which the entire world has unfortunately become familiar in recent months.

This intentional delay of 10 days, as Chairman Khrushchev informed us, had the cynical purpose of "confusing" us. I quote his word "confusing."

These facts are clear and incontrovertible, and the Soviet Union knows that they are.

Precautions Taken To Avoid Soviet Territory

Now, Mr. President, this aircraft was equipped with the most modern and reliable systems for navigation, and the crew had had many years of experience in celestial and other forms of navigation, including electronic means. The crew would have had no reason whatever to depart from their prescribed course, on which they could perform their duties fully. Indeed they had every reason to stay away from Soviet territory and territorial waters. The plane was equipped with the most

sensitive available radar to tell them—with the degree of accuracy only possible through electronic means—how near they were to any land mass. Their instructions required them to rely on this radar for navigation. Further, they were instructed that before they got closer than 75 miles from Soviet territory and before they started on this portion of the prescribed course, they should make a special check to assure themselves that the radar was functioning properly and accurately.

Mr. President, these precautions—these elaborate precautions—were taken because the crew knew, as do so many of us, that the Soviet Union had in the past lured planes toward its frontier.

Course of the RB-47

This chart shows the planned course of the RB-47. Now let me show you in detail on this other map, which magnifies that particular part. Here is the magnification of that part that was in the other map.

The Soviet Government has stated—indeed it has boasted—in its memorandum to the Council² that the RB-47 entered Soviet territorial waters on July 1, 22 kilometers (12 miles) north of Cape Svyatoy Nos, indicated by the red star on this chart—that is the Soviet claim—and that the plane proceeded in the direction of Archangel and was shot down by a Soviet fighter over Soviet territorial waters to the east of Svyatoy Nos at 1503 GMT, that is 3 minutes past 3 GMT. That is the Soviet claim. So as to avoid confusion, I point out that there are two places called Svyatoy Nos—one is on the Kola Peninsula, the other about 200 miles east, beyond the Kanin Peninsula. When I use the term, I refer to Svyatoy Nos on the Kola Peninsula.

But the truth is that at 1503 hours GMT on July 1, 1960, the RB-47 was over international waters—50 miles northeast of Svyatoy Nos, not in territorial waters east of that cape, as alleged by the Soviet Government.

The Soviet allegation that the plane violated the Soviet national frontier at a point 22 kilometers (12 miles) north of Svyatoy Nos (at the red star), was moving "in the direction of the city of Archangel," and was shot down in Soviet territorial waters east of Svyatoy Nos, is a complete fabrication and must be dismissed as a poor at-

² U.N. doc. S/4385.

tempt to cloak a wanton attack on a plane which was over international waters.

The plane was never 12 miles north of Svyatoy Nos or in Soviet territorial waters east of Svyatoy Nos. I repeat: The plane was never in either of these places. At no time did it penetrate Soviet territory or even areas which have been claimed at one time or another as territorial waters or airspace of the Soviet Union, because they have made some claims that are in dispute. It has never even been in any of the claimed areas and never at any time was it proceeding "in the direction of the city of Archangel."

How the RB-47 Was Forced Off Course

The RB-47 did not fall at 1503 hours either in Soviet territorial waters, as the Soviet Union claims, or into the high seas 50 miles northeast of Svyatoy Nos, where it actually was at that moment. The plane was brought down by the Soviet Union neither at the place nor at the time which the Soviet Union claims. Now I hope the Council will listen very carefully.

What actually happened was this: Before the plane reached the point more than 50 miles north of Svyatoy Nos at which it was scheduled to take its turn to the northeast, a Soviet fighter pressed in from the seaward side and tried to force the plane off its course and into Soviet territory. That is what happened.

The Soviet fighter was successful in forcing our plane off its course and in delaying its planned turn to the northeast, but it was not successful in forcing the plane into the Soviet airspace. It caused our plane to make a detour. That detour is shown by the green line. The prescribed course is shown by the black line.

This astonishing and criminal fact is established beyond doubt by the evidence of our scientific devices, which followed the RB-47 through all the events which I have described.

It is noteworthy that the plane tried to get back on its prescribed northeasterly course and that it succeeded in doing so. In the process of its delayed turn and while flying away from Soviet territory, the RB-47 made its closest approach to Soviet territory. This is the closest it ever was to the territory of the Soviet Union and that was at a point 30 miles off the tip of the Kanin Peninsula—that is still far from Soviet territory.

Twenty minutes after the time that the Soviet

note says that the airplane was destroyed, it was 200 miles away from Svyatoy Nos, far from Soviet territorial waters. And we ask the Soviet Government: What did you do to this plane when it was at this point at 1522 hours? What did you do with it?

Let me dwell on these events for a moment. The approach of the Soviet fighter, which took place over international waters, was from the seaward side, from the ocean side. It prevented our plane from making its prescribed turn to the northeast, which means that it prevented a prescribed turn away from the Soviet coastal region. They apparently did not want it to go away from the Soviet coastal region, and they did not want it to go out toward the open waters of the Barents Sea. If the RB-47 had tried to make the prescribed turn on schedule, it would have had to turn toward the Soviet fighter—it had to turn right into it.

And note this well: If the RB-47 had turned toward the Soviet fighter, this turn might have been used as an excuse by the fighter pilot to open fire on the United States plane. The plane was therefore forced to overshoot its turning point.

Shortly afterward the Soviet fighter broke off from the RB-47, perhaps because it was running low on fuel.

Then finally the RB-47 was able to make a delayed turn—still, as I have shown, well outside Soviet airspace—to the northeast and to resume its prescribed course. Through the technical means which we have, we were able to follow these events in detail.

Now, Mr. President, only one conclusion can be drawn from this. The Soviet fighter was trying to force—to compel—the RB-47 to fly southward over Soviet territory. There it could have been shot down on land. But their attempt failed.

Speculation on Reasons for Soviet Distortions

Now, Mr. President, we wonder why the Soviets have presented so many distortions about this. Perhaps the Soviet Air Force was reluctant to admit to Chairman Khrushchev that the aircraft could not be shot down over Soviet airspace—for the very good reason that it was not there—and therefore the Soviet Air Force did not inform him of the facts. Perhaps they did not tell him that they had to go 200 miles from Cape Svyatoy Nos to follow the RB-47. Perhaps Chairman Khrush-

shchev has been lied to. That often happens in dictatorships. That is one possibility. There are others. We can all speculate.

Now, Mr. President, I wish to speak about the crew members of the RB-47. They are military personnel in the service of the United States. They were carrying out a legal flight over international waters. International law and custom demand that they must have the right to get in touch with the American mission in the country in which they are held. This right has not yet been honored by the Soviet Government. Nor has the Soviet Government seen fit to respond to the suggestion of the United States for an on-the-spot joint search for other missing crew members and the remains of the aircraft. What more flagrant disregard of the standards of international conduct could there be—and, Mr. President, what plainer admission of guilt? Because what reason would they have for denying the right of our men to get in touch with the American Embassy other than that they know that they are guilty? By “they” I mean the Soviet Union.

Appeal for Release of Crew Members

Last Friday I appealed to you here in the Council to release these men. I now make another appeal to the Soviet Government. By your own admission you are holding First Lieutenant John R. McKone of Tonganoxie, Kansas, and First Lieutenant Freeman B. Olmstead of Elmira, New York, from the crew of the RB-47, as prisoners. This is an illegal act and you have up to now ignored our appeals to release these men and any other survivors who may be in your hands. We ask you once again to release them and, if there should be any delay in their release, to admit representatives of the International Red Cross to reassure their families of their well-being.

We also ask you to tell us whatever you know about the men who are missing. Look into your hearts and ask yourselves what earthly point there can be in denying some reassurance to the wives and families of these men. The missing men about whom we ask you for information are: Captain Oscar L. Goforth of Sardis, Oklahoma, First Lieutenant Dean B. Phillips of Inwood, Long Island, New York, and Captain Eugene E. Posa of Santa Monica, California. We desperately want information about the welfare of those men.

I also wish to mention here another member of the crew, Captain Willard G. Palm of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, of whose death we know. I mention his name because he died a hero's death and his name belongs on the roll of honor which I have just cited.

Concern Over Soviet Threats

Mr. President, the Soviet Union has committed a predatory act in international waters. This is serious enough in itself. But the situation has been further aggravated by the subsequent allegations and pronouncements of the Soviet Government. It is thus pertinent to ask what is behind these lawless actions and these reckless statements emanating from the Kremlin and echoed here in the Council.

We know that the Soviet Union has brutally subjected thousands of square miles of land and millions of people to Soviet domination. But now, and not for the first time, it commits an act of piracy over the high seas.

You may be sure that the Government of the United States will resist any Soviet effort to extend its dominion over the high seas and that we will never condone piracy in any form, regardless of the smokescreen behind which this piracy may be carried out.

Many people in many countries are both mystified and concerned by the recent behavior of the Soviet Union, and they are asking whether the Soviet leaders are actually seeking a pretext for war. People are asking that. All of mankind has reason for concern about the repeated threats of the Soviet rulers to launch rockets anywhere in the world in support of Soviet ambitions. To us this marks a new turn in Soviet public statements, which I have followed closely for many years and which, although often abusive and intemperate in the past and, in accordance with standard Soviet policy, designed to create as much disorder in the world as possible, have not contained this kind of threat until recently.

It is not unnatural that we should find reason for concern about those who speak sweetly of peaceful coexistence and then in the same breath threaten to unleash a war which would certainly destroy most of human civilization, including the Soviet Union—a war which Mr. Khrushchev himself admitted on June 21 would be “incomparably more appalling” than the wars of the past.

We have reason for concern about those who make loud proclamations concerning the importance of disarmament and who simultaneously threaten to use the most terrible armaments in a reckless and tragic manner.

The world is well aware that the Soviet Union possesses rockets. So do we possess rockets. But the Soviet Union threatens to use them in order to bend peaceful nations to their will. We do not.

Now, Mr. President, nuclear war is too serious a matter to be made the subject of blustering threats or propaganda. If the Soviet Government has any genuine interest in the preservation of peace and the relaxation of international tensions, it will heed the resolution adopted by this Council on May 27, 1960,³ and will desist from irresponsible threats of force and violence.

Mr. President, I have now presented to you, first, the facts about the destruction of the American plane over international waters. I then spoke briefly about the international significance of it, making it clear that a repetition of similar predatory acts cannot fail to have the most serious consequences. Now I come to the question of what action the Council should take.

U.S. Asks Impartial Investigation

Mr. President, our argument in this case is so strong, as you can see, and the Soviet Union is so clearly in the wrong that the United States Government had grounds for introducing a complaint of our own at the time that the plane disappeared—before the Soviet Union introduced the item we are considering today. In fact we seriously considered doing just this. There is no doubt in our minds that the members of the Security Council would not only have sustained us by a large majority but would willingly have voted a condemnation of the Soviet Union which we would have been fully justified in seeking.

But we thought it over and on reflection we decided to forgo this because we thought it was more in accord with the spirit of the United Nations Charter, particularly of article 33, which calls on all of us first of all to seek solutions to dangerous issues through inquiry or other peaceful means, to appeal to the Government of the Soviet Union to join with us in an objective examination of the facts of this case.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of JUNE 13, 1960, p. 361.

You all heard Mr. Kuznetsov on Friday brush aside this offer.

In these circumstances the United States would be fully justified in asking the Security Council to condemn this outrageous attack and to call upon the Soviet Union to make prompt payment of indemnities for the loss of lives of innocent airmen and the destruction of our RB-47 plane. But in the hope that the Security Council can persuade the Soviet Union to abandon its uncooperative attitude, we simply ask the Council, as a first step, to call on the Soviet Union to accept an impartial investigation.

We do not ask the Security Council to take our word for what happened, even though we know that it is true. But we do ask the Council to help ascertain the facts. We therefore are introducing a resolution which provides for an investigation of this matter or an adjudication of it by the International Court of Justice.

I would like to read the text of the resolution which I am herewith introducing.

[At this point Mr. Lodge read the text of draft resolution S/4406.]

That is the text of our resolution.

Mr. President, the Soviet Union has already made the extraordinary admission in advance of these meetings, which were called at its request, that the Security Council will not support the Soviet charges. They have admitted that, Mr. Khrushchev has stated publicly that his real purpose in bringing the matter before us—and I am quoting Mr. Khrushchev—“is to discredit further the dishonest judges of the Security Council.”

Evidently the head of the Soviet Government thinks nothing of insulting the integrity of the representatives sitting on this Council and the integrity of the governments for which all of you gentlemen speak. He seems positively to want to be defeated here. Just what lies behind this strange maneuver is hard to fathom.

The United States is not only willing—we are anxious—that the Security Council consider the Soviet charges. We want it to consider our charges as well. We are certain that an honest and thorough consideration of the facts can lead to but one conclusion: that the Soviet Government has taken a lawless action and tries to camouflage it with reckless talk.

Mr. President, in conclusion, our purpose here is not to defend ourselves. We have done nothing

which requires defense. We want the Council to deal with this criminal and reckless act of piracy committed by the Soviet Union so that our men, now in illegal detention, may be freed and so that the whole world may breathe more easily again.

FIRST STATEMENT, JULY 26

U.S./U.N. press release 3449

Before I begin my main statement, let me say that I welcome the suggestion which you, the distinguished representative of Ecuador [José Correa] as well as our President, made to add to the text of the United States draft resolution, contained in document S/4409, a new operative paragraph as follows:

Requests the parties concerned to report to the Security Council as appropriate on the steps taken to carry out this resolution.

Mr. President, we believe this is an improvement, and we therefore ask that it be incorporated in the text of our draft resolution.

The United States also welcomes the resolution introduced by the representative of Italy⁴ this morning. It has been carefully drafted to avoid contentious issues growing out of this incident and invites a favorable response by the Soviet Union to the very real anguish of the families of the members of the crew. I sincerely hope this humanitarian resolution will be unanimously supported by this Council.

Mr. President, Mr. Kuznetsov asked today this question: If we knew where our plane was, why did we search so far out to sea? Mr. President, the reason is very simple. We knew that the plane had reached this point 200 miles northeast of Svyatoy Nos. We therefore conducted our search along the portion of the plane's planned route—the dotted line—which had not yet been flown. And for that purpose our search was around here [indicating], on the prescribed return route. We knew that the plane had eluded the Soviet fighter 50 miles north of Svyatoy Nos, and certainly there was therefore no reason for searching. That's a very simple answer, a very simple set of facts.

In his opening statement of July 22 presenting the Soviet case against the United States Mr. Kuznetsov asked what the United States would

do "if American radar were to detect a Soviet bomber flying in the airspace of the United States toward New York, for instance, or Chicago, and, the more so, if this bomber were to refuse to obey an order to land." That is Mr. Kuznetsov's question.

Well, in the first place, it is a loaded question. The implication is in that question that the United States RB-47 which disappeared on July 1 flew over Soviet territory—which, as I have already shown in detail, it did not do. So the question is not a parallel question at all. The course which the RB-47 followed never brought it closer than 30 miles from the nearest Soviet land. It would not have come even that close if its prescribed turn away from the Soviet coast had not been prevented by a Soviet fighter coming at it from the seaward side and forcing it—not luring it, Mr. Kuznetsov—toward the land. It was instructed not to violate Soviet airspace, and it did not violate Soviet airspace.

Soviet Union's Contempt for Truth

Mr. Kuznetsov asked in his speech for the grounds on which the United States maintains this account of the facts. I explained yesterday that the United States possesses scientific devices which followed the RB-47 throughout its flight. I am sure that Soviet military authorities would like to know all about these devices, but I can assure you that the United States is not going to give them that satisfaction; it is not going to divulge our military secrets.

The surprising thing is that Mr. Kuznetsov sees no need to present evidence for his assertion. He makes the charge, and then I make an answer; and he expects me to prove my answer, but he does not prove his charge. What kind of backward thinking is that? For Mr. Kuznetsov it is enough that someone in Moscow in authority has made up this story, and for that reason it becomes holy writ. But we are not in Moscow; we are in the United Nations. It makes a great difference.

Mr. Kuznetsov made the assertion in his statement of July 22—not once but by actual count 29 times—that the RB-47 had violated Soviet airspace. But he has given no proof—only a naked assertion. He said "the Soviet Union has indeed already furnished all the necessary evidence," but it hasn't furnished any. And on top of this it has continued to refuse the impartial inquiry

⁴U.N. doc. S 4411.

which we proposed. It would be hard to imagine a way of showing greater contempt for the truth.

Therefore Mr. Kuznetsov's question—what we would have done about a Soviet bomber violating United States airspace—is beside the point. It is just dragged in from nowhere.

Soviet Vessel Photographed Off U.S. Coast

Well, now, let us unload the loaded question. And if you unload it, there remains another question which is very much to the point. Sir Pierson Dixon [representative of the United Kingdom] told us yesterday that the Soviet Union engages extensively in reconnaissance activities in the vicinity of the British Isles. It has long been Soviet practice to engage in similar activities off the shores and airspace of the United States. So the question arises: What does the United States do about Soviet aircraft and Soviet ocean vessels which come near our shores with electronic gear?

I shall cite two recent examples.

On April 26, 1960, the Soviet trawler *Vega* appeared off the Atlantic coast of the United States about 105 miles southeast of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. In this area at that moment the United States nuclear submarine *George Washington* was conducting tests of the Polaris missile ejection system. Our ships instructed the *Vega* to stand clear of the area. It disregarded these instructions. It actually tried to retrieve, to pick up, one of the loaded test vehicles which had been shot by the *George Washington* at about 7 o'clock that morning. Indeed, one of our support ships, the *Vimpac*, managed to recover the test vehicle but in doing so had to maneuver sharply to avoid colliding with the *Vega*.

The *Vega* then sailed southwest, as this map shows, until it arrived at a point 30 miles off New Jersey—not far from here—in the vicinity of Fort Monmouth, which is the site of the United States Army Signal Center and therefore an excellent place for the Soviets to try to gather electronic intelligence. From there the *Vega* sailed south to a point off Wallops Island, Virginia, which is the place where our National Aeronautics and Space Administration carries on major scientific testing work with high-altitude balloons and other devices. The *Vega* then moved westward, directly toward Wallops Island, until it stood 13 miles off Cape Henry. This was its nearest approach to

United States territory—13 miles. Of course, when the Soviet Union does it, it isn't spying; it is virtuous because they do it.

Now, Mr. President, perhaps the *Vega* was one of the "Soviet trading and scientific vessels" about which Mr. Kuznetsov spoke with such an air of injured innocence in his statement of July 22, which he said had been subjected to "provocative buzzing" by United States aircraft.⁵ Our airships did indeed come close to the *Vega* and took photographs of her. And here is one right here. This is one of the photographs—and there is a difference between taking a picture of that boat and shooting the men on it. I'll tell you that right now.

And this photograph shows that the *Vega* carried a mobile van mounted on top of her pilot house and partly concealed by square liferafts. On this van were installed numerous antennas used for electronic intelligence, capable of picking up radio and radar emissions ranging from very long range to the so-called X-band, which is above ultrahigh frequency. The van appeared to be completely portable and probably could be moved easily to another vessel or platform.

This is what our photographs revealed; and I may add that they did not show any fishing gear at all—a very funny kind of a fishing boat!

Now, on this chart you can see the course sailed by the *Vega* parallel to the United States coast. At one point it came within 13 miles of land—much closer than the nearest approach of our RB-47 to Soviet territory.

But we did not sink it. We did not shoot at it. We photographed it.

Reconnaissance Flights by Soviet Planes

Then, Mr. President, there are the Soviet electronic reconnaissance flights off the coast of the United States. We are coming to airplanes now, this time off the State of Alaska. These have been going on for years, as I am sure Mr. Kuznetsov knows. I can see one of his aides nodding his head; he knows.

I have here a chart on which are plotted the dates and courses of six such flights by Soviet reconnaissance planes, which took place in 1959 and 1960.

⁵ For an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union on this subject, see BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1960, p. 212.

In 1959:

March 18—5 miles from St. Matthews Island—5 nautical miles—that's United States territory.

March 19—15 miles from Cape Lisburne

March 24—25 miles from Point Barrow

March 26—20 miles from St. Matthews Island

In 1960:

February 3—10 miles from St. Matthews Island. I wonder what they are interested in St. Matthews Island for!

February 5—12 miles from St. Lawrence Island.

Now, there is a list—by no means all. I could be here all night with things like this. We have got them all on a map. You think we do not know, but we do. But I am giving you these six flights by Soviet reconnaissance bombers off the coast of Alaska, which is just as much a part of the United States as New York or Boston. And note this: In all six of those flights the Soviet plane came within less than 30 miles of the United States; in other words, closer than our RB-47 plane came to the Soviet Union before you brought it down. One flight came within 5 miles of St. Matthews Island.

Now, according to the Soviet reasoning, I would have been justified in calling a Security Council meeting because of each one of these and many other incidents and seeking to make an international crisis out of each one. That is what I could do.

Now, here is a photograph of the type of Soviet plane which made these flights. This was taken when it was going at high speed over the North Pacific. That is one of your planes, Mr. Kuznetsov; there is the Red Star right there. It is a two-engine jet bomber modified for electronic reconnaissance, which the Soviets call the TU-16 and which we call the "Badger." Under the wing there is a pod which houses electronic equipment for making electronic observations.

In other words the Soviet Union has been sending these electronic reconnaissance planes regularly off the coast of Alaska as close as 5 miles from our territory to gather intelligence on our radars and other electronic signals.

Mr. President, all of this Soviet activity took place in an area which the United States included in its 1958 proposal right here in the Council for

mutual inspection in the Arctic zone. And you remember there were 10 votes in favor of that proposal, and the Soviet vetoed the Arctic inspection proposal after complaining about flights over the Arctic.⁶ They vetoed it. But I say to you tonight, the offer still stands.

The difference between the United States and the Soviet Union is that we shoot their planes with cameras. They shoot ours with guns and rockets and kill or imprison our crews, even though not one man, woman, or child in Russia has ever been injured by one of our planes—not one. What are you crying about? When I said the first day that your proposal was hypocritical, that is what I meant. How can you complain about us, when this is what you are doing?

Now, these acts of character assassination and piracy appear to be part of the campaign of threats which the Soviet Union has been making against free nations since last spring—for some reason it started last spring—and by which it apparently hopes to intimidate us. In this campaign they use force and the threat of force directly in violation of the United Nations Charter.

Summary of the Situation

Now, Mr. President, let me try at this stage in the debate to recapitulate and see just where we stand. I think the situation can fairly be summarized as follows:

The Soviet Union brought a charge against us. Under any form of jurisprudence the burden of proof is on the person who brings the charge. And proof does not mean the Krenlin instructed Mr. Kuznetsov to say this; that's not proof. And clearly the Soviet Union did not make its case. It merely asserts and does not prove. It has peremptorily demanded us all to take what it says on faith.

Then what is particularly damning is that, when a suggestion was made for an impartial investigation, the Soviet Union rejected it.

If they were right, why didn't they accept it? They must know that they are wrong. There can't be any other conclusion to be drawn from it.

Surely, if Mr. Kuznetsov was deliberately trying to put himself and his Government in the

⁶ For background, see *ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 816.

wrong, he could not have found more effective ways in which to do it.

And I am sure if news of this ever got through to the Russian people—which I do not doubt that it will not—that they would think that a very bad job had been done.

I wonder if Mr. Kuznetsov will not reconsider his attitude about the investigation. And I would like to appeal to him right now. In all the years that I have been here—and I have been here about 8 years—I cannot remember the Soviet Union ever being willing to have an impartial investigation of its own actions.

Now I submit—I put it to you, Mr. Kuznetsov—that that attitude is out of date. The Soviet Union is now a great power. That fact is universally acknowledged. Mr. Kuznetsov in his statement here last Friday spoke again, as his colleagues often do, of the “growing might and prestige of the Soviet Union.” But if the Soviet Union is a great power with growing might and prestige, as it is, then it ought to act like one. It ought not to hide things as if it were in mortal fear of being caught doing something wrong. It ought to let its actions be seen by all of us in clear daylight. Surely, if its system is so strong, it will not be injured by an impartial investigation into the facts.

What we want is a world in which there are no Soviet facts or American facts—there are just facts, universally accepted by reasonable people all over the world.

That, in itself, Mr. President, would be a big step toward peace. That is why I say that, if the Soviet Union in this instance would be willing to have an investigation, it would certainly be a very welcome thing and would make an excellent impression throughout the world. It would help the Soviet Union, among other things.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Union is not willing to permit an investigation or an impartial adjudication, either one, then its case will come to nothing and will be regarded everywhere as a work of fiction and the Soviet Union will be regarded as an imposter. We are not in Russia; we are in the United Nations, where all are treated equally and the so-called Soviet “facts” must be matched up against the truth.

Mr. Kuznetsov asked the American people to believe in the peaceful desires of the Soviet Government. As regards the “Soviet people,” I might

give him a different answer; but when Americans look at Hungary and Eastern Europe and when Americans read Chairman Khrushchev’s threats to use rockets, they may be excused, I think, for doubting the peaceful desires of the Soviet Government.

Whatever happens, Mr. President, we will not be put off by Soviet slanders. We will not be intimidated. We demand again that our captured fliers be freed and that the Soviet Union cease these provocations which contain so much danger for the entire world.

SECOND STATEMENT, JULY 26⁷

U.S./U.N. press release 3450

I am sure that in every part of the world where newspapers are published, where radio stations operate, where men and women know what is going on, the fact that the Soviet Union has put itself tonight in this absolutely impossible position will not pass unnoticed.

They came here with a charge. The burden of proof was on them. They gave no proof. And then, when an impartial investigation was offered them and supported by an overwhelming majority of the Council, they blocked it with their veto, which shows to every person that they do not believe their own charge. If they believed it, they would have welcomed an investigation. He who comes into court with clean hands has nothing to fear, and he can have an investigation and stand it.

Now, you might say that I might be pleased to see the Soviet Union put itself in this impossible position; but I am not. I am very sad about it. I would like to see the nations of the world get along together. I want to see peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.

I was hoping—and I tried to say so—that they would accept this investigation because nothing could do more to reestablish them in the eyes of the world than to show this decent respect for the opinions of mankind and to show that they believed in their own case. I am sorry that they have done this, for their sake as well as for our sake.

⁷ Made after the vote on the U.S. and Italian draft resolutions.

You would almost think that would be enough for one evening. But then they went ahead and vetoed the resolution proposed by my friend, the representative of Italy, which was nothing more than a compassionate resolution. They did not have to concede any of their points about airspace or territorial integrity or any of those things. This was a humane matter. This was to provide the Red Cross with a chance to call on these survivors.

I tell you, it is a sad thing when a people which is as warmhearted as the Russian people is—because I have been there and I know—should be represented by a government that is as cold-hearted, as brutal, as hard, and as cynical as they have shown themselves to be tonight.

SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION⁸

The Security Council,

Having examined the question of "New aggressive acts by the Air Force of the United States of America against the Soviet Union, creating a threat to universal peace".

Noting that the Government of the United States of America continues premeditatedly to violate the sovereign rights of other States, a course which leads to the heightening of international tension and creates a threat to universal peace.

1. *Condemns* these continuing provocative activities of the Air Force of the United States of America and regards them as aggressive acts;

2. *Insists* that the Government of the United States of America should take immediate steps to put an end to such acts and to prevent their recurrence.

U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION, AS MODIFIED⁹

The Security Council,

Having considered the item submitted by the Soviet Union on 13 July 1960;

Having heard the statements of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union;

⁸ U.N. doc. S/4406; rejected by the Council on July 26 by a vote of 2 in favor (Poland and U.S.S.R.) to 9 against.

⁹ U.N. doc. S/4409, as modified by incorporation of the final paragraph proposed by Ecuador; not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council (U.S.S.R.). The vote, on July 26, was 9 in favor and 2 against (Poland and U.S.S.R.), with the U.S.S.R. casting its 88th veto.

Noting the existence of differences between the two Governments as to the facts of the incident of 1 July 1960, in which a United States Air Force plane was brought down by Soviet military forces, and as to questions of legal liability arising from the incident;

Recalling its resolution of 27 May 1960 (S/4328), in which the Council (1) stated its conviction that every effort should be made to restore and strengthen international good will and confidence based on the established principles of international law, (2) recommended to the Governments concerned to seek solutions of existing international problems by negotiation or other peaceful means as provided in the Charter of the United Nations, and (3) appealed to all Member Governments to refrain from the use or threat of force in their international relations, to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and to refrain from any action which might increase tensions;

Recommends to the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to undertake to resolve their differences arising out of the plane incident of 1 July 1960 either (a) through investigation of the facts by a commission composed of members designated in equal numbers, by the United States, by the Soviet Union, and by a Government or authority acceptable to both parties, charged with inquiring into the incident by inspecting the site, examining such remains of the plane as may be located, and interrogating survivors and other witnesses; or (b) through referral of the matter to the International Court of Justice for impartial adjudication;

Requests the parties concerned to report to the Security Council as appropriate on the steps taken to carry out this resolution.

ITALIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION¹⁰

The Security Council,

Having considered the item submitted by the Soviet Union on 13 July 1960,

Noting the declaration of the U.S.S.R. according to which, as a consequence of the incident of 1 July 1960 in which a United States Air Force plane was brought down by Soviet military forces, two members of the crew of said plane are kept in custody by the Soviet authorities and three of them are missing,

Expresses the hope that, pending any further inquiry or development related to the substance of the matter, the International Committee of the Red Cross, in accordance with international practice, be permitted to fulfill the humanitarian tasks which come within its role as a neutral and independent institution with respect to the members of the crew.

¹⁰ U.N. doc. S/4411; not adopted. The vote, on July 26, was 9 in favor and 2 against (Poland and U.S.S.R.), with the U.S.S.R. casting its 89th veto.

Prime Minister of Republic of Congo Visits Washington

Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, in the United States to confer with the Secretary-General of the United Nations regarding the situation in his country,¹ made a visit to Washington July 27-29. He met with Secretary Herter and other officials of the Department of State on July 27, with the chiefs of the diplomatic missions of the African states July 27 and 28, and with Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, on July 28. Following are the texts of an exchange of greetings between Secretary Herter and Prime Minister Lumumba at the Washington National Airport on July 27 and a Department statement released on July 29, together with a list of the members of the Prime Minister's party.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

Secretary Herter

Press release 416 dated July 27

I am happy to welcome you to Washington, Mr. Prime Minister, and to take this first opportunity to extend to you my congratulations on the independence of the Republic of the Congo. On behalf of the American Government I wish to express heartfelt wishes for the speedy return of tranquillity to your country. We are, as you know, doing all in our power to support the United Nations in its response to your appeal for aid.

I am especially pleased to have this occasion to meet you and the members of your party personally. Your visit here affords us a welcome opportunity to exchange views and discuss ways in which the United States, one of the oldest democracies, may cooperate with the Republic of the Congo, one of the newest. I feel confident these discussions will be the bases for increasingly close and beneficial ties between our two peoples.

Prime Minister Lumumba

Press release 417 dated July 27

Mr. Secretary, it is with real pleasure that I find myself now in the United States, a country of

democracy and liberty, where I have the opportunity to make contact with you. I should like warmly to thank President Eisenhower and all of the people of the United States for according me this cordial welcome, which is evidence of the fact that the Republic of the Congo can count upon the support of the American people, and in such a way that we may restore order in our country and pursue the program that we have for the reconstruction of our country.

Unfortunate events with which you are all aware have recently occurred in our country quite independently of our own wishes. We immediately made appeal to the United Nations asking that all necessary aid be given us. We wish the Republic of the Congo to be unified, strong, and prosperous. We desire true democracy in our country, and I should like to dissipate all misunderstandings which may have arisen with respect to our country. The Republic of the Congo has cordial and correct relations with all democratic countries which wish to help us. We desire that all Europeans and all foreigners who are among us should live in peace and contribute to the welfare of our country.

We are convinced that we will find in the United States the aid that we desire, and we appreciate the efforts being made by the United States to restore international peace. If the Western World wishes, desires, to understand our position they may be sure of our friendship and support. We are friends of the United States and all other countries, and we are happy to deal with the United States on problems relating to the Republic of the Congo and to Africa in general. We wish that it be known that the Congo has with the United States and all other countries bonds of friendship and desires cooperation.

To the people of the United States I would like to extend the sentiments of friendship which the people of the Congo have for the United States. The people of the Congo count upon the people of the United States for their support, and if it should happen that technicians or other personnel should come to our country, you may be assured that they will find there a cordial welcome. Thank you.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of AUG. 8, 1960, p. 221.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT²

Prime Minister Lumumba has just completed a 2-day visit to Washington. During the course of this visit, he conferred with the Secretary of State and other officials in the Department. Prime Minister Lumumba explained the importance his Government attaches to the prompt and complete evacuation of all Belgian troops from the Congo. He also outlined the great need of the Congo for all kinds of technical assistance as well as for emergency funds to insure the operation of basic services, the supply of food, and the pay of Government employees including security forces. The Secretary of State informed the Prime Minister that the United States had placed its confidence in the United Nations regarding all these matters. He informed the Prime Minister that the United States was prepared to make available to the United Nations its fair share of technical and financial assistance required to maintain peaceful and orderly government in the Congo.

MEMBERS OF OFFICIAL PARTY

The Department of State announced on July 27 (press release #15) that the following persons would accompany Prime Minister Lumumba on his visit to Washington, July 27-29.

Joseph Kasongo, President of the Chamber of Deputies
Joseph Mbui, Minister of the Middle Classes
Joseph Okito, Vice President of the Senate
Joseph Mbeka, Executive Director of the Ministry of Economic Coordination and the Plan
Abkar Marof, Press Attaché
Captain Mawoso, Ordnance Officer
Bernard Salumu, Private Secretary
A. Mungita, newspaperman

Department Comments on Belgian Withdrawal of Troops From Congo

Department Statement³

The Department of State noted with gratification yesterday the Belgian Government's announcement of the withdrawal of 1,500 troops from the Congo to Belgium. This withdrawal represents a further step in the planned withdrawal

which started when U.N. troops took over from the Belgians in the city of Léopoldville as well as other points in the Congo.

We are satisfied that the Government of Belgium sent its troops to the Congo in order to protect the lives which were endangered and that it had no aggressive intent in introducing its troops into the Congo when public order broke down. At that time the Belgians stated that their troops would be withdrawn as soon as order was restored. In implementation of that statement as well as the resolution of the Security Council, Belgium is now starting to withdraw its troops from the Congo.

With this continuing implementation of the Security Council resolution by Belgium, and with the evident success of the U.N. operation, the situation in the Congo appears to be stabilizing. We hope that these Belgian steps will lead to the re-establishment of a climate of cooperation and confidence between Belgium and the Congo in which Belgians, working side by side with the Congolese in cooperation with the United Nations, can continue to play a role in the successful development of the new Congolese state.

Secretary, Senator Smathers Exchange Views on Hemisphere Police Force

Following is an exchange of correspondence between Secretary Herter and Senator George A. Smathers regarding a proposal to establish an inter-American police force.

SECRETARY HERTER TO SENATOR SMATHERS

JULY 16, 1960

DEAR GEORGE: I am very glad to have the benefit of your views regarding the establishment of an Inter-American Police Force under the authority of the Organization of American States. As your letter of July 2, 1960 suggests, such a force might be used, presumably in accordance with Rio Treaty procedures, to maintain the security of the hemisphere against internal threats requiring the application of collective military force. Moreover, it is possible that it might act as a deterrent to elements which threaten the peace, and also give assurance to countries possessing very little military capability that attacks against them

² Read to news correspondents by Lincoln White, Director, Office of News, on July 29.

³ Read to news correspondents by Robert J. McCloskey, Department press officer, on July 30.

could be met by effective collective action taken by a standby force under the Organization of American States.

It remains to be seen, I believe, whether such a force would contribute substantially to a reduction of armaments in the area or result in a significant diversion of local energies and resources from military projects into economic and social development channels. There is evidence to indicate that a number of countries desire to maintain forces capable of making a contribution to collective defense against an attack emanating from outside the hemisphere and that the Latin American authorities are sometimes disposed to acquire expensive armament primarily for reasons of prestige.

With regard to your recommendation that we initiate within the Organization of American States a proposal that an inter-American police force be established, the Council, acting for all Governments, has agreed that this topic may be discussed at the Eleventh Inter-American Conference within the terms of agenda item 12, which provides that the Conference give attention to: (a) the improvement of the methods and instruments for the settlement of disputes; and (b) the possibility of holding a specialized conference on, (1) the effective strengthening of the inter-American system of collective security, and (2) the limitation of the armaments of the American States, without prejudice to the needs for self-defense and for hemispheric defense.

With a view to ascertaining the feasibility of a U.S. initiative on the subject at the Quito Conference or any other appropriate Conference that may be convened in the interim, I am requesting the Secretary of Defense to advise me of the military practicability of establishing an inter-American force from the U.S. military point of view. I have in mind, for example, such problems as the development of a formula that would provide, on the one hand, for contributions from all countries desiring to contribute either for military or political reasons, and that would assure, on the other hand, that Latin American forces, particularly those of the small Caribbean countries, would not be depleted of the manpower and equipment they require to maintain internal law and order against existing threats to their security; the development of a plan for financing such a force, including the financing of logistic support, bearing in mind the

inadvisability of the U.S. assuming all costs and the economic inability of many countries to assume additional financial burdens; and the problem of developing an acceptable command structure for a force comprised of many nationalities.

While we are prepared to give this project high priority consideration, I believe it would be misleading for me to imply that it could be brought to fruition soon enough to be useful in connection with the settlement of problems we are now encountering in the fast-moving Caribbean situation. Even under the most favorable circumstances, I foresee prolonged inter-American consideration of this project, including discussion of the numerous political and technical problems which it raises.

With warmest personal regards,

Most sincerely,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

The Honorable
GEORGE A. SMATHERS,
United States Senate.

SENATOR SMATHERS TO SECRETARY HERTER

JULY 2, 1960

The Honorable CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
*Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am writing to renew, with all possible urgency, my suggestion that the United States propose establishment of an Inter-American Police Force under authority of the Organization of American States.

Heretofore, I believe, department representatives have taken the position that the police force concept, while attractive in principle, would have little chance of acceptance by other members of the O.A.S. If this was so, recent events in the Caribbean, which require no elaboration here, seem to me to have materially altered the situation.

No one would contend now that the police force idea is directed against an abstract or imaginary danger. The contagion of tension and inspired "revolution" is spreading through the hemisphere, diverting the energies and resources of hemisphere governments from the essential work of economic and social development.

The only alternatives to the police force, it seems to me, are: one, an arms race, which would further increase tension and further reduce the capacity of the governments to pursue their economic objectives, or, two, a quarantine of the area proclaimed and enforced by the United States.

The first would certainly lead to economic and political chaos, indeed may already be leading in that direction. The second would put this country in the untenable position of having to distinguish, unilaterally, external sub-

version-aggression from those wholly internal upsets which have regularly occurred in the history of Latin America. The United States would then be returning, in the eyes of many Latins, to that unhappy era when their governments were created, supported in power, or swept aside as suited the policy makers in Washington.

On the other hand, multilateral control would assure that an OAS police force would never become the instrument of United States policy except as U.S. purposes coincide with the interests of the hemisphere.

Under the circumstances, I believe the nations of the Western Hemisphere are prepared to give favorable consideration to this proposal at the present time, and I therefore urge you to bring it before the Organization of American States at the very earliest opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE A. SMATHERS
United States Senator

United States Lends Nepal \$1 Million in Indian Rupees

Press release 421 dated July 29

The Department of State on July 29 announced the loan of the equivalent of \$1 million in U.S.-owned Indian rupees to the Nepal Industrial Development Corporation to stimulate private industrial development in that country.

The loan is being made by the International Cooperation Administration from rupees received by the United States from the sale of agricultural commodities to India under provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480).

The funds will be used by NIDC to make loans for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment and industrial construction materials in India for Nepalese development projects accepted for financing by NIDC.

The loan agreement with ICA was signed on July 29 by Rishikesh Shaha, the Ambassador of Nepal, on behalf of NIDC, and by Samuel C. Waugh, President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington, which will administer the loan for ICA.

NIDC was established in May 1959 to promote private industrial projects in Nepal through advice and training in engineering management and marketing and extension of credit to worthy enterprises. The Government of Nepal has purchased stock in the corporation, and additional subscriptions are expected to come from sales to the Nepalese public.

President Releases Interim Report on Food-for-Peace Program

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 23

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

I have received an interim report on the food-for-peace program. This commendable effort provides a constructive use of our agricultural capabilities and is our chief weapon in the world-wide war against want and hunger.

There is no form of overseas assistance which this country is better able to provide than the supplying of American farm products and agricultural science.

The overwhelming share of our food-for-peace effort is going to the nations of Asia, Latin America, the Mediterranean area, and Africa which need it most.

I note with gratification the achievements of the program thus far. I am heartened by the prospect that our accomplishment can be further improved, with emphasis on a continuing effort to make sure that the hazards of the program will be minimized.

I am making this report public since it deals with matters of current and prospective importance at home and abroad.

TEXT OF INTERIM REPORT

FOOD-FOR-PEACE

AN INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
BY DON PAARLBERG, FOOD-FOR-PEACE COORDINATOR

1. The concept of Food-For-Peace is the associating of our agricultural capability with the need for food abroad. This is in a world which for the first time in history sees the possibility of feeding its people adequately.

A. Agricultural abundance in the United States is a present and a prospective fact.

1. American agricultural science, technology, and education are the best in the world. The American farmer outproduces the farm worker of the Soviet Union by a ratio of about five to one.

2. The CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation] investment in loans and inventories is now near \$9 billion. In a joint study done by USDA [U.S. Department of Agriculture] and the Bureau of the Budget, projected for five years on the basis of present legislation, this investment is expected to rise further.

B. Food needs abroad are substantial.

1. In the developing nations, which are about three-fourths agricultural, live nearly a billion people. They

have a low level of food intake. They need our farm products and our agricultural know-how.

2. It is to our interest, in our efforts to help the developing nations, to emphasize an area in which we have a great comparative advantage, which is agriculture.

C. The Food-For-Peace program thus is an attack on those ancient enemies, hunger and malnutrition. In this attack we not only meet a great human need but also accomplish two purposes of direct interest to ourselves.

1. We move our inventories of farm products which, if not moved, are a wasting asset.

2. We serve the foreign economic policy interest of the United States.

II. The program provides both food and know-how.

A. About two-thirds of our agricultural exports are sold for dollars in the regular commercial channels. Our special export programs are intended to develop this kind of trade, and have done so.

B. Important to the Food-For-Peace effort are the special export programs, carried on primarily under Public Law 480 [Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act], enacted in 1954. The great bulk of these shipments go to Asia, Latin America, the Mediterranean area, and Africa.

1. Title I, sale for foreign currency, is the largest of the various special export programs.

a) An illustration is the recent Indian four-year program, totaling \$1,276 million, market value.¹

i) This is the biggest grain transaction in history. It includes:

587 million bushels of wheat (half of one U.S. wheat crop)

22 million hundredweight of rice (half of one U.S. rice crop)

On the average, this will be a shipload of food each day for four years.

ii) Rupees generated by this program will be put to the following uses:

42.2%: loans to India for economic development, including agricultural betterment.

42.2%: granted back to the Indian government, largely for economic development.

5.0%: loans to private United States and Indian business firms.

10.6%: U.S. uses, including agency programs and agricultural market development.

b) Total movement under Title I from 1954 to December 31, 1959; the equivalent of more than 3,000 shiploads:

wheat	\$1,380 million
cotton	560 million
fats and oils	477 million
other	731 million

Total.....\$3,148 million, market value

2. Under the Mutual Security Act we have sold, for foreign currency, in a program similar to Public Law 480, from 1954 to December 31, 1959, about \$1,700 million worth of food, feed and fiber, at market value. This is the equivalent of about 1,250 shiploads.

¹ BULLETIN of May 30, 1960, p. 889.

3. Title II of Public Law 480, Relief of Disaster, primarily a government-to-government program, is an important part of Food-For-Peace.

a) During the last fiscal year we provided food for victims of natural disasters in eleven countries. We fed refugees in Hong Kong and the Middle East, supported school feeding programs in Italy and Japan, and supplied food for charitable institutions abroad.

(b) Total movement under Title II from 1954 to December 31, 1959; the equivalent of about 275 shiploads:

bread grains	\$239 million
milk	27 million
rice	38 million
other	130 million

Total.....\$434 million
plus ocean freight.....25 million

Grand Total.....\$457 million, CCC cost

4. Another important part of Food-For-Peace is Title III of Public Law 480, food donations through non-profit charitable agencies such as CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service, and the Jewish relief agencies. Presently we are supplying food in earthquake-ravaged Chile and Agadir.

a) Seventy-five million American people support this program through their gifts, their work, and their membership in these voluntary agencies.

b) U.S. surplus food is thus distributed in ninety-one countries and dependencies. Sixty-two million people abroad get a part of their food from this source.

c) Movement under Title III from 1954 to December 31, 1959: Total, mostly wheat, milk, and rice, including ocean freight:

\$1,405 million, CCC cost, the equivalent of about 400 shiploads.

5. Additionally, we have bartered surplus agricultural products for strategic and other materials such as manganese, chrome, and industrial diamonds.

a) From 1954 to December 31, 1959, \$1,140 million worth of surplus farm products at market value have thus been bartered. This is the equivalent of 1,500 shiploads.

6. Altogether, from 1954 through 1959, approximately the following quantities of surplus agricultural products have been moved:

	<i>Number of shiploads</i>
Sales for foreign currency	
Under Public Law 480.....	3,000
Through the Mutual Security Act.....	1,250
Relief of disaster (government-to-government).....	275
Donations through charitable agencies (people-to-people).....	400
Bartered for strategic and other material.....	1,500
Total.....	6,425

C. A complement of our special export programs is United States assistance to agricultural production abroad. The objective is to help other countries develop their agriculture in accordance with their capabilities and in a manner which will retain appropriate export opportunities for American farm products. This effort, like our

special export programs, is concentrated in Asia, Latin America, the Mediterranean area, and Africa.

1. Twelve hundred U.S. agricultural technicians are now working overseas for ICA [International Cooperation Administration].

2. Through 1959, Ex-Im Bank has approved loans for irrigation and water supply (some urban) totaling \$210 million.

3. Through 1959, the Development Loan Fund has approved loans for agriculture and irrigation abroad totaling \$55 million.

4. The ICA program, in promoting balanced agricultural development abroad, averages about \$50 million a year.

5. In addition, about \$200 million in local currencies generated by Public Law 480 are being used by foreign governments, with our help and guidance, for agricultural improvement.

6. Results of this activity are hard to measure. Foreign governments themselves have made substantial contributions to agricultural improvement. These things seem clear:

a) Agricultural production abroad has increased. During the past decade the annual rates of increase for four selected countries were as follows:

Colombia	2.4%
India	3.0%
Turkey	6.3%
Mexico	7.0%

b) There have been no major famines in the free world during the past decade.

c) Nutritional levels in the underdeveloped parts of the world have crept up slightly.

d) Agriculture generally has kept abreast of or ahead of the population increase.

e) American export trade in agricultural products has increased, both in terms of total movement and dollar sales.

III. Many governmental agencies cooperate in the Food-For-Peace program.

A. The Departments of Agriculture and State, including ICA, have major responsibility.

B. Other Departments and agencies which have responsibility are Treasury, Budget, Commerce, Ex-Im Bank, and Defense.

C. Consultations, formal and informal, are held with other governments and with agencies of the United Nations.

1. Cooperative efforts are under way with other major wheat exporting countries—Argentina, Australia, Canada, and France—through a Wheat Utilization Committee.² This Committee, with the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations as an adviser-observer, is investigating the possibility of increasing and making more effective coordinate use of wheat surpluses to promote economic development, improve nutritional standards, and expand world commercial trade in wheat.

IV. The program presents both accomplishments and hazards.

² For background, see *ibid.*, June 1, 1959, p. 793.

A. Accomplishments of the Food-For-Peace program have been significant.

1. We have relieved our heavy inventory position. Without Public Law 480, the CCC investment in surplus commodities would be about twice its present level.

2. We have won good will abroad. The "Indian Express" editorialized thus after signing of the recent Public Law 480 program with India:

"The Eisenhower-Patil food agreement stands out as an act of good faith in human relations. It is of high material value enhanced by the terms and the timing. It is of far greater import in terms of the spirit . . . of faith in human ideals and in the striving to retain them."

3. We have helped some countries (Japan, Italy, Austria, and other countries of Western Europe) "graduate" from sales for foreign currencies to sales for dollars. The special export programs have meant additional exports; sales of farm products for dollars have likewise increased.

4. Through market development, we have built new dollar markets such as the market for U.S. poultry in Germany and for U.S. fats, oils, and wheat in Japan.

B. The Food-For-Peace program is not without its hazards.

1. We must not hurt the economies of other agricultural exporting countries by usurping their markets.

2. We must beware of making the developing countries dependent upon us, indefinitely, with their growing populations, for our continuing help.

3. We must avoid flooding the recipient countries with our food, depressing their farm prices and hurting their agriculture.

4. We must not unwisely stimulate agricultural production abroad, thereby depriving the United States of legitimate export markets.

5. We must not give away, barter, or sell for foreign currency food and fiber that we could otherwise sell for dollars.

6. We must not, through the accumulation of excess supplies of foreign currencies, create fiscal problems for our own or for foreign governments.

7. We must not, by our use of these surpluses, provide a rationale for the continuation of unwise farm legislation.

8. Most important, we must not, for fear of the above hazards, forego the use of our capability in the agricultural field. *We must not bury our talent.*

C. An evaluation is in order.

1. The accomplishments of the program have been demonstrated; for the greater part the hazards have been avoided. The Departments of Agriculture and State, including ICA, which are the major responsibility-bearing agencies, have done an outstanding job.

2. Accomplishments exceed public understanding. There is need for greater enlightenment.

3. Public Law 480, which began primarily as a surplus disposal program, has demonstrated its usefulness as a positive arm of U.S. foreign economic policy.

V. Some questions and some answers.

A. Can and should the program be expanded?

It can and should. Increased movement of surplus, however, is likely to be modest rather than sensational.

B. How can our performance be improved?

By being opportunity-oriented, not problem-prone.

By improving the understanding of this program at home and abroad.

By searching out and welcoming opportunities to improve the program.

C. Can this program "solve the farm problem"?

No, not by itself.

D. Is additional Food-For-Peace legislation needed?

Only slight changes in Public Law 480. Legislation with respect to the program is generally adequate.

Prime Minister of Malaya To Visit United States

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 20

Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj of the Federation of Malaya has accepted an invitation from President Eisenhower to make an official visit to the United States. Prime Minister Rahman is expected to arrive in Washington on October 25. Details will be announced later.

Mining Executives To Advise India on Coal Expansion Program

Press release 420 dated July 25

The Department of State announced on July 25 that a three-man team of top U.S. coal mining executives will be sent to India in response to a request from that Government to advise in developing a program for expansion of its production of coal.

The team, which is going to India under the auspices of the International Cooperation Administration, is comprised of Herbert E. Jones, Jr., president, Amherst Coal Co., Charleston, W. Va.; Edwin R. Phelps, president, Pittsburg and Midway Coal Mining Co., Pittsburg, Kans.; and Raymond E. Salvati, president, Island Creek Coal Co., Huntington, W. Va.

Mr. Salvati will serve as team leader. Bayman Saunders of Island Creek Coal Co. will accompany the team as its executive assistant. The group is expected to depart from New York for New Delhi on August 6.

India, under its third 5-year plan, is committed to doubling its present annual output of coal, which is now approximately 50 million long tons.

Recently the Government of India requested advice on its program for the realization of this goal and suggested that a team of top executives from U.S. coal mining companies could be most helpful at this stage of its planning.

The U.S. group will survey plans for the expanding coal mining program and, upon its return to the United States, will submit a report of its findings and recommendations.

U.S. and Canada Hold 6th Session on Columbia River Development

Press release 414 dated July 25

The United States and Canadian delegations appointed to negotiate an agreement for the cooperative development of the water resources of the Columbia River system held their sixth session at Washington July 23 and 24.

The chairmen of the delegations, E. F. Bennett, U.S. Under Secretary of the Interior, and E. D. Fulton, Canadian Minister of Justice, stated the negotiations continued to make substantial progress on issues remaining to be resolved prior to the submission of a report to their Governments. It is anticipated that the next meeting will be held in Canada about mid-August.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 2d Session

United States Relations With Panama. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January 12-February 2, 1960. 107 pp.

Briefing on Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January 20-27, May 16, 1960. 142 pp.

Panama Canal Toll Formula. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Panama Canal of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 8983, to require Panama Canal tolls to be prescribed in accordance with the tolls formula provided in section 412 of title 2 of the Canal Zone Code and pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, and H.R. 10968, to amend section 412(b) of title 2 of the Canal Zone Code. February 16, 17, March 29, 30, 1960. 131 pp.

Foreign Commerce Study (U.S. Trade Position). Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. April 25 and 26, 1960. 626 pp.

Foreign Commerce Study (U.S. Trade and Common Market). Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. May 9 and 10, 1960. 294 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During July 1960

ITU Administrative Council: 15th Session	Geneva	May 28-July 2
U.N. ECOSOC Group of Experts on Geographical Names	New York	June 20-July 1
ICAO Panel of Experts To Consider the Arab League Request for Interpretation of Article 77	Montreal	June 23-July 2
10th International Berlin Film Festival	Berlin	June 24-July 6
CPU Consultative Committee on Postal Studies: Annual Meeting of Management Council	Eastbourne, England	June 27-July 9
WMO Executive Committee: 12th Session	Geneva	June 27-July 15
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 24th Session (and Working Parties)	Geneva	June 29-July 1
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 1st Session of Working Group on Statistical Activities	Geneva	July 4-8
Development Assistance Group: 2d Meeting	Bonn	July 5-7
23d UNESCO/IBE Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 6-15
IBE Council: 26th Session	Geneva	July 9 (1 day)
8th San Sebastian Film Festival	San Sebastian	July 9-19
International Union for Protection of Industrial Property: Meeting of Heads of Industrial Property Offices	Geneva	July 11-14
Wheat Utilization Committee: 3d Meeting	Ottawa	July 11-14
Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission: 2d Meeting	Petrópolis, Brazil	July 11-15
UNESCO Intergovernmental Conference on Oceanographic Research	Copenhagen	July 11-16
8th International Grassland Congress	Reading, England	July 11-22
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: Experts Statistical Committee	Geneva	July 12-13
South Pacific Commission: 11th Meeting of South Pacific Research Council	Nouméa, New Caledonia	July 12-20
Caribbean Commission: 30th Meeting	San Juan	July 18-21
3d Inter-American Symposium on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy	Petrópolis and Brasília	July 18-23
Inter-American Indian Institute: Governing Board	México, D.F	July 19-20
International Sugar Council: Statistical Committee	London	July 19 (1 day)
Executive Committee	London	July 20-21
Venice Film Festival: 12th International Exhibition of Films for Children	Venice	July 20-31
Venice Film Festival: 11th International Exhibition of the Scientific, Cultural, Educational, and Entertainment Documentary	Venice	July 20-31
International Sugar Council: 7th Session	London	July 21 (1 day)
1st FAO/IAIAS Inter-American Technical Coffee Meeting	Bogotá	July 24-31

In Session as of July 31, 1960

Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests	Geneva	Oct. 31, 1958-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 30th Session	Geneva	July 5-
12th Triennale di Milano	Milan	July 16-
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics: 12th General Assembly	Helsinki	July 25-

Scheduled August 1 Through October 31, 1960

For a list of meetings scheduled August 1-October 31, 1960, see Bulletin of August 1, 1960, p. 183. In the future the list of scheduled meetings will appear in the first issue of each month and the lists of meetings adjourned and currently in session² in the third issue.

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 28, 1960. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAIAS, Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; U.N., United Nations; UNECO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UPU, Universal Postal Union; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

United States Requests Meeting of U.N. Disarmament Commission

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 21

I have been greatly concerned that everything possible be done to make progress on the question of disarmament.

The abrupt breakup of the 10-nation talks in Geneva by the Soviet Union last month¹ makes it desirable to take further steps so that the vital issue of disarmament can be considered promptly once again. Our efforts to get the Soviet Union to return to the conference table through normal diplomatic channels have not met with success. The need for disarmament in the present world situation is too important to set aside at the present time when deliberate efforts are being made to increase tensions.

The United Nations under the charter has primary responsibility in this field. I have therefore today instructed Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to request an early meeting of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations so that we and other members of the international community can continue to search for ways and means to achieve the universal desire to reduce the risk of war by controlled steps of disarmament.

LETTER TO COMMISSION CHAIRMAN

U.S./U.N. press release 3437 dated July 22

Following is the text of a letter transmitted on July 22 by Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Luis Padilla Nervo, Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

EXCELLENCY: On behalf of the United States, I have the honor to request that you convene early in August a meeting of the Disarmament Commission.

From March 15, 1960 to June 28, 1960 the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament met in Geneva in an effort

¹ BULLETIN of July 18, 1960, p. 88.

to make progress toward a disarmament agreement. At the start of the Conference the Governments of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted a major disarmament proposal.² A new proposal, taking into account developments during the Conference, had been prepared when on June 27 the delegations of the Eastern European countries, led by the Soviet Union, walked out of the Conference without warning, after being told by the United States representative that the new proposal would soon be submitted.³

The United States attached great importance to this Conference and deplores the cavalier manner in which the group led by the Soviet Union callously disrupted what otherwise might have been fruitful negotiations. As the verbatim record of the meeting on June 27 reveals, the Polish Delegate, then acting as Chairman, heard speeches by each of the five Eastern European delegations, but, in flagrant disregard of all accepted rules of procedure, denied the repeated requests of Western delegates to speak and arbitrarily attempted to declare the Conference ended. It was particularly distressing and difficult to comprehend the action taken by the Soviet Delegation and its associates in view of their knowledge of the forthcoming new disarmament proposals.

The Western states, intensely aware of the seriousness of the disarmament question, instructed their delegations to remain in Geneva to be available to resume negotiations. Each of the five Western states dispatched a communication to the Soviet Government asking that it reconsider its decision to break off disarmament negotiations. These communications have been distributed as documents of the General Assembly and of the Disarmament Commission. Thus far the Soviet Union has not replied to these communications nor given any indication that it attaches urgency to the resumption of negotiations.

Since disarmament is a matter of vital concern to all United Nations members, I believe that the Disarmament Commission, which includes representatives from all Member States, should consider promptly the situation arising from the Soviet decision to break off these negotiations.

In this connection I am transmitting a copy of the disarmament proposal which the United States introduced in the Ten Nation Disarmament Conference on the very day the Soviet Union abruptly walked out of the meeting. I request that this proposal be circulated to the members of the Disarmament Commission.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

HENRY CABOT LODGE.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1960, p. 511.

³ For text of the U.S. disarmament proposals of June 27, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 90.

Migration From Europe in 1960

FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH SESSIONS OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND TWELFTH SESSION OF COUNCIL OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION

by George L. Warren

The Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration convened in its 12th session at Naples on May 5, 1960, at the special invitation of the Italian Government.¹ Twenty-five of the twenty-nine member governments were represented. The Dominican Republic, San Marino, and the Holy See were in attendance as observers. The United Nations and the U.N. specialized agencies, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the Council of Europe, and nongovernmental organizations interested in migration were also represented at the session. Established in 1951 on the initiative of the United States at the Brussels Conference on Migration, the organization facilitates the movement from overcrowded areas of Europe of migrants and refugees who would not otherwise be moved.

The session of the Council was preceded by an emergency session of the Executive Committee of nine governments in January at Geneva and by a regular session at Naples just prior to the meeting of the Council. Eric O. Baron van Boetzelaer (Netherlands) presided at both sessions of the Executive Committee. The emergency session of the Committee was required by the necessity of raising and assuring the administration of sufficient operating income at the beginning of 1960

to insure continuity of movements at the 1959 level during the first quarter of the year.

Representative Francis E. Walter, alternate U.S. representative on the Council, was elected chairman of the session. D. Mario Pico (Argentina) served as first vice chairman, M. Willibald Liehr (Austria) as second vice chairman, and Eren Laor (Israel) as rapporteur.

Robert S. McCollum, Deputy Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of State, was the U.S. representative at the sessions of the Executive Committee and the Council. George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State, served as alternate U.S. representative at the meetings of the Executive Committee and as principal adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Council. Representatives Frank Chelf and Donald L. Jackson served as congressional advisers.

The 1,000,000th Migrant

One reason for the Italian invitation to the Council to meet in Naples was to permit the Council to participate in the ceremony associated with the departure from Naples on May 9, 1960, of the 1,000,000th migrant moving overseas under ICEM auspices.² With appropriate speeches by a number of representatives at the meeting of the Council, 10-year-old Andrejs Suritis, a Latvian refugee, accompanied by his father, was speeded on his way to join the other members of his family in Kalamazoo, Mich. Previously, on May 7, the Italian

• *Mr. Warren is Adviser on Refugee and Migration Affairs, Department of State. He served as alternate U.S. representative to the 14th and 15th sessions of the ICEM Executive Committee and as principal adviser to the U.S. delegation to the 12th session of the Council.*

¹ For an article by Mr. Warren on the 11th session of the Council and the 13th session of the Executive Committee, see BULLETIN of Feb. 8, 1960, p. 218.

² *Ibid.*, May 20, 1960, p. 859.

Government had supplied a special train to take the representatives to Rome for an audience with the Pope and a visit to the Rossi Longhi Processing Center for Emigration at Latina on the return trip. Later in the session the Italian Government also served as host for a visit of the representatives to the Vocational Training Center for emigrants at Salerno. ICEM had assisted in previous years in the establishment of both institutions through one-time grants of \$250,000 each.

Report of Director on Work of Committee in 1959

ICEM moved 105,706 migrants and refugees in 1959, an increase of 11,000 over the movement achieved in 1958. The increase in ICEM movements contrasted conspicuously with the continuing decline in all movements from Europe in 1959. In analyzing ICEM's experience the Netherlands representative suggested that the upward trend of movements under ICEM auspices undoubtedly reflected the role played by the counseling of potential emigrants, assisted by information supplied by the immigration countries through ICEM with respect to the opportunities for immigrants in the receiving countries. The discussion developed the point that, whereas counseling with respect to emigration was generally available to refugees and probably accounted in part for the continuing movement of refugees in economic circumstances not generally favorable to migration, such counseling for normal migrants had only developed in the Netherlands. The Netherlands representative made the further observation that approximately one-half of the emigrants leaving Holland do so at the instigation of relatives and friends who have preceded them in emigration. The remaining half decide to emigrate as a result of the counseling provided by the Netherlands Government and voluntary agencies in the Netherlands.

The Council also noted that for the first time in 1959 the Australian Government had agreed to experiment with migrant loan arrangements for the passage to Australia of a selected group of 600 migrants from Italy. Australia had previously as a matter of principle opposed repayments on passage loans by migrants.

The World Refugee Year provided new opportunities for the movement of refugees during 1959. ICEM moved a total of 42,032 refugees during the year, of which 1,525 were White Russian refugees

from the Far East. Generally speaking, total movements of migrants and refugees to the Latin American countries were disappointing in 1959.

Progress Report for 1960

The trend in movements already evident in 1959 continued in 1960, namely, higher movements of both normal migrants and refugees to Australia and lower movements to the Latin American countries. As a consequence of the higher costs of movements to Australia, ICEM will require an additional \$1,300,000 in non-per-capita income not yet in sight in 1960 if all movements offered are to take place and migration services currently afforded are to be maintained. Some \$500,000 of this amount will be required for the servicing and movement of refugees. The Director reported that to date contributions for this latter purpose had been disappointing in 1960.

Resignation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

In response to the Director's report that the Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had notified him of intention to resign from the Committee for financial reasons and because of new policies on immigration, the Council on recommendation of the Executive Committee authorized the chairman of the Executive Committee and the Council to transmit a letter to the Government of Rhodesia and Nyasaland appealing for a reconsideration of this decision on the basis that continuance of membership in the Committee through a contribution to the administrative expenditures without a contribution to operations would not prove financially burdensome to that Government.

Review of Services Afforded by Missions

The Director reported that, in response to a request by the Executive Committee made at its special session in January, the administration had initiated a review of all services afforded by the ICEM country missions to determine whether they should be maintained under existing conditions. Savings totaling over \$100,000 were already envisaged for 1960 as a result of reductions in staffs in the missions in Australia, Austria, Germany, Italy, and the United States. The Council in considering this report recognized that the review in process would also assist the administration to present at the next session a completely docu-

mented justification of all migration services provided by ICEM as of the date of the report. The purpose of the report would be twofold, to assure the Council that the services in question could not otherwise be performed by an interested government and to serve as an interpretation of the services deemed necessary to be performed by ICEM in the effort to raise more funds from governments to support them.

Pilot Projects

The Council learned with satisfaction that all of the government officials who had received special training in Canada in 1959 (project 1) were now engaged either in the selection or the placement of migrants for Latin American countries and that the vocational training of emigrants at the training center at Salerno, Italy, was well under way (project 2). In response to the appeal for funds in support of pilot project 3, the proposed farm training and placement center for immigrants in Argentina, pressed vigorously by the Argentine representative and the Director, the U.S. representative indicated the possibility of a U.S. contribution of \$220,000 provided certain essential conditions could be met. The Italian representative reported that a contribution of \$100,000 from his Government was virtually assured, and the Spanish representative made a firm pledge of a contribution of \$10,000. These contributions coupled with the anticipated contribution of \$191,900 from the Argentine Government practically assure the initiation of the project after certain modifications required by the conditions of the U.S. contribution have been worked out.

Social Security for Migrant Workers

An Italian proposal advanced at previous sessions and repeated at the current session, that ICEM share with the International Labor Office the expenses of joint research into the complicated questions of social security provisions for migrant workers in Latin American countries, failed to receive majority support from members of the Council. Many representatives, including the U.S. representative, took the position that the field of social security legislation lies predominantly within the competence of the ILO and that the proposed study would in fact prove to be but the first step in a long process of developing a draft multilateral convention on the subject to

be submitted to governments for adoption. The prospects of helpful action in the field of social security legislation for migrants seemed quite remote to a majority of the Council.

Migrant Contributions to Costs of Passage

On the initiative of the U.S. representative in the Executive Committee and the Council, the Council after lengthy debate adopted a resolution requesting the Director to explore every possible opportunity to place a larger proportion of the movements under ICEM auspices on a migrant loan basis. The majority of the members of the Council approved in principle migrant contributions toward transport costs by prepayments before movement or repayments on passage loans within 3 years after arrival in the immigration country. Australia and the Netherlands, however, vigorously opposed migrant repayments on passage loans on the ground that the burden of repayment for passage would handicap and delay the migrants' adjustment in the receiving countries and would have the further indirect effect of reducing the numbers of those willing to emigrate. When faced with the alternative of raising government contributions in lieu of repayments by migrants on passage loans, which experience has shown can be from 30 to 90 percent of the costs of passage depending on economic conditions in particular receiving countries, Australia and the Netherlands agreed to the adoption of the resolution.

Financing the Transport of Refugees

The Director reported that, after giving effect to all contributions received or pledged in 1960 for the purpose, \$393,682 was still required in additional contributions for the transport of refugees from Europe and \$47,880 for services connected with refugee movements. These appeared to be the requirements after all governments which had contributed in previous years to the movement of refugees had recorded their contributions for 1960. The additional total of \$441,562, therefore, would have to be sought from new sources and particularly from the special contributions resulting from the World Refugee Year. The ensuing discussion produced a number of suggestions on ways of bringing to the attention of World Refugee Year committees in member and nonmember countries ICEM's need for funds

for refugees, and a resolution appealing to all governments for further contributions for the movement of refugees in 1960 was unanimously adopted.

Subcommittee on Finance

Refining and restating a proposal which they had advanced at the previous session of the Council and at the special meeting of the Executive Committee in January, the Italian and Netherlands representatives proposed the establishment by the Council of a subcommittee on finance of five governments to consider in the first instance all financial questions arising under the budget for operations referred to it by the Council, the Executive Committee, or the Director. As the terms of reference of the subcommittee are also within the terms of reference of the Executive Committee, the subcommittee is to report its recommendations and conclusions to the Executive Committee. The proposal resulted from a growing conviction on the part of some of the larger contributing governments that substantial improvements might be made in administration practices in estimating income and expenditures in a given financial year. In 1959, particularly, the administration's estimates of required operational income proved unrealistic, and governments were requested to make special additional contributions toward the end of the year to preclude the cancellation of movements which, in later experience, proved not to be in jeopardy. Furthermore, the organization as a whole has not yet developed satisfactory methods of raising the non-per-capita or lump-sum income required to meet the annual shortfall in per capita transport income and the expenditures of \$2,500,000 to \$3,000,000 for migration services. The proposal provided all governments with an opportunity to express their views on ICEM's financial problems. After full discussion the proposal was finally adopted, and Australia, Brazil, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States were elected as members of the subcommittee.

The Provident Fund

By inadvertence the interest accruing from the deposits of the contributions of the organization and of the staff members to the provident fund had been treated in previous years as miscellaneous income and applied to ICEM's operations. On the

proposal of the U.S. representative, supported by the Director and the Staff Association, the Council adopted a resolution distributing such interest to the accounts of the individual staff-member beneficiaries of the provident fund as from January 1, 1957, provided that the expenses of administering the provident fund, if identifiable, are deducted as a first charge and that such distributions can be funded within the limits of the current year's administrative budget or, failing this, be made a charge upon the administrative budget of later years as required. The Director assured the Council that the funds required, which would not exceed \$40,000, could be found within the limits of the administrative budget for 1960.

Budget and Plan of Expenditure for 1960

The Council considered the current status of the budget and plan of operations for 1960. The Director advised that governments had made non-per-capita or free-fund contributions (in addition to per capita contributions) totaling \$3,420,000 in 1960 against estimated requirements of \$4,350,962, thus leaving some \$930,000 still to be raised, chiefly to cover expenditures for moving refugees and for services and technical assistance to governments. These contributions were \$900,000 higher than in 1959. So advised, the Council authorized the Director to continue operations after July 1, 1960, at the level provided in the budget for 1960 already adopted, but, should the remaining required income fail to materialize in the last 6 months of the year, he should notify the emigration and immigration governments 3 weeks in advance of the impending cancellation of any movement of normal migrants because of lack of funds and give all governments the same notice in the event that he found it necessary to cancel any refugee movements.

Changes in U.S. Contributions to Operations in 1961

During the discussions in the Executive Committee and the Council on such subjects as migrant contributions, financing the transport of refugees, and status of the budget and plan of expenditure for 1960, the U.S. representative seized every opportunity to notify the other member governments that beginning in 1961 the U.S. Government would make contributions to operations in such a manner as to reduce progressively the proportion which the U.S. contribution presently bears to the

contributions of all governments, from 45 percent to 33½ percent. This objective might be accomplished within a period of 3 years. Similar notices were given in two private meetings of the five governments which were later elected as members of the subcommittee on finance and in private conversations with the representatives of other interested governments. It was explained that the United States was not convinced of the present necessity to contribute at the level of previous years to the movement of normal migrants, particularly those emigrating from and to countries whose economies had experienced substantial recovery since ICEM initiated subsidized movements in 1952. The governments were advised that the United States would endeavor to allocate its contributions increasingly in the future to the support of ICEM services and pilot projects of interest to the United States, particularly those designed to stimulate migration under any and all auspices and under varied methods of financing rather than to the continuing subsidization of actual movements at present levels. The governments were assured nonetheless that the United States would not fail to provide appropriate support for the movement of refugees as long as refugees require ICEM assistance in resettlement.

Having concluded its work the Council adjourned its 12th session late in the evening of May 13, 1960, and agreed to reconvene in the next session at Geneva on December 1, 1960. The Executive Committee agreed to reconvene at Geneva on November 21, 1960.

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Council Committee on Non-governmental Organizations. Further Steps Towards Full Convertibility of Currencies. Statement submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce. E/C.2/553. June 6, 1960. 4 pp.

Council Committee on Non-governmental Organizations. Taxation of Royalties. Statement submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce. E/C.2/554. June 8, 1960. 13 pp.

¹Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

TREATY INFORMATION

Agricultural Commodities Agreement Signed by U.S. and Poland

Press release 404 dated July 21

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

An agreement was concluded at Washington on July 21 by the United States and Poland which provides for the sale to Poland of agricultural commodities having a total export market value of \$130 million, including certain ocean transportation costs. Under the provisions of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (Public Law 480), Poland will purchase surplus agricultural commodities, including wheat, cotton, barley, corn, grain sorghums, edible oils, tobacco, and nonfat dry milk.

As provided in the act payment will be in local currency (Polish zlotys). This currency will be deposited to the credit of the United States and will be available for use by the U.S. Government. The agreement provides that, beginning July 1, 1970, the Polish Government will repurchase for dollars at the rate of \$4,330,000 annually such zlotys as have not been used.

Similar agreements under Public Law 480 between the United States and Poland since 1957 have provided for a total of \$235.3 million in sales of agricultural commodities. An additional total of \$61 million in credits has been extended by the Export-Import Bank which has been used for the purchase of equipment, agricultural commodities, and poliomyelitis vaccine.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Polish People's Republic:

Recognizing the desirability of expanding trade in agricultural commodities between their two countries in a manner which would not displace usual marketings

of the United States of America of these commodities or unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities;

Considering that the purchase for zlotys of surplus agricultural commodities produced in the United States of America will assist in achieving such an expansion of trade;

Desiring to set forth the understandings which will govern the sales, as specified below, of surplus agricultural commodities to Poland pursuant to Title 1 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the measures which the two Governments will take individually and collectively in furthering the expansion of trade in such commodities;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Sales for Zlotys

1. Subject to the availability of commodities for programming under the Act and to issuance by the Government of the United States of America and acceptance by the Government of the Polish People's Republic of purchase authorizations, the Government of the United States of America undertakes to finance the sales for zlotys to purchasers authorized by the Government of the Polish People's Republic of the following agricultural commodities determined to be surplus pursuant to the Act, in the amounts indicated:

Commodity	Market value (million)
Wheat -----	\$61.5
Barley -----	12.5
Corn -----	2.5
Grain sorghums -----	4.5
Cotton -----	28.0
Soybean/cottonseed oil -----	7.5
Tobacco -----	1.5
Nonfat dry milk -----	1.5
Ocean transportation (50%) -----	10.5
Total -----	\$130.0

2. Applications for purchase authorizations will be made within 90 calendar days after the effective date of this Agreement. Purchase authorizations will be issued promptly and will include provisions relating to the sale and delivery of commodities, the time and circumstances of deposit of the zlotys accruing from such sale, and other relevant matters.

ARTICLE II

Uses of Zlotys

1. The two Governments agree that the zlotys accruing to the Government of the United States of America as a consequence of the sales made pursuant to this Agreement will be used by the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with Section 104 of the Act, to help develop new markets for United States agricultural commodities under subsection (a) thereof; to finance the purchase of goods or services for other countries under subsection (d) thereof; to pay United States obligations under subsection (f) thereof; to finance edu-

national exchange activities under subsection (h) thereof; to finance the translation, publication and distribution of books and periodicals under subsection (i) thereof; and for other expenditures by the Government of the United States of America under subsections (k), (l), (m), (n), (q), and (r) thereof.

2. The zlotys accruing under this Agreement shall be expended by the Government of the United States of America, for the purposes stated in paragraph 1 of this Article, in such manner and order of priority as the Government of the United States of America shall determine. It is understood that, with respect to the purchase of goods or services for other countries, the types, quantities and prices will be subject to negotiation between the two Governments.

ARTICLE III

Deposit of Zlotys

1. The deposit of zlotys to the account of the Government of the United States of America in payment for the commodities and for ocean transportation costs financed by the Government of the United States of America (except excess costs resulting from the requirement that United States flag vessels be used) shall be made at the highest of any rate of exchange (i.e., the largest number of zlotys per U.S. dollar) established by the Government of the Polish People's Republic or any agency thereof, prevailing on the dates of dollar disbursements by the Government of the United States of America.

2. The two Governments agree that the following procedure shall apply with respect to the zlotys deposited to the account of the Government of the United States of America under this Agreement.

(a) On the date of the deposit of such zlotys to the account of the United States they shall, at the same rate of exchange at which they were deposited, be converted and transferred to a special dollar denominated account to the credit of the United States Government in the National Bank of Poland.

(b) Withdrawals in zlotys from such special dollar denominated account by the United States for uses referred to in Article II of this Agreement other than the purchase of goods or services for other countries shall be paid by the National Bank of Poland at the highest of any rate of exchange (i.e., the largest number of zlotys per U.S. dollar) established by the Government of the Polish People's Republic or any agency thereof, prevailing on the date of the withdrawal, provided that if such rate is more appreciated than the rate at which zlotys were deposited under paragraph 1 of this Article, the rate in paragraph 1 shall apply.

(c) Payment for purchases of goods or services for other countries referred to in Article II of this Agreement shall be made by reducing the balance in the dollar denominated account by an amount equal to the dollar prices of such purchases agreed upon by the two Governments.

(d) If any unused balance remains in such special dollar denominated account on and after July 1, 1970, the

Government of the Polish People's Republic agrees that if the United States Government shall so elect, the National Bank of Poland will sell to the Government of the United States the sum of \$4,330,000 in dollar exchange annually, beginning on July 1, 1970, and on each succeeding July 1, such dollar exchange to be paid for by reducing the balance in the dollar denominated account by the same amount.

ARTICLE IV

General Undertakings

1. The Government of the Polish People's Republic agrees that it will take all possible measures to prevent the resale or transshipment to other countries or the use for other than domestic purposes (except where such resale, transshipment or use is specifically approved by the Government of the United States of America), of the surplus agricultural commodities purchased pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement, and to assure that the purchase of such commodities does not result in increased availability of these or like commodities for export to other countries.

2. The two Governments agree that they will take reasonable precautions to assure that all sales or purchases of surplus agricultural commodities pursuant to this Agreement will not displace usual marketings of the United States of America in these commodities or unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities.

3. The Government of the Polish People's Republic agrees to furnish, upon request of the United States of America, information on the progress of the program particularly with respect to the arrival and condition of commodities and information relating to exports of the same or like commodities.

ARTICLE V

Consultation

The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application of this Agreement or to the operation of arrangements carried out pursuant to this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

Entry Into Force

The Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective representatives, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the English and Polish languages this 21st day of July, 1960.

For the Government of the
United States of America:

THOMAS C. MANN

For the Government
of the Polish People's Republic:

TADEUSZ LYCHOWSKI

U.S. and Iran Terminate 1943 Trade Agreement

BILATERAL

Press release 419 dated July 28

The Government of Iran has undertaken a comprehensive economic stabilization program which became necessary, in part, because of a growing balance-of-payments problem. Part of this program will involve modification of the Iranian schedule of tariffs on imported goods, particularly those not considered essential to Iran's economic development. In order that the Government of Iran might exercise complete freedom of action in this field, it requested the U.S. Government to agree to the mutual termination of the reciprocal trade agreement of 1943¹ between Iran and the United States. The President has considered that it is consistent with our friendly relations with Iran to agree to the Government of Iran's request. The exchange of notes² terminating the U.S.-Iran reciprocal trade agreement of April 8, 1943, took place on July 27, 1960, and the termination of the agreement will become effective August 26, 1960.

Future U.S.-Iran trade relations will be governed by terms of the 1955 treaty of amity, economic relations, and consular rights (effective June 16, 1957),³ which contains several provisions also found in the 1943 trade agreement.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Signed at Quebec October 16, 1945. Entered into force October 16, 1945. TIAS 1554. *Acceptance deposited:* Togo, May 23, 1960.

Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959.⁴ *Ratification deposited:* Belgium, July 26, 1960.

Sugar

International sugar agreement of 1958. Done at London December 1, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1959; for the United States October 9, 1959. TIAS 4389. *Cessation of application to:* Somaliland Protectorate, June 23, 1960.

¹ 58 Stat. 1322.

² Not printed.

³ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2852.

⁴ Not in force.

Argentina

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of July 29, 1955 (TIAS 3229). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. *Entered into force:* July 27, 1960.

Burma

Agreement supplementing the economic cooperation agreement of March 21, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3261 and 4326). Effected by exchange of notes at Rangoon June 29, 1960. Entered into force June 29, 1960.

Italy

Agreement relating to a weapons production program. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome July 7, 1960. Entered into force July 7, 1960.

Agreement concerning a special program of facilities assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome June 24, 1954. Entered into force June 24, 1954. TIAS 3110. *Terminated:* July 7, 1960.

Agreement expanding the program of facilities assistance provided for by the agreement of June 24, 1954. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome July 9 and 16, 1958. Entered into force July 16, 1958. TIAS 4194. *Terminated:* July 7, 1960.

Muscat, Oman, and Dependencies

Treaty of amity, economic relations, and consular rights. Signed at Salalah December 20, 1958. Entered into force June 11, 1960. *Proclaimed by the President:* July 8, 1960.

New Zealand

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of June 13, 1956 (TIAS 3526). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. *Entered into force:* July 22, 1960.

Thailand

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of March 13, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3522 and 3842). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. *Entered into force:* July 26, 1960.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Foreign Service Examination To Be Held December 10, 1960

Press release 418 dated July 28

The U.S. Department of State will hold its next written Foreign Service officer examination on December 10, 1960, in approximately 65 centers throughout the United States and at Foreign Service posts abroad. In announcing the examination the Department is seeking to interest undergraduate and graduate students who have studied in such fields as economics, public and business administration,

language and area studies, history, and political science.

To be eligible to take this examination, candidates must be at least 21 and under 31 years of age as of October 24, 1960. Persons 20 years of age may also apply if a college graduate or a senior in college. They must be American citizens or at least 9 years' standing. Although a candidate's spouse need not be a citizen on the date of the examination, citizenship must have been obtained prior to the date of appointment.

Candidates who are successful in the 1-day written examination, which tests their facility in English expression, general ability, and background, will be given oral examinations within 9 months by panels which will meet in regional centers throughout the United States. Fluency in a language, while not an examination requirement, must be attained before an officer can advance in the Service. Those candidates who pass the oral test will then be given a physical examination and a background investigation. If found qualified in all respects, candidates will be placed on a register and appointments will be made therefrom as needed, in the order of examination scores. The names of candidates failing to receive appointments within 30 months from the date of the written examination will be removed from this register. Upon appointment, the candidate will receive three commissions from the President—as Foreign Service Officer Class 8, as Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, and as Vice Consul of Career.

A newly appointed Foreign Service officer may serve his first tour of duty either in the Department's headquarters in Washington, D.C., or at one of the 286 American embassies, legations, and consulates abroad. The new officer may be assigned to several functions to give him varied training and experience in consular work, in administrative assignments, including ones in the accounting and management fields, and in political, economic, international finance, and commercial reporting.

The starting salary for the newly appointed Foreign Service officers ranges from \$5,625 to \$6,345 per year, depending upon the qualifications, experience, marital status, and age at the time of appointment. Also certain allowances, plus insurance, medical, educational, and retirement benefits are granted, as well as annual and sick leave.

Application forms and other information may be obtained immediately by writing to the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. The closing date for filing the application is October 24, 1960.

Post at Abidjan Raised to Embassy, Accredited to Four African States

The Department of State announced on July 31 (press release 423 dated July 29) that the American consulate at Abidjan, Republic of the Ivory Coast, will be elevated to an Embassy on August 7, 1960. This Embassy will be accredited to each of four African Republics to attain independence during the first week in August. They are the Republic of Dahomey, which will achieve independence on August 1, the Republic of Niger, on August 3, the Republic of Upper Volta, on August 5, and the Republic of the Ivory Coast, on August 7. Donald R. Norland, U.S. consul at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, since December 1958, has been named Chargé d'Affaires to each of the four new states. The consulate at Abidjan was first opened on July 29, 1957.

Resignations

Mason Sears as U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, effective July 31. (For an exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Mr. Sears, see White House press release dated July 21.)

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 25-31

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. Release issued prior to July 25 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 404 of July 21.

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414	7/25	U.S.-Canadian Columbia River talks.
415	7/27	Visit of Congolese Prime Minister Lumumba (rewrite).
416	7/27	Herter: welcoming remarks to Prime Minister Lumumba.
417	7/27	Lumumba: response to welcoming remarks.
418	7/28	Foreign Service officer examination.
419	7/28	Termination of 1943 trade agreement with Iran.
420	7/28	U.S. coal group to India.
421	7/29	Loan to Nepal.
*422	7/29	Rubottom nominated Ambassador to Argentina (biographic details).
423	7/29	Consulate at Abidjan, Ivory Coast, raised to embassy.

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COMMUNIST ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS

the

Department

of

State

The Communist economic offensive continued its rapid pace in 1959 and early 1960, not only reaching new levels for many of its activities but also expanding into new areas. Countries in Africa and Latin America became the focal points of major bloc efforts to establish beachheads in Western spheres of influence.

This new pamphlet, based on the most recent information available to the U.S. Government regarding the Communist program of economic penetration, brings up to date the Department of State study entitled *The Communist Economic Threat*, published in 1959. After an initial discussion of bloc economic policy in the less developed areas, the 38-page booklet describes the nature of the offensive, the trade drive, and the areas of concentration.

Publication 7020

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Bulletin

Vol. XLIII, No. 1104

August 22, 1960

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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August 22, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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U.S. Delegation to Conference on Disarmament Submits Report to Secretary Herter

The Department of State made public on August 6 (press release 430 dated August 5) the following official report of the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, held at Geneva March 15-June 28, 1960, which was submitted to the Secretary of State by Fredrick M. Eaton, chairman of the U.S. delegation.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

I. BACKGROUND

The Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament held 48 sessions in Geneva between March 15, 1960 and June 28, 1960. The committee recessed between April 29 and June 7.

The committee originated as a result of an initiative of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and USSR. The Foreign Ministers of these countries, in a communique of September 7, 1959, declared that:

As was announced on August 5, 1959, prior to the closing of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva, the Foreign Ministers of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics discussed possibilities by which further negotiations on the question of disarmament could be most effectively advanced.¹ Agreement has now been reached among the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to set up a committee to consider disarmament matters. Understanding has also been

reached that the participants in the disarmament committee will be the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, and Rumania, subject to the agreement of all the named states.

The United Nations Charter recognizes that disarmament matters are of world-wide interest and concern. Accordingly ultimate responsibility for general disarmament measures rests with the United Nations. The setting up of the disarmament committee in no way diminishes or encroaches upon the United Nations' responsibilities in this field. In setting up the committee the special responsibility resting on the great powers to find a basis for agreement is taken into account.

The four governments conceive of this committee as a useful means of exploring through mutual consultations avenues of possible progress toward such agreements and recommendations on the limitation and reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces under effective international control as may, in the first instance, be of particular relevance to the countries participating in these deliberations. Furthermore, it is the hope of the four governments that the results achieved in these deliberations will provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations.

It is the intention of the four governments that the United Nations Disarmament Commission will be kept appropriately informed of the progress of the deliberations of the committee. For this purpose the four governments have agreed that the committee will present reports on its work to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and through it to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. As a first step in this direction, they have requested the Secretary General, in accordance with Resolution 1252-D (XIII), to convene the Disarmament Commission during September 1959 if feasible, in order that the members may be fully informed of the nature and purpose of the disarmament committee.

The four governments will consult with the United Nations Secretary General with respect to providing appropriate facilities to the newly established committee. They expect that the committee will begin its work early in 1960 in Geneva.

¹For text of a Four Power declaration on disarmament, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1959, p. 269.

The General Assembly on November 20, 1959, adopted Resolution 1378 (XIV),² in which it called upon governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The same resolution requested the Secretary General to make available to the ten-nation committee for thorough consideration the U.K. declaration of September 17, 1959, the Soviet declaration of September 18, 1959,³ and other proposals or suggestions made, as well as the records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the First Committee at which the question of general and complete disarmament was discussed. The General Assembly also expressed the hope in this Resolution that "measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time."

II. THE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

A. Before the Recess of April 29

At the opening session of the conference on March 15th the Soviet bloc renewed its support of the plan presented by Chairman Khrushchev to the United Nations General Assembly on September 18, 1959.

The plan called for complete and general disarmament to be carried out, within a four-year period, in three stages. Stage one proposed significant reductions in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces. The second stage called for the complete disbandment of all remaining armed forces and the elimination of all foreign military bases. The final stage proposed the total elimination and/or destruction of all means of waging war, including abolition of all military institutions, courses and organizations.

The Allied plan was formally submitted at the second session of the Conference.⁴ As an ultimate goal the preamble of the plan looked toward a secure, free and peaceful world disarmed under

effective international control where disputes would be settled in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. To attain this objective the plan proposed three stages. The first and second stages detailed specific measures of disarmament which, in the first instance, would serve to stabilize the existing military environment. These two stages set forth basic measures to: guard against surprise attack or accidental war; halt future production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; reduce existing nuclear weapons stockpiles; bring about beginning balanced reductions in conventional arms and armed forces and initiate steps toward assuring the peaceful use of outer space. The third or final stage outlined far-reaching measures of disarmament. These aimed at the elimination of armaments to levels required only for internal security purposes and the build-up of an international enforcement system backed by universally accepted rules of law.

During the first three weeks of the negotiations each side probed the position of the other side.

The Soviet bloc, in asking the Allied powers to elaborate on their program, argued that the Allied plan did not provide for the total elimination of all means of warfare and did not embody concrete measures which, within a fixed time period, would lead to general and complete disarmament. They claimed that it was not responsive to Resolution 1378 (XIV) of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Allies, in turn, noted that the Soviet bloc, while having stated its willingness to embark upon a program of complete and general disarmament, omitted any reference to specific measures by which this objective could be reached; its plan had unrealistic time limits and avoided control measures in the early stages. In particular, the Allies cited the fact that it detailed no specific measures which would lead to the first essential requirement—that of halting the arms race and securing a generally stable military situation.

Midway through the conference's first round, it became apparent that neither side was prepared materially to change its basic position.

At this juncture, the Soviet bloc took a new tack. On April 8, the Soviet representative tabled, ostensibly to find a way out of the apparent stalemate, a document entitled "Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament".

² For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 23, 1959, p. 766.

³ For text, see U.N. doc. A/4219.

⁴ For text of a working paper on general disarmament released by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, together with texts of a statement made by Ambassador Eaton at the opening session of the Conference and President Eisenhower's letter of Mar. 12, 1960, to Mr. Eaton, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1960, p. 511.

This stated that general and complete disarmament should: include the disbanding of all armaments and armed forces; be achieved in a sequence of three stages within four years; be implemented under international control; result in states having only internal security forces of an agreed size; and not be interrupted by any condition not covered in the treaty. In addition, a so-called "concrete measure" was proposed. To back up an agreement on principles by a deed, the bloc suggested that states possessing nuclear weapons should "solemnly declare" that they would not be the first to use them.

The Soviet bloc's "General principles" document was a step backward rather than a step forward. It was nothing more than a rephrased version of objectives contained in the Khrushchev plan. As to the proposed measure of renouncing first use of nuclear weapons, the West's view was that uncontrolled paper proclamations of intent which in no way would assure world stability or security were unacceptable.

At this point, the conference seemed to be stymied. In an effort to break the apparent deadlock, the Allies, on April 26, presented to the conference a "statement on conditions" for disarmament. It was hoped that such a statement would overcome the intransigence on the Communist side and permit negotiations to proceed on specific measures.

The statement declared that the disarmament process and any agreement finally reached must fulfill the following conditions: disarmament must be carried out in stages and as rapidly as possible, but with no fixed timetable; nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced in the interest of equal security for all countries; disarmament measures must be effectively controlled to ensure full compliance; and disarmament measures must be negotiated progressively according to the possibility of their early implementation and effective control. The statement concluded that the final goal of a program of general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be to achieve the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and the reduction and limitation of all types of forces and weapons to levels required only for internal security and the fulfillment of obligations under the U.N. Charter.

While the Communist countries did not spe-

cifically reject the Western paper, their reaction offered no encouragement to the Allied hope that the conference could turn toward a discussion of specific measures.

The conference recessed on April 29 in anticipation of the meeting of Heads of Government.

At the last session the Soviet bloc reiterated its determination to seek, as the first prerequisite of the conference, agreement on general principles for complete and total disarmament.

For its part, the West made it quite clear that unless and until the Soviet bloc was prepared to negotiate and agree on a number of specific disarmament measures, the conference's prospects for success were dim.

The Allies had hoped that through general probing this first round would indicate possible areas of common interest for negotiation. This unfortunately was not the case.

B. After the Conference Reconvened on June 7

Upon the resumption of the conference on June 7, the Soviet Delegation submitted the paper, Basic Clauses of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, which had been transmitted by the Soviet Union to the Western governments on June 2,⁵ as well as to some 80 odd additional nations, and which revised the earlier Soviet proposals of September 18, 1959. The Soviet Delegation maintained that these new proposals represented an attempt to meet some of the views expressed by the Western Delegation prior to the recess.

The Soviet Delegation was told that the Western Delegations and their governments would carefully study the Soviet proposals in the hope that they might represent a serious desire to negotiate.

The work of the conference thereafter consisted primarily of two endeavors, first a renewed effort by the Western Delegations to have the Soviet and other Eastern European delegations discuss the concrete measures of disarmament as set forth in the Western proposals of March 16, and secondly attempts by the Western delegations to obtain clarifications regarding the new Soviet paper, in order to facilitate study of those proposals by Western governments.

Our efforts to get the Soviet delegation to dis-

⁵ For text of a U.S. reply to a Soviet note of June 2, see *ibid.*, June 27, 1960, p. 1018.

discuss specific practical measures of disarmament that would enable the world to make a start toward the goal of general and complete disarmament were unsuccessful. In spite of the fact that we invited the Soviet Delegation to choose any one of the measures in the March 16 paper as a basis for initial discussion, the Soviet Delegation persisted in refusing to discuss these proposals or the inspection requirements for each. The excuse used was to charge that the March 16 proposals were essentially proposals for control without significant measures of disarmament.

The Western effort to obtain clarification of the Soviet proposals of June 2 was made by a series of questions which were put to the Soviet Delegation. Only some of these questions were answered during the course of the discussions and the answers were unsatisfactory. The questions on control which were submitted by the French Delegation were answered evasively. The Soviet and other Eastern European delegations spent most of their time making propaganda speeches charging that the Western delegations were avoiding substantive responses to the new Soviet proposals and were displaying a negative and inflexible attitude.

In spite of the evasiveness of many Soviet answers to questions, it became clear that the new Soviet paper was primarily a change in format from the earlier September 18 proposals, and that most of the unrealistic and unacceptable concepts of that earlier document remained. Various changes which the Soviet Delegation maintained had been made in the September 18 paper in order to meet Western views proved in fact to be illusory or tied to impossible conditions.

Thus, for example, the Soviet Delegation maintained that moving a proposal for elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles from the last to the first stage of a disarmament program was in response to views expressed by the French Delegation, whereas in fact the Soviet proposal would have required the free world to commit itself as a first step to destroy within a matter of months its essential means of collective self-defense.

Similarly, the discussions showed that Soviet indication of a possible willingness to abandon its previous insistence on a four year time table for complete disarmament was merely the abandonment of this particular figure but not of the impractical principle upon which it is based, that a

fixed time table for the entire complex disarmament process must be agreed on before any steps can be taken to halt the arms race. As a corollary position the Soviet Union continued to insist that a time table for complex and radical disarmament measures be agreed to without the benefit of any joint studies to determine the problems or even feasibility of implementing each measure.

With regard to the critical question of control and inspection, there appeared to be little change in the Soviet position even though the Soviet paper of June 2 devoted more space to the subject than did the Soviet paper of September 18. The discussions showed that the Soviet Delegation was unwilling to accept even in principle that international inspectors would have the right to determine if clandestine installations existed in excess of agreed amounts; the Soviet position would limit the inspectors merely to counting those particular installations or forces that a government declared it was eliminating.

Finally, the responses made by the Soviet Delegation to some of the questions put to it made it apparent that a fundamental difference between positions remained. The position expressed by the Soviet Delegation was that the whole range of general and complete disarmament must be negotiated in detail in the Ten Nation Conference and then submitted to a world conference where all the nations of the world would have to approve a complex world-wide treaty before any actual measures to halt the arms race could be instituted. This approach would, of course, foredoom the world to endless discussion and no action could be taken to get the disarmament program started while negotiations were continuing on later stages.

The U.S. Delegation indicated to the Soviet Delegation the general nature of our concerns about the above indicated Soviet positions. The U.S. Delegation had also indicated in earlier meetings those elements of the June 2 paper which appeared to represent some slight movement toward a more rational approach to disarmament, such as the Soviet recognition, at least in principle, of the need to develop improved peace-keeping arrangements within the United Nations to assure the security of nations as national forces are progressively reduced, and the apparent recognition of the need to study at an early stage the arrangements necessary for the cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons.

Notwithstanding the serious and fundamental faults in the Soviet paper which the discussions in the conference had revealed, and despite the fact that the Soviet Delegation had refused to discuss the allied proposals of March 16, the U.S. Representative returned to Washington for consultations during the week of June 19. The Soviet Representative, Mr. [Valerian] Zorin, was informed by the U.S. Representative that he was returning to Washington to discuss the various views that had been presented during the discussions since the recess. During these Washington consultations a revised U.S. proposal was prepared. This new paper was based on the same sound basic principle of that of the Western proposals of March 16, namely, that we should proceed with earlier measures of disarmament and then discuss the details of later and more difficult stages of general and complete disarmament. The new U.S. paper did, however, clarify and amplify certain of the proposals put forth by the Western delegations on March 16 and it contained modifications which reflected views expressed by our allies and certain of those expressed by the Soviet Union. Thus, its purpose was to provide a fresh basis for advancing the negotiations.

The U.S. Representative informed Mr. Zorin before the meeting of June 27 that discussions in Washington had been fruitful and that the U.S. Delegation would table a new paper within the next few days, following consultations with allied delegations.

In the light of these facts, the subsequent action of the Soviet and other Eastern European delegations during the meeting of June 27 in withdrawing from the conference clearly demonstrated that their governments were not interested in serious negotiations but rather were concerned only with propaganda.

The action of the Polish Representative who was acting as Chairman of the meeting was unprecedented in the annals of international conferences. The Polish Representative refused to permit Western representatives who had been inscribed to speak the opportunity to make statements, recognizing only communist representatives. He then attempted the illegal procedure of declaring the meeting and conference ended. His departure from the room required the United Kingdom Representative to take the chair for the remainder of the meeting. The U.S. Delegation,

in view of the actions by the communist delegations, tabled the new U.S. paper (TNCD/7). It was not possible, of course, to present the paper as a Five Power document, since none of the Allied delegations had had time fully to consult with their governments.⁶

The Conference held one subsequent meeting on June 28 in order to give the communist delegations an opportunity to reconsider their arbitrary withdrawal. The communist delegations, however, did not attend the June 28 meeting. The Conference adopted the following communique at the end of the meeting:

The forty-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament was held in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 28 June 1960, under the chairmanship of the representative of the United Kingdom.

The Conference requested the United Nations Secretariat to forward all records of the Conference to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and, through it, to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The Conference decided that the verbatim record of the forty-eighth meeting should be made public as soon as possible.

The Conference adjourned at 11:10 AM.

The United States Delegation, together with the delegations of Canada, France, Italy and the United Kingdom remained on in Geneva in order to be available in the event the governments of the communist delegations reconsidered their actions and decided to resume negotiations. The failure of the communist governments to return their delegations to the Ten Nation Conference, however, created a situation in which further useful work by the Conference was impossible.

The United States Delegation expresses its regret that the communist governments have, by their actions, prevented successful negotiations on disarmament. The importance to the world of the task of halting the arms race and of achieving balanced and staged disarmament remains unchanged by recent communist actions in the Conference.

It is important that the United States continue its efforts to seek safeguarded disarmament agreements that will reduce the danger of war and per-

⁶For text of the U.S. proposals, together with a Department statement and an exchange of communications between the U.S. and Soviet Governments regarding the termination of the Conference, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

mit the devotion of a greater portion of man's creative capacity to the construction of a better world for all peoples. It remains, however, for the communist governments, and particularly the Soviet Union, to decide that they are more interested in serious practical negotiation than in propaganda before this hope can be realized.

III. CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

A. Secretariat

As a result of consultations with the Secretary General of the United Nations, all facilities and services for the conference were provided by the United Nations Secretariat under the direction of Dr. Dragan Protitch, who was present as the personal representative of the Secretary General.

B. Rules of Procedure

Prior to the first private meeting of the conference, agreement was reached on the following document (TNCD/INF. 1):

AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS

Agreement has been reached by the representatives of the ten Nations on the following matters. Modifications may be made by agreement of the ten Nations.

1. Nature of Meetings

All meetings will be private, except when agreed otherwise by the ten Nations.

2. Time of Meetings

There will normally be one meeting per day at 10:30 AM Mondays through Fridays. If experience proves that this time creates difficulties for any Delegation the matter may be raised again for further discussion.

3. Publicity and Communique

Publicity by or on behalf of the conference will be limited to the communique following each meeting. The draft communique will be prepared by the Chairman of the day and approved by the ten Nations. It will normally refer to the chairmanship of the meeting, any new documents tabled, agreements reached and the time of the next meeting. Delegations reserve the right to brief the press as regards their own positions.

4. Languages and Records

The languages of the conference will be English, French and Russian and there will be simultaneous interpretation into each of these languages. The right is reserved for delegations to request consecutive interpretation, but wherever possible advance notice of the request should be given to the Secretariat. Verbatim records will be furnished in the three languages.

5. Seating and Chairmanship

Delegations will be seated in English alphabetical order and the chair will be taken in rotation by the ten Delegations in English alphabetical order.

C. Agenda of the Conference

No formal agenda was proposed or agreed upon. In addition to the documents transmitted to the committee by General Assembly Resolution 1378 (XIV), the committee had before it the following documents tabled during its deliberations:⁷

Message of greetings from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N. S. Khrushchev, to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. (TNCD/1 of 15 March 1960)

A message by President Eisenhower to Ambassador Eaton for the Conference of the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament. (TNCD/2 of 15 March 1960)

A Plan for General and Comprehensive Disarmament in a Free and Peaceful World submitted by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America on 16 March 1960. (TNCD/3 of 16 March 1960)

Proposal by the Delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Polish People's Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Czechoslovakia, submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 8 April 1960 (TNCD/4 of 8 April 1960)

Proposal by the delegations of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 26 April 1960. (TNCD/5 of 26 April 1960)

Proposals by the Soviet Government submitted to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 7 June 1960 (TNCD/6/Rev. 1 of 8 June 1960)

Program for General and Complete Disarmament under Effective International Control submitted by the delegation of the United States of

⁷ Texts of the following documents, together with a list of members of delegations to the Conference (TNCD/INF. 3/Rev. 2), were appended to the report in press release 430.

Exchange of Correspondence Between President and Mr. Eaton

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 22

The White House on July 22 made public the following exchange of correspondence between the President and Fredrick M. Eaton, chairman of the American delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva.

The President to Ambassador Eaton

JULY 20, 1960

DEAR MR. EATON: Upon the closing of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, I want you to know how deeply grateful I am to you for undertaking the Chairmanship and for your efforts to find an agreement which would halt the building up of armaments.

Your strong, courageous and imaginative leadership has been a source of pride to all of us who have been working with you. It was not due to any fault on the part of yourself and your associates that no agreement was reached. In any event you have made the United States position of dedication to peace clear to the world.

You have my congratulations and best wishes.

With warm regard,
Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Ambassador Eaton to the President

JULY 5, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament has come to an unhappy end.

I regret that it has not resulted in discussion or agreement which would have, at least, pointed in the direction of halting the buildup of armaments. From this, one day, might have come the elimination of national forces and the progressive establishment of an effective international peace force.

I undertook this assignment because of my hope that there might have been constructive talks—although I was without illusion—and because of my conviction of your own dedication and deep devotion to the cause of peace in a world where men can live in freedom without fear of oppression.

I am grateful to you for giving me this opportunity to serve our country.

Respectfully yours,

FREDRICK M. EATON

America to the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament on 27 June 1960 (TNCD/7 of 27 June 1960)

IV. UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE

UNITED STATES DELEGATION

Ambassador Fredrick M. Eaton, Chairman, U.S. Representative
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Minister, Deputy U.S. Representative

Advisers

Mr. Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State
Mr. Vincent N. Baker, Department of State
Mr. N. Spencer Barnes, Department of State
Mr. Jeremy Blanchet, Department of State
Rear Admiral Paul L. Dudley, U.S.N., Senior Military Adviser, Department of Defense
Mr. F. Richards Ford, III, Department of Defense
Mr. G. McMurtrie Godley, Department of State
Mr. Robert E. Matteson, Department of State
Mr. Alan G. Mencher, Department of State
Captain Willard deL. Michael, U.S.N., Department of Defense

Mr. D. F. Musser, Atomic Energy Commission
Mr. John M. Stuart, Jr., Public Affairs Officer, American Consulate General, Geneva
Mr. Robert G. Sturgill, Department of State
Mr. Charles A. Sullivan, Department of State
Lt. Colonel Harry E. Tabor, U.S. Army, Department of Defense

Mr. Malcolm Toon, Department of State
Mr. Henry S. Villard, Minister, U.S. Representative at the European Office of the United Nations

Mr. Lawrence D. Weiler, Department of State
Colonel Thomas W. Wolfe, U.S.A.F., Department of Defense

Secretaries of the Delegation

Mr. Richard C. Hagan, Department of State
Mr. Virgil L. Moore, U.S. Resident Delegation and Consulate General, Geneva

V. OTHER DELEGATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE

1. Delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria . . . (4 members)
2. Delegation of Canada . . . (5 members)

3. Delegation of the Czechoslovak Republic . . . (11 members)
4. Delegation of France . . . (19 members)
5. Delegation of Italy . . . (10 members)
6. Delegation of Polish People's Republic . . . (8 members)
7. Delegation of Rumanian People's Republic . . . (9 members)
8. Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . (17 members)
9. Delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . (20 members)

U.S. Welcomes August 15 Meeting of U.N. Disarmament Commission

Following is the text of a letter from Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to Luis Padilla Nervo, Chairman, U.N. Disarmament Commission.

U.S./U.N. press release 3453

AUGUST 5, 1960

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have the honor to reply to your letter of July 29, 1960 in which you ask my views regarding the suggestion that the Disarmament Commission be convened on August 15th.

It is well known that the United States favors an early meeting of the Disarmament Commission.¹ We are therefore fully in accord with the proposal that the Disarmament Commission should meet on or about August 15th.

The convening of a Disarmament Commission meeting is of course thoroughly in accord with the communique issued by the Governments of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States on September 7, 1959² which stated that . . . "It is the intention of the four Governments that the United Nations Disarmament Commission will be kept appropriately informed of the progress of the deliberations of the [Ten-Nation Disarmament] Committee. For this purpose, the four Governments have agreed that the Committee will present reports on its work to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and, through it, to the

United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council".

Moreover, and particularly in light of recent developments, an early meeting of the Disarmament Commission is entirely consistent with, and responsive to the resolution³ adopted by the Commission at its last meeting on September 10, 1959 which "welcomes the declared intention of the countries concerned to keep the Disarmament Commission appropriately informed of the progress of their deliberations", and its recommendation "that it be convened whenever deemed necessary".

I know that you regard the scope of the meeting of the Disarmament Commission as a matter for the members of the Commission themselves to decide. The United States requested this meeting to provide opportunity to report on the discussions which took place in Geneva, and at the same time intends to inform the Disarmament Commission of its proposals which were made at the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva⁴ and which, together with other proposals, provide a basis for further negotiation. It is not the intention of the United States at this meeting to request the Disarmament Commission to make decisions regarding specific measures of disarmament. We believe that the most constructive outcome of the Disarmament Commission meeting would be a resolution which registers the common desire for prompt resumption of negotiations.

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE

U.S. Repeats Demand for Release of RB-47 Officers Held by Soviets

U.S. NOTE OF AUGUST 4¹

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, on instructions from its Government, has the honor to state the following:

¹ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 439.

² For text, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 90.

³ Delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the American Embassy at Moscow on Aug. 4 (press release 427).

In its note of July 18² with regard to the RB-47 case, the United States Government repeated its demand for the release of the two Air Force Officers, Lieutenant Olmstead and Lieutenant McKone, who are being detained illegally, and its further demand that a representative of the Embassy be permitted to see them without delay.

In its reply of August 2, the Soviet Government has failed to respond to these requests. Indeed, the Soviet reply merely restates the baseless Soviet version of this event and is evidently aimed at diverting attention again from the Soviet illegal behavior in the RB-47 case by dragging in once again the U-2 incident. The Soviet Government cannot divest itself of the serious responsibility it bears in the RB-47 case by this deliberate attempt to confuse these two cases, which were entirely different in character as the Soviet Government well knows.

In the meantime, the Security Council has considered the RB-47 case³ and has overwhelmingly rejected the Soviet Union's position. The peoples of the world were astonished that the Soviet Union vetoed both this Government's resolution calling for an impartial and objective investigation of the RB-47 incident, and the Italian Government's humanitarian resolution calling upon the Soviet Government to admit representatives of the International Red Cross to see the men in order to reassure their families as to their well-being.

The Soviet Union's refusal to agree to an objective investigation of the RB-47 case is incomprehensible in the face of urging from such non-permanent members of the Security Council as Ceylon, Tunisia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Italy. The veto of the Italian resolution, designed to relieve the anxiety of the families of the men, was callous and inhumane.

The United States Government can only conclude from these actions that the Soviet Government has decided, for purposes of its own, to hold these two men in illegal detention and to seal them off from all contact with the outside world in flagrant disregard of international law and practice.

As was conclusively demonstrated in the Se-

curity Council, the RB-47 aircraft, which was on a legitimate mission on a course carefully charted to carry it well outside Soviet waters, did not violate Soviet territory at any time. At no time did it approach closer than about 30 miles from the Soviet coast, and even this approach was forced upon the RB-47 by a Soviet fighter plane which pressed it from the seaward side in an effort to compel it to overfly Soviet territory. The members of the RB-47 crew were wantonly shot down over international waters, long after the time and far away from the place alleged by the Soviet Government.

The United States Government wishes to emphasize the very serious view it takes of the Soviet action. Since the Security Council overwhelmingly rejected the Soviet Union's position in this case, the United States Government fails to see on what basis the Soviet Union is continuing to detain American airmen at present illegally incarcerated by Soviet authorities. It demands again that the Soviet Government move immediately to permit a representative of the American Embassy at Moscow to see Lieutenant Olmstead and Lieutenant McKone at once and to make arrangements for their return to the United States. It further requests that the Soviet Government provide any information that it may have regarding the men of the RB-47 crew who are still unaccounted for.

Should there be any further delay in the arrangements for the return of the men, the United States Government also reiterates the request that representatives of the International Red Cross be allowed to see the men in order that word of their health and well-being may be given to the members of their families.

The United States Government requests an urgent reply to the demands contained in its note of July 18 for the release of Lieutenant Olmstead and Lieutenant McKone and for immediate access to them.

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 2⁴

Unofficial translation
No. 79-OSA

Having familiarized itself with the United States note of July 18, the Soviet Government states that the U.S.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1960, p. 209.

³ For background and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1960, p. 235.

⁴ Delivered to Edward L. Freers, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, at Moscow on Aug. 2 by Acting Soviet Foreign Minister V. S. Semenov.

Government continues to adhere to the position of an unfounded denial of the fact of the intrusion into Soviet airspace of the American military aircraft RB-47 on July 1 of this year. By distorting reality the U.S. Government apparently counts on putting a screen around the policy of illegal, provocative activities with respect to the U.S.S.R. which has met with just condemnation throughout the world.

Repetition in the aforementioned note, as well as in speeches of the American representative in the Security Council, of unsubstantiated assertions that the bomber RB-47, downed after the violation of the Soviet border, was allegedly engaged in carrying out "a legal task over international waters," does not make such assertions convincing.

The U.S. Government adduced no proof which would support its assertions regarding the circumstances of the flight of the bomber RB-47, nor could it adduce such proof, since the intrusion of this aircraft into the airspace of the U.S.S.R. is a fact established precisely by appropriate organs of the Soviet Union. Pretensions to conduct some kind of "on-the-spot investigation," which have been advanced by the U.S. Government, can be appraised only as a maneuver designed to distract attention from the inadmissible character of the activities of American military aviation. Instead of inventing new methods of espionage in the region of the Soviet border, the U.S. Government should concern itself to end once and for all the provocative sallies by its military aircraft into the airspace of the U.S.S.R.

Assertions concerning the alleged "legal" character of the assignment of the aircraft which violated the Soviet border, the absurd version about "the study of electromagnetic phenomena" which the U.S. Government did not abandon in its note of July 18, illustrate especially vividly the entire unsoundness of the new effort to justify aggressive actions of the U.S. Air Force with the help of fabrications spread by official sources in Washington.

The U.S. Government expresses its dissatisfaction that the note of the Soviet Government mentions the mendacious declarations to which official U.S. organs attempted to resort to disguise the fact of the aggressive intrusion across Soviet boundaries by the American U-2 aircraft, downed May 1 in the area of Sverdlovsk. It asserts that the intrusion which took place May 1 "is not connected with the present incident," that is, with the violation of U.S.S.R. boundaries by the RB-47 aircraft. It is possible, of course, to agree that these are two separate incidents. In one of them the violator was downed deep inside Soviet territory; in the other, the crime was interrupted in the initial stage, after the violation by the American aircraft of the Soviet state boundary. However, it is perfectly apparent that the essence of the actions of the U.S. military aircraft in both cases was one and the same, and that behind them stands the same unprecedented policy of premeditated provocations with respect to the Soviet Union, openly announced by the U.S. Government in May of this year but carried out by it in practice already in the course of a prolonged period. As is evident, devices with the help of which the U.S. Government attempts to lead astray public opinion and

escape the responsibility for its aggressive activities, which constitute the rude violation of generally accepted norms of international law, increase international tension, and create a threat to peace, have also not changed.

The Soviet Government again confirms the position stated in its notes of July 11 and 15⁵ and repeats its emphatic protest against the violation of the Soviet boundary by the American RB-47 bomber, which took place July 1. The U.S.S.R. Government expects that the U.S. Government will put an end to the provocative actions of the American Air Force against the Soviet Union. If this is not done, the Government of the Soviet Union will take, as it has already warned earlier, necessary measures to insure the safety of the peoples of the Soviet Union by all means available to it.

Moscow, August 2, 1960.

United States Seeks Access to Francis Powers

Press release 433 dated August 6

Following are the texts of notes exchanged by the U.S. and Soviet Governments regarding Francis Gary Powers.¹

U.S. NOTE OF MAY 19

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to public statements of the Soviet Government indicating that an American civilian, Francis Gary Powers, is under detention in Moscow. The Embassy requests that an officer of the Embassy be permitted to interview Mr. Powers.

U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF JULY 11

The Embassy refers to its note No. 1039 of May 10, 1960 and reiterates its request that an Embassy officer be permitted to interview Francis Gary Powers.

The Embassy wishes to inform the Ministry that the United States Government urges the Soviet Government to grant the visas for their attorneys requested by the Powers family in their telegram

⁵ For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 164, and Aug. 8, 1960, p. 210.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 30, 1960, p. 851.

of June 23, 1960 to Premier Khrushchev. The Embassy requests the earliest possible reply from the Ministry concerning these visas.

Reference is made also to the telegram of July 8, 1960 from Francis Gary Powers to his father, Oliver W. Powers, and made available by the latter to the Department of State. The Embassy requests the Ministry to inform it as to the identity of the Soviet defense counsel mentioned in the telegram and as to the means by which the family's legal counsel might communicate with him at the earliest possible date so that they might make preliminary contact with him in order to cooperate with him in the matter.

U.S. NOTE OF JULY 30

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, under instructions of the Government of the United States, has the honor to refer to the Embassy's note No. 1039 of May 10, 1960, and the Embassy's aide memoire of July 11, 1960, regarding the case of Francis Gary Powers.

In its note of May 10 the Embassy requested that an Embassy officer be permitted to interview Francis Gary Powers, an American civilian under detention by the Soviet Government. Since that date the Embassy has made frequent and repeated requests that the Soviet Government, in accordance with normal diplomatic practice, reply promptly to the Embassy's note and that it permit an Embassy officer to interview Mr. Powers. On July 11, 1960, the Embassy handed the Soviet Foreign Minister an aide memoire again reiterating its request. In spite of the frequent and insistent requests of the Embassy, the Soviet Foreign Ministry has made no reply to the Embassy's representations.

On July 9, an announcement of the official Soviet news agency, TASS, stated that the inquiry in the case of Mr. Powers had been completed, that the indictment of Mr. Powers had been endorsed by the Prosecutor General of the U.S.S.R. and the case referred to the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. for consideration. A subsequent TASS release on July 18 stated that the trial of Mr. Powers had been fixed for August 17, 1960. The Embassy notes that in a press conference of May 12, 1960, Chair-

man Khrushchev stated that he could not answer a question concerning the Embassy's access to Mr. Powers "because the investigation is proceeding." The Embassy protests most strongly against the protracted delay of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in replying to the Embassy's original request in its note of May 10 and asks most urgently that, in view of the completion of the investigation of Mr. Powers and the setting of his trial for an early date, an officer of the Embassy now be permitted to interview Mr. Powers.

In its aide memoire of July 11 the Embassy also urged that the Soviet Government grant visas for the attorneys requested by the Powers family in their telegram of June 23, 1960 to Chairman Khrushchev. The aide memoire further requested that the Ministry inform the Embassy as to the identity of the Soviet defense counsel mentioned in the telegram and as to the means by which the legal counsel of the family might communicate with the Soviet defense counsel at the earliest possible date in order to cooperate with him in any appropriate manner.

The Embassy reiterates the requests made in the aide memoire and requests that the Ministry furnish it an urgent reply.

SOVIET REPLY OF AUGUST 4

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and with reference to the Embassy's note of May 10 and the Embassy's aide memoire of July 11, 1960, has the honor to state the following:

As has already been officially announced, the American citizen Francis Gary Powers has been indicted for criminal responsibility under Article 2 of the Law on Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes (Espionage). The case involving the charge against F. G. Powers has been assigned for hearing to the Military Collegium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court in accordance with Articles 9 and 16 of the Decree on Military Tribunals.

At the present time, by request of F. Powers, a member of the Moscow City Lawyers' Collegium has been assigned to his defense, Attorney Griniv, with whom F. Powers has already had several meetings.

In view of the above, and in accordance with Soviet judicial legislation, the attorneys mentioned in the Embassy's aide memoire cannot be permitted to participate in the F. Powers case.

Concerning the question of a meeting with the Soviet attorney conducting the Powers case, relatives of F. Powers, should they come to Moscow, will be granted this opportunity.

International Educational and Cultural Relations: The Boundaries of Action, Governmental and Private

by Robert H. Thayer¹

I am particularly gratified at being invited to assist in opening this conference tonight. In the first place, the subject of the conference, "Cultural Aid to Underdeveloped Areas: Education and Training," is not only a subject with which the Government of the United States is very vitally concerned today; it is indeed a subject which is of vital concern to all the free nations of the world. Education and training is being demanded as a matter of right by many thousands of people covering enormous areas of the world—people suffering severely from intellectual and spiritual as well as economic hunger—and they are going to get education and training as quickly as they can, somewhere. In the second place, the title for this session of the conference, "International Educational and Cultural Relations: The Boundaries of Action, Governmental and Private," defines a problem, the solution of which I have been working hard to find ever since I was appointed to my present position in the Department of State 18 months ago.

One can perhaps find no better example of the rapidity and depth of the change that is taking place in the world today than in the phenomenon of this great, unwieldy, bureaucratic machine that is our Government suddenly being actively plunged into the operational field of education, a field hitherto reserved to private endeavor of

a highly specialized type. Now when something of this kind happens in this magnificently flexible democratic system of ours, it does not, as you well know, happen in an orderly, logical, and understandable fashion—it just happens. And almost overnight 17 different agencies of the Government became engaged in the same type of work which had for years been occupying the attention of great American private institutions, foundations, universities, and others—the work of international education. Government was impelled into this activity through its foreign relations because of the magnitude of the international need—a need to which the American people had long been responding; and so we suddenly find ourselves today, both in the public and in the private domain, with the same basic objectives, all striving to the same end, all going to the same very limited sources of supply for our tools, all discovering how very limited the time is in which to achieve our objectives, and none of us very sure of how we are going to attain them.

It seemed to me, when I was asked by the Secretary of State what could be done to coordinate this activity of all these Government agencies and what could be done to make their efforts an intelligent and efficient complement to the many different activities of private institutions, that the first thing to do, after analyzing the nature and scope of Government activity, was to find some means of drawing together representatives of the public and private domains for quiet, uninterrupted, and serious discussion of objectives and means of attainment. And so we held a confer-

¹ Address made before the Harvard Summer School of Arts, Sciences, and Education at Cambridge, Mass., on Aug. 1 (press release 424). Mr. Thayer is Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for the Coordination of International Educational and Cultural Relations.

ence in April of 1959 at Annapolis at which representatives of the Government and of the universities and of our great foundations came together at the invitation of the Secretary of State for a 2-day thorough discussion of our common problems. I am glad to see here tonight some of those who contributed so much to the success of that conference.

I believe that I am justified in saying that from this conference came the formation of the Committee on the University in World Affairs, headed by former President [James Lewis] Morrill of the University of Minnesota. We are awaiting with great anticipation the results of the work of this committee in exploring the role of the American university. Its labors should make a very substantial contribution to the solution of the problem presented by the title of this session of this conference.

Again at Harvard this spring we gathered together representatives of many fields of activity in the United States to visit with Government representatives to discuss that absorbing question of the cultural relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. There has been much misinformation and much misunderstanding of the Government's operation of our exchanges with the Soviet Union, and I believe that this conference served to clarify the problem and contribute to a greater understanding of our objectives and the basic reason for our operating methods of attaining them. These conferences have already justified the time and effort put into them. They have great value not only for the development of ideas but particularly as a means of communication between the diverse groups concerned with international education. We need more of them in every area of the country, and this conference at Harvard is therefore particularly welcome to me and to all of us in the State Department. We are so keenly aware of the need for more cooperative effort in this field of international education and cultural relations.

I would like to add that we are planning this fall to hold another conference on the question "What contributions private industry has in the past and can in the future make in the field of international education in the less developed areas," and there are other important fields that justify conferences. What contributions can be made by science, agriculture, and labor? Every

group in this country can and should be thinking of the stupendous task that lies immediately ahead in this field.

Exploring the Requirements

As I thought over the topic assigned to me for this address this evening, "The Boundaries of Governmental and Private Action," I was reminded of an article in the *Harvard Guardian* which was written by your distinguished chairman. I believe that the article appeared in the fall of 1937. In the article, Dr. [William Y.] Elliott urged that this country go to war with Hitler's Germany and made the profound observation that after we had fought the war we would know what it was that we fought for. I suggest, gentlemen, that after we have conceived and placed into operation a genuine, realistic, and workable international educational and cultural program we can look back and review what we have accomplished and the boundaries which I am to discuss this evening will have been defined.

If we take the word "boundaries" as applied to a land mass, it is obvious that no boundary can be established until the terrain has been suitably explored. No boundary could be run between Mexico and the United States, or between Canada and the United States, until men had first discovered, explored, settled, and claimed the land and established some form of political organization to make good the claims.

I do not want to press my analogy too far; we are not involved with claims but rather, I would think, with responsibilities for action in international education and cultural matters. However, I would suggest that the terrain itself has been but slightly explored, and at this conference I think that we ought to be more concerned with exploration than with boundaries. We ought to think of ourselves as mixed parties of surveyors, not trying to run lines of demarcation but, rather, exploring the requirements of other countries for education and our responsibilities to make a contribution to their welfare and what and how each of the groups represented here can best contribute. I suppose that this is in a sense working toward establishing boundaries, but I suggest that the only boundaries we can really talk about are those familiar to us at home. Here we have some notion of the line separating the work of foundations,

universities, and the Government, but I am not at all sure that those boundaries apply when we move into the foreign field.

Relationships Between Government and Foundations

The foundations have long been engaged in educational, cultural, and technical work abroad. The programs of the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations are much older than the present programs of the U.S. Government.

I believe that it is quite clear what the role is of a foundation in the utilization of its money within the United States. I suspect that from time to time one or the other of the foundations is placed under pressure to spend money in ways it would prefer not to, but I believe that it is generally true to say that they know what it is they want to do and that, by and large, what they want to do they can do without feeling they are in competition with the larger resources of the Federal Government and State governments. Their contribution to our colleges and universities, and to research of all kinds, and to the cultural growth of our country, is enormous. But there lie before us the problem and the need to relate the work of the foundations to that of the Government—or, if you will, vice versa—in the foreign field. My suggestion of the need for a relationship does not mean to imply Government control of foundation work. I merely mean that an exploration of foundation programs and Government programs might reveal what are those things, by regions or countries in which there are foundation programs, that a foundation can do and do well and with satisfaction, that the Government cannot do or ought not to try to do.

Now a determination of what the foundations ought to do instead of the Government should never be made on the basis of Government budgetary limitations. This approach I deplore, for it destroys the meaning and significance of the corporate life of the foundation. I will not suggest here what ought to be the foundation's role abroad or even how the Government and the foundations ought to work together, but I do think we ought at this conference to explore this problem. I am sure that from time to time the foundations examine their programs over the years and reach a conclusion as to what ought to be the direction they should take or, if you will, what boundaries they should establish for themselves. The need

for relating foundation and Government work is, to me, inescapable. The problem is how can it be done so as to enhance the work of the foundations as well as our own.

Historical Role of Universities

If we turn now to the universities, we have, I think, a far more difficult problem. The role of universities in international education and culture at this point in time is, I believe, less defined than that of the foundations. After all, the foundations have the money to underwrite projects in foreign countries, and, by and large, the universities have not. Yet the university has historically always been engaged in international educational and cultural affairs by the mere fact that it is a university and that the members of faculties teach, write, and do research and move from university to university.

Universities are older than the modern state and have, as we all know, had much to do with the growth of our society. This has come, in part, on the international side through what we call academic exchange, which I think should be thought of both as an exchange of persons and as an exchange of ideas, whether through persons or books. Under the conditions which have existed since the end of the war, the United States Government has found it necessary to finance a part of these academic types of exchange, thus introducing new elements in this age-old process.

In the last 10 years many of our universities and technical schools have entered into what one might think of as a modified kind of exchange through contracts with the International Cooperation Administration for work in the less developed countries. Under these contracts universities have sent abroad teams of faculty members, or teams composed in part of faculty members and others, to carry out a specific assignment for the Government. These contract teams are sometimes associated with a foreign university and sometimes not. They may be establishing a technical institute, or they may be advising a foreign government on public administration, or doing both. This contract system has been found by ICA to be a useful mechanism for getting done work requiring continuity and a team of men.

I do not believe that this contract system as yet really has precipitated the American university

into the problems of international education. It would seem to me that the universities must come to define for themselves their role as universities in this field of endeavor, regardless of the source of financing of their activities. A Government contract for an assignment in a foreign country hardly, it seems to me, involves the university as a university in the foreign field. I believe that there is an enormous role for the university in international educational and cultural affairs, but that role needs to be defined, for as yet the boundaries of university action are not in the least discernible. As I said before, we are looking to the Committee on the University in World Affairs for guidance on this problem.

Two Roles of Government

Finally, a few words about the Government. The role of the Government, in one sense, is no more defined than the role of the foundations or the universities. I suppose that the only groups in the country who have defined their roles in international education are the missionaries, who represent institutions—religious institutions—older than both universities and nation states and who, like the universities, have had much to do with influencing the shaping of the society in which we live. I have suggested the need for explorations as regards both foundations and universities, and I certainly think that the same is true as regards the Federal Government and its foreign work. It seems to me that here we can define what ought to be the role of the Government as, in part, distinguished from the roles of the universities and foundations, though I will not go so far as to say that the Government has, as yet, adequately assumed its role. I do not think that the time has yet come—though I believe that the time is close at hand—when the Government will play its role fully and adequately.

The Federal Government has two roles, and both are quite obvious roles, and in both it has assumed responsibilities but not as much responsibility as I believe it must and ought. One role is that of policymaker, and the other is that of furnishing the resources to carry out the policy.

At the present moment we do not really have an international educational policy, and this, I think, we need. And at the point of policy formation for international education work I think we

need some degree of "fusion," if you will, of foundations, universities, and Government. By "fusion" I mean some identification as to the general purposes and the ideals we are moving toward. The policy we need, though it will finally be written within the Government, surely depends on all of you as much as on us in Washington.

I have said that we do not really have an international educational policy. That we don't. We are, as you know, concerned with international education in many ways. ICA is deeply involved in education but largely as it relates to economic development and then only in specific fields designated by the Congress. It would seem to me that, though all education undergirds economic development, it is a mistake to limit our educational work to those particular things which in our judgment promote economic development. This means that we are largely concerned with the technical and are in no position to assist in the growth of educational systems in other countries embracing the whole of education.

Our Department of Defense runs a very large training program and brings to this country for technical military training many thousands a year. There is an enormous potential here for education beyond the military requirements, and I think this is especially important as one notes the changing character of the military establishment in this day and age. I suppose that the State Department, in certain of its exchange programs, comes the closest to having an international educational program related to overriding national political objectives without being limited by either military or economic factors.

I believe that we must move on, and rapidly, from this point and work in the coming months for a policy which will permit the broadening of our work in the international educational field. I think that this policy needs to be broad enough not only to direct the particular programs of the Federal Government but to provide guidelines to the universities and foundations. I do not believe that the universities can take their full part in this foreign effort until such time as the Government has provided the needed political leadership and direction.

I will conclude by saying that, to me, we are all exploring, that we need not so much to establish boundaries between foundations, universities, and the Government as to establish the boundaries of

Policy Toward American Republics Reaffirmed by United States

what ought to be the total United States effort in the international educational and cultural field. When the terrain has been explored and the Government has defined the boundary through policy, I do believe that it will be easier than it is now to find the boundaries between foundations, universities, and Government programs. An enormous effort born of some degree of fusion is required, and it is toward this that I have been working for the past 18 months in Washington and in the various conferences I have mentioned.

Finally, I cannot emphasize too strongly here and at every possible occasion the seriousness with which the Department of State views the need for concentrated and cooperative effort on the part of every segment of American life, both public and private, in a very difficult task. That task is to assist the recently developing nations of the world in their legitimate and understandable desire to hurdle the centuries we required for our development and take the shortest route to sound social, political, and economic equality within the family of nations. Our united effort must be to persuade them that the soundest route is not always the shortest route, but this effort must be inspiring and will require sacrifices on the part of not only the taxpayer but also the foundations, the universities, and all of our great private institutions—not sacrifices of principle or of standards of learning or of ethics, not sacrifices of philosophical doctrine, nor of the traditions of intellectual freedom, for all of these form the basis of the value of our institutions—they are the buoys marking the claim to freedom—but sacrificing the security and the comfortable isolation that pervade institutions which have been hitherto bounded by principally domestic considerations. We can live and work within the United States effectively on our own, but if we are to live and work abroad—and that is our destiny for many decades to come—we are going to need very close, cooperative effort. This conference can perform a great public service by exploring the nature of this cooperation.

On July 29 the White House announced the President's intention to appoint Richard R. Rubottom, Jr., to be Ambassador to Argentina and the designation of Thomas C. Mann as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Following is a White House statement of that date read to newsmen by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President.

White House (Denver, Colo.) press release dated July 29

These new appointments involve no change in United States policies toward Latin America. Both of these officers are career Foreign Service officers with long experience in Latin America. Mr. Rubottom has served in the Department over 4 years since his last field assignment, and his return to a field post this fall is in accord with the normal Foreign Service assignment pattern.

United States policies toward Latin America are clear. The President's announcement last week¹ of his intention to go forward in cooperation with other American Republics with additional programs of economic assistance to help support the efforts of the peoples of Latin America to achieve a better standard of living will help to chart new areas in the economic sector.

In the political sector the United States has been equally forthright. We are dedicated to the strengthening of the entire inter-American system. We have reiterated our repudiation of dictatorships of the left and the right and have reaffirmed our full support of the Rio Treaty and other inter-American agreements in which all of the American states have assumed a collective responsibility for repelling outside intervention in the affairs of this hemisphere.

¹ BULLETIN of AUG. 1, 1960, p. 166.

Political Divisions of Africa¹

INDEPENDENT STATES (in chronological order)

Country	Date of independence	Capital	Area ² (in thousands of square miles)	Population ³ (in thousands)	Former legal status	Present chief official and title
Ethiopia (includes Eritrea).	Since ancient times.	Addis Ababa	455	21, 600		Haile Selassie I, Emperor.
Liberia	1847	Monrovia	43	1, 250	Private colony	William V. S. Tubman, President.
Union of South Africa (includes Walvis Bay).	1910	Pretoria and Capetown.	472	14, 673	British colonies and independent republics.	Hendrik F. Verwoerd, Prime Minister.
United Arab Republic (Egyptian Region).	1922	Cairo	386	25, 032	British protectorate.	Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir, President.
Libya	December 24, 1951.	Tripoli and Benghazi.	679	1, 153	Former Italian colony jointly administered since World War II by France and Britain.	Idris I, King.
The Sudan	January 1, 1956.	Khartoum	967	11, 390	Anglo-Egyptian condominium.	Gen. Ibrahim Abboud, President of the Supreme Council
Morocco	March 2, 1956.	Rabat	174	10, 330	French and Spanish protectorates, International Zone of Tangier.	Mohamed V, King.
Tunisia	March 20, 1956.	Tunis	48	3, 880	French protectorate.	Habib Bourguiba, President.
Ghana	March 6, 1957.	Accra	92	4, 911	British colony and protectorate, British U.N. trusteeship (British Togoland).	Kwame Nkrumah, President.
Guinea	October 2, 1958.	Conakry	95	2, 707	French overseas territory.	Sékou Touré, President.
Cameroun	January 1, 1960.	Yaoundé	167	3, 187	French U.N. trusteeship.	Ahmadou Ahidjo, President.
Togo	April 27, 1960.	Lomé	22	1, 100	"	Sylvanus Olympio, Prime Minister.
Federation of Mali, composed of:	June 20, 1960.	Dakar	541	6, 850	None	Modibo Keita, President.
a. Republic of Senegal.		Dakar	76	2, 550	Autonomous member, French Community.	Mamadou Dia, Prime Minister.
b. Soudanese Republic.		Bamako	465	4, 300	"	Modibo Keita, Prime Minister.
Malagasy Republic (Madagascar).	June 26, 1960	Tananarive	228	5, 184	"	Philibert Tsiranana, President.
Republic of the Congo (Belgian Congo).	June 30, 1960	Léopoldville	905	13, 653	Belgian colony	Joseph Kasavubu, President; Patrice Lumumba, Premier.
Somali Republic (includes Somalia and British Somaliland).	July 1, 1960	Mogadiscio	246	1, 980	Italian U.N. trusteeship and British protectorate.	Abdirasid Ali Scermarche, Prime Minister.

¹ Prepared in the Africa Division of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Mid-East and Africa, Aug. 17, 1960


² Area figures from *Encyclopaedia Britannica World Atlas*, 1960, Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., Chicago, Ill.

³ Population figures from *Population and Vital Statistics Report*, Apr. 1, 1960, United Nations, N.Y.

⁴ No capital.

⁵ Area under 1,000 sq. miles.

⁶ Population under 1,000.



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INDEPENDENT STATES—Continued
(in chronological order)

Country	Date of independence	Capital	Area ² (in thousands of square miles)	Population ² (in thousands)	Former legal status	Present chief official and title
Dahomey.....	Aug. 1, 1960	Porto-Novo.....	45	1, 725	Autonomous member, French Community.	Hubert Maga, Prime Minister.
Niger.....	Aug. 3, 1960	Niamey.....	459	2, 555	"	Hamani Diori, Prime Minister.
Upper Volta.....	Aug. 5, 1960	Ouagadougou.....	106	4, 000	"	Maurice Yameogo, President.
Ivory Coast.....	Aug. 7, 1960	Abidjan.....	125	3, 103	"	Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Prime Minister.
Republic of Chad..	Aug. 11, 1960	Ford Lamy.....	495	2, 600	"	François Tombalbaye, Prime Minister.
Central African Republic.	Aug. 13, 1960	Bangui.....	242	1, 177	"	David Dacko, Prime Minister.
Republic of Congo..	Aug. 15, 1960	Brazzaville.....	135	795	"	Fulbert Youlou, President.
Gabon.....	Aug. 17, 1960	Libreville.....	102	421	"	Léon M'ba, Prime Minister.

STATES SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE INDEPENDENCE SOON
(in chronological order)

Country	Date of independence	Capital	Area ² (in thousands of square miles)	Population ² (in thousands)	Former legal status	Present chief official and title
Nigeria.....	Oct. 1, 1960	Lagos.....	339	33, 663	British colony and protectorate.	Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister.
Mauritania.....	Nov. 28, 1960	Nouakchott.....	419	725	Autonomous member, French Community.	Moektar Ould Dad-dah, Prime Minister.
Sierra Leone.....	Apr. 27, 1961	Freetown.....	28	2, 260	British colony and protectorate.	Sir Milton Margai, Premier.

OTHER TERRITORIES
(grouped by metropole)

Territory	Capital	Area ² (in thousands of square miles)	Population ² (in thousands)	Present status
France				
Algeria.....	Algiers is the administrative capital of the 13 northern departments. The 2 Saharan departments are administered by the Ministry of the Sahara from Paris.	920	10, 265	15 Departments of the French Republic.
Comoro Islands.....	Dzaoudzi.....	1	182	Overseas territory.
Europa, Juan de Nova, Bassas da India, Iles Glorieuses, etc.	(⁴)	(⁵)	26	Small islands adjacent to Madagascar which have remained under the French minister charged with overseas departments and territories as unclassified possessions.

OTHER TERRITORIES—Continued

(grouped by metropole)

Territory	Capital	Area ¹ (in thousands of square miles)	Population ² (in thousands)	Present status
French Somaliland	Djibouti	9	69	Overseas territory.
Réunion	Saint Denis	1	321	Overseas Department of the French Republic.
<i>Portugal</i>				
Angola (includes Cabinda)	Luanda	481	4, 508	Overseas province of Portugal.
Cape Verde Islands	Praia	2	192	"
Mozambique	Lourenço Marques	298	6, 234	"
Portuguese Guinea	Bissau	14	559	"
São Tomé and Príncipe (includes São João Baptista da Ajuda).	São Tomé	0. 3	62	"
<i>Spain</i>				
Ceuta	(^o)	(^o)	61	Spanish possession (<i>plaza de soberanía</i>).
Fernando Póo (Fernando Póo, Annobón, and adjacent islands).	Santa Isabel	1	45	African province of Spain.
Ifni	Sidi Ifni	1	52	"
Islas Chafarinas	(^o)	(^o)	(^o)	Spanish possession (<i>plaza de soberanía</i>).
Melilla	(^o)	(^o)	85	"
Peñon Velez de la Gomera	(^o)	(^o)	(^o)	"
Peñon de Alhucemas	(^o)	(^o)	(^o)	"
Río Muni (Río Muni, Corisco, Great Elobey, Little Elobey, and adjacent islands).	Bata	10	172	African province of Spain.
Spanish Sahara (Río de Oro and Sekia el Hamra).	Villa Cisuceros	103	19	"
<i>Union of South Africa</i>				
South West Africa	Windhoek	318	554	League of Nations mandate administered by the Union of South Africa.
<i>Belgium</i>				
Ruanda-Urundi	Usumbura	21	4, 700	Belgian U.N. trusteeship.
<i>United Kingdom</i>				
Basutoland	Maseru	12	658	Colony.
Bethuanaland	Mafeking	275	337	Protectorate.
British Cameroons	Buea	34	1, 621	British U.N. trusteeship (plebiscite planned for 1961 to decide future status of the British Cameroons with respect to Nigeria and Cameroun).
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland).	Salisbury	490	7, 990	Semiautonomous member of Commonwealth.
Gambia	Bathurst	4	289	Colony and protectorate.
Kenya	Nairobi	225	6, 450	"
Mauritius (including dependencies).	Port Louis	1	650	Colony.
Seychelles	Victoria	0. 1	42	"
Swaziland	Mbabane	7	237	Protectorate.
Tanganyika	Dar es Salaam	362	9, 076	British U.N. trusteeship.
Uganda	Entebbe	94	6, 517	Protectorate.
Zanzibar and Pemba	Zanzibar	1	304	"

President Praises Ghana for Support of U.N. Assistance to the Congo

The White House on July 31 made public the following exchange of messages between President Eisenhower and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana.

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated July 31

President Eisenhower to President Nkrumah

JULY 31, 1960

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you very much for your letter of July twenty-seventh expressing your thanks for the assistance which my Government has been able to provide in airlifting from Accra to Léopoldville Ghanaian forces contributed to the United Nations. The prompt and generous manner in which your Government made its forces available in response to the appeal of the United Nations is deserving of the highest praise.

I agree with you that the United Nations action in the Congo is a most heartening demonstration of the effectiveness with which the world community can cooperate.¹

The American Government is particularly gratified that it has been able to play a part in this operation, and I want to thank you for the indispensable assistance Ghana has given United States aircraft operating through Accra, not only those transporting Ghanaian troops but also those making transit stops with Moroccan and Tunisian forces. This splendid support has been a vital element in the success of our common effort.

I have learned of the military proficiency and the high morale with which the forces of Ghana have carried out their duties under the United Nations Command in the Congo. I extend to you and the people of Ghana my admiration and that of the American people for the conspicuously successful contribution of Ghana in support of the United Nations mission of peace in the Congo.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

President Nkrumah to President Eisenhower

JULY 27, 1960

DEAR MR. EISENHOWER: Now that the airlift of Ghana forces to Congo is complete and all Ghana troops have been carried safely to Léopoldville, I should like to send

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221.

you my personal thanks for the assistance which America has rendered in this regard.

I am particularly happy that United States of America, United Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United Arab Republic aircraft were able to use Accra Airfield to cooperate with Ghanaian civil aviation in support of the United Nations. It gives me great pleasure that we have had in Accra so practical a demonstration of international cooperation in carrying out the Security Council Resolution.

I hope that you will be able to convey to the pilots and the crews who took part in the operation, my thanks and the thanks of the people of Ghana for the service which they have rendered so ably and efficiently in the cause of upholding the principles of the United Nations.

Yours sincerely,

KWAME NKUMAH

President Sends Message to Korean Students

White House (Newport, R.I.) press release dated August 2

The White House made public on August 2 the following message from President Eisenhower to the students of the Republic of Korea. This message was requested by Daeyung Kim, a member of the editorial staff of the Chungang Herald, an English-language school paper of Chungang University at Seoul, Korea.

JULY 26, 1960

TO THE STUDENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA:

Throughout my life I will cherish the memory of the warm and gracious welcome recently accorded me by the people of Korea.¹ For this I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude. Your welcome afforded convincing proof, if it were necessary, of the friendly and strong bonds between our two peoples.

The world well knows the dedication of the youth and students of Korea to the cause of freedom. You have proven your courage and your willingness to defend man's most precious possession. You and your country are now embarked upon the intricate, more difficult task of ensuring that the liberties you have won will find lasting expression in the Republic of Korea.

¹ President Eisenhower made a trip to the Far East June 14-20, during which he visited the Republic of Korea. For background, see BULLETIN of July 25, 1960, p. 123.

Youth has the priceless assets of vigor and enthusiasm. Yet you must also bring to your tasks a sense of infinite patience, broad vision, and deep humility if you are to meet the challenge which faces Korea and the world. Courage alone will not suffice. You must demonstrate that sense of individual responsibility and self-restraint which will serve to guarantee both freedom and its inseparable twin, justice. Free men face a difficult choice; whether they will dissipate their liberty through license; or whether they will take up the burdens which liberty imposes and go forward in the service of mankind. For freedom must be served as well as sought. It imposes duties and obligations, as well as bestowing rights and liberties. Your success in fulfilling these obligations will determine whether your generation will succeed in maintaining a balance between the extremes of license on the one hand and repression on the other.

There are those who would deny you your freedom to achieve their aims—indeed they want to dominate the world. They exploit both anarchy and servitude. They seek to convince you that the free world poses a threat to peace and progress. In this they persist despite clear evidence that they, not we, have brought a third of the world's people into brutal subjugation; that they, not we, refuse to disarm and, instead, threaten to rain down instruments of destruction upon the weak and the powerful alike. There is, indeed, existing a threat to peace and progress, to your right of self-determination and your liberties; it is posed by the ruthless colonial aggressions which characterize international communism.

Your generation, in Korea and elsewhere, faces as none before it the issue as to whether mankind is to progress united in freedom and justice or whether nations will fall victim one by one to a new and deadly colonialism. Upon your response depend the future of your nation and, in considerable measure, the future of the free world. I have deep confidence that you are equal to the task be-

fore you, and I wish you full and complete success in this great responsibility.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

1960 Pacific Festival

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

WHEREAS the 1960 Pacific Festival will be held at San Francisco, California, from September 9 to September 18, 1960, inclusive; and

WHEREAS the purpose of this festival is to focus the attention of the world on the interdependence of the cultural and economic interests of the cities, States, and nations bordering the Pacific Ocean and to foster mutual understanding and cordial relations among the peoples of these areas; and


WHEREAS this purpose is consistent with our national policy of promoting peace and friendship through the cultivation of mutually beneficial economic, social, and cultural relationships among the nations and peoples of the world; and

WHEREAS the Congress, by a joint resolution approved July 14, 1960, has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation inviting foreign nations to participate in the 1960 Pacific Festival:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, do hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of State to invite, on my behalf, such foreign nations as he may deem appropriate to participate in the 1960 Pacific Festival at San Francisco, California, from September 9 to September 18, 1960.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fourteenth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-fifth.



By the President:
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3356; 25 Fed. Reg. 6869.

Economic Assistance as a Cooperative Effort of the Free World

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State released on August 4 (press release 431) a special report on the bilateral efforts of the United States and 10 other free-world nations to help the newly developing countries achieve economic progress and self-sustaining growth. Also included in the 66-page document is a section on multilateral aid with particular reference to United Nations technical assistance, the U.N. Special Fund, and the several international financial agencies.

The report, entitled "Economic Assistance as a Cooperative Effort of the Free World," was prepared jointly by the Department of State (including the International Cooperation Administration), the Departments of the Treasury and Defense, the Development Loan Fund, and the Bureau of the Budget. It was prepared in response to section 413(d) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, and submitted to the chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees on August 1.

The report includes statistics on the expenditures since 1954 by free-world nations to help the less developed countries, figures which clearly indicate the increase in the economic assistance efforts of America's free-world partners. The economic assistance extended by each of the countries is described in some detail.

In a special subsection entitled "New Developments in Multilateral Cooperation" the promising prospects for the newly formed Development Assistance Group (DAG) are outlined. The Development Assistance Group, consisting of 10 capital exporting nations and the European Economic Community, is a consultative group which meets on an informal basis to discuss ways and means of increasing the volume and effectiveness of aid extended by these countries to the less developed areas. It is planned to hold the third meeting of the Development Assistance Group in Washington early in October.

The report assesses existing aid patterns with a characterization of the national aid policies and institutions of major capital exporting countries. In addition, it contains a complete listing and description of the international organizations which deal with economic development in the less developed areas.

EXCERPT FROM REPORT¹

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AS A COOPERATIVE EFFORT OF THE FREE WORLD

Part I. Introduction

This report is submitted in response to section 413(d)² of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended, which provides that:

"Under the direction of the President, the Department of State and such other agencies of the Government as the President shall deem appropriate shall conduct a study of methods by which the United States and other nations including those which are parties to regional agreements for economic cooperation to which the United States is a party, or any of them, might best together formulate and effectuate programs of assistance to strengthen the economies of free nations so as to advance the principal purposes of this Act, as stated in section 2 thereof."

This document consists of two basic elements:

1. A report on existing patterns of coordination of economic assistance to the less-developed countries, including the manner in which the assistance activities of other free world nations and of multilateral instruments and

¹The report is divided into three parts, the first two of which are printed here. Part III, "Existing Patterns of Assistance," contains three sections: "Problems in Assessing the Amount of Assistance," "Brief Characterization of National Policies and Institutions of Major Capital Exporting Countries," and "International Organizations Dealing With Economic Development of Less-Developed Areas." The table on p. 295 is taken from Part III. Copies of the full report may be obtained, within the limits of supply, by writing to the Office of Public Services, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

²This subsection was added by section 205(m)(5) of the Mutual Security Act of 1959. [Footnote in original.]

organizations are taken into account in the programming of assistance under the Mutual Security Program. This section is concluded by a description of the trends of coordination within the newly formed Development Assistance Group (DAG).²

2. An assessment of the volume of assistance available to advance economic development in the less-developed countries, and the trends of future resource availabilities. This section is supplemented by brief analyses of the national policies of the major capital exporting countries with respect to economic aid and the instruments through which development assistance is provided. There is also provided a complete listing of the international organizations, both worldwide and regional in scope, which deal with economic development of the less-developed areas.

The dimensions of the problems of assisting the individual less-developed countries are only now becoming clear. The need for such assistance is so large that the drive for such assistance must be carried on on all fronts—as part of the drive for the dignity and freedom of man. The tried and successful methods in which the free nations of the world have together formulated and implemented programs of assistance must continue. Therefore a study of such proven methods of cooperation in economic assistance was made and here presented together with comments on the recently evolved forum of discussion and coordination, the Development Assistance Group.

Part II. Cooperation in Assistance to Less Developed Countries

A. PROGRESS TO DATE

1. Review of Findings and Conclusions

The United States has for many years pursued the policy of encouraging Free World industrialized countries to facilitate movements of private capital abroad and to supply public capital and technical assistance to less developed nations and, where appropriate, to join with the United States in continued efforts to build economic strength within a free society in the less developed nations.

The United States has consistently participated in joint assistance to the less developed countries through international organizations dealing with the economic development of such areas. Such multilateral activity is expanding in scope. An example of such a cooperative venture is the United Nations Special Fund, established in 1958 to assist less developed countries in planning and engineering the preliminary stages of development. The United States has also participated actively in the international financing agencies associated with the United Nations and in other regional organizations described later in this report.

U.S. bilateral assistance benefits directly from the multilateral examination of the economies and programs of the less-developed countries by international organizations in which the United States is an active member. The products of these reviews are important factors in

the level of United States assistance. The critical financial problems of Turkey and Spain, for example, were multilaterally discussed within the forum of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation prior to the development of plans for their resolution. On the basis of these discussions, the United States was able to develop more effective aid programs, taking into account multilateral and other types of assistance available to the countries under consideration. The annual Colombo Plan consultations on economic development problems and progress in South and Southeast Asia have also been useful in this respect.

With few exceptions, other industrial countries of the Free World have improved their financial positions and their relative competitive positions in the Free World have been restored. These countries could now, in the words of Secretary of the Treasury Anderson at the 1959 annual meetings of the Board of Governors of the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], IMF [International Monetary Fund] and IFC [International Finance Corporation],⁴ "face the common obligations to share in the task of providing capital to the less developed parts of the Free World." Towards these ends, the U.S. is encouraging prospering industrialized nations to assume more substantial roles in fostering the advancement of less-developed areas.

There is today general recognition on the part of the Free World industrial nations that assistance to the less-developed countries in their economic development is an imperative task which the industrialized nations must assume in their own interest.

Efforts so far have not been adequate to fill the requirements. The large and growing disparity of living standards in the less-developed countries, the rapid population growth in some of the less developed areas, the continuing technological revolution in the advanced countries, the continuing emergence of new nations with new expectations and aspirations indicate that a sustained and growing effort is needed for some time to come until at least some of the less-developed nations reach a level of self-generating growth.

Total government long-term loan and grant expenditures from the industrialized countries of the Free World to the less developed areas has increased substantially over the past few years. In the years 1954-1958 the flow of assistance is estimated to have averaged almost \$3 billion annually; in 1959 it was over \$4 billion, of which about 10 percent was disbursed through multilateral agencies.⁵ Of this total about two-thirds was contributed by the United States and one-third by the other Free World countries. The increase in these aid funds over the past few years was almost equally divided between contributions from the United States and from the other Free World industrialized countries.

It is reasonable to expect that the economic assistance expenditures of the Free World industrialized countries will continue to increase. Known commitments made by many of these countries in the last two years are likely

⁴ *Ibid.*, Oct. 19, 1959, p. 531.

⁵ See table, p. 295.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1960, p. 577.

to increase the rate of expenditures over the 1958-1959 level, and their announced budgetary plans suggest further increases. The recent establishment of new institutions, such as the Overseas Development Fund of the European Economic Community, the U.N. Special Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank, and the prospective establishment of the International Development Association will further increase the flow of capital and technical assistance to less-developed countries.

Economic assistance provided in the form of government-financed capital and technical aid is not the only measure to assist less-developed countries and should be viewed together with other policies, including efforts to encourage private investment and expanding world trade. But government-financed programs have special significance inasmuch as they do what other instruments of assistance cannot or will not undertake.

Capital requirements should not be viewed in quantitative terms alone. The effectiveness of capital can vary greatly depending on the proper combination of other factors of production. In fact, the improvement of technical and managerial skills, the improvement of government administration and development policies, and in general the creation of a social and cultural framework conducive to economic growth are of equal importance to investment and should also engage the ingenuity and determined effort of the developed nations.

Some of the methods and results of encouragement by the United States of other nations to increase their participation are described in the following pages. These include discussions with other industrialized nations on the problems of underdeveloped countries in order to increase the availability of funds for economic development. The United States has also encouraged the growth of international joint action in providing help to the less-developed countries and programs in which the underdeveloped countries themselves participate in assisting other less-developed countries. One of the objectives of the recently established Development Assistance Group, now comprising ten major capital exporting countries of the Free World and the European Economic Community, is to increase and improve the flow of capital assistance to less-developed countries.

There has been little or no overlap between the various bilateral programs and multilateral programs of the Free World countries. Except for the "ad hoc" multilateral assistance packages described in Section 3, below, however, it is not possible to assure complete and formal coordination of U.S. aid programs with each and every aid program of other countries as well as with the programs of international agencies. Nevertheless, the United States considers very carefully all known or expected activities in each country or region before formulating its programs, as described in the discussion below of the methods used by the United States in planning the kind and extent of United States economic activity abroad. Informal bilateral discussions continue to take place between the United States and other industrialized countries on behalf of the less-developed countries. The responsibility for the coordination of U.S. programs with those of multilateral organizations as well as with bi-

lateral programs of other nations, falls to a large extent upon the diplomatic missions and the U.S. Operations Missions. Cooperation is necessary to avoid duplication and overlapping, but even more to increase the effectiveness of the limited amounts of capital available for assistance to the less-developed countries. Development capital is still scarce in relation to the multitudinous requirements of the less-developed countries. The bulk of the assistance of other industrial nations has come from Western Europe and gone to the overseas countries where the United States has had few programs.

The task is great, the stakes high and of mutual concern to all Free World industrialized nations.

2. Coordination of U.S. Economic Assistance with Programs of Other Countries

In the preparation of the Mutual Security Program, the ability of other developed nations to finance an increasing share of the growing requirements of the less-developed countries has been taken into account. The United States has taken steps to encourage an increased level of aid from other countries.

U.S. Operations Missions abroad, in presenting the justification for an economic assistance program, evaluate in detail the role of external assistance in the economy of the cooperating country, including present and potential programs of other foreign governments and international organizations, potential investments of foreign business enterprises, and other forms of capital or technical assistance.

The purpose of such consideration is to provide the basis for an appraisal of the total external resources and techniques available to the country from all sources, in relation to the country's own material and human resources.

Bilateral discussions with other industrial countries are an increasingly important technique for coordinating economic assistance from the United States and other countries.

The U.S. has held informal talks, for example with the British regarding economic assistance programs to Libya and Jordan and with the British, French and Italians on Somalia. The United Kingdom continues to contribute to the support of the Jordanian budget, for example, and carries out economic development projects, particularly in the field of transportation. These efforts complement the ICA [International Cooperation Administration] program in Jordan which comprises technical assistance, special assistance in the form of budget support and economic development projects, and a PL 480 drought relief program.

Another example of cooperation in assistance is the continued provision by the United Kingdom of an annual cash grant of \$9.1 million to the Government of Libya for budgetary support.

There are numerous instances of cooperation between the United States and the metropolises on behalf of the economies of the newly emerging African States.

An example of industrial countries working together on behalf of the less-developed countries is the cooperation between ICA and the European Productivity Agency in the training of industrial technicians. Nearly a thousand participants from the less-developed countries have been

trained in Europe in the last year, and this program is being continued in FY 1961. The European Productivity Agency enlists the cooperation of the various national technical assistance bodies in Europe to arrange for the placement of participants in training institutions within their respective countries. All of the administrative costs incurred by these national technical assistance bodies are a contribution by the respective European countries. In addition, European countries bear roughly two-thirds of the cost of maintaining the European Productivity Agency's operating program.

Expected, if gradual, increases in bilateral assistance from other free world industrialized countries may not necessarily lead to decreases in the total U.S. assistance to the less-developed countries, although such decreases are likely in certain specific cases. Increased assistance from other free industrialized nations is needed in order to help meet the accelerated capital demands of the newly emerging nations and the increasingly concentrated requests from those less-developed countries which already have programs well underway and are able to undertake a more extensive program of capital development once financing is available.

3. *Ad Hoc Multilateral Cooperative Efforts*

One of the most significant developments in cooperation between industrialized countries and international institutions on behalf of the less-developed countries has been the conclusion, on an ad hoc basis, of several joint efforts providing for special or emergency assistance to individual countries. This method of international agreement to assist less-developed nations may be expected to continue to be used in the future as appropriate occasions arise. This method has, for example, been used to give assistance to Spain, Turkey and India, and is currently being used for the lower Mekong River Basin and the Indus Waters Project.

Spanish Stabilization Program: As the result of negotiations between the Spanish Government, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, the United States Government and private banks in the United States, the Spanish Government last year was able to adopt an extensive internal monetary and price stabilization program. Funds were made available from the following sources: OEEC—standby credit of \$100 million; consolidation of bilateral debts with various European countries—\$45 million; IMF drawing rights—\$75 million; Export-Import Bank—standby credit of \$30 million; MSP [Mutual Security Program] Defense Support—\$45 million; PL 480 Title I Sales—approximately \$60 million; private banks of the United States—\$71 million credit.

Since the beginning of the program in July 1959 private bank credits have shown no net increase after substantial annual increases since 1954; the cost-of-living index has been stabilized; the budget deficit has been substantially reduced; Spain's gold and dollar reserves position has been improving steadily and the heavy balance of payments deficits on current and capital account were eliminated.

At the end of FY 1960 \$146 million of the international

credits provided for by the "stabilization aid package" remain to be drawn upon.

Turkey: Another example of cooperation was that which culminated in the announcement of the Turkish stabilization program on August 4, 1958. This program was supported by financial assistance in the amount of nearly \$360 million provided by credits of approximately \$100 million extended by members of the OEEC and the European Payments Union; \$234 million of loans, grants and sales of PL 480 commodities by the U.S. Government; and a drawing on the International Monetary Fund of \$25 million, half in U.S. dollars, and half in deutsche marks.

This stabilization assistance was the product of consultations in Ankara, Washington and Paris among senior officials of the United States, the OEEC member governments and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It was designed to take into account the Turkish balance-of-payments situation and to enable the Turkish Government to carry into effect its stabilization program, including changes in the Turkish exchange system, with continued consultation with the IMF and the other governments concerned.

India: As a result of two IBRD-sponsored meetings held in FY 1959 to discuss ways and means of meeting the then-existing Indian financial crisis and assist India's economic development, loans were made to India by the U.K., the United States, Germany, Canada, and Japan as well as the IBRD. These loans helped India bring its deteriorating financial position under control. Since the first IBRD meeting in August 1958, a total assistance of \$717 million has been extended by the participating countries and the IBRD. This consisted of a \$35 million grant from Canada, and long term loans of \$175 million from the IBRD, \$70 million for Germany, \$153 million from the U.K., \$10 million from Japan and \$274 million from the United States (DLE [Development Loan Fund]). In addition, an Export-Import Bank loan of \$13.6 million was extended.

The PL 480 sales agreements with India are in addition to the above assistance. Agreements of September 1958 and August 1959 provided for sales totalling about \$560 million. The agreement, signed in May 1960, provides for the sale of \$1,276 million of wheat and rice (at U.S. export market prices), deliveries under which are to be made over a 4-year period.

Mekong River Basin: With the encouragement and assistance of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) the four countries of the lower Mekong River Basin, (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand) have set up a coordinating committee for the investigation of the economic potential of the Mekong River Basin. Approximately \$6.5 million of support has been pledged to this program by eleven countries and eight U.N. organizations including the U.N. Special Fund. Its principal purpose is the collection of the necessary hydrographic, meteorologic, geologic, mapping and other data necessary for the efficient exploitation of the Mekong River Basin's resources. All contributions are coordinated through an executive agent for the Committee who is furnished by the United States.

The major donors are the United States and Canada

who have offered \$2.2 and \$1.3 million respectively for establishing a system of hydrologic stations, surveys, and aerial mapping. France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are supplying equipment and boats; Australia, France, and Japan are assisting with certain surveys; India is furnishing rain gauges; Iran petroleum products; and Israel and China cement. The specialized agencies of the United Nations—ILO [International Labor Organization], FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization], WHO [World Health Organization], WMO [World Meteorological Organization], and IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] are making available the services of experts in their respective fields. The Special Fund has authorized \$1.3 million for assistance in assessing the development possibilities of four tributaries. The United Nations Technical Assistance Board is financing an advisory board.

The *Indus Basin Settlement Plan* is thus far the largest undertaking in which a number of countries have jointly planned to provide economic assistance to another nation.⁶ Basically, the plan provides for resolution of the long-standing dispute between India and Pakistan over the distribution of the waters of the Indus system in a manner which assures India the water required for extensive new developments such as the Rajasthan Desert and assures to Pakistan a continued water supply to the downstream irrigated areas. The system calls for a series of diversion and link canals and storage dams, with power development at the storage sites. It will also provide essential flood control.

The proposal was developed by the IBRD after years of study. The Bank's work has included not only development of the basic plan but also of the required engineering study and of a system of financing.

The cost of the Pakistan portion of the scheme is beyond that country's capacity to finance. IBRD has proposed that financial assistance for works in that country be provided by the Bank and by a group of friendly countries through a proposed Indus Basin Development Fund, to be administered by the Bank itself. Under the Bank plan, India and Pakistan would agree to a Waters Treaty governing settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan on the Indus River System. Final agreement is expected in the near future.

The project is financed jointly by the IBRD, Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and by India and Pakistan. The total cost of the Indus Waters System, estimated at somewhat more than \$1 billion equivalent over a 10-year period, is planned to be financed as follows:

A. *Contributors to Pakistan (through the Indus Basin Development Fund)*

	Millions of dollars equivalents
1. Foreign Exchange Grants	
Australia.....	15.6
Canada.....	23.2
Germany.....	30.0

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of Mar. 21, 1960, p. 442.

New Zealand.....	2.8
United Kingdom.....	58.4
United States.....	177.0
Total.....	307.0

2. Foreign Exchange Loans

U.S. Loan to Pakistan.....	70.0
IBRD Loan to Pakistan.....	80.0
Total.....	150.0

3. Local Currency

U.S. Loans and Grants Equivalent of U.S.	235.6
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4. India and Pakistan..... See C, below

B. *Contributors to India*

1. Foreign Exchange Loans

United States.....	33.0
IBRD.....	23.0
Total.....	56.0

C. *Contributions by India and Pakistan*

These figures have been supplied to the Congress.

4. *Cooperation Among the Less-Developed Countries Themselves*

Cooperation among the less-developed countries may be expected to expand. Certain of the less-developed countries have taken the initiative in sharing their experience with others without waiting for full industrialization.

As a part of the technical cooperation program, a small but growing number of less-developed cooperating countries are participating with the United States in the support of training at "third country" facilities located within their territory. These third country facilities ordinarily provide training for participants from other less-developed countries in situations or problem areas akin to those actually experienced in their home countries.

Among the less-developed countries assisting in the third country training operations under the Mutual Security Program are Taiwan, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Ceylon, Israel, India, Iran, and Lebanon. Approximately 450 third country participants annually are now undergoing courses of study or receiving practical training in the lesser-developed countries named above. While the principal costs, such as tuition and per diem, are often paid out of the Mutual Security Act funds, the receiving or third country training countries are beginning to assume certain other costs which constitute a contribution to the training program.

Israel is playing an important role in extending technical assistance to the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia and, in order to operate these programs effectively, has recently established a Department for International Assistance and Cooperation under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Assistance to the countries of Africa and Asia is centered in three main fields: (1) provision of Israeli experts, (2) the training of Africans and Asians in Israel, and (3) joint commercial enterprises.

Israeli technicians in various fields are serving in Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, French Sudan, Ethiopia, Burma, the Philippines, Cyprus, and Turkey. In addition, Nepal has recently expressed an interest in receiving technical assistance. These experts are sent at the request of the foreign governments to assist in projects connected with agricultural irrigation and water supply problems, medical, maritime and aviation services, housing, land resettlement, and business management. In most cases the expenses of technicians sent abroad are shared by Israel and the receiving country.

An outstanding example of cooperation involving the less-developed countries is the continuing tri-partite negotiations between the U.S. and India for the benefit of Nepal as the result of which India, out of its own internal resources, has given technical assistance to Nepal.

There are about 50 technicians in the Indian Aid Mission to Nepal. Major fields in the past have been construction of the Rajpath Highway into the capital city of Katmandu; and construction of the Katmandu Airfield. Technical assistance services have also been provided. Indian aid is generally provided within the framework of the Colombo Plan.

In an effort to assist Nepal in its five-year plan for economic development, India offered the rupee equivalent of \$26,000,000 for the years 1956-1961. These funds have been drawn down gradually for projects such as regional roads, village development, and Trisuli Power.

In addition 29 Nepali participants are receiving training in India particularly in the field of education.

On January 28, 1960, it was announced that India agreed to provide financial assistance of \$50,000,000 in rupees to assist Nepal over a five-year period. Of this, about a fourth is a carry-over from previous years. In addition, India has offered to construct the East Kosi Canal in eastern Nepal and continues to supply assistance to Nepal's military establishments.

There are many other examples of economic cooperation between the less-developed nations. Under the Colombo Plan for instance, the less-developed countries have given considerable training assistance to others. Burma has provided training facilities for trainees from Nepal, Thailand, and Sarawak. From the beginning of the Colombo Plan through FY 1959, Indonesia has provided training facilities to 85 students from countries which are members of the Plan; Ceylon has trained 53 foreign trainees in the fields of medicine and health, food and agriculture, engineering, transport and communications, public administration and co-operatives—and has assisted the Pakistan Government in coconut experimental work at its research station at Karachi, making available coconut seeds and seedlings at a low cost. India provided 1165 training places to students from other less-developed countries, mainly in agriculture, civil engineering, forestry, medicine, statistics, water resources development, poultry management, post and telegraph, community development and radio technology. The services of 26 Indian experts were also made available.

Burma, Sarawak and Singapore have utilized Colombo Plan fellowships offered by the Philippines in 1958-59, in malariaology, rural home extension and public admin-

istration. The Philippines continues to make other scholarships available for students from South and South-East Asia in education, social and cultural studies and various branches of engineering.

In 1958, a total of 153 trainees from Laos received training in Thailand under programs sponsored by the United Nations Specialized Agencies and various Colombo Plan countries. Such training programs continue.

B. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN MULTILATERAL COOPERATION

As the problems of the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the economic strength of the industrialized nations of the Free World have been solved, the way has been opened for a new era of cooperation between these countries and the United States for assisting less-developed countries. To facilitate this effort there will have to be some adaptation of old institutions.

New institutions are being built on those existing institutions which have served the industrialized countries well in their past co-operative effort, which can continue to strengthen their economic ties and which can readily be adapted to the new tasks. Thus, last January, the United States proposed to the European countries belonging to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation that that body be reconstituted into an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Negotiations to that end are now in process. Meanwhile the Development Assistance Group has been formed, now comprising ten capital exporting countries plus the European Economic Community, which can make substantial economic assistance available to less-developed areas over and above their contributions to international organizations. As stated in the resolution which initiated the Development Assistance Group, the purpose of the Group is to discuss among its members the improvement of the flow of capital to less-developed areas. While the present Group is an interim organization, its task is expected to be incorporated under the OECD. The present membership of the Development Assistance Group includes Japan; this is in recognition of the important role Japan can play in capital exports to the less-developed countries, and also to indicate the global, as against the regional nature of the task of the cooperative developmental effort.

As with all new departures, the new organization faces a number of problems. These pertain primarily to the scope and nature of its functions, to its relation to other existing international organizations and to the relations with less-developed countries; these three problems are interrelated.

The rationale of the Development Assistance Group—and to some extent its future parent organization, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development—is to provide a forum where the capital exporting countries can discuss among themselves the problems of economic assistance to less-developed countries in order to achieve a high degree of cooperation in this field. The Development Assistance Group is primarily concentrating on matters of broad policy, general principles, and techniques which are of common interest to the capital exporting countries. These include such problems

as the ways and means of mobilizing capital flows to less-developed countries, the easing of terms under which capital is provided for development purposes, institutional arrangements, improvements in the procedures of information exchange, consultation and coordination. The Development Assistance Group has no operational functions, nor will it administer a fund.

The relationship of the Development Assistance Group to existing international organizations, to the less-developed countries or to their regional groupings evolves from its own function and terms of reference. By and large, it is an indirect relationship. From time to time the Group may directly consult on matters of general interest to such organizations as the various institutions of the U.N., including the IBRD, the IMF, and the various regional Economic Commissions. However, the Development Assistance Group will encourage cooperative efforts among its members, with or without the participation of existing international institutions, directed toward the development problems of a given country or region, possibly by recommending procedures on how such cooperative efforts may be initiated or implemented or by simply intensifying the informal contacts and mutual understanding among high level officials of its members and the managers of their administering institutions.

The nature and function of an institution such as the Development Assistance Group and the emerging OECD will have to evolve and grow on the basis of experience. In fact, a major role of the new institutions will be to develop a closer identity of interests among its members, a greater sense of shared responsibility and a greater sense of urgency for the tasks of the economic development of the less-developed areas of the world. There is no blueprint, no detailed prescription which at the outset of this new venture can establish firm rules on how these goals can best be achieved. The work program will have to evolve from the pragmatic experience which the industrialized nations of the Free World gain from working ever closer together.

Nor should the OECD and DAG be viewed as a radical departure from the existing and established channels of coordination and cooperation. They are not meant to replace any of the functions of these organizations or to overlap with their activities. The new organizations are simply filling a gap. As Sir Oliver Franks remarked in a recent speech:

"None of these discussions would get in the way of the proper work of the great existing agencies like the International Bank in their job of planning and lending resources entrusted to them. I speak of the necessary preliminaries which must be accomplished if the industrialized nations are to approach their task soundly and thereafter join in cooperation with the developing countries, often through the great distributing agencies, in working out the fruitful application of the available resources."

Ideally the OECD and the Development Assistance Group should complement and strengthen the existing institutions and there is every reason to expect that the appropriate relations and contacts will be worked out with all the important agencies and organizations dealing with the problem of economic development of the less-developed countries.

The improvement in the cooperative task of economic assistance to less-developed countries is not likely to be possible without special and persistent efforts to bring it about.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES BY CERTAIN INDUSTRIALIZED FREE-WORLD COUNTRIES¹

(Expenditures in millions of dollars)

Country	Annual average 1954-56	1957	1958	1959	Total 1954-59
Australia.....	23.7	34.3	41.5	34.7	181.6
Belgium.....	4.0	8.0	12.0	22.2	54.2
Canada.....	21.4	23.2	60.5	67.4	215.3
Denmark.....			0.2	0.5	0.7
France.....	481.4	857.1	754.6 ²	770.0	3825.9
Germany ³	3.0	33.5	107.1	124.9	274.5
Italy ³	5.5	7.6	10.2	38.6	72.9
Japan ³	11.4	3.0	3.0	13.0	53.2
Netherlands.....	19.5	24.7	22.9	26.9	133.0
New Zealand.....	3.3	5.8	3.0	4.6	23.3
Norway.....	1.0	0.9	1.5	0.7	6.1
Sweden.....	0.7	0.3	0.8	1.1	4.3
Switzerland.....	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6
United Kingdom.....	161.5	155.9	177.2	241.1	1058.7
	736.5	1154.4	1194.6	1345.8	5904.3
United States ⁴	1554.6	2417.0	2250.7	2694.0	12,025.5
Grand total (exclusive of reparations).....	2291.1	3571.4	3445.3	4039.8	17,929.8

¹ Expenditures (grants and loans) during Fiscal Years of countries concerned.

² The apparent drop in French aid expenditures is largely accounted for by devaluations of the franc at the end of 1957 and 1958.

³ Not including reparations payments to less-developed countries. In the case of Germany, these have through 1959 amounted to about \$428.4 million. During the same period, Japanese reparations payments were \$204 million; in addition, the accumulated trade debt of Indonesia to Japan, totaling \$177 million, was cancelled in 1958 under the reparations agreement. Italian reparations payments have been \$181.3 million.

⁴ Including Mutual Security, Export-Import Bank and P. L. 480 expenditures.

Provisional Agenda of the Fifteenth Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly¹

U.N. doc. A/4420 dated July 22

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Peru.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly:
 - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
 - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. Opening of the general debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Election of members of the International Court of Justice:
 - (a) Election of five members of the Court;
 - (b) Election of a member of the Court to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht.
18. Appointment of the members of the Peace Observation Commission.
19. Election of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [decision of the General Assembly of 14 November 1958, see A/3987].
20. Admission of new Members to the United Nations.
21. The Korean question: report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea [resolution 1455 (XIV) of 9 December 1959].
22. Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [resolution 1472 A (XIV) of 12 December 1959].
23. Question of an increase in the membership of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council [resolution 1404 (XIV) of 25 November 1959].
24. Report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation [resolution 1376 (XIV) of 17 November 1959].
25. Final report of the Secretary-General evaluating the Second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in relation to the holding of similar conferences in the future [resolution 1344 (XIII) of 13 December 1958].
26. Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949].
27. United Nations Emergency Force:
 - (a) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the Force;
 - (b) Progress report on the Force.
28. Progress and operations of the Special Fund [resolution 1240 (XIII) of 14 October 1958, part B, para. 10].
29. Economic development of under-developed countries:
 - (a) International flow of private capital: report by the Secretary-General and recommendations thereon by the Economic and Social Council [resolution 1318 (XIII) of 12 December 1958];
 - (b) Question of the establishment of a United Nations capital development fund: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1424 (XIV) of 5 December 1959];
 - (c) Methods and techniques for carrying out a study of world economic development: report by the Secretary-General and comments thereon by the Economic and Social Council [resolution 1428 (XIV) of 5 December 1959];
 - (d) Promotion of wider trade co-operation among States: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1421 (XIV) of 5 December 1959].
30. Programmes of technical assistance:
 - (a) Report of the Economic and Social Council [see resolution 1383 B (XIV) of 20 November 1959];
 - (b) United Nations assistance in public administration: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1385 (XIV) of 20 November 1959];
 - (c) Confirmation of the allocation of funds under the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance [resolution 831 (IX) of 26 November 1954].
31. Opportunities for international co-operation on behalf of former Trust Territories and other newly independent States: report of the Economic and Social Council [resolutions 1414 (XIV) and 1415 (XIV) of 5 December 1959].
32. Question of assistance to Libya: report by the Secre-

¹To convene at Headquarters, New York, on Sept. 20, 1960.

tary-General [resolution 1303 (XIII) of 10 December 1958].

33. Assistance to refugees:

- (a) Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General on the World Refugee Year.

34. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights [resolution 1458 (XIV) of 10 December 1959].

35. Draft Convention on Freedom of Information [resolution 1459 (XIV) of 10 December 1959].

36. Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information [Economic and Social Council resolution 756 (XXIX) of 21 April 1960].

37. Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations: reports of the Secretary-General and of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories:

- (a) Progress achieved by the Non-Self-Governing Territories in pursuance of Chapter XI of the Charter [resolution 1461 (XIV) of 12 December 1959];
- (b) Information on economic conditions;
- (c) Information on other conditions;
- (d) General questions relating to the transmission and examination of information;
- (e) New developments connected with the association of Non-Self-Governing Territories with the European Economic Community: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1470 (XIV) of 12 December 1959].

38. Study of principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for in Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations: report of the Special Committee established under General Assembly resolution 1467 (XIV) [resolution 1467 (XIV) of 12 December 1959].

39. Dissemination of information on the United Nations in Non-Self-Governing Territories: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1465 (XIV) of 12 December 1959].

40. Participation of the Non-Self-Governing Territories in the work of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1466 (XIV) of 12 December 1959].

41. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1471 (XIV) of 12 December 1959].

42. Election to fill a vacancy in the membership of the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories.

43. Question of South West Africa:

- (a) Report of the Committee on South West Africa [resolution 749 A (VIII) of 28 November 1953];
- (b) Report on negotiations with the Government of the Union of South Africa in accordance with

General Assembly resolution 1360 (XIV) [resolution 1360 (XIV) of 17 November 1959];

(c) Election of three members of the Committee on South West Africa [resolution 1061 (XI) of 26 February 1957].

44. Question of the future Western Samoa [Trusteeship Council resolution 2014 (XXVI) of 1 June 1960].

45. Question of the future of Ruanda-Urundi [Trusteeship Council resolution 2018 (XXVI) of 30 June 1960].

46. Dissemination of information on the United Nations and the International Trusteeship System in Trust Territories: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1410 (XIV) of 5 December 1959].

47. Offers by Member States of study and training facilities for inhabitants of Trust Territories: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1411 (XIV) of 5 December 1959].

48. Financial reports and accounts, and reports of the Board of Auditors:

- (a) United Nations (for the financial year ended 31 December 1959);
- (b) United Nations Children's Fund (for the financial year ended 31 December 1959);
- (c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (for the financial year ended 31 December 1959);
- (d) Voluntary funds administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (for the financial year ended 31 December 1959);
- (e) United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (liquidation and final accounts).

49. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 1960.

50. Budget estimates for the financial year 1961.

51. Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly:

- (a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions;
- (b) Committee on Contributions;
- (c) Board of Auditors;
- (d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the appointment made by the Secretary-General;
- (e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal.

52. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.

53. Audit reports relating to expenditure by specialized agencies of technical assistance funds allocated from the Special Account [resolution 519 A (VI) of 12 January 1952].

54. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the United Nations with the specialized agencies and with the International Atomic Energy Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions [resolution 1437 (XIV) of 5 December 1959].

55. Report of the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds [resolution 1440 B (XIV) of 5 December 1959].

56. United Nations Library: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1354 (XIV) of 3 November 1959].
57. Construction of the United Nations building in Santiago, Chile: progress report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1407 (XIV) of 1 December 1959].
58. Organization and work of the Secretariat: report of the Committee of Experts appointed under General Assembly resolution 1446 (XIV) and provisional recommendations thereon by the Secretary-General [resolution 1446 (XIV) of 5 December 1959].
59. Public information activities of the United Nations: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1405 (XIV) of 1 December 1959].
60. Personnel questions:
- Geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1436 (XIV) of 5 December 1959];
 - Proportion of fixed-term staff;
 - Other personnel questions.
61. United Nations International School: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1439 (XIV) of 5 December 1959].
62. Annual report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.
63. Comprehensive review of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund [resolution 1310 (XIII) of 10 December 1958].
64. Proposed amendments to certain provisions of the Pension Scheme Regulations of the International Court of Justice [decision of the General Assembly of 1 December 1959, see A/4297, paras. 3 and 11].
65. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twelfth session.
66. Question of the publication of a United Nations juridical yearbook: report by the Secretary-General [resolution 1451 (XIV) of 7 December 1959].
67. Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament [item proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics].
68. The problem of the Austrian minority in Italy [item proposed by Austria].
69. Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests [item proposed by India].
70. Treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa: report by the Government of India [item proposed by India].
71. Treatment of people of Indo-Pakistan origin in the Union of South Africa [item proposed by Pakistan].
72. Question of Algeria (item proposed by Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Yemen).
73. Question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Union of South Africa [item proposed by Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Denmark, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Guinea,

Haiti, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen and Yugoslavia].

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202. *Ratifications deposited:* Italy, June 9, 1960; British Overseas Territories, including the colonies, protectorates, and territories under trusteeship, June 23, 1960.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement extending the agreement of October 14, 1950 (TIAS 2475), relating to the cooperative vocational and industrial education program in Brazil. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro June 20, 1960. Entered into force June 29, 1960.

Cambodia

Agreement relating to the exchange of official publications. Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh July 15, 1960. Entered into force July 15, 1960.

Colombia

Agreement amending the agreement of April 5 and 7, 1960 (TIAS 4464), for the loan of a destroyer to Colombia. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogotá July 25, 1960. Entered into force July 25, 1960.

European Atomic Energy Community

Agreement additional to agreement of November 8, 1958 (TIAS 4173), for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 11, 1960. *Entered into force:* July 25, 1960.

Italy

Agreement supplementing the memorandum of understanding of March 29, 1957 (TIAS 3524), regarding war-damage claims. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome July 12, 1960. Enters into force when the two Governments have notified each other that the formalities prescribed by their respective laws have been complied with.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement of April 28, 1950 (TIAS 2039), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul June 30, 1960. Entered into force June 30, 1960.

Peru

Agreement amending the military aviation mission agreement of October 7, 1946, as extended (TIAS 1562 and 2385), the army mission agreement of September 6, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3636 and 3821), and the naval mission agreement of July 31, 1940, as extended (54 Stat. 2344, 58 Stat. 1220, TIAS 2504 and 3511). Effected by exchange of notes at Lima April 26, May 2, May 21, and July 15, 1960. Entered into force July 15, 1960.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 1-7

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

No.	Date	Subject
424	8/1	Thayer: Harvard Summer School conference on aid to underdeveloped areas.
*425	8/3	Cultural exchange (Peru).
†426	8/4	Visit of Crown Prince and Crown Princess of Japan (rewrite).
427	8/4	Note to U.S.S.R. on RB-47.
*428	8/4	Designation of Berenson, USOM, Libya (biographic details).
†429	8/4	Amendment of air transport services agreement with Italy.
430	8/5	Report of delegation to 10-Nation Disarmament Committee.
431	8/4	Special report on aid to newly developing countries.
†432	8/5	U.S. document on Cuba released.
433	8/6	U.S.-U.S.S.R. correspondence on Francis Powers.
*434	8/6	Herter: death of Ambassador Karrick.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



COMMUNIST ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS

the

Department

of

State

The Communist economic offensive continued its rapid pace in 1959 and early 1960, not only reaching new levels for many of its activities but also expanding into new areas. Countries in Africa and Latin America became the focal points of major bloc efforts to establish beachheads in Western spheres of influence.

This new pamphlet, based on the most recent information available to the U.S. Government regarding the Communist program of economic penetration, brings up to date the Department of State study entitled *The Communist Economic Threat*, published in 1959. After an initial discussion of bloc economic policy in the less developed areas, the 35-page booklet describes the nature of the offensive, the trade drive, and the areas of concentration.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLIII, No. 1165

August 29, 1960

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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August 29, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Strategy of Incitement

by Andrew H. Berding

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

Almost 3 months ago today I left Washington with Secretary of State Herter for Paris for the summit conference.

In the nearly 3 months that have elapsed since Mr. Khrushchev torpedoed the summit conference² the Soviet Union has engaged in a militant campaign of extraordinary scope and intensity. In some respects this campaign has been without precedent in peacetime diplomatic history. It has been designed to inflame the international atmosphere, increase tensions, provoke and encourage disorders, and arouse worldwide apprehensions about the possibility of war.

When President Eisenhower returned to Washington after Mr. Khrushchev sabotaged the summit conference, he stated in his report to the Nation,³

We must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts between our own and the Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it.

The purpose of this statement was twofold: One was to state to our own people and other peoples that the United States, despite the hostility of the Soviets at Paris, still wanted to do all within reason to achieve an honorable understanding with the Soviet Union. The other was to leave the door wide open to Mr. Khrushchev to reciprocate, if he wished, through businesslike dealings.

¹ Address made before the Jewish War Veterans' annual national convention at Miami, Fla., on Aug. 10 (press release 447).

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 6, 1960, p. 904.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 899.

What has happened since then, however, has been exactly the contrary. Instead of accepting the offer extended by the President, the Soviets have launched a broad and complex campaign against the United States, involving wide-range Soviet and bloc actions, threats, and encouragement of disorder and mass agitation.

As for *actions*, the Soviets set the stage by killing off the summit talks, on which the world had placed at least some hopes. And Mr. Khrushchev canceled President Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union. The Soviets walked out of the disarmament conference in Geneva June 27 on the very day they knew the United States was preparing to offer new proposals.⁴ And Mr. Khrushchev directed a letter to the President accusing the United States of the breakdown of the negotiations. The Soviets resorted to the direct use of military force July 1 by shooting down a United States plane on a legitimate mission over international waters. Likewise, they sought to take advantage of their own illegal action by convoking a special session of the Security Council⁵ designed to create the impression of another U-2 incident.

As for *threats*, the Soviet Union has cast its menaces in various directions, generally embellished with missile rattling. They have threatened to fire missiles at bases from which they guess

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88; for text of a report submitted to Secretary Herter by the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, see *ibid.*, Aug. 22, 1960, p. 267.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1960, p. 235; for exchanges of notes between the U.S. and Soviet Governments on the RB-47 incident, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 163; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 209; and Aug. 22, 1960, p. 274.

that planes had made flights across the Soviet border, accidental or otherwise. After building a stage show of United States aggression against Cuba, Mr. Khrushchev on July 9th threatened missile retaliation against the United States.⁶ Despite urgent and determined United Nations efforts to restore order in the Congo, Mr. Khrushchev on July 15th threatened to take measures to suppress what he called "aggression" if what he called the Western "criminal actions" continued. Mr. Khrushchev also repeated his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the Communist puppet regime in East Germany, if the West German Parliament decides to meet in Berlin this year, as it has done in past years. The Kremlin likewise sent a series of menacing notes to the Japanese Government to dissuade it from ratifying the security treaty with the United States.

Underlying all these threats is the Soviet expansive and insistent claim to have established military superiority over the West. Still more inflammatory and dangerous is the implicit suggestion that the Communist bloc is now willing to employ military force to support both its own policies and anti-Western moves by other countries. Finally there is the belief which the Soviets wish to inculcate, that the United States and Western Powers will be deterred from counteractions by fear of Soviet bloc power.

As for *encouragement of disorder*, this has been constant on the part of the Soviets since the breakup of the summit conference. Communists, encouraged by Moscow and Peiping, played a leading role in Japan in promoting rioting and mass demonstrations against the United States-Japanese security treaty and the President's visit to Japan. In the Congo situation, the Soviet behavior in the United Nations and through public statements has been deliberately designed to motivate and expand rioting and disorder by charges of Belgian and Western aggression and imperialist intentions. The Soviets completely ignore the fact of the voluntary Belgian grant of independence to the Congo and the fact that the United Nations is actively working to restore stability. It is thereby making the United Nations task much more difficult. In Italy Communists, unquestionably supported by the ruling Communist Party

of the Soviet Union, seized on anti-Fascist demonstrations to incite and provoke violence and widespread disorder in which many lives were lost and many persons wounded.

As for *encouragement of mass agitation*, the Soviets have engaged in various forms of this activity since the Paris debacle. The Communist-front World Peace Council on July 11th adopted a decision to launch a major agitation campaign against Western bases, presumably on the model of the old Stockholm "peace appeal."

Simultaneously the Soviets are inciting people in less developed countries to expropriate Western assets.

It is clear that the Soviets believe that the broad range of their objectives is served by this campaign of hate and incitement against the United States. They obviously hope to encourage local action against the United States and Western Powers by emphasizing anti-Western issues and throwing a protective cloak of Soviet power over those who might take action. And simultaneously they hope to generate fear of war and an impression of an awesome Soviet military supremacy to preclude the United States and Western Powers from acting to protect their own interests.

Soviet Ultimate Ambition

It is clear that the Soviet campaign has certain specific aims. The Soviets wish to impair the usefulness of United States' and its allies' overseas base systems generally. They want to undermine the influence of freedom and democracy in less developed areas. Ultimately they hope to achieve two of their basic objectives. These are to bring about the withdrawal of all United States bases overseas and to produce the dissolution of regional security pacts, in particular NATO, but also the Organization of American States, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Central Treaty Organization.

All these are steps in what still remains the Soviet ultimate ambition—the triumph of the Soviet empire over the free world. Mr. Khrushchev has done us the favor of making no bones about this being his ultimate aim. He has recently revised his previous estimate that our grandchildren will live under communism. He now expresses the hope that the Communist flag will fly over the world during his lifetime. He may or may not believe that this will come about,

⁶ For a statement by President Eisenhower concerning the Soviet threat, see *ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 129.

but he fully intends through every means at his command, legitimate or illegitimate, to bring it about.

Results of Soviet Anti-American Campaign

What has been the result of this feverish campaign by the Soviet Union in the last 90 days? In general, it can be safely said that the Soviets have overreached themselves.

Mr. Khrushchev's sarcastic efforts to impugn the capabilities of the President have served to arouse support for and appreciation of the President.

The Soviet denunciations of and actions against the United States have served to rally our allies more closely around us.

The Soviet attempt to use the United Nations as a propaganda platform for spurious charges against the United States has brought other members of the United Nations to our support. When the Soviets took the case of their shooting down of our RB-47 reconnaissance plane to the United Nations Security Council, they found themselves outvoted by nine to two and had to use two more vetoes—their 88th and 89th—to prevent the passage of resolutions they did not like. One of these called for an impartial investigation of the incident, which, of course, they did not dare permit.

The Soviets' presumptuous association of themselves with the Cuban Government, their threats to fire missiles into the Western Hemisphere, and their denunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, have served to alert the Western Hemisphere to the dangers inherent in Soviet penetration of this part of the world. This will be one of the subjects to be discussed at the foreign ministers meeting of the American Republics to begin next Tuesday [August 16] in San José, Costa Rica.

The Soviets' walkout from the disarmament conference in Geneva showed the world that the Soviets were far more interested in producing propaganda out of disarmament than in producing disarmament itself. Therefore, Mr. Khrushchev had later to make the proposal—equally for propaganda value—that the heads of government of the 82 members of the United Nations meet in the General Assembly to discuss disarmament. As if disarmament could result from a brief discussion by 82 heads of government!

Menace of Communist China

In all this campaign of denunciation, threats, and agitation, the Soviet Union has had the enthusiastic support of the Chinese Communists. We have seen them engaging in the same and even more virulent forms of denunciation and vilification. In all our realization of the extent of the Soviet menace, let us never lose sight of the widespread menace that comes from Communist China.

Our American people have only the vaguest understanding of the extent of Chinese Communist effort now under way in this hemisphere. To the average American, Peiping seems so far away that we find it hard to grasp the fact that it is working busily in what is sometimes called our own backyard.

In the last year 402 Latin Americans traveled to Communist China, all or partly at the expense of the Communist Chinese regime. This was 3½ times as many as in each of the 2 preceding years. Many of them were brought to Peiping for the 10th anniversary celebration of the Communist takeover, and some were received by the Communist Chinese leaders. During 1959 and into 1960 the Chinese Communists sent two large performing troupes to tour Latin America, and also journalists and delegates to conferences. During the first 4 months of 1960 at least 13 Latin American delegations visited Communist China, delegates from 11 Latin American countries attended the May Day celebrations in Peiping, and delegates from 16 Latin American countries went to the 11th World Federation of Trade Unions Council meeting in Peiping in early June.

Last year Peiping stepped up its Spanish-language broadcasts to this region to 21 hours per week. This was supplemented in March of this year with a 10½-hour program per week in Portuguese. The propaganda carried on these broadcasts has, of course, been bitterly vituperative of the United States.

Since last November a Chinese Communist newspaper has been published in Habana. A slick-paper magazine in Spanish began to be distributed in this hemisphere by the Peiping regime as of January of this year. Last year joint cultural associations, financed by the Chinese Communists, were formed in Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Uruguay, in addition to those already

started in Chile, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. Another was formed in Cuba early this year.

As for Cuba, the Chinese Communists signed, last month, a 5-year trade agreement to purchase 500,000 tons of sugar annually, to be paid for almost entirely in Chinese goods. Agreements regarding scientific and cultural exchanges were concluded at the same time. The Chinese Communist delegation that negotiated these agreements invited Castro to visit Peiping. Prominent Cuban officials visited Communist China early this year, and Peiping sent a youth delegation to attend the recent Latin American Youth Conference in Cuba and another group to attend the Fourth National Congress of Cuban Youth in April. Peiping has established an office of the New China News Agency in Cuba and has hired correspondents in other Latin American countries. The trend of its news is sharply anti-American.

All the efforts of the Chinese Communists in Latin America are directed to one end—the isolation of the United States from its southern friends in preparation for an eventual Communist takeover of the New World. The United States is the target of a ceaseless campaign of abuse which attempts to confuse our good-neighbor policy with an outdated “imperialist exploitation of semi-colonial peoples,” to use the proper Marxist terminology.

In these circumstances, people who advocate that the United States should recognize Communist China and agree to its admission to the United Nations would do well to scrutinize the extensive endeavors of the Peiping regime to undermine us in our own neighborhood. The heightened prestige that Peiping would receive from such recognition and such admission would enable it to conduct its anti-American program with still greater success.

Soviet Propaganda Distorts U.S. Position

Soviet propaganda has turned itself inside out in the last couple of months to distort the position of the United States and to put the United States in the wrong.

It was Mr. Khrushchev who refused to permit the summit conference in Paris to meet, but Soviet propaganda charges the United States with torpedoing the summit.

It was the Soviets who walked out of the disarmament conference in Geneva, but Soviet prop-

aganda charges the United States with the break-up of the conference.

It was the Soviets who threatened to send troops unilaterally into the Congo, but Soviet propaganda charges the United States with aggression against the Congo.

It was the Soviets who threatened to use rockets against the United States because of Cuba, but Soviet propaganda charges the United States with aggression against Cuba.

It was the Soviets who shot down an American RB-47 plane in international waters, but Soviet propaganda charges the United States with espionage and aggression over Soviet territory.

At the same time the Soviet Government is committing a grave injustice against its own people by denying them the facts. An Associated Press dispatch from Moscow dated July 28 stated:

No attempt has been made to present the American point of view in the Soviet press. The newspapers have generally passed up United States notes to Moscow and speeches by President Eisenhower touching on such things as the RB-47 incident, Cuba and the Congo.

Only selected phrases are published, permitting Soviet writers to give their own answers. These answers parallel in every respect the official Kremlin line. The average Russian reader is left unaware that there is an opposing point of view or facts.

The Soviet Government does its people a further injustice when it prevents objective reporting of the debates in the United Nations. American newspapers and radio-TV give liberal space—and rightly so—to all sides in these debates, including the Soviet delegate, but Soviet readers and listeners get only the Soviet side. Membership in this great world organization should carry with it the obligation on the part of the Soviet Government to make the proceedings of the U.N. known to the Soviet peoples. One of the basic objectives of the United Nations, to become the meeting place of the world, can never be fulfilled until the peoples of all members of the Organization have the opportunity of free access to its debates.

Why is it that the Soviet Government will not permit its people to have the facts? Is it that the Soviet people are disappointed that President Eisenhower was not permitted to visit them and therefore the President has to be downgraded in their eyes? Is it that they are not convinced that their Government is in the right and therefore it is not well for them to read and hear arguments other than those of the Kremlin? Is it that they

fear their Government is creating an atmosphere of war, and therefore all blame must be put on the United States for the existing tensions?

Foreign Policy During Election Campaign

There is little point in trying to assign motivations for the Soviet anti-American campaign. But there is one theory I should like to comment on. This is that during an election campaign there exists in the United States a vacuum or semivacuum in foreign policy, of which the Soviet Government might be trying to take advantage.

It is all too true that this impression exists in some quarters abroad. It is likewise true that during an election campaign the American people naturally devote much of their attention to the activities of the principal candidates and to making up their minds as to who shall guide their destinies during the next 4 years.

Perhaps the impression of a vacuum had some validity up until the last war. Then the United States could afford the luxury of concentrating on its own affairs. But then the United States was not the leader of the free world; it did not have, as it now has, mutual security agreements with 42 nations; it was not a member of regional security organizations like NATO and SEATO; it had not signed the 1947 Rio Treaty of mutual assistance in the Western Hemisphere; it had not spent some \$60 billion in military and economic assistance to our allies and other members of the free world; it did not have more than one million men in the armed services overseas. In sum, it was not tied in so intimately and vitally with the rest of the world as it is now.

The situation now is vastly different from what it was before the war.

Even during the recent national conventions, events in the foreign field occupied a considerable portion of the attention of the American people. The speeches at Los Angeles and Chicago did not drown out the speeches in the United Nations on Cuba, the Congo,⁷ and the RB-47 or statements by this and other governments on the same and additional subjects. Some newspapers and radio

⁷ For statements made in the Security Council during the debates on the Cuban complaint of U.S. aggression and on the situation in the Republic of the Congo by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, see *ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1960, pp. 199 and 221.

networks diverted to New York correspondents they had intended to send to the conventions.

In 1956 we proved that a presidential election campaign could not wholly distract our attention from other parts of the world. The Suez crisis and the Soviet brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution occurred during the last few weeks of that campaign. The United States Government was not in any sense prevented from acting immediately and forcefully in the United Nations and in direct approaches to other nations.

Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues would be most unwise to assume that the American Government and people are nowadays less alert during a presidential campaign. It would be a dangerous assumption on their part that the American people and both political parties would not instantly unite behind their Government if the Soviets chose to take advantage of this period of electoral battle to provoke a crisis. If anything, we are all more on the alert and more prepared as a result of the Soviet Union's nefarious actions and statements of the last 3 months than might have been the case had they continued to play out the line of "peaceful coexistence."

What Lies Behind "Peaceful Coexistence"

Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues have done us an important favor by their campaign of hostile actions and statements against the United States. They have clearly exposed to the world what lies behind the pose of "peaceful coexistence."

Even now Communist propaganda continues to claim that Soviet policy is based on the concept of "peaceful coexistence." This "peaceful coexistence," therefore, includes walking out of the disarmament negotiations, shooting down planes over international waters, threats to drop nuclear rockets on the United States and half a dozen other countries, personal attacks on foreign chiefs of state, including the making of such attacks on the territory of neutral countries, and approving and encouraging, in public statements, violence and disorder in a new African nation.

If at the same time the Soviets say they are conducting a policy of "peaceful coexistence" and likewise engage in the type of campaign they have recently unleashed, they have conclusively proven the fact that "peaceful coexistence," far from being peaceful, is a state of tension and conflict merely short of open war.

The United States Government has never been taken in by the Soviet brand of "peaceful coexistence." We have regarded it as what Soviet doctrine and Mr. Khrushchev himself have clearly stated—no general shooting war, but Soviet continuance of a bitter struggle in the political, economic, and psychological fields for the eventual triumph of communism over the free world. This means the continuance of the struggle by the Soviets through all means possible, legal and illegal, including subversion and overthrow of governments.

We reject the basic assumptions which underlie the belief that they can bring about world communism through aggressive but nonmilitary conflict in the political, economic, and psychological fields. We reject as untrue the basic assumption that the balance of power has shifted or is shifting in favor of the Soviet Union, that communism is the wave of the future, and that opponents of this wave are now isolated and can be downgraded or insulted with impunity.

Around the world there is a steady upsurge in demands for freedom, independence, and economic betterment—demands with which we sympathize and which we support. In no sense do these demands suggest a forthcoming victory for communism but rather a victory for freedom and democracy. Mr. Khrushchev is making a serious miscalculation if he mistakes these manifestations for procommunism or for a weakening of the appeal of freedom and democracy. His present exposure of the real essence of "peaceful coexistence" will simply serve to isolate the Soviet bloc—and not the Western Powers—from the world community.

Achieving an Honorable Peace

These are difficult times, and there is no reason to believe that in the weeks ahead there will be any lessening of present tensions. The Soviets are out to make a great stage play of the trial of Francis Powers, pilot of the U-2, which begins a week from today [August 17].² They may seek to do the same later on with a trial of the pilots of the RB-47. They will do their utmost at the General Assembly of the United Nations this autumn to level renewed charges against the United States.

² For background, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1960, p. 851, and Aug. 22, 1960, p. 276.

They will seek to divide the United States from our allies and sow dissension between one ally and another. They will try to create unrest in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere.

The United States has sought to preserve and restore conditions under which serious negotiations with the Soviet Union could hold a prospect for settlement of some differences and particularly progress toward disarmament. It will continue to follow the thought of the President that "the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it."

The United States, however, has full confidence in its basic policies and will not change them as a result of Soviet threats.

The United States has full confidence in its allies and will continue to strengthen relations with them, regardless of Soviet efforts to split and divide.

The United States has full confidence in its military power and that of its allies, including the power to deter the Soviets from nuclear war, and it will not yield legitimate positions to Soviet pressure tactics out of fear of Soviet military action.

Our efforts will be directed toward achieving an honorable peace. To achieve this peace it is necessary to be resolute, strong, and united. We believe that the peoples of the world, as they become more fully aware of Soviet ambitions and the true nature of Soviet "peaceful coexistence," will be ever more with us.

Crown Prince and Princess of Japan To Arrive in U.S. September 22

The Department of State announced on August 4 (press release 426) that Their Imperial Highnesses Crown Prince Akihito and Crown Princess Michiko of Japan, whose visit to the United States during the centennial year of Japanese-American relations was announced by the President on May 7, 1960,¹ will arrive at Honolulu on September 22 and depart from Seattle on October 5. During this visit the Crown Prince and Princess will pay an official visit to Washington from September 27 to September 30. They will also visit Honolulu, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and Seattle.

¹ BULLETIN of May 23, 1960, p. 823.

Secretary Herter's News Conference of August 9

Press release 440 dated August 9

Secretary Herter: I have a brief preliminary statement that I would like to read if I may. And Andy Berding will have copies of it available immediately after the press conference.¹

An illusion is current in some quarters abroad that in foreign policy the United States becomes paralyzed or semiparalyzed during a presidential election period. It is well that our friends and our opponents should fully realize that nothing could be further from the truth. The United States—the President—can act just as quickly and forcefully during this election period as at any other time.

It is natural and healthful that a presidential election campaign should occupy a large part of the attention of the American people. That is the way free people normally react to free elections. We can take pride in the fact that our candidates seek to make themselves and their thinking known to as large a number of Americans as possible, that our newspapers, radio and TV, and magazines devote generous space and time to the speeches and activities of the candidates, and that our people are intensely interested in the electoral competition that will determine who is to guide their destinies for the next 4 years. All these are elements of the process of a democracy and an informed public opinion which we could not and would not do without. The world would be a safer and better place in which to live if the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc enjoyed the same freedoms of expression, of thought, and of choice.

We have shown in the past, and we are showing even now in handling the major issues before us, that a presidential election period is no bar to national action. Our allies and other nations of the free world can rest assured that when action is necessary it will be taken. Our opponents should

take warning that the American Government and people can move with speed, force, and unity during this period just as at any other time.

We proved this during the height of the last presidential campaign when action was required and immediately taken in the United Nations and outside on the Suez crisis with widespread public support.

If the Soviet rulers believe a presidential campaign ties the hands of the administration, they would do well to recall that their effort to blockade West Berlin during the campaign of 1948 was defied with the Berlin airlift, in which Britain and France joined. They might also recall that during the same campaign negotiations started in July and concluded in September for one of the most important events in the history of American foreign policy—the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The Soviet rulers might also remember that during the 1940 presidential campaign occurred the transfer of U.S. destroyers to Britain and the lease of British bases to the United States and also the enactment of the Selective Service Act.

Today our two major political parties are united in working wholeheartedly with our friends throughout the world and in showing a common and resolute front to opponents who seek to destroy our way of life.

Let no one mistake for a sign of weakness, and seek to profit therefrom, what is instead a sign of strength, that we Americans, as citizens of a free country, can unhesitatingly and openly debate our policies so as to arrive at the best political decisions for our nation.

Mr. Rubottom's Appointment

There is just one other matter that I want to comment on. During recent weeks, since the report came out, and then was confirmed, that Assistant Secretary of State [Roy R.] Rubottom

¹The following eight paragraphs were also released separately as press release 438 dated Aug. 9.

was being appointed as Ambassador to the Argentine and that Assistant Secretary Tom Mann would take his place, there has been, in my opinion, unjustified criticism of Mr. Rubottom as an individual and an unjust interpretation of this transfer.

I have worked with Secretary Rubottom ever since I have been in the Department. I have the very highest opinion of him as a very dedicated Foreign Service officer who has given his utmost in the handling of our Latin American problems during that period of time and, in my opinion, has shown real courage, real determination, and real skill and ability.

His shift as Ambassador to the Argentine came about solely as a result of an understanding that I had with him over a year ago: that after he had completed over 4½ years in the very exacting task to which he had been assigned as Assistant Secretary, he would be allowed, as is customary for a Foreign Service officer, to take his place in the field again.

I just wanted to make that very clear and to reiterate not only my complete confidence in him as an individual but also my great gratification that we have as able and dedicated a man as Assistant Secretary Tom Mann to take his place.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the statement with which you opened the news conference—is that statement issued because you believe there do exist in Moscow some illusions which might lead to a miscalculation on the part of the Soviet Government?

A. In part for that reason, and in part for the reason that in certain journalistic expressions that have reached us from various other nations the opinion seemed to be gaining currency that, because of our constitutional processes during an election year, a form of semiparalysis took place during the election period itself.

Test Ban Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports that the administration may request a revision of the McMahon Atomic Secrecy Act in order to declassify certain nuclear secrets for the Russians so that they may agree to a resumption of underground atomic testing for controlled development purposes. Will such a request be made? And, if so, can you give us some idea of the information to be declassified?

A. I cannot give you a specific answer to that

at the present time. Since the Soviet Government rejected the proposal that we made in connection with the pooling of devices by the British and the Russians and ourselves in order to carry out a series of tests so as to improve seismic capability—since they have refused that, we have been considering certain alternatives that might be offered in order that that test series could be carried on.

We have not yet determined just which would be the best of those alternatives. Among them would be one which would require us to go to the Congress and ask for certain declassification.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a broader question on the test ban issue: It has been nearly 2 years now since we went into a moratorium with no international controls. I wonder in your opinion how much longer we can permit the situation of an uninspected moratorium to continue?

A. Well, as you know, there is no moratorium at the present time as far as we are concerned. Ever since January 1 there has been no moratorium. The fact that we have not tested has been a matter of our own choice—not because of any public declaration or any agreement. We are free to test whenever we see fit to test. We have not done so up to now in the hope that we would be able to reach a satisfactory agreement.

It is obvious that the negotiations have dragged out a very long period of time, during which, in effect, a moratorium has existed since no testing has taken place. Obviously there has got to be a time limit on that since indefinite negotiations would, in effect, if we ourselves observed the procedures that we have to date, constitute an indefinite moratorium. I do not think that that would occur.

Aid to Latin America

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator [Mike] Mansfield has criticized the President's request for \$600 million for Latin American aid² on the ground that it seems linked with our troubles with Cuba and that it seems to be—I think he calls it “a callous attempt to purchase favor in Latin America at a time when we need favor.” He also suggests that a resolution would be preferable—a resolution that we will aid them in a common effort. Can you tell

² For an excerpt from the President's message to Congress of Aug. 8, see p. 314.

us what you think of his statements and whether a resolution of that kind would be acceptable to the State Department?

A. As you know, the President's suggestion was not a request for the \$600 million—it was a request for authority, not the appropriation of the sum of money during this short term of the Congress.

I think that either a resolution or the authority would be acceptable to the administration. I think that what we would want would be an indication of favor on the part of the Congress in some specific form, which would assist very materially in carrying on the negotiations of the [Committee of] 21 at Bogotá, which commences on the 5th of September; and, certainly, references are likely to be made on this at San José, when we go there on the 16th of August. As you know, this has not been in any sense connected with the Cuban difficulties. This has been something that has been in the President's mind for some time, ever since his last trip to South America.

Q. Mr. Secretary, reports from Laos today speak of the overthrow of the pro-Western government, and among the four or five communiqués issued so far is an invitation for foreigners to leave the country or be expelled. Would you speak about this, sir—your comment on it?

A. Well, I am sorry to say that I cannot give anything more specific than what has come over the news ticker.

Apparently a battalion of paratroopers, whose principal commander was out of the country (he had been in this country and was on his way back through Thailand), but under the command of a captain, did in the early hours of this morning stage what appeared to be a nonviolent *coup d'état*. We know there was a little firing during the night but no violence to speak of.

Just what the orientation of that group will be, whether it will be supported out of the immediate locality of Vientiane, we don't know. The information is extremely limited at the present time, and I wouldn't want to generalize with respect to it until we have further information.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported yesterday that when you went to Newport you had recommended a substantial increase in spending to demonstrate to Russia that we would certainly counter any aggressive moves on their part.

First of all, is that report correct? And, if so, what are the special reasons for the recommendation?

A. I am not going to comment in any way on my conversations with the President at Newport. That is something for him to comment on and not myself. I think that the recommendations that the President has made, the statements that were made in his message to the Congress, speak for themselves.

Meeting of Western Hemisphere Foreign Ministers

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Western Hemisphere foreign ministers meet a week from today in San José. As you see it, what are the possible lines of action on (1) Venezuela's denunciation of the Dominican Republic,³ and (2) Peru's call for consideration of the extracontinental menaces to the Western Hemisphere?⁴

A. Well, I think it would be merely speculation at the present time to indicate what is likely to develop there. With respect to the first matter on the agenda, namely, the Venezuelan charges against the Dominican Republic, those presumably will have been reported on to that conference by the special investigating committee of the Organization of American States. Much will depend on the substance of that report. Presumably the Venezuelans will then ask that certain specific steps be taken by the other states with regard to the Trujillo government. We have a double-barreled difficulty there, both in not knowing what Venezuela is likely to recommend and, secondly, not being quite certain what the complexion of the Dominican Government may be as of that moment. So it would be rather futile, I think, to speculate on what precisely will happen.

With regard to the second matter, in effect the Peruvian resolution opens up the whole question of the interjection of a foreign power into the intra-American system, the organization and the working of the Organization of American States. Presumably that resolution, as drafted, is wide enough open so that all of the American states will have an opportunity of discussing just what

³For statements by John C. Dreier, U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States, see BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1960, p. 224.

⁴For a statement by Ambassador Dreier, see *ibid.*, p. 225.

the effect of the increasing degree of influence of the Soviet Government in Cuba will be on the other states and what action, if any, they should take to counter it. As you know, we have taken the position throughout that the difficulties in Cuba are not just United States-Cuban difficulties, that they are difficulties of a much broader and more widespread importance and significance affecting all of the states of Latin America. I expect that it will be a frank and very full discussion of this whole matter. What the specifics are, I think again it would be premature for me to comment on.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on a related point, the Dominican press has been very bitterly criticizing Mr. Rubottom and other high Department officials. Do you foresee any change in this attitude as a result of the shifts in the Dominican Government announced recently, or what is your forecast, sir?

A. We cannot yet judge whether or not the shifts in the Government represent a real shift in policy or whether it's merely the carrying on of the same policy under a different set of names. Perhaps that situation will become clearer in the next few days.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when Castro visited the United States in April of 1959, he brought with him some of his economic and financial advisers. During that period and during the months immediately prior, was there any indication from the Cuban Government that they were interested in financial assistance from the United States, and, if so, what was our reaction?

A. No. Insofar as I personally am concerned—and I had an opportunity of seeing him, and I entertained Mr. Castro at lunch when he was here—the question of financial assistance was never raised, either by his financial minister or by him himself. I am not aware that it was raised with any officials of the Government because, as you know, he was not here officially. He came here at the request of the newspaper editors and was in Washington only a very short time before he went to New York. Whether he made any approaches of a private nature in New York to private institutions or not, I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, specifically what does the United States hope to see achieved at the meetings of the American foreign ministers?

A. I think that perhaps the most important thing is to achieve a sense of solidarity in the face of what is very clearly a threat to all of the Latin American nations, a threat somewhat anticipated in the charter of the OAS and certainly in the Caracas resolution.⁵ And we, of course, hope very much that there will be a solidarity from the point of view of any specific steps that may be recommended to be taken at that time.

Question of Bundestag Meeting in West Berlin

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Khrushchev has indicated that he might go ahead and sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if the West German parliament should meet in West Berlin. In view of our responsibility in West Berlin, has the American Government taken a position on this, and will it take one?

A. No. The United States Government has not taken a position on whether the Bundestag should meet in West Berlin. Within the Government itself it has taken the position that this was entirely an internal matter for the West Germans and the Berliners to decide, that meetings in Berlin have been held in the last 5 years—in each of the last 5 years—of the Bundestag, so that there is no new precedent being set here at all. At the present time, as you know, the Russians are threatening that they might take action if it occurred again. We feel that that is an internal matter for the Germans themselves to decide and not for us to decide.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this independent Katanga delegation that was at the United Nations for the meeting yesterday had a press conference Sunday night, and the head of this delegation, Van den Bosch [Jean Baptiste Kibwe, Finance Minister of the Province] accused Lumumba⁶ of being a Communist who was trying to set up a dictatorship. Of course the opponents, his supporters—the supporters of Lumumba—say that the Katanga thing is merely a Belgian puppet operation. Do you feel—which way would you like to go on those two alternatives, Mr. Secretary? [Laughter.]

A. With all due respect, I do not want to get

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 638.

⁶ Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo.

involved in making comments on the internal political situations and particularly the views of individuals in the Congo at this very difficult and complicated time.

Q. If I might ask one other thing. Van den Bosch said he hoped to be able to speak to some State Department officials here, that a councilman in Elizabethville had arranged for him to speak. Is there any truth in that?

A. That I know nothing about whatsoever.

The Cuban Situation

Q. Mr. Secretary, are we at all concerned with the repercussions of the Cuban situation in Haiti, especially in the light of some official statements issued by the Government that had a definite anti-American turn?

A. Well, I am not sure that we are too much concerned about any one particular country in Central or South America. I think that we are concerned, as those countries themselves are concerned, with the effect of the turn that the Cuban revolution has taken and its implications in the other countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the Department contemplate any action in regard to the latest confiscations of United States property by Cuba?

A. The United States Government is filing [has filed] a protest indicating that it is completely arbitrary, confiscatory, and discriminatory and protesting against the violent manner in which they are being done.⁷ It would appear that they are being done without any opportunity for even discussion of adequate compensation and prompt compensation, which are the two factors in international law which have always gone with the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Those factors seem to be completely missing in this very arbitrary action that is being taken.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how does this Government consider its rights to turn over a Polaris missile or to base Polaris missiles in West Germany or in any other country that we wish to do so with the consent of our allies?

A. There will be a release on that—I think it will be given out momentarily—in which our re-

ply to the Soviet Government on that subject is clearly set forth.⁸

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you said you were filing a protest, in response to the previous question, do you mean a protest is being made to the Cuban Government about the seizures?

A. The Cuban Government, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel hopeful that among the alternatives you are considering to propose to the Soviet Union on the atom ban there can be some meeting of the minds and that there may be some underground seismic pooling of some kind?

A. Well, I would hope so. As you know, I have always been hopeful that we might reach agreement in this field. I must say that the obstacles that we have met are pretty discouraging from time to time, and then sometimes one doubts whether or not the Russians have any intention of signing up or prefer to keep the negotiations going and profit indirectly by the *status quo*, which means no testing as of now as a result.

Q. Have their objections been this time based on scientific considerations? The reason I ask is that it appears that way, since you are considering alternative proposals such as perhaps declassifying some of our atomic secrets that appear to be essential.

A. Their rejections have not been on scientific grounds at all. They have been on purely political grounds. In May, when the scientists met in Geneva, the scientific group were in complete accord with regard to the whole test series and its being a coordinated effort among the British and the Soviets and ourselves. That accord, while it was never reduced to any more than a recommendation to the Commission, was completely kicked overboard by the Soviets on political grounds, and they said it had no standing whatsoever—that the agreement of the scientists had no standing whatsoever.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the protests to Cuba, what's the purpose of these pronouncements? Is it to make a record, or are they preliminary to something more concrete, something more definite in the way of retaliatory action?

A. I assume what you're really asking is, where do we plan to go next?

⁷ For text, see p. 316.

⁸ For text, see p. 347.

Q. That's right. Are we just talking, or do we mean to do something?

A. These protests have got a very real purpose. They do establish a record, and in international law a record is a very important thing. Furthermore, no one knows what shift may take place in Cuba. We, of course, hope that the Cuban people themselves, with whom we have nothing but sympathy, will take care of the situation and eventually our long-standing happy relationship will be restored. In the intervening time we have, as you know, exercised very great patience. We still feel very strongly that what happens internally in Cuba is a matter primarily for the Cubans to determine for themselves.

Q. Thank you, sir.

President Urges Congress To Act on Free-World Programs

*Message of President Eisenhower (Excerpt)*¹

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I welcome the return of the Congress. There is much important legislative work still pending that cannot await the selection and assembly of a new Congress and a new administration. The executive and legislative branches must act together on these pressing needs these next few weeks. I shall do my part. I am sure that the Congress will be similarly disposed.

First, the world situation, with its great significance to us.

Fundamentally, it is as it was. The free world still faces a Communist imperialism fixed upon conquest of all the world.

Vigilance, therefore, must still be our watchword. Continuing strength—military, economic, spiritual—must remain our reliance. Our basic objective, to secure a permanent peace, is yet to be won. Our programs have long been keyed to this situation. They must continue.

During the congressional recess events have dramatized tensions that still plague the world.

We have seen an intensification of Communist truculence.

Indeed, the Soviet dictator has talked loosely

and irresponsibly about a possible missile attack on the United States.

An American aircraft has been attacked over international waters. Our resolution requesting an investigation of this matter has been vetoed by the Soviets in the United Nations Security Council.² Surviving crew members are still being held prisoner.

The Soviet delegation has walked out of the Geneva disarmament negotiations.³

The Communists continue to exploit situations of unrest, flagrantly striving to turn to their ends the struggles and hopes of peoples for a better world. These Communist efforts have recently reached new extremes in central Africa.

All of us know about Cuba.⁴

As a result of continuous appraisal of changing Communist tactics and attitudes, I have ordered the military services to take certain practical measures affecting the readiness and posture of our military commands. These include the deployment of additional aircraft carriers to the 6th and 7th Fleets. A number of B-47 medium bombers and their accompanying tankers, which had been scheduled to be phased out of our forces, will be retained in service for the time being; and the tempo of operation of the Strategic Air Command will be increased and its deployment further dispersed. The readiness of our ground forces will be further improved by expanding the number and scope of strategic field and airborne exercises.

I have also directed expansion of certain long-range programs. The Strategic Air Command capability to conduct a continuous airborne alert will be further strengthened. More funds will be applied to the modernization of the Army combat equipment and to military airlift. Additional effort will be devoted to the development of the B-70 and the reconnaissance satellite Samos.

During the congressional recess we have made extraordinary progress in testing one of America's most important weapons systems—the Polaris ballistic missile submarine. It is with great satis-

² For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1960, p. 235; for exchanges of notes between the U.S. and Soviet Governments, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 163; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 209; and Aug. 22, 1960, p. 274.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88; for text of a report submitted to Secretary Herter by the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, see *ibid.*, Aug. 22, 1960, p. 267.

⁴ See p. 317.

¹ S. Doc. 115, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

faction that I report to the Congress that the first test firings of the Polaris missile from the submerged nuclear submarine *George Washington* had rifle shot accuracy at great ranges. Never in my long military career has a weapon system of such complexity been brought from its original conception to the operational stage with such sureness and speed—an achievement that in its entirety has taken less than 5 years.

The time is now right to increase the scope of the Polaris program and five instead of three more submarines have been started this fiscal year. Furthermore, I have directed the development of a much longer range version of the Polaris missile, which will give America a weapon of even greater versatility, power, and invulnerability.

The Defense Department will carry out these defense measures with its available resources insofar as possible. Measures pertaining to weapons systems programs will be carried out by utilizing appropriations already made in this session. Total resources are adequate, although a modest increase in military personnel and in operation and maintenance funds may prove to be necessary to carry out the readiness measures. If such an increase should be required, I shall promptly request the necessary funds.

Incidentally, provision will have to be made after the first of the year to fund the civilian-pay increases imposed by Congress a few weeks ago. These will add permanently to our defense costs some \$200 million a year.

Once again I assure the Congress that this Nation's military power is second to none and will be kept that way. Our long-range strategic bombers and air-to-ground missiles, our intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles, our Polaris submarines, our attack carriers, the tactical air units overseas, the air defense forces, and the atomic and conventional firepower of our ground forces worldwide are indeed a retaliatory and defensive force unmatched anywhere.

So much for administrative actions which I have recently taken. Congressional actions, too, are required.

Our national security needs encompass more than excellence and strength in our own Military Establishment. They include measures to build free world strength everywhere. These require, and I therefore request, appropriations of the full amount authorized by the Congress for the mutual

security program. At this point in the legislative process, these appropriations have been cut by well over a half-billion dollars. The Nation's security and our inescapable interest in a stable world require that these amounts be restored.

In addition, I request a \$100 million increase in the authorization and appropriation for the mutual security contingency fund. This increase is needed to keep America poised for sudden developments such as those in the Congo where a U.S. airlift and other efforts were needed suddenly and critically. Happily, in this instance, we were able to respond in a matter of hours. We must maintain ourselves in a position to give rapid backing to the efforts of the United Nations in this troubled region.

At my direction, two other matters will be presented to Congress, their purpose being to promote free world stability by stimulating the hopes, morale, and efforts of our friends everywhere. These programs are—

First, an authorization in the magnitude of \$600 million to help our Latin American neighbors accelerate their efforts to strengthen the social and economic structure of their nations and improve the status of their individual citizens. This program, which should include further assistance for the rehabilitation of devastated Chile, will promote the dynamism and effectiveness of all our efforts in this hemisphere. I urgently request enactment of this authorization prior to the Economic Conference of the American Republics, which convenes at Bogotá on September 5, so that discussions leading to the development of detailed plans may be initiated there.

Second, a proposal to be presented in September before the General Assembly of the United Nations, whereby we and other fortunate nations can, together, make greater use of our combined agricultural abundance to help feed the hungry of the world. The United Nations provides a multilateral forum admirably suited to initiate consideration of this effort.

I consider it important that Congress approve a resolution endorsing such a program before the United Nations Assembly convenes.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 8, 1960.

Secretary Comments on New Program for Latin America

Following is a statement made by Secretary Herter after a meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 11.

Press release 452 dated August 11

Today's meeting with the committee provided an opportunity to discuss with the members the President's request¹ that this session of Congress authorize \$600 million for two new programs in Latin America. Of this amount \$500 million would be for projects designed to contribute to opportunities for a better way of life for the individual citizens of the countries of Latin America. The additional \$100 million is for rehabilitation in the area of Chile devastated by earthquakes earlier this year.

In his Newport statement of July 11 on Latin America the President said:² "... widespread social progress and economic growth benefiting all the people and achieved within a framework of free institutions are the imperatives of our time." The legislation now before the Congress has as its objective the acceleration of social development, and thereby of economic growth, in Latin America. Thus it is designed to implement the President's program. The concept of this proposed new program is to supplement existing forms of financial assistance which are devoted mainly to projects of economic development. The new program would provide funds for cooperative projects in such fields as land utilization, land settlement, housing, and public facilities. I believe this type of assistance will help the Latin American countries achieve the social stability which will assure steady progress and help strengthen free democratic institutions.

This program should be considered in relation to Operation Pan America, conceived some 2 years ago by President Kubitschek of Brazil.³ President Eisenhower's program may be described as a complement to Operation Pan America, which

has already been launched on its course toward the acceleration of the economic development of Latin America. Operation Pan America, like President Eisenhower's program, is based on the premise that the problems of economic development and those of the strengthening of democratic freedoms are inseparably welded.

United States Protests Cuban Seizures of Property

The United States Embassy at Habana on August 8 delivered to the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations the following note from U.S. Ambassador Philip W. Bonsal protesting the seizure of various U.S.-owned properties by that Government.

Press release 441 dated August 9

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to this Embassy's note No. 344 dated July 16, 1960¹ in which, under instructions from my government, I conveyed to Your Excellency a most solemn and serious protest against law number 851 of July 6, 1960 empowering the President and the Prime Minister of the Government of Cuba to decree the nationalization through expropriation of property located in Cuba of citizens of the United States of America. I stated and I reiterate that the law in question is in its essence discriminatory, confiscatory and arbitrary.

Under date of August 6, 1960, pursuant to the above-cited law, the President and the Prime Minister have signed a resolution nationalizing through forced expropriation the properties of 26 companies wholly or partially owned by citizens of the United States of America.

Under instruction from my government, I wish to express to Your Excellency the indignant protest of my government against this resolution and its effects upon the legitimate rights which American citizens have acquired under the laws of Cuba and under International Law.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 171.

¹ See p. 314.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 166.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, June 30, 1958, p. 1090, and Oct. 13, 1958, p. 574.

Responsibility of Cuban Government for Increased International Tensions in the Hemisphere

The Department of State announced on August 7 (press release 432 dated August 5) that it had released on that date a memorandum entitled "Responsibility of Cuban Government for Increased International Tensions in the Hemisphere," which was submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee on August 2, 1960, with a letter of transmittal from Ambassador John C. Dreier, U.S. Member of the Peace Committee.

The memorandum stresses two major points—the close relations between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc and the emergence of a dictatorial pattern of political control of Cuba—in three sections entitled "The Promise of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba"; "The Practice of the Revolutionary Government in Governing Cuba"; and "Practices of the Cuban Revolutionary Government in International Affairs."

Following are the texts of Ambassador Dreier's letter of transmittal and the memorandum.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

AUGUST 2, 1960

His Excellency
DR. HÉCTOR DAVID CASTRO,
*Acting Chairman,
Inter-American Peace Committee.*

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I refer to my note addressed to the Acting Chairman of the Inter-American Peace Committee on June 27, 1960, with which I submitted to the Committee on behalf of my Government a memorandum entitled "Provocative Actions of the Government of Cuba Against the United States which have Served to Increase Tensions in the Caribbean Area."¹

At the time this memorandum was made public, my Government stated that it referred to only one aspect of the problem of Caribbean tensions and that the Government of the United States would continue to provide further information on other aspects of this problem which were considered relevant to the Committee's study of international tensions in the Caribbean.

I now have the honor to submit for the infor-

mation of the Committee a memorandum entitled "Responsibility of the Cuban Government for Increased International Tensions in the Hemisphere." This memorandum deals with certain actions and policies of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba, in addition to those discussed in the memorandum of June 27, which, in the opinion of the Government of the United States, are clearly contributing to international tensions not only in the Caribbean but throughout the American continent.

The memorandum transmitted herewith is made available to the Committee pursuant to various requests which the Committee has made of the member Governments of the Organization of American States for information and points of view which would assist the Committee in its study of the problem of Caribbean tensions.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN C. DREIER
*United States Member
Inter-American Peace Committee*

Enclosure:

Memorandum entitled "Responsibility of the Cuban Government for Increased International Tensions in the Hemisphere."

¹For text of the memorandum, see BULLETIN of July 18, 1960, p. 79.

TEXT OF MEMORANDUM

August 1, 1960

RESPONSIBILITY OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT FOR INCREASED INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IN THE HEMISPHERE

Introduction

The present document is submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee in response to the Committee's requests addressed to the American Governments for information and points of view which would aid the Committee's study of Caribbean tensions. In this document, the United States presents certain information and viewpoints which are additional to those presented to the Committee on June 27, 1960 in a memorandum entitled "Provocative Actions of the Government of Cuba Against the United States which have Served to Increase Tensions in the Caribbean Area." The present document deals principally with two additional subjects of major concern: the relations between the Revolutionary Government of Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc; and the emergence of a dictatorial pattern of political control in Cuba. The document also categorically rejects Cuban imputations and charges that the United States has violated, or contemplates any action which would violate, principles which are consecrated in the United Nations Charter and the various inter-American agreements to which it is signatory.

1. RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC

International tensions in the Americas have been heightened by the nature of the relations that have developed during the past year between the Revolutionary Government of Cuba and the Governments of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other countries belonging to the Sino-Soviet bloc. The maintenance of commercial and other normal relations by the Cuban Government with the countries belonging to the Communist bloc might not of itself cause concern to other countries. However, the increasingly intimate relationships established between the Revolutionary Government of Cuba and the Governments of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China and other countries associated with them are such as to create a deep concern on the part of other American Governments because of the growing evidence of the intention of the Communist powers to exploit these relationships for the purpose of actively intervening in the affairs of the American Continent.

Statements of Soviet Russian and Communist Chinese leaders indicate that the Sino-Soviet powers are attempting to use the Cuban revolution as an instrument of foreign policy with the objectives of increasing world tensions, undermining Hemispheric solidarity and carrying forward their aggressive attacks against the Free World, and especially the United States. The Communist powers, moreover, not only support the revolution in Cuba itself, but openly espouse it as a dictatorial pattern that should be applied to all of Latin America.

In May 1960, Premier Nikita Khrushchev expressed approval of the Cuban revolution:

"I can but welcome the events in Cuba, where the people

proudly and courageously rose up under the banner for the struggle for their independence. I am convinced that other Latin American countries will also rise up in the struggle and applaud their successes in this fight."

On June 22, 1960, Peng Chen, a member of the Politburo of Communist China, spoke in similar terms:

"Enjoying the sympathy and support of the socialist camp, the correct fight of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys is rapidly developing and has become an historical uncontrollable torrent. The valiant people of Cuba have given a brilliant example for the peoples of Latin America. . . . Only through . . . waging a resolute fight against the American imperialists and their lackeys and isolating the American imperialists to the maximum, can the war be prevented and world peace defended."

On July 9, 1960, Premier Khrushchev added to a statement of support a military threat:²

"We shall do everything to support Cuba in her struggle. . . . We will help our Cuban brothers fight an economic blockade and the blockade will be a failure. . . . Now the United States is not so unreachable as it once was. . . . Speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support with rocket fire the Cuban people if aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to start intervention against Cuba."

Cuban leaders have acknowledged the statements of the Sino-Soviet leaders with expressions of friendship and gratitude.

Captain Antonio Núñez Jiménez, Director of the National Agrarian Reform Institute, on June 8, 1960 said that Cuba was "the Soviet Union's greatest and most loyal friend." On July 10, 1960, President Osvaldo Dorticós, saying that the economic war had begun and that "tomorrow there may be armed war," stated:

"Tonight we hail the message of solidarity spoken by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and coming to us in our most difficult hour. But of course this solidarity, which is a guarantee of world peace, must not diminish our efforts of preparation. We must prepare ourselves better than ever . . . every day, more peasants in the militia, more students in the militia, more workers and women and men in the militia." [Dr. Castro gave substance to the statement of President Dorticós by stating on July 26, 1960 that "this is the last time that the militia will have to march without rifles. The arms for the militia are already here, in the national territory." Dr. Castro has stated that Cuba will arm a militia of 100,000 men.]

The same day, Dr. Ernesto Guevara, pointing out that "We are practically the arbiters of world peace," stated:

"The people of the world are with us and against North American imperialists. The Prime Minister of the USSR has said that if the United States invades Cuba, it will mean not only death and destruction in Cuba, but also the launching of tremendous destructive force from the USSR against Cuba's aggressor. They must be careful, those sons of the Pentagon . . . who up to now have been flaunting their arrogance throughout America. Let them take thought. We are defended by one of the most powerful military forces in history."

On July 21, 1960, Major Raúl Castro stated that the Soviet Union would "use all means at its disposal to pre-

² For a statement by President Eisenhower on July 9, see *ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 139.

vent an armed intervention of the United States against the Republic of Cuba," and that Cuba was profoundly grateful for "the political and moral support the Soviet Union is giving the Cuban people."

High officials of the Cuban Government, in concert with the statements of Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders, have frankly stated their desire that the Cuban revolution be taken as a model for similar revolutions throughout Latin America. Dr. Castro said on July 26, 1960: "We promise to continue making the nation the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American Continent." In Alexandria, Egypt, on July 27, 1960, Raúl Castro said that Cuba would "defend . . . the revolution of 200 million Latin Americans that consider the Cuban revolution as their own revolution."

In a speech before the Latin American Youth Congress in Habana on July 29, Dr. Guevara called upon the Latin American nations to choose sides as "friend or foe." The friendship of the Sino-Soviet bloc, he said, "can be the basis for the carrying out of the American revolution".

The threatened intervention of the Soviet Union—to the extent of suggesting missile warfare—has been based upon the alleged intention of the United States to intervene in Cuba with military force. The complete lack of foundation for such allegations was discussed in the memorandum presented to the Inter-American Peace Committee by the United States on June 27. Cuban officials have, while hailing the offers of military support from the Soviet Union, conveniently disregarded the repeated assurances expressed by the President, the Secretary of State and other high officials, that the United States, far from having any aggressive designs, intends fully to live up to its inter-American and other international commitments which obligate it to refrain from any form of intervention or aggression and to seek the solution of international controversies by peaceful means.

2. EMERGENCE OF A DICTATORIAL PATTERN OF POLITICAL CONTROL IN CUBA

The close association between the Revolutionary Government of Cuba and the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the encouragement by the Communist powers of revolutionary movements patterned on the Cuban model in other Latin American countries, give particular grounds for concern over developments in Cuba that have a bearing upon principles and objectives of the American Republics set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States.

The Revolutionary Government of Cuba came to power with the sincere applause and good wishes of the peoples of the United States and other friendly countries, who were impressed by the valor of the revolutionaries and by the lofty aims professed by the 26th of July Movement. The almost immediate recognition granted to the new government made evident the sincere desire of other governments in the Hemisphere to give it all possible friendly support.

Many of the pronouncements and initial acts by leaders of the 26th of July Movement gave hope that Cuba would assume the position of a leader in the common struggle

of the peoples of America for freedom and representative democracy, and for the economic and social reforms necessary to build a better human life. Dr. Castro was acclaimed as a new figure on the American scene who was genuinely interested in the welfare of his people, who was dedicated to a program of democracy and economic betterment, and who would seek ways of strengthening the bonds of Hemispheric solidarity by giving renewed vigor to principles and objectives which underlie the Inter-American System.

Unfortunately the opposite has taken place with reference to the political structure being erected in Cuba by the Revolutionary Government. Instead of building upon the basic elements of a democratic system as set forth in the *Declaration of Santiago*,³ the Cuban Government has increasingly followed practices, and adopted formulas, typical of dictatorial political systems.

In the *Declaration of Santiago* certain of the main principles of the democratic system in this Hemisphere were set forth, with no attempt to be complete, "so as to permit national and international public opinion to gauge the degree of identification of political regimes and governments with that system, thus contributing to the eradication of forms of dictatorship, despotism, or tyranny, without weakening respect for the right of peoples freely to choose their own form of government." A recital of the facts of political developments in Cuba in relation to the principles of the *Declaration of Santiago* is included in the body of this document. These developments have all been publicly proclaimed. The record clearly demonstrates, among other factors, the absence of any move to hold elections, the virtual prohibition of political opposition, the practical elimination of freedom of the press and other violations of fundamental human rights.

Repeated statements by Prime Minister Castro and his associates have impugned the value of democratic elections and have indicated a clear intent not to hold elections in the foreseeable future. Thus, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba perpetuates itself in power without an electoral mandate or any fixed term of office.

Political opposition has been virtually eliminated. All opposition parties have been driven under ground or eliminated and many of their leaders have sought asylum in other countries. Only the *Partido Socialista Popular* (Communist Party) is permitted to act openly.

Freedom of the press, radio and television has been virtually extinguished. There exist in Cuba today almost no independent organs of public opinion. Newspapers and radio and television stations have been taken over; and editors and publishers who did not conform to the official views of the Revolutionary Government have been forced to seek asylum and flee to other countries. Outstanding among these was the recent case of Miguel Angel Quevedo, editor of the internationally known magazine *Bohemia*, who had been one of the most enthusiastic and powerful supporters of the revolution. The text of the impressive statement made by Dr. Quevedo

³ For a provisional translation, see *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

when he sought asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy in Habana is included in the body of this document.

Individual liberties have been suppressed by military trials and summary executions, imprisonment for political activities, forced exile and the arbitrary imposition of penalties for crimes vaguely described as "counter-revolutionary" which has generally meant any opposition to the Revolutionary Government. Anti-Communism has been defined as counter-revolutionary. The labor movement has also been deprived of its democratic character and converted into an instrument of control by the Revolutionary Government in disregard of the expressed will of the membership of labor organizations.

The course of political developments in Cuba outlined above, and described in detail in the body of this document, has had an inevitable effect upon the standing of Cuba in the inter-American community. Increasing numbers of exiles have sought refuge in foreign lands. In the beginning, most of these were persons associated with the previous regime. The last several months have, however, seen an increasing flight of exiles who had been actively associated with the revolution in its early days but whose independence or difference of opinion had resulted in danger to their personal safety. Former Provisional President Manuel Urrutia and Major Huber Matos, one of the chief military lieutenants of Dr. Castro in the revolutionary movement, are now political prisoners. Dr. José Miró Cardona, first Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government, has sought asylum in the Embassy of Argentina in Habana. The presence of opposition leaders in other countries has been accompanied by intensified complaints by the Government of Cuba against other governments, particularly the United States, for harboring what it terms "war criminals."

The developments in Cuba outlined above are a particular cause of concern on the part of the Government and people of the United States because of the relationship between these developments and the growing Communist influence on Cuban policy. This influence has been reflected in the emergence of the Communist Party (*Partido Socialista Popular*) as the main political organization in Cuba. Like other Communist parties, it is of course responsive to the dictates of the Soviet Union.

Communist influence existed in the early days of the Cuban revolution, but its growth since that time has been rapid and continuous. With the active cooperation of Raúl Castro and Ernesto Guevara, whose sympathy for Communist purposes and methods is well known, Communists have been placed in key positions throughout the Revolutionary Government where they are now deeply involved in remodeling Cuba along dictatorial lines. By July 17, 1959, Communist control was sufficiently strong to force the resignation of Provisional President Manuel Urrutia because he had criticized Communist influence in the government. By October of that year, the Communists had seized control of the Cuban Confederation of Labor and the Federation of University Students at the University of Habana. (In July 1960, the Federation took control of the University.) Also in October 1959, Communist control of the armed forces was accelerated by the appointment of Raúl Castro as Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

In June 1960, it was possible for Captain Antonio Núñez Jiménez to state in Moscow that "The Communist Party of Cuba . . . is the party whose members are receiving the benefits of the Revolution." A few days later, Dr. Castro confirmed that "anti-Communism is counter-revolutionary." On July 9, 1960, Fauré Chomón, who has been named Cuban Ambassador to Moscow, stated:

"I wonder if you have ever thought about what political party is now ruling Cuba. We all know . . . that the revolution is led by a group of revolutionary comrades. . . . But what party do they represent? These comrades belong to the revolutionary party. Little by little we have been forming a revolutionary party. The several revolutionary groups have united in order to make the revolution a success. Our revolutionary party is composed of the active members of the 26th of July Movement, the Socialist [Communist] Party, the Revolutionary Directorate and the other groups."

When it is considered that most of the non-Communist leaders of the 26th of July Movement are "inactive" and others have defected and been forced into exile, and that the Revolutionary Directorate has only nominal existence, the Communist Party emerges as the sole remaining member of the ruling groups mentioned.

From the above, it is therefore clear that not only is Cuba under its Revolutionary Government being transformed rapidly into a dictatorial political state, but a state in which the reins of political control are increasingly being concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party, thereby contributing to the general subservience of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba to the purposes of the Sino-Soviet bloc. These developments cannot fail to increase international tensions not only in the Caribbean area but throughout the American Continent and place in jeopardy the cooperation of the American States as well as the purposes and principles of their Organization.

I. The Promise of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba

When the Government headed by Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz assumed power in Cuba on January 1, 1959, the press and people of the entire Hemisphere hailed the event. Recognition of the Government was granted by all the American states by January 8, 1959⁴ and it was evident that there was a sincere desire to give all possible friendly support to the new Government and to welcome it to the community of western democratic nations and to the Organization of American States.

Dr. Castro's role in the Sierra Maestra mountains of Cuba had captured the imagination and raised the hopes of millions of freedom-loving Americans. Many of the pronouncements and initial acts by leaders of the 26th of July Movement gave hope that Cuba would assume its position as a leader in the fight for freedom, representative democracy, the dignity of man, opposition to all forms of tyranny, and belief in those ideals which are the roots of our mutual American heritage.

Coming after the developments of a democratic nature

⁴The United States extended recognition on Jan. 7, 1959; for text of a U.S. note, see *ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1959, p. 128.

in other countries of the Hemisphere, the advent of the new Cuban Government was viewed by many as a further important step which would help to establish more firmly democratic institutions and procedures throughout the Americas.

This hope of the American community did not seem to be unrealistic at that time. Dr. Castro, in his defense before the Emergency Tribunal of Santiago de Cuba on October 16, 1953, when he and his followers were tried for attacking the Moncada Army barracks, had been described by writers as "a solitary figure consecrated in body and soul to defend the truth." He had been further lauded in the book, *History Will Absolve Me*, by his then friend, Luis Conte Agüero, as one who "is keeping the promises that the rebel made. He does not break his pledges. His acts are true to his words. . . . He is democratic, humanist and humanitarian."

Among the five "revolutionary laws" set forth in Dr. Castro's defense plea in the Moncada trial, one "would have returned power to the people and proclaimed the Constitution of 1940 the supreme law of the land, until such time as the people should decide to modify or change it. . . ." At that time and subsequently, Dr. Castro has consistently deplored atrocities committed by previous regimes in Cuba's history.

Then, on July 12, 1957, Dr. Castro's "Declaration of the Sierra Maestra" was issued. Its general lofty tones also gave those who welcomed the Revolutionary Government hope that democracy would be restored to Cuba. The first eight points of the Declaration are particularly worth recalling.

"1. Immediate freedom for all political prisoners, civil and military.

"2. Absolute guarantee of freedom of information, both of newspapers and radio, and of all the individual and political rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

"3. Designation of provisional mayors in all municipalities, after consultation with the civic institutions of the locality.

"4. Suppression of graft in all its manifestations and adoption of measures which will tend to increase the efficiency of all the organizations of the State.

"5. Creation of a Civil Service.

"6. Democratization of union politics, holding free elections in all unions and industrial federations.

"7. Immediate beginning of an intensive campaign against illiteracy and of civic education, emphasizing the duties and rights which the citizen has both in the society and the Fatherland.

"8. Establishment of an organization for agrarian reform to promote the distribution of barren lands and the conversion into proprietors of all lessee-planters, partners and squatters who possess small parcels of land, be it property of the state or of private persons, with prior indemnification to the former owners."

In an address to the Cuban people on January 2, 1959 just before Dr. Urrutia was sworn in as Provisional President, Dr. Castro said that one of the first acts of the Government would be to restore constitutional guarantees of all types. The new Government would also protect the economy of the country and Dr. Urrutia would be Provisional President and supreme authority in all respects until elections were held.

On January 5, 1959 in Camaguey, Dr. Castro made clear his opposition to press censorship by stating:

"We want the press to function here. There won't be any more censorship as there was under the tyranny. Only a Government which has something to hide imposes censorship."

On the same day in reply to a question, President Urrutia replied:

"My Government will never impose measures of coercion on the press. There cannot be healthy democracy in a country not well informed."

In Santa Clara on January 6, in response to a question on relations with Russia, Dr. Castro was quoted as stating that he:

"... reiterated his personal opinion that Cuba should not maintain diplomatic relations with any dictator."

In a publicized interview given early in January 1959, Dr. Castro expressed the opinion that:

"The tyranny having been defeated there were automatically reestablished all civil rights, including the right to dissent and to make opposition."

President Urrutia in a press interview on January 7 said:

"Cuba will always exert the maximum effort to assure that in our country there are no more dictators. Cuba wishes to respect international law and not intervene in the internal problems of other countries, and intends to present to international organizations the question of respect for human rights. I believe when this occurs there will be no more dictators."

On May 21, 1959, Dr. Castro said:

"We wish to free man from fear, we want to free man from dogmas, to free him socially and economically, without dictatorship of any kind. . . .

"I know that the Cuban people and the Latin American people understand what a revolution is that satisfies man's material necessities without sacrificing his liberties. And we can be very satisfied to say that this revolution hasn't needed to resort to terror or to mass executions. . . . And here we haven't pressured any social sector, we have respected liberties, religious beliefs, and individual rights and we are going to achieve a revolution with democratic methods, and we understand that if we achieve this the Cuban Revolution will become a classic revolution throughout the world because it will have achieved the objectives which people seek, in modern times, after having respected the rights and the liberties of man."

These were the promises which led students, labor leaders, the press, the ordinary citizens, and the statesmen of the Hemisphere to acclaim Dr. Castro as a new figure on the American scene who was genuinely interested in the welfare of the people, who was dedicated to a program of democracy and economic betterment, and who would seek ways of strengthening the bonds of Hemispheric solidarity by adherence to the ideals and philosophies which underlie our inter-American relations and heritage.

II. The Practice of the Revolutionary Government in Governing Cuba--Disregard for the Principles Stated in the Declaration of Santiago

The Organization of American States has long concerned itself with the encouragement of representative

democracy in the Americas, a principle that is set forth in its Charter. In August 1959, the Foreign Ministers of the American States issued in Santiago⁵ a declaration—the *Declaration of Santiago*—which once again expressed the devotion of the Americas to democracy and specified eight Principles essential to the concept. The Cuban Foreign Minister joined in affirming that:

"The faith of the peoples of America in the effective exercise of representative democracy is the best vehicle for the promotion of their social and political progress."

The record of the Government headed by Dr. Castro in observing the seven Principles of the *Declaration* dealing with human rights is set forth below.

A. SEPARATION OF POWERS

The first of the Principles specified in the Declaration is:

"The principle of the rule of law should be assured by the separation of powers and by the control of the legality of governmental acts by competent organs of the State."

There is no separation of powers in Cuba today. According to the Fundamental Law of February 7, 1959, under which Cuba is now governed, the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Republic (Article 125), assisted by the Council of Ministers (Article 135). The legislative power is vested in this same Council of Ministers (Article 119).

The Fundamental Law provides only for the President's qualifications, functions and method of replacement in the event of his absence, illness or death. The method for becoming President remains constitutionally unanswered. Yet dependent on the President are all designations to the Supreme Court and to the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister. In actual practice, Dr. Manuel Urrutia y Lleó, the first Provisional President of the Revolutionary Government, was named by Dr. Castro from his headquarters in the Sierra Maestra mountains. Dr. Urrutia's resignation as Provisional President on July 17, 1959 came after Dr. Castro's accusations on television that Dr. Urrutia was guilty of "counterrevolutionary" attitudes when he spoke out against Communism. Dr. Urrutia was not permitted to defend himself. Dr. Castro presented his own resignation in an obvious maneuver to force that of the President. After Dr. Urrutia's resignation, Dr. Castro almost immediately resumed his post as Prime Minister and named Dr. Osvaldo Dorticós to the Presidency.

Although provision is made in the Fundamental Law for an independent judiciary, it has, in substantial measure, been superseded by Revolutionary Tribunals. Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the President of the Republic from a panel of three names proposed by an electoral college of nine members, with the approval of the Council of Ministers. In practice, this procedure

⁵ The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States met at Santiago, Chile, Aug. 12-18, 1959. For statements made by Secretary Herter and texts of resolutions, see *ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1959, p. 290, and Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

has the effect of putting the appointment of all Justices in the hands of Dr. Castro. There have been many instances, examples of which are given below, to indicate the disregard by Cuban officials of the judiciary.

B. FREE ELECTIONS

The second Principle of the *Declaration of Santiago* is:

"The Governments of the American States should be the result of free elections."

Despite promises that elections would be among the first goals of the revolutionary movement, repeated subsequent statements by Dr. Castro and other Government leaders have indicated that there are no plans to hold elections in the near future.

In February 1959 Dr. Castro said:

"The people do not want elections now. They want work."

In a speech on April 9, 1959, Dr. Castro again indicated that there were no plans for elections. He said elections would be held only after the goals of the revolution had been achieved, including agrarian reform and full employment. Dr. Castro expanded this theme when he coined the slogan: "Revolution First, Elections Afterward."

"We desire", Dr. Castro said, "that when elections come here everyone may be working, that agrarian reform be that reality . . . that every child may have a school . . . that every family has access to a hospital . . . that all Cubans have work and a decent salary . . . that there is already in existence a civil service . . . that there every Cuban know his rights and his duties, that every Cuban know how to read and write. When we have achieved these grand objectives, it will be possible to speak of elections. . . ."

On May 1, 1960, Dr. Castro said in a speech in Habana:

"Some Latin American governmental official has recently stated that only those governments which are the result of an electoral process should be admitted to the OAS. As though a revolution, as though a true revolution like that of Cuba, could achieve power against the will of the people. As though the only democratic procedure for gaining power were electoral processes, so often prostituted in order to falsify the will and the interests of the people and bring to power many times the most inept and the cleverest, not the most competent and the most honest. As though after so many fraudulent elections, as though after so much false and traitorous politics, as though after so much corruption, it were possible to make the people believe that the only democratic procedure for a people were the electoral process and that on the other hand a process involving the blood and the lives of 20,000 fellow citizens were not democratic."

On his trip to South America and Mexico in May and June 1960, the President of Cuba, Osvaldo Dorticós, stated that before elections were held there must come integral development of the first step of the constructive process of revolution: that democracy need not be confined to institutional formulas not essential to the achieving of economic and social objectives; and that when demanding the right to vote, the right to eat and be educated should also be demanded.

Experience shows that democratic elections require considerable preliminary preparation of the electoral

machinery and organizations throughout the country. Yet there is no evidence that the Revolutionary Government is taking any preparatory steps.

Furthermore, the 26th of July Movement has not been organized as a political party. Although no parties are now legally registered, the *Partido Socialista Popular* (Communist Party) is alone permitted to operate openly as a party. No basis exists therefore for an electoral process permitting the freedom of choice which is essential to a meaningful election.

It must be concluded that the present Government of Cuba does not intend to call elections or to establish its power constitutionally.

C. PERIODIC AND DEMOCRATIC CHANGES OF POWER

The third Principle of the *Santiago Declaration* is:

"Perpetuation in power, or the exercise of power without a fixed term and with the manifest intent of perpetuation, is incompatible with the effective exercise of democracy."

The failure to prepare for elections is an important indication that the present Government of Cuba has no intention of placing the question of its perpetuation in power before the people of Cuba. Other statements by Government leaders indicate their will to remain in power until the revolution is completed. Prime Minister Castro on November 30, 1959 at Santiago, Cuba, confirmed this, stating:

"And what we have not been able to do in the first year, we will do in the second year, we will do in the third year; and what we have not been able to do in the third, we will do in the fourth, and if I don't do it, another revolutionary will, the Revolution will do it; and what we can't do in the fourth year we will do in the year in which the people wish us to do it."

The Prime Minister has also publicly announced the designation of his brother Raúl Castro, as his successor, in the manner of a dynasty.

D. FREEDOM FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

The fourth Principle of the *Santiago Declaration* is:

"The governments of the American states should maintain a system of freedom for the individual and of social justice based on respect for fundamental human rights."

On June 15, 1959, after assuming the office of Minister of State, Dr. Raúl Roa said:

"We shall continue giving absolute support to human rights and the dignity of man and will maintain our revulsion against those who violate those rights. Compliance with these obligations by Cuba and by other democratic countries of the continent is implicit in the Bogotá Charter."

I. Executions

One of the first acts of the Revolutionary Government of Dr. Castro was the establishment of a new system of summary execution, previously almost unknown in the history of the Americas. This "revolutionary justice" outraged the conscience of every country in the Hemisphere.

Revolutionary tribunals were established, suspended after a few months in the face of Hemispheric revulsion, and then reinstated. They were still operating as recently as June 1960, when three persons were sentenced to be shot in a trial lasting only a few hours; their appeal was denied almost immediately after the trial.

By January 13, 1959, only thirteen days after the inception of the new Government, it was estimated that almost two hundred persons had been "tried" by revolutionary tribunals, found guilty and summarily shot. The *Diario de la Marina* of January 13, 1959 reported that 71 had been shot in front of an open grave on January 12; that five of these had received an early morning secret hearing before a military tribunal, and that there was no record of the other 66 having been given any kind of a trial.

On January 15, 1959, replying to overwhelming foreign criticism of the executions, Foreign Minister Azaramonte stated:

"I must repeat again that there is no mass execution by firing squads in Cuba. I cannot deny, however, that there have been many and there will be more executions. We have no reason to hide this fact from anyone. These executions are being carried out under the 17 penal laws of the revolutionary law drawn up while the revolution was in progress. . . ."

On January 17, 1959, *Revolución*, the official news organ of the 26th of July Movement, carried an article calling for a mass rally in front of the Presidential Palace in support of the policy of "social prophylaxis" represented by the "exemplary punishments of those responsible for the tyranny, so beloved by the paid yellow press." This cry of *Revolución*, and this appeal to mass hysteria, was soon to foment one of the watchwords of the revolutionary forces for anyone who opposed them, "*To the Wall*" ("*Al paredón*").

The Revolutionary Criminal Code was given legal status on January 30, 1959 when it appeared in the official gazette as Law No. 33, after approval by the Council of Ministers. By that time, over two hundred persons had already been executed.

By February 16, 1959, on the date he became Prime Minister, Dr. Castro publicly stated that over three hundred persons had been executed by the "military tribunals." By the end of 1959, the count was over six hundred.

It was not the executions alone, however, which outraged the sensibilities of the democratic forces of the Hemisphere, but also the absence of normal judicial procedure, the lack of right of appeal, the summary way in which the executions took place, and the arbitrary and capricious decisions made in many cases.

On February 13, 1959, twenty Cuban Air Force pilots and twenty-four Air Force gunners went on trial in Santiago de Cuba charged with crimes of homicide, assassination and genocide. On March 2 the court found the defendants not guilty as charged. The prosecutor immediately demanded a retrial, which was granted in spite of the defense attorney's protest that this was not legal under the Revolutionary Criminal Code. Nevertheless, the retrial took place from March 4-7, 1959, amid great publicity and with the personal interference of Dr. Castro,

who was reported to have been enraged by the earlier court decisions. Augusto Martínez Sanchez, later named Minister of Labor and largely responsible for delivering the CTC [Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba] into the hands of the Communists, was handcuffed by Dr. Castro and his brother, Raúl, to preside over the retrial.

In the face of growing criticism by the National Bar Association and others, Dr. Castro appeared on television on March 6. He said it was preposterous that these "war criminals" should be acquitted and freed. He made a scathing attack on the leadership of the bar associations, labeling them "pettifoggling, reactionary, counterrevolutionaries." Within 36 hours after Dr. Castro's speech, the second court handed out prison terms to the accused remarkably similar to those suggested by Dr. Castro on television.

In a speech on October 26, 1959, the Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Raúl Castro Ruz, defended the conduct of the Government:

"... because now there is respect, because now the people are not killed, because now people are not tortured, because now persons detained are not insulted; we do not kill, we do not torture, we do not offend, BUT WE EXECUTE BY FIRING SQUADS."

For a brief period the revolutionary tribunals were abolished, but on October 29, 1959, they were re-established.

2. Political Prisoners

It is public knowledge that the Revolutionary Government, utilizing criteria apparently similar to those which it employed in sentencing opponents to be executed by firing squads, has sentenced hundreds, if not thousands, of persons to jail as "counterrevolutionaries" through military tribunals, rather than civil courts. While exact figures are not available, estimates from reliable sources range from a minimum of 3000 to a maximum of 6000 as the number imprisoned as political opponents of the regime. One report indicates that the Government has admitted freeing common criminals in order to make room in Cuban prisons for political opponents.

Public attention was drawn in March 1960 to reports that Captain Herman Marks took a group of soldiers into the prison galleries at *La Cabaña* while the officer in charge was absent and subjected the prisoners to torture and humiliation.

Reacting to those incidents, relatives of the prisoners protested publicly. The Christian Democratic Movement issued a statement on April 5, 1960 condemning the *La Cabaña* incident and calling on the Government to fix responsibility and punish the guilty. The Supreme Court took cognizance of the *La Cabaña* incident and requested the Instructional Court of the First Section to handle the denunciation presented by Elio Alvarez López, an ex-magistrate of the Court of Appeals of Habana who was a prisoner at *La Cabaña* and who alleged that he suffered the humiliations. The Government showed its disregard for the judiciary by ignoring the action of the Supreme Court and by stating that the Government "would investigate."

In addition to these actions, Revolutionary Law No. 33 of January 29, 1959, and the modification by the Council

of Ministers on October 28, 1959 of Article 174 of the Fundamental Law, grant revolutionary tribunals jurisdiction over any crime, criminal or civil, committed by a person classified as "counterrevolutionary", a term which has now been applied by Dr. Castro himself to any Cuban claiming to be anti-Communist, as well as to all others who express opposition to the policies of his regime.

3. Persecution of Disillusioned Cubans

Closely related to the treatment of political prisoners is the denial of human rights by the Cuban Government to those who criticize it. It has quickly labeled such critics "counterrevolutionaries", and has either jailed, forced out of office, forced to flee, or otherwise persecuted those who have dared to raise their voices in protest of certain acts of the Revolutionary Government, or the increasing Communist influence in the country. Included among those so treated have been several former associates and revolutionary battle-companions of Dr. Castro.

On December 5, 1959, Ulises Carbó (anti-Batista editorialist of the Habana newspaper *Presna Libre*) wrote:

"It would be absurd to expect that everyone will give his unconditional support and obedience to each and all of the official measures, however revolutionary and just they may be.

"The free opinions of free Cubans cannot be conspiracy. . . .

"The political extremists should forget the absurd thesis of dividing Cubans into two huge bands: those who are unconditionally on the side of the revolution, and those who are against it. . . . This is really insulting the people. This is to force them to extremes or condemn them to ostracism, under threat of being regarded as traitors and counterrevolutionaries. . . .

"Provided that this divine right will be given to him who wishes to make use of it: to say no, to differ, to publicly defend his own ideas even though they may be most unwise. . . . That is necessary for the public good. As necessary as the air we breathe."

Revolución, organ of the 26th of July Movement, immediately replied to this editorial. In an editorial entitled "Opposition Is Counterrevolution", this statement appeared:

"However, if one is not satisfied and moves toward the opposition, one is no longer a revolutionary, not even an oppositionist, because in times like those in which Cuba is now living, opposition is counterrevolution."

Case of Huber Matos. Major Huber Matos Benítez, former military commander of Camaguey Province, had been one of Dr. Castro's important lieutenants throughout the Sierra Maestra campaign. He was one of the most popular of the revolutionary leaders. Major Matos became increasingly concerned over Communist infiltration and influence in the Government, however, and spoke out strongly against it. As a result of this, and his request for permission to resign, he and 33 other officials were put on trial from December 11-15, 1959, on charges of conspiracy, sedition, and treason. Huber Matos was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. From the outset Major Matos insisted he had in no way conspired against the revolution. Apart from personal attacks against his character and reputation, particularly by Raúl Castro, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, the prin-

principal contention in the public trial was that in resigning he had attempted to bring about a wave of other resignations and manifestations of public support in an effort to divide, weaken, and defeat the revolution.

Case of Manuel Urrutia. Manuel Urrutia y Lleó was selected by Dr. Castro as the first Provisional President of the Revolutionary Government, apparently because of his valiant defense of Dr. Castro at the Moncada Trial. Dr. Urrutia fell victim to Dr. Castro's wrath when he spoke out against the growing Communist influence in the government.

Dr. Castro, in televised harangues, denounced the Provisional President for his counterrevolutionary attitude. There were threats of mob violence unless Dr. Urrutia resigned. Dr. Castro resigned his position as Prime Minister to protest Dr. Urrutia's action, and then quickly resumed that position when Dr. Urrutia, bowing to the inevitable, resigned the Presidency. Dr. Urrutia is now under house arrest and goes out only with an escort.

Case of Luis Conte Aguero. Luis Conte Aguero was a television commentator and friend of Dr. Castro. It was Conte Aguero who had written the preface to Dr. Castro's book *History Will Absolve Me* and who had praised Dr. Castro for his revolutionary zeal and aims in defense of democracy. The betrayal of these aims and the continuing infiltration by Communists caused Conte Aguero to sound an alarm. He was forced to take asylum and flee the country because of this open activity against Communist infiltration and influence. Student agitators led by the President of the Student Federation at the University of Habana (FEU), Rebel Army Major Rolando Cubela, attacked and broke up anti-Communist meetings at which Conte Aguero was to speak.

Case of José Miró Cardona. Dr. Miró Cardona was first Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government, later Ambassador to Spain and more recently Ambassador-designate to the United States. He was also a highly respected member of the law faculty of the University of Habana and a distinguished lawyer in his own right. On July 3, 1960 Dr. Miró Cardona resigned both his post in the University and as Ambassador-designate to the United States. He took asylum in the Embassy of Argentina in Habana.

A memorandum in which Dr. Miró Cardona described his meeting with President Dorticos before his resignation reveals that the President of the Republic of Cuba stated:

"If Cuba wishes, we shall say that we are Communists. So what?"

It was Dr. Miró's conclusion that:

"From that moment I realized that I had been betrayed, and he immediately resigned because 'the ideological differences between the plans of the Government, revealed with clarity by the President, and my conscience were impossible to resolve.'"

There have been many other cases of this kind of disillusionment, a few of which are cited below.

Manuel Artime Bueso, an ex-first Lieutenant of Dr. Castro and an ex-official of Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (INRA), was forced to flee after expressing opposition to the increasing Communism.

Captain Achilles Chinea, highly respected army officer, sought asylum in the Brazilian Embassy in November 1959 after protesting Communist influence.

José Ignacio Rasco, President of the Christian Democratic Movement, and two colleagues—Pedro Leyva Ugarriza and Enrique Villareal de la Concepción—took asylum in the Ecuadorian Embassy on April 17, 1960 after being called counterrevolutionaries because they urged elections and spoke out against Communism.

Ambassador Andre Vargas Gómez, Ambassador to the United Nations offices in Geneva, gave up his post because, according to statements attributed to him, of "the regime's contempt for electoral procedures and the destruction of the system of individual rights and civil liberties."

4. Suppression of Labor

The sixth point of Dr. Castro's "Declaration of the Sierra Maestra" of July 12, 1957, pledged "democratization of union politics, holding free elections in all unions and industrial federations." The point was elaborated in an editorial statement by Radio Rebelde on September 7, 1958 which declared the 26th of July Movement to be "against official interference in the trade unions; for union democracy and free elections; against collaborationist policy imposed in the ranks of the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba (CTC); against firings for union, political and economic reasons; for the rehiring of all persons dismissed; for freedom of assembly and association; for the right to strike; for labor courts and a labor code."

During the first seven months following the revolution, the democratic program for labor as enunciated by the 26th of July Movement was carried out. Labor leaders accused of collaborating with the Batista regime were removed. Workers who had been discharged for political reasons during the Batista regime were rehired. A round of wage increases was granted to most workers. A nine-man Provisional Directorate was formed, headed by David Salvador, to take charge of the CTC with its 1.2 million members. Provisional directorates took over the CTC's 33 industrial federations and their 1800 local organizations. Within a short time, orderly elections began to take place in the industrial federations with the purpose, announced by the CTC Provisional Directorate, of convening a general congress to elect the top leaders of the CTC after the elections among the industrial federations had taken place.

By July of 1959, the process of the "democratization of union politics, holding free elections in all unions and industrial federations" had been conducted, and new leaders had been elected, as well as delegates for the CTC general congress, the date for which was set for September, 1959. In July, the CTC Provisional Directorate announced that leaders belonging to the 26th of July Movement had won the elections in most of the industrial federations. David Salvador, Provisional Secretary General of the CTC, estimated that 26th of July leaders had won 28 of the CTC's 33 industrial federations. *Prensa Libre* in July estimated that in 3 industrial federations a Communist leadership had won the elections and that in 3 others mixed slates of 26th of July leaders and Communists had been elected.

It can be noted, in connection with the industrial federation elections, that Communists had full freedom to campaign and compete for union office. In February, 1959, the Minister of Labor, Manuel Fernández García, had stated that Communists were "free to participate in all labor union activities". Despite this freedom explicitly granted to the Communists; despite the return to Cuba of former Communist labor leaders who had been living outside the country; despite the Communists' possession of a newspaper, *Noticias de Hoy*, when most of the industrial federations had not yet resumed their publications; despite the Communist effort to persuade 26th of July labor leaders to accept Communists on so-called "unity-slates" of candidates for office in the industrial federations; and despite energetic campaign activity among the unions, the Communists were overwhelmingly defeated by the 26th of July labor leaders, as indicated by the estimate of David Salvador that the latter had won elections in 28 of the 33 industrial federations.

The competition between the adherents of the 26th of July Movement and the Communists was strong in several important unions. For example, in the CTC's largest industrial federation of over 450,000 members with about 40% of the CTC's total membership, the Sugar Workers Federation (*Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Azucareros*—FNTA) a particularly spirited electoral campaign had taken place. The FNTA Congress took place in May 1959 and a slate of candidates, which included the Communist labor leader, Ursinio Rojas, was rejected in favor of a slate headed by the 23th of July labor leader, Conrado Bécquer. Before the Congress opened the Communist daily, *Noticias de Hoy*, had attacked Bécquer and the others of the then Provisional Directorate of the FNTA, accusing them of attempting to rig the Congress. An aroused FNTA membership adopted a resolution of censure of *Hoy*, for its "unfounded, defamatory and counter-revolutionary statements", and a mob of FNTA members stormed the offices of *Hoy*, making it necessary for the directors of *Hoy* to request and receive a special police guard for their offices for several days.

Similar tensions had developed in several other unions, and late in May, 1959, there was formed a *Frente Obrero Humanista Cubano*, composed of the 28 industrial federations won by the 26th of July leaders, who explained that the name for this bloc was selected to "declare the humanist, non-Communist character of the labor leadership of the 26th of July Movement."

The events following the month of July, 1959, completely altered the labor situation in Cuba. Labor Minister Manuel Fernández García resigned in October, 1959. Shortly thereafter a new Minister of Labor, Major Augusto Martínez Sánchez, who had, as noted earlier, presided over the re-trial of Air Force personnel, was appointed. He was known to be a close confidant of Raúl Castro, with no prior labor experience, and at the time he was shifted to the Ministry of Labor was occupying the post of Minister of Defense. When Martínez was appointed, it was announced that the CTC Congress would be postponed until November, 1959.

During September and October, six 26th of July leaders in four industrial federations were accused of "counter-revolutionary activities" and were suspended by their in-

dustrial federations, later to be deposed. An identical pattern emerged in all six cases. The attacks were launched in the Communist newspaper, *Hoy*. The cases were brought to the CTC by two members of the CTC Provisional Directorate, Jesús Soto and José María de la Aguilera. The latter called meetings of the industrial federations involved, made the charges, and asked for the suspensions. The Provisional Secretary General of the CTC, David Salvador, expressed his opposition to this procedure, and the question of the validity of the procedure was still pending when the CTC Congress convened early in November. The six suspended leaders had all been outspokenly anti-Communist during their electoral campaigns.

Three thousand delegates convened for the November Congress to elect the CTC's top officers; 265 of these were Communists. When, during the first evening of the Congress, the delegates learned that a proposed slate of 13 candidates for the top posts included three Communists, the Congress broke into a noisy uproar. This was the point at which Prime Minister Castro was summoned, and although his support for the proposed slate was greeted with disorderly objections from the Congress, he pleaded for unity for several hours, and ended by authorizing David Salvador to draw up a list of candidates to "achieve unity".

David Salvador conferred with Raúl Castro to draw up the slate of candidates, which he presented to the Congress the following day. The Communist delegates protested the fact that the slate omitted the names of the three Communists first proposed, and all 265 Communist delegates retired from the Congress. On the other hand, the two leaders with whom David Salvador had differed about "purification" procedures, Jesús Soto and José María de la Aguilera, were promoted to posts of greater responsibility than the ones they held on the Provisional Directorate. Also, three well-known 26th of July leaders of the Provisional Directorate who had supported David Salvador—Conrado Bécquer, Reinel González and Jesús Planas—were dropped from the final slate. David Salvador retained the post of Secretary General.

Two measures were adopted by the Congress on the final day. A procedure for "purification" of "counter-revolutionary" elements was adopted; and the Congress voted to break the CTC's traditional ties with the Western Hemisphere democratic labor organization, the Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT), and resolved to promote a new, "united" Latin American labor movement, excluding the labor organizations of the United States and Canada, but inviting all Latin American groups regardless of ideological persuasion. This latter measure undid the work of Reinel González, who, as Provisional Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had met on several occasions with ORIT officials to work out a basis for the CTC's continued affiliation to ORIT, an affiliation that the Provisional CTC Directorate had not dissolved. Reinel González and Jesús Planas, who, as noted earlier, had not been elected from their posts on the Provisional Directorate to the permanent Directorate of the CTC, were members of the Cuban *Juventud Obrera Católica* (JOC).

Between November, 1959, and April, 1960, over twenty

former 26th of July leaders, who had been elected by their industrial federations during the first six months of 1959, were deposed under the new authority given to the CTC Directorate. All were known to be anti-Communist. Most of these former leaders have left Cuba, some by taking asylum in foreign embassies. David Salvador again protested the procedures being used, and in the case involving six leaders of the Construction Workers Union (*Federación Nacional de Construcción*), in March, 1960, Salvador intervened to present a formal plea to the Minister of Labor regarding the manner in which a special congress was convened by Jesús Soto to depose these leaders. Salvador took this step after violent clashes between Communist and anti-Communist delegates had required intervention of the military police to restore order. The leaders were later voted out of office. From that time on, Salvador disappeared from the labor scene. He did not attend the May 1, 1960 celebrations, nor has he been present at any of the numerous CTC Directorate meetings since then.

Between November and April, 1960, while the known anti-Communist 26th of July labor leaders were being removed from office, a series of Government decrees were issued, vesting the Minister of Labor with vastly increased powers over labor and labor relations matters.

Law No. 647 of November, 1959, empowered the Minister of Labor to "intervene" any company in which a labor dispute threatened to interrupt production or where serious economic difficulties developed.

Law 696 of January, 1960, empowered the Minister of Labor to place all workers in employment, forbidding companies and unions from participating in the employment process.

Law 761 of March, 1960, required all workers to register with the Ministry of Labor, whether employed or unemployed, and to receive a work *carnet* . This law was designed to implement Law 696.

Law 759 of March 15, 1960, empowered the Minister of Labor to settle all labor disputes, either by conciliation or by Ministerial decree.

By virtue of these laws, the Ministry of Labor was given authority over promotion, hiring and firing of workers, over all collective bargaining, and over all labor disputes; and the Ministry of Labor was also authorized to intervene and to operate companies threatened by labor disputes and companies in economic difficulties.

Since the elimination of the more than twenty 26th of July leaders, between September 1959 and April 1960, the CTC has become a propaganda instrument for the Government, sending letters, bulletins and publications all over the world, particularly to Latin American countries. From time to time the Cuban Foreign Ministry has communicated with Latin American labor organizations on political matters. The CTC Union of Graphic Arts instructed its members to comment editorially upon any newspaper story regarded as criticizing the Government. Until the seizure of the Cuban newspapers, members of the Graphic Arts Union extensively engaged in the practice of adding "coletillas" (clarifications) to newspaper stories, either attacking the newspaper or the reporter, or "clarifying" the newspaper report. In the seizures of the newspapers, *Avance*, *Diario de la Marina*

and *Prensa Libre*, the Union of Graphic Arts participated directly in the takeovers.

The CTC has formed a labor militia, and since October, 1959, the leaders of the industrial federations and the CTC Directorate wear semi-military uniforms: boots, khaki garb, and berets. The 1960 celebration of May Day resulted in a parade featuring almost exclusively military elements and uniformed labor militia.

The CTC on June 9, 1960, conducted a plenary session and enunciated its new "revolutionary philosophy". At that session, the labor movement was given its new role as an "organ of revolutionary indoctrination". Its "revolutionary role" was henceforth to act as an organized militia, to discipline labor against requesting wage improvements, and to exhort workers to strive for greater production. The constituent industrial federations of the CTC were ordered to conduct plenary sessions all over the country to spread the new "revolutionary indoctrination".

Since the November, 1959, Congress of the CTC, an explicit orientation towards labor movements of the Soviet-Sino bloc has taken place. For the May Day celebrations of 1959 a large and varied delegation from the Western Hemisphere was invited, including ORIT representatives, and representatives from many Catholic labor groups. Only a few outside Communist representatives were invited and attended. A year later, for the May Day celebrations of 1960, no ORIT and no Catholic labor groups were in attendance. There were, however, two Soviet representatives, two from Communist China, two from East Germany, one Italian delegate representing the Soviet-sponsored World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), one delegate from Yugoslavia, and Vicente Lombardo Toledano, representing the Communist CTAL [Confederación de Trabajadores de America Latina]. For the May Day celebrations of 1959, authorized CTC representatives were sent to other Latin American countries exclusively. For the May Day celebrations of 1960 the CTC sent its Secretary for Foreign Relations, Odon Alvarez de la Campa, to Moscow; and its Secretary of Finances, José Pellón, to Peking.

Odon Alvarez de la Campa is quoted in a UPI [United Press International] despatch datelined Tokyo, July 10, as stating in Peking on July 9 in an address before a gathering of Chinese textile workers that:

"Your experience with revolution aided us to carry out our struggle with success . . . the common struggle in which we are engaged against the same enemy—the imperialism of the United States—has united us and has intensified relations and aid between our two countries. . . . There are many similarities between the Cuban and Chinese revolutions. The Chinese revolution proved to the world that when the people rise in arms and fight determinedly for independence and national sovereignty, everything is possible."

In June of 1960, although the CTC nominally maintains no international affiliations, three of its members attended the Communist WFTU Executive Committee meeting in Peking: Ursinlo Rojas (who was defeated for office in the Sugar Workers Union in May, 1959); José María de la Aguilera, CTC Secretary of Propaganda; and Armando Cardero, who occupies a substitute delegate office on the CTC Directorate.

Lázaro Peña, Communist leader of the CTC during the first Batista regime, who returned to Cuba early in 1959 after a long period as Vice President of the Communist CTAL, has made several trips to Soviet bloc countries.

Violeta Casals participated in the creation of an Association of Cuban-Chinese (Communist) Friendship. She had replaced Manolo Fernández, prominent in the 26th of July Movement, as leader of the Association of Theatre Artists when he was deposed early in 1960 by the CTC Directorate and forced to flee to Venezuela.

In the Western Hemisphere, the CTC has actively engaged in promoting a "united" labor movement with Communist groups in other Latin American countries. It has sent funds to Communist unions in strike situations. It has invited Communist labor leaders from Latin America to seminars and conferences conducted in Cuba. It has sent representatives to meetings and conferences held by Communist labor groups throughout Latin America. It has advocated the organization of Latin American industrial federations with Communist groups among journalists, graphic arts workers, agricultural workers, and other groups.

In conclusion, from an initial seven-month period of democratization and free elections in the Cuban labor movement, the Government has placed the labor movement under the authority of the Ministry of Labor; the freely elected leadership loyal to the 26th of July Movement has been deposed; the labor movement has been militarized and has become an instrument for "revolutionary indoctrination" of labor; collective bargaining has been abolished; wage improvements have been discouraged; and the labor movement has been oriented towards relations with Sino-Soviet labor organizations.

In June of this year, the CTC Directorate met and resolved to adopt, as an invitation of its own, Dr. Castro's invitation to Soviet Premier Khrushchev to visit Cuba.

5. Destruction of Academic Freedom and University Autonomy

In his early speeches, and in his Sierra Maestra declaration, Dr. Castro demonstrated an awareness of the importance of education and a concern over improving educational methods and facilities and eliminating illiteracy throughout the island. It is now clear, however, that his Government is moving in the direction of a guided educational system to eliminate all forms of opposition, to label any thinking which does not coincide with that of the ruling cliques as "counterrevolutionary", and to establish educational methods to assure unquestioning loyalty to the revolution.

As indicated by one competent observer, in an article in the *New York Times* of June 8, 1960:

"The pattern of training is similar to that used by many totalitarian governments. It includes indoctrination in schools, on radio and television and in the press; military training from seven years of age; a hate campaign, this time directed against the United States; the organization of work brigades of boys from 14 to 18; and meetings and fiestas, all with a political purpose."

Teachers are receiving special training in Castro's doctrines and new text books, written to conform with

the official line, will be ready for the September opening of schools.

University Education: Law No. 11—Soon after the advent of Dr. Castro, a law was promulgated (Law No. 11 of January 14, 1959) invalidating all credits and degrees earned by students in private universities since November 1, 1956, on the grounds that these students should have been in the hills fighting alongside of Dr. Castro rather than studying. This law provoked so much controversy that it was modified on May 29, 1959. The modification abolished the National University, José Martí, established during the Batista regime, and subjected the credits and degrees earned by its students to review by State Boards. Students in other private institutions such as the highly respected Catholic University of Villa Nueva, who received their degrees between November 1956 and January 1959, may not practice their professions for a one-year period. Those who did not complete their work may have their credits count toward their degrees if approved by State Boards, but they may not practice their professions for a one-year period after obtaining their degrees.

Control of the University of Habana—Major Rolando Cubela, a known pro-Communist, has been established as President of the *Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios* (FEU). Cubela and other members of the top echelons of the FEU were members of the now moribund *Directorio Revolucionario*, whose leader, Fauré Chomón, is the new Cuban Ambassador to the USSR. Both Cubela and Angel Quevedo, the Secretary of the FEU, are majors in the rebel army. The holding of governmental positions by students is contrary to University precepts.

Early in May 1960, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, editor of *Hoy* and a member of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, was named as interim Professor of Economics. It will be recalled that Rodríguez served as the liaison between the Communists and the 26th of July Movement in the Sierra Maestra. This appointment was met with unrest and clashes between Communist and anti-Communist students, with the United Front of Democratic University students (FEUD) taking the lead. Major Cubela and his group have responded to protests by preventing access to the University by anti-Communist students and other measures. He has stated:

"Today there are no Disciplinary Tribunals except those formed by the masses of students.

"... as they (anti-Communist students) are frankly involved in the counterrevolution, they should be in the military prisons together with the criminals of war, in order that they be judged before the revolutionary tribunals. Because we are not going to let them continue to come to the University to perturb our revolution. But, if they want trouble, we will give it to them."

True to Cubela's words, several anti-Communist students were severely beaten during the same day. At least one was hospitalized.

The FEU, under Majors Cubela and Quevedo, recently succeeded in forcing the resignation of the Council of the University, and a new University Council has been installed under their control.

E. EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

The fifth Principle of the Declaration of Santiago reads:

"The human rights incorporated into the legislation of the American states should be protected by effective judicial procedure."

This principle basic to the maintenance of human rights is in sharp contrast with the philosophy inherent in the attack on the Supreme Court of Cuba by Captain Antonio Núñez Jiménez, Director of INRA. In a television program on April 6, 1960, Captain Núñez Jiménez severely criticized the Supreme Court of Cuba for ordering a report by an expert on the actual value of a tract of expropriated land which the former owner thought had been valued far below its actual worth by a lower court. Captain Núñez Jiménez declared:

"Even though I am a citizen respectful of the judicial power, I say these words: the revolution is the fountainhead of law, and if there is a law of past regimes which stands in its way, which blocks its advance, the natural thing is that the law should be abolished in order that the revolution can continue its march toward progress."

He added that the judges should be reminded that they had voted against Cuba, against the people, and against the revolution.

These words of a high Cuban official, quoted above, illustrate that the Cuban Government has subordinated the concept of an independent judiciary, dispensing equal justice to all through impartial judicial procedures which protect the rights of every man, to a philosophy which requires the courts to serve, not as an instrument of justice, but as a political arm of the revolution. It is becoming increasingly difficult to find a lawyer who will represent a person because of the intimidation and possible incarceration to which lawyers are subject if they represent the interests of the citizen against the Cuban Government. The duly elected leadership of the Habana Bar Association has itself been ousted from its offices by a handful of Communist lawyers. A request from the Association leadership to President Dorticós for protection against this unlawful act has gone unheeded. One of the first demands of the new leadership is that all lawyers report for militia training.

How the philosophy of Captain Núñez works in practice can be seen from the following examples in which civil rights have been suspended or limited and judicial impartiality to the revolution shown:

Although provided for in Article 29 of the Fundamental Law, the right of *habeas corpus* was suspended for successive periods of 90 days. When the revolutionary tribunals were reestablished on October 29, 1959, the suspension was extended for "as long as the revolutionary tribunals are active, in regard to persons accused of counter-revolutionary activities. . . ."

One case may be cited as indicative:

On June 14, 1959, Dr. Enrique Llaca Orbíz, Jr., a Cuban lawyer, was arrested after officials of the Directorio de Investigaciones del Ejército Rebelde (DIER) gained entrance into his house through subterfuge. He was taken from his home by force without being informed of the rea-

son for his arrest. Later when his father, a former official of the newspaper *Diario de la Marina*, appeared at DIER headquarters to inquire about his son, he was also arrested. The father was released several hours later, but the son remained in custody. One high official of the judiciary said that it was a military matter and that the courts could not interfere.

On June 20, however, the Fifth Chamber of the *Audiencia* of Habana, evidently acting on its own authority, admitted a writ of *habeas corpus* in favor of Llaca. On June 22 the *Audiencia* decided in favor of Llaca. The court argued that although *habeas corpus* had been suspended in the case of those detained by military authorities pending investigations of crimes against the national economy and public order, there seemed to be no evidence in Llaca's case to support such a charge. Llaca was ordered released. He was released on the same day, but immediately rearrested by the *Cuerpo de Investigación de Denuncias de los Institutos Armados Revolucionario (CIDIAIR)* in spite of the court order. He was held until June 23 when the Prime Minister personally ordered he be released.

Dr. Castro denounced as illegal the action of the *Audiencia* because *habeas corpus* could not be applied in such cases. Meanwhile the Minister of Justice ordered an investigation of the judges responsible for granting the *habeas corpus*. He said they had ignored the fact that *habeas corpus* had been suspended by the Third Transitory Disposition of the Fundamental Law. Later the same day the chief prosecuting attorney of the Supreme Court indicated that a criminal complaint would be lodged against Judges Manuel Gómez Calvo, Cláudio Padrón Hernández and Tomás Perate Herrero.

Article 27 of the Fundamental Law provides that every person arrested shall be placed at liberty or delivered to a competent judicial authority within 24 hours, and released or committed to prison within 72 hours after having been judged. It also provides that preventive custody be in a separate place from those used for serving sentences, and that those in preventive custody not be forced to labor or be subjected to other penal regulations.

As in the case of *habeas corpus*, Article 27 has been suspended by subsequent laws. By Article II to the Transitory Dispositions of the Fundamental Law, it is suspended as long as the revolutionary tribunals are in existence.

The right to appeal before the Supreme Court and before the Court of Constitutional Guarantees on questions of constitutionality and unconstitutionality has been curtailed by Resolution V of the Constitutional Reform of January 30, 1959, and by the Resolution on Constitutional Reform dated May 6, 1959, and by Law No. 425 of July 7, 1959.

Article 25 of the Fundamental Law of February 7, 1959, states that with certain exceptions the death penalty may not be imposed. In its original form the Fundamental Law excepted from this penalty:

" . . . members of the Armed Forces, the repressive corps of the tyranny, the auxiliary groups organized by it, privately armed groups organized to defend it, and its confidential agents, for crimes committed in behalf of the

restoration or defense of the tyranny overthrown on December 31, 1958."

Also excepted were persons guilty of treason, etc., in time of war with a foreign nation.

By subsequent modifications of the Fundamental Law (particularly by Constitutional Reform of June 29, 1959) almost every Cuban opposed to the present Cuban Government could be sentenced to death by "revolutionary tribunals." Specifically the law now provides, in addition to the exceptions cited above in the original Article 25, that the following may be executed:

- (1) Persons guilty of subversion of an internal order.
- (2) Persons guilty of counterrevolutionary crimes.
- (3) Persons guilty of crimes which damage the national economy.
- (4) Persons guilty of crimes which damage the public treasury.

Article 24 of the Fundamental Law says that the confiscation of property is forbidden, but excepted from this provision are "private individuals or corporations responsible for crimes committed against the national economy or the public treasury during the tyranny." Law No. 17 of January 16, 1959, ordered the confiscation by the Ministry of Public Works of property and equipment belonging to persons who had signed any contracts with the Ministry between March 10, 1952 and December 31, 1958. The reason given for ordering this confiscation was that many of the contracts had been made without public bidding. The Revolutionary Government then itself halted bidding on contracts for public works carried out by the Government or for material or equipment for the armed forces. (Law No. 225 of April 14, 1959 and Law No. 394 of June 23, 1959.) Under Law No. 17 equipment worth millions of pesos was confiscated without proof being established of illicit contracts or illicit enrichment.

Disdain for judicial procedures is shown by cases involving the *Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria* (INRA). *Revolución* reported on November 24, 1959, that at the request of Dr. Guevara, the Chief of the Legal Department of INRA had addressed a communication to the Chief Justice of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court on the subject of Agrarian Reform. He requested that adequate instructions be issued to prevent "improper" use of the courts by large landowners, counterrevolutionaries, and others to obstruct the execution of the Agrarian Reform plans to which the revolution had pledged itself.

Further underlining the non-existence of judicial protection for human rights, the Court of Appeals of Pinar del Rio dismissed an administrative appeal following the intervention of a large property by INRA on the basis that the Supreme Court had resolved (as a result of the above request) that courts of justice should avoid proceedings tending to obstruct the Agrarian Reform program. This waiving of jurisdiction to INRA by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals is another indication of the lack of independence of the judiciary in Cuba.

The conflict between the non-political career judges who uphold the independence of the judiciary and the Government appointed prosecuting attorneys who believe that the courts should subordinate the law to the political needs

of the revolution is exemplified by the case of the ex-magistrate, Elio Alvarez López. After being imprisoned in Cabaña Prison, he presented a denunciation to the Supreme Court in which he charged that he had been mistreated and humiliated. The Supreme Court took cognizance of the denunciation and in early April of 1960 requested the Instructional Court of the First Section to consider it. Despite the action by the Supreme Court, the Chief Prosecuting Attorney of the Supreme Court issued a press statement on April 7 stating that he had appointed a Prosecuting Attorney of the Habana Court of Appeals to investigate the case. He also charged that the whole incident was a part of a conspiracy by the enemies of the revolution who were seeking to damage the prestige of the Government.

This brief review of one result of a policy which subordinates human rights to political aims has shown that the present Cuban Government, far from providing judicial protection for human rights in the country, has moved in the opposite direction. This arbitrary concept of justice has been a contributory factor in the growing number of Cubans who have left their country because of fear or distrust of the regime's intentions.

F. FREEDOM FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The sixth Principle of the Declaration of Santiago declares:

"The systematic use of political proscription is contrary to American democratic order."

1. *Proscription of Individuals*

One of the measures taken by the Revolutionary Government in the field of political proscription was the disfranchising for thirty years of all persons who were candidates—many in opposition to Batista—in the elections held under the Batista Government on November 3, 1958. At least 20,000 persons were affected by this decree which was included in Revolutionary Law No. 2 of October 10, 1958 issued in the Sierra Maestra mountains.

Those same persons were also deprived of the right to hold public office, or to receive retirement benefits and pensions. If made no difference that many of these had been candidates in opposition to Batista.

Thus, Cubans are not equal before the law, despite Article 20 of the Fundamental Law which states:

"All Cubans are equal before the law. The Republic recognizes no exemptions or privileges."

2. *Proscription of Political Parties*

Only the Communist Party—*Partido Socialista Popular*—functions effectively as a party in Cuba today. Prime Minister Castro has stated that the 26th of July Movement will become a political party, but to this date it has not been constituted as a political party.

Many persons affiliated with the two great parties which abstained from the 1954 and 1958 elections—*Partido Auténtico* and *Ortodoxo*—and who assisted Dr. Castro in many ways in his revolutionary fight, have been silenced or have been forced out of the country. Such leaders as

Antonio Varona and Aureliano Sánchez Arango are examples.

In addition, most important leaders of the political parties which participated in the 1954 and 1958 elections are in exile outside of Cuba. Many of their properties have been confiscated and most of them are disfranchised by the Law No. 2 of October 10, 1958 and by Laws No. 912 and 151 covering "Confiscation of Properties Because of Political Responsibilities."

The Government has also eliminated, for all practical purposes, the *Directorio Revolucionario* which actively collaborated with the 26th of July Movement in the overthrow of the Batista regime.

Finally, the *Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano—MDC—* issued a statement on May 28, 1960 indicating that it could no longer operate freely in Cuba and therefore it had decided to "suspend its public activities and to recess as an organized movement." It said, however, that this move did not imply retreat or resignation and that the movement:

"... remains as an ideal and as a hope, but will recess as an organization of groups and entities of diverse ideologies."

The statement explained that:

"Lamentably, the rich and creative impulse of the revolution has been clouded more and more by certain negative aspects which have darkened the national scene."

It then described these aspects as:

"The move of the Government toward a regime characterized by a sole, impersonal wish, the rigid limitation of oppositionist voices, the totalitarian tendency to subordinate to the state all economic activity and progressive control of all means of public expression."

The statement concluded:

"The development of these tendencies has contributed to such an extent to the reduction of the [margin of] mobility of non-governmental groups that it can be stated today that beside the official spokesman, the Communist Party is the only one able to develop its program and its action program fully without hindrance."

Moreover, the systematic take-over of independent newspapers, magazines, radio, and television, and the branding of all opposition as "counterrevolutionary" have effectively eliminated any open public discussion of political issues. Thus political parties, whose lifeblood is the public discussion of the issues faced by a nation, have no chance to develop. Only the Communist Party now functions.

G. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND RADIO

The seventh Principle in the Declaration of Santiago states:

"Freedom of the press, radio and television, and, in general, freedom of information and expression, are essential conditions for the existence of a democratic regime."

Dr. Castro's views on freedom of thought and expression were stated in his speech of May 1, 1960 in Habana:

"Democracy is that which guarantees to man not the right to freedom of thought, but rather the right to know how to think, the right to know how to write what he thinks, the right to know how to read what he or others think."

Two sections of the "Code of Special Defense" adopted July 9, 1959 give the Cuban Government power to act against those who criticize the Government in the press, on the radio or on television.

Article 149.

"... whosoever should introduce, publish, propagate, or try to make obeyed in Cuba any dispatch, order, or decree which might tend to impair the independence of the nation or provoke the non-observance of the laws in force [will be condemned], by a penalty of imprisonment of from six to eighteen years."

Article 156.

"... the incitement, carried out publicly, to arouse feelings that may lead to the execution of some of the counter-revolutionary crimes stated in Articles 128, 147, 148 and 149 shall be punished by imprisonment for 10 to 20 years ... but if, as a direct or indirect consequence of that incitement, acts of violence result against the Revolutionary Government in which lives are lost, the penalty shall be from twenty years imprisonment to death."

Since "counterrevolutionary crimes" may include any form of opposition, the present Cuban Government has arrogated to itself the power to punish with sentences ranging up to and including the death penalty those who criticize the regime in the media of public communication. Furthermore, the death penalty can be given to those who utter public criticism which has as its "indirect consequence" acts of violence against the Revolutionary Government. Thus, in this and other ways, the right, guaranteed in Article 40 of the Fundamental Law, of "resistance for the protection of individual rights" which Dr. Castro so vigorously defended in his Moncada trial is being extinguished.

One by one, and by one means or another, the present Cuban Government has eliminated any newspaper, radio station or television station which has criticized the regime or has called attention to the infiltration of Communists in the Government. The slogan enunciated by Dr. Castro and by his brother Raúl Castro that "anti-Communism is counterrevolutionary" has been applied to the press and radio as well as to other groups or individuals.

The story of press and radio control in Cuba has been made particularly insidious because it has been accomplished by means which the Cuban Government has claimed represents the will of the people rather than dictatorial tactics. Instead of resorting only to direct Government closures of opposition media, the Cuban Government has, in most cases, employed subtler means, and then claimed that freedom of press and radio still existed. It has encouraged or utilized workers' groups to take over newspapers, and by insinuation or threats has forced others to cease publication. The issue has been beclouded by the fact that the Cuban Government has allowed some foreign press correspondents to file uncensored stories from Cuba, but it has tried to intimidate foreign press correspondents by arbitrary arrest and imprisonment in an effort to force them out of Cuba.

1. Control of Press

Statistically, the record is very clear. Of the 16 Spanish language newspapers in Habana in existence when the Revolutionary Government came to power on January 1, 1959, only three are still under their original owners. Two of these are trade papers—*Finanzas* and *Industria y Comercio*. The third, *Información*, which is the only independent regular newspaper still being published in Habana, has thus far escaped seizure by avoiding controversial articles. However, it is now being attacked by its union, a maneuver which preceded the demise of *Diario de la Marina* and *Prensa Libre*.

Of the thirteen defunct Habana newspapers, *Alerta*, *Mañana*, *Tiempo*, *Ataja*, and *Pueblo* were confiscated by the Government on January 1, 1959. *El País* and *Excelesior* became insolvent in February, 1960. These two were taken over by the Government and incorporated on March 15, 1960 into *Imprenta Nacional*, a Government publishing enterprise printing books, pamphlets, and educational material. *Diario Nacional* was purchased by the Government in June, 1959 and also incorporated in *Imprenta Nacional*. *Avance* and *El Mundo* were intervened by the Government in January and February 1960. *Diario de la Marina* and *Prensa Libre* were taken over by their employees on May 10 and 15, 1960, respectively, and the owners ousted. *El Crisol* announced on June 1960 it had ceased publication owing to economic difficulties.

In other parts of the island the Matanzas newspaper *Adelante* was forced to close after it was censured by the Revolutionary Student Committee of the 26th of July Movement. Important provincial newspapers, *El Camagueyano* in Camaguey and *Prensa Universal* in Santiago de Cuba, have also been confiscated by the Government. The *Diario de Cuba* in Santiago de Cuba was requisitioned by the rebel forces and has not reappeared.

Traditionally, few newspapers in Cuba have been self-supporting financially. Most newspapers have benefited from the official subsidies obtained through Government purchases of advertising space. After the Government of Dr. Castro came to power on January 1, 1959, a number of newspapers was eliminated by being deprived of this support.

In other instances, however, particularly with regard to the more important newspapers which vigorously criticized the Government for its pro-Communist policies or for the manner in which the various economic measures were being implemented, and which refused to heed Government indications to cease their opposition, an indirect method was used. The Union of Graphic Arts, the Secretary of which is a Communist, seized the premises of the offending newspapers and expelled the publishers. The three most flagrant examples of this type concerned the closure of Cuba's most important newspapers: *Avance*, *Diario de la Marina*, *Prensa Libre*.

In the case of *Avance*, in September 1959 Dr. Castro, in a television speech, personally attacked three of its writers, Agustin Tamargo, Bernardo Viera Trejo and Pedro Leyva, accusing them of being counterrevolutionaries because of their criticisms of the policies of the Cuban Government. The three writers responded to the attack in the

September 29 issue of *Avance*. There followed numerous strong editorial attacks on the *Avance* writers by the pro-Government press. Finally on January 18, 1960 members of the Union of Graphic Arts occupied the plant, and the Government subsequently intervened the enterprise. The publisher, Jorge Zayas, and Leyva departed Cuba to go into exile. Viera Trejo subsequently fled when the editor of *Bohemia*, for whom he was working, sought asylum.

The *Diario de la Marina* was Cuba's oldest newspaper. It had been published for 128 years. Throughout the latter part of 1959 and during the current year, the *Diario de la Marina* had become increasingly critical of the Government's encroachment on press liberty and of the infiltration of Communists in the Government. By the end of April the pro-Government press and radio attacks on the *Diario de la Marina* had become violent, with the *Diario* fighting back editorially on its right to freedom of expression.

On May 10, 1960 a group of armed men, accompanied by the Communist Secretary of the Union of Graphic Arts, entered the premises of the *Diario* and broke the plates from which were to be printed in the next edition copies of a letter signed by over 300 of the *Diario's* workers. This letter supported the position of the newspaper's Director, José Ignacio Rivero. Requests by the *Diario's* publishers for protection directed to President Dorticós, the Minister of Interior, the Chief of National Police and the Supreme Court brought no response. An appeal to the Captain of Police in the *Diario's* district was refused with the comment that insufficient trouble was being created to warrant "police interference." On May 13th, José Ignacio Rivero took refuge in the Peruvian Embassy. Shortly thereafter he went into exile.

Prensa Libre was Cuba's largest mass-circulation newspaper. Together with *Avance* and the *Diario de la Marina*, *Prensa Libre* had been a strong advocate for freedom of the press and the right to dissent from the Government's position. After the closure of the *Diario*, *Prensa Libre* insisted on these principles. On May 16, 1960, workers of the Union of Graphic Arts occupied the plant and the paper ceased to exist under the Carbó and Medrano management. Sergio Carbó, Humberto Medrano and Ulises Carbó, its director and sub-director, are now in exile.

While these tactics have served to eliminate opposition newspapers, four new newspapers, *Trinchera*, *La Calle*, *Revolución* and *Avance Revolucionario* which are all pro-Government, have come into existence. In addition the Communist press is now flourishing unhindered with a wide variety of publications, including the daily newspaper *Noticias de Hoy*.

Dr. Armando Hart, Minister of Education, stated on October 24, 1959 to a group of journalists that "impartiality is a myth of civilization". Reporters, he explained, are conditioned by "personal bias" or are dominated by "determined interests and ideologies". He stated further that "the only true basis for objectivity rests on alignment with public opinion", and the only true expression of public opinion, according to Dr. Hart, came from Dr. Castro. In his view, when Dr. Castro spoke, he

spoke for the people and therefore expressed public opinion. Thus if the press did not attune itself to public opinion it "defended the interest of oligarchy."

The most recent example of the destruction of the freedom of the press has been the demise of the leading Spanish language magazine in the Hemisphere, *Bohemia*, which even the Batista regime dared not attempt to silence. Miguel Angel Quevedo, editor of *Bohemia*, from asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy, explained on July 20, 1960 the reasons which forced him into exile:

"But with profound regret *Bohemia* now recognizes that there is nothing to support even this remote hope [that there would be an opportune change which would save the revolution]. The Revolution has been betrayed, the Republic vilely delivered to the nefarious interests of international communism. What many have justified as a political tactic to strengthen our sovereignty, has resulted in nothing more than a diabolical plan, ably executed and progressively unfolded, to establish in the middle of the American continent a Communist regime organized under the direction and close vigilance of Moscow. Of this there is no longer any doubt, after the declarations of Nikita Khrushchev, giving us in international affairs, the appearance of a country submissive to the political influence of the Soviet Union; and after the pronouncements made in the demonstration in front of the Palace that Cuba is a small nation protected by the rockets of 'the greatest military power on earth'; and after the solidarity expressed by Fidel Castro himself with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries.

"The deceit has been discovered. This is not the Revolution for which more than 20,000 Cubans died. In order to carry out a genuinely nationalistic Revolution, there was no necessity to submit our people to hateful Russian vassalage. In order to carry out a profound social revolution it was not necessary to install a system that degrades man to the condition of a servant of the State, obliterating all vestiges of liberty and dignity. This is not a true revolution. It is a revolution betrayed. To continue in the face of this is to contribute to the treason and slavery. This cannot be the role of *Bohemia*."

2. Control of Television and Radio

In an exclusive article which appeared in *Coronet Magazine* in February, 1958 entitled "Why we Fight", Dr. Castro had stated that he stood for "full and untrammelled freedom of public information for all communications media—radio, television, the daily and periodical press." Sixteen months after the Revolutionary Government came into power, Cuba's leading radio and television stations were directly or indirectly under government control. The methods used were similar to those used to dominate the press.

On January 1, 1959 there were 88 independent AM radio stations, 13 AM radio networks (comprising 75 radio stations), one Government-owned AM radio station, 24 independent FM radio stations, and 24 independent TV stations. All the leading stations and most of the others have been intervened and are operated under Government control. As of May, 1960, after 16 months of government under Dr. Castro, the following is noted:

Unión Radio (10-station network) is operated by the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba.

Circuito CMQ (8-station network) was confiscated by the Ministerio de Recuperación de Bienes Malversados (Ministry for the Recovery of Misappropriated Assets)

and is now operated by a bureau of the Ministry of the Treasury.

Circuito Nacional Cubano (9-station network) was confiscated by the Ministerio de Recuperación de Bienes Malversados and is operated by a bureau of the Ministry of the Treasury.

Radio Minuto Nacional (11-station network) is now operated by the Cadena Oriental de Radio.

La Voz Libre in Camaguey is now Radio Revolución.

The El Periódico del Aire stations in Havana (COCO and CMCK) were confiscated by the Ministerio de Recuperación de Bienes Malversados.

La Voz de Santa Clara is now La Voz del INRA de Santa Clara.

Radio Varadero is now La Voz del INRA.

There has been an even more drastic change in control of the FM radio stations. Out of 24 stations, 18 have been taken over by the Government.

Eight FM stations owned by Unión Radio are now operated by the CTC.

Seven owned by *Circuito Nacional Cubano* were confiscated by the Ministerio de Recuperación de Bienes Malversados and are operated by a bureau of the Ministry of the Treasury.

Three owned by *Circuito Nacional Cubano* were confiscated by the Ministerio de Recuperación de Bienes Malversados and are operated by a bureau of the Ministry of the Treasury.

In television only one out of 24 stations remains independent. The other 23 have been confiscated by the Ministerio de Recuperación de Bienes Malversados and now are operated by a bureau of the Ministry of the Treasury.

In February 1960, a Government-consolidated network consisting of all radio and TV stations which had been confiscated by the Ministerio de Recuperación de Bienes Malversados was organized under the name of "FIEL" (Frente "Independiente" de Emisoras Libres). With the exception of the two Government-owned stations, Radio Unión and Radio Manabí, all stations belonging to the FIEL chain are operated by a bureau of the Ministry of the Treasury. The stated purpose of this network is to "consolidate the revolution and orient the people".

One of the most notable examples of how radio freedom has been throttled is the one involving Luis Conte Agüero, a fellow-revolutionary of Dr. Castro, and a leading radio-television commentator. Conte Agüero, whom Dr. Castro had at one time called "his friend", took issue with the Government over the question of Communist infiltration in Cuba. The conflict culminated on March 25, 1960 in an open break between Conte Agüero and the Government.

At noon on March 25, Conte Agüero read an open letter to Dr. Castro over *Radio Progreso* which called upon Dr. Castro to maintain friendly relations with the United States, to beware of the perfidies of the Russians, and warned that the Communists were taking over the revolution. Immediately following this broadcast he was viciously attacked by the pro-Government commentator and follower of Juan Peron, José Pardo Llada. He said that Conte Agüero should either be expelled from Cuba within twenty-four hours or shot. Conte Agüero was later

forcibly prevented by a Communist group from entering CMQ studios, the most important in Cuba, for his daily commentary. CMQ had provided, for two weeks, his principal platform from which he attacked Communism.

On Monday, March 28, Dr. Castro appeared on TV and denounced Conte Aguero in exceptionally strong terms. On Tuesday night, March 29, Conte Aguero sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy and left Cuba shortly thereafter.

In early March 1960, Arturo Artalejo, independent news commentator and head of the Habana radio station Radio Capital suspended his news commentary indefinitely. Artalejo did so because the "clarifications", read by an announcer at the end of his news broadcast which questioned the Government's version of the *La Coubre* explosion, stated that Artalejo's comments "did not conform to the truth."

Abel Mestre, who together with his brother Goar Mestre, headed CMQ, insisted on the right of free expression in an unusual telecast on his own program *Ante la Prensa*, on Thursday, March 31. As a result, Channel 4, 65% of which was owned by the Mestre combine, was intervened on the same date and the Government froze the personal accounts of the two Mestres. This was the first time that the Government had, without the excuse of alleged former affiliation with General Batista, taken over a large mass media enterprise clearly on the basis of its opposition to Communism. It gave other media leaders a further example of what the Government could and would do to any opposition in the public media field.

This is the record of the Cuban Government with respect to human rights. Dr. Castro himself summarized the effect on a country of the lack of respect for human rights. Writing to "My very dear friend" Luis Conte Aguero in the middle of March 1955, he had turned down a proposal of amnesty from General Batista provided Dr. Castro would make certain promises. He said in his letter:

"The best proof that there is no dictatorship is that there are no political prisoners.' This is what they [General Batista and his adherents] said for many months, but today the prisons are full and 'exile' is a common word. Therefore, they cannot say that we are living in a democratic and constitutional regime. Their own words condemn them."

The failure of the Cuban Government to respect human rights as enunciated in the Declaration of Santiago has resulted in thousands of exiles fleeing the country or taking refuge in foreign embassies in Habana. The political problems which this causes are known as well to the Latin American Governments as they are to the United States. These exiles have now formed groups in other Latin American countries with the stated purpose of removing Dr. Castro and his followers from power. With respect to the United States, political exiles in the United States have engaged in unauthorized flights from the United States. In an effort to prevent such flights the United States has had to establish some of the most extensive police measures in its history. The evidence, as set forth in the Memorandum from the United States Government to the Inter-American Peace Committee, shows quite clearly that the Cuban Government has taken

advantage of this situation and has itself organized unauthorized flights from the United States to embarrass the United States Government. Because of the acceptance in the United States of Cuban exiles, and for other reasons, the Cuban Government has launched a hostile propaganda campaign against the United States. Governments of other American Republics have been similarly subjected to hostile propaganda.

The close association between the practice of democracy and the maintenance of inter-American solidarity was asserted in the Charter of the Organization of American States. The fact that disregard for human rights might be a cause of international tension was implicit in the directives given to the Inter-American Peace Committee (IAPC) in Resolution IV⁶ of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Santiago in 1959. The IAPC has issued two reports on the situation in the Caribbean area, one general and one specific, in which this relationship between flagrant disregard for human rights and international tensions is pointed out. Cuba demonstrates this relationship again beyond any reasonable doubt and demands the attention of the Organization of American States.

It would be a matter appropriate for inter-American consideration and concern even if it were confined to the impact of the Cuban Revolutionary Government itself upon the Americas. It has become increasingly clear, however, that more than that is involved. The international communist movement sponsored by the Soviet Union, the activities of which in this Hemisphere have been formally and officially defined by the American Governments as intervention, and correspondingly condemned by them, has made the Cuban revolution an instrument of its world-subversive program. In so doing, it has not only magnified the threat which it poses to the free and independent nations of the world, but it is steadily depriving Cuba of that independence which leaders of the Cuban revolution have so stridently proclaimed.

III. Practices of the Cuban Revolutionary Government in International Affairs

A. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND SINO-SOVIET COMMUNISM

1. Cuban Relations with Sino-Soviet Bloc

The Cuban, Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments have been weaving a common pattern of relations and actions among themselves since the visit of Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba in February, 1960, but it had been clear even several months before the Mikoyan visit that this pattern was developing.

This relationship has since been openly and enthusiastically acknowledged by leaders of all three Governments in a manner that leaves no doubt that they are pursuing a similar policy with respect to their relations with the United States and with their desire to place Latin America within their orbit or at the very least in a neutralist position. An essential prerequisite to the achievement of the objective which Khrushchev has re-

⁶ *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 343.

cently described as seeing the flag of communism flying over every country in the world, is the isolation of the United States from the other American republics and other free world countries.

At a press conference following the recent Paris summit meeting, Chairman Khrushchev stated:

"And I can but welcome the events in Cuba, where the people proudly and courageously rose up under the banner for the struggle for their independence. I am convinced that other Latin American countries will also rise up in the struggle for their independence. We will sympathize with their struggle and applaud their successes in this fight."

Peng Chen, Politburo member and delegate of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, spoke on June 22, 1960 before the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party on the Cuban situation in almost identical terms.

"At the same time, enjoying the sympathy and support of the socialist camp, the correct fight of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism and its lackeys is rapidly developing and has become an historical uncontrollable torrent. The valiant people of Cuba have given a brilliant example for the peoples of Latin America. . . ."

"Only through constant strengthening of the forces of peoples from the countries of the socialist camp, through persistent strengthening of the forces of the movement of liberation of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, through constant strengthening of the forces of the revolutionary fight of the peoples of the capitalist countries themselves, relying on the unity of all these forces, waging a resolute fight against the American imperialists and their lackeys and isolating the American imperialists to the maximum, can the war be prevented and world peace defended."

This statement by Peng Chen is particularly significant when read in the context of the Bucharest Declaration of the twelve Communist-bloc parties in June 1960 which stated:

"At the same time it is also necessary to proceed from the possibility of the working class gaining a victory for the Socialist revolution by non-peaceful means."

Stripped of Communist jargon, this simply means that a "socialist peace" is to be obtained by fomenting armed violence, revolution and bloodshed throughout the free world, whenever the Communists consider it necessary and feasible.

The attitude of important figures in the present Cuban Government to the statements of leaders of the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments has been clear and unequivocal.

The joint Soviet-Cuban communique issued in Habana on February 13, 1960 was signed for Cuba by Prime Minister Fidel Castro, and for the USSR by First Vice Prime Minister Anastas I. Mikoyan. It stated in part:

"In the course of the conversations held by Mr. Anastas I. Mikoyan with the President of the Republic, Dr. Osvaldo Dorticos, the Prime Minister Dr. Fidel Castro, the Ministers Doctors Regino Boti, Raul Cepero Bonilla and Armando Hart and the President of the National Bank, Dr. Ernesto Guevara, carried out in an atmosphere of frank cordiality, there was expressly set forth the interest of both Governments in actively collaborating,

in the United Nations Organization, in favor of co-existence, cooperation, and friendship of all the peoples of the earth. The two parties considered that the consolidation of world peace depends, in notable measure, on the development of the most ample and effective international collaboration, on the basis of complete mutual respect and the inalienable right of every nation freely to decide its own political, economic and social course."

Captain Antonio Núñez Jiménez, Director of the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, stated in Moscow on June 8, 1960 that of all the Latin American countries Cuba was "the Soviet Union's greatest and most loyal friend."

Chairman Khrushchev added to these expressions of mutual understanding in a speech before a meeting of schoolteachers at the Kremlin on July 9, 1960. He said that the Soviet Union is:

"Raising its voice and extending a helpful hand to the people of Cuba fighting for their independence. . . . We shall do everything to support Cuba in her struggle. . . . We will help our Cuban brothers fight an economic blockade and the blockade will be a failure. . . . Now the United States is not so unreachably as it once was. . . . Speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support with rocket fire the Cuban people if aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to start intervention against Cuba."

The reaction of the Cuban Government to this statement by Chairman Khrushchev was prompt and gave further indication of the close working relationship that has developed. In a speech from the balcony of the Presidential Palace on July 10, the President of the National Bank of Cuba, Ernesto Guevara, attacked the United States Government and said "the men of the Pentagon walked with arrogance" until Russia stepped in. Cuba, he said, is defended by the "greatest military power in history," meaning the Soviet Union. At the same rally, President Dorticos announced the receipt of a telegram from Chairman Khrushchev to Dr. Castro in which the Soviet Government offered to purchase the Cuban sugar which could not be sold to the United States because of a change in the Cuban sugar quota.⁷ An agreement has now been announced under which the Soviet Union will purchase this sugar on the same terms, advantageous to the Soviet Union, discussed below.

Raúl Castro, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, said in Moscow on July 20 that the "noble gesture" of the Soviet Union in promising to defend Cuba with its missiles had prevented the United States from intervening militarily in Cuba. He expressed thanks to the "Soviet people who voluntarily stretched out their hands to Cuba . . . when our motherland was going through a most difficult period." The Soviet Government issued a communique which "confirmed" Chairman Khrushchev's statement "that the Soviet Union would use every means to prevent any United States armed intervention against the Cuban Republic." Thus the Soviet Union once more attempted to pose as the defender of Cuba against a threat that has never existed.

In sum, it appears to be the present objective of the

⁷ For a statement by President Eisenhower and text of a proclamation, see *ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 140.

Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments with respect to Latin America to promote movements against the existing Latin American governments, except the Cuban Government, by helping revolutionary movements which may exist within those countries to seize power. The type of government to be installed is that now being developed in Cuba. The present Cuban Government has openly associated itself with this objective.

The words of the leaders of the present Cuban Government, and of the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments, are sufficient to demonstrate the pattern. Actions which have been and are being carried on merely add additional evidence.

The initial efforts of the Soviet Union to tie other countries to the tail of the Communist kite have usually been through trade. This move was taken in February 1960 when Cuba and the Soviet Union signed a commercial agreement the major feature of which provided for the sale at world market prices of 1,000,000 tons of Cuban sugar annually over the next five years to the Soviet Union to be paid for 20% in dollars and 80% in Soviet equipment at prices set by the Soviet Government, and the granting to Cuba of a \$100 million credit for the purchase of Soviet equipment.

This arrangement was highly beneficial to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union will purchase the sugar at approximately 3 cents per pound and sell it in the Soviet market at the Government-controlled prices of four rubles, or from 40 cents to \$1 depending on the rate of exchange used. The Soviet Government therefore stands to obtain from its own citizens each year, if the lower figure of 40 cents is used, about \$600 million more than it pays Cuba for the sugar. It is easy to understand why the Soviet Union was willing to grant Cuba a \$100 million credit to purchase machinery in the Soviet Union at 2% interest. Even if Cuba should default on the credit, and even if the Soviet Government charges fair prices for its equipment, the Soviet Government stands to make over 800% profit in the first year alone. This agreement makes clear what will happen to Cuba in its economic dealings with the Soviet Union as it exercises, in the words of the joint Soviet-Cuban communique, its "inalienable right to decide freely its own political, economic and social course."

Other Bloc economic activities which have been publicly reported include the conclusion of a Cuban-East German inter-bank agreement for the exchange of Cuban agricultural and mining products for East German manufactured goods; a Cuban-Polish trade and technical cooperation agreement which closely parallels the Cuban-Soviet agreement in context; the purchase by Bloc countries of 1,500,000 tons of Cuban sugar over the past twelve months; and a Cuban-Czech trade agreement signed on June 12, 1960. Cuba has also entered into active trade relationships with Communist China.

Bloc activity in the political and diplomatic fields has, of course, been substantial since January 1, 1959. A June 1959 visit by a four-man delegation from the official Communist New China News Agency (NCNA) resulted in the establishment of a NCNA office in Habana. In November 1959 a three-man team of Soviet "observers" attended the National Congress of the Confederation

of Labor of Cuba. One of the observers, Vadim Listov, is known to be a Soviet intelligence specialist in Latin America. A representative of the East German labor movement also attended the conference.

Anastas Mikoyan's official visit to Cuba in February 1960 overshadowed all previous travel by Bloc officials to Cuba. Mikoyan, accompanied by a party of approximately 40, came to Cuba to open the Soviet Industrial Exposition in Habana; his visit had the propaganda objective of showing to Cuba and the world that the Soviet Union considered itself to be the Revolutionary Government's friend and benefactor. At least another 40 Soviet technicians and other personnel had preceded Mikoyan to arrange for the Exposition. The fourth Congress of the *Juventud Socialista* held in April 1960 in Cuba was attended by representatives from the USSR, Rumania, and Communist China. Both the Soviet and Communist Chinese delegations spoke at the Congress.

The steady stream of Sino-Soviet visitors to Cuba has been matched by an impressive list of visits to Sino-Soviet Bloc countries by Cuban Government officials and persons travelling with the official support of the Cuban Government. These visits have had the avowed purpose of developing close political, economic, cultural and other ties with the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments and are part of the general pattern. Government officials who have traveled to Soviet Bloc countries and Communist China are mentioned throughout this report as are other persons who have gone with official approval of the Cuban Government. They include the top echelon of the Government: Major Raúl Castro; Captain Antonio Núñez Jiménez; Major William Galvez, Inspector General of the Army; Major Ramiro Valdez, chief of Army G-2; Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara; and Fauré Chomón, head of the moribund Revolutionary Directorate and Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

The long-rumored re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union took place on May 7, 1960. The Cuban-Czech diplomatic missions were raised to embassies on May 16, 1960. Diplomatic relations with Poland were re-established June 15, 1960. It is expected that diplomatic relations with other Bloc countries will be established.

Although normal commercial and other contacts between the Communist Bloc and Cuba are not necessarily to be deplored, events clearly demonstrate that activities of the Cuban Government and the Sino-Soviet Bloc are not "normal", but constitute a pattern of political and economic intervention by the Soviet Union and Communist China inimical to the peace and security of the Hemisphere.

2. *Partido Socialista Popular (Communist Party) and its Activities*

The Communist Party was organized in Cuba in 1925 but had no important influence in the country until the revolution of 1933. In the early months after that revolution, the Communist Party fomented strikes and unrest leading to an attempted general strike to overthrow the Government and seize power. This effort was decisively thwarted by the Government headed by Colonel Mendieta

and the Communist Party was outlawed. In 1937 and 1938, however, the Communist leaders made an arrangement with Colonel Fulgencio Batista in which they were to support Colonel Batista if he would permit them to reorganize the labor movement. The Communist Party was once more permitted to operate openly after 1938 and the Communist organized and maintained control of the Cuban Confederation of Labor (CTC) until 1944 when Dr. Grau San Martín became President of Cuba. It was in 1944 that the Communist Party changed its name to the *Partido Socialista Popular*, as its Secretary General then admitted, deliberately to confuse the people of its true nature. Communist influence waned after 1944 without the support or recognition of the Cuban Government. Communist strength in Cuba among the masses is best demonstrated by the fact that out of the 4,500 delegates who attended the last meeting of the Cuban Confederation of Labor before General Batista retook power in 1952, only 11 could be identified as Communist. It was demonstrated again in 1959 when the Communists were decisively defeated in CTC elections—until Government officials intervened and saved them from defeat. Although the Cuban Government in 1952 outlawed the Communist Party, it was simply the official party organization that disappeared to be replaced by a second group of Communist leaders that are always held in readiness for such an eventuality.

The Communists worked on rebuilding their organization during the Batista regime from 1952 to 1958 and were probably the best organized Party in Cuba when the 26th of July Movement finally succeeded in its revolution on January 1, 1959. There were persons in the leadership of the 26th of July Movement with known Communist backgrounds such as Raúl Castro, brother of the present Cuban Prime Minister; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine-born professional revolutionary, and others. But the majority were not Communists and many, in fact, were openly anti-Communist. The Communists, however, attempted to claim credit for the success of the revolution and the downfall of General Batista, their friend and benefactor from 1938-1944.

It is difficult to state at precisely what moment the Communists within the 26th of July Movement, and those pro-Communist opportunists outside, became a major influence in the revolutionary movement. An important indication of the trend of events was given on July 17, 1959 when Dr. Manuel Urrutia yielded under attacks from Dr. Castro for criticizing the Communist influence in the Cuban Government and resigned as President to be replaced by Dr. Osvaldo Dorticos, a former member of the Cuban Communist Party. It was in September 1959 that Dr. Ernesto Guevara returned from his travels to countries in the Sino-Soviet bloc. It was in September or October 1959 the Communists secured backing from officials within the Revolutionary Government to seize control of the Cuban Confederation of Labor, over-riding the resistance of David Salvador, Secretary General of the CTC, and others. The CTC withdrew from ORIT and ICFTU in November 1959. Also in October 1959, the Communists obtained control of the University Student Federation at the University of Habana and installed Rolando Cubela, a Rebel Army major as President

of the Federation. The FEU reaffiliated with the Communist-controlled International Union of Students in November 1959. It was in October 1959 that the Armed Forces were reorganized and that Raúl Castro became Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. It was at this same time that the present Cuban Government decided to abstain in the United Nations on the resolution relating to the admission of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations whereas previously Cuba had opposed such admission.

These events, and others related in more detail in other sections of this document, demonstrate rather conclusively that there was a struggle for power within the Cuban Government beginning in July 1959 and that the Cuban Communist Party and its supporters emerged as the dominant force. The steady tightening of the grip of Soviet Communism on Cuba has continued since that time and now, one year later, leaders of the Governments of Cuba and the Soviet Union openly speak of "solidarity" between the two countries.

The Communists seem to find their relationship with the 26th of July Movement satisfactory. Dr. Castro's aims and actions, particularly his virulent anti-US attitude, and his readiness to use authoritarian methods, are consistent with their own present objectives. Furthermore, support of Dr. Castro and his Government gives them the tactical advantage of identifying themselves with an indigenous movement, whose influence and example they can exploit throughout Latin America. Through their assistance to the Revolutionary Government, and with the active cooperation of its most influential leaders, Raúl Castro and "Che" Guevara, they have been able to infiltrate Communists and their supporters into positions of great importance throughout the Revolutionary Government. Communists are now deeply involved in the remodeling of Cuba and the country has in effect become a base for the propagation of the ideology and policies of Soviet Communism in Latin America. On June 18, 1960, Moscow radio quoted Capt. Antonio Núñez Jiménez, Director of INRA, at the time in Moscow, as follows:

"The Communist Party of Cuba, which is called the Popular Socialist Party, is basically a party made up of very poor classes. [The Communist Party has approximately 20,000 members.] There are no big capitalists in it, no imperialists, no big landowners whose land can be expropriated, no war criminals. That is, it is the Party whose members are receiving the benefits of the revolution."

Despite the absence of legally authorized political parties, the Popular Socialist Party is active as such a group. Dr. Castro's 26th of July Movement, itself Communist-infiltrated, lacks most attributes of an organized party. Thus, the Communists have come increasingly to provide for Dr. Castro the type of vigorous support which other dictatorships have traditionally obtained from strong military or well-organized personal followings. Given the mutuality of interest between the present Government and the Cuban Communists, it is difficult to distinguish official policy and actions from those which would be expected of a government under actual Communist control in the present circumstances in Cuba.

Almost all moderates have been purged in recent months

from top positions in the Cuban bureaucracy. The principal agencies of the Government are now controlled by Raúl Castro, who heads the Revolutionary Armed Forces and police; Antonio Núñez Jiménez, Director of the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA); and "Che" Guevara, President of the National Bank. All work closely with Communists, use their positions to facilitate Communist infiltration into most sectors of national life, participate in Communist-front activities, and aid the PSP by persecuting its opponents. All have furthered closer relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Since January 1959, PSP leaders have traveled extensively in Communist China and in the Eastern European satellites. Juan Marinello, President of the PSP, visited Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Communist China after the 21st CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Congress. Later, in October 1959, he headed a PSP delegation to Communist China's 10th Anniversary celebrations in Peking. Blas Roca, Party Secretary General, visited Communist China in April 1960. PSP propagandist and Central Committee member Salvador García Agüero spoke before the 15th French Communist Party Congress in Paris June 24-28, 1959; Executive Bureau Labor Secretary Lázaro Peña attended the 20th Session of the Executive Committee of the Communist Front World Federation of Trade Unions in Bucharest December 14-17, 1959; and Central Committee member Eladio Ladislao González Carvajal y Dolzado was present at the East German 10th Anniversary celebrations in East Berlin in October 1959. *Juventud Socialista* leader Ramón Calcinés headed a JS delegation which attended a meeting of member councils of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) held in Prague following the Seventh World Youth Festival in August 1959.

The *Partido Socialista Popular* (PSP) maintains contact with the other Communist parties in Latin America and with the policy makers in the Soviet Bloc from whom policy directives are received. Because of the fact that the PSP is the only political party active in Cuba today, it is important to review, at least briefly, the nature of the Party and how it influences Cuban activities in Latin America.

The PSP has consistently followed the policies enunciated by the Soviet Communist Party. Under the guidance of seasoned leaders such as Juan Marinello, Blas Roca, Lázaro Peña and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, the PSP reappeared in 1959 as a potent political force officially unchallenged. It has proceeded to gain a position of importance on the political scene disproportionate to its size. Although the combined strength of the PSP and its youth affiliate, the Socialist Youth (*Juventud Socialista*—JS), makes the Cuban Communist organization one of the largest in Latin America, estimates indicate that members only make up approximately one-half of one percent of the Cuban population.

a. INRA

The *Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria* (INRA) has rapidly become the Cuban Government's principal instrument for extending state monopolistic practices. Although the original intent of INRA was confined to agrarian reform the organization now controls many enterprises of

a non-agricultural nature and its activities are constantly increasing. The statement of Captain Núñez Jiménez, Director of INRA, in Moscow that the Communist Party is receiving the benefits of the revolution leaves no doubt as to the Communist influence in INRA.

b. ARMED FORCES AND POLICE

The PSP has been successful in penetrating the armed forces with the support of Raúl Castro, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. Officers who have opposed this infiltration such as Major Pedro Luis Díaz Lanz, Major Huber Matos and others have been removed or forced to flee the country under charges of "counterrevolutionary" activity.

PSP infiltration of the rebel army at the rank-and-file level has been systematic and extensive. Under the direction of Luis Fajardo Escalona, the PSP member in charge of this program, Communists have been ordered to join the army as common recruits.

Communists participate actively in army indoctrination courses. For example, prominent Communists such as Nicolás Guillén, Severo Aguirre Agüero and Joaquín Ordoqui Mesa have lectured at these courses.

c. PROPAGANDA FACILITIES

Hoy, the Communist newspaper, started publication of a daily (except Monday) 4-page issue at provisional printing plants in Santiago de Cuba and subsequently in Habana in early January 1959. Since early April 1959, the Director of *Hoy* has been PSP Executive Bureau member Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, who went to reside at the headquarters of Dr. Castro in the Sierra Maestra in mid-1958 to establish liaison between the PSP and the 26th of July Movement. Other staff members are Raúl Valdés Vivo, sub-director; Honoria Muñoz, editor-in-chief (*jefe de redacción*); and Carlos García Santos and Jacinto de Peso, members of the Administrative Council. All are well-known Communists.

The PSP publishes several periodicals and newsletters aimed principally at party members. The largest of these is *Carta Semanal*, a weekly 4-page newsletter edited by PSP Labor Officer Lázaro Peña and printed in Habana. *Fundamentos*, a Party doctrinal publication, is issued monthly under the editorship of PSP Secretary General Blas Roca. It is printed in Habana by *Gráfica Horizontes*, a PSP-owned publishing house which also prints miscellaneous party propaganda. The PSP also publishes intermittently *Unidad Femenina*, a guide for women Party members edited by Ofelia Aguilar. A Communist news service, *Prensa Continental*, publishes a weekly news bulletin. In August or September 1959 a group of Cuban-Chinese Communists, with the aid of the PSP and type from Communist China, reestablished a weekly Chinese-language newspaper, *Kieong Wah Po*.

In Santiago de Cuba the Oriente Provincial Executive Committee publishes intermittently a 4-page newsletter, *Boletín Informativo*, which is distributed to Party members in Oriente province. Also in Santiago de Cuba Communist members of the Bacardí distillery union (*Sindicato Bacardí*) issue *La Chispa*, a labor newspaper.

The *Juventud Socialista* (JS) publishes *Mella*, a semi-monthly 28-page, 5-color magazine edited by JS National

Executive Committee member Isidoro Malmierca. The magazine contains JS news and politically oriented sports and feature articles and comic strips designed to appeal to a youthful audience. The JS Agrarian Committee publishes *Tierra*, a mimeographed bulletin issued monthly, which is designed for rural youth.

In addition to the above official and semiofficial PSP and JS publications, a semi-monthly Communist-front magazine for intellectuals, *Nuestro Tiempo*, is printed in Habana.

The PSP disseminates propaganda over several Cuban radio stations. Central Committee member Salvador García Agüero is the president of a printing firm, *Talleres Tipográficos Internacionales, S.A.*, which is the corporate owner of long wave station CMX and short wave COCX. In May 1959 the Party inaugurated a program entitled "Doctrine and Action" over *Cadena Oriental de Radio* (Eastern Radio Network), directed by García Agüero. The program featured members of the PSP Central Committee who alternated as commentators on current events. As of April 1959 García Agüero headed another regular program "*Hora Popular*" over station COCO which was sponsored by the PSP and the JS. The Habana-Municipal Provincial Committee of the PSP broadcasts a nightly series entitled "Avanzar" (to go Forward) and a Sunday program *Despertar Criollo* over station COCO, and a twice-weekly program "Municipal Committee Hour," over station *Nuevo Rumbo*. The PSP operates a television program "Problems of Yesterday and Today" 4 times weekly on CMQ, Channel 4.

PSP members and their sympathizers exert a strong influence on the non-Communist press and other information media. The most widely distributed of these media is the Cuban-based Latin American news agency, *Agencia Prensa Latina* (APL), whose materials are used by approximately 125 Government newspapers, radio and television stations. APL was started early in 1959 largely with the aid of a financial grant from the Cuban Government. The general tenor of APL news releases parallels that of the Communist press in many ways. In January 1959 APL made exchange agreements with news agencies in the Soviet Union (TASS), Communist China (HSINHUA), Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, there has been a large increase in the flow of press releases from these Iron Curtain agencies to the Habana office of APL.

d. YOUTH, STUDENT AND CULTURAL GROUPS

Strong influence by the Party and its youth wing among Cuban university students dates back to the 1944-47 period, when a small Communist minority—possibly no more than 200 of the 15,000 students—controlled the Federation of University Students (*Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios*—FEU) at the University of Habana. The FEU was an attractive target for the Communist Party because, from its founding in 1936, it had been designated by the University Council as the sole representative of the student body. Thus, it had official standing.

Besides exerting control over the students, the FEU had power over the University through its ability to call

student strikes and to promote demonstrations against any acts by the University administration to which it was opposed.

Rolando Cubela, a major in the Rebel Army, was elected as President of the FEU in October 1959 with the strong backing of Raúl Castro. He was sent on a trip in mid-1959 which included Communist China where he participated in the 10th anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime and, in November 1959, was instrumental in the re-affiliation of the FEU with the Communist front IUS [International University Students]. Cubela has led FEU efforts to stimulate Latin American student interest in the creation of an area-wide student confederation. A Latin American Youth Congress was held in Cuba in July 1960 with the support of the Cuban Government, the Soviet-sponsored World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and others. The Communists had sought to hold such a meeting in Latin America for over six years.

In line with their priority goal of influencing Cuban educational and indoctrination institutions, the PSP has attempted with considerable success to place its members in strategic positions in the Ministry of Education and to force the ouster of anti-Communist career employees. A prominent example of Communist penetration at the primary level is PSP member Dulce María Escalona Almeida, Director General of Primary Education. Her authority to hire and dismiss all primary school teachers under her jurisdiction is of obvious value to the Communists.

At the secondary level the position of General Superintendent of Secondary Education is occupied by Pedro Cañas Abril, a Communist sympathizer and former Dean of Philosophy and Education at the University of Oriente, who has been associated with Communist-front organizations over a long period of time. Juan Marinello, president of the PSP, is a professor of the Habana Normal School, where primary school teachers are trained. Marinello was put in this position by the Revolutionary Government early in 1959.

e. PRINCIPAL FRONT GROUPS

The PSP has met with considerable success in its efforts to penetrate and influence a wide range of special interest and minority groups among Cuban society through the establishment of front groups. Since the present administration came to power, the Communists have been instrumental in creating or reviving organizations appealing to such sectors of the Cuban populace as women, artists and intellectuals, youth, Negroes, and Spanish and Chinese residents in Cuba. Among the active front groups only the Cuban affiliate of the Soviet-sponsored World Peace Council is designed to appeal to all sectors of the population. The extent and degree of coordination of Communist front activities are revealed in the appearance of a small number of Communists and pro-Communists among the officers of numerous, ostensibly unrelated front organizations. Several of these groups appear to be little more than paper organizations at present, probably because they were too recently formed or reactivated to have yet attracted a significant following. Nevertheless, the PSP has succeeded in establishing the foundation for an elaborate system of interlocking front organizations throughout Cuba.

The Feminine Revolutionary Unit (*Unidad Femenina Revolucionaria—UFR*) is the major Communist women's front organization. The UFR was founded on April 10, 1959 with the avowed purpose of uniting Cuban women in support of the Revolution. Since its inception the UFR has been the creature of Vilma Espín, the wife of Raúl Castro, who has played a leading role in the organization. At the organization meeting she was elected honorary president of the UFR. Other honorary presidents, less prominent in UFR activities, are Aleida March (second wife of Ernesto "Che" Guevara) and Lupe Veliz (wife of Antonio Núñez Jiménez). Among the national officers of the UFR the following are known Communists: Carlota Miró, President; Ester Noriega, Vice President; María Núñez, Secretary General; and Candelaria Rodríguez, Secretary. In addition, there are at least two known Communists on the UFR executive committee.

The most notable activity of the UFR to date has been its support of and participation in the Latin American Women's Congress (*Congreso Latinoamericano de Mujeres—CLAM*) held in Santiago, Chile during late November 1959. In addition, the UFR has held two national rallies: the first in Habana on July 26, 1959 and the second in Santiago de Cuba on October 29, 1959.

The PSP has also gained control of the Cuban National Commission for UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. An election of members held at the *Casa de las Américas* on January 18, 1960 produced the following Commission, composed entirely of Communists and fellow travelers: Elías Entralgo, president; Nicolás Guillén; Dr. Pedro Cañas Abril; Dr. José Bustamante; Alfredo Guevara; Dra. Vicentina Artuña; and Manuel Corrales, all Communists, and Haydée Santamaría, a pro-Communist.

The JS and PSP were active in the promotion of Cuban attendance at the Seventh World Youth Festival of the Soviet-sponsored World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) held in Vienna during July and August 1959. The Cuban Committee in Support of the Seventh World Youth Festival (*Comité Cubano Pro-VII Festival Juvenil Mundial*), composed of Baldomero Alvarez, Rolando López, and Violeta Casals, of whom all are reportedly Communists, sent 156 Cuban delegates to the Festival.

Numerous Latin American Communist Party members have visited Cuba at the invitation of the PSP or the JS. At least three Central American Communists were guests of the PSP in late August 1959 on the occasion of the PSP's 34th anniversary celebration. Indications were that the PSP was assuming the role of a senior adviser in its relations with some of the Central American parties.

The 4th Congress of the JS, in Cuba, in March 1960, drew a large gathering of Communist youth delegations from Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, in addition to Bloc representatives.

The *Ku Pa Hua Chiao Hsin Min Shu Tung Meng* (New Democratic Alliance—NDA) is a Communist-front organization oriented toward the large Chinese community in Habana. Statements of the directors of the NDA showed that the group's main interests are to support

the Chinese Communist Government and the Cuban revolution. A daily newspaper, *Kwong Wah Po*, is published by the NDA as a propaganda organ to advance its program. In April 1959 officers of the organization were reported as Simon Chiong, president; Chan Pu-yun, secretary; Tung Ko Shiang, treasurer; Mei Min, secretary of propaganda; Wu Hun-hsing, secretary of organization; Chang Wen-chan, secretary of colony affairs; and Huang Chen-chin, secretary for liaison.

The National Peace Committee (*Comité Nacional por la Paz*) was established on December 4, 1959 as an affiliate of the Soviet-sponsored World Peace Council (WPC). Members of the Executive Committee of the National Peace Committee are Juan Marinello, PSP President and WPC member; Nicolás Guillén, Communist poet; Marta Frayde, Elías Entralgo and Eduardo Corona, also Communists; Violeta Casals; José Pardo Llada, a follower of Juan Perón; Fauré Chomón, head of the now moribund Revolutionary Directorate and Cuban Ambassador to the USSR; and Fernando Campoamor. The Committee's first acts were to extend greetings to peace movements throughout the world and to call for national homage to the late Frederic Joliot-Curie, a well-known French Communist. The main function of the Committee has been to sponsor a meeting of peace committees from several Latin American countries which was held in Habana March 12-15, 1960.

The control which the Communist Party exercises in Cuba through the apparatus described above is now clear. It was summarized by Fauré Chomón, head of the now defunct Revolutionary Directorate, over Habana television station CMQ-TV on July 9, 1960:

"I wonder if they have ever thought about what political party is now ruling Cuba. We all know, for instance, and we have seen that the revolution is led by a group of revolutionary comrades. . . . But what party do they represent? These comrades belong to the revolutionary party. Little by little we have been forming a revolutionary party. The several revolutionary groups have united in order to make the revolution a success. Our revolutionary party is composed of the active members of the 26th of July Movement, the Socialist Party [Communist Party of Cuba], the Revolutionary Directorate and of other groups. We have become convinced that we must march together and that we must follow the tactics and strategy planned by our revolutionary leaders in order to succeed."

The Revolutionary Directorate is now moribund. Leaders of the 26th of July Movement who opposed the Communist Party have been driven into exile. The only group left in the revolutionary party which is being formed "little by little" is the Communist Party of Cuba.

B. CUBAN INTERVENTIONIST ACTIVITIES IN THE HEMISPHERE

Dr. Castro is reported to have stated on more than one occasion that his Government does not engage in the exportation of the Cuban revolution. And yet from the moment of his assumption of power, one of the principal aspects of the inter-American scene, particularly in the Caribbean area, has been the manifest increase in tension resulting from movements or activities which

have had Cuba as their source. These have taken on a variety of forms, each of which is illustrated below. These have directly affected the United States and other friendly American States. The illustrations of such activity given below are but a few and are drawn from sources which are well and publicly known. They are cited in an effort to do no more than illustrate what is common knowledge. It may well be that governments immediately and directly affected will, as some have already done, provide additional details to further confirm the nature and extent of the interventionism in which the Cuban Government has been engaged.

What is most important about this record in present circumstances is the manner in which it demonstrates the character of the Government which the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments have now publicly indicated that they desire to take advantage of for their own interventionist purposes.

1. Armed Incursions

No sooner had the Revolutionary Government of Cuba taken power than it launched a program for exporting its revolution to other countries in the Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean area. Invasions and attempted invasions of Panama, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti followed closely upon one another in the spring and summer of 1959. Support of Cuban officials for military expeditions against the Governments of these countries, although vehemently denied, has been established beyond reasonable doubt. With the invasion of the Dominican Republic came the realization among the American Republics that international tensions in the Caribbean area, to which Cuba had significantly contributed, had risen to the extent that a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States was necessary.⁴

The Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the OAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in the Panama case in June, 1959 concluded "that the Republic of Panama was the victim of an invasion, organized abroad, that sailed from a Cuban port and was composed almost entirely of foreigners". The Committee report stated that the Chairman of the Committee was able to confirm that 82 of 84 imprisoned invaders were Cubans. Further, the Government of Panama, prior to the departure of the invasion group from Cuba, informed the Cuban Government of reports about this impending event, invoking the 1928 Habana Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The Cuban Foreign Minister in turn assured Panama that the Cuban Government would take the necessary preventive measures. It is true, of course, that when it became apparent the Organization of American States would not tolerate such activity, the Cuban Government did everything it could to stop the armed invasion.

In connection with several of the invasions or attempted invasions of Nicaragua from Costa Rica and Honduras in

June, 1959, and the individuals organizing them, documentary and other types of evidence which came to light demonstrated Cuban official support in the form of arms and financial contributions.

Official Cuban complicity in the invasion of the Dominican Republic in the same month was clear. The expedition was organized, trained, and equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials. An officer on active duty with the Cuban Rebel Army was one of the expedition's leaders. The Cuban Navy escorted the three landing craft used by the invading force on their voyage to the Dominican Republic.

Even during the Fifth Meeting of Consultation in Santiago, Chile, a report was received of the invasion of Haiti on August 13, 1959, by a group of armed men coming from Cuba. The Haitian Government, after the Santiago meeting, expressed its fears of further invasion attempts. It charged that the August 13 invasion from Cuba was a violation of the 1928 Habana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The assistance of Cuban officials, including the Cuban Ambassador to Haiti and his five military attachés, in the attempt to overthrow the Haitian Government was denounced by that Government. The Cuban Government, though admitting that the invasion was launched in Cuba (all but one of the participants was Cuban) conveniently disavowed the acts of the Cuban citizens involved.

These attempts at direct assistance to revolutionary movements and armed expeditions in the Caribbean area ended in failure, though leaving their mark in seriously increased international tensions in the area. Following these setbacks and apparently bowing to the force of inter-American opinion expressed most articulately at the Santiago Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the Government of Dr. Castro reaffirmed and then for a time appeared to follow, for outward appearances at least, a policy of not actively assisting the organization of revolutionary expedition. Cuba has turned, however, to an intensification of more subtle means of accomplishing its goal of spreading revolution to other countries in Latin America,—means which have caused Cuba to become more and more identified with and used by the international Communist movement.

2. Support of Revolutionary Movements

The Revolutionary Government of Cuba, in close association with Communists and extremists in the countries of the Americas, has been organizing, supporting, and encouraging a number of revolutionary leaders and movements of other countries designed to undermine and violently overthrow existing national governments. This assistance has been given impetus by the visits to these countries of Cuban officials and by the activities of Cuban "tourists". An example was the visit in December 1959 through Central America of one of Dr. Castro's intelligence specialists, August Aldama Arosta, to organize revolutionary movements in these countries.

Included among the targets of Dr. Castro's Government is the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico where an objective is to make contact with and actively assist a handful of Puerto Rican radicals whose avowed policy is the overthrow of the Government of Puerto Rico by

⁴ For a statement by Ambassador Dreier, see *ibid.*, July 27, 1959, p. 136.

violent means and to bring about revolutionary changes contrary to the will of the people of Puerto Rico.

The assistance offered to indigenous revolutionary movements includes promises of arms for the revolutionary effort, propaganda materials, and, most importantly, training in Cuba in the techniques of guerilla warfare. The handbook *La Guerra de Guerrillas* used in this training is one written by Dr. Ernesto Guevara, in which he strongly implies that guerilla warfare would be used to overthrow in each country in Latin America the existing economic and social order and the duly established national institutions.

The Cuban Government is also embarked upon a program of enlisting adherents in each country who are willing to fight for "Cuban independence". Financial and moral support is given to organizations calling themselves "Friends of the Cuban Revolution" or with similar titles. These have been formed in many countries of Latin America. Extreme leftists, persons with records of pro-Communist affiliations, or known Communists play important roles in the activities of such groups.

3. Activities of Cuban Diplomats and Agents

The intervention of Cuban diplomatic personnel in the internal affairs of the United States has been flagrant. Cuban diplomatic and consular establishments have been the distribution points for propaganda material insulting to the Government and people of the United States. The Government of the United States has found it necessary to request the recall of two Cuban consular officials² because they had engaged in highly improper activities incompatible with their status as consular officials including illegal arms transactions, smuggling, and agitation to foment racial dissension in the United States. The Memorandum, which the United States submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee on June 27, 1960, on provocative acts of Cuba against the United States, contains accounts of some of these activities.

Cuba's official relations with the rest of Latin America have been marked in recent months by frequent interference in the domestic affairs of several countries by Cuban diplomatic representatives and other official visitors. Cuban ambassadors and diplomatic personnel, in complete disregard of diplomatic customs and procedure, have identified themselves with local opposition and pro-Castro groups and have materially aided and encouraged these groups, harangued political rallies, distributed propaganda against states friendly to the host government, and engaged in other propaganda and agitation activities incompatible with their diplomatic status. Partly as a result of the activities of diplomatic personnel certain governments have broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. In several countries, Cuban Ambassadors and other diplomatic officials have been declared *persona non grata* or have left under circumstances which indicated serious breach of diplomatic etiquette. In one country the Cuban Ambassador was publicly accused of "having taken advantage of his position and encouraged political activities aimed at renewing terrorism" and of having "supported

the subversive plans of certain opposition sectors" in the country to which he was accredited.

C. ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY

1. Attacks by Cuban Leaders

From its inception the present Cuban Government has evidenced its distrust of and scorn for the Organization of American States and the inter-American system. Its top leaders have made frequent attacks against the OAS, and Cuba since January 1, 1959 pursued policies which have been designed to undermine and discredit the OAS.

As early as February 19, 1959, in a televised speech, Dr. Castro stated:

"I honestly have no faith in the OAS. I look upon it like that organ, like that Congress that functioned here. It decides nothing, the whole thing is a lie, it is all fiction, it fundamentally does not fill any role. . . . It really has not rendered any service to the people, to the countries of America. . . . The OAS has not fulfilled its destiny."

This statement has set the tone for the Cuban attitude. The Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments, seeing in this attitude the possibility of achieving one of their fondest ambitions, i.e. the breakup of the inter-American system, have given all possible support to this Cuban position. Moscow has echoed Cuban attacks against the OAS on many occasions.

Raúl Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister, at his first meeting with the OAS Council in March 1959, reiterated Dr. Castro's deprecation of the OAS by stating:

"I have the painful duty of informing you of the deep lack of confidence of the people of Cuba and its most representative leaders, above all Dr. Fidel Castro, the Prime Minister of the Government, in the power of the Organization of American States to achieve effectively its stated purposes and goals.

In this same speech, however, Dr. Roa made a plea for action against those countries which violate the norms of representative democracy and human rights and liberties. In speaking about the social structure of the country, the Foreign Minister said that the Cuban revolutionary movement was developing it:

" . . . in accordance with the purest principles of representative democracy, fully recognizing the basic human freedoms, with an absolute respect for human rights, as set forth in the Charter of Bogotá and in inter-American and world conventions and agreements."

Although Cuba voted for the holding of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers, it threatened not to attend. The Cuban Government was undoubtedly aware that its interventionist activities in other countries were partly responsible for the convoking of the Meeting. On August 14, 1959, two days after the Meeting had begun, Dr. Fidel Castro attacked it before a television audience, stating that it was part of a gigantic conspiracy against the Cuban democratic revolution, and describing the Meeting as a "farce."

On August 17, 1959, in Lima, enroute to the Santiago Meeting, Raúl Castro, as reported in the Habana press, stated:

"The OAS is an ineffectual organization dominated by the same master who gives orders to the Dominican, Para-

² *Ibid.*, July 4, 1960, p. 7.

guayan and Nicaraguan tyrannies, working always against the interest of the Latin American peoples. . . ."

He warned that the OAS would disappear if it did not immediately adapt itself to the current sentiments of the American peoples. He repeated his brother's statement that the meeting was a "farce".

More recently, Foreign Minister Roa and President Dorticos have continued the criticism. According to *La Nación* of Buenos Aires of May 28, 1960, Dr. Roa referred to the OAS before an audience in the University of La Plata as "the Ministry of Colonies."

Although President Dorticos signed a joint declaration with President López Mateos of Mexico in June 1960 in which there was a reaffirmation of support for the inter-American system, other statements attributed to him during his visit to Mexico City took a wholly different note.

In an interview with *Nocturnos* on June 14, the Cuban President is quoted as stating:

"Cuba's affirmation of sovereignty . . . finds as the main obstacle to this policy the Pan American system with its pretensions to solving problems in the family, considering Latin America as a world apart."

At the University of Mexico, President Dorticos went even further. He called the OAS an "instrument of international conspiracy," and said the "OAS cannot enter Cuba, and if it enters it will stay in Cuba."

On July 8, a *Prensa Latina* despatch datelined Paris quoted Captain Antonio Núñez Jiménez as stating:

"Its statutes (OAS) establish no obligation of complying with whatever collective recommendation may be adopted. The OAS did not impede the course [of events] against Guatemalan democracy; the OAS permits the installation of dictators; the OAS is an instrument at the service of imperialist interests."

2. Prime Minister's Statements on Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

One of the most important examples of the Cuban Government's lack of respect for the inter-American system was the speech of Dr. Castro on March 28, 1960 in which he deprecated the Rio Treaty, a fundamental inter-American instrument. In that speech Dr. Castro gave ample warning that his country would not consider itself bound by inter-American commitments to which Cuba, as well as all the other American governments, are parties. He stated that his Government had not signed the Rio Treaty and therefore was not obligated by its terms. The Prime Minister by this statement completely ignored the fact that one of the conditions for the recognition of the Revolutionary Government by other countries had been its promise to respect and comply with its international commitments. Dr. Castro stated in his speech:

"And then they threaten to incite the Latin American countries against us with this pact of Rio de Janeiro, by which we do not feel obligated because the revolution did not sign this pact. That is to say, and it is well that we do not feel, and we declare it categorically, that we do not feel obligated by this pact of Rio de Janeiro."

There could be no more conclusive demonstration of Dr. Castro's utter disregard of the principles upon which the inter-American system is founded. The Rio Treaty has been welcomed by all Member States of the OAS as a

positive protection to them against aggression, rather than as a threat against any one of them. Only the Cuban Government has portrayed this Treaty as one which might be used to violate the sovereignty of a Member State. A memorandum of April 8, 1960 of the Cuban Delegation to the OAS in which this portrayal is found, attempted to rationalize Dr. Castro's statement of March 28. It succeeded only in bringing out more clearly the Cuban Government's irrational fears, as well as the disturbing and insulting implication that the governments of the Americas might arbitrarily employ this inter-American instrument, which provides precisely for collective security against aggression, for aggressive purposes against an American state, or otherwise apply it in a manner violating the spirit and letter of the Treaty itself. Such a suggestion was a reflection upon the good faith of all the member states of the Organization of American States.

3. Other Aspects of Cuban Disrespect for the OAS

The attitude of the Cuban Government toward the inter-American system has also been clearly shown in its apparent unwillingness to cooperate in the work of the Organization, even when this involves matters of importance to the maintenance of inter-American solidarity, and the extent to which it has sought to use the OAS as a sounding board for its propaganda against the United States and others. Despite its concurrence in the Resolution which charges the Inter-American Peace Committee with a serious effort to examine the factors of tension in the area, there is no record of any Cuban cooperation with that body. On the contrary, it has been publicly spoken of in terms of contempt by the Prime Minister of Cuba.

As noted previously, the Cuban Government has disregarded the seven Principles of the *Declaration of Santiago* with respect to human rights. It has also shown contempt for the eighth Principle on inter-American economic cooperation:

"The American States, in order to strengthen democratic institutions, should cooperate among themselves within the limits of their resources and the framework of their laws so as to strengthen and develop their economic structure, and achieve just and humane living conditions for their peoples."

The Cuban Government is the only member of the OAS which has not joined in the formation of that important institution of economic growth, the recently established Inter-American [Development] Bank. Thus, despite the plea of Dr. Castro for additional financial assistance for Latin American development, his Government has refused to join the instrumentality of the inter-American system designed to achieve that precise objective.

D. MILITARY BUILD-UP IN CUBA

It has long been an aspiration of all free nations to be freed from the burden of armament so that the resources utilized for this purpose could be devoted to the service of man instead of his destruction. There was every reason to believe that the Cuban Government shared this view and was seriously interested in employing the maximum of the country's resources for the purpose of economic development. The contrary has happened, however.

The Government headed by Dr. Castro fell heir to military equipment in the possession of the previous Cuban Government on January 1, 1959, sufficient to equip an Army of 25,000 men, in addition to that possessed by the 26th of July Movement. In an estimate taken since that time, the Cuban Government has acquired from European countries over 1,200 machine guns; some 50,000 rifles; almost 200 mortars, howitzers, flame throwers, and rocket launchers; and fifteen tanks. In addition it has purchased some 50,000,000 rounds of ammunition and over 100,000 shells and grenades. It is well known that high officials of the Cuban Government are attempting to obtain military equipment in addition to these amounts.

The Cuban Government under Dr. Castro has retained regular armed forces as large as those of the previous Government and has proceeded to create and arm a civilian militia of 100,000 men. If Dr. Castro carries out this militarization program, Cuba will have under arms almost five times as many men as there were in the Cuban Army before Dr. Castro came to power. The Government has attempted to justify the creation of such a large military force with the argument that it is needed to defend Cuba against possible aggression from the United States. Only Sino-Soviet bloc countries have used this argument to rationalize their conduct.

The proposal of certain of the American republics to reduce the burden of armaments was greeted with derision by the Cuban Government. The limitation of arms proposal presented to the OAS by Chile was pictured as an anti-Cuban plot originated in the United States.

The semi-official newspaper *Revolución*, in an editorial of March 7, 1960 branded the proposal of President Alessandri on arms limitation as a "campaign against Cuba" and part of an "anti-Cuban plot" hatched in the United States. The editorial accused the United States of complicity in the *La Coubre* incident²⁹ and charged that this was part of the atmosphere being developed so that the proposal of the Chilean President would prosper.

The effects of this build-up of military strength have not, of course, been confined to Cuba. Military personnel trained in Cuba, and arms originating in Cuba, have already been used for armed incursions against other American republics as discussed above.

The gravest danger to the security of the Americas, however, is to be found in the developing military relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union. As noted previously, the Soviet Union has brandished its military strength, including rockets, in a manner clearly intended to suggest that it will come to the aid of Cuba and high officials of the Cuban Government promptly welcomed that aid. The Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, Raúl Castro, has made his second trip to Prague and Moscow to discuss the acquisition of armaments and a member of the Czech trade mission to Cuba is an armaments specialist.

E. CUBAN ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION AND AGGRESSION

The Cuban Government has engaged in a propaganda campaign aimed at the elimination of the historic

economic relationship which has existed between Cuba and the United States. This objective of Cuban policy was frankly stated by Foreign Minister Raúl Roa in an address at the University of Montevideo and reprinted in the Montevideo newspaper *El Sol* on June 10, 1960. He stated that Cuba had decided to break the economic ties with the United States because the structure of those relations until recently was fundamentally semi-colonial and because . . . [foreign] investments in the country had totally deformed the economic development of Cuba.

This view was even more bluntly stated by Dr. Ernesto Guevara, the President of the National Bank of Cuba, on March 2, 1960, when he said that:

" . . . the representatives of the [American] sugar companies are trying to show that by selling to another country we are enslaving ourselves, and they have never stopped to analyze what amount of slavery the three million tons of our sugar which we customarily sell at supposedly preferential prices to the giant of the north has meant and means for the people of Cuba."

On the program "Universidad Popular" Dr. Guevara is reported in the Cuban newspaper *Revolución* of March 20, 1960 to have said:

"We all know now that to win our economic sovereignty we must wrest it from that someone called monopoly, which has no country, nevertheless has very close ties with the United States. Our war, therefore, is against the great power of the north and we have to obtain the victory over the North American monopolies."

It is recognized by the Government of the United States that any country has a legitimate right to reduce its economic ties with any other country as long as this is done in a manner consistent with international law, the rights of foreign interests, and through mutual consultation and agreement between the parties involved. The Cuban Government, however, has seen fit to endeavor to sever Cuban-United States economic relationships without any regard for equity and international law and practices.

The Cuban Government through its high officials has engaged in a hostile propaganda program against the United States and its economic objectives and policies which is unrivaled in the history of inter-American relations. These attacks by the Cuban Government on the Government of a country to which it is bound by obligations of friendship and cooperation under the Charter of the Organization of American States and other inter-American agreements are not only to be regretted but are also destructive of harmonious economic relations among the American family of nations. In view of the extremely antagonistic tone of these attacks on the economic policies and position of the United States and in view of their total lack of veracity, it can only be assumed that the Cuban Government is motivated by a fundamental desire to weaken international economic cooperation within the free world and especially in this Hemisphere. The actions of the Cuban Government have clearly served the global Communist strategy of impairing the ability of western civilization to improve the economic well-being of its population.

The Cuban Government has taken discriminatory

²⁹ For background, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 80.

actions against the property of United States citizens in Cuba, valued at over \$850 million. Without regard for customary practices of civilized nations, United States citizens have been dispossessed of property which often had been acquired as the result of a life-time of toil; no effort has been made by the Cuban Government to assure anything approaching adequate compensation.³¹

The Cuban Government has attempted to justify these acts by stating that there is no discrimination because Cuban citizens are undergoing the same treatment. While this may be the case, it does not justify action contrary to accepted international law and practices. The fact remains that the Cuban Government has failed to protect adequately the rights of United States citizens who have in no way contravened Cuban law or the accepted practices of international law.

In addition the Cuban Government has taken discriminatory economic actions in its commercial and financial policy toward the United States. In disregard of its obligations under international trade and financial agreements, the Cuban Government has diverted its import trade from the United States to Soviet Bloc countries despite the fact that the dollar reserves of the National Bank of Cuba have increased substantially since the advent of the Castro Government. This increase is due largely to the unwillingness of the Cuban Government to permit the payment of dollar obligations now in excess of the reserves held. Cuban importers have been forced by the Government to find other sources of supply despite their traditional desire to use United States products. For example, companies owned by United States citizens have been threatened with reprisals, and in the case of the oil refineries there was actual seizure because of an unwillingness to refine crude oil from the Soviet Bloc. The insistence of the oil companies that they had commitments to purchase oil supplies from Venezuela was brushed aside. Quota devices and import prohibitions have been used to curtail the use of United States goods to a minimum. Yet, at the very same time, United States imports of Cuban products were increasing and Dr. Castro was boasting of the sizeable growth in his country's dollar exchange holdings. By financial controls the Cuban Government has refused to allow remittances on capital or trade account and has blocked the peso balances of United States citizens. The Government has refused to permit payments to United States exporters unless such exporters continue to ship goods to Cuba in at least an equivalent amount, so that many small United States businessmen are thus virtually blackmailed into sending goods to Cuba in hope of retrieving their capital. Despite numerous representations on behalf of United States citizens whose assets are no longer available to them no satisfactory reply has been received from the Cuban Government.

Article VIII of the International Monetary Fund Agreement, to which Cuba is a party, prohibits the imposition of restrictions on the making of payment

³¹ For a Department statement protesting seizures of U.S. properties in Cuba, see p. 316; for texts of U.S. notes, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1960, p. 158; July 25, 1960, p. 141; and Aug. 1, 1960, p. 171.

and transfers for current international transactions without the approval of the Fund. In September 1959, the Cuban Government requested approval by the Fund for exchange surcharge applicable to import payments representing about 15% of the total value of Cuba's imports. The Fund granted the request on a temporary basis until June 30, 1960 and called for further discussions prior to that date. Thereafter Cuba increased and intensified its restrictions. Late in June 1960 discussions between the Cuban Government and the Fund were resumed. During the discussions it became evident that, among other things, the actual implementation of the restrictive system did not appear to conform, in practice, to the description given by Cuban officials and that the system failed to provide clear rules under which international trade could be conducted. The Fund refused approval of the exchange practices proposed, noted the need for their early elimination, and urged the adoption of measures which would lead to that result. The Cuban Government has taken no action to comply with the Fund's findings.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade forbids, subject to specific exceptions, the maintenance by a Contracting Party of prohibitions or restrictions on imports from other Contracting Parties. Under Articles XII and XVIII a Contracting Party may restrict imports to the extent necessary to safeguard its monetary reserves. The restrictions must be administered so as to avoid unnecessary damage to the commercial and economic interests of other Contracting Parties and the unreasonable impairment of regular channels of trade. When availing itself of this exception, in order to introduce new restrictions or intensify substantially existing restrictions, a Contracting Party is obligated to consult immediately (if prior consultation is not practicable) with the Contracting Parties as to the nature of its balance-of-payments difficulties, alternative corrective measures which may be available, and the possible effect of the restrictions on the economies of other Contracting Parties. Cuba has made no attempt to consult the Contracting Parties regarding these matters; to justify its restrictions under these balance-of-payments exceptions; nor has it attempted to invoke any of the other exceptions in the General Agreement.

The Cuban Government has sought to justify its discriminatory trade and financial actions, which are aimed primarily at the United States, by asserting that the United States has been the favored party in the trade relations between the two parties; that is, that Cuba has typically purchased more from the United States than the United States has purchased from Cuba and that Cuba has had a substantial balance of payments deficit with the United States. This is an argument for barter or bilateral trade that has long been discarded by reputable economists and such trade has been greatly reduced by free world countries in recent years. This is of course the trade philosophy of the Soviet Union and Communist China, designed to destroy multilateral trade upon which the strength of the free world depends. The question is not whether there is an exact balance in trade and payments between the United States

and Cuba but whether in all of its trading relationships Cuba has a balance of trade or payments equilibrium. The answer to that is provided unequivocally by figures of the International Monetary Fund. For the same period for which the Cuban Government asserts that it had an unfavorable balance of trade and payments with the United States it has maintained an average foreign exchange balance of \$270 million, the greatest percentage of which is United States dollars. The Cuban peso has been at parity with the United States dollar except for a short period from 1936-41 and there were no payments restrictions whatsoever. Only since the assumption of power by Dr. Castro has there been any real question of the stability of the Cuban peso.

Without according the affected United States parties an opportunity of obtaining a hearing, the Cuban Government has levied arbitrary and excessive taxes on types of properties which were almost wholly owned by United States citizens. As a result investments of approximately \$70 million in minerals production and exploration were rendered worthless to their United States owners. It should also be pointed out that it has been a general practice of the Cuban Government to refuse legal remedies to any persons having grievances arising out of the implementation of internal laws, decrees, and other orders pertaining to revolutionary economic programs. In some instances, Cuban judges who have shown some independence of judgment have been threatened by Government officials for harboring counterrevolutionary ideas.

Despite this long record of utter disregard for the rights of United States citizens and of Cuba's obligations to the United States, Cuban Government officials have repeatedly asserted that the United States has committed "economic aggression" against Cuba.¹²

The United States Government has tried to avoid any action which would interfere with the legitimate aspirations of Cuba to continue its economic development and advance the well being of its inhabitants. However, in view of the political and economic discrimination of the Cuban Government, which manifested itself in statements and actions so harmful to the interests of the United States, the United States Government was finally compelled in July 1960 to take some measures to protect the vital interests of its own citizens. No Government can permit itself to be in a position in which an openly hostile Government, such as that of Cuba, may cut off without warning one-third of its total sugar supply. The fact that Cuba is now in open league with the Soviet Union and Communist China makes obvious the hazard involved in depending on Cuba as a source of supply. Therefore, the United States Government had to consider methods under which it would become less dependent on Cuban sugar supplies to protect itself against the effects of further Cuban unfriendly action. The United States is attempting to diversify its sources of supply for sugar in order to protect itself against the possibility that a dictatorial

¹²The Security Council on July 18 and 19 considered a complaint by Cuba; for statements made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and text of a resolution, see *ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1960, p. 199.

regime would continue to threaten its essential requirements.

History has shown that ill-conceived and drastic measures aimed at destroying existing systems of agricultural production have led to sharp declines in production. The experience of the Soviet Union and other Bloc countries has clearly shown that the serious decline in agricultural production which they experienced was a consequence of the drastic collectivization policies followed by those governments. In fact, a number of Communist countries which were previously self-sufficient in foodstuffs now meet these requirements only by importing surplus agricultural products from the United States. In view of this historical record, there is a reasonable basis for believing that Cuba no longer continues to be a certain source of supply.

In summary, the Cuban Government is embarked on a program of breaking its economic ties with the United States and its other traditional trading partners and has completed or is negotiating a series of arrangements which will tie Cuba economically to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It is achieving this through hostile and discriminatory economic and financial actions, including the seizure of assets of nationals of the United States and other countries without any adequate compensation in disregard of its own laws and international law. Despite its protestations to the contrary, it has been unwilling to negotiate on these matters even though on certain of its actions it has an obligation to do so under the International Monetary Fund Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Peru Granted Loan for Economic and Social Development

Following is a statement by President Eisenhower released by the White House on July 28 after it had announced a loan of \$53.2 million to Peru for land development and low-cost housing.

The purposes of this program are closely in accord with those which I had in mind on July 11 when I stated that a new affirmation of purpose was called for in our cooperation with friendly developing Latin American countries in their efforts to progress.¹ I stated that the aspirations and needs of the peoples of the Americas for free institutions and a better way of life must be met, and that among the things I had in mind were the opening of new areas for settlement and opportunities for free self-reliant men to own their own land and their own homes.

The Government of Peru has succeeded in establishing internal financial stability and

¹ BULLETIN OF AUG. 1, 1960, p. 166.

strengthening its economy, essential foundations for accelerated economic and social progress. It has established a concrete program to achieve such progress and it will dedicate substantial resources to this end. Its program is to open for settlement virgin lands in the rich Upper Selva, to make better use of land now under cultivation, and to give urban working families the opportunity to own their own homes.

Representatives of the Export-Import Bank, the Development Loan Fund, the International Cooperation Administration, and the Department of State recently visited Peru and discussed the details of this program with President [Manuel] Prado [Ugarteche], Prime Minister [Pedro] Beltrán, Cabinet Ministers, and other officials responsible for the program. They personally inspected, from the air and on the ground, typical areas already settled and to be settled and urban areas where new homes are being built for workers and their families.

U.S. Replies to Soviet Allegation on Midrange Ballistic Missiles

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT OF JULY 20

Press release 403 dated July 20

The latest Soviet note¹ is on a par with other attempts by the Soviet Government to confuse the world and to distort the truth in a transparent effort to deflect attention from those Soviet actions which are the real cause of tension.

The discussions currently under way in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to determine the most suitable means for meeting NATO requirements for midrange ballistic missiles for the defense of the treaty area are part of a long-range program determined upon by the NATO Heads of Government at their meeting in December 1957² and carried out by the Alliance since that time. The Heads of Government recognized that as long as the Soviet Union persists in introducing missiles of all kinds into its forces, NATO must continue to build up its defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

¹ See below.

² BULLETIN of Jan. 6, 1958, p. 3.

Such steps as may be taken by the Alliance to provide midrange ballistic missiles for the defense of the treaty area will be taken in accordance with agreed NATO defense plans and not by individual member governments acting outside the NATO framework.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has made it clear that the Federal Republic looks to its legitimate defense requirements entirely within the 15-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Germany's participation in NATO and in the defense arrangements of the Alliance does not constitute a threat to anyone. This fact stands in contrast with Soviet attempts to provide the East German puppet dictatorship with the opportunity to impose a regime of tyranny over the free people of Berlin. It is the threat of unilateral action by the Soviet Government which constitutes a real danger to peace in Europe.

Soviet professions of concern contrast sharply with the action of the Soviet Government in breaking off the disarmament discussions in Geneva.

Moreover, at a time when the Soviet leadership engages in a campaign of threats against smaller nations of the free world, seeks to disrupt efforts by the United Nations to maintain stability in the Congo Republic, and threatens the use of rockets in support of its policies toward Cuba, Soviet professions of concern for peace and security are suspect. It is actions such as these by which the Soviet leadership seeks deliberately to increase tensions.

While remaining ready at any suitable time to take part in serious negotiations to solve outstanding international questions and arrive at effective arrangements for disarmament, the United States and its allies will not be deflected from taking jointly such measures as they deem necessary for their defense.

U.S. NOTE OF AUGUST 8

Press release 437 dated August 9

Following is the text of a note delivered on August 8, 1960, by the United States Embassy at Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. in reply to the latter's note of July 19, 1960, making certain allegations with respect to discussions underway in NATO to meet

NATO requirements for midrange ballistic missiles.

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and, under instructions from its government, has the honor to communicate the following with reference to the Ministry's note No. 72/OSA dated July 19:

The United States Government considers that the note of the Soviet Government constitutes a deliberate attempt to mislead world public opinion by distorting the facts and to divert attention from actions of the Soviet Government which are serving to increase tensions throughout the world.

The Soviet Government has made it clear for a number of years that it is equipping its armed forces with modern weapons of all types. The Soviet Government appears to contend that it can pursue this course of action, and moreover do so in an atmosphere of strictest secrecy, while denying the NATO member countries the right to provide for their common defense. Characteristically the note of the Soviet Government makes repeated misleading assertions regarding the provision of mid-range ballistic missiles for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. The attitude of the United States Government has been set forth in its statement of July 20, 1960. That statement stresses that the United States and its Allies will not be deflected from taking jointly measures they deem necessary for their defense and points out that such steps as may be taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to provide mid-range ballistic missiles for the defense of the Treaty area will be taken in accordance with agreed NATO defense plans.

The note of the Soviet Government makes wholly unfounded charges against the actions and policies of the Federal Republic of Germany. As the Soviet Government is aware, the Federal Republic of Germany has made it clear that it looks to its legitimate defense requirements entirely within the 15-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Federal Republic of Germany does not threaten to resolve the German question by unilateral action even though the people of East Germany have for more than fifteen years been denied by force the right freely to determine their own future.

The repeated threats of the Soviet Government to take unilateral action with respect to Germany and to deprive the people of Berlin of their freedom stand in contrast to the constructive policies pursued by the freely elected Government of the Federal Republic. It is threats such as these, for which the Soviet Government bears full responsibility, which create tension in Europe and give cause for apprehension and concern.

The note of the Soviet Government expresses concern over the intensification of the arms race. The Government of the United States finds it difficult to reconcile this expression of concern with the recent action of the Soviet Government in breaking off the negotiations of the 10-power Disarmament Committee in Geneva. The disruption of these negotiations at the very time when the Soviet Government knew that the Western powers were prepared to table new proposals raises serious doubts concerning the desire of the Soviet Government for meaningful disarmament measures.

The note of the Soviet Government professes concern for the cause of peace and the security of the European peoples. But it is the Soviet Government which has on repeated occasions in the recent past threatened the use of rockets in pursuance of its policies particularly with respect to the smaller countries of the world. The Soviet Government is well aware that these threats increase tensions in the world. They are also the cause of deep misgivings as regards the intentions of the Soviet Government not only with respect to the European peoples, but also with respect to those in other parts of the world, including Latin America.

The United States Government regrets that the Soviet Government has chosen to pursue a policy of threats of unilateral action and deliberate distortion of the truth which is not conducive to an improvement in the international atmosphere. The United States Government remains ready to take part at any suitable time in serious negotiations to solve outstanding international issues including the problems of Germany and European security and the problem of safeguarded disarmament. The United States Government and its Allies will not in the meantime be deflected from taking the measures they jointly deem necessary to insure their security and to maintain the peace.

Unofficial translation

No. 72 OSA

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to state the following to the Government of the United States of America.

According to reports which have not been contradicted by the Government of the United States, U.S. Secretary of the Army [Wilber M.] Brucker, while making an "inspection" trip to several countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa, announced on July 4 in Bonn that the U.S.A. intends to give "Polaris" rockets for the armament of the West German Bundeswehr. In this connection, it is also noteworthy that the announcement of the U.S. Secretary of the Army was made soon after an address by the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] Minister of Defense [Franz Josef] Strauss who announced after returning from the United States that the FRG Government is willing to accept American intermediate range rockets if they will be offered to the FRG as a NATO member.

The Soviet Government cannot but reach the conclusion that the trip of Mr. Strauss to the U.S.A. and the subsequent arrival of Mr. Brucker in the FRG, as well as their announcements concerning the armament of the West German army with "Polaris" rockets, are premeditated concerted actions calculated to prepare anxious world public opinion for the open armament of West Germany with destructive rocket-nuclear weapons.

That the "Polaris" rocket is able to carry an atomic charge, that it is an attack weapon calculated for aggression and by no means a defensive weapon, is evidenced by the technical-tactical characteristics of this rocket and its radius of action (over 2,000 kilometers), as well as the frank statements concerning this by American military figures, including Secretary of the Army Brucker. If it is considered that these arms are being put at the disposal of the West German armed forces, the leading figures of which do not conceal their revanchist inclinations, then it becomes absolutely clear that the Government of the United States goes ever further along the dangerous path of creating an active hot-bed of aggression in the very heart of Europe.

In the light of the indicated actions of the Government of the United States, directed toward the rearmament of West Germany, increasing the arms race, and kindling the "cold war," the position taken by the United States on the question of general and complete disarmament in the Committee of Ten States at Geneva,⁴ leading to the break-up of the work of the Committee, is wholly understandable. It is completely clear that the United States did not wish to proceed to any kind of effective measures in the field of disarmament because all its actions were

directed toward a completely opposite goal—the accumulation by all means of armaments not only in the United States itself, but also in countries bound to it in military pacts.

The supply by the United States of aggressive rocket weapons to West Germany will still more strain the situation in Europe, create an additional threat by German revanchists to the states which are neighbors of West Germany, will increase the danger of the outbreak of a new war.

The Government of the United States by its actions not only crudely violates the solemn obligation which it undertook jointly with other participants in the war against Hitlerite Germany—to ensure such conditions "that Germany would never again threaten its neighbors or the maintenance of peace throughout the world," but it also directly places in the hands of the West German army, at the head of which stand former Hitlerite generals, destructive weapons which can be used by them for new aggression.

The dangerous activities of the Government of the U.S.A. threaten the security not only of the immediate neighbors of the FRG, but also of all the countries of Europe, including present allies of the U.S.A. in military blocs. If some people across the ocean are prepared to consign to oblivion the misdeeds of German fascism, can this really be forgotten by peoples of European countries, who only recently experienced the terrible sufferings of the last world war?

The Government of the U.S.A. evidently prefers to ignore the growing alarm and concern of the peoples of Europe over the policy conducted by it of feverishly rearming the West German revanchists. Matters have now come to a point where they are being provided with weapons whose utilization would engender disastrous and dangerous consequences difficult to overestimate.

The Government of the U.S.A. should also not forget that, once having rockets in their possession, the West German revanchists could use them for unleashing a war without the consent of the U.S.A., could drag the United States into a military conflict during the course of which the American people would be forced to pay dearly with the blood of their sons for the irresponsible policy of its government. The experience of history also convincingly demonstrates that the countries which engaged in rearming Germany became themselves the first victims of German aggression.

The Soviet Government warns the Government of the United States of America in a most serious manner that the path on which it has entered is fraught with dangerous consequences for the cause of peace and security of the peoples of Europe and that responsibility for these consequences will rest completely on the Government of the U.S.A.

The Soviet Government will be compelled to take such counter-measures as it deems necessary for ensuring the security of the Soviet Union and the states allied with it, for safeguarding the peace in Europe and throughout the world.

Moscow, July 19, 1960

³ Delivered to Edward L. Freers, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires, at Moscow on July 19 by Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1960, p. 267.

U.S. Withholds Comment on Powers Trial

Department Statement

Press release 442 dated August 9

In order to avoid any possibility of prejudicing Mr. Powers' situation¹ and in the interests of national security, the United States Government for the present will withhold comment on any aspect of the trial itself. However, it is to be noted that Powers has been in the exclusive control of the Soviet authorities for 101 days, that despite all efforts of this Government *no one* other than his jailers and captors has had access to him, and that anything he says should be judged in the light of these circumstances and Soviet past practices in matters of this kind.

Soviet Diplomat Requested To Leave United States

Press release 456 dated August 13

The Department of State on August 13 requested the departure from the United States of Valentin M. Ivanov, a First Secretary at the Soviet Embassy at Washington. The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Raymond A. Hare, informed the Soviet Ambassador, Mikhail A. Menshikov, that Ivanov had grossly violated the established norms of diplomatic behavior.

Ivanov importuned an American citizen, Roger C. Foss, to obtain employment in a U.S. Government agency and gave him substantial sums of money for this purpose.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959.²

Ratification deposited: Japan, August 4, 1960.

Ratification advised by U.S. Senate: August 10, 1960.

Shipping

Modification of paragraph 5, annex II, of the International Load Line Convention signed at London, July 5, 1930 (47 Stat. 2228). Proposed by Australia in 1949; entered into force August 7, 1959.

Proclaimed by the President: August 4, 1960.

¹ For background on the case of Francis Gary Powers, see BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1960, p. 276.

² Not in force.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1959, with annex. Opened for signature at Washington April 6 through 24, 1959. Entered into force July 16, 1959, for part I and parts III to VIII, and August 1, 1959, for part II. TIAS 4302.

Acceptance deposited: Belgium, August 1, 1960.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement relating to guarantying U.S. investors against the risk of inconvertibility, in accordance with the terms of section 413 (b) (4) (B) (i) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 846-847; 70 Stat. 558; 22 U.S.C. 1933). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago July 29, 1960. Enters into force upon notification by Chile that this agreement has been approved pursuant to its constitutional procedures.

India

Agreement supplementing the agricultural commodities agreement of May 4, 1960 (TIAS 4499), with related letter. Signed at New Delhi July 29, 1960. Entered into force July 29, 1960.

Iran

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Tehran July 26, 1960. Entered into force July 26, 1960.

Italy

Agreement relating to the improvement of the child-feeding program carried out by the Amministrazione per le Attività Assistenziali Italiane ed Internazionali. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome July 19, 1960. Entered into force July 19, 1960.

Agreement amending schedules 1 and 2 of the annex to the air transport services agreement of February 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1902 and 2081). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 4, 1960. Entered into force August 4, 1960.

Japan

Agreement relating to the waiver of a contribution to the support of U.S. forces in Japan by the Japanese Government for the Japanese fiscal year 1960. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 15, 1960. Entered into force July 15, 1960.

United Arab Republic

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchanges of notes. Signed at Cairo August 1, 1960. Entered into force August 1, 1960.

Uruguay

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo July 22, 1960. Entered into force July 22, 1960.

Consulate at Brazzaville Elevated to Embassy, Accredited to Four States

Effective August 15 the American consulate at Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, was elevated in rank to mission status. The Embassy is also accredited to the Republic of Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Republic of Gabon.

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*435	8/8	Cultural exchange (Colombia).
†436	8/8	Hanes; entry of domestic servants.
437	8/9	Reply to U.S.S.R. on midrange ballistic missiles.
438	8/9	Herter: foreign policy during election period (combined with No. 440).
†439	8/9	Airlift of U.N. troops and supplies into Congo.
440	8/9	Herter: news conference.
441	8/9	U.S. protests Cuban seizures of property.
442	8/9	U.S. to withhold comment on trial of Francis Powers.
*443	8/9	Bartlett appointed ambassador to Malagasy Republic (biographic details).
*444	8/9	Burrows appointed ambassador to Honduras (biographic details).
*445	8/9	Newbegin appointed ambassador to Haiti (biographic details).
†446	8/9	Moore and Oenslager appointed to Advisory Committee on the Arts (rewrite).
447	8/10	Berding: "Strategy of Incitement."
*448	8/10	Cultural exchange.
*449	8/10	Cultural exchange.
*450	8/10	Rubottom: Canadian Institute on Public Affairs.
†451	8/11	Delegation to 6th and 7th Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States.
452	8/11	Herter: aid to Latin America.
†453	8/11	Reply to Polish note of July 20.
*454	8/11	Haggerty designated director, I'SOM, Greece (biographic details).
†455	8/12	Reply to Soviet note of June 30 on Bundeswehr and Berlin.
456	8/13	Soviet diplomat declared <i>persona non grata</i> .
†457	8/13	Soviet note of August 11 on Francis Powers.
†458	8/13	Air transport agreement with Mexico.

*Not printed.

†Filed for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



COMMUNIST ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS

the
Department
of
State

The Communist economic offensive continued its rapid pace in 1959 and early 1960, not only reaching new levels for many of its activities but also expanding into new areas. Countries in Africa and Latin America became the focal points of major bloc efforts to establish beachheads in Western spheres of influence.

This new pamphlet, based on the most recent information available to the U.S. Government regarding the Communist program of economic penetration, brings up to date the Department of State study entitled *The Communist Economic Threat*, published in 1959. After an initial discussion of bloc economic policy in the less developed areas, the 38-page booklet describes the nature of the offensive, the trade drive, and the areas of concentration.

Publication 7020

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Bulletin

Vol. XLIII, No. 1106

September 5, 1960

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

VOL. XLIII, No. 1106 • PUBLICATION 7061

September 5, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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OAS Condemns Government of Dominican Republic

Secretary Herter left Washington on August 15 to attend the Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Consultation of the American Foreign Ministers at San José, Costa Rica. Following are two statements he made at the Sixth Meeting, regarding charges brought by Venezuela against the Dominican Republic, together with the text of a resolution passed at that meeting, Mr. Herter's departure and arrival statements, and a list of the members of the U.S. delegation.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 18

Press release 473 dated August 19

I wish, in the first place, to associate myself with my other colleagues in their expressions of satisfaction that we are holding our meetings in this universally admired country of Costa Rica. The shining example of freedom and democracy given us by Costa Rica and its people and their well-known devotion to the principles of inter-American cooperation are an important stimulus to constructive deliberations here.

My delegation has listened carefully to the statements which have been made before this meeting by the Foreign Ministers of Venezuela and the Dominican Republic and the other foreign ministers who have spoken. We have also given full study to the report of the committee appointed to investigate the charges of the Venezuelan Government against the Dominican Government. We are impressed by the thoroughness, impartiality, and high sense of responsibility with which the committee carried out its task and prepared its report. We find that the evidence brought out in the report is convincing and the conclusions arrived at by the committee are well founded. We believe, in short, that there is a firm basis for the finding that the Government of the Dominican Republic has engaged in grave acts against the sovereignty of Venezuela.

These acts merit the condemnation of this meet-

ing. They have created a situation within the scope of article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, calling for the taking of appropriate action for the maintenance of peace and security in the hemisphere. The matter before this meeting of foreign ministers involves specific actions of one American Government against another American Government contrary to the principles that govern the relations of the American states as expressed in solemn treaty obligations. This Meeting of Consultation should clearly and unequivocally express condemnation of such conduct and take decisions which will give adequate expression to this opinion.

There is, moreover, Mr. Chairman, a larger responsibility facing the member governments of the Organization of American States. That is the responsibility for making clear that the Organization will effectively enforce the principles it has adopted and give full support to the maintenance of a system of law among the American states.

In the view of the United States, Mr. Chairman, this meeting is confronted with the solemn duty of insuring that principles of the Rio Treaty and of the charter of the Organization of American States, with respect to nonaggression and nonintervention, be not violated, especially when such violation would endanger the security of any American state. This meeting by its action should make unmistakably clear that the Organization of American States is effectively carrying out its purposes essential to the individual and collective security of our various Republics.

In addition to the developments referred to in the investigating committee's report, my delegation believes that an important aspect associated with the subject of this meeting is that discussed by the Inter-American Peace Committee in its report of June 6, 1960. The committee found that international tensions in the Caribbean area had been aggravated by "flagrant and widespread violations of human rights in the Dominican Republic" and stated that these tensions would con-

time to increase so long as these violations persisted.

The question now arises, Mr. Chairman, as to how best the ministers here present can formulate and adopt a constructive plan of action. There has been some sentiment here for the application of all the sanctions provided for in article 8 of the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro with the exception of the last one, namely, the use of armed force. Without entering into any debate over questions of whether such action would be affected by the provisions of the charter of the United Nations with respect to enforcement action by regional agencies, I wish to pose the question as to whether or not this is really the most effective means of achieving our aims.

First of all, let us be very clear as to our intent. The intent of this Meeting of Consultation is not alone to stop the type of action which I have condemned in my statement but also to create a situation within the Dominican Republic whereby that country can be brought back into respected membership in the American community and its citizens permitted to enjoy the benefits of representative democracy as set forth in the Declaration of Santiago.¹ If this is our intent, is the application of sanctions at this time the best means of achieving this end? I have serious doubts.

My delegation feels that there is another approach which could constitute a practical means of preventing a recurrence of these acts that led to the calling of this consultative meeting. It might be called a preliminary approach, which might well offer a better opportunity. This is to recommend, with the full force of this meeting of foreign ministers, that the Dominican Republic agree to receive a special committee of this body in the Dominican Republic to assure that, within a specific and reasonable period of time, free elections by a people, who in fact shall have had the right of free expression and free assembly, be held under the supervision of the committee itself, subject to appropriate safeguards to assure observance of principles in conformity with the Declaration of Santiago. There are numerous precedents for the holding of elections under international supervision.

From the remarks made by some of the speakers who have preceded me, notably the distinguished

¹ For a provisional translation, see BULLETIN of Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

Foreign Minister of Argentina [Diógenes Taboada], I am encouraged to think that this idea will receive a favorable response on the part of this meeting.

For the success of this proposal, it is essential that the powers of the committee—and they must be real—be clearly set forth and accepted. This is necessary to forestall any attempt to obstruct or water down the creation of the necessary conditions for genuinely free elections. Accordingly, if the proposal I am making commends itself to my colleagues, I would suggest that the resolution to be adopted at this meeting include a clear statement of the necessary powers, immunities, and rights essential to the proper functioning of the OAS supervisory committee. This statement would be included in the proposal to be given to the Dominican Government.

Should this offer be accepted by the Dominican Republic, this Meeting of Consultation will have the satisfaction of knowing that it has taken the best possible step to achieve its objective by orderly and peaceful change.

If, however, this offer should be refused, we should then consider what measures under article 8 of the Rio Treaty might be most effectively applied in order to bring about acceptance of this proposal by the Dominican Government. Sanctions in these circumstances would pass beyond the purely punitive stage and have a specific and constructive aim.

We are responsible representatives of responsible countries in an organization which has responsibility for the whole of the Americas. It behooves us in this capacity to think soberly and deeply as to the decision and courses of action we adopt here. It is our duty to our peoples and to the principles which animate this organization to try to assure that what we do here now will in the future turn out to be a constructive contribution to the peace, liberty, and well-being of the peoples of the Americas.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 20

Press release 478 dated August 22

In voting in favor of the resolution that has just been adopted, the United States has joined with the other American Governments in condemning the acts of intervention and aggression against the Government of Venezuela which were

carried out with the participation of the Government of the Dominican Republic. We have also joined in applying certain measures including the breaking of diplomatic relations and the partial interruption of economic relations in accordance with article 8 of the Rio Treaty.

The United States was prepared, as I stated in my remarks to this meeting on August 18, to go on further in achieving the real purpose that we have had in mind here. That purpose was not only to express our disapproval of the acts of intervention and aggression which had been carried out but to get at the root of the matter in order to assure that the aggressive and interventionist policy of the Government of the Dominican Republic did not continue. That would involve, as was made clear in the conclusions of the Inter-American Peace Committee in its report of June 6, 1960, the establishment in a peaceful and orderly way of a situation within the Dominican Republic under which human rights would be respected and the Dominican people permitted to enjoy the benefits of representative democracy set forth in the Santiago Declaration.

The United States proposed on August 18 that, in addition to the condemning of the acts of intervention and aggression that had been brought to the attention of the consultative meeting, we should ask the Dominican Government to accept the appointment of a committee that would be fully empowered to assure that free elections were held under its supervision. This committee would assure the full right of free expression and free assembly by the people. It would establish such additional appropriate safeguards as would be necessary to assure observance of the principles of the Declaration of Santiago. If the Dominican Republic did not accept this proposal at this very meeting, the sanctions would be applied.

Subsequently, in the further discussion of this subject, the United States made known its specific ideas regarding the powers and duties of such a committee which, in our opinion, would have enabled the committee to achieve this important task.

Finally, if the Dominican Government did not accept such a proposal, the United States position was that sanctions should then be considered not merely as punitive measures but as measures which would bring about the acceptance of the proposal regarding the aforementioned committee

and thereby achieve a constructive result. In view of the intimate relationship which is recognized to exist between the violations of human rights and the lack of representative democracy in the Dominican Republic and the international tensions which have culminated in the acts of intervention and aggression against the Government of Venezuela, any measures that the Organ of Consultation might take under the Rio Treaty could and should, we believe, be addressed to this basic aspect of the problem. Such collective measures would not, by definition of article 19 of the charter of the OAS, constitute a violation of article 15, namely, the nonintervention principle.

There is a growing and insistent demand on the part of the peoples of the American nations to achieve a greater respect for human rights and a more effective exercise of representative democracy. These goals must, of course, be achieved primarily by the action of the peoples of each country. When, however, a situation develops which, because of its flagrant and notorious character and its relationship to the maintenance of international peace and security, calls for action by the Organization, the transition to a representative democracy can, in the opinion of the United States, best be achieved by resorting to orderly and peaceful processes. We hope that our proposal may serve as a basis for future consideration of the question of how the Organization of American States may contribute to the achievement of this important purpose should the occasion arise. To sum up, the United States has been glad to associate itself with the majority opinion of the meeting because:

First, it condemns, as strongly as any nation here, the acts of the Dominican Government that prompted the convocation of this meeting.

Second, it believes, as strongly as any nation here, in the need to maintain the solidarity and common approach of our community. To do so it has been willing to adjust its views to achieve an acceptable solution.

Third, it is prepared to act, as strongly as any nation here, in supporting the decisions of this community.

It is now, Mr. Chairman, the task of the members of the Organization of American States to keep in close and intelligent touch with the situation created by the action of the Dominican Republic, exchange views frequently in the carrying

out of our resolution, observe the effect of our decisions, and be ready to adopt new attitudes should the situation change, as indeed we hope it will.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION²

The Sixth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, having seen the report of the investigating committee appointed pursuant to the provisions of the third paragraph of the resolution approved by the Council of the Organization of American States on July 8, 1960, and,

CONSIDERING:

That the Charter of the Organization of American States sets forth the principle that international order consists essentially of respect for the personality, sovereignty and independence of states, and the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other sources of international law;

That in connection with the incident denounced by the Government of Venezuela before the Inter-American Peace Committee on November 25, 1959, that organ of the Inter-American System reached the conclusion that "the necessary arrangements to carry out the flight from Ciudad Trujillo to Aruba—planned for the purpose of dropping leaflets over a Venezuelan city—and to load these leaflets in Ciudad Trujillo, could not have been carried out without the connivance of the Dominican authorities";

That the Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation that was entrusted with the investigation of the acts denounced by the Government of Venezuela, reached the conclusion that the Government of the Dominican Republic issued diplomatic passports to be used by Venezuelans who participated in the military uprising that took place in April, 1960, in San Cristobal, Venezuela;

That the Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, which was charged with the investigation of the acts denounced by the Government of the Republic of Venezuela, also reached the conclusions that:

1. The attempt against the life of the President of Venezuela perpetrated on June 24, 1960, was part of a plot intended to overthrow the Government of that country.

2. The persons implicated in the aforementioned attempt and plot received moral support and material assistance from high officials of the Government of the Dominican Republic.

3. This assistance consisted principally of providing the persons implicated facilities to travel and to enter and reside in Dominican territory in connection with their subversive plans; of having facilitated the two flights of the plane of Venezuelan registry to and from the military air base of San Isidro, Dominican Republic; of providing arms for use in the coup against the Government of

Venezuela and the electronic device and the explosive which were used in the attempt; as well as of having instructed the person who caused the explosion in the operation of the electronic device of that explosive and of having demonstrated to him the destructive force of the same.

That the forementioned actions constitute acts of intervention and aggression against the Republic of Venezuela, which affect the sovereignty of that state and endanger the peace of America, and that in the present case collective action is justified under the provisions of Article 19 of the Charter of the Organization of American States,

RESOLVES:

To condemn emphatically the participation of the Government of the Dominican Republic in the acts of aggression and intervention against the state of Venezuela that culminated in the attempt on the life of the President of that country, and, as a consequence in accordance with the provisions of Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

AGREES:

1. To apply the following measures:

a. Breaking of diplomatic relations of all the member states with the Dominican Republic;

b. Partial interruption of economic relations of all the member states with the Dominican Republic beginning with the immediate suspension of trade in arms, and implements of war of every kind. The Council of the Organization of American States, in accordance with the circumstances and with due consideration for the constitutional or legal limitations of each and every one of the member states, shall study the feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade with the Dominican Republic to other articles.

2. To authorize the Council of the Organization of American States to discontinue, by a two thirds affirmative vote of its members, the measures adopted in this resolution, at such time as the Government of the Dominican Republic should cease to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere;

3. To authorize the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States to transmit to the Security Council of the United Nations full information concerning the measures agreed upon in this resolution.

DEPARTURE STATEMENT, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 15

Press release 463 dated August 15

The Meetings of Consultation of the American Foreign Ministers which will begin Tuesday night in San José, Costa Rica, are of paramount importance. They are important not only to the Organization of American States and to the American Republics but to the rest of the world as well.

In San José the representatives of the American states will seek further ways by which a free community of nations can apply its fundamental rules

²Adopted on Aug. 20 by a vote of 19 to 0; the Dominican Republic and Venezuela abstained.

of conduct and meet the threats of extracontinental intervention. The free world will hopefully watch for new confirmation of the strength of cooperation in freedom.

We of the Americas believe that the moral strength and the opportunity for progress to be found in the inter-American system are unique and must be protected. I am confident that the foreign ministers, recognizing that the welfare of the hemisphere and the ideals of its peoples are gravely threatened, will face these threats and act to reaffirm the solidarity of the American Republics in defense of the security and principles of the inter-American community.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, SAN JOSÉ, AUGUST 16

Press release 465 dated August 16

I am most happy to be here in the beautiful and progressive Republic of Costa Rica. This is my first visit to your country, and from what I have already been able to see of it I know that my expectations will be more than fulfilled.

It is most fitting that the Organization of American States has chosen Costa Rica for the two forthcoming Meetings of Consultation of ministers of foreign relations of the American Republics. For many years Costa Rica and its people have offered a splendid example of freedom and democracy at work. The people of the United States have not forgotten that in the grim hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, in 1941, Costa Rica acted even more quickly than my own country in declaring the existence of a state of war, thus expressing its repudiation of aggression as an instrument of policy. In this free atmosphere I think that all of us, as representatives of our respective governments, will be stirred to work harder to preserve the principles of democracy in the Western Hemisphere and to intensify the bonds that unite the American nations in seeking to achieve peace and security and economic and social progress with freedom for all their peoples.

I am looking forward with pleasure to meeting the President of the Republic, Don Mario Echandi Jiménez, whose invitation has made this meeting in San José possible and who is well known as an advocate and leader in the struggle to preserve democratic institutions and live in peace with other nations. I also look forward to working with my

colleague, the Foreign Minister of the Republic, Don Alfredo Vargas Fernández, and with the foreign ministers of the other American Republics.

U.S. DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on August 11 (press release 451) that Secretary Herter is heading a U.S. delegation to San José, Costa Rica, for the Sixth and Seventh Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States. The Sixth Meeting will convene August 16. The Seventh Meeting will be convened at San José following the adjournment of the Sixth Meeting. Composition of the U.S. delegation is as follows:

United States Member

Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State

Advisers

Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Alex A. Cohen, Embassy of the United States of America, San José, Costa Rica
John C. Dreier, Ambassador, United States Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States
Edward A. Jamison, Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State
Roger Kirk, Staff Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of State
Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Earl H. Luboensky, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State
Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Richard I. Phillips, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
Robert J. Redington, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State
Henry C. Reed, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Department of State
Roy R. Rubottom, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Marjorie M. Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of State
William A. Wieland, Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Department of State
Whiting Willauer, Ambassador of the United States of America, San José, Costa Rica

Secretary of the Delegation

Donald B. Eddy, Office of International Conferences, Department of State

James L. Carson, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

Frank A. Mau, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

U.S. Calls Attention to Cuban Inconsistencies on Sugar Trade

Department Statement

Press release 476 dated August 19

With regard to the remarks made in a television appearance in Habana on August 14 by the Minister of Commerce of the Government of Cuba, Mr. Raúl Cepero Bonilla, the Department of State wishes to point out the most recent of the many disparities and inconsistencies which have characterized the official statements of the Government of Cuba concerning its sugar trade with the United States.¹

On August 10 the Government of Cuba sent a note² stating that seizure of U.S.-owned property under Law No. 851, which the United States Government previously had protested as being discriminatory, arbitrary, and confiscatory,³ was primarily justified as a means "to make amends to the nation for the economic damage inflicted upon it by the cut in its historic and moral rights in supplying sugar to the United States market."

However, the Minister of Commerce in his television appearance 4 days later stated that "for the coming year it would be more advantageous to Cuba if the United States did not purchase a single grain of sugar" from Cuba. He later reiterated this in saying, "I have observed that it would be to our advantage in 1961 if not a single ounce of sugar were sold in the United States."

The Government of the United States wishes to record its observation that this statement places the Government of Cuba officially on record as finding the quota reduction to be advantageous to

that country and in essence constitutes a nullification of that part of the note regarding the justification for the arbitrary seizure of property in Cuba owned by citizens of the United States.

It will be recalled that the Cuban quota in the U.S. sugar market was reduced to allow diversification of foreign suppliers as a means of protection to American consumers in view of Cuba's long-range commitments to new purchasers such as Soviet Russia during a foreseeable period of probable decline in Cuban sugar production. It was explained at the time that the quota reduction was not a punitive measure.

The Government of the United States is gratified that the Government of Cuba, as demonstrated through the statements of its Minister of Commerce, is now in complete agreement that this measure will have no disadvantageous effects on the Cuban economy.

Nuclear Test Negotiations Discussed With U.K.

Press release 462 dated August 15

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, John A. McCone, and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Livingston T. Merchant, left for London on August 15 to discuss with the British Government the present status of the nuclear test negotiations in Geneva. In view of the wide range of proposals and counter-proposals in the last several weeks in those negotiations, it seemed opportune to review with the British authorities the important unresolved issues with a view to laying a common groundwork for the continuation of the conference.

Letters of Credence

Spain

The newly appointed Ambassador of Spain, Mariano de Yturralde y Orbegoso, presented his credentials to President Eisenhower on August 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 470 dated August 19.

¹ For a statement by President Eisenhower on the reduction of the Cuban sugar quota and text of a proclamation, see BULLETIN of July 25, 1960, p. 140.

² Not printed.

³ For text of a U.S. note of July 16, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 171.

President Regrets Severity of Powers' Sentence

Francis Gary Powers was sentenced to 10 years' loss of liberty by a Soviet court on August 19. Following are statements made on that date by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, and Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, Department of State, together with a Department statement of August 15 and the text of a Soviet note of August 11.

STATEMENT BY MR. HAGERTY, AUGUST 19

White House press release dated August 19

The President has been informed of the sentence imposed on Mr. Powers by the Soviet Court, and he deplores the Soviet propaganda activity in connection with the entire episode,¹ beginning last May, and regrets the severity of the sentence.

He extends his sincere sympathy to the members of Mr. Powers' family.

STATEMENT BY MR. WHITE, AUGUST 19

The United States Government has no intention of prosecuting Francis Powers because it sees nothing in his conduct to warrant such prosecution. Provision has been made for continuing compensation for Francis Powers while he is under detention. Arrangements have also been made to provide for his wife.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, AUGUST 15

Press release 461 dated August 15

In view of the continued inability of the American Embassy at Moscow, despite its repeated representations to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to arrange for an Embassy representative to interview Francis G. Powers, Secretary of State Herter addressed a letter to Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko, which was handed to Mr. Gromyko by Ambassador [Llewellyn E.] Thompson on Friday, August 12.² The Secretary's letter

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 30, 1960, p. 851; June 13, 1960, p. 955; and Aug. 22, 1960, p. 276.

² Not printed.

pointed out certain cases involving Soviet nationals which involved violations of U.S. espionage laws, as well as similar incidents in other countries, in which Soviet authorities demanded access to the individuals concerned and in which permission for such access was promptly granted. The Secretary's letter pointed out that further Soviet persistence in refusing to permit an Embassy official to visit Mr. Powers could only lead to the conclusion that there are certain aspects regarding the preparation of the trial of Mr. Powers which the Soviet Government, for its own purposes, desires to conceal.

The Soviet Foreign Minister's oral response to the Secretary's letter constituted a further refusal of the U.S. request for an Embassy representative to see Mr. Powers before the trial.

SOVIET NOTE OF AUGUST 11

Press release 457 dated August 13

Following is the text of a note received from the Soviet Government in response to the American Embassy's note of July 30, 1960,³ about Francis Gary Powers.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and with reference to the Embassy's note of July 30, 1960 has the honor to state the following:

As is known to the Embassy, criminal proceedings have been instituted against American citizen Francis Gary Powers under Article 2 of the Law on Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes (Espionage). F. Powers will be tried according to the laws of the Soviet Union. The Powers case has been accepted for consideration by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., open court session of which has been set for August 17. The competent Soviet organs consider it possible to solve the question of a meeting of an official of the U.S. Embassy with F. Powers at the end of F. Powers' trial.

Considering the circumstances of the case, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declines the protest of the U.S. Embassy contained in the note of July 30 and expresses surprise at the form to which the Embassy resorted for expressing its requests to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.

As for the other questions presented in the U.S. Embassy's note of July 30, an answer to them was given in the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Note of August 4, 1960.³

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1960, p. 277.

U.S. Urges Cessation of East German Military Activities in Berlin

Following is an exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning German military activities in Berlin. The U.S. note, which is identical to notes of France and the United Kingdom, was delivered by the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 12.

U.S. NOTE OF AUGUST 12

Press release 455 dated August 12

The Government of the United States has the honor to refer to the Soviet Government's note of June 30, 1960, which alleges that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is attempting to utilize the Western Sectors of Berlin for military preparations.

The Government of the United States can confirm without hesitation that the recruiting of members of the Bundeswehr is not taking place in Berlin. Moreover, there is no conscription for the Bundeswehr in Berlin and no organizations which register individuals for military service. Furthermore, there are no organizations in Berlin which have the character of reserve units of the Bundeswehr and no Federal law subordinating the Berlin economy to the defense needs of the Federal Republic is being applied in Berlin. As there is no recruitment for the Bundeswehr in Berlin, there is no question of using Allied communications to transport contingents of recruits for the Bundeswehr from Berlin to the Federal Republic. Had such situations been found to exist in conflict with the special status of Berlin and with their own responsibilities for Berlin, the Allied authorities would, of course, have taken immediate steps to remedy them.

Such situations do, however, exist in the Soviet Sector of Berlin and the Government of the United States would like to believe that the Soviet Government now proposes to take measures to put an end to them. Moreover, the Government of the United States hopes that bellicose demonstrations by East German military and para-military forces, as for instance on May 1, 1960, in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, will cease. The United States, French and British authorities have frequently

had to call this problem to the attention of the Soviet authorities.

Any ordinances issued in Berlin pursuant to the Federal law on the Securing of Goods and Services of the Industrial Economy, which is referred to in the Soviet Government's note, must be issued under the authority of the Berlin Senat. They would have no force or effect if they were contrary to existing laws, including Allied Control Council Law 43 which prohibits military production in Berlin.

The Government of the United States notes that a different situation now obtains in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, where Allied Control Council Law 43 is no longer respected. An ordinance on the "General Conditions for the Delivery to and the Provisioning of the Armed Forces of the German Democratic Republic" was published in the Soviet Sector on December 16, 1959.

The Soviet note not only makes unfounded charges regarding the violation of the special status of Berlin in the Western Sectors but also proceeds totally to disregard that status, in violation of the Soviet Union's pledged obligations, by asserting that Berlin is "on the territory of the German Democratic Republic." As the Government of the United States has frequently pointed out, the pertinent quadripartite agreements relating to the Allied occupation of Germany clearly confirm that the Greater Berlin area is not part of any zone and that by no thesis can Berlin be said to be "on the territory of the German Democratic Republic".

Assertions of "provocation" where none exist and assertions contrary to clear agreements already reached among the powers concerned only complicate the task of finding solutions to the outstanding problems which the United States, for its part, believes require diligent efforts of both sides to resolve.

SOVIET NOTE OF JUNE 30¹

Unofficial translation

The Government of the U.S.S.R. considers it necessary to draw the attention of the Government of the United States of America to the following:

It has become known to the Soviet Government that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is

¹ Delivered to the American Embassy at Moscow by the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs on July 1.

attempting to utilize West Berlin for its military preparations. On the territory of West Berlin, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany are conducting active recruitment of residents of that city into the West German Army. In West Berlin a number of military and civilian institutions of the Federal Republic of Germany have been set up which are engaged in the registration of persons qualified for military service and in recruiting them into the Bundeswehr. At the same time communications between Berlin and West Germany, granted as is known for other purposes, are being illegally utilized for the transportation of recruited contingents. Different sorts of associations and "brotherhoods" are being formed from among those residents of West Berlin who have completed service in the West German Army, which constitute in fact reserve units of the Bundeswehr in West Berlin.

Moreover, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is even attempting to subordinate the economy of West Berlin into the interests of arming of West Germany. On January 8, 1960 a federal law was extended to West Berlin on the basis of which the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany assumes the right to charge West Berlin enterprises with the fulfillment of military orders.

In the past the U.S.S.R. Government has already drawn the attention of the United States Government to provocative activity by the Federal Republic of Germany Government in relation to West Berlin, which is located on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, never was and is not included in the state territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, and cannot be governed by organs of the Federal Government. New facts indicate that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany not only has not ceased such activity but that this assumes an increasingly more dangerous and provocative character.

It is entirely evident that efforts being undertaken now by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to include West Berlin in the sphere of its militaristic measures only pursues the objective of heating up the situation even more in Berlin and Germany and bringing the situation to dangerous conflicts. All of this once more convincingly testifies to the necessity for the most rapid possible conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany and the normalization on this basis of the situation in West Berlin.

In connection with the above, the Soviet Government expects that the United States Government, which, as it declares, bears at the present time together with Great Britain and France responsibility for the situation in West Berlin, will put an end to efforts by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to utilize West Berlin for its military preparations and will take measures for the prevention of such illegal activity on the part of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Analogous notes have been sent by the Soviet Government to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

U.S. Replies to Polish Note on German-Polish Border Question

Press release 453 dated August 11, for release August 12

Following is the text of the U.S. reply to a Polish note of July 20,¹ which was handed to the Polish Chargé d'Affaires at Washington on August 11, 1960.

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of the Polish People's Republic and has the honor to refer to the Polish Embassy's note of July 20, 1960, requesting the views of the Government of the United States regarding certain questions pertaining to the Federal Republic of Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, particularly in connection with the settlement of the Polish-German border.

As the Polish Government is aware, the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, when defining in Article VIII B of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference those former German territories which were to be under the administration of the Polish State, reaffirmed their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement. The position of the Government of the United States on this matter remains unchanged. An obvious prerequisite for the peace settlement which will take into consideration the interests of all parties is the re-establishment of a representative and responsible German Government capable of negotiating and concluding a peace treaty on behalf of the entire German people and of assuring fulfillment of such a treaty. This is not only the view of the Government of the United States, but also that of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Federal Republic of Germany has never sought or obtained any assistance from its NATO allies in pressing territorial claims nor, in fact, is it pressing any. NATO is a purely defensive alliance whose members are fully and openly committed to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Na-

¹ Not printed.

tions. There are no mutual obligations among the NATO countries which are not a matter of public knowledge.

Spokesmen for the Federal German Government, including Chancellor [Konrad] Adenauer, have repeatedly stated their conviction that force should not and will not be used in fixing the borders of a reunited Germany. A careful reading of the entire speech made by Chancellor Adenauer in Duesseldorf on July 10 confirms that Chancellor Adenauer continues to look to a solution of the border question only through the peaceful negotiation of a German peace settlement.

The Government of the United States can well understand the desire of the Polish People's Republic for a definitive solution of the border question, a desire which is shared by the German people. It seems clear, however, that this desire can only be satisfied when the obstacles to a peace settlement can be removed. The Polish Government is aware of the continuing efforts of the Government of the United States to overcome these obstacles and to prevent a prolongation of the division of Germany, which, by preventing a real peace settlement, continues indefinitely the uncertainty arising from the border arrangements made at Potsdam. It is the hope of the Government of the United States that all of the powers concerned will eventually realize the necessity of the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom. Only on this basis can a settlement be achieved and a basis established for normal and harmonious relations between Germany and all her neighbors.

Secretary Announces Appointments to Advisory Committee on Arts

The Secretary of State announced on August 9 (press release 446) the appointment of Lillian Moore and Donald Mitchell Oenslager as members of the Advisory Committee on the Arts created by the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act of 1956 (Public Law 860, 84th Congress). Miss Moore is a dancer and a member of the American Ballet Center. Mr. Oenslager is professor of scenic design, Department of Drama, Yale University.

President Eisenhower Congratulates Prime Minister Ikeda of Japan

White House press release dated August 4

The White House on August 4 made public the following exchange of messages between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda of Japan.

President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Ikeda

JULY 30, 1960.

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I extend my congratulations and best wishes on your election as Prime Minister. I look forward to working closely with your government on all matters of mutual interest and to strengthening the bonds that link our two countries in their dedication to the preservation of peace and human freedom.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Prime Minister Ikeda to President Eisenhower

AUGUST 3, 1960

I am most grateful for your cordial message of congratulations on my election as Prime Minister. I shall continue to work for the strengthening of the ties of friendship and cooperation between our two countries for the cause of world peace and prosperity.

HAYATO IKEDA

U.S. Prepared To Assist Ghana in Volta River Project

Press release 468 dated August 18

K. A. Gbedemah, Minister of Finance of Ghana, has recently concluded a series of talks with officials of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Department of State, the Treasury Department, the Export-Import Bank, and the Development Loan Fund concerning the Volta River project—a major hydroelectric project which would produce power for the smelting of aluminum and for other industrial and private purposes.

The Government of Ghana has been informed that the U.S. Government is prepared to provide funds totaling \$30 million from U.S. sources toward the financing of the Volta River project

when the Government of Ghana reaches a satisfactory arrangement with the owners of the proposed aluminum smelter and the financing required in addition to the possible U.S. participation is assured.

The U.S. Government has long been interested in assisting the Government of Ghana in its program of economic development and diversification. The Volta River project is an important aspect of Ghana's development program and a survey of the project's feasibility was jointly financed by the Government of Ghana and the Government of the United States. It is hoped that, when the Volta River project is completed, this new source of power will enhance the existing favorable climate for private foreign investment in Ghana. The Government of Ghana offers attractive tax-holding inducements to many industries as well as the added security provided by the investment guaranty agreement signed by the Government of the United States of America in 1958.¹

U.S. and Italy Amend Air Transport Agreement

Press release 429 dated August 4

The Department of State and the Embassy of Italy exchanged notes at Washington on August 4 amending the air transport services agreement between the two countries. Under the amendment Italy received the right to fly to Chicago via intermediate points en route to the United States and to extend its only previous route, which terminates at New York, to points in other countries which may be determined by the two Governments in the future. The United States received the right to serve Turin in addition to the other points in Italy, namely, Milan, Rome, and Naples, which have heretofore been served by its airlines. At the same time the two Governments formalized an arrangement to exchange air traffic statistics on operations under the bilateral agreement.

This action was taken as a result of the formal aviation consultations which took place in Washington in January and February of this year and is a tangible evidence of the cordial aviation relations existing between the two countries.

¹Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4121.

Unethical Practices in Bringing Domestic Servants Into U.S. Deplored

*Statement by John W. Hanes, Jr.
Administrator of Security and Consular Affairs*

Press release 436 dated August 8

Last week I sent Miss Alice C. Mahoney to Los Angeles to confer with local officials about an allegedly serious situation in the Los Angeles area involving the entry into the United States of domestic servants.

The Department of State was informed that a few unscrupulous employment agencies had been bringing domestic servants—primarily young girls—to the United States under highly questionable circumstances.

Miss Mahoney is one of the most experienced officers of the Visa Office and has had wide experience at our posts abroad, particularly with fraud situations. I wished Miss Mahoney to bring me a firsthand report based on her talks with the people in the Los Angeles area most involved with this situation. In handling such matters, the Department of State always works in closest cooperation with the local, State, and Federal representatives on the spot who have jurisdiction. At the same time we try to give full support, through our consular officers abroad, to their local efforts.

After conferring with Miss Mahoney, I have transmitted a special instruction to Foreign Service posts abroad directing consular officers to review with particular care all offers of employment to domestic servants being presented by intending immigrants. The consular officers have been instructed to withhold a visa in any case where it appears that the pay is insufficient to allow for a living wage, or where it is necessary for the applicant to work for several months virtually without salary to repay agency fees and other expenses, or in similar questionable circumstances.

If the Department of State learns that any agency or individual is engaged in any unethical practice in bringing domestics to this country, we intend to give every assistance to a full-scale investigation of such agency or individual through competent local, State, and Federal agencies with a view to criminal prosecution or other suitable corrective action.

President Amends Executive Order on Administration of P.L. 480

White House press release dated August 17

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President on August 17 amended Executive Order 10560¹ to assign primary responsibility to the Secretary of Agriculture for developing a long-range supply and dollar-credit program for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities under the new title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954.²

Under title IV the U.S. Government may enter into agreements with the governments of friendly nations for delivery of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities for periods up to 10 years. Credit periods of up to 20 years are authorized. Payment will be in equal annual installments in dollars with interest. It is expected that the sales arrangements to be developed under this title will be based on shorter supply commitment and repayment periods.

(Executive Order 10560 was issued originally September 9, 1954, and assigned to various Government departments and agencies responsibilities for administering the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480). Title IV was added to the act by the 86th Congress in 1959, and responsibilities are being delegated by the amended order.)

The Department of State will continue to perform the functions of negotiating and entering into agreements with friendly nations and will exercise foreign policy responsibility in carrying out the provisions of the act under the amended Executive order.

While care will be taken to avoid interfering with the markets of other friendly countries, the new long-range credit and supply provisions of title IV will strengthen our efforts to gain the broadest possible use of agricultural surpluses in our continuing overall food-for-peace program.³ Underdeveloped countries will be able to obtain longer term supply commitments on a credit basis

for the purchase of surplus U.S. agricultural commodities for consumption during periods of economic development. The assurance of a food supply will permit these countries to mobilize their resources more effectively during their struggle to achieve industrial and other economic progress.

In addition initial discussions indicate that these new provisions may provide the means to open up new markets for certain farm goods and to maintain or expand U.S. dollar exports of surplus agricultural commodities through longer term commitments with other friendly countries.

Exploratory discussions indicate that friendly nations are interested in using long-term credit to buy U.S. farm goods to be supplied over a period of years.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10884⁴

AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10560, PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 10560 of September 9, 1954, as amended, providing for the administration of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, be, and it is hereby, further amended by deleting therefrom sections 1 and 5 and by inserting in lieu thereof the following sections 1 and 5, respectively:

"SECTION 1. *Department of Agriculture.* (a) Except as otherwise provided in this order, the functions conferred upon the President by Titles I and IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, are hereby delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture.

"(b) The administration on behalf of the United States of the credit provisions of agreements entered into pursuant to Title IV of the Act (including the receiving of payments under agreements) shall be performed by such Federal agency or agencies as shall hereafter be designated therefor by the President.

"SEC. 5. *Reservation of functions to the President.* There are hereby reserved to the President the functions conferred upon him by section 108 of the Act (including that section as affected by section 406 of the Act), with respect to making reports to the Congress."



THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 17, 1960.

¹ 25 Fed. Reg. 8019.

² 19 Fed. Reg. 5927; 3 CFR, 1954 Supp., p. 70.

³ 73 Stat. 610.

⁴ For an interim report on the food-for-peace program, see BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1960, p. 248.

Department Supports Request for Amendments to Mutual Security Act

Following are statements made by Under Secretary Dillon before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 15 and before the Senate Appropriations Committee on August 17.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 15

Press release 459 dated August 15

My purpose this morning is to support the request for amendments of the Mutual Security Act to:

1. Authorize the appropriation of \$500 million for a new social development program in Latin America.¹
2. Authorize the appropriation of \$100 million for further rehabilitation assistance to the Republic of Chile, and
3. Increase the existing authorization for appropriations of contingency funds by an additional \$100 million.

It is not the intention of the administration to seek appropriations during this session for either of the first two items, but appropriation of additional contingency funds is urgently needed and will be requested when authorization action permits.

I realize that you have heard from Secretary Herter the political considerations underlying these proposals.² I do not propose to dwell further on them, although I will be glad to respond to questions on this score.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 166; for an excerpt from the President's message to Congress on Aug. 8, see *ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1960, p. 314.

² Secretary Herter met with the Foreign Relations Committee in closed session on Aug. 11; for a statement made by him following the meeting, see *ibid.*, p. 316.

First, I would like to describe briefly the proposed new social development program for Latin America as we envisage it.

The General Concept

We have a special relationship with our Latin American neighbors. We are bound with them in unique and indissoluble ties of history, geography, and trade. In a political sense that special relationship has been developed over the years through the OAS [Organization of American States]. In many ways we have strengthened economic and financial relations among the American states. There is now a need to develop this special relationship in the field of social progress.

Latin America has the will and the ability to achieve the hemispheric ideal of economic development under free institutions. The new program we now propose is conceived as one to assist the Latin Americans to help themselves in achieving higher standards of life for all their people by cooperating in building the social institutions which are necessary to balanced development and the maintenance of political freedom.

In recent decades Latin America has made massive investments in basic facilities, which are prerequisite to industrialization and economic development in general. Industry has grown at a rapid, though not uniform, rate through much of the area. Agriculture has grown, though much less rapidly. But while there has been a steady rise in national incomes throughout the area, millions of underprivileged have not benefited thereby.

To Latin American economic growth the United States has made very important contributions in the form of both private and public capital. It is essential that we continue to help finance sound industrial development in Latin America in substantial amounts.

But more than this is needed if we are to achieve our objectives.

The Specific Need

The progress achieved in Latin America has been impressive, but improvement in the standard of living of the great majority of the population has been disappointingly slow. There are various reasons for this.

In the first place the rate of population growth in Latin America is very high. This means that a substantial part of the annual increase in national product must go to feed more mouths.

Second, economic growth in Latin America started from a very low base so that even large percentage increases meant only relatively small gains in absolute terms.

Third, the distribution of national incomes in many countries has been far from equitable, with the bulk of the income going to a very small portion of the population.

Fourth, the low level of both general and technical education has severely limited the productivity of the average Latin American worker.

Finally, in some countries progress has been impeded by outdated economic, legal, and social institutions. There are great differences in this regard among the various countries. But where obsolete institutions exist, the result is not only to prevent the best utilization of the country's resources but to deny to a large part of the population an opportunity to share equitably in the growth of the national product.

The great majority of the people of Latin America still live in conditions of extreme poverty—a poverty which is reflected in every aspect of their daily lives. In some ways the very process of economic development has intensified the social problem. Rapid industrialization has attracted people on a mass scale to the cities, thereby creating new needs for housing, schools, hospitals, and other public facilities. Thus far, private and public resources have not been able to meet the social requirements of this trend toward urbanization.

Housing is a formidable and intractable urban problem. Literally millions of people in the large cities of Latin America are living in overcrowded and squalid slums, without running water and without the most elementary sanitary facilities. Most residential building, whether public or private, has been beyond the means of the great bulk

of the population. Water and sewage systems in the big cities have also been outgrown. There are few cities in Latin America that have sanitary water supplies meeting reasonable health standards.

Our purpose is not to finance public housing—the requirements of that are far too great. Our purpose is to stimulate the mobilization of private capital in the other American Republics through the means which have been so successful in this country, such as building and loan associations and similar credit institutions. Secondly, we wish to encourage and assist the development of “aided self-help” housing, through which the governments assist in the acquisition of land, the prospective homeowner furnishes the labor, and we provide technical assistance and help the governments in financing the costs of materials.

While industry has grown, Latin America is still mainly agricultural. More than half of its labor force is engaged in agriculture. In some countries and for certain products agriculture is well developed, but in most countries substandard living conditions characterize the great majority of the rural population. To improve living standards in the cities without doing so on the land merely increases migration to the cities and promotes new slums.

Latin American agriculture needs more adequate agricultural extension services, improved marketing organizations, and greater availability of farm credit.

Many countries still maintain land-tenure and land-taxation systems which date from colonial times and which frequently result in the underutilization or nonutilization of large areas of potentially productive land. These antiquated systems have led to a rising tide of demands for land reform.

I referred earlier to the low level of education and its effect on productivity. There is in particular a great scarcity of qualified industrial and agricultural technicians and of trained professional personnel in government. There is a need for more technical and vocational schools, and in existing schools there is a marked shortage of physical facilities and equipment, ranging from laboratories to workshops and textbooks.

This situation has all the unfortunate effects of a vicious circle. A lack of adequate social development is reflected in inadequate education,

poor health, and social unrest. This in turn results in lower productivity, which means that fewer resources are available for social betterment.

Thirty or forty years ago the masses of the people in most of Latin America were sunk in ignorance and apathy. Since then a wider awareness of modern life in the "outside" world has produced a heightened social and political consciousness. Today the Latin American masses are awake. They intensely aspire to a better life. But unfortunately most of them see little ahead that offers them the hope of achieving it. The result is frustration and social unrest which threatens to erupt in violence and the overthrow and destruction of existing institutions even when no good alternative is at hand. Surely such conditions pose a serious threat to the continued existence of free democratic institutions in our hemisphere.

It is clear that a significant alleviation of the social conditions I have described is a task of enormous magnitude which will require large resources over a long period. It is equally clear that a major part of the burden involved in this effort must unavoidably fall on the countries of Latin America themselves. But they cannot bear the entire burden. They need our help and encouragement.

Our Proposal

What we would like to say to our Latin American friends, and for which we need the support of the Congress, is roughly as follows:

We recognize that if the peoples of Latin America are to attain the goal of higher material and cultural standards for which you are all striving, and which are eloquently set forth in Operation Pan America, social development and economic development must go hand in hand. Many of your progressive leaders have impressed on us the need for social overhead capital and have told us of the good uses to which they could and would put it. To the extent that you yourselves are willing to move ahead progressively in this field we would like to work with you and assist you. This must, of course, be a cooperative effort, and cooperation is a two-way street. But with your determination to address the problems and tasks at hand constructively, we know that the job can be done.

Because of the magnitude of the need, we believe our initial contribution to this cooperative enterprise should be not less than \$500 million. We recognize that additional amounts will be required as progress is made.

We envisage these sums being used as rapidly as effective projects or programs can be developed. We have in mind assistance in such fields as land settlement and land utilization, housing, vocational, technical, and scientific training, and basic public facilities such as potable water systems and sewage systems.

Since you must finance your external needs for economic and industrial development primarily by borrowing and since many of you have difficulties in servicing outstanding foreign exchange loans, we envisage our contribution to programs for social development as being available in the form of loans on favorable terms including repayment in local currencies. Where it is appropriate and necessary, our contribution may be made on a grant basis.

This, in substance, is what we would like to be able to say to our Latin American friends at the forthcoming meeting at Bogotá.³

Congressional Action Needed

We do not ask for appropriations for this program at this time because we wish first to develop sound and specific program proposals in concert with our Latin American neighbors which will reflect a complementary relationship between our assistance and the efforts being made by our neighbors. We hope that a firm foundation for the development of coordinated programs can be laid at Bogotá. Since such programs will require strong actions by the Latin American countries, it is essential for progress that they be convinced that the United States really means business. That is the reason we are asking for an authorization which would be a concrete indication of our interest. An authorization would give us the necessary framework within which to develop the new program.

We would expect to use our funds through a variety of existing instrumentalities, the choice to be dictated by the circumstances prevailing. We expect that the Inter-American Development Bank will rapidly assume a leading role, hopefully *the* leading role, in administering the program. This institution, which is scheduled to open its doors on October 1, has the advantage of being an inter-American multilateral institution. We are confident that it will rapidly develop into an effective instrument for cooperative effort.

³The Special Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States To Study Formulation of New Measures for Economic Development (Committee of 21) opened its third meeting at Bogotá on Sept. 5.

We also contemplate making greater use of the technical cooperation program of the ICA [International Cooperation Administration]. On a demonstration and training basis it has done a great deal to help people to help themselves and to assist governments to do so, but it has not had capital funds to help in financing the programs of agricultural, educational, and health improvement to which it has shown the way.

We would hope to include in the new social development program for Latin America the federation of The West Indies, which has achieved self-government and which will soon become fully independent—probably next year.

The timetable we contemplate looks to appropriations in the spring or summer of next year. In order to make a modest start in the meanwhile we intend to utilize the facilities of the DLF [Development Loan Fund] to the extent possible. This makes it all the more important that the Congress appropriate the full \$700 million requested for the DLF rather than only the \$550 million contained in the House appropriations bill.

The Proposal for Chile

I should like to turn now to the request for an authorization for \$100 million for use in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Chile. This task of reconstruction, as the committee knows, is the result of the recent series of earthquakes and floods which left great destruction over wide areas of the most populous regions of the country.

According to the Chilean Government's latest estimates the cost of reconstruction will amount to approximately \$450 million. We assume that the largest part of this cost will be met by the Government and people of Chile themselves, but they cannot bear the entire cost and need generous help from outside sources. We have already provided emergency help in the form of approximately \$25 million in grants from contingency funds. An Eximbank reconstruction credit of \$10 million has been extended. We are also actively exploring the use of Public Law 480 [Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act] and of other authorities to help meet Chile's needs. In addition to assistance from other countries the Government of Chile has requested a loan of \$150 million from the United States. While a part of this need may be met through other means, I am

certain that Chile will need additional resources of at least \$100 million in order to carry out its reconstruction and maintain financial stability.

Authorization action now will provide the necessary reassurance to the Government of Chile that, in undertaking the arduous and burdensome task of reconstruction, which will require substantial sacrifices by its people, and in adhering to its courageous program of economic stabilization, it can depend upon further and timely assistance from the United States.

Additional Contingency Funds

The President has requested that the authorization for appropriations for contingency funds be increased by \$100 million. The need for this additional authorization and for the additional appropriations is real and it is urgent.

The events which have occurred in Africa since the enactment of the authorizing legislation for fiscal year 1961 confront us with a dramatically altered situation and a substantial increase in the needs to be met from contingency funds.

This is not to say that the need for some use of contingency funds to assist new nations in Africa was not envisaged prior to the recent events. For example, we did foresee a need in the Congo, and that need might have been met within the original authorization. What we did not foresee was that the transition from colony to independent state would be accompanied by the violence we have witnessed and the disruption of relationships between Belgium and the Congo with such adverse effects on the interests of both countries.* The new Congo Republic needs help urgently to restore some of the fundamental conditions that will permit a more normal life to be resumed. Administrators and technicians must be trained. Minimum social services must be resumed. Transportation must become available once more, and telephones, telegraph stations, and the mails must operate throughout the country. Essential banking and other services to the business community must be performed. It is our earnest hope that stability may be restored in this troubled area and the energies of its peoples and of the United Nations may be turned to the tasks of redirecting its economy into a path of peaceful progress.

Despite the uncertainty of the situation, a care-

* For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221.

ful review of the present economic situation in the Congo makes unmistakably clear that the restoration of order, the resumption of economic activity, and the conduct of government will be totally impossible within the resources which can be presently mustered by the Congolese internally. Substantial outside help will be essential for some time. The Congo has a real potential for achieving a healthy economy, but the realization of this potential will be possible only if aid is forthcoming.

It is our view that the problems of achieving economic order and starting on the road to progress should be dealt with through the offices of the United Nations. We wish it to be clear to the Congolese that we are willing to help them in achieving stability and a start toward progress within free Congolese institutions and do not aspire to control or direct their affairs. Certainly we expect and believe that other free-world nations will wish to assist in the same way. Still other nations will offer to assist with a view to securing Communist control. It is too early to know what precise dimension or form of help will be needed by the Congo and what our fair share may be. However, it is very possible that the needs in the Congo together with the \$20 million grant of fiscal year 1961 funds for Chilean reconstruction could come close to exhausting the present contingency authorization, leaving little or nothing for the needs that experience has taught us will surely develop elsewhere.

For instance, during the present year some 16 additional African nations will gain their independence.⁵ It is our earnest hope that the transitions will be made peacefully, but in this vast and often troubled continent it would not be surprising if serious problems arose beyond the capacity of the peoples immediately concerned to resolve alone. We must be in a position to take prompt and constructive action in concert with other free nations if the need arises.

I sincerely urge that favorable action on the President's request be promptly taken. It is an essential element in assuring our nation's interest in the uncertain days that lie ahead.

Mr. Chairman, there is one additional matter that I would like to put before you at this time. Your committee has frequently expressed its interest in providing adequate flexibility in the con-

duct of the Mutual Security Program and invited suggestions for removal of any restrictive provisions which impair efficient operations.

We are confronted at this time with a situation which in our opinion gives to section 551 of the Mutual Security Act, at least in part, a restrictive character which may well impede an effective response to the emerging situations with which we are likely to be confronted during the present fiscal year.

That section, as the committee will remember, was enacted at its suggestion and was quite properly intended to prevent undue augmentation of various administrative expense accounts by use of either the transfer authority of the President under section 501 of the act or by use of the contingency funds. While we do not quarrel with the basic purpose sought by this committee in adopting this provision and believe that under normal circumstances it does not seriously interfere with efficient administration, we do believe that in the particular situation we now face it will have this effect.

Authorization and appropriation requests for administrative expenses under sections 411(b) and 411(c) were formulated some months ago, in advance of both the recent congressional action increasing pay scales for Government employees and the unforeseen acceleration of demands for assistance to meet the troublesome political and economic situations in Africa. The action taken by the House Appropriations Committee has reduced the amounts originally requested rather substantially. This action was also taken in advance of the pay legislation and the African developments. While we are hopeful that the Senate Appropriations Committee will report an appropriations bill which may have the ultimate effect of alleviating the administrative fund situation somewhat, it is not possible within the existing authorization to obtain adequate funds to cover both the pay legislation and necessary administrative expenses for the institution and execution of new programs in the African Continent which the rapidly developing situation is likely to require.

I have discussed this matter with the Bureau of the Budget and have obtained the agreement of the Director of the Bureau that we suggest to you the desirability of obtaining a modification of the authorizing legislation which would have

⁵ For a list of the political divisions of Africa, see *ibid.*, Aug. 22, 1960, p. 283.

the effect of suspending the application of the restrictive injunction in section 551 insofar as it applies to sections 411(b) and 411(c) for the duration of this fiscal year. We are not suggesting the deletion of this provision from the law but rather a measure of temporary relief. If such action is looked upon with favor by the committee, we believe that drafting of the necessary language can be quickly accomplished.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 17^a

Press release 469 dated August 17

The President in his message to the Congress of August 8 requested that there be provided at this session an additional authorization and appropriation for mutual security contingency funds in the amount of \$100 million. We believe that this additional authorization and additional appropriation is urgently needed at this session.

Day before yesterday I appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requesting that it take the most rapid action reasonably possible to obtain the authorizing legislation. Yesterday morning that committee approved this authorization. I should like to explain to you why we feel so urgently the need for an appropriation to be added to the mutual security bill now before your committee.

You will recall that the executive branch originally requested \$175 million for the contingency fund. The Congress authorized \$150 million, and this sum was recommended by the House in the appropriation bill before you. The \$175 million originally requested by the executive branch was thought by us to be barely adequate to meet contingency needs which could be foreseen at the time our program was prepared nearly a year ago and to meet the kinds of emergencies which our experience over the last several years had indicated to us would inevitably arise. Now, however, in the short space since I last met with you, the events which have occurred in Africa confront us with a situation which has dramatically altered our anticipation as to the adequacies of the present contingency fund and has shown all too plainly that a substantial increase in it is essential if the national interest of the United States in

this turbulent area and in other danger areas of the world is to be supported.

Situation in the Congo

I would not want to imply that we did not foresee prior to the recent events the need for some contingency funds to assist nations in Africa. We did, for example, foresee such a need for help to the Congo and anticipated that it might be met within the contingency fund originally requested. However, we were not able to foresee the violence and extreme disruption of established organizations which has occurred with such adverse effect on the civil administration and the economy of the new nation. The disorders of the past month have understandably resulted in the departure of large numbers of the skilled Belgians who had been key people in the administration of the Government and in the management of the public utilities, businesses, mines, plantations, and other enterprises on which the economy of the Congo depends.

It is all too apparent now that the new Congo Republic is urgently in need of immediate and substantial help to restore the most fundamental activities of the Government and of commerce to permit the resumption of even an approximation of normal life.

We believe that the United Nations is the proper channel through which to attack the problems of bringing about economic order in the Congo and setting that nation again on the road to progress. We cannot yet determine exactly how much help will be required or in what form precisely it will be needed, but it is highly important that we indicate at once our readiness to contribute our share to the work of the United Nations in assisting the Congolese to reestablish themselves on the way toward peaceful development.

This could be a job of substantial magnitude. It will be necessary to train technicians and administrators and to meet minimum requirements for social services and the furnishing of public utilities.

Transportation must be reestablished. The telephones and telegraphs must be put back in working order, and the mails which have left thousands of letters piled up undelivered must be put back in operation. The country cannot operate without essential services to the business community

^a Mr. Dillon testified in his capacity as Acting Secretary of State.

such as banking and the management of basic enterprises.

There are many unknowns in this situation but it is clear from the analysis which we have carefully made that the restoration of order, the re-establishment of economic life, and the orderly conduct of government cannot be carried out by the Congolese themselves with the resources they have available. Substantial outside help will be essential and will be needed for some period of time. We believe that the Congo will be able to achieve a healthy economy, but it is certain that it cannot do so without assistance now to reestablish itself on the road toward progress from which it was diverted by the recent disorders.

We expect that the United Nations will make all possible efforts to obtain contributions by other nations capable of contributing to the common effort to assist the people of the Congo. Nevertheless from the dimensions of the problem we know that the United Nations may require very substantial sums from us.

Urgent Need for Full Appropriations

We would not now be asking the Congress—with all the heavy pressures on it at this short session—for an additional authorization and appropriation of \$100 million for the contingency fund if we thought there would be any money to spare from the appropriations already asked. In fact it is possible to limit this new request to \$100 million only on the assumption that substantially all the appropriations now before you will be made available by your committee, by the Senate, and in the final conference with the House.

The effect of this request is, of course, to increase the total amount of appropriations requested under the Mutual Security Act by \$100 million. It is not my intention at this time to repeat the testimony regarding need for appropriations for the Mutual Security Program which I and other administration representatives have previously presented to this committee. In my last appearance before you, on June 28th,⁷ I indicated in some detail the administration's views with respect to the need for funds and with respect to the need for modification in the specific provisions of the appropriations act passed by the House of Representatives.

⁷ BULLETIN of July 18, 1960, p. 109.

Suffice it to say at this time that the events which have occurred during the weeks since I appeared before you only serve to accentuate the urgent need for full appropriation of the amounts requested.

The current situation in Africa strikingly demonstrates the necessity of appropriating the full amount authorized for special assistance. It is this account which provides the funds for programs of economic assistance to Africa. Without the full appropriation anything approaching an adequate response to the requirements of this area will be extremely difficult.

Requirements for technical assistance programs in Africa are also sure to mount as a result of many African nations' achieving independence more rapidly than has been anticipated.

The belligerent and provocative attitude of the Soviet Union in its numerous threatening utterances underscores the importance of adequate defense support appropriations to assure maintenance of adequate defensive forces in our allied nations.

The need for an immediate start on the problems of social development in Latin America makes it all the more important that the full \$700 million requested for the DLF be provided.

In essence it is in the common national interest to demonstrate clearly that even during moments of great domestic political contest our nation stands united in its firm determination to resist the expansion of aggressive communism and to offer a helping hand to the less fortunate peoples of the world.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 1st Session

The U.S. Government and the Future of International Medical Research. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. International Health Study, pursuant to S. Res. 347, 85th Cong., S. Res. 42, and S. Res. 255, 86th Cong. Part I (includes transcript of conferences in Europe, November-December 1958). July 9 and 16, 1959. 310 pp.

Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean. Hearing before the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part V. Testimony of Hon. Spruille Braden. July 17, 1959. 62 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

Adjourned During August 1960

In Session as of August 31, 1960

Lists of meetings adjourned and those currently in session now appear in the third issue of the Bulletin each month.

Scheduled September 1 Through November 30, 1960

5th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations.	Geneva	Sept. 1-
GATT Tariff Negotiations Committee	Geneva.	Sept. 1-
Ad Hoc Committee of U.N. General Assembly To Consider General Questions of Transmission of Information.	New York	Sept. 2-
Information Officers of Colombo Plan Countries: 2d Conference	Bangkok	Sept. 5-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 2d Session.	Geneva.	Sept. 5-
COAS Special Committee To Study Formulation of New Measures for Economic Development: 3d Meeting.	Bogotá	Sept. 5-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Mechanization of Agriculture	Geneva.	Sept. 5-
International Scientific Radio Union: 13th General Assembly	London.	Sept. 5-
ICAO Legal Committee: 13th Session.	Montreal	Sept. 6-
FAO Regional Conference for the Near East	Tehran	Sept. 12-
GATT Working Party on Market Disruption	Geneva.	Sept. 12-
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain: 8th Congress	Buenos Aires	Sept. 12-
UNICEF Committee on Administrative Budget	New York	Sept. 12-
Inter-American Travel Congress: 3d Meeting of Technical Committee of Experts on Travel Plant.	Washington.	Sept. 12-
IAEA Board of Governors: 18th Session.	Vienna	Sept. 13-
ITU CCIR Study Group V Working Party	London.	Sept. 13-
Inter-American Social Security Conference: 6th General Assembly.	México, D.F.	Sept. 14-
WMO Interregional Seminar on Tropical Agrometeorology.	Maracay, Venezuela	Sept. 15-
U.N. ECAFE Highway Subcommittee and Highway Transport Subcommittee: 5th Session.	Katmandu, Nepal	Sept. 15-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 48th Meeting	Moscow.	Sept. 19-
International Rubber Study Group: 15th Meeting	Kuala Lumpur, Malaya	Sept. 19-
GATT Council of Representatives	Geneva.	Sept. 19-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee: 51st Session	Geneva.	Sept. 19-
IAEA General Conference: 4th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 20-
U.N. General Assembly: 15th Session	New York	Sept. 20-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, and International Finance Corporation: Annual Meetings of Boards of Governors.	Washington.	Sept. 26-
ILO Ad Hoc Meeting on Civil Aviation	Geneva.	Sept. 26-
6th International Technical Conference on Lighthouses and Other Aids to Navigation.	Washington.	Sept. 26-
WMO Regional Association VI (Europe): 3d Session	Madrid.	Sept. 26-
GATT Committee III on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva.	Sept. 26-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 8th Session.	Geneva.	Sept. 26-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning: 6th Session.	Bangkok	Sept. 27-
Interparliamentary Union: 49th Conference	Tokyo	Sept. 29-
U.N. Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation: 8th Session.	Geneva.	September
GATT Article XXII Consultations With Italy	Geneva.	September
U.N. ECE Senior Economic Advisers: Preparatory Meeting	Geneva.	September
Development Assistance Group: 3d Meeting	Washington.	Oct. 3-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 18, 1960. Following is a list of abbreviations: CCIR, Comité consultatif international des radio communications; CCITT, Comité consultatif international télégraphique et téléphonique; COAS, Council of the Organization of American States; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OAS, Organization of American States; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—Continued

Scheduled September 1 Through November 30, 1960—Continued

GATT Committee II on Expansion of International Trade	Geneva	Oct. 3-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee	Geneva	Oct. 3-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 18th Session	Geneva	Oct. 3-
International Committee of Weights and Measures	Paris	Oct. 4-
The Hague Conference on Private International Law: 9th Session.	The Hague	Oct. 5-
Executive Committee of the Program of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 4th Session.	Geneva	Oct. 5-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 3d Meeting of Technical Committee of Experts on Tourist Travel Promotion.	México, D.F.	Oct. 6-
International Criminal Police Organization: 29th General Assembly.	Washington	Oct. 10-
FAO Regional Conference for Europe: 12th Session	Rome	Oct. 10-
U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade: 9th Session	Geneva	Oct. 10-
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Foodstuffs.	Geneva	Oct. 11-
IAEA Symposium on Inelastic Scattering of Neutrons in Solids and Liquids.	Vienna	Oct. 11-
International General Conference on Weights and Measures	Paris	Oct. 11-
10th Pan American Railway Congress	Rio de Janeiro	Oct. 12-
	São Paulo	Oct. 20-
	Brasília	Oct. 27-
	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Oct. 13-
	New York	Oct. 13-
	Rome	Oct. 17-
	Geneva	Oct. 17-
	Tokyo	Oct. 17-
	Geneva	Oct. 17-
	Montreal	Oct. 18-
	Abidjan, Ivory Coast	Oct. 20-
	Vancouver	Oct. 24-
	Geneva	Oct. 24-
	Buenos Aires	Oct. 24-
South Pacific Commission: 21st Session		
U.N. Special Fund Pledging Conference		
FAO Council: 34th Session		
GATT Balance-of-Payments Consultations		
ECAFE/FAO Far East Pulp and Paper Conference		
U.N. ECE Consultation on Agricultural Production Projections		
ICAO Airworthiness Committee: 4th Session		
FAO Technical Meeting on Coffee Production		
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 7th Meeting		
ILO Permanent Agriculture Committee		
Inter-American Travel Congresses: 3d Meeting of Technical Committee of Experts on Removal of Travel Barriers.		
WHO Executive Board: 26th Session	Geneva	Oct. 25-
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia ("Colombo Plan"): 12th Meeting: Officials Meeting	Tokyo	Oct. 31-
Ministerial Meeting	Tokyo	Nov. 14-
GATT Contracting Parties: 17th Session	Geneva	Oct. 31-
Inter-American Travel Congresses: Permanent Executive Committee.	Buenos Aires	Oct. 31-
FAO Advisory Campaign Committee on Freedom From Hunger	Rome	October
FAO Group on Cocoa: Executive and Statistical Committees	Rome	October
Pan American Institute of Geography and History: 7th General Assembly:		
9th Pan American Consultation on Cartography	Lima	October
6th Pan American Consultation on Geography	Lima	October
5th Pan American Consultation on History	Lima	October
IA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: 3d Meeting.	Rio de Janeiro	October
IMCO Subcommittee on Unification of Maritime Tonnage Measurement.	London	October
10th U.N. Technical Assistance Conference	New York	October
UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 5th Session	London	October
FAO/OAS/ILO Technical Meeting on Rural Cooperatives for the Northern Zone of Latin America.	San Juan	Nov. 1-
1st FAO Regional Conference for Africa	Lagos, Nigeria	Nov. 3-
ILO Inter-American Study Conference on Labor-Management Relations.	Montevideo	Nov. 3-
UNESCO Executive Board: 57th Session		
ILO Governing Body: 147th Session	Paris	Nov. 7-
FAO International Rice Commission: 7th Session	Geneva	Nov. 8-
International Wheat Council: 31st Session	Salgon	Nov. 9-
FAO International Rice Commission: Working Party on Engineering Aspects of Rice Production, Storage, and Processing.	London	Nov. 9-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 2d Session.	Salgon	Nov. 10-
U.N. Scientific Advisory Committee	Bangkok	Nov. 10-
ICAO Visual Aids Panel: 1st Meeting	Geneva	Nov. 11-
6th Meeting of Experts of American Central Banks	Montreal	Nov. 14-
UNESCO General Conference: 11th Session	Guatemala	Nov. 14-
5th FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East	Paris	Nov. 14-
	Salgon	Nov. 21-

ILO Asian Advisory Committee: 10th Session	Geneva	Nov. 21-
ICEM Executive Committee: 16th Session	Geneva	Nov. 21-
ITU CCITT: 2d Plenary Assembly	New Delhi	Nov. 21-
U.N. ECE Working Party on Steel Statistics and <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meetings of Experts on Productivity and Automation.	Geneva	Nov. 21-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Housing and Building Materials: 6th Meeting.	Bangkok	Nov. 22-
U.N. ECF Committee on Agricultural Problems: 12th Session . .	Geneva	Nov. 28-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: <i>Ad Hoc</i> Working Party on Classification of Inland Waterways.	Bangkok	November

U.N. Disarmament Commission Recommends Earliest Possible Continuation of Disarmament Negotiations

Following are statements made by Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, in the U.N. Disarmament Commission on August 16, 17, and 18, together with the text of a resolution adopted unanimously by the Commission on August 18 and a five-power report transmitted to the Commission on August 12.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 16

U.S./U.N. press release 3457

The United States appreciates the willingness of the members of the Disarmament Commission to hold this meeting at the request of the United States.¹

There should, we think, be no misunderstanding as to why the United States requested this meeting. We very much want negotiations on disarmament to resume. But we do not call this meeting for the purpose of conducting negotiations on disarmament here and now in this Commission. The United States knows that the Soviet Union has said that it does not wish to negotiate at present. There were no successful negotiations at Geneva, and, unless the Soviet attitude changes, there will be no negotiations either here in the Disarmament Commission or next month in the General Assembly.

Why, then, did the United States ask for this meeting? For several reasons: It is because we thought the Commission had a right to be informed about the Geneva talks, and it is because

we wanted to present our case to the United Nations and to world opinion. We wanted also to present it to the Soviet Union.

On June 27 the United States Representative at Geneva [Fredrick M. Eaton] was about to present the new United States position. At this point the Soviet Union walked out of the meeting.² There were members then who thought at that time that we should have a meeting of this Commission. The Secretary-General thought that such a meeting was inadvisable at that time. We agreed, and we believed that we should make an appeal by ourselves to the Soviet Union before resorting to the Commission. We did this on July 2,³ but our overture did not bring a resumption of talks.

We think we have a good proposal, Mr. Chairman. What I am going to say today not only restates the proposal which we made at Geneva but it adds something to it which we think is very significant. We do not, of course, insist that the Soviet Union must agree to this; but we do think that the Soviet Union ought to hear it.

We also think that world opinion ought to hear it and ought to hear it in a forum like this, which is devoted exclusively to disarmament, and not merely hear it in the General Assembly, where it is only one of more than 80 other issues.

Now those are some of the reasons why we called this meeting. But finally—the final reason for which the United States called this meeting is because the United States believes that the great-

¹ For background, including the text of the U.S. proposals of June 27, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 88.

² *Ibid.*

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1960, p. 253.

est service that the Disarmament Commission could render would be to use its great influence to have disarmament negotiations resumed without delay. They are now stalled. What we ask of this Commission is to do all in its power to get the talks going again.

Now that, Mr. Chairman, is what I want to say as to why we called this meeting.

The members of the Commission have before them the most important papers presented in the Ten-Nation Committee, including the United States proposal of June 27, which was presented on the same day that the Soviet Union walked out. It is contained in document DC/154, and I urge members of the Commission to study this paper. It proposes a number of concrete measures of disarmament. I mention this because Soviet documents circulated in the Commission assert time and again that the United States and its allies have proposed "no disarmament measures whatever." As you can see from these documents, that charge is entirely incorrect.

Historical Background

Mr. Chairman, the quest for disarmament is long and difficult. At difficult moments such as this we must keep a clear view of our fundamental goals. And they are these:

We want a world at peace: not the fearful peace of an armed truce but a genuine peace which rests on trust among nations.

We want a world in which all nations and peoples, both great and small, are secure from aggression and can shape their destinies in freedom.

We want a world of open societies in which peoples are no longer separated by barriers of official secrecy and official hatred.

We want a world whose rich resources and spectacular scientific prowess will be used not for conquest, nor for defense against the fear of conquest, but only for the welfare of mankind and the growth of the human spirit.

We want world peace under law which is inspired by justice.

And we want the kind of disarmament—which is both fair and fully verified—which will help the world toward those great ends.

The United States has pursued such a disarmament policy for many years. We have made far-reaching, concrete proposals, of which I shall cite only a few.

1. In 1946, when the United States alone possessed atomic weapons, we proposed in the Baruch Plan complete international control of atomic energy, which would have meant giving up all national atomic armaments. This proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union. If they had accepted it, how different the world might be today!

2. In 1953 President Eisenhower, in his address to the General Assembly on atoms for peace,⁴ urged the Soviet Union to make with us joint contributions to an international pool of nuclear materials, thereby reducing our atomic weapons stockpiles. This proposal has never been agreed to by the Soviet Union.

3. In July 1955, at the Geneva summit meeting, President Eisenhower proposed that the Soviet Union join with the United States in mutual aerial inspection to guard against surprise attack.⁵ This plan held great possibilities for peace, security, and disarmament. But it too was rejected by the Soviet Union.

4. In March 1956 President Eisenhower proposed that the Soviet Union join us in an inspected program to end all production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and to reduce existing weapons stockpiles through gradual contributions to stockpiles under international control.⁶ This too met with no response.

5. In August 1957 the United States and its allies proposed a system to prevent the use of outer space for military purposes.⁷ We have repeated this proposal several times and spelled it out in more detail in the meetings of the Ten-Nation Committee. The Soviet Union has not been willing to discuss this vital step.

6. In April 1958, in the Security Council, we responded to Soviet anxiety about bomber flights in the Arctic region by proposing a system of ground and air inspection against surprise attack.⁸ Our resolution received 10 votes but was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Only in one field related to disarmament, that is, the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, have we had any real promise of success. Progress there is slow, but the discussions are going on. This

⁴ *Ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1957, p. 451.

⁸ *Ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 816.

negotiation suggests what might be accomplished if the same patient and constructive efforts could be applied to other definite, concrete parts of the disarmament problem.

That, Mr. Chairman, is the historical background for what I am now going to say.

Work of Ten-Nation Committee

Against this background let me now take up the work of the Ten-Nation Committee. Whatever setbacks may have occurred, I think I have already said enough to show that the United States and its allies are hard to discourage and are determined to continue the search for a sound agreement. What I shall now say will therefore not be said in any spirit of recrimination but in a spirit of seeking the truth—which is the only basis for progress.

The United States brought to the 10-nation talks certain basic convictions born of experience. These can be stated as follows:

A sound disarmament plan must be broad enough in scope to take in all kinds of armaments and armed forces.

It must be concrete and realistic, tied to the growing complexity of modern weapons.

It must move step by step, always under adequate control, toward the ultimate goal of complete and general disarmament under effective international control.

It must be so fair at every stage that no country will gain a military advantage over another country at any stage.

It must include agreed procedures for settling international disputes peacefully, in accordance with the charter of the United Nations, after complete and general disarmament has been achieved.

Finally, before nations can proceed confidently with great reductions in weapons, a sound disarmament plan must reduce the enormous uncertainties and risks which exist today, which present a real danger of war by accident or miscalculation and which give a great impulse to the arms race.

We know what contributes to these risks and uncertainties. There is the danger of surprise attack prepared in secret; the threat of nuclear attack from outer space; the constantly mounting stockpiles of nuclear weapons; and the vast size of armed forces and nonnuclear weapons stocks. Those are the danger points which would be attacked in Stage One of the plan which we proposed

on June 27. This first stage is designed to build safeguards against surprise attack, to stop further nuclear weapons production, to cut down existing nuclear weapons stocks, to start cutting nonnuclear armaments and armed forces, and to take the first steps to prevent the militarizing of outer space.

When those steps are completed at the end of Stage One, we believe we will have a much more stable situation in which nations can move confidently toward general and complete disarmament—the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the reduction of national armed forces to levels required only for internal security and to meet obligations under the United Nations Charter.

The disarmament plan put forward in Geneva by the Western Powers on March 14⁹ and that proposed by the United States on June 27 were both designed to accomplish these aims. You have already received copies of the June 27 proposal. We believe—and the other Western Powers also believe—that it forms an entirely reasonable and practical basis for negotiations and for the conclusions of agreements which would lead to our ultimate goal.

Western Three-Stage Plan

This proposal is of course not control without disarmament, as has been alleged by the Soviet Union. It contains far-reaching, concrete disarmament measures. It is realistic. It envisages disarmament as proceeding through three stages, each containing measures which are phased, safeguarded, and fair to all. Each of these stages would be carried out within an agreed and definite time period under the supervision of an international disarmament control organization within the framework of the United Nations. It also reflects our conviction that in the process of disarmament no state should obtain military advantage by reason of this process over another.

The *first stage*, to be embodied in a treaty by the 10 nations involved in the conference, includes initial and controllable measures which can and should be undertaken without delay for these reasons: to preclude expansion of armed forces and of weapons stockpiles; to reduce armed forces and armaments; to ban the launching of weapons of mass destruction into outer space; and to provide against surprise attack. These measures

⁹ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1960, p. 511.

would do much to reduce the risk of wars and to bring about the increase in confidence so necessary for achievement of disarmament. We suggested that while we were negotiating this treaty arrangements should be made for technical studies to work out necessary control arrangements. One such study would concern the measures necessary to verify control over and elimination of agreed categories of nuclear delivery systems. Now that is what I want to say about the first stage.

The *second stage* of the United States proposal envisaged further reduction of armed forces, reduction in armaments of all kinds, and destruction or conversion to peaceful use of the discarded weapons. Agreement would be reached on a reduction in expenditures for military purposes and on an international peace force, to be progressively established within the United Nations to preserve world peace when general and complete disarmament has been achieved.

That gets us to the *final stage*, and the final stage would see the reduction of military establishments to levels required only for the purposes of maintaining internal order, of insuring personal security of citizens, and of providing agreed contingents to the international peace force. There would be a commensurate reduction of military expenditures, and no manufacture of armaments would be permitted except for supplying agreed-upon weapons to the international peace force and to the remaining national contingents.

We proposed that after reaching agreement on the first stage of the program an agreed treaty on the second and third stages of the program be prepared for submission to a world disarmament conference. There we hope that all states would accede to the treaties.

Now, Mr. Chairman, that plan of June 27 is so full of concrete measures for the elimination and destruction of weapons and the demobilization of armed forces that it is really astonishing to read in the Soviet Union's letter of July 31, addressed to you as Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, that our proposal of June 27 "makes no provision for any real disarmament measures whatever but reduces the whole issue to the institution of control without disarmament—i.e., of measures to legalize an extensive system of espionage on an international scale." That, and other recent Soviet statements like it, are so obviously contrary to ascertainable facts which I have just

cited—and which you can easily confirm yourselves—that I cannot really think that the Soviet officials who wrote that letter really believe their own statements.

And as for calling inspection espionage, this seems once again to show the Soviet obsession with secrecy which so hampers all realistic efforts toward disarmament. The facts are clear. The United States does not propose, and has never proposed, a single measure of inspection on Soviet territory which we are not prepared to accept also on United States territory. When the Soviet representatives talk that way the world must ask: "What have you got to hide?"

The three-stage plan which we proposed on June 27 is not a short process. It cannot be exactly defined as regards time. But its goal is clear, its methods are clear, and its urgent initial steps can be agreed upon promptly. When those steps are taken they will themselves generate the confidence born of experience and success, which is now so sorely lacking and which is so necessary for further progress. Ours is no mere collection of cloudy principles. It is concrete and definite, and it can be done.

Concessions to Soviet Views

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, our proposal of June 27 made genuine concessions to Soviet views. I must emphasize this because the Soviet representatives have done rather their best to create the opposite impression. For instance, Mr. Gromyko [Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs] in his letter to the Secretary-General, dated the very same day, June 27—which he sent without even waiting to hear the proposal which he knew we were about to make—said: "The United States and the other Western Powers . . . failed to take a single step to meet the Soviet Union's position"—et cetera, et cetera. And that was made before he had been willing to hear our statement.

Here is a list of the concessions to the Soviet view which we embodied in our proposal of June 27:

1. We included a definition of general and complete disarmament, in terms not very different from the Soviet definition.
2. We accepted the principle that each measure of a disarmament program would be carried out in an agreed and strictly defined period of time.

3. We adopted a provision based on the Soviet plan of June 2 for a review by the Security Council of the progress of disarmament at the end of each disarmament stage. This is something they wanted.

4. We agreed to a figure of 1.7 million for the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. and the United States in the second stage of the disarmament program. That is a real thing to agree to.

5. We accepted a technical examination of measures necessary to control, reduce, and eliminate agreed categories of nuclear delivery systems, including missiles, aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and artillery. This concerned a measure to which the Soviet Union had given first place in its disarmament program. And this, Mr. Chairman, we accepted.

I think that is evidence of our real will to reach an agreement. In fact, after the Ten-Nation Committee reconvened on June 7, following the collapse of the summit meeting, we immediately made clear our interest in the new Soviet paper of June 2. The United States representative, Mr. Eaton, sought clarification from Mr. [Valerian] Zorin on several points, then returned to Washington for consultations. Our delegation made it clear to the Soviet representative that these consultations were intended to facilitate progress in the negotiations. The very morning that Mr. Eaton returned to Geneva, that is, June 27, he informed Mr. Zorin that a new United States proposal would be made within a few days, after consultation with our allies.

But the Soviet delegation and its associates evidently had other purposes. That same day, June 27, 20 days after making their last proposal and almost on the eve of receiving our reply, they made a series of speeches bitterly attacking the motives of the Allied nations. When the Allied delegates sought the floor, the Polish representative, who happened to be in the chair that day, arbitrarily refused them the right to speak—which is certainly a flagrant breach of parliamentary procedure and of common courtesy. In spite of an attempt by the Soviet side to end the conference then and there, it continued under the chairmanship of the United Kingdom representative and the United States proposal was submitted. By that time, of course, they had gone.

In the light of that performance, Mr. Chairman, it is hard to understand Mr. Khrushchev's state-

ment, both in his letter of June 27 to President Eisenhower¹⁰ and in his interview with *Pravda* which has been circulated to the Commission, that the United States and the other Allied nations do not wish to conduct serious negotiations on disarmament. That was the reason he gave for withdrawing from the Geneva talks. But nothing, we say, could be further from the truth.

It was, in fact, the Soviet Union which presented an "all or nothing" proposition to the Ten-Nation Committee. The Soviet spokesmen said in effect that we must accept their plan for general and complete disarmament, with all its vague language, or there would be no disarmament. They insisted that a treaty covering the whole process of complete disarmament should be signed before inspection arrangements could be worked out—in a word, that we should buy a pig in a poke. Then they walked out when we had had less than a month to consider and react to their proposal.

Now, that is what happened. That is not a policy of negotiation. It is more like a policy of threats and ultimatums.

Dangers of Delay

Mr. Chairman, the United States refuses to be discouraged. But we should lose no time in resuming disarmament discussions on some basis which promises progress. Modern armaments are constantly growing more complex and more difficult to control or to abolish with certainty. We must not wait, as the Soviet Union seems to want us to do, while the problems grow more difficult and more dangerous.

Let me give one example of the dangers of delay.

The Allied nations have proposed an early agreement to ban the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. If we do not grasp this opportunity now, the day is sure to come before very long when the disarmament negotiations will have passed another point of no return—just as we did a decade ago in the case of detection of concealed nuclear weapons. If that happens in the case of outer-space weapons, we will be threatened by weapons and vehicles which can fly deep into space and by bombardment satellites hovering above us against the background of stars and planets. Now that is not science fiction. It is a technical certainty

¹⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, July 15, 1960, p. 92.

unless the nations which can launch such vehicles soon cooperate to prevent it.

Once again we seem to stand at a fork in the road. On one side is the road either to war or, at best, to a growing burden of ever more complex and powerful weapons, with all the fear and tensions and real dangers that such a situation implies.

On the other side is the road to disarmament. It begins with first steps which can reduce the fear of accidental war or surprise attack. It leads to the steady growth of confidence and finally to an age when man can at last turn to humane works worthy of his genius.

In the Ten-Nation Committee it seemed that we had made a good beginning toward finding that road. It is a forum which was quite satisfactory to the Soviet Union when it was established last year. We believe that negotiations in that Committee should be resumed at once.

Two New Proposals

Mr. Chairman, as proof of the serious purpose with which the United States requests the renewal of negotiations, I am authorized to present today to the Soviet Union two new proposals, and I do so now.

The first proposal relates to ending the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In the past the United States has proposed that, when this production was cut off, agreed quantities of fissionable materials be transferred, under international supervision, from existing accumulated weapons stocks to peaceful uses, thereby reducing directly the number of nuclear weapons now in national arsenals.

The United States is ready to carry out this proposal on a reciprocal basis with the Soviet Union. In doing so the United States is ready, also on a reciprocal basis, to set aside 30,000 kilograms of weapons-grade U-235 as the amount which the United States and the Soviet Union would each initially transfer.

Let me say by way of explanation that 30,000 kilograms of weapons-grade U-235, if used in our modern nuclear weapons, would generate an explosive force well over 1,000 times greater than that of all the high-explosive bombs dropped by all the warring powers during World War II. That is what that means.

I will repeat that because I think it is impressive.

Thirty thousand kilograms of weapons-grade U-235, if used in our modern nuclear weapons, would generate an explosive force well over 1,000 times greater than that of all the high-explosive bombs dropped by all the warring powers during World War II.

The transfer of that amount to peaceful uses by the United States, and an equal amount by the Soviet Union, would mean an immediate and sizable reduction in the nuclear threat. It would be a real and practical measure of disarmament. And I put that today before the Soviet Union.

If the Soviet Union is not prepared to join in a plan of this kind, I am authorized to propose another proposal, a second direction in which we might now make a start. The United States is ready to join the Soviet Union in halting by successive steps the production of fissionable materials for weapons use. We are prepared to shut down, one by one, under international inspection, our major plants producing enriched uranium and plutonium, if the Soviet Union will shut down equivalent facilities. We are prepared to do this now—with no delay at all.

The United States is eager to renew negotiations on concrete disarmament measures such as these. We are willing to hear new Soviet proposals.

If we do not act now and act effectively, history may leave us behind—all of us here in this room and the countries we represent. The peoples of the world demand that this tragedy should not be allowed to happen.

Whatever issues of philosophy or recent history may lie between us, the United States and the Soviet Union share the heaviest responsibility for solving the problem of armaments. We must work together to solve it. We again invite the Soviet Union to work with us—not with the object of one of us putting the other in the wrong and thus winning a small victory of some sort. Victories of that kind are likely to prove hollow very soon. Let us rather join to win a common victory for the future of mankind.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 17

U.S./U.N. press release 3458

My statement is a statement of clarification. It is not with regard to the statement that I made; it

is with regard to the statement that one of the members of the Commission has made.

One of the members said yesterday, in speaking of the new proposals which I put forward, that: "The proposals . . . imply primarily an invitation for future manufacture of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. What is more important, they do not imply the destruction of stockpiles at present existing."

This represents such a fundamental misunderstanding of the new United States proposal that it is important for me to make an early clarification.

Two brief points I think will suffice:

1. Since all future manufacture of fissionable materials would go to peaceful uses only—and *not* into weapons—it is obviously incorrect to characterize our proposal as an invitation to make more weapons. I repeat, under our proposal all plants producing enriched uranium and plutonium would either be completely shut down or their output earmarked exclusively for peaceful purposes. That evidently was not understood.

2. Our proposal was for the transfer of weapons-grade U-235—30,000 kilograms of it. For our part, the only place from which this material could come is from present weapons stockpiles. Therefore this transfer would directly and immediately result in the dismantling of sizable numbers of presently existing weapons.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 18

U.S./U.N. press release 3459

The United States asked for these meetings of the Disarmament Commission, and we wish to thank all members for attending and taking such assiduous part in the proceedings.

We hoped that the United Nations Disarmament Commission would take the view that this disarmament matter is an urgent matter and that negotiations should be resumed at the earliest possible moment.

We felt sure that any United Nations body must always be in favor of the resumption of negotiations on disarmament. Not only have we not been disappointed; we have accomplished everything and a little more than we desired.

We are very grateful indeed to all of you, and we thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having presided in your usual excellent manner.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹¹

The Disarmament Commission,

Recalling its resolution of 10 September 1959, welcoming the resumption of disarmament negotiations and expressing the hope that such negotiations would provide a useful basis for the consideration of disarmament in the United Nations,

Noting with regret that these negotiations have not yielded the expected positive results,

Reaffirming the continuing and ultimate responsibility of the United Nations in the field of disarmament,

Taking into account resolution 1378 (XIV) adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on 20 November 1959,

Recommends to the fifteenth session of the General Assembly to give earnest consideration to the question of disarmament;

Considers it necessary and recommends that in view of the urgency of the problem continued efforts be made for the earliest possible continuation of international negotiations to achieve a constructive solution of the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

Recommends to the General Assembly that the Disarmament Commission as set up in General Assembly resolution 1252 (XIII) should continue in being and be convened whenever deemed necessary.

TEXT OF FIVE-POWER REPORT

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations announced on August 12 (U.S./U.N. press release 3455) that the representatives of Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States had transmitted on that date to Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo, Chairman of the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the following report to the Commission prepared by their Governments.¹²

1. In establishing the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1959, the responsibility of the UN in the field of disarmament was recognized. The nations concerned pledged to keep the UN Disarmament Commission informed of the progress of its deliberations. The Governments of Canada, France, Italy, the U.K. and the U.S., therefore, wish to inform the members of the Disarmament Commission of the events connected with the disruption of the work of the conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a conference to which they attached great importance.

¹¹ U.N. doc. DC/182/Corr. 1; adopted unanimously by the Disarmament Commission on Aug. 18.

¹² For text of the official report made to the Secretary of State by the U.S. delegation to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, see BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1960, p. 267.

2. The conference of the Ten-Nation Committee convened on March 15, 1960 in Geneva and recessed during the period of April 29 through June 7. During the first part of the proceedings (March 15-April 29), a plan submitted by the allied delegations on March 16 was before the conference. The Soviet delegation rejected this plan and insisted that the discussions be based on the general concepts advanced by the Soviet Union at the United Nations General Assembly in September 1959.³³ The goal of general and complete disarmament was common to both plans; what was at issue was the question of how to reach that goal. The readily attainable measures set forth in the first two stages of the Western plan of March 16 would have served as practical and constructive steps toward the disbandment of the armed forces of all states and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form whatsoever.

3. On June 7, the Soviet delegation and its associates laid before the conference a revision of its disarmament plan. Just three weeks later, on June 28, the Western delegations were obliged to adjourn the conference. The delegations of the Eastern European countries, led by the Soviet Union, walked out of the conference room on June 27, without warning. It will be seen from the available verbatim record of this meeting that the Chairman at that time, the Polish delegate, denied the repeated requests of the Western delegates for the right to speak in disregard of all accepted rules of procedure and practice and, without authority to do so, attempted to declare the conference ended.

4. Despite this action on the part of the Soviet delegation and its associates, the Western Powers, being intensely aware of the seriousness of the disarmament question, instructed their delegations to remain in Geneva to be available to resume negotiations. The five Western Powers each despatched communications to the Soviet Government, asking that it reconsider its decision to break off the disarmament negotiations. Thus far, there has been no indication that the Soviet Union is prepared to resume negotiations. Nevertheless, the Western nations are determined to persevere in their efforts toward the successful outcome of disarmament negotiations, in the belief that such negotiations must not be allowed to come to an end. Although a serious difference of view prevailed in the Ten-Nation Committee, the Western nations believe it is imperative to carry out further discussion which may permit a reconciliation of differences, which could, in turn, lead to important agreements.

5. In abruptly breaking off negotiations, the Soviet Union and its associates have gone against the wishes of the General Assembly, as expressed in Resolution 1378 (XIV) which called upon "Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem," and the wishes of the Security Council, as expressed in the Resolution of May 27, which requested the "Governments concerned to continue their efforts to achieve a constructive solution of the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control in accordance

with Resolution 1378 (XIV) of the General Assembly." It is difficult to explain the reasons for this decision in view of repeated avowals on the part of the USSR of the importance of disarmament negotiations.

6. The proposals advanced by the Western Powers in the negotiations contained a comprehensive program consisting of concrete measures which if negotiated and put into effect would lead to general, complete and verified disarmament. Just prior to the Soviet bloc's walkout, the U.S. Representative informed the Soviet Delegate that further constructive proposals were soon to be made. These facts refute the Soviet contention that the Western Powers were not willing to negotiate. If the USSR had remained at the table, the Ten-Nation conference could have produced important agreement in the areas of conventional and nuclear arms reduction, surprise attack and outer space controls. This would have resulted in strengthening world security without creating military advantages for any party, and would have begun the advance toward the goal of general, complete and verified disarmament.

7. The desire of the Western Powers to make progress was, however, frustrated by the rigid attitude of the Soviet Union. The behavior of the Soviet delegate and his associates implied that the entire Soviet program of disarmament had to be accepted or there would be no disarmament at all. Such a position is contrary to the spirit and purpose of any meaningful negotiations and indeed does not accord with the Soviet Government's own statement, in its most recent proposals on disarmament, that "it was prepared to take into account any constructive considerations and desires of other participants in the negotiations, that will contribute to the achievement of an agreement on the practical implementation of disarmament." Throughout the short period of just three weeks between the submission of the new Soviet proposals and the withdrawal of the East European delegations those delegations displayed reluctance and impatience over reasonable requests for elaboration of their proposals. It could hardly be expected that the problem of disarmament could be solved in so short a time.

8. In their abrupt break-off of the negotiations, the Soviet delegation and its associates did not cooperate in fulfilling the obligation to bring the records of the proceedings of the conference to the UN Disarmament Commission. Consequently, at the final meeting on June 28, which was not attended by the Soviets and East European delegations, the Western delegations gave authorization for this to be done. The present report is an introductory explanation of these records.

9. In conclusion, the Governments of Canada, France, Italy, the U.K. and the U.S. reaffirm that they are prepared to direct their delegations to return to Geneva at any time the Soviet Union is prepared to resume these important discussions in the Ten-Nation Committee. The Western nations hope that the Disarmament Commission will be instrumental in reactivating disarmament negotiations without delay, and pledge to the Commission their earnest cooperation in its deliberations.

³³ U.N. doc. A/4219.

Security Council Considers New Difficulties in Congo

STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE¹

The decisions which we must take today follow from those which we took on two previous occasions.² At that time the United Nations decided to assist in the establishment of order in the Congo, on the one hand, and, on the other, to achieve the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the whole country. The United Nations was on the right track then; it is on the right track now.

Since our fateful decisions of July 14 and July 22, what has happened?

First, the United Nations, with the Secretary-General leading the way, has so far transported 11,500 troops to the Congo and has deployed them to points in five of the six provinces. We commend the Secretary-General for his efficiency, his drive, and his courage.

Second, all Belgian troops from five of the six provinces have now been moved to their home base of Kitona on the western edge of the Congo. Fifteen hundred have actually left for Belgium, and we have Belgian assurances that this number is steadily growing.

Third, the gratifying speed and effectiveness of the United Nations action has come up against a thorny but, we believe, temporary obstacle in Katanga. The Secretary-General has now quite properly come back to the Security Council for support and instructions in completing his task.

This brings us squarely to the problem of Katanga. The Secretary-General in his latest report to the Council³ has wisely separated the internal political aspect of this problem, which lies *outside* the concern of the United Nations, from the task of the United Nations, which is to insure peace and security and thereby the withdrawal of Belgian troops.

¹ Made in the U.N. Security Council on Aug. 8 (U.S./U.N. press release 3454). Ambassador Lodge is U.S. Representative in the Security Council.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159, and Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221.

³ U.N. doc. S/4417 and Corr. 1, Add. 1 Rev. 1, and Add. 2.

The task of the Council today is to help the Secretary-General get on with his job in Katanga. To do this we must reinforce the Secretary-General's view that the United Nations cannot be drawn into the political struggle between Prime Minister [Patrice] Lumumba and Provincial President [Moise] Tshombe.

The United Nations Charter and United Nations practice for 15 years emphasize that the United Nations cannot be involved in internal political disputes.

Let me now speak of the presence of Belgian troops in Katanga. We understand the motives which led Belgium some time ago to reinforce her troops in the Congo, which includes Katanga. But the presence of those troops became a source of friction between Belgium and the Congo. The Belgian Government, therefore, pulled back its troops as United Nations forces came into position.

This process should now be extended to Ka-

President Welcomes Security Council Resolution on the Congo

Statement by President Eisenhower

White House press release dated August 10

I believe that the Security Council resolution adopted early yesterday represents another step forward in the United Nations determination, under the Secretary-General's tireless efforts, to find a peaceful solution to the difficult situation in the Congo.

The United States welcomes the steps Belgium has already taken and has said it will take in conformity with the Security Council resolutions. Belgium has contributed much in past years to the development of the Congo. The United States hopes that loyal cooperation with the United Nations on the part of all concerned will restore confidence between the Belgian and Congolese peoples and enable Belgian civilians to continue their contributions in the development of the new Congolese state.

tanga. United Nations forces are now in a position to move into Katanga. The time has come for Belgian withdrawal at the earliest moment under arrangements to be worked out by the Secretary-General for the preservation of law and order.

The United States considers that local authorities in Katanga will have no grounds to object to United Nations forces once the Council has assured them that the only task of the United Nations is to insure law and order and thereby Belgian withdrawal. Nor can Belgium have any reason any longer to postpone speedy withdrawal from Katanga.

Mr. President, the United Nations is well on its way to a great achievement in the Congo. At stake, as the Secretary-General so well said this morning, is the issue of peace not only for the Congo but for the world. We must not be disheartened by some rough weather, nor must we be put off by those who are trying to fish in troubled waters. At the 877th session I stated, on behalf of the United States, that no nation could arrogate unto itself the right to make threats of independent action concerning the Congo. It becomes necessary to repeat that word of caution today. All should help the efforts of the United Nations; and it is imperative that none work against the United Nations effort.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION⁴

The Security Council,

*Recalling its resolution of 22 July 1960 (S/4405),⁵ *inter alia*, calling upon the Government of Belgium to implement speedily the Security Council resolution of 14 July (S/4387)⁶ on the withdrawal of their troops and authorizing the Secretary-General to take all necessary action to this effect,*

Having noted the second report by the Secretary-General on the implementation of the aforesaid two resolutions and his statement before the Council,

Having considered the statements made by the representatives of Belgium and the Republic of the Congo to this Council at this meeting,

Noting with satisfaction the progress made by the United Nations in carrying out the Security Council resolutions in respect of the territory of the Republic of the Congo other than the Province of Katanga.

Noting however that the United Nations had been pre-

⁴ U.N. doc. S/4426; adopted on Aug. 9 by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (Poland and U.S.S.R.).

⁵ For text, see BULLETIN of AUG. 8, 1960, p. 223.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 161.

Summary of U.S. Support for Airlift of U.N. Troops and Equipment Into Congo

Press release 439 dated August 9

The airlift of United Nations troops and equipment into the Congo is now about completed. The following summarizes the part that the United States played in this phase of the operation.

As of August 7, U.S. Air Force planes had lifted to the Congo 9,190 troops from eight countries and 1,134.6 tons of equipment. These were:

2,400 Moroccan troops and 277 tons of equipment;
2,250 Tunisian troops and 232.8 tons of equipment;
637 Ghanaian troops and 55 tons of equipment;
625 Guinea troops and 57 tons of equipment and rations;
612 Swedish troops and 182.5 tons of equipment;
250 Liberian troops and 10 tons of equipment;
1,168 Ethiopian troops and 101.3 tons of equipment;
673 Irish troops and 125.5 tons of equipment; and
566 Mali troops and 93.5 tons of equipment.

In addition, the following items were furnished and transported by the United States: 400 tons of flour; 6 H-13 and 2 H-19 U.S. helicopters; 6 light U.S. reconnaissance aircraft; 10 C-47 and 5 C-119 U.S. transport aircraft; 20 U.S. jeeps; and 11,000 helmet liners. Additionally transportation was provided for 6 Swedish light aircraft and 2 Norwegian light aircraft.

All of this was done within a period of 16 days.

This is not only an impressive demonstration of the capability and effectiveness of our Defense Establishment but also a demonstration of this Government's firm commitment to the principles of the United Nations and its willingness and ability to implement that commitment in support of peace and security.

vented from implementing the aforesaid resolutions in the Province of Katanga although it was ready, and in fact attempted, to do so,

Recognizing that the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Province of Katanga will be a positive contribution to and essential for the proper implementation of the Security Council resolutions,

1. *Confirms* the authority given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council resolutions of 14 July and 22 July 1960 and requests him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby;

2. *Calls upon* the Government of Belgium to withdraw immediately its troops from the Province of Katanga under speedy modalities determined by the Secretary-General and to assist in every possible way the implementation of the Council's resolutions;

3. *Declares* that the entry of the United Nations force into the Province of Katanga is necessary for the full implementation of this resolution;

4. *Reaffirms* that the United Nations force in the Congo will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise;

5. *Calls upon* all Member States, in accordance with Articles 25 and 49 of the Charter, to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to implement this resolution and to report further to the Security Council as appropriate.

International Bank Issues Year-End Financial Statement

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on August 9 reported additions of \$86.5 million to its reserves during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, raising its total reserves to \$506.4 million.

Additions during the year were made up of net earnings of \$59.5 million, which were placed in the supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guarantees, and loan commissions of \$27 million, which were credited to the special reserve. These figures compare to net earnings of \$46.5 million and loan commissions of \$24 million in the fiscal year 1959. On June 30 the supplemental reserve totaled \$341.6 million and the special reserve was \$164.8 million.

Gross income, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$150.9 million, compared with \$122 million in the preceding year. Expenses, which included \$77 million for interest on Bank borrowing and other financial expenses, totaled \$91.4 million, compared with \$76 million last year.

During the year the Bank made 31 loans totaling the equivalent of \$658.7 million, compared with a total of \$703 million last year. This brought the gross total of loan commitments at June 30 to \$5,181 million. This year's loans were made in Algeria and Sahara, Austria, Belgian Congo, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Sudan, United Arab Republic, and Uruguay.

Disbursements were \$544 million, compared with \$583 million in the preceding year. Cumulative disbursements amounted to \$3,921 million on June 30, 1960.

During the year the Bank sold or agreed to sell \$242.6 million principal amount of loans, all without its guarantee. On June 30 the total sales of loans amounted to \$811 million, of which \$69 million was with the Bank's guarantee.

Principal repayments received by the Bank during the year amounted to \$73.7 million, and borrowers repaid \$84.4 million on parts of their loans which were held by other investors. This brought total repayments to \$659 million on June 30, consisting of \$338 million repaid to the Bank and \$321 million repaid to the purchasers of borrowers' obligations sold by the Bank.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

General Assembly

Final Report of the Secretary-General Evaluating the Second United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Relation to the Holding of Similar Conferences in the Future. A/4391. July 5, 1960. 6 pp.

Question of the Publication of a United Nations Juridical Yearbook. Report of the Secretary-General. A/4406. July 19, 1960. 25 pp.

United Nations Emergency Force: Budget Estimates for the Period 1 January to 31 December 1961. Second report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the General Assembly at its 15th session. A/4409. July 21, 1960. 3 pp.

Letter Dated 19 July 1960 From the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, Addressed to the Secretary-General Concerning the Breakup of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference. A/4421. July 22, 1960. 4 pp.

Letter Dated 15 July 1960 From the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations, Addressed to the Secretary-General Concerning Disarmament. A/4423. July 25, 1960. 35 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Council Committee on Non-governmental Organizations. United Nations Report on the Promotion of the International Flow of Private Capital. Statement submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce. E/C.2.556. June 8, 1960. 9 pp.

World Economic Situation: Ways and Means of Promoting Wider Trade Co-operation Among States. A preliminary report by the Secretary-General. E/3389. June 13, 1960. 32 pp.

Consolidated Work Programme in the Economic, Social and Human Rights Fields. Statement submitted by the Secretary-General. E/3389. June 15, 1960. 32 pp.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. E/3397. June 15, 1960. 85 pp.

Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries; United Nations Capital Development Fund. Replies received from governments. E/3393/Add. 1. June 16, 1960. 5 pp.

Provisional Agenda for the Thirtieth Session of the Economic and Social Council. Application from Kuwait for membership in UNESCO. E/3393/Add. 2. June 17, 1960. 5 pp.

Calendar of Conferences for 1961. Memorandum by the Secretary-General. E/3400. June 17, 1960. 7 pp.

Economic Commission for Latin America. Report by the Government of Chile on the Situation in the South of the Country and on the Reconstruction Programme in Course of Preparation. E/CN.12/AC.46/2. June 25, 1960. 69 pp.

Meeting of the Group of Experts on Geographical Names, 20 June-1 July 1960. Draft Recommendations; Draft Chapter III, Recommendations on Problems of Domestic Standardization of Geographic Names. E/CONF.3/L.2. June 29, 1960. 9 pp.

Economic Commission for Latin America. Report on the Third Extraordinary Session of the Committee of the Whole of the Economic Commission for Latin America, 28-30 June 1960. E/3402. June 30, 1960. 18 pp.

United Nations Tin Conference, 1960. Second International Tin Agreement. Adopted at the final plenary session held at U.N. headquarters on June 24, 1960. E/CONF.32/4. July 1, 1960. 58 pp.

Trusteeship Council

Ninth Report of the Committee on Rural Economic Development of the Trust Territories. T/1544. June 24, 1960. 146 pp.

Disarmament Commission

Letter Dated 19 July 1960 From the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, Addressed to the Secretary-General. DC/153. July 22, 1960. 4 pp.

Letter Dated 22 July 1960 From the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. DC/154. July 22, 1960. 8 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic and annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.

Applications to: St. Vincent and Sierra Leone (with reservations and declarations) and North Borneo (with reservation), April 22, 1960; Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (with declaration), April 24, 1960.

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization shall be held not less than once in 3 years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, July 5, 1960.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific, and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952.¹

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, July 8, 1960.

Cultural Property

Convention for protection of cultural property in event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution; Protocol for protection of cultural property in event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹

Ratifications deposited: Nicaragua, November 25, 1959; Lebanon, June 1, 1960.

Accession deposited: Liechtenstein, April 28, 1960.

Finance

Agreement on German external debts. Signed at London February 27, 1953. Entered into force September 16, 1953. TIAS 2792.

Extension to: Syrian Province of the United Arab Republic, July 8, 1960.

Property

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958.²

Ratification advised by the Senate: August 17, 1960.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1959, with annex. Opened for signature at Washington April 6 through 24, 1959. Entered into force July 16, 1959, for part I and parts III to VIII, and August 1, 1959, for part II. TIAS 4302.

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, August 15, 1960.

BILATERAL

Argentina

Agreement relating to the appointment of officers to constitute a U.S. Army mission to Argentina. Signed at Buenos Aires August 2, 1960. Entered into force August 2, 1960.

Brazil

Agreement amending agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy of August 3, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3303 and 4255). Signed at Washington June 11, 1960.

Entered into force: August 2, 1960.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Chile

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of June 2, 1960 (TIAS 4501). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago August 12, 1960. Entered into force August 12, 1960.

France

Convention of establishment, protocol, and declaration. Signed at Paris November 25, 1959.²
Ratification advised by the Senate: August 17, 1960.

India

Agreement amending the agreement of February 2, 1950, as amended (TIAS 2054, 2881, and 4318), for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi May 9 and July 29, 1960. Entered into force July 29, 1960.

Pakistan

Treaty of friendship and commerce. Signed at Washington November 12, 1959.²
Ratification advised by the Senate: August 17, 1960.

United Arab Republic

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 455; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Cairo August 9, 1960. Entered into force August 9, 1960.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Consulate General at Nicosia, Cyprus Elevated to an Embassy

Press release 464 dated August 16

The Department of State announced on August 16 that, concurrent with the achievement of independence by the Cypriot people and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the U.S. Government is extending recognition to the Government of Cyprus and elevating its consulate general at Nicosia to embassy status, effective August 16. Pending the arrival of the first American ambassador, L. Douglas Heck will act as Chargé d'Affaires.

Resignations

Henry Cabot Lodge as U.S. Representative to the United Nations and as U.S. Representative in the Security Council, effective September 3. (For an exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Ambassador Lodge, see White House press release dated August 19.)

² Not in force.

Designations

George M. Abbott as Deputy Director of the Foreign Service Institute, effective August 15.

Robert L. Berenson as Director, U.S. Operations Mission, Libya, effective August 4. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 428 dated August 4.)

J. Lampton Berry as Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, effective August 8. Theodore L. Elliot, Jr., and James C. Haahr as Special Assistants to the Under Secretary, effective August 1.

Howard Elting, Jr., as Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research, effective August 7.

Robert B. Elwood as Director, Office of Intelligence Resources and Coordination, effective August 1.

John J. Hagerty as Director, U.S. Operations Mission, Greece, effective August 10. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 454 dated August 11.)

Robert F. Hale as Director of the Visa Office, effective August 15.

Owen T. Jones as Director, U.S. Operations Mission, Yugoslavia, effective August 19, and as Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs, effective September 4. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 475 dated August 19.)

Gerson H. Lush as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Administration, effective August 15.

Robert R. Schott as Officer in Charge of Greek Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, effective August 15.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Mutual Security in Action—Korea. Pub. 6975. Far Eastern Series 91. 16 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet summarizing U.S. assistance to the Republic of Korea and discussing the country, its economy, and government.

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States. Pub. 6982. Department and Foreign Service Series 92. 55 pp. 20¢.

A publication containing a complete and official listing of the foreign consular offices in the United States, together with their jurisdictions and recognized personnel.

Mutual Security in Action—Laos (Revised). Pub. 6990. Far Eastern Series 92. 12 pp. 5¢.

A fact sheet outlining U.S. military and economic assist-

ance and discussing the country, government, and economy of Laos.

Mutual Security in Action—Iran (Revised). Pub. 6902. Near and Middle Eastern Series 54. 12 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet describing the country, government, economy, and the U.S. military and economic assistance programs.

Mutual Security in Action—China. Pub. 6998. Far Eastern Series 93. 16 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet giving background information on the country and discussing its economy, government, and the extent of U.S. assistance.

Mutual Security in Action—Thailand (Revised). Pub. 7004. Far Eastern Series 94. 10 pp. 10¢.

A fact sheet describing the country, trade, and government of Thailand, and the role of U.S. economic and technical aid.

President Eisenhower's Report to the Nation, May 25, 1960—Secretary Herter's Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 27, 1960. Pub. 7010. General Foreign Policy Series 151. 26 pp. 15¢.

A pamphlet containing the texts of the President's report on the collapse of the summit conference and the Secretary's testimony on events at the Paris summit meeting.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4430. 16 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Peru. Signed at Lima February 12, 1960. Entered into force February 12, 1960. With exchanges of notes.

Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations on Behalf of Third Parties. TIAS 4442. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Honduras. Exchange of notes—Dated at Tegucigalpa October 26, 1959, and February 17, 1960. Entered into force March 17, 1960. With related note dated at Tegucigalpa February 19, 1960.

Grant for Procurement of Nuclear Research and Training Equipment and Materials. TIAS 4445. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and New Zealand. Exchange of notes—Signed at Wellington March 23, 1960. Entered into force March 23, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4446. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Arab Republic, amending agreement of December 24, 1958, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo March 26, 1960. Entered into force March 26, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4448. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Arab Republic, supplementing agreement of July 29, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo March 26, 1960. Entered into force March 26, 1960.

Parcel Post. TIAS 4449. 22 pp. 15¢

Agreement and regulations of execution between the United States of America and Zanzibar. Signed at Zanzibar October 20, 1959, and at Washington December 30, 1959. Entered into force May 1, 1960.

Sale of Military Equipment, Materials, and Services—Assurances. TIAS 4450. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and New Zealand, modifying agreement of June 19, 1952. Exchange of notes—Signed at Wellington March 25, 1960. Entered into force March 25, 1960.

Settlement of Claims of United States Nationals and Other Financial Matters. TIAS 4451. 17 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Rumania. Signed at Washington March 30, 1960. Entered into force March 30, 1960. With exchanges of notes.

Settlement of Claims of Spanish Subcontractors Arising From Construction of Military Bases. TIAS 4452. 42 pp. 20¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid February 8 and 13, 1960. Entered into force February 13, 1960.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Extension of Loan of United States Vessels. TIAS 4454. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul March 28 and April 1, 1960. Entered into force April 1, 1960.

Defense—Loan of Vessels to Argentina. TIAS 4455. 5 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Argentina. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 4 and April 1, 1960. Entered into force April 1, 1960.

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes—Filing of Classified Patent Applications. TIAS 4456. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara March 17 and September 16, 1959. Entered into force September 16, 1959.

Grant for Procurement of Nuclear Research and Training Equipment and Materials. TIAS 4457. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Chile. Exchange of notes—Signed at Santiago July 23, 1959, and February 19, 1960. Entered into force February 19, 1960.

United States Educational Commission in Turkey. TIAS 4458. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey, modifying the agreement of December 27, 1949, as modified. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara February 1, 1960. Entered into force February 1, 1960.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 4459. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and El Salvador. Signed at San Salvador January 29, 1960. Entered into force April 8, 1960.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. TIAS 4462. 7 pp. 10¢.

Procès-verbal containing schedules to be annexed to the declaration on the provisional accession of the Swiss Confederation to agreement of October 30, 1947 (Japan and Switzerland). Done at Tokyo November 13, 1959.

Tracking Stations. TIAS 4463. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Spain. Exchange of notes—Signed at Madrid March 11 and 18, 1960. Entered into force March 18, 1960.

Defense—Loan of Vessel. TIAS 4464. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Colombia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Bogotá April 5 and 7, 1960. Entered into force April 7, 1960.

Defense—Weapons Production Program. TIAS 4465. 8 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and Turkey. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ankara March 2, 1960. Entered into force March 2, 1960.

Tracking Stations. TIAS 4466. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agreement between the United States of America and

Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at México April 12, 1960. Entered into force April 12, 1960.

Reciprocal Trade—Temporary Waiver of Certain Requirements of Agreement of April 8, 1943. TIAS 4467. 4 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Iran. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tehran April 12, 1960. Entered into force April 12, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4468. 5 pp. 5c. Agreement between the United States of America and Iceland. Signed at Reykjavik April 6, 1960. Entered into force April 6, 1960. With memorandum of understandings.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4469. 4 pp. 5c. Agreement between the United States of America and Pakistan, supplementing agreement of November 26, 1958, as amended. Signed at Karachi April 11, 1960. Entered into force April 11, 1960. With exchange of notes.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4470. 9 pp. 10c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Pakistan. Signed at Karachi April 11, 1960. Entered into force April 11, 1960. With exchange of notes.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Equipment, Materials, and Services. TIAS 4471. 7 pp. 10c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo April 13, 1960. Entered into force April 13, 1960.

Defense—Weapons Production Program. TIAS 4472. 9 pp. 10c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Belgium. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels April 6 and 22, 1960. Entered into force April 22, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4473. 3 pp. 5c. Agreement between the United States of America and Finland, supplementing and amending the agreement of March 23, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Helsinki May 6, 1960. Entered into force May 6, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4474. 2 pp. 5c. Agreement between the United States of America and Iceland, amending the agreement of March 3, 1959, as supplemented. Exchange of notes—Signed at Reykjavik May 10, 1960. Entered into force May 10, 1960.

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes—Filing Classified Patent Applications. TIAS 4476. 7 pp. 10c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Greece. Exchange of notes—Signed at Athens April 26, 1960. Entered into force April 26, 1960.

Guaranty of Private Investments. TIAS 4477. 5 pp. 5c. Agreement between the United States of America and Nepal. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 17, 1960. Entered into force May 17, 1960.

Oceanographic Research Station in the Turks and Caicos Islands. TIAS 4478. 4 pp. 5c.

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Oceanographic Research Stations in the Bahama Islands. TIAS 4479. 4 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-

land, supplementing the agreement of November 1, 1957. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 12, 1960. Entered into force May 12, 1960.

Money Orders. TIAS 4480. 8 pp. 10c.

Convention between the postal administrations of the United States of America and the Colony of British Virgin Islands, West Indies. Signed at Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands, February 18, 1957, and at Washington March 14, 1957. Entered into force July 1, 1957.

Money Orders. TIAS 4481. 8 pp. 10c.

Convention between the postal administrations of the United States of America and the British Colony of Montserrat, West Indies. Signed at Montserrat, British West Indies, March 15, 1957, and at Washington June 10, 1957. Entered into force September 1, 1957.

Money Orders. TIAS 4482. 7 pp. 10c.

Convention between the postal administrations of the United States of America and the British Colony of Antigua, West Indies. Signed at Antigua, British West Indies, December 5, 1956, and at Washington March 22, 1957. Entered into force December 1, 1957.

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*460	8/15	Martin nominated Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
461	8/15	Department statement on Francis Powers.
462	8/15	Nuclear test talks with U.K.
463	8/15	Herter: departure for OAS meeting at San José.
464	8/16	Recognition of independence of Cyprus.
465	8/16	Herter: arrival at San José.
*466	8/17	Wilkins nominated Ambassador to Cyprus (biographic details).
†467	8/17	Dillon: Senate Appropriations Committee.
468	8/18	Aid to Ghana for Volta River project.
469	8/17	Dillon: Senate Appropriations Committee.
470	8/19	Spain credentials (rewrite).
*471	8/19	Cultural exchange (athletic coaches for 1960 Olympics).
*472	8/19	Passport Office moves to New State extension.
473	8/19	Herter: statement at OAS on Venezuelan complaint.
*474	8/19	Air transport agreement with Mexico.
*475	8/19	Jones designated director, USOM, Yugoslavia (biographic details).
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COMMUNIST ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE LESS DEVELOPED AREAS

the
Department
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The Communist economic offensive continued its rapid pace in 1959 and early 1960, not only reaching new levels for many of its activities but also expanding into new areas. Countries in Africa and Latin America became the focal points of major bloc efforts to establish beachheads in Western spheres of influence.

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Bulletin

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September 12, 1960

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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American Foreign Ministers Condemn Sino-Soviet Intervention in American States

Following are three statements made by Secretary Herter at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of the American Foreign Ministers at San José, Costa Rica, together with the text of a declaration adopted by the ministers on August 28 and statements made by the Secretary upon his departure from San José and his return to Washington.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 24

Press release 486 dated August 24, as delivered

For the seventh time the foreign ministers of the American Republics meet to consider safeguards for the hemisphere. As was clearly indicated in the call issued by the Government of Peru requesting this meeting,¹ a major concern affecting relations among the American states has been the threat of extracontinental intervention in hemisphere affairs. What was feared only as a possibility when we met a year ago in Santiago, Chile,² has now become a stark reality. The leaders of the Soviet Union and Communist China have made abundantly clear their determination to exploit the situation in Cuba as a means of intervening in inter-American affairs. Their purpose is to break the bonds of inter-American solidarity, sow distrust and fear among the people of the American hemisphere, and thereby prepare the way for political control of the New World.

The United States Government believes that the Organization of American States is the proper forum to discuss this issue. Our organization has again and again demonstrated its capacity to confront and resolve the threats to peace in the Western Hemisphere. The Government of Cuba has repeatedly stated that the Organization of American States is not the proper forum. It bypassed our organization by filing a petition with the

United Nations. The United Nations Security Council indicated that the matter should properly be considered by the Organization of American States.³ Nevertheless the President of Cuba [Osvaldo Dorticós] stated on August 9, according to the text of a message attributed to him by the Government organ *Revolución* August 11, as follows:

It is not important to us, and we wish to make this clear now, what the formal results of the Foreign Ministers meeting may be. What matters to us is that we will convert the conference into the revolutionary tribunal of America.

On an earlier occasion the Minister of Revolutionary Armed Forces, Raúl Castro, speaking in Habana, was quoted as having stated on television (August 5, 1960) that

We convened an OAS meeting . . . the other day in the CTC (Cuban labor federation). Representatives from all Latin America were there. We convened the revolutionary OAS at the headquarters of the revolutionary CTC.

Earlier this year, on March 28, Dr. Fidel Castro said:

. . . and then they threaten to incite the Latin American countries against us with this pact of Rio de Janeiro, by which we do not feel obligated because the revolution did not sign this pact. That is to say, and it is well that we do not feel, and we declare it categorically, that we do not feel obligated by this pact of Rio de Janeiro.

I should like to call the attention of the Ministers here to the press statements made by Fidel Castro last night which it would be well for all of us to read and ponder.

I ask the Foreign Minister of Cuba whether this statement represents a repudiation of all the agreements signed by the Government of Cuba. I also ask the Foreign Minister of Cuba to inform this meeting later on whether he does or does not regard the Organization of American States as

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1960, p. 225.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1960, p. 199.

the proper body for the consideration of the matters before us. If his answer is in the negative, this meeting has a right to know his reasons and to ask just what are the objectives of his Government in attending this meeting.

Mr. Chairman, our consultative meeting has before it a four-point agenda. I should like to suggest that we discuss this agenda as a whole rather than point by point. The first two points deal with the extracontinental threat to peace in this hemisphere. The last point is related since it deals with peace and stability in the Caribbean. I shall discuss these three points now.

Extracontinental Threat to Inter-American System

Mr. Chairman and distinguished colleagues, an urgent challenge faces the inter-American system today. This is Sino-Soviet imperialism. The American Republics have adopted and sanctified the principle that the Western Hemisphere is not to be regarded as an area for military or political intervention by any power external to this hemisphere or for the establishment of colonies, protectorates, or other instrumentalities of such intervention. This collective principle is a main pillar of the Organization of American States. It has been given clear expression in the Rio Treaty. In earlier times the danger was simple. It was clearly recognizable. Intervention by an external power in the affairs of the Americas meant the use or threat of armed force on a national basis.

Since the rise of totalitarian states in the modern world, however, there has been added a new type of danger. Even more real, it is also more devious. This is the danger of the exercise of power by agencies owing allegiance to a foreign, non-American power and expressed through indigenous personnel using indigenous language, but nonetheless agencies controlled from without. This was true with regard to the Fascist powers in the period immediately preceding and during World War II. It now presents itself under the guise of communism.

We should, therefore, examine briefly whether or not the institution in the Western Hemisphere of a Communist regime in any one of the American Republics constitutes in effect foreign intervention. I believe the history of the last 43 years gives only one answer. This is that a Communist government is in effect the agency of a foreign

power. It owes its primary allegiance not to the people of the country in which it operates but to a foreign power or powers.

This unchallengeable fact can be demonstrated exhaustively in the history of the Communist movement since seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in 1917. Almost from the very moment of its establishment by Lenin in 1919, the Communist International, or Comintern, as it was called, operated as an instrument of the policies of the Soviet Union. This became progressively more evident until under the personal dictatorship of Stalin it was specifically stated that the first duty of any of its parties abroad and its members under party discipline was to support and defend the policies of the Soviet Union above any other form of allegiance. Whatever the changes since Stalin's death, there have been none in this field.

The postwar history of Eastern Europe, where these Communist parties were installed in power with the help of the Soviet armed forces, has demonstrated to the satisfaction of any reasonable person that once a Communist regime is installed that country loses its political personality and its freedom of action in democracy. Above all, the foreign policies of that country parallel with unnatural accuracy those of the Soviet Union.

In the history of the Communist movement there is only one successful important departure from this pattern, and this departure in itself constitutes perhaps the greatest proof of the validity of the statement I have just made. In order to escape from the domination of Moscow, the Republic of Yugoslavia was forced in an open and spectacular manner to break with Moscow. The fact that such open defiance was necessary and the savagery with which this defection was greeted by Moscow is among the most convincing proofs that the domination by Moscow of Communist parties and regimes is fact and not fiction.

If further proof were needed it can be found in the tragic and unsuccessful attempt by the Hungarian people to free themselves from Moscow dominance. In this instance the attempt was not successful, primarily owing to the presence of Soviet forces in Hungary. The gallant attempt of the Hungarian people to recapture their freedom was drowned in blood by Soviet armed divisions.

I think we can accept as a fact, in light of the historical record, that any Communist regime es-

established in any one of the American Republics would in effect constitute foreign intervention in the Americas as defined in our numerous agreements and treaties. It would therefore be a matter of the gravest concern to all the states of the Americas.

As developments in Eastern Europe demonstrated, the installation of a Communist regime in any American Republic could automatically involve the loss of that country's independence in foreign relations and to a large degree in its domestic affairs. Additionally any such regime would automatically by its very nature become an operational base for the propagation of Communist ideas, for infiltration, subversion, and interference in the internal affairs of all the Americas, designed in the last analysis to overthrow by force every government in this hemisphere.

I think we can accept as an established fact that our inter-American association is firmly based on the foundation of resistance to intervention in our affairs by any foreign power. We can also accept as fact that a Communist regime, once installed, would be an obedient and servile agency of a foreign power or powers and therefore in truth constitutes foreign intervention no less than does overt armed intervention. It is obvious that foreign-directed communism is 20th-century imperialism.

Evidence of Communist Control in Cuba

We should now consider on the basis of available evidence whether the present regime of Cuba has submitted to the control of the Communist powers or to what degree it has moved in that direction. We can only note that the emergence of a pattern in the Cuban Government and the direction in which it is heading, based in no small measure on the statements of its own leaders, are sufficient to cause the gravest concern to all members of the American community.

In the first place, the Communist Party of Cuba, operating under another name, is the only political party permitted any activity in Cuba.

Secondly, thanks to this encouragement and support of the present Cuban leadership, the Communist Party, following the classic pattern established by Lenin and perfected by his successors, seems to be infiltrating and establishing even more control over such organizations as the trade union movements, farmers associations, people's

militia, and indeed every form of social and political association in Cuba.

Thirdly, we have heard from the mouths of Cuban Government leaders the repeated statements that anticommunism is the equivalent of counterrevolution.

The application of the label "counterrevolutionary" to any group or individual who differs in the slightest degree from the regime is a standard Communist technique. It has been used throughout Soviet history as a pretext for the use of terror as an instrument of government. It has been indiscriminately applied to any political or active opponent of the regime, including, I might add, men who actively directed the 1917 coup d'etat in Russia.

We should, I think, take very careful note of this fact of identifying anticommunism in any form with counterrevolution. The present regime in Cuba is following faithfully the Bolshevik pattern in providing for itself a pretext under which any opponent of whatever political coloration may be dealt with as a counterrevolutionary and hence as the object of any illegal method, arrest, or execution which the regime, unfettered by law, may find most expedient to apply. This doctrine of the Cuban Government, that anticommunism means counterrevolution, is also, of course, a terrible blow to democracy in Cuba. It means that the Communist Party is the only one to be supported, the only one against which not a word can be uttered with impunity.

Fourthly, I am sure we have all noted the increasing tendency of the Cuban regime to support the Soviet Union and Chinese Communists in the field of foreign affairs. I have yet to see in recent months the slightest criticism from any official Cuban source of any Soviet or Chinese action or attitude. This is another manifestation of a developing pattern in the Cuban revolution which is a legitimate matter of concern to us all.

Fifthly, Cuban soil is being used for the export of Soviet communism to other American Republics. The extent of this effort is known to all of us. Some elements of it have been experienced by virtually every other American Republic. Note has been taken, for example, of the statement by Fidel Castro at a rally on July 26, 1960, as follows:

Let us promise, let us promise to those who gave their lives to create a new life for the fatherland, that we will continue to make efforts so that our fatherland will

daily be a better example. And here, before the undefeated mountain range, let us promise ourselves to continue making our fatherland the example which will make the Andes Mountains the Sierra Maestra of the American Continent.

Sixthly, we all have noted, I believe with sorrow, the enthusiastic welcome given by the Cuban Government to statements by Soviet rulers that they are ready to support Cuba with rocket fire against the United States.⁴ Whether or not the Soviet rocket threat against this hemisphere is real or a characteristic bluff is immaterial to the point we are discussing. What is important, however, is the enthusiastic welcome which it has received in Cuba.

These trends and the general pattern we see developing in Cuba would indicate to any reasonable person that it is in the Communist direction that the present Cuban leadership, in contravention of the original expressions of the revolution, is leading the country. It is not clear from the statements made at our previous meetings last week⁵ by the Cuban Foreign Minister and from statements of his superiors in Habana whether the present Cuban Government regards communism and its installations in the American states as a form of controlled foreign intervention in the affairs of American states and hence a threat to our peace and security as defined in inter-American treaties. I think this meeting is entitled to a clear answer from the Cuban representative on this point.

Conflict With Declaration of Santiago

As the process of Soviet intervention moves forward into every phase of the national life of a country, it naturally conflicts with the basic political objectives which the American peoples have set for themselves, namely, the establishment of representative democracy. It is essential to the purposes of Moscow and Peiping that the basis of political democracy be destroyed.

The American concept of democracy insists upon a belief in the dignity of man and a recognition of fundamental human rights and freedoms. These ideas are in direct conflict with the authoritarian concepts of the Communist powers, in whose eyes all morality and political belief are but instruments of the party and the state. Appro-

riating the slogans, symbols, and terms of political democracy, the Communist forces use them to destroy the very basis of democracy as well as its institutions. This, too, has been a major feature in the increasing influence of the Sino-Soviet bloc and their associated instrumentalities in Cuba.

The objectives of the Cuban people in overthrowing the dictatorship that had existed in their island, and in setting up a new government with a revolutionary program, were received with widespread sympathy and support throughout the American states. We heard with deep satisfaction the promises of Dr. Castro to restore individual and political rights and to introduce other political reforms that would assure to the Cuban people the benefits of true democracy under constitutional guarantees. It has therefore been a cause of deep disappointment to see the original purposes of the Cuban revolution distorted and perverted to fit the pattern of totalitarian Communist development.

Of particular significance to this meeting of foreign ministers is the record of how the leaders of the Castro government, bending to the influence of extracontinental forces, have increasingly departed from the principles of representative democracy and respect for human rights.

Mr. Chairman, 1 year ago almost to the day the foreign ministers of the American Republics adopted in Santiago, Chile, the historic document known as the Declaration of Santiago.⁶ I should like now to turn to the application in Cuba of the vital principles contained in that declaration, which, I might add, was subscribed to without qualification by the Foreign Minister of Cuba, who is participating here in our deliberations.

The Declaration of Santiago sets forth seven principles. The first principle is that the rule of law be assured by the separation of powers and by the control of the legality of governmental acts by competent organs of the state. But today, 1 year later, there is no separation of powers in Cuba. The present government of Cuba, by the fundamental law of February 7, 1959, vests the executive power in the President of the Republic, assisted by the Council of Ministers, which Council also possesses the legislative power. The once independent judiciary of Cuba has been subjected to executive pressures and in large part superseded by revolutionary tribunals.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 139.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1960, p. 355.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

The second principle of the Declaration of Santiago is that the Governments of the American Republics should be the result of free elections. In Cuba free elections were a stated aim of the revolutionary movement and were an early promise by the Castro government. But today, 1 year later, in its 20th month in office, the Castro regime has not given elections to the Cuban people nor even indicated when, if ever, it plans to hold elections.

The third principle of the Declaration of Santiago is that perpetuation in power, or the exercise of power without a fixed term and with the manifest intent of perpetuation, is incompatible with the effective exercise of democracy. But today, 1 year later, the determination of the Castro government to hold on to power indefinitely is proven by its refusal to hold, or even prepare to hold, elections. The fact is that Dr. Fidel Castro has named his brother Raúl to succeed him—hardly a democratic method of election.

The fourth principle of the Declaration of Santiago is that the governments of the American states should maintain a system of freedom for the individual and of social justice based on respect for fundamental human rights. But today, 1 year later, the present Government of Cuba continually, and obviously as a fixed policy, flouts fundamental human rights. One need but mention its initial mass shootings at the *paredón* and subsequent hasty trials and executions without right of appeal; the increasing numbers of political prisoners; the persecution of disillusioned critics of the Castro regime; the suppression of free labor movements; the destruction of academic freedom and university autonomy.

The fifth principle of the Declaration of Santiago is that human rights incorporated into the legislation of the American states should be protected by effective judicial procedures. But today, 1 year later, the Castro regime has so twisted and altered fundamental law that the right of habeas corpus has been suspended. Citizens actively opposing the regime are in peril of severe penalties, including death sentences from the revolutionary tribunals. Private property is confiscated arbitrarily. Judicial procedure is disdained. Judicial protection for human rights is but a phrase in a law book.

The sixth principle of the Declaration of Santiago is that the systematic use of political pro-

scription is contrary to American democratic order. But today, 1 year later, the Castro government has disfranchised for the next 30 years those persons—about 20,000 in all—who were candidates in elections held under the previous government, even though some of them were opposing the dictator then in power. These same persons have been deprived of the right to hold public office or to receive any retirement benefits or pensions they had earned under previous administrations. Furthermore the former political parties have been eliminated for all practical purposes. Only the Communist Party, known as the Popular Socialist Party, now flourishes in Cuba, though the Communist-controlled remnants of the 26th of July Movement may also be soon recognized as a political party.

The seventh principle of the Declaration of Santiago is that freedom of the press, radio, and television and, in general, freedom of information and expression are essential conditions for the existence of a democratic regime. But today, 1 year later, the Cuban Government exercises absolute control over press, radio, and television. One by one, the Cuban newspapers have been made subservient to the Castro regime. Outstanding editors, some of them among the earliest enthusiasts for the revolution, have fled the country. Radio and television have likewise been subjected to strict government control. Opposition views can no longer be read or heard. This, then, is the record of the perversion of the democratic political purposes of the Cuban revolution. The Inter-American Peace Committee has pointed out in its special report of April 14, 1960, the relationship that exists between international tension, on the one hand, and the violation of human rights and lack of representative democracy, on the other. It is clear that the violations of human rights and the failure to apply the principles of representative democracy in Cuba are likewise contributing to international tensions in the Caribbean.

The suppression of democratic freedoms in Cuba to serve the purposes of an extracontinental power is properly a matter of concern to all the member states of the Organization. This is no purely local and internal affair. The process I have described is part of a determined effort by the Sino-Soviet powers to extend their control over an American state. It is a challenge not

only to one of the basic principles and objectives of the inter-American system but to the very security of our 21 Republics.

Cuban Charges in Security Council

Mr. Chairman, I should now like to mention the subject of the charges brought by the Castro government against the United States in the Security Council of the United Nations. I shall speak on that subject when those charges are presented in our present forum. The United States is entirely agreeable to the consideration of Cuban-United States problems in the context of the Organization of American States and its principles and procedures. We would be happy to utilize any appropriate procedure or organ of the OAS as a means of clarifying facts and thereby facilitating the solution of Cuban-United States problems at such a time as the other member governments of the Organization are convinced that the Cuban Government is ready to play its part in genuinely seeking solutions to these problems.

If Cuba really fears aggression, she can find her best guarantees against it in the Organization of American States. And in this same relationship a Cuba that is a truly independent and loyal member of the American family will find in the United States a readiness to respond with a genuine desire to restore friendship and understanding in keeping with the principles to which all members of the American family of nations have sworn allegiance.

Mr. Chairman, I have now referred to the first, second, and fourth points on our agenda. As to the third point, we shall have a full opportunity to discuss economic problems in depth and I hope with fruitful results when the American Republics meet within 2 weeks in Bogotá.⁷ The United States Government will go to that conference prepared to take its full share in the plans and actions required for the material progress of our neighbors to the south. In the meantime, of course, we shall be glad to listen to the foreign ministers here and to consider with them any observations they wish to make on this agenda and such a declaration as this meeting can appropriately make. Our suggestions in this regard are

⁷The Special Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States To Study Formulation of New Measures for Economic Development (Committee of 21) opened its third meeting at Bogotá on Sept. 5.

expressed in a draft resolution which we have submitted. I believe we should encounter no difficulty in this matter since our objectives are the same.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished colleagues, I believe that all of us here will agree that this is a critical period for the Organization of American States. The effectiveness with which the Organization meets the grave problems that confront us will test its capacity to serve our future. Last week the Sixth Consultative Meeting of Foreign Ministers acted courageously to meet one threat to peace in this hemisphere. Now it must act with equal courage to meet another threat to peace in the hemisphere, this time greatly magnified by an extracontinental menace.

I am confident, Mr. Chairman, that this meeting of foreign ministers, in the capital of a country which epitomizes so many of the virtues of the inter-American system, will face the crisis of present events and take the necessary positive decision. We should vigorously condemn Soviet and other Communist intervention in our affairs and clearly indicate our grave concern over Cuba's toleration and encouragement of such intervention. We should call for effective resistance to these efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc and restate the validity of our regional association and its principles as the guide and instrument for our continued cooperation.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 25

I am confident that the foreign ministers here assembled will examine today's speech by the Cuban Foreign Minister [Raúl Roa] together with the address by Dr. Castro night before last and reach the right conclusions. The Foreign Minister's speech clarified Cuba's attitude at this conference because: First, it showed clearly the Cuban Government is walking hand in hand with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Second, it strongly indicated that Cuba is willing to assist the Soviet Union in spreading communism in the rest of the hemisphere, in contempt of all the principles of the Organization of American States. Third, it revealed the Cuban Government's cynical definition of democracy, since the Cuban Foreign Minister characterized as democracy the situation now existing in Cuba, where the fundamental human freedoms have been abrogated. It was also a

repudiation of the principles of the Santiago Declaration, signed by the Foreign Minister of Cuba just 1 year ago. Fourth, it exhibited a basic and calculated antagonism to the United States which will render more difficult the constant efforts of my country to restore friendly relations with Cuba.

STATEMENT OF AUGUST 26

Press release 493 dated August 26

At the last meeting of this [General] Committee we heard at some length the views of the Foreign Minister of Cuba. I had hoped that he would address himself in a serious and constructive way to the first two items on the agenda, those concerning the threats of extracontinental intervention and subversive activities directed against American states.

I am sorry that the Foreign Minister did not see fit to make direct and responsive replies to the questions which I asked in my statement to this meeting. One can only adduce from his statements that the Communist Party of Cuba, operating under another name or names, will continue to be the only political party permitted any activity in Cuba. One can only conclude that this party will continue to have a large hand in perfecting its control of Cuban institutions and that the attempt by any Cuban to oppose it will be labeled counterrevolutionary with all that that implies.

Dr. Roa's remarks also clearly indicate that the Castro regime will continue to place reliance on the political and military help of the Sino-Soviet bloc and that it will not submit itself to the principles and disciplines of the inter-American system. Our deep concern with those policies of the Castro regime can only be increased by the contempt which has been expressed here for the principles and institutions of representative democracy and for the commitments which were assumed at Santiago only a year ago. It has been asserted that the Castro regime represents the will of the Cuban people and that there is no need for elections. Never in modern history has there been a dictator who did not claim to represent the will of the people. Hitler did, Mussolini did, and so did Josef Stalin. So, too, the dictators of today. But there never has been and never will be contin-

uous unanimity of opinion in any country. The appearance of conformity is always brought about by force and oppression. Democracy is founded on the recognition of the diversity of the human spirit and makes provision in its political institutions for expressions of this diversity.

The failure by the Castro regime to respect the principles of the Santiago Declaration and its evident intention of perpetuating itself in power until the Cuban people are "mature" is cogent evidence of the influence already exercised in Cuba by the Communist powers. The intervention by the Sino-Soviet bloc, the threat of armed attack by the Sino-Soviet bloc based on a fictitious assertion that there is a present danger of military attack on Cuba, the export of communism from Cuba to other countries in this hemisphere, and the related issue of the lack of representative democracy in Cuba are not, I wish to make entirely clear, bilateral issues between the United States and Cuba. They are issues which concern the entire American family. They are issues which go to the very heart of inter-American solidarity and threaten our peace and security.

The United States has never had any intention and has none now of making any military attack on Cuba. I repeat here the statements made by Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge in the hearings in the Security Council of the United Nations on July 18, 1960:⁸

The . . . Foreign Minister of Cuba has told us that Dr. Castro would like assurance from the United States that the United States has no aggressive purposes against Cuba. Unnecessary though it most certainly seems to me, let me here and now give him this assurance, heaped up and overflowing: The United States has no aggressive purposes against Cuba.

This statement came from the second-ranking Cabinet member of the United States Government. The failure therefore of the Cuban Foreign Minister yesterday even to take cognizance of the statement of the official representative of the United States to the United Nations is a very curious omission. This is especially so since he in person heard the statement by Ambassador Lodge and therefore cannot, in honesty, claim he was unaware of it. What may appear to be a small matter in reality gives us a very clear idea as to what is going on. For its own reasons, having nothing to do with what the United States has or has not done, the present Cuban regime appears to be

⁸ BULLETIN of Aug. 8, 1960, p. 199.

determined to destroy its relations with the United States. Can it be that Mr. Roa deliberately avoided reference to the solemn assurance of Ambassador Lodge in order to provide justification for Mr. Khrushchev's threat of military action in this hemisphere?

Distinct from the basic issue I have cited is the matter of the charges which were made against the United States. I shall not dignify the attacks on the United States social and political system by replying to them except to say that 180,000,000 people living and working under the flag of the United States are proud of their traditions of representative democracy and social justice. There was a time when negroes were discriminated against in their right to vote in some parts of the United States. This has been progressively remedied. Today all citizens, male or female, unless they have a criminal record, are entitled to vote. It comes with poor grace for the representative of Cuba to inject this false issue into our discussions when not a single citizen, male, female, black, white, or otherwise, is entitled to vote in Cuba.

In this connection I should like to call attention to the telegram each one of us has received from the very distinguished President of Venezuela, Rómulo Betancourt. In that telegram he made the following statement:

In the view of Venezuela the opportunity ought to be seized in the next Inter-American Conference in Quito to draw up a declaration or specific treaty in which there will be defined and specified that governments will not be allowed to form part of the juridical regional community unless they have been elected by the vote of the people and be of irrefragable political character. At the same time it should be stipulated that those governments must respect the fundamental rights of the individual in his quality as a man and as a citizen, guaranteeing freedom of the press and of information and recognizing the right of minorities to organize themselves into political parties and to function freely. Likewise, they should recognize the effective exercise of democratic unionism, because without that, workers' movements acquire a negative, typically totalitarian character.

My Government wishes to state that the lofty principles reiterated in this message as to the need to encourage and protect democracy against totalitarianism are an excellent expression of our sentiments about the problem of Cuba. As to President Betancourt's specific recommendations for action at the Quito conference, we shall at an appropriate time be glad to consider it as a possi-

ble method of strengthening the democracy of the hemisphere.

The United States has consistently exercised restraint in the face of continuing attacks by the Cuban Government which commenced in January 1959, before any of the acts of alleged aggression against the Castro regime occurred. From January 1959 until the present day the political attacks on the United States Government and the scurrilous attempts to besmirch the character of its leaders have nevertheless been consistent and have increased in savagery.

Many of the factors relating to the charges which have been made by the Castro regime are set forth in the documents, one entitled "Provocative Actions of the Government of Cuba Against the United States Which Have Served To Increase Tensions in the Caribbean Area,"⁹ and the other entitled "Responsibility of the Cuban Government for Increased International Tensions in the Hemisphere,"¹⁰ which have been filed with the Inter-American Peace Committee.

The documents, together with a supplement,¹¹ contain facts in connection with charges by the United States against the Cuban regime. I will not take the time of my colleagues here to make a tedious refutation of details which have already been made available in writing. However, if my colleagues wish me to do so, I will be glad to read the entire 125 pages in this forum.

I do, however, wish to say a few words about what seem to me to be the most important assertions made by the Foreign Minister of Cuba.

Cuban Charges of Military Aggression

First, there are the charges of aggression of a military or quasi-military character, namely, the assertion that the United States Government connived at flights by aircraft which took off from Florida bases and violated the Cuban air space, and secondly, charges that United States naval vessels have violated Cuban territorial waters.

What is needed here is a determined effort to uncover the true facts. We would welcome this. We have nothing to hide. I therefore suggest that this meeting consider the constitution of a committee for the purpose of making on-the-ground investigations in the United States and in Cuba of

⁹ For text, see *ibid.*, July 18, 1960, p. 79.

¹⁰ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1960, p. 317.

¹¹ For text, see p. 409.

what actually transpired. A report could be made by this committee of its findings, together with appropriate recommendations. I would hope that this report could include the techniques which have repeatedly been used by Cuban nationals to violate United States neutrality, including those used by Dr. Castro when he was hatching his revolution.

Insofar as control of aircraft in Florida is concerned, the United States has instituted the most vigorous and elaborate system of controls ever adopted by my Government in time of peace with the aim of preventing unauthorized flights in the Caribbean area. With 75,000 private planes to police in the United States and 200 airports in the Florida area alone, this is no easy task. Dr. Castro and other 26th of July adherents while in exile in our country can be the best witnesses to what I say. There are only four flights concerning which the United States authorities have any substantial evidence. We have continually asked the Cuban Government to give us evidence of other flights so that we can investigate them, but no such evidence has been furnished.

I will now specifically examine these four flights. In one of these flights the pilot and copilot were agents of Fidel Castro. Castro arranged these flights—in our country we say “rigged” these flights—in order to create false evidence of U.S. aggression. I ask this meeting whether, if Fidel Castro indeed had any real evidence of a substantial nature about the alleged campaign of flights—which has been blown up in importance by the Foreign Minister—I ask him why he has bothered to spend the Cuban people’s money in buying false evidence. In two flights of those four, the pilots managed to escape the elaborate preventative network set up by the United States Government which I have described above. As to these two flights, the United States has officially expressed its regrets to the Cuban Government. The final and fourth flight, in May 1960, is still under investigation by my Government. We have asked the Cuban Government to help us in this investigation, but we have never had either any help or even a comment from them other than propaganda talk. We might understand this treatment of the United States, given the calculated campaign of calumny against us, but it is interesting to recall that the Cuban Gov-

ernment has treated the Inter-American Peace Committee with equal disdain.

Concerning alleged violations of Cuban territorial waters, it is known that a United States submarine was fired upon without warning while 11 miles from the Cuban shore, well beyond the 3-mile limit, which, as far as the Government of the United States knows, is still the width of the marginal area claimed by Cuba. The factfinding committee which I have suggested might be able to obtain from the Cuban authorities information concerning other United States naval vessels thought to have been within Cuban territorial waters. I can assure you that this committee would have the full cooperation of the Government of the United States.

Charge of Alleged Economic Aggression

The second charge relates to an alleged economic aggression in reducing Cuba’s sugar quota. Beginning in January 1960, the Castro regime has instituted a series of measures which discriminate against and injure United States trade with Cuba. These measures include: (A) imposition of import licensing requirements contrary to Cuba’s obligations under the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]; (B) discrimination against the United States in the administration of Cuban trade policy—import licensing, threats and pressures to induce customers of the United States to divert their orders to other suppliers, and state trading are some of the techniques that have been used; (C) reduction by more than 25 percent of the United States rice quota, one of our most important exports to Cuba, the requirement of a fixed “contribution” for each quintal of rice imported, and severe limitations on dollar exchange made available for rice imports—all of this while the Cuban Government imported duty free at least 16,500,000 pounds of rice from a third country with which a bilateral trade agreement had been concluded; (D) imposition of surcharges on remittances of foreign exchange for payment of certain categories of imports ranging from 30 percent to 100 percent; (E) requirement that all exporters in Cuba as well as all persons receiving foreign exchange for services rendered in Cuba must surrender all foreign exchange receipts to an agency of the Castro regime. As a consequence

there now exists a commercial backlog estimated to be in excess of \$100 million; (F) refusal of discount facilities to United States-owned financial institutions with the aim of forcing them to bring in funds from abroad to meet normal business requirements.

These and other measures to reduce United States trade while continuing to benefit from access to the United States market have been successful. On the one hand, Cuban imports from the United States were reduced by value during the first 4 months of 1960 by approximately 50 percent of the total for the same period in 1958 and 75 percent of the total for the same period in 1959.

On the other hand, Cuban exports to the United States in the same 4 months' period in 1960 were only slightly below those for the same months of 1958 and well above Cuban exports in the first 4 months of 1959. The United States does not contend that the trade policies of the Castro regime constitute aggression against the United States or intervention in our internal affairs within the meaning of inter-American agreements. Provided it does not violate its international obligations—in this case principally the GATT and the IMF [International Monetary Fund] agreements—it may change its commercial policies as it wishes. We do find it incongruous, on the one hand, that Cuban exports paid for in dollars which can be used by Cuba to purchase goods anywhere in the world are thought to be a form of economic bondage while, on the other, barter agreements which tie the Cuban economy to the Sino-Soviet bloc and prevent the exercise of choice of origin, cost, and quality of Cuban imports are considered to be economic freedom.

I should like to digress for a moment to say something for the possible interest of those in this room with regard to the agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Union for the sale by Cuba to the Soviet Union of 1 million tons of sugar. The purchases made by the United States from Cuba have until only recently been made at the rate of 5 cents per pound. This sugar is shipped to the U.S., the transportation and refining costs paid there, and is sold there and the American people paid for it at the rate of 10 to 11 cents per pound.

By the agreement between Cuba and the Soviet Government, the Soviets pay for the sugar at the rate of 3 cents per pound. But this is paid for

only 20 percent in cash, and the balance in goods shipped from Soviet Russia.

However, that sugar being sold today in Russia to Soviet citizens is paid for at 30 to 40 cents per pound.

The Soviet Government is thereby receiving profits going to the Soviet Government of \$500 million on that million tons of sugar purchased from Cuba. I mention this only to show who got the better of that trade.

But if these acts of the Castro regime—all of which preceded the reduction in Cuba's share of the United States sugar quota—are said to be commercial and legitimate, then how can a reduction of the degree of preference which Cuba has in the United States sugar market, and which leaves Cuba still in the first position of preference in this hemisphere, be aggression or intervention? There is no such thing as some being more equal than others. All of the American states have equal rights. There cannot be one standard of conduct for the United States and another standard of conduct for the Castro regime.

But Cuban discrimination against United States trade was not the reason for reducing the Cuban sugar quota. Our motive was not retaliatory in purpose. United States commercial policy is based on the principles of nondiscrimination and most-favored-nation treatment. The sugar quota is an exception to this policy. It gives to Cuba the lion's share of the United States sugar market—about 71 percent of United States import requirements as compared with a very small percentage for the balance of Latin America. While Cuba's percentage margin of preference in the United States sugar market has declined slightly over the years, the volume of Cuban sugar sold in the United States market has increased from 2,428,000 short tons for the period of 1901-1930 (the period which the Castro regime has selected as desirable) to 2,580,000 short tons for the period of 1931-1958 (the years about which the Castro regime complains). And Cuba's dollar earnings from sales of sugar in the United States jumped from a depression low of \$39 million to \$100 million in 1936 to \$400 million in 1947 and were at \$350 million in 1959.

Cuba first acquired its preferential position in the U.S. sugar market under the terms of the reciprocity treaty of 1902. In 1934 a quota system

replaced the Smoot-Hawley tariff and gave Cuba a more stable market at better prices. Not only does Cuba enjoy a preference in tariff which gives it a 20 percent advantage over other foreign producers, but, as I have said, it has the lion's share of the foreign quota. This preference, then, has its roots in history and represents a sincere effort on the part of the United States to help the Cuban economy—not, as has been said, to put the Cuban people in economic bondage.

It has sometimes been alleged that we are making this payment to Cuba not to help the Cuban economy but to help the American farmer. This is entirely false, since it would be only too easy to return to the tariff system whereby the difference between prices would be compensated for by a tariff which we ourselves collected—instead, we are giving higher prices to Cuba and others in order that they can pay better wages to those who produce the cane in the respective countries.

Similarly, the payment of premium prices for Cuban sugar, which last year benefited the Cuban economy by roughly \$150 million, was freely and gladly paid with the same constructive end in mind. It is only fair to Cuba to say that the United States also received benefits from this arrangement in the past. In exchange for a premium price, the Cuban sugar industry maintained large stocks which were freely made available to us at fair prices during times of crisis such as the Korean conflict and the Suez incident.

This year, with the termination of the existing congressional authority, it became necessary to obtain new legislation. New considerations influenced United States decisions. First, given the savage attacks on the United States which mounted in intensity week by week, growing Sino-Soviet influence in Cuba, and the repeated assertions by the highest officials in the Castro regime concerning political and commercial advantages of selling Cuban sugar elsewhere, we had to take into account the possibility that a political decision would be taken either to refuse to sell to the United States or to sharply reduce the amount of sugar that would be made available to us. For example, as late as August 13, 1960, the Minister of Finance, Raúl Cepero Bonilla, stated that "for the next year, it would be much more advantageous to Cuba if the United States did not buy a single grain of sugar." These and other state-

ments by officials of the Castro regime were accompanied by agreements committing Cuba to sell large quantities of sugar to the Sino-Soviet bloc, accompanied by indications that the bloc was prepared to barter or purchase even larger quantities of sugar.

I do not wish to dwell here on the inconsistency between the thesis, on the one hand, that Cuba needs to reduce its trade with the United States because the terms offered by the Sino-Soviet bloc are more advantageous and, on the other, the claim that the Cuban economy is damaged by our reduction in the Cuban quota. I only wish to point out that ordinary prudence requires us to take into account that even the possibility that these threats will be carried into effect poses a problem because of our dependence on Cuba for such large quantities of sugar. Of course, alternate sources of supplies can be developed. But this takes time and the assurance—which because of lack of legislation providing for the future we have not been able to give—that expanded production elsewhere will find a durable market in the United States. Second, even if the Castro regime should desire to continue to sell sugar to the United States in the quantities we need, we can have no assurance that it will be able to do so.

Estimates of production are, of course, only estimates, regardless of whether they are made by the United States or by others. Our experts think that Cuba may produce as little as 4,900,000 tons of sugar in 1961. Also, I am informed that the Cuban Foreign Commerce Bank has circulated forms for letters of credit covering jute sugar bags for only 4,800,000 Spanish long tons of sugar. If we accept this estimate of the Cuban Bank, and if we take into account estimates of used sugar bags on hand, it would appear that the Castro regime, in spite of its statements to the contrary, really expects the crop to be somewhere between 4,900,000 and 5,300,000 Spanish long tons. This is a substantial reduction from last year's crop. And there is good reason to believe production will drop still further in the future. But regardless of whether these estimates are accurate, the fact remains that we no longer consider Cuba a safe source of supply in quantities adequate for our needs. This is a judgment which only those who have the responsibility for assuring an ade-

quate supply for the United States consumer can make.

Alleged Curtailment of Commercial Credits

A third charge of aggression, also in the economic field, relates to the alleged curtailment of commercial credits to the Cuban Government and economy. In the United States commercial banks are privately controlled. As a result of certain internal policies of the Cuban Government, a commercial backlog of debts owing to United States exporters was accumulated in excess of \$100 million. The manifest financial and commercial irresponsibility of the Cuban Government and the heavy losses entailed by American institutions engaged in commercial transactions with Cuban enterprises are the reason for curtailment of credit by them. This has not been the result of any policy of the Government of the United States.

The fourth specific charge of aggression, also economic in character, relates to the refusal of two American oil concerns to continue to supply petroleum and its products. These two companies had been supplying products to the Cuban Government for a year and a half without more than token payment. The accumulated indebtedness owing to these companies exceeded \$50 million. Negotiations were in progress looking toward an agreement with the Cuban Government under which a partial payment of this debt would have been accomplished and future deliveries placed on a normal commercial credit basis. At the last minute, however, the Cuban Government imposed a new condition, namely, that the companies use large quantities of Soviet crude in lieu of crude oil produced by these companies in Venezuela. It is not difficult to understand why these companies which are charged with responsibility to their own stockholders were unwilling to become mere agents for the processing of Soviet crude displacing their own production.

Charge of Refusal To Negotiate

One other point. The Cuban Foreign Minister has asserted that the United States Government refused to negotiate with the Revolutionary Government of Cuba when, last February, it decided to name a commission to conduct negotiations in Washington. I need not point out that the Gov-

ernment of Cuba, in its proposal, suggested that the Government of the United States should bind both the Executive and the Congress to refrain from any action whatever which the Government of Cuba might consider to affect its interests while leaving the Government of Cuba free to negotiate or procrastinate as it chose. It is appropriate to ask, however, why the Government of Cuba deliberately refrained from quoting my Government's reply²³ in its entirety. I say deliberately refrained because, Mr. Chairman, this is the third time that the Government of Cuba has truncated this note before responsible international bodies to serve its own purpose in completely distorting the position of the U.S. Government in this matter. The fact is that the part of the United States note which Minister Roa has again deleted from his presentation to this body went on to affirm the friendship between the Cuban and American peoples and to welcome any proposals which the Cuban Government might wish to make, the subjects which might be discussed, as well as the manner and the place in which negotiations might be conducted. It may be well to recall to the Foreign Minister of Cuba the full text of the closing paragraph of the note sent on February 29, 1960, by the U.S. Ambassador in Cuba, which he has again found it so convenient to omit:

The Government of the United States for its part firmly intends to continue by its conduct and through its utterances to reaffirm the spirit of fraternal friendship which, as Your Excellency so well stated, has bound and does bind our two peoples and which the Government of the United States believes is earnestly cherished by them. Prior to the initiation of negotiations and through normal diplomatic channels the Government of the United States would wish to explore with the Government of Cuba the subjects to be discussed and the manner and place in which negotiations might be conducted. Accordingly, I would welcome, for transmittal to my Government, any proposals which Your Excellency might care to submit in these respects.

To this date, despite the several subsequent efforts to elicit a reply from the Government of Cuba, none has been forthcoming. When, shortly after the note referred to above was delivered, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba designated Dr. José Miró Cardona, who preceded Dr. Castro as Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Govern-

²³ For text of U.S. note of Feb. 29, 1960, see BULLETIN of Mar. 21, 1960, p. 440.

ment, as its Ambassador to Washington, there was high expectation that he would carry forward the negotiations. He never arrived. After months of waiting, he was forced to seek asylum in the Argentine Embassy in Havana after protesting the increasing role of communism in Cuba. He is still there.

In conclusion, I wish to distinguish once again between the basic issues which threaten hemispheric peace and security and those of a bilateral character between Cuba and the United States. On the first, we have filed resolutions which we believe contain the essentials for action here. On the latter, I believe that a factfinding commission of the type I have suggested should be established to separate fact from fiction, so that the Organization of American States will have an adequate basis for passing a judgment on the assertions which have been made. An examination of each of these charges will, I am confident, demonstrate that the United States has not only satisfactorily complied with its obligations but has exercised great restraint in the face of continuous provocation.

And finally, Mr. Chairman and fellow Ministers, I wish to turn from these details of problems with the United States, which Cuba has largely created for itself, to the human relationship between the people of the United States and those of Cuba—yes, and those of all Latin America.

As Ambassador Lodge suggested during his discussion of these matters with Foreign Minister Roa in the United Nations, the United States which the Minister has described in such detail is not the United States which we, its citizens, know. Neither is it, I venture to say, the United States which is known to the people of Cuba or to those of the other countries represented here.

Many people from my country live and have lived in your countries, and many from your countries have lived in the United States. We cannot, of course, speak for the impressions which you have of these contacts and associations which have been so constant over the years, but we can and do say that we of the United States value tremendously the friendship of your citizens which has done so much to create in this continent an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding.

We do not believe that this spirit of mutual

purpose in the way of democracy can in the long run be destroyed by forces whose principal motive is to sow hatred and distrust in order that they may deprive every independent nation of the liberty its people enjoy and of the opportunity which it has to move forward toward increased political and economic development in freedom. For our part, I can say that we shall continue unceasingly our efforts to strengthen and develop further the conditions of life and spirit which have made the freedom of the Americas one of the hopes of the world.

DECLARATION OF SAN JOSÉ, COSTA RICA¹¹

Unofficial translation

The Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

1. Condemns emphatically the intervention or the threat of intervention, even when conditional, by an extracontinental power in the affairs of the American republics and declares that the acceptance of a threat of extracontinental intervention by any American state jeopardizes American solidarity and security, wherefor the Organization of American States is under obligation to disapprove it and reject it with equal vigor;

2. Rejects, also, the attempt of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use of the political, economic, or social situation of any American state, inasmuch as that attempt is capable of destroying hemispheric unity and jeopardizing the peace and the security of the hemisphere;

3. Reaffirms the principle of nonintervention by any American state in the internal or external affairs of the other American states, and reiterates that each state has the right to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and naturally, respecting the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality, and as a consequence, no American state may intervene for the purpose of imposing upon another American state its ideologies or political, economic, or social principles;

4. Reaffirms that the inter-American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism and that democracy will achieve the full scope of its objectives in the hemisphere only when all the American republics conduct themselves in accordance with the principles stated in the Declaration of Santiago, Chile, which was approved at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the observance of which it recommends as soon as possible;

5. Proclaims that all member states of the regional organization are under obligation to submit to the discipline of the inter-American system, voluntarily and freely agreed upon, and that the soundest guarantee of their

¹¹ Adopted on Aug. 28 by a vote of 19-0. The Dominican Republic did not participate in the Seventh Meeting, and Cuba withdrew before the vote was taken.

sovereignty and their political independence stems from compliance with the provisions of the Charter of the Organization of American States;

6. Declares that all controversies between member states should be resolved by the measures for peaceful solution that are contemplated in the Inter-American system;

7. Reaffirms its faith in the regional system and its confidence in the Organization of American States, created to achieve an order of peace and justice that excludes any possible aggression, to promote solidarity among its members, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their political independence, since it is in this Organization that the members find the best guarantee for their evolution and development;

8. Resolves that this declaration shall be known as "The Declaration of San José, Costa Rica."

DEPARTURE STATEMENT, SAN JOSE, AUGUST 29

The two meetings of foreign ministers which have just concluded here in San José have reaffirmed the faith of the governments and people of the hemisphere in the Organization of American States. Our regional organization has proven that the principles on which it is based must be followed equally by all of its members, who have freely submitted to its discipline.

The international conduct of the Governments of two of our members, the Dominican Republic and Cuba, has been the subject of searching scrutiny during our deliberations here in San José. In the Sixth Meeting unprecedented measures directed against the Dominican Government were imposed. The Declaration of San José adopted at the Seventh Meeting constitutes a clear indictment of the Castro government of Cuba. And particularly the role which it has played in furthering the Sino-Soviet efforts of intervention into this hemisphere. The attention of the other American Republics will continue to be focused on the future behavior of the Governments of these two members of the community—judging them on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Santiago and the charter of the OAS. The United States delegation firmly associated itself with the feeling of so many of its colleagues in hoping that the people of the Dominican Republic and Cuba will have the opportunity quickly to return their Governments to the principles of freedom and true democracy within the inter-American system.

On leaving San José I wish to pay the highest

tribute to the Government and people of Costa Rica. The warm hospitality and friendship which they extended to our delegations made our stay here unforgettable.

The excellent arrangements, the democratic attitude, and the well-merited pride of the Costa Rican people in their exemplary civic institutions provided an ideal atmosphere for these deliberations we have just concluded. On behalf of my delegation may I extend grateful thanks for all of the kindness which you have extended to us and assure you that the noble example of Costa Rica is one which gives inspiration to efforts to perfect the institutions which give meaning and significance to our American way of life.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, WASHINGTON, AUGUST 29

Press release 498 dated August 29

There should be no question in anyone's mind as to the success of the meetings of foreign ministers at San José in strengthening the effectiveness of the inter-American system. Through their representatives there, the peoples of the hemisphere expressed their determination to protect their heritage of freedom—not only from Sino-Soviet intervention but also those within the hemisphere who would lend themselves as tools for such intervention.

The indictment at San José of the Castro government of Cuba was clear—both as to its international conduct and its failure to modify its domestic institutions to conform with the principles of representative democracy agreed to by all of the American Republics in the Declaration of Santiago over a year ago.

The collective measures against the Dominican Government, unanimously agreed upon, express the condemnation by the American Republics of the actions taken by the Dominican Republic against another American state and its president. These measures are intended to contribute to the establishment there of a government which will be both representative and responsive to its obligations within the inter-American system.

The sixth and seventh meetings of foreign ministers at San José underscored the obligations of member states to submit themselves to the discipline of the inter-American system. The attention

of the hemisphere will continue to be focused on these two delinquent members of the regional organization.

The inter-American system embodies the dynamism which can expect compliance with the inter-American principles subscribed to freely by all of the American Republics in the Santiago Declaration and the charter of the OAS.

U.S. Submits Supplement to Document on Cuba to OAS Ministerial Meeting

Press release 480 dated August 23

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The U.S. delegation to the Meetings of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers at San José, Costa Rica, has submitted for consideration additional data on Cuban responsibility for increased tensions in the Western Hemisphere. The document, entitled "Supplement to Document on Responsibility of Cuban Government for Increased International Tensions in the Hemisphere," was transmitted to the secretariat of the meeting on August 22, 1960, at San José.

TEXT OF SUPPLEMENT¹

SUPPLEMENT TO DOCUMENT ON RESPONSIBILITY OF CUBAN GOVERNMENT FOR INCREASED INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IN THE HEMISPHERE

This supplement provides information on the actions of the Cuban Government additional to that provided in the document presented to the Inter-American Peace Committee on August 2, 1960. This supplementary information gives added confirmation to the facts stated in the basic document of August 1, 1960. It brings out three significant additional facts, however.

1. Cuba is establishing a training program for Communist agents and guerrillas to spread the Communist revolution throughout Latin America. This is being done through an international work brigade recently established in Cuba with the support of the Soviet-sponsored World Federation of Democratic Youth.

2. The Cuban Government has opened the assault on the remaining vestige of individual liberty in Cuba—religious freedom.

3. Contradicting previous statements that the US re-

¹For text of the original memorandum, submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee on Aug. 2, see BULLETIN of Aug. 29, 1960, p. 317. Items in the supplement are keyed to the original memorandum by section numbers and headings.

duction of the Cuban sugar quota constituted "economic aggression," its Minister of Commerce announced it would be "more advantageous to Cuba" if the US ceased all sugar purchases from Cuba.

II. The Practice of the Revolutionary Government in Governing Cuba—Disregard for the Principles Stated in the Declaration of Santiago

D. FREEDOM FOR THE INDIVIDUAL

4. Suppression of Labor

Labor delegations to the Latin American Youth Congress joined with the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba* in a joint declaration of August 3, 1960, which:

a) Pledged solidarity by the Cuban and Latin American labor delegates in support for the Cuban revolution and the signing of a mutual assistance pact between the CTC and *Central Unico de Trabajadores de Chile* (CUTCH).

b) Hailed the Cuban revolution as opening the way to the national liberation of all Latin America, welcomed the support and friendship of the Soviet Union and Communist China, emphasized the threat of aggression by Yankee imperialism and its "tool", the Organization of American States, and pledged the workers of Latin America to give their lives if necessary to repel such aggression.

c) Endorsed a movement to create a Latin American labor group to support the struggle against internal reactionaries and the forces of imperialist monopolies.

d) Alerted labor organizations to combat any effort by imperialists to use the OAS at San José, Costa Rica, as a means for attacking Cuba.

6. Attacks on Religious Freedom

The Castro dictatorship has moved to eliminate the last remaining vestige of individual liberties in Cuba—the right to freedom of worship. The Communist orientation of the Cuban Government and its relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc concerned the Church so deeply that a pastoral letter on the subject from the Archbishops and Bishops of Cuba was read in Catholic Churches throughout Cuba on August 7, 1960. After expressing strong approval of the original social welfare objectives of the Cuban revolution, the letter said:

"In recent months, the Government of Cuba has established close commercial, cultural, and diplomatic relations with the Governments of the principal Communist countries, especially with the Soviet Union. . . . We are deeply concerned over the fact that, in connection with these events, journalists, members of the Government, labor union leaders, and even certain high Government officials have repeatedly praised warmly the way of life prevailing in those nations, and have suggested in speeches delivered both within and outside of Cuba coincidences and similarities of aims and procedures, between the social revolutions of those countries and the Cuban revolution.

"This point concerns us deeply, because Catholicism

and Communism are based on two diametrically opposed concepts of man and of the world, which can never be reconciled.

"We condemn Communism . . . because it is an essentially materialistic and atheistic doctrine, and because the Governments guided by it are among the worst enemies the Church and mankind have known throughout their history. . . ."

"We also condemn Communism because it is a system that brutally denies the fundamental rights of man; because, to obtain total state control of the means of production, they establish everywhere a dictatorial regime in which a small group is installed in power by using police terroristic methods on the rest of the population; . . . because [it converts] all citizens . . . into virtual slaves of the state; . . . because it subordinates family life to the state . . . training children in the manner desired by the government. . . ."

Quite naturally, the reading of this pastoral letter has produced strong reactions from the new governing group of Cuba. Some church-goers were attacked on leaving church, and in one case a priest had to be given police protection from revolutionaries. In another case, pro-Castro elements started fighting within the church. *Revolution*, the semi-official organ of the Government, in its edition of August 8, 1960, defied and threatened the Church.

After a special mass at the ancient Columbus Cathedral in Habana on August 9, revolutionary thugs attacked emerging communicants and insulted, threatened, assaulted and stoned them.

The following day, August 10, President Osvaldo Dorticos, alluding to clashes between church-goers and hecklers and to the arrest of two priests, said that the "provocations" and "counterrevolutionary activities" of Cuban Roman Catholics would be taken care of by "the reaction of revolutionary Catholics." (It is significant to point out that, under the law of the Revolutionary Government, "counterrevolutionary activity" is a crime which may be punishable by death.)

According to the statement of Dr. Castro on August 11, 1960, the "provocations" of the Church were the work of "scribes and Pharisees who are serving Yankee imperialism and its partner, Franco." He added:

"There is no doubt that the American Embassy has thrown into combat its last pawns. There is no doubt that imperialism, the partner of Franco and his Fascism, has utilized the influence of Franco so that he will mobilize as many Fascist priests as can be found to fight against the revolution."

Dr. Castro was threatening when, stating that the "responsibility of their provocation" rested on them, he said that the Government would give them "time to realize they are in error, time to reflect and time to change their actions."

Dr. Castro, in condemning the Catholic Church in Cuba, drew a parallel between his Cuban revolution and the earthly career of Jesus Christ when he said:

"Those who condemn [the Cuban revolution] condemn Christ, and they would be capable of crucifying Christ because He did what we are doing."

7. Restriction on Travel

The Cuban Government has recently announced that outstanding exit permits will be cancelled as of August 22, 1960. This will result in a tightened official control

of foreign travel by Cubans and other residents of Cuba, and is suggestive of the practice of Communist governments in this respect. This amounts to a partial raising of what may be called a "cane curtain" serving to isolate the Cuban people from normal and customary contacts with the outside world.

E. EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

Illustrative of the persecution of the professional classes, in this case the respected Habana Bar Association, which was dispossessed of its offices by a usurping group of Communist-inclined dissident lawyers, is the declaration issued by the Association and published in *Información* on August 6, whereby the Governing Board:

a) Declared the professorships in the School of Law at the University of Habana in dispute, warning that any lawyer performing functions inherent in the professorships would be guilty of breach of professional ethics.

b) Made public its decision to resist the action taken by a small group of lawyers who illegally occupy the Association premises.

c) Suspended the payment of dues to the Association.

d) Urged lawyers to remain away from the offices of the Association, and not to attend meetings called by persons who do not legitimately represent the Association.

A Government-inspired proposal to call a general assembly of the Habana Bar Association to elect a new slate of officers suggests that the technique used to oust legitimate officers of the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba* may be repeated against the Bar Association.

III. Practices of the Cuban Revolutionary Government in International Affairs:

A. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND SINO-SOVIET COMMUNISM

1. Cuban Relations with Sino-Soviet Bloc

International Work Brigade. An international work brigade, a common Communist device, has brought to Cuba about 200 persons from numerous countries, including Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Thailand, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, North Korea, North Vietnam, Communist China, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Algeria, Spain, Cyprus, France, Great Britain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, and all of the Latin American countries. The members of this work brigade arrived in Habana in the first days of August, 1960, and all are said to be members of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, a Communist-dominated organization.

The purposes for which the "brigadeers" have visited Cuba are to assist in the construction of an educational center in the Sierra Maestra, and to do manual work. The last stated purpose is incongruous in the light of the unemployment in Cuba at the present time.

That the work brigade may have other purposes is indicated by the statement of one of the members, who

was quoted in *Revolución* as saying, "We are . . . disposed to defend Cuba with arms if she is attacked."

The international work brigade device further stamps the Government of Dr. Castro as being of a Communist character, and reveals the closeness of its practices to those of the Sino-Soviet pattern.

Scholarships to Communist Countries. Ernesto Guevara has recently stated that a large number of scholarships would soon be given to Cubans to study technological skills in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Communist China, and that preparatory language courses would be offered in the University of Habana.

Speaking at the opening session of the Latin American Youth Congress on July 28, 1960, Guevara virtually stated that the Cuban revolution is Marxist. According to his statement, if the Cuban movement is Marxist, "it is because the revolution discovered by its method the road that Marx laid out" and "if we do that which is called Marxism, it is because we discovered it."

B. CUBAN INTERVENTIONIST ACTIVITIES IN THE HEMISPHERE

2. Support of Revolutionary Movements

On the occasion of the opening of the Latin American Youth Congress on July 28, 1960, in Habana, Ernesto Guevara, eulogized a Puerto Rican rebellion movement, by saying:

"And we wish to greet also one of the delegations that has suffered most perhaps in all America, that of Puerto Rico, which still today . . . keeps fighting to take the first step, perhaps the most difficult one, that of achieving at least formally a free government. And we wish the delegates from Puerto Rico to convey my greeting and that of all Cuba to Pedro Albizu Campos; we wish them to carry to Pedro Albizu Campos all our heartfelt cordiality, all our recognition for the road that he has laid out with his valor, and all our fraternal sentiments as free men toward a free man, in spite of his being in a dungeon of the self-styled North American democracy."

On August 2, at a luncheon given by the Government-controlled news agency, *Prensa Latina*, for the delegates to the Youth Congress, the director of the agency, Jorge Masetti, said:

"We will continue to announce our presence to our brothers in Puerto Rico and Panamá, and we will continue to tell them, 'Plant bombs, throw out the gringos!'"

C. ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY

1. Attacks by Cuban Leaders

Recent statements by Cuban leaders have again revealed the contempt with which the OAS is regarded by the Cuban Government, and the official Cuban view that Latin American nations which support it are "slaves" and "lackeys" of the U.S.

Raúl Castro, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed

Forces speaking before the *Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba* (CTC) and the Latin American Youth Congress at Habana on August 4, 1960, stated that US:

. . . "admirals and generals advocated direct aggression [against Cuba]. The other trend was for multi-lateral action. . . . An instrument was needed in order to maneuver through multilateral action. This was the OAS, which has lost all its prestige. . . . This organization only serves to legalize the aggressions against Latin America."

He disparaged the OAS further in a television speech the following day:

"We convened an OAS meeting ourselves the other day in the CTC. Representatives from all Latin America were there. We convened the revolutionary OAS at the headquarters of the revolutionary CTC. Latin American youth and leaders expressed the support of 200 million Latin American men and women for the Cuban revolution."

On August 6, 1960, Antonio Núñez Jiménez, Executive Director of the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), in a speech before the Latin American Youth Congress at Habana, said:

"Among the American States there is a vandal, an assassin like Trujillo. There is seated a representative of the Somoza dynasty. There is seated a little old man who dances through the fracas to show his people that he is strong, Ydigoras. And there are seated others, and then they think that they [the US] are going to achieve there [at San José] what they have not achieved by bribery, bombardments, the sugar quota, the petroleum, armed aggression, etc., but I am sure that the next time I speak to you in public I shall bring to view the failure of aggressive intentions by means of the OAS also."

Dr. Castro, the Prime Minister, had more things to say about the OAS in a speech before the closing session of the Latin American Youth Congress on August 7, 1960:

"The accomplices of the Guatemalan affair were the lackeys who used the OAS to support US aggression against a peaceful people, who wanted to wage a revolution in order to free themselves. You must know that the protective doctrine of the Yankees is called 'The Monroe Doctrine' and that they have used this doctrine to make Latin America a protectorate. . . . Now these same gentlemen are trying to maneuver the OAS against us. Why was no OAS meeting called when a ship laden with ammunition mysteriously blew up, after the US Government had failed in its negotiations to prevent a certain country from selling us arms and munitions? Why was no OAS meeting called when the Pentagon met to formulate plans to attack Cuba?"

"Yet when the USSR declares that it will support Cuba if attacked, they do not like it. Obviously, there will not be any need of that support, if we are not attacked. The 'Yankees' have been busy distributing our sugar quota to their servants before the OAS meets. They have been giving up our loans and offering help to their lackeys before the OAS meets. How can these slaves judge our case honestly, if they have already sold their souls to the US imperialists?"

"They are not going to the OAS to give us a fair trial; they are going there to watch Herter's finger and to do what he bids them do."

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers, according to Dr. Castro, was no more than "a Yankee maneuver against Cuba. What does it matter if the OAS condemns us?"

Foreign Minister Raúl Roa, also speaking on August 7,

described the OAS as a "Ministry of Colonies" of the US Government, and said that the coming San José meeting was a new North American maneuver against Cuba. Regarding the Rio Treaty, he said it was an instrument of US military policy. "This treaty, like the Monroe Doctrine, was not made to help Latin America, but to aid the predominance of the US in Latin America."

With respect to the OAS, Roa had the following to say:

"We cannot contaminate ourselves with pre-determined decisions of the OAS; we cannot contaminate ourselves with this atmosphere without carrying an oxygen container in our pocket, the pure and clean oxygen of the Cuban revolution. We neither surrender nor sell ourselves."

A vote against Cuba at San José would not matter, according to Roa. "We would laugh at this, because we would already have denounced all its machinations."

President Osvaldo Dorticós, on August 10, spoke of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers as having been "called to attack our country and our revolution". He went on to say that "Many of the Latin American Governments", who serve the interests of US imperialism, "will serve on their knees the order of their imperialist boss". He further stated that the Government of Cuba did not feel itself obligated by the 1954 resolution of the OAS at Caracas which called Communism a threat to the Americas.

President Osvaldo Dorticós, on August 13, saluted the Meeting of Foreign Ministers at San José by stating before a mass meeting in Habana that it was invoked by imperialists. He arrogantly added that it would be the Cuban Delegation, not the Foreign Ministers, that would speak for the Latin American peoples.

E. CUBAN ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION AND AGGRESSION

The duplicity of Cuban economic policy was made unmistakably clear on August 13, 1960, by the Minister of Commerce, Dr. Raúl Cepero Bonilla, who informed a television audience:

1. That Cuba's sugar sales had increased under the Castro regime. He did not explain that these sales would result in less income for Cuba or that the cost of production of Cuban sugar exceeds the world market price for which most of the sales to countries other than the US were made.

2. That "for the next year it would be much more advantageous to Cuba if the United States did not buy a single grain of [Cuban] sugar." He did not explain that this was a contradiction of previous statements that the reduction of the Cuban sugar quota in the US market meant "economic aggression" against Cuba, which, in turn, was announced as "justification" for arbitrary seizure of more than \$1 billion invested by private US citizens in Cuba.

3. That Cuba would not sell sugar to countries that might benefit from the reduction in Cuba's sugar quota. This warning was addressed to all countries, but the Minister specifically mentioned Brazil.

United States Severs Relations With Dominican Republic

Department Statement

Press release 489 dated August 26

A United States Embassy official in Ciudad Trujillo today [August 26] delivered a note¹ to the Dominican Foreign Office advising that Government that the Government of the United States was severing diplomatic relations with the Government of the Dominican Republic and was withdrawing its diplomatic mission. This action is in consonance with the decisions taken at the Sixth Meeting of Consultation of American Foreign Ministers in San José, Costa Rica.² At the same time the Dominican Government was requested to recall its diplomatic mission in the United States.

It is expected that consular functions will be continued.

A friendly power has been requested to assume responsibility for diplomatic representation of the United States in the Dominican Republic.

President Asks for Discretion in Purchase of Dominican Sugar

MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER¹

To the Congress of the United States:

The meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at San Jose, Costa Rica, has just completed its deliberations on the charges made against the Dominican Republic by the Government of Venezuela, as well as on the flagrant violation of human rights by the Trujillo regime.⁴ The Foreign Ministers voted unanimously to condemn the Dominican acts of aggression and intervention against Venezuela, culminating in the attempt on the life of the President of that country, and resolved to (1) break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, and (2) interrupt partially economic relations with that country

¹ Not printed.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 355.

³ H. Doc. 451, 86th Cong., 2d sess.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 355.

beginning with a suspension of trade in arms and implements of war, with the provision that the Council of the Organization of American States shall study the feasibility and desirability of extending this trade suspension to other articles. The United States joined with the other American Republics in approving these measures.

Some 322,000 short tons of the sugar not being purchased from Cuba pursuant to the reduction in the Cuban quota⁵ is, under the July amendment to the Sugar Act, to be allocated to the Dominican Republic. This allocation is in addition to the Dominican Republic's 1960 quota amounting to approximately 130,000 tons. Since total imports of sugar from the Dominican Republic in 1959 amounted only to about 84,000 tons, the statutory allocation would give that country a large sugar bonus seriously embarrassing to the United States in the conduct of our foreign relations throughout the hemisphere.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Government should have discretion to purchase elsewhere the quantity apportioned to the Dominican Republic pursuant to the July amendment to the Sugar Act. I therefore request legislation providing that amounts which would be purchased in the Dominican Republic pursuant to the July amendment need not be purchased there, but may be purchased from any foreign countries without regard to allocation.

I would also remind the Congress that the Sugar Act's present termination date of March 31, 1961—only 3 months after the reconvening of Congress next January—could cause a serious gap in supplies, because it often takes as much as 1 or 2 months after purchase for sugar from distant areas to reach our refineries. Thus an extension of the Sugar Act beyond its present termination date is necessary at this session in order to protect consumers in the United States against the possibility of unreasonable prices for sugar next February and March.

I request that the Congress give urgent consideration to and take favorable action on the proposed legislation.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 23, 1960.

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 140.

The actions of the Trujillo regime, both inside and outside the Dominican Republic, have been for some time the cause of grave concern to the United States and the other nations of the hemisphere.

On June 3d of this year, the Inter-American Peace Committee of the Organization of American States issued a report, in which the United States concurred, which concluded that the Dominican Republic has contributed to political tensions in the Caribbean area by its flagrant violation of human rights including "the use of intimidation and terror as a political weapon." Seven Latin American countries had already broken diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic before the meeting of Foreign Ministers convened on August 16 in San José to discuss the problem which the Trujillo regime presents to the hemisphere.

At this meeting the charges brought against the Dominican Government by Venezuela were considered. The Foreign Ministers voted unanimously to condemn the Dominican acts of aggression and intervention against Venezuela, culminating in the attempt on the life of the President of that country. Under the rules of the OAS, neither Venezuela nor the Dominican Republic participated in the voting. The Ministers resolved (1) to break diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and (2) to interrupt partially economic relations with that country beginning with a suspension of trade in arms and implements of war. They also provided that the Council of the Organization of American States shall study the feasibility and desirability of extending this trade suspension to other articles. The United States joined with the other American Republics in approving these measures.

The United States was prepared to go further in attempting to insure that human rights would be respected in the Dominican Republic and that the Dominican people would be permitted to enjoy the benefits of representative democracy. The United States had proposed that a committee of the OAS be established to supervise free elections in the country and that, if the Trujillo regime did not accept such a committee, then economic sanc-

* Made before the House Committee on Agriculture on Aug. 24 (press release 484).

tions would be imposed. The final resolution of the Foreign Ministers, however, took the form just outlined in condemning the present Dominican Government.

In the light of these circumstances it is apparent that the U.S. Government would be in an extremely equivocal position if our Government were now to grant to the Dominican Republic an economic benefit by authorizing the additional purchase of nearly four times as much sugar as the United States imported from that country last year, especially when more than one-third of the purchase value would be a windfall resulting from the premium of the U.S. price over the world price.

To reduce the sugar quota of a country with a leftist dictator only to grant a substantial portion of that quota to a dictator whose activities have been formally condemned by all the American states would seriously handicap the conduct of our foreign relations throughout the hemisphere.

In applying the provisions of section 408(b) (2) of the Sugar Act, as amended, the Secretary of Agriculture has, pursuant to Proclamation 3355 of July 6, 1960, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, apportioned and authorized the purchase by private importers of the major part of the amount of sugar by which the Cuban quota has been reduced as a result of that proclamation. In making the apportionment pursuant to subparagraph (iii) of section 408(b) (2), an apportionment of approximately 322,000 short tons, raw value, was made to the Dominican Republic but was "not authorized for purchase at this time."

The importation of approximately 130,000 tons from the Dominican Republic has already been authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture for calendar year 1960. This figure consists of approximately 81,000 tons which is its regular quota and about 50,000 additional tons accruing by law as a result of increases in estimates of United States domestic consumption. If this authorization should be still further increased by an additional 322,000 tons, as a result of the reduction made by the President in U.S. purchases from Cuba, total imports from the Dominican Republic for calendar year 1960 would be approximately 452,000 tons as compared with total imports from that country of about 84,000 tons in 1959.

These facts and considerations lead us to the

conclusion that it is clearly desirable—indeed urgent—that the legislation should explicitly provide that amounts which would be purchased in the Dominican Republic pursuant to subsection (iii) of section 408(b) (2) need not be purchased or may be purchased from any foreign countries without regard to allocation.

King and Queen of Denmark To Visit U.S. in October

The Department of State announced on August 22 (press release 477) that arrangements are being completed for the visit to the United States October 4-17 of Their Majesties the King and Queen of Denmark.

King Frederik and Queen Ingrid, who as Crown Prince and Crown Princess toured the United States in 1939, are returning to this country to make a state visit at the invitation of President Eisenhower. They will arrive at the Military Air Transport Service Terminal, Washington National Airport, on October 11, where they will be met by the President.

Preceding their arrival at Washington, Their Majesties will visit Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Chicago. The party will remain in Washington until October 14, when they will depart for New York City and Albany.

Czechoslovakia Queried on Barring of Mail Bearing Masaryk Stamp

Press release 487 dated August 25

Following is the text of a note which the Department of State delivered to the Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Washington on August 24.

The Acting Secretary of State [Douglas Dillon] presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic [Jaroslav Žantovský] and refers to the reported rejection by Czechoslovak postal authorities of United States mail bearing postage stamps honoring the late President Thomas Masaryk of Czechoslovakia.

This postage stamp was issued in March 1960¹

¹ BULLETIN of Mar. 28, 1960, p. 494.

in keeping with the practice of honoring outstanding leaders of other nations who championed the cause of independence, including such men as Lafayette, Bolivar, and Magsaysay. Since its issuance the United States Government has received many reports from persons in the United States to the effect that letters bearing this postage stamp which they had mailed to addresses in Czechoslovakia had been returned by Czechoslovak postal authorities. This action appears to be directed against a man who has enjoyed great respect in the world for his humanitarian and democratic principles and for his accomplishments in behalf of Czechoslovak statehood and who, in his lifetime, had warm and close associations with the American people.

In the absence of information to the contrary, the United States Government will regretfully be forced to conclude that it is the policy of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to bar international mail to addresses in Czechoslovakia bearing United States postage stamps honoring the late President Masaryk.

Air Coordinating Committee Abolished

White House press release dated August 11

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President has issued an Executive order terminating the Air Coordinating Committee. The order takes effect in 60 days.

The creation of the Federal Aviation Agency in 1958 with responsibilities for many of the matters formerly referred to the ACC, and the inclusion in the 1958 statute of provision for specific types of interagency coordination, have eliminated the need for this Presidentially established Committee.

The Committee was set up in 1946¹ to provide for interagency coordination of aviation activities and responsibilities. The Presidentially established Air Coordinating Committee was needed at that time because of the absence of the present statutory provisions for interagency coordination and because of the narrower responsibilities of the FAA predecessor.

In a memorandum addressed to the heads of

agencies heretofore represented on the Air Coordinating Committee, the President made general provision for future interagency coordination in the aviation field. That coordination pertains to matters which, by reason of law or practical considerations, require agreement of two or more Federal agencies. The President requested the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency to take the initiative to bring into being necessary coordinating arrangements. In view of the fact that a preponderance of matters to be coordinated concern international aspects of aviation, the President specifically indicated that there should be established, under the chairmanship of a representative of the FAA, a group to be concerned with the international aviation field. That group would, as a minimum, have members representing the Federal Aviation Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Civil Aeronautics Board but is to be a small group.

The basic task of the new coordinating group will be to provide recommendations to the Secretary of State on international aviation. The Secretary of State will continue to provide foreign policy guidance to the agencies concerned, to conduct all negotiations with foreign governments, and to appoint and instruct U.S. delegations to international conferences in this field.

In terminating the Air Coordinating Committee the President expressed his thanks to the members and Committee staff and others who assisted for their significant contribution to the advancement of U.S. aviation.

In the Executive order the President directed the Administrator of FAA to make necessary provisions for winding up any outstanding affairs of the ACC.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 10883²

TERMINATION OF THE AIR COORDINATING COMMITTEE

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. The Air Coordinating Committee is hereby terminated.

2. Executive Order No. 10655 of January 28, 1956, relating to the Air Coordinating Committee, and Executive Order No. 10796 of December 24, 1958, amending that order, are hereby revoked.

3. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency shall make such provisions as may be necessary for wind-

¹ BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1946, p. 646.

² 25 Fed. Reg. 7710.

ing up any outstanding affairs of the Air Coordinating Committee, and such provisions may be made at any time after the date of this order.

4. Except as provided in paragraph 3, this order shall become effective on the sixtieth day following the date thereof.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 11, 1966.

MEMORANDUM OF AUGUST 11²

Memorandum for The Secretary of State, The Secretary of Defense, The Secretary of the Treasury, The Postmaster General, The Secretary of Commerce, The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, The Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, The Director of the Bureau of the Budget, The Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

I have today issued an Executive Order terminating the Air Coordinating Committee as of the sixtieth day after today.

Since its inception in 1946, the Air Coordinating Committee has made a significant contribution to the development and coordination of aviation policies and activities of Federal agencies. I wish to thank the members of the Committee, and all who have assisted the Committee, for their services.

It has become evident that a committee established by Presidential Executive Order and concerned with the coordination of both international and domestic aviation matters is no longer needed. In major part, this has resulted from the enactment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which vested enlarged coordination responsibilities in the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency and also provided expressly for certain types of inter-agency coordination.

It is recognized, however, that suitable substitute methods of interagency coordination of aviation matters will be needed in the future. Any interagency arrangements needed for such coordination can be effected without relying on a Presidentially established committee. Accordingly, it is directed that the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency shall initiate such arrangements as may be appropriate to effect the needed interagency coordination and to meet the related requirements of the agencies concerned. The responsibilities of the Adminis-

trator for establishing such coordination arrangements pursuant to this memorandum will pertain primarily to matters in which agreement of two or more agencies is necessary by reason of either law or practical considerations; in other matters the agency having responsibility should adopt such means of obtaining the advice of and informing other agencies as may be appropriate.

In carrying out the responsibilities assigned to him by this memorandum the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency may, subject to law, cause to be established any committees, councils, working groups and liaison arrangements which he deems to be necessary or desirable. Participation in the activities of any such committee or other similar body should be limited to agencies having a substantial interest in subjects under consideration. Any secretariat services required in connection with any such committee or other body should be supplied by the Federal Aviation Agency except as other arrangements may be agreed to by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency and the participating agencies.

The need for formalized interagency coordination, and therefore the need for coordination facilities provided upon the initiative of the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency, may be expected to be greatest in the international field. Without limiting the foregoing portions of this memorandum, I suggest that the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency cause to be established a new interagency group for the purpose of developing recommendations to the Secretary of State. The group should have only a small continuing membership, including, but not necessarily limited to, a representative of the Federal Aviation Agency, as chairman of the group, and representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce and the Civil Aeronautics Board. Any other appropriate agency should participate in the activities of the new group when matters of substantial concern to the agency are under consideration. Any secretariat services for the group should be supplied by the Federal Aviation Agency except as other arrangements may be agreed upon by the Administrator of that Agency and the participating agencies.

The Secretary of State will continue to provide foreign policy guidance to the agencies concerned, to conduct all negotiations with foreign governments, and to appoint and instruct United States delegations to international conferences in this field.

In setting forth in this memorandum certain guidelines respecting arrangements for interagency coordination in the aviation field, it is not my intention to preclude the use of other or additional interagency arrangements permitted by law, with respect to that field.

This memorandum shall be published in the *Federal Register*.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

² 25 Fed. Reg. 7710.

President Urges Congress To Restore Mutual Security Fund Cuts

White House press release dated August 26

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT EISENHOWER

I am gravely concerned by the conference action on mutual security appropriations.

I have repeatedly stated that the appropriation of the full \$4,086 million authorized is vitally needed. Moreover, needs which have developed since my original request, particularly the emergency in the Congo, have made necessary an additional \$100 million for the contingency fund.¹

Only day before yesterday [August 24], by a 67-26 vote, the Senate approved the additional \$100 million and at the same time increased last month's House appropriation of \$3,584 million by \$297 million. The conference, while approving the \$100 million increase in contingency funds, virtually disregarded the Senate restoration in the basic mutual security budget. It accepted only \$31 million—one-tenth of the \$297 million restoration that the Senate had just overwhelmingly approved.

In short, the conference recognized the need for \$100 million of new funds but at the same time slashed by \$265 million the budget to which these new funds are to be added.

This cut would sharply curtail support indispensable to the defense of allies now under intensified Soviet pressure and deny aid urgently needed by other friendly nations struggling under the gravest difficulties to make progress in freedom.

Not only are the funds now provided by the conference inadequate, but also a number of administrative restrictions were retained which would impair the management of the Mutual Security Program.

Surely, in the world situation now confronting

our country, the Congress will not accept these recommendations which fall so short of the need.

I urge that this appropriation be returned to conference. We must, for America, correct its deficiencies.

A congressional rejection of this request will hamper greatly the Nation's Chief Executive who succeeds me next January. Upon him will fall the heavy responsibility of continuing to guide our country in a troubled world. He, no less than I, must have adequate funds to do the job.

LETTER TO SENATE LEADERS

The President on August 26 sent the following letter to Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, Majority Leader of the Senate, and to Senator Everett M. Dirksen, Minority Leader of the Senate.

DEAR SENATOR (JOHNSON) (DIRKSEN): I am deeply disturbed by the action yesterday of the conference on the mutual security appropriation. I cannot state too strongly my belief that a cut of this size will jeopardize the security of the country.

I hope the Senate will reject the Conference Report should the House approve it. Both political parties and all of the major national candidates are publicly committed to the support of an adequate mutual security program. No one can responsibly contend that this Conference Report and the amounts approved constitute adequacy in today's world.

In view of the world-wide scope of this program and the necessity for planning so far ahead in such an effort, time is of the essence. These critical matters simply will not wait until the Congress returns in January, then to assess the results of its actions taken now. There is at the moment such an acceleration of events in the world that we must be forearmed at all times and ready to deal with critical situations as they develop. It must be evident to the Congress from the speed with which the situation in Africa recently developed that we must stay ready and that our free world security programs, economic and military, must be kept continuously adequate. Postponement of these funds needed now may irretrievably cripple us later.

I enclose a public statement that I have just released.

I am sending an identical letter to Senator (Johnson) (Dirksen) and similar communications to the House Leaders.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

¹ For a statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee by Acting Secretary Dillon, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 372.

LETTER TO HOUSE LEADERS

The President on August 26 sent the following letter to Speaker of the House of Representatives Sam Rayburn, and to Congressman Charles A. Halleck, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. (RAYBURN) (HALLECK): I am deeply disturbed by the action yesterday of the conference on the mutual security appropriation. I cannot state too strongly my belief that a cut of this size will jeopardize the security of the country.

I am writing Senator Johnson and Senator Dirksen urging that the Senate reject this Conference Report should, despite all our efforts, the House approve it. I hope I can count on your cooperation in leading the House to recommit the bill so that the final action can conform fully to the national interest.

Both political parties and all of the major national candidates are publicly committed to the support of an adequate mutual security program. No one can responsibly contend that this Conference Report and the amounts approved constitute adequacy in today's world.

In view of the world-wide scope of this program and the necessity for planning so far ahead in such an effort, time is of the essence. These critical matters simply will not wait until the Congress returns in January, then to assess the results of its actions taken now. There is at the moment such an acceleration of events in the world that we must be forearmed at all times and ready to deal with critical situations as they develop. It must be evident to the Congress from the speed with which the situation in Africa recently developed that we must stay ready and that our free world security programs, economic and military, must be kept continuously adequate. Postponement of these funds needed now may irretrievably cripple us later.

I enclose a public statement that I have just released.

I am sending an identical letter to (Speaker Rayburn) (Mr. Halleck).

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Funds Requested To Finance Export Expansion Program

Statement by Acting Secretary Dillon¹

I appeal to you today to consider favorably requests for appropriations to finance the President's export expansion program. I am particularly concerned with the need for \$1,042,000 to finance the Department of State's activities under this program. Without these additional funds it will be impossible for our Foreign Service establishments to service American business adequately

¹ Made before the Senate Appropriations Committee on Aug. 17 (press release 467).

in its search for foreign markets under increasingly competitive conditions. Today our export markets are more important to the Nation than ever before, and we must do all we can to expand them.

We face a wholly changed international economic situation from that which existed at the end of World War II. In the immediate postwar period, the United States was primarily concerned with rebuilding the war-torn economies of other nations. American goods sold themselves to the extent that other countries were able to pay for them. Then our concern was the "dollar gap." Now, however, the other industrial nations of the world have reconstructed their economies and rebuilt their monetary reserves and are competing strongly for world markets.

As a result of these developments the former "dollar gap" has been replaced by a large deficit in the United States balance of payments. In 1958 the deficit amounted to approximately \$3.4 billion, and in 1959 it rose to \$3.7 billion. Figures for the first half of 1960 indicate that there will be a substantial improvement in our payments situation for this year. Even so, the deficit will be larger than what we can continue to afford. We cannot relax our efforts to assure reasonable equilibrium in our balance of international payments over the years ahead.

World trade is larger than ever before and continues to increase. But the United States must participate in this increased trade on a basis which will yield a sufficiently large export surplus to finance our necessary military expenditures abroad, an adequate outflow of private American investment capital, and a portion of the economic and development assistance which we provide under the Mutual Security Program. In short, an adequate export surplus is essential to our national security, our economic and financial health, and the achievement of our foreign policy objectives.

Removal of Discriminations

The only practicable means to develop the large export surplus we need, and thus to restore a reasonable equilibrium in our balance of payments, is to substantially expand American exports.

A first and essential step in expanding our exports has already been taken. This is to open world markets to the American trader by removing foreign discriminations against American

goods. The financial need for such trade discrimination has now been largely eliminated, and remarkable progress has been made in removing them. We are confident that quota discriminations against American exports will cease to be a significant obstacle in the very near future. However, the extent to which American trade takes advantage of these new opportunities will depend upon how vigorous an effort American business makes to sell its products abroad against increasingly keen competition in world markets. It is the purpose of the export expansion program to assist American business in this effort.

The Department of State has already stepped up its assistance to American business in developing export markets. The Foreign Service has significantly increased its reporting of information of interest to American exporters. Our missions have made special studies and recommendations regarding specific products which could best be marketed in their countries. In these efforts they have elicited the help and cooperation of American business abroad. The flow of reports from our posts abroad on trade opportunities for American exporters is one-third higher than last year.

Additional Staff Needs

These improvements have been made within present budget limitations. But the further improvements necessary for full implementation of the export program will require staff additions and improved facilities. For this we need the modest additional appropriations we are now requesting.

Our commercial staffs abroad will be expected to increase their efforts to develop specific opportunities for United States exports and generally to improve the services which they offer. This means more personal attention and assistance to American businessmen and more time spent with the foreign business community.

Our embassy staffs will also devote more time to assisting and supporting the increased level of trade fairs, trade missions, and travel promotion activity being planned. In London and Bangkok our missions will be expected to provide general supervision and local personnel for the permanent United States trade centers being planned for those cities as part of the export program.

This planned increase in the commercial activity of our posts abroad will require additional staff. If we are to accomplish the task, the number of

commercial officers abroad will have to be somewhat more than doubled over a 3-year period. We presently have 112 officers assigned to this work. We will need 125 to 150 more if we are to do the job properly. The present supplemental budget request calls for an increase of 39 such commercial officers as the first phase in this program, in addition to 14 new commercial officer positions already included in the regular fiscal year 1961 budget, making a total of 53. The supplemental budget request will permit us to assign commercial officers to 12 cities where no such officers are presently assigned and to make necessary staff increases in 24 other locations. It also provides for necessary additional local employees in order to bring about a strengthening of commercial staffs. The total request for staff, including supporting personnel in the Department, is \$832,405.

Because personal contact with foreign officials and the foreign business community is basic to successful trade promotion, we also are requesting additional representation funds for use by our commercial staffs abroad. For this we are requesting \$27,000.

Measures are also being taken to improve the quality of staff performance. These include better procedures for assignment and staffing, recruitment, career development, tour of duty, and training. The latter is the only one of these qualitative improvements for which funds are being requested. A modest provision is made for introductory training in foreign languages for commercial officers before they report to posts abroad and also for travel costs relating to the training of both local and American commercial officers. This totals \$33,656, which is included in the figure given above for staff strengthening.

It is also essential to improve the commercial facilities available at our posts abroad. In developing the export expansion program, we undertook a post-by-post survey of existing commercial libraries and promotional materials in order to determine the adequacy of present facilities. The present budget request contains \$115,110 for improvements in worldwide facilities based upon the findings of the survey. The expansion in post facilities, like the rest of the program, will be phased over a 3-year period.

The proposed United States trade centers at London and Bangkok are envisaged as pilot projects. Through these trade centers, United States business will be given, for the first time, an op-

portunity to place on permanent display a wide range of United States products in two representative markets. The degree of success achieved will enable us to evaluate this medium of promoting United States exports. The State Department will be responsible for the administrative and housekeeping costs for the two centers, for which \$67,485 is requested.

Other exporting countries now provide their business interests with substantially greater support than we do. For instance, the United Kingdom now has 50 to 55 commercial officers serving in the United States alone compared to our 112 worldwide.

The export expansion program as a whole is designed to provide American business with services and facilities comparable to those now available to their competitors in other countries. We seek to provide the tools that will enable vast numbers of small business concerns, which have never before exported their products, to enter this competitive field with a reasonable chance to make a profit.

Success of the program would produce benefits going beyond the improvement of our balance of payments. It would benefit labor by providing jobs, help business by increasing output and profit opportunity, and help the economies of the countries with whom we trade through the beneficial effects of healthy commerce, through which nations prosper and grow.

The sums presently being requested for this program are modest but of critical importance considering the stakes involved. In my judgment the program has been well conceived and prepared and is essential to the national interest.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 2d Session

- Great Lakes Pilotage Requirements. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, and Navigation of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on H.R. 10593. March 9-11, 1960. 122 pp.
- Organizing for National Security. The National Security Council. Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part IV. May 10 and 24, 1960. 59 pp.
- Organizing for National Security. Mobilizing Talent for Government Service. Hearings before the Subcommit-

- tee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. Part III. May 11-13, 1960. 145 pp.
- Sale of Vested Enemy Property. Hearing before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 404 and H.R. 1345, bills to amend section 9 (a) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, as amended. May 24, 1960. 89 pp.
- Disposal of Surplus Property Overseas. Hearing before a special subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee on S. 2605, S. 2725, S. 2732, S. 3154, S. 3489, S. 3288, and S. 3493. June 1, 1960. 166 pp.
- Public Law 480 Amendments. Hearings before the House Committee on Agriculture on H.R. 9725, H.R. 11609, H.R. 12104, H.R. 12292, and H.R. 12605. Serial FFF. June 2-14, 1960. 156 pp.
- Report on the Operations of the Department of State. Letter from the Secretary of State transmitting a report on the operations of the Department of State under section 2 of Public Law 584, 79th Congress, as required by that law. H. Doc. 410. June 3, 1960. 156 pp.
- Disarmament Developments, Spring 1960. Hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. June 10, 1960. 49 pp.
- Soviet Espionage Through Poland. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Testimony of Pawel Monat. June 13, 1960. 41 pp.
- Antarctica Legislation, 1960. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Affairs of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. June 13-14, 1960. 123 pp.
- Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission. Hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 3223, a bill to authorize the appropriation to the Commission of \$7.5 million to be used to carry out the provisions of the act of August 5, 1953, as amended. June 16, 1960. 13 pp.
- United States Contributions to International Organizations. Letter from the Acting Secretary of State transmitting the 8th report on the extent and disposition of U.S. contributions to international organizations for the fiscal year 1959, pursuant to section 2 of Public Law 806, 81st Congress. H. Doc. 418. June 17, 1960. 130 pp.
- Amistad Dam and Reservoir. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 12263, an act to authorize conclusion of an agreement for the joint construction by the United States and Mexico of a major international storage dam on the Rio Grande in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of February 3, 1944. June 21-22, 1960. 40 pp.
- Extension of Sugar Act of 1948, as Amended. Hearing before the House Agriculture Committee on H.R. 12311, H.R. 12334, and H.R. 12624. June 22, 1960. 25 pp.
- Report on a Long-range Program for Isthmian Canal Transits. Report of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. H. Rept. 1960. June 23, 1960. 831 pp.
- Office of International Travel. Hearing before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 11342, H.R. 11954, and S. 3102. June 24, 1960. 68 pp.
- Ocean Sciences and National Security. Report of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. Serial h. II. Rept. 2078. July 1, 1960. 180 pp.
- Exposé of Soviet Espionage, May 1960. Prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, and transmitted by direction of the Attorney General for use of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S. Doc. 114. July 2, 1960. 41 pp.
- Extending for 1 Year the Sugar Act of 1948. Conference Report to accompany H.R. 12311. H. Rept. 2090. July 3, 1960. 3 pp.

U.S. Supports U.N. Position in the Congo

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge
U.S. Representative in the Security Council¹*

The Secretary-General has again clearly explained his position on the use of the United Nations Force in the Congo, and the United States fully agrees with his views.²

Together with other members of the Security Council the United States believed that Belgian troops should leave the Congo and that United Nations troops should assume responsibility for maintaining order.

We now think that this has been substantially done. The Secretary-General says that all troops will be out within the week. We warmly congratulate the Belgians for the cooperation they have shown in carrying out the decisions of the Security Council under extremely difficult circumstances. We also congratulate the Secretary-General for getting United Nations troops there promptly so as to make possible the withdrawal—and for getting United Nations troops into Katanga. From the beginning the United States has recognized the Congo as one unit.

While we recognize the utility of consultative committees and note with approval the Secretary-General's plans in that regard, we do not think that anyone should represent the Secretary-General in the Congo other than himself or his agents. We recognize the right of the Congo Government to be consulted by the Secretary-General regarding his plans. We believe that he does consult them, that he will do so in the future, and of course we think that he should.

We do consider it unthinkable that the United Nations should ever draw a racial line. The world has suffered too much from racism for it to raise its head here in this organization.

¹ Made in the Security Council on Aug. 22 (a.m.) (U.S./U.N. press release 3461).

² For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 384.

Mr. [Vasily V.] Kuznetsov [Soviet representative] has referred to the possibility of so-called "volunteers" from Africa as well as from other continents coming to the aid of the Congo.

The United States is opposed to such "volunteers." The United States has made it clear many times that we think that the United Nations should act exclusively in the Congo. When we say "exclusively," we mean not only to exclude "volunteers" but incursions from any quarter.

We think that Mr. Kuznetsov cannot have meant what he said when, in connection with the matter we are now considering, he spoke of the Canadians and the Belgians being allies in NATO. Surely he knows that the Canadians and the Belgians are allies only as regards an attack from the Soviet Union. This is neither germane nor relevant to the Congo. It has nothing to do with it.

Mr. Kuznetsov's suggestion that the Canadian troops should not serve with the Congo force is quite incomprehensible. The Secretary-General has explained why he needed Canadian help. The United States cannot accept any implication that Canada with its magnificent record will not fully and loyally discharge its responsibilities to the United Nations.

Something has been said about the Americans who were employed in the United Nations technical assistance plan in the Congo, and Mr. Kuznetsov complained about them. I would like to say that they are working under a plan approved by the Secretary-General and Prime Minister [Patrice] Lumumba. That is good enough for us, and we think, in view of Mr. Kuznetsov's protestations of loyalty to Mr. Lumumba, that it should be good enough for him.

In any case the few American experts cannot, as Mr. Kuznetsov alleged, threaten the independence of the Congo. No one has ever been enslaved by the United States. These American experts are not under the orders of the United States Government. I do not know whether the Soviet Union regards its citizens who are employed by the United Nations and its agencies as being under

the orders of the Soviet Government, but I can assure him that United States citizens who work for the United Nations are in no position of that kind.

Mr. President, the United Nations is doing a vital job to prevent Congo from becoming an object of international contention and thus a cause of war. This in itself deserves wholehearted support. But beyond that the United Nations is laying the foundations for law and order, for sound administration, and for economic recovery.

This is no time to be looking for fly specks. We are embarked on a great adventure. Let us all get behind this project and put our shoulders to the wheel.

U.S. Asks Inclusion of Item on Hungary in G.A. Agenda

Following are texts of a letter and explanatory memorandum from Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.

U.S./U.N. press release 3460 dated August 21

AUGUST 20, 1960

EXCELLENCY: On the instructions of my Government I have the honor to request that an item entitled "The Question of Hungary" be included as a supplementary item in the agenda of the Fifteenth General Assembly. In accordance with Rule 20, an explanatory memorandum is enclosed.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

HENRY CABOT LODGE

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

The Fourteenth General Assembly in resolution 1454 (XIV),¹ after considering the report of the United Nations Special Representative on Hungary and deploring the continued disregard of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the present Hungarian regime of the General Assembly's resolutions on Hungary, requested Sir Leslie Munro to continue his efforts and called upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and

the present authorities in Hungary to cooperate with him.

On April 8, 1960, the United Nations Special Representative on Hungary announced during a press conference in Geneva that his efforts to consult with Soviet and Hungarian authorities had been rejected. Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any indication that the Soviet and Hungarian authorities are prepared to cooperate with Sir Leslie Munro, we believe that the members of the United Nations should consider further the question of Hungary at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

FAO Conference on Fishery Products To Be Held in U.S. in 1961

Press release 490 dated August 26

The U.S. Government will serve as host to a world conference on the nutritional value of fishery products, sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, scheduled to be held at Washington during the last 2 weeks in September 1961.

The conference will deal with the benefits of fishery products, both for human food and for animal feeding. Considerable research has been accomplished in the United States and in other countries on this subject, and the conference will endeavor to assemble this wealth of widely dispersed information. Recent nutritional research findings by the Department of Interior's Bureau of Commercial Fisheries have shown the importance of fishery products to protein malnutrition, which affects nearly two-thirds of the world's population.

About 400 authorities on nutrition, representing some 80 nations, are expected to attend the conference.

President Appoints John W. Hanes, Jr. to Caribbean Commission

The Department of State announced on August 26 (press release 492) that the White House on that date had announced the appointment of John W. Hanes, Jr., to be a Commissioner and Chairman of the U.S. section of the Caribbean Commission, vice Roderic L. O'Connor.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1950, p. 946.

United States and Mexico Sign New Air Transport Agreement

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT, AUGUST 13

Press release 458 dated August 13

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States announced today that their delegates have successfully completed discussions for the conclusion of an air transport agreement between the two countries, which will replace the provisional arrangement on civil aviation which has been in force since 1957.¹ The new agreement will be signed in the course of the next week, and will enter into effect as of August 15, 1960.

The new agreement represents the successful conclusion of meetings which took place recently at Washington, D.C., and México, D.F. In the course of these meetings, delegations appointed by the respective governments agreed that the experimental period which the provisional arrangement of 1957 was designed to meet had been successfully completed and that air services between the two countries should now be placed on a more permanent and stable basis, commensurate with the cordial relations between them. Accordingly, the agreement is based upon the friendly relations between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States, the contiguity of their respective territories, and the mutual desire to strengthen even more the cultural and economic ties which bind their peoples and the understanding and good will which exist between them. It recognizes the increasing importance of international air travel between the two countries and within the Hemisphere, and the mutual desire to ensure continued development of such travel in the common welfare and on a basis of equality and reciprocity.

In order to facilitate the attainment of the aforementioned objectives, the agreement provides for a significant expansion in the routes to be served by the United States and Mexican airlines, and sets forth liberal principles under which the respective services will be provided.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States,

Considering the contiguity of their respective territories and the friendly relations between them;

Desiring to strengthen even more the cultural and economic bonds which link their peoples and the understanding and goodwill which exists among them;

Recognizing the increasing importance of international air travel between the two countries and within the Hemisphere and desiring to ensure its continued development in the common welfare on bases of equality and reciprocity; and

Desiring to conclude an Agreement which will facilitate the attainment of the aforementioned objectives;

Have accordingly appointed duly authorized representatives for this purpose, who have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

For the purposes of the present Agreement:

A.—The word "Agreement" shall mean the Agreement and the Route Schedule annexed thereto.

B.—The term "aeronautical authorities" shall mean, in the case of the United States of America, the Civil Aeronautics Board or any person or agency authorized to perform the functions exercised at the present time by the Civil Aeronautics Board; and, in the case of the United Mexican States, the Ministry of Communications and Transport or any person or entity authorized to perform the functions exercised at present by the Ministry of Communications and Transport.

C.—The term "airline" shall mean any air transport enterprise offering or operating an international air service.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 8, 1957, p. 575.

D.—The term "designated airline" shall mean an airline which the aeronautical authorities of one contracting party have notified the aeronautical authorities of the other contracting party to be the airline which will operate a route or routes specified in the Route Schedule annexed to the Agreement. Such notification must have been communicated in writing, through diplomatic channels.

E.—The term "territory", in relation to a State, shall mean the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection, jurisdiction or trusteeship of that State.

F.—The term "air service" shall mean any scheduled air service performed by aircraft for the public transport of passengers, cargo or mail.

G.—The term "international air service" shall mean an air service which passes through the air space over the territory of more than one State.

H.—The term "stop for non-traffic purposes" (technical stop) shall mean a landing for any purpose other than taking on or discharging passengers, cargo or mail.

ARTICLE 2

Each party grants to the other party rights necessary for the conduct of air services by the designated airlines, as follows: the rights of transit, of stops for non-traffic purposes, and of commercial entry and departure for international traffic in passengers, cargo, and mail at the points in its territory named on each of the routes specified in the appropriate paragraph of the annexed Route Schedule. The fact that such rights may not be exercised immediately shall not preclude the subsequent inauguration of air services by the airlines of the party to whom such rights are granted over the routes specified in the said Route Schedule.

ARTICLE 3

Air service on a specified route may be inaugurated immediately or at a later date at the option of the party to whom the rights are granted by an airline or airlines of such party at any time after that party has designated such airline or airlines for that route and the other party has given the appropriate operating permission. Such other party shall, subject to Article 4, be bound to give this permission provided that the designated airline or airlines may be required to qualify before the competent aeronautical authorities of that party, under the laws and regulations normally applied by these authorities, before being permitted to engage in the operations contemplated in this Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

Each party reserves the right to withhold or revoke the operating permission provided for in Article 3 of this Agreement from an airline designated by the other party in the event that it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of such airline are vested in nationals of the other party or in case of failure by such airline to comply with the laws and regulations referred to in Article 5 of this Agreement, or in case of the failure of the airline or the Government designating it to fulfill the conditions under which the rights are granted in accordance with this Agreement.

ARTICLE 5

A. The laws and regulations of one party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of the airline or airlines designated by the other party and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from, and while within the territory of the first party.

B. The laws and regulations of one party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew, or cargo of aircraft, such as regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew, or cargo of the other party upon entrance into or departure from, and while within the territory of the first party.

ARTICLE 6

Certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by one party, and still in force, shall be recognized as valid by the other party for the purpose of operating the routes and services provided for in this Agreement provided that the requirements under which such certificates or licenses were issued or rendered valid are equal to or above the minimum standards which may be established pursuant to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Each party reserves the right, however, to refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to its own nationals by another state.

ARTICLE 7

In order to prevent discriminatory practices and to assure equality of treatment, both parties agree further to observe the following principles:

(a) Each of the parties may impose or permit to be imposed just and reasonable charges for the use of public airports and other facilities under its control. Each of the parties agrees, however, that these charges shall not be higher than would be paid for the use of such airports and facilities by its national aircraft engaged in similar international services.

(b) Fuel, lubricating oils, consumable technical supplies, spare parts, regular equipment, and stores introduced into the territory of one party by the other party or its nationals, and intended solely for use by aircraft of such party shall be exempt on a basis of reciprocity from custom duties, inspection fees and other national duties or charges.

(c) Fuel, lubricating oils, other consumable technical supplies, spare parts, regular equipment, and stores retained on board aircraft of the airlines of one party authorized to operate the routes and services provided for in this Agreement shall, upon arriving in or leaving the territory of the other party, be exempt on a basis of reciprocity from customs duties, inspection fees and other national duties or charges, even though such supplies be used or consumed by such aircraft on flights in that territory.

(d) Fuel, lubricating oils, other consumable technical supplies, spare parts, regular equipment, and stores taken on board aircraft of the airlines of one party in the territory of the other and use in international services shall be exempt on a basis of reciprocity from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other national duties or charges.

ARTICLE 8

There shall be a fair and equal opportunity for the airlines of each party to operate on any route listed in this Agreement.

ARTICLE 9

In the operation by the airlines of either party of the trunk services described in this Agreement, the interest of the airlines of the other party shall be taken into consideration so as not to affect unduly the services which the latter provides on all or part of the same routes.

ARTICLE 10

The air services made available to the public by the airlines operating under this Agreement shall bear a close relationship to the requirements of the public for such services.

It is understood that services provided by a designated airline under the present Agreement shall retain as their primary objective the provision of capacity adequate to the traffic demands between the country of which such airline is a national and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic. The right to embark or disembark on such services international traffic destined for and coming from third countries at a point or points on the routes specified in the Route Schedule shall be applied in accordance with the general principles of orderly development to which both parties subscribe and shall be subject to the general principle that capacity should be related:

(a) to traffic requirements between the country of origin and the countries of ultimate destination of the traffic;

(b) to the requirements of through airline operation; and,

(c) to the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.

Both parties agree to recognize that the fifth freedom traffic is complementary to the traffic requirements on the routes between the territories of the parties, and at the same time is subsidiary in relation to the traffic requirements of the third and fourth freedom between the territory of the other party and a country on the route.

In this connection both parties recognize that the development of local and regional services is a legitimate right of each of their countries. They agree therefore to consult periodically on the manner in which the standards mentioned in this Article are being complied with by their respective airlines, in order to assure that their respective interests in the local and regional services as well as through services are not being prejudiced.

Every change of gauge justifiable for reasons of economy of operation, shall be permitted at any stop on the specified routes. Nevertheless, no change of gauge

may be made in the territory of one or the other party when it modifies the characteristics of the operation of a through airline service or if it is incompatible with the principles enunciated in the present Agreement.

When one of the parties after a period of observation of not less than ninety days considers that an increase in capacity or frequency offered by an airline of the other party is unjustified or prejudicial to the services of its respective airline it shall notify the other party of its objection to the end that consultation is initiated between the appropriate aeronautical authorities and decision on the objection is made by mutual agreement within a period which may not be more than ninety days beginning on the date of such notification. For this purpose the operating companies shall supply all traffic statistics that may be necessary and required of them.

ARTICLE 11

1.-All rates to be charged by an airline of one contracting party to or from points in the territory of the other contracting party shall be established at reasonable levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as costs of operation, reasonable profit, and the rates charged by any other carriers, as well as the characteristics of each service. Such rates shall be subject to the approval of the aeronautical authorities of the parties, who shall act in accordance with their obligations under this Agreement, within the limits of their legal powers.

2.-Any rate proposed to be charged by an airline of either contracting party for carriage to or from the territory of the other contracting party, shall, if so required, be filed by such airline with the aeronautical authorities of the other contracting party at least thirty (30) days before the proposed date of introduction unless the contracting party with whom the filing is to be made permits filing on shorter notice. The aeronautical authorities of each contracting party shall use their best efforts to insure that the rates charged and collected conform to the rates filed with either contracting party, and that no carrier rebates any portion of such rates, by any means, directly or indirectly, including the payment of excessive sales commissions to agents or the use of unrealistic currency conversion rates.

3.-It is recognized by both contracting parties that during any period for which either contracting party has approved the traffic conference procedures of the International Air Transport Association, or other associations of international air carriers, any rate agreements concluded through these procedures and involving airlines of that contracting party will be subject to the approval of that contracting party.

4.-If a contracting party, on receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph 2 above, is dissatisfied with the rate proposed, it shall so inform the other contracting party at least fifteen (15) days prior to the date that such rate would otherwise become effective, and the contracting parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the appropriate rate.

5.-If a contracting party upon review of an existing rate charged for carriage to or from its territory by an airline of the other contracting party is dissatisfied with that rate, it shall so notify the other contracting party

and the contracting parties shall endeavor to reach agreement on the appropriate rate.

6.—In the event that an agreement is reached pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4 or 5, each contracting party will exercise its best efforts to put such rate into effect.

7.—(a) If under the circumstances set forth in paragraph 4 no agreement can be reached prior to the date that such rate would otherwise become effective, or

(b) If under the circumstances set forth in paragraph 5 no agreement can be reached prior to the expiry of sixty (60) days from the date of notification :

then the contracting party raising the objection to the rate may take such steps as it may consider necessary to prevent the inauguration or the continuation of the service in question at the rate complained of *provided, however*, that the contracting party raising the objection shall not require the charging of a rate higher than the lowest rate charged by its own airline or airlines for comparable service between the same pair of points.

8.—When in any case under paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article the aeronautical authorities of the two contracting parties cannot agree within a reasonable time upon the appropriate rate after consultation initiated by the complaint of one contracting party concerning the proposed rate or an existing rate of the airline or airlines of the other contracting party, upon the request of either, the terms of Article 13 of this Agreement shall apply. In rendering its advisory opinion, the arbitral tribunal shall be guided by the principles laid down in this Article.

9.—Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, each contracting party undertakes to use its best efforts to insure that any rate specified in terms of the national currency of one of the parties will be established in an amount which reflects the effective exchange rate (including all exchange fees or other charges) at which the airlines of both parties can convert and remit the revenues from their transport operations into the national currency of the other party.

ARTICLE 12

Consultation between the competent authorities of both parties may be requested at any time by either party for the purpose of discussing the interpretation, application, or amendment of this Agreement. Such consultation shall begin within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of the receipt of the request by the Department of State of the United States of America or the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the United Mexican States as the case may be. Should agreement be reached on amendment of the Agreement, such amendment will come into effect upon confirmation by a further exchange of diplomatic notes.

ARTICLE 13

Except as otherwise provided, any dispute between the parties relative to the interpretation or application of this Agreement which cannot be settled through consultation shall be submitted for an advisory report to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by each party, and the third to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators so chosen, provided that such third arbitrator shall not be

a national of either party. Each of the parties shall designate an arbitrator within two months of the date of delivery by either party to the other party of a diplomatic note requesting arbitration of a dispute; and the third arbitrator shall be agreed upon within one month after such period of two months.

If either of the parties fails to designate its own arbitrator within two months, or if the third arbitrator is not agreed upon within the time limit indicated, either party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to make the necessary appointment or appointments by choosing the arbitrator or arbitrators.

The parties will use their best efforts under the powers available to them to put into effect the opinion expressed in any such advisory report. A moiety of the expenses of the arbitral tribunal shall be borne by each party.

ARTICLE 14

This Agreement, all amendments thereto, and contracts connected therewith shall be registered with the International Civil Aviation Organization.

ARTICLE 15

If a general multilateral air transport Convention accepted by both parties enters into force, the present Agreement shall be amended so as to conform with the provisions of such Convention.

ARTICLE 16

Either of the two parties may at any time notify the other party of its intention to terminate the present Agreement. Such notice shall be sent simultaneously to the International Civil Aviation Organization. In case such notification should be given the Agreement would terminate six months after the date on which the notice of termination may have been received, unless the communication under reference is annulled before the end of this period by agreement between both parties. Should the other party not acknowledge receipt it shall be considered that the notification was received by it 14 days subsequent to the date on which it is received by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

ARTICLE 17

Upon entry into effect of the present Agreement the aeronautical authorities of the two parties must communicate to each other as soon as possible the information relating to authorizations given to the airline or airlines designated by them to operate the routes set forth in the Route Schedule.

ARTICLE 18

The present Agreement shall enter into effect provisionally as of the fifteenth day of August, one thousand nine hundred sixty, and will enter into force definitely upon receipt by the Government of the United States of America of notification from the Government of the United Mexican States that the Agreement has been approved by the Senate of the Republic.

The Agreement will remain effective for a period of three years from the fifteenth day of August, one thousand nine hundred sixty unless terminated earlier by action pursuant to Article 16 of this Agreement.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly au-

thorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present Agreement.

Done in duplicate at Mexico City in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic, this fifteenth day of August, one thousand nine hundred sixty.

For the Government of the United States of America :
ROBERT C. HILL

For the Government of the United Mexican States:
W. BUCHANAN

ROUTE SCHEDULE

1.-An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled stops in Mexico at the points specified in this paragraph:

- A. New York, Washington-Mexico City.
- B. Chicago, Dallas, Fort Worth-Mexico City, via intermediate points in the United States.
- C. Los Angeles-Mexico City, via intermediate points in the United States.
- D. New Orleans-Mexico City.
- E. New Orleans-Merida and beyond to Guatemala and beyond.
- F. Miami-Merida and beyond to Guatemala and beyond.
- G. Houston-Mexico City and beyond to Guatemala and beyond, via intermediate points in the United States.
- H. San Antonio-Mexico City.
- I. Miami, Tampa/St. Petersburg-Merida and Cozumel and beyond (cargo and mail only).
- J. Miami, Tampa-Merida, Mexico City.

2.-An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United Mexican States shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified via intermediate points, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States at the points specified in this paragraph:

- A. Mexico City-Washington, New York and beyond New York to Europe.
- B. Mexico City-Dallas, Fort Worth, Chicago, via intermediate points in Mexico.
- C. Mexico City-Los Angeles, via intermediate points in Mexico.
- D. Mazatlan, Torreón, Monterrey-San Antonio, via intermediate points in Mexico.
- E. Mexico City-Miami and beyond.
- F. La Paz, Baja California-Los Angeles, via intermediate points in Mexico.
- G. Mexico City, Monterrey-San Antonio.
- H. Hermosillo-Tucson, via intermediate points in Mexico.
- I. (Pending).

3.-Points on any of the specified routes may at the option of the designated airlines be omitted on any or all flights with the exception of United States Route J, on which the designated airline is required to make an intermediate stop at Merida.

ROBERT C. HILL
W. BUCHANAN

Weapons Development Agreement Concluded With Australia

Press release 481 dated August 23

The Governments of the United States and Australia on August 23 concluded a Mutual Weapons Development Program agreement which provides for technical cooperation in research and development activities. The agreement was signed by the Australian Ambassador, Howard Beale, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, J. Graham Parsons.

Under this agreement, the United States and Australia will jointly participate, financially and technically, in the development of mutually agreed projects that will assist in the defense of Australia and improve the strength of the free world. The agreement also provides for a wider exchange of scientific and technical military information designed to improve military research and development in Australia and avoid duplication of effort.

The signing of this agreement marks the first time that the Mutual Weapons Development Program has been undertaken outside of NATO.

U.S.-Iran Trade Agreement Terminated August 25

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated August 24

The President has issued a proclamation giving effect to the termination of the trade agreement between the United States and Iran.

The Government of Iran requested the termination of that 1943 agreement in order to carry forward its economic stabilization program. This was effected, as announced earlier by the Department of State,¹ through an exchange of notes by the two Governments on July 27, 1960.

The termination of the agreement alters the tariff treatment of certain articles imported into the United States.

¹ BULLETIN OF AUG. 15, 1960, p. 261.

PROCLAMATION 3366²

TERMINATION OF THE IRANIAN TRADE
AGREEMENT PROCLAMATIONS

1. WHEREAS, under the authority vested in him by section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the act of June 12, 1934, entitled "An Act To Amend the Tariff Act of 1930", 48 Stat. 943, and the joint resolutions of Congress approved March 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 24, and April 12, 1940, 54 Stat. 107, the President entered into a trade agreement with His Imperial Majesty the Shah-in-Shah of Iran on April 8, 1943, 58 Stat. 1322, and proclaimed such trade agreement by proclamation dated March 31, 1944 (58 Stat. 1322), and the effective date thereof by proclamation dated May 29, 1944 (58 Stat. 1356);

2. WHEREAS the Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Government of Iran have agreed to terminate such trade agreement as of August 25, 1960; and

3. WHEREAS paragraph (6) of section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, authorizes the President to terminate, in whole or in part, any proclamation


² 25 Fed. Reg. 8279.

carrying out a trade agreement entered into under such section:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350(a) (6) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, do hereby proclaim that the proclamations dated March 31, 1944, and May 29, 1944, specified in the first recital of this proclamation, shall terminate as of the close of August 25, 1960.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-fourth day of August in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-fifth.



By the President:
DOUGLAS DILLON,
Acting Secretary of State.

LIST OF IMPORTS AFFECTED

CHANGES IN UNITED STATES IMPORT DUTIES RESULTING FROM TERMINATION OF UNITED STATES-IRAN TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1943

Tariff Act of 1930, paragraph	Description of products	Rates of duty	
		Trade agreement	New rate
736	Barberries, edible, dried, desiccated or evaporated.....	1¼ cents per pound..	2½ cents per pound.
762	Apricot and peach kernels.....	2½ cents per pound..	3 cents per pound.
911(a)	Quilts or bedspreads, wholly or in chief value of cotton, whether in the piece or otherwise, if block-printed by hand.....	12¼% a.v.....	25% a.v.
911(b)	Table and bureau covers, centerpieces, runners, scarfs, napkins, and doilies, made of plain-woven cotton cloth, and not specially provided for, if block-printed by hand.	15% a.v.....	30% a.v.
1102(b)	Hair of the Cashmere goat: In the grease or washed.....	18 cents per pound of clean content.	34 cents.
	Scoured.....	21 cents per pound of clean content.	37 cents.
	On the skin.....	16 cents per pound of clean content.	32 cents.
	Sorted, or matchings, if not scoured.....	19 cents per pound of clean content.	35 cents.
1552	Cigar and cigarette boxes, finished or unfinished, not specially provided for: Wholly or in chief value of silver and valued at 40 cents or more per ounce.	30% a.v.....	60% a.v.

TREATY INFORMATION

BILATERAL

Australia

Mutual weapons development program agreement. Signed at Washington August 23, 1960. Entered into force August 23, 1960.

Germany

Second agreement regarding certain matters arising from the validation of German dollar bonds. Signed at Bonn August 16, 1960. Enters into force upon the exchange of ratifications.

Guatemala

Agreement providing for investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala August 9, 1960. Enters into force on the date of notification by Guatemala of ratification pursuant to its constitutional procedures.

Italy

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9 and October 27, 1959, relating to the procedures for the reciprocal filing of classified patent applications. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome April 29 and August 2, 1960. Entered into force August 3, 1960.

Mexico

Air transport agreement. Signed at México August 15, 1960. Entered into force provisionally August 15, 1960. Enters into force definitively upon receipt by the United States of notification that the agreement has been approved by the Mexican Senate.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. Done at Washington January 15, 1944. Entered into force November 30, 1944. 58 Stat. 1169.

Ratification deposited: Uruguay, March 22, 1960.

Protocol of amendment to the convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences of January 15, 1944 (58 Stat. 1169). Opened for signature at Washington December 1, 1958.¹

Signatures: Peru, March 24, 1960; Nicaragua, April 19, 1960.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, May 9, 1960.

Adherence deposited: Uruguay, March 22, 1960.

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952.²

Adherences deposited: Hungary, May 17, 1960; Finland, June 22, 1960.

Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959.³

Ratifications deposited: United States, August 18, 1960; Norway, August 24, 1960.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding airmail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

Ratification deposited: Thailand, July 21, 1960.

Publications

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958.¹

Ratification deposited: France, May 30, 1960.

Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between states. Adopted at Paris December 3, 1958. Will enter into force May 31, 1961.²

Ratification deposited: France, May 30, 1960.

Shipping

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Signed at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, July 5, 1960.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.

Notification of approval: June 16, 1960.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ Will not enter into force for the United States on this date.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Walter G. Whitman as Science Adviser, effective September 4. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 491 dated August 26.)

Designations

William W. Walker as Deputy Director, Office of Personnel, effective August 18.

PUBLICATIONS

Department Limits Use of Documents Prior to Official Publication

Press release 483 dated August 23

The Department of State has from time to time permitted scholars to look at cleared documentary material while it was in the process of being prepared for publication. Normally the resulting

historical studies are published at about the same time as, or later than, the release of the official documentation. This same procedure was followed in providing access to certain authors who asked to see the material on the Potsdam Conference during its preparation.

The recent book *War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference* by Dr. Herbert Feis and the book *No High Ground* by Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey were based on access to these cleared documents as described above. In the light of the extension of use of this material for a current newspaper series the Department has decided to suspend the granting of access to such material before official publication.

The discovery of relevant additional documentation on the Potsdam Conference at a late stage of the editorial work has made it impossible to complete the publication of the two volumes on the Potsdam Conference until early in 1961 because of extensive necessary revisions in the page proof, the requirements for new pagination, and the complete revision of the index which is required to make the volumes useful to the reader.

The Department has assigned a high priority to the completion of the two volumes of Potsdam papers but, in the light of the recently acquired additional material and in the interests of presenting a complete documentation, regrets that it will not be able to publish the two volumes before early 1961.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Mutual Security in Action—Israel. Pub. 6985. Near and Middle Eastern Series 51. 13 pp. 10c.

A fact sheet describing the country, government, economy, and the U.S. economic assistance program.

Mutual Security in Action—India. Pub. 6988. Near and Middle Eastern Series 52. 20 pp. 10c.

A fact sheet giving background information on the country and discussing its economy, government, and the extent of U.S. assistance.

Communist Economic Policy in the Less Developed Areas. Pub. 7020. European and British Commonwealth Series 60. 38 pp. 20c.

This pamphlet brings up to date the Department of State study entitled *The Communist Economic Threat*, published in 1959. Since the Communist program of economic penetration has extended to additional free-world countries while becoming increasingly active in the countries it has already penetrated, this publication deals with the

subject on a wider scale, covering the general characteristics of Communist economic policy in less developed areas, the nature of the offensive, the trade drive, and the geographic areas of concentration.

Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank. TIAS 4397. 160 pp. 50c.

Between the United States of America and Other Governments. Done at Washington April 8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 1959.

Money Orders. TIAS 4483. 7 pp. 10c.

Convention between the postal administrations of the United States of America and the British Colony of Saint Christopher Nevis and Anguilla, West Indies. Signed at Basseterre, St. Kitts, British West Indies, June 27, 1959, and at Washington September 14, 1959. Entered into force February 1, 1960.

Defense—Weapons Production Program. TIAS 4484. 9 pp. 10c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Denmark. Exchange of notes—Signed at Copenhagen April 12, 1960. Entered into force April 12, 1960. With exchange of letters signed at Copenhagen May 11 and 18, 1960.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Releases issued prior to August 22 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 458 of August 13 and 467 of August 17.

No.	Date	Subject
477	8/22	Visit of King and Queen of Denmark (rewrite).
478	8/22	Herter: Foreign Ministers meeting, San José (printed in BULLETIN of September 5).
*479	8/22	Cultural exchange.
480	8/23	Supplementary document on Cuba.
481	8/23	Mutual weapons development program agreement with Australia.
*482	8/23	Dillon: House Foreign Affairs Committee.
483	8/23	Public access to historical documents.
484	8/24	Dillon: House Committee on Agriculture.
*485	8/24	Wadsworth and Barco nominated U.S. Representative and Deputy Representative to United Nations (biographic details).
486	8/24	Herter: Foreign Ministers meeting, San José.
487	8/25	Note to Czechoslovakia on Masaryk stamp.
†488	8/25	Dillon: Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
489	8/26	U.S. severs diplomatic relations with Dominican Republic.
490	8/26	FAO conference on fishery products.
*491	8/26	Whitman appointed Science Adviser (biographic details).
492	8/26	Hanes appointed U.S. chairman, Caribbean Commission (rewrite).
493	8/26	Herter: Foreign Ministers meeting, San José.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

FACT SHEET

Mutual Security in Action

the
Department
of
State

The nature and objectives of the United States Mutual Security Program in various nations of the world are described in a series of country fact sheets published by the Department of State. Now available in the series are leaflets on the following countries:

	Publication Number		Publication Number
Afghanistan	6752	Korea	6975
Brazil	6951	Pakistan	6981
Cambodia	6931	Paraguay	6843
Ceylon	6936	The Philippines	6908
Chile	6969	Spain	6913
The Republic of China	6998	Thailand	7004
India	6988	Tunisia	6754
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Copies of these fact sheets may be obtained for 10¢ each from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C.

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Bulletin

Vol. XLIII, No. 1103

September 19, 1960

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Progress Toward a World of Law

Address by Secretary Herter¹

I am glad to have this opportunity to talk about basic concepts of United States foreign policy which are of concern to us all. These concepts depend on contributions which the law makes to a world where lawlessness too often occurs.

Let me stress at the outset that I am talking to you this evening about the foreign policy of the United States—not of any particular administration.

Need for a Central Concept

As lawyers you understand the need to relate a number of different, difficult, and seemingly contradictory elements to a central concept—an overall design. In building toward this design of foreign policy we devise successive working arrangements to achieve purposes of the moment. But the underlying concept must remain in sight if we are to maintain our perspective on final goals and have a scale for the measurement of values.

The central goals of our policy will sometimes be pursued steadily over a number of years as in the case, for example, of our longstanding goal of expanding world trade. At other times a basic purpose will meet defeat in one form only to recur strengthened in another. The defeat of the League of Nations did not put an end to the effort to strengthen world order and the rule of law. It only interrupted it and served as the preface to the stronger, more promising effort that followed in the shape of the United Nations.

Today the basic concepts of United States for-

ign policy must look toward even longer range and more complex goals than those of the past. There are three main courses of action.

Preventing War

First, we are seeking to create world relationships which will not deteriorate into war. To this end:

1. We maintain an invulnerable strategic deterrent.
2. We maintain a secure and diversified capability for responding to, and suppressing, a wide variety of lesser threats to the peace.
3. We maintain collective security arrangements which make clear to the Soviets and the Chinese Communists our intention to defend our allies and thus diminish the chance of conflict by miscalculation.
4. We seek safeguarded arms reduction which will diminish the risk of war resulting from a continuing and spiraling arms race.

This first major element in our policy—the prevention of war—will, I am confident, continue to succeed if we persist in these lines of action.

Making Freedom Work

As the second major element of our policy we try to reinforce those basic historic trends which can reshape the world along constructive lines.

1. We support the efforts of newly independent peoples in the less developed areas to build nations in which the social, political, and economic aspirations of free men can be fulfilled.

In working toward this end an important consideration is the fact that the rapid advance of science and technology now makes it necessary to

¹Made before the American Bar Association at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 1 (press release 507).

adjust political concepts of nationhood to these new technological conditions. I believe the officials directing our foreign programs are sufficiently aware of these factors, particularly as they affect nations in various stages of development, to give us reason to be hopeful.

On the other hand, it is possible that the Soviet Union, although an established industrial power with impressive achievements in science and education, could prove to be lacking in political adjustment to these new facts by reason of its doctrinal attachment to a theory which is essentially based on power conflict. After all, Marx, while trying to break the social structure of the period in which he lived, was necessarily a prisoner of that time as far as the potentialities of science and modern weapons are concerned. He proposed to reduce the clash between great powers into a single clash of classes. But he was blind to the fact that the development of nuclear weapons and technology would make power resolution of these conflicts of advantage to neither side. He also could not foresee other implications of technological advance, such as its dramatic potential for aid programs to satisfy demands of developing areas of the world.

It is interesting, I think, to pursue some of the contrasts between Soviet and United States assistance programs which stem from a different approach to the less developed areas. In giving foreign aid the Soviet Union has often shown itself more concerned with the appearance of assisting the development process than with genuinely assisting it. Not only would successful development be contrary to Communist doctrine; it would be contrary to Communist ambitions. It is plain that the Soviet Union hopes that present governments in the developing countries will sooner or later be overwhelmed by their problems. It believes that these countries cannot establish a sound economic base without having the full Communist formula applied. Soviet policy, therefore, does not appear to concern itself with how well aid projects are geared into the country's overall economic pattern or with the extreme financial strain to the recipient country which loan provisions may ultimately impose.

Aid from the Soviet Union often takes the form of financing spectacular projects which are of more propaganda than economic value. Soviet prestige, therefore, is less involved with the basi-

cally much more important question of whether or not the recipient country is attempting a feasible economic plan.

United States aid policy, on the contrary, cannot and does not divest itself of the responsibility which it has for the larger consequences of aid programs. What we hope to create in the less developed countries is a responsible and sustained process of economic growth under reasonable conditions of internal stability.

One of the notable successes in the newly independent countries has been achieved by the British, working with the people of their former dependencies to set up parliamentary governments, civil services, and legal systems. It is extremely difficult, given the accelerated timetables for independence, to provide these newly emerging nations with the necessary stability. The work during the last few years in Nigeria, for example, shows how much time and effort are required to try to create forces for unity among regions of strikingly diverse economic and cultural background.

The world is learning anew that much more than economic assistance is required from the more developed countries if the less developed countries are to stand on steady feet.

2. In our efforts to make freedom work, however, we naturally support the trend toward a free world economy in which barriers to the exchange of goods and services are constantly being reduced—a world in which individual enterprise can flourish and become ever more productive.

3. We support voluntary movements toward federation or integration, where these are manifest. I have in mind particularly the trend toward ever closer relations among the nations of Western Europe.

4. We have tried to encourage any trend toward greater freedom within the Communist bloc. We aided Yugoslavia, whose break with the bloc compounded the difficulties of maintaining monolithic Soviet control over the remaining Eastern European states. We are helping Poland. We have sought through exchange programs and other personal and cultural contacts to broaden the exposure of the Soviet people to outside influences.

These various efforts are bearing fruit. The less developed countries are setting out on the road to progress. There is a freer world economy today than 10 years ago. The movement toward

European integration has made substantial progress in the last 10 years. The Communist bloc has undergone significant change since the days of Stalin.

If we hold to our course, I believe that these trends will continue and will work in our favor. Basically our policy is running with the grain of history.

Toward a World of Law

As the third major element of our policy, we seek to move toward a world of law—not as a remote and abstract goal, but as something that we are beginning to accomplish now through tangible and specific steps.

I returned just 2 days ago from the meetings of foreign ministers of the Organization of American States.² That conference was an interesting and significant demonstration of the process of developing the law as it relates to the conduct of nations. Although the meeting was regional rather than worldwide, it made a definite contribution to standards of behavior in international relationships generally.

The action taken by the foreign ministers in regard to the Dominican Republic, while it dealt with a specific violation of the code of international conduct, emphasized that the measures applied will not be lifted until that country has complied with the principles of the Declaration of Santiago,³ signed in Chile last year, which was concerned with the bases of democracy such as free elections and freedom of the press.

The action taken by the foreign ministers in the case of Cuba expressed their conviction that the Soviet Union should not export its doctrine or otherwise intervene in the Western Hemisphere through the gateway of Cuba. In this connection also the foreign ministers reiterated their belief that all American Republics—and this includes Cuba—should conform to the standards of the Santiago declaration.

The purpose of the law of nations is to influence the conduct of nations. By effective action as a regional group, the OAS thus contributes to the worldwide development of law.

Our best longrun hope for the worldwide de-

velopment of law is the United Nations, whose value has been dramatized anew, and reinforced, by recent events. As the Soviet leaders have attempted to use it in the past 15 years the United Nations has been just another instrument for extending their power; when they cannot control it, they seek to ignore it or to nullify it as an instrument of alleged imperialism. The United States, however, shares a common sense of purpose with a large majority of U.N. members. They, like we, view the U.N. as a channel through which the moral forces of humanity find expression.

In our efforts to enhance the work of the U.N.:

1. We have supported and continue to support its efforts in the Congo, where it is an effective instrument for executing international decisions. The U.N. efforts in the Congo point up the central obstacle to the establishment of a world of order. The Soviet Union has sought to complicate rather than assist U.N. efforts to aid the Congo Republic to get on its feet. The collapse of order is the purpose of Soviet policy—a collapse which is a condition precedent to their hoped-for new order of Communist control. To the Soviets the U.N., being just another instrument of power, is not a forum in which the moral forces of humanity can become articulate. The recent example of how they tried to obstruct the operations of the U.N. force in the Congo I think illustrates the basic difference in their approach and ours. At one point Khrushchev certainly set himself up as a court of last resort beyond, above, and outside the U.N. if, in his view, it failed in its mission in the Congo—and this even though the Soviet Union had voted in favor of the U.N. action. The United States, by contrast, is anxious to work as closely as possible with other nations in the U.N.

2. A realm of the law of nations where new ground has been plowed and much more remains to be plowed is the field of disarmament. A part of the disarmament effort has taken place within the United Nations, a part beyond it. I have noted that safeguarded arms control is essential if we are to continue to serve our first basic purpose, preventing war. Progress in disarmament will both demand and contribute to the evolution and strengthening of the body and the institutions of international law. Treaties will be required, along with the machinery for inspection and control. If

² BULLETIN of Sept. 5, 1960, p. 355, and Sept. 12, 1960, p. 395.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

complete disarmament is to be achieved it must be accompanied by the creation of an international police force. This force could operate only within rules of law which are generally accepted. Disarmament thus can contribute not only to a direct reduction of the risk of war but to the experience and the institutions which will better enable mankind to live according to a rule of law.

The United States has also supported the U.N. in a number of other efforts:

3. We backed U.N. action in Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, and Laos, where it has played a stabilizing role at the behest of the free-world community.

4. We support and encourage U.N. efforts to create standby peace-force arrangements, which would permit it to act even more promptly and effectively in future crises.

To this end we will encourage other countries to respond at the next meeting of the General Assembly to the Secretary-General's continuing efforts to obtain national contingents for possible service in future U.N. forces. We are prepared to see our assistance used to train and equip these earmarked contingents for the specialized U.N. types of duty. Nations which do not earmark forces should, we believe, earmark logistic and transport facilities.

5. We also wish to enhance the effectiveness of the World Court. An immediate step which is open to us, as President Eisenhower made clear to you this week, is the repeal of the "Connally amendment," which now permits the United States to avoid the jurisdiction of the court by a unilateral finding that any given matter lies within the domestic sphere of the United States.⁴ I wish to add my unqualified endorsement to the President's words. As a world leader we are setting an exceedingly poor example by such parochial action as the Connally amendment. We would do well to recognize that the Connally amendment works to our relative disadvantage because it is also available to, and used by, other countries who defend against us in World Court cases.

6. We seek to bring international authority to bear wherever an international vacuum exists. One recent example is the U.S. initiative leading to the Antarctica treaty which removed that vast continent from the area of disputes among na-

tions.⁵ This treaty establishes a worthy precedent for the resolution of other international problems. Its recent ratification by the Senate is indeed welcomed and comes as a successful climax to Mr. Herman Phleger's long days of negotiation.

7. We seek to develop international instruments for coping with new problems and opportunities. As one example, the first international political benefit derived from President Eisenhower's great atoms-for-peace concept of 1953 was the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This specialized agency under the aegis of the U.N. is now in its formative years. It represents a small but highly significant step toward internationalization of the greatest problem facing the nations—the control of atomic energy whose peaceful and destructive aspects are technologically intertwined.

In all these ways we are trying now to move toward a world of law, and we are succeeding. We are closer to that goal today. We have a stronger international community and more effective international instruments today than we had 10 years ago.

Continued progress toward a world of law will require continuing vigor and ingenuity. The legal fraternity has a vital role to play if it is to supply full measure of that quality—reason—which Sir Edward Coke termed the "life of the law." I hope that you will devote your attention to further specific steps that we can take to this end.

Conclusion

These, then, are the three elements of our basic concept:

1. To ward off the immediate threat of war.
2. To use the resulting period of peace to press forward along constructive lines that will strengthen the fabric of freedom.
3. To cap the edifice by moving toward our ultimate goal of a rule of law, within which freedom and peace can securely exist.

This three-point basic concept is one that commands the support of the American people. I would be less than frank, however, if I pretended

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1960, p. 227.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1959, p. 911, and July 11, 1960, p. 49.

that these goals were likely to be achieved in the near future. For an effective international community of law presupposes the existence of open societies. Open societies might make possible the ideal of an open world in which there is voluntary acceptance of the precepts of international conduct.

We are still confronted with the problem, however, of the Communist view of the future of the world. This would probably take the form of a federation of Soviet states. This would be dominated by Moscow and would be more inflexibly organized than the Pax Romana of the ancient world in that it would rely on ideological conformity and physical coercion—aspects which we regret to find so enduring a feature of Communist life.

Despite these obstacles I have complete faith that our own resolute courses of action will help us meet this problem. I mentioned earlier that our policy was “running with the grain of history.” In principle this is quite true but only if, by moving forward ourselves, freedom is made to work and justice and equality of opportunity can be extended in tangible form to millions now denied these benefits. This, I believe, is consistent with our country’s mission as Jefferson expressed it when he said that America’s purpose was not to extend our national power but to spread the dominion of our national idea.

We must expect the coming years to be full of practical problems as 20th and 21st century evolutions toward freedom give further political expression to one of man’s oldest and most noble urges. In this period the rule of law, as it is developed into a more perfect international instrument, with the necessary sanctions this implies, will act as a valuable balance wheel—a balance wheel not countering but providing equilibrium for the vast changes in course.

This challenge I am sure will not disturb you. The science of law, after all, is more than that of reason and logic combined. It depends on experience in fields as varied as all the pursuits of man.

In facing this challenge the central, strategic concept I have outlined will help a united and vigorous America, acting in concert with its friends throughout the world, to meet the demands of a new age. In this age there must be created a world order in which the will of in-

dividual nations, expressed in force, gives way to the will of the international community, expressed in law.

Western Powers Protest Curb on Travel to and Within Berlin

The Communist East German regime on August 30 issued a statement to the effect that it would take measures to ban, from August 31 to September 4, the travel to West Berlin of West Germans intending to participate in two meetings of German expellees and former prisoners of war scheduled for the period September 1-4. The movement of West Germans into the Soviet sector of Berlin was also banned during the same period.

Following are the texts of a Department statement read to news correspondents at Washington on August 30 by Lincoln White, Director of the Office of News, and a tripartite announcement released to the press at Berlin on August 31.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

It is not our practice to dignify propaganda statements of the so-called German Democratic Republic by official comment. It is obvious, however, that in this instance, as in others in the past, the danger to peace in Berlin lies in the aggressive threats constantly being made by the Soviet puppet regime in East Berlin. It should be recalled that Berlin is not now and never has been on East German soil and that the responsibility for free access to Berlin rests clearly with the Soviet Government which reaffirmed this responsibility in the Four Power communique of June 20, 1949, which confirmed the New York agreement of May 4, 1949, restoring free communication between West Germany and Berlin, following the lifting of the Soviet-imposed blockade on Berlin. We are awaiting further information concerning the situation from our mission in Berlin and Embassy in Bonn.

TRIPARTITE ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States, French and British Commandants in Berlin took note this afternoon in a

protest which they sent to the Soviet Commandant in Berlin of an announcement by Soviet Zone officials on August 30 that would restrict free movement within Berlin from August 31-September 4, 1960, and also of the declaration that accompanied the announcement.

The Western Commandants held the restrictions announced by the Soviet Zone authorities to be a "flagrant violation of the right of free circulation in Berlin," a "direct contravention" of the agreement reached between Western and Soviet representatives at Paris on June 20, 1949, and a violation of Four Power agreements.

In protesting the infringement of the quadripartite status of Berlin, the Western Commandants emphasized to the Soviet Commandant the common responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Berlin.

U.S. Welcomes Collective Efforts for Solution of African Problems

Following is the text of a message sent by Acting Secretary Dillon to the chairman of the African states conference, Premier Patrice Lumumba of the Republic of the Congo, on the occasion of the opening of the 5-day conference at Leopoldville on August 25.

On behalf of the Government of the United States please accept my sincere best wishes for the successful outcome of the deliberations in which you are now engaged. The United States Government has traditionally demonstrated great interest in Africa and sympathy with the aspirations of African peoples. We welcome all collective efforts in which constructive statesmanship on the part of the independent African states may find expression in the solution of African problems. The African contribution to the United Nations effort in the Congo again convincingly demonstrates the ability and desire of African states to take the lead in finding a constructive solution in the Congo and in general to seek an approach to political problems best guaranteed to assure the stability, welfare, and independence of the African states themselves. We are sure that the present discussions will be guided by the same spirit of statesmanship.

U.S. Airmen in Stanleyville Attacked by Congolese Troops

Following is the text of a U.S. note of protest from Ambassador Clare Timberlake to Justin Bomboko, Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo, and an exchange of correspondence between Secretary Herter and U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.

U.S. PROTEST

Press release 500 dated August 30

AUGUST 29, 1960

I have the honor to protest in the most vigorous terms the outrages perpetrated by elements of the Congolese National Army at Stanleyville on the unarmed members of the crew of an American globemaster aircraft on Saturday, August 27, 1960. Eight of the nine members of the crew were badly beaten with rifle butts, kicked and dragged over the ground. Eight of them are in the hospital.

These men and their plane were bringing U.N. supplies to the U.N. forces at Stanleyville in support of efforts by the U.N. to help your country.¹ The treatment accorded to them by the Congolese army is inexcusable. I ask that those responsible for the attack on this American crew be punished. I furthermore request the assurance of your government that adequate measures be taken to prevent such attacks in the future.

EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE

Press release 503 dated August 31

Secretary Herter to Mr. Hammarskjöld

AUGUST 31, 1960

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I thank you for your expression of sympathy personally and on behalf of the United Nations for the Americans who suffered injuries recently while in the performance of their duties in connection with the airlift requested by the United Nations in the Congo. The families of the injured personnel

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 12, 1960, p. 421.

will, I am sure, appreciate your expressions of deep sympathy.

With warm personal regards,
Most sincerely,

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

Mr. Hammarskjöld to Secretary Herter

AUGUST 29, 1960

His Excellency
MR. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

On behalf of the United Nations and myself I wish to extend to the Government of the United States my deepest sympathy for the scandalous treatment inflicted on African nationals during the attack in Stanleyville on 27 August 1960 by members of the National Congolese Army. This involvement by American nationals is so much more regrettable as they were engaged in a single airlifting operation under a special request by the United Nations. Will you kindly extend my personal sympathy to the Americans involved as well as to their families. Highest considerations.

DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD
Secretary General
of the United Nations

**U.S. Travelers to Cuba
Warned To Exercise Care**

Press release 514 dated September 3

During recent weeks and in the light of certain conditions now existing in Cuba, the Department of State has received a number of inquiries from American citizens asking whether they might expect to encounter undue hazard or inconvenience if they were to travel to that country. While travel facilities at this time remain fully available, the Department nevertheless desires to warn American travelers that they should take particular care while in Cuba to avoid activities or statements which might be construed by Cuban Government agents to be of a political nature. They should take care, also, to have their travel documentation in order and to avoid infractions of emergency laws or new regulations, such as those relating to currency controls, unauthorized use of cameras, or visits to restricted areas within Cuba. It is further pointed out that all travelers

to Cuba are invited to make known their presence to the Embassy in Habana or to the consulate in Santiago.

**Improving World Health
and Nutrition**

Remarks by President Eisenhower¹

I am delighted to open this Fifth International Congress on Nutrition, a Congress attended by representatives from 59 countries, including every continent on the globe. Since you have previously met in London, Basel, Amsterdam, and Paris but this is your first visit to Washington, I bid you a hearty welcome to this side of the Atlantic and to this city.

May I remark, President [Charles Glen] King, that I envy you in your association with this Congress. You will not need to veto any of its actions. Now this, of course, is because each of you is selflessly and wholeheartedly dedicated to the advancement of a science that underlies human health. You have come with a vision to build a better world now and for years to come.

The 20th century is unique in many ways—not the least of which is the fact that ours is the first generation which has dared to think in terms of food enough for all. And our age is the first to be deeply concerned about the quality as well as the quantity of the food supply. For the first time in history man's ancient enemies, hunger and malnutrition, are on the defensive. They are not whipped. But ours is the first generation to catch the scent of victory.

Crop Surpluses for Needy Areas

Let me turn for a moment to one phase of the free world's campaign against hunger, a program to send crop surpluses to needy areas. I take as an example the case with which I am most familiar, that of my own country. But first a word of caution. Any transaction involving the transfer of commodities from one nation to another is of more than bilateral interest. Thus, in moving our

¹Made before the opening session of the Fifth International Congress on Nutrition at Washington, D.C., on September 1 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

abundant surplus of food products overseas, we must be diligent to avoid disrupting the markets of others. Irresponsible handling of our huge stocks of wheat, for example, could unjustifiably harm a nation which is heavily dependent on foreign exchange earnings from wheat and other cereal exports. My concern regarding this problem is one of the reasons for recommending increased use of the United Nations so as to distribute surplus crops under methods that will benefit all.

During the past 6 years, the United States Government has sent more than 4,000 shiploads of food abroad in exchange for foreign currencies.

In similar transactions we have done or engaged to do things like the following: to one country 16 million tons of wheat and 1 million of rice; for disaster relief, in earthquakes and hurricanes, 300 shiploads of food have gone abroad—through voluntary charitable agencies 400 shiploads of food to help 60 million stricken people.

Twelve hundred United States agricultural technicians are now working overseas, translating agricultural science into better living for the world's millions. Last year we received more than 3,000 agricultural visitors from other countries, who came here to study food production, agricultural research, and education and to meet our farmers and to see how they work.

We have loaned \$265 million abroad to build irrigation projects, fertilizer plants, and to improve transportation facilities.

Now these activities of my own country are only a part of the total free-world program to lift the scourge of hunger. Great efforts are being made by the developing countries themselves. Much help has come from other industrialized nations. The special agencies of the United Nations—the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund, and the Food and Agriculture Organization—have all made outstanding contributions in our common effort to eliminate hunger from this planet.

And the combined effort has been effective. There have been no major famines in the free world during the past decade, and, to my knowledge, this cannot be said of any previous decade. Nutritional levels in most of the developing countries, while still distressingly low, have nevertheless crept up slightly. World agriculture

has generally kept abreast or ahead of the population increase.

While we have thus helped lift production capabilities abroad, the stream of agricultural and industrial exports from the more industrialized nations has increased, not diminished. The reason is a simple one: A better fed neighbor is a better customer.

This is as it should be and reflects the wisdom of programs which meet current needs while building long-term self-reliance. To make the recipient countries indefinitely dependent upon our assistance would be disadvantageous to them and to us. Compassion and prudence are equally important in this undertaking; our food-for-peace program partakes of both.

Facing Up to Our Opportunities

There is a Danish proverb which says: "You may light another's candle at your own without loss." Indeed there is gain in the lighting of many candles; in the brighter light we can all see better.

There are risks, indeed, in our undertaking. But the risks of failing to face up to our opportunities are greater than those involved in considered action. Political explosions can result, in a shrinking world, from a widening gap between the wealthy and the underdeveloped nations.

And science has given us a set of tools designed for human betterment. Farm people, in the United States and elsewhere, have translated these tools into a capability for constructive action. Though the task is gigantic, we seek opportunity to move ahead rather than becoming preoccupied with despair.

The world cups its ear to hear the rattling of rockets. It listens less closely to the sounds of peace and well-being which emanate from the slow but steady improvement in world health and nutrition.

For centuries orators and writers have developed the habit of warning about the crossroads that the world was facing at the very moment of the particular speaking or writing. Many of these crossroads have existed only in a lively imagination. Yet if history, which will one day view the events of this period in perspective, could only say that it was at this moment the world began truly to take the high road of health and plenty leading toward peace, leaving forever

the path of strife and anxiety, then indeed would our great-grandchildren call this the brightest era of all time.

To each of you, my best wishes for a successful Congress. To the degree that you succeed, the human family in the nations here represented will step from under the shadow of want. This is the purpose that has brought you halfway around the world. The earth's nearly 3 billion people join me, I am sure, in my good wishes for your success. And may God ever be your helper.

Thank you very much.

U.S. Freedom of the Press Explained to Moscow Editors

The White House on August 28 made public a reply from James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, to a letter received at the White House from the joint editorial board of the Moscow News and Nouvelles de Moscou. Following are texts of Mr. Hagerty's and the board's letters.

White House press release dated August 28

MR. HAGERTY'S LETTER

AUGUST 15, 1960

SIRS: I have your letter of June twenty-fifth addressed to the White House.

Of course, I disagree wholeheartedly with your statement that the content of President Eisenhower's report to the nation¹ was "directed essentially against the friendship between our peoples." Nothing could be further from the truth. The President made it clear that he and his government consider that "progress toward the goal of mutual understanding, easing the causes of tensions, and reduction of armaments is as necessary as ever" and that the United States "shall continue these peaceful efforts." In virtually every speech that the President has made on international affairs, he has consistently stressed the friendship that exists between the American people and the people of the Soviet Union.

I realize that no purpose would be served by trying to discuss your letter on an ideological basis—

the differences between our two ways of life are too great and too complex to be covered by a single short letter. But I would hope that I could discuss it from a professional press viewpoint.

Frankly, your letter confirms the fact that the Soviet press is not free to publish or broadcast any viewpoint that runs counter to the policies of the Soviet Government.

In the United States of America—indeed in the free press of the world—conflicting viewpoints on any news development are published and broadcast as a matter of record and in the interest of informing the general public. Here in my country the remarks and speeches of Chairman Khrushchev are regularly broadcast and published—often in full text—regardless of whether an editor agrees or disagrees with him, and without the editor consulting any official of the United States.

The free press in America and the free press of the world are not afraid to let people judge for themselves and reach their own conclusions after studying both sides of any controversy. Only in that way can the truth of any situation be recognized and accepted as the truth.

I realize that this may be completely alien to your thinking, but to me it typifies the fundamental difference between a free press for free people and a government-dominated press for a controlled society.

Sincerely,

JAMES C. HAGERTY

Press Secretary to the President

MOSCOW EDITORS' LETTER

JUNE 25, 1960

SIRS: The Joint Editorial Board of Moscow News and Nouvelles de Moscou has received today from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow two copies in Russian of President D. Eisenhower's "Address to the Nation" of May 25, 1960.

In view of the fact that the entire content of this report is directed essentially against the friendship between our peoples while the above said Papers seek every possible expansion and consolidation of the bonds of friendship between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., overall improvement in the relations between our countries, we are returning herewith the said copies of the "Address to the Nation" and hope that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow will in future refrain from addressing to us materials of this description.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of JUNE 6, 1960, p. 890.

Foreign Educators Participate in Teacher Development Program

Press release 504 dated September 1

Approximately 340 foreign teachers and school administrators are expected to arrive in Washington, D.C., during the Labor Day weekend to take part in a special cultural exchange program sponsored by the Department of State. Representing 67 countries from all areas of the world, the visiting teachers have been invited to observe the American educational process and to become better acquainted with the American people. The U.S. Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is coordinating the program for the Department of State.

The teachers will remain in Washington, D.C., until September 16 for orientation to American life at the Washington International Center and for visits to Government agencies and places of interest in the Capital area. Highlights of the Washington stay will include an international tea and reception on September 6, with all of the teachers in their national dress, a special exhibit of articles and products brought in by the teachers on September 9, and an international talent show on September 15.

Following their Washington visit the teachers will divide into 11 separate groups and travel to American universities for special seminars in the field of education. The seminars will last for 3 months and will give the participants an opportunity to exchange ideas with American educators and professional leaders in various fields. A list of the host universities and the subjects of the seminars follows:

University of Texas	Teaching of English
University of Michigan	Teaching of English
University of Pittsburgh	Science Teaching
San Francisco State College	Teaching of English
University of Southern California	School Administration
Southern Illinois University	Vocational Education
San Diego State College	Elementary Education
Northwestern University	Elementary Education
Ball State Teachers College (Indiana)	Secondary Education
Syracuse University	Secondary Education
University of Washington	American Civilization

Following the university seminars the teachers will be assigned to different school districts throughout the United States to observe actual classroom instruction and school administration as well as the relationships between the school and

the local community. This last phase of the program will last for 3 months, with the teachers returning to Washington, D.C., for final meetings before returning to their own countries.

Claimants Reminded of Deadline for Filing Claims in Austria

Press release 496 dated August 29

The Department of State wishes to bring to the attention of possible claimants residing in the United States that the deadline for filing of claims under the Austrian War and Persecution Property Damage Law (Austrian Federal Law 127 of 1958) is December 31, 1960.

Copies of official forms for the filing of claims may be obtained at the Austrian Embassy, 2343 Massachusetts Ave., NW., Washington, D.C., or at Austrian consulates at New York, Chicago, Detroit, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, Miami, Atlanta, New Orleans, or Cleveland. The forms contain detailed information and instructions concerning the filing of claims, and inquiries for further information should be directed to the Austrian Embassy or the nearest consulate.

DLF Summarizes Activities for Fiscal Year 1960

The Development Loan Fund announced on August 22 that in addition to approving 52 credits totaling \$535,150,000 to private and public enterprises in 26 countries during the fiscal year which ended June 30, 1960, it has also made significant policy adaptations in pursuance of its objective of assisting the economic development of less developed nations.

Since it began operations early in 1958 the DLF has extended 153 credits with a total value of \$1,356,556,000 to enterprises in 44 countries.

As of June 30 the DLF had only \$41,778,328 remaining available for lending. The President has requested an additional appropriation of \$700,000,000 for DLF activities. Before the congressional recess the House of Representatives voted \$550,000,000. This was before the President made his

July 11 statement with respect to a new initiative in Latin America.¹

On June 30 total receipts by DLF of interest earnings and loan repayments totaled \$15,504,992, of which \$2,572,145 was in dollars and the equivalent of \$12,932,847 was in foreign currencies.

A large proportion of DLF assistance during the year—17 loans totaling \$279 million—went to South Asia, mainly to India and Pakistan. This was in accordance with the U.S. Government's desire to focus assistance on areas where foreign policy objectives require maximum support, conditions are best for rapid development, and governments are taking effective self-help measures.

In this area the DLF has cooperated with the World Bank in support of such programs as the Indus basin development program² and the 5-year plans of India and Pakistan.

By using its special authority to help share risks, the DLF is becoming an important means of attracting U.S. and other private capital to less developed countries. In coming months it is expected that at least \$100 million of private capital will be invested in DLF-aided ventures. By contrast, in 1958 the total U.S. private investment in enterprises other than oil in the Near East, Far East, and South Asia combined totaled only \$59 million.

During the fiscal year the DLF created the position of Deputy Managing Director for Private Enterprise, whose function is to help American enterprise extend its investments in underdeveloped regions. In cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce the DLF is organizing a series of symposia in which representatives of U.S. business, the U.S. Government, and developing nations are brought together to explore investment opportunities in those nations. This effort has already produced tangible results in the form of specific investment proposals.

The DLF has made assistance available to small private business enterprises in less developed countries by providing credit to intermediate institutions such as development banks, which in turn investigate and approve loans to small concerns.

As of June 30 the DLF had extended 19 loans and 1 guaranty, with a total value of \$108.6

million, to intermediate credit institutions in 14 countries—Guatemala, India, Iran, Israel, Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Somalia, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United Arab Republic (both the Egyptian and Syrian regions). 188 loans have thus far been made by these institutions.

Congressional revisions of DLF's basic legislation during the fiscal year reflected the view that greater emphasis should be given to housing, land resettlement, agricultural credit, and other overhead activities, particularly in Latin America.

Up to June 30 the DLF had approved 26 credits totaling \$119.4 million to undertakings in 13 Latin American countries. One of these, approved in March, was a precedent-setting \$2 million loan to provide "seed capital" for a new savings and loan association in Peru, which will provide financing for moderate-cost housing on a long-term basis at reasonable interest rates.

President Accepts Tariff Commission's Findings on Certain Imports

Articles Containing Cotton

White House press release dated August 23

The President has accepted the U.S. Tariff Commission's report on articles containing cotton.

On the basis of its investigation and determinations of fact, the Tariff Commission found, with two members dissenting, that import restrictions were not warranted under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. The President had requested this investigation on November 10, 1959.¹

Linen Toweling and Watch Movements

White House press release dated August 23

The President has concurred with the U.S. Tariff Commission's recent findings that no formal investigation should be instituted at this time to determine whether the tariff should be reduced on imports of linen toweling and watch movements. The President found, with the Tariff Commission, that there is not sufficient reason at this time to reopen the escape-clause actions of several previous

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1959, p. 803. Copies of the Commission's report, dated June 27, 1960, may be obtained from the U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington 25, D.C.

² BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 166.

³ *Ibid.*, Mar. 21, 1960, p. 442.

years which resulted in increases in the tariffs on these items. The President's decision means that the increased rates of duty previously established as the result of escape-clause actions will continue to apply without reduction or other modification.

The President's action was taken after consultation with the Trade Policy Committee. The Tariff Commission studies were made pursuant to Executive Order 10401, which requires the periodic review of affirmative actions taken under the escape clause. The Commission submitted to the President on July 25, 1960, its reports on the third review of the 1956 tariff increase on linen toweling and on the fifth review of the 1954 increase in duty on watch movements.

President Increases Import Duty on Cotton Typewriter-Ribbon Cloth

White House press release dated August 23

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

The President has accepted the unanimous recommendation of the U.S. Tariff Commission in the case of cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth. Accordingly, the President issued a proclamation withdrawing existing tariff concessions on cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth and thus restoring the higher statutory rates of duty.

In taking this action, the President had the advice of the interdepartmental Trade Policy Committee.

In a report to the President of June 30, 1960, the Tariff Commission stated its finding that the domestic industry was suffering serious injury and its recommendation that the tariff be increased under the escape clause, section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 as amended.

PROCLAMATION 3365¹

MODIFICATION OF TRADE AGREEMENT CONCESSIONS ON COTTON TYPEWRITER-RIBBON CLOTH

1. WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1351), the President on October 30, 1947, entered into a trade agreement with certain foreign countries, which

consists of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including a schedule of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as Schedule XX-1947) and the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, together with a Final Act Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (61 Stat. (pts. 5 and 6) A7, A11, and A2051), and by Proclamation No. 2761A of December 16, 1947² (61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1103), proclaimed such modifications of existing duties and other import restrictions of the United States and such continuance of existing customs or excise treatment of articles imported into the United States as were then found to be required or appropriate to carry out such trade agreement, and that proclamation was amended by Proclamation No. 2790 of June 11, 1948 (62 Stat. (pt. 2) 1515);

2. WHEREAS such General Agreement has been supplemented by an agreement consisting of the Protocol of Terms of Accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade dated June 7, 1955 (6 UST (pt. 5) 5833), which includes a supplementary schedule of United States concessions (hereinafter referred to as Schedule XX-1955), and the President, by Proclamation No. 3105 of July 22, 1955³ (69 Stat. c44), proclaimed such modifications of existing duties as would be required or appropriate to carry out such supplemental agreement, and that proclamation was supplemented by a notification by the President to the Secretary of the Treasury dated August 22, 1955⁴ (20 F.R. 6211);

3. WHEREAS United States tariff concessions on cotton cloth provided for in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph 904 of the Tariff Act of 1930 were granted in the trade agreements referred to in the first and second recitals of this proclamation, as set forth in items 904(a) [first and second], 904(b), and 904(c) in Part I of the said Schedule XX-1947 and in Part I of the said Schedule XX-1955;

4. WHEREAS the current United States duties applicable to

"cotton cloth suitable for making typewriter ribbon, classifiable under subparagraph (a), (b), or (c) of paragraph 904 of the Tariff Act of 1930, containing yarns the average number of which exceeds No. 50 but not No. 140, the total thread count of which per square inch (counting warp and filling), is not less than 240 and not more than 340, and in which the thread count for either the warp or filling does not exceed 60 percent of the total thread count of the warp and filling"

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth) reflect the tariff concessions granted in items 904(a) [first and second], 904(b), and 904(c) referred to in the third recital of this proclamation;

5. WHEREAS, pursuant to the authority vested in him by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the President on January 9, 1936, entered into a trade agreement

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 28, 1947, p. 1258.

² For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1955, p. 226.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1955, p. 397.

³ 25 Fed. Reg. 8278.

with the Swiss Federal Council (49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3918), and by proclamation of January 9, 1936 (49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3917), proclaimed such agreement, and that proclamation has been supplemented by a proclamation of May 7, 1936 (49 Stat. (pt. 2) 3959), and a proclamation of November 28, 1940 (54 Stat. (pt. 2) 2461);

6. WHEREAS item 904(b) (c) in the United States schedule of tariff concessions included in the trade agreement referred to in the fifth recital of this proclamation includes a tariff concession on certain cotton cloth provided for in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 904 of the Tariff Act of 1930;

7. WHEREAS the United States has accepted the Declaration for Provisional Accession of the Swiss Confederation to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done at Geneva November 22, 1958 (TIAS 4461), and the Government of the United States and the Government of the Swiss Confederation, by an Exchange of Notes signed March 29, 1960,³ relating to the said Declaration, entered into certain understandings with regard to the actions that may be taken pursuant to Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the case of a product subject to a concession under the trade agreement referred to in the fifth recital of this proclamation and also to a concession under such General Agreement (TIAS 4447);

8. WHEREAS the United States Tariff Commission has submitted to me a report of its Investigation No. 7-85 under section 7 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1364), on the basis of which investigation, and a hearing held in connection therewith, the Commission has found that, as a result in part of the duties reflecting the concessions granted thereon in the trade agreements referred to in the first and second recitals of this proclamation, cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities, both actual and relative, as to cause serious injury to the domestic industry producing like products, and that in order to remedy such serious injury it is necessary to increase the duties on cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth to the rates originally established in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph 904 of the Tariff Act of 1930;

9. WHEREAS upon the modification of various items in Part I of Schedule XX-1947 and Part I of Schedule XX-1955 as hereinafter proclaimed, the rates of duty on cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth originally established in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of paragraph 904 of the Tariff Act of 1930 will apply to such cloth:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and by section 7(c) of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, and in

accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, do proclaim that, effective after the close of business on September 22, 1960, and until the President otherwise proclaims:

A. Items 904(a) [first and second], 904(b), and 904(c) in Part I of the said Schedule XX-1947 and Item 904(a) [second] in Part I of the said Schedule XX-1955, are modified by inserting in each such item, immediately after the matter in the column headed "Description of Products", the following:

"Provided, that this item shall not apply to cotton cloth suitable for making typewriter ribbon, containing yarns the average number of which exceeds No. 50 but not No. 140, the total thread count (treating ply yarns as single threads) of which per square inch, counting warp and filling, is not less than 240 and not more than 340, and in which the thread count of either the warp or filling does not exceed 60 per centum of the total thread count of the warp and filling."

B. Items 904(a) [first], 904(b), and 904(c) in Part I of Schedule XX-1955 are modified by inserting in each such item, immediately after the matter in the column headed "Description of Products", the following:

"Provided, that this item shall not apply to cotton cloth suitable for making typewriter ribbon, containing yarns the average number of which exceeds No. 50, the total thread count (treating ply yarns as single threads) of which per square inch, counting warp and filling, is not less than 240 and not more than 340, and in which the thread count of either the warp or filling does not exceed 60 per centum of the total thread count of the warp and filling."

C. The proclamations referred to in the first and second recitals of this proclamation shall be applied to Items 904(a) [first and second], 904(b), and 904(c) in Part I of Schedule XX-1947 and in Part I of Schedule XX-1955 as modified by paragraphs (A) and (B) of this proclamation.

D. The proclamations referred to in the fifth recital of this proclamation shall be suspended insofar as they apply to cotton typewriter-ribbon cloth included in item 904(b) (c) of Schedule II of the trade agreement referred to in such recital.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twenty-third day of August in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-fifth.



By the President:
DOUGLAS DILLON,
Acting Secretary of State.

³ For text of notes, see *ibid.*, Apr. 18, 1960, p. 601.

Promoting Peace and Stability in the Middle East

FIFTH REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ACTIVITIES UNDER THE JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROMOTE PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST¹

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith the fifth report to the Congress covering activities through June 30, 1960, in furtherance of the purposes of the joint resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. This report supplements earlier reports forwarded to the Congress.²

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 15, 1960.

TEXT OF REPORT

CHAPTER I—PROGRESS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE RESOLUTION: JULY 1, 1959, TO JUNE 30, 1960

As a basis for existing and contingent courses of action by the United States in the Middle East, House Joint Resolution 117,³ approved by the President March 9, 1957, remains an important basic document of U.S. policy. The resolution sets out in terms clearly understandable to the leaders of international communism the continuing interest of the United States in the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. It authorizes U.S. cooperation with and assistance to nations of the Middle East in development of their economic

strength and directs continuance of U.S. support to the United Nations Emergency Force. Under the resolution's provisions, the U.S. Government continues active pursuit of policies aiding world peace and the security of the United States.

The report on the resolution for the year ending June 30, 1959, noted development in the Middle East of relatively stable conditions subsequent to a period of acute crisis and unrest in the summer of 1958. Relations among the Arab countries continue relatively good and some lessening of tensions among them has tended to reduce opportunities for increased Soviet influence. However, basic problems existing between the Arab States and Israel remain largely unresolved. This situation continues unfortunately to provide the Soviet bloc with opportunities for exploitation.

The governments and peoples of the area continued their preoccupation with problems of economic development. During the period under review the Sino-Soviet bloc moved rapidly to seize opportunities for providing aid to significant components of development programs in several Middle Eastern countries. In the United Arab Republic the Soviet Union has agreed to construct with the aid of Soviet technicians the second stage of the Aswan High Dam in a 10-year project. Soviet credits in excess of \$300 million will be required and it is clear the Soviet Union intends the Aswan Dam to become a symbol of Soviet interest in the economic growth of countries in the Middle East and Africa. An extensive effort is being carried forward by the Sino-Soviet bloc in Yemen where port facilities constructed by the Soviets are nearing completion, as is a road from the country's principal port to its largest inland

¹ H. Doc. 448, 86th Cong., 2d sess.; transmitted on Aug. 15, 1960.

² For texts of previous reports, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1957, p. 339; Mar. 31, 1958, p. 524; Feb. 2, 1959, p. 169; and Mar. 14, 1960, p. 424.

³ For text, see *Ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.

city. For construction of the latter, Communist China has sent to Yemen over 800 engineers and skilled workmen. Similarly, the Soviet bloc secured Iraq's acceptance of indiscriminate offers of assistance although there are signs that, like other countries in the area, Iraq is determined not to become excessively dependent on such aid.

These efforts have not so far enabled the forces of international communism to threaten seriously the independence and integrity of any countries of the region. Hence no occasions arose on which it was necessary for the President to invoke powers provided him under section 2 of the resolution by which he may, if requested, use Armed Forces of the United States to assist countries seeking to resist aggression from international communism.

The Middle East resolution remains as a safeguard in reserve, available to any country of the region desiring outside assistance against a possible threat to its independence and stability from the external forces of international communism.

CHAPTER II—ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The President was authorized by the resolution to cooperate with any nation in the area in the development of its economic strength and security through economic and military assistance programs. During the period covered by this report, the United States continued fulfilling its commitments for economic aid made during fiscal year 1957 pursuant to section 3 of the resolution.

Under the authority of the Mutual Security Act, funds appropriated for the fiscal year 1960 were used to further the purposes of the Middle East resolution. Some of these countries received defense support aid. The foreign exchange provided under defense support financed essential imports; the local currency counterpart generated by the sale of such imports was used in part to defray a portion of the cost of maintaining armed forces which the country had agreed to maintain but which it could not support unaided. This command over both foreign and domestic resources augmented the ability of these countries to maintain economic stability and development. Special assistance, in furtherance of economic growth and maintenance of security, was also provided to other countries in the Middle East. Continued aid from the United States has helped materially in building the strength of the countries in the

area to resist Communist pressures and maintain their independence, and has also encouraged an accelerated rate of economic growth.

CHAPTER III—ACTION PURSUANT TO SECTION 4 OF THE RESOLUTION

In furtherance of section 4 of the joint resolution which states that the President should continue to furnish facilities and military assistance to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, and with a view to maintaining the truce in the region, the United States, on May 5, 1960, transmitted to the Secretary General a check in the amount of \$6,497,064, representing its assessment for 1960. Also, the United States contributed voluntarily \$3,500,000 from fiscal year 1960 mutual security funds to help finance the Force's operations during the remainder of 1959. These contributions brought the total contributions to \$40,884,623 through fiscal year 1960.

Equipment and services valued at \$7 million have been made available to the Force from the time of its establishment to January 1, 1960. As of January 1, 1960, the United Nations has compensated the United States for this material and services to the amount of \$7 million.

Advancing Food-for-Peace Program Through United Nations System

Statement by Acting Secretary Dillon¹

The President is considering the advisability of including in a statement to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September an expression of the willingness of the United States to join with other members in developing plans whereby all of them able to do so could work through the United Nations system to provide substantial quantities of food to needy peoples in member states. The President wishes to be assured that such an initiative would elicit the support of the Congress.

I should like to outline for the committee today our reasons for proposing to work through the United Nations system and the general nature of the procedures which we have in mind.

¹ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Aug. 25 (press release 488).

There are several reasons for offering such a proposal at this time. In the first place it is a steady objective of the United States to increase the prestige, authority, and effectiveness of the United Nations system. To this end, we try to make use of the United Nations system for constructive undertakings whenever this can be done without loss of effectiveness. We believe that a stage has now been reached in the food-for-peace program² where participation of the United Nations system might be arranged with beneficial results. Moreover, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations has just recently launched a freedom-from-hunger campaign,³ and our proposal seems to be one useful and appropriate way in which the United States, and perhaps other countries, might contribute to the success of that effort.

A second reason for proposing cooperative action through the United Nations system now is that there are some underdeveloped areas where recipient countries definitely prefer to receive foreign assistance through the United Nations system.

Finally, in our surplus disposal operations under Public Law 480 [Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act] we have in the past encountered objections from other exporting countries—for example, Canada, Argentina, and Australia in the case of wheat and Thailand in the case of rice. We hope that by arranging for a cooperative program in which such countries are invited to participate, and by placing the Food and Agriculture Organization in a position to consider and make recommendations regarding the action to be taken in particular cases, we may further reduce the feeling of friendly exporting countries that their commercial interests are being encroached upon.

The draft concurrent resolution⁴ which is before the Congress has been submitted in order that the President might be assured of having the support of the Congress for such a proposal. Adoption of the resolution would add measurably to the weight of the United States proposal and

would elicit more serious consideration of it by other countries.

The procedures which we have in mind for carrying out the President's proposal are still tentative and will remain so until discussions have been had with other nations and international organizations, but I wish to present to the committee the ideas that we expect to pursue. There are two distinct procedures or proposals. While these may be considered as alternatives, we think of them at this time as supplementary to one another.

1. *The United Nations system as a coordinating and advisory body.*

The Food and Agriculture Organization would be the principal action agency in the United Nations system which would participate in the program. It would have a coordinating and advisory function. In addition to keeping informed as to worldwide production, consumption, and trade in food products the Food and Agriculture Organization would receive current information from the United States and other food-exporting countries with regard to the types and quantities of foods available on concessional terms and the pertinent requirements of their national laws and administrative policies and from food-importing countries with regard to their needs for assistance.

The Food and Agriculture Organization would make appropriate dissemination of the information thus collected. It would also, consulting if necessary with the countries concerned, prepare recommendations with regard to the composition, size, and duration of programs for transfers of foods on concessional terms. These recommendations would take into account the objectives of furthering agricultural development in the food-importing countries and of avoiding disturbance of normal markets.

The United States and the other food-exporting countries would then follow their established programing procedures, carrying out the Food and Agriculture Organization's recommendations whenever practicable but reserving the right to proceed in some other way.

The Food and Agriculture Organization could lend its most effective cooperation with respect to the programing that is done under title I of Public Law 480 in sales for foreign currencies. Titles II, III, and IV, and also section 402 of the Mutual Security Act (providing respectively

² For an interim report on the food-for-peace program, see BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1960, p. 248.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 94, and July 18, 1960, p. 117.

⁴ S. Con. Res. 114.

for grants of agricultural products to foreign nations or peoples, for donations to voluntary agencies and others and for barter, for sales for dollars on long-term credit, and for grants or sales for foreign currencies under the Mutual Security Program) would all continue to be administered by the United States just as they are at present. The United States Government would also retain and exercise its existing powers under title I, giving due consideration to the recommendations of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

It would appear that to proceed in the manner above outlined would require no new legislation.

Transfers of food by the United States under title I of Public Law 480 would continue to be sales for local currency subject to the extension of grants of such currency for economic development on the basis of waivers by the Bureau of the Budget in the name of the President.

2. Multilateral donations through the United Nations.

The Food and Agriculture Organization would establish a semi-autonomous operating unit within its secretariat, reporting to an appropriate committee of government representatives. This might, for example, be a new committee including representatives of both food-exporting and food-importing countries.

Each contributing country, including the United States, would give a commitment to deliver at the request of the Food and Agriculture Organization specified foods in amounts up to specified limits and on a basis whereby the United States contribution would not exceed a reasonable proportion of the total contributions. The contributing countries would continue to hold the foods until requested by the Food and Agriculture Organization to turn them over physically for shipment to the recipient countries.

The Food and Agriculture Organization would receive requests from members desiring assistance and would decide which of these requests to meet and to what extent and from what source.

In principle the transfers of food under this procedure would be on a grant basis. If local currency proceeds were derived as a result of the sale of the commodities, such proceeds would belong to the recipient countries. To the extent practicable they should be used to help pay the costs of the program. The Food and Agriculture

Organization would probably wish to obtain a voice in the use of a portion of the local currency proceeds to support technical assistance projects in which it was interested. For the rest the government of the receiving country could be allowed to do what it liked with the proceeds.

For this second proposal we believe new legislation would be required. Consequently, if this type of approach is found to be desirable and if our discussions with other governments and international organizations indicate that a useful and workable program can be developed, including a reasonable contribution by other countries, a request will be made to Congress for appropriate legislation.

These two procedures or proposals are in outline form. Details have still to be worked out. Both are within the intent of the President's statement and within the compass of the resolution before the Congress. They represent a range of constructive possibilities within which other useful approaches may be found. They indicate the present thinking within the executive branch and may be useful to the Congress as it considers the resolution. Following consultations with other countries and with appropriate agencies in the United Nations system, we will be in a position to reach specific conclusions regarding the best method of proceeding.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 2d Session

- Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1961. Report to accompany H.R. 11666. S. Rept. 1777. June 29, 1960. 17 pp.
- Evaluation of Wartime Loans to Certain American Citizens. Report to accompany H.R. 808. S. Rept. 1766. June 29, 1960. 3 pp.
- Permitting Use in the Coastwise Trade of Certain Foreign-built Hydrofoil Vessels. Report to accompany H.R. 3900. S. Rept. 1778. June 30, 1960. 9 pp.
- Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. Conference report to accompany H.R. 11748. H. Rept. 2074. July 1, 1960. 3 pp.
- Temporary Adjustment of Sugar Quotas. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 217. S. Rept. 1833. July 1, 1960. 2 pp.
- Report of the Third Meeting of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, Washington, D.C., April 21-22, 1960. Report by Hon. Edna F. Kelly, chairman of the House of Representatives delegation. H. Rept. 2087. July 2, 1960. 7 pp.
- Enabling the United States To Participate in the Resettlement of Certain Refugees. Conference report to accompany H.J. Res. 397. H. Rept. 2088. July 2, 1960. 3 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings ¹

Adjourned During August 1960

U.N. Economic and Social Council: 30th Session	Geneva	July 5-Aug. 6
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics: 12th General Assembly	Helsinki	July 25-Aug. 8
U.N. ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party on Standardization of Conditions of Sale for Cereals	Geneva	Aug. 1-5
IAEA <i>Ad Hoc</i> Preparatory Panel on Third-Party Liability for Nuclear Shipping: 2d Meeting	Vienna	Aug. 1-6
3d FAO/IAIAS Latin American Meeting on Soils and Fertilizers	Raleigh, N.C.	Aug. 1-11
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 7th Session	México, D.F.	Aug. 3-5
10th General Assembly of the International Geographical Union and 19th International Congress of Geography	Stockholm	Aug. 6-12
5th Inter-American Conference on Agriculture and 6th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	México, D.F.	Aug. 8-20
2d U.N. Conference on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders	London	Aug. 8-20
PAHO Executive Committee: 41st Meeting	Habana	Aug. 12 (1 day)
WHO Regional Committee for Western Pacific: 11th Session	Manila	Aug. 12-17
12th Meeting of PAHO Directing Council and 12th Meeting of Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas	Habana	Aug. 14-26
7th International Soil Science Congress	Madison, Wis.	Aug. 15-23
International Union of Crystallography: 5th General Assembly	Cambridge, England	Aug. 15-24
21st International Geological Congress	Copenhagen	Aug. 15-25
U.N. Disarmament Commission	New York	Aug. 16-18
6th and 7th Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American States	San José, Costa Rica	Aug. 16-29
3d U.N. ECAFE Workshop on Budget Reclassification	Bangkok	Aug. 17-26
U.N. ECE Committee on Development of Trade: Consultation with Experts on Export Documents	Geneva	Aug. 22-26
UNESCO World Conference on Adult Education	Montreal	Aug. 22-31
PAHO Executive Committee: 42d Meeting	Habana	Aug. 26 (1 day)

In Session as of August 31, 1960

Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests	Geneva	Oct. 31, 1958-
12th Triennale de Milano	Milan	July 16-
WMO Commission on Maritime Meteorology: 3d Session	Utrecht	Aug. 16-
14th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 21-
21st International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	Aug. 24-
5th World Forestry Congress	Seattle	Aug. 29-

Scheduled September 1 Through November 30, 1960

{ For a list of meetings scheduled September 1-November 30, 1960, see Bulletin of September 5, 1960, p. 374. A list of scheduled meetings now appears in the first issue of each month and lists of meetings adjourned and in session in the third issue. }

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 24, 1960. Following is a list of abbreviations: ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IAIAS, Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

GATT Tariff Negotiations Conference Opens at Geneva

Following is the text of a statement made at Geneva, Switzerland, on September 1 by Clarence B. Randall, Special Assistant to the President of the United States, at the opening meeting of the 1960-61 tariff negotiations conference sponsored by the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,¹ together with an announcement of the members of the U.S. delegation.

STATEMENT BY MR. RANDALL

Press release 505 dated September 1, as delivered

I have the honor of bringing to this distinguished company the personal greetings of the President of the United States. President Eisenhower has asked me to convey to all who will have a part in this conference his earnest hope for its success and his full confidence that the results which will flow from it will be such that all participants will have pride and satisfaction in its achievements. He will be following your deliberations with the deepest interest.

It seems to me clear, as this tariff negotiations conference begins, that the Contracting Parties are here embarking upon the most complicated single effort which they have ever undertaken. The importance, therefore, of bringing your deliberations to a successful conclusion cannot be overstated. It is certain that the patterns of free-world trade for a long time to come will be vitally affected by what you here achieve.

There is happy augury in the record of the past. Throughout the years since 1947 the General Agreement has served as the principal forum for the free world in which trade problems might amicably and equitably be resolved and has proved itself adaptable to the resolution of a varied spectrum of difficult questions. That mutual bene-

fit flows to all participants from the principles of the GATT, and from this continuing program of multilateral tariff negotiations, has been abundantly demonstrated by the marked decrease in tariff barriers among the participating countries which has already been brought to pass.

Implicit in your presence here is the mutual faith of all participants that trade problems among friendly countries can be fully resolved in a mutually satisfactory manner by hard work, good will, and adherence to the GATT principles.

Negotiations on Common External Tariff

With entire candor we all accept the fact that the most significant challenge facing this conference will be found in the negotiations on the common external tariff of the European Economic Community. You must here continue and bring to conclusion the serious consideration which all the contracting parties have, since 1957, been giving to their future relationships with the Community.

The United States is satisfied that the objectives of the GATT and those of the Treaty of Rome are in basic harmony. The economic integration of the six member states of the Community within a liberal trade pattern is consistent with the liberal GATT trade philosophy embracing the whole free world. Because this is the first experience of the GATT with a customs union established by a group of contracting parties, it is not surprising that unique problems will be presented. It is equally certain that they can be solved in the spirit in which earlier problems have been met. It is also clear that the development of permanent relationships between the GATT and this important trade area will require continuing attention over a period of years. Nevertheless we in the United States feel full confidence that a new pattern can, and will, be created which will meet the needs of all concerned.

From the beginning the Contracting Parties have believed that one of the most important

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 13, 1960, p. 968; for an article by Honoré M. Catudal on "The 1960-61 GATT Tariff Conference," see *ibid.*, of Feb. 22, 1960, p. 291.

aspects of the Community's relationships with the rest of the world is the level of the common external tariff. With the publication of the tariff earlier this year, including most of the negotiated List G rates, evaluation of the scope of this problem began to be possible. When the remaining List G rates, notably on petroleum products and newsprint, are made known, the new tariff can be studied as a whole.

The decision of the Community last May to accelerate implementation of the Treaty of Rome underscores the need to settle these tariff problems expeditiously in this conference. We were, of course, cheered by the simultaneous decision of the Community to offer a 20 percent reduction in the level of the common external tariff. This was true not only because of the potential trade interest of our exporters but especially because we interpreted this action as recognition by the Community that the lowest possible level of the common external tariff will serve the interest not only of third countries but of the Community as well. We shall, however, wish to discuss with the Community certain cases wherein not even a 20 percent decrease would produce a rate conforming to the equities of the situation as we see them. We have every confidence that these cases will be examined sympathetically by the Community.

We can sense, too, problems which are of substantial importance to other contracting parties. For example, there is the case of tropical products which will be imported into the Community duty free from associated overseas territories of the member states but which would be subject to full and sometimes burdensome duties if imported from the rest of the world, including those less developed countries which are contracting parties to the GATT. Also, as you know, in many countries, including the United States, there is now wide public discussion of the European trade problems. We are therefore gratified to note that efforts will be made here to minimize these differences.

Guideposts for these negotiations are established by the General Agreement itself, by the body of experience already built up under it, and by the care with which this conference has been planned over the last 2 years. With the best of endeavor, however, not every contingency will have been foreseen. New problems, or unexpected variations of old ones, are likely to arise as this conference em-

barks upon its first task, namely, the negotiations with the EEC under article XXIV:6 of the GATT to establish a new schedule of tariff concessions to replace the existing national schedules of the member states.

I have entire confidence that with patience and good will on the part of all concerned these matters can be equitably adjusted. I further have faith that we can similarly resolve all problems that have to do with the general incidence of the common external tariff under the criteria of article XXIV:5(a) of the GATT. I have this faith because I know that we are all working toward the same goal—a world in which expanded international trade will move with a minimum of restrictions and with mutual benefit to all. From its very inception the European Economic Community has given the most unqualified assurance that it will be outward looking and not a closed, restrictive organization.

In this tariff conference, where the entire tariff structure of the Community is spread candidly open for review, there can be no shadow of doubt but that the Community will deal sympathetically with the problems which its establishment has presented to the individual contracting parties. Nor can it be thought that those contracting parties who have already initiated the renegotiation of some of their existing concessions under article XXVIII of the GATT will fail to deal fairly with those countries whose interests have been affected by these actions.

Import Restrictions on Agricultural Trade

There is a shadow in the picture, however, as I see it. By this I mean the questions that arise from the import restrictions that would be applied to agricultural trade. No matter how well we may resolve the problems in other fields, we cannot reach a satisfactory overall result unless at the same time those that relate to agriculture are dealt with in accordance with GATT principles.

I must in all candor say that the United States has serious apprehension on this point. It is difficult for us to see how mutual agreement could be arrived at so long as the future treatment of this large and important area of trade is clouded with uncertainty.

I refer here to the proposal by the Commission of the Community for variable import levies on

many important farm products. It is our conviction that, unless greater opportunity for trade is provided for than is now evident in the Commission's proposals, the system will work to the serious detriment of the United States and other third-country suppliers—in fact, to the Community itself. Whatever serves unduly to insulate the Community market from the competition of world prices is out of harmony with our common GATT objective for the expansion of international trade.

I do not see how fixed concessions granted by contracting parties could be measured against the uncertainty of variable import levies which, by hypothesis, are subject to fluctuations. Further, the impact on trade of a system of variable levies will depend on the level of the future common support prices for grains and other farm products. If they are much above world prices, the adverse effect is obvious. We urgently need proposals from the Community that offer some way of coping with this perplexing problem.

Difficult as the negotiating problem, as such, is, much more is at stake in this issue. If the Community were to insulate its agriculture from international competition and not make it subject to negotiation, an adverse reaction would be created that would extend far beyond the borders of the Community. The pattern set by the Community will be vital wherever the GATT endeavors to deal with agricultural protectionism. The entire concept of liberal trade policy is at stake. All countries who are endeavoring to maintain the liberal point of view will find themselves in a difficult position, whether with respect to agricultural commodities or industrial products, if the Community's trade policy excludes competition in the field of agriculture.

I have spoken frankly because it seems to me that the situation requires it. Nevertheless, let me say at once that I am entirely confident that a workable solution for this difficult problem can be found as this first phase of the conference develops. Others equally perplexing have been answered in the past, and so can this one.

We can then move ahead at the beginning of next January to the second phase under which contracting parties will undertake a reciprocal exchange of new trade concessions with one another.

We in the United States are now earnestly en-

gaged in preparing offers of concessions in our tariffs which we hope can be reciprocated by the other participants. In this task we look forward not only to negotiating with many of the contracting parties but also with additional countries which will be seeking accession to the General Agreement.

It is a thrilling concept to me that in these days of world complexity and tension the governments here represented bring to this conference such firm determination to go forward once more with the utmost of good will in further multilateral attacks upon the barriers to world trade.

I wish you every success in your endeavors.

U.S. DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on August 29 (press release 494) that Clarence B. Randall, Special Assistant to the President and chairman of the Committee on Foreign Economic Policy, will represent the United States at the opening meeting of the multilateral tariff negotiations conference, beginning on September 1 at Geneva, Switzerland. C. Edward Galbreath of the White House staff will act as Mr. Randall's adviser at this meeting.

Carl D. Corse, a Foreign Service officer, has been designated by the President as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the conference. The delegation will participate in these negotiations under the authority given to the President in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958 and in accordance with all the customary domestic procedures.

The negotiations, which are being held within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will take place in two phases.

During the first phase of the conference, the United States, along with other GATT contracting parties, will negotiate with the Commission of the European Economic Community concerning the establishment of a new schedule of tariff concessions for the Common Market as a whole to replace the present individual schedules of the member states. The United States will also negotiate, under provisions of article XXVIII of the General Agreement, with several other contracting parties for the modification or withdrawal of individual concessions in existing schedules.

During the second phase, scheduled to begin early in 1961, the United States expects to negotiate for the reciprocal exchange of new concessions with the Commission of the EEC on behalf of the member states (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and at least 20 other countries which are contracting parties to the GATT or which are expected to negotiate for accession to the agreement.

In addition to the chairman the following have been designated as members of the delegation for the first phase of the conference:

James W. Birkhead, Department of Agriculture
Helen L. Brewster, Department of State
Edgar L. Eaton, Department of Labor

David Fellman, Department of Commerce
Morris J. Fields, Treasury Department
Walter Hollis, Department of State
Roderick L. Jones, Department of State
Harold P. Macgowan, Department of Commerce
Parker G. Montgomery, Department of State
Edward I. Mullins, Department of Defense
Weber H. Peterson, Department of Agriculture
B. Robert Sichel, Department of Commerce
Howard F. Shepston, Department of Commerce
Enoch W. Skartvedt, Department of Commerce
Kenneth B. Smith, U.S. Tariff Commission
John W. Stewart, Department of Agriculture
William A. Vogely, Department of the Interior
I Herman Walker, Jr., Department of State
Joseph Watstein, Department of Commerce
Guy A. Wiggins, Department of State

U.S. Supports Admission to U.N. Membership of Eight African States and Cyprus

*Statements by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*

STATEMENT ON AFRICAN STATES¹

It gives me great pleasure to join with other members of the Council to welcome the simultaneous application for United Nations membership of eight African members of the French Community.

When the Council acts affirmatively—as we are certain it will—we will have taken a necessary step toward bringing into the United Nations so far this year 13 new African states, as well as the Malagasy Republic, which is close to if not actually part of the African Continent.²

These new states represent an area more than half that of Europe, and their governments speak for well over 16 million people. For an area that appears so homogeneous on the map, these countries are incredibly diverse in culture, history, climate, and ethnic background. There are important common factors which however do not mask their intense and vital individuality.

¹ Made in the Security Council on Aug. 23 (U.S./U.N. press release 2463).

² For background, see BULLETIN of July 25, 1960, p. 149.

The political experience they share in common is a progression from colony to self-government to complete independence under the leadership and inspiration of France. This process has brought to prominence leaders experienced in government and people accustomed to the ideas and the practice of democracy.

All share in common the use of the French language as their passport to the great world of thought, commerce, and political activity. As members of the French-speaking world they also embrace many of the great traditions of France.

Each of them has in turn greatly influenced France itself. I need only mention that it was Brazzaville, capital of the Republic of Congo, which first offered hospitality to General de Gaulle and contributed heavily to the Free French Movement. It was at Brazzaville that the first great step toward complete sovereignty began under General de Gaulle's leadership. For many years each country has sent outstanding parliamentarians and cabinet officers to the French Republic; these men now govern in their own countries. This experience cannot fail but benefit

to their own people and the United Nations itself.

The accession of these eight states to the United Nations is a source of great satisfaction to the United States. The United States is, I think, the oldest country in the world to achieve independence directly from colonial status. We have not forgotten what this means; indeed, we continue to commemorate this event every year.

We expect each of these countries to bring vitality and a fresh point of view to the United Nations. The United States welcomes this just as we welcome in turn the application of each of these countries.

There is the Central African Republic, inspired by the statesmanship of its late leader, Barthélemy Boganda:

The Republic of Congo, under the leadership of Abbé Fulbert Youlou:

The Republic of Chad, which throughout history has been a crossroads of Africa:

The Republic of Dahomey, noted for its art and its contributions to the political development of Africa:

The dynamic Republic of Gabon, with its important mining industry;

The Ivory Coast, with its great industrial potential and its thriving economy under the leadership of President [Felix] Houphouët-Boigny, whom so many of us here know well;

The Republic of Niger, like the United States, a successful multiracial society; and

The Republic of the Upper Volta, site of one of the great African empires of the past.

The United States has already welcomed the independence of each of these countries formally in their own capitals. Their people and those of the United States share a common dream, to be free under governments of our own choosing. We hope that we will help each other when we can in full respect for each other's sovereignty. We wish for them a life of freedom in dignity and prosperity.

By the end of this year, Mr. President, there may well be 100 members of the United Nations. If this fact itself represents a challenge to our organization, it also brings new vitality and new ideas. The years ahead will be exciting, with many problems to be solved. We welcome another group of new members to assist in the task to which the United Nations is dedicated.

I am happy, Mr. President, to vote in favor of

the resolution sponsored by the delegates of France and Tunisia recommending the admission of the eight states members of the Community to United Nations membership.³

STATEMENT ON CYPRUS⁴

We meet today to add a new page to the history of a place steeped in history and famous to men everywhere. The legendary home of Aphrodite has now become the Republic of Cyprus, and its Government has applied for membership in the United Nations. It is a privilege which can be described as stirring for me on behalf of the United States to bid the people and Government of Cyprus welcome and to assure them of our support.

This lovely island in the eastern Mediterranean and its people have known greatness and tragedy, and the things that have happened there have stirred men's imaginations from Homer's day to the present.

Indeed, if all the records of Western civilization were to be destroyed save for a single history of Cyprus, scholars could reconstruct almost the entire story from that one volume. Such has been the intimacy of this island with the epic events of the Mediterranean basin and with the dominant land and sea powers of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Greeks returning from the Trojan War, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Macedonians, and Romans all came to Cyprus.

When the Roman Empire was divided, Cyprus went with the eastern empire and thus became one of the heirs to the great religious heritage of Byzantium. The vitality of this heritage is attested by the transcendent role of the Orthodox Church in Cypriot history. The present Archbishop Primate of the Church, Archbishop Makarios, is now also the first President of the Republic of Cyprus, and we extend to him our respect and our sincere congratulations.

³The Security Council, on Aug. 23, adopted unanimously eight draft resolutions recommending to the General Assembly that the Republic of Dahomey, the Republic of Niger, the Republic of the Upper Volta, the Republic of the Ivory Coast, the Republic of Chad, the Republic of Congo, the Gabon Republic, and the Central African Republic be admitted to membership in the United Nations.

⁴Made in the Security Council on Aug. 24 (U.S. U.N. press release 3464).

Sharing the fate of the Byzantine world, Cyprus knew the rule of the Crusaders under Richard the Lion Hearted and, for three centuries, the Frankish dynasty of Guy de Lusignan.

Coming under the rule of Venice, a period during which, so Shakespeare tells us, Othello ruled for a time, Cyprus fell in 1573 to the armies of the Sultan. Turkish rule lasted almost 300 years, and during this time Frankish feudalism was abolished and the Orthodox Church was restored to its former place. For the past 82 years Cyprus was administered by the United Kingdom.

History and geography have thus left to Cyprus the monuments of many cultures and a talented and varied population. Hard work and enlightened British administration have given the island today a high standard of living for which the United Kingdom deserves a full measure of credit. Roads, schools, and other public works are numerous. A highly efficient and modern public health service has practically eliminated contagious diseases. Scientific agriculture has increased the yields of the island's citrus groves and vineyards.

Indeed the primary challenge facing Cyprus is not economic underdevelopment—although there are things which remain to be done in this field—but the creation of a national identity out of diverse elements.

It is a matter of history, well known here, that independence was not the first choice of many and perhaps even the majority of Cypriots. For years the world was saddened by the violence of fratricidal strife on the island resulting from the clashing demands of *enosis* and partition.

Therefore, when the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom together with Cypriot representatives agreed that Cyprus should be independent, the decision was greeted with special joy in the United States.

The United States is certain that the people of Cyprus will come to value this independence no less than we in the United States value our independence. We also feel sure in the United States that a truly united country can be built from diverse elements. Cyprus is fortunate in having leaders of the stature of Archbishop Makarios and Vice President [Fazil] Kınçuk. The high statesmanship which led to the establishment of Cyprus will in the days and years ahead assist the leaders of the two major communities in their

efforts to build a vigorous and prosperous new nation.

The United States is confident that in the future the fortunate residents of this land will look around at their handiwork and back at their history and take justifiable pride that they are—first and foremost—Cypriots.

The United States, Mr. President, will vote in favor of the draft resolution submitted by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Ceylon.²

James J. Wadsworth Confirmed to 15th General Assembly

The Senate on August 27 confirmed James J. Wadsworth to be a representative of the United States to the 15th session of the U.N. General Assembly.

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- Letter Dated 1 August 1960 From the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General. S/4415. August 1, 1960. 6 pp.
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- Second Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolutions S/4387 of 14

² A resolution recommending U.N. membership for the Republic of Cyprus was adopted unanimously by the Security Council on Aug. 24.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N.Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

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Letter Dated 25 July 1960 From the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. DC/156. July 28, 1960. 1 p.

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Letter Dated 31 July 1960 From the Acting Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R. Addressed to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission. DC/158. August 1, 1960. 4 pp.

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MULTILATERAL

Finance

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Acceptance deposited: United States, August 9, 1960.

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Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.¹
Accession deposited (with reservations): Venezuela, July 12, 1960.

Health

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Acceptances deposited: Cameroun, May 6, 1960; Ceylon and Kuwait, May 9, 1960; Nepal, May 12, 1960; Togo, May 13, 1960; Greece, May 23, 1960; Ecuador, June 10, 1960; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, June 17, 1960; Albania and Cuba, July 27, 1960.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air-mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.
Adherence deposited: Cameroun, July 26, 1960.

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Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3206), with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.
Notifications of approval: New Zealand, July 7, 1960; Canada, July 13, 1960.
International telecommunication convention with six annexes and final protocol. Signed at Geneva December 21, 1959.²
Ratification deposited: Iceland, July 5, 1960.
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Notification of approval: New Zealand, July 7, 1960.

¹ Not in force for the United States.² Not in force.

Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the United Nations. Addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4426. August 2, 1960. 21 pp.

Special Committee of Six on Transmission of Information (Non-Self-Governing Territories). The Application of Chapter XI and the Obligation of Members To Transmit Information Under Article 73 c of the Charter of the United Nations. An account of discussions prepared by the Secretariat. A/AC.100/2. August 3, 1960. 46 pp.; Annex I (excerpts from opinions expressed by members). Add. 1. August 3, 1960. 41 pp.; Annex II (excerpts from treatises on the interpretation of the U.N. Charter). Add. 2. August 12, 1960. 25 pp.

Financial Reports and Accounts for the Year 1959. Note by the Secretary-General. A/C.5/817. August 4, 1960. 6 pp.

Special Committee of Six on Transmission of Information (Non-Self-Governing Territories). Replies of Governments Indicating Their Views on the Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists To Transmit the Information Called for in Article 73 c of the Charter of the United Nations. A/AC.100/1/Add. 1. August 5, 1960. 6 pp.

Comprehensive Review of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund: Report of the Pension Review Group. A/4427. August 5, 1960. 150 pp.

Supplementary List of Items for the Agenda of the Fifteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly:

Item Proposed by Ireland—The Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons. Letter dated August 15, 1960, from the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4434. August 15, 1960. 3 pp.;

Item Proposed by Rumania—Measures Designed To Promote Among Youth the Ideas of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding Between Peoples. Letter dated August 18, 1960, from the Permanent Representative of Rumania to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4442. August 19, 1960. 3 pp.;

Item Proposed by Czechoslovakia—Appeal for Maximum Support to Efforts of Newly Emerging States for Strengthening Their Independence. Letter dated August 19, 1960, from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4443. August 19, 1960. 3 pp.;

Item Proposed by the Federation of Malaya and Thailand—The Question of Tibet. Letter dated August 19, 1960, from the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Federation of Malaya and the Acting Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4444. August 19, 1960. 2 pp.;

Item Proposed by the U.S.S.R.—The Menace to World Peace Created by Aggressive Actions of the United States Against the Soviet Union. Cable dated August 20, 1960, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4446. August 20, 1960. 4 pp.;

Item Proposed by the United States—The Question of Hungary. Letter dated August 20, 1960, from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4447. August 20, 1960. 2 pp.;

Item Proposed by the Secretary-General—Question of the Composition of the Trusteeship Council. Note by the Secretary-General. A/4448. August 21, 1960. 3 pp.;

Item Proposed by Morocco—The Problem of Mauritania. Letter dated August 20, 1960, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Morocco addressed to the Secretary-General. A/4445. August 22, 1960. 2 pp.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement setting forth an understanding concerning article 111 of the agricultural commodities agreement of June 9, 1959, as supplemented (TIAS 4258 and 4428). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei August 17 and 24, 1960. Entered into force August 24, 1960.

France

Agreement extending the agreement of March 23, 1956, as supplemented (TIAS 3647 and 4298), relating to the establishment and operation of a rawinsonde observation station on the island of Guadeloupe. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris December 23, 1959, and July 25, 1960. Entered into force July 25, 1960.

Japan

Agreement providing for Japan's financial contributions for U.S. administrative and related expenses during the Japanese fiscal year 1960 under the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo August 9, 1960. Entered into force August 9, 1960.

of Mali. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 402 dated July 18.)

James J. Wadsworth to be a representative of the United States to the United Nations and the representative of the United States in the U.N. Security Council. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 485 dated August 24.)

Fraser Wilkins to be Ambassador to the Republic of Cyprus. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 406 dated August 17.)

Designations

Hugh G. Appling and Edward T. Long as Special Assistants to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, effective August 29.

Thomas C. Mann as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, effective September 1. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 506 dated September 1.)

James E. Nugent as Deputy Inspector General and Comptroller of the Mutual Security Program, effective September 4. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 512 dated September 2.)

Resignations

Horace E. Henderson as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, effective September 2. (For biographic details, see press release 509 dated September 2.)

John E. Murphy as Inspector General and Comptroller of the Mutual Security Program, effective September 9. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 512 dated September 2.)

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on June 22 confirmed Leland Barrows to be Ambassador to Togo. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 322 dated June 13.)

The Senate on August 27 confirmed the following nominations:

James W. Barco to be a deputy representative of the United States to the United Nations and the deputy representative of the United States in the U.N. Security Council. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 485 dated August 24.)

Frederic P. Bartlett to be Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 443 dated August 9.)

Charles R. Burrows to be Ambassador to Honduras. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 444 dated August 9.)

Edwin M. Martin to be an Assistant Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 460 dated August 15.)

Robert Newbegin to be Ambassador to Haiti. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 445 dated August 9.)

Christian M. Ravndal to be Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 405 dated July 21.)

Roy Richard Rubottom, Jr., to be Ambassador to Argentina. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 422 dated July 29.)

Henry S. Villard to be Ambassador to the Federation

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

Technical Assistance—Third-Country Training Program in Japan. TIAS 4475. 7 pp. 10c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo March 23, 1960. Entered into force March 23, 1960.

Grant for Procurement of Nuclear Research and Training Equipment and Materials. TIAS 4485. 6 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Guatemala. Exchange of notes—Signed at Guatemala April 7 and 23, 1960. Entered into force April 23, 1960.

Weather Stations—Cooperative Program at Guayaquil. TIAS 4486. 3 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ecuador, extending the agreement of April 24, 1957, as extended and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Quito February 12 and May 4, 1960. Entered into force May 4, 1960. Operative retroactively January 1, 1960.

United States Educational Commission for France. TIAS 4487. 6 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and France, amending the agreement of October 22, 1948, as amended and extended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Paris April 29, 1960. Entered into force April 29, 1960.

Interchange of Patent Rights and Technical Information for Defense Purposes—Filing Classified Patent Applications. TIAS 4488. 8 pp. 10c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Belgium. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels May 6 and 18, 1960. Entered into force May 18, 1960.

Kindley Air Force Base, Bermuda—Extension of Area of Civil Air Terminal. TIAS 4489. 4 pp. 5c.

Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, supplementing the agreement of March 23 and April 25, 1951. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 25, 1960. Entered into force May 25, 1960.

High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean—Amendment to the Annex to the Convention Signed at Tokyo May 9, 1952. TIAS 4493. 4 pp. 5c.

Adopted at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, Seattle, Washington, on November 7, 1959. Entered into force May 24, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities—Typhoon Rehabilitation in the Ryukyu Islands. TIAS 4495. 7 pp. 10c.

Agreement between the United States of America and Japan. Exchange of notes—Signed at Tokyo May 31, 1960. Entered into force May 31, 1960.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. TIAS 4498. 6 pp. 5c.

Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to agreement of October 30, 1947. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force with respect to the United States of America and Tunisia June 15, 1960.

Surplus Agricultural Commodities. TIAS 4499. 15 pp. 10c.

Agreement between the United States of America and India. Signed at Washington May 4, 1960. Entered into force May 4, 1960. With exchange of notes.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 29-September 4

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

Release issued prior to August 29 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 488 of August 25.

No.	Date	Subject
494	8/29	Delegation to GATT conference (re-write).
*495	8/29	Cultural exchange.
496	8/29	Deadline for filing claims in Austria.
*497	8/29	Cultural exchange.
498	8/29	Herter: return from Foreign Ministers meeting, San José (printed in BULLETIN of September 12).
*499	8/30	Schwartz designated USOM director, Afghanistan (biographic details).
500	8/30	Protest of Congolese attack on U.S. airmen.
†501	8/30	Delegations to presidential inauguration, Ecuador, and OAS meeting, Bogotá (rewrite).
*502	8/31	Cultural exchange (United Arab Republic).
503	8/31	Herter-Hammarskjöld: Congolese attack on U.S. airmen.
504	9/1	1960 teacher development program.
505	9/1	Randall: opening meeting, GATT conference.
*506	9/1	Mann sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (biographic details).
507	9/1	Herter: American Bar Association.
*508	9/1	Martin sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (biographic details).
*509	9/2	Horace Henderson resignation (biographic details).
*510	9/2	Cultural exchange.
†511	9/3	Dillon: arrival, OAS meeting.
*512	9/2	Nugent designation and Murphy resignation (biographic details).
514	9/3	Notice to prospective travelers to Cuba.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Bulletin

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September 26, 1960

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Our Expanding Foreign Relations

Address by Secretary Herter¹

I should like to discuss some of the problems faced by the United States in the world today. The issues that confront us nearly everywhere have two qualities in common: their complexity and their interrelation.

These attributes are reflected in the complex and interrelated means with which this country seeks to deal with the foreign scene.

Before the Second World War the United States maintained diplomatic relations with 63 nations. Now we maintain relations with nearly 100, in addition to assigning diplomatic missions to the United Nations and 3 regional associations of nations.

Before the second war we had no mutual defense alliances. Now we have them with 42 nations.

Before the war we were members of no regional defense arrangements. Now we are members of four—NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], the OAS [Organization of American States], and ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, and United States]—and active participants in a fifth, CENTO [Central Treaty Organization].

Before the war we occasionally helped other nations in case of disaster. Now we have within the Department of State the farflung Mutual Security Program, which operates in 74 countries and territories, with an appropriation this year of nearly \$4 billion.

This growing complexity has tended to draw the Secretary of State, even though he is acting for the President of the United States, who has the sole constitutional responsibility for the con-

duct of foreign affairs, into personal attendance at a great many international conferences. At the same time it piles his desk in Washington higher and higher with issues and problems. Thus, to use a newspaper image, he finds himself more and more managing editor, business manager, editorial writer, rewrite man, and roving reporter—everything but the copy boy; and sometimes I am not so sure about that.

A newspaper image is in more than one way appropriate to this discussion, for you editors, likewise, have faced and are facing the need to build an increasingly complex and interrelated apparatus.

Before the Second World War only a few American correspondents went to Geneva for the sessions of the League of Nations, of which the United States was not, of course, a member. Now a substantial corps of American correspondents regularly covers the United Nations, supplemented by many more during the sessions of the General Assembly.

As we in the Department of State must attempt to cover the African Continent with our diplomatic, consular, and other representatives, you have to cover the same continent from a news point of view. Before the last war if just one American reporter went to the Congo during the course of a year, and then only for a few days, I suppose that was average. Now a dozen and more American correspondents have been in the Congo for many weeks and are likely to stay there for some time to come.

One thing has not changed about either journalism or diplomacy. They can be hazardous professions, demanding sacrifice. The tragic death in the Congo of Harry Taylor, in the line of duty as a reporter, is testimony to that. I knew Harry Taylor well. He covered the Department of State

¹ Made before the United Press International Conference of Editors and Publishers at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 8 (press release 518, as delivered).

accurately and comprehensively, attended many of my press conferences, and talked with me privately on numerous occasions. You and we both will keenly feel his loss.

As we look at the foreign scene from a headquarters view, we in State and you in the New York UPI office face the same difficulties. How do you and we make sense out of the welter of telegrams that come in throughout the day and night? How do we draw the correct conclusions? How do we present them clearly and convincingly to the public? How do we foresee an approaching crisis and try to meet it? How do we see through what seems to be a crisis, not become unduly alarmed, and avoid creating a crisis situation?

Where do we find space and time either on the official or journalistic side to handle these vastly increased relations as they should be handled? Both you and we will be faced in the years to come with a process of selection and assignment of priorities. Neither of us can permit himself to be swamped by the multiplicity of relationships and reports. We must be able to assign important action and space to the things that are important and keep in proportion the things that are secondary.

The Year of African Independence

This year will be remembered for a long time as the year of African independence. In 12 months 16 countries will have gained independence. Never before have so many nations emerged in so short a time.

This year of independence has been marked by some violence, it is true. But the most important fact about the emergence of the new African countries has been that the turnover of authority in most cases occurred peacefully. The difficulties in the Congo are important, but they are not typical. They must not obscure the more important fact that most of the new African countries enjoy good relations with their former metropolises. The remaining bonds of good will and avenues of assistance can make an important and perhaps decisive contribution in the critical era that lies ahead.

In the case of the Congo it was evident that the transfer of sovereignty by the Belgians to the Congolese would be accompanied by certain problems, especially by new needs and expectations,

accompanied by inadequacy of administrative personnel. The United States Government explored these needs in advance of independence and made provision for a substantial assistance program. Then came the crisis, leading to the request of the Congolese Government for United Nations assistance.²

Such assistance offered the best hope, in our opinion as in the opinion of the great majority of states, for restoring order so that forward progress might again be possible for the Congolese people. The United States Government declared itself at once and unequivocally in support of the United Nations effort and agreed not to act independently of that effort in the Congo.

The subsequent events are revealing. The Soviet Union, after voting to support the United Nations action, has persistently conducted a campaign of agitation against the United Nations in the Congo, and this campaign has found its echo in harassments suffered by United Nations elements on duty in the Congo. Just before I left the office, I saw a ticker report that Lumumba has once again asked the U.N. to withdraw its troops.

More recently we have seen evidences of a politically motivated incursion of planes, so-called technicians, and equipment into the Congo from the Soviet bloc, quite outside the United Nations effort. The President has voiced our protest over this activity.³ We are keeping this whole matter under careful scrutiny, for it has obviously grave implications for the peace and security of Africa and, as Secretary-General Hammarskjöld has said, for the larger world.

We are pleased to note that the African nations in their recent conference in Léopoldville gave a strong endorsement to the United Nations operation and to the principle of excluding outside interference.⁴

The experience of the Congo shows just how critical are the first weeks and months in the life of a new country. In that time attitudes can be formed which may have enduring effect.

This Government believes that African countries, because they have so long sought their new

² For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159, and Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221.

³ See p. 473.

⁴ For text of a message sent to the Léopoldville conference by Acting Secretary Dillon, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1960, p. 440.

independence, would wish to do nothing that would open them to subversion by foreign imperialism in any form. Advice, both sincere and interested, will come to them from many sides. We hope the African countries will be able to counsel among themselves, separate the good from the bad, and profit from their own experiences in dealing with their own internal problems and with the outside world.

The United States wishes to help Africa channel her energies into nation building rather than conflict. But while we are interested in stability, we know our approach cannot be merely tranquilizing and conservative. New forces are on the march. There is an atmosphere of change. Our role is to try to help the Africans see that changes will be in the direction of progress—economic, social, and political—with the stability such progress brings.

In offering development assistance to Africa the United States gives priority to the development of human resources and the institutions necessary to nation building and economic growth. In our current budget is included a special program for tropical Africa which contains authority to give assistance in the fields of education and training, both on a national and a regional basis. It is our hope to encourage regional cooperation for the development of resources through multicountry consultation, planning, research, and surveys. By this means we believe the soundest basis can be laid for economic progress and the improvement of living standards. I hope this program will be expanded substantially by whatever administration takes office next year.

Problems Facing Latin America

Latin America, like Africa, has been of concern to us recently. Latin America is at a more advanced state of development than Africa. But the two continents share problems in common, and the destiny of one, like the other, is linked to our own.

Since the war there has been a rise in national incomes in Latin America, but the improvement of the standard of living of the great majority of the Latin American people has been very slow. The rate of population growth is so high that a substantial part of the annual increase goes to feed new mouths. Moreover, a low level of technical and general education puts severe limits on the productivity of the average worker. And in some

countries outdated economic, legal, and social systems deny to a large part of the population an opportunity to share in the benefits of growth. The result has been frustration and social unrest which at intervals threatens to erupt in violence and the overthrow of existing institutions, even when no good alternative is at hand. Such conditions pose a threat to free democratic institutions everywhere in the hemisphere.

At the meeting which began Monday [September 5] of the Special Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States, the United States seeks, in cooperation with the other American Republics, to develop a Latin American social development program. Its purpose will be to attack such problems as housing, land development, and education and thereby give the hope of a better life to scores of millions of people throughout the Americas. By this means it is hoped the complex problems of development facing the Americas will be more soluble, without destructive social upheaval and its accompanying dangers.

The need for social change in Latin America, and the danger of too abrupt change, are nowhere better shown than in the problems of the Caribbean area.

We have seen the example of Cuba, where the outcry for social justice toppled one dictator only to place another in power, a despot who seized the reins of government by trading upon and then betraying democratic ideals. Today he proclaims that he represents "the people" at the same time that he spends more money for the arms, propaganda, and alien advice to suppress them. One of his favorite devices to demonstrate his so-called "popular support" is to close government offices and suspend other activities in the hope that a million people will attend his political harangues. Elections are apparently unnecessary, because a crowd assembled in a public square in Habana is the real and genuine "General Assembly of the Cuban People."

It was my privilege to participate with delegates of the other American Republics in formulating, 1 year ago, the Declaration of Santiago,⁵ which spelled out the meaning of representative democracy and human rights for the Americas and, just recently, the Declaration of San José,⁶ which establishes the victory of the inter-Ameri-

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 407.

can system over dictatorships of both the right and the left. While the trend of government in both Cuba and the Dominican Republic is away from rather than toward representative democracy, both of these dictatorships now have been served notice that they are under the watchful eye of the rest of the hemisphere.

The Atlantic Community

In the developing areas the major challenge is to promote economic growth and strength. In the Atlantic Community there is a great opportunity for continued growth, but there are other major challenges also. In addition to taking steps that will insure a continued high level of development, the Atlantic nations face the need to maintain a balanced and flexible defense apparatus in a world of modern weapons and to bring their vast resources to bear upon the problems of the less developed countries.

There is increasing need for a common approach, for consultation and cooperation among the members of the Atlantic Community, if these purposes are to be achieved. Interdependence is unavoidable in a shrinking and increasingly industrialized world.

I am confident that the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, for which the United States and 19 other nations are now laying the groundwork, will prove an important new organ of common action and a major contributor to widened trade and future economic growth, both within the Atlantic Community and in the world beyond. Significantly, the United States and Canada would become full members of the new OECD, while they have not been members of the existing OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation]. I hope it will be possible for a new administration to lay before the next session of the Congress a convention for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

New efforts in the economic development of Europe are possible only so long as there is peace and the confidence that peace will endure. Peace and confidence in turn can only survive over the long term if the apparatus of defense—both in weapons and organization—remains adequate to the dangers we continue to face.

A respectable posture of military defense within

the Atlantic Community requires, in addition to modern weapons, forces of a balance and flexibility to meet any challenge, regardless of location or size, and a command structure appropriate to modern weapons technology.

The fact of nuclear stalemate makes the intentional waging of major war less likely today. But this in turn makes it more tempting for an aggressor to experiment with aggression by means short of major war. Only if we maintain the capacity to meet such threats promptly and appropriately can we deter them or prevent them from spreading into unintended all-out nuclear war if they occur.

Modern weapons technology, as you know, substantially reduces the margins of time and space available for military defense. This means that a collective security effort, to be capable of fulfilling its purpose in the present age, requires a far greater degree of integration in planning, command, and logistic support than has been the case in the past. In the First and Second World Wars there was time for mobilization and the creation of international commands after hostilities began. In today's world this is not possible. Experience in the Atlantic Alliance has shown that integration in defense is possible without detracting from the sovereignty of independent yet interdependent members of the alliance. It continues to be the policy of the United States to encourage the concept of integration in NATO.

Also essential to the defense posture of NATO is to include nuclear-capable weapons in American and Allied forces. This has increasingly been done in recent years. New proposals, designed to fit the requirements of the alliance in the early and mid-1960's, are now being considered in the alliance.

Neither economic progress nor military power will alone assure the security of the Atlantic nations unless such areas as Africa, Asia, and Latin America continue to advance in freedom and peace. There is a trend toward a greater contribution by the industrialized nations of Europe of assistance to the developing areas. This is a healthy trend. I hope it will continue, and I believe it should.

The members of the Atlantic Alliance must also continue the close coordination of their policies for dealing with the Soviet bloc, particularly with respect to arms reduction. Meanwhile, they must

maintain adequate public support for military defense, so that eventually the Soviet Union will come to see that it cannot succeed either in splitting the alliance or imposing its will on the rest of the world. At the same time the Atlantic nations must continue to hold open the door to genuine negotiations with the Soviet Union against the time, whenever it comes, that meaningful settlements are possible.

Events in Other Areas

Events in other areas of the world have been less immediately pressing upon our attention than Africa, Latin America, and Europe. The Middle East had been relatively quiet until just a few days ago, when the Prime Minister of Jordan [Hazza Majali] was assassinated. It is our hope that stabilizing, constructive trends in that area will continue and that this disruptive act will not set off a new chain of difficulties.

In the Far East also, while the threat of Communist pressure continues and the development process is not always smooth, there are underlying trends of steady progress, both economic and political. In Japan the firm stand of the Ikeda government, the results of recent prefectural elections, and indications of an awakened public opinion all suggest that Japan's close association with the United States and the free world is unwavering. They further emphasize that the unhappy events which led to the cancellation of the President's visit have in no way impaired our basic ties with the great majority of the Japanese people. The visit to Korea by Japanese Foreign Minister [Zentaro] Kosaka is a very important first step in healing a difference of many years' standing between two of our staunchest allies. There are other areas of the Far East where ancient differences impair unity and impede progress. A major facet of American policy is to lend our influence to healing these rifts, in contrast to the longstanding aim of communism: divide and conquer.

The Republic of China continues to make progress in its campaign for the political, economic, and social welfare of its people. In southeast Asia the occasional front-page incidents, sometimes twisted out of context, must not be permitted to obscure the slow, undramatic, but very real progress that continues. This progress goes on

despite the constant grinding pressure of Communist subversion, oftentimes obscured in domestic political crises, as in the case of Laos.

U.S. Newsmen Barred From Communist China

Communist China maintains its hard and belligerent hostility toward the United States, a doctrinaire antagonism which is used by the warlords there to distract their subjects from exploitation and hunger and the violent dislocation of their lives in the drive for world power. The continuing ideological dispute between the Russians and the Red Chinese provides a challenging and complex puzzle, both to journalists and to diplomats. Whatever the long-term effect of these differences may be, we have no indication for the foreseeable future that they will in any way diminish the Communist threat in any area.

For many months the United States Government has been seeking to obtain Communist Chinese agreement to the entry of American newsmen into Communist China. We have validated the passports of 33 American correspondents to go to the China mainland. In Warsaw, Poland, the United States Ambassador, Jacob D. Beam, proposed to Communist Chinese Ambassador Wang [Ping-nan] that parallel announcements be made by the two Governments, admitting correspondents of each country into the other in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity. The day before yesterday [September 6] came the Chinese Communist reply. This tied admission of American correspondents to political conditions, required the United States to set aside our laws and regulations if these would bar the newsmen selected by the Communist Chinese, required the United States to guarantee the professional conduct of American correspondents, and contained provisions restrictive of legitimate press freedom.

The United States obviously could not accept these conditions. It was evident that the Communist Chinese were seeking to use the admission of American correspondents to extract political concessions from us. The Department of State issued this morning a press release on this subject, along with the text of the Chinese Communist reply.⁷

⁷ See p. 497.

I regret that we have had no success in our efforts to facilitate the entrance of American newsmen into Communist China. We believe that objective reporting by American correspondents from the Chinese mainland is consonant with our foreign policy.

Why the Chinese Communists continue to refuse to admit American correspondents to their country is anyone's guess. It can only be conjectured that they are afraid of the objective reporting which we believe would be helpful. It is known that the Communist Chinese have had immense difficulties in their efforts to develop the economy of the country in an inflexible mold and to harness the personal lives of their citizens in their system of communes. They may well wish to hide such developments from the light of skillful reporting.

We shall, of course, continue our efforts with the Communist Chinese in the hope that in due course we can bring about the reciprocal and equal admission of newsmen into our respective countries.

Mr. Khrushchev's Intentions

The most recent major Communist initiative, as you are aware, is the announcement by Chairman Khrushchev that he will head the Russian delegation to the 15th General Assembly in New York.⁸ In a sense perhaps Chairman Khrushchev's attendance falls more neatly within your sphere of operations than it does into that of the Department of State. Those of you who are seasoned veterans of the Soviet leader's visit to the United States just a year ago will remember well the harvest of headlines then and the famine of actual results later.

We in the Department of State at least like to think of ourselves as engaged in serious diplomatic discussions and negotiations. In the light of the frenzied Soviet publicity campaign going on at the moment, however, it is difficult to believe that Mr. Khrushchev is coming to the General Assembly with the intention of contributing to the creation of an atmosphere favorable to serious, nonpolemical discussion of current international problems.

The Soviet Government is apparently also pressuring the heads of government of some other

states represented in the United Nations to attend the General Assembly. In the case of their own satellites, however, it is not the heads of government who are coming but instead the real holders of power—the Communist Party chieftains. Whether they will succeed in persuading many free-world heads of government to attend is open to doubt. Personally, I regard the Soviet proposal for negotiations among the "leaders" of 80 and more nations as ludicrous in the extreme.

According to his advance notices, Mr. Khrushchev wishes to discuss the problem of disarmament at the General Assembly. He presumably has in mind a repetition of his appearance before the General Assembly in 1959, with embellishments taken from the Soviet postsummit propaganda campaign. In evaluating Mr. Khrushchev's intentions in this regard we should remember that the Soviet Union has so far refused to consider the United States disarmament proposals, which were tabled at the Ten-Nation Conference at Geneva.⁹ You remember what happened: The Soviets took a walk.

In the period since that walkout, the Soviets have been busy rattling their rockets and flexing their missiles, to quote one of our well-known commentators. They have been lavish with the threats of nuclear destruction for those who oppose them. It remains to be seen what new visions of Soviet capabilities for launching global devastation Mr. Khrushchev will conjure up when he appears before the General Assembly.

As far as the news aspects of the coming General Assembly are concerned, I will gladly defer to your professional evaluation. In the field of diplomacy, however, the outlook right now is not promising. The Government of the United States remains ready to consider in a thoughtful manner and discuss in any appropriate forum serious proposals from whatever quarter designed to reduce the present tensions in international relations. I wish that I could discern in the present Soviet attitude an equal willingness to behave in a responsible fashion.

Journalism and Diplomacy

Today I have reviewed with you some of the more timely aspects of the complex and changing world scene which concerns both our professions

⁸The U.N. General Assembly convenes at New York Sept. 20.

⁹For text, see BULLETIN of July 18, 1960, p. 90.

and makes demands upon the organizations we represent. As we seek to adapt our organizations to meet these demands, there must be a constant increase in the caliber of the people who represent us overseas and staff our headquarters offices.

I have heard it said that journalism is like the ministry and marriage. One should not get into it unless he finds that he cannot stay out of it. The same is true of diplomacy. Nationally, of course, we have no hope of staying out of world diplomacy. So we must get into it with all its burdens and tribulations, and at the same time all its fascination and challenge—all its possibility for creation and fulfillment.

Your jobs are hard now. They will not grow easier with time. Whoever undertakes either of our professions has his work cut out for him and his headaches ready made.

And yet there are young men and women eager to break into the professions of international journalism and diplomacy, and I must say I do not blame them. Indeed, I envy them, for they will not be bored by whatever lies ahead, and they will find the challenges worthy of their finest efforts.

U.S. Urges Soviet Union To Cease Unilateral Action in the Congo

Statement by President Eisenhower

White House press release dated September 7

The United States deplors the unilateral action of the Soviet Union in supplying aircraft and other equipment for military purposes to the Congo, thereby aggravating an already serious situation which finds Africans killing other Africans. If these planes are flown by Soviet military personnel, this would be contrary to the principles so far applied regarding use in the Congo of military contingents from the larger powers.

As far as I know, these rules have previously been upheld by the Soviet Union itself. Therefore, it would be doubly serious if such participation by military units were part of an operation in the civil war which has recently taken on very ugly overtones.

The main responsibility in the case of the Congo has been thrown on the United Nations as the

only organization able to act without adding to the risks of spreading the conflict.¹ The United Nations maintains very strict principles regarding foreign military intervention in the Congo or in any country. I am sure that, within the limits set by the charter itself, the United Nations is doing what it can to uphold these principles and will do so in the future.

The constitutional structure of the Congo Republic is a question which should be worked out peacefully by the Congolese themselves.

This objective is threatened by the Soviet action, which seems to be motivated entirely by the Soviet Union's political designs in Africa. I must repeat that the United States takes a most serious view of this action by the Soviet Union. In the interest of a peaceful solution in Africa, acceptable to all parties concerned, I urge the Soviet Union to desist from its unilateral activities and to lend its support instead to the practice of collective effort through the United Nations.

West Holds Soviets Accountable for Berlin Travel Restrictions

Following are texts of a U.S. statement released to the press at Bonn on September 3 and a Department statement read to news correspondents at Washington on September 9 by Joseph W. Reap, Deputy Director of the Office of News.

U.S. STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 3¹

On August 30, East German officials issued a decree entitled "Decree on Entry into the Capital of the German Democratic Republic (Democratic Berlin) by Citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany", and also published a "Declaration Against Misuse of West Berlin and Revanche Agitation". Thereafter certain citizens of the Federal Republic have been prevented from traveling by road and rail between the Federal Republic and the city of Berlin.²

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 1, 1960, p. 159; Aug. 8, 1960, p. 221; Sept. 5, 1960, p. 384; and Sept. 12, 1960, p. 421.

² Identical statements were released to the press at Bonn by the Ambassadors of France and the United Kingdom.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1960, p. 439.

The Government of the United States of America wishes to reject emphatically the pretension that East German officials are competent to issue decrees applying to Greater Berlin, which city, as is well known, retains its quadripartite status resulting from the unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945. The decree is thus objectionable in its inaccurate designation of the Soviet sector of the city as the "capital" of the so-called "German Democratic Republic". This false claim of sovereignty over a portion of Berlin is used as a basis for the illegal imposition of fresh restrictions on free circulation within the city.

East German interference with access to and from Berlin by road and rail is also illegal; in particular it constitutes a flagrant violation both of the New York Four-Power agreement of May 4, 1949⁴ and the Paris decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of June 20, 1949,⁵ in which the normal functioning and utilization of rail, water and road transport were secured.

In their declaration East German officials stated inter alia that air corridors between the Federal Republic and Berlin were set up only to provide for troops of the Western Powers stationed in West Berlin. The three Allied Powers are bound to point out that the air corridors were established by the quadripartite decision of the Allied Control Council on November 30, 1945, and they are no concern whatever of the East Zone authorities. The Allied Control Council approved creation of the three presently existing corridors in use by aircraft of the powers occupying Berlin. There has been no subsequent change in the status of the corridors. The three Allied Powers acknowledge no restriction on the use of the Berlin air corridors by their aircraft.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 9

The position of the United States Government on the issue of free circulation within Berlin was clearly set forth by the British, French, and United States Ambassadors at Bonn in the statements they issued on September 3, in connection with the East German action last week designed to impede the travel of West German citizens en route to Berlin. We reject as completely illegal any interference by the illegitimate East German

puppet regime with travel to and from Berlin, whether by road, rail, or air, or with the free circulation of persons within the Berlin area. Responsibility for these actions rests squarely with the Soviet Government, which will also be held accountable for any consequences deriving from this open violation of the quadripartite agreements. The Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States are conferring at Bonn with representatives of the Federal Republic to determine what steps should be taken in the event the East German order is not rescinded.

U.S. Replies to Soviet Protests on Legislation Affecting Berlin

GERMAN DRAFT RADIO LEGISLATION

Press release 519 dated September 9

Following is the text of the reply of the U.S. Government to the note of the Government of the U.S.S.R. of July 28, 1960,¹ protesting German draft radio legislation providing for the establishment of a central radio network possibly having its administrative headquarters in West Berlin. The reply was delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. by the American Embassy in Moscow on September 8.

The Government of the United States acknowledges receipt of the note of July 28, 1960 from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning draft radio legislation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and its bearing on Berlin.

The Government of the United States has expressed its attitude on this subject in its note of December 15, 1959,² which it deems unnecessary to repeat.

The attitude of the Soviet Government is the more unjustified since East Zone authorities operate several broadcasting stations in Berlin and interfere with normal broadcasting in Germany through numerous jamming stations.

The United States Government notes the concern of the Soviet Government for maintenance of the special status for Berlin and considers it necessary to emphasize that matters relating to Berlin should be studied from the point of view of conditions existing respectively in East and

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, May 15, 1949, p. 631.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, July 4, 1949, p. 857.

¹ Not printed.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 4, 1960, p. 7.

West Berlin. In particular, it seems to the United States that the Soviet Government would be in a better position to defend Berlin's special status if that special status were respected by the Soviet Government and by East Berlin authorities.³ The Government of the United States must point out that the essential provisions of this status are constantly being flouted by the Soviet Government and by East German authorities, who justify their actions by false and provocative assertions that Berlin is "on the territory of the German Democratic Republic" and is the "capital of the German Democratic Republic." The United States Government, for its part, will continue to maintain in Berlin a situation consistent with international agreements in force.

BERLIN WATERWAYS LEGISLATION

Press release 521 dated September 9

Following is the text of the reply of the U.S. Government to the note of the Government of the U.S.S.R. of May 16, 1960,³ protesting against Berlin waterways legislation. The reply was delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. by the American Embassy in Moscow on September 8.

The Government of the United States wishes to refer to the note of May 16, 1960 from the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in which it was stated that West Berlin authorities have adopted legislation on water management which provides that the competence of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany should extend to several major water routes in Berlin.

The United States Government wishes to assure the Soviet Government that under the Berlin water law of February 23, 1960 the Government of the Federal Republic is not authorized to exercise control over waterways in Berlin.

The importance which the United States as one of the occupying powers attaches to the maintenance of the special status of Berlin has been dealt with in numerous communications to the Soviet Union. The United States Government wishes to reaffirm the principle of Four-Power

responsibility for Greater Berlin and would be gratified if the actions of the Soviet Government were to bear out the desire reflected in its note under reference to maintain the existing status of the city.

U.S. Requests Withdrawal of Cuban Consular Assistant From Puerto Rico

Press release 515 dated September 6

By a note dated September 2, 1960,¹ delivered to the Cuban Embassy at Washington on September 3, the Department of State requested the Government of Cuba to arrange for the prompt withdrawal of Mrs. Angelica Cruz Espinosa de Henríquez, a member of the staff of the Cuban consulate at San Juan, P.R. The note stated that Mrs. Cruz Espinosa de Henríquez has, since her arrival in Puerto Rico, engaged in "highly improper activities."

Secretary Herter Rejects Charges on Conduct of Cuban Relations

Statement by Secretary Herter

Press release 526 dated September 10

I have just seen the release by two members of the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security based entirely on the testimony of two individuals no longer associated with the Government and without any request whatever for comment or testimony from the Department of State.

I flatly reject the charge that I and my senior advisers in the Department have not been or are not now fully seized of the problems facing the United States in its relations with Cuba.

While United States relations with Cuba have always been given close attention by the senior officials of this Department, this has been especially true during the past few years under both Secretary Dulles, with whom I was associated as Under Secretary in 1957-58, and myself.

I reject out of hand the shocking and unfounded allegations that State Department personnel have conducted our relations with Cuba without the knowledge of their superiors and on any basis other than our own national interest.

The information in the release, in sum, is incorrect or misleading.

¹ Not printed.

³ For text of the 1944 agreement defining the special status of Berlin, see *ibid.*, Apr. 11, 1960, p. 554.

⁴ Not printed.

A Decade of Trial and Triumph

by Andrew H. Berding
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs¹

The foreign policy of the United States can be simply stated to be the promotion of the security and development of our people in peace. Sometimes I have heard it said, "The United States does not have a foreign policy." How empty and hollow is that statement! We have had a foreign policy from the days of Washington, Jefferson, and Franklin. This foreign policy translated the principles of the Declaration of Independence into the fields of overseas endeavor. It has grown and gained substance through an infinity of statements and a succession of actions. It embraces the independence of nations, the interdependence of nations, cooperation among nations, assistance to other nations, and the freedom and dignity of the individual. It holds to the belief that in the exercise of effective democracy lies one of the best hopes for peace.

Today we are beset with many problems. We are confronted with a hostile ideology, linked to an inordinate national ambition, sworn to and admittedly working for our overthrow. No means is too low for this still lower end.

This decade of the sixties will be for the American people a decade of trial. It will call for all our sense of purpose, our strength of spirit and muscle, our dedication to the intensely thrilling principles of our founders, our willingness to sacrifice, our unconquerable resolution, our calm determination to advance and to win. I am unalterably convinced that, while this will be a decade of trial, it will also be a decade of triumph.

Soviet Misuse of the United Nations

Now we are faced with a new Soviet technique—the use of the United Nations at the heads-of-government level. Mr. Khrushchev, who is now

en route to New York, intends to make the utmost use of the United Nations as a propaganda sounding board. He will try to get the most mileage out of his pronouncements, accusations, hashed-over proposals, and show business.

There is an arresting contradiction between the Soviets' traditional attitude toward the United Nations and Mr. Khrushchev's desire to attend the General Assembly as head of the Soviet delegation. The traditional attitude is exemplified by three facts.

One is that to date the Soviets have cast 89 vetoes in the Security Council, as compared with none by the United States. When something is brought up they do not like, they simply veto it. They have thus to a large degree hamstringed the operations of the Security Council.

The second is that when they go to the United Nations they go there not with the idea of negotiating and settling issues but with other objectives in mind. Mr. Khrushchev said, for instance, that he was taking the issue of the U.S. Air Force RB-47² to the Security Council to dramatize their contention that the Council was the "slave" of the United States.

The third is that, even when they have voted for a United Nations action, the Soviets frequently take other unilateral action which negates the U.N. action. We have had a striking example of this in recent weeks. Although the Soviets voted for the Security Council resolution calling on the U.N. to restore stability in the Congo,³ they subsequently engaged in operations of their own in the Congo, without reference to the United Nations.⁴ These operations were obviously designed to hamper or thwart the objectives of the United Nations. At the same time the Soviets were bringing

¹ Address made before the National Exchange Club at Birmingham, Ala., on Sept. 11 (press release 525 dated Sept. 10).

² For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1960, p. 274.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1960, p. 161.

⁴ For a statement by President Eisenhower, see p. 473.

pressure on Prime Minister [Patrice] Lumumba to oppose the U.N.

The real Soviet attitude toward the United Nations is best demonstrated by their utter defiance of a large number of General Assembly actions and recommendations over a long period of years. It is significant that the Soviet Union has ignored or defied more United Nations resolutions than all of the rest of the world put together.

The United Nations long ago called for the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections. The Soviet Union has consistently refused to hold such elections in the Eastern Zone of Germany. The United Nations took action to protect south Korea against Communist aggression and adopted resolutions calling for the reunification of Korea under conditions of freedom. The Soviet Union opposed and attempted to sabotage all United Nations efforts in this field and has continued to ignore the resolutions calling for Korean reunification.

The United Nations has passed approximately 15 resolutions dealing with the Hungarian situation, condemning Soviet aggression, calling for an end of the suppression of human rights and the restoration of freedom to the Hungarian people. The Soviet Union has not only defied these resolutions but has openly announced its intention to continue this defiance.⁶

The Soviet Union has even refused to pay its budgetary assessments to the United Nations where it has not approved the purposes of the assessment. In particular it has refused to contribute to the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

Last year the U.N. called upon the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva to negotiate in good faith toward a general and complete disarmament agreement. In June the Soviet Government and its satellites walked out of that committee.⁶

Only a few weeks ago the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution calling upon all nations to refrain from threats of force and violence in international relations.⁷ Within a few days thereafter the Soviet Government was openly threatening to launch rockets against neighboring states.

The list is long and the net effect depressing. The Soviet Government is always willing to use the United Nations as a springboard for propaganda. But it is almost never willing to accept the judgments or decisions of the United Nations on any matter which involves Soviet interests or ambitions.

We can reasonably expect Mr. Khrushchev to make disarmament the major facet of his appearance at the United Nations. In June, as I mentioned, the Soviet Union physically walked out of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. That conference had made virtually no progress, but it could have advanced in the right direction if the Soviets had been willing to discuss concrete measures.

The world reaction to the Soviet walkout was unfavorable. Since then the Soviet Union has been striving to retrieve lost ground in world public opinion—on the one hand by accusing the Western Powers, particularly the United States, of not wanting disarmament, and on the other hand by proposing that the heads of government meet at the United Nations to reach a disarmament agreement.

Anyone who knows anything about the subject knows that disarmament is so complicated that heads of government—unless they meet together for months, which is manifestly impossible—cannot reach an agreement. As Secretary Herter said on Thursday [September 8], the Soviet proposal for negotiations among the "leaders" of 80 and more nations is ludicrous in the extreme.⁸ But world public opinion does not generally know this, and there lies Mr. Khrushchev's fond expectation. He ardently hopes to convince the unknowing that only the Soviet Union wants disarmament—and therefore peace—and that the United States in particular and the other Western Powers also are opposing disarmament—and therefore want war. He undoubtedly will remind the General Assembly of his address to that Assembly last September when he dusted off and once more presented the old Soviet proposal for complete and general disarmament without spelling out in practical terms how this was to be achieved.

Mr. Khrushchev comes to the United Nations at a time when 15 new African nations may be admitted to membership, and he can be expected to take full advantage of this fact. He will un-

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of Sept. 12, 1960, p. 422.

⁷ For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1960, p. 376.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1960, p. 244.

⁸ See p. 467.

doubtedly pose as the champion of African independence and strew accusations of colonialism right and left, east, west, north, and south.

I am confident that most, if not all, of the new African nations will keep in mind three cautions. The first is that the Soviet philosophy is never to promote the independence of a colonial people with the idea that that people will remain independent. Rather it is to promote conflict between the colony and the mother country which will lead in the first stage to independence and then, because of Soviet assistance, infiltration, and subversion, will lead in the second stage to absorption in the Soviet bloc. The push that the Soviets give a people toward being upright in independence will continue until that people lies prostrate in dependence upon the Soviet bloc.

The second caution is to remember that the Soviet Union has taken over people after people since the end of World War II and reduced them to the ranks of satellites. Until this year the number of peoples that had been granted independence by the former colonial powers was about equal to the number of peoples whose independence had been torn from them by the Kremlin. The world needs to realize more acutely than it does that the old white colonialism has a more formidable rival in red colonialism.

The third caution is that, as the new nations enter the United Nations and are subjected to the blandishments of the Soviet Union, these new nations who rightly set such store on their membership in the Organization should ask themselves the questions: What has the Soviet Union done for the United Nations? What is its attitude toward the United Nations? A sincere quest for the answers to these questions will open the eyes of the new members.

"Peaceful Coexistence"

When Mr. Khrushchev speaks at the United Nations he will undoubtedly extoll his concept of "peaceful coexistence." The Soviets have sought to make a major propaganda effort throughout the world with peaceful coexistence. They have tried to convey an impression that peaceful coexistence means they are for peace. Gradually, however, the world is becoming convinced of what Mr. Khrushchev himself admits, that peaceful coexistence simply means the absence of general war

during a period in which the Soviet Union through political, economic, and psychological struggle will gain the mastery of the world.

Any evaluation of peaceful coexistence should bear in mind the declaration of the conference of Communist parties in Moscow, November 16, 1957. This stated: "The severity and forms of the class struggle are dependent not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance of the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on the use of force by these circles at one or another stage of the struggle for socialism."

This means that everything will be peaceful unless the free world resists the attempt of the Soviet bloc to overwhelm it. This is the philosophy of the bandit who prefers to obtain the worldly goods of his victim without having to shoot him; but if the victim resists, then the blame for the use of force lies with the victim.

Recently the world press has carried many articles on ideological differences between the Soviet Union and Communist China over the question of the inevitability of war. The Soviets argue that war is not inevitable. The Chinese Communists cling to the old Communist doctrine that war is inevitable. Without entering into detail in this dichotomy, I should like to warn against any deduction that the Soviet rulers, by virtue of this argument, are peaceably inclined.

It is quite possible that Soviet propaganda may seek to draw some advantage before the world from their dispute with the Chinese Communists. They may seek to show, by contrast, that they are the party of peace. The fact is, however, that, although they may have eschewed general war because they know better than the Chinese Communists the horrible destruction that would come with nuclear war, they are just as resolved as ever to engage in struggle of all other kinds until the "eventual victory" of communism over the free world.

Peaceful coexistence is a Soviet doctrine to be applied as part of their long-range strategy for world conquest. It is designed to lull the rest of the world so that the Soviet techniques of subversion, division, and penetration can be applied with a minimum of opposition. It does not rule out the use of force whenever the Soviets think they can get away with it. Riots, uprisings, and civil war are tools of their trade.

This is anything but peace. Summing it up, to the Soviet Union peaceful coexistence means: Live and let live under us.

Soviet Press Coverage of U.N. Meetings

While Mr. Khrushchev is at the United Nations he will expect, and he will receive, the utmost attention for his statements and activities. The American press and radio and TV, and the free-world media generally, will give him more than generous space and heed. This is as it should be. Part of our education is to know what our opponents do and think. Part of our strength as a democracy lies in our freedom of information and discussion.

But will the Russian press and radio-TV give adequate space and attention to the statements of United States and free-world leaders during the General Assembly? Far from it, if we are to judge by past experience. We can expect a virtual blackout of news about the General Assembly except as concerns Mr. Khrushchev. We can expect that the Voice of America broadcasts of the speeches at the General Assembly will be jammed. We can even expect that the United Nations' own broadcasts will be jammed. That is what has happened in the past. The Soviet Government evinces no intention of permitting the Soviet peoples to learn there is another side to the coin. Both sides of its coin identically carry the hammer and sickle.

I herewith challenge my Soviet counterparts to permit the Soviet readers and listeners to have just a fair account of the proceedings of the General Assembly. I challenge them to give something even remotely resembling the coverage our newspapers, news magazines, and radio-TV networks will give to the statements and actions of Mr. Khrushchev. I challenge them to provide for the address of Secretary of State Herter just one-tenth the coverage that American media will give to the address of Mr. Khrushchev. Even that would be a miraculous change of policy.

Certainly one of the obligations of membership in the United Nations is to permit people all around the world to know fairly and accurately what is going on in the United Nations. Otherwise how can the Organization become the meeting place of the world which it is designed to be?

Why does the Soviet Government continue to be so afraid to permit its people to have access to

essential facts and opinions? If, as the Soviet rulers say, communism is so strong that eventually it will dominate the world, can it not stand the light of fact and argument? Can it grow only in the mushroom cellar of a closed society, carefully immuned against outside thinking?

Mr. Khrushchev comes to the United Nations just exactly a quarter of a year after President Eisenhower was supposed to be in Moscow. There can be no doubt that the reason Mr. Khrushchev canceled the President's visit is the same reason why he will not permit adequate reporting in the Soviet Union of United Nations developments.

The American people could take in their stride 10 days of Mr. Khrushchev in the United States a year ago this month.⁹ But not so with the reverse in Moscow. Just imagine President Eisenhower on a nationwide broadcast in the Soviet Union describing the American system of Government, our free enterprise, our individual freedoms, our standard of living! Just imagine him with his dynamic personality mixing freely with Russians from all walks of life and exchanging views with them, as the Soviet Premier did in the United States!

Well, Mr. Khrushchev could imagine that too, and it must have given him nightmares. The U-2 provided the out,¹⁰ and he grasped it eagerly. To avoid the visit it was then necessary to make an enemy of the President. There is no reason to believe that Mr. Khrushchev will take any other approach now.

I am convinced that the United Nations has a right to know what steps its member countries take to make the proceedings of the United Nations known to their peoples or to keep these proceedings from them. Speaking personally, I should therefore like to propose that the U.N. Secretariat make a special study of the public media coverage of the United Nations during each session of the General Assembly. How much press space and radio-TV time is given by each country to the United Nations? What percentage is this of the total space and time available? How is this space and time divided as between opposing points of view? Is the treatment reasonably objective or otherwise?

Such a study could be done most easily by

⁹ BULLETIN of Oct. 12, 1959, p. 499.

¹⁰ For background, see *ibid.*, May 30, 1960, p. 851.

beginning with the newspapers. This would involve no interference in the internal affairs of any country, because the newspapers could be procured and analyzed outside. The radio-TV broadcasts could come later. Whatever form this effort took, a report could be made to the General Assembly each year at about the time of the Assembly's closing. I am confident this would be a revealing and helpful service to awaken many members to one of their responsibilities toward the United Nations.

The United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union

I began this talk by describing the decade of the sixties as a decade of trial but also of triumph. Let us now take a look at where we stand.

Recently I read in a newspaper column that we were losing ground overseas. The writer's argument was that, whereas in the past we had to face Soviet actions only on the periphery of the Soviet Union, now we are faced with the Soviet actions in other parts of the world, including right on our doorstep. The examples given were Cuba and the Congo.

I freely grant the validity of the examples. The Soviets are indeed striving mightily, and with some real success, to make Cuba a Bolshevik satellite. They have also had some success in the Congo. And the Chinese Communists are moving into these and other areas in ways and to an extent of which the American public is very little aware. But the only true way to look at the picture of who is coming out ahead is to take the whole panorama and examine it from east to west, from north to south. If we do so we find many reasons for encouragement.

In the last few years the Soviets tried to win back Yugoslavia into the Soviet bloc. They failed.

Three years ago next month the Soviets made great gains in world public opinion with their first sputnik. But the United States has achieved such advances in the meantime that in various fields of space exploration we are ahead of the Soviets and making constant progress. Of the 16 satellites now in earth or solar orbit, 14 are American. Of the 30 satellites placed in orbit around the earth, 24 were American.

In the Soviet Union the process of evolution has moved ahead. The Soviet peoples have been exposed to free-world thinking far more in the

last several years than had been the case before. They have obtained more of the material benefits of life and are asking for much more. They have somewhat more freedom of expression and movement, although this has slowed up following Mr. Khrushchev's torpedoing of the summit conference and his violent turning upon the United States.

Mr. Khrushchev's sabotaging of the summit conference, his cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Russia, and his insulting comments about the President reacted against him worldwide. So did the Soviet walkout from the disarmament conference in Geneva.

Now the Soviets and the Chinese Communists are engaged in a sharp ideological controversy. It is too soon to speak of any real political break between the two countries, but the seeds are sown. And certain actions have also been taken, such as a considerable withdrawal of Soviet technicians from Communist China. Some of the activities of both countries, even while superficially they seem to complement each other, also carry overtones of competition for influence, as in South Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

The Chinese Communists failed in their attempt to take Quemoy. They alienated India by their border incursions into that country. They estranged Indonesia by their violent demands concerning the Chinese minority in that country. Their institution of the commune system, which communizes all activities and shatters family existence, sent a wave of horror around the world. Their policy has alerted nations in the area generally to the dangers from Red China.

Although Communist action was able to prevent the President's trip to Japan,¹¹ nevertheless the security treaty¹² with the United States was ratified. And subsequently the firm position taken by the Ikeda government, the outcome of the recent provincial elections, and the rallying of public opinion behind the Japanese Government show that that country is marching along with the free world.

The Soviet Union has indeed moved in on Cuba, but the result of Mr. Khrushchev's rocket rattling over that island has been to awaken the American Republics to their common danger and to their taking of steps to meet it. The recent De-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, July 25, 1960, p. 131.

¹² For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 8, 1960, p. 184.

claration of San José, Costa Rica, documented their solid stand.¹³

And in Europe steady testimony of the failure of Communist life comes in the form of a never-ending flight of refugees from Eastern Europe. During August 18,000 refugees poured into West Berlin from the east, as compared with 10,000 in August of last year. In the past this flood has been made up largely of professional people. Now it is composed largely of farmers who leave in protest against Communist collectivization.

I have jumped from area to area to give you these examples. There are many more that could well be cited. They should be useful in showing that our position in the world remains solid and strong.

To sum up the position of the United States in the world, the attitude of other nations toward us can best be seen in the fact that in the 15 years of the United Nations the United States has never once suffered a defeat on a major issue before that Organization.

Too often we hear that the United States has lost prestige here or there or perhaps everywhere. You will always find people who think the worst of themselves and the best of others. We Americans have a capacity for self-criticism, but sometimes this is overly developed.

In general it may be wise never to overrate ourselves. It may be realistic to discount by a few points whatever appraisal we make of our position in the world, for the most dangerous inclination would be to embrace complacency.

However, there is also strength in confidence. If we are sure of the strength and wisdom of our course and demonstrate that sureness, we will find that our confidence has inspired others to support us. That is certainly the tactic of Mr. Khrushchev. He invariably exudes confidence in Soviet strength and policy. Communism to him is the wave of the future, the bandwagon that all others had better climb aboard.

I am convinced that if we pursue resolutely and skillfully the course that we now follow, working

for peace in cooperation with other nations, democracy and not communism is the wave of the future. We may and will suffer setbacks or slow-downs from time to time, but the progress that democracy has made in the world since our Declaration of Independence will continue irresistibly until we are able to achieve that true peace that all men desire.

New U.S. Disarmament Administration To Develop and Coordinate Policies

Press release 520 dated September 9

The Department of State announced on September 9 the establishment of the U.S. Disarmament Administration to develop and coordinate U.S. policies and activities in the field of arms limitation and control. The Administration is being established as the result of a study initiated last fall by the Secretary of State, at the request of the President, to investigate arrangements which would provide the United States with the most effective means of dealing with the increasingly complex disarmament problem.

The Administration will be responsible to the Secretary of State and will be staffed with personnel drawn from other agencies and from outside Government as well as from the Department of State.

In addition to coordinating an intensified program of study and research, the new organization will be responsible for formulating policy recommendations for consideration within the U.S. Government with respect to the limitation and control, by international agreement, of armed forces and weapons of all kinds and for the direction and support of international negotiations on these matters.

It will marshal in a single unit political, military, scientific, and technical skills in a continuing effort to discover reliable means for easing the burden of armaments, lessening the dangers of war by miscalculation, and helping to promote a just and durable peace.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 395.

Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests

HISTORY OF POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM OCTOBER 31, 1958, TO AUGUST 22, 1960

by William J. Gehron

GENESIS OF THE CONFERENCE

President Eisenhower, in a letter of January 12, 1958, to Premier Nikolai Bulganin,¹ proposed that, in order to pave the way for a possible political decision on the various aspects of disarmament, the United States and the Soviet Union convene groups of experts to study the technical questions involved. This proposal was accepted in part by the Soviet Union when it agreed on May 9 to participate in a technical conference on the question of nuclear test cessation. Although it was initially agreed that the discussions should proceed without prejudice to any political decisions, in subsequent communications the Soviet Union sought unsuccessfully to gain prior commitment from the United States that a successful outcome of the conference would lead automatically to a "universal cessation" of nuclear weapons testing.²

As a result of this correspondence between the United States and the Soviet Union, a Conference of Experts To Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests met at U.N. European headquarters at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 1, 1958.³ It was generally assumed that if the experts agreed it was technically feasible to detect nuclear tests—at the end of their 7-week conference the experts did reach this conclusion—political nego-

tiations looking toward a controlled cessation of nuclear weapons tests would follow.

On August 21, 1958, the Conference of Experts adopted a final report, which was made public on August 30, 1958.⁴ On the following day President Eisenhower issued a statement welcoming the report and setting forth U.S. aspirations for negotiating an agreement on the suspension of nuclear weapons tests on the basis of the experts' recommendations.⁵ In part, the statement said:

The United States, taking account of the Geneva conclusions, is prepared to proceed promptly to negotiate an agreement with other nations which have tested nuclear weapons for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the actual establishment of an international control system on the basis of the experts' report.

If this is accepted in principle by the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, then in order to facilitate the detailed negotiations the United States is prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the negotiations.

As part of the agreement to be negotiated, and on a basis of reciprocity, the United States would be further prepared to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons on a year-by-year basis subject to a determination at the beginning of each year that: (A) the agreed inspection system is installed and working effectively; and (B) satisfactory progress is being made in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control meas-

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Jan. 27, 1958, p. 122.

² For exchanges of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, see *ibid.*, May 19, 1958, p. 811; June 9, 1958, p. 939; and June 30, 1958, p. 1083.

³ For background, see *ibid.*, July 7, 1958, p. 11; July 14, 1958, p. 47; and July 21, 1958, p. 101.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1958, p. 453.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.

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ures such as the United States has long sought. The agreement should also deal with the problem of detonations for peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests.

Through exchanges of notes, it was agreed among the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. that negotiations looking toward a controlled discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests would commence in Geneva on October 31, 1958.⁶ The voluntary suspension of nuclear weapons tests was carried out by the three negotiating powers at the time of or shortly after negotiations commenced.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Initial Positions

The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests convened, as scheduled, at U.N. European headquarters at the Palais des Nations at Geneva on October 31, 1958. Since that time it has met continuously, except for the following recesses: December 19, 1958, to January 12, 1959; March 20 to April 13, 1959; May 12 to June 8, 1959; August 28 to October 27, 1959; December 19, 1959, to January 12, 1960; April 15 to April 24, 1960; and August 22 to September 27, 1960.

The U.S. delegation was headed by Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Representative on Disarmament and Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations. The head of the U.K. delegation was David Ormsby-Gore, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Michael Wright later acting in his behalf), and Ambassador Semyon Tsarapkin represented the Soviet Union. It was agreed that during the course of the negotiations the proceedings of the Conference would be considered private.

The meetings during November and December 1958 were concerned primarily with discussion of agenda and other procedural matters. The United States and the United Kingdom, maintaining that any agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear tests must also contain the details of an international system of control and an obligation to establish such a system, supported an agenda which called for discussion of control

measures as the first item, with actual drafting of an agreement on the suspension of tests as the second item. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, maintained that, before controls were discussed, the Conference must reach agreement on a permanent cessation of tests. Its representative accordingly tabled at the first meeting a draft treaty which provided for an obligation by the three negotiating states to cease forever all tests of nuclear weapons and to accept a system of verification based on the report of the Conference of Experts. The treaty, however, contained no provisions for the establishment of control machinery under international auspices.

The Soviet Union took the position that the important task before the Conference was to agree to stop tests and that the details of international control over an agreement to this effect could be adequately agreed upon in a subsequent meeting of parties and included in a protocol which could later be attached to the treaty to discontinue tests.

The United States and the United Kingdom maintained that any agreement reached on a measure as far-reaching and vital to the security of the parties concerned must contain not only the obligations to discontinue nuclear testing and to refrain from assisting or participating with other nations in such tests but also firm and detailed provisions for the establishment and successful operation of an international control organization.

As the Conference moved into its second month, the Soviet Union agreed to discuss a treaty along the lines proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom. With this initial logjam broken, the Conference proceeded with its work of drafting a treaty.

An earnest approach to the key matter of an effective control system to police a ban on nuclear weapons testing commenced in the early days of 1959. Although the Soviet Union seemed willing to agree to a ban on nuclear weapons testing, its representatives appeared extremely reluctant to get down to cases on a control system which could effectively police such a ban. Because the United States and the United Kingdom considered a control system to be the essential element in the structure of a test ban treaty and because it was therefore necessary to focus Conference attention on this matter, the Western delegations on January 19 announced a significant modification in their

⁶ For text of exchanges of notes between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., see *ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1958, p. 503, and Nov. 10, 1958, p. 723.

position vis-a-vis the Conference negotiations. Prior to this date the two Western Powers had maintained that a continued suspension of tests depended on a year-to-year determination that (a) an effective control system is installed and operating satisfactorily and (b) progress is being made on other disarmament measures. The January 19 announcement stated that the continuation of a nuclear test suspension was no longer considered contingent on progress in other disarmament areas and made it clear that agreement hinged solely on the requirement of effective control.⁷ In this manner *control* became the key to agreement and the core of the negotiations.

U.S. Proposal of April 13, 1959

During the early stages of the negotiations the United States submitted on January 5, 1959, certain technical data⁸ which raised questions about the adequacy of certain aspects of the control system originally recommended by the 1958 Geneva experts' conference. In addition, the Soviet Union, although insisting on a comprehensive test ban agreement, was not only reluctant to consider this data but, as noted, was reluctant to accept on a political basis even the minimum requirements for effective controls. These factors were responsible for a number of major policy moves on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R., on the other.

The first significant shift was initiated by the United States during the months of April and May 1959 with an exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev. In both of his letters, dated April 13 and May 5, 1959,⁹ the President suggested that, in the absence of Soviet agreement to controls that would be effective in all environments where nuclear weapons tests might be conducted, a phased agreement providing for discontinuance in certain environments be negotiated. The President suggested banning all atmospheric tests initially. This agreement would then be expanded to other testing environments as rapidly as corresponding measures of control could be agreed upon.

Chairman Khrushchev, in letters of April 23

and May 14, 1959,¹⁰ rejected the President's proposal and insisted that efforts continue with the sole objective of concluding a treaty that would provide for the cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests. He expressed the belief that it would not prove too difficult to find agreement on a comprehensive treaty, noting that the U.S.S.R. considered it possible to agree on a number of inspections which would fully guarantee the possibility of detection of violations of the agreement.

In his letter of May 5, 1959, President Eisenhower reiterated that an agreement providing for cessation of all nuclear weapons tests was the U.S. objective. However, until the Soviet Union accepted the measures of control that would make such an agreement possible, he called again for an initial agreement banning atmospheric tests.

On the Soviet side, the exchange fostered a significant development. The United States for some time had called for further experts' conferences to consider data submitted by the United States on the increased difficulties of detecting and identifying underground events and the problem of detecting high-altitude explosions—an area in which the 1958 experts' conference had made no recommendations for establishing controls. Until Chairman Khrushchev's letter of May 14, 1959, the Soviet Union had consistently rejected the idea of convening technical sessions on the grounds that the technical work had been completed by the experts in 1958 and any further experts' meetings had no place in the political conference. However, Chairman Khrushchev, in his May 14 communication, expressed the Soviet Union's willingness to join in an experts' meeting on high-altitude controls. The precedent having been set, the Soviet Union, some 6 months later, also agreed to have experts discuss the matter of underground detection. The high-altitude technical conference resulted in submission to the political conference of agreed recommendations on controlling nuclear tests in this area. The underground technical conference, however, concluded with major disagreement among the experts, and therefore the question of adequate control in this environment was left unresolved. The results of these conferences were reflected in further important policy moves.

¹⁰ For texts, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 705, and June 8, 1959, p. 826.

⁷ For a Department statement concerning the key issues of the Geneva negotiations, see *ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1959, p. 188.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1959, p. 118.

⁹ For texts, see *ibid.*, May 18, 1959, p. 704, and June 8, 1959, p. 825.

U.S. Proposal of February 11, 1960

A second major political move occurred on February 11, 1960, when the United States again took the initiative by presenting to the Conference a proposal for a phased treaty which would immediately end all nuclear weapons tests in those environments where effective control could be established.¹¹

The proposal, which was supported by the United Kingdom, called for a ban on all tests above ground up to the maximum height to which effective controls could be agreed, all underwater tests, and all underground tests above a seismic magnitude "threshold" of 4.75 (corresponding, according to U.S. estimates, to a 19-kiloton yield). At the same time, the proposal made provision for a joint research and experimentation program to improve detection of underground tests below the 4.75 threshold—an area in which the United States believed existing technical problems precluded adequate monitoring by the particular control system recommended by the Geneva experts in 1958. The United States felt that a phased approach would permit agreement to be reached on testing in most environments, while the remaining difficulties in the underground testing area were worked out through a research program. As the research program resulted in improved capabilities for identification of small underground disturbances, the threshold could be progressively lowered to match such improvements.

The 4.75 threshold was established to overcome the limitations in the ability of the Geneva system to identify small underground disturbances and was expressed in terms of signal strength, since Soviet and Western scientists were in general agreement as to the measurement of signals expressed in these terms but disagreed on its definition in terms of kiloton yields.

The immediate Soviet reply to the February 11 proposal rejected the main features of this phased treaty approach. However, the Soviet Union did accept the concept of a phased approach with respect to the criteria to be established for determining which underground disturbances would be eligible for inspection. In this connection the Soviets proposed, subject to agreement on a specific quota of annual inspections, that the control system during the first few years of its operation

should use a simplified criteria until a detailed study developed stricter criteria. The criteria proposed for this early period by the Soviet Union opened as eligible for inspection almost all events which produced a seismic signal and were located by the control system. This represented a significant shift in the Soviet position on criteria, since up to this time the Soviets had insisted on criteria which would have greatly restricted the events eligible for inspection.

U.S.S.R. Counterproposal of March 19, 1960

This immediate Soviet response to the United States proposal of February 11 was not, however, to be the last word. A counterproposal representing the third major shift was advanced by the Soviet Union on March 19.¹² In effect, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to agree to a treaty banning all tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in cosmic space and all underground tests above seismic magnitude 4.75. It also stated its readiness to participate in a research program as suggested by the United States. However, conclusion of a treaty on the above basis and participation in a research program were both made contingent on a proviso that all parties to the treaty undertake an obligation not to test below the seismic threshold of 4.75 during the period required to conduct a research program, a period which the Soviets estimated to be between 4 and 5 years.

By this move the Soviet Union accepted, conditionally, a phased treaty approach banning tests in most environments, including all underground tests producing a seismic signal of 4.75 or greater. It accepted as well the idea of a coordinated research program. This provisional acceptance of the major features of the U.S. proposal had, of course, no direct bearing on resolving a number of key political issues, such as the quota for on-site inspections, voting procedures, etc., as well as other key technical issues.

U.S.—U.K. Proposal of March 29, 1960

Following the Soviet move of March 19, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan met at Camp David, Md., to discuss further

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 29, 1960, p. 327.

¹² For background, see *ibid.*, Apr. 11, 1960, p. 547, footnote 1.

U.S.-U.K. actions in the negotiations.¹³ Their discussions culminated in a joint declaration issued on March 29, 1960, which carried the United States proposal of February 11 one step further. It stated the willingness of both nations to accept a temporary, unilaterally declared moratorium on tests below the seismic magnitude threshold of 4.75. However, the declaration made clear that neither was prepared to institute such a moratorium until the remaining treaty issues were resolved, the treaty signed, and arrangements made for a coordinated research program. On the latter point, the declaration urged that the three parties work out arrangements for such a program as soon as possible.

The United States and the United Kingdom formally submitted the declaration to the conference on March 31.

Soviet Declaration of May 3, 1960

The official Soviet response to the U.S.-U.K. declaration of March 29 was made on May 3. The Soviet Union stated that the March 29 U.S.-U.K. declaration could have a "positive" effect on bringing the positions of East and West closer together on an agreement to halt nuclear weapons tests.

The statement also made these points: The duration of the moratorium should not be less than the period of time required to carry out the three-nation research program; necessary arrangements to implement the research program should begin at once; the program could include a "strictly limited number" of nuclear experiments (the need for nuclear experiments in a research program was frequently stressed by the United States and the United Kingdom but was previously objected to by the Soviet Union); and the moratorium could be established by unilateral declarations.

The immediate outgrowth of the two declarations was the convening, on May 11, of a conference of scientists from the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. to exchange information on the research programs each power believed should be undertaken to improve capabilities for detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions.¹⁴

Key Issues

Hand in hand with efforts to establish an agreed basis for a treaty, the negotiation was concerned with a number of political matters which eventually would constitute the substance of the agree-

ment. While some progress was made on these questions, particularly on the adoption of draft articles to a treaty (see appendix for texts of agreed preamble, articles, and Annex III), others essential to an efficient control system fostered major disagreements and remain as issues not yet satisfactorily resolved. Important among these are voting arrangements, on-site inspections, composition of the control commission, control-post staffing, and safeguards for nuclear detonations for peaceful uses and nuclear detonations conducted in a nuclear test detection research program. These issues are summarized below.

The Veto

In the early stages of the conference the Soviet Union was proposing that the affirmative votes of all three initial parties to the treaty (the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) should be required for all decisions on matters of substance in day-to-day treaty operations. The United States has made clear that such a built-in veto power could render the whole system meaningless and ineffective, since a violator could frustrate inspection procedures by use of this veto power. The U.S. position has been that it is essential that there be no veto power over decisions relating to the everyday operation of the control system. The factfinding processes of inspection, to be effective, must be as nearly automatic as possible. As time went on, the Soviet Union shifted somewhat from its original position and indicated that it was willing to drop the veto over most matters of substance if certain conditions were met. A number of these issues are not yet finally settled.

On-Site Inspections

Some progress has been made toward resolving disagreements in this area. Initially the Soviet Union held that on-site inspections must be subject to a veto, that the teams' freedom of access be strictly limited, that the teams be organized on an *ad hoc* basis as the need for on-site inspections arose, and that they be composed of nationals of the country to be inspected. The United States and the United Kingdom pointed out that these requirements would render unreliable an essential element of the control system. The U.S. position

¹³ For a statement by President Eisenhower and text of a joint declaration, see *ibid.*, Apr. 18, 1960, p. 587.

¹⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, May 23, 1960, p. 818, and May 30, 1960, p. 892.

has been that trained, permanent, mobile inspection teams are required—teams that could be quickly sent to a suspect area and which would be staffed by nationals of countries other than the country being inspected.

A partial break in the on-site inspection problem occurred when Chairman Khrushchev proposed in his letter of April 23, 1959, to President Eisenhower that a predetermined annual quota of on-site inspections be set. In return for Western acceptance of agreed specific quotas, the Soviet Union, it was made clear in the negotiations, would be prepared to withdraw the veto on dispatch of inspection teams, to grant freedom of access to suspect areas, and to agree to permanent on-site inspection teams.

The crucial aspect of this issue centered on the size of the quota of on-site inspections. The Soviet Union took the position that any agreed quota must be determined solely on a political basis. The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, maintained that any limitation placed on numbers of such inspections must be based on scientific facts and detection capabilities.

The quota problem was dealt with in specific terms when the United States set forth its February 11 proposal for a phased treaty. In setting the threshold of 4.75 seismic magnitude the United States estimated that, of the approximately 100 located underground seismic events per year in the Soviet Union above the 4.75 magnitude, some 20 on-site inspections would be required annually to provide adequate deterrence to violation. A corresponding percentage of inspections would, of course, be carried out in the territories of the United States and the United Kingdom.

The long-awaited Soviet response to the U.S. quota figure did not come until July 26, 1960, when it proposed three on-site inspections annually in the territory of each of the three negotiating powers—the three to be applicable to seismic events both above and below the threshold of 4.75. The United States and the United Kingdom termed the Soviet offer unacceptable but welcomed the proposal of a figure as at least providing an initial basis for negotiation on this matter after the long Soviet silence.

Control Commission

The importance of the seven-nation control commission—overseer of the entire test ban in-

spection system—has made the question of its composition a major issue.

The Soviet Union called for a 3-3-1 formula for the commission—the United States, the United Kingdom, and one of their nominees; the Soviet Union and two of its nominees; and one mutually accepted neutral.

The United States and the United Kingdom wished to see the commission more “international” in character. In early discussions both informally suggested a 3-2-2 arrangement—the United States, the United Kingdom, and one of their nominees; the Soviet Union and one of its nominees; and two mutually acceptable neutrals. This composition was formally submitted to the conference on August 9, 1960.

Control-Post Staffing

On this unresolved issue the Soviet Union began negotiations by proposing that all supervisory, technical, and service personnel at control posts be nationals of the country in which the post is located. One or two controllers would be permitted from “the other side” at each post, but they were simply to be observers with no authority over the operation of the control post. The United States and the United Kingdom considered that such a staffing pattern would constitute nothing more than self-inspection and could not be relied upon to insure objective control to the other side. The Western Powers, as a compromise measure, proposed on July 20, 1959, that supervisory and technical staffs at control posts should be composed of one-third U.S. or U.K. personnel, one-third Soviet personnel, and one-third from other countries. Service personnel could be nationals of the host country. Control-post directors would not be nationals of the host country.

The Soviet Union maintained that the U.S.-U.K. proposal was an attempt by the two Western Powers to establish an espionage net within the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet Union gradually did increase the number of outside inspectors it would accept. The best offer made, until submission of the Soviet Union’s “package” proposal, was its willingness to have 10 or 12 foreign specialists, who would be an integral part of the operative staff, as part of the 30-man complement at each control post. However, the Soviet Union continued to insist upon a host-country national as the chief of the control post.

On December 14, 1959, the Soviet Union proposed a "package" solution to the outstanding conference issues of control-post staffing, veto on budgetary matters, and the composition of the control commission. Specifically, the proposal called for acceptance of the Soviet Union's composition for the control commission, with no specific veto rights, but included provision for a control-post staffing pattern of one-third technical specialists of the United States and the United Kingdom, one-third specialists of the Soviet Union, and one-third international technical specialists—the latter third to be divided equally between the West, the Soviet bloc, and neutrals—and adoption of budget matters by a vote of two-thirds of the members.

The United States and the United Kingdom, after studying the elements of the package proposal, replied that subdivision of the final third of the control-post staff was considered unwieldy and that selections in this category should be based on technical competence rather than on artificial political criteria which would be difficult to administer. It was noted that the requirement for a two-thirds vote on budget matters would in fact permit a veto, since the composition of the control commission under the Soviet proposal would allow both the Western nations and the Soviet bloc to muster three votes out of a total of seven. Both nations continued to believe that the 3-3-1 composition of the control commission, in which only one place is reserved to neutrals, was an inadequate reflection of the international nature of the control system and placed an excessive burden of tie breaking on one member.

It should be noted that the Soviet Union eventually broke out of its package proposal the control-post staffing formula of thirds. However, it continued to maintain that the last third be divided equally among the West, the Soviet bloc, and neutrals. It also continued to insist upon a host-country national as chief of each post.

Safeguards

From the beginning of the political negotiations, the United States took the position that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes must be permitted under the test ban agreement. With the Soviet Union's "acceptance in principle" of this condition on January 30, 1959, the three negotiating powers set forth their views on safeguard

arrangements aimed at assuring that any such detonations would not be used to further the development of nuclear weapons.

Early in the negotiations the United States proposed that each of the negotiating powers set aside in a special depository, on or before the date the treaty enters into force, nuclear devices to be detonated for peaceful purposes. These devices would not be subject to external or internal inspection—this has been referred to as the "black box" proposal. Devices not deposited before the treaty enters into force would be open to full internal inspection and exchange of blueprints.

In response, the Soviet Union called for safeguard arrangements whereby external and internal inspection of the devices would be permitted and whereby drawings of the construction of the devices would be made available for study.

Not until after May 3, 1960, when the Soviet Union accepted the U.S.-U.K. proposal for an immediate launching of an exchange of seismic research program, was the safeguard problem considered further. At this point, emphasis naturally shifted from safeguards for peaceful-uses detonations to safeguards for detonations used as experiments in a seismic research program.

As a partial followup to the Soviet acceptance, the United States initially proposed the same "black box" formula for assuring that these seismic research detonations would not be used to further nuclear weapons development.

The Soviet Union termed the U.S. proposal unacceptable and, as in the case of detonations for peaceful uses, called for inspection of the external and internal construction of the devices prior to their use to insure that no weapons development advantage would accrue to the state conducting the detonation.

In an effort to surmount this hurdle the United States, supported by the United Kingdom, presented a new approach to the problem on July 12, 1960. It suggested that the three powers each contribute devices which would be pooled and subsequently drawn on as needed. Most important, the U.S. proposal provided for external and internal inspection of the devices by all three parties prior to their being placed in the pool.

This proposal was also termed unacceptable by the Soviet Union, which now declared that it would not contribute nuclear devices for experi-

mentation to the pool since it had no interest in carrying out a coordinated research program. It made clear, however, that if the United States used nuclear devices in its research program and the Soviet conditions for inspection were not met, the U.S.S.R. would assume the United States was resuming nuclear weapons tests and would therefore resume its own weapons tests.

VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION OF TESTS

On August 22, 1958, the United States had offered to withhold further testing of nuclear weapons for a 1-year period from the beginning of negotiations on October 31, 1958, provided that the Soviet Union did not test after that date.¹⁵ Since the Soviet Union did conduct tests shortly thereafter, the President announced on November 7, 1958,¹⁶ that while the United States was relieved of any obligations under its offer to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons, it would continue its voluntary suspension for the time being.

As far as is known, the Soviet Union has carried out no tests since November 3, 1958. The President, in order to allow a reasonable period of time for the negotiations to proceed, therefore directed on August 26, 1959, that the unilateral suspension of testing by the United States be extended throughout the calendar year 1959.¹⁷

In a statement on December 29, 1959,¹⁸ the President expressed his disappointment in the rate of progress of the negotiations and in the conduct of the Soviet experts during the technical negotiations held in the latter part of 1959 and announced that the United States considered itself free to resume testing but would not do so without announcing its intention in advance. An active program of nuclear weapons research, development, and laboratory-type experimentation would meanwhile be continued.

Prior to the convening of the political conference on October 31, 1958, the United Kingdom made an offer similar to that made by the United States on August 22, 1958. Although the United Kingdom subsequently stated that because of the

Soviet tests carried out in November 1958 it was relieved of any obligation inherent in that offer, the United Kingdom has since that time taken the position that it will not resume nuclear weapons testing as long as the Geneva discussions prove useful.

Following its tests in November 1958, the Soviet Union has consistently stated that it would not resume tests, provided that the United States and United Kingdom do not carry out any nuclear explosions.

TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In addition to the plenary conference, there have been four technical conferences—one in 1958, two in 1959, and one, informal in nature, in 1960.

1958 Geneva Conference of Experts

On July 1, 1958, a Conference of Experts To Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests was convened at Geneva to explore the technical feasibility of policing a possible nuclear weapons test ban agreement. It was composed of experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada on one side, and the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania on the other. The Conference concluded on August 21, 1958, with agreement that an effective control system could be devised to police a test ban.

Specifically, the experts described a control system designed to detect and identify nuclear explosions, with good probability, down to about 1 kiloton of yield, provided such explosions occurred on the earth's surface and at less than 10 kilometers of altitude. Certain phenomena caused by nuclear detonations may be detected by sensitive instruments and may be used to estimate the time and the place of a detonation. These phenomena include sound waves, earth shock waves, radio pulses, optical and gamma radiation, and radioactive debris. The experts recommended that control posts be established and equipped with apparatus for detecting these phenomena.

It was recognized that underground explosions and very high altitude explosions presented special problems to a detection system. On underground explosions, the experts said "that the problem of detecting and identifying under-

¹⁵ For a statement by President Eisenhower, see *ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1958, p. 378.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1958, p. 810.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1959, p. 374.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 78.

ground explosions is one of the most difficult, and that, to a large extent, it determines the characteristics of the network of control posts." As to high-altitude explosions, the experts stated that the recommended system would have a "good probability of detecting, but not always of identifying, explosions taking place at altitudes from 10 to 50 kilometre." The system did not include means to detect and identify nuclear explosions at altitudes above 30-50 kilometers.

The problem of identifying underground disturbances—either natural or manmade—is complicated by the fact that such events can now be detected only by the shock waves which are produced in the earth. When a single seismograph picks up such waves, there is no way of distinguishing an explosion from a natural earthquake. In theory, an explosion should produce an upward movement of the earth at all points of the compass. Earthquakes, however, produce upward movements of the earth in two opposing directions and downward movements of the earth in the other two directions. The experts concluded that this distinction might be used to identify positively shocks produced by earthquakes, provided the shocks were recorded by seismographs surrounding the origin of the shocks. Experimental evidence relating to nuclear explosions available to the experts came principally from a single detonation in Nevada in the fall of 1957. The experts concluded, mainly on the basis of this evidence, that the control system they described had a good probability of identifying as such about 90 percent of continental earthquakes giving signals equivalent to those produced by 5 kiloton (or larger) nuclear explosions, and that from 20 to 100 seismic signals in a year would require on-site inspection for identification.

High-altitude explosions produce another kind of difficulty for the detecting system. If the explosion occurs at a point sufficiently high above the earth's surface, no shock waves or radioactive debris are introduced into the earth's atmosphere. The experts recognized that some special system would have to be devised to prevent nuclear explosions from being carried out undetected in the regions beyond the earth's atmosphere. Suggestions were made that artificial satellites, radio techniques, and apparatus to detect light phenomena might be useful in detecting nuclear detonations in those regions, but the experts made no concrete recommendations for such techniques.

The system unanimously recommended by the experts called for 160-170 land control posts, 10 control posts on ships, aircraft sampling operations, and on-site inspection of events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions. In addition to seismographs each control post would be equipped with instruments for recording radio and sound waves produced by nuclear explosions conducted in the atmosphere. There would also be apparatus for the collection of debris produced by the nuclear detonation. This last apparatus is especially important, because the collection of radioactive debris is the only method of positively identifying a nuclear explosion. Not only do earthquakes produce signals which might be confused with underground explosions, but such natural phenomena as lightning and meteors also produce signals similar to those caused by nuclear explosions. In sum the experts came to the conclusion that "it is technically feasible to establish [within] the capabilities and limitations indicated . . . , a workable and effective control system to detect violations of an agreement on the worldwide suspension of nuclear weapons tests."

High-Altitude Conference

The convening of the first technical conference of 1959 was agreed to by the three negotiating powers in June 1959. Agreement stemmed from Chairman Khrushchev's letter of May 14, 1959,¹⁹ in which he expressed a willingness to join in technical discussions as proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom on the problem of detecting high-altitude nuclear explosions. The high-altitude area was the only one in which the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts had failed to provide a set of agreed conclusions.

Experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union accordingly met at Geneva from June 22 until July 10, 1959. At the completion of its work the technical working group submitted an agreed report to the Conference, making the following general recommendations:

That five to six earth satellites, to be equipped with counters for the detection of neutrons, prompt gamma rays, delayed gamma rays and soft X-rays, be placed in orbits at altitudes of more than 30,000 kilometers so as to ensure complete surveillance of the earth and outer space;

¹⁹ For text, see *ibid.*, June 8, 1959, p. 826.

That if it were thought necessary for technical or economic reasons to establish an earth satellite system at low altitudes, such system could be set up as an alternative to the above;

That a satellite be placed into an appropriate elliptical orbit around the earth to provide maximum coverage of the region in the earth's magnetic field in which electron trapping occurs;

That, if it were thought necessary to expand the capabilities of the system to provide increased coverage of the regions behind the moon and the sun, a system of four satellites be placed in appropriate solar orbit;

That ground control posts be equipped with instruments for observing direct visible light, for observing fluorescence in the upper atmosphere, for measuring the absorption of cosmic radio noise in the ionosphere and for measuring radio signals.

Underground Detection Conference

The second technical conference in 1959 came about only after very protracted and difficult negotiations.

As a result of underground nuclear explosions carried out in Nevada in the fall of 1958, new evidence concerning the identification of underground explosions became available to United States scientists. The data, when thoroughly analyzed, led to two conclusions: (1) The method of distinguishing earthquakes from explosions by the direction of the earth's movement, as reported on seismographs, is less effective than previously estimated; and (2) the number of earthquakes per year equivalent to a nuclear explosion of a given yield is about double that previously estimated. As a result of these conclusions, the annual number of unidentified continental earthquakes equivalent to a 5-kiloton yield or larger were now believed to be at least 10 times greater than had been previously estimated. Identification would require on-site inspection as recommended by the experts, including the possibility of drilling for radioactive debris to determine positively whether a nuclear test had occurred.

The difficulties which these estimates create for a detection system were obvious. While the data did not invalidate the system originally recommended by the experts, it made clear that its capabilities with respect to identification of underground events were substantially lower than the experts had estimated.

The new seismic data was submitted on January 5, 1959, to the other participants in the current negotiations.²⁰ The United States proposed at

that time that the three delegations convene a small technical committee in Geneva to consider the new data and how the capability of the control system with regard to underground explosions might be improved.

The Soviet delegation refused to consider the data and claimed that it was submitted solely to place an obstacle in the way of agreement. Moreover, they maintained that the Conference of Experts provided the technical basis for the present political conference and any modifications to the total system could only be considered by the control commission when it is established. The United States took the position that the control system must be based upon the latest up-to-date scientific information, for without effective control no agreement can be reached or would be meaningful.

Panel on Seismic Improvement

With this in mind, the United States had asked its scientists to study the new seismic data with a view to restoring the original effectiveness of the Geneva system through modification in detection and identification techniques, and, at the request of the Department of State, the President's Special Assistant for Science and Technology had, on December 28, 1958, appointed a Panel on Seismic Improvement, under the chairmanship of Lloyd Berkner, president of Associated Universities, Inc., to review in the light of this new seismic data the feasibility of improving the detection system recommended at the 1958 technical conference. This panel reported its findings on March 16, 1959.²¹ Subsequently the panel also submitted a detailed report entitled "The Need for Fundamental Research in Seismology."

The panel's findings were submitted to the Conference in Geneva on June 12, 1959. The following general analysis summarizes the conclusions contained in the panel's report:

Considering the network of 180 control posts, as proposed by the Geneva experts in 1958, the panel concluded that, by equipping each post with long-period seismographs and arrays of 100 seismometers (rather than only 10 as was proposed in 1958), the originally estimated capability of the Geneva control system could be partially restored.

In addition, the panel believed that, by a vigorous research and development program in seis-

²⁰ For a summary of the conclusions reported by the panel, see *ibid.*, July 6, 1959, p. 16.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 26, 1959, p. 118.

mology, the identification capability originally ascribed by the Geneva experts to the control system might actually be attained in about a 3-year period.

Further, the panel indicated that very significant improvements in the efficiency of the detection system could also be realized by setting up, in addition to the 180 manned posts, an auxiliary network of unmanned seismic stations.

Finally, the panel pointed out that consideration would have to be given to the possibility that the present or future capabilities of the Geneva system might be reduced by the intentional concealment of underground tests. The panel concluded that decoupling techniques existed that could reduce the seismic signal by a factor of 10 or more. Moreover, the panel reported that preliminary theoretical studies have shown that it is possible in principle to reduce the seismic signal from an explosion by a much greater factor than this. In view of the many complexities involved, the panel stated that it would be necessary for these ideas to be tested by appropriately designed experiments to determine how large a decoupling factor could actually be realized in practice. It suggested that many of these tests could be carried out with high explosives but that complete evaluation of the theory probably could not be made without nuclear explosions.

Although the United States continued to emphasize the importance of the new seismic data to the problem of underground test detection and continued to press for joint consideration of the data, the Soviet Union long rejected such proposals and charged that the introduction of new data on January 5 and the panel's report on June 12 were calculated attempts on the part of the United States to obstruct progress toward an agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests.

Technical Working Group 2

Finally, on November 3, 1959, after 10 months of prodding by the United States and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union proposed the formation of a technical working group of experts which would meet to draft objective criteria on the basis of which inspection teams would be sent to the site of unidentified underground events. At the same time, it was indicated that the group could consider other data bearing on the underground detection problem. This, according to the

Soviet delegate to the Conference, the Soviet Union was prepared to do in order to eliminate the "artificial obstacle" that the United States had put up to the negotiations by insisting on consideration of its new seismic data.

The Conference of Experts, which arose out of this November 3 Soviet proposal, came to be known as Technical Working Group 2, and it met officially 21 times in the period November 25 to December 18, 1959, inclusive.

Technical Working Group 2 was given the task of considering the question of the use of objective instrument readings in connection with the selection of an event that cannot be identified by the international control organ and that could be suspected of being a nuclear explosion, in order to determine a basis for initiating on-site inspections. As part of its work the group, proceeding from the discussions and the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts of 1958, was also to consider all data and studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events and possible improvements of techniques and instrumentation.

In prior technical conferences dealing with control aspects of nuclear testing the Soviet scientists had generally carried out their work in an objective manner. Unfortunately, however, the conduct of the Soviet scientists during the final stages of this meeting was characterized by strong political overtones, and they refused to consider much of the data submitted by the United States.²² At the end of the technical conference each of the three scientific delegations submitted separate reports on their areas of disagreement to the parent conference. The reports of the United States and the United Kingdom were, however, essentially in agreement on substance. A joint report was submitted to the conference also. It dealt with possible techniques and instrumentation that could improve the detection and identification of seismic events—the one area in which agreement was reached.

The Soviet scientists rejected new data submitted by the U.S. scientists in regard to the "first motion" technique, which the 1958 Conference of Experts had considered to be the primary means of discriminating between earthquakes and explosions by the use of seismographs and which the new U.S. data indicated was a much less effective

²² For a statement by Dr. James B. Fisk, chairman of the U.S. technical group, see *ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1960, p. 79.

tive method of discrimination than was recognized at that time.

The Soviet experts also rejected the U.S. calculations relative to decoupling and to the possibilities of successfully concealing underground tests, which theoretically showed that the seismic signal of a given explosion could be reduced three hundredfold or more.

Finally, the Soviet scientists rejected technical criteria to determine the basis for on-site inspection proposed by the United States. The criteria were based on our experts' belief that, given the present state of scientific capabilities, very few seismic signals could be positively identified as caused by earthquakes without on-site inspection. While the report of the U.S.S.R. delegation to Technical Working Group 2 did not contain any criteria, the criteria proposed by the U.S.S.R. during the conference would have been such as to classify the U.S. underground nuclear test Blanca (19 kilotons) as an earthquake.

The refusal of the Soviet scientists to accept or discuss seriously the above matters left the problem of underground detection wholly unresolved until, in response to the U.S. proposal of February 11, 1960,²³ the Soviet Union, on May 3, indicated its willingness to engage "at once" in a seismic research program. This expressed "willingness" culminated in the calling of an experts conference on coordinating seismic research programs.

With the Soviet Union's readiness to enter into a discussion looking toward the coordination of national seismic research programs as indicated in its May 3 declaration, the United States on May 7 announced plans for an expanded research program for fiscal year 1961.²⁴

The program, known as Project Vela, had been initiated in 1959 and evolved from recommendations made by the Panel on Seismic Improvement (Berkner panel). The enlarged program called for increased basic research in seismology; procurement of instruments for a worldwide seismic research program; development of improved seismic instruments; construction and operation of prototype seismic detection stations; and an experimental program of underground detonations encompassing both high-explosive and, where necessary, nuclear explosions.

²³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 29, 1960, p. 327.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, May 23, 1960, p. 819.

It was made clear in conjunction with the announcement that any nuclear experiments conducted would in no way relate to nuclear weapons development and that appropriate safeguards would be arranged to assure other interested nations of this fact. Hope was also expressed that in view of the Soviet Union's positive response to a three-nation research program, as stated in its May 3 declaration, it would be possible to determine areas in which joint research, including the use of nuclear detonations, could be most profitably undertaken by the three nations.

Experts' Conference on Coordination of Research

As noted above, technical experts of the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. met to discuss ways and means by which a coordinated seismic research program could be carried out to avoid duplication and to standardize research methods to insure agreement as to the results of research experiments. During the course of the meetings, covering a period from May 11 to May 27, 1960, the three parties separately outlined their respective plans for extensive seismic research including plans for chemical detonations. The U.S. experts, in addition, presented plans for U.S. nuclear detonations.

The results of the experts' discussions were reported separately and informally to the heads of the political delegations. In sum, there seemed to be a wide area of technical agreement on needed research and its objectives, but a number of problems with political aspects remained unresolved. These primarily concerned the question of nuclear versus chemical explosions and whether program coordination must, as the Soviets insisted, await the signing of a treaty.

Following the experts' reports to the political conference the Soviet representative, in direct contradiction of the Soviet experts' presentation during the course of the May meetings, stated that any early research was unnecessary, that the U.S.S.R. would carry out no research program whatsoever on Soviet soil, and would, in particular, not conduct the high-explosive detonations which the Soviet scientists had indicated they would carry out. Moreover, he declared that, if the United States wished to carry out its program, it must be open to full participation and prior agreements by Soviet scientists, thus suggesting that the Soviet Union should have the right to veto elements of the U.S. national re-

search program. As a consequence of this basic shift in the Soviet position, the entire research program and the political problems inherent in it remained unsettled.

APPENDIX

Agreed Text of Preamble

The Parties to this Treaty

Pursuing the aim of reducing international competition in armaments and in the development of new weapons of war;

Endeavouring to take a practical step towards the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament including the eventual elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons under effective international control and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only;

Desirous of bringing about the permanent discontinuance of nuclear weapons test explosions;

Recognizing that the establishment and continuous operation of effective international control is essential to the achievement of this objective;

Hoping that all other countries will also join in undertakings not to carry out nuclear weapons tests and to ensure the satisfactory operation of that control throughout the world;

Confident that a discontinuance of such tests under effective control will make possible progress toward agreement on measures of disarmament

Have agreed as follows:

Texts of Agreed Draft Articles

ARTICLE 1

Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes, subject to the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes:

(a) to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear weapons test explosions at any place under its jurisdiction or control; and

(b) to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of nuclear weapons test explosions anywhere.

ARTICLE 2

(a) For the purpose of assuring that the obligations assumed in this Treaty are carried out by the Parties there is hereby established a Control Organization upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Treaty and the Annexes thereto;

(b) Each of the Parties agrees to co-operate promptly and fully with the Control Organization established under paragraph (a) of this Article and to assist the Control Organization in the discharge of its responsibilities pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty and the provisions of any agreement which the Parties shall have concluded with the Control Organization.

ARTICLE 3

1. The Control Organization established under Article

2 of this Treaty shall consist of: a Control Commission, hereinafter referred to as "the Commission"; a Detection and Identification System, hereinafter referred to as "the System"; a Chief Executive Officer, hereinafter referred to as "the Administrator"; and a Conference of Parties to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as "the Conference".

2. The Headquarters of the Control Organization shall be located at Vienna.

ARTICLE 4

1. The Commission shall consist of one representative from each of the following States:

(a) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, as original Parties to this Treaty; and

(b) four other Parties to the Treaty elected by the Conference.

2. The States referred to in paragraph 1(b) of this Article shall be elected and shall serve for a period of two years, and shall be eligible for re-election.

3. The representatives elected to the first elected Commission shall serve from the time of their election until the end of the third regular session of the Conference. The representatives elected at the third regular session of the Conference, and biennially thereafter, shall serve from the end of the Conference at which they are elected until the end of the Conference which elects their successors.

INSTALLATION AND OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM IN PARTIES' TERRITORIES²⁵

Each of the original Parties and all other Parties to this Treaty agree to accept on territory under their jurisdiction or control components of the System which is established on the basis of the report of the Conference of Experts to Study the Methods of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests and shall be installed and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and its Annexes.

UNDERTAKINGS CONCERNING CO-OPERATION WITH THE SYSTEM

1. Each of the Parties undertakes to assure that adequate and expeditious transportation is available from the point of entry, or within its territory to the site of any element of the System or any area where an on-site inspection is to be conducted.

2. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of existing meteorological and commercial aircraft flights over ocean areas for routine air-sampling purposes.

3. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appropriate arrangements with the Commission to have aircraft immediately available for special flights, carried out pursuant to the provisions of —, over territory under its jurisdiction or control or to permit such special flights by aircraft forming part of the System.

4. Each of the Parties undertakes to enter into appro-

²⁵No number has yet been assigned to this and the following agreed draft articles.

appropriate arrangements with the Commission for the utilization of existing weather or geophysical exploration vessels for use as components of the System.

5. Each of the Parties undertakes to give inspection groups, despatched pursuant to the provisions of —, immediate and undisputed access to the area in which an on-site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from interference with any operation of an inspection group and to give such groups the assistance they may require in the performance of their mission.

6.²⁸

THE CONFERENCE

1. The Conference consisting of representatives of Parties to this Treaty shall meet in regular annual session and in such special sessions as shall be convened by the Administrator at the request of the Commission or of a majority of Parties to the Treaty. The sessions shall take place at the headquarters of the Organization unless otherwise determined by the Conference.

2. At such sessions, each Party to the Treaty shall be represented by not more than three delegates who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. The cost of attendance of any delegations shall be borne by the State concerned.

3. The Conference shall elect a President and such other officers as may be required at the beginning of each session. They shall hold office for the duration of the session. The Conference, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, shall adopt its own rules of procedure. Each Party to the Treaty shall have one vote. Decisions on budgetary matters shall be made pursuant to Article — and decisions on amendments pursuant to Article —. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional questions or categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a simple majority of the Parties to the Treaty present and voting.

4. The Conference may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of this Treaty or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in this Treaty and may make recommendations to the Parties or to the Commission or to both on any such questions or matters.

5. The Conference shall:

(a) elect States to serve on the Commission in accordance with Article 4;

(b) consider the annual and any special report of the Commission;

(c) approve the budget recommended by the Commission in accordance with paragraph — of Article —;

(d) approve reports to be submitted to the United Nations as required by any relationship agreement between the Organization and the United Nations; or return them to the Commission with the recommendations of the Conference;

(e) approve any agreement or agreements between the

Organization and the United Nations or other organizations as provided in Article — or return such agreement with its recommendations to the Commission for re-submission to the Conference;

(f) approve amendments to this Treaty in accordance with Article —.

6. The Conference shall have the authority:

(a) to take decisions on any matter specifically referred to the Conference for this purpose by the Commission;

(b) to propose matters for consideration by the Commission and request from the Commission reports on any matter relating to the functions of the Commission.

PERIODIC REVIEW OF THE SYSTEM

1. Two years after the coming into force of this Treaty, the Commission shall review the System established under this Treaty in order to:

(a) evaluate its effectiveness for verifying compliance with the obligations set forth in Articles 1 and — of this Treaty;

(b) determine in the light of experience and scientific progress whether any specific improvements should be made or new elements added to the System;

(c) consider such measures to improve or maintain the effectiveness of the System as may be proposed by any Party to the Treaty in the light of experience in the operation of the Treaty.

2. The System may be reviewed by the Commission annually thereafter for the same purpose upon request of the Conference or any of the original Parties.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each Party to this Treaty such legal capacity and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.

2. Representatives in or to the Commission of Parties to the Treaty and representatives in or to any other organ established under this Treaty, including the Conference, together with their alternates and advisers, the Administrator, the staff, experts and advisers of the Organization shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary to the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.

3. A detailed statement of legal capacity, privileges and immunities to be recognized and accorded by the Parties to this Treaty is set forth in Annex II.

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

1. The Commission, with the approval of the Conference, is authorized to enter into an agreement or agreements establishing an appropriate relationship between the Organization and the United Nations.

2. The Commission, with the approval of the Conference, shall arrange for the Organization to be brought into an appropriate relationship with any international organization which may in the future be established among any of the Parties to this Treaty to supervise disarmament and arms control measures.

²⁸ Paragraph 6 will be drafted to make provision for high-altitude detection after this matter has been further discussed. [Footnote in original.]

ANNEXES

The Annexes to this Treaty form an integral part of this Treaty.

PARTIES TO THE TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty shall be:

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, referred to herein as the "original Parties".

2.²⁷

SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE AND ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature on _____ by the States referred to in paragraph — of Article —, and shall remain open for signature by those States for a period of six months.

2. The signatory States shall become Parties to this Treaty by deposit of an instrument of ratification.

3. Instruments of ratification by signatory States and instruments of acceptance by States referred to in paragraph 2 of Article — shall be deposited with the Government of _____, hereby designated as the depositary Government.

4. Ratification or acceptance of this Treaty shall be effected by States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

5. This Treaty shall enter into force when all the original Parties have deposited instruments of ratification in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article. Instruments of ratification and instruments of acceptance deposited thereafter shall take effect on the date of their deposit.

6. The depositary Government shall promptly inform all States signatory to this Treaty of the date of each deposit of ratification and the date of entry into force of the Treaty. The depositary Government shall promptly inform all signatories and Parties to the Treaty of the dates on which States subsequently become Parties thereto.

REGISTRATION

1. This Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. Agreements between the Organization and any Party to this Treaty or any other State or public international organization shall be submitted for registration by the Commission with the United Nations.

DURATION

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely subject to the inherent right of a Party to withdraw and be relieved of obligations hereunder if the provisions of the Treaty and its Annexes, including those providing for the

²⁷Item 2 will contain provision for other States to become parties to the agreement. Although there is agreement in principle on this part, language has not yet been worked out among the three negotiating powers. [Footnote in original.]

timely installation and effective operation of the control system, are not being fulfilled and observed.

AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this Treaty and its Annexes shall enter into force for all Parties to the Treaty when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the Members of the Conference and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Parties to this Treaty, including all the original Parties.

AUTHENTIC TEXTS

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary Government. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary Government to the Governments of the other signatory States and to the Governments of States which become Parties to this Treaty pursuant to paragraph — of Article —.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at _____, this _____ day of _____, one thousand nine hundred and _____

Text of Agreed Draft Annex III

THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION

A. A Preparatory Commission, consisting of one representative from each of the original Parties to this Treaty, shall come into existence on the day after this Treaty shall have been signed by all the original Parties. The Preparatory Commission shall remain in existence until the Control Commission has been elected in accordance with Article 4 of this Treaty.

B. Except as provided in Section E of this Annex, the Preparatory Commission shall take decisions by agreement among the three original parties, adopt its own rules of procedure, meet as often as necessary and determine its own place of meeting. It shall appoint an executive secretary and such staff as shall be necessary, who shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as the Preparatory Commission may determine.

C. The expenses of the Preparatory Commission may be met by a loan provided by the United Nations or by advances from governments. The repayment of loans shall be included as an item in the budget for the Control Organization's first financial period. The Preparatory Commission shall make the necessary arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations for repayment of the loan. Advances from governments may be set off against assessments of the governments concerned levied in accordance with the provisions of Article —.

D. Pending deposit of instruments of ratification of the Treaty by all the original Parties, the Preparatory Commission shall:

1. Conduct preliminary technical studies and consultations with regard to the location, installation, and equipping of control posts and other components of the Control Organization, including:

(a) geological and topographic map studies of geo-

graphical areas of the world where control posts are to be located;

(b) consultations with technical representatives of the original Parties for the purpose of adopting standard construction designs for control posts and regional offices and of choosing types of equipment for each of the four basic methods of detection;

(c) studies of the surveys which will be required for selecting sites for control posts;

(d) studies of communication requirements;

(e) consultations with the original Parties for equipping and utilizing their aircraft for routine flights and vessels to be stationed in accordance with the Treaty and its Annexes;

(f) studies of requirements for standard time transmission and reception to ensure accurate relative time at all control posts and other components of the Control Organization.

2. Draw up detailed requirements and regulations for the staffing of the Organization and invite applications for posts to be filled during the initial operations of the Organization;

3. Draw up requirements and invite applications for the post of Administrator;

4. Recommend the site in Vienna of the permanent headquarters of the Organization;²⁸ draw up recommendations for the provisions of a headquarters agreement defining the status of the Organization and its rights and relationship with the host country;

5. Draw up detailed plans for the day-to-day technical and administrative operations of the Organization;

6. Draw up for submission to the Conference the budget for the Organization's first financial period and a recommended scale of assessment in accordance with Article — of this Treaty;

7. In conjunction with the United Nations, initiate the preparation of a draft agreement which would be in accordance with Article — of this Treaty;

8. Make arrangements for the convening of the first Conference, to be held not later than six months from the date instruments of ratification have been deposited by all the original Parties.

E. 1. On the day after deposit of instruments of ratification of the Treaty by all the original Parties, or as soon thereafter as possible, the Preparatory Commission shall be enlarged, to consist of one representative from each of the original Parties to this Treaty and one representative from four other states, chosen by agreement between the three original Parties from among those states which at that time have deposited instruments of ratification of the Treaty.

2. The Preparatory Commission thus enlarged shall exercise the powers conferred upon the Control Commission by the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures therein specified for the Control Commission. After the Preparatory Commission has been enlarged and pending the appointment of the Administrator, the executive secretary of the Preparatory Commission shall exercise

²⁸ Possible provision for recommendations concerning location of regional offices to be considered later. [Footnote in original.]

the powers conferred upon the Administrator by the Treaty.

3. Pending the enlargement of the Preparatory Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) of this Section, the Preparatory Commission shall continue to exercise only those functions listed in Section D of this Annex.

Department Continues To Seek Release of Americans Imprisoned by Red China

*Statement by Joseph W. Reap
Deputy Director, Office of News¹*

Five years ago, on September 10, 1955, the Chinese Communist regime pledged the "expeditious" release of those Americans on the mainland of China who desired to return to the United States.² It is a matter of the greatest regret and concern to the Government and people of the United States that the Chinese Communist regime has callously disregarded their solemn pledge made 5 years ago and is continuing unjustifiably to hold five American citizens in prison.³ The Department of State will continue to seek the release of these men by every feasible means.

Communist China Rejects U.S. Proposals for Exchange of Newsmen

Following is a Department statement containing the text of a U.S. proposal for exchange of American and Communist Chinese newsmen which was presented at the Warsaw negotiations on June 7 by Ambassador Jacob D. Beam to Communist Chinese Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, together with the text of a Communist Chinese counterproposal of September 6.

Press release 517 dated September 8

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Since August 1957 the United States has been endeavoring to obtain Chinese Communist agreement to the entry of U.S. newsmen into Communist China.⁴ On June 7, 1960, at Warsaw, in

¹ Read to news correspondents on Sept. 9.

² BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

³ The five Americans still held in Communist China are John Thomas Downey, Richard D. Fecteau, Robert McCann, Hugh F. Redmond, Jr., and Maryknoll Bishop James Edward Walsh.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of May 16, 1960, p. 789.

the 98th meeting of the ambassadorial talks with the Chinese Communists, United States Ambassador Jacob D. Beam proposed to Chinese Communist Ambassador Wang Ping-nan the issuance of an agreed announcement on the admission of newsmen into their respective countries. Ambassador Beam proposed that this announcement contain the following explicit statement of the position made known by the United States since August 1957 on admission of Chinese Communist newsmen. The announcement was to be conditional on a parallel statement by the Chinese Communists:

Ambassador Beam has explained to Ambassador Wang that the position of the United States with respect to the admission and treatment of newsmen of the People's Republic of China to the United States is:

The Government of the United States of America, subject to the Constitution and applicable laws and regulations in force in the United States and in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity, will admit to the United States newsmen of the People's Republic of China in order to permit direct reporting about conditions in the United States. Newsmen of the People's Republic of China who are admitted to the United States will be accorded the same facilities for news reporting as are generally accorded newsmen from foreign countries in the United States.

At the 100th meeting of the two Ambassadors at Warsaw on September 6, 1960, Ambassador Wang rejected this proposal and refused to issue a parallel statement. From this it is clear that, while the United States stands prepared to engage in an exchange of newsmen in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity with Communist China, the Chinese Communist regime is not willing to enter into such an exchange.

In rejecting the United States draft, the Chinese Communists put forward a proposal of their own. This draft was rejected by Ambassador Beam because it (1) maintained the Communists' insistence that the United States set aside its laws and regulations if these would bar a newsman selected by the Chinese Communists; (2) required the United States to guarantee the professional conduct of American correspondents; (3) tied in the admission of American correspondents with political conditions; and (4) contained provisions restrictive of legitimate press freedom. For example, it would require the United States to "guarantee" that American newsmen would not write reports contrary to Chinese Communist objectives, including the "withdrawal of all U.S.

armed forces from China's territory of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area."

The rejection of Ambassador Beam's proposal follows the similar rejection by the Chinese Communists of every other initiative of the United States Government designed to make possible an exchange of newsmen. As a consequence the Department of State is reluctantly compelled to conclude that Communist China, whatever its reasons may be, has no serious interest either in reporting by its own newsmen from the United States or reporting by American newsmen from the China mainland. By refusing to issue a statement that the United States newsmen will be admitted to mainland China in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity along the lines of the statement proposed by Ambassador Beam, and by putting forward their totally unacceptable counterproposal, the Chinese Communist regime has again demonstrated that it is opposed to a reciprocal exchange of newsmen.

Despite Chinese Communist obstruction, the representatives of the United States will continue to press for a satisfactory solution to this problem.

CHINESE COMMUNIST PROPOSAL⁵

September 6, 1960

CHINESE COMMUNIST COUNTER-PROPOSAL ON NEWSMEN EXCHANGE

Agreed announcement of the Ambassadors of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on the exchange of correspondents between China and the United States.

Ambassador Wang Ping-nan, on behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and Ambassador Jacob D. Beam, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, agree to announce:

In order to seek to eliminate estrangement between the Chinese and American peoples, to make a preliminary improvement in the present relations between the two countries, and furthermore to impel the two countries to settle peacefully in accordance with the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence, the question of withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from China's territory of Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area, the governments of the two countries have agreed on the following provisions to enable correspondents of each country to enter the other for news coverage on an equal and reciprocal basis.

1. The two governments agree that correspondents of

⁵ Rejected by the United States at Warsaw on Sept. 6.

Sixth Anniversary of SEATO

their own countries who desire to enter the other country for press coverage must apply to the government of the other country for approval, and that the number of correspondents of the other side whose entry is approved by the two governments must be equal each time.

2. The two governments agree that neither of them will obstruct the entry of approved correspondents of the other side by any laws and regulations now in force or promulgated in the future.

3. The two governments agree that correspondents of the other side whose entry has been approved will enjoy the same facilities for news coverage as enjoyed by correspondents of their own countries in the other country.

4. The two governments guarantee that correspondents of their own countries entering the other country for news coverage will not engage in activities contrary to the aims mentioned in the preamble of the present agreement.

U.S. States Views on Situation in Laos

Department Statement

Press release 527 dated September 10

According to broadcasts from Laos, a revolution has started in that country. The revolutionary movement is reportedly headed by Prince Bonn Oum with General Phoumi head of the military committee.

The United States has in the past consistently supported duly constituted governments of Laos in their efforts to maintain the independence and integrity of Laos against Communist encroachment from without or within. It would regret a situation in which violence destroyed unity thereby increasing the danger of such encroachment. The United States has no desire to intervene in the internal affairs of Laos. It has consistently adhered to and supported the policy that their affairs should be settled by peaceful means by the Lao themselves. It would, however, be immediately concerned by the efforts of any other outside power, or the agents thereof, to take advantage of the disturbed conditions prevailing and to intervene directly or indirectly.

The Department is in regular communication with the United States Ambassador in Vientiane. There are no reports of any danger to Americans in Laos. Dependents of Americans were evacuated to Thailand several weeks ago because of disturbed conditions aggravated by dangerous flooding of the Mekong River.

Following is the text of a message of President Eisenhower for SEATO Day, September 8, which was issued at special ceremonies at Bangkok commemorating the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.

White House press release dated September 8

Today, the eighth of September, 1960, marks the Sixth Anniversary of the signing, at Manila, of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty¹ which brought into being the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, more commonly known as SEATO. Joining together in accordance with the purposes set forth in the charter of the United Nations, the member nations of SEATO—Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States—have demonstrated a firm adherence to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, have subscribed to the attainment of self-government through peaceful means and are supporting the development of economic and social well-being of all peoples in the Treaty Area.

SEATO has, in its six years of existence, performed admirably the task of coordinating the efforts of its members in collective defense for the preservation of peace and security against the threat of Communist imperialism. At the same time, SEATO's accomplishments in fostering social and economic progress have been noteworthy. It is working towards the eradication of the scourge of cholera in Southeast Asia and is conducting other medical research in the area. It is training and developing a needed reservoir of skilled Asian technicians. It is advancing education through grants of scholarships and fellowships, cultural exchanges and lecture tours by persons eminent in their fields of achievement. It has established a Graduate School of Engineering, now in its second successful year in Bangkok, for the advanced training of Asian engineers and scientists. It is currently planning for an area-wide radio meteorological network and for an institute of tropical agriculture. All these constitute examples of the way SEATO is carrying out its objectives.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

The United States is proud to share in these accomplishments and it was honored by having the opportunity last May to act as host for the Sixth Annual Meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers in Washington.² On that occasion I had the great honor and pleasure of greeting personally the Council members, their senior civil and military advisers, the Secretary-General and the Chief of the Military Planning Office of SEATO. At the Sixth Annual Meeting, the member nations renewed their pledges to insure mutual security, reaffirmed their determination to resist Communist aggression and subversion and further developed their plans to foster and support the economic and social advancement of the Treaty Area. On this occasion, I am happy to reaffirm United States support for these solemn pledges.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

President Disapproves Legislation on Import Marking Requirements

White House press release dated September 7

MEMORANDUM OF DISAPPROVAL

I am withholding my approval from H.R. 5054, "To amend the Tariff Act of 1930 with respect to the marking of imported articles and containers."

The bill would provide that new packaging for articles imported in containers required by present law to be marked with the name of the country of origin must be similarly marked by the repacker, whether the importer, distributor, retailer, or other handler of the merchandise. Goods in packages not so marked would be subject to seizure and forfeiture. The requirement could be waived only where found to necessitate such substantial changes in customary trade practices as to cause "undue" hardship.

H.R. 5054 runs counter to one of our major foreign policy objectives—the reduction of unnecessary barriers and hindrances to trade. The burdens the bill would impose are unnecessary because the Federal Trade Commission requires the disclosure of the foreign origin of repackaged imported articles when it is in the public interest to do so.

² *Ibid.*, June 20, 1960, p. 983.

The United States and other principal trading nations of the world have recognized that burdensome marking requirements can be a hindrance to trade and have agreed to the principle that such hindrances should be reduced to a minimum. H.R. 5054 might well result in successive domestic handlers requiring written assurances of proper marking in order to avoid the severe penalty of seizure and forfeiture. The cost and the complications involved in such cumbersome paper work would tend to discourage such imports. Moreover, this measure could prove ultimately damaging to our export-expansion efforts, for needlessly restrictive action on our part could readily lead to similarly restrictive action by other countries against American goods.

In addition, the bill would unnecessarily extend the Bureau of Customs into new areas by requiring the Bureau to follow goods after they have entered the stream of domestic commerce and to act against handlers of merchandise who are not importers. The Bureau would be required to determine the nature of customary trade practices and the possibility of "undue" hardship in a field outside its normal competence. Aside from the unnecessary additional expense, these new responsibilities would be most awkward for the Bureau to administer.

For these reasons I am withholding my approval of H.R. 5054.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 6, 1960.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

86th Congress, 2d Session

The Practical Values of Space Exploration. Report of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, pursuant to H. Res. 133. Serial I. H. Rept. 2091. July 5, 1960. 54 pp.

Space, Missiles, and the Nation. Report of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, pursuant to H. Res. 133. Serial C. H. Rept. 2092. July 5, 1960. 61 pp.

Forty-first Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations. Message from the President and text of report on lend-lease operations for the year ending December 31, 1959. H. Doc. 429. July 29, 1960. 37 pp.

Legislative Program. Message from the President relative to the legislative program. S. Doc. 115. August 8, 1960. 6 pp.

Certification of Quotas on Certain Philippine Tobacco. Report to accompany H.R. 3392. H. Rept. 2064. August 15, 1960. 2 pp.

Dividends Received Deduction for Dividends Paid by a Foreign Corporation From Earnings and Profits Accumulated by a Domestic Corporation. Report to accompany H.R. 12036. H. Rept. 2101. August 15, 1960. 4 pp.

Twenty-fourth Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activities. Letter from the Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, Department of State, transmitting the 24th semiannual report for the period January 1-June 30, 1960. H. Doc. 446. August 15, 1960. 6 pp.

Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1960. Report to accompany S. 2633. H. Rept. 2104. August 17, 1960. 97 pp.

Import Taxes on Lead and Zinc. Report to accompany H.R. 11584. H. Rept. 2105. August 17, 1960. 9 pp.

Protocol Between the United States of America and Japan. Message from the President and a protocol between the United States and Japan signed at Tokyo on May 7, 1960, modifying and supplementing the convention of April 16, 1954, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. S. Ex. K. August 17, 1960. 6 pp.

American Republics Cooperation Act. Report to accompany S. 3861. S. Rept. 1838. August 17, 1960. 5 pp.

Amendment to the Budget for Mutual Security Programs. Communication from the President transmitting an amendment to the budget for the fiscal year 1961 involving an increase in the amount of \$100 million for Mutual Security Programs. S. Doc. 117. August 17, 1960. 2 pp.

Mutual Security and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1961. Report to accompany H.R. 12619. S. Rept. 1849. August 19, 1960. 19 pp.

Joint Resolution To Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East. Message from the President transmitting the fifth report covering activities through June 30, 1960. H. Doc. 448. August 22, 1960. 3 pp.

Mexican Farm Labor. Report to accompany H.R. 12759. S. Rept. 1901. August 23, 1960. 6 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Accession deposited (with reservations): Poland, March 16, 1960.

Cultural Property

Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, and regulations of execution. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹
Ratification deposited: Spain, July 7, 1960.
Accession deposited: Ghana, July 25, 1960.

Protocol for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Done at The Hague May 14, 1954. Entered into force August 7, 1956.¹
Accession deposited: Ghana, July 25, 1960.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) annexed to the international telecommunication convention of December 22, 1952 (TIAS 3266), with appendixes and final protocol. Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.
Notifications of approval: Hungary, June 22, 1960; Federation of Malaya, July 18, 1960; overseas territories for the international relations of which the United Kingdom is responsible, July 29, 1960.

Trade and Commerce

Protocol relating to negotiations for the establishment of new schedule III—Brazil—to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 31, 1958.²
Signature: Australia, July 5, 1960.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Israel to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva May 29, 1959. Entered into force October 9, 1959; for the United States December 19, 1959. TIAS 4384.
Signature: Switzerland, June 23, 1960.

Declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21, 1960; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.
Signature: Denmark, July 29, 1960.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement relating to the establishment and operation of a minitrack station in the vicinity of St. John's, Newfoundland. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa August 24, 1960. Entered into force August 24, 1960.

Korea

Insured parcel post agreement. Signed at Seoul July 15 and at Washington August 17, 1960. Enters into force on a date to be determined by mutual agreement.

Liberia

Agreement supplementing articles III and VII of the agreement of August 13, 1950 (TIAS 4293), relating to radio relay facilities in Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia August 8 and 15, 1960. Entered into force August 15, 1960.

Netherlands

Agreement amending the agreement of November 12 and 26, 1953, relating to the disposition of equipment and materials furnished in connection with the mutual defense assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at The Hague August 10 and 13, 1960. Entered into force August 13, 1960.

Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo July 21 and August 18, 1960. Entered into force August 18, 1960.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Foreign Service Selection Boards Meet

Press release 516 dated September 7

The Department of State announced on September 7 the convening of the Fourteenth Selection Boards, which will review the records of all career Foreign Service officers for purposes of promotion and selection out. The Selection Boards are established by the Secretary of State under the terms of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended.

Selection Boards, which normally meet once each year, are composed of senior career Foreign Service officers and distinguished private citizens. The Boards are given the task of evaluating the performance of Foreign Service officers as the basis for the President's promotion of the top officers in each class.

The task confronting the Selection Boards this year has grown in scope, owing largely to the increase in the size of the Foreign Service Officer Corps by virtue of the integration program. As a result of this program the Foreign Service Officer Corps has expanded from 1,300 in 1954 to approximately 3,600 this year.

The Selection Boards will meet for approximately 4 months. The Boards include 28 active Foreign Service officers, several public members drawn from private life, and observers from departments holding membership on the Board of the Foreign Service. Participation by these observers represents the direct interest of their departments in the work of the Foreign Service of the United States.

The Foreign Service officer members include six career ministers: Herbert S. Bursley, former chief, Career Development and Counseling Staff; Vinton Chapin, recently Ambassador to Luxembourg; C. Burke Elbrick, Ambassador to Portugal; Julian F. Harrington, recently Ambassador to Panama; William J. Sebald, Ambassador to Australia; and Edward J. Sparks, Ambassador to Venezuela.

The public members are: Paul R. Leach, former chief, Washington Bureau, Knight News-

papers, Inc.; C. A. R. Lindquist, former executive, General Motors Acceptance Corporation; Grant L. Thrall, chairman and executive vice president of Ballagh & Thrall, Philadelphia; William J. Walsh, director, district 2, Communication Workers of America; and Kenneth Wernimont, assistant director, Agricultural Sciences, the Rockefeller Foundation, New York.

Consulate at Colón, Panama, Closed

Department mailing notice dated August 24

The consulate at Colón, Panama, was permanently closed for business on August 19. The consular district for the Embassy at Panama City will include the whole of the Republic of Panama.

Designations

R. Austin Acly as Deputy Director, Office of Dependent Area Affairs, effective September 4.

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., as Director, Executive Secretariat, effective September 6.

Emory C. Swank as Deputy Director, Executive Secretariat, effective September 6.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 5-11

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515	9/6	Cuban consular assistant requested to leave Puerto Rico.
516	9/7	14th Foreign Service selection boards.
517	9/8	Proposals on exchange of newsmen with Communist China.
518	9/8	Herter: United Press International.
519	9/9	Reply to Soviet note on German draft radio legislation.
520	9/9	Establishment of U.S. Disarmament Administration.
521	9/9	Reply to Soviet note on Berlin waterways legislation.
*522	9/9	Lavergne designated USOM director, Tunisia (biographic details).
*523	9/9	Delegation to Mexican ceremonies.
†524	9/10	Aide memoire to Soviet U.N. mission.
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526	9/10	Herter: Department's conduct of Cuban relations.
527	9/10	Situation in Laos.
†528	9/10	Aide memoire to Hungarian U.N. mission.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN

Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1959

A factual account of the U.S. Government's participation in the work of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies during the year 1959 is contained in this fourteenth annual report by the President to the Congress.

The report is divided into five sections: Part I—Maintenance of Peace and Security; Part II—Economic and Social Cooperation and Human Rights; Part III—Dependent Territories; Part IV—Legal and Constitutional Developments; and Part V—Budgetary, Financial and Administrative Matters.

The appendixes to the volume contain U.N. charts and other organizational information and information on the availability of publications and documentation.

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